Sitting of 21 December 1965

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  LOCAL GOVERNMENT

    Derelict Land (Colliery Spoil Heaps)
    Mr. Boardmanasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what plans he now has for dealing with derelict land and, in particular, colliery spoil heaps.
    The Minister of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Richard Crossman): I am anxious to see much quicker progress on this and I hope to be able to make grant available to local authorities for this purpose in the context of the present review of local government finance.
    Mr. Boardman: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Will he bear in mind that the existence of the spoil heaps in the coalfields is due to the exploitation of one of our greatest national assets and that it is strongly felt by the local authorities concerned that the removal or landscaping of the spoil heaps ought now to be accepted as a national charge?
    Mr. Crossman: Yes, I am aware of that. In our survey we discovered that no less than 51,000 acres are suitable for treatment and I hope that I shall be able to give a specific grant, but I am afraid that my hon. Friend must wait for the announcement of that until we come to the second Rating Bill.

    Sub-Standard Property, Wellington
    Mr. William Yatesasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he has decided to give loan sanction
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    to Wellington Urban District Council in order that it may bring up to date its sub-standard property in Regent Street and Urban Gardens, Wellington.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. Robert Mellish): The council asked my right hon. Friend on 2nd December to approve a scheme in principle.
    It may be necessary to consult it on one or two aspects but he hopes to write soon to say that a formal application for loan sanction will be approved.
    Mr. Yates: I take this opportunity to say that that news will be received by these people as one of the best bits of news which they have heard this Christmas time.

    Rates
    Mr. Allasonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he is aware of the severe rise in rates likely to arise next year in counties with an expanding population; and whether the remedies that he proposes will be in time to take effect in 1966–67.
    Mr. Crossman: I cannot forecast next year's rates. Although there will be no changes in the grant system until the following year, there will be relief in 1966–67 for ratepayers with small incomes.
    Mr. Allason: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that all ratepayers in counties with an expanding population are going to suffer very severely in the coming year, as year by year they have to pay more of the rateborne expenditure and less and less falls on the Exchequer?
    Mr. Crossman: That would not be strictly true. I am not going to underrate the burden of rates—I have often repeated that it is very heavy—but the assistance we can give to the general ratepayer will come in our second Bill. Our first Bill was only an interim relief for the 2 million worst-off families.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Although the right hon. Gentleman says that he cannot forecast next year's rates, did he not forecast an average increase in rates throughout the country of 10 per cent. next year when he spoke at Plymouth on 20th November?
    Mr. Crossman: I said at Plymouth, and I think it was a reasonable thing, that I thought that 10 per cent. was the kind of increase likely. It might be more in some areas and less in others. I cannot make a very precise prediction on that.

    Local Authorities (Rateable Values)
    Mr. Armstrongasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what proposals he has to give financial assistance to local authorities similar to those in West Durham where there has been a decline in rateable value because of the run down in the mining industry.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. James MacColl): Where, as is the case in West Durham, the local authorities get rate-deficiency grant, it automatically compensates for a loss of rateable value.
    Mr. Armstrong: Is my hon. Friend aware that in this area additional burdens are now being placed upon local authorities because of the tremendous scars left by the mining industry, which has declined so rapidly? Will he continue to look at this question so that local authorities, which are already doing all that they can to rehabilitate the area, may have extra help?
    Mr. MacColl: As my hon. Friend knows, I visited the area during the Recess and was very much seized of its problems. We will certainly keep them in mind.

    Woolwich Arsenal Site (Redevelopment)
    Mr. Hamlingasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what discussions his Department has had with the Greater London Council and the borough of Greenwich on the redevelopment of the Woolwich Arsenal site.
    Mr. Mellish: Both authorities are represented on a liaison group with officers of the Government Departments concerned and of the public transport undertakings. This group meets from time to time to review progress and to consult on major problems.

    Industrial Plants, Birmingham (Noxious Fumes)
    Mr. Julius Silvermanasked the Minister of Housing and Local Govern-
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    ment what steps he will take to protect the people of Cranemore Street and other adjacent streets in Nechells, Birmingham, from the emission of noxious fumes and gases by nearby industrial plants.
    Mr. MacColl: The industrial plants in the area are under the regular supervision of either the Alkali Inspectorate or the public health inspectors of the Birmingham City Council. At the sulphuric acid works, alterations now being carried out should improve the quality of the chimney gases and methods of improving their dispersal are under consideration.
    Mr. Silverman: Is the Minister aware that so far there have been no substantial improvements and that the emission of gas results in the aggravation of bronchial complaints suffered by people in the area? Is he further aware that there is a nasty smell in the neighbourhood, that vegetation dies because of the emission of these fumes and that local authorities are completely dissatisfied with what is being done? I hope that the Alkali Inspectorate will look at the situation again.
    Mr. MacColl: It is true that any industrial area with heavy chemical industries suffers from these problems, which create a nuisance to residents in the area. The firm has made various experiments to try to improve the position and my right hon. Friend will keep an eye on the situation.

    Noxious Fumes (Emission)
    Mr. Julius Silvermanasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will now introduce legislation to amend and strengthen the Alkali Act, in order to protect the health of people menaced by the emission of noxious fumes and gases.
    Mr. Crossman: No, Sir. I have no reason to believe that the levels of emission permitted from processes registered under the Alkali Act are dangerous to health.
    Mr. Silverman: Does the Minister realise that that is contrary to the experience of people, not only in this area but in many other areas? Will he consider whether the power to deal with industrial emissions could be dealt with by local authorities, perhaps by an extension of the Clean Air Act, 1956?
    Mr. Crossman: I will consider that, but I must say that I have doubts, because these fumes, although extremely unpleasant, according to a special inquiry which I have had made, show no evidence of danger to health. This is similar to sea pollution where unpleasantness and violation of amenity is not necessarily bad for health.

    New Local Tax
    Mrs. Thatcherasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government upon what basis his new local tax will be assessed.
    Mr. Crossman: I would refer the hon. Member to my reply to her Question on 14th December.
    Mrs. Thatcher: In that reply, the right hon. Gentleman said that the future structure of the local tax would depend on the future structure of local government. When will he bring forward his proposals for that?
    Mr. Crossman: I have nothing more to add. We want a thorough investigation into the tax and local government question. All that I said was that the two hang together. In my view, we are unlikely to get a new tax without a radical reform of local government.
    Dame Irene Ward: Will the Minister's Answer apply to the new proposals for the Tyneside area in view of the fact that the whole place is being blown up and that there will be nothing left of anything?
    Mr. Crossman: Great as I believe the effects of boundary reorganisation to be, I do not think that a fair description of what will happen is to call it a total explosion if the Tyneside accepts the proposals which I have tentatively put forward.
    Dame Irene Ward: I hope that it will not.
    Mr. Crossman: There is still some time before what the hon. Lady describes as an explosion will happen. I have made it clear that what we are doing under the existing Boundary Commission must go on.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does not the Minister's earlier reply mean that, like
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    the Prime Minister, he has not the faintest idea of any alternative tax to rates?
    Mr. Crossman: In replying seriously to the right hon. Gentleman, what it means is this. We should face the fact that if we continue, as we must do, to try to make the rates less regressive and remain content with rates as a tax, more and more of the cost will have to be moved to the central Government, and that means a decline in local democracy.
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether his proposals for a new local tax to replace rating will extend to water rates.
    Mr. Crossman: I would refer the hon. Member to my reply to the Question by the hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) on 14th December.
    Mr. Ridsdale: Will the relief for ratepayers with small fixed incomes apply to the increase in water rates particularly caused by the last Budget which will fall very heavily on those least able to bear it?
    Mr. Crossman: I will not enter into a semantic debate with the hon. Gentleman, but, in my view, water rates are not technically rates but a charge for a commodity.

    Rating System (Comprehensive Review)
    Mr. Ridsdaleasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government on what date he will announce his proposals for a comprehensive review of the rating system; and from what dates these proposals will take effect.
    Mr. Crossman: The Rating Bill embodies the first instalment of the Government's proposals. I expect to announce the remainder early next year.
    Mr. Ridsdale: As it seems so easy for the Minister to make a general criticism of the rating system without giving detailed proposals, may I ask him to assure the House that it is his intention to bring these detailed proposals to the House before the next General Election?
    Mr. Crossman: We shall bring them before the House. I hope that the Bill will be before the House in the spring.

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    We are now having discussions with the treasurers before finalising our proposals on the reorganisation of the grant system.
    Mr. Alfred Morris: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his sentiments against such regressive taxes as rates have been widely welcomed in the country and by people of all persuasions?
    Mr. Bessell: Has the Minister given serious consideration to proposals for a system based upon rating and taxation of site values? Further, will he at least consider a survey in an industrial area similar to the one which took place at Whitstable?
    Mr. Crossman: We are certainly willing to consider the possibility, although I doubt whether another survey would be valuable. The hon. Member should study the proposals for the Land Commission and, perhaps, the Committee stage of the Bill before he makes up his mind whether site value taxation has been replaced by betterment tax as a desirable method.

    Oxford Development Plan
    Mr. Woodhouseasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government when he will announce his decision on the Oxford development plan.
    Mr. Crossman: I am still not in a position to announce a decision, but it should not be much longer.
    Mr. Woodhouse: Is the Minister aware of the impatience and indignation which are universally felt in Oxford at the interminable delay in his decision? Can he give any good reason for the delay? In particular, can he say whether he is having second thoughts about a road across Christchurch Meadow?
    Mr. Crossman: I have had no sign of the feelings that the hon. Member describes in Oxford. Oxford quite rightly is frustrated by over 10 years of delay in the decisions about its development plan. This is an extremely difficult decision and I make no apology whatever for delaying it to try to get the best possible solution for Oxford City.

    Footpath Survey
    Mr. Blenkinsopasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will use his powers under the National
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    Parks Act to expedite the preparation of maps and statements relating to the footpath survey.
    Mr. MacColl: My right hon. Friend is ready to consider using his power of direction if it is in fact likely to secure faster progress. This may not be the case where a large number of rights of way are in dispute.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: In welcoming that reply, may I ask my hon. Friend to follow up his inquiries to see whether something cannot be done, particularly in the case of those counties which show no interest in getting on with the job and which are over 10 years behindhand?
    Mr. MacColl: My right hon. Friend is aware of the delays and is actively considering the best way of speeding things up.
    Mr. Blenkinsopasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will appoint staff that could be seconded to assist county councils in completing their footpath surveys.
    Mr. MacColl: This is the county councils' responsibility, and my right hon. Friend thinks the work is best done by their own staffs.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Is not my hon. Friend aware that in some instances counties make the excuse that they do not have staff to carry out this work? In that case, cannot something be done to help them?
    Mr. MacColl: I appreciate that. On the other hand, this is essentially work in which local knowledge is important, because it depends upon the assessment of footpaths which are very much a local matter. It is, therefore, difficult to see how help from the centre would speed things up.

    Swynnerton Site (Development)
    Mr. Hugh Fraserasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether, to avoid further delays in the use of the abandoned Royal Ordnance factory site at Swynnerton, he will now permit its limited development for industry and for afforestation, without major prejudice to wider schemes which may or may not develop over the next decade.
    Mr. Crossman: I can well understand the impatience of the right hon. Gentleman, but I am still waiting for the views of the West Midlands Regional Economic Planning Council and local authorities concerned. When they are received, it will be possible to decide whether there should be any big new expansion project in North Staffordshire, and, if so, whether the Swynnerton site should play a part in it.
    Mr. Fraser: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that in view of the unlikelihood of anything decisive emerging from these three local authorities—if one includes the City of Stoke-on-Trent—which are at daggers drawn on this issue, it would be better in the national interest to declare that we should go ahead with a modest scheme?
    Mr. Crossman: No, I do not think that would be right. I would much rather wait not so much for the local authorities as for the West Midland Regional Council, which can give a much more independent view. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that when that happens, my feeling also is that we much decide about the site, which is looking loathsome and neglected after years of Government delay.

    House Building (Statistics)
    Mr. Costainasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government in which years since 1959 the total number of houses completed was greater than the number of those under construction in the public sector; and whether he will give similar comparative figures for the private sector.
    Mr. Mellish: Since 1959, the number of dwellings under construction at the end of the year in Great Britain in the public sector has always exceeded the number completed in the year. In the private sector completions in the year have always exceeded the number under construction at the end of the year. With permission, I will circulate the figures in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Costain: Does not this prove that private enterprise houses are built quicker than public enterprise houses? Will not the Minister admit that his policy of restricting private enterprise housing is not helping to solve the housing short-
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    age? Will not he adopt a different approach?
    Mr. Mellish: The hon. Member is talking a lot of nonsense, because 91 per cent. of all public authority building is built by private enterprise. One has, therefore, to ask why, when working for public authorities, private enterprise does not work as fast as when it works for itself.
    Mr. Lubbock: Since it is clear that for one reason or another builders are taking longer on local authority contracts than they take on private building, will the hon. Gentleman ask local authorities to include a penalty clause in all their contracts and to enforce it rigidly?
    Mr. Mellish: I should not like to commit my right hon. Friend to that one. I was trying to answer the rather stupid point made by the hon. Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain).
    Sir Harmar Nicholls: Is not the Minister aware that on any building site different decisions have to be taken almost every hour of the day and that to have to refer to somebody else for a decision is bound to take longer than making the decision oneself?
    Mr. Mellish: That is not my experience—and I have had quite a lot of experience—of public authority building which private enterprise has built.
    Following are the figures:

    Great Britain

    Thousands

    Public Sector

    Private Sector

    Completed

    Under construction at end of year

    Completed

    Under construction at end of year

    1959

    …

    126·0

    154·0

    150·7

    112·7

    1960

    …

    129·2

    151·1

    168·6

    126·8

    1961

    …

    118·6

    155·5

    177·5

    138·7

    1962

    …

    130·6

    162·5

    174·8

    149·9

    1963

    …

    1240

    207·1

    174·9

    174·4

    1964

    …

    155·6

    230·1

    218·1

    203·8

    NOTE: The figures are for all dwellings i.e. flats as well as houses. A much larger proportion of flats are built in the public sector than in the private sector.

    Roads (Dumping of Rubbish)
    Sir Knox Cunninghamasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what progress has been made by local authorities towards agreement on a scheme to prevent roadside dumping of

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    large articles such as baths, motor cars, cisterns and furniture; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. MacColl: Many councils have acted on the advice given them in Circular No. 8/65 about derelict motor cars, or are considering how best to do so. As regards other bulky articles, my right hon. Friend will get into touch with local authorities again when he has the report of the Working Party on Refuse Collection. This report is now expected to reach him in the spring.
    Sir Knox Cunningham: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this nuisance is increasing almost daily in the south of England and will not be ended until all local authorites arrange to collect these articles from householders? Will he ask his right hon. Friend to use all his influence to see that this is done as soon as possible?
    Mr. MacColl: The response of local authorities to the circular has been encouraging and my right hon. Friend feels that it is desirable to wait for final advice from the working party before taking final steps.
    Mr. Thorpe: Is the Minister aware that many of my constituents are horrified at the prospect of people dumping baths on the highway? Is he aware that there are many villages which want to have running water installed, so that baths can therefore become of greater use? Will he see not only that baths are not dumped on highways, but that electricity, water and drainage are provided so that all the baths can be used?
    Mr. MacColl: This is a matter which was relevant to our discussions on the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Bill, which the House has already passed.
    Mr. Manuel: Will my right hon. Friend get in touch with the Northern Ireland Government and find what rigid set of controls they have to make certain that there is no dumping on roadways in Northern Ireland——
    Sir Knox Cunningham: Very much better over there.
    Mr. Manuel: —or is the poverty over there such that they have nothing to dump?

    Cattle Market, Braintree
    Mr. Brian Harrisonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he will now approve the purchase of the cattle market in Braintree by the Braintree and Bocking Urban District Council.
    Mr. MacColl: No, Sir.
    Mr. Harrison: Will the Minister reconsider this? Here is an opportunity that will be lost for ever unless loan sanction is granted.
    Mr. MacColl: I do not think that the opportunity will be lost for ever, because the local authority can get powers to acquire later if necessary. I agree that the scheme is a good one, but a necessary part of the cutting down of capital commitments is that some degree of priority should be exerted.
    Mr. Harrison: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of that reply, I give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest possible opportunity.

    Howards Road, Birkenhead
    Mr. Howeasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will cause an inquiry to be held under Section 279 of the Highways Act, 1959, and for the purposes of his functions under that Act, into the reasons why no highway has yet been constructed or effectively made up along the line of Howards Road, Thingwall, Birkenhead.
    Mr. MacColl: No, Sir. The hon. and learned Member has sent my right hon. Friend copies of correspondence from which it appears that there is a dispute about the liability for making up this road. My right hon. Friend is investigating the facts of the matter and will get in touch with him when these investigations are complete.
    Mr. Howe: I am grateful to the Joint Parliamentary Secretary for that reply, but may I ask whether he is aware that the dispute has been going on for many months now and that new and old residents in the road are very anxious to know when something will finally be decided about it? Will he hold his hon.

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    Friend's formidable powers in reserve and be ready to hold an inquiry if it should be necessary to resolve this deadlock?
    Mr. MacColl: I do not think that an inquiry would help necessarily, but I quite agree with the hon. and learned Member for Bebington (Mr. Howe) that these problems are very difficult ones to solve in a way which satisfies everyone.

    Birkenhead (New Streets)
    Mr. Howeasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will now require the Birkenhead County Borough Council, under Section 157 of the Highways Act, 1959, to make bye-laws regulating the construction of new streets in their area that will ensure the proper construction by a building contractor of a new street in front of any houses built by such contractor.
    Mr. MacColl: No, Sir. The Birkenhead Council already has in force a set of byelaws regulating the construction of new streets.

    New Towns Commission, Crawley (Chairman)
    Mr. Hordernasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether, in view of the concern over the circumstances of General Sir Neville Brown-john's resignation as Chairman of the New Towns Commission for Crawley, he will publish the correspondence between himself and General Brownjohn.
    Mr. Crossman: No. But General Brownjohn can of course do so if he wishes.
    Mr. Hordern: Does the Minister realise that by his refusal to publish the correspondence between himself and General Sir Neville Brownjohn, although I am sure that the General will be very grateful to hear what the right hon. Gentleman has to say, he has cast a slur upon the reputation of a very distinguished officer and public servant? Does he appreciate that an appointment as Chairman of the New Towns Commission has never been considered previously as a party political appointment, and does he not realise that his new appointment smacks of political jobbery of the worst and most odious kind?
    Mr. Crossman: It seems to me that the slur is going to be cast on the Minister, and not on the General. Of course there is no slur on the General by not publishing the correspondence between him and me. I said that he could publish if he wished. As for the members of the Commission, it seems to me that those should be appointed who have the confidence of the local council irrespective of the party to which they belong, and that was the principle on which I decided.
    Mr. Hordern: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the Ministers' reply, I shall seek an early opportunity to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Chilterns
    Mr. Ronald Bellasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he intends to confirm the order submitted by the National Parks Commission to designate the Chilterns as an area of outstanding natural beauty; and why his decision has been delayed.
    Mr. Crossman: I had to consider suggestions that certain parts of the area were not up to the normal A.O.N.B. standard and should therefore be excluded. But having regard to the high quality of the area, taken as a whole, I have now decided to confirm the order without modification for the whole Chilterns area.
    Mr. Bell: In regard 10 the matter of delay, does the Minister realise that in this case the end excuses all? His decision will be welcomed by all who value the beauty of the Chiltern Hills. We shall be happy to welcome the Minister to the stewardship of the local hundreds. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that we were all waiting for that.

  HOUSING

    House Purchasers (Protection)
    Mr. Ioan L. Evansasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will introduce legislation to regulate the contractual terms imposed by builders upon private buyers of new dwelling-houses or houses to be erected.
    Mr. Mellish: Purchasers of new houses from builders registered with the National House-Builders' Registration Council are protected against the most onerous conditions and are given remedies against bad workmanship. My right hon. Friend would prefer first to see how far this form of protection can be developed; he is using his best endeavours to encourage it.
    Mr. Evans: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Has the Ministry received any representations about this matter from the Consumer Council?
    Mr. Mellish: The Consumer Council knows of our activities in this connection and there have been consultations between it and the House-Builders' Registration Council. My right hon. Friend is most anxious to try to get the voluntary system going and we are doing everything we can to achieve that.
    Mr. Graham Page: Would not the hon. Gentleman go a little further than that and introduce legislation to provide a warranty in these contracts, in the same way as a warranty is provided in the Sale of Goods Act?
    Mr. Mellish: If we were to introduce legislation, the question of compulsory registration would arise. All I can say now is that my right hon. Friend will make a statement on the matter as soon as these discussions are completed.

    Housing Associations
    Mr. Freesonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what steps he proposes to take to ease the difficulties facing housing associations and to encourage local authorities to help them in any campaign for the repair, improvement and conversion of old houses with many years' life ahead of them.
    Mr. Crossman: Local authorities have wide powers to help housing associations with loans and grants for the improvement and conversion of existing houses. This is a field in which there is great scope for housing associations, particularly in the big cities, and many authorities welcome their efforts.
    I am doing all I can to encourage them to help.
    Mr. Freeson: I thank my right hon. Friend for that sympathetic reply. Know-
    1856
    ing his general interest in this matter, may I ask him whether it is intended in the not-too-distant future to issue a circular of advice to local authorities? Will he bear in mind that while some are sympathtic, many are unsympathetic and that serious financial problems face housing associations which require a good deal of work?
    Mr. Crossman: Yes, I am aware of the great difference between far-sighted local authorities who see the invaluable help which housing associations can give and the reactionary few who do not. However, the loans by local authorities have doubled since 1963 to a rate of £4 million a year, although that could be greatly increased.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Will the right hon. Gentleman also consider the possibility of relaxing some of the fiscal and legal restrictions which inhibit the growth of housing associations?
    Mr. Crossman: Yes, I am considering this and I have already had talks with a number of them and we are considering what action we can take to help them.

    Council Houses (Rent Increases)
    Mr. Rowlandasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will take steps to revise the procedure under which council rent increases must be accompanied by a notice to quit and a renewed offer of tenancy.
    Mr. MacColl: My right hon. Friend proposes to refer this matter to the Law Commission with a request that it should take it into consideration in its current examination of the law of landlord and tenant.
    Mr. Rowland: May I thank my hon. Friend for that Answer and say that I hope that the proposals which come from the Law Commission will avoid the uncertainty and distress caused by this procedure? May I further ask the Minister to apply his fertile mind to putting forward some suggestion to the Royal Commission to deal with this?
    Mr. MacColl: Since my hon. Friend used the phrase "fertile mind", I assume that he was referring to my right hon.

    1857
    Friend. My right hon. Friend will no doubt give any information and help to the Law Commission for which it asks.
    Mr. Frank Allaun: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware of the needless and additional shock that this causes to many tenants? Is he further aware that in 1961 the then Housing Minister looked at this and agreed that it was a bad regulation and said that he was going to alter it but he did nothing?
    Mr. MacColl: My right hon. Friend is very much aware of this problem and that is why he wants to refer it at an early stage to the Law Commission. He feels that it is a matter which should be looked at in the context of the general law of landlord and tenant.

    Wandsworth
    Mrs. McKayasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what proposals there are for providing new houses in the London borough of Wandsworth by redevelopment of existing residential areas; and how many houses he expects can be provided by these means in the next four years.
    Mr. Mellish: Under the four-year housing programme for Greater London which my right hon. Friend approved last September, schemes for about 4,750 new local authority dwellings will be started in Wandsworth, 3,550 by the borough council and 1,200 by the Greater London Council. Practically all these will involve redevelopment. His approval to the programme is, of course, without prejudice to any decisions he may have to make on compulsory purchase orders submitted to him by either of these authorities. It is not possible to give comparable figures for private enterprise housebuilding.
    Mrs. McKay: Is the Minister aware of the chronic shortage of housing land for rebuilding in Clapham? Would the Minister encourage local authorities to demolish deteriorating properties of which there are so many in Clapham, in order to provide land for new and better housing?
    Mr. Mellish: Wandsworth Council is a very progressive council and I have reason to believe that it will not only reach these targets but exceed them. With
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    regard to the point made about deteriorating property, I hope that Wandsworth, like other authorities, will first of all look to see whether some improvements can be made to properties rather than demolishing them.

    Municipal Housing (Planning Procedure)
    Mr. Hefferasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government whether he proposes that the planning procedure concerning municipal housing should be speeded up; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. MacColl: My right hon. Friend will certainly deal as quickly as he can with any applications or appeals that come to him. But the important thing is that the Housing authorities should look well forward in assessing their land needs; and the Department will be in touch with all those with big programmes ahead to make sure that this is being done.
    Mr. Heffer: Will my right hon. Friend make it quite clear that this question of procedure must be speeded up, because one of the great difficulties of local authorities has been the delay in Ministry decisions? Is he also aware that sometimes there are difficulties between the planning and housing committees? Could he look into this and indicate some way of speeding up the procedure at local level?
    Mr. MacColl: My right hon. Friend is never afraid of work, but I do not think that he can take it upon himself to sort out the difficulties of two committees of the same local authority. With regard to our end of the problem, it is true that there are delays, and we are constantly aware of them and doing our best to speed things up.

    London Boroughs
    Mr. Hamlingasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what is the policy of his Department in relation to in-filling and building on open spaces in boroughs on the outskirts of London.
    Mr. Mellish: My right hon. Friend's general policy is to maintain as open space land zoned for that purpose in the development plan. But he considers on

    1859
    their merits proposals to use land which has relatively little value for open space and which can properly be developed for housing.
    Mr. Hamling: Is my hon. Friend aware that in the Borough of Greenwich there is a good deal of open land, private sports fields and other land of that sort, which is very valuable not only to our borough but to many other parts of south-east London? Is he further aware that there have been recent cases of in-filling there, and will he make sure that this situation is watched most carefully?
    Mr. Mellish: We are doing so, and each case which comes before my right hon. Friend is considered generally on its merits.

    Council Houses (Tenancy Rules)
    Mr. Hattersleyasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he will introduce legislation to enable him to prepare model rules for the allocation of corporation tenancies and to recommend each local housing authority to revise its lettings regulations to correspond with them.
    Mr. Crossman: Since circumstances vary widely in different areas I doubt whether model rules would be appropriate. But I am making inquiries into the extent to which local authorities require residential qualifications before applicants are admitted to their waiting lists.
    Mr. Hattersley: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that Answer, particularly what he said about residential qualifications, may I ask him whether he agrees that many other anomalies in housing need codifying? Will he consider what additional advice and assistance can be given to local authorities in this respect?
    Mr. Crossman: I will consider it, but I am thinking mainly about the problems of multi-occupation. My hon. Friend may like to know that I have invited the 50 local authorities which have the main multi-occupation problem to discuss with me their qualifications for allocation.
    Mr. Graham Page: Will not the right hon. Gentleman at least draft a model rule for local authorities saying that where
    1860
    houses are available those who can afford to buy should not be offered a council house?
    Mr. Crossman: I would not consider that a model rule. I would consider that an expression of a dogmatic Conservative attitude.
    Mr. Bessell: Would the Minister agree that, in the main, local authorities exercise their powers in this matter in a most humane and human way? Therefore, would he disregard this Question?
    Mr. Crossman: It is fair to say that this varies a great deal among local authorities. I would not say that all local authorities have residential qualifications which are humane. A great improvement could be achieved, but better by persuasion than by abuse.

    Local Authorities (Direct Labour)
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government why he issued Circular No. 50/65; and, in the light of the withdrawal by that circular of the requirement of one competitive tender in three, how he proposes to ensure that an adequate check is kept on the costs of local authorities' direct labour organisations.
    Mr. Crossman: I want all agencies which can contribute to a rising housing programme to give their maximum help. This circular frees local authority direct labour organisations from conditions which stood in the way of continuity of work, and therefore of efficiency. Direct labour estimates of cost will be checked by my Department.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: But does it make for efficiency to treat any organisation of this kind as being in the position that it may never have its costs checked against competitive bids by other people? In view of what the Minister has said about an increasing programme, is not the need for this valuable check the greater and the need for such a provision to secure continuity of work the less?
    Mr. Crossman: I do not know whether the right hon. Gentleman remembers what we discussed in the previous debate. What was needed was to enable direct labour organisations to contribute to industrialised building. This cannot be

    1861
    done without negotiated contracts. Therefore, this one-in-three rule was the problem. I have not said that there should be no tendering. Indeed, it is essential to have tendering and genuine competition.
    Mr. Orme: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his Measure has been widely welcomed throughout the country and that it will expedite the building of municipal houses which are so essential? Would he take all measures to extend the policy of direct building which brings these results?
    Mr. Crossman: What I shall do is to try to enable direct building organisations to contribute as much as they can. They do only 9 per cent. of house building now. In my view, they can do more, and a high proportion of it can be done on industrialised building.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: If the right hon. Gentleman is so satisfied that this system will not cause costs to rise, why does he put in the circular itself an appeal to local authorities to devise a new method of keeping a check on them?
    Mr. Crossman: It was because I was convinced that the innovation of the one-in-three rule was easy for the inefficient to evade and merely an obstacle to the efficient that I removed it. I want to insist on efficiency in these organisations and ensure that they do things properly and test their efficiency.
    Mr. Heffer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this does not give direct labour an advantage over private enterprise? All that it does is to bring it into line with private enterprise procedure which we have had in the past.
    Mr. Crossman: That is a perfectly fair comment. It is brought into line in negotiating for industrialised building contracts.

    Houses (Building Standards)
    Mr. Alfred Morrisasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government ii he will make a statement on the progress of the discussions between the National House-Builders' Registration Council and the Council of the Building Societies Association aimed at ensuring that houses for owner-occupation are built to acceptable standards.
    Mr. Mellish: My right hon. Friend is keeping in touch with these discussions, but he is not yet ready to make a statement.
    Mr. Morris: Can my hon. Friend indicate how long he is prepared to wait for voluntary action to solve the problem of jerry-building? Would he agree that there should be legislation early in the New Year to protect home buyers if voluntary action cannot be taken?
    Mr. Mellish: If there were to be legislation, it would take some time to have effect. We are hoping for a voluntary scheme. These discussions may well prove fruitful. I hope that my right hon. Friend will be in a position to make a statement early in the New Year.
    Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the reformation which has been going on in the structure of the N.H.B.R.C. is a great improvement? What is needed is for the building societies to play a more important part in these organisations.
    Mr. Mellish: The hon. Gentleman is quite right. The key to this is that the building societies should say that no mortgage shall be issued unless a certificate is issued by the N H.B.R.C. If we can get that from the building societies, we shall have achieved what almost every hon. Member wants.

    Lambeth
    Mr. Liptonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what action he is taking to deal with the special housing problems facing the London borough of Lambeth.
    Mr. Mellish: My right hon. Friend is aware that the London borough of Lambeth has difficult problems, but he does not think they are worse than those of other Inner London boroughs. As my hon. Friend knows, my right hon. Friend has taken a variety of steps to help all the Greater London housing authorities.
    Mr. Lipton: In view of the fact that this special difficulty is caused by the movement of population, cannot my hon. Friend give some indication here and now that, for instance, the Borough of Lambeth can have accommodation for 3,000 or 4,000 people in the Woolwich new town when it comes into being?
    Mr. Mellish: The Greater London Council is the overspill authority. It is in close touch with the Greater London Borough of Lambeth. There is a good understanding between both of them. My hon. Friend need not be unhappy about the future.

    Tenants (Rent Increases)
    Mr. Bostonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government if he is aware that some landlords and their agents, in sending notice of rent increases to tenants, advise them to apply to the National Assistance Board for a grant to cover the increase or the whole rent, and that, because of this advice, some tenants are being persuaded to pay increases which might not be payable if referred to a rent officer or rent assessment committee under the Rent Act, 1965; and whether he will take steps to deal with this practice by landlords and their agents.
    Mr. Mellish: My hon. Friend has sent my right hon. Friend details of a case of this kind which occurred prior to the commencement of the new Rent Act. With some limited exceptions the Act in effect freezes the rents of unfurnished lettings until a fair rent is registered. A tenant who is asked to pay a higher rent should therefore make sure of his position before he agrees. I would also refer my hon. Friend to the reply given him yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance.
    Mr. Boston: Would my hon. Friend agree that while it is important that those who are eligible should be encouraged to apply for National Assistance, this is, at the same time, a sharp practice which is being used by some landlords and agents and that it is important to warn tenants as fully as possible about this?
    Mr. Mellish: Yes, but we are doing what we can to give publicity to the Rent Act. Information vans will tour a number of areas, and town halls have been asked to give as much publicity as possible to rent-payers so that they will know their rights under the Act.

    Completions
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenterasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what was the average annual per-
    1864
    centage rate of increase in housebuilding from 1960 to 1964; and what is the average annual percentage rate of increase from 1965 to 1969 contemplated in Command Paper No. 2838.
    Mr. Crossman: Completions in the United Kingdom increased between 1960 and 1964 by an average of 6½ per cent. a year. Between 1965 and 1969 the Government aim is to increase completions by 1 per cent. less, an average of 5½ per cent. a year.
    Of course, while the percentage increase is smaller the actual numbers are much greater—we are going to have an extra 90,000 houses in the next four years compared with the extra 79,000 achieved between 1960 and 1964.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Does not that admission that the rate of increase in house building is planned for the next four years at a rate lower than that for the last four years make a nonsense of all the right hon. Gentleman's ballyhoo about a housing programme?
    Mr. Crossman: I do not think that it does. What we have done is to get a balanced programme between the public and the private sector in a form which was not even attempted in the previous four years.
    Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: But is the price of that balanced programme a reduction in the rate of growth?
    Mr. Crossman: It is a balanced programme which the country can afford and which in the National Plan we have decided that we can allocate to housing. If I can say this to the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), his side never envisaged 500,000 houses a year. Indeed, they said that it was impossible to achieve it.

  PRIME MINISTER (VISIT TO UNITED STATES)
  Mr. G. Campbellasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his visit to the United States of America.
  Mr. Blakerasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his recent discussions with leading members of the United States administration.
  Mr. Bruce-Gardyneasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had with the President of the United States of America and other members of the United States administration, during his recent visit to Washington, regarding plans for the sharing of control over nuclear weapons within the Western Alliance.
  Mr. Wallasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his meeting will the President of the United States of America.
  Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement about his recent discussions in Washington on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's nuclear rôle.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkinsasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had with President Johnson about the existence of the British independent nuclear deterrent.
  Mr. Warbeyasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had with President Johnson about the co-ordination of British and United States nuclear strategy in the areas East of Suez.
  Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had with President Johnson on the Government's policy towards giving up the independent British nuclear deterrent, on a continued nuclear rôle for the Royal Air Force and on the purchase of F.111 aircraft from the United States of America and their possible use with nuclear bombs.
  Mr. Ioan L. Evansasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his recent discussions with United Nations representatives at the United Nations Organisation.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): I would ask hon. Members to await the account I hope to give later today during the course of the debate on foreign affairs, if I catch your eye, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. Campbell: Can the Prime Minister now or later in his speech in the debate say whether he made any progress in composing the differences between the United States and this coun-
  1866
  try on a treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons?
  The Prime Minister: I shall be dealing with that question. I think perhaps it had better wait until speak later.
  Mr. Allaun: Regarding Question No. 20, if the British Government are to have nuclear weapons, which many of us oppose, can the Prime Minister say in what circumstances those weapons would be used?
  The Prime Minister: I shall have something to say about that as well. I have made it clear that we intend to internationalise the British nuclear deterrent. It was never independent. But certainly I can tell my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, East (Mr. Frank Allaun) that at no point did I discuss weapons or weapons systems with the President of the United States during my visit.
  Mr. Wall: Can the Prime Minister say whether British responsibility in the Indian Ocean was discussed and whether agreement was reached about joint island staging and tracking posts?
  The Prime Minister: We had a general review of the defence position, with an exchange of views on it, but we did not get into details about island bases.
  Mr. Warbey: In the light of the Prime Minister's statement to the United Nations that we are in favour of the creation of nuclear-free zones in Asia and other parts of the world, may I ask whether he could give an assurance that it is not part of our policy or American policy to initiate or promote the dissemination of nuclear weapons in the Far East?
  The Prime Minister: It is certainly not part of our policy to initiate or promote nuclear weapons in the Far East, or indeed anywhere else, and my right hon. Friend and my noble Friend are hard at work trying to get world agreement to a non-dissemination treaty.
  Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Could the Prime Minister tell us whether he made it clear to the President that, as we were assured by the Minister of Defence the other day, the Government will have no truck with the suggestion that we might sell or

  1867
  resell the Polaris fleet to the United States?
  The Prime Minister: I think that my right hon. Friend's words have been noted in Washington, and the proposition was not put to me. If it had been, it would have had the same answer that my right hon. Friend gave.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: As all the efforts to get rid of British nuclear weapons by internationalisation have not yet met with success, may I ask whether my right hon. Friend would agree that the best way would be to give them back to the United States—especially the Polaris submarine, which is specifically mentioned?
  The Prime Minister: Having refused to sell them, we are certainly not going to give them. Our position is to internationalise them on the most effective basis possible, as we said in our election manifesto.
  Mr. Evans: I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his brilliant address to the United Nations. Did he follow up his discussions on the question of nuclear weapons when he met President Johnson, and if in future he meets Prime Minister Kosygin, will he follow up the initiative there so that we can get a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons?
  The Prime Minister: That was one of the important questions discussed, and I agree that it will be important to follow up in Moscow the very constructive discussions that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary had with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Gromyko on the question.
  Mr. Maudling: The Prime Minister has referred more than once to internationalising the British nuclear deterrent. Does this refer to the position east of Suez?
  The Prime Minister: I have said many times that there must be some solution to the anxiety of non-nuclear nations in Asia who are now fearful because of the detonation of the Chinese nuclear device. They need reassurance, and I think it is important to us and to the world that these countries do not feel impelled to become nuclear Powers themselves.
  Mr. Blaker: With regard to Polaris, will the Prime Minister say whether he
  1868
  told any of the American leaders that the Government would be prepared at a later stage to discuss with their allies the joint ownership of Britain's Polaris submarines?
  The Prime Minister: On this question we did not go beyond in any sense what has been discussed in our proposals for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, which are now before N.A.T.O.

  SPACE PROGRAMME
  Sir J. Edenasked the Prime Minister what is the Government's policy towards a British space programme; and what steps are being taken to implement it.
  The Prime Minister: We participate in space activities, including those of international space organisations, as fully as our resources permit.
  Sir J. Eden: In view of the complexity of this subject, will the Prime Minister agree to setting out in a White Paper exactly what are the objectives of Her Majesty's Government's policy, and stating the resources which have been earmarked over the next few years to achieve it?
  The Prime Minister: I agree with the hon. Gentleman about the complexity and about the difficulty of dealing with this by Question and Answer. I shall consider, however, whether there is any way in which we can make a fuller statement. One of our objectives must be to deal with the problem of escalating, even rocketing, costs in this field which is causing great anxiety in some of these international organisations.
  Mr. Marten: Would not the Prime Minister agree that if we are to play our full part in the European space programme, we must have a very strong national space and technological programme? To this end will he consider appointing one Minister to be in charge of space?
  The Prime Minister: To the extent that we overspend in our own national programme, we have less resources for spending overseas. Both the previous Government and ourselves found it difficult to deal with the question of the allocation of Ministerial responsibility.

  1869
  Post Office satellites must be a question for the Post Office. I think that the right rule is that Ministers in their celestial capacities should pretty well correspond to their terrestrial responsibilities.
  Mr. Woodburn: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind the tremendous importance to our modern industry of being on the ground floor in developing science and micro engineering? This is an entirely new development in engineering, and we should be lost if we missed the boat in this connection?
  The Prime Minister: I am bound to say that as the greatest master of mixed metaphors in the House I could not have done better myself. We will certainly keep our feet on the ground in these matters, and this means keeping a sharp control over costs where this is possible, but I agree with what my right hon. Friend said about micro engineering, which i3 vital not only in space matters, but in many other fields of technological advance.
  Mr. Hogg: In view of the immense importance to modern technology of the aerospace industry, and also the possible commercial advantage of a communications space satellite, will the Prime Minister bear in mind the absolute necessity of having these really advanced technologies on this side of the Atlantic as well as on the other side of it?
  Will he also give us news, if he can, of the progress of the two European organisations, E.L.D.O. and E.S.R.O., of which we are members?
  The Prime Minister: I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has a very strong point there. We are doing all that can be done in the matter of space satellites, particularly for telecommunication purposes, but we have to consider the cost, and the latest news that I have to give about the two European organisations to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred is that costs are escalating fast.

  RHODESIA
  Mr. Ian Lloydasked the Prime Minister what consultations Her Majesty's Ambassador in Pretoria has had with the South African Prime Minister and
  1870
  Foreign Secretary on the application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the Answer given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 13th December to similar Questions by hon. Members.
  Mr. Lloyd: As the ultimate success of any policy of sanctions against Rhodesia has always depended, and will continue to depend, on the policy of the South African Government, is it not wholly irresponsible of Her Majesty's Government to embark on a stiffening of sanctions without finding out and informing the country what that policy is likely to be?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I cannot understand whether some hon. Gentlemen want these sanctions to be effective or not. There is no reason to believe that South Africa is likely to frustrate what is now the law of Rhodesia in relation to oil sanctions. We are in close touch with them. I do not think that in every case we ought to go round every country which could frustrate sanctions before deciding to introduce them.
  Mr. Ian Lloydasked the Prime Minister what consultations Her Majesty's Ambassador in Pretoria has had with the South African Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary on the likely reaction of that country towards the intervention of British troops in Rhodesia.
  The Prime Minister: None, Sir.
  Mr. Lloyd: In view of the fact that the stiffening of sanctions against Rhodesia is bound to mean that country stiffening its measures against Zambia to the point where, as the Prime Minister will recognise, there will be pressure for the involvement of British troops, again is it not irresponsible to lead the country in this direction without finding out what the consequences are likely to be?
  The Prime Minister: The country is not being led in this direction. I am not certain that pressures for deploying troops in Rhodesia could be any stronger than the pressures we have already had in these last few weeks, but since we have no policy at all—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—I think we have a policy on Rhodesia, and we hope this afternoon to hear what policy hon. Gentlemen opposite have. I am prepared to state what ours

  1871
  is. As I was saying, since we have no policy at all of intervening with military forces in Rhodesia, since that is our position, it would have been highly irresponsible to have asked South Africa what her attitude would have been if we had.
  Mr. Onslowasked the Prime Minister what discussions he has had with the British Broadcasting Corporation concerning the content of programmes beamed to Rhodesia.
  The Prime Minister: None, Sir. The British Broadcasting Corporation will have full responsibility for programme content.
  Mr. Onslow: As these broadcasts are now presumably an instrument of official policy, is the Prime Minister really content that they should not be under any form of Government control?
  The Prime Minister: I think that the B.B.C. has a very high reputation in its overseas broadcasts. That reputation stems from its independence and from its ability to present news bulletins as it thinks fit. We all remember the terribly unhappy incident at the time of the Suez collusion when there was interference with the B.B.C., and we are leaving to the B.B.C. the preparation of its normal African news bulletins.

  EMBASSIES AND MISSIONS (SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STAFF)
  Mr. Gregoryasked the Prime Minister if he will transfer to the Ministry of Technology the scientific and engineering attaches and diplomatic service officers with scientific and technological qualifications in British embassies and missions abroad, who are at present attached to the Foreign Office.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. There would be no advantage over present arrangements in doing so.
  Mr. Gregory: Is the Prime Minister aware that there is a great need for strengthening the scientific and technological staffs of our embassies overseas? Will he again look at the possibility of transferring this responsibility to the Minister of Technology, who is in close contact with industry, so that he can deal with training and selection?
  The Prime Minister: This was dealt with in the Plowden Report, and I think the recommendation was right that the diplomatic service should be unified and everyone abroad should be under the control of an ambassador. We have the most distinguished scientists, technologists, atomic specialists, and so on in these embassies, and I met two of them in Washington last week. It is right that they should be on the foreign service staff while they are there, with the closest link with the Ministry of Technology, and where necessary with the Department of Education and Science.
  Mr. Hogg: While recognising the need for scientific attaches to be on the staff of an embassy, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he can tell us how the relationship between the Minister of Technology and the Secretary of State for Education and Science operates as regards those attaches who are of considerable interest to both Departments?
  The Prime Minister: This is very often the case with other attaches and consuls who have specialised functions, but where it is a question of atomic energy matters, and responsibility for the A.E.A., some of those who are seconded from the A.E.A. have direct contact with the A.E.A. and with the Ministry of Technology. Where there are questions of pure science, which the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows all about, the contact in London is with the Department of Education and Science.
  Mr. Speaker: Mrs. Renée Short.
  Mrs. Renée Short: Is the Prime Minister aware that considerable anxiety has been expressed by——
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The Prime Minister has not answered the hon. Lady's Question. I called her to ask Question No. 10.
  Mrs. Renée Short: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker. I thought that you were calling me to ask a supplementary question.

  WEST GERMANY AND RHODESIA
  Mrs. Renée Shortasked the Prime Minister what representations he has made to the West German Government about the discussions that have been held between representatives of the illegal

  1873
  government in Rhodesia and West German industrialists for the supply of arms to the value of £5,000,000 for the Smith government.
  The Prime Minister: None, Sir.
  Mrs. Short: Is the Prime Minister aware that this report has been given considerable publicity in the Tanzanian Press and elsewhere, and that in fact representatives of the illegal Smith régime visited West Germany to bring forward this arms deal? Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is urgently necessary to keep an eye on this, because arms are as important as oil in this context?
  The Prime Minister: I must confess that I am not as regular a reader of the Tanzanian Press as is my hon. Friend, and I have not seen this suggestion. We have no evidence at all of any such suggestion. In fact, we have every reason to believe that it is not true, in view of the attitude of the West German Government, but if, either from her past Press cuttings, or from future ones, my hon. Friend has any information on this, I should be glad to look at it, and I hope to relieve her of the particular nightmare which seems to be worrying her.
  Mr. Hugh Fraser: What representations have been made to the Government of Ghana who are still buying Rhodesian tobacco?
  The Prime Minister: We have made representations to everyone who is buying Rhodesian tobacco. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday mentioned one or two African countries who have been extremely vociferous in their call for stricter action against Rhodesia but who have not yet got round to taking the necessary measures—I have no doubt that they will do so—in support of the action that we have taken.

SAUDI ARABIA (ORDER FOR AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM)
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation (Mr. John Stone-house): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I would like to make a statement.
I have to tell the House that the Government of Saudi Arabia have this morn-
1874
ing announced that a consortium of British firms has secured the major part of the order for their new complete air defence system. The remainder of the system will be provided by American firms and we have had valuable cooperation from the United States Administration in formulating the joint programme.
The value of the British components in the order, including Lightning and Jet Provost aircraft, radar and data handling equipment, is over £100 million, from which over £75 million will accrue to this country as export earnings.
This is a great achievement for the three British firms concerned, namely, the British Aircraft Corporation Ltd., Associated Electrical Industries, and Airwork Services Ltd. and it demonstrates that our aircraft and electronics industries have really first-class equipment to offer.
The American firm of Raytheon will be supplying the Hawk surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile.
During the past twelve months the British firms have acted in close cooperation with my Department and have received our active support. The success of these negotiations has demonstrated conclusively the results which can be achieved with such co-operation.
A number of other countries have already expressed interest in the Lightning aircraft and the radar equipment and I have great hopes that further orders will be obtained.
Mr. R. Carr: May my hon. Friends and I warmly associate ourselves with the welcome given for this order and congratulate the industries concerned? It is a successful culmination of several years of hard negotiations on the part of the Government and industry, and I am sure that, among other things, it will give great pleasure to my right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery). I have two questions. First, is there a link of any kind—whether formal or informal—between the United States Administration's co-operation on this order and any possible order from us for the F.111? Secondly, how can such orders be expected in the future if the Royal Air Force is equipped entirely with American-built aircraft?
Mr. Stonehouse: There is no question of the agreement with the Americans to cooperate in giving technical and political support in this proposed deal being in any way linked with a commitment concerning the F.111. That subject did not come up in my discussions in the United States. As for the right hon. Member's second point, we are here concerned with the export of equipment that is in modern use with the Royal Air Force and we are satisfied that there are very good export prospects for aircraft with radar equipment that is currently being produced in the United Kingdom.
Mr. Robert Howarth: Can my hon. Friend indicate whether the Lightning fighters will be equipped with British-built and British-designed missiles and, if so, which ones?
Mr. Stonehouse: This question is confidential with the customer, but I am glad to be able to confirm that they will be equipped with United Kingdom-provided equipment.
Mr. J. Amery: May I offer the hon. Gentleman my congratulations for the personal contribution which he has made to pulling off this deal? Having had some part in the early stages, I know some of the difficulties that he had to encounter both from the American side and, sometimes, within the British Government machine. I have heard both from industry and from Saudi quarters that he played a very important part in obtaining this order.
Mr. Stonehouse: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his generous remarks, but I ought to point out that we had very close co-operation not only from industry but from all Departments concerned.
Mr. Warbey: Can my hon. Friend say how this order fits in with the Foreign Office's policy of restricting the supply of arms to countries in the Middle East?
Mr. Stonehouse: This is essentially a defensive system. I am sure that the House will have no objection to any country's obtaining this sort of equipment.
Sir H. Harrison: Can the hon. Gentleman say a word about the terms of payment for this very good contract and whether we have had to give a very long-term credit?
Mr. Stonehouse: My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade has a Question on this matter to which I believe he is replying tomorrow.
Mr. Snow: Will my hon. Friend accept from this side our congratulations on the personal part that he played in this matter? Will he nevertheless beware the Greeks that bear gifts, especially from the other side?
Mr. Mawby: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this news has been received very well by hon. Members on this side of the House? Will he also point out to his right hon. Friend that what is good enough for Saudi Arabia ought to be good enough for this Government?
Mr. Urwin: May I join in the congratulations which have been extended to my hon. Friend the Minister? I am sure that this news will be received with a great deal of interest by those Members who have recently visited Saudi Arabia. Can he tell me the nature of the contractual arrangement entered into with the Saudi Arabian Government concerning manning the equipment and its maintenance? Can he say how this compares with the agreement reached by the Americans in that part of the world?
Mr. Stonehouse: On my hon. Friend's second point, this is a matter for commercial arrangement between the Saudi authorities and Airwork. As for his first point, I am glad to be able to confirm that the Parliamentary mission led by my noble friend Lord Blyton made a very fine contribution to improving relations between Saudi Arabia and this country.
Mr. Carr: Will the Minister address himself to my second question, which related to the importance of Britain's maintaining her ability to export the next generation of aircraft, which she cannot do unless she makes them?
Mr. Stonehouse: This is a very wide question concerning the development of further and more sophisticated equipment. We have already announced that we will co-operate with the French, but when that equipment is developed we hope to give it the same sort of support, from the point of view of exports, as we have done on this occasion.
Mr. Speaker: Order. We must move on.

BILL PRESENTED
  LAND COMMISSION
  Bill to provide for the establishment of a Land Commission, to make provision as to the finances of the Commission and to confer on the Commission powers to acquire, manage and dispose of land; to impose a betterment levy in respect of land; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by Mr. Frederick Willey; supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Herbert W. Bowden, Mr. Ross, Mr. J. Griffiths, Mr. Richard Crossman, the Attorney-General, Sir Eric Fletcher, Mr. Niall MacDermot, and Mr. Arthur Skeffington; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 52.]

ADJOURNMENT
Motion made, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Short.]
Mr. Edward Heath Mr. Edward Heath (Bexley) rose——
The Minister of Power (Mr. Frederick Lee): Mr. Speaker——
Mr. Speaker: Order. I gather that something is wrong. We must have an explanation.
Mr. Lee: On a point of order. Was it not intimated to you, Mr. Speaker, that I requested your permission to answer Question No. 71?
Mr. Speaker: I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman. The message has not reached me. I am sure that the House will allow the right hon. Gentleman to Answer the Question.

NORTH SEA GAS SUPPLIES
The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
71. Mr. VARLEY: To ask the Minister of Power, in the light of the British Petroleum Company's recent test of its natural gas well in the North Sea, whether he expects that gas from this field will be available for use in Great Britain; and, when, and in what quantities, it will be so available.
The Minister of Power (Mr. Frederick Lee): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I will now answer Question No. 71.
British Petroleum are now satisfied that gas will be available from the field in Block No. 48/6 in the North Sea in quantities which should justify piping it to the land. Terms and conditions of supply are under discussion between British Petroleum and the Gas Council. It is now thought that, if all goes well, it should be possible to deliver at least 50 million cubic feet a day onshore by 1967–68.
Mr. Varley: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this Answer will be welcomed in the country? As a result of his Answer, will the individual fuel forecast—as set out in the White Paper on fuel, published in October—now need to be revised?
Mr. Lee: Not necessarily. The quantities which I have just announced are

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equivalent to roughly half a million tons of coal a year, or 5 per cent. of current consumption of town gas. Production could eventually, of course, exceed 50 million cubic feet a day, but the full extent of the field will not be known until more exploration wells have been drilled.
Mr. Peyton: Would the right hon. Gentleman not acknowledge that the fact that he is able now to make this very welcome announcement is largely due to the speed with which the previous Administration acted? Perhaps he would call the attention of his right hon. Friend the First Secretary of State to this announcement, in view of the wild and extravagant attacks which the right hon. Gentleman made at that time. Would he not agree that it is now of urgent importance that an agreement be reached without unnecessary procedural delays between B.P. and the Gas Council, that neither should drag its feet?
Mr. Lee: I agree thoroughly on the second point. Discussions between B.P. and the Gas Council are now taking place. On the first point, I do not think that the previous Government held us back too greatly. As this is the festive season, I will grant that they did not hold us back more than a couple of days anyway. In fact, there has been a great deal of constructive work by my Department in the last 14 months and we believe that it is as a result of that work, which has progressed since the days when the hon. Gentleman was there, that this announcement is now possible. I agree with him that this is an announcement of a date for delivery far in advance of anything previously contemplated.
Mr. Lubbock: Would the right hon. Gentleman tell us what savings there will be to our balance of payments when the well comes into full operation? Could he draw any conclusions about the extent of the field as a whole from this one success?
Mr. Lee: We cannot know the extent of the whole field, though we are hopeful of the position. I cannot give an estimate of the saving on balance of payments, but this is, of course, an enormously important development, given the fact that B.P. has as yet drilled only one well. It will drill more exploratory wells and we are not unhopeful of the consequences.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that miners will naturally ask whether this development will not mean more pit closures? Should this not result in a speeding-up in the provision of alternative industries in the mining areas where there is likely to be unemployment?
Mr. Lee: My hon. Friend knows that there is a great drive now to provide alternative employment in the mining areas. I would not be so pessimistic as he is in saying that this will mean more pit closures. I do not think that it will. The quantities which I have announced would be equivalent to half a million tons of coal and I would not think that this would necessarily displace coal.
Dame Irene Ward: In view of this important announcement, will prices come down when the thing comes into operation?
Mr. Lee: I am not unhopeful that, in the fullness of time, that will result. In the immediate future, the point which the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock) made, of the saving on the balance of payments, is a very important consideration.
Mr. Hector Hughes: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this important announcement is of very great value to north-east Scotland? Will he say what provisions there are in the licences which he has granted to drill for oil in the North Sea for the holders to account to him and the nation for the amount of oil and the profits from it?
Mr. Lee: Of course, the profits are considerable and on previous occasions I announced precisely what they were. I hope that the House is not afraid of a surfeit of riches. We are making a most remarkable indigenous fuel available to the British people and I hope that hon. Gentlemen, even on that side of the House, will not take a narrow approach to what is a very important discovery.
Sir Harmar Nicholls: On a point of order. Although the Minister said that he was answering Question No. 71 on the Order Paper, in fact he made a statement. Ought not the right hon. Gentleman to have given a copy to his opposite number?
Mr. Speaker: What happened is what has happened before, many times in the

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recollection of the hon. Gentleman as well as of anybody else. From time to time a Minister wishes to answer a Question on the Order Paper which, in the ordinary course of events, would not be reached. I would not have thought that in such cases there was any question of the Minister supplying his opposite number with a copy. This, however, is a matter between them and certainly not for me.
Mr. William Clark: Further to that point of order. I understood the Government Chief Whip to move the Adjournment of the House, and I understood you, Mr. Speaker, to say that you had not had notice that Question No. 71 would be answered. All I am saying is that I trust that it will not be a precedent that a Minister can stand up to make such a speech without giving notice.
Mr. Speaker: I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman did not appreciate what took place. I thought that the House had been rather generous. There was an error in communications somewhere and in the circumstances I allowed the Question. It is certainly not a precedent.

ADJOURNMENT
Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
3.46 p.m.
Mr. Edward Heath: According to the announcement of this week's business, today was to have been the second day of a foreign affairs debate in which we should have reviewed the world situation. [HON. MEMBERS: "It still is."] I had much that I wanted to say not only about the Far East but also, in particular, about Europe, a subject on which I have not addressed the House for nearly three years. However, since then a most important event has occurred. The Government announced last Friday evening, after the House had risen, the imposition of an oil embargo on Rhodesia. The First Secretary very courteously informed me of the Government's intentions at six o'clock, before the announcement was made. Of course there was no consultation about this action, but I was grateful to him for his courtesy. The Prime Minister gave the House more details of the embargo yesterday.
Following the imposition of the oil embargo, we on this side of the House believe that we have reached the position where both the House and the country must immediately take stock of the situation. The limit of economic measures to be taken by this country and by a number of other major Powers has now been reached——
Mr. Archie Manuel: How do you know it has?
Mr. Heath: If the hon. Gentleman looks at the list of economic measures, he will find that to be true.
Any further step, therefore, can be only the use of force, which is abhorrent to us on this side of the House and, I believe, to many hon. Members in all parts of the House. [Interruption.]—I am sorry that the use of force should not be abhorrent to anybody—or the resolution of the present situation by peaceful means, about which, I say to the Prime Minister, all too little so far has been said by him or the Government.
It was for this reason, and because we believe that we have reached this situation just before the House rises for the Recess, that the Opposition last night placed a Motion on Rhodesia on the Order Paper with a request through the

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usual channels that it should be debated today. This is a vital Motion dealing with the use of British forces by the Government and with the process of reconciliation in order to find a solution to this tragic situation before it escalates to disaster.
The Government, for their part, quite rightly have placed their own Amendment to that Motion on the Order Paper. This Amendment illustrates the difference which now, alas, exists between the Government and the Opposition, because the Amendment calls on the House to support the Government "in all measures", without qualification, which must, of course, include the use of British forces as the Government decide—[Interruption.]—to secure the return to legal rule. There can be absolutely no doubt about the meaning of these words. Of course they mean that Her Majesty's Government could use force and that that could escalate into war. That we on this side of the House cannot and will not support.
I am astonished that the Government should refuse to debate a Motion and an Amendment of such importance at such a critical time but should continue with a general debate, especially as one of these two days is an Opposition day. I must tell the Prime Minister that I thoroughly deplore his decision not to debate this Motion and the Amendment. I realise perfectly well that the right hon. Gentleman wishes to report on his visit to Washington——
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): The right hon. Gentleman wished me to do so.
Mr. Heath:—but he could have done that in any case. We asked the right hon. Gentleman yesterday to make that report and to open the debate. Or he could have done it by making a statement this afternoon. This is the most important single problem affecting the British and Rhodesian people at this moment, and it is a matter for the greatest regret that Her Majesty's Government should not have debated this Motion and Amendment today.
I propose, therefore, to devote the whole of my speech to the urgent and critical question of the Rhodesian problem. I do so because I want there to
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be no misunderstanding about the position we have reached or about the future. I detect that some hon. Gentlemen opposite, now that they have reached the brink after these economic measures, are beginning to realise what is involved.
I want, first, to discuss the objective of British policy—we must be clear about this in order to have a criterion by which we can judge each of the Government's measures and the actions they have taken or proposed; it is over the objective of British policy that some differences have now begun to appear. I want, secondly, to consider the methods the Government have so far pursued to achieve this objectice, and I want, thereafter, to examine the question of the use of force. Finally, I will discuss how this question can be resolved.
I come, first, to the objective of British policy, and in my view—and I think there may be agreement in the House about this—it must be to secure the return of Rhodesia to constitutional legality. Not only must it be our objective; we must constantly make it plain to the people of Rhodesia that we here in Britain want this to happen. We want them to be in partnership with us again and within the Commonwealth.
Our position can be summarised very briefly. We as a Government and as an Opposition were opposed to a unilateral declaration of independence. We did our best to dissuade Mr. Smith from seizing independence illegally. When he did so, we condemned it. We are opposed to permanent minority rule. We are opposed to apartheid and to measures which have the aspects of a police State. We believe that the progress towards majority rule must continue, but we also recognise that it must take time before there can be full responsible majority Government. I believe that there is now a growing recognition of this fact in this House as well as among the African leaders, both inside and outside Rhodesia. Indeed, one of the tragic aspects of this situation was the belief that only two courses were open to those taking part; illegal independence or immediate African majority rule. And in this country there are, alas, some who believe this also. From our point of view, this was certainly never the case. There was always the middle way of continuing steadily

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along the path of constitutional development, and I believe that this middle way must constantly and clearly be shown to be always there.
There are some who say, "Why speak of the task of persuading the people of Rhodesia?" I do this quite deliberately. I do not know, and I am sure that the Prime Minister does not know, how many Africans support the present régime because they fear intimidation from African majority rule. The Prime Minister has himself spoken of such intimidation. There is a task to be done here as well, and I believe that it is right to speak of the Rhodesian people as a whole, of all races.
I want now to speak of the difference of objective which seems to be appearing between the two sides of the House. In the Prime Minister's statement of 10th December I believe that he moved into a dangerous position. [Interruption.] I believe so for this reason. He is now equating the return of Rhodesia to legal rule—on which both sides of the House can be agreed—with the objective of toppling Mr. Smith and his entire régime. This is t very dangerous position for the Prime Minister and the Government to be in, and I will explain why, because I shall sustain this argument for some time in my speech and I want to examine how it has occurred. On 23rd November the Prime Minister used words which I have quoted already in the House. He said:
… as soon as the people of Rhodesia"—
that was his phrase—
"are prepared to return to constitutional paths, as soon as the Governor feels that there is an opportunity of, perhaps, forming a Government among those who will act in a constitutional manner"—
that was without qualification—
"we would want to deal with those people, without any recrimination or any rancour about the past …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd November, 1965; Vol. 721, c. 258.]
That was entirely without qualification. They were the words which were chosen by the Lord Chancellor to quote in another place on 7th December. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor went further and said that it was open to Mr. Smith now to put before the Government any proposals and that these proposals would be most carefully considered by the Government. Again, that was said without qualification. There was no qualification about the
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mechanics of it. However, on the same night the Commonwealth Secretary said:
"… we cannot deal with Smith in any way—because he is not a man to be trusted."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 7th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 385.]
Everyone realised that there was a conflict here. I have every sympathy with the Commonwealth Secretary, because he was called upon suddenly to answer an Adjournment debate and obviously he had not had time to prepare himself. He did not at that time wish to deal in detail with the subject of the B.P. tanker, and I recognise his difficulties. But his remarks included that phrase, which I believe was unwise.
The Prime Minister made his statement about this on 10th December. He could have adhered to his original statement and the Lord Chancellor's amplification of it and expressed his regrets about the Commonwealth Secretary's remarks, but he did not do so. He went back on both statements, and, indeed, went much further than the Commonwealth Secretary, for he said:
"We cannot negotiate with these men, nor can they be trusted, after the return to constitutional rule, with the task of leading Rhodesia in the paths of freedom and racial harmony."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 771.]
[Interruption.] Perhaps hon. Gentlemen opposite will see later and will be able to consider just what this means. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister went on to say that he would discuss only the mechanics of constitutional rule. Last night on television he went even further than that.
What the Prime Minister has done, therefore—either to shield the Commonwealth Secretary or as a deliberate act of policy—is to insist on the complete, absolute, and unconditional surrender of everybody in the present illegal régime in Rhodesia and, further, to exclude them from any part in the future of Rhodesia.
One may ask how he proposes to do this. Does this mean that in any constitutional settlement there must he a clause which specifically excludes those men? What happens if, after a constitutional return, the people of Rhodesia themselves want these men to play some part, or to elect them? This, therefore, is an absolutely untenable position. But what is important at the moment is that,

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far from persuading the members of the régime—one, or some, or any of them—to change their minds and their policies—which, surely, is part of the objective of the return to legal constitutional development—this can only reinforce their determination at all costs to retain power, come what may. This is the change of objective that has taken place between the two sides of this House as a result of the Prime Minister's second statement qualifying the arrangements he is prepared to make to reach a solution.
I will express our anxieties very clearly on this point to the Prime Minister. What he has done in this way is to commit all his personal prestige and the prestige of the Government as a whole, to use the current phrase of some hon. Members opposite, to toppling the Smith régime, and there lies the real danger—[Interruption.] Yes, and for this reason. The Prime Minister will be under constant pressure—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a grave debate. Neither side will help its case, or Parliament, by merely shouting.
Mr. Heath: The Prime Minister will be under constant pressure—as, indeed, one can hear from the support on that side of the House—to go further and further to achieve this new objective, and the danger is that he will be tempted into adventures to achieve this. I must tell him that we on this side are determined to do all we can to prevent actions by the Government being determined by questions of personalities rather than by policies which we believe to be wise.
I wish now to turn to the methods that have so far been used to bring about the return to legality. They are economic and financial. We have supported these measures which the Government have taken—[Interruption.] We have supported them, though for some of my hon. Friends it has meant heartsearching as to whether these measures would help or hinder the purpose that I have described as the objective of British policy.
I believe that we have been right on this side to support what the Government have done in order to try to bring about a change of policy in Rhodesia itself. We have been right in the national interest. I believe that we have been
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right in the interests of the Commonwealth as a whole. We have realised the impact of Mr. Smith's action on Africa, and on all the developing countries. We have taken this into account, and we have recognised the dangers that are inherent in this situation—which, in fact, we always pointed out forcibly to Mr. Smith. We are determined that the economic measures that have been taken should be given every opportunity of working, and I want to say something a little later about the time it takes for economic measures to work.
But I must tell the Prime Minister this, also; that in the timing of some of the measures he has taken in the economic field particularly—not the first batch, but the second batch, and, again, those in Washington last Friday—he has given the impression that he has succumbed to the heavy pressures to which he has been subjected, and this can only raise further anxieties about the pressures to which he will be subjected in the future. [Interruption.] The reason why it raises anxieties is that the other pressure to which he will be subjected is the pressure to use force.
I must also say that the way in which the measures have been introduced has indicated that the Government have not, in fact, any clearly-thought-out or balanced plan for dealing with these measures in the present situation. The ban on the payment of pensions was a very clear illustration of this—a ban which the Chancellor of the Exchequer quite rightly withdrew.
I want to turn to the oil embargo itself as the latest of the economic measures. It is the measure of all the measures so far taken which calls for the deepest consideration. It is supported by the United States, by the members of the Commonwealth, by France and Italy, and, I read today—perhaps the Prime Minister will confirm this later—by the Netherlands and by some other countries. It can, therefore, I believe, have an effect on Rhodesia in the same way as other economic measures. I believe that this is effective in the same way as some of the other measures that have been taken are effective on Rhodesia and the Rhodesian economy, and in the same way as are the other economic and financial measures on the régime in Rhodesia. But

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there are three major fears which are in the minds of all hon. Members about this action.
The first fear concerns Zambia. The Order, of course, has led to further escalation, and the question is whether the needs of Zambia can be met by other means and whether the Government's contingency plan is adequate. We should like to hear more about this. Those who saw in The Times today the photograph of the airfield at Lusaka after the oil-carrying aircraft had landed on it must have anxieties about the capacity of the air supply for Zambia's total needs. The Government will indeed have been reckless if they have imposed an embargo without being able to ensure the satisfaction of Zambia's needs in this way.
The second anxiety is that the oil embargo will not only affect the economy of Rhodesia but will make the maintenance of law and order impossible and lead to a complete breakdown there. I accept what the Prime Minister said yesterday about the arrangements that have been made for distribution to hospitals and other hardship cases, but there is this second anxiety that the imposition of an oil sanction will lead to the breakdown of the economy in Rhodesia, and also of law and order.
We on this side do not want to see the economy of Rhodesia reduced to chaos. We believe that that would be wrong, so that it is important now that there should he emphasised again—now that this oil embargo is being imposed—the vital need to keep in touch with the régime in Rhodesia and to show clearly the alternative way back to legality in order that the situation should not be reached in which the economy or law and order is reduced to chaos, or to anything near it. The effects of these economic measures are bound to take time, and I would emphasise again to the Prime Minister that it is essential that there should be discussions in Rhodesia before there is any question of wrecking the economy, or of law and order breaking down.
The third and deep anxiety is that this Order—[Interruption.] I have already said that it is essential that the Government should find means of keeping the channels of communication open either
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with the régime or with anyone outside the régime—[Interruption.]
Mr. Sydney Silverman Mr. Sydney Silverman (Nelson and Colne) rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Heath: —in order to prevent the situation arising, at the moment when the Government are proposing even more drastic economic measures, in which the economy and law and order are reduced to chaos.
The third and deep anxiety is that the Order will lead to the use of force which will itself escalate. This has always been the question in connection with oil and any oil embargo throughout modern history. I know that some hon. Members believe that an oil embargo must inevitably lead to force, because the oil embargo itself will be ineffective. I do not myself share that view. I do not believe that the imposition of an oil embargo automatically leads to the use of force.
I want to make this absolutely plain, because I believe that it is the crux and that it is at the heart of the whole matter. It does not automatically lead to force, any more than the imposition of any other economic measures justifies or leads to the use of force. That does not follow. But what others believe, inside the House and out, is that the Prime Minister is prepared to use force to carry out the oil embargo. That is not a question of automatically; they believe that the Prime Minister himself would be prepared so to do, and I am putting this to him quite bluntly. Yesterday the Prime Minister would give the House no assurances on this point. He was asked by his hon. Friend the Member for Fife, West (Mr. William Hamilton) about a blockade of Beira. The Prime Minister replied:
"this is quite hypothetical at the moment."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December 1965; Vol. 722, c. 1696.]
We in the House, about to break for nearly five weeks recess, are not concerned only with the moment. We are concerned with the future. It is this with which we are vitally concerned today, and that is why we ought to be debating the Motion and the Amendment.
We have discussed the use of force in the Rhodesian situation on an earlier

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occasion. On 1st December the Prime Minister said this:
"If that did mean a limited operation we should be prepared to undertake that operation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 1st December 1965; Vol. 721, c. 1440.]
The Prime Minister must know that in Rhodesia today, in present circumstances, no operation around Kariba could remain a limited operation.
On 6th December in the Daily Mirror, replying to the article of 3rd December, the Prime Minister said this:
"We have made it clear time and time again that we shall not invade Rhodesia or get into a military clash on or over Rhodesian soil with forces controlled by the illegal Smith régime."
That is quite contradictory of the fact that the Prime Minister was prepared to undertake a limited operation if it arose. It is precisely what the Prime Minister had not said time and time again, that he would not get involved
"in a military clash on or over Rhodesian soil with forces controlled by the illegal Smith régime."
So the House is entitled to wonder which of these two choices it should make. This is why we have tabled our Motion clearly and explicitly denying the use of force to the Government, because we believe that force can solve nothing in this crisis.
The Prime Minister: I agree. Force can solve nothing in this crisis. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that I have twice met him and twice explained what I meant in relation to Kariba to him. He knows that if I were to spell out publicly what I said to him men's lives would be at risk. He knows the answer. Is he still going to press this argument, or does he want me to say publicly what I have said to him privately?
Mr. Heath: The Prime Minister has never been prepared to give the assurance in the House that the other means, which he has mentioned, and which he mentioned in his same statement, would be used but not a limited operation.
Hon. Members: Answer.
Mr. Heath: That is what he has not been prepared to give. If the Prime Minister is prepared to give it, there is
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no need for him in his Amendment to demand authority from the House "to all measures".
A blockade—this was mentioned by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) yesterday—will produce dangers of conflict with troops of other Powers and then pressure to extend a blockade to the whole of Southern Africa. In Rhodesia any use of force will mean conflict between Europeans and Europeans, Europeans and Africans, and, with a divided nationalist movement, between Africans and Africans. Therefore, we are categorically opposed to it.
The Prime Minister has frequently stated that he wants a quick solution. I beg of him to get this out of his mind, because it is the desire to get a quick solution which can lead to other policies, including the use of force, which would not be justifiable or tenable. Economic measures cannot work as quickly as he sometimes seems to think. There may not be a quick solution to this problem. Certainly the creation of economic chaos, the breakdown of law and order, or military chaos, is no solution.
But the Prime Minister calls for support for "all" measures. This, I repeat, we cannot and will not accept. The line here is absolutely firmly drawn. I do not believe that the line is drawn on the oil Order on which the United States, the Commonwealth and our N.A.T.O. allies are co-operating. I do not believe that that is where we draw the line. I do believe that the line is drawn at using force in connection with it. I believe that that is an absolutely clear line. That is set out in our Motion.
Some may ask, as a newspaper does today, why the difference between the economic and the military? There are many obvious differences, but one I want to emphasise is that the economic measures which the Government are taking remain always under the Government's full control and can be changed at any time. Once force is used to support those economic measures, then no one can tell where that is going to lead or what the consequences of it would be. It is for this reason that I strongly advise my right hon. and hon. Friends that it is not on the economic measure of the oil embargo Order that

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we should oppose the Government to-night. It is on the use of force for which they ask authority and about which the Prime Minister gave us no assurances today and there are no assurances in the Amendment he has tabled.
I believe, too, that the people of Britain support this view. They are seeing the economic measures being taken. They are much to the distaste and dislike of many people in this country, but they regard them as necessary. But they are not prepared to see these measures backed up by the use of force. I must tell the Prime Minister that if the Government attempt to do this while the House is in recess, we shall, of course, demand the recall of Parliament and we shall do everything in our power within the Parliamentary system to prevent him using force in these circumstances.
The other matter on which it is apparent——
Mr. E. Shinwell: Force against whom?
Hon. Members: Order.
Mr. Shinwell: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) knows that there is only one way to ask questions.
Mr. Shinwell: A point of order, Mr. Speaker. In the past your predecessors have always encouraged the cut and thrust of debate. All I want to do is to ascertain from the right hon. Gentleman what he means.
Mr. Speaker: Order. Like my predecessors, I encourage the cut and thrust of debate and wish to hear it; but the cut and thrust of debate has never meant continuously asking questions from a seated position.
Mr. Heath: I now want to turn to the fourth and final part of my remarks about Rhodesia, and that is on the question of how this situation can be resolved. I have already dealt with the limitations which the Prime Minister has placed on those with whom he is prepared to deal. We believe that this is wrong, because what is the object of the whole operation except to get people to change their minds and their attitudes? If Mr. Smith
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ever had any illusions about the action which would be taken against an illegal régime, he and his colleagues can certainly be under no illusions now, nor can their supporters.
In this situation it is important that the door should be kept open and not slammed, as the Prime Minister has done. It is surely somewhat ironical that in every other corner of the globe right hon. and hon. Members opposite are now and always have been wanting to talk in situations of difficulty with whoever is involved in the dispute. Today they are in the Far East. Yet here is the one situation in which they exclude that entirely.
In their Amendment the Government suggest that, as the proposals last put forward in the negotiations were rejected, that is the end of the matter as far as Mr. Smith is concerned. That need not be so. If the Government's purpose is working out and people are changing their minds and attitudes, then surely there is a possibility that this situation, too, will change, even if it has not done so already. What is necessary is that the Government's own proposals should be spelled out clearly. If they believe that amendments are necessary to the 1961 Constitution, let them specify them. [HON. MEMBERS: "They have"]. With great respect, they have not.
It is the unknown which prevents progress in this situation. I believe that it was wrong, and I said so at the time, that the Prime Minister should speak at all about direct rule, even for a short time. This may be a tidy Whitehall solution for starting all over again, but few in Rhodesia, not even those of moderate opinion who are lamentably few, will believe that direct rule, once started, is very quickly going to be brought to an end. Nobody will believe that.
The important thing now is constantly to make plain that while these economic measures are being taken, which the Prime Minister himself suggested must be abhorrent to all of us, we seek at the same time reconciliation and are prepared to take steps towards it with all those in Rhodesia who are prepared genuinely to respond.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) suggested in his Glasgow speech the basis on which this might be

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done. I do not propose to go over this in detail. My right hon. Friend set out the principles of the 1961 Constitution, moving on to majority rule, and educational advances. The Prime Minister himself, in his last offer to Mr. Smith and the Rhodesians, suggested that the Government would help with financing educational advance. We said that we should also back this if it were done. It is no good the Prime Minister saying that it was turned down then. The point is whether there are going to be constructive developments in Rhodesia. I would add—because one of the objections was that if Africans were educated there would not be a standard of employment for them—that we should go further and perhaps offer help with industrial development to Rhodesia to meet that point as well.
The Prime Minister: The objection taken by Prime Minister Smith was not that there would be no economic jobs for them. The objection stated was that to press on with African education would be to give Africans votes. That was why he was against it.
Mr. Heath: At the same time, Mr. Smith offered to put nearly another 1 million Africans on the electoral roll.
The Prime Minister: The B roll.
Mr. Heath: Yes, the B roll. This is not an occasion for getting into the details of the argument about the last negotiations. It is a time for discussing what might be possible in the changed circumstances in which the present measures are to take effect. If the Prime Minister would turn his mind to the future instead of constantly to the past we might make progress. The Prime Minister has developed a habit of declaring that everything depends on the illegal régime, and of course that was created by Mr. Smith and his colleagues. At the same time great responsibility rests on Her Mejesty's Government and on all of us in the House not to stand aside but to take positive steps.
The Prime Minister must not underestimate the depth of feeling which exists in Rhodesia today, and I hope that he is under no illusions about the difficulties which we are facing there. If we want to find a resolution of this situation and
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if this tragedy is not to end in disaster, the Prime Minister must follow a twofold policy in which the details of active reconciliation are put just as prominantly and constantly as the economic measures and sanctions. If the Prime Minister wants the House to have more information he should consider again the proposal for senior Members of the House to visit Rhodesia, when possible, and report back here. This could be constructive and psychologically helpful. I believe that it would be right for the Prime Minister to reconsider this suggestion.
I think that the people of this country long to see an end to this division between Britain and Rhodesia and a settlement on an honourable basis which will ensure that the rights of all races are secured in Rhodesia. I believe that when the time comes when people in Rhodesia are prepared to return to constitutional legality the attitude of the Government, the Prime Minister and his colleagues should be that long ago defined by Burke, that
"Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom …".
Returning to the Opposition Motion and the Government's Amendment, I have described the differences in objective which I now fear have developed between the two sides of the House, and the differences over the means of reaching a solution to this problem. But above all it would be unfortunate, indeed it would be deplorable, if there were differences between the two sides over the use of force. Here, far from giving us assurances, the Government's Amendment asks for a blank cheque. It is on this that we must challenge the Government tonight.
Mr. F. J. Bellenger: On a point of order. We are now discussing the Motion to adjourn. Although he has been using arguments supporting his Motion, surely the right hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath) is not in order now to bring into the debate, and thereby try to fasten on to hon. Members who themselves do not support force or want to support it, that if they vote for the Adjournment tonight they are voting for force.
Mr. Speaker: That is a point of argument, not of order.
Mr. Heath: I appreciate the position of the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw

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(Mr. Bellenger). I do not wish in any way to be unfair to him or others on his side who feel like him. I am quoting the Motion on the Order Paper and the Government's Amendment. If the Government had agreed to debate these the right hon. Gentleman would have had an opportunity of showing his views in the Division Lobby tonight.
Mr. William Hamilton: On a point of order. Is not it the case that we are now debating a Motion for the adjournment? We are certainly not debating either the Motion in the name of the Leader of the Opposition or the Government's Amendment. Which are we debating, that Motion and Amendment, or that the House do no adjourn?
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman asks me what we are debating. We are debating whether the House shall adjourn. Nothing has happened so far in the speech of the right hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath) that is out of order.
Mr. John Hynd: On a point of order. The right hon. Member for Bexley (Mr. Heath) has constantly referred to the fact that we shall he voting tonight and demonstrating whether we support the Motion or the Amendment which we are not debating. Can it be made clear that the vote tonight is not on either the Motion or the Amendment but on the Adjournment and nothing else?
Mr. Speaker: This is a matter of argument, not of order.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: On a point of order. I should like to put the point the other way. The only Question before the House is whether the House adjourns or does not adjourn. There may be a variety of arguments for or against either proposition, but is it in order to invite the House to decide that Question by reference to arguments which would be appropriate only if the other Motion and the Amendment to it were being debated?
Mr. Speaker: That is surely a third way of putting exactly the alleged point of order which is not a point of order.
Mr. Heath: Not only did the Leader of the House, who is not here at the moment, say at ten o'clock last night that the Motion and the Amendment would be entirely in order for discussion today, but
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he also said that there could be a Division at ten o'clock upon the Motion. But the interruptions we are suffering from the benches opposite indicate very clearly why the Government did not wish to debate either of them.
I believe that this is a vital debate before the House rises for the Recess. I remind the House and the Commonwealth that we on this side have supported the economic and financial measures which the Government have taken. I wish again to advise my right hon. and hon. Friends, as firmly as I can, that we should not challenge the Government tonight on the oil embargo Order. But I must state quite categorically, as we say in our Motion, that we cannot support the use of force. It is here that we firmly draw the line. As the Government have refused to debate the Motion and the Amendment, then it is on the Adjournment that we must divide the House tonight.
4.30 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): In view of the opening and closing words of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, I must just refer to the procedural tangle in which the House was in danger of finding itself last night. For several weeks, there has been pressure for a two-day foreign affairs debate, the more urgent because we did not debate foreign affairs during the debate on the Address and it is, therefore, more than five months since the last foreign affairs debate. The general view of the House—we have had many consultations about it—was that the two-day debate should be after and not before my visit to Washington.
Following your Ruling yesterday, Mr. Speaker, that Rhodesia as well as foreign affairs could be debated in the two-day Adjournment debate, I thought that the House seemed content to continue with the arrangements we had made. That was the position after the right hon. Gentleman raised his point of order at 3.30 yesterday afternoon. But then the Opposition tabled a Motion on Rhodesia, the Motion to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, covering what was, in fact, the lowest common denominator of agreement on Rhodesia within the Opposition. That Motion does not deal with the principal issues and the issues of principle which ought to be covered in

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any discussion of Rhodesia or in any declaration by this House, nor does it recognise that these statements are read outside and on a selective basis in Rhodesia.
Of course, if the Opposition Motion had been a Motion of censure—I challenged the right hon. Gentleman a fortnight ago to table one—a Motion calling in question the Government's handling of this infinitely difficult problem, as I am sure he will agree, then the Government would have felt it necessary to interfere with the Parliamentary programme of debate in order to resolve the matter. But this Motion was no Motion of censure. It was deliberately drawn to avoid being a Motion of censure. In fact, as the right hon. Gentleman said, we tabled an appropriate Amendment, and I shall deal with all the issues, but we did not feel that it would be right or appropriate to interfere with the rights of hon. Members who have been waiting for months to debate foreign affairs, some of whom yesterday were waiting to get in today. We felt that it would not be right to say at 10 o'clock last night, "You will not have an opportunity to do so because we propose to change the business in order to deal with the right hon. Gentleman's Motion", the more so as those who want to debate Rhodesia may still do so today and those who want to debate foreign affairs can stick to the original arrangement.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition chose, as was well within his rights, to devote the whole of his speech to Rhodesia. I shall come to those points later. At this stage, I say only that it seemed to me that his speech was more concerned with the passions behind him than with the problems in front of him. I sometimes wish that the right hon. Gentleman would look at the problem which we face in Rhodesia as what it is, a grave moral problem—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—yes, it is—a world problem and a very dangerous world problem, and not think that he can deal with the whole thing as though it were a point of order at the Tory Party conference or a meeting of the 1922 Committee. However, I was glad of one thing he said more than once, when he expressed his utter repugnance to the use of force at all for settling
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disputes of this kind. I agree with him. That was the Chief Whip at the time of Suez who used his very considerable expertise—[HON. MEMBERS: "Cheap."]—it is not, and it was not cheap in terms of lives in the Suez operation. The right hon. Gentleman used his expertise then to keep his party together in support of Suez, which is more than he has done in keeping his party together on Rhodesia, and we now know, on the admission of the parties to that dispute, including the then Prime Minister, thet the whole thing was a collusive put-up job and this House was misled by the right hon. Gentleman himself.
I have referred to the fact that he dealt exclusively with Rhodesia in his speech. I shall come back to that in the second part of my own, but the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not follow him entirely, but turn first to some vital issues of foreign affairs and then later pick up some of the points which he made.
On the broad issues of international affairs, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday dealt with many of the questions troubling hon. Members in all parts of the House—Vietnam, disarmament, non-proliferation. relations with the Soviet Union, and relations with Europe. Other right hon. and hon. Members on both sides stressed a number of other issues, some of them including the situation in the Middle East referred to by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) when he wound up last night, and I hope that these will be dealt with by my hon. Friend the Minister of State, if he catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, at the end of the debate. But it was the desire of right hon. Members opposite, expressed more than once, that I should give the House a report on my visit to Washington and to Ottawa, and on this I propose to concentrate before turning to Rhodesia.
Perhaps I might just refer to another forthcoming visit on which the right hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Soames) yesterday produced some uncharacteristically negative observations. He is usually very positive in his speeches, but yesterday the right hon. Gentleman seemed to think that it would be wrong for me to visit Moscow in the near future. Obviously, the timing of discussions of this kind is always debatable, and some right hon.

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Members opposite have expressed regret that I have not been to Moscow already. However, I have most carefully studied the exchanges between my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and Soviet Ministers on his visit to Moscow at the end of November, and I have had the benefit of a continuing exchange of messages with Mr. Kosygin since last spring. In the light of these exchanges, and having regard to some of the vitally urgent questions which, I think, now require discussion, I have accepted an invitation from the Soviet Government to spend some days in the Soviet capital in February, from 21st to 24th February.
Now, my visit to Washington. I shall not at this point deal with the part of the talks with the President which dealt with Rhodesia, because I shall come to that matter later. It was, obviously topical and urgent, but I assure the House that our talks in Washington about Rhodesia formed only a very small part, not the main part in any sense, of our discussions.
The main subject of our discussions in Washington related to the defence review. As the House knows, for many months we have been undertaking a thorough and searching review of our defence programme, defence expenditure, defence rôles and commitments, the deployment of our forces and the arming of our forces. We started from the proposition not only that our forces were overstretched in relation to the commitments which they might have to meet but that the commitments themselves required review both in their totality and in relation to one another. Of course, any Government who are really reviewing defence policy after a period of time will find an accumulation of commitments, some, perhaps all, of which were accepted rightly and relevantly against different strategic situations, but they then find themselves involved in meeting particular roles which are, perhaps, less urgent than when they were undertaken. Then again there is the choice of individual weapons, which has greatly exercised the minds of hon. Members in all parts of the House and which is very often closely related to the kind of commitments which we keep in our programme or which we reject.
Arising from the Defence Review, the total cost of our Defence effort by 1970
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must be brought to a figure within the economic capacity of the nation. This requires ruthless pruning, not only in terms of weapons but in terms of the commitments that we have inherited, many of which, perhaps all, were right to be undertaken at the time they were taken on.
We believe that, within such a programme, we can get a realistic and effective defence policy—effective in terms of the job that has to be done and in terms of cost. In the past few weeks, we have completed the first stage of our work. We have identified the operations and the costs and have begun to form some idea of the priorities.
It was right and proper that, at this time, we should discuss these problems with our allies in the United States and in the Commonwealth, not with the idea of giving them any power of decision on our defence expenditure or priorities but in order to hear their ideas about the roles and commitments that we should be undertaking, having regard to the fact that, not only in Europe but all over the world, Britain's defence policy must be constructed on the basis of interdependence and collective security and not on unilateral, costly "go it alone" policies. But, of course, the final decision must be with Her Majesty's Government and the House of Commons.
During my Washington talks, I outlined the options facing us, the nature of the choices and priorities. I think that the American leaders with whom I discussed the question felt that our approach was realistic and related to the kind of world we are living in and which we must expect to be living in in the 1970s. The details are to be further examined when my right hon. Friends the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary visit Washington. They will discuss all these questions in detail and in depth with their opposite numbers and we shall also have early discussions with Australia and New Zealand about British defence policy in the Far East. This will give time for the Government's decisions, when taken, to be incorporated in the Defence White Paper to be published when the time comes next year.
Perhaps I should repeat what I said at Question Time. I had no discussion in Washington about weapons, whether aircraft or naval weapons or any other

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type of weapons system. We dealt with commitments and their relation to overall foreign policy. We reviewed every part of the world in which Britain has a defence rôle.
In our European rôle, we do not contemplate any substantial change unless an international agreement between East and West makes it possible to agree on the reduction of forces both East and West of the Iron Curtain on the basis of an agreed phased withdrawal. Again, there could be changes in N.A.T.O. strategy leading to changes in our deployment in Europe, although, once again, as I have said many times, we do not envisage any substantial unilateral changes in our deployment in N.A.T.O. —only those changes which are agreed within the alliance.
In considering the other areas—the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Far East—it would be wrong now, with so many decisions to be taken, for me to go into detail. But I think that I should say that there was complete agreement in Washington with the British Government's decision to continue to maintain a world-wide defence rôle, particularly to fulfil those commitments which, for reasons of history, geography, Commonwealth association and the like, we, and virtually we alone, are best fitted to undertake.
Equally, it was recognised that this rôle has to be exercised within an overall ceiling of cost, both financial and in terms of real resources allocated to the purpose. Taking the east of Suez rôle as a whole, there was a lively recognition on both sides that we could fulfil the kind of rôle I think that it is our duty to fulfil only on the basis of inter-dependence with our allies and by burden sharing in terms both of commitment and cost.
Turning to commitments as a whole, two points should be made—and I am glad that they are widely and wisely recognised by the American Administration. First, the burden of watching Western interests in other parts of the world is very unfairly shared. Mr. McNamara was right, at the N.A.T.O. Conference last week, to seek to interest other European nations, whose preoccupations with Europe are pressing and
1904
recognised, in looking outwards to some of the problems we and other nations face in Africa and Asia.
Secondly, we are making a costly contribution to the defence of Europe. In terms of cost as a proportion of gross national product, we are carrying the heaviest burden of European defence, at any rate as far as costs across the foreign exchanges are concerned. If we are to maintain any European rôle and at the same time defend Western interests in a much wider area, our Western allies and partners have to be prepared to share these costs on a more widespread basis. This idea is fully realised in Washington.
I must also refer to the problem of the strengthening of N.A.T.O., especially the nuclear side, which has dominated our foreign policy debates for many years. I think that we are beginning to move towards a rational solution. I felt this last week. The right hon. Member for Bedford had some good natured fun at our expense about the question of the A.N.F. It is not normally the funniest of subjects but he managed to get some fun out of it.
It would be churlish of me to point out—but I will do so nevertheless—that, in the last 12 months, we have begun to inject some sense into this subject whereas the Government of which he was a member was split from top to bottom as to whether Britain should or should not support the idea of a mixed manned force. Even since they have been in Opposition, we have had disagreement between successive Front Bench speakers on the subject.
For reasons that I know that the right hon. Gentleman understands very well, little progress has been made this year on the A.N.F. proposal and even less on the mixed manned force. However, now we begin to make progress. We have always made it clear that we would reject any solution which would involve the proliferation of nuclear striking power, whether in the form of a crude addition of more fingers on the nuclear trigger or in any other form conferring nuclear power where none exists today. We have made that plain. However, I am still not clear as to where the Opposition stand on this. I hope that they will tell us in some future foreign affairs debate.
I have never felt that the original M.L.F. proposal was proliferatory and

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have argued that point of view fairly hard in Moscow. But whatever arguments there may be about that, one of the distinctive features of our A.N.F. proposal was the clear inclusion of specific guarantees against proliferation and the acquisition by non-nuclear Powers of nuclear weapons. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has clearly and realistically indicated the importance of proceeding on lines which must not inhibit the conclusion of a worldwide treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons. This will continue to guide our actions and the part we play in inter-allied discussions.
In the Washington talks, we did not attempt to solve this problem because N.A.T.O. has already charted the future course of discussions on a basis that all of us feel to be realistic and designed to make progress. In particular, I hope that we have now got away from the idea which right hon. and hon. Members opposite have suffered from as much as we and which has dominated the thinking of so many people—that we here or our friends in America are the people best fitted to say exactly what Germany, for example, or Italy or any other non-nuclear power wants.
Too many people have been saying that the Germans want a certain thing and that the only way to buy them off is to pursue one certain course or another. Now, in N.A.T.O., we have the situation where we shall find out from the non-nuclear Powers exactly what their position is instead of having to guess. Thus we can get the basis of dealing with the problem—and in doing so we shall be guided by considerations going beyond the requirements of N.A.T.O. alone.
Now I wish to deal with Vietnam. On the basic issues presented by the war, I have nothing to add to what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said yesterday and nothing to subtract. No one in this House, in any part of it, will under-rate the dangers of a continuance of this fighting. First, the war is above all a tragedy for the people of Vietnam. Peace has been a stranger to their country for a generation. Secondly, as long as the war continues, there is continuing danger—some would say a growing danger—that what is at present a local war could escalate into a major war in Asia or something even worse.
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Thirdly, we must face the fact that the fighting has up to now cast a shadow over the whole conduct of international relations. The hopes of a year or two ago that we could make a reality of coexistence between East and West, believing profoundly that our two systems of Government could move closer together, have been set back because, over the past year, Vietnam has been the cause of division not only between East and West but of competitive division within the Communist world itself. As a result of all this, there is deep feeling in the House not only on this side, but on both sides of the House, deep feeling in the country and deep feeling in the United States, too, about the dangers which we are facing, particularly the dangers of escalation.
What I want to suggest, with the greatest respect, to those who have identified themselves in the House with the Vietnam question is this: I welcome their deep concern, just as I always have, but I resent any suggestion that they feel any more strongly about this question than I do, or than my right hon. Friend does. One thing I am absolutely satisfied about after my talks last week is that, while President Johnson is quite clear about the duty which he feels lies on his own country to resist Communist infiltration and aggression, he is as anxious and as determined as any hon. Member in the House of Commons to get the talks to the conference table on a basis designed to bring the fighting to a speedy conclusion and to find an honourable, just and permanent solution to the Vietnam problem within the ambit of the 1954 and 1962 Agreements.
I have studied a long record of pronouncements, not all of which have been quoted in the House, in which the President himself and the Secretary of State and others have committed themselves, generally or in specific instances, to a willingness to negotiate on this question. As my right hon. Friend said yesterday, there has not been—not yet anyway—a corresponding willingness on the part of others who are fighting in Vietnam. I shall not weary the House with the whole record of instances—the resolution of the 17 uncommitted nations, the Gordon Walker mission, the proposed U Thant mission, the proposed Commonwealth Peace Mission, the visit of my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the

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Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance and the rest. [Laughter.] Those are not things to titter about. We have never had a suggestion from right hon. Gentlement opposite about how this question could be resolved, just a little bit of bar humour on the subject; very funny and we will join in the laughter, but this is a tragic war. It is a war which carries with it a very grave danger of escalation and we should like to think that either they back what we are doing, or can suggest alternatives. Humour is not enough in this situation.
We are conscious of our duty as one of the co-chairmen under the Geneva Agreement, and throughout this year my right hon. Friend has been pressing and pressing his Soviet counterpart to call a conference under the aegis of that agreement, so far without success. We are going to go on pressing. We shall examine every possibility of mounting a new initiative which could lead to negotiation. I know that this may not be fully acceptable to some right hon. Gentlemen opposite, because in the summer they seemed very concerned to suggest that it was wrong for us to take any initiative which might lead to rebuffs. If we are not prepared to risk rebuffs, we shall not get peace in Vietnam. The road to peace in Vietnam may well mean a whole succession of rebuffs, disappointments and snubs and there may be one or two hon. Members opposite who think to make capital out of each, but that will not deter us.
Right hon. Gentlemen opposite last summer showed in their insistence that we must proceed through well-defined diplomatic channels that they ignored the unique difficulty of this problem, and the unique difficulty of this problem is that neither Russia nor any other country with whom we are in diplomatic communication has so far been able or willing to try and turn the key, the key which is to be found in Hanoi and only in Hanoi. That is why unusual unconventional and sometimes devious methods, even methods considered humorous, may have to be used to open that door. But we shall not hesitate to go on trying to get that door open, because until we do there will be no peace in Vietnam.
Having been to Washington, I now know that I have the fullest support of
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the President of the United States who, in a public statement in my presence in Washington on Friday last, at the time of the Christmas tree ceremony, described and welcomed Britain's peace rôle in the Vietnam context and said that any initiative which we were able to take—any initiative which we were able to take—would find a ready response in the Government of the United States. In the summer when we took initiatives—the Commonwealth Peace Mission, the visits of my hon. Friend, and others—right hon. Gentlemen opposite chided us, because, they said, this would be unacceptable to the United States. They got their reply shortly afterwards when the President praised the efforts which we were making in both cases. I want them to understand now that we now have his solid support in any initiative which we can take. He has his duty to do and he feels that duty very strongly and no one is in any doubt about that, but at the same time it is quite wrong to suggest that he is not as keen to get a peaceful and honourable settlement in Vietnam as any hon. Member on either side of the House.
Sir Harmar Nicholls: It is all very well for the right hon. Gentleman to make his hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary sound heroic, but has not any Government of this country a responsibility for seeing that when any member of the Government goes abroad as an envoy he is likely to be received with some sort of courtesy? There are established ways of ensuring this.
The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, and we can stick on that, or ensure that nobody goes there who is not wearing striped pants and a black coat and be absolutely certain that we shall not get rebuffed, but at the end of the day we will not get peace either.
Mr. Michael Foot: Will my right hon. Friend say whether he discussed with the President of the United States a question which has been very widely discussed in the Press of this country and the United States, the possibility of the intensification of the bombing in North Vietnam and its extension to fresh areas, plus the possibility of the United States sending considerably larger numbers of troops to Vietnam itself? Did

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he discuss that question with the President and was consideration given to the influence which such actions might have on the possibility of getting going negotiations with Hanoi?
The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. We discussed all those problems and, as I told the House before, we have always made it clear that there are some escalations of the bombing which we could not support, including bombing of the major cities in North Vietnam. Of course, it is no good approaching these problems on the basis which says that the United States should do this and stop doing that unilaterally. It is for us to be able to get some corresponding willingness on the other side. We are then prepared to put to the United States that the Americans should take or not take any particular course of action, as was suggested by the Commonwealth Peace Mission.
Sir Robert Cary: But surely Australia and New Zealand are making a military contribution to the war in Vietnam.
The Prime Minister: They have made a contribution. The hon. Gentleman seems to think that we cannot have a voice in this matter because we have not. I hope that he will leave it to President Johnson to make his representations. He does it with even more authority than the hon. Gentleman. It is not for any hon. Member to tell us where our duty lies in the matter of supplying the war in Vietnam with troops. Of course Australia and New Zealand have troops there but the President of the United States understands our very special rôle as co-chairman under the Geneva Agreement. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that with that rôle we have a very special responsibility for peace and a very special responsibility not to be involved in fighting in Vietnam.
The House will understand that these subjects which I have mentioned—the Defence Review, N.A.T.O., the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons and the special problems which we face in Africa—naturally formed only part of very thorough and searching talks which I had with the President last week. It is difficult in setting out the position in each of them to give any concept of the brisk, crisp, comradely and fruitful nature of
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our discussions on every single point which we covered. I doubt whether relations between our two countries have been closer and more frank and marked by clearer understanding, even when we did not agree—and, of course, there are important issues on which it is well known that we do not agree than probably at any time since the Second World War.—[An HON. MEMBER: "Such as?"] I do not think that we agree on the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, as we have made very plain in the past. I hope that no one will under-rate the importance of this not only for Britain and America, but for world understanding and world peace. A great deal of this improvement has resulted from frankness and from realism and from ridding our relationships of nostalgic pretence and pretence of independent weapons when the Americans knew perfectly well that those weapons were not independent.
I have dealt specially with my talks in Washington—I wish that there were time to give an account of my valuable and interesting talks in Ottawa as well—to the exclusion of a broader discussion of the problems of world affairs generally, the subject which we are supposed to be debating today. I feel that it would not be right to weary the House by going over the same ground so fully covered by my right hon. Friend yesterday.
I should now like to turn from this brief review of the Washington visit, which I think the House wanted me to make, to the issue of Rhodesia which was opened up by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. I agree with him that it is important to have a clear statement of principles about our approach to the Rhodesian situation. I cannot say that we have had this from the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon. What we have had is a series of the things which he is not prepared to support and I will come to each of those in a moment. I would agree with a lot of what the right hon. Gentleman said, for example, with his statement of the need for a return to constitutional rule, for progress to majority rule, his rejection of apartheid methods, by which I understood him to refer to that one of the five principles which refers to, for example, the Land Apportionment Act

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and things of that kind. What he is saying will be very abhorrent to the present régime in Rhodesia, and I am glad he said it. He also referred to the methods which he said have the aspect of police State methods. It would have been simpler if he had said "under a police State", because I think that that is what he meant. He rightly spoke of the African fears of intimidation, though he referred only to that fear of intimidation by certain nationalist extremists. He must realise that no African today can speak freely, because of the fear of intimidation by the police. He knows that perfectly well, and I think it is right to mention the considerable fear that many Africans have.
He was abundantly right when he said that many Rhodesians have deluded themselves by thinking that it was a simple choice between two alternatives, either of an illegal independence on the one hand or of African majority rule the day after tomorrow on the other. I agree with him. The whole course of our negotiations was designed to show that there was a constructive constitutional alternative if it had been taken. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, I went to great lengths in Rhodesia to make a statement trying to persuade the people that there was not this simple choice, that there were other choices and that what was needed was patience and time and the dismissal of fear on all these things. But it is very difficult to get these things across in a country where there is such a perverted system of communications. One of the things which I want to say in all seriousness to the right hon. Gentleman after his speech today, and to other hon. Gentlemen, is that it is terribly important for everyone who addresses himself to this subject in this House to recognise the effect that our speeches, our actions or our inaction, can have in a country where there is this highly selective form of amplification of what is said. The right hon. Gentleman knows this to be true.
One of the biggest problems we had in our negotiations, was the hope which turned out to be false, by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, that there was going to be a major political revolution in this country, that at the time of the Conservative Party conference the noble Lord, Lord Salisbury, and those who supported him,
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were going to get the upper hand. I know this for a fact, and anyone who has been to Rhodesia knows this for a fact. They thought, when the voice rang forth from an hon. or right hon. Member below the Gangway, that this was the voice of Britain or the voice of the Conservative Party.
We know what weight to attach to these voices but in Rhodesia they do not and I think that I am right in saying, particularly since the illegal declaration, that the selection and biased use of their broadcasting, sound radio and television, has been to amplify, beyond anw reasonable measure, the voices of those who have criticised the British Government's policy, and to suppress, almost totally, the voices of those who have expressed, on both sides of the House, support for the policy, which up to now has had fairly general national support.
I want to say to those hon. Gentlemen who write to me from time to time most courteously—and to those who do not—about their intentions to visit Rhodesia, that I hope they will recognise that if they go, maybe on some journalistic assignment, to get every point of view and all the rest, they have a very heavy responsibility to express not their own personal views, not the views which they may find to be acceptable to those with whom they talk, but the views that have been expressed by this House as a whole.
I still believe, despite the efforts of the right hon. Gentleman who sought to try and whip up an artificial feeling of division on the Rhodesian question this afternoon, that there is, broadly, a very great basis for unity and agreement on the Rhodesian question. The right hon. Gentleman has anxieties, and I am going to deal with these later. I understand them, and I understand his feelings about them. I think that he is wrong to take them as the basis for the kind of speech he made and the kind of action he is taking, but I understand his difficulty. He has been through an extremely difficult time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] We have only had to handle the problem—he has had to handle his party.
There were occasions, I am bound to confess, when I felt that he was going to yield to the temptation to try to get some minor point to cause a diversion between the two parties and then rough it

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up in the country on this issue. It is to his honour and his credit that, even though he has found many of our measures repugnant when we have announced them, after due consideration and discussion with his colleagues, he has felt able to support them.
I should like to set out the principles on which I hope we could all agree before we go any further in this matter. The first thing is to ask whether we all accept that we cannot in any circumstances tolerate this illegal action, whether we can all assert that this Parliament, and this Parliament alone, has the power to grant independence and to lay down conditions for that grant of independence. I think that the right hon. Gentleman has expressed himself clearly on this point and I hope that all hon. Members in all parts of the House will agree with that as a proposition. This means that we have to take every measure in our power that we think right and proper to bring this illegal action to an end. I hope that we all agree about this.
This raises the next question—what means do we consider right? We have ruled out the use of military force for ending the situation in Rhodesia. I have said this time and time again, and I said it in Rhodesia before the illegal declaration. I said it to Mr. Smith, although there were some who felt that I had weakened our position by doing so, and that I ought to have said that we were prepared to use military force, or to have left him in doubt. I know that many people thought this, particularly in Africa. Because I thought it right to be utterly frank on this, as on other things—[Interruption.]—I am one of the very few Ministers who has ever published every exchange they have had in this, every exchange, even when they were meant to he private discussions. With Mr. Smith's permission, we started to prepare them, even before the illegal declaration, and I published every exchange. Hon. Gentlemen have gon through them with a microscope, trying to find something wrong. I stand by everything I have said. I should say that Mr. Smith said that if my predecessors had been as frank with him as we had—these were his words—then this problem would not have been left to us.
I will stand by what I said to him on that occasion and I have said this
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before. I said that my immediate predecessor had been as completely frank on this issue as I had. It is all on the record. He was as frank on that occasion as I have been. There may have been others—[Interruption.]—I tell the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Enfield, West (Mr. Iain Macleod) that if there is one subject on which all Rhodesians, agree, it is on him. At any rate the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) was utterly frank. I said to Mr. Smith that if some of our predecessors had been as frank as he and I, the problem would have come to a head earlier. I think that it is fair to say that.
I was saying, when I was interrupted, that we have been utterly frank to Mr. Smith and everyone else in Rhodesia and said, since the illegal declaration, that we ruled out military force. This has caused great feeling in African States, and I think that right hon. Gentlemen completely discount the importance of that view. The Africans say, "You used force against African Colonies such as Kenya when there was trouble or illegal action. Why do you not do it today?". They say, "Is it colour prejudice? Do you use force only against the black men and not against the white men?" Another question is "Is it because the Rhodesians are your own kith and kin?". The Africans have kith and kin in Rhodesia, too—twenty times as many as we have. These are the question which people are asking, and they have to be answered.
May I tell the House what our answer has been. I said this in the United Nations last week. The first point relates to the history of Rhodesia, which many of our African friends do not understand. Rhodesia is a Colony, but it has been a substantially self-governing Colony for more than 40 years. In the course of this time, uniquely among all Colonies in history, it has developed its own armed forces, which means that it could resist any form of attack and invasion and that the use of military force against Rhodesia would not be like these other acts. It would not be a case of arresting a subversive individual. It would mean a bloody war—and probably a bloody war turning into a bloody civil war. This must be realised, and I keep telling it to our friends in Africa.

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I have said repeatedly that we do not believe that military force is the right answer to settle this constitutional problem. This is why I cannot understand—perhaps I can, but I do not think that it is to his credit—why the Leader of the Opposition worked himself up into such a passion this afternoon pretending that he invented the idea that we should not use force to solve the Rhodesian problem. If I am on record on one question above all others before and since the illegal declaration, it is that we are opposed to the use of military force for settling this constitutional question.
Mr. Heath Mr. Heath rose——
The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman did not give way very much and I have a lot of ground to cover. I will deal with some of the points which the right hon. Gentleman made. If I do not deal with them before I sit down, I will give way to him then. I do not want to waste his time and that of the House by giving way now.
Another reason why we are against the use of military force—and I have had to explain this to the top military representatives from Zambia this morning—is this. One of the by-products of trying to solve the problem by unconstitutional methods might be that there would be grave and lasting damage done to essential installations. I am thinking particularly of Kariba. If we were to invade Rhodesia to procure the end of the illegal régime, one of the earliest casualties could be the switching station and probably the generators, and possibly even—I hope not—the dam itself.
These are the reasons why we have ruled out military force throughout, and I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman was so deafened by the noise behind him that he did not hear what we have been saying from this side of the House.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Since I have to wind up the debate, I should like to be clear about this. On "Panorama" last night the Prime Minister was asked:
"Are you prepared to blockade the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique?"
His answer was:
"Well, there are a number of measures, aren't there? A lot depends on what kind of
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seepage or leakage we have to face. It may well be the United Nations would decide to take action under Chapter VII."
Will the right hon. Gentleman support that?
The Prime Minister: I was going to come to the Beira problem. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to deal with it in my own way. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I intend to deal with it. But the right hon. Gentleman must recognise that at this point in my remarks I was speaking about those who had advocated the use of military force for unseating the illegal Government in Rhodesia. That is not what we are talking about. The question of any form of force to make the oil sanction more effective is entirely different. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am going to deal with it. But no one could suggest that a naval blockade of Beira is the same thing as an invasion with military force. I agree that this point is important. Let us look at it when we come to it in a reasonable part of our discussion.
Because I have said that we are not prepared to use military force to settle the constitutional issue in Rhodesia—and I have just spelled out the dangers of doing so—we have applied successively deepening economic sanctions, and the test which we have had to consider at every point was whether these sanctions would be effective in bringing the illegal régime to an end.
At the beginning, there were semantic discussions about the word "punitive", and for a time we wondered whether those who made so much of this meant that they would have any sanctions as long as they were not effective. That was the point made by the Leader of the Liberal Party. The right hon. Member for Bexley, who now, rightly, says that he supported us on sanctions right along the road, must remember that at the beginning he was fighting very hard with his own conscience about whether he could support a tobacco sanction, which was a very long time ago and a very much smaller part of the problem. But I agree that he has come with us right along the road of economic sanctions.
I believe that these sanctions will be effective. There is already considerable economic dislocation, especially monetary dislocation, externally and internally, partly due to our measures and partly due

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to some of Rhodesia's own measures which she introduced both on and after independence. I will not try to predict this afternoon how long this régime can last with these economic difficulties, but I say again that the sooner this problem is solved the better.
We want a quick solution, and I was very worried when the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition warned me against trying to seek a quick solution. I cannot imagine why he adduced this argument this afternoon. He said that an attempt to get a quick solution was likely to lead to the use of military force. I must tell him that if we do not get a quick solution it is much more likely to lead to force being applied externally—not by us but by others—and in conditions which will present this country with a most appalling dilemma. I want the right hon. Gentleman to recognise the world dangers which we are facing when he makes speeches of that kind.
Mr. Heath: I recognise the world dangers fully, but what the Prime Minister does not appear to realise is that economic measures take time to work. When we have reached the limit of economic measures, we cannot produce a quick solution. We must wait for them to work. Realising the difficulties on Rhodesia, one knows that it must take time before opinions change. If the Prime Minister keeps pressing for a quick solution he may get into a brash adventure which he may regret.
The Prime Minister: I am not taking anything about rash adventures from the right hon. Gentleman. I have made that clear.
Of course, I recognise that this will take time. I am being pressed by every Commonwealth country in Africa to say how long this will take. They ask, "Why do not you use military force?" None of us can say how long these measures will take to have effect. I hope that they will be quick in their effect. The quicker they are in being successful, the greater our chance—and it will not be easy—of escaping measures taken by other nations that we shall be powerless to stop which might lead to the use of military force in conditions which none of us in the House could contemplate with any degree of coolness.
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But the additional reasons why I say that we want these measures to be quickly effective is, first, that the hardship will be less than if there were a long, drawn out agony of slow-working sanctions; secondly, it will be much easier to reconstruct the economy when Rhodesia has returned to constitutional rule and we could cut off the economic sanctions very quickly—as quickly as we imposed them; thirdly, the more quickly a solution is reached the less bitterness there will be and, therefore, the greater the opportunity of creating the multi-racial harmony on which we all agree and on which any permanent solution of the Rhodesian problem must depend. As I have said, the quicker the solution, the less danger there is of grave external action.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition referred to oil sanctions. I do not think that there is much more I need say about this than I said yesterday. In our view, these measures are necessary to deny the munitions of rebellion to the Smith régime and to speed the day of the return of constitutional methods. Of course, this action is repugnant to every one of us in the House, but I believe that it is essential in a wider sense, because if we had not taken these measures we would by now have been faced with sweeping mandatory international measures which might have produced irrevocable consequences on a continental, if not on a wider, scale.
I have been asked about the oil embargo and Kariba. I said yesterday—and this is our position—that we believe that this oil embargo will be effective. I think that it is quite wrong for people to assume that it will break down. There are possibilities. I mentioned "spivs" in international trade. They might have to be dealt with. It is possible, although I hope that it is not likely, that Angola might ship oil around the Cape to Beira for putting through the pipeline. I said yesterday that if that happens we shall have to consider this problem. There is more than one way of dealing with it.
We might take legal action, for example, to close the pipeline. I hope that this is a way in which we could do it, by making it illegal for that pipeline to be used as far as it is on Rhodesian soil. That is one possibility. [Interruption.] We want the oil sanctions

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to be effective, do we not, all of us? I do not think that any of us would want to go through all the agonies which we have gone through in imposing our part of it if we are to be quite calm about some other people breaking the embargo and breaking the law of Rhodesia as it has been since last week.
I hope, therefore, that there will not be the seepage or leakage which was referred to in the quotation from my broadcast last night. If there is, we shall have to decide how it must be handled, and it will be decided internationally. Certainly, we have no intention of imposing a naval blockade round Beira, and we never have had. I do not know whether that is the fear that the right hon. Gentleman had. We have not considered this. If the embargo fails, it will fail because it is not sufficiently international and multi-lateral. The House can be quite certain that it would then be raised at the United Nations, and not by us. If there is a decision under Chapter VII in which it is suggested that a couple of frigates be placed outside Beira to stop oil tankers going through, this is what will happen, and it will happen by international decision. We do not ourselves propose to seek such a resolution. We certainly do not propose to take individual unilateral action to blockade Beira.
We are dealing with a hypothetical situation, but right hon. and hon. Members opposite entirely misconceive the whole feeling in Africa and in the United Nations if they think that in the event of such a seepage nothing would be done about it. It would happen, and it would happen under Chapter VII, which would be mandatory on all countries. I do not believe that it would be a particularly notable use of force in the sense of bloodshed such as a military force against Rhodesia would have been. I believe that it would be one of the simpler operations. But we do not seek it, and we shall not seek to promote it.
Mr. Ronald Bell Mr. Ronald Bell (Buckinghamshire, South) rose——
Mr. Patrick Wall Mr. Patrick Wall (Haltemprice) rose——
The Prime Minister: One at a time.
Mr. Ronald Bell: Since the United Nations is precluded by its Charter from
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taking any action in relation to this matter, how could it possibly be mandatory on all countries?
The Prime Minister: The hon. Member has tried this before from the back benches. He is deluding himself. He can go to the United Nations and do his legal hairsplitting there. He would have a pretty thin time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."]
The United Nations is not precluded from using the Charter or from Charger VII decisions. Chapter VII applies possibly to economic, possibly to military action. It is a question of whether it is Article 41 or 42. The hon. Member can go on shaking his head, but even more distinguished lawyers than himself in every country in the world take a different view. However, he has made his point.
Mr. Wall: Would not the Prime Minister agree that many nations in the United Nations have for many years been calling for an oil blockade of South Africa? Is it not inconceivable, therefore, that South Africa could permit a successful oil blockade of Rhodesia?
The Prime Minister: I do not speak for South Africa. I cannot forecast what its attitude will be. I would feel that South Africa would behave with great prudence and caution in all this matter concerning Rhodesia. South Africa has not recognised the illegal régime. I agree that South Africa is placed in a very difficult situation.
I do not think that we would help by trying to examine the arguments that might be going through the minds of the South African Government. When, however, the hon. Member says what he has done, I think that there will be a fear in many places in South Africa that if they were to frustrate this limited embargo there would be growing pressure in the United Nations for widening the embargo. That might be a reason for continuing with very great caution. I hope that the hon. Member will not say anything that will put South Africa in a more difficult position concerning this matter.
Turning to the question of Kariba, the right hon. Gentleman upset me a little when he was talking about the question of the cut-off of Kariban power. He knows the tremendous passion with which, for example, President Kaunda, a very

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good friend of this country and of right hon. Members opposite, approaches the question of Kariba. All the arguments about Javelins and about troops centre around the question of Kariba. President Kaunda is terribly concerned lest, for one reason or another, the Smith régime should cut off the Kariba power from Zambia, which would mean the most tremendous and most dreadful interference of Zambia's economic position, industrial production and the rest, and would have a serious effect, indeed, on us in this country.
So far, we have not reached agreement with the President of Zambia on the stationing of British troops for defensive purposes there, simply because we ourselves have refused to agree that those troops should be deployed south of the Zambesi or could be sent in to take over the Kariba Dam, the power station and the rest and defend them. I hope that the Leader of the Opposition will not underrate the passion that this subject arouses in the heart of President Kaunda and his colleagues in the Zambian Cabinet. Certainly none of us, I think, would want to stand idly by if that power were cut off. It is a vital British interest as well as a vital Zambian interest. We have seen right hon. Gentlemen opposite rush in to protect what was felt to be a vital British interest at the wrong place and at the wrong time, which caused us months of economic difficulty in this country and years of political difficulty thereafter.
I am surprised if right hon. and hon. Members opposite take the view that we would not do anything in the Kariban situation if that power were cut off. They are the great believers in the deterrent, but the deterrent must be credible. That is why their deterrent never was. This is a deterrent. That was why the right hon. Gentleman was never himself a credible independent deterrent. That is why nobody believed him. [Interruption.] If he interrupts from a sitting position, he will get a reply. I am trying to deal with a serious situation and the need for a deterrent against any irresponsible person in Rhodesia.
I am not thinking all the time of Mr. Smith. They are people around him who are a great deal more irresponsible than he is, and there are some highly irresponsible and Fascist types among
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his police and his own forces—not, thank heaven, at the top. It is important for them to realise that if they irresponsibly cut off power from Zambia we cannot leave that situation where it is. We cannot.
The Leader of the Opposition knew exactly what we have in mind, because I have told him. It is irresponsible of him to go on pretending that he does not know and for the right hon. Gentleman to try to find what he thinks is a contradiction between what I said in the House and what I said in the Daily Mirror. He knows that there is no contradiction. I challenge him to say whether, in our discussions, he has ever pointed out that there was a contradiction or whether he accepted what I said. He knows that for me to spell out in full would be dangerous and irresponsible. I hope that on consideration he will recognise that what has been explained to him about how we could make this deterrent effective is something which should be kept in conversation between him and me. When he has accepted it, he should not come to the House and pretend that he does not understand what I was talking about.
Mr. Heath: The Prime Minister knows full well that this matter has not been discussed with him since his statement in the House about Kariba. What he did not do, as I said in my speech, was to limit himself in his statement in the House to what he has said to me. I specifically said that I did not ask for any explanation in the House. What I asked for was the assurance that the Prime Minister would not use troops in a limited operation, but he did not give that assurance.
The Prime Minister: It was explained to the Leader of the Opposition on the day before the statement was made in the House. It was explained to him in a telephonic conversation which we had the day after—the Friday—before he recorded his broadcast. He will very well remember what I said on that occasion. I think that on reflection he will agree that it is a pity that we have to bring this up. He is raising some dangerous issues. I think that the right hon. Gentleman will reflect again that both my statements are reconcilable and effective, but it would be wrong to spell

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it out further. If not, I would be glad to have a further discussion with him and, if we cannot satisfy one another, for one of us to make a statement in the House. But I imagine that he will be satisfied and it is very wrong to go on pressing it.
There was one suggestion that he made on the same day, and that was that we should ask Sir Robert Menzies to intervene in our negotiations with Mr. Smith to see whether there could be some kind of solution to the Kariba problem. I expressed my reasons for saying that it would be wrong to ask him to do it. But the right hon. Gentleman will no doubt be aware that a very high-powered representative of the International Bank, which has a real stake in the Kariba Dam and the whole operation, has in the past few days been in Salisbury and Lusaka trying to bring about an arrangement for the quarantining of the dam on an agreed basis. I cannot say whether that would involve British or Commonwealth troops, but, if it could be worked out, we would be prepared to send troops across the Zambesi for the purpose, because it would be part of an agreed and unopposed operation, and I do not think that any hon. Member could object to that. But so far we have not had anything that looks like an all-clear on the point.
In winding up, I want to emphasise once again, because I am not sure that the right hon. Gentleman has taken she point on board, the world nature of the problem. It is not a local difficulty in a little rural district council. Time and time again it has been discussed as though it was purely a matter within Rhodesia or between Britain and Rhodesia. All the time, right from 12th November, the day after the illegal declaration, I have mentioned the dangers that we are facing. Yesterday I warned the House that if we had not taken this oil action under the powers given to the Government by Parliament, we would have had the same policy forced upon us by a mandatory United Nations resolution, with, as I have said, all the dangers then of escalation from mandatory economic and military sanctions.
We may argue about the question of military force. All of us are against the
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use of military force, but I believe that those who oppose oil sanctions are more likely to bring about military force than those who support them.
I must warn the House—especially those who think of this in narrow constitutional or negotiation terms, still more any there may be who think of it in terms of intra-party manoeuvres—that within weeks now, despite the oil sanctions, we may find ourselves faced with grave international action, with all the consequences that can follow.
I hope, therefore, that the House will agree that there has been no alternative to the successive measures that we have followed. Certainly at no stage have we had alternatives suggested from the benches opposite. Sometimes voices have been raised in anger from back bench and Front Bench, and I understand that. But when there has been the suggestion that we have gone too far with any particular economic sanction, there has never been any appreciation of the world problems that we face. I think that too often they attack the form and not the central issue of policy involved.
I stress, therefore, that it is our responsibility, and we have taken that responsibility. Nevertheless we cannot protect ourselves from the tremendous passions which I saw at the United Nations last week and which others have seen. This is a world problem. It is also, as I have said, a moral problem. As I said at the United Nations last week to those who stayed to listen, quoting from Dante,
"The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who are neutral in a moral crisis."
That is, I hope, something that every right hon. and hon. Gentleman here will think about before deciding his final attitude on the question.
Finally, like the right hon. Gentleman, I want to refer to the question of what he called a negotiation. I said yesterday how much we agreed with the proposals made by the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) in his speech last Monday. But, when all is said and done, everything that he suggested was at the very centre of our negotiations with Mr. Smith's Government. There is no reason for not saying what he said, and I agree

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with a great deal of it, but the five principles on which we were negotiating were the principles that his Government had followed. We have throughout these negotiations kept this common approach across the Floor of the House. The five principles have gone on for very many years, long before the change in Government. Mr. Smith made this point to me. But I must remind the House that every one of those points suggested by the right hon. Gentleman was flatly rejected by Mr. Smith throughout the negotiations.
Guaranteed progress to majority rule: yes, we are all agreed upon that. It is a cardinal point with all of us. But Mr. Smith blandly announced that he was proposing to destroy those parts of the 1961 Constitution which provided for B roll seats, and he said frankly that he would do that to delay the day of majority rule. That cannot be called guaranteed or impeded, and it was the subject of long drawn out discussions between by right hon. Friend and my right hon. and learned Friend with Mr. Lardner Burke and others on this question.
The right hon. Gentleman referred to Mr. Smith's willingness to create a million more votes on the B roll. Yes, that is true, but no more seats. He did not offer to take on a single extra African on the A roll, which is what matters. All he promised us was that if it looked likely that more Africans would be on the A roll, then B roll seats would disappear and he would get rid of them.
Those who devised the 1961 Constitution had never taken the precaution of entrenching these provisions, and I do not blame them. Day after day in our negotiations—and it is all on record—Mr. Smith and his colleagues flatly refused any provision that would have safeguarded the Constitution in writing. He rejected a blocking third. He was prepared to give us a so-called blocking proportion provided it was made up of his stooges. He was prepared to increase African representation, provided that they were his chiefs who were appointed, every man Jack of them paid by him and everyone of them totally responsive to what Mr. Smith tells them to think. I had the chance of evaluating them when I met them—charming and courteous, asserting their hereditary right to rule in terms which would never be asserted by any
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hon. or noble Member of either House here. Totally unaware of the meaning of many of the constitutional questions that I addressed to them, they asserted their right to speak for 4 million Africans. I was cheered at one point when they said that they would oppose illegal action by the Smith Government. I was correspondingly disappointed when after the illegal declaration they expressed their full support for Mr. Smith's action.
When the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire talks about incorporating the necessary constitutional amendments either in the Constitution or in a treaty, I support him. That is exactly what we set out to achieve. But we soon found that the treaty suggestion was no more than a time-wasting manoeuvre on Mr. Smith's part timed to put the responsibility for a break on us. As Mr. Smith and his colleagues agreed, what matters is not whether it is a treaty or a constitutional amendment. It is not the vehicle in which the changes are made that matters, but the content of the changes. On every one of the content points, such as the blocking third, the entrenching and the safeguarding provisions, they were utterly obdurate. They were obdurate because they were determined men utterly resolved on one proposition, and that was that we should not seek majority rule in Rhodesia in their lifetime. It was as simple as that, and it became clear that that was why the negotiations broke down.
The right hon. Gentleman suggested an imaginative proposal when he was leader of his Government, and he has repeated it many times since and so have we, and that is the need for a great African education programme. But, as the record of our meetings shows, when we asked Mr. Smith if he was prepared to speed African education for the purpose of using those constitutional clauses which provided for political enfranchisement as education proceeds, he not only made it clear that he would not do so, but he and his colleagues said that if education meant too fast a rate of enfranchisement, they would slow up the programme.
When I went to Salisbury I took with me a Minister specially for the purpose of discussing a massive programme of educational advance. He was wasting his time. I was wasting time by taking him. It was the last thing they wanted. Indeed,

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after the illegal break, one of Mr. Smith's Ministers poured scorn on the idea of taking a Minister there for the purpose of discussing African educational advance if it could have this effect of increasing the number—
Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish: Is the Prime Minister aware that these generous proposals to help with education in Rhodesia made by my right hon. Friend when he was Prime Minister, and which the right hon. Gentleman has repeated, were not in fact ever explained to the Rhodesian electorate? Will the Prime Minister give an assurance that, in view of the censorship, every means, including the new broadcasting station, will be used to make it quite clear to the electorate in Rhodesia what is the constructive alternative to the illegal path which they are now following?
The Prime Minister: I agree with the hon. and gallant Gentleman, and I give him the assurance that it will be done. I know that he pressed this very hard, and indeed I believe that if Mr. Winston Field had continued in office he would have made a reality of the right hon. Gentleman's proposal. We followed it and tried to support it, but I agree that the people of Rhodesia as a whole have never been told the whole story of what the right hon. Gentleman tried to do, and what we tried to do in fulfilling this programme. Let us by all means support the proposition laid down by the right hon. Gentleman. I do, but we will never get this from Mr. Smith and his colleagues.
This raises the whole question of the 1961 Constitution. I apologise for going on for longer than I meant to, but I have had to make two speeches this afternoon, as we have two debates in one. My colleagues and I never thought that the 1961 Constitution was either perfect or appropriate. We voted against it. So did Mr. Smith, but for opposite reasons. But, at any rate, let me concede that it was devised in good faith in the hope of providing a constitution which men of good will could work. I believe that the then Government here, and the then Government in Rhodesia, meant what they said when they enshrined, even though they did not entrench, clauses designed
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to provide a gradual but unimpeded movement towards majority rule. I believe that it was not entrenched because they trusted the then Government to carry out the spirit as well as the letter of the Constitution. I believe that the then Rhodesian Government would have made a reality of the 1961 Constitution, but not Mr. Smith's colleagues.
This is one reason why there is no solution to this problem based on resuming with Mr. Smith and his colleagues the negotiations which he broke off. We did not break them off, he did. Quite apart from the repugnance, which I hope we all share, about negotiating with the illegal régime, the very idea that it would be successful, that we could ask the rest of the world to reverse the policies they carried out at our request, that we could ask other countries to hold their hand while we parley with Mr. Smith and his colleagues, is the product of the most woolly-minded thinking that I have come across.
The House will have noticed that I have sometimes drawn distinctions between Mr. Smith and some of his colleagues. Despite my disappointments, I still feel that I was right. In Salisbury in one of our frank talks, I told him that I thought he was a natural leader of his own people, but I could not understand why he was surrounded by such a bunch of thugs. He took both parts of this proposition extremely well. I believe that he could have averted this declaration to which, on my information, he was opposed, if he had had the courage to go to the Governor and ask his leave to form a more broadly based Government. I believe that there was a real chance of that.
I hope that no one will suggest that we negotiated with him the terms of ending illegality. His Government have made it clear that they are only interested in terms which will give them the substance of what they have taken by illegal action, while we for our part have to provide the form of constitional rectitude. There may be, though I doubt it, some hon. Members who would be prepared to negotiate with a burglar on the basis that they would allow him to retain his illegal gains, provided that they did not stay illegal, by changing a theft into a gift. This is what negotiation on Mr. Smith's terms would mean.

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It would make a mockery of centuries of constitutional action and law in this country. It would isolate us in the world and make us the laughing stock of world opinion. But that is the proposition which some hon. Gentlemen, and I think even right hon. Gentlemen, are putting forward to us at this time. Equally I say to them as earnestly as I can, now that we have seen how far Mr. Smith and his colleagues are prepared to go in twisting and perverting the 1961 Constitution, in a sense in which it was never meant, in turning it into a police State, by the trickery of a pre-U.D.I. declaration of emergency—and this was trickery and there were lies about it—by every device they could think of aimed at obstructing the safeguarded positions, when hon. Members consider this, I hope that they will feel that we cannot entrust the future of Rhodesia to these men or to this régime.
Finally, I would set out our proposals for restoring constitutional rule. The Governor has a standing authority to talk to anyone in Rhodesia who can provide the means of a return to constitutional rule. The British Government have authorised him to discuss even with the illegal régime the mechanism by which Rhodesia can be returned to constitutional rule. There are a lot of detailed points on the mechanism, including—and this is very important—the transfer of the armed forces and the police to the Governor's authority, and also a number of other administrative matters which will be handled more smoothly if there are discussions.
What we cannot do is to barter all these questions against fresh demands from Mr. Smith and his colleagues. Illegal action has totally altered the situation. We cannot wipe out the past five weeks and all that has happened in the world and go back to the morning of that telephone call, because we now know the quality of the men with whom we are dealing. I still had hopes before that call, but their action, particularly in the matter of censorship, the police State and in other ways, has created conditions in Rhodesia which make it impossible—even if on other grounds it may be possible—for these men to lead Rhodesia to independence based on multi-racial harmony. Without that multi-racial harmony there cannot be any future for Rhodesia.
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The Governor can give to Mr. Smith or to any other Rhodesian the assurances that we have given at various times about the fears which still obsess them. For example, the danger they feel that a return to constitutional rule will be followed within days or weeks or months by majority rule. We have given assurances about that. If Mr. Smith were to say, "We will agree to end the illegal régime, provided we have an assurance that it will not mean one man one vote tomorrow", and then stand down, the Governor is authorised to give him or anyone else that assurance. What he cannot do is to barter the constitutional position in this country and in Rhodesia against any kind of return to the sort of negotiations that we had before.
We believe that the time has come to set up more clearly for the use of the Governor our ideas for the future following the return to constitutional rule, and the terms on which he can be authorised to enter into discussion with representative leaders of Rhodesian opinion. We are in communication with him, though communications are inevitably limited and cannot obviously be perfect. I am proposing, therefore, to ensure not only that the Governor knows more fully what is in the mind of the Government here, but that we know more of what is in his mind.
Hon. Members have suggested that the Governor might come to London. There could be great advantages in this, though hon. Members will realise some of the possible difficulties and dangers. He may find that Government House had been taken away when he went back, but I would hope that that would not happen. I do not want to go further with this point today, except to say that I believe the Governor, when he enters into discussions in Rhodesia—and I can see signs that these discussions could emerge—should be able to do so after the fullest possible interchange of views between him and the Government here in London.
Mr. Sandys: May I ask whether it will be possible for Rhodesia to return to constitutional rule on the basis of the 1961 Constitution as a first step?
The Prime Minister: I was going to say a word about that. Although the right hon. Gentleman did riot suggest an

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unamended 1961 Constitution, he referred to the need for changes, and heaven knows we can all see the need for changes. I think that the great problem is the fear which has obsessed many of Mr. Smith's followers, though not I believe a majority, even of his present limited and unrepresentative electorate, because he has never attempted, either by referendum or in the election, to secure a mandate for the action he took.
I set out to allay these fears in a public statement which I made in Salisbury. I think that a copy of it is in the Library of the House, and I used these words again at the United Nations. I said that there need be no fears about this question. I think that this illegal action will come to an end only when the hardships and inconvenience resulting from the economic measures which have been taken—that is which Mr. Smith has taken—begin to loom larger in the minds of the Rhodesian people than the fears they feel—genuine fears, though unjustified—about the consequences of a return to constitutional rule.
We have said, and we mean, that once constitutional rule returns we shall immediately act to reverse the economic measures that we have taken—this can be done quickly—and approach the problem of reconstruction not in any punitive or backward looking spirit, but constructively. But every week that passes increases the dangers, and I hope that Rhodesians will respond quickly to what we have in mind.
We believe it will be necessary—we cannot be sure yet—to have a period of direct rule. None of us can forecast how this unhappy incident will end. It may end in dislocation and chaos. I trust and pray that it will not end as it could, in disorder or bloodshed. But I believe that it will be necessary for a period—and this may be one of the surest ways of reassuring those who are afraid of a speedy move towards majority rule—to have direct rule under the Governor with the widest possible advice available to him from Rhodesian leaders representing different sections of opinion and different races. We would hope to proceed as quickly as possible to areturn to constitutional government, on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, with whatever amendments are now seen to be needed
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to safeguard that constitution against misuse.
I believe that there will have to be effective means of ascertaining the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole before we make any changes in the 1961 Constitution. We must get the views of the Rhodesian people as a whole—to use the phrase enshrined in the fifth principle—as to what amendments and changes are needed to guarantee unimpeded and sure progress to majority rule. Whether this would be by a constitutional conference or a Royal Commission with wide powers must be a matter for consultation at the time. But I am certain that the whole House will insist on adequate safeguards, including the assurance to the House for a period that this House should decide what guarantees are necessary to protect human rights, and what safeguards are necessary to protect the rights of individual races, African or European.
I realise that there is bound to be anxiety from one side or another about the steps that we have taken, are taking, and may have to take. I do not believe that a British Government have ever had to face a problem so complicated or so apparently insoluble. I have to use a mixed metaphor to explain how this problem strikes me. What we are trying to do is to go straight down the middle of the road in a four-dimensional situation. There is the dimension of Rhodesian opinion—and that is not uncomplicated the dimension of public opinion in Britain, and that is not entirely uncomplicated the dimension of the Commonwealth and the strong views that our Commonwealth colleagues have and the dimension of world opinion, as expressed particularly in the United Nations, where it can take the form of a mandatory and possibly dangerous resolution.
Somewhere among all the pressures we hope that the right answer will be found, and I think that I can say with confidence that it will be found some way between the demands of the O.A.U. and those of perhaps the Monday Club. This gives a pretty broad choice. We must expect to be criticised and attacked in Africa and elsewhere, and we will take this criticism so long as we respect the motives and sincerity of those attacking us. But at the end of the day we must do what is right in this situation. I was comforted

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by rereading some words of Abraham Lincoln which, although I quoted them in the United Nations, I make no apologies for repeating in this House before I sit down:
"I will do the very best I can, the very best I know how. And I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me now won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference."
I think that the number of angels who are prepared to swear I am right is diminishing at present, but when hon. and right hon. Members opposite decide how to vote tonight I hope that they will also decide what they are voting about. I believe that I have answered every point raised by the right hon. Gentleman. He was seeking, by raising points about wording, to suggest that we are asking for a mandate from this House to use military force. We are not asking for that mandate. He fears that we plan a British naval blockade of Beira, but we do not. He fears that we are not prepared to enter into negotiations with those who can bring peaceful constitutional rule to Rhodesia. We are prepared.
If the right hon. Gentleman votes against us tonight, he will confirm some of our suspicions that his actions are dictated not by considerations of what is required to solve this problem but by considerations of a misconceived approach to Conservative Party unity.
5.55 p.m.
Mr. J. Grimond: I found myself in agreement with a great deal of what the Prime Minister said until he came to his penultimate paragraph. He then seemed to imply that the policy of this country in respect of Rhodesia should be dictated by the pressure of various opinions and not by the conviction of the British people about what they think this country ought to do. In my opinion the problem of Rhodesia is primarily a moral one. The world looks to Britain to see whether it has any moral views on the matter, and not to see whether Britain can reconcile different pressures.
Important as is Rhodesia, before I return to it I want to say something about Vietnam and Europe. I regard Vietnam as the most dangerous conflict in the world today. I want to ask only two ques-
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tions about it. First, when the Government talk about finding a settlement based on the Geneva proposals, do they mean that they are prepared to accept the division of Vietnam? The Geneva proposals looked to a unified Vietnam. If the Government accept the division of that country, do they hope to obtain guarantees about the maintenance of the frontier, and do they intend to couple this with a demand that troops should leave both North and South Vietnam?
Secondly, when the Prime Minister said that the Government could not support the Americans in the bombing of—I believe he said—major cities, does he mean that the Government are opposed to bombing civilian targets in Vietnam? This is a matter of great importance.
The Americans should be pressed on two points. First, they cannot expect unqualified support from their allies unless they consult them about their policies at a much earlier stage than they have been doing over Vietnam. Secondly, what is the long-term policy of the Americans in the Far East? Do they hope to reach a position of stability such as has been reached in Europe? If so, what is it to be built on. Is it hoped to build it on India, Australia and Japan? Japan is a vital factor for stability in the Far East today.
As for Europe, I was greatly impressed by the conversion to the idea of a Common Market which ran through the Chamber yesterday. We had the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling), the architect of the alternative to the Common Market, saying that we must enter it and accept all the political implications. I hope that at the next election the Conservative Party will not only refrain from sending round speakers attacking the Liberals who suggest entering the Common Market but will go so far as to say something about it in their own election addresses.
The Government seem still to be tied to the five principles. The House should be clear whether they are in fact tied to them. If they are, it makes it quite impossible to go into the only type of Europe worth going into, which is a Europe of the Communities.
I now return to the subject of Rhodesia. I have never heard more devious reasons advanced in this House for a vote than

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were advanced by the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon. We have heard a great deal lately about "non-events". This evening we are going to have a vote on a Motion and an Amendment which are both out of order in this debate, and on a supposition which the Conservative Party knows to be untrue. Does the Conservative Party believe that this Government are keen to use force? Of course they do not. Yet they will allow it to be said all over Rhodesia tomorrow—this will be the effect of the vote tonight—that they are convinced that the British Government are planning an invasion and the use of force in Southern Rhodesia. This is the contribution of the so-called responsible party. This is the party which responds to appeals for national unity. They will allow a statement to go out in which they have no belief.
Of course, the vote tonight will not be about Rhodesia: it will be about the internal affairs of the Conservative Party. It is a device for covering up their total disintegration and disagreement on this issue. They have said that they approve of sanctions and that they support oil sanctions. Very well, having gone through this Amendment with a microscope, they have discovered one small point on which it is possible for them to unite and oppose the Government. They oppose the words "all measures". Apparently, if the Amendment had said:
"All measures so far brought forward",
they would have accepted it and there would have been no vote.
In that situation, it is wholly irresponsible to allow it to go out to Rhodesians tonight that the Conservative Party is convinced that the Government are determined to use force. The Prime Minister has fallen over backwards to throw out lifelines to the Leader of the Opposition. The Leader of the Opposition cannot ask for the time without the Prime Minister patting him on the head and saying, "A very statesmanlike intervention." This is a hypocritical performance which we have gone through today.
The Leader of the Opposition said that we are faced with a police State in Rhodesia. Who is in charge of that police State? Mr. Smith and his colleagues. Yet we are told that they, poor people, did not really understand that the
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British Government did not intend to introduce total African suffrage at once. Of course they understood.
It is well know that they have no intention whatever of allowing an African majority in their lifetime. Therefore, it is no good starting negotiations again with Mr. Smith, and still less so with many members of his Cabinet. The sooner the House is possessed of that fact the better. Perhaps hon. Members read the colour supplement of the Daily Telegraph three or four weeks ago. The Daily Telegraph is not a journal renowned for its radical and dangerous opinions. It sent two journalists to speak to Southern Rhodesians, and they went to see one husband and wife who were recommended to them by Mr. Smith's information office.
These people said:
"Blacks are responsible for all the trouble in the world. Blacks, blacks, blacks, I'd shoot the lot."
Let us not delude ourselves. Of course, not all Rhodesians believe this, but a number do, and some who believe it are in the Government of Mr. Smith. The same journalists reported:
"Virulent contempt for the African is now the height of fashion."
Hon. Members may also have seen a circular air-mail letter which was sent to some people in this country. It proves that double-talk is certainly not confined to the Communists. It says:
"The nation must decide its future in the world."
Precious little chance the black majority of tha nation have in deciding their future in the world. It talks of "all the free nations of Africa." Precious little freedom Mr. Smith has guaranteed to the blacks in Rhodesia. It talks of "a just stand" and finally, of course, it talks of "our kith and kin". Apart from the obvious fact that large numbers of white Rhodesians are not our kith and kin at all, what would people say if the Germans announced that as they must support their kith and kin, they must support the Nazis? How far is the doctrine of kith and kin to be taken? It is a reflection on the people who claim that the British that they are harming the traditions of this country in carrying out the measures which we have in Southern Rhodesia. The fact that they are our kith and kin makes

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it all the more disgraceful that they should do so.
Therefore, I and my hon. Friends will support the Government. We shall not look through a magnifying glass at every tiny error which they might have made. We shall not try to curry some favour with the electorate by riding two horses at once and we shall not subordinate what should be the needs of this country to the needs of party. Of course, faults can be found with the Government. I would say that their contingency planning for U.D.I. was not as complete as it should have been and, candidly, I think that the Prime Minister went too far in ruling out the use of force in any circumstances.
We should probe the question of force a little further. Force can mean many things. The imposition of sanctions might be said to be a form of force, as it will cause hardship to many people. If we had sent out a small body of armed men to protect the Governor and they had been attacked, would that have been the use of force? If the men had been unarmed and had been attacked by Rhodesians, would that have been the use of force? I would ask the Conservative Party, since they are now converted to pacifism rather late in the day, what they mean. Do they mean that if this had been a black rebel Government would there have been an outcry from the Conservatives against the possible use of force? We have never had it up to now.
Do they mean that, if the Governor were threatened, they would be totally against the use of force? If Zambia were invaded, would they be against force? If there were an uprising in Rhodesia and chaos resulted, would they be against the use of force? This is a strange and new doctrine of Conservatism.
There may still be occasions when this country must reluctantly move to use force. I should deplore it, because I hope that we can settle this matter without force, but I would also say that the Prime Minister was unwise to suggest at one point that the only time it would be justified was if our economic interests were threatened by the blowing up of the Kariba Dam. There might be greater issues than that. There might be, as the
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Prime Minister indicated, a worldwide rising of opinion against the régime in Rhodesia so strong that force will be used by someone. The right hon. Gentleman went too far. If there is any question about who is prepared to use force, we are told that Mr. Smith has mined the Kariba Dam himself. This would surely show no great reluctance on his part to use force, if we had not already seen what he has done in the enforcement of a police State.
Let us now consider the United Nations. If we can settle this matter by ourselves so much the better, but I have detected in some announcements by the Government a strange antipathy to United Nations intervention of any sort. The Labour Party used to be great upholders of the United Nations. Oil sanctions could be made multilateral through the United Nations. In his last speech on this subject the Prime Minister ended with what was meant to be a terrible threat—that we might see a Red Army in blue berets. It would not be entirely unhopeful for peace if some Communist countries provided a contingent to a United Nations force.
I do not say that this is the right situation in which to begin, but if we are to bring Communist countries into any worldwide organisation, they must be allowed to put on blue berets. They would then learn some of the difficulties in carrying responsibilities like our own in Africa.
In turning to the remarks of the Prime Minister about the future, while I agree that a return to direct rule is inevitable, is the right hon. Gentleman calculating the means to carry it out? Although we may say that we treat everybody in Rhodesia equally, there are bound to be people who feel extremely bitterly and it may be that the Governor will need increased support from this country. Are we planning to provide it?
I would like to hear more about, for example, definite proposals concerning African education because we will have to face a large grant for this purpose. I would like the Prime Minister to be more specific about the guarantees to be offered to the white Rhodesians and others in regard to their pensions. This is a matter which has caused great anxiety, and it may be that this country

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will have to shoulder some of the responsibility. Otherwise the opposition to majority rule will remain as strong as it is now.
The solution to this problem seems to be that the British nation should show itself to be strong, united and consistent in its policy of solving this matter by sanctions and, at the same time, be prepared to explore all the avenues which may be open in Southern Rhodesia to people of more sensible and humane outlook. We should make it clear, time and again, that there is no question of handing over to a black majority at once and that reasonable terms and guarantees will be given to the white people in regard to their future. But majority rule must come.
As I said at the beginning of my speech, this is something more than a question which can be nicely balanced between different sections of opinion here or elsewhere. It has been said time and again that one of the most important issues for this and the next generation is the relationship of the black and white races. It is exactly that issue with which we are confronted in Rhodesia, and anybody who believes that this is a dominant issue should be extremely careful about giving the impression that this country is prepared to mete out one law and take one line of action for the whites and a totally different one for the blacks.
I believe that the Western world should be at pains to see how much belief it has in all this talk about democracy. And for people who admit that this is a police State to then say that it is a mild one, and a white one, is not good enough. We should protest about Ghana and police States wherever they are. Nevertheless, this is a police State for which we are responsible. That is the difference between this and anywhere else. We claim to stand for human values in the world. I am not so much concerned about world opinion or about African opinion. In the end, I am concerned about the good name of this country.
6.13 p.m.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I find myself in a dilemma. I am profoundly doubtful whether it is any use for any hon. Member to make a speech
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today concerning subjects other than that of Rhodesia. I propose to say only this about Rhodesia I warmly agree with the remarks of the Leader of the Liberal Party at the beginning of his speech about the vote tonight. I appeal to the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home), for whom I have a high personal regard, to call off the Division with which he has threatened his party and the House.
I raise matters other than Rhodesia because I hope to suggest how we might in future avoid the dilemma in which hon. Members like myself find themselves today. I wish to speak about a theme on which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary—who is, happily for him, not in his place at the moment—has heard me speak before, a theme on which, I hope, there will be agreement in various quarters of the House. It is about the share which the House of Commons now has in formulating the foreign policy which the Government pursue.
Nobody doubts that the issues which we have discussed today and yesterday—Vietnam Malaysia Santo Domingo South Arabia and the Yemen the overriding issue of world peace and war—are incomparably more important than most of the matters which we have de bated since October, 1964. Nobody values more than I do what the Government have done in home affairs. No one thinks more highly than I do of the Government's programme for the present Session. The achievement of that programme will be of great benefit to the people of this country. But everything that the Government may have accomplished by October, 1966, would be dust in the balance against the losses which we would sustain if we were engaged in even a minor war, while the likely outcome of a wider conflict might be the obliteration of our people for good and all. I will not labour the point. It only needs to be stated to be obvious to all.
Democracy in Britain means government by Ministers who are responsible to this House, Ministers who must defend their actions and explain their reasons for them before the House. They are Ministers who are advised by civil servants, but who must share their decision-making with the hon. Members

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of this House. Democracy means government by Parliamentary Question and by public Parliamentary debate. The League of Nations and the United Nations were created to extend that system into the conduct of international affairs. They were created to end the secret diplomacy of the past, to bring out the merits of international disputes before the public opinion of the world, and to render it possible for world opinion, based on world law, to become the decisive factor in the working of the community of States.
How has this democracy worked in the House of Commons and the United Nations in recent times? It is not so long since Foreign Office Questions came first on the Order Paper on every Monday and every Wednesday of every Parliamentary week. It was a valuable arrangement, in an epoch of ever-closer international co-operation and ever-greater dangers from the arms race and war. Today we do not hear the Foreign Secretary answering Questions twice a week but once in six weeks, and even then he cannot answer all the Questions which hon. Members seek to ask him.
Crises happen, vital Government decisions are made and it is so long before they come up at Question Time to be answered by the Foreign Secretary that they are almost forgotten.
It is even less satisfactory with Parliamentary debates. Momentous events have come and gone and we have been locked in silence. In October, 1964, it was obvious that Vietnam was the most important question in the world; that it vitally affected British interests that the whole future of relations between Asia and the West was at stake; that further fighting would only make a settlement harder to achieve; that world opinion should be mobilized; and, above all, that British opinion—which has special influence in the United States and in Asia—should be mobilised to seek to bring the conflict to an end.
All that was obvious in October, 1964, but we had no debate on Vietnam before Christmas of that year. After we reassembled, in February, 1965, we learned that U Thant had been negotiating for a settlement and had made great progress with Hanoi. We knew, alas, that, so far from accepting his proposals, the United States had made a very dangerous
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escalation of the war by starting large-scale and systematic bombing of North Vietnam. In spite of those grave events, of such sinister significance for us in Britain, we had no debate until 1st April. Then, in just one day, we covered the whole range of world affairs.
On 27th April there came the United States occupation of San Domingo. I shared, and still share, the opinion of Mr. Halyard Lange, for 20 years the Foreign Minister of Norway, who said in the N.A.T.O. meeting in London in May this year that the San Domingo challenge to the United Nations was even more dangerous to its future than the Vietnam war itself.
Let me give three verdicts—three American verdicts—on the events in San Domingo. On 4th May—within a week of the occupation—the New York Times said in an editorial:
"In the absence of anything more menacing than the names of a few Communist activists, it would he disastrous to let fear of another 'Cuba' become the excuse for employing our military might to prop up a right-wing dictatorship."
A little later, the Christian Science Monitor wrote:
"A typical Latin American observer said that the United States rescued the militarists from defeat after they (the militarists) had admitted that they could no longer keep control. The United States, said this observer, supplied and financed the militarists, fought with them, confined Caamano to a narrow area, and gave the militarists leaders time to prepare an assault on the so-called rebels".
Those are the two most respected organs of the Press in the United States, and they were writing on the basis of day-to-day reports which their able and experienced reporters were sending from the spot. Their combined witness is decisive about the purpose of the intervention which the C.I.A. inspired, and about the wholly lamentable result which it produced.
Three months later they were confirmed by the highest authority in the United States. The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs conducted a full inquiry into the whole Dominican operation. It heard all the witnesses and every point of view—the Pentagon, the State Department, the C.I.A., and all the rest. At the end of the inquiry the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Fulbright, made the following statement of the committee's conclusions.

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He said that the occupation of San Domingo was illegal, a flagrant violation of the charter and of the Statute of the O.A.S. He said that no American lives had been lost before the landing of the U.S. Marines. He told us that the San Domingo line would make his country
"… the enemy of all revolutions and the ally of unpopular and corrupt military oligarchies."
He made it clear that the invasion was a squalid plot—the last of many in other peoples' countries—by the C.I.A.
It was our Foreign Secretary who brought that squalid plot to failure. Three weeks after the invasion, he told our delegate in the Security Council that the authority of the United Nations must be upheld, and a real cease-fire applied. Our delegate accordingly moved a resolution, and subsequently accepted a French redraft. The United States representative—the hapless Adlai Stevenson, whose end we all so deeply deplore—was instructed to oppose us, and to urge that the whole thing should be left to the Organisation of American States. He was beaten in the Security Council by ten votes to nil.
Aroused by that sensational defeat, President Johnson sent new orders to the United States Generals in San Domingo. He told them to stop helping the Fascist military junta to establish a real ceasefire, and to work for a return to democratic constitutional Government in the Dominican republic. There have been great difficulties since that decision was made. In recent weeks it seemed that progress towards fair and democratic elections was being achieved. But only this morning the newspapers have a report of the murderous attack on Colonel Caamano, the leader of the democrats—an attack in which his principal assistant was killed.
Before President Johnson gave his new instructions, more than 3,000 Dominicans had lost their lives 26 United States soldiers had been killed and 150 had been wounded destruction had been wrought, hatreds had been bred, which will imperil the whole future of the democratic Government which we all hope will be set up. Above all, this episode was dangerous, as Mr. Halyard Lange said, because it was a flagrant challenge to the binding
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force of the Charter of the United Nations.
In my submission, this House should have had an immediate debate on this important matter. I tried to get a debate, but I failed. I had hoped that such a debate would have led to an immediate debate in the Security Council, with our Foreign Secretary taking part, and standing up for the Charter of the United Nations. I believe, on the basis of a fairly long experience in these matters, that if that debate had happened, it might have led to a swift and satisfactory result for the Dominican Republic. At least we should have given the principles of democracy and of the Charter a chance to work. But we had no debate till 19th July, and then we covered the whole of world affairs.
I add only one further illustration of the case I am seeking to make. All this autumn it has been plain that the Vietnam war was growing more dangerous week by week. It has been plain that there were unresolved confusions about the readiness of one side or the other to come to conference. It has been plain that the word "unconditional" was being used with different meanings by different people. All this was of crucial importance, and it was all eminently suitable for Parliamentary debate.
We were promised a day on the Address—it was put off. We were promised two days a little later. In the end, we have our debate in the Christmas week—originally on a one-line Whip. It is after the Prime Minister's visit to the United Nations. It is supposed to cover, and for many months ahead to dispose of, the whole range of world affairs. Yet the Opposition are told that they can use up this debate by their Motion and the Government's Amendment on Rhodesia.
I believe that this system gives this House of Commons no proper share in the formulation of British foreign policy, or in the consideration of the problems which week by week arise. I believe that we should have far more debates on foreign affairs. I believe that we should have them on each new crisis as it occurs. I believe that each should be confined to a single issue, so that a coherent discussion can take place. I believe that what I now propose is certainly required by the importance of the international developments of today. I believe that it would be far more satisfactory to hon.

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Members of all parties, and even to the Government themselves.
Having said all that I want to say on that subject, I only add a few words about the speech made by the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) at the end of yesterday's debate. At the beginning of his oration he said:
"Obviously the purpose of any foreign policy must be to achieve a universal system of law and justice that is working and enforceable."
After that impeccable sentiment, he went on to say:
"… there is no possibility of that at the present moment. There is no prospect in the forseeable future of a comprehensive and effective system of international law."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1965 Vol. 722, c. 1817.]
He then launched into a discussion of power politics, which was as nihilistic as it was confused.
Of course, it should not surprise us that such a sentiment should come from Opposition Front Bench leaders. It was 30 years ago last week that a Tory Government made the Hoare-Laval Agreement 30 years since they betrayed the Abyssinians and the election pledges on which they had newly come to power 30 years since they thereby destroyed the League of Nations and brought the Second World War. Have they forgotten the words of Sir Winston Churchill who, speaking of Abyssinia and attacking the Tory Government in 1938, said of them:
"They exploited and discredited the vast institution of the League of Nations …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 5th October, 1938 Vol. 339, c. 366.]
Have they forgotten that he wrote to Lord Cecil in 1944:
"This war could easily have been prevented, if the League of Nations had been used with courage and loyalty by the associated nations",
meaning that the Tory Government should have given the lead?
Now, as I understand him, the right hon. Member for Barnet says, "Forget the Charter; that is all unrealistic nonsense appropriate to some distant, happier age. Forget the Charter, power is what matters; tighten and strengthen the military groupings, although we know the other side will do the same; let the arms race escalate to still more lunatic levels than it has reached today."
Mr. William Yates: I cannot make out which right hon. Gentle-
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man the right hon. Gentleman is now referring to. Is it my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) who made this speech?
Mr. Noel-Baker: As I understand it, the right hon. Gentleman's constituency is Barnet. I mean the right hon. Gentleman who wound up the debate last night. I hope that the hon. Gentleman, whose opinion I respect, will read in HANSARD what the right hon. Gentleman said. He said—I say it again——
Lord Balniel: The right hon. Gentleman is making a sustained attack on my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling). Has he notified my right hon. Friend that he intended to raise this matter?
Mr. Noel-Baker: In fact I did not do that because I was not at all certain that I was going to speak and I did not want to keep the right hon. Gentleman in the Chamber if I did not, especially as my introduction was very long. I hope that the right hon. Member for Barnet will read what I have said and that we shall have other opportunities, if I succeed in my main contention, of dealing with the matter very soon. If I understood the right hon. Gentleman—I ask the noble Lord to read his words—he said, "Forget the Charter do not try to settle disputes by law and justice; stick to the ancient maxim, 'My ally right or wrong'", the formula that leads to world-wide war.
We all recognise that the binding force of the Charter has been undermined by many events. We remember how Stalin challenged it in the early days; we remember Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, Korea. The United Nations came through that challenge, and in its first 10 years it stopped wars and settled disputes in many countries.
Then, alas, there came Suez. If the U.N. does fall into the international anarchy which the right hon. Gentleman described, we shall know where the deadly work of sabotage began. But let the right hon. Gentleman reflect on the following facts. Of course the Charter is undermined by such events as Suez, the Bay of Pigs, or San Domingo. But it was in the name of Charter law that the General Assembly halted France and Britain over Suez and made them bring their troops away. It was in the name of

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Charter law that the Foreign Secretary stopped the C.I.A.'s plot and the United States generals in San Domingo. It was in the name of Charter law that a truce was accepted by India and Pakistan not long ago.
The issue of world law or power politics is still in the balance; and a speech like that of the right hon. Gentleman yesterday afternoon does ill service to mankind. But happily the right hon. Gentleman and his party are not in power. Those who remember the pledges of the two world wars, those who believe that the peoples of all continents are longing for law and justice, will rejoice that Britain stands today behind the Charter, as the Prime Minister said so nobly in New York a week ago.
6.35 p.m.
Mr. Philip Goodhart: I remember that Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, whose grasp of history was, I think, rather stronger than that which the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) displayed this afternoon, said that it was the policy of the Labour Party to carry out the old Benthamite maxim of the greatest happiness to the greatest number. The record of the Labour Party—the present Administration—since it became responsible for the affairs of Central Africa some fourteen months ago makes it very difficult to argue that the greatest happiness is being advanced by the policies the Labour Government are putting forward.
We see, as a result of the oil sanctions now introduced, that the somewhat fragile economy of Zambia is now under grave pressure and the inevitable countermeasures taken by the Smith régime of increasing the charge for coal to Zambia will certainly increase the pressure on Zambia's economy still further. We see the Malawi Government of Dr. Banda faced with the severe economic threat which would follow from unemployment in Rhodesia itself and the possible repatriation of the many workers from Malawi who earn their subsistence and support their families in Malawi by the wages they earn in Rhodesia.
It is the deliberate policy of this Government to increase the economic pressure and suffering both of the white community in Rhodesia and inevitably of the African community as well, because
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the effects of oil rationing and the effects of a slow-down in the economy will be felt first and foremost by the African population in Rhodesia. It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to increase that pressure still further.
I cannot myself believe that this by itself is a correct approach. I regret that only four of the 84 minutes the Prime Minister took to address the House were spent discussing the possibility of reconciliation and that those 4 minutes were spent on mumblings largely into the Dispatch Box. There was one reference which the right hon. Gentleman made which I found interesting during this brief affair, when he suggested that in fact a period of direct rule was a form of guarantee and that there would not after a reconciliation be an over-swift hand-over to independent African majority rule. If independence under present terms is unacceptable, one course which we might follow is the possibility of saying to the Rhodesians as a whole that the alternative is for Britain to stay in Rhodesia for a very long time and to say that we would continue our presence there, with guarantees for law and order and respect for property for a considerable period after the workings of the 1961 Constitution had brought an African Government had come into power. I believe that the time has some for us in this country to say that when we return to Rhodesia we will stay there for a long time and that we will afford a guarantee as it were, for the medium future of that country.
Those on the benches opposite who are most keen to see the use of pressure on Rhodesia, extending even to force, are almost invariably those who wish to see us adopting in other parts of the world a policy not of unilateral independence but of unilateral surrender. Certainly many of those hon. Members opposite who are loudest in attacks on Rhodesia and the Smith régime are just those who wish to see a complete end to any defence against Communism in Vietnam.
I have recently returned from Saigon. A few days after my return I took part in a broadcast with the General Secretary of the National Association of Local Government Officers, which is an important organisation in my constituency, because about 800 members of N.A.L.G.O. are employed in the Greater London

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borough of Bromley. In the course of the first nine months of this year in South Vietnam, 450 local government officers have been murdered by the Vietcong. We are facing a campaign not only of the big battalions but also of murder. When the Vietcong rebellion began in the early 1960s the rate of individual murder ran at more than 15 a day, and always the local administration and local government officers were the prime targets.
This poses considerable problems for us and the Government, as well as for the unfortunate people of South Vietnam because, quite rightly, our Government believe in advocating a policy of negotiation between the two sides. They believe that there should be negotiations leading to a cease-fire. Heaven knows it is difficult enough to negotiate a cease-fire even in a conventional type of war when the territory is clearly held by one side or another and there are fixed lines of battle, but in South Vietnam today one has to try not only to bring about a cease-fire between the big battalions but also, if there is to be any reality in the position, to brine about a cease-murder. This will be a difficult proposition. After all their talk of sponsoring negotiations, I do not believe that this Government have any idea how negotiations for a cease-murder can be conducted, but I think that in the course of the next few months this Government will be faced with some very hard choices in that part of the world.
We heard the Prime Minister saying this afternoon that we could not consider sending troops to South Vietnam because we were co-chairmen under the 1954 Geneva Agreements, but I think that it is inevitable that as the pressure on the Americans mounts—and at the moment they are losing in one day as many men as we are losing in the confrontation struggle with Indonesia in a year—their request for help will become rather more insistent. I understand that there has been lying on the table for some months a request for help with medical supplies for refugees from the Vietcong. There seems to have been a considerable delay in meeting that request. We hear that there is a mission in Saigon at the moment studying how best we can afford medical assistance to South Vietnam. I hope that when it is received the mission's report will be acted upon promptly. I certainly
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do not object to the sending of field ambulances to help in the situation there.
Again I think that this is only a beginning. The Prime Minister this afternoon began to skirt round the question of the future establishment of joint forces east of Suez. There is quite a lot to be said for this, but we should be perfectly clear about one point. But let us be clear that, if a joint American-British-Australian-New Zealand force is formed east of Suez, it will mean quite squarely that our soldiers will have to go into the struggle in South Vietnam.
I should like to see greater co-operation between the United States and ourselves in this part of the world, but I turn now to one field in which Anglo-American co-operation has fallen down badly in recent months. I refer to weapon procurement. We heard this afternoon of the one order which we had obtained from the Saudi Arabians in the teeth of considerable opposition from the United States. We know that American methods of arms salesmanship are very tough. I do not think that there is much point either in deploring this or in saying that American salesmen should pull their punches; nor do I think that they are likely to do so. But, as the Plowden Committee pointed out a few days ago, we face a situation in which our aircraft, computer and communications industries are likely, as a result of American expenditure on weapon development, to become increasingly dominated by the Americans.
What can we do? The Plowden Committee has talked about close co-operation with Europe in this field, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), in a report to Western European Union, has emphasised the value and importance to the industries of all Europe of European co-operation in defence matters. I am sure that we must develop quickly along this road, and it happens to be one road which at the moment offers more fruitful room for co-operation than any other. Now, when the Common Market is split between President de Gaulle and the other partners, because President de Gaulle himself is obsessed by the fear of American industry taking over the advanced technologies of Europe, this is one field in which he, in co-operation with his Common Market partners and ourselves, is likely to co-operate to advance towards

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what I have always felt to be the desirable end, that is, a European defence procurement agency. In opening the debate yesterday, the Foreign Secretary poured cold water on our developing relations with the Continent of Europe, but, in our view, this is an issue of paramount importance.
6.55 p.m.
Mr. John Hynd: I shall make only a short reference to what the hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) has just said about the Vietnam situation. I understood him to advocate British military intervention in the Vietnam conflict.
Mr. Goodhart: A field ambulance.
Mr. Hynd: Not military intervention?—I am very glad to hear it, because I thought that that was what he was proposing. I should myself have taken what the Prime Minister said today as the basis accepted by all parties in the House of our attitude towards the Vietnam conflict, with certain reservations. As my right hon. Friend said, we are co-chairman of the Geneva Conference. The situation in the conflict at present, so far as one can judge from reports in the Press and elsewhere, is that (a) the Vietminh are basing their demands for a settlement on the Geneva Conference conception, that is, free elections throughout Vietnam and the reunification of the country, and (b) the Americans, too, are now accepting the Geneva Conference principles as the basis for a satisfactory settlement. Therefore, if the co-chairman were to become involved in the hostilities or directly associated with the American military effort in Vietnam, this would be the biggest blunder we could possibly commit. If there is to be any prospect of a negotiated settlement in that territory, it must come, at the beginning, on the basis of discussion on the Geneva proposals and we must, therefore, keep ourselves ready to act in that capacity.
The second point I make about the Vietnam conflict—I do not want to develop it too far—I put in the form of a question. What is the position of the United States at this stage? We all know the history of the American attitude and actions in this conflict. At the beginning, they made clear that they were in the conflict (a) to defend a democratic Gov-
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ernment and democratic principles in South Vietnam; (b) to prevent the spread of Chinese Communism or Communism in general in that area; and (c) to prevent, through the check of Communist expansion there, the spread of Communism throughout the Far East, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere.
Since then, however, the United States, having earlier refused to negotiate at all, is now prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva agreements and, as the Geneva agreements provide for free elections throughout Vietnam and the reunifiaction of that country, and it is generally accepted as probable that such free elections would result in a Communist Government being elected, there seems to be little left in the American effort to defend democracy in that country.
I believe that the Americans realise that they are now in a dilemma, a dilemma rather similar, though it has developed on a much greater scale, to the dilemma in which they found themselves over Dominica. They went into Dominica with a few troops for a specified and justified objective, those few troops rapidly became a vast army, and they were rescued from their situation in Dominica very largely—if I may say so, this is considerably to our credit—by diplomatic interventions made by our own Government. Their dilemma in the Vietnam situation has not been resolved, but it is becoming clearer and clearer that the Americans would like it to be solved on the basis of a negotiated settlement.
What worries me about the Vietnam situation is what has worried me in many of these situations, such as the Dominican situation, in which the Americans have been involved. It is not that American intentions or principles are wrong but the interpretation of the situations into which the Americans get themselves in intervening on behalf of those principles. One is worried about the conflict of interests or influences within the American Government, where power is curiously dispersed. Sometimes it seems that the President himself is not clearly aware of what is happening until it has happened. I am worried about the misinterpretations of what the Americans consider to be their mission—to defend democracy and check Communism.

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Mr. Dean Rusk made a curious statement in August to the Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington, for example, he quoted from Pravda to the effect that national liberation upsurges in Latin America were largely due, as everyone was aware, to the activities of the Communist parties. I welcome the forthcoming visits of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and my noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State to Latin America. They will find that what Mr. Rusk said is absolute nonsense. It is just not true. Where are these Communist States and upsurges in Latin America? In Mexico? At the beginning of the Mexican Revolution the United States denounced it as Communist. Now it welcomes Mexico as being the greatest example of democracy south of the United States in the American continent.
Or in the model democracy of Costa Rica? the one country in the world which has abolished its army and military forces. Who was it who overthrew Jimenez in Venezuela? Was Betancourt a Communist? Was Guatemala Communist? Was the American intervention there useful on behalf of democracy? Was it a Communist party which destroyed Trujillo in Dominica? Where are all these Communist upsurges?
Panama, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Salvador and Colombia are democracies. Others are under military dictatorships which overthrew democratic Governments. The fact is, as Mr. Rusk must know, that there is not a single case, with the exception of Cuba, in all Latin America where a Communist action or revolt has succeeded or where the Communists have won a single democratic election. It is disturbing that the Americans should look at South America in this light. However, we know the attitude within America that regards anything from President Johnson's "Medicare" scheme to our own national health service or the nationalisation of an industry by some Latin American State as sheer "Communism."
I have grave suspicions sometimes about where the United States is going. It should therefore be our purpose to try to bring an end to the Vietnam conflict through negotiation and I cannot understand why we do not try to utilise the United Nations to a greater extent. It is clear that the Vietcong has shown no signs
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of responding so far to representations made by various British Ministers and other emissaries, by the 17 uncommitted nations, by India, by Canada or by the Commonwealth Mission. But we have not really invoked United Nations intervention.
Is there any reason why the United Nations should not make a call for an end to the bombing and the terrorism, for a peace conference to be convened either through the Geneva group or through the United Nations itself. Since there is no apparent purpose in the Americans carrying this burden themselves any more, is there any reason why the U.N. should not replace the American troops by an effective U.N. force?
Of course, the U.N. is only the instrument of its members—and we are a member. I believe that perhaps our Government have been a little too reserved in not expressing concern—not necessarily denouncing the United States—publicly at the development of the war in Vietnam and some of the actions which have taken place on the American as well as on the other side. I believe that there are occasions when a public statement made on the international platform can have very considerable effect.
When the Foreign Secretary goes to South America he will find, as anyone who has toured the area has found, that it was not the British diplomatic intervention in Dominica—one of the biggest contributory factors to the temporary settlement—which created enthusiasm throughout South America, but the public declaration of President de Gaulle denouncing American policy, although that was the only contribution that he made. This is a fact of political life that we must not ignore.
Now I want to deal with the Rhodesia problem. The House is in a curious situation. Tonight we shall vote on the Motion for Adjournment, but the Chair has indicated that nevertheless it is in order for right hon. and hon. Members who are voting for or against the Motion to do so for quite another purpose. I will be voting for the Government as an expression of my regret that they have not done a bit more about the reunification of Europe!
We are voting on the Motion for the Adjournment, but with reference to a

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Motion and an Amendment which are not before the House. According to the Leader of the Opposition we are voting, in terms of the Motion, for or against the use of force in Rhodesia in any form. But the Prime Minister has categorically repeated the assurance that he has given before that it is not the Government's intention to use force in any form. So what is it that the Opposition are to vote on?
We are aware of the dilemma of the Leader of the Opposition. He himself has claimed, and the Prime Minister has given him credit for it, that he has not opposed sanctions. Yet he has protested at each one introduced. He protested against the tobacco embargo, the extension of the trade embargo, the financial measures, and the oil embargo even before it was imposed. He talked about these being punitive sanctions. Today we are told that they are all accepted by the Opposition as necessary in the situation but we know, as the Press knows, what the situation has been in the Conservative Party in the last two or three days.
The right hon. Gentleman and other right hon. Gentlemen have faced the opposition of the Monday Club to each specific proposal. We have watched the balancing act of the Leader of the Opposition over the last two or three weeks and the climax has been reached with the Motion signed by 100 or 150 hon. Members opposite, led by the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery).
So tonight we find the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition having to perform his final balancing act in this situation. He accepts all the sanctions but opposes and will vote against what is not proposed. He claims that it is his opinion that the Government should continue to maintain contacts with the régime. Which régime? Does he mean the illegal régime of Mr. Smith which he himself has called illegal? Does he reject the Government's position that the only régime is the Governor? If he does not, he must recognise that we are maintaining contact with the Governor when he talks of maintaining contact with "the régime". He should be prepared to state clearly what he means.
Finally, to my astonishment the Leader of the Opposition protested against the
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Prime Minister bringing a "detail" into the speech. It turned out that the detail was his reference to African constitutional rights. That is not a detail. That is the issue. The issue of Rhodesia is not that of the British industrial interest in the copper belt. It is not specifically a British issue. It is an issue of the conflict between black and white. It is an issue concerning the constitutional rights of 4 million of our citizens in Rhodesia. It is an issue concerning the rights of the black population in a territory for which the British Government are responsible. Therefore, I hope that everyone in this country will understand the proper concern which has been shown by the Organisation for African Unity about this issue.
I agree with a great deal, and probably all, that was said by the Leader of the Liberal Party. This is not purely a British matter. At an earlier stage of our debates, I was afraid that the Prime Minister was too much emphasising that this was peculiarly a British matter which must be kept in British hands. I am glad to know that he is now emphasising the world nature of the problem and the world nature of the situation with which it is facing us.
The challenge which has been made by Mr. Smith and his friends is not a challenge to this country. It is only a challenge to this country in so far as it challenges our constitutional position, but that is not serious. After all, we are all agreed in all parties that, given the restoration of constitutional government, or if there had been no break in constitutional government, our purpose was to leave Rhodesia and to let it become entirely independent. The challenge to our constitutional position is therefore completely unimportant.
What Mr. Smith has challenged is the whole of black Africa. What he has challenged is the right of the black citizens of that continent to proper consitutional advance, in or out of the confines of a British territory for which we for the moment have constitutional responsibility.
The African States have asked that we in Great Britain who claim to be responsible for this territory should take such steps as are necessary to ensure—not just hope for—the end of this development of apartheid by the illegal Smith régime. Is this what we are doing? In all humility

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I accept that I am not as fully informed as the Prime Minister or other members of the Cabinet who are directly concerned about the effect of sanctions. I do not know whether the influences inside and outside Rhodesia which may be working for the success of sanctions and the success of the present policy will be able to succeed, but from the information available to the ordinary back bencher it does not seem to me that we are taking any steps which will ensure—not just give the hope—that this attempt to spread apartheid further throughout Africa and to oppress many millions more of our black African citizens will not succeed.
Our troops have been sent to Zambia, but not to interfere with Rhodesia. They are not to provide protection for African subjects against the illegal police State measures being taken in our territory. Our troops must not set foot on British territory. Those are the instructions. Why, then, are they there? I have been a little disturbed by my interpretation of what the Prime Minister has said on this subject. He has strongly suggested that they are there only to prevent the African States, who are obviously the people mostly concerned and whose constitutional rights are threatened, from taking unilateral action, or to prevent the United Nations from interfering.
This may be very desirable and possible, but it is difficult to understand why in a situation of this kind we should be seeking to prevent intervention against the Smith régime which operates on our territory against our black subjects. I find it difficult to understand why we should not go direct to the United Nations and say that we are not able to handle this problem ourselves, that we are not capable of it, or not courageous enough, or too wise, to try to intervene by force to bring the situation to an end. If it is our territory and we are unable to face up to the responsibility for that territory, I find it difficult to understand how we can claim that it must remain our sole responsibility.
I entirely endorse what the Leader of the Liberal Party said about blue berets. What is the objection to Russians in blue berets? I would have thought that that would be something which would be universally welcomed throughout the democratic world. The whole of Government policy, and I thought Opposition policy,
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is to work towards the creation of a United Nations peace force which would take the place of unilateral national military intervention anywhere. If we are to have a United Nations police force, it is surely better that all members of the United Nations should be taking part in it than that we should continue the cold war within the U.N. and have only Eastern or Western police in particular territories.
Mr. Humphry Berkeley: Is not the hon. Gentleman aware of the amount of subversion taking place in Africa at the present time by the Russians and Chinese? If he is, does he think that Russian troops in whatever uniform should intervene in Rhodesia?
Mr. Hynd: If the United Nations does not intervene in a situation of this kind and the only country which claims the right to intervene does not intervene, that is to create a situation in Africa which would be the best gift to the Communist agents and the Communist agitators in that continent which they could wish to have. The fact that the situation seems to have reached deadlock and that no one can do anything about it and that Britain will not allow anybody else to intervene and that Smith is getting away with it while the African nations are rising in their indignation is surely meat to them. What a wonderful opportunity this is for the Communist agitators! What would be the objection to having a proper proportion of Russian troops within an international body under United Nations command to deal with a temporary situation of that kind? If we cannot accept this kind of possibility, we can forget any idea of an effective international United Nations police force.
Sir Hamar Nicholls: Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that if he had his blue beret multi-nation force, the reaction in South Africa might lead to the complication which he says he is trying to avoid?
Mr. Hynd: That might well be, but that would be a matter for South Africa which would then be challenging the whole world, and I doubt whether South Africa would be prepared to face up to that. We must make up our minds whether we believe in a United Nations police force or whether in this democratic country we are to insist on the exclusion

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of the United Nations from all such situations and to continue on the road of unilateral national interventions by the more powerful States.
Mr. William Yates: The hon. Gentleman must also take into account that during the Hungarian troubles we were not allowed to intervene in Hungary. He must try to be more realistic.
Mr. Hynd: That is precisely my point. That is what we have all been doing until now. I am suggesting that if we can now establish a proper United Nations force, there is less possibility of a Hungarian kind of situation in future. One cannot have it both ways. Either one asks for a United Nations peace force or one says that it is not possible or it is too dangerous. I am saying that if this cannot be handled by Britain, if it is a world concern, then it is a responsibility of the United Nations, whether we like it or not. I am not saying that the Government should at this stage take this step, because I am not aware of all the facts. But if it is the fact that we have not been able to deal with this situation, I cannot see how one can exclude the United Nations. If the United Nations is brought in it is difficult to see why we should be worried about the nationality of one of the sections of the United Nations forces.
The present state of the Commonwealth has been raised. It is an unhappy thing and certainly a new manifestation that, when one of our African territories is faced with a situation when there is a confrontation betwen black and white, Commonwealth countries in Africa, which include the area in dispute, have sought to consult with other African countries rather than consult within the Commonwealth. These African States within the Commonwealth have ranged themselves with other African States outside the Commonwealth in order to reach a decision.
It seems strange that the Commonwealth was directly by-passed, not only in the negotiations, but to the point where now many of our Commonwealth partners are breaking relations with this country because we are taking no steps to intervene in the Rhodesian situation on their behalf. This must raise the question of what is the Commonwealth to
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these African countries, and whether we ought not to begin to review the Commonwealth in its present conception in order to replace it by something much more effective so that we can determine what are our mutual responsibilities.
I hope that Her Majesty's Government will note some of the points I have made, and I hope that the Commonwealth question will be sorted out as a result of these discussions and this crisis. I hope that by the utilisation of whatever powers we have at our disposal, the policy of the Government, which I support, will succeed. But if it does not succeed, how can we continue to claim that this is specifically a British interest and rule out the intervention of the United Nations?
7.23 p.m.
Mr. Dennis Walters: I have given an undertaking that I shall speak for no more than about 10 minutes, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. John Hynd) will forgive me if I do not follow him in the remarks he has made. For the same reason I shall not be speaking about Rhodesia. I should like to say a few words about the Commonwealth. I find that I have a considerable emotional reluctance to say what I am going to say, and I appreciate that it may not be acceptable to a number of people, but, I believe that, as one studies the realities of the Commonwealth today, one comes more and more to the conclusion that we are dealing with a myth. Although the preservation of a myth is not necessarily damaging in itself, it can be dangerous if it ever encourages one to formulate policies on the basis of a nonexistent premise.
The breaking of diplomatic relations by a number of African members is the most recent example of an increasingly paradoxical situation. Looking back one can see that the physical pain of the loss of Empire was much smaller than the psychological pain. At the time of the United Kingdom negotiations to enter the Common Market much was said about the need to forge the Commonwealth into a cohesive force and attempts were made to do this. They failed and the Commonwealth has remained divided and impotent as an organised and united body. It is internally weak because of the manifold clashes of interest within it,

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and it has been most seriously undermined when it did not prove itself to be an effective force for peace.
Recent examples of this failure can be seen in the clash between India and Pakistan, in the total failure of the attempts by the Prime Minister to convene a Commonwealth peace mission in Vietnam, in the refusal of Ceylon to support India in respect of a flagrant act of aggression carried out by China against India. The severance of diplomatic relations is the most blatant example because, although of course it can be argued that Britain is just another member of the Commonwealth and that there can be relations between other members of the Commonwealth without Britain, the truth is that the only relations which actually do matter are those between individual members of the Commonwealth and Britain. Thereto e, it makes no sense at all to sever relations with this country and yet to remain in the Commonwealth.
My remarks are not caused by hostility towards the African countries concerned. I have considerable sympathy for the position in which President Nyerere of Tanzania found himself, and I hope that the aid programme for Tanzania will not be cut, and that we shall fully maintain the technicians required to administer it. Britain should not take any dramatic initiative to end the Commonwealth, but on the other hand, I believe that we should not strive, acrobatically, to keep within the Commonwealth members who find themselves happier outside it and wish to preserve indefinitely something which, as a cohesive force, is becoming increasingly a figment of the imagination.
Deep historic and I believe unbreakable relations with Australia, New Zealand and Canada would be affirmed by bilateral treaties. So would our relations with India and Pakistan, and I believe, that, whatever roots there are in our relations with these countries, they owe their depth not to joint membership of the Commonwealth, but to history, shared in peace and war; to the traditions of the Indian Army and the Indian Civil Service; and of course to economic interests which are still very real and live today. Bilateral agreements will also preserve our relations with the most recent members of the Commonwealth. The danger of preserving myths is that they can hamper the development and fulfil-
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ment of policies which are right and essential.
Britain's place is in Europe and it is to achieve this end that we should set our plans and our energies. One of the first things we should do is to look into the alignment of policies prior to our eventual membership of E.E.C. The Brussels Commission has, until the present deadlock developed, believed that Britain could not enter the Community until 1968, when the Customs Union would be complete, a common policy in operation and the three committees fused. I believe that it is wrong for us to try to wait until the end of the de Gaullist era. We must start putting forward practical suggestions now. I shall mention some of these later.
I should like to refer to the possibility that the result of the French elections may conceivably alter General de Gaulle's attitude. He may be far more willing to see Britain in Europe soon, looking upon Britain as at least in part an ally and a supporter of his own views on the future development of Europe. It may be extremely difficult for the Gaullists to win the parliamentary election in 1967 and the General may well consider the possibility of a total reversal within France of the policies he advocates and the assumption by France of a strongly federalist position. We must be ready to seize any opportunity which arises, and which may arise earlier than we believe, to take the initiative because only by being a member of the European Economic Community shall we be able to shape the future development of the Community.
In technology, the costs of industries like the aircraft, missile, communications and computer industries have increased dramatically so that a single European nation State cannot bear them alone. Such industries, with their enormous overheads, depend on the public buyer, and, given the scale of the United States Federal Administration spending, we cannot hope to compete successfully by ourselves. Unless co-operation with Europe is established on a realistic basis the alternative may have to be the regrettable destruction of these key industries, not only in Europe, but in the United Kingdom.
This view has met with considerable approval and sympathy from President de Gaulle who has been very quick to

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grasp the scale problem of European States, and with the French anxiety over the cost of delivery systems for the force de frappe they increasingly realise how much they need technological expertise to preserve independence from the United States. We must accept that, with France, technological co-operation will be one of the keys, and perhaps the key, to our entry into the E.E.C.
Some of the practical proposals which we could carry out straight away prior to entry would be the abolition of the surcharge as soon as possible; to abolish the road haulage licensing system so as to make it easier for continental hauliers to operate here; to harmonise standards and measurements; to sign the European Declaration of Human Rights; to realign the steel industry pricing policy as under the E.C.S.C. and to create, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) said earlier, some kind of agency which would formulate a purchasing programme and award contracts for defence purchases.
May I say a few words about the defence situation and N.A.T.O.? I believe that the crucial task from our point of view is to support the United States effort to establish multilateral nuclear co-operation—a trend which will also give us additional impetus in our rapprochement wtih Europe. The McNamara recommendations for a consultative committee allowing for German participation in a form which may even be acceptable to the Russians offers the best opportunity ever for solving the problem of German participation in nuclear strategic planning. I hope that the Government will be more active in taking initiatives to back the McNamara recommendations. It is regrettable that they have played such a passive role so far. I do not believe that there is vast pressure in Germany demanding actual German possession of hardware. A scheme which would allow for real participation in nuclear planning would very probably satisfy Germany's aspirations and requirements.
Turning to N.A.T.O., it is always important to bear in mind that the maintenance of the Western military alliance and Western military strength is essential not only to prevent any possible Communist attack in future but to enable
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us to pursue policies of co-operation and reconciliation with Eastern Europe. The objectives of N.A.T.O. are defensive, but it is important that there should never be any uncertainty on the Soviet side about the West's determination to protect its interests. With this basic reality unequivocally established, it should become increasingly possible to take economic initiatives in Eastern Europe.
I see a great deal to commend in some of the suggestions and recommendations which have been made on the need to formulate a joint all-European economic development plan, including the creation of a special fund to finance East-West trade and common European investment projects. Western policy must continue to reckon with persistent Soviet hostility, but also with the possibility of a favourable Soviet evolution.
In conclusion, I wish to say a word about Vietnam. It would be extremely important if Britain could make some token participation in the shape of an ambulance field unit, as was mentioned earlier in a debate. The United States is looking for, and badly needs, gestures of support, and a concrete sign of British involvement would be very welcome. It would be useful from the point of view of Anglo-American relations, and it would be right, because it is as well not to forget that in Vietnam the United States is representing the Western Alliance.
7.37 p.m.
Mr. Norman Atkinson: I shall not attempt to follow the analysis of the hon. Member for Westbury (Mr. Walters) of President de Gaulle and the Common Market. In a debate of this kind, in which time is so important and when many hon. Members want to speak, to do so would broaden my argument far too much. Therefore, I know that the hon. Gentleman will understand if I do not follow him into that realm.
I want to confine my remarks to what was said by the Prime Minister this afternoon and the Foreign Secretary yesterday. I was very sorry that the Prime Minister had nothing to add to or subtract from the Foreign Secretary's statement yesterday. Many of us felt very disappointed about the way in which the Foreign Secretary presented the situation as he saw it. We hoped that the

1965
Prime Minister would give us positive ideas about the Labour Party's attitude in international affairs and a much wider report of his discussions with the American President. However, we were denied this, and we regretted it very much.
One had the impression, in listen-to the Prime Minister in his almost adulation of the Americans and the policy which they are pursuing in foreign affairs, that we were on the verge of going in for a massive American loan. I hope that this is not so, but this is the kind of impression which one had when listening to the platitudes about the present international situation and the British participation in it. However, I entirely agree with what my right hon. Friend said about Rhodesia. My disagreement with him and the Foreign Secretary is essentially on the question of international relationships outside the African Continent.
Yesterday the Foreign Secretary referred to the question of technical skill and primitive politics in the world. In his summing up he gave a graphic description of the situation. This is one of the great dilemmas of the world. Scientists and engineers have combined brilliantly to present to the world nuclear weapons, inter-continental missiles, and so on, but in so doing they have created a world of entirely new concept and dimensions. In this way, they have far outstripped the thinking of world politicians. We now find that there is an ever-increasing gap between scientists and engineers, who create these new dimensions in the world, and politicians, who flounder about behind them searching and groping for an idea and understanding of how they may use the ideas which are presented to them by the scientists.
One of the things that politicians have done in post-war years has been absolutely to misuse this power which has been presented to them. In world politics in post-war years, the person who has misused that power more than anyone else in the world was the former United States Secretary of State, the late Foster Dulles. Not only was he the architect and author of the current military and political strategy which is now being pursued in the world, but he is the hidden influence behind the debate which has
1966
been taking place here during the past two days.
When we try to analyse current American theory, the question of the nuclear umbrella and what they believe to be a cold war stalemate, one can easily appreciate the dangers that are involved if we pursue the policy which is being advocated by the American Administration. They are now saying—and this was the original argument of Foster Dulles—that by providing the umbrella or the nuclear shield, it was possible within that so-called protection of nuclear weapons to use conventional weapons for permissible small wars. Foster Dulles described this as the art of brinkmanship. We have seen two tragic and outstanding examples—Korea and Vietnam —of how the Americans interpret this nuclear umbrella.
They have gone further than that and said that their whole purpose and function in the world is to contain Communism by military means to bring about political isolation and, at the same time, to practise military containment. This particularly applies to China. It is saddening to have heard within the last few days leading members of the American Administration outline their ideas concerning the containment of China. This was what saddened me most in the statement of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, because it seemed to me to be extremely limited and to be riddled with the disease of anti-Communism. Unless the Foreign Secretary can get away from this narrow concept of world politics, there is not much hope for any expansion of British influence in world affairs.
It was significant yesterday that the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) deliberately excluded China from the whole of his speech. He said that the future of international developments would depend on the ability of this country, together with America, to reach out in friendship towards the Soviet Union so that these three great Powers could dictate the pattern of world events. It was significant that he did not at any time mention China in that development. We assume, therefore, that both the foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Barnet are agreed about this and that they accept the premise, which is practised at present by Americans, of excluding China politically and

1967
containing China militarily. This again was a great regret.
This is the first opportunity that we have had to examine the British role in the recent United Nations debate on the admission of China. Our Government stand condemned for their behaviour in that debate at the United Nations. We have said often that we honestly believe that China should be admitted to the United Nations and we have exercised our vote in that direction. We were one of the 47 nations which voted to that effect. Afterwards, however, Britain started to face both ways, because instead of pursuing the logic of saying that China should be admitted to the United Nations, Britain then supported the American procedural motion which required that no less than two-thirds of the members must support the motion before it could be carried in the Assembly. This, therefore, was a situation in which Britain once again faced both ways on this issue and showed the kind of hypocrisy which we have seen in our international ideas and relationships concerning China.
Before turning to Vietnam, I should like to comment on the contribution to the debate yesterday by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell). My hon. Friend gave us a verbal textbook, a brilliant survey of the relationships between Indonesia and Malaysia. This in itself showed complete understanding of the developments that had taken place. It was not surprising, therefore, when the right hon. Member for Barnet said that my hon. Friend had made a strange speech. Even hon. Friends of mine on this side said that it was strange, and the hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) described it as a very strange speech. Why is it so strange? Is it because they did not understand what it was all about that hon. Members did not recognise its truth and understanding? Time will prove that my hon. Friend has contributed a great deal to our understanding of that part of the world.
I want to take up the question of developments in that area and to engage, perhaps, in a little crystal gazing about events there. I well remember that the United States went into Vietnam with what it described as the domino theory.
1968
Because of that, the Americans argued, they rejected the 1954 Agreement. Something else which is occurring at present, however, is the economic necessity of the nations in South-East Asia to pursue the domino theory effectively. What they were frightened of and what the United States considered to be its motivation for going into Vietnam will take place in any event because of economic necessity.
I am convinced that Vietnam with Laos and Cambodia will become one entity in the economic sense before long and that they will integrate their economies and stay under Communist leadership. I do not think there is any doubt that this is the future pattern of events in that part of the world along the peninsula.
Another interesting development that will take place, also by reason of the same economic forces, is the economic integration of the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, which for the very same reasons will finish up with Communist leadership forming a Communist commonwealth which ultimately will become completely integrated in the whole area of South-East Asia.
I say that because there are signs already beginning to seep through so far as Malaysia is concerned, and it does not need a great deal of prediction to understand what will be the result once 95 per cent. of the world demand for rubber is met by synthetic means. Malaysia's exports are mainly dependent upon rubber, and one can understand that within the next 10 years the whole economy of that part of the world will be undergoing fundamental changes. Therefore, I believe in quite the opposite of the Americans' pursuance of the domino theory. Because economic considerations have been avoided in South-East Asia, those measures will create the domino theory and bring about the economic integration of the whole area.
A great deal was also said on Vietnam, and the Foreign Secretary went to some length to say that both sides should be heard. I hope that my hon. Friend who is to reply to the debate will give us an answer to one very important question. If the Foreign Secretary was sincere in saying that he wanted both sides of the case heard, could he tell us why he instructed the Home Secretary to refuse

1969
visas to the four Vietnamese women who wanted to come to this country at the invitation of many Members of the House? If the Foreign Secretary wanted to be honest and sincere, could he give an answer to that, because here was an opportunity of putting the other side of the coin and allowing those four women to come; but we find that the Home Secretary was instructed by the Foreign Office riot to grant visas, as a result of which these women were left in Paris and not allowed to enter the country. So much of the Foreign Secretary's sincerity in saying that he wants to listen to both sides of the question.
Every hon. Member who has contributed to the debate so far has agreed that there is no military solution to the Vietnam struggle. But there is another dangerous fact, which is that possibly the United States see no political solution and, because of that, may provoke China deliberately. Military experts have already said that United States strategy could shift in such a way that the only answer would be either to extend the bombing beyond Hanoi or to move in something like 200,000 troops, in which case they would find that as part of their strategy of occupation they would also have to move troops into Laos and Cambodia and have an extension of the struggle in that way.
Whatever decision they took, both are absolutely dangerous in themselves. The danger of escalation which has been referred to often is a real one and very much with us. Our ideas and our contribution towards a peaceful solution should be directed to doing what we can to persuade the American President not to think in terms of policies of that kind.
What is often forgotten is why the Americans are there. During the debate, both the Foreign Secretary and Members on the Front Bench opposite have referred to the invitations by the South Vietnamese Government—a non-existent factor at the time. Nevertheless, what is forgotten is that American troops are in South Vietnam because of their fundamental disagreement with the 1954 Geneva Agreement. At that time, the Americans said that they could not in any circumstances accept an agreement of that kind because it called for free elections. The Americans said at the time, "We know
1970
what would happen. Ho Chi Minh would become President of a unified Vietnam", and therefore that was totally unacceptable to the American Government and they opposed it. From then on they moved forces into South Vietnam. That is why they are there.
We now have the curious argument put forward that the basis for negotiations could be the 1954 Agreement. It means that the wheel has turned a complete circle. That was the basic reason why the Americans went there in the first place, so it is hardly likely that the Americans will contemplate negotiating on the 1954 Agreement. President Johnson himself said on 25th March:
"We have said many times that we seek no more than a return to the 1954 Agreement."
I could continue with a string of quotations to the effect that it is the intention of the Americans to stay in Vietnam and in no circumstances, unless they are given long-term guarantees which are not possible at the moment about the maintenance of the South Vietnam Government, would they consider leaving South Vietnam for one moment. They have spelt out quite deliberately that it is their intention to stay there.
If that is the basis upon which the Americans stand at the moment, they cannot possibly accept the Geneva Agreement which calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops and for free elections to take place following the unification of the country. So why this hypocrisy of talking in terms of what is a non-starter and a very unreal situation?
Those are some of the ideas that we have discussed during the debate, and I hope that we will get something like clear leadership about the future.
May I finish with a quotation from the Daily Mirror of 15th December? It said:
"The prospects of American military victory without a world war involving China are positively nil. Why not face it and bury pride instead of the human race?"
It went on to detail the whole situation in Vietnam as it saw it. I think that that is the most simple and brutally frank summing up of the Vietnam situation that I have read recently. I do not know which newspapers President Johnson reads, but I sincerely hope that he will start to take the Daily Mirror.
7.57 p.m.
Mr. Gilbert Longden: After listening to the hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson), I do not think that it can lie in the mouths of the party opposite to accuse the party on this side of being divided.
I am sorry that he was disappointed in the speech of his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, because I thought that it was one of the best speeches I had heard for a long time. That is possibly why it disappointed the hon. Gentleman. His anti-Americanism, like that of his Friends round him below the Gangway, appears to blind him altogether to the realities of China.
I agree with him about China and the United Nations, but is he completely oblivious of the fact that the Government in Peking is the one Government who have stated that peaceful coexistence is not possible? I wonder if he has read the latest epigram of Mao Tse-tung, which says that war is blessed because it brings peace. I recommend him to study these things a little more before he condemns the Americans for what they are trying to do for the Western alliance.
There are many aspects of foreign affairs on which I would like to touch tonight, but I should be abusing the privilege of having caught your eye, Mr. Speaker, if I talked about more than one, and that is Rhodesia.
My main object in intervening in the debate is to appeal for a continuation of national unity in fulfilling a task which is our responsibility and ours alone. That means understanding and forbearance from both sides.
As I have said before, there are three parties involved in the situation, clearly, and each has a distinctly different aim. There is, first, the illegal Government in Rhodesia, whose aim is indefinite white supremacy, and we need not kid ourselves that it is anything else. Secondly, there is Her Majesty's Government, whose aim is gradual majority rule. That, after all, as everyone in Rhodesia must have known, has been the aim of successive British Governments for a very long time, and that was the ultimate objective of the 1961 Constitution to which all parties in Rhodesia agreed.
1972
The third party is the United Nations whose aim is one man, one vote tomorrow.
That is not the aim of any party in this House, and if I might digress for a moment, the United Nations Organisation had better get that clear. But I fear that the collective wisdom of the United Nations cares very little for the happiness of the African in the bush. If his country is "free" that is enough. What totalitarian tryanny, what total abolition of any kind of rule of law and of all human rights, what murder and famine and pillage, as for example in Zanzibar, may follow, is nobody's business, and certainly not theirs. And if that is the attitude of any of our Commonwealth partners, then I am afraid that we shall have to part company with them, and here I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Westbury (Mr. Walters).
It may be difficult to define what the Commonwealth stands for, not necessarily Parliamentary Government on the West-minister model, though certainly for the rule of law and respect for elementary human rights, but it should certainly stand against everything that is being perpetrated, for example by the Nkrumah régime in Ghana, and the breath-taking impudence of the Ghanaian representative, and other representatives from non-Commonwealth African countries, lecturing this country, or even Rhodesia, on freedom and on the rule of law will not have escaped the notice of hon. Members.
The United Nations merely earns the contempt of all reasonable men of goodwill by the selective criteria which it adopts for visiting its wrath upon erring nations. No sanctions are even suggested to try to redeem the agony of Hungary, the martyrdom of Tibet, the appalling massacres in Zanzibar or Ruanda or the Sudan; but let a country be too weak to offer resistence, or, like Britain, be the perpetual Aunt Sally for the abuse and vituperation of small countries which she has created, and rightly or wrongly, continues to succour, then it is another matter.
To return to the three distinct aims for Rhodesia's future, surely there can be no question which of them we should support? Most of us in this House I think agreed at the outset of this sorry business, first, that U.D.I. was an illegal act because only the British Parliament

1973
can grant sovereign independence to Rhodesia. Secondly, that in the Prime Minister's words in this House on 11th November,
"It would be … unworthy of this House, to allow this challenge … to go unanswered." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 356.]
Indeed, were we to do so, we should invite economic and perhaps military action by others.
There, of course, lies the true significance of this, in itself, comparatively insignificant event. A handful of men have illegally seized the power to rule a small country, and event which has happened scores of times in Europe, in Asia, and in Latin America, without any one batting an eyelid. But the difference here is that the rulers are of a different race and colour from the ruled, and in the present state of African and world opinion it might easily be the spark which ignited the whole continent in an inter-racial holocaust. That is what makes Mr. Smith's action so irresponsible, and I do not think that all his many supporters in this country fully understand that.
The third proposition upon which I thought most of us were agreed was that this challenge must be "answered" by certain sanctions, of which the Rhodesians were clearly warned by both the late Conservative Administration and by Her Majesty's present Government. The fourth proposition was that such sanctions should not include the use of force.
If, which I doubt, any of my hon. and right hon. Friends do not agree with the second and third of those propositions, I would respectfully commend to their notice a passage from the leading article in last Sunday's Times which read as follows:
"In all honesty they … should ask themselves what it is they want: if it is ineffective sanctions, then why not come straight out and say that Mr. Smith's illegalities should be forthwith forgotten and forgiven—with all the consequences for the Commonwealth and Britain's position in the world that this would entail."
But I think that so far most of us are agreed, and that was why I regretted the Motion recently put on the Order Paper by my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) and 120 of my hon. Friends, not so much for what it says, but because it gives the impression to the world outside that there is no unity of purpose in this House. And now we
1974
have my right hon. Friend's decision to vote tonight. Not all in this House, and very few outside it, know what a Motion to adjourn this House means. It will almost certainly be taken as being a Motion of censure on the Government's Rhodesian policy.
So far as I am concerned, I have heard my right hon. Friend's speech in opening this debate, and I am fully reassured. He made it quite clear that, up to now, and short of force, Her Majesty's Opposition have supported the Government's Rhodesian policy. But who outside the House, and who inside Rhodesia, will read what my right hon. Friend has said? I much regret that a vote should be taken tonight, and if it is, I shall feel justified in voting against the Government only because of my right bon. Friend's speech, and because of the words of the Government's Amendment to my right hon. Friend's Motion on Rhodesia which asks us to express our full support for
"all measures designed to secure a return to legal rule … "
I am afraid that I could never vote for that.
There are a dozen issues of domestic policy on which we can and must fight the Prime Minister with every weapon we have. I do not feel that his handling of the Rhodesian situation so far merits censure. I say "so far" advisedly because of the words of the Amendment. I for one could not approve, and as was made abundantly clear by my right hon. Friend, this party could never approve the use of force, and though it may be illogical to exclude force, human affairs cannot invariably be ruled by logic.
I could not agree to military sanctions because, apart from the expense and the enormous logistic difficulties—which could, I suppose-, be overcome if necessary—it would be asking too much of the loyalty of Her Majesty's Forces, and because the British people as a whole would not stomach it. It is true that the Liberal Party is baying for bloodshed, and that the Left-wing Socialist pacifists are as usual eager to egg others on to face bullets fired in anger if it is for something which they like, or against something which they do not like, but most people in this country would find the use of force against our kith and kin, if I may coin a phrase, abhorrent. But short of force, I hope that we shall

1975
maintain unity of purpose in this House on this business.
I can never forget the Suez crisis. Whether it was right or wrong for us to have done what we then did is arguable. What is, to my mind, certain is that, having done it, we should have carried it through to a successful finish. That we did not succeed in doing this was due, I think, mainly to the fact that the then Labour and Liberal Oppositions opposed what we were trying to do. I believe that that had a far more damaging, and in the end fatal, effect on what we were trying to do than anything threatened by Russia, or by the United Nations, or even by the United States.
That is why I believe that my right hon. Friends have been right to put national unity first in this fateful affair in which the nation's honour and credit are so deeply and irrevocably involved. That is why I hope we shall maintain that support. It is our responsibility, and we must see it through together. National unity means, first and foremost, unity in this House.
8.10 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: My agreement with the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) lies in the fact that we would both choose the same thing if we had the choice. But in this world there are many places and many occasions where we have no choice. Rhodesia, today, is one. When we have no choice it is a question whether we make the best or the worst of a bad job. That U.D.I. is a bad job and an unnecessary job—a criminal job, if one likes to put it that way—we would all agree. The question is: within the power and the means available to us shall we make it a better job or a worse job? That is my approach to this problem.
When U.D.I. was first proclaimed we confined ourselves broadly to what may be termed consequential sanctions, and with those I could find myself in agreement. The essence of those consequential sanctions was that they were, and clearly appeared to be, the consequences of Mr. Smith's action—and they were pretty severe consequences. The advantage of being a member of the Commonwealth for a new and developing nation is very large. Commonwealth preference is a
1976
very valuable thing. But even more valuable is access to the development capital and short-term capital which is necessary to finance trade, which is so important for that sort of country.
I believe that those consequential sanctions might well have succeeded if they had been given a chance to work. If people in Rhodesia had found how inconvenient this rather unnecessarily-seized independence was in practice—if they had found how difficult it was to obtain finance to carry on their trade, to dispose of their tobacco and to deal with the products of their new light industries which were not competitive without preference—these disadvantages would have clearly been ascribed to Mr. Smith, who was manifestly and clearly responsible for them.
But they have not been given a chance to work; they have been prematurely escalated by sanctions for which nobody in Rhodesia blames Mr. Smith. Nobody blames him for the financial sanctions and the abortive stopping of pensions, still less for the oil sanctions and the withholding of a shipment of oil already belonging to Rhodesia. All this is blamed not on Mr. Smith but on us. So, instead of the original sanctions working against the illegal régime the new sanctions have worked for it. Nobody has any real doubt that the strength of the Rhodesia Front today is vastly greater than it was on the day that U.D.I. was declared.
Mr. Longden: The Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations doubts it.
Mr. Paget: I have a good many sources of information here, and in my opinion it is very much a minority view. It may be the view of the Minister of State, but he has been in Zambia and not in Rhodesia.
Why did we prematurely escalate the original sanctions? We cannot blame Mr. Smith for this. His action in proclaiming U.D.I. was both a folly and a crime. But since U.D.I. he has left the Governor in his residence. He has not interfered with the judges, and he has refrained from taking many actions which most people expected him to take. His attitude has been restrained.
What has been responsible for the escalation? The pressure of the African States, Just what do they threaten? The

1977
Prime Minister said that we should not imagine that if we took no action nobody else would. He said that we should have a mandatory resolution in the United Nations. But we cannot have a mandatory resolution in the United Nations unless we consent to it. The organisation of the United Nations provides that action cannot be taken without the consent of all the permanent members of the Security Council.
My right hon. Friend threatens us with Russians wearing blue berets, but no Russians can wear blue berets or form a United Nations force unless we consent. No action can be taken unless we consent to it. The Prime Minister must not behave like an over-passionate girl running in terror from the prospect of her own consent. It just will not wash.
What else have we had. We have had the performance at Addis Ababa—the withdrawal of recognition. I should have thought that this was evidence of the impotence of the African States. Let us see just who has withdrawn recognition. There is Tanzania, whose President we had to rescue from his own troops only about a year ago. There is Ghana—and the hon. Member has dealt with that. The most appalling case of all is the Sudan. When we think what the Northern Arabs of the Sudan are doing to their black Africans we realise that it makes Dr. Verwoerd appear to be a patriarchal and beneficial protector. What has happened there has been appalling.
These are the people who are withholding recognition from us. How do we treat their irresponsible folly? We continue to give them aid. It seems an odd contrast to the manner in which we treat the irresponsible folly of the White Rhodesians. We are told that these are people who will set Africa on fire. I do not think that Dr. Banda was exaggerating when he said that all the forces that black Africa could put upon the Zambesi could be dispersed by a platoon of Mr. Smith's army.
What have their follies forced us to do? First, we have imposed financial sanctions which amount to this: in order to restrain and to deprive the illegal Government of Rhodesia of between £9 million and £14 million we excuse them from a liability to pay £26 million a year. For all the evasions of my hon. and learned Friend the Financial Secretary,
1978
that is a liability which we shall have to take on. We have clearly got to pay it. We are the Government of Rhodesia. We have taken their reserves, we have taken their bank, we are that Government and we have to pay its debts: we shall not avoid it. This is a bite which is painful to the biter.
I do not think that oil sanctions will hurt or even cause any serious inconvenience to Rhodesia. That is equally so, even if we blockade Beira, for the simple reason that oil is available to the Union, the pipeline has gone through to Johannesburg and that has released the tanker fleet which previously brought the oil to Johannesburg. Of course, Johannesburg requires vastly more oil than the whole of Rhodesia, and that tanker fleet is available to take the oil north. The oil is going through, and it is not all that expensive—it has been worked out.
The Rhodesian Government do not expect that anything, even in the nature of petrol rationing, will be necessary. At any rate, that movement of oil is immensely cheaper than the one in which we have involved ourselves. The airlift which burns more oil than it carries, to runways which are not fit to receive it, is a good deal to maintain. In the background of all this there is copper. If we cannot get Zambian copper, which depends—apart from anything else, like transport—on Rhodesian coal, this will add £300 million to £500 million as an adverse item to our balance of trade, which will undo more than all our efforts since we became the Government have achieved.
If we are to deliver a few more bites like this, I am put in mind of the old morality poem which ended:
"The man recovered from the bite: it was the dog that died."
Why is the Prime Minister doing this? After all, whatever else anybody may have accused him of, it is not foolishness. I must express real and serious alarm that, when sanctions so plainly futile as these are being run through, they are only run through as the next step. The next step after that and the only available step is war—not just naval war, not just blockade of Beira. When we see these millions being spent on development of communications to Zambia, we must wonder whether they are just for this absurd oil lift. I am deeply worried about the direction we are taking.

1979
I believe, as I told the right hon. Gentleman yesterday, that we have reached the point at which we have either to fight or negotiate. When I say negotiate, I mean negotiate with power. One cannot negotiate—there is no point in negotiating—with someone who has no power. The people with power are the Rhodesia Front. It may not be all the Rhodesia Front, negotiation may divide the Rhodesia Front, but negotiation must take place with that power organisation. No other negotiation has any reality. When my hon. Friends beg us to negotiate with the Vietcong rebels, I find it difficult to understand why they should hold up their hands in horror at the idea of negotiating with the Rhodesians.
First, what should be the basis of those negotiations? We have had repeated, almost parrot fashion, "The return to constitutional rule". This quite plainly is not available. The bitterness which has been built up now means that a re-acceptance of the authority of the British Government is unconditional surrender. Every instinct of patriotism in Rhodesia from everyone, including the enemies of Mr. Smith, is roused against that. To do that we should have to use armed force.
We can no more impose the authority of this Government on Rhodesia without force than we could impose it on South Africa in 1901. That is not negotiation. I believe not only that that is not available but that it is not desirable. We should consider for a moment. What was the position of the constitutionality to which we are being asked to return? Under that constitutionality we had had, since 1923, unrestrained minority rule with no interference from this country. Since 1931, the Land Apportionment Act has been in force, confining the vast majority to comparatively limited areas. Since even before the Smith régime, we had the Law and Order Act, with detainees kept in concentration camps—the badges of a police State.
We should remember that the whole basis of the Prime Minister's negotiations was the acceptance of all these things. It was the assurance that minority rule would not be interfered with, that land would not be interfered with, that the power to impose restrictions would not
1980
be interfered with. All that existed, and I see no real advantage in returning to it.
What we must try to ensure is something else—some new dispensation which may provide a fitting guarantee for the rule of law, for African advance in the sense that Africans as they qualify are registered, that the rules are not changed during the game and which will provide that the Africans have access to education.
I entirely agree that all these things were refused during the negotiations of the Prime Minister. They may go on being refused, but, as long as it does not involve subjection to Her Majesty's Government here, this matter may be negotiated. What I do not think can ever be negotiated now without defeat is subjection to Her Majesty's Government, and therefore we may have to find a new form of dominion status. Perhaps in that new form the Governor will be appointed by the Queen, perhaps on the advice of a committee of the Privy Council, drawn, say, from Prime Ministers within the Commonwealth, not including Her Majesty's Government, with the Governor having power, as guardian of the entrenched clauses, to control, say, African education and so on.
We must remember that the Smith Government are today facing a very grim situation. I do not believe that we could or should assume that they will necessarily go on rejecting the things which they have regrettably rejected in the recent negotiations. At any rate, we should look for the opportunity and try to find out the position, because the alternative is destruction by force of arms. We are speaking of a fragile economy, and the great majority of African people, after five years of drought, are living on the edge of starvation. Victory here means famine and destruction.
If we were to make peace on such terms, on terms of destruction, we would make a desert. We would then have the appalling job of beginning again with what is said to be direct rule, having destroyed the means of rule because what we have now is not ordinary colonial rule. It is Rhodesia's own kind of rule, with its own civil service and so on. That would all have gone and we would have before us a still utterly dissatisfied Africa which was still demanding one man, one vote, tomorrow.

1981
It is immensely urgent that we realise the necessity of negotiating this matter because of the very horrible alternative. Having said that, I will only add that when we come to vote for the Adjournment of the House tonight that vote could be understood in many different ways. From my point of view, let nobody understand my vote as being an expression of confidence in my Government's conduct of the Rhodesian problem.
8.32 p.m.
Sir Alexander Spearman: We have just listened to a striking speech from the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). I only wish that the Prime Minister had been here to hear it.
I have always believed in a bipartisan approach to external affairs and that the Opposition, unless there is a fundamental disagreement, should do all it can to support the Government of the day. Equally, the Government should accept that if there are genuine doubts it is the duty of the Opposition to express those doubts.
I have only once criticised the Government of the day on foreign policy, at any rate in this Chamber, and that was a Conservative Government for their Suez policy. I was opposed to the use of force then, and I am opposed to it now. I am deeply apprehensive that the dangerous consequences of carrying out the embargo on oil may result in our sliding, step by step, into a position in which we will have to use force. I am glad that we on this side of the House are opposing any form of force to obtain a settlement of this dispute.
It is surprising that a Labour Government cannot accept the Motion. I am sure that that would equally astonish some former Labour leaders and, perhaps, many Labour supporters in the country. I have found the Prime Minister's recent statements disturbing. He said yesterday that he did not contemplate a military blockade at this stage because, he said, he believed that the measures would be effective. However, on 1st November the right hon. Gentleman said something more definite:
"It is our view that these measures will be effective … we have no other measures in contemplation …."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 635.]
1982
The Prime Minister has moved a very long way in a very short time. It is very difficult to have great confidence that what he says today is what he will do tomorrow.
Why did this miscalculation occur? Was it just a mistake? We all, even Prime Ministers, make mistakes, and the House is always sympathetic to a confession of a mistake. But we have not had that explanation—
Mr. Leslie Hale: The hon. Member has said that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has acted too quickly, but could he refer to the fact that the last censure Motion was directed to the fact that he had gone too slowly? We therefore have had an argument all the time about whether my right hon. Friend has been slow or fast. My right hon. Friend consulted the President of the United States, and he got agreement. Was not that good enough?
Sir A. Spearman: Why was there this drastic change? Before I was interrupted, I asked whether it was a miscalculation or whether he was pushed by the African States, some of which would not cooperate, as the Foreign Secretary told us yesterday. It would be very unwise as a result of this sort of pressure to do in December what he was not willing to do in November.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton is not the only hon. Member on the opposite side of the Chamber who thinks that. I will quote, without comment, what I saw written by a Labour Member in the Daily Mirror on 16th December. He stated:
"If they"—
that is, the O.A.U.—
"are so barmy and ungrateful that they start blackmailing us when we have a difficult problem like Rhodesia on our hands, they had better go and be done with it. They won't harm us, only themselves."
I do not necessarily associate myself with those views, but the quotation shows that they are held on the other side of the House.
Sanctions are a very bad device. They are rarely effective. They impoverish all concerned and generally embitter. It is a terrible confession of failure that the nations have not been able to devise a better machinery for settling their disputes, but I accept that the world being

1983
not as we would like it but as it is there are times when we must have sanctions.
What I do not accept is the theory that very sharp sanctions are necessarily shorter and, therefore, less painful. I believe that very severe sanctions are a challenge that unites the moderates and the extremists. We all know that when we are angry we make sacrifices, so we get resistance when what we want is compliance. If the moderates are shown that the policy they are supporting does not pay, that there is something to be gained by being reasonable and a lot to lose by being obstinate, I suggest enthusiasm turns to hesitation, and hesitation to opposition to the policy they have supported. In high temper most of us are prepared to cut off our nose to spite our face, but when tempers cool down most of us feel hate feeling uncomfortable and losing money.
I believe that our aim should be to persuade white Rhodesia on the lines of my right hon. Friend's Glasgow speech and—and this is where I shall not get support from the other side—I believe that we should make the first move. That is much easier for a great country, particularly if it knows that it is in the right, and much more difficult for a small country, particularly if it suspects that it is in the wrong.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition spoke today of a possibility of its becoming a question of prestige to topple Mr. Smith. I think it would be a disaster if prestige were to become a factor in this matter. I suppose politicians, even the humblest of us, have all got a streak of vanity, even if we are not always aware of it. Perhaps it is appropriate in this debate to quote the only words I know by Cecil Rhodes:
"Beware of vanity. You can make your book with roguery, but vanity is incalculable. It will always let you down."
I want to make a suggestion, very diffidently, but one which it seems to me could not do any harm and it might conceivably do good. I suggest that a leading member of the Government—the Lord Chancellor is the one who comes to mind—should go to Rhodesia with a leading Opposition Front Bench spokesman. They should go to report to the Prime Minister and report to my right hon. Friend. These Privy Councillors
1984
would not go to negotiate but possibly to pave the way for negotiations. I do not speak like this out of sympathy for the Smith régime. I speak out of very deep anxiety about the very dangerous situation we are getting into.
The Times had an impressive article last week which I expect most hon. Members read. The last sentence said:
"Sanctions will prove either an impotent or a terrible weapon—no one knows which."
I want to see the Smith régime bent so that it could be reshaped in different form. I do not want to see it cracked so that there is a dangerous vacuum. It may well be that after long and bitter struggle the Smith régime will be utterly crushed. In that case it may be that the Government will think that they have triumphed, but I think they will utterly fail and the price will be confusion, violence and bloodshed.
8.42 p.m.
Mr. James Tinn: I am particularly glad to have the opportunity of speaking in this my first foreign affairs debate, even though only briefly. It gives me the opportunity to redress a little a certain imbalance which might have appeared on these benches over recent weeks. Regular readers of HANSARD, if there are any, might be tempted to judge the opinions of the Parliamentary Labour Party from the Questions and interventions on foreign affairs tabled and made from time to time.
I speak with no authority whatever on this subject. Perhaps this is not altogether a bad thing. Noted authorities on any subject are often the prisoners of their own published opinions or perhaps the victims of their congealed prejudices. At least I have a certain freedom.
I am speaking to counteract the impression that might have been conveyed by those I have come to think of as—I hope that they do not mind the term; I do not see any of them here at the moment—my cash register friends. I call them that because one has only to mention the subject of Vietnam in the Chamber and, like pressing the button on a cash register, they immediately jump up in their places. I do not intend this as a joke. I have great respect for their sincerity and diligence. However, the number of interventions made or the

1985
length of time one speaks on subjects like this is no indication of the depth of one's feelings or of one's concern about the terrible problem of Vietnam.
I am one of the silent supporters of the Government on these benches. Perhaps hon. Members on the back benches opposite, who spent a few years in Government, will appreciate some of the voluntary restraints that are imposed on back benchers on this side. But I have been able to be, as most of us have been on this side of the House, a silent supporter of the Government in their conduct of foreign affairs, particularly in relation to Vietnam, because of our confidence, which has been borne out by their repeated and genuine initiatives, in my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and because of their preference for action rather than for the attitudes which so often they have been asked to adopt.
As I said earlier, I claim no depth of knowledge or authority in foreign affairs, but I have always been bewildered to know what advantage would result from the British Government's dissociation from the United States in this affair. Surely there is no indication whatever that if a British Government was to do a Pontius Pilate act of washing their hands of this association with America and demanding unilateral action on their part, without a similar condemnation of the North, this would influence in the least the authorities in Hanoi or persuade them in any way to become more ready to accept negotiation.
The price of making this empty but in some quarters popular gesture would have been the destruction of the confidence which exists between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States. Because our Government have firmly turned their back on and resisted this pressure, we now see that Her Majesty's Government are still in a position of being able to play a leading part in perhaps bringing the United States to the conference table over Vietnam. As for Hanoi, that can be no responsibility of Her Majesty's Government. That is a task which must be left to others.
After spending most of two days in the Chamber hoping to catch the eye of the Chair it is with a real sense of de-
1986
privation that I disregard the other copious notes which I have prepared, but the usual channels have indicated that the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) hopes to be called shortly by the Chair and I should hate to deprive him of that opportunity.
8.45 p.m.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The whole House will sympathise with the plight of the hon. Member for Cleveland (Mr. Tinn) and will hope that on another occasion we shall have a chance to hear him at greater length. I have risen at this time because the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs has to answer in effect a two-day debate, because his Front Bench did not see fit to put up a Front Bench speaker to answer the foreign affairs debate last night. The whole House will be very sorry that the Foreign Secretary has to be absent through illness on this second day of the debate. I know that all of us on both sides of the House wish him a speedy recovery from his painful illness.
Yesterday we had from the right hon. Gentleman an example of clear and lucid reasoning which would have been hard to match on the subject of the future of the free peoples of Asia. This is a matter which stirs up considerable controversy on different sides of the House but the right hon. Gentleman approached this problem with a sense of realism. There will be no settlement in Vietnam—and this is something which I would have said to the Prime Minister if he had been here—until, first, the Soviet Union is persuaded to exercise influence in that respect, and, second, until there is an agreement to cease fire, to meet round the table, and to replace the sense of security which American power now gives to South Vietnam with an actual police force which is effective on the ground. That can be the only solution to this problem.
The House will be grateful, as I am, for the account which the Prime Minister gave today of his talks with President Johnson. It is always gratifying when two allies talk together in harmony, and the alliance of Great Britain and America means a great deal for the future of the free world. The right hon. Gentleman told us that he and the President talked

1987
of many things, of United Kingdom defence expenditure, for instance, which, said the Prime Minister, must be within our economic capacity. I notice that he did not speak of £2,000 million at 1964 prices. I shall be surprised if we hear much more of that. He talked about pruning British commitments all over the world, but he did not say which. He talked about sharing with the United States the expense of our policy east of Suez and N.A.T.O. expenses in Europe, but he did not say, and he could not say, what extra amounts the United States would he willing to pay or the Europeans would be willing to bear.
The right hon. Gentleman said one thing which was probably welcomed in all parts of the House. He told us that he and President Johnson had taken the preliminary steps for burying both the M.L.F. and the A.N.F. and for substituting for both a different conception, that is Mr. McNamara's conception of a committee of N.A.T.O. on which the non-nuclear Powers would have increasing influence in the preparation of N.A.T.O. strategy. I welcome this. It is, so to speak, the child of a parent which I introduced in Athens four years ago when we set up the N.A.T.O. Nuclear Committee for this very purpose. I am glad, therefore, of this development.
I am glad, also, that the Prime Minister is to go to Moscow in February. That date will give the necessary time for the preparation of a mission of this kind, unlike what happened to some missions which have set out in recent months and years. I put it to the Minister of State—perhaps he will convey this to the Prime Minister—that the two most important subjects on the agenda will probably be, first, the non-dissemination treaty, which, I think, ought to be attainable if the McNamara Committee proposal is accepted by the N.A.T.O. allies, and, second, the solution of the Vietnam problem. I repeat that no solution there is possible unless the United Kingdom Government persuade the Russian Government to lend their good offices to that effect.
The debate has ranged over a number of subjects, but, in order to give the hon. Gentleman plenty of time, I shall turn now to what has been the main subject, or, at least, the subject uppermost in
1988
the minds of most hon. Members, namely, Rhodesia. No one who has anything to do with the political evolution of Central Africa over the years and, more lately, with the transition of Rhodesia to independence, can fail to recognise the acute dilemmas which the situation presents to a British Parliament and British Government, dilemmas made infinitely greater, of course, when there has been a failure of statesmanship to find an agreed settlement. The failure to find an agreed settlement rears the ugly spectacle of the division of the Continent of Africa by race. This is the trouble which the House of Commons and people far afield must face today.
There was one opportunity in past years, which happened when I was Commonwealth Secretary, to put the future of Central Africa on a multiracial basis for a considerable time and, possibly, for good. I have always thought that the political structure of this part of Africa must be multi-racial. If it is not, there will be a solution born of racial intolerance, either from the European angle or from the African.
I remember at that time arguing—incidentally with members of the present Government—that the three territories of the Federation were inter-dependent economically. Everything we said at that time is illustrated every hour of every day now. I argued that unity of the three territories was the only way in which we could be certain of diluting the racial problem, because if we did not corner it in one territory—Southern Rhodesia—it was likely that the problem would be insoluble.
At that time, I asked the Monckton Commission to go out and report. It brought back a multi-racial solution signed by a number of prominent Africans. I say now to right hon. and hon. Members opposite who are so apt to be critical of us and who sometimes accuse us of thinking in terms of racial policies, that the Socialist Party then refused to serve on the Commission, refused to accept the conclusions of the Report and above all refused to recognise the issues for Britain in the future involved in that failure to accept the Report. The party opposite could not see the signs which were so clearly written then and which have so starkly reared in the House today. I do not quote that

1989
experience just to say that I was responsible for the Monckton Commission but to point out that it was very nearly the last if not the last chance in which a multi-racial solution could be found in that part of Africa.
I have done all in my power ever since then to sustain a national policy on the future of the independence of Southern Rhodesia. I know what it is when there is some division between the parties on a matter of this importance. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition felt likewise and so did all my colleagues. Therefore, in these past few weeks, we have leaned over backwards in trying to assist the Government to follow a national policy. We have been accused up and down the country of tagging along in the wake of the Government but that is a political risk I am willing to accept in the national interest.
But we could do this only so long as the objectives of British policy were broadly agreed between Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Opposition and so long as they were seen broadly to coincide. But if a duty lay on the Opposition to assist the Government—stretching even our consciences in a number of cases—so, too, in this matter of unity there is a duty on the Government. Unity is something at which two must play.
Last week in Scotland I found it necessary to give the first warning because felt that the Government's policy in recent weeks had become totally negative and that they had given no thought at all in recent weeks to the necessity for conciliation. I felt that all the policies they have followed in recent weeks—and it is of recent weeks that I am talking—were bringing the country gradually to a point of no return in two respects.
First, I felt that if the Government's policy were pursued to the ultimate end there would be no future for multiracialism, a split between Africans and Europeans in Rhodesia and a breach between Britain and Rhodesia which could no longer be bridged.
Mr. Eric Heller: Rubbish.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: The hon. Member is entitled to his opinion but I can claim that at least I know something about this problem.
1990
For some time we have been able to follow a joint approach and that joint approach was based on the Prime Minister's statements and the Prime Minister's answers to Questions early in November. I summarise them as we understand them, and I hope that I shall summarise them fairly. These were the objectives: to give the Rhodesians an opportunity for a change of heart; to enable Rhodesians to return by a change of heart to a constitutional relationship with Britain; and to enable Rhodesians to resume the search for independence for Rhodesia based in the beginning on the 1961 Constitution, thus placing them back within the law. I think that that is a fair summary. Penalties there were and the penalties were harsh, but I ask the House to remember that they were penalties which the Rhodesians brought on themselves by rupturing their relations with Britain and their relations with the Commonwealth.
Those penalties, with which I and my hon. Friends felt bound to agree, were accompanied by many statements from the Prime Minister at that time that the penalties were specifically not designed to break Rhodesia's economy and to force Rhodesia into a state of social chaos and disruption. I rejoiced in this for this reason, that so long as this was so there was an escape route for decent, ordinary Rhodesians, because they could use the escape route with honour and without loss of pride.
Certainly as I listened in the House in those days to the right hon. Gentleman's statements, all over the Houee there were nods of approval, because it seemed to me, and I think that it seemed to very many hon. Members at that time, that to make the lives of Europeans and African, friend and foe of Mr. Smith alike, intolerable was a policy likely to harden the Rhodesians' support for Mr. Smith and to place the nation under siege, for when a nation is under siege, it rallies to its elected leaders whether it likes them or not. Certainly it would be a poor prelude to conciliation.
But under pressure—and this is the refrain which is bound to go through the speech which I have to make tonight—the Prime Minister changed his mind and with his mind his policy. He applied a trade embargo and oil sanctions with the

1991
current declaration that it was the intention to bring chaos to the Rhodesian economy. That has been one of the troubles—the parallel statements—and even the Foreign Secretary, the mildest of people and the kindest of men, yesterday used the word "crushing" Rhodesia.
I do not know whether the Prime Minister quite yet understands what he has done to the Rhodesians in this change of policy and change of mind and change of face. They now feel that they are in for a siege and it is useless for hon. Members to say that this will be a quick and easy thing. If they do, they do not know the Rhodesians, because to them now—not a few weeks ago, but now—the future after the kind of sanctions which have been applied holds only one of two alternatives. The first is return to colonial rule and the second is a precipitate rush to African majority rule tomorrow. I must tell the House from my knowledge of Rhodesians that they will go down in ruins rather than accept either of those propositions.
That is why it is vital—and I give that overworked word its precise meaning for once—that there should be a third alternative to put before the Rhodesian people, and that third alternative must be a positive proposal on which independence can be based within the law. Every right hon. and hon. Member in the House sees the arguments which the Prime Minister deploys, recommending a quick kill as being the most humane. The statistics are given to him and he judges that the statistics will produce a quick kill. He is given the advice of many businessmen and bankers who hold the same opinion. I have no doubt whatever that he has concluded that the sanctions ought to work. The question I would like to ask is, at what price?
The bitterness and the hate and the defiance already engendered in Rhodesia passes belief. The Prime Minister must do more than add up the statistics and hope for a quick kill. It is the duty of a statesman to sense the spirit and heart of a people and to know what happens if that heart is broken. If the heart of the people of Rhodesia is broken, then what will happen in Africa? [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the Africans?"] I have said that no fault will be found in
1992
the rest of my speech in what I have to say about the Africans and their rights.
Of course we must taken the African reactions into our calculations. The Prime Minister has been perfectly right to do this all along and to be very careful of them. He has been right, in weighing up the balance, always to consider the reaction of the Africans in the Commonwealth countries, but there is a right way to satisfy the African nations and there is a wrong way. The right way is to provide in such proposals as the Government may make for the future Constitution of Rhodesia for a certainty that the Africans will have majority rule in the country.
The wrong way to deal with the Africans is to tag along behind those extremists who want force. When force is demanded, as it certainly will be, what I am afraid of is that the British Government will then be able to find no logical reason for resisting it because—[Interruption.] That is the basis of the warning which my right hon. Friend expressed earlier on behalf of our party. I must say to the Prime Minister that every time he has made a proposition to this House and every time that we have felt that it was a firm proposition, it has turned out that he has left a loophole. Before he came into the Chamber just now I was saying that we had understood from him that there were to be no vindictive sanctions, and then that sanctions were not to be directed to break Rhodesia's economy. But there was a loophole and he put on a trade embargo, of which he had at first seemed to give no sign. The trade embargo came along, but there was no sign of oil sanctions. Then he left the loophole and they came later, even although an international study as to the efficiency of oil sanctions had not been completed or published.
Now, when oil sanctions have come along, he has left a loophole for force. It is not as big as we thought it might be at the beginning of the day. But he has left a loophole for force under international action. He has said categorically, in spite of the wording of the Amendment to the Resolution which we put down on the Paper, that Britain will not use force in Rhodesia and that Britain will not blockade the port of Beira or anywhere else.
The Prime Minister The Prime Minister indicated assent.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: I am glad to have the right hon. Gentleman's confirmation. He did suggest that somehow, if it seemed to be the consensus of opinion in the United Nations, Britain might be compelled to adopt the policy of force along with other countries. How could that happen? The right hon. Gentleman must refresh his memory of the Charter. It is impossible for a mandatory resolution to be passed urging Britain to apply sanctions unless it is passed under Article VII and by the Security Council, of which Britain is a member, and where Britain has a veto. I will not ask him today whether in such circumstances he would apply the veto. Obviously he could not answer at this time. But the suggestion that there can be, by some extraordinary method of consensus of opinion, a mandatory resolution passed against Britain's will is simply not the case.
The Prime Minister: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. He knows all the arguments about the veto; and, of course, he knows that if the veto were applied it would be the end of the Commonwealth as we know it. On the other hand, he met Sir Abubakar last week, who is the most restrained of Africans. The right hon. Gentleman knows what he feels on this question. But, veto or not, he must know—and if he had been with me in New York he would know—that if the matter were transferred from the Security Council to the General Assembly there would be an overwhelming majority for these measures. I hope to support him and everyone in the House who wants to stop extreme measures by the United Nations. I cannot guarantee that they will not happen, and this is one reason why we have introduced the oil sanction.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: The Prime Minister has made one speech—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I have got the point, but the Prime Minister has not. The point is that whatever the Assembly does is not mandatory. The only point that I am making is that the right hon. Gentleman cannot sit on that bench and suggest to the House and country that, by some process of which the British Government are not aware and by which the British Government might be caught against their will, some sanctions could be applied, because it is not possible. The
1994
British Government have control of this situation in accordance with Article 2(7) of the Charter, as the Prime Minister knows. If Chapter VII is invoked, surely neither Portugal nor South Africa can conceivably be guilty of a breach of the peace or an act of agression. The Prime Minister made suggestions today about sanctions and the possible implication of the United Kingdom in a United Nations force which simply do not hold water. He has therefore left a loophole.
United Nations military operations directed against Portugal, a N.A.T.O. ally, and against South Africa, which would need a vast military operation to patrol her coast, are so dangerous that we must now lay down—
The Prime Minister: Hear hear.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: I will help the Prime Minister. Tonight we shall lay down a marker to show how dangerous force is and tell the right hon. Gentleman that we would not support him if he tried to introduce it.
I want to turn to the question of conciliation and a negotiated settlement.
Mr. Orme: That is a change.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: The hon. Gentleman says that that is a change, but he may have noticed that I was the first person to propose conciliation when not one member of the Government Front Bench said a word in favour of it. I hope to keep the temperature down.
I turn to conciliation and a negotiated settlement. I believe that there is complete uncertainty in Rhodesia as to the basis on which it might return to legality. I cannot say that the speeches of the Prime Minister have made the position much clearer.
I will start, to please the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) in particular, with two propositions which must precede any proposal for conciliation. The first is this. Majority rule for the Africans must be certain. That is the proposition which I make in response to the hon. Gentleman's earlier interruption. The second proposition is this: when it arrives, it must be responsible. The question before all Governments in the past and before this House is whether those two propositions are reconcilable in a constitution. I believe that they are.

1995
Majority rule, when it arrives, will be closely hinged with two things—the economic advance of Rhodesia, and education and training in Rhodesia. There is a relationship between both of those and the vote.
I put the ingredients of a settlement in the following order. We should begin with the 1961 Constitution and keep it in existence, because it provides for the principle of uninterrupted progress towards majority rule. It contains many other wise provisions, too. It is, therefore, better to keep it as the basis of the law of Rhodesia unless a better constitution can be divined. The 1961 Constitution has its defects but, because it is always difficult to deal piecemeal with constitutions, I want to keep alive the idea of a parallel and a complementary treaty.
To stop up the loopholes which at present might allow a recession in the Africans' rights, I have two particular loopholes in mind: the possibility of altering the numbers of the constituencies on both the A and B rolls, and an alteration, too, in the educational qualification. I see value in the treaty. Reading the conversation between the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith, I cannot quite accept that Mr. Smith was responsible for turning this down entirely. The Prime Minister did not seem to me to like this very much at the time either.
Then there must be a body to adjudicate, and this should be spelt out with much more definition than hitherto. That body, I suggest, should be the Privy Council. It should be acceptable for the reason that it is part and parcel of the constitutional machinery and it operates in the relations between the United Kingdom Government and independent members of the Commonwealth. That is the virtue of the proposal for the Privy Council being the arbiter in any disputes in this matter.
On that basis, the Africans would be expected to work the Constitution and, equally, certainly to take part in the Government and in the administrative machinery. The kernel of the matter, however, is this. There are two qualifications for the vote, the property and monetary qualification—economic expansion of the country will, I think, look
1996
after that—and the educational qualification.
If I were conducting the negotiations, the programme of education which I would propose would not be one which made education, the secondary schools and the universities a factory for votes and voters. That is not the idea. The scheme for educational advance must not imply any lowering of standards of education.
There is, however, convincing evidence that steady, unfettered, increasing progress in secondary and university education, in which the opportunities for European and African are equal, could be attainable. The Prime Minister has said that Mr. Smith rejects this idea. All I can say is that when I, with Mr. Winston Field, was working on a joint programme for education, we had not got this to a completed stage. If it is completed now, it should be put before the people of Rhodesia, because they have not had a chance to see it. If they did, it would be irresistible, because the huge majority of decent Rhodesians wish to see the African educated in their country.
There are two remaining questions. One is the consent of the people of Rhodesia. If the Africans co-operate in government, there would be no need for formal machinery to register their consent. But I have never accepted the idea that machinery is impossible to devise to assess the feeling in Rhodesia and even in the tribal areas. We did it in Swaziland, and I recommend the Government to look at the Swaziland pattern.
Secondly, with whom should we consult and when? On this, we must take the Governor's advice. I was glad to hear the Prime Minister say today that the Governor had been instructed to look for opportunities. This has been lacking hitherto and I hope that it is right. We look forward to hearing more of that from the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister may say that all I have said has been embraced within the five principles. I would describe the difference that I have with him in this way. The five principles are written and defined difficulties, and they define them very well. What I have been trying to do is to give definition to a solution, which is rather different.

1997
In all our minds the debate which we are having on the wide problems of Rhodesia is connected inevitably with the debate on the Order which will follow dealing with oil sanctions.
The Prime Minister: I agree with everything that the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has said in the last 10 minutes. I agree with every word. On Swaziland, the educational programme, the co-operation of the Africans, and the Privy Council point—on all those things I fully agree with him. I have pressed all of them, and every one was rejected by Mr. Smith originally. I agree that what the right hon. Gentleman is saying is the way to the future, but he must not think that it can be negotiated with the present régime.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: The Prime Minister has commended the last 10 minutes that he has heard of my speech. I wish that he had heard the first 10 minutes. Perhaps he will not like the last minute quite as much, but at any rate I have got some point of agreement and contact with him.
I was saying that I was trying to give definition to a solution.
Mr. Shinwell: Smith—[Interruption.]
Sir A. Douglas-Home: I am trying to help the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister, if his right hon. Friend will allow me to do it. The Government have had to be prodded, jolted and prodded again and it is our duty to keep up the process——
Mr. Shinwell: Take Smith——
Mr. Speaker: Order. I have already called the right hon. Member's attention to the fact that he must not keep interrupting from a sedentary position.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: I want to conclude. I was saying that in this matter the question of the oil Order which follows is naturally very much in our minds, and in a crisis of international proportions each of us must think with great care before he acts.
I can give only my own conclusion after the debate. The Prime Minister was, we thought, asking for a blank cheque on the use of force. [Interruption.] We had every excuse to believe
1998
that when we read the Amendment. I am not yet satisfied that the Prime Minister has eliminated international force and his support for it, which he hinted, at any rate, might happen.
I believe that the Government's policies generally have brought Rhodesia to a situation which is a dead end and in which there is now no room for political manœuvre. The processes of conciliation are urgent, but in fact they have been absent until, at any rate, the Prime Minister made his speech today, and I hope that something will follow.
I shall give my vote tonight, therefore, on a much wider front than oil sanctions covering the trend in recent Government policy which, as I said earlier, has brought us to the point of no return between African and European and between Rhodesia and Britain. It would be easy to vote against the oil sanction. I think that it was ill-conceived, as all the Government's policies lately have been.
Mr. Shinwell: Then why not vote against it?
Sir A. Douglas-Home: If the right hon. Gentleman will restrain himself for only a quarter of a minute——
Mr. Shinwell: I will do what I like. Answer my question.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: I am asking the right hon. Gentleman to do what the House wants for one moment, and that is to allow me to conclude my speech. I am saying that it would be easy to vote against oil sanctions. I think that the Government's policies have been ill-conceived, but I want to make sure that the message which goes out from this House tonight, and in particular from these benches—[Interruption.]—the Prime Minister is behaving like a schoolboy who is unable to contain himself. Neither the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), nor the mutterings of the Prime Minister—[Interruption.]
Mr. Speaker: Order. The Speaker wants to hear the cut and thrust of the debate.
Sir A. Douglas-Home: I shall try to provide one of them in one sentence. I do not know which it is. I think it is thrust. The message, and the only message, that I want to go out from

1999
the benches behind me, is a message in favour of conciliation, because that is still the answer to this problem for civilised people.
9.26 p.m.
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. George Thomson): I am grateful to the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) for sitting down as he promised at 9.25 p.m., because, as he said, I have to try to make two speeches to his one. The reason for this is not the fault of this side, as the right hon. Gentleman indicated, but is due to the activities of the Opposition during the later part of yesterday evening, which left the House with no alternative but the present rather untidy procedure. I should like to thank the right hon. Gentleman also for his good wishes to my right hon. Friend, who apologises to the House for not being here for the second day of the foreign affairs debate, for reasons which everyone knows and sympathises with.
The right hon. Gentleman quoted my right hon. Friend's speech as an example of how the Government's attitude had become more immoderate. He accused my right hon. Friend of saying in his speech yesterday that we wished to crush Rhodesia. I think that that was the phrase the right hon. Gentleman used. In fact, what my right hon. Friend said, with his customary precision, was that it was the policy of Her Majesty's Government to crush the rebellion. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will acknowledge the correction.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I acknowledge the correction. The word I was thinking of was "crush".
Mr. Thomson: I am not sure what else one can do with a rebellion but seek to crush it, and I shall come back to this in a moment.
Before I deal with Rhodesia, I should like to comment briefly on some of the main themes in this foreign affairs debate. There has been a great deal of discussion about the dangers inherent in the Vietnam situation. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), and a number of other hon. Members, asked for clarity in the tangled tale of the attitude
2000
of the Vietnamese authorities to peace offers, and since a good deal of confusion has been created about the initiative by U Thant, and subsequently described by the late Adlai Stevenson, it ought to be said plainly to the House that these events related to a period more than a year ago, before Her Majesty's present Government were in office, and before President Johnson had won his first election after succeeding the late President Kennedy.
Whatever happened in the past, we have to face the dangerous problems of the present. The facts remain that again and again and again during recent months the Americans have reiterated their willingness to talk, but the North Vietnamese so far have refused. Now we have a new version of the same story that is adding to the confusion in the House among those who are seeking some peaceful way out of the dangers of the Vietnamese war. Italian emissaries believed that they had a favourable message to bring from Hanoi. The Americans explored it privately, as they did on the previous occasion. The story this time leaked out, and this time again the Hanoi Government have denied suggestions that they had probed about negotiations and have described the whole story as "sheer groundless fabrication".
I have only three comments to make on this. First, I do not see how anyone reading the text of Mr. Dean Rusk's letter can call it other than a reasonable and serious search for negotiation. Secondly, the premature leak of which my right hon. and learned Friend rightly complained did not come from the American State Department. We cannot rule out the possibility that it came from someone concerned in the original message. Thirdly, and what is important, when its existence became public the Americans published their message and reiterated their readiness to talk. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, denied that the message existed, and denounced the idea that they should talk.
I am genuinely puzzled that some of my hon. Friends, whose devotion to peace is deep, should, in relation to a question in which nobody can be dogmatic about the answers, attack the side willing to talk and defend those who use such language—as was used on this occasion—as "a peace hoax". I can only add that

2001
my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has come back from his talks with President Johnson ready, as ever, to do all he can as Head of this Government—which is one of the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference—to seize any new opportunity that offers to try to avert the dangers which are inherent in this situation.
Mr. J. J. Mendelson Mr. J. J. Mendelson (Penistone) rose——
Mr. Thomson: I am sorry, but I cannot give way. I have a lot of ground to cover, and I have two speeches to make.
The right hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Soames) and others asked for the Government's reaction to Mr. Rusk's reported request, at the N.A.T.O. Conference in Paris last week, for medical aid in Vietnam. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has pointed out, we have already sent a distinguished medical representative to Vietnam to see what could he done. We did this well before Mr. Rusk's appeal to N.A.T.O. countries.
Mr. Mendelson Mr. Mendelson rose——
Mr. Speaker: Order. It should be clear to the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson) that the Minister is not giving way to him.
Mr. Thomson: Perhaps I may finish this point about Vietnam, and then I will gladly give way to my hon. Friend. I am in some difficulty because I am trying to answer two separate sets of questions.
This year we have given priority to medical aid and have sent 20 mobile anaesthetic machines to Vietnam. We know that these have been greatly valued and put to immediate use in provincial hospitals. More will be sent. Now, following upon the report and recommendations of the distinguished expert who visited Vietnam, we are pushing ahead with efforts to assemble and dispatch a paediatric team to work in the Saigon children's hospital.
We also hope to contribute in other directions, for example, by establishing a vocational teacher training school near Saigon.
Mr. Mendelson: Can my hon. Friend tell the House whether the Government have pursued the proposal coming from the South Vietnamese Liberation Front for an armistice at least on Christmas Day?
2002
Before the Prime Minister's visit the hon. Member said that the Government supported this. Can he say whether the President of the United States agrees, and has he seen the appeal made by the head of the Roman Catholic Church that this might be the beginning of further armistice negotiations?
Mr. Thomson: Yes—my right hon. Friend discussed this proposal with the President in Washington. As my hon. Friend knows, I welcomed it in the House at Question Time about a week ago. We have carefully noted the appeal referred to by my hon. Friend. I have nothing to add at this point, but my lion. Friend can rest content in knowing that we are pursuing this in every way.
The other main theme on the foreign affairs side was Britain's rôle East of Suez. This controversy does not run along party political lines. It cuts across all three political parties—even the Liberal Party—and this is as it should be, because it is, at bottom, an argument about Britain's future rôle in world affairs and also an argument about what part the West as a whole should play in the developments amongst the emergent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This is one of the most important international issues today. It is right that there should be a radical examination of the relationship, economic, political and military, between the developed countries of the world and the emerging countries. It is inevitable that there should be sharp differences of opinion about how this relationship should develop and how Britain, in particular, should adapt herself to the revolutionary changes which are taking place in what is nowadays known as the Third World.
We cannot be dogmatic about the solutions in facing these problems, but we can be reasonably dogmatic about some things. A starting point for this argument is that, whatever military role Britain attempts to play in world affairs, it must be brought within our economic resources. This is what the Government are seeking to do in the Defence Review. The Prime Minister has given the House a full account of his talks on this subject with President Johnson. Some hon. Members opposite are inclined to look suspiciously at our determination to reduce our defence expenditure and see

2003
this as a weakening of our world influence. This is the complete reverse of the truth.
Nothing weakens one's real influence in world affairs than to aspire to a rôle beyond one's real resources. Nothing is more disastrous than to accept commitments beyond one's ability to fulfil them——
Mrs. Anne Kerr Mrs. Anne Kerr (Rochester and Chatham) rose——
Mr. Thomson: —nor is it simply enough to argue that we can afford——
Mrs. Kerr Mrs. Kerr rose——
Mr. Thomson: I apologise to my hon. Friend, but I have too much to cover in the time.
Nor is it simply enough to say that we can afford the present proportion of our national income which we spend on defence, as some hon. Members opposite have been inclined to do during the debate. What we spend has to stand comparison with other countries in Europe, not only as a matter of justice but as a matter of sheer economic necessity. If we have to accept a burden disproportionate to that of our friends and competitors, our own economic competitiveness is weakened—and our military political strength is, in the end, a direct reflection of our economic strength.
There is a big difference between pruning a tree to promote growth in the forest and cutting the tree down. The Defence Review target is £2,000 million, which is still a good deal of money: I am sure that many of my hon. Friends feel that it is too much money. It will require tough decisions and ruthless application of the new techniques of cost effectiveness to reach this target. But that £2,000 million still represents a powerful defence force which, deployed wisely, can be a strong force for peace.
However, I wish that we would all stop talking—I say this with due respect to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—about east of Suez. We should talk instead about total peace, because this is what the argument is about. "East of Suez" has a latter day, Kipling ring about it and calls to mind a nostalgic looking over one's shoulder
2004
to the rôles of glory which have gone from us. Those of us who believe that Britain has an important rôle to play along with others outside Europe do so because of our urgent sense of the dangers of the present and future and not out of any longing to go back to the past. We are concerned to discover what contribution Britain can make, within the sharp limitations imposed on us by our own economic resources, to keeping the peace wherever it is threatened.
It seems to be forgotten these days that peace is indivisible. We have become rather complacent about the degree of détente which we have managed to achieve in the world between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the countries of the Warsaw Pact——
Sir Kenneth Pickthorn: Will the hon. Gentleman allow me?
Mr. Thomson: I am sorry. I refused, on grounds of time, to give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mrs. Anne Kerr) and, in that circumstance, I must refuse to give way to the right hon. Gentleman.
We must also face the fact that the most immediate threats to peace in the world are in Asia and Africa today and not in Europe. Therefore, it is simply not enough to bring about a balance of forces with Eastern and Western Europe, and reduce the danger of war there, unless we can create a similar balance in the Middle East and the Far East. Of course, completely different conditions exist in these areas from those which existed in post-war Europe, when N.A.T.O. was created. In Asia and Africa are the great problems of economic poverty and political instability. Inevitable suspicion is left behind between the new nations and the former colonial powers.
There is the over-shadowing presence of China, the most populous nation on earth, the most continuously civilised country in the world, a country with a tradition of domination of great land areas of the Far East and now a country which adds to its ancient imperial history a Communist ideology which, unlike the Communism of the West, still believes in the inevitability of a third world war.
These are dramatic differences from the conditions in Europe. How is peace

2005
to be preserved? What is Britain's best contribution? How can we, to use the language of the right hon. Member for Bedford, avoid a collision course with China and achieve the peaceful co-existence we now have with Russia?
There are those who argue that we ought to cease seeking to play any important rôle in the Indo-Pacific area. They appear to argue that we should seek our future in what amounts to a European isolationism. The right hon. Member for Bedford said plainly—and the right hon. Member for Barnet (Mr. Maudling) said equally plainly—that a British military presence was required in the Indian Ocean. But the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), who is hiding coyly on the end of the Opposition Front Bench, argued powerfully recently that a Western military presence in the area creates more problems than it solves. His argument, apparently, is that Chinese-Soviet rivalry, together with the indigenous forces of nationalism, would create a sufficient balance to preserve the peace of the world. Whether or not the right hon. Gentleman is right, would it not seem that many Asian democracies would have gone down and many Asian countries would have lost the right freely 10 determine their own future for themselves?
For this reason we on this side of the House believe that there is a rôle for Britain to play on a global basis, and it is this that we are tackling in our discussions about the future shape of our defence forces in the Defence Review.
I must go on from here to the Rhodesian part of the debate. What I have been saying about the importance of Britain's rôle in the world as a whole is directly relevant to the main theme of the debate, certainly from the benches opposite.
Mr. Eldon Griffiths Mr. Eldon Griffiths (Bury St. Edmunds) rose——
Mr. Thomson: I am sorry. I cannot give way.
What I have been saying is relevant to our policies for ending the Rhodesian rebellion, for Britain's rôle in the Indo-Pacific area, for example, links directly with what has been happening in Africa in recent weeks. We have seen our Javelins go, at the request of President
2006
Kaunda, to help Zambia. We have seen the "Eagle" aircraft carrier standing by, and R.A.F. Britannias transporting oil to help Zambia. All these things can be done only because we have a defence presence on a global basis.
It cannot be said too strongly that what is ultimately at stake over Rhodesia is Britain's rôle in world affairs. It was this central point which the right hon. Gentleman, with his great experience of these matters, seemed to miss from his argument. If we were to follow the course which he charted it would, in the end, result in a serious diminution of the kind of influence we can bring to bear in Africa and Asia and in the other emergent countries of the world.
If the one or two hon. Members in the House who feel that we should come to terms with Smith were to have their way and if 200,000 Europeans in Central Africa, the population of a moderate English city, were to defy the 55 million population of Great Britain—this in a world where racialism is one of the great moral and political issues—it would destroy our influence in the world for a generation. This is the reality we face and the kind of difficulty which my right hon. Friend and the Government must tackle.
I know that hon. Gentlemen who take that view about the Smith regime do not remotely represent the House of Commons, but the efforts of the Leader of the Opposition to hold his troops together is likely to obscure that fact from the outside world. Fortunately, the rest of the world has, I think, been becoming increasingly aware of our determination here to bring this rebellion to an end and to restore peaceful progress to majority rule. Oil sanctions are an important element in creating that conviction of determination both inside and outside Rhodesia.
The right hon. Gentleman complained that we had gradually changed our position on this matter and that each time we had taken a decision there was a loophole for the next stage, but the behaviour of the Opposition has been one of constantly opposing each decision as it was taken, then coming to accept it, and going on to oppose the next decision. I do not think that we should be too critical of each other on this matter. We are facing an unprecedented position and one that is always changing.

2007
The test we have applied to oil sanctions is whether they are likely to make an effective contribution, along with other economic measures, to making those who have supported or acquiesced in the rebellion feel that it is better to return to lawful paths. Given the American assurance of support which the Prime Minister obtained in Washington, Her Majesty's Government were convinced that this was the right course to take.
The decision was not taken to appease African pressures, as was suggested by the right hon. Gentleman but because we believed that it was the right decision in Britain's interests in the present circumstances. We did it not because of but despite some of the extraordinary forms of protest that have been employed against us. I ignore the African delegates who walked out of the General Assembly —anyone who is accustomed to speaking here and seeing the exodus from this Chamber to the Tea Room is not likely to be put off by that sort of thing. But to use the weapon of breach of diplomatic relations as a weapon of protest seems particularly short-sighted. This is the very time when channels of communication between ourselves and African countries are particularly needed.
Perhaps the saddest, pettiest and most irrelevant of the protests was the move led by Ghana at the United Nations to kill the British initiative for a serious and constructive study of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes. We had done an immense amount of preparatory work, and my noble Friend, Lord Caradon, had introduced it in a most eloquent speech in the United Nations not many days previously. Then came this quite stupid act of political passion, which I feel should not go unrecorded——
Mr. Tom Driberg: My hon. Friend has referred to Ghana. Will he take the opportunity of correcting the unfortunate misstatement by the Foreign Secretary yesterday that Ghana was still importing tobacco from Rhodesia? This is quite untrue. None has been imported for three years.
Mr. Thomson: Inquiries have been made, and I am sorry to say that my hon. Friend the Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) has been misinformed by the
2008
Ghana authorities. The last external trade statistics for Ghana, published in 1964, show that in that year Ghana imported nearly £100,000 worth of goods from Rhodesia, mainly tobacco. We have made most careful inquiries, and there is no indication that the Ghanians have since taken any legislative or administrative action to cut off these imports.
What I am anxious to say to the House is that neither the passions of some Africans—which we understand—nor the prejudices of some hon. Members will divert us from our course. As quickly as is possible, with careful thought, without rancour or vindictiveness, with no thought of personal victory or of scoring a triumph, Her Majesty's Government seek only a return to legality in Rhodesia.
I emphasise again that there is no chance for Britain to play a long-term rôle for peace in Africa and Asia unless we can decisively defeat this rebellion. The behaviour of the Opposition during this two-day debate represents a curious and, I think, a dangerous contradiction. They spent the first day of the debate supporting and urging a British rôle outside of Europe, but spent the second day urging on the House a course which makes nonsense of the first half of the debate. It would in fact seriously destroy our chances of exercising a future influence in the new countries of the world. If the terms of the Motion as the Leader of the Opposition explained them were to be accepted, I am bound to say that from our experience of world reactions to the Rhodesian rebellion the course that he urges would only aggravate the present dangers and would damage our overseas influence.
I beg the right hon. Gentleman, even at this stage, to think again before dividing the House. The most important passage in his speech was not in fact his arguments about the Motion that he put on the Order Paper yesterday. It was his announcement that the Opposition would support the Government over the oil embargoes later tonight. I know that this cannot have been an easy decision for the right hon. Gentleman to take. He spelled out in his speech some of the real risks and dangers associated with an oil embargo. I can only tell him that the Government are as keenly aware of these as he is, but there are even graver

2009
risks to the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia if we did not decide to go for an oil embargo when, as we now know, we have international support for it.
I tell hon. Members who have expressed concern during the debate that both before and since the United Nations resolution calling for an oil embargo we have been engaged in painstaking studies of its feasibility. The right hon. Gentleman was wrong in thinking that there had been a call for an international study of this that had not yet come forward. We wanted this, but the United Nations would not accept it in the resolution, so we were forced to take the initiative ourselves. However, in taking the initiative we have had invaluable help from the United States in the inquiries which went on beforehand, which culminated in the President's offer of support to the Prime Minister during his visit to Washington.
This is the real, concrete and difficult decision that the Government have had to take this week in the light of the developments in relation to the Rhodesian rebellion. I think that this is the real issue before the House tonight, rather than the hypothetical questions which the right hon. Gentleman has put up in his Motion about blockades, the use of force, and so on. We know the reasons of internal party politics that led to this. Parties on both sides of the House face these problems from time to time. I am not making a great thing of that.
The Leader of the Opposition has, however, had during the Prime Minister's speech clear assurances in regard to both the use of force and the question of the blockade. The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire in fact conceded this, though he seemed to feel that even at this stage they had not gone far enough. I hope that even at this late hour the Leader of the Opposition will feel able to advise his party that there is now no need to take the very grave step of voting against the Government and breaking national unity over the handling of the Rhodesian crisis.
I do not argue that the Opposition have an obligation to maintain national unity if they have a genuine conviction that the Government have done something fundamentally wrong, but this is not remotely the sort of situation facing
2010
the House of Commons tonight. The Prime Minister indicated in his speech earlier today the Government's willingness to talk, through the Governor, to those who are willing to bring the rebellion to an end. The right hon. Gentleman who wound up talked about the need for a third alternative. Again and again my right hon. Friend has sought to spell out, both for the House and for public opinion in Rhodesia, exactly the kind of third alternative that we see. He has described the path by which Rhodesia can return to unimpeded constitutional progress to majority rule.
The right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire made some very constructive suggestions in this field. They were not exactly the same points that my right hon. Friend had advanced, but there are many uncertainties in the future course of events here and nobody can be sure exactly how things will develop. I must say that I did not think that the differences between what my right hon. Friend said at the beginning of this afternoon and what the right hon. Gentleman spelled out a few moments ago would justify the very grave decision of dividing the House.
I repeat that I hope that the Opposition will still put what is right for Britain before what is right in terms of their own internal party politics. I feel sure that there are a great many hon. Members opposite who do not feel in their hearts tonight that it is the right thing to go into the Division Lobbies. I would like to say, as solemnly as I can and in knowledge of some of the developments that surround this decision, that it would be a bad moment to divide the House of Commons.
The right hon. Gentleman quoted that great Conservative Edmund Burke a little earlier in the day. I have here my own quotation from him, and I commend it to the right hon. Gentleman. Mr. Speaker, it comes from a speech in the debate on the Gracious Speech made by Edmund Burke in 1784. He said this:
"If, therefore, in the arduous affairs recommended to us our proceedings should be ill adapted, feeble and ineffectual, if no relief should be given to any of the natives unjustly dispossessed of their rights, jurisdiction and properties, we stand acquitted to our honour and to our conscience, who have reluctantly seen the weightiest interests of our country and the policy and character of this renowned

2011
nation rendered contemptible in the eyes of the world."
Whatever the Opposition decide to do tonight, the Government are determined to pursue to the best of their judgment the course which they believe to be right. They will continue to do so, undeflected by any pressures either domestic or international. What is at stake here is Britain's whole future world rôle, and it is far too grave for any other course to be followed.
9.57 p.m.
Mr. Charles Doughty: The House will undoubtedly divide tonight, but it will divide not on any particular question that divides the two sides of the House but, when we are adjourning for four or five weeks, as a strong warning to the Government not to gallop their fences. Do not let us forget that although we are dealing with an undesirable rebellion in Rhodesia we are dealing with our own kith and kin. If that be an expression which the Foreign Secretary does not like, we are dealing with people who talk the same language as ourselves. If we are not prepared to talk with them the situation will go from bad to worse.
I shall not vote tonight, if there be a vote, upon oil sanctions against Rhodesia. I think that the Rhodesians have brought a great deal of their own troubles upon themselves. They were unwise and stupid to take this totally unnecessary step of making a U.D.I., and they have brought the consequences entirely upon them-
selves. But do not let us go too far against people of our own race, our own kith. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Are not they? If hon. Members think that they are not, let me correct them entirely.
Let me ask whether if hon. Members were living 6,000 miles away and saw the countries to the north of them, which have dealt with one man, one vote and have added subsequently the word "once", they would not feel, if not entirely in favour of the Rhodesian Front, at any rate a sense of fear that what was happening to the north of them might happen to them. That is what we have to remember in the House tonight.
In the vote which I hope we shall have in a minute or two—and I assure the Chief Whip that I shall sit down in 90 seconds—we shall be saying, "We will support you in the action you have taken but do not during the Recess try to go galloping on in matters which may lead to somebody, whoever it may be, shooting and leading to trouble. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I am sorry if hon. Members opposite have so little interest in——
Mr. William Whitelaw Mr. William Whitelaw (Penrith and The Border) rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.
Question put accordingly, That this House do now adjourn:—
The House divided: Ayes 272, Noes 299.

Division No. 15.]

AYES

[9.59 p.m.

Agnew, Commander Sir Peter

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hn. J.

Cooke, Robert

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Boyle, Rt. Hn. Sir Edward

Cooper, A. E.

Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)

Braine, Bernard

Cooper-Key, Sir Neill

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Brewis, John

Cordle, John

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Corfield, F. V.

Anstruther-Gray, Rt. Hn. Sir W.

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. Sir Walter

Costain, A. P.

Astor, John

Brooke, Rt. Hn. Henry

Courtney, Cdr. Anthony

Atkins, Humphrey

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Awdry, Daniel

Bruce-Gardyne, J.

Crawley, Aidan

Baker, W. H. K.

Bryan, Paul

Crowder, F. P.

Balniel, Lord

Buchanan-Smith, Alick

Cunningham, Sir Knox

Barber, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Buck, Antony

Curran, Charles

Barlow, Sir John

Bullus, Sir Eric

Currie, G. B. H.

Batsford, Brian

Burden, F. A.

Dalkeith, Earl of

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Dance, James

Bell, Ronald

Buxton, Ronald

Davies, Dr. Wyndham (Perry Barr)

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos. & Fhm)

Campbell, Gordon

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Berry, Hn. Anthony

Carlisle, Mark

Dean, Paul

Bitten, John

Carr, Rt. Hn. Robert

Deedes, Rt. Hn. W. F.

Biggs-Davison, John

Cary, Sir Robert

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Bingham, R. M.

Channon, H. P. G.

Dodds-Parker, Douglas

Birch, Rt. Hn. Nigel

Chataway, Christopher

Doughty, Charles

Black, Sir Cyril

Chichester-Clark, R.

Douglas-Home, Rt. Hn. Sir Alec

Blaker, Peter

Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)

Drayson, G. B.

Bossom, Sir Clive

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

du Cann, Rt. Hn. Edward

Box, Donald

Cole, Norman

Eden, Sir John

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Kershaw, Anthony

Ridsdale, Julian

Elliott, R. W.(N'c'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Kilfedder, James A.

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Emery, Peter

Kimball, Marcus

Robson Brown, Sir William

Errington, Sir Eric

King, Evelyn (Dorset, S.)

Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)

Eyre, Reginald

Kirk, Peter

Roots, William

Fell, Anthony

Kitson, Timothy

Royle, Anthony

Fisher, Nigel

Lagden, Godfrey

Russell, Sir Ronald

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles (Darwen)

Lambton, Viscount

St. John-Stevas, Norman

Fletcher-Cooke, Sir John (S'pton)

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Sandys, Rt. Hn. D.

Foster, Sir John

Langford-Holt, Sir John

Scott-Hopkins, James

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Sharples, Richard

Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Shepherd, William

Gammans, Lady

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsm'th, Langstone)

Sinclair, Sir George

Gardner, Edward

Longden, Gilbert

Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)

Gibson-Watt, David

Loveys, W. H.

Smith, John

Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn

Smyth, Rt. Hn. Brig. Sir John

Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)

McAdden, Sir Stephen

Soames, Rt. Hn. Christopher

Glover, Sir Douglas

MacArthur, Ian

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Glyn, Sir Richard

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy

Speir, Sir Rupert

Godber, Rt. Hn. J. B.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. lain

Stainton, Keith

Goodhart, Philip

McMaster, Stanley

Stodart, Anthony

Goodhew, Victor

McNair-Wilson, Patrick

Studholme, Sir Henry

Gower, Raymond

Maddan, W. F. M.

Summers, Sir Spencer

Grant, Anthony

Maginnis, John E.

Talbot, John E.

Grant-Fen-is, R.

Maitland, Sir John

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Gresham Cooke, R.

Marples, Rt. Hn. Ernest

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

Grieve, Percy

Maude, Angus

Taylor, Frank (Moss Side)

Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St. Edmunds)

Maudling, Rt. Hn. Reginald

Teeling, Sir William

Griffiths, Peter (Smethwick)

Mawby, Ray

Temple, John M.

Gurden, Harold

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)

Hall-Davis, A. G. F.

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Thomas, Rt. Hn. Peter (Conway)

Hamilton, M. (Salisbury)

Mills, Peter (Torrington)

Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hn. Peter

Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

Miscampbell, Norman

Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Mitchell, David

Tliney, John (Wavertree)

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

Monro, Hector

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

More, Jasper

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Harvie Anderson, Miss

Morgan, W. G.

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Hastings, Stephen

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Hawkins, Paul

Munro-Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Vickers, Dame Joan

Hay, John

Murton, Oscar

Walder, David (High Peak)

Heath, Rt, Hn. Edward

Neave, Airey

Walker, Peter (Worcester)

Hendry, Forbes Higgins, Terence L.

Nicholls, Sir Harmar

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Higgins, Forbes

Noble, Rt. Hn. Michael

Wall, Patrick

Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)

Nugent, Rt. Hn. Sir Richard

Walters, Dennis

Hirst, Geoffrey

Onslow, Cranley

Ward, Dame Irene

Hobson, Rt. Hn. Sir John

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian

Weatherill, Bernard

Hogg, Rt. Hn. Quintin

Page, John (Harrow, W.)

Webster, David

Hopkins, Alan

Page, R. Graham (Crosby)

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Hordern, Peter

Pearson, Sir Frank (Clitheroe)

Whitelaw, William

Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hn. Dame P.

Peel, John

Williams, Sir Rolf Dudley (Exeter)

Howard, Hn. G. R. (St. Ives)

Percival, Ian

Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

Howe, Geoffrey (Bebington)

Peyton, John

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Pickthorn, Rt. Hn. Sir Kenneth

Wise, A. R.

Iremonger, T. L.

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Pitt, Dame Edith

Wood, Rt. Hn. Christopher

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Powell, Rt. Hn. J. Enoch

Woodhouse, Hn. Christopher

Jennings, J. C.

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Woodnutt, Mark

Johnson Smith, G. (East Grinstead)

Prior, J. M. L

Wylie, N. R

Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

Quennell, Miss J. M.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Jopling, Michael

Rawlinson, Rt. Hn. Sir Peter

Younger, Hn. George

Joseph, Rt. Hn. Sir Keith

Redmayne, Rt. Hn. Sir Martin

Kaberry, Sir Donald

Rees-Davies

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Renton, Rt. Hn. Sir David

Mr. McLaren and Mr. Pym

Kerr, Sir Hamilton (Cambridge)

Ridley, Hn. Nicholas

NOES

Abse, Leo

Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Albu, Austen

Bessell, Peter

Brown, Rt. Hn. George (Belper)

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Binns, John

Brown, Hugh D. (Glasgow, Provan)

Alldritt, Walter

Bishop, E. S.

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & Fbury)

Allen, Scholefleld (Crewe)

Blackburn, F.

Buchan, Norman (Renfrewshire, W.)

Armstrong, Ernest

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Buchanan, Richard

Atkinson, Norman

Boardman, H.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Bacon, Miss Alice

Boston, Terence

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Bagier, Gordon A.T.

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Barnett, Joel

Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics S.W.)

Carmichael, Neil

Beaney, Alan

Boyden, James

Carter-Jones, Lewis

Bellenger, Rt. Hn. F. J.

Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

Castle, Rt. Hn. Barbara

Bence, Cyril

Bradley, Tom

Chapman, Donald

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Coleman, Donald

2014

2015

Conlan, Bernard

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Paget, R. T.

Cousins, Rt. Hn. Frank

Hunter, Adam (Dunfermline)

Palmer, Arthur

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Hunter, A. E. (Feltham)

Pargiter, G. A.

Crawshaw, Richard

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Park, Trevor (Derbyshire, S.E.)

Cronin, John

Hynd, John (Attercliffe)

Parker, John

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Pavitt, Laurence

Crossman, Rt. Hn. R, H. S.

Jackson, Colin

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Dalyell, Tam

Janner, Sir Barnett

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

Darling, George

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Pentland, Norman

Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Jeger, George (Goole)

Perry, Ernest G.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Popplewell, Ernest

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Prentice, R. E.

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey

Johnson, Russell (Inverness)

Probert, Arthur

Delargy, Hugh

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Pursey, Cmdr. Harry

Dell, Edmund

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Randall, Harry

Dempsey, James

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Rankin, John

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Redhead, Edward

Doig, Peter

Kelley, Richard

Rees, Merlyn

Donnelly, Desmond

Kenyon, Clifford

Reynolds, G. W.

Driberg, Tom

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Rhodes, Geoffrey

Duffy, Dr. A. E. P.

Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

Richard, Ivor

Dunn, James A.

Lawson, George

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Dunnett, Jack

Ledger, Ron

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Edelman, Maurice

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Robinson, Rt. Hn. K.(St. Pancras, N.)

Edwards, Rt. Hn. Ness (Caerphilly)

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Rose, Paul B.

English, Michael

Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)

Ross, Rt. Hn. William

Ennals, David

Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)

Rowland, Christopher

Ensor, David

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Sheldon, Robert

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Lipton, Marcus

Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.

Evans, Ioan (Birmingham, Yardley)

Lomas, Kenneth

Shore, Peter (Stepney)

Fernyhough, E.

Loughlin, Charles

Short, Rt. Hn. E.(N'c'tle-on-Tyne, C.)

Finch, Harold (Bedwellty)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Short, Mrs. Renee (W'hampton, N. E.)

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

MrBride Neil

Silkin, S. C. (Camberwell, Dulwich)

Fletcher, Sir Eric (Islington, E.)

McCann, J.

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

MacColl James

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

MacDermot, Niall

Skeffington, Arthur

Floud, Bernard

McInnes, James

Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)

Foley, Maurice

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)

Foot, Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Small, William

Ford, Ben

Mackenzie, Gregor (Rutherglen)

Snow, Julian

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)

Mackie, George Y. (C'ness & S'land)

Soskice, Rt. Hn. Sir Frank

Freeson, Reginald

Mackie, John (Enfield. E.)

Spriggs, Leslie

Galbraith, Hn. T. G. D.

McLeavy, Frank

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Garrett, W. E.

MacMillan, Malcolm

Stonehouse, John

Garrow, Alex

MacPherson, Malcolm

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)

Ginsburg, David

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Stross, SirBarnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Gourlay, Harry

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Summerskill, Hn. Dr. Shirley

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Swain, Thomas

Gregory, Arnold

Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Swingler, Stephen

Crey, Charles

Manuel, Archie

Symonds, J. B.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Mapp, Charles

Taverne, Dick

Griffiths, Rt. Hn. James (Llanelly)

Marsh, Richard

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Griffiths, Will (M'chester, Exchange)

Mason, Roy

Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

Grimond, Rt. Hn. J.

Mathew, Robert

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.

Mellish, Robert

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Hale, Leslie

Mendelson, J. J.

Thornton, Ernest

Thorpe, Jeremy

Hamilton, James (Bothwell)

Mikardo, Ian

Tinn, James

Hamilton, William (West Fife)

Millan, Bruce

Tuck, Raphael

Hamling, William (Woowich, W.)

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Urwin, T. W.

Hannan, William

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

Varley, Eric G.

Harper, Joseph

Molloy, William

Wainwright, Edwin

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Monslow, Walter

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Hart, Mrs. Judith

Morris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)

Wallace, George

Hazell, Bert

Morris, John (Aberavon)

Watkins, Tudqr

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Mulley, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Sheflield P k)

Weitzman, David

Heffer, Eric S.

Murray, Albert

Wellbeloved, James

Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Newens, Stan

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

White, Mrs. Eirene

Hobden, Dennis (Brighton, K'town)

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Whitlock, William

Holman, Percy

Norwood, Christopher

Wigg, Rt. Hn. George

Hooson, H. E.

Oakes, Gordon

Wilkins, W. A.

Horner, John

Ogden, Eric

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

O'Malley, Brian

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)

Oram, Albert E. (E. Ham, S.)

Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

Howarth, Robert L. (Bolton, E.)

Orbach, Maurice

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Orme, Stanley

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Howie, W.

Oswald, Thomas

Willis, George (Edinburgh, E.)

Hoy, James

Owen, Will

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Padley, Walter

Wilson, William (Coventry, S.)

2016

2017

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Wyatt, Woodrow

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Winterbottom, R. E.

Yates, Victor (Ladywood)

Mr. Sydney Irving and

Woof, Robert

Zilliacus, K.

Mr. George Rogers.

RHODESIA (OIL EMBARGO)
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, dated 17th December, 1965, made by Her Majesty in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, a copy of which was laid before this House on 18th December, be approved.—[The Attorney-General.]
10.14 p.m.
Mr. Nigel Birch: I want to ask some questions about this Order, and it may well be that the Attorney-General will be able to answer them. None of us really knows what effects and when this Order will have upon Southern Rhodesia, but we all know what effects and when it will have on Zambia. The effect of the Order is the immediate cessation of oil supplies to Zambia. What I want to ask is what the Government's plans for supplying Zambia are. Will the airfields stand the traffic? How many tons of oil do the Government think they can get in each week? Will that tonnage be anything like sufficient to fulfil the needs of Zambia?
Unless we can have answers to these questions, the introduction of the Order is highly irresponsible, because clearly the Government must have thought this out. They must have thought it out. If what the Government are doing now would bring the economy of Zambia to a halt without bringing the economy of Southern Rhodesia to a halt, then it was clearly not a very sensible thing to do. So, presumably, they must have full contingency plans. It is up to them, when moving this Order, to explain exactly what the logistics of this matter are.
10.15 p.m.
The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): It may be for the convenience of the House if I give some explanation of the terms of this Order. It seemed possible, at any rate from the speech the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition made at the beginning of the earlier debate, that the House might have been disposed to approve of this Order on the nod. That is not, apparently, the immediate wish of the House and accordingly I will deal briefly with its provisions and my hon. Friend the Minister of State will deal with the matters of economic politics.
2020
The right hon. Gentleman has just referred to the Order which I invite the House to approve—the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, dated 17th December, 1965, made by Her Majesty in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965. It came into force on the evening of the 17th December and was laid before the House the next morning. Accordingly the Government, now, at the earliest opportunity, bring it before the House for approval in accordance with the provisions of Section 2(5) of the Southern Rhodesia Act. The House will recollect that Orders in Council made under that Act may extend to Southern Rhodesia and the Colonies as well as to the United Kingdom. This Order applies to the United Kingdom and in part to Southern Rhodesia. There is also power under Article 7(3) of the Order to extend it to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and the Colonies and Protectorates in relation to the carriage of petroleum by ships and aircraft to Southern Rhodesia. The House will see that Article 1 operates solely——
Mr. Graham Page: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves that point of the extension of the Order, it is clear, is it not, that by Article 7(3) Her Majesty may by Order extend this to the Channel Islands and the other countries? What is it which Her Majesty has to extend? The ships registered in the other countries or the people resident in the other countries? By the Act this already extends to the Channel Islands and the other countries mentioned.
The Attorney-General: That is so by the Act, but it is not so under the Order as it at present stands, and a further Order in Council will be necessary to extend it to the Colonies and Protectorates. Article 1 operates solely as part of the law of the United Kingdom. As the House will see, it forbids any person except under the authority of a licence granted by the Minister of Power, from supplying or delivering or agreeing to supply or deliver petroleum to any person in Rhodesia or to any person who, he knows or has reasonable cause to believe, will deliver it to Rhodesia or to do anything, such as acting as an agent, calculated to promote the supply of oil.
A person in Southern Rhodesia, as the House will see from the interpretation

2021
provided by Article 6, is defined as including not merely a Rhodesian incorporated body, but also a body, wherever it functions, which is Rhodesia controlled. Under Article 1 any person of whatever nationality or citizenship who contravenes these provisions within the United Kingdom is committing a criminal offence. What is more, contravention of the provisions of this Article is an offence if committed anywhere in the world by a citizen of the United Kingdom and the Colonies ordinarily resident here.
The House will observe that the Minister is empowered under Article 1(1) to licence the importation of oil which would otherwise be in contravention of this Article; and there is a similar power under Article 2. This provision is to enable oil to be lawfully imported or conveyed in British ships or aircraft in particular cases—for example, if we consider that supplies would become necessary for hospitals and such institutions and we are satisfied that the consignment in question will be used for that purpose.
Article 2, which also operates as part of the law of the United Kingdom, prohibits the use, except under licence, of any ship or aircraft registered in the United Kingdom or Colonies for the carriage of petroleum to Rhodesia.
Under Article 2(2) the owner and master of any ship or the operator and commander of any aircraft used in contravention of the Order will be guilty of an offence unless he can prove that he did not know, and had no reason to suppose, that the oil was destined for Rhodesia.
Article 3 also operates as part of the law of the United Kingdom, but, in addition, it operates as part of the law of Southern Rhodesia by virtue of Article 7(2) of the Order. It prohibits any person from importing petroleum into Rhodesia or from taking delivery outside Rhodesia of oil destined to be imported therein. Any Rhodesian, therefore, or any other person in Rhodesia who seeks to import oil will commit a criminal offence both under United Kingdom law and under Rhodesian law and will be liable to be punished by either the Rhodesian courts or, if he enters the jurisdiction, by the courts of this country.
2022
The House will observe that the Secretary of State is given a power to make Regulations authorising the importation of petrol in circumstances which would otherwise be a contravention of this Article. That power has already been exercised in one case. Immediately after the Order came into operation, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations made Regulations permitting aircraft to import petroleum into Rhodesia otherwise than as cargo—that is to say, their own reserves of fuel.
May I pause for a moment and consider the three substantive provisions with which I have dealt. Right hon. and hon. Members will observe—and, indeed, the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) raised this point yesterday—that the effect of this Order is to provide criminal sanctions against any person in this country or Rhodesia and against any citizen of the United Kingdom and the Colonies or of Rhodesia anywhere else in the world who seeks to supply oil to Rhodesia. But, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman pointed out, no such sanctions have yet been imposed against, for example, a citizen of the United States who acts in this way while outside this country or Rhodesia. This is perfectly accurate. The fact is that we have no power to legislate for such persons.
However, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday:
"The United States Government welcome and support our decision, fully recognise the authority of Her Majesty's Government in this matter, and are advising all United States citizens and enterprises to comply with the terms of the Order in Council."
My right hon. Friend added that:
"The United States Government are completely satisfied with the assurance that they have had from the American oil companies …"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1965; Vol. 722, c. 1691–3]
The fact also has to be noted that quite apart from the United States, a great many countries are giving us their support in this endeavour.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Has the United States Government the power to compel American oil companies to co-operate?
The Attorney-General: The United States Government has indicated that it is satisfied that with the coming into being

2023
of this Order in Council, its own shippers and those concerned in the trade of oil will comply with the desires of the American Government. Assurances have been given to my right hon. Friend to that effect. In my view this Order will undoubtedly assist the Governments of other countries to arrange for the support of their oil embargo.
Prohibition of the importation of oil into Rhodesia may render ineffective any future contracts for the supply of oil to Rhodesia and relieve the foreign contractor of his obligations under existing contracts.
Article 4 of the Order prescribes the penalties for a conviction either summarily or on indictment. Paragraph (2) of Article 4 contains the common form provision relating to the liability of a director, manager or other officers for the offences of a body corporate. Article 4(3) arises out of the ordinary rule that proceedings in a court of summary jurisdiction, unlike proceedings on indictment, have to be brought before the expiry of a fixed period from the date of the commission of the offence.
Since offences which might be created in breach of the Order will, in some cases, have been committed, or may be committed, outside the United Kingdom, it is necessary to provide that the time should run only from the date when the offender first returns to the United Kingdom.
Sir Harmar Nicholls: The Attorney-General is making clear what will be the penalties under the Order for any British shipper. He has only said that America and the other countries have expressed a pious hope that their people will comply. Have any other countries contemplated introducing legislation which would impose penalties upon anybody who commits offences of the kind which are dealt with in the Order?
The Attorney-General: I certainly have not used the phrase that the American Government have expressed a pious hope. On the contrary, as my right hon. Friend said yesterday, he has been informed that the United States Government are fully satisfied with the assurances which it has had from the oil companies. There is no reason to doubt that there will be wholehearted co-operation in this en-deavour on the part of those who want
2024
to maintain the rule of law in the world. All shippers will be concerned in maintaining the rule of law and in particular those with international shipping and other business interests. One would hope that they would take an honourable part in the process of suppression of rebellion, which is what this exercise is all about.
Mr. John Hall Mr. John Hall (Wycombe) rose——
The Attorney-General: No, I cannot give way; I must continue. [HON. MEMBERS: "Give way."] I am not reluctant to give way, but I suspect——
Mr. A. E. Cooper: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is frightened.
The Attorney-General: Certainly, I am not frightened. The hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Cooper) should come into the House and not make observations from below the Bar.
Mr. John Hall: I am glad that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has given way. I am certain that his reluctance is not due to any fear of what I might have to say. I wish only to raise a reasonable point in which we are all interested. The question was raised by an hon. Friend of mine whether the United States has power to introduce legislation that would make the action of supplying oil illegal. If the American Government has the power, why cannot this be done? Am I not right in saying that any American citizen will be able to supply oil without any penal sanction whatever against him by the United States Government?
The Attorney-General: The answer is that, of course, the United States has power to legislate about anything. But these matters take time, and we shall have to see what actions the supporting Governments may deem it necessary to take to ensure their full co-operation in this international endeavour to sustain the rule of law.
As I was saying when I was interrupted, Article 5 of the Order provides that the Minister may grant either general or special licences subject to or without conditions. Article 6 deals with interpretations, and I hope that the interpretations are self-explanatory. Article 7 deals with citation, commencement and extent,

2025
and, as I have already mentioned, Article 3 and the relevant provisions of Articles 4 and 6 are extended to Rhodesia. Paragraph (4) of Article 7 provides that Orders in Council under the preceding paragraph are to be laid before Parliament after being made.
I hope therefore that, in the light of that explanation, the House will now proceed to enthusiastic acceptance of this urgent, necessary and important Order in Council.
10.32 p.m.
Mr. R. H. Turton: We have heard a lot about Rhodesia today, and therefore I will confine my remarks within as short a compass as possible.
In my view, the Order is likely to be ineffective. It will effect legal sanctions on British subjects. It appears, too, to affect Rhodesian citizens, but it cannot be enforced. It has no effect at all on any American citizen who is supplying oil to Rhodesia. Unless we can get agreement from Portugal and South Africa to enforce an oil sanction, we will not make an effective oil sanction without force. My experience is that sanctions are quite unenforceable unless military or naval force is brought in to enforce them.
The Prime Minister himself said on 23rd November:
"… we are not going in for a trade embargo or an oil embargo on our own… The oil embargo is bristling with difficulties".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd November, 1965; Vol. 721, c. 252.]
I agree with him. However, he has changed his ground continually. He said today that he had gone on from a succession of deepening economic measures.
I believe that here he has passed beyond the boundary where he can get the full support of the House. This is likely to cause chaos and bloodshed in Africa and prevent negotiations with the moderate people who are in Rhodesia. For that reason, I regret that I shall have to vote against the Order.
10.34 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Fraser: I am sure that the words spoken so well by the Attorney-General could be translated into every known language and sent
2026
to the 1,500 or so shipping companies throughout the world for their enlightenment and guidance and also to the many oil companies which are possibly in a position to supply Rhodesia.
As one of those who pressed yesterday that this Order should be debated before the House adjourned, I believe that our decision to debate it tonight is correct. It is not a pleasant task to speak in this debate, and I hope that the House will overcome the tedium not merely of my voice but of a long-debated topic.
There are certain problems which arise from what the Government propose to do, to which I must take exception. First, throughout this affair the Government have taken the view, and a very important view, that the decisions on the sanctions and the actions taken against the illegal régime in Rhodesia must be in the control of Her Majesty's Government, and of course by this proposal to impose oil sanctions the control of our efforts passes completely outside this country.
What the Attorney-General has just said are the wild words of a Canute on the edge of the sea. The stuff that we have just heard is pure Canutism. The effectiveness of an oil sanction must depend entirely on international action, as those more learned in the law will show. The effect of that international sanction will have to depend eventually on the authority of the United Nations. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister said this afternoon that he would not contemplate the use of force, but I believe that this sanction will not be effective unless there is a blockade of the port of Beira. This is the fact which the House ought to face in bringing forward this sanction. This is my first accusation of imprudence in these matters, demonstrating that the control of events is no longer in our hands.
Secondly, as my right hon. Friend said, I have reason to believe that this sanction will not be effective in Rhodesia in the short term because of the stocks of oil already there. It will not be effective, because I believe that the Rhodesians have the capacity to put in substitutes which will add considerably to their supplies. Finally, as the Prime Minister said this afternoon, I believe that there is a considerable danger of what he called leakages of oil coming from elsewhere.

2027
There is the existence of the sugar crop surplus to requirements which can be reduced to alcohol. There is the question of Wankie coal, and the production of producer gas. There are many methods of producing alternatives, as we saw during the war, and as my right hon. Friend said, we are enforcing on the Rhodesian economy a siege economy—the "laager" and stockade mentality.
Far more serious, however, is the fact that this sanction is imposed at the wrong point, because, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) said, the people who will be most damaged by this sanction are not the people of Rhodesia, but the people of Zambia. Whether or not this sanction succeeds against Rhodesia, there is the certainty that it will succeed against the people living in Zambia.
As I undestand it, the present consumption of oil in Zambia is between 180,000 and 200,000 tons a year. Thus, if there is to be an airlift, the planes will have to bring in oil at the rate of 500 tons a day on to inefficient and pretty well useless airfields. The Canadian Government have granted us four aircraft. Carrying how much? If it means that there will be a further heightening of tension between Zambia and Rhodesia, and copper has to be taken out by the aircraft which brine in oil, the turn round of the aircraft will become almost impossible. The task of moving oil at the rate of 500 tons a day is a very great one, and those people whom I have consulted in various sections of the oil industry assure me that alternative supplies cannot be arranged for nearly nine months—and certainly not in a few months.
It is a very serious matter when this Government, perhaps to satisfy a whim of their own or perhaps because of a feeling that there are other and more dangerous forces abroad, starts off this sort of sanction and counter-sanction, which inevitably escalate. Let us face the fact referred to in an article by Mr. Arthur Wina, the extremely able Minister of Finance of Zambia, in this morning's Financial Times. Anyone reading it will realise how dangerous this situation could become for Zambia, if it means Rhodesia cutting off the fuel supply to Zambia and making it difficult for her to obtain electric power. This dangerous situation will
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escalate, because the Government have taken a foolish decision in imposing a sanction which they cannot enforce, and which is bound to react, first, by driving the Rhodesians even more into Mr. Smith's camp, and making economic life in Zambia almost impossible. Mr. Wina ended his article by saying that if this led to the breakdown of the Copperbelt it would not be merely the people of Zambia who will suffer, but there would be 750,000 unemployed in this country.
10.41 p.m.
Mr. Patrick Wall: This is the last of the economic weapons in the hands of the Prime Minister. He has said that measures must be taken, but that they are not to be vindictive, and must be effective. Many of my hon. Friends believe, with me, that some of the measures taken by the Government have been vindictive—especially the stopping of money for malaria control and tsetse fly control, together with T.B. research—but it would be out of order to discuss those matters now.
What does the Minister consider will be the effect of this Order—considered together with all the other Orders—first, on the people of Rhodesia? I believe that it can only unite them, both black and white, even more firmly behind Mr. Smith. Secondly—and the Government have been very coy on this question—they have not fully answered Written Questions on the economic effect of previous Orders. What will be the effect of this Order, on top of the previous Orders, on the already rocky British economy?
This Order will involve not only the cost of the airlift but our support of the Zambian economy, and the total cost together with the effect of previous Orders could work out between £300 million and £500 million a year. I should like an estimate from the Government of the total cost of enforcing these sanctions before the House rises for the Recess. Finally, what will be the effect on Zambia? My right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) has dealt with part of this point. There are two other points to which I wish to refer. First, there was the gimmick of running copper in American aircraft from Zambia to the coast, which severely damaged Lusaka Airport runway. There has been further damage by the Javelins, and the airport is likely to be put out of action

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in the near future by the oil airlift. There are only two other effective airfields in Zambia, at Ndola and Livingstone. How do the Government think they can sustain the Zambian economy when the Order becomes effective? One of the quickest ways of stopping production in the Copperbelt is not by pulling a switch at Kariba but by making life impossible for Europeans living in Zambia. That is what the Order may do.
Can the oil sanctions be swiftly effective? With many of my hon. Friends, I believe that they cannot be effective without a blockade. We have had the curious situation of the Prime Minister going to the United States, where many people expected him to secure a joint declaration by President Johnson and himself to the effect that their nationals were not to ship or carry oil to Rhodesia, but where, instead, we have merely had pious platitudes from the U.S.A. and many other countries compared with this Order which will be effective only in respect of British nationals.
We have had a statement in the House that the oil-producing States will refuse to supply oil to Rhodesia, but once oil goes into a tanker the oil-producing States have no control over its destination and indeed no knowledge of its destination. This Order cannot possibly be effective either in Angola, which produces oil, or in South Africa where it is refined. I believe, therefore, that the Order will, of necessity, escalate into a blockade, perhaps to start with of Beira, after which the Government may soon be urged, again by the United Nations, to increase their scope to cover all the South African ports.
The African pressure which has been exerted on the Government during the past few weeks, has been largely directed by a small number of men in Africa who wish to eliminate the 4 million whites in Southern Africa, and who expect us to start doing this job for them. The Leader of the Opposition said today that he did not believe that the oil sanctions under the Order would necessitate the use of force, and I agree with him. But I believe that this power in the hands of our Prime Minister will lead to the use of force, and I am not prepared to take that risk.
The Prime Minister said today that he was opposed to an invasion of Rhodesia,
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but added a few minutes later that force to make the oil sanctions work was a different matter. I believe that he will be driven to use force and will try to disguise it by saying that it is action in support of the United Nations. I believe that the Afro-Asian majority at the United Nations will jump at this; that the U.N. would willingly blockade Beira and, if it can find anyone to do this work, that it will extend to a blockade of the whole of Southern Africa; that this could lead to the entry of a United Nations force into Zambia; and that this could in turn lead to the invasion to Rhodesia to which the Prime Minister says that he is opposed. Because of all these consequences flowing from this Order, I am opposed to it and will vote against it.
10.48 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: I am surprised, not for the first time. I was under the impression that the Leader of the Opposition, supplemented by the former Prime Minister, was agreed that the Government were correct in their judgment about the imposition of oil sanctions. I am ready to be corrected, but that was my impression. Now I discover that several hon. Members on the other side of the House are revolting against their leaders. This breaks my heart. Of course, I am sorely tempted to encourage them: the Labour Party will gain considerably from a split in the Tory ranks. But I beg them not to revolt against their leaders. We have to weigh the political advantage which may accrue to the Labour Party—and there may be a snap election—[AN HON. MEMBER: Who are the patriots now?]—if and when there is another election, because of this turbulence in the Tory ranks, which we deplore—against the advantage which will accrue to Great Britain, the enhancement of its prestige in the eyes of the world, if we display unity on an important and vital issue of this kind.
There is the choice. Politically speaking, from an electoral point of view, I would prefer a split in the Tory ranks. I should love to see——
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): Order. The right hon. Gentleman is getting very far from the Order which we are discussing.
Mr. Shinwell: I am very innocent in these matters. I should have thought that that was the issue before the House. Do we accept the Government's proposition or do we reject it? I gather from the speeches I have heard since entering the Chamber that some hon. Gentlemen opposite, no doubt from genuine conviction, would prefer not to have oil sanctions and would, therefore, be disposed to reject the Order. If so, let them be honest about it and demonstrate their integrity by being counted when the vote takes place. It would be deplorable—and the country would be disturbed and the caucuses in the Tory constituencies would be equally concerned—if they did not have the courage of their convictions. However, if they do not have that courage we will have to bear it with our customary fortitude.
At exactly what are hon. Gentlemen opposite driving? There is almost complete unanimity on the benches opposite about the need to avoid violence and force. These—the hon. Gentlemen opposite—are the new pacifists. They are usurping the function of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes).
Mr. Emrys Hughes: I trust that my right hon. Friend will remember that the Prime Minister is against bloody war, too, so that we are all pacifists now.
Mr. Shinwell: My hon. Friend argues in a global fashion. I want to be more selective. I should not be surprised if, before long, hon. Gentlemen opposite demand that the Polaris submarine bases be removed from this country. There is no saying how far they will go.
Sir Douglas Glover: On a point of order. For our guidance, Mr. Deputy Speaker, can Polaris submarines, which run on nuclear fuel, have anything to do with this oil Order?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I agree that it seems to be rather far from the subject under discussion. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will now come to the Order.
Mr. Shinwell: I was merely trying to pour a little oil on troubled waters, Mr. Deputy Speaker. What are hon. Gentlemen opposite troubled about? Why do
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they object to my expressing my honest opinion? Is it because they dislike what I am saying, because I have found them out or because they dislike being exposed to the country? These pseudo patriots ! Is that why they object?
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman really must come to the point of the Order before the House.
Mr. Shinwell: I believe that it is a good Order. [Interruption.] What is wrong with hon. Gentlemen opposite? Why can I see one of them glaring at me so? I assure him that I am not troubled by the severity of the look he is giving me. His judgment is very faulty and defective. [Interruption.] I will not shirk the implied rebuke that what I am saying is buffoonery. In today's proceedings we have had not only an example of buffoonery but of political manoeuvrability of the most despicable kind. Hon. Gentlemen opposite know that to be the truth. Talk about playing politics. We have had a manifestation of playing politics in the course of our deliberations——
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman really must now discuss the Order which is before the House.
Mr. Shinwell: I reject the argument which was adduced by the hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall). Anyway, we know his views on this matter. What has he just said? He has said that the results of this Order will be a disposition to employ force. Force against whom? Against Rhodesia? Does the hon. Gentleman suggest that? He does? Then by whom? Does he suggest that the Government contemplate using British Forces, either on the ground or in the air or on the sea, against Rhodesia? Is that what he suggests?
Mr. Wall: The right hon. Gentleman cannot have been listening to what I was saying. I said that I believed that the Government would use the United Nations as a cloak for the use of force to blockade Beira, which could extend to U.N. intervention in Zambia, and a possible blockade of the whole of Southern Africa.
Mr. Shinwell: There was a suggestion that I am out of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but is the hon. Gentleman in

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order in making accusations that the Government will use the United Nations as a cloak in order to cover up their own intents'? Is that in order—an allegation of that kind against the Government? If so, how was it that we had those speeches from the leader of the Opposition on the previous occasion?
If this is in order, whom are we to believe? Whom are we to trust on the other side—the leaders of the Opposition or the back benchers who were making a noise just now, and objecting to my observations? Whom are we to believe? Anyhow, let us see what happens at the end of this debate. Let them be counted for what they are, and for what they are worth in the eyes of the country.
10.56 p.m.
Mr. Graham Page: The House enjoys the childish games—or the second-childish games of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), Mr. Deputy Speaker, but we are discussing an extremely serious Order. I object to this Order because it seeks to empower the Government to go further than the Order itself allows. It gives the Govern-tent the power by further Order to extend their powers under this Order without presenting that further Order to this House. I strongly object to that being done.
The Preamble to the present Order is that the Order is made in the exercise of powers under the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, whereby Her Majesty
"… may by Order in Council make such provision … as appears to Her to be necessary or expedient in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein."
That is, in Southern Rhodesia.
This Order requires the approval of both Houses of Parliament within 28 days of being made, but it also seeks to give the Government the power to extend this Order by an Order which does not need the approval of the House. That is shown in Article 7(3). It purports to permit the Government to extend this Order to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, Colonies, Protectorates and countries over which Her Majesty has foreign jurisdiction without producing that Order to the House for approval, but merely laying it as a Statutory Instrument.
I have three specific complaints to make about the Order. The first is its ambiguity. I refer the right hon. and
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learned Gentleman to Article 7(3), which seeks to extend this Order to those countries I have mentioned. It seeks to extend Article 2—but what in Article 2 does it seek to extend? Article 2 relates to ships and aircraft. Does it seeks to extend the Order to the ships and aircraft of other countries? I ask, because paragraph (3) states:
"This Article applies to British ships registered in the United Kingdom or in any other country or place to which the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 extends. …"
If the right hon. and learned Gentleman refers to the Act, he will find that it already applies to those countries mentioned in Article 7, so Article 7 cannot refer to extension of this Order in regard to ships and aircraft. If it does not, then it must refer to the Government's extension of the Order to acts occurring to or from those other countries. Is that the case?
Article 2 refers to petroleum being taken to or from Southern Rhodesia. Is it intended to extend that so that it applies to petroleum to or from the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, the Colonies and the Protectorates? That is how the Order reads.
I therefore object to it, first, on the ground of ambiguity. I object to it on the ground that every Order should be justified under the Act as one which appears to be necessary or expedient in consequence of an unconstitutional act taken in Southern Rhodesia. The Select Committee on Statutory Instruments has already raised this matter in connection with a previous Order of this Government. The fact that those words are not included in this Order shows that the Government are ignoring the Select Committee and its recommendations to the House.
Finally, I object to the Order because it extends further than is allowed by the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, which allows Orders in Council to authorise further Orders if the latter are "incidental, supplemental or consequential" upon the parent Order. Can it be said that it is incidental, supplemental or consequential to apply au Order, which applies to the United Kingdom, to all the other countries mentioned in Article 7? This would not be just incidental or supplemental or consequential. It would be a new Order altogether. Why do

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the Government seek to do these things in this hole and corner way? If they seek to do the things mentioned in the Order without bringing them before the House, how far do they intend to go in making Orders without bringing them before the House?
11.2 p.m.
Dr. M. S. Miller: The hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) accuses the Government of using their powers to govern. Surely he realises that everything which is now taking place was inevitable. It became inevitable when the decision was taken by the previous Smith Government. If we mean to restore constitutional government in Rhodesia, the hon. Member must realise that every step now proposed must be taken. Did the Smith Government misread the signs? Were they depending upon people in this country who were advising them wrongly as it subsequently transpired? Did they believe that what would happen in this country should not be taken too seriously and that we were merely making gestures? This was the burden of some of the speeches we have heard about Rhodesia.
The hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) asked what would be the effect upon the British economy. It comes not as a surprise or a shock but it takes one aback a little to hear someone whose Government left a £800 million deficit suddenly asking us this and using it perhaps as an excuse for doing nothing in this case. We have duties to discharge to the Commonwealth and to other human beings. We know that we cannot discharge those duties without their costing us something. After all, we spend £2,000 million a year on defence against what is perhaps a hypothetical enemy.
It is seldom that both moral and practical issues are so clearly seen. There is a clear moral issue here, a clear moral lead which this country must take. There is also the practical implication. We live in a world of 3,500 million people, and more than two-thirds of them are not white people. Surely, no hon. or right hon. Member will deny that every step must be taken to restore constitutional Government in Rhodesia. Some hon. Members seem to worry about what is
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happening or what may happen in Zambia. Has Zambia indicated that she does not want us to take the steps we are proposing to take?
Perhaps the most important point is this. Are we united in our desire to bring about the end of the rebel Government, and are we discussing only the means to do it? There are only three possibilities. The first is that we apply sanctions of all kinds——
Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. We are discussing only one sanction at this time.
Dr. Miller: I appreciate that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I shall try to confine my observations to this particular sanction. We must apply the oil embargo, and we must apply it forcibly—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh".]—I did not say by military force, but forcibly because sanctions are force, economic force—or we must use military means, which we do not want to do. This has been made quite clear. The third possibility is that we permit the Smith regime to carry on. If we adopt the third course, we condemn 4 million people in Rhodesia to virtual slavery, and we lose every vestige of principle and morals we ever possessed. We ought not to discuss these things in terms of patronising or giving benefits to the coloured people of Rhodesia. We do not give people something if they are entitled to it and it has been denied them for many years.
Oil sanctions will increase Mr. Smith's difficulties. If this is what we want, we must pass the Order and agree to an oil embargo. On the other hand, if our object is to make it easier for him, we should oppose the application of an oil embargo. Not many hon. Members have admitted openly that it is their intention to make things easier for Mr. Smith. The Leader of the Opposition has stated that he is not in favour of the continuation of the rebel régime and, therefore, by implication—indeed, he has said it openly—he agrees that an oil embargo must be imposed.
The British people expect the Government to act on principle and give a lead. I respectfully suggest that this is what we should be giving tonight.
11.9 p.m.
Lieutenant-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: The hon. Member for

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Glasgow, Kelvingrove (Dr. Miller) talked about giving the Africans something. He seems to have failed to realise that the imposition of sanctions in general, and this sanction in particular, will remove from many hundreds of thousands of Africans something which to them is probably the most valuable thing in their lives—stable employment on good wages. [Laughter.] Those who indulge in laughter at this matter, which to many hundreds of thousands of Africans is a serious matter, are only exhibiting their own abysmal ignorance.
My objection to the Order is based on several grounds. To start with, the Prime Minister has continuously since the beginning of this very sad episode shifted his ground. We were told at the beginning that sanctions were not to be punitive. Only this evening, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs used the words "without rancour and without vindictiveness".
Mr. William Hamilton: Only one sanction.
Lieut.-Commander Maydon: We are discussing the oil Order tonight, if the hon. Gentleman will be a little patient for the moment. He has the reputation of being a little bad tempered about these matters. So I entreat him this evening to hold his wrath for a little until he has heard what I have to say.
Mr. William Hamilton: I am just trying to keep the hon. and gallant Gentleman in order. That is all.
Lieut.-Commander Maydon: This Order imposing this last sanction can be one of two things. It can be a reformative sanction, or it can be a punitive sanction. I submit that the main reason why it is so wrong is that it is punitive. It will destroy the economies of two countries—Zambia, which is quite innocent in this matter, as well as Southern Rhodesia. Quite apart from that, we ought to ask ourselves this general question when discussing any form of sanction. This is a little wide of the Order under consideration. What is the ultimate purpose of a sanction? What is the ultimate purpose of stopping the oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia?
I would say that the ultimate purpose of this sanction and any other sanction should not be to punish the perpetrators
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of an illegal régime, because régimes cannot be punished. The people punished in the long run are the ordinary common people of the country, and they surely in this case do not deserve punishment. What we want to do is to bring those reasonable elements within Rhodesia into a position where they are prepared either to persuade their leaders to negotiate or else to find leaders who will negotiate on a reasonable and sensible basis.
Mr. Christopher Rowland Mr. Christopher Rowland (Meriden) rose——
Lieut.-Commander Maydon: Let me finish my argument first. Then I will give way. This sanction will do nothing of the sort. There is plenty of evidence already coming out of Rhodesia that these sanctions, and particularly this one, if it is implemented, will just harden opinion in favour of Mr. Smith's régime. For that reason, I consider that it will be completely abortive and cannot support it.
Mr. Rowland: Before the hon. and gallant Member sits down——
Mr. Deputy Speaker: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has sat down. Mr. Richard.
11.14 p.m.
Mr. Ivor Richard: This is in many ways a much more honest debate than the earlier debate. At least the Rhodesian lobby is now out in the open where we can see it. The speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon) seemed to me to indicate very clearly where that lobby stands in relation not only to this sanction but to the other sanctions which have been imposed. The hon. and gallant Gentleman drew a distinction between punitive sanctions and a beast I have never heard of before, which he called a reformative sanction. I do not know quite what sanctions he puts into that class, since the lobby of which he apparently is a member has consistently opposed the imposition of any substantial sanction since the U.D.I.
Lieut.-Commander Maydon: The question is whether sanctions are reformative or punitive. The earlier sanctions which were the immediate result of U.D.I., which inevitably

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followed the consequential sanctions, were undoubtedly reformative and not punitive.
Mr. Richard: The hon. and gallant Member now talks of "consequential sanctions". I am afraid that I do not understand, either, what they are. If hon. Members opposite are going to go into this sort of nonsense and talk of sanctions falling into this category or that, then somebody on that side of the House should decide into which category the various sanctions are to be put. The hon. and gallant Member says that this is not a reformative sanction at all but a punitive one and may very well hurt the very people in Rhodesia who are most deserving of the protection of this House. Yet another lobby said that it would cause chaos and bloodshed in Rhodesia, while at the same time as that argument is being made we hear that it will be ineffective in any case.
How can a punitive sanction—which we are told that this country cannot impose in any case because no other country will follow it up, and which will be ineffective—cause chaos and bloodshed? That really is something which I cannot understand. With the greatest respect to those in the Rhodesian lobby, I do ask that they get the logic of their situation right before they come along at this hour of the night projecting some of the humbug and nonsense we have heard. I should like to follow this from that point.
We have had a demonstration by right hon. and hon. Members of the Opposition—and I mean not just the Front Bench but the Opposition as a whole—unequalled, so far as my political experience goes. Here, tonight, we have an Order imposing the most serious of all the sanctions which this Government has so far thought it necessary to impose against Rhodesia. The House has heard views from the Opposition as to whether a tobacco embargo should be imposed, and whether a sugar ban should be imposed, and even whether a total trading ban should be undertaken. Yet this is the only sanction which this House has discussed in this whole Rhodesian affair in which we have not had the official view from the Opposition Front Bench.
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Perhaps that is slightly unfair. We did get an opinion from the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon saying that he would support an oil sanction, while the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) said that he would, too. What we have is a straightforward rebellion against the Front Bench on the U.D.I., and what the House as a whole objects to is the cowardice of the Tory Front Bench in having given as its only advice in the matter of this most serious of sanctions that hon. Members should abstain from voting.
What is the country at large to make of such a piece of manoeuvring—[Interruption.] I will make my own speech in my own way and in my own time. We have heard already enough to make tears come to my eyes, at least. We have heard that the Rhodesia lobby is concerned only with the interests of Zambia; but what a lot of nonsense! Have its members asked the Zambians? Have they had any talks with President Kaunda? Has anybody got that sort of opinion? Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), who has just come back into the Chamber, can assist us by saying to what extent the Zambian people are to be helped by this sanction.
Mr. Bernard Braine Mr. Bernard Braine (Essex, South-East) rose——
Mr. Richard: Normally I am quite prepared to give way in debate, but, frankly, the conduct of the Opposition earlier today and in the course of the debate this evening does not encourage me to allow hon. Members opposite to interrupt me during the few remarks which I want to make.
The Rhodesian lobby tell us that their opposition to the Order is based upon the effect which it will have upon the Africans in Rhodesia. What information have they about the effect upon the Africans in Rhodesia? Have they some information which we do not have? Have they some information that Mr. Nkomo, who is apparently in restriction, and the African Nationalist Party in Rhodesia are opposed to the imposition of this oil embargo? I have seen no such information in the Press. If any right hon. or hon. Gentleman can give me that information I will willingly give way to him.

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The hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) was at least honest when he said that the basis of his opposition to the Order was that he did not trust the Prime Minister. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am obliged for those cheers which I accept from the source from which they come. If the view of Opposition back-bench Members is that they do not trust the Prime Minister, is that the view of the Opposition Front Bench? Are they saying that in acquiescing in the noises which are coming from their back benches? It is a very grave charge to make, and it ought to be justified, if it can be justified. Do they believe that the Prime Minister is misleading the House and the country about Rhodesia? I notice that the cheers are getting fewer, and I trust that by the end of the debate, when we vote, they will be down to the residue on the other side of the House.
Mr. Braine Mr. Braine rose——
Mr. Richard: I will not give way. There are hon. Members opposite whom I call the Rhodesian lobby, and who, as my hon. Friends have said, do not want the Government to succeed in their opposition to the Smith régime. The longer this whole affair drags on, the more Orders about Rhodesia that are brought before the House and the more debates about Rhodesia there are, the clearer it becomes that there are hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite who are only too anxious that Smith should succeed. But I do not address myself only to those in the Rhodesian lobby. Hon. Members on the Front Bench below the Gangway opposite, may be satisfied with the way in which the Opposition have behaved today. I wonder whether some hon. Members on the back benches opposite, of whom I thought better, are just as satisfied.
11.24 p.m.
Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I have not listened with any pleasure, nor, probably, I think, have the majority of the House to the speech which we have just heard by the hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard). It has confirmed the view which I have had through 20 years of experience in the House—that the more offensive in tone a speech is, the less its effect on the House. At one stage, the hon. Member prayed his political experience in aid in
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support of his argument. His political experience is short, slight, slender and unsubstantial, if those words are apposite tonight.
Mr. Shinwell: Who is being offensive now?
Sir D. Walker-Smith: The right hon. Gentleman made a long speech and I am seeking to make a short speech which will, I hope, be strictly to the point of the Question now before the House.
I think that every hon. Member has brought and should have brought careful consideration to the issue which lies before us tonight. It can be formulated into three questions which should be answered. First, will oil sanctions as proposed to be imposed prove effective? Secondly, will the hardship which they may bring in their train be disproportionate to the chances of their proving effective? Thirdly, will these sanctions carry an unacceptable risk of involving resort to force?
On all these three matters it is inescapable that the burden of proof lies on the Government, as it must, and I venture to submit that in none of those questions have the Government succeeded in discharging that burden of proof. When I use the words "burden of proof" in the House I am not using the phrase with the strict and particular exactitude with which it is used in the courts where the right hon. and learned Gentleman and myself from time to time meet in friendly forensic conflict. Certainly if we applied those strict standards of proof, everybody would have to concede at once that the Governments' case would be struck out for disclosing no cause of action. I am not proposing to apply that strictness of proof here tonight. I am simply applying the robust, practical, common sense standard of proof which we would expect in the House of Commons; and, applying that standard of proof, none of those questions can confidently be answered in the way in which the Government would wish.
On the first of these matters, whether the sanctions would prove effective, there are two questions. The first concerns the stocks and possible substitute supplies, dealt with so clearly by my right hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser), and the second is the

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question of the chances of a continued supply in spite of our sanctions. The right hon. and learned Gentleman was good enough to refer to the point which I put to the Prime Minister yesterday. Of course it is a fact and is confirmed that we have the unique position of being the only country, so far as we know, to bring this prohibition on oil supplies within the ambit of penal control. I fully accept that the United States and the other countries are sincere in their protestations as to the exhortations which they will give to their suppliers and their hope that they will be complied with. But exhortation is not a substitute for law, and all experience shows it, not only in this country, but in the United States and other countries as well.
There is a provision in the Order saying that the provisions can be applied to foreign countries over whom we have jurisdiction. But it is the countries over whom we have no jurisdiction that we have to take into account. While I accept their good will, they will not be on the same footing as this country. Therefore, we cannot consider that the burden of proof has been discharged in regard to this question either.
I come briefly to the third question—whether it would be likely to involve an unacceptable risk of resort to force. I accept entirely that the Prime Minister is sincere when he says that he does not wish to resort to force. But there is a legal maxim, which will be well known to the right hon. and learned Gentleman—people are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts. We have therefore to look to see what is likely to ensue from the imposition of these sanctions.
Mr. William Molloy: Would the right hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that what he has just said applies, with greater force, to this illegal régime of Smith and his colleagues?
Sir D. Walker-Smith: I have said what I had to say about that. I pointed out that it was an illegal and foolish action when I made my speech on the Rhodesian Constitutional Order in Council. I do not want to repeat what I said then within the narrower ambit of what we are now discussing. The question that we must
2044
face is, accepting the sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman, what will the position be if the policy of oil sanctions drives him, unwillingly, to resort to force. Suppose the choice becomes this, the failure of sanctions or resort to force by way of blockade?
As I understood the right hon. Gentleman he has not excluded the possibility of the use of force if it comes to that position. The question we have to ask is, where will it end'? Before asking that we need to ask, where will it begin? It will begin with the imposition of force on third-party countries, not themselves parties to the dispute. This will raise very grave questions of international law. We ought not to embark upon this lightly or without great consideration and restraint on the part of the Government and this House. It should not be forgotten that this will arise within the ambit of a matter which lies within Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter—that is, within the domestic jurisdiction of this country. It is the pith and purport of the case made by the Government that this is a domestic matter and that the Government of Rhodesia is still exercised from this country.
In conclusion, I accept that the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friends do not want to resort to force. I cannot resist the conclusion, however, that if these sanctions are imposed they may be driven, in the event to force, unwillingly, imperceptibly, but ineluctably and inexorably. There being this possibility, I feel it is my duty to vote against this Order.
11.28 p.m.
Mr. Dick Taverne: I am sorry that the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) took exception to the approach of my hon. Friend the Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard). We realise that the right hon. and learned Gentleman's oratorical style is more elaborate and circumlocutious. He raised a number of points which need looking at. The right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) suggested that one of the difficulties of this Order is that outside powers will be involved. If this is the objection why was the same objection not raised to the imposition of the tobacco or sugar sanctions? There was no vote on them. It is suggested

2045
that other Powers may not support this sanctions, because they have not taken legal action. There has been every support for the other sanctions from a large number of Powers, who were more concerned to suppress the Rhodesian régime than many hon. Members opposite.
Mr. Turton: There have been no Orders before this House introducing tobacco or sugar sanctions.
Mr. Taverne: Technically the right hon. Gentleman is right, but the issue of these Orders has certainly been discussed, as has the question of whether to oppose them, to move a Motion of censure or to vote against them. There was no opposition then. The Leader of the Opposition said that, so far, all these were measures which he had not opposed and which he was willing to support.
Part of the trouble on the benches opposite is that some hon. Members make a perfectly valid point when they question whether the sanctions will be effective—this is a matter which must certainly be looked into—and some hon. Members opposite question them because they will be effective. Amongst these are to be found hon. Members who bring their cars into the car park here with "Support Rhodesia" labels on the back of their car. These are people who ask for support for a rebellious act against the Crown. I wonder sometimes whether some of the leaders of the Opposition Front Bench would not denounce some of this blatant support for the rebellion.
Let the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East argue the question of effectiveness with his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, because the Leader of the Opposition told us this afternoon that he would support the oil sanctions; he thought that they would work. He did not think that further measures would be required.
The hon. and gallant Member for Wells (Lieut.-Commander Maydon), apparently disagreeing with his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition concerning effectiveness, said that one of the results of the Order might be that Africans were hurt. It is true that effective sanctions will hurt not only rebels, but other people in Rhodesia. That is a valid point. It is, however, a point which must be faced about every sanction that is proposed.
2046
If sanctions do not hurt, there is no point whatever in imposing them.
If the only purpose of sanctions was to show a sign of our disapproval, do hon. Members opposite really think that by ticking off the rebellion the régime in Rhodesia would say, "We are sorry, we did not realise that you would disapprove, we will now come to heel"? Until sanctions hurt, which must mean hurting innocent citizens as well as those who support the rebellion, there is no prospect of a return to constitutional rule.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether this sanction was likely to lead to resort to force. In all this, there is one consideration which hon. Members opposite completely fail to consider. Suppose that we do nothing. Suppose that we do not impose sanctions and that we do nothing to reassure African and world opinion that we are determined to bring the rebellion to an end. Do hon. Members opposite think that in those circumstances there is no likelihood of resort to force by anybody else? Do they imagine that if we sit back, let the rebel regime take its course and say, "We are sorry, it may be a rebellion, but there is nothing we can do or intend to do about it", other Powers will do nothing whatever about the enslavement of 4 million Africans? That could never be the outcome.
It is suggested that a result of this sanction might be that at some stage somebody will take it further. That may be the case. The Leader of the Opposition thinks not, but it may well be that because we have no legal authority to enforce it against Portugal, and because South Africa is not under a legal obligation to observe it, if at some stage, contrary to the view of the Leader of the Opposition, further action is necessary, there will be a mandatory resolution in the United Nations. Because of the legal authority that a mandatory resolution in the United Nations would provide, Portugal would be legally bound to observe the sanction.
There is at present no reason to suppose that Portugal and South Africa, which have played the matter strictly according to the legal position, would necessarily ignore a mandatory resolution of the Security Council. The great question, however, which hon. Members

2047
opposite must face is that if we are not prepared to take effective action, impose severe sanctions and get the co-operation of the Powers which are co-operating with the tobacco and sugar sanctions also, the conflict which they so much fear is much more likely to come about than as a result of the policy which is now being followed.
11.40 p.m.
Mr. Eric Lubbock: The hon. and learned Member for Lincoln (Mr. Taverne) is quite correct in underlining the risk that, if we do not impose effective sanctions, there will be a resort to force by other Powers in the world besides ourselves. I think that we ought to bear that in mind in looking at the remarks of the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith), who said that failure of sanctions might involve resort to force by the use of a blockade. That is perfectly true, but the resort to force by the use of a blockade will be a much less harmful alternative to the people of Rhodesia and the people of Africa as a whole than the resort to force by other Powers in the continent of Africa—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Haltemprice (Mr. Wall) may not agree with what I have to say, but I hope that he will listen to me with the same respect that I listened to him.
Not all Conservatives follow the line which has been expressed this evening. I am very pleased that that is so and that there is a cross-current of opinion which makes this a non-political matter. I would like to treat it as such, if I may be permitted to do so—[Interruption.] The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East asked three questions: would oil sanctions prove effective, would they produce hardship disproportionate to their chances of being effective, and would there be unacceptable risk of the resort to force? It is important for anyone who is taking part in the debate to provide the answers to those questions.
I would say that oil sanctions are likely to prove effective. It is a pity that the Government did not take this action earlier on, and I was in full support of my hon. Friend the Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) when he complained about the delivery of oil by the tanker
2048
"British Security" to the port of Beira. At that time, the Prime Minister was saying still that the oil embargo bristled with difficulties, and that he was not in a position to come to the House with firm proposals. I think that, in the light of experience, it would have been much better if the oil embargo had been imposed before the tanker, which was under British control, had reached that Portuguese port and discharged her cargo of 21,000 tons of oil which is now bringing aid and comfort to the rebel regime of Rhodesia.
It is certainly true that if the sanctions which have been imposed so far have proved partially effective, the addition of oil sanctions to those that we have imposed hitherto is likely to be more effective, and that is the answer to the first question which was posed by the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East.
Then he asked if the hardship will be disproportionate to the chances of these sanctions being effective, and I would say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that inevitably the sanctions which we have imposed and which our allies, the Americans, the French and the Germans, are now imposing on oil are likely to bring some degree of hardship to the people of Rhodesia, both black and white. But unless there is some hardship among the people of that country, they are unlikely to come to their senses and agree that the illegal declaration of independence has been a gross aberration and mistake on the part of the Smith régime.
Thirdly, I think that it is quite obvious to anyone who has considered the matter at all that if we want to avoid the use of force we must use every possible peaceful means, including the imposition of oil sanctions, before we go any further. It strikes me as very odd that those who are most irrevocably opposed to the use of force against the illegal régime are those who cry out loudest against the imposition of an oil sanction. I think that there is something inconsistent in this attitude, and that they ought to attempt, at least in their speeches this evening, to try to reconcile that conflict.
The hon. Member for Barons Court (Mr. Richard) rightly asked what kind of sanctions the Opposition would like to impose, and into which categories they would like to divide them. I do not think that one can do this. We have embarked

2049
on a course from which there is no turning back. If we wish, as I think the whole House does, to crush the rebellion of the Smith régime, we must go on imposing sanctions until it is brought back into the path of constitutional government.
It is quite unrealistic to talk, as the hon. Member for Crosby (Mr. Graham Page) does, about the incidental and supplemental provisions of this Order. This evening we have to stand up and be counted. Are we on the side of illegal rebellion by a small junta in Rhodesia, or are we in favour of the restoration of constitutional government in that territory'? Are we prepared to accept, as I believe a small minority of hon. Members on this side of the House are, the de facto existence of a police State in a territory which is supposedly under our control or are we determined to do everything in the power of this House to quell that revolt?
I have always been an admirer of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), but I was disappointed in his speech this evening. I think that he has been mistaken in attempting to focus the attention of the House on the political aspects of this problem, and I think that he has underestimated the seriousness of the position which faces this House, this country, and the world as a whole in dealing with the Rhodesian problem. I think that this is far too serious an issue for the kind of levity with which he treated the House.
Mr. Shinwell: I regard the matter as seriously and as gravely as anyone in this House. I had to deal with the subject when I was representing the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association at the recent Parliamentary Conference, but I am entitled to point out that the Leader of the Opposition and the previous Prime Minister both agreed with the Government about the imposition of oil sanctions, and implied that they would not vote against the Order. The difference of opinion seems to be on the part of some hon. Members on the back benches opposite. Surely I am entitled to point that out?
Mr. Lubbock: The point which the right hon. Gentleman has missed is that we are trying to preserve some national unity on this matter, and he has attempted
2050
to drive a wedge in the Conservative Party, in the unfortunate division which already exists in the official Opposition, and I think that it is his duty to try to help them to rally behind the Government. That is my opinion. The right hon. Gentleman may disagree with me, but I think that if he asks the Prime Minister he will find a different point of view.
The Prime Minister has tried his best to rally national support behind the policy which he has advocated all along, and hitherto he has been remarkably successful in doing so. But today we find the first signs of a rift in the official Opposition, and the right hon. Gentleman, instead of trying to rally support behind the Government for their policy, has attempted to drive a wedge in the Conservative Party and to widen and to exacerbate the divisions which have already appeared.
Mr. Ioan L. Evans: Before the hon. Member sits down——
Mr. Speaker: Order. I think that the hon. Member has sat down.
Mr. Lubbock: No, Mr. Speaker; I had given way to the hon. Member.
Mr. Ioan L. Evans: Would not the hon. Member agree that it is the function of the Leader of the Opposition to keep his party together, and not that of hon. Members on this side of the House?
Mr. Lubbock: I agree that the Leader of the Opposition is paid a salary for that purpose, but that is not of the utmost importance. What I am considering is the position of this country in the world, what we are trying to achieve in Rhodesia, and what our object is in the United Nations and the Commonwealth as a whole, and I do not think that the right hon. Member for Easington has been very helpful in the task that we are trying to undertake this evening.
Mention has been made by hon. and right hon. Members on this side of the House of the hardships which they say will be caused to the people of Zambia by the imposition of the oil sanctions. It is extremely important for the Government to back up the Government and

2051
people of Zambia to the utmost. I am extremely pleased that an airlift has been organised for oil into Zambia, and that the Americans have promised to support us in this. I see that we have already sent a Britannia aircraft with oil to Zambia, but I should like to know why we should not also use Belfast aircraft, which have a much greater capacity than the Britannias, and also the VC10s, which I understand have been newly taken over by Transport Command.
The right hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. Hugh Fraser) has expressed unrepresentative views, and the hon. Member for Haltemprice outrageous views. I hope that when this debate is read in Rhodesia, as no doubt it will be, full account will be taken of the views expressed in the opposite sense from hon. Members on both sides of the House—not only from the Government benches but also from the Conservative benches—because it is extremely important to preserve at least an element of bi-partisanship on this issue.
I agree absolutely with the Prime Minister that notice is taken of the speeches of hon. Members who are against the Government policy on Rhodesia and not the speeches of those in favour of the measures taken to restore that territory to constitutional Government. I hope that the broadcasts which are made by the B.B.C. from Bechuanaland and other places to the people of Rhodesia will take full account of the speeches of Conservative Members who support the oil sanctions imposed by this Order.
11.54 p.m.
The Minister of State, Commonwealth Relations Office (Mr. Cledwyn Hughes): We have heard some predictable criticism from a number of hon. Members, and I want to make it absolutely clear to the House that the Government's decision to make this Order was reached after a very thorough survey of all the practical problems involved. Only after we were completely convinced that oil sanctions were a workable proposition and that oil supplies could be maintained to Zambia did we decide to implement this Order.
I agree that the primary prerequisite of an effective embargo of this kind is the fullest international co-operation, and
2052
Her Majesty's Government have constantly stressed that unilateral action would be totally inadequate without the collective action which I have mentioned. In this respect, we have had the full backing and co-operation of the Government of the United States. They have welcomed and supported the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make the Order in Council, recognising the authority of this Government in this matter, and advising all United States citizens and enterprises to comply with the terms of the Order.
A number of hon. Members have asked what the United States Government are doing. I will give one example to the House. The Norwegian tanker the "Tamarita," on charter to the United States company Aminoil, was due to arrive at Beira on 22nd December with a cargo of crude oil for Rhodesia. I am able to tell the House that the United States Government have instructed the oil company concerned to divert the "Tamarita". This is the extent of the co-operation of the United States and the ability of that Government in this respect.
The responses of other Governments to our requests have also been encouraging. There seems to be a wide-scale willingness to help in all possible ways. I believe that, during my recent visit to Zambia, tangible results were achieved, in particular in arranging to supply Zambia with alternative supplies of petroleum if the Salisbury regime decided to suspend delivery. The institution of an airlift will be a major contribution to continuing these vital supplies. As the House knows, when Mr. Smith, in retaliation against the Order, refused to maintain supplies of oil to Zambia, two British aircraft were able to fly at once into Lusaka in accordance with our agreement. In this respect too, we have the fullest co-operation of the Government of the United States.
I should like to tell the House precisely what is being done over the airlift. It will initially consist of the provision of Britannias of Transport Command to fly oil from Dar-es-Salaam to Ndola. This will be supplemented shortly by a commercial airlift. The Canadian Government has also co-operated fully: they are providing C130s to supplement the British airlift. The United States Government is initially providing DC7 aircraft, which will operate from Elizabethville and

2053
Leopoldville to Ndola. This airlift will be supplemented by an additional supply transported by surface routes.
During my visit to Zambia, I discussed the best land routes into the country in great detail, bearing in mind that supplies from Rhodesia might be cut off, as they were. We are satisfied that the equipment requested by the Zambian Government and the other expenditure proposed were necessary to bring the routes to maximum capacity as quickly as possible, and a list was prepared of the equipment needed, most of which had been ordered in this country. From information we were given, it seems certain that, by about the end of April, the capacity of the land routes should be sufficient to cover Zambia's essential needs.
It is, of course, inevitable that there will still be a certain amount of hardship in Zambia. The Government of Zambia have decided to ration petroleum fairly strictly, although there will be a considerable relaxation once the airlift has reached its peak. In view of what some hon. Members have said, I should like to stress—it is important that I should make this point—that all our measures are being taken with the full agreement and co-operation of President Kaunda and the cabinet of Zambia.
Mr. Braine: There is one question which has not been asked tonight and which, so far, has not been answered. [Laughter.] Before hon. Gentlemen opposite dissolve completely into laughter, I should point out that I asked the Prime Minister this question yesterday and he did not answer it. Has a calculation been made by the Government of the cost of this airlift to Zambia or are we entering into an open-
commitment at a time of acute economic stress in this country?
Mr. Hughes: Certainly calculations have been made. Her Majesty's Government would not enter into a commitment of this kind without having made careful calculations. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] This is a phased operation. As I have tried to explain—[Interruption.]—it would not be proper for me to give detailed calculations this evening. If I gave them they would be helpful to people whose only desire is to circumvent this embargo.
I would like, finally, to stress that the Order is designed to bring about the downfall of the illegal regime in Salisbury with the minimum possible delay. With each day that passes with the illegal regime still in office the difficulty of creating a genuine multi-racial society in Rhodesia increases. Tensions are building up throughout Africa. Failure to secure the rapid downfall of Smith and his associates will lead to others taking over the responsibility of that country for the solution of the problem. This could only lead to chaos and misery throughout Central Africa and a situation which would be to the detriment not only of all the peoples of Africa but also of the free world as a whole. It is for this reason that I ask the House to support the Order.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Edward Short)The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Edward Short) rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.
Question put accordingly.
The House divided: Ayes 276, Noes 48.

Division No. 16.]

AYES

[12.2 a.m.

Abse, Leo

Blenkinsop, Arthur

Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)

Albu, Austen

Boston, Terence

Coleman, Donald

Alison, Michael (Barkston Ash)

Bottomley, Rt. Hn. Arthur

Conlan, Bernard

Alldritt, Walter

Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics S.W.)

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Boyden, James

Cousins, Rt. Hn. Frank

Armstrong, Ernest

Braddock, Mrs. E. M.

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Atkinson, Norman

Bray, Dr. Jeremy

Crawshaw, Richard

Awdry, Daniel

Brinton, Sir Tatton

Cronin, John

Bacon, Miss Alice

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Crosland, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Bagier, Gordon A. T.

Brown, R. W. (Shoreditch & Fbury)

Crossman, Rt. Hn. R. H. S.

Barnett, Joel

Buchan Norman (Renfrewshire, W.)

Dalyell, Tarn

Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton

Buchanan, Richard

Darling, George

Beaney, Alan

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Davies, C. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)

Benn, Rt. Hn. Anthony Wedgwood

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Berkeley, Humphry

Callaghan, Rt. Hn. James

Davies, Ifor (Gower)

Bessell, Peter

Carlisle, Mark

de Freitas, Sir Geoffrey

Binns, John

Carmichael, Neil

Delargy, Hugh

Bishop, E. S.

Carter-Jones, Lewis

Dell, Edmund

Blackburn, F.

Chapman, Donald

Dempsey, James

Diamond, Rt. Hn. John

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Perry, Ernest G.

Doig, Peter

Johnson, James (K'ston-on-Hull, W.)

Popplewell, Ernest

Driberg, Tom

Johnston, Russell (Inverness)

Prentice, R. E.

Dully, Dr. A. E. P.

Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Dunn, James A.

Jones, Dan (Burnley)

Probert, Arthur

Dunnett, Jack

Jones, Rt. Hn. Sir Elwyn (W. Ham,S.)

Pursey, Cmdr. Harry

Edelman, Maurice

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Randall, Harry

Edwards, Rt. Hn. Nest (Caerphilly)

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Rees, Merlyn

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Jopling, Michael

Reynolds, G. W.

English, Michael

Kelley, Richard

Richard, Ivor

Ennals, David

Kenyon, Clifford

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Ensor, David

Kerr, Mrs. Anne (R'ter & Chatham)

Rodgers, William (Stockton)

Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

Kerr, Dr. David (W'worth, Central)

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Evans, loan (Birmingham, Yardley)

Kirk, Peter

Rose, Paul B.

Fernyhough, E.

Lawson, George

Ross, Rt. Hn. William

Finch, Harold (Bedwellty)

Lee, Rt. Hn. Frederick (Newton)

Rowland, Christopher

Fisher, Nigel

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

St. John-Stevas, Norman

Fitch, Alan (Wigan)

Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)

Sheldon, Robert

Fletcher, Sir Eric (Islington, E.)

Litchfield, Capt. John

Shepherd, William

Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)

Lomas, Kenneth

Shinwell, Rt. Hn. E.

Fletcher, Raymond (Ilkeston)

Longden, Gilbert

Shore, Peter (Stepney)

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles (Darwen)

Loughlin, Charles

Short, Rt. Hn. E. (N'c'tle-on-Tyne, C.)

Floud, Bernard

Lubbock, Eric

Short, Mrs. Renée (W'hampton, N. E.)

Foley, Maurice

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Silkin, John (Deptford)

Foot, Sir Dingle (Ipswich)

McBride, Neil

Silkin, S. C. (Camberwell, Dulwich)

Ford, Ben

MacColl, James

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Tom (Hamilton)

MacDermot, Niall

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Freeson, Reginald

McKay, Mrs. Margaret

Sinclair, Sir George

Garrett, w. E.

Mackenzie, Alasdair (Ross & Crom'ty)

Skeffington, Arthur

Garrow, Alex

Mackenzie, Gregor (Ruthergien)

Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)

Ginsburg, David

Mackie, George Y. (C'ness & S'land)

Small, William

Gourlay, Harry

Mackie, John (Enfield, E.)

Snow, Julian

Greenwood, Rt. Hn. Anthony

Maddan, W. F. M.

Soskice, Rt. Hn. Sir Frank

Gregory, Arnold

Mahon, Peter (Preston, S.)

Steel, David (Roxburgh)

Grey, Charles

Mahon, Simon (Bootle)

Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)

Swain, Thomas

Griffiths, Will (M'chester, Exchange)

Manuel, Archie

Swingler, Stephen

Gunter, Rt. Hn. R. J.

Mapp, Charles

Symonds, J. B.

Hale, Leslie

Marten, Neil

Taverne, Dick

Hamilton, William (West Fife)

Mason, Roy

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Hamling, William (Woolwich, W.)

Maude, Angus

Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

Harper, Joseph

Mayhew, Christopher

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)

Mellish, Robert

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Hattersley, Roy

Mendelson, J. J.

Thornton, Ernest

Hazell, Bert

Meyer, Sir Anthony

Thorpe, Jeremy

Healey, Rt. Hn. Denis

Mikardo, Ian

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Heffer, Eric S.

Millan, Bruce

Tinn, James

Herbison, Rt. Hn. Margaret

Miller, Dr. M. S.

Tuck, Raphael

Higgins, Terence L.

Mills, Stratton (Belfast, N.)

Urwin, T. W.

Hobden, Dennis (Brighton, K'town)

Milne, Edward (Blyth)

Varley, Eric G.

Holman, Percy

Miscampbell, Norman

Wainwright, Edwin

Hooson, H. E.

Molloy, William

Walker, Harold (Doncaster)

Hornby, Richard

Monslow, Walter

Wallace, George

Horner, John

Morris, Charles (Openshaw)

Warbey, William

Houghton, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Morris, John (Aberavon)

Watkins, Tudor

Howarth, Harry (Wellingborough)

Murray, Albert

Weitzman, David

Howarth, Robert L. (Bolton, E.)

Newens, Stan

Wellbeloved, James

Howell, Denis (Small Heath)

Nicholson, Sir Godfrey

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Howie, W.

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

White, Mrs. Eirene

Hoy, James

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Whitlock, William

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Norwood, Christopher

Wigg, Rt. Hn. George

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Ogden, Eric

Willey, Rt. Hn. Frederick

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Oram, Albert E. (E. Ham, S.)

Williams, Alan (Swansea, W.)

Hunt, John (Bromley)

Orbach, Maurice

Williams, Clifford (Abertillery)

Hynd, John (Attercliffe)

Orme, Stanley

Williams, Mrs. Shirley (Hitchin)

Iremonger, T. L.

Oswald, Thomas

Williams, W. T. (Warrington)

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Page, Derek (King's Lynn)

Wilson, Rt. Hn. Harold (Huyton)

Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

Palmer, Arthur

Winterbottom, R. E.

Jackson, Colin

Pannell, Rt. Hn. Charles

Wyatt, Woodrow

Janner, Sir Barnett

Parker, John

Yates, Victor (Ladywood)

Jay, Rt. Hn. Douglas

Pavitt, Laurence

Zilliacus, K.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)

Jenkin, Patrick (Woodford)

Peart, Rt. Hn. Fred

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)

Pentland, Norman

Mr. John McCann and

Mr. Brian O'Malley.

NOES

Allason, James (Hemel Hempstead)

Bruee-Gardyne, J.

Currie, G. B. H.

Amery, Rt. Hn. Julian

Bullus, Sir Eric

Davies, Dr. Wyndham (Perry Barr)

Baker, W. H. K.

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Biggs-Davison, John

Cordle, John

Fell, Anthony

Box, Donald

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Fletcher-Cooke, Sir John (S'pton)

Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)

Cunningham, Sir Knox

Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (St'fford & Stone)

2056

2057

Grieve, Percy

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn

Teeling, Sir William

Griffiths, Peter (Smethwick)

Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C,

Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)

Hay, John

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Turton, Rt. Hn. R. H.

Hirst, Geoffrey

Neave, Airey

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hn. Sir Derek

Hordern, Peter

Nicholls, Sir Harmar

Wall, Patrick

Howard, Hn. G. R. (St. Ives)

Page, John (Harrow, w.)

Weatherill, Bernard

Hutchison, Michael Clark

Quennell, Miss J. M,

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Jennings, J. C

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Woodnutt, Mark

Kerby, Capt. Henry

Talbot, John E.

Lagden, Godfrey

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Lloyd, Ian (P'tsmth, Langstone)

Taylor, Edward M. (G'gow, Cathcart)

Mr. Stephen Hastings and

Mr. Victor Goodbew.

Resolved,
That the Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order, 1965, dated 17th December, 1965, made by Her Majesty in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, a copy of which was laid before this House on 18th December, be approved.

LABELLING OF FOOD
12.13 a.m.
Mrs. Joyce Butler: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision for the labelling of food and toilet preparations, the display of notices in relation to food, and matters connected therewith.
Since I sought to introduce a similar Bill last February, a number of developments have taken place both at home and abroad which show the need for comprehensive food labelling and a fresh examination of the whole question. The Council of Europe, meeting at Strasbourg, has recommended member countries to take more vigorous steps to control by legislation the use of food additives, and it has pointed out that a man eating his favourite food every day, as many people do, may in the course of time build up a normally harmless residue to a dangerous level. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the World Health Organisation are setting up an international survey of food additives.
Here at home, the director of the Consumer Council has said that most of the complaints about foodstuffs which the Council receives are now concerned with the lack of information about additives. The Government's own Food Standards Committee has asked for stricter requirements for declaring the chemical additives in food. The British Industrial Biological Research Association is to spend £100,000 on investigating chemical additions to food. The Joint Conference of Women's Groups on Public Welfare and the Standing Conference of Women's Organisa
2058
tions both support stricter Government legislation to control food chemicals.
This is an impressive body of official support for the principles behind the Bill, and the backing for it from members of the public is growing every day. But, when we consider that the Government's own National Food Survey revealed that one-third of our population is deficient in two major nutrients and that the position in this respect is worse than it was ten years ago, this concern is not surprising. The journal Medical Officer, voicing the anxiety of the medical profession, on the close connection between specific nutritional deficiencies and clinical disease, has said:
"In her choice of the family food, the housewife has the greatest single measure of control of the health of her family."
I agree, but, until food manufacturers are forced to disclose all the dyes, flavourings and additives in foods, the housewife has to shop in blinkers. She does not know, when she buys coloured foods—and almost all packaged and tinned foods are dyed now—whether the colour is one of the six which were condemned by the Food Standards' Committee; and it will almost certainly be one of the 30 which have not yet been proved to be safe although they are in common use. She does not know, when she buys a bottle of orange juice, which may be labelled "Made with pure fruit", that the minimum standards standard laid down by law for this product permits the actual juice to be only 5 per cent., with 95 per cent. water and artificial colouring, artificial flavouring and artificial sweetening added.
To take a recent case, when the weight of jam in jars was reduced from one pound to 12 ounces for a similar price, the housewife had no means of knowing whether the higher priced jam was of better quality made from fresh fruit in season and free from preservatives, as the manufacturers claimed, or the cheaper

2059
jam contained pulped fruit preserved with sulphur dioxide, because there was no requirement to label the jam accordingly.
We have been far too complacent and too indifferent about possible dangers from food additives in this country, and it is time that we checked the ever increasing flood. We lag behind the United States, which is more strict than we are, and still further behind Western Germany. West Germany has proved that it is practicable to impose a rigorous obligation on manufacturers to disclose to the public by strict and enforceable regulations what additives have been used and, contrary to what some food manufacturers in this country have suggested, the long chemical names, the real meaning of which is known only to the experts, have come to be recognised by German housewifes when they appear on the labels and they have known which to avoid buying.
As a result food in Germany has greatly improved in quality. Margarine in Germany, for example, is now completely free from chemical colourings, emulsifiers and additives of any kind and the enforcement of food regulations has been made more effective.
It is small comfort to learn, as I did a short time ago, that food containing unlabelled additives which cannot be sold in Germany because of their strict regulations is exported to be sold in this country because our regulations in this respect are so lax.
My Bill would insist that food manufacturers should label their products according to all the chemicals contained in them or used in their preparation. It would also contain provisions for labelling cosmetics as well as food, because of the possible health hazard of absorbing substances through the skin or, in the case of lipstick, by way of the mouth.
2060
It would, moreover, be in line with the Brambell Committee Report on factory farming, in that it would provide for the appropriate labelling of meat and meat products produced in this way. While it is right that we should be concerned about the animals' welfare and the economic implications to the farmer, there is also the health hazard to the consumer to be considered from meat raised with artificial feeds and under unnatural conditions. Appropriate labelling would allow the customer to choose or reject such meat at will.
I recognise that the Minister is very much concerned about this problem and is considering new regulations, but these may be a long time coming into operation and are unlikely to be so comprehensive and far-ranging as my Bill. I strongly suspect that there is a close link between the ever increasing expenditure on chemical fertilisers, pesticides and food additives and the ever increasing bill for National Health, which is now running at £1,200,000 million a year. If we put the truth on the label, we shall be making an important contribution to consumer choice and to the nation's health which is long overdue. I therefore ask the House to give me leave to bring in this Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mrs. Joyce Butler, Mrs. Braddock, Sir Stephen McAdden, Mr. John Farr, Mr. John Rankin, and Mr. Jeremy Thorpe.

LABELLING OF FOOD
Bill to make provision for the labelling of food and toilet preparations, the display of notices in relation to food, and matters connected therewith, presented accordingly, and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 11th March, and to be printed. [Bill 51.]

POST OFFICE (OPENING OF LETTERS)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mrs. Harriet Slater.]
12.24 a.m.
Mr. Godfrey Lagden: For the past two days the House has been discussing matters which have held the attention not only of the vast majority of the people in this country but of the world. A few minutes ago these benches were crowded with Members, most of whom have now gone about their various duties. It now falls to me to address you, Mr. Speaker, on a matter which I consider a duty, a duty which I do not relish, for the reason that it implies of criticism of those I know to be hard working and those who have always been kind and helpful to me personally. Nevertheless, I have a duty to perform on behalf of a constituent of mine, Miss Robinson, of 58, Hyland Close, Horn-church, the Midland Bank, and the public in general.
I spent considerable time and thought before deciding to seek this opportunity for raising this subject, which falls into three categories—the interests of Miss Robinson, the security of the Midland Bank, and the safeguarding of the public in general. Miss Robinson had a letter sent to her on 7th October, 1965, but because of a typing error on the envelope it was addressed to 50, Hyland Close instead of to number 58. It was quite properly refused by the occupant of that house and taken away by the postman, who also correctly returned it to the "Return Letter Branch", having endorsed it, "Name not known as addressed".
So far, so good; but the letter in question, the envelope of which I hold photographic copies, had on the front in bold, black print, the word "Private, The Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company", and, on the back of the envelope, "Private, if undelivered, return to the Midland Bank Ltd.". This is heavily underlined. The stuck-down flap of the envelope was covered by a seal of the Midland Bank, but, despite these clear instructions, the letter was opened by the postal authorities and, from the contents, which were most confidential,
2062
Miss Robinson's address was obtained, and the Midland Bank letter taken to her home. The time taken from the first delivery at 50, Hyland Close to its delivery at No. 58 was twelve days; twelve whole days.
The letter contained a bank statement, salary warrant and cheques, all of which were highly confidential to Miss Robinson, and my constituent is understandably concerned that such an action had been taken. She then referred the matter to me. I made inquiries at a local level, expecting a complete apology and perhaps regrets, together with an assurance that steps would be taken to see that this would not occur again; but, to my surprise, what happened was far from this. In point of fact, I received an official letter, which I will now read to the House, and I feel sure that it will cause some great uneasiness. This is an official letter, dated 10th November, 1965, stating,
"I am replying to your letter dated 28th October. The envelope was incorrectly addressed to Miss Robinson. Because the postman on this walk did not know Miss Robinson's address, he rightly endorsed the envelope 'Name not known as addressed' and the item was returned to the local Returned Letter Branch. Printed on the back of the envelope are the words, 'Private—if undelivered please return to Midland Bank, Ltd.' There were no instructions on the envelope indicating to what branch of the Bank the item should be returned, and, as there are four branches in the W.C.1 area, it would appear to me that there was no alternative but to open the item in order that it could be returned to the branch from whom it was sent.
The officer who opened the item noticed from its contents …"
and here I would interpose to say that he noticed a cheque,
"… that it was wrongly addressed, and forwarded it to the correct address. I would have thought that Miss Robinson might have commended, rather than cricitised, the Post Office, and I resent Miss Robinson's assumption that 'idle curiosity prompted the opening of the envelope'. I think that Miss Robinson should have complained to her Bank Manager about the wrongly addressed envelope rather than have a go at the Post Office.
We do not open letters on which the sender's name and address appear on the outside, letters from a British Commonwealth or foreign country, letters addressed to a titled person or a Member of Parliament, a letter sent from a Royal residence, a Consulate or an Embassy, a letter bearing outside the signature of a Peer, a Bishop, or other person of eminence, or a letter bearing the seal of the House of Commons.

2063
The contents of a returnable letter should not be examined in the hope of ascertaining its correct address, yet, if it is observed that the address of the addressee appears at the head or the foot of the letter and that it differs from the address on the cover then the letter must be issued to the correct address. Miss Robinson's letter did not come in the category of letters which should not be opened. Her main complaint seems to be …"
The letter continues.
I hope that the House will note the nature of this letter, which states that the Post Office do not open letters to persons of eminence. Who, I wonder, decides who are persons of eminence, apart from Members of Parliament, bishops, etc.? The House will also notice that, according to the Post Office letter, the top and bottom of any letter is all that should be examined in an attempt to find the correct address and that in this case the contents were thoroughly examined. Why was this rule broken? The reason given by the Post Office for not returning the envelope to the bank was that it did not state the branch of the Midland Bank. Surely this is the most pathetic excuse and one which which appears to insult the intelligence of those hearing it. The Midland Bank has 1,000 branches. Thousands of letters go out daily from banks all over Britain in envelopes bearing a request to return them to the Midland or other bank—a quest which in most cases, if not all, is complied with. Why this exception? Perhaps the Postmaster-General will tell us.
The House will realise that a considerable security risk is involved here. If a bank, writing under strict private cover, and having specially printed envelopes carrying a request printed on the back and underlined, cannot rely on this request being respected, then it is not necessary for me to explain to the Postmaster-General the security risk which can be incurred. All sorts of possibilities fly to one's mind. There is the ordinary investment advice which may be given in confidence. A letter may reveal to people opening it such knowledge as who is paying for the support of a child, and that may lead to considerable embarrassment. There was a Midland Bank within a very short distance of this sorting office.
I am sure that the Postmaster-General feels it incumbent upon him to apologise
2064
to my constituent and to give an assurance to the bank that in the public interest the bank will have the same privileges as those granted to the list of persons I mentioned, particularly the persons of eminence. I submit that people are entitled to feel that when a bank sends letters to them in these special envelopes, with the heavily printed instruction on them, this instruction will not be disregarded. Hon. Members will also agree that the general public are entitled to expect that when they lodge a complaint to their Member of Parliament, at least some form of apology will be made. Had that happened it would not have been necessary for me to bring this matter to the House tonight. I stress again that it has not been raised by me for any petty personal reasons. I have always valued the close co-operation which I have received from the postal authorities and the postmaster in my area. I must ask the Postmaster-General to give an assurance that this sort of thing will be seriously looked into and instructions given.
In case the right hon. Gentleman may think of saying that this is an exceptional case, I will say that after I made a few remarks concerning this debate to the B.B.C. at midday, I received a considerable number of telephone messages to say that this sort of thing does happen. One gentleman took the trouble to come to the House and leave with me an envelope. His name is F. T. Faulkner, Esq., 2, Selhurst Road, London, S.E.25. He has been receiving his payments from St. Anne's Post Office for a number of years. On this occasion, the payment did not arrive and inquiries had to be made. I will not weary the House beyond giving the brief facts. One of the Post Office's own envelopes was correctly addressed to this gentleman at the house which he has occupied for years, but somebody took it upon himself to cross out "S.E.25" and substitute "S.E.23", whereupon the letter could not be delivered, because "S.E.25" was correct and "S.E.23" was not. On inquiry, St. Anne's Post Office wrote a letter, one paragraph of which said:
"I am afraid that I am at loss to understand either why the dividend should have been delivered late, or why it should have been opened. …"
Here is a branch of the Post Office saying that this should not have been done.

2065
All I ask is that the right hon. Gentleman will give an assurance that he will look thoroughly into this matter and give an apology to the persons whom I have mentioned.
12.36 a.m.
The Postmaster-General (Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn): I am grateful to the hon. Member for Hornchurch (Mr. Lagden) for raising this subject tonight, and particularly for the tone with which he did so. I underline what he said—that it is the duty of a Member of Parliament to raise the grievance of a constituent, and he is quite right to have brought it to the House as he did.
I listened very carefully to what the hon. Gentleman had to say. So far as we can find out, this is probably the first time that the issue of wrongly or incompletely addressed mail has been brought to the attention of the House, at any rate for some long time, and the debate gives me the opportunity to say something about the considerable efforts which the Post Office makes to get such mail delivered. Whatever may be said about the methods which we used in this instance, to which I shall return later, I can assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that their sole aim was to get the letter delivered to the person for whom it was intended and, as we know, in this case we were successful.
The general position is that when a letter is incompletely or incorrectly addressed, the delivery postman uses all his own ingenuity and common sense to find out where it should go. I am sure that, as I have had, the hon. Gentleman has had letters saying "Try No. 12" or "Try No. 48", in the hope that this can be done. When he is unsuccessful—and this sometimes happens—the Post Office searches street and telephone directories to try to find out the correct address. This is a very time-consuming task, but we do it because we work on the basis that our first and over-riding obligation is to deliver mail to the man or woman to whom it is addressed whenever that is humanly possible. I do not have statistics with me this evening, but I am glad to say that the methods we use are frequently successful and hon. Gentleman will no doubt have seen references in the Press from time to time of some extra-
2066
ordinary examples of mail being delivered when the address is quite inadequate.
However, in many other cases where such information is not available—and this is frequently the case—we cannot just let matters rest there. The sender of a letter clearly wants it to reach his correspondent and it seems obvious to us that if, despite our best efforts, we cannot fulfil the sender's wishes, the least we can do is to let him know this and return the letter to him. In many cases, particularly where business mail is concerned, the senders put their names and addresses on the outside together with the request that undelivered mail should be returned to them. This arrangement has a double advantage for the sender and the Post Office. We can dispose of an undeliverable letter with the minimum of delay and the sender can get it back unopened, also with the minimum of delay. I hope that this debate will be instrumental in persuading more people to show a full return address on the outside of their mail.
However, when neither the name nor the address of the sender is on the outside of an undeliverable letter—and this unfortunately happens all too often—we have only two effective choices—to destroy the letter or to open it in the hope that we shall be able to find either the name and address of the sender or that of the addressee. It clearly would not be sensible to destroy such letters If we were to do this we might be destroying documents or some other contents of great value. We therefore open these letters, even if, as in the instance to which the hon. Gentleman has drawn my attention, they are marked "Private and Confidential". There are circumstances where the only alternative is to open a letter marked "Private and Confidential" or to destroy it.
I must stress that the letters are opened under very close supervision. The staff concerned all know and act on the strict instructions that they are to do no more than to look for a name and address at the head and foot of the letter, and that they are not in any circumstances, on pain of dismissal, to divulge any other information which may come to their knowledge while doing this work. It is clear from our experience that these rules are well understood and observed.
The letter with which we are concerned falls into none of these categories which

2067
I have described. It could not be delivered as it was addressed, but it was not completely without information. As the hon. Gentleman said, it carried the name of the bank which had sent it, but it did not carry enough information about the address of the branch to which it should be returned. With the very best of intentions, the local staff decided to open the letter, in the hope that they could obtain the information about the branch concerned. I must emphasise that this letter was opened for this reason only. This was a matter of local judgment, taken locally. I would like to reaffirm what was said in correspondence, that it would not be done out of idle curiosity. The hon. Member may not know, but 70 million letters a year are incorrectly addressed and undeliverable. That is over a million letters a week. I assure him that with the pressure of work in Post Offices, there is no idle curiosity encouraging Post Office workers to open letters which are not properly addressed.
Mr. Lagden: This letter had the address printed very clearly on the back of it —the right hon. Gentleman can probably read it from here—"If undelivered return to Midland Bank". If Post Office workers are so hard-pressed, how much easier it would have been for them to do what they were asked to do, instead of opening it and searching it. If they had taken the trouble to look through the telephone directory, as the right hon. Gentleman says is done, they would have found the address.
Mr. Benn: It is true, and I must apologise for this, that it took a longer time than we would have liked to complete the task. But the lady in question got the letter, and I am told that in the office in question there were a large
2068
number of undeliverable letters at that time.
Although our instructions for dealing with this kind of mail are very full, they do not at the moment bear specifically on the kind of letter with which we are concerned—where one large and well-known organisation asks for an undeliverable letter to be returned to it but does not say to which of their many offices it should be sent. I think that in such cases it would be best to send the letter to the headquarters of the organisation, and if that cannot readily be done, and it would be acceptable to the organisation concerned, to send it to the manager of one of the local branches so that he can decide what to do with it and we are now considering how we can deal with this problem. It would be better still if large organisations, including banks, would have their stationery printed to show which particular branch the letter came from. This would eliminate any difficulties.
By raising this matter the hon. Gentleman has pointed to an area where changes might be made. I gather that the present regulations, which I had not seen until this case came up, covers persons of eminence and peers and all that sort of nonsense, and that only indicates that as a general rule the office will send the letter on to any person who can be identified. This is all that it meant. It is not always, however, that on the postal side we can do something which will both help our customers and, at the same time, cut down our own work. I repeat again my thanks to the hon. Member for drawing attention to this case.
Question put and agreed to
Adjourned accordingly at a quarter to One o'clock.

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  Flyover Bridge (Llandudno Station)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Oxford

CIVIL SERVANTS AND B.B.C. FILM
2.35 p.m.
LORD ST. HELENS: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government for what purpose the television programme, The War Game, was seen by a group of senior civil servants.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, they were invited by the B.B.C. to see the film. Having done so, they reported to Ministers who decided that the question of showing the film was entirely one for the B.B.C. The Corporation have themselves made it clear that the decision not to broadcast the film was their own.
LORD ST. HELENS: My Lords, may I thank the Minister for his reply, and for finally scotching any rumour there may have been about this particular occurrence?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord.
LORD ERROLL OF HALE: My Lords, could the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, give the House an assurance that it is not going to become the practice that civil servants will be invited to spend their time seeing films, and will then give their advice to the B.B.C. on controversial matters?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, it is impossible to give an assurance of that kind. It is entirely a matter for the B.B.C. to invite whom they wish to see
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a film. The Government have not interfered in this matter in any way whatsoever.

GOVERNMENT GRANTS FOR YOUTH SERVICE
2.37 p.m.
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is now their policy, in making grants for the benefit of youth service, to curtail their grants to one-sex organisations such as boys' clubs, in order to divert the money so saved to mixed organisations.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (LORD SNOW): My Lords, grants were offered during the last three years to national voluntary youth organisations towards their headquarters' administration and training expenses. A list of these grants was given in the OFFICIAL REPORT of another place on October 28. There is no bias against single-sex organisations, and such is not the policy of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science. He acknowledges the valuable services they provide, especially for the younger age groups; but he is also aware of the need for new thinking, and possibly new kinds of provision, in the upper age range.
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: My Lords, I should like to express my thanks to the Minister for his courteous reply—indeed his most comforting reply. On the other hand, I should like to ask whether he is aware that the Sunday Times of November 7 published a report containing alleged quotations from the Minister responsible for sport, which gave an exactly contrary impression and has caused a lot of discouragement among those who are working in and for boys' clubs. Perhaps I might ask the Minister, if he is aware of that report, whether he considers that some statement ought to be issued along the lines of the reply he has given in order to make the matter clear generally?
LORD SNOW: My Lords, I was not aware of the report which the noble Lord has just quoted. The policy I stated is, of course, the policy of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science and all his Ministers. But I will certainly bring the noble Lord's remarks to the attention of my right honourable friend.

BRITISH CONTROL OF RESERVE BANK OF RHODESIA
2.40 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether their action in taking over control of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia is to be taken as a precedent for the future and as in keeping with our role as bankers for the sterling area.]
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the present situation is unique. The suspension of the former Board of the Reserve Bank and the appointment of a new Board was done under the quite exceptional powers conferred upon Her Majesty in Council under the Southern Rhodesia Act. It cannot be taken as a precedent.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his Answer, I would ask whether he is aware that there are many people in this country who, while agreeing that the Rhodesian Government has committed an illegal act, also remember cases in which other countries whose balances we hold have committed illegal acts—for instance, the invasion of Goa by India. Is the noble Lord aware that people wonder why the British Government did not on that occasion seize the balances held in this country by the Bank of England on behalf of India?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, there is a great deal of misunderstanding in many parts of the country, and possibly also in your Lordships' House. In regard to the incident to which the noble Lord referred, he will take into account that India was an independent country. The present circumstance is of an issue
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between Her Majesty's Government, Parliament and the country, with a Colony—a quite different proposition.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that, while agreeing technically that Rhodesia is a Colony, she has been self-governing for forty years, and responsible for her own home affairs and her defence, and that in the case of Rhodesia many people regard the term Colony as a misnomer?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I would imagine that that was a statement. The noble Viscount will have an opportunity of expressing his views, if he so wishes, in the debate later this afternoon. But I hope that he will bear very much in mind that Parliament is responsible for the Colony of Rhodesia, and whatever action we are taking is taken to bring Rhodesia back within the Commonwealth.

TANZANIA AND TERRORIST GROUPS
2.42 p.m.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government, in view of the statement made by the Secretary for External Affairs for the Mozambique Liberation Front that terrorist groups are to be trained in military camps in Tanzania for action in Rhodesia, what representations, if any, they intend to make to President Nyerere not to grant training facilities for these terrorists, in order to avoid bloodshed in Central Africa.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LORD WALSTON): My Lords, I am not aware of the statement to which the noble Viscount refers. Her Majesty's Government do not believe that terrorism in any form is the right way of solving the problems in Central Africa or anywhere else. As the noble Viscount will no doubt be aware, the Government of Tanzania are no longer in diplomatic relations with the British Government.
VISCOUNT MASSEREENE AND FERRARD: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his Answer, may I ask him whether he is aware that the statement referred to in my Question was that of Mr. Santos Mancellini, and was quite widely publicised in the Press? Is the noble Lord further aware that, though Tanzania has broken off diplomatic relations with this country, she is still in the Commonwealth and is to a great extent subsidised by the British taxpayer? Might I also ask the noble Lord whether he remembers the statement of the Prime Minister, in an interview to the Daily Mirror earlier this month, in which he stated that he did not underrate the horrors of externally inspired subversion in Rhodesia?
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, I am aware of all those things which the noble Viscount has stated. But that still does not, in my view, justify Her Majesty's Government in any way interfering and making representations to the Government of an independent country. Her Majesty's Government's views on terrorism are well known and are as I have stated. They are clearly well known to all the other countries with which we are in contact and to those with which we have no diplomatic relations.

RHODESIA: GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE ON BLOCKADE
2.44 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the following Question, of which I have given notice:
To ask Her Majesty's Government if they will undertake not to impose a blockade or the use of force in any other way in the implementation of their policy in relation to Southern Rhodesia, without first securing the approval of Parliament.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, I can certainly assure the noble and learned Viscount that, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made clear on a number of occasions, it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to embark upon unilateral military action, including the institution of a blockade against the illegal régime in Rhodesia. I can further assure the noble and learned
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Viscount that, were there to be grave developments in the United Nations during the coming Recess, Her Majesty's Government would seriously consider recalling Parliament. The Government will, in any case, be at the disposal of the Leaders of the Opposition Parties in both Houses for consultations on these matters at any time during the Recess.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for the Answer he has given, and if it means what I think it means I would regard it as satisfactory. There is a reference in the Answer to "grave developments in the United Nations". Am I correct in thinking—I think it is to be inferred from this Answer— that any proposal to impose a blockade would be regarded as a grave development?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount will realise that I am now offering my personal interpretation of a Government Statement, and I must speak subject to that qualification I am not sure that "any proposal" (to use that precise term) in the United Nations would be a grave development. After all, it might be a development that was rejected. But any imposition of a blockade would, in my opinion, appear to be a grave development.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sorry to press this matter a little more. But the noble Earl will appreciate that, before this country voted for, or was committed to, any such proposal at the United Nations, it would, as I think, be a widely felt desire that this House should have an opportunity of debating the matter before Her Majesty's Government were committed.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am sure that very great attention will be paid to what the noble and learned Viscount has said. He will appreciate that I cannot add to what is in the Statement, but since he interpreted it in the way favourable to his point of view, let us hope that his interpretation is correct.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I noted one word in the noble Earl's reply. As I understood it—I am asking a question, only this is preliminary to the question—he said that we would

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not use force or a blockade unilaterally, unless Parliament was consulted first. What does that word "unilaterally" mean? Does it mean that, if we did it in combination with other nations, the Government would not be bound to recall Parliament before action was taken?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am afraid that the noble Marquess did not quite hear my statement, which I may have read too fast. I did not give an absolute pledge that Parliament would be recalled in any circumstances. But I did give a pledge that Her Majesty's Government, in certain circumstances, would seriously consider recalling Parliament and would, in any case, be accessible for discussions with the Opposition Leaders. I should not like there to be some misunderstanding on that point. If I understand the noble Marquess correctly, he would regard, as I would, any serious plan of using force on behalf of the United Nations as a grave development, which would be clearly covered by what I have read out this afternoon.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, do I understand the noble Earl aright in his answer? My noble friend, as I understood him, asked for a categorical pledge that no force would be used, by blockade or otherwise, without getting Parliamentary approval. Do I understand the noble Earl aright in saying that the answer to that is, No: he can give no such pledge; he can only declare the intention. Is that right? He has given no pledge?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I have gone a long way to meet the noble and learned Viscount, and I think that when the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, reads what I have said he will feel that I have gone further than he may have expected.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, why cannot the noble Earl give a positive undertaking that these steps will not be taken without Parliamentary approval?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am afraid that, as the noble Lord realises, we are responsible, or may be responsible, for very rapid action. But I think that taken together the two pledges I have given, of complete accessibility at all times to the Leaders of the Opposition, and a readiness to consider a
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recall if there were grave developments, would satisfy the vast majority of Members of the House.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, is there not a technicality here which may arise from the way in which I framed the Question—namely, that it does not rest with the Government to recall Parliament; that has to be done by other machinery? I took the sentence in the last part of the Answer to be referring to that technical situation, where it does not in fact lie in the Government to decide on the recall of Parliament; other steps have to be taken. Am I not correct in thinking that that is the reason for the somewhat unusual language, perhaps, of the last part of the Answer? And am I not correct in taking it that this does in fact mean that, before there was any proposal to use force, whether by the United Nations or by ourselves, which looked like being implemented, steps would be taken through the ordinary machinery to enable Parliament to be recalled if it was thought right by the Leaders of both the Opposition Parties?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I think the noble Viscount's contribution has been entirely helpful. He has called attention to the technical point that the decision must come from the Speaker in the House of Commons and the Lord Chancellor here. In the light of that, and when this Statement is read, cannot believe that, however much some noble Lords may be critical of the Government, they are in the event likely to be critical of us in this particular respect.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, in the event of a blockade being proposed from any quarter, can we take it that Her Majesty's Government will pay some regard to the requirements of International Law?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I think that that can be taken for granted.
LORD REA: My Lords, does this matter not divide itself into three stages: first, the proposal from any quarter that action should be taken; secondly, the intention of Her Majesty's Government to follow that proposal; and, thirdly, the implementation itself? Could the noble

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Earl say whether Parliament will be consulted on the second stage, as it presumably will not be consulted on the first stage, since any country may suggest action which will not be implemented?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I think it is rather difficult, if I may say so, to follow up the steps in that analytical way; but, of course, the noble Lord has complete access to me as Leader of this House at any time. I can only repeat that, while there may be many differences in this House on certain aspects of Rhodesian policy, I honestly do not believe that this is a matter on which any difference will, in the event, arise.

LIGHTNING AIRCRAFT FOR SAUDI ARABIA
2.52 p.m.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, at a suitable moment after 3.30 p.m. I shall be making a Statement on Lightnings for Saudi Arabia.

COVENT GARDEN MARKET BILL
Read 2a, and committed to a Select Committee.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (BANK ASSETS) ORDER 1965
2.55 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND FOR THE COLONIES (LORD BESWICK): My Lords, I beg to move that the first Order standing in my name be approved; and, if it is to the convenience of your Lordships' House, I would speak also to the second Order standing in my name, and suggest that they be discussed together.
The effect of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order is to suspend the governor and other members of the board of directors of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia; to provide for the appointment of a board by the Secretary of State; and to provide that the Secretary of State may give directions to the board relating to the policy of the Bank for the
948
conduct of its business. The Order transfers control of the Reserve Bank from the previous board to a new board appointed by the United Kingdom Government. It does not—I repeat, does not —transfer to the United Kingdom Government the assets of the Bank. The new board at present will operate in London, but the Order permits it to function in Rhodesia or elsewhere.
It is the intention that the internal affairs of the Bank should continue to be conducted from Salisbury, as now. Although inevitably the internal affairs of the Bank in Salisbury will be affected to some extent by this new arrangement, the chief cashier and other officers of the Bank continue in office in Salisbury and will be responsible for day-to-day operations in Rhodesia. As the House will know, a new board has been appointed, under the chairmanship of Sir Sidney Caine, and composed of men of outstanding experience and unchallengable integrity.
The first objective of the Bank under this new dispensation will be to ensure that the assets of the Reserve Bank held abroad are safeguarded in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole, and to help achieve Her Majesty's Government's aim to bring about a return to constitutional government in Rhodesia. I must emphasise that Her Majesty's Government have not confiscated these assets; nor do they intend to do so. References by Mr. Smith and others to "confiscation" are totally unfounded. The assets remain, as they have always been, the property of the Bank and its customers. While under the control of the new board, the accounts of the Reserve Bank will be administered in a way proper to the administration of a Central Bank, subject to any directions which the Government may give. The new board has already been recognised by the Bank of England and by the Central Banks of certain other countries. No Central Bank has refused recognition.
In his speech commenting on this Order concerning the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, Mr. Smith complained that he had been let down by the Bank of England and that the whole of the international financing mechanism had been brought into disrepute. This complaint is entirely without justification. In recognising the new board, the Bank of

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England has done no more than recognise the law of the land, and no responsible banking institution could have done otherwise.
The connection between the Reserve Bank Order and the Southern Rhodesia (Bank Assets) Order is manifest. The Exchange Control powers which were introduced on November 11 brought all Rhodesian sterling accounts under Treasury control, and the Treasury was enabled to obtain information about transference in or out of those accounts. These measures—the measures relating to the exchange control—did not, however, enable the Treasury to obtain information about net balances held by the banks in the United Kingdom on behalf of Rhodesian banks, and this first Order will enable complete information to be obtained. Although one purpose of the Order is to enable the Treasury to obtain information about the assets of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, it has been deliberately drafted in such a way as to cover the assets held in the United Kingdom on behalf of any Rhodesia bank. The Order safeguards the legal position of banks which, at the request of the Treasury, supply the Treasury with information about these assets, for otherwise the banks might be liable for damages. Any information received by the Treasury under the Order will be treated with the strictest secrecy and will be used to the minimum possible extent.
The Order does not apply to assets held in United Kingdom offices of banks on behalf of any Rhodesian resident other than banks; for example, it does not apply to the assets of Rhodesian companies or individuals. It does apply to all United Kingdom offices of banks, whether they be United Kingdom banks or otherwise.
In the belief that your Lordships are more concerned with the general effects and purposes of these Orders, I have not dealt with their technical details. Of course, if there are questions on detail which any noble Lord would wish to put, then those questions will be answered, and my noble friend Lord Shepherd will be glad to deal with them in winding up this debate. However, I do urge those noble Lords who want to probe the details and consequences of
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these Orders to make it clear that they are concerned primarily about their effectiveness to achieve an objective which we all have in common—namely, to create conditions in Rhodesia under which a return to constitutional government becomes inevitable.
That we all regret the necessity for these Orders cannot be disguised, but the necessity arises wholly and solely because of the selfish and intolerable behaviour of Mr. Smith and his supporters in breaking off negotiations and assuming illegal power. The sooner this power is given up, the more hope can we have for averting a threatened catastrophe. It is in the belief that these Orders will play their part in bringing about constitutional government in Rhodesia that I ask the House to support these two Motions. My Lords, I beg to move,
Moved, That the Southern Rhodesia (Bank Assets) Order 1965, be approved. —(Lord Beswick.)
3.0 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sure it will be for the convenience of the House that we should consider these two Orders together. I do not think that this is an occasion for any kind of general debate, or indeed discussion, of the conduct of Mr. Smith and his supporters. Their conduct should not, I think, affect our consideration of these important measures on which we have the advantage of having reports from the Special Orders Committee. In relation to the first Order, the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order, that Committee have reported that "the Order raises an important question of policy and principle—namely, whether it is necessary or expedient for the Secretary of State to gain control of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia"; and they say that in their opinion the Order cannot be passed without special attention. I am sure that the Special Orders Committee were right—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, will the noble and learned Viscount allow me to intervene to point out that the first Order is the Bank Assets Order. That is the one which is technically before the House at the present time.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. I did, in fact, mention that both were being discussed together and I mentioned the Order to which I was referring, the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order.
As I was saying, I am sure that the Special Orders Committee were right and that we should give this Order very close attention, because this Order, I think, covers an important point. Not only has the board of directors been replaced by a board consisting of very eminent gentlemen whom the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, described as of outstanding ability and unchallengeable integrity; but, also, the Secretary of State is given very wide power to give them directions as to what they may or may not do in the conduct of the Bank. The result is that the British Government have now taken over control of the Bank. The assets held by the Bank for its customers have not been confiscated; and I agree with the noble Lord that it is quite ridiculous for anyone to say that they have. But the Secretary of State now has power to direct the board not to give effect to the instructions of its customers even though giving effect to them does not involve any breach of the law. I do not myself know whether cheques are drawn on this Bank; but, supposing they were, it clearly would be within the power of the Secretary of State to direct the Bank not to honour a particular customer's cheque even though it held assets with which to meet it.
This is a very far-reaching power. The Order contains no provision for making known to Parliament what directions the Secretary of State gives, and Parliament has no power to control the Secretary of State's exercise of the power to give directions. If there were any danger of the former board allowing Mr. Smith and his colleagues to make use of the funds held by the Bank for the Government of Southern Rhodesia, then clearly it is right that that board should have been suspended from office. But was there any such danger? Mr. Smith and his colleagues are no longer Ministers. They have now no lawful claim to constitute the Government of Southern Rhodesia. In these circumstances, I should be surprised to hear that any bank was prepared to let them operate accounts
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in the name of the Government of that country. I am glad that we have Lord Beswick's assurance that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, will be glad to answer all questions raised in this debate.
So I put the question: Was there any real risk that this Bank, with its original board, would give effect to instructions given by Mr. Smith or his ex-Ministers in relation to assets held for the Government of Southern Rhodesia? I think we ought to be told about that. Was the original board asked to give an undertaking not to allow Mr. Smith and his colleagues to operate these acounts, and did they refuse to give one? Again, I think the House should be told, because it seems to me that only if they were asked to give, and refused to give, such an undertaking, and only if there was a real risk of their allowing the funds held by them for the Southern Rhodesian Government to be used by the illegal régime, can it be argued that this part of the Order is justified. So, when the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, comes to reply, I hope he will deal fully with this. I am not saying that justification for this Order does not exist; but that we ought to know what it is. For the justification of this part of the Order must, it seems to me, depend on the very real risk that the illegal regime (who are no longer Ministers of any lawful Government) would have been able to exercise control over assets held by the Bank in the name of the Government. That is the first matter that I want to ask the noble Lord about.
But I would ask him this further question. Why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to be given absolute, unlimited and unfettered power to give directions to the new board consisting of these men of outstanding ability and unchallenged integrity'? Can they not be relied upon to see that the funds held by the Rhodesian Government are not made use of by the illegal regime? I should have thought that the British Government could have relied upon them completely. Therefore I find it difficult to understand why it was thought necessary to give the Secretary of State power to give any directions he thinks fit as to the conduct of the Bank's business. The noble Lord, in introducing theseMotions—and I am sure that the House was grateful for his explanation of them—did not

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really put forward any reasons for giving the Secretary of State such powers. Has the Secretary of State given any directions? If so, what are they? I think we should be told. I think we should also be told of any future exercise of this power.
My Lords, the other Order is the Southern Rhodesia (Bank Assets) Order; and that, in the opinion of the Special Orders Committee, also raises:
"an important question of policy and principle, namely, whether it is necessary or exdicnt to require banks"—
in this country—
"to disclose to the Treasury confidential information about their customers:"
The noble Lord said, rightly, that the disclosure is limited to the disclosure of the assets held by any bank in this country on behalf of any Southern Rhodesian Office of any bank. The only reason given by the Chief Secretary in moving this Motion in another place was (and I quote) that:
"This information, too, may he relevant to the formulation of our policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722, No. 26, col. 1154; 14/12/65.]
That was all he said about the reason why this information was wanted and the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said that the information, when obtained, would be treated with the strictest secrecy and would be used to the least possible extent.
My Lords, how is this information to be used? I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, will be able to tell us a little more than that in justification of this Order, which clearly breaches the confidentiality which exists between customer and bank. It may be very nice to know what assets are held in this country on behalf of any Southern Rhodesian bank, but what use is it intended to make of this knowledge? Is it thought that the steps already taken to stop payments being made to Rhodesia are inadequate? Is it thought that the funds held here on behalf of any bank in Rhodesia are likely to be applied to the use of the illegal régime? If so, mere knowledge of the assets will not suffice. Is it intended by another Order to give the Secretary of State power to direct how such assets ought to be used? My Lords, I think we should ask for answers to all these questions, because upon those answers depends the justification for these Orders.
954
I want to turn now to what I feel is a very important question. I am sorry to ask so many questions, but I think they require to be answered, and I hope that the noble Lord will be able to deal with them fully and satisfactorily. By the Reserve Bank Order, as I have said, the British Government now have complete control over the assets held by the Bank. If he wished, clearly the Secretary of State could direct that those assets should be applied in the payment of interest on the Rhodesian public debt. I am sure that the noble Lord will not dispute that the Secretary of State could do this, and that, if he did, no one could say that his action was either illegal or ultra vires.
If I understand the position correctly, Mr. Smith and the other ex-Ministers have no power to direct the Reserve Bank, or anyone else, to pay such interest. Power to do so resides in the Government of Southern Rhodesia, and paragraph 42 of the 1961 Constitution provides, inter alia, that the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia is vested in Her Majesty and may he exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Governor. Therefore, it is possible to direct the payment of interest under the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965, made under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by the Secretary of State.
My Lords, I have dealt with this matter in some detail for the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, in another place was, I am sorry to say, singularly evasive with regard to it. If the position is as I think it is, that the Secretary of State can direct the payment of interest on the Rhodesian public debt out of the assets held by the Reserve Bank, why has that not been done?
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I deal with this point, since the noble and learned Viscount is putting emphasis on its importance?—and of course it is important. This Order has no effect, so far as the transference of any power is concerned, save from one board to another. Of itself, the board has no power and cannot decide to pay out interest. Nor does this Order give any power to the Secretary of State to direct that the board shall pay out any interest. Therefore,

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the argument of the noble and learned Viscount on this point is going outside the actual scope of the Order which we are discussing.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I do not think that is so. Certainly, in another place it was not considered so outside, and I should not think that it is outside the argument in your Lordships' place.
LORD BESWICK: It is outside the Order.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I do not know whether that is so, because one has to consider this Order. In a sense the noble Lord is right, but I did not say that the power would be exercised by the Secretary of State under this Order. I pointed out that under this Order there is no limit to the directions which the Secretary of State can give, and that if he were to give directions, under this Order, that the interest shall be paid, no one could say that he was acting illegally or ultra vires. That is to say—and perhaps the noble Lord will be good enough to look at the Order—there is no limit on the power of the Secretary of State to give directions.
I was pointing out, when the noble Lord interrupted me (I am grateful for his interruption), that under the Constitution Order passed and approved by this House, and by Parliament under the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965, there is express and clear powers for the Secretary of State to do things as part of the Government of Rhodesia, and that he could, under that same power, give directions for the payment of interest. I think that is clearly so, and I shall be very surprised to find that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, contradicts it.
I am asking—and I think it is relevant —if power exists, as in my view it clearly does, to authorise the Reserve Bank to pay out interest out of the assets held by the Government of Rhodesia on Rhodesian public debt, why this has not been done. Surely it is unprecedented that there should be default in the payment of interest on Colonial stock, and if enough assets are there, why have the British Government not directed that the interest should be paid? Perhaps, in view of the interest taken by the noble Earl the Leader of the House in these matters, I
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should make it clear that I have no interest of any kind to declare. I hold no such stock.
My Lords, I can see that there are good reasons for withholding the payment of such interest to persons in Southern Rhodesia, but it is quite a different thing to withhold the payment of interest to people outside that country. The noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said that when considering these Orders we should be concerned primarily with their effectiveness in bringing about a return to constitutional government. I cannot feel that the withholding of the payment of interest to people outside Rhodesia on Rhodesian public debt can possibly have any effect on events within Rhodesia. If, as I think is the case, it is within the power of the British Government, under the Constitution Order and under the Reserve Bank Order, to make provision for the payment of interest out of assets held by the Bank for the Government of Rhodesia, I hope we shall be told why that has not been done.
My Lords, I should perhaps make clear that we do not intend to vote against these Orders, but I have asked a number of questions which I hope will be answered to my satisfaction, and will not be brushed aside in any cavalier fashion. In this House—and not only in this House—the Government have, I fear, on some occasions shown a somewhat unfortunate tendency not to answer questions very specifically. If these questions are not answered to-day (and I would point out that much the same questions were asked in another place, and were not answered there) one can only conclude—I trust that the country will conclude—that the Government are not able to justify the action they have taken in withholding the payment of interest.
3.20 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, once again, in deference to the request of the noble Earl the Leader of the House, I must say that I have business interests in Rhodesia. I want to say at the outset that, in my view not only was the Government's action in setting up this board right, but, looking back and being wise after the event, it was an action which was long overdue. It should have been included in the original sanctions.
I would also say that informed opinion in business circles with which I come into

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contact is strongly in support of any such action as this, which will be effective and will result in helping to restore constitutional government in Southern Rhodesia. Therefore, I welcome it, and I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating the members of the new board, under Sir Sidney Caine, whose immediate comprehension of the real issues at stake here has been extremely welcome and very much in contrast to the speeches made in other quarters, which tend to try to undermine the national policy and give indirect and unwitting support to the illegal regime in Rhodesia. I am glad that the Government took the opportunity of getting such people to sit on this board.
But, having said this, I would follow the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and say that in my view we ought to have a clearer statement as to how the board propose to carry out their function. The speech on this matter by the First Secretary in another place was, if I may say so, a masterpiece in camouflage. I think that this is a mistake. The Government are more likely to get public opinion behind a common policy if they expound the policy of the board in some detail, rather than try to hide it, as appeared to be the case, even if it was not done deliberately, in another place.
Am I right in thinking that the overriding consideration of the new board will be to discover, first of all, all the foreign assets of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank, and secondly, to assert title to them so that they can be preserved in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole and denied to the illegal Smith régime. I should like to know, if this is so, what Rhodesia is going to use to pay for its essential imports? I ask this because I want to know how effective this action is going to be—because I want it to be effective. I want to know from the Government if they can tell us whether this has had any effect since it started on December 7. I should also like to know what was meant by the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, when he said that the internal affairs of the Bank are operating normally in Salisbury. This I cannot understand. Could we have some clarification of this point, because it looks to me as if these sanctions are not so effective as many of us would like to see them be.
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Am I also right in thinking that the funds now in the possession of the new board, held in the name of Rhodesia, can he used for some commercial purposes, provided that they do not help the illegal régime? It is important to know this. Would it not be worth while considering whether certain transactions might be undertaken—for instance, the payment of interest on Rhodesian stocks, which are in the category of trustee stocks? I would suggest, as the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, did, that if this payment were made to non-residents of Rhodesia, nothing would be done to help the illegal Smith regime. Of course I can see the objection to paying out to residents in Rhodesia, because that would help the illegal régime.
Could we not earmark the interest which would be due to residents in Rhodesia so as to show that it is there for them when constitutional government is restored in Rhodesia? It might possibly be worth while paying interest on the interest while it is in the bank, as a token gesture of good will. If there is some reason against this, something which would weaken the effectiveness of a sanction of this sort, then I withdraw the suggestion; but, if not, it seems to me that it might be worth while considering. I think that I am right in saying that there are about three of these trustee stocks which are due in December, and that practically nothing more is due until about July of next year. So it might be worth while looking into it.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, may I make it clear that, whatever may be the justice in what the noble Lord is now saying about the general interest in these stocks in the Bank, in these Orders no power is given to the Secretary of State to direct that interest shall be paid.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, in that case, may I ask how interest came to be paid before U.D.I.? Was it not, in fact, a power invested in the old Federal Reserve Bank? I gather that it was not. Perhaps we could have an answer on that point later. Somebody must be responsible and authorised to pay this interest, if it is so decided by the Government. Whether this is a technicality or not, I think that the position might be cleared up.
I should like to see it made clear that the United Kingdom Government are

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really acting as the generous custodian of the interests of individuals in Rhodesia, who are being prevented from enjoying their full rights only by the illegality of the unileral declaration of independence by Mr. Smith. I believe that it is vital, in making sanctions effective, that the British Government should make it clear that only the illegal régime stands in the way of the complete restoration of the status quo and that, in the meantime, the British Government must be seen to be preserving in full measure the proper entitlement of Rhodesian residents in respect of contracts which were properly entered into before U.D.I. It is important that, on reaching the stage in which sanctions begin to bite. the Rhodesian people as a whole should come to realise that their real grievance lies with Smith for proclaiming U.D.I. and not with the British Government for resisting an illegal act.
Furthermore, I would say that if sanctions are to be effective—and I hope they will be—we have the responsibility to start indicating to the Rhodesian people in a positive fashion exactly how they can return to constitutional government under different leaders on a basis which will offer genuine political stability and protection of minority interests, whether they be European, African or Asian. I believe that this is a great task. It is all related to Orders of this type. I hope that we shall not accept the doctrine of unconditional surrender. I hope that we shall make it clear that there is an alternative. But during the period in between, let us make it crystal clear that we will protect and safeguard the interests of the Rhodesian people in the proper way, as the Government have done. I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, comes to reply, he will be able to tell us that everything will be done to make action such as this effective, so that the time between now and the restoration of constitutional government is the shortest possible.
3.28 p.m.
LORD COLYTON:` My Lords, before addressing myself to these Orders, I should like, with the permission of the House, to make some brief remarks of a rather more general character. Watching the course of the Government's actions on sanctions against Rhodesia over the past few weeks, I have been struck by
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two points. I am not now referring to oil sanctions, which I understand we shall have an opportunity of discussing to-morrow, but to such matters as the ban on the payment of pensions, the ban on the payment of insurance benefits, and now this attempt to grab the assets of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank.
It seems to me that these actions are calculated to do the maximum damage, first of all, to individuals in Rhodesia, as opposed to Mr. Smith's Government, and secondly, to Britain. In the case of individual Rhodesians, the damage is of such a cruel and petty character that one really cannot imagine that any British Government could set their hand to it. It has in fact become a form of persecution, far removed from the measures that the Prime Minister outlined in his speeches in another place on October 11 and 12.
As regards the damage to ourselves, it seems to me that the Government have embarked upon a most dangerous path, which can have repercussions of the widest character, which we cannot even visualise at the present time. It seems to me that they strike at our position as one of the great central reserve bankers of the world, as the greatest centre of insurance of the world and as a people who, for all our shortcomings in other respects, have always regarded the fulfilment of our financial obligations as a matter of honour from which we could not in any circumstances depart. I do not want to exaggerate these matters, but there can, I fear, be no doubt, whatever may be said to the contrary, that our position has been altered by these events, and our reputation damaged.
I turn now to the Orders. As noble Lords who have followed these debates are well aware—and again, in deference to the noble Earl the Leader of the House, I must mention—that I am a director of a company with a small proportion of its interests in Rhodesia. So far as I can gather, these interests will not be affected in any way by these Orders, but I nevertheless declare them. Both these Orders, it seems to me, illustrate in the highest degree what I mean when I speak of the damage done to our reputation as the central bankers of the sterling area. This is a serious matter. For the first time, except of course during time of war, a British Government have laid their hands (whether you put it like that

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or not) on funds deposited in all good faith in London. Such funds were not interfered with when Colonel Nasser violated the Suez Canal Convention of 1889, and subsequently sequestrated the property of thousands of British subjects in Egypt. I have been told I do not know whether it is right or wrong—that similar funds belonging to the Boer Republics were not interfered with in any way during the South African War. And I believe that it is also a fact that even during the American revolutionary war General George Washington's personal bank account in London was never touched.
No doubt this is all, strictly speaking, absolutely legal, having regard to the powers which the Government have been given by Parliament. But my point is that, whether it is legal or not, it is unethical, immoral and unjust; and I fear it will be remembered years after this problem of Rhodesia has been settled, for better or worse, one way or another. I am bound to say that I regard it as sheer humbug on the part of the Chief Secretary to talk as he did in another place last week about safeguarding the interests of the people of Rhodesia. These funds belong to the people of Rhodesia. These balances are their accumulated savings, the results of their overseas trade, the produce of taxation, and they were mainly earned by the very people who are now wholeheartedly supporting the illegal régime in Rhodesia.
The Government's action is not limited to laying their hands on balances in this country; they are also seeking to get control of the Rhodesian balances held elsewhere in the world. However legal their action may be under the domestic or municipal law of this country, there still seems to be a great deal of doubt about its legality outside this country. The Chief Secretary said last Tuesday that in certain countries the need to consult legal opinion had led to the funds of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank being frozen. Then he went on to say, I thought rather smacking his lips, as he did so, that this was:
"an equally satisfactory way of denying the use of these funds to the illegal régime".[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No.
676), col. 1152, 14/12/65.]
What grounds were there for dismissing the governor and the directors of the
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Rhodesian Reserve Bank, who were nonpolitical appointees, and to substitute for them the group of no doubt very eminent and distinguished gentlemen in this country? It was simply, I take it, that the members of the board in Rhodesia could be relied upon to carry out certain orders of Mr. Smith's Government. But that applies equally to thousands of civil servants, soldiers and airmen and many others. If my information is correct—and if it is not, I will withdraw it immediately—the greatest pressure had to be brought to bear on these eminent gentlemen to serve on this board. I feel that it must be most uncongenial for them, and I am extremely sorry for them.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am afraid my attention was somewhat distracted. Did I hear the noble Lord say that the greatest pressure had to be brought to bear on them?
LORD COLYTON: Yes.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Could the noble Lord disclose the nature of this pressure?
LORD COLYTON: I will not go into details, but I have heard it said that great pressure had to be brought to bear on these gentlemen. I leave it at that. The Chief Secretary, in winding up the debate in another place, said that this board in London would have all the powers conferred upon it by the 1964 Rhodesia Act. What action has it taken to carry out these powers in regard to the day-to-day running of the Bank where, as the Chief Secretary and the Minister this afternoon said, the chief cashier and other officers of the Bank had not had their tenure of office affected by Her Majesty's Government's action? The Chief Secretary talked a great deal about the Bank having to obey the orders of its customers. Who are those customers? Is it Mr. Smith's Government? Or is it the British Government? He said:
"No Bank proceeds to dispose of the money which it holds without the request of its customers."—[Col. 1203.]
If so, and if it is not the British Government or the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who are the customers of the Bank? And why is the new board attempting to take control of Rhodesian balances here and elsewhere?

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This brings me to the crucial point mentioned by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne. Mr. Smith, very naturally after this latest move on the part of Her Majesty's Government, has said that the Rhodesian Government cannot fulfil its obligations to pay the interest on its external loans, apart from those that may be held in Rhodesia. This is a most serious matter. This is the first time in history that there has ever been a default on a Commonwealth loan, and, of course, on obligations which are trustee security stocks. As I say, it is a serious matter, and again not calculated to enhance our financial reputation in the world. It would not have been so bad if the British Government, having taken this action, had stepped in and said that they would themselves service these external loans. I believe that the interest amounts to well over £1 million a year. But the Chief Secretary said, and the Minister has repeated it this afternoon, that the British Government have categorically refused to accept any responsibility for servicing these loans.
Many of your Lordships will recollect that the question of the servicing of these loans was the subject of great pressure on the then Government by many of us in this House and elsewhere when the breakup of the Federation was being discussed at the end of 1963. We felt that, having regard to the way in which these Federal loans had been divided up in three tranches between the three territories, there was a duty on the part of the British Government to guarantee these loans or, at any rate, to underpin them in some way. The Government at that time refused to accept our plea. Now we are seeing the tragic results of their not doing so. What it means, in fact, is that thousands of small investors in this country. in addition to the banks and corporations, insurance companies and their policy holders, are now to be deprived of their rightful dividends.
The Chief Secretary said last week:
"It is absolutely inaccurate … that we, the British Government own the assets or the funds of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia." [Col. 1207.]
Who then does own those assets? It surely must be the legal Government of Rhodesia. Who is the legal Government? Is it Her Majesty's Government, or is
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it not? I thought that we were told on November 24 that the legal Government of Rhodesia was now vested in the Secretary of State, acting either directly or through the Governor or other officials
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I feel that I should correct the noble Lord and say to him that it is clear that the Government are not the Government of Southern Rhodesia. It is perfectly clear, if one looks at the Statute and the various statements that have been made by Ministers.
LORD COLYTON: Then who is the Government of Rhodesia? Perhaps the noble Lord will be able to inform us about that when he comes to reply. I certainly was under the impression that the Government of Rhodesia was now vested in the Secretary of State. I was quite clear in my own mind.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, if my noble friend will forgive me for interrupting, may I say that the provision of the Constitution Order in terms says that the executive powers of the Southern Rhodesian Government can be exercised by the Secretary of State. It is not saying that the Secretary of State is himself the Rhodesian Government or that he can do under that Order what that Government could do. It is not quite the same.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that informative intervention. I should like to say this. I read the debate in another place with great care, and the Chief Secretary was again and again pressed to say to whom the Reserve Bank did belong. As a matter of fact, he was finally saved from having to answer by the Question being put from the Chair at the end of the debate. Can we have a clear answer to this Question to-day? The Chief Secretary stated categorically that the Reserve Bank was an agent of its customers. But who are those customers? Again, I presume it is the Government of Rhodesia. But, surely, if we are the Government of Rhodesia, as I understood it, or if we act for the Government of Rhodesia, it becomes our responsibility to service these loans. I do not see how the Government can have it both ways.
As most of your Lordships know, I have always been opposed to sanctions against Rhodesia, except for those which were

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consequential on the illegal declaration of independence. I have never concealed my views in these matters. But from the Government's point of view, however, the actions to which I have referred, damaging as they are to our credit and our reputation and, it seems to me, cruel and vindictive towards individuals, could only conceivably be justified if it could be shown that there is any likelihood of their helping to achieve the aim which the Government have set themselves; that is to say, to bring about the return of law and order in Rhodesia (whatever that may mean) and, more important, to secure the restoration of the constitutional relationship between Rhodesia and the Crown and, we hope, her return to the Commonwealth.
All these measures—and this, of course, applies perhaps even more so to oil sanctions—are merely calculated to drive Mr. Smith and the Rhodesian people including (and this is my information from Rhodesia) a great many moderate Africans, and the whole of the coloured community, along the path which, rightly or wrongly, their Government chose for them. We must not forget the fact that most of the people whom Her Majesty's Government are seeking to coerce into what I can only describe as unconditional surrender are men and women of British stock. The few who are not are of Dutch and Afrikaner stock, and if there is one person who is more obstinate than the British when it comes to being pushed around it is the Dutchman or the Afrikaner. These people feel to-day exactly as we did in 1940. They feel that they are right, and although the whole of the world may turn against them they will not surrender. It is perfectly clear from all the information which one receives from Rhodesia, and particularly from circles who were violently anti-Smith and opposed to U.D.I., that day by day they are becoming more and more determined not to give way. Measures such as these which are taken against them can serve only to enhance their determination.
What is worse is that these measures are giving rise to a new bitterness which, when the time comes to negotiate, as it surely will, will make the task increasingly difficult. I do not believe that at present that bitterness is directed against the British people, thank God, but it is directed against Her Majesty's
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Government and, I fear, particularly against the Prime Minister. I think that the people of this country—I have tried to find out what people think about these things, talking to them in the streets, shops and trains—are bewildered by all this. I think their sympathy is basically with Mr. Smith. They cannot understand what they regard as petty and vindictive acts being taken against him, and it is driving them in the same sort of direction as it is driving the people of Rhodesia.
Having regard to all these factors, I urge the Government. I beg them, to turn to the path of conciliation and negotiation, and to turn to it rapidly, before we drift into some sort of situation from which there is no retreat. I fear the worst as I read the news every day, and I beg the Government to turn their minds to the course of conciliation and negotiation; and, in doing so, I urge them—I do not expect them to agree with me—to drop this measure which is so very dangerous from the point of view of the people of Rhodesia, those people whom we are trying to bring back into the paths of constitutional life.

BRITISH AIRCRAFT FOR SAUDI ARABIA
3.45 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, my noble friend Lord Champion stated that he would be making the Statement on Lightnings for Saudi Arabia, since it was not certain that I should be able to attend your Lordships' House. Now, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to intervene to repeat the Statement, which is being made by my honourable friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation in another place, on Lightnings for Saudi Arabia. The Statement is as follows:
"I have to tell the House that the Government of Saudi Arabia have this morning announced that a consortium of British firms has secured the major part of the order for their new complete Air Defence System. The remainder of the system will be provided by American firms and we have had valuable co-operation from the U.S. Administration in formulating the joint programme.

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"The value of the British components in the order, including Lightning and Jet Provost aircraft, radar and data-handling equipment, is over £100 million, from which over £75 million will accrue to this country as export earnings.
"This is a great achievement for the three British firms concerned—namely, the British Aircraft Corporation Limited, Associated Electrical Industries Limited, and Airwork Services Limited, and it demonstrates that our aircraft and electronics industries have really first-class equipment to offer.
"The American firm of Raytheon will be supplying the Hawk surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile.
"During the past twelve months the British firms have acted in close cooperation with my Department—that is, the Ministry of Aviation—and have received our active support. The success of these negotiations has demonstrated conclusively the results which can be achieved with such co-operation.
"A number of other countries have already expressed interest in the Lightning aircraft and the radar equipment and I have great hopes that further orders will be obtained."
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful to the noble Lord for conveying to the House this very welcome information and, indeed, for the tribute he paid to what has been achieved by three companies engaged in private enterprise.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, might I congratulate the Government on getting this contract? I led a delegation this year meeting King Feisal and the Saudi Arabian Defence Minister, which discussed this matter; and I am glad to learn that, in spite of all the competition, we have succeeded in getting such a reward for our endeavours.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, first of all, I should like to thank the noble and learned Viscount. This represents a good example of co-operation in Government and private enterprise. I should like to pay a tribute to the officials in the Ministry of Aviation—I have already paid tribute to the firms—and in particular to my colleague Mr. John
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Stonehouse, who I know played a very big part in landing this order. At the same time—and I am not just here to hand out bouquets—I would acknowledge the part that my noble friend Lord Blyton and his delegation played. It demonstrates the value of the sort of contacts that it is possible for a delegation such as Lord Blyton's to achieve.
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: My Lords, is this not clear evidence that the British aircraft industry is capable of fending for itself, without needing the dead hand of nationalisation to help it out? Since there is no answer, may I take it that the noble Lord agrees with me?
LORD SHACKLETON: The noble Duke w as determined to get me to my feet. His point does not arise on this Statement at all, and I certainly do not agree with the implications of what he said.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA (BANK ASSETS) ORDER 1965
3.50 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, in the debate of November 15, I endeavoured to make clear what my attitude was to sanctions in the case of the illegal Government of Rhodesia. I expressed my fear that Her Majesty's Government were not asking themselves what I believed to be the most important question, which was whether the sanctions that they were considering were in fact calculated to bring about the results they desired. The noble Lord who commended these Orders this afternoon said he hoped the sole question we should raise would be that of effectiveness. I make no complaint of that, but I think there is some danger of the word "effective" being used in two quite different senses. Sometimes these sanctions are recommended as being effective when by "effective" the speaker means "drastic". Provided they are sufficiently drastic it is assumed that they will be effective. What I mean by "effective" is, calculated to bring about the object that the Government have proclaimed.
On November 15 I ventured to quote what the Prime Minister himself had said, and I expressed my doubts whether

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some of the sanctions were calculated to bring about the desired result. I notice the most recent statement of the aim of the Government appears in the terms of an Amendment to a Motion tabled in another place, and, if I may quote the words describing their sanctions, they are
"designed to secure the return of Rhodesia to constitutional rule".
I think it will be agreed on all sides that this is the proclaimed objective of Her Majesty's Government.
I share with my noble friend whose speech preceded mine an increasing alarm at the series of sanctions which I believe, taken cumulatively, are really approaching a state of war between this country and Rhodesia—and a state of war without even some of the few hopeful things consistent with war. There was a passage in the speech made by the noble Lord who commended these Orders this afternoon in which he made some violent remarks about Mr. Smith. I am not going to say whether or not they were justified. I merely believe that, if negotiations are desirable, for the two sides to call each other names is not going to help. But the noble Lord used language which has been used by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in another place when he was dealing with insurance contracts, which had reference to the parallels of war and even its justifications.
There is one very great difference between war and our position vis-à-vis Rhodesia. It is this: that when you are at war you do at least recognise the Government against which you are fighting. That is extremely important. Naturally, when you are engaged in war and fighting another Government, you seek to deprive it of all means that could strengthen it, and there are the ordinary consequences of war with which we are familiar, such as the frustration of insurance contracts, and so on. But, as between us and Rhodesia, the Prime Minister has said repeatedly that he desires that the effect of our sanctions shall be such that other people in Rhodesia become dissatisfied with Mr. Smith and approach the Governor, proposing a Government that they and we should prefer. If that is the object, to treat Rhodesia to a series of measures which appear to have been designed to inflict the maximum of economic damage may not in the least
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tend to bring about the result which Her Majesty's Government desire.
I generally credit my political opponents with complete honesty in these matters and I am going to assume that the object of the Government is that which they declare. What I question is whether these cumulative sanctions that they are imposing are in the least likely to bring about the desired result. A more likely probability is that they will increasingly unite even the former opponents of Mr. Smith behind him, and in fact an article in the current issue of the Economist, which has hitherto been taking a strongly pro-Government view on sanctions, expresses the fear that now even some of the trading community and others who were very much opposed to a U.D.I. are lining themselves up behind Mr. Smith because it is felt that any questioning of Mr. Smith and his Government is almost like treason.
Taking the view I do of the dangers of the course on which the Government have embarked, I thought it right to express those doubts and fears to the House because I feel them most strongly, but I come now to the specific point raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne and others, though I am going to put it in a slightly different way. It concerns the Southern Rhodesian stocks. I think the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, thought that the power of direction in paragraph 3(e) could be exercised so as to enable payment of interest to be made from these funds. I am not going to argue for one moment whether that is right or wrong, though coming from my noble and learned friend, of course, I treat that view with great respect. But I can understand the other view being taken, that, though there are powers of direction, they should be limited to what would otherwise be proper in dealing with these Bank assets. I can understand either view; but my point on these loans does not depend on that in the least. Nor am I concerned with the hardship caused by not paying interest on these loans. What I am concerned with is the credit of Her Majesty's Government.
I want to put the point absolutely simply. These loans are the debts of the legitimate Government of Rhodesia. I take it that is agreed. I imagine Her Majesty's Government think that the conception of a legitimate Government in

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Rhodesia is not merely a myth. There is such a thing. In fact, if I might quote one statement by the Prime Minister, which I quoted on November 15, he referred to "the only legal 'Government' there, the Governor". My noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne has quoted from another constitutional Order that has been made, showing that the Secretary of State has executive power to act as the legitimate "Government" of Rhodesia. If you get these two things in regard to this stock (it is a trustee security of course), that it is a debt of the legitimate Government of Rhodesia and that we have power—in fact we are always asserting we have power—to exercise the powers of the legitimate Government of Rhodesia, why is it that we have not paid the interest? That question is quite independent of the question from what funds that interest should be paid. But if that is an obligation on Her Majesty's Government, it ought to be discharged.
Perhaps I may give quotations to show that it is not merely I who have these doubts. In the debate in another place the other day there was a quotation from the City Editor of The Times, who said this:
"It is, however, an unhappy precedent, as are so many others, as it looks like being the first time ever that there has been a default on any British or Commonwealth stock."
That is not a matter of trivial importance. Nor is it only The Times and I who are saying this. Let me quote what the Economist said, not in the current number but last week. After dealing with other matters with which I will not trouble the House, they say this:
"Leaving the meaningless technicalities aside, the interest should surely have been paid. Either London is responsible for Rhodesia or it is not."
I do not think anything could be clearer. I hope I have made the point that I am asking reasonably clear. It is three propositions: that this is a debt owed by the lawful Government of Rhodesia; the Secretary of State has all powers to act as the lawful "Government" of Rhodesia; why are these debts not being paid? I hope that will be answered.
The other matter I should like to raise is that the noble Lord who introduced these Orders twice observed—and I think
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I see the force of his remark—that whatever merits there may be in these points I am making, he thinks they do not arise directly out of the Orders before the House.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, the noble Lord is perfectly entitled to quote me, but I think he is wrong in saying what I think. It is not a question of what I think, but of what I am advised by the legal advisers of Her Majesty's Government.
LORD CONESFORD: I am sorry if I put it wrongly. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that that was the impression made to the House. I did not mean to imply anything to the contrary. The noble Lord was making quite clear in his submission, what was the advice of his Department.
I was now coming to the relevance of these Orders. I can understand the submission that the point I am now raising does not arise directly out of these Orders. But, of course, it is very closely connected because this Order, which, as the Economist last week pointed out, is an extremely effective Order—it is perhaps the most effective Order which has yet been made by Her Majesty's Government in depriving the de facto Government of Rhodesia of its ability to get hold of sterling—provides an excuse for the de facto Government of Rhodesia to do nothing about the loans. It accentuates, if I may say so, our responsibility.
There is also another result. I forget if it was the noble Lord, Lord Byers, or somebody else who hoped that these sanctions would deprive the de facto Government of Rhodesia of its means to carry on, and so forth. But, of course, the trouble about these sanctions is that you not only hit those you wish to hit; you hit some you do not wish to hit at all. What has happened? The de facto Government of Rhodesia, deprived by these sanctions of a great deal of the assets on which it would otherwise rely, takes immediate steps, through raising the price of coal and putting a duty on coal, calculated to cause disaster to Zambia. I beg Her Majesty's Government to consider two things. First of all, is this series of sanctions tending to produce the result they want—that is, to cause the people of Rhodesia to desire, or work for, a

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different Government? And, secondly, what effect are they having on third parties, and third parties whom we certainly do not wish to injure?
May I mention, since it has been mentioned in the course of this debate, the insurance question? HerMajesty's Government, I know, are trying to make some of the so-called sanctions sanctions which will be followed by other countries, too. But nobody supposes that any other country is going to prohibit payment under its insurance contracts. I should like to know, should the noble Lord who is going to reply have any information on this subject, whether it is true (I heard it as a rumour during the last two days) that certain foreign countries, in their propaganda in Rhodesia and elsewhere, are claiming that they pay on their own insurance contracts but that Lloyd's do not.
I regard these threats to our interests as very serious. I do not wish to lengthen the debate on this matter, because on the main question of sanctions, perhaps, to-morrow's debate provides an even better opportunity. But I hope that on the one specific question about the interest on these Rhodesian loans, we shall have a perfectly clear reply.
4.10 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, I have never spoken in your Lordships' House on Rhodesia. I have known Rhodesia in peace time and I have had much to do with Rhodesia in war time. I have listened with increasing distress over the months which have passed to the sorry tale which your Lordships have heard. There comes a time when, if a man is going to live with himself and he feels deeply upon some subject, he must make those views known. The discussion of these matters to-day gives me a chance for a few moments to express my views. Like most other noble Lords, I should think all noble Lords in this House, I shared the regret at the illegal Declaration of Independence, but with a measure of sympathy for those who truly felt they were the victims of a long period of "double think" and "double talk" by successive British Governments. Even after that illegal declaration, I shared the view which I am sure the majority of your Lordships had, and I believe millions of people felt outside, that the position was not lost. But now,
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step by step, it seems to me that we are slipping to a state of war, and these Orders are further steps in that direction.
For this Order and for all preceding Orders dealing with sanctions, the Prime Minister's defence has been twofold: quick sanctions which will hurt; an alternative to force. That is the first defence. The second defence has been the prevention of foreign intervention in that territory. We know of the possibility that the Prime Miniter talked of, of red berets and blue United Nations uniforms. What is the position now in relation to that dual defence? There are to-day the veiled threats of a United Nations blockade, if required, upon Portuguese East Africa—a blockade which Britain would be forced to take part in if the United Nations so wish. Secondly, as regards foreign intervention, we ourselves have invited a foreign Power to come in and assist us with the airlift, in the form of American transport aircraft. It is these contradictions which so alarm me when looking at the present situation. I believe that, sooner or later, a Government —this Government or another Government—will have to negotiate, and with Mr. Smith. I believe that the sooner we start, the better it will be.
This Order is not going to have an effect against rebels, against traitors, against men of treason—those stupid words which are bandied about far too lightly and far too easily. This Order is against a body of British citizens, exasperated and determined people, who feel they wish to rebel against the policy of the British Government, at present backed by a majority in Parliament. This talk of rebels—rebels against whom? Not against Her Majesty. But rebels against a policy which they believe would bring disaster to their country. And they see the example of the Belgian Congo next door, which bears so heavily upon their minds.
On the effect of these Orders we, too, like the Government, have our sources of impartial, disinterested information from Rhodesia. I would summarise the information I have tried to gather under four points. The first is that there has been a great change in Rhodesia since the sanctions policy by this Government has been put into effect. Between July and September last many business interests in Rhodesia were antagonistic to

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Mr. Smith. To-day, Mr. Smith probably carries 95 per cent. of the Europeans behind him. Secondly, the territorial sanctity of Rhodesia is something that every Rhodesian man and woman—and do not forget the women—would definitely fight for. Thirdly, there is no force in the illusion the Prime Minister seems to hold—I can only conclude this from the words I have listened to in his speeches, and from reading them—that suddenly some middle-of-the-road white Liberal is going to arise and gather a measure of strength which will be sufficient to overthrow the Smith regime. That is not so. Rightly or wrongly, the Europeans are behind Mr. Smith to-day.
Finally, let me say that they are never going to surrender. The sanctions may bite. The sanctions will bite. In March next, I think they will bite harshly. But I hope the Government realise that there is still a pioneer spirit in that country. They will pull in their belts and will not surrender. So I come back to the point that, sooner or later, Her Majesty's Government will have to negotiate with Mr. Smith; and for the sake of the whole outside world, the Commonwealth, Rhodesia and ourselves, the sooner the better. It seems to me that a rather dangerous impression is gaining ground that this Order and others are part of a sort of personal conflict between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith, and that Mr. Wilson has nailed his colours to the mast and that there is marked on them "Unconditional surrender!". I think that was partly caused by the regrettable language which the Prime Minister used in speaking of Mr. Smith, then the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, and his colleagues as "frightened men". They may be misguided men; they may be obstinate men. But Mr. Smith fought in a Spitfire over Italy and was shot down. Mr. Harper led a Royal Air Force wing. These men are not lacking in courage; they are not frightened men.
No one, except a few here and, I believe, a few in Rhodesia, wishes to perpetuate white supremacy. That is not the issue. The issue is the speed with which the 1961 Constitution provisions shall be implemented. There is a lot of silliness in Rhodesia, their best friends will say, in the way of stupid racial discrimination which must be abandoned.
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But there is a great deal of good sense, and good men there who are allied to Mr. Smith and who are being more and more alienated. This Order and the oil sanctions Order which your Lordships will be debating soon will, I hope, be the last Orders on the road towards a conflict in which all might be involved. Let this Order be the last, and let it mark the start of talking around a table with the men in power.
I conclude by one prophesy to your Lordships—namely, that any Government in this country, of whatever political complexion, if it once allies itself to a policy which allows white man to shoot at white man, will, by a great upsurge of public opinion, be out within twenty-four hours, and I believe deservedly so.
4.20 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, like most of your Lordships, I came into this Chamber this afternoon with a sense of great responsibility and great complexity; and I am compelled to intervene because I feel strongly that the Government are fooling themselves in thinking that these measures are wise. The noble and learned Viscount who spoke for the Opposition put a great number of points, which doubtless will be answered. I say that, because those of us who have assiduously read the report of the debate on these measures in the other Chamber, could not help feeling that there was a great deal of evasion. There were answers of a kind, but the Government certainly did not give direct answers to what was asked.
The original Act establishing the Rhodesian Reserve Bank is quite a complicated one, and doubtless it covers all the things that should be covered. The point I want to make is that I feel that the results of this action by the Government are without doubt going to have a very bad effect throughout the world on confidence in sterling, and in British insurance, and the propriety of actions interfering with that confidence must be considered. The Order is, of course, virtually equivalent to what was introduced when war broke out the last time. Technically, I suppose, we are in a state of war, and this Government are given power to do anything they like.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I leave it to lawyers present to

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explain to the noble Lord the technicalities, but we are certainly not technically in a state of war with Rhodesia. They are technically in a state of rebellion.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I understood the noble Lord the Government Chief Whip to say that the exercise was to bring Rhodesia back into the Commonwealth. One wonders which other States intend leaving the Commonwealth. But the noble Earl the Leader of the House has raised a technical point. I repeat that there will be widespread repercussions in all circles which have regard for the historical responsibility of sterling, and, of course, in circles concerned with insurances and premiums and matters of that kind.
I say that because through a long life I have been in touch with considerable financial and banking operations, and I am satisfied that Governments cannot pass Orders like this without introducing a great deal of confusion. The financial Press this morning emphasises what confusion is being caused. It must break out everywhere, and the Order is therefore dangerous. The effect on insurances with regard to the delays in payment of premiums is equally dangerous.
Of course, this situation is unique. There has never before been a suspension of a Reserve Bank. After all, the Reserve Bank is of relatively recent introduction. There was no Reserve Bank in the United States until 1932, and until then banks did not even guarantee deposits. New Zealand, for instance, had no Reserve Bank until quite recently, so the Government are now seeking to upset a new mechanism. That causes great surprise. Incidentally, we have all these difficulties about who is what, who is the Government and so on; but I cannot help reflecting that, although United States policy has been progressively to encourage de-colonialisation, we now have the humorous situation that the United States Government is reported to be strongly in support of a policy which apparently is going to restore to London the administration of a certain part of what, in spite of what has been said, is still the Commonwealth.
I hope that, in replying, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, will deal with a question which was put to the Chief Secre-
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tary in another place, but which was not answered—namely:
"who is the customer of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia? Is that customer the Governor of Rhodesia? Are we the Government of Rhodesia?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 722 (No. 26), col. 1208, 14/12/65.]
The point I want to emphasise is that the Government should remember, as my noble friend Lord Coleraine has said, that they have got a tiger by the tail, and this is not a very good way of dealing with it. I should like to associate myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Colyton, and of my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye. I have read very carefully the Report of the debate in another place, and many points were put there which do not appear to have been answered.
The noble and learned Viscount has put a great number of points here. I should like to conclude by confirming what I believe is the situation to-day. Whatever intensification there is in the actions announced against Rhodesia, it will only strengthen the resolution of the Afrikaner population of Rhodesia to resist. The Government are only fooling themselves if they do not recognise what is human nature, and what we should want to be the case if it were Britain and they were Britons, rebellion or no rebellion. They believe that Rhodesia is their country, and they see nearby what has happened in the Congo with the withdrawal of normal government. So in that tone I appeal to the Government to realise that negotiation is now the best policy. Coercion will not achieve the desired result.
4.28 p.m.
LORD REAY: My Lords, the single logic of the successive measures introduced by Her Majesty's Government in respect of Rhodesia, subsequent to Smith's declaration of independence, has been to bring the Rhodesian Front, or some plausible political alternative, to sue for terms by temporarily destroying that country's capacity to continue as a trading nation. From the initial sanction of the withdrawal of Commonwealth Preference, to the sanction on tobacco, to the initial discretionary control of Rhodesia's reserves held in London, to the almost complete freezing of all those reserves—these have had the single objective of denying that country foreign

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exchange with which to enable it to finance its imports. What we now need is more information on which to judge how fully these sanctions, designed to reduce the availability of foreign exchange to the Rhodesian Front, are operating, and a scrutiny of where further pressure might be applied.
In the first place, I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will reveal the extent to which the board of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia have succeeded in locating the Rhodesian reserves held overseas, and whether the board would publish a statement of the Rhodesian reserves—their total and their distribution. It was the policy of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, under the old board, to publish a statement of the reserves each week. Could we also have an assurance that these reserves are nowhere available for use by the Rhodesian Front, and that, if foreign commercial banks are found to be making funds available for such use, the Government will consider taking action in the courts of the appropriate country to claim those funds?
Secondly, would Her Majesty's Government consider the possibility of instructing the subsidiaries of British companies in Rhodesia to see that their foreign exchange earnings are not used for the purchase of imports into Rhodesia, but are turned over to the English parent company or to the Bank of England? Thirdly, would Her Majesty's Government look into the possibility of restricting the extension of internal credit in Rhodesia by the issue of instructions from the Reserve Bank (if this should be possible) to the commercial banks of Rhodesia to call in, for example, overdrafts? Fourthly, would Her Majesty's Government be prepared to direct the Board to devalue the Rhodesian pound? I should like to know if they would in any circumstances be prepared to do this; and, if so, in what circumstances. Finally, in view of the situation that has arisen on the board of the Central African Power Corporation, would the Government, in order that this board should continue to discharge its functions and responsibilities for the generation of electricity at Kariba, appoint three members to replace those three Rhodesian members whose resignations fall due today?
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It has been argued here, and has been very widely argued in another place, that Her Majesty's Government have already, by these Orders, destroyed that confidence in the integrity of this country to meet its obligations without which this country can no longer hope to continue its role as a hanker in the world. But whether this is so is not to be tested by describing the unprecedented character of the present situation: it is tested by watching the banking reactions of other countries to these events. If other countries were to cease to bank with us, were to cease to insure with us, if they became nervous at the mere hint of political trouble, then clearly there might be some cause for alarm. But there are reasons for not expecting this. First, this is, on any viewing, an exceptional occasion, of which other countries can hardly need persuading; but, if they did need persuasion, it should be the quite manageable duty of Her Majesty's Government to provide it. Secondly, there was very explicit warning. It was not by the unannounced severity of our retaliatory measures that other countries have been surprised. It was a unique event preceded by every warning of the most unambiguous nature.
We are at war with a country which we wish to defeat without resort to the use of military force. It is a situation which offers a horrifying potential of escalating responsibilities and costs. The cost of rescuing Zambia from destruction for each week that this lasts: of air-lifting oil, of organising coal, of restoring her economy ultimately; the risk of incapacity to the Copper Belt by sabotage, direct or indirect; the costs of imposing an oil blockade, which of course may be necessary; the outbreak of disorder in Zambia or in Rhodesia itself, which would equally certainly require military intervention, perhaps even the ultimate re-occupation of Rhodesia with our own police and troops, and their maintenance there for years—these dangers increase with the passage of each month, each week, each day.
There seems no comparison between these risks and the disputed fractions of notional integrity we allegedly put at hazard by any additional element of stringency in our financial measures. And certainly any element of confusion or

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timidity or carelessness in the consideration of the slightest detail of possible extra effective power derivable from or associated with these Orders would be as grave and regrettable an offence as if the issue were one of committing soldiers of this country to risk their lives—for that, of course, if we were to fail, is what it might always come to.
4.35 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, I do not intend to inflict a speech upon your Lordships now: I want only to express in a sentence or two the deep anxiety which I believe is now felt by many in this House and outside that the Government are taking one step after the other (of which the latest, but not perhaps the last, is now under discussion here) which will soon result in the Prime Minister finding himself in a position in which he cannot escape forcible aggression, against which practically all those on whom the present measure of government, stability and direction of the economy in Rhodesia depend will feel that they must unite to defend all that is dearest to them. I never questioned the sincerity of the Prime Minister when he stated, time after time, that he did not wish to use force, but I do gravely doubt, as I think many others do, whether he is not finding himself going along a course which will have that consequence, with further consequences on which I will not now dilate but which will be in all your Lordships' minds.
4.36 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF NORTH CAPE: My Lords, I intervene only because I have at times had under my command many Rhodesian people, and my admiration for them has been beyond measure. I believe most of us will think that Mr. Smith is much the same—a likeable, courageous, determined man. The fact remains that the law of England is that, whatever the provocation—and there may have been provocation from Her Majesty's Government—you are not allowed to take the law into your own hands; and that is what Mr. Smith has done. In consequence, every sort of sanction is entirely his responsibility.
Now a great deal has been said about the united support of the Rhodesians for Mr. Smith's Government. Unfortunately, if you have a likeable, courageous and
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determined leader people will blindly follow him. We have experienced that, of course, with our own Commanders-in-Chief. Armies and Navies will follow them blindly. If the Commander-in-Chief leads them to disaster, it is entirely his responsibility, in his own heart, soul and conscience. If we go back to the past, Napoleon, I suppose, had the support of the whole French people: he led them to disaster. Hitler, I suppose, had 95 per cent. German support: he led them to disaster. Mussolini had 95 per cent. Italian support: he led them to disaster. It is not the peoples: it is the leaders who are to blame.
In the case of Rhodesia, Mr. Smith is, as I have said, a likeable, courageous and determined man. I suppose no greater courage is required of a man than for him to retrace his steps. If Mr. Smith were to bring his country back to the legal position he would certainly, I think, by the suffering which he would thereby save, be worthy of the George Cross; and if he did that I think he would get the admiration and the sympathy of the whole world.
4.39 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, in the interests of Party unity on this question (which has been a little shaken, perhaps unintentionally, by some recent statements of Her Majesty's Government), and also in the interests of that objective on which I think we are all agreed—the early return of Rhodesia to constitutional government—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, who is going to reply for the Government, will answer clearly and unequivocally the questions which were put to him at the beginning of the debate by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne.
I am going to refer very briefly to only one of those questions—the last one, concerning the payment of interest on the Rhodesian Government loan stock. I feel bound to say that I do not think it would have been necessary even to ask this question in your Lordships' House if it had been answered in another place. And the reason why it has been pressed strongly—and, in my view, rightly so—by nearly every noble Lord who has spoken this afternoon is that it was asked in another place repeatedly, clearly and

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politely, but the reply of the official Government spokesman was one which I can only describe as an impenetrable smokescreen of verbosity. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, is altogether incapable of employing a defensive weapon of this kind.
It really is not good enough to tell us that it is outside the scope of this Order; because paragraph 3(e) of the second Order (No. 2049), which I look upon as the most important paragraph, states that:
"the Secretary of State may from time to time give to the Governor or to the Deputy Governor or to any other director or (through the Governor or Deputy Governor) to the Board such general or special directions relating to the policy of the Bank or the conduct of its business as he may think fit and it shall be the duty of every person to whom any such directions are given to comply with them."
Nor, my Lords, do I think it is good enough to tell us simply that we are not the Government of Rhodesia. That may be technically true; but, surely, we hold the view that the present de facto Government of Rhodesia is an illegal Government; and, surely, it was because we regarded it as an illegal Government that the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order of November 16 was issued. This Order, in paragraph 4, provides that:
"the executive authority of Southern Rhodesia may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by a Secretary of State".
Then, in sub-paragraph (d) it says:
"a Secretary of State may exercise any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in a Minister or a Deputy Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary".
What has happened is that the illegal Government of Rhodesia paid the interest due upon the Government loan stock on November 21. On December 6, when another instalment fell due, the interest was not paid because we had made it impossible for the illegal Rhodesian Government to obtain the necessary currency to pay it to persons resident outside Rhodesia. Therefore, for the first time, there was a default upon a Commonwealth Trustee stock; and I understand that this default again took place on December 15 on the instalment which then fell due.
I really do not think it will redound to our credit or advantage if we plead
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that the de facto Government of Rhodesia is illegal in so far as it is competent for us to take away its assets, and that it is still a legal Government in so far as it still has the liability to pay the interest which we have made it impossible for it to do. I really do not see how we can argue that if we have the power—as I think we have—to deprive this illegal Government of the financial assets of the people of Rhodesia, we can go on to argue that we have the power to take away its assets but no power to take over its liabilities. Surely, if we pursue this line we shall be regarded, to say the least of it, as equivocating and disingenuous; and I think this is of fundamental importance. So far from being irrelevant to the Order, it is the most important thing about it.
In normal circumstances it would have been a sufficient reason for a vote against the Order, but as my noble friend Lord Dilhorne has said, we do not intend to divide against the Order because we feel that to follow such a course would not help our agreed common objective of bringing back Rhodesia at the earliest possible moment to constitutional Government. But surely that makes it all the more important that we should act in a manner which is clearly above reproach in the eyes of the world. As the noble Lord, Lord Byers—rightly, I think—said, our refusal to pay the interest due upon these bonds after we had deprived the illegal Government of the funds necessary to pay it and of having the constitutional power to pay, may, in itself, indirectly delay our objective of bringing back Rhodesia to constitutional Government—because the more honourable and more straightforward we are seen to be, the sooner that result is likely to be brought about.
I would ask the Government, indeed I beg the Government, to be consistent and to be straightforward in order to achieve our common objective and in order to retain our unity on this question, which is of such importance to the Commonwealth and to the world. I am sure the Government wish to be both; but there have been statements lately which have appeared to be ambiguous in some respects. The Prime Minister began by saying—and he said it very well—that the use of force was absolutely out. I do hope that that is still so, because more lately

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there have been statements made by the Prime Minister land by others which might perhaps be interpreted to mean that this may not be so. I think we all agree with and admire the Prime Minister's statement on November 23 about conciliation, in which he said that as soon as the people of Rhodesia are prepared to return to constitutional paths, and as soon as the Governor feels there is an opportunity of people there forming a Government which will act in a constitutional manner, we would want to deal with those people without any recrimination or rancour about the past. I think that was a very fine conclusion to the sentence: without any recrimination or rancour about the past. But we are not altogether certain, in view of recent statements, whether the Government still feel that recrimination and rancour are to be avoided.
I am not going to say anything about the recent ambiguities concerning those with whom we should negotiate, but the impression has been created that the Government may not perhaps wish to negotiate in any circumstances with people who have deceived them and who have acted illegally. I hope that this is not the true mind of the Government; because, if you are going to have constitutional rule in Rhodesia, clearly you must have constitutional elections; and you cannot have constitutional, free elections if the only people who are allowed to stand for election are those people whose honesty and good character have the approval of the British Government. Therefore, I hope that the Government will bear in mind that if we are to achieve our common objective, we must not rule out negotiations with any Rhodesian, however illegally he may have acted and however exasperating his behaviour may have been to all of us.
4.50 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, to me this has been a strange debate, and I think I might ask for the sympathy of the House when attempting to wind it up and to deal with the various points which have been raised. We had the sad and sobering speech of the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. I would not agree with all he said, but I certainly share the sense of his speech, that what we are now being called on to do is as utterly repugnant to the members of my Party, my Government and their supporters, as
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it is to any noble Lord opposite. There was the speech of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Fraser of North Cape, with all its simplicity, which struck at the very heart of the subject; that we are not, in fact, considering the evils of a people but the, perhaps, misguided actions of their leaders.
Then there was the deep and penetrating speech that we should expect to hear from the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne—and here I may say that some of my difficulty is due to the fact that the noble and learned Viscount fired his questions so fast that, not being a shorthand writer, I am not sure that I got down all the questions, or even the right sense of them. If I do not answer all his points, it will not be because I am being evasive. If I miss any point put by the noble and learned Viscount, or by any other noble Lord, which he feels is important, perhaps he will remind me. Because I sense the concern of the House that these matters should be dealt with, I will undertake that, if I cannot deal with them adequately this evening, I will, between now and Christmas, read Hansard carefully, and if necessary I will communicate with the noble Lords concerned.
When listening to the noble Lord, Lord Colyton (who seeks the forgiveness of the House because he has had to leave early owing to the illness of his wife), I had the feeling that we were dealing with a domestic matter. But most of us, I think, are conscious that this is not a domestic matter between Mr. Wilson, as was suggested, and Mr. Smith. This is an issue between the Government of Rhodesia and the British Parliament—because the British Parliament is the only organisation which, in the end, can grant independence to the Colony of Southern Rhodesia. The action of Mr. Smith was not against the Labour Government; it was an action against the sovereign Parliament of Great Britain.
My Lords, we should never forget that in the end it will be for Parliament to decide what further steps should be taken and what conclusions should be arrived at. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Salter, who suggested that we should move from one step to another and that finally we should be confronted with the need for military action. On November 11, 1965, we had the choice between military action or taking economic sanctions. The

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Government, I believe wisely and rightly, and with the unanimity of the whole House, decided to reject military action and take economic sanctions.
We know why we had to take economic sanctions. It was not only to bring Southern Rhodesia back into the Commonwealth and under Constitutional rule: it was, in fact, to safeguard the interests of the people of Southern Rhodesia, because unless we had retained responsibility for Southern Rhodesia in the face of world opinion, the actions and conflicts in Africa would have beggared description. My Lords, we had no alternative but to take action, and we chose economic sanctions. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, said during his speech on the enabling Bill that our concern must always be about the effect of economic sanctions. They have been applied on a number of occasions, and they have failed because the nations were not prepared to implement them to the full. By itself no sanction, and particularly the Orders which we are considering this afternoon, would have the desired effect. It may be that some of the measures taken have loopholes in them, but we must consider the aggregate effort of all the sanctions which we have applied to Southern Rhodesia.
I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, who said that sanctions will bear harder on some individuals than on others. When you use economic sanctions, you are using a blunt instrument; but that is infinitely superior to using the sharp weapon of the sword. We have taken account of the views of your Lordships' House with regard to pensions. We are very sensitive about the application of these sanctions, but we feel that we must use them to achieve the desired end. As we have said on many occasions—but it is well worth repeating—the need is that Southern Rhodesia should have a constitutional Government and return to the Commonwealth.
When we are talking of purpose, I think it necessary that we should think in terms of the spirit which prevails at the end of the day. I would use the words of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, when he was interviewed
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by the Daily Mirror, which were quoted. I believe, by the noble Lord, Lord Molson. The Prime Minister said:
"Given a return to constitutional rule, I am sure that everyone in Britain will want to see a rapid and constructive solution to the problem without recrimination.
"It was Abraham Lincoln, at the end of the American Civil War. who spoke of 'malice towards none' and 'binding up the nation's wounds'."
My right honourable friend concluded,
"That will be our attitude."
So, if there are noble Lords who have closer contacts with Southern Rhodesia than I, or others, have, perhaps they can communicate the message that we are not enemies of the people of Rhodesia; that if the Rhodesians will return, not by unconditional surrender, but if they will return to what they were, a country with a constitutional Government within the Commonwealth, their interests will at all times be safeguarded by Parliament, because in the end it is Parliament which decides what shall be the final solution for Rhodesia.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, can it be understood that Rhodesia is not now in the Commonwealth, and that Tanzania is in the Commonwealth?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, knows as well as I do that when the Government of Southern Rhodesia became an illegal régime it automatically left the Commonwealth. Tanzania—and here I express the greatest regret—decided to break with us in Britain, and I can understand their feelings. They broke with us, but they did not break with the Commonwealth, because we are not the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is all the countries who decide to remain in the Commonwealth. My Lords, may I express the hope that we shall see Tanzania hack, because we believe that the Commonwealth still has a great part to play in the pacification and the growth of Africa and the world.
May I turn now to more detailed points which have been raised in this debate? The question has been asked, whether the Government or the Secretary of State is the Government of Southern Rhodesia. Reference has been made to the Southern

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Rhodesia Constitution Order 1965, Section 4(a), of which reads:
"The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia may be exercised—
I stress the words, "may be"—
"on Her Majesty's behalf by a Secretary of State".
That does not make Her Majesty's Government the Government of Southern Rhodesia. It merely empowers the Secretary of State to take such action as may be necessary. It does not place upon Her Majesty's Government the authority of what was the Government of Southern Rhodesia.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I feel that the noble Lord should also look at Section 42, which says that
"The executive authority of Southern Rhodesia is vested in Her Majesty and in the Governor."
This provision deals with the United Kingdom's exercise of the powers of government. It makes plain that the executive authority in Southern Rhodesia may be exercised on Her Majesty's behalf by a Secretary of State. The question is not to whom do we attach the label of Governor, but who has the authority to tell the Reserve Bank whether or not to pay interest. The point I was putting to the noble Lord, if I may make it clear, is that beyond any shadow of doubt the Secretary of State has power to order the Bank to pay the interest. That, I think, is confirmed by Section 4(1)(d), to which the noble Lord referred.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I think that the noble and learned Viscount is going a little further than I have reached in this matter. I was trying to deal with the claim that Her Majesty's Government are the Government of Rhodesia.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: We did not say that.
LORD SHEPHERD: I understood that some noble Lords had. The noble and learned Viscount asked what was the justification for the Government suspending the old board and appointing a new one. It was clear to the Government that the old board were obeying the orders of Mr. Smith between November 11 and December 3, 1965, and up to this day, even though Mr. Smith has been suspended, the old board have continued to work with him. This was one of the
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reasons why the Government decided to suspend the old board.
The noble and learned Viscount also asked about the powers of the Secretary of State, which he described as "unfettered". In relation to the 1964 Act, which set up the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, with great respect, we were talking about the paragraph in the Order which gave the Secretary of State unfettered and unlimited powers.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is what I am dealing with. We have to consider the Act of 1964. As I understand it—and I have sought very close advice upon this—the Secretary of State has no special powers, other than those which are in the Order, to amend the constitution of the Bank laid down in the 1964 Act, and if he were to make an instruction which departed in any way from the provisions of the 1964 Act, a further Order in Council would have to be made. The Secretary of State has not unfettered power.
The noble and learned Viscount asked what sort of directions the Secretary of State is likely to make. At this stage, most of these would be confidential, but one of them might well be for the transfer of the assets of the Bank from one centre to another in the interests of the shareholders and customers of the Bank. As I understand it, he would not have power to prevent cheques being paid. The board, like that of any commercial organisation, is responsible for the proper conduct of business activities between one customer and other.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, dealing with the powers of the board, Section 6 of the Bank constitution says:
"No person shall be appointed as a director if he is a director or shareholder of any bank or accepting or discount house".
Is it to be understood that the old board are suspended, and not dismissed, and that the new members appointed can be appointed only under these same personal considerations as the original directors?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord is right in saying that the old board have been suspended and not

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dismissed. In regard to their qualifications, the noble Lord will see that these have been waived in making the appointment of the present board.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, asked why, in the Assets Order, we ask for information regarding net balances. It is true that under present Orders we should know about transfers from one account to another, but in order that we should understand the significance of these movements, we now need to know the balances. As my noble friend Lord Beswick said, in introducing these Orders, all information in regard to the accounts of private individuals would be treated as secret matter.
May I now turn to a matter which has given concern to most noble Lords who have spoken—that is, the position in regard to payments on bonds. There has been a considerable misunderstanding in the minds of many noble Lords. In regard to general loans raised by Southern Rhodesia (I am not talking about loans raised for the Kariba Dam and for special purposes), all these have been raised by the Colony of Rhodesia under a lawful Constitution consisting of a Government and Parliament. The liability for the repayment and the servicing of these loans remains with Southern Rhodesia.
All these loans were credited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Section 113(1) of the Constitution clearly lays down that all sums that are raised by the Colony of Rhodesia shall be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund and not into the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia. It is clear that interest payments and repayments are made from the annual Rhodesian Estimates, which have to be approved by Parliament and by a warrant of the Governor. The authority for paying any interest on loans raised by Southern Rhodesia rests with the Southern Rhodesian Parliament and the executive of the Colony—namely, the Governor. The revenue for the payment of interest arises from the taxes raised by the Southern Rhodesian Government, and all these sums for the present year are now available in the Rhodesian Treasury.
I believe there have been some suggestions that the reason for the latest default
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in payment on the Rhodesian stock was the measures taken in regard to the Bank. I think your Lordships should know of the sequence of events. On December 1 we announced further economic and financial measures. These undoubtedly began to bite. December 6 was the day on which the warrants should have been issued and paid. As I understand it, the Bank of England were expecting to receive instructions from Southern Rhodesia between December 1 and December 3. I think this should be borne in mind, in view of the fact that the particular Bank Order was not published until the evening of the 3rd. As I understand it, the payments that were due had been collected and provided for by the Rhodesian Estimates in the earlier part of the year, and there would have been an automatic instruction to the Bank to pay to the Bank of England. But, as I understand it, on a certain date between the 1st and 3rd the usual mechanism of the payment of interest was interrupted. Who it was, and for what purpose, I do not know. I think it should be clear that it was Mr. Smith or one of his colleagues who interfered with the general mechanism of the payment of interest on these stocks.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord would answer a question that rather puzzles me. I see the general validity of the argument he has just put forward, but I cannot see its validity in these particular circumstances. I would ask him this hypothetical question. Suppose Mr. Smith's Government had met these obligations and had paid this interest, and suppose Her Majesty's Government had been asked for their attitude towards this transaction, would not Her Majesty's Government have been obliged to say that it was an illegal action on the part of Mr. Smith's Government, because nothing that Mr. Smith's Government does has any legal validity? If that is so—and I do not see how you can avoid it—where does the legal obligation rest now? It cannot be with Mr. Smith.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Lord has raised an interesting point. The fact is that the Rhodesian Estimates had been passed by the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia prior to U.D.I.
LORD COLERAINE: The debts were in December.
LORD SHEPHERD: Let me finish. The provisions had been made, and therefore that would have been a lawful payment.
LORD COLERAINE: Before U.D.I.
LORD SHEPHERD: No. The monies authorised had been authorised by the Parliament of Southern Rhodesia prior to U.D.I., and in that sense it would be lawful. Therefore, if the payment had been made by the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia, acting as agents for the Rhodesian Government, to the Bank of England, there would have been no difficulty in meeting the interest that had arisen on the bonds.
LORD COLERAINE: In the view of the British Government they could not have acted as agents for the Rhodesian Government, because by December 6 Mr. Smith's Government had ceased to exist and, therefore, could have no legal obligation by December 6. Where did that obligation lay?
LORD SHEPHERD: I do not appear to have made myself clear to the noble Lord. What, I said was that the collection of taxes to meet the interest due on the stocks was authorised by the Parliament that was then sitting, prior to U.D.I., and, therefore, the sum that could have been made available would have arisen from a lawful act of the Rhodesian Parliament and there would be no question of any illegality in the transfer of that sum to London. It may well be that Mr. Smith's Government is an illegal Government, but, as I understand it—and it is a strange thing—if an instruction was given within the 1964 Constitution and it was lawful then it could be transacted. I want to make it clear that the halt in the payment of the interest on the shares of Southern Rhodesia was no part of, and did not stem from, the decision of the Government to take control of the Reserve Banc of Southern Rhodesia.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, there is one point I should like to raise, quite apart from the question of illegality. I know that the Rhodesian Parliament can collect enough revenue to pay interest to its residents in Rhodesia. But can the noble Lord confirm what I take him to mean, that the illegal Government of Rhodesia possesses enough British currency in the Bank of England which it
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could have used to make these interest payments on December 6 and 15, and could it have done that, in spite of the fact that we had impounded their reserves in the Reserve Bank? Had they enough in the Bank of England to do that?
LORD SHEPHERD: I think I should need notice of that particular technical point
THE EARL. OF DUNDEE: It is not a technical point. Surely it is fundamental.
LORD SHEPHERD: It is a technical point (if the noble Earl will only allow me to finish) as to whether the sums were available in London. But this I can say to the noble Earl: that if instructions had been given by the agent of Southern Rhodesia—namely, the Reserve Bank—to the Bank of England, there was no reason at all why the sums should not have been paid to the holders of the stocks in question.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I understand that, but it really comes back to the question I put to the noble Lord, and which I do not think has been clearly answered yet. Who was the person who at that time could have given instructions to the Reserve Bank, as agent, to pass on to the Bank of England? The answer surely is the Secretary of State.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble and learned Viscount is rather naughty. He puts a question and then gives me the answer, and it is the wrong answer.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Then let us have the right one.
LORD SHEPHERD: This is one of the most difficult debates in which to answer. I do not mind taking questions, but I strongly object to having a question put and an answer given. We will not get angry at this season of good cheer.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: What is the answer?
LORD SHEPHERD: Let me come to it. This is a serious matter. We are not in a sort of teach-in. Having made that clear, I think I ought to come back to the relationship of Her Maesty's Government with Southern Rhodesia. It is not my usual practice, but I should like to read this to your Lordships. The

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Government of Southern Rhodesia continues to exist as a separate entity, despite the rebellion that has taken place there. It remains governed by its own Constitution, and it continues to operate (so far as the physical circumstances of the rebellion permit) through its own institutions and offices, headed by the Governor. It is still regulated by, and it is still its duty to administer, its own laws (which are interpreted and enforced by its own courts), and it is still entitled and subject to the legal rights and liabilities which it has previously acquired or accepted in its own right or which it may in the future so acquire or accept. It has not in any sense been merged into the Government of the United Kingdom. Though the Government of the United Kingdom have been given certain powers to enable them to ensure the lawful government of Southern Rhodesia, including the power to make laws and, in certain cases, to exercise or control the exercise of executive powers in Southern Rhodesia, they have not assumed the government of that country, and have not in any way succeeded to either the assets or the liabilities of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. I hope I have dealt—I have done so to the best of my ability—with the question of bonds and loans.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that point, may I ask him one question? From what he states, it sounds very much as though the Government could have given instructions to the Reserve Bank to pay the interest. Should we be right in assuming that?
THE EARL. OF DUNDEE: The noble Lord said that the Bank of England was expecting to be told between December 1 and December 3 to make this interest payment. What the noble Lord has not told us is how the Bank of England obtained the necessary currency to do that.
LORD SHEPHERD: To deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, may I say this to him? The Governor is the executive power within the Constitution. My noble and learned friend on the Woolsack will correct me if I am wrong. The Constitution of Southern Rhodesia consists of the executive authority and the Rhodesian Parliament—and
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the Rhodesian Parliament is still in being; it has not been suspended. It is only the Ministers, Mr. Smith and his colleagues, who have been suspended. On the question as to whether the Rhodesian Bank should have paid, I tried to say earlier on that the Government are not the Government of Southern Rhodesia and, therefore, could not have given an instruction to the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia to make these payments.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, would the noble Lord be good enough to give way once more? I know it is very difficult for him. I listened with the greatest interest to the passage he read—and he was reading very carefully—when he said in terms that it is quite right that the Secretary of State can discharge the executive functions of a Minister of the Southern Rhodesian Government. I heard him say that distinctly. It is not a question of who succeeded to the assets or the liabilities. I have not suggested for one moment that the British Government succeeded to the assets or the liabilities. I put the question, which the noble Lord has not yet answered, though I suggest it is the vital question: who, after the making of the Southern Rhodesian Constitution Order, had authority, on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, to tell the Reserve Bank to tell the Bank of England to pay the interest?
LORD SHEPHERD: I will try to deal with this point. The Reserve Bank of Rhodesia is like any other bank it takes instructions from its customers. One of the customers of the Reserve Bank is the Government of Rhodesia. The fact that Her Majesty's Government have taken certain powers does not make it the Government of Rhodesia; it does not make it a customer of the Reserve Bank. The noble Viscount shakes his head, but I have taken the best advice that I can, and if my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack disagrees with what I have said, I will seek his assistance. But that is the advice I have received.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I was not challenging the advice in that respect. But when the Government of Rhodesia is the customer of the Reserve Bank, some member of that Government, from time to time, would give instructions, on behalf of that Government, to the bank. Now that power has been taken for the

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Secretary of State to discharge any functions of any Minister, including the Parlimentary Secretary, the question is: Has the Secretary of State power to give instructions on behalf of the Government of Southern Rhodesia which a Minister of that Government would have?
LORD SHEPHERD: I think I said earlier—and if I did not. I am sorry—that Her Majesty's Government do not have the power to instruct the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia to make these payments, for the very reason that I have given. Noble Lords may shake their heads, but I have taken the best advice available, and I am giving it.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord, as I have not done so before? I have tried to understand this. Could the noble Lord say what individual, Secretary of State or Minister had the power to authorise payment to the Bank of England by the Reserve Bank? That question has not yet been answered.
LORD SHEPHERD: If the noble Lord will read what I said earlier, he will see that I have already explained that situation—that is, if he was referring to the past interest and dividends that were made prior to, or shortly after, U.D.I. Have I the attention of the noble Lord? Is that the point he is after?
LORD DERWENT: I understood the noble Lord to say that the collection of the money had been authorised perfectly legally. He has not said that at a particular date it had been authorised to be paid to the Bank of England. There is a period of several months between the two.
LORD BARNBY: Before the noble Lord replies, may I read from column 1207 of Hansard, when the Chief Secretary of the Treasury replied:
"… we, the British Government, own the assets or funds of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia."—[OFFICIAL REPORT (Commons) Vol. 722, No. 26, col. 1207; 14/12/65.]
If they have the power, as the noble Lord explained, of direction, and they own the funds, could he confirm that those funds are owned by the British Government? What about the liabilities? Do the Bank own the liabilities, too?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I would venture to appeal to the House to let the noble Lord continue with his speech. I do not think the oldest Member will recall a speech which was interrupted quite so often.
LORD SHEPHERD: In view of the help that I have had from the Leader of the House, I cannot very well "knock" the noble Lord, Lord Derwent. But I would ask that he should read my speech, because I think there was some misunderstanding. I was referring to the interest paid on the loans shortly after U.D.I. We are now talking about the default of some later stuff, which raises quite a different matter. If the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, reads what I have said, I think he will see that I have dealt with this matter satisfactorily.
May I now move on? The noble Lord, Lord Byers, asked how the board was operating. The board is operating like any board but, of course, under considerable difficulties. Technically, it has control of all the assets of the Bank. We are sending messages to the chief cashier and the senior officers of the Rhodesian Bank in Salisbury, and we have no reason to believe that the officers of the Bank have acted in any way beyond the constitution of the Bank. Naturally, we are watching with considerable interest.
In regard to how effective the measures are, as I said earlier, you cannot judge one measure by itself; you need to take them all. Certainly the noble Lord will appreciate that Mr. Smith has become a good deal more angry than he was in the past, and I have no doubt that these matters are biting. The officials in Salisbury carry out the normal banking operations of the Bank as they did in the past. I think there was also a question from the noble Lord, Lord Byers, as to whether Sir Sydney Caine's board is locating the assets. This takes some time, and considerable strides have been taken; but it is one of those operations you will never know all about until you can open the full books. But the board is very active indeed. In view of what the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, said, I think I should make it clear (because I think he more or less referred to the assets of Southern Rhodesia as those of the white Rhodesians) that the assets are of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. They

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are contributed in various ways. Certainly the natives of the country have contributed by their labour, and they have a share in those assets.
My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, who asked who is the owner of the Reserve Bank. If any noble Lord will look up the constitution of the Bank of 1964 he will see that the share capital of £1 million arrived out of the funds which became available with the dissolution of the Central African Federation. In other words, it was the contribution made by the old Colony of Rhodesia into the Central African Federation, and when it was dissolved it came back and became the funds of the Central Bank.
I should like to answer one question put by the noble Lord, Lord Barnby. He asked whether this action would have bad effects on sterling and confidence in British banking and insurance. This is very far from the truth. We have taken an action which is repugnant to all of us, to meet the desires and, I believe, the demand of the world, and I do not believe any action we have taken will in any way influence confidence in the British banking system, because, as my noble friend Lord Beswick said in regard to the Bank of England, they were acting within the law of the land.
The noble Lord, Lord Reay, asked, has the Reserve Bank located reserves, and can they deny these reserves to any particular individual or group of individuals. This, of course, arises from the Assets Order, but, as my noble friend Lord Beswick said, and as I reiterate, in regard to the Assets Order the inquiry is not in any way to affect the rights of private individuals, whether they are in Rhodesia or in this country. I think that would be an infringement of banking knowledge and banking secrecies. The noble Lord also asked a number of other questions, as did many other noble Lords. I will reply, if I may, by letter.
I would say one last word in regard to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee. He repeated a number of the questions which had been raised by his noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne and he then referred to Party unity being shaky. My Lords, I do not believe that in regard to Party unity in the long-term
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aim of bringing Southern Rhodesia back to constitutional rule within the Commonwealth there is any dispute between us. One well remembers the days during the war when naturally the Opposition or members of the Government Party would question the Government as to the wisdom of one particular action or another. That is the duty of the Opposition and indeed of every Member of the House, but I would say this to the noble Lord, and I will say it to the House again, because I am sure most of us are conscious of the great passions that are now aroused in Africa and what I believe is the desire of the whole House that this matter should be dealt with without fighting in Africa: that one should make sure, when one is making speeches and questioning the decisions of the Government, that such speeches should not be couched (unless they are deliberately couched) to give comfort to Mr. Smith.
I said earlier that sanctions are longterm weapons—they take weeks, and even months—but once you let the other side know that you are in any way lacking in determination to see the end, all that you have done and all that they have suffered is at naught. I do suggest, particularly in view of the Order which will be presented to-morrow, that we keep our unity. We still reserve our rights to criticise and question, but we should never let Mr. Smith and his colleagues believe that there is any lack of determination in this House or in the British Parliament to see the return of Southern Rhodesia, with honour, to constitutional government within the Commonwealth.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, despite the appeal by the noble Earl the Leader of the House, I should like to ask the noble Lord what I believe is the most important question on these Orders. Although he may feel he has given a satisfactory answer I think I can say that he has not really satisfied at all those on this side of the House. I am sorry to annoy him by suggesting the answer, but I want to put the question as clearly as I can. It really divides itself into two parts. I start with the assumption that someone in authority before U.D.I.—some authority in Southern Rhodesia or some member of the Government—had to authorise the Reserve Bank to pay money to the Bank of England in order to pay the interest. Am I correct in that?
LORD SHEPHERD: Yes, the noble Viscount is correct.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: If that is so, I should be grateful if the noble Lord could point out why it is that under the Constitution Order in Council, paragraph 4, the Secretary of State has not now power to give similar instructions to the Reserve Bank, because under paragraph 4 he has not only got power to exercise any functions vested in a Minister or Parliamentary Secretary but he also has power to exercise any function that is vested by the Constitution or any other law in force in Southern Rhodesia in any officer or authority of the Government.
What I am seeking to find out is who does the noble Lord now say, at the present time, would have the legal authority to say to the Reserve Bank, "Hand over the money to the Bank of England to pay that interest"? And why did he say that it is not the Secretary of State? I put these questions originally, and I think that they still require to be answered.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I have done my best, in a very long speech, and I will try to summarise it in a few words. The original payment was authorised by an act of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament following provision in the Estimates; and there is an automatic provision, as I understand it, that, having authorised the general payment, the Rhodesian Bank will then automatically remit to the Bank of England the sums due; but somewhere or another between the 1st and the 3rd, countermanding instructions were given.
As to the payments of the recent shares, these have been authorised by Parliament, and I believe, subject to correction, that they have been authorised by the Governor. The noble Lord is asking why Her Majesty's Government cannot instruct the Bank to make the payment. I tried to say earlier that the Bank can only take instructions from a customer. Her Majesty's Government are not the Government of Southern Rhodesia, and are not a customer of the Rhodesian Bank. I know it may sound strange, but it is for that reason that Her Majesty's Government at present have no power to make payment of the interest due. The noble Viscount may shake his head, and I will certainly seek to amplify this advice
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by letter; but this is the advice I have received and I cannot depart from it.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I see a noble Lord rising, but may I say this. At the end of a speech of this kind by a Minister somebody occasionally rises to mention one question, but I should have thought it was quite out of order to continue cross-examining, whether it is done by those who have taken part in the debate or not.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I am, of course, in the hands of your Lordships' House as to whether it is moved that I be no longer heard.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am certainly not going to say anything remotely offensive to the noble Lord, but I think that it would be extremely unusual if a noble Lord made a speech at the end of the proceedings.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: This is a very unusual debate and an unusual occasion.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I should like to support the noble Earl the Leader of the House. My noble friend the Leader of the Opposition is not here at the moment. I think it has not been the custom while I have been in the House for a noble Lord to speak following the winding-up speech by a Minister speaking for the Government. I know it is done sometimes in the Commons if time permits, but I have never seen it done here, and I would have thought that, on reflection, my noble friend would think it would be better, as we shall be debating Rhodesia to-morrow, to wait. I think it would be somewhat of an innovation if my noble friend now sought to follow the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I should like to respond to my noble friend's appeal and I will do so, but I must first say this. Her Majesty's Government have produced a situation in which there has been a default on a colonial loan for the first time. We have asked how it can be put right and who is now responsible for the interest, but they do not answer us. I think it is a sufficiently serious question for us to continue the debate to get an answer, but if the noble and learned Viscount the

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Deputy Leader of my Party puts pressure upon me to say we should not continue the debate, I must accept it. But I must say, and I leave it to your Lordships, that this is a completely unprecedented occasion: there has been a default on a British Trustee stock owing to action by the British Government, and your Lordships cannot get the answer as to how that is to be put right.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

RESERVE BANK OF RHODESIA ORDER 1965
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, I beg to move that the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order 1965 be approved.
Moved, That the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia Order 1965 be approved.— (Lord Beswick.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COAL INDUSTRY BILL
5.43 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Stonham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2:
CAPITAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS, OF BOARD
2.—(1) All outstanding liabilities of the Board to the Minister in respect of any advances made to the Board by the Minister before 28th March. 1965, or in respect of any expenses and liabilities incurred as mentioned in section 28(1)(a) of the Act of 1946 before that date, other than liabilities in respect of interest for the period beginning with 31st December 1964 and ending with 27th March. 1965, shall be extinguished; but—
(b) the Board shall credit the sum of £415,000.000 to their reserve fund;
EARL FERRERS EARL FERRERS moved, in subsection (1)(b), to leave out "£415,000,000" and to insert "£372,000,000". The noble Earl said: After such a debate as we have
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recently had over money, I tremble to put forward an Amendment which deals with any sum of money, let alone millions of pounds. The object of this Amendment is in fact quite simple. It is modest, if not in size at least in intent, and it is simply to give the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, a chance, which I am sure he welcomes, of clarifying to the Committee an issue which has been, and is, very clouded.
Your Lordships are aware that this particular clause of the Bill, Clause 2, deals with writing off a sum of £415 million of debt of the Coal Board. What in fact it does is to transfer this debt of £415 million from the Coal Board to the taxpayer. I think it is right and just that your Lordships should be able to ask for the reason why the figure should be £415 million; and it is the answer to this question which has remained peculiarly obscure through all stages in another place, and indeed on Second Reading in this House. I thought that, as the noble Lord is always anxious to be fair and to make issues perfectly clear, he would welcome the opportunity of explaining precisely why £415 million is the figure which is chosen, because this matter does basically end up by being arithmetic.
The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, I know, disagrees with this because he said so on Second Reading; in fact he said so twice. He said:
"That is not a question which could be decided by calculation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 271 (No. 19), col. 666; 14/12/65.]
Later on he said:
"I emphasise that this was not arithmetic, but judgment."
With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, I do not think it is quite good enough. I do not think he can say one word, "judgment", and then off goes £415 million. I think we should consider what the Government's judgment is moved by and find out what reasons prompted their judgment to come to this figure. If it is a question of judgment, I should like the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, to put to your Lordships the facts which led the Government's judgment to consider that £415 million was right, and not £515 million or £315 million, or indeed, as my Amendment says, £372 million. What were the reasons? In dealing with this huge sum of money, your Lordships know that judgment on its

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own, although it is extraordinarily important, is not sufficient, and it must be backed up by facts.
In fact, the White Paper does do precisely this: it gives the facts. Paragraph 7 of the White Paper gives the facts and the figures, and I would suggest for one reason: to back up the figure, and rightly so, which Her Majesty's Government are suggesting Parliament should transfer from the Coal Board to the taxpayer. But the facts the White Paper gives only add up to £372 million and not £415 million, if you take into account the £15 million which the Government have decided to allow the Coal Board because it is not permitted to raise its prices until April 1 next year. In essence, what paragraph 7 says is that £140 million should be written off for 150 pits, £110 million for 100 pits, £16 million for coke ovens and £91 million for the accumulated deficit. In addition to that, £15 million, as I have explained, was the sum allowed for the Coal Board because it was not allowed to raise its prices. Those figures amount to £372 million, the figure which appears in my Amendment.
There is, of course, a discrepancy between this figure and the £415 million which appears in the Bill, and my question to the noble Lord is quite simple: Why an extra £43 million? Why do the Government wish to write off this extra £43 million? And I would say with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, that it is no use getting up and saying "judgment" and sitting down again—though even that would be one better than his honourable friend, the Parliamentary Secretary, in another place, who said it was "part of the rounding up exercise", which I think is one of the most extraordinary and unconventional arguments I have ever heard for disposing of £43 million.
I feel slightly sorry for the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, because I realise he has got a rotten brief. He somehow has to defend writing off £43 million for no specific reason. I should not care to be in his shoes. The only consolation I can give him is that it will give him an opportunity to display the skill which—I was going to gay we all know he has, but I think it would fairer to say, which none of us doubts he has, of arguing a bad case very effectively; but I hope that he
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will do so with conviction this time, because I really think that we want an explanation as to why this extra £43 million is to be written off.
Amendment moved—
Page 3, line 43, leave out ("£415.000,000") and insert ("£372,000,000").—(Earl Ferrers.)
5.50 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: I should like to say to the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, at once how grateful I am to him for extending to me his sympathy for possessing what he alleged was a rotten brief. I would repay his sympathy by extending to him my own sympathy for the fact that he has had to move a rotten Amendment; because, although I am grateful to the noble Earl for explaining his object so clearly, I am bound to point out that it would not be achieved by his Amendment.
This is one of the difficulties in explaining and understanding the situation—and if the noble Earl will look at Clause 2, he will understand what I mean. A reduction, or indeed an increase, in the Board's debt can be effected only by subsection (1)(a) of Clause 2; whereas subsection (1)(b), which he seeks to amend, only makes provision for a consequential entry in the Board's books. Therefore, the reduction in the figure of £415 million which he proposed in line 43 of page 3 would merely leave a sum of £43 million which the Board would be free to dispose of elsewhere in its books. That is the kind of waste and profligacy which I am quite sure that the noble Earl, and indeed any of your Lordships, would frown on most severely. I would mention that if that disturbing state of affairs did prevail, we, or the Minister, would have recourse to Section 29 of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, and it would then avert that catastrophe.
Although, on the grounds that I have just mentioned, I know that the noble Earl will agree that his Amendment could not succeed, I want to do my utmost to satisfy him on the most proper request he has put to me regarding clarification of the basis on which the figure of £415 million was decided. I say to him, "do my best", because, as he himself has said, this point was thoroughly canvassed at every stage of the Bill in another place, and I myself on Second Reading here dealt with it at some length, without

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apparently giving the answer the noble Earl required. Lord Ferrers has taken the figures from paragraph 7 of the White Paper, quite properly, because they were the only figures available to him, in arriving at a total of £372 million; and deducting that from £415 million he gets an unexplained deficit of £43 million.
I will not repeat the figures in detail because the noble Earl has given them quite correctly. But I am bound to say that, to me, the explanation given in the White Paper is a model of frankness and clarity. May I just quote it again for the noble Earl:
"… the Government think it right, in view of the extent of currently unprofitable operations, to take a cautious view of the future earning power of the Board's colliery assets, and, with the contraction in the market which is now taking place and which seems likely to continue, to allow for some further increase in the amount of unremunerative investment which should he written off."
I submit that the key phrases in the paragraph I have just read out are these: first, "the future earning power of the Board's … assets"; and, secondly, the need "to allow for some further increase in the amount of unremunerative investment" to be written off; and if your Lordships will refer to columns 666 to 668 of the Second Reading debate, you will note that I have already fully explained this.
This £43 million assumption is understandable, but nevertheless false. It arises because, as I pointed out before, although the fixing of the global figure was a matter not of arithmetic but of judgment, the noble Earl has insisted, because we have not given any specific figure for the over-valuation of colliery assets, on using only those figures in the White Paper to arrive at his total of £372 million and therefore has a gap of £43 million. I hope that the noble Lord will interrupt me whilst I am speaking if what I say is not quite clear. In fact, what the White Paper shows is that the book value of the pits in 1964 that were unable to contribute anything to their interest charges amounted to £250 million. This only indicated the approximate total of completely unremunerative colliery capital in 1964. That is the point. It was not a determination of the assets to be treated as valueless, because as we explain in paragraph 7 of
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the White Paper, some of the pits valued at £250 million which were unremunerative in 1964 may be expected to improve, while others now profitable, and therefore not included in the £250 million, will become unprofitable. There was, and there is, no certainty that the specific pits which made losses in 1964 will all be closed in the foreseeable future. Some pits which were included in this calculation may improve, while others, not included, may be expected to decline. Therefore, it is wrong to take the £250 million en bloc as an integral part of the £415 million. Is the noble Earl with me so far?
EARL FERRERS: Yes.
LORD STONHAM: Let me put it in another way. What in fact we are doing in this Bill is to write off £415 million of the Board's debt to the Exchequer; and the Board, with the Minister's consent, will write off in its books over a period assets equivalent in total to that amount as and when they become valueless. But at this moment we cannot say in every case which assets in which particular pits will become valueless.
What the Government have in mind in this cancellation of the Board's debt is to relieve the coal industry of the financial burden it could no longer support, and to provide the Board with a financial structure suited to the circumstances of the industry in the years ahead. To do this we have had to determine the amount of debt to be written off by reference to the earning capacity of the Board's assets in the future. In making this determination, the Government have had to have regard to the likely trend of the market for coal. In 1964-65 the total output of coal was 192½ million tons. And here I must repeat what I said on Second Reading, and what the noble Earl did not like; that there is no intention of arbitrarily cutting back to a target figure for future output. What we say is that, on the best estimates the Government can make, it would not be wise to count on being able to sell more than 170 to 180 million tons of coal in 1970. Understandably, this fall in anticipated demand led us to the view that reduced demand made it likely that the amount of the Board's colliery assets that would be unremunerative in the years ahead would

1009
be greater than the £250 million of assets which were completely unremunerative in 1964.
The Government also took into account the revenue prospects of the Board. Unfortunately, despite a respectable increase in productivity, the Board's revenue outlook, since the middle of 1963, has deteriorated almost continuously. The White Paper, indeed, made clear the Board's view that the benefits from the proposed capital reconstruction would not be sufficient to cover losses in the current year, and that, after some five years of price stability in the general level of coal prices, increases were necessary. The White Paper also made provision in the current year for the writing off of a deficit of up to £25 million. Since then the Board's revenue results for the first half of 1965–66, have been published showing a deficit of £44·6 million. I submit that this is further ample justification for our view that we should make allowance for some further deterioration in the earning power of the Board's colliery assets. The latest development, of which the Committee will be aware, is the reference to the National Board for Prices and Incomes. This shows that the Board now estimate that they require to raise additional revenue in the year 1966–67 of about £80 million. This bears out our contention that a cautious view ought to be taken of the future earning power of colliery assets, and it surely proves beyond doubt that the amount to be written off is reasonable.
The effect of the cancellation of debt on the Board's revenue account in 1965–66 will be to relieve it of interest charges of about £20 million and of depreciation to the extent of about £10 million. The amount of debt to be cancelled to which the noble Earl is objecting that is £43 million—would make a reduction of about £2 million a year in the benefit of the Board from relief of interest charges. The smallness of this in relation to the Board's £900 million turnover shows that the decision facing the Government was a matter of judgment rather than of arithmetic, and I hope that, in the light of facts I have quoted, particularly the further deterioration of the Board's revenue position, your Lordships will agree that our decision was right. I think it was just about right.
The noble Earl will remember the story of the firm's outing, when the employer
1010
asked the foreman what the beer was like. The foreman said "Just right". The employer was incautious enough to ask what "Just right" meant. "Well", said the foreman, "if it had been any better we wouldn't have got it, and if it had been any worse it wouldn't have been fit to drink." The position we are in here is really this: that if you were to chisel anything off this, then quite certainly it would do other than we want to do. It would make the Board's position such that they could not do what we hope they can do; that is, go ahead with a fresh start. Perhaps if it had been put any higher it could have been argued that it was not fair to the taxpayer.
Finally, I would remind the noble Earl that Section 2(3) of the Bill empowers the Minister to direct the Board to pay to him the whole or any part of any excess of the Board's revenue over their outgoings for any year. This provision was inserted in the Bill because there is inevitably some uncertainty about the future of the coal industry. The Government recognise that in the event of a fundamental change in the financial position of the industry, it would be unfair to the Exchequer and the general public, after taking on their shoulders the proposed massive cancellation of the Board's capital, if the Board were able to earn large surpluses, and, at the same time, to avoid making any adequate return to the Exchequer. The present situation does not lead us to believe that there is any early likelihood of circumstances requiring the use of this provision, but your Lordships can rest assured that this power is available to the Government and would be used if there should be a fundamental and favourable change in the financial position of the Board.
In the light of this safeguard, and in the light of the other facts that I have mentioned, and the explanation by which I have honestly tried to answer the noble Earl's question, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw his Amendment and let the Bill go forward with a fair wind.
6.6 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his answer to-day—indeed, I think he would be very worried if I were not satisfied, and if I were to press my Amendment, because I know that he is very anxious

1011
to get the Bill. Of course, I should not dream of trying to press any such figure into the Bill. I warned your Lordships that I thought the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, had a rotten brief but that he would make the best of it, and I think that on both grounds I can be considered right.
I thought the noble Lord's opening words were full of vindication of my opinion, when he began to argue on a complete technicality and said that my Amendment would not work because Clause 2 said something different. I thought he was going to rest the whole of his argument on that; and it would have been a pretty poor answer to the question. But the noble Lord did his best over this, and I am grateful. What is evident is that the Government have, in fact, used their judgment. Although they used the figures in the White Paper as a basis of argument for the first £372 million, they then used their judgment for the last £43 million.
I think that the noble Lord's simile of the gentleman with the glass of beer possibly pointed more to the truth about the figure of £400 million than he realised, when he said, "If it were any better we would not have got it". One is left with the impression that if the noble Lord's Government had asked for more than £415 million, they might well have run into trouble in another place, and therefore they set the figure as high as they thought they could get. However, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for doing his best to answer the point, and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Remaining clauses and Schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment; Report received.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of December 13), Bill read 3a, and passed.

TEACHERS' SUPERANNUATION BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

A MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
6.10 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN LORD GLADWYN rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have come to the conclusion that the time has now arrived for the establishment of a single Ministry of External Affairs. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall be very brief, but some of your Lordships may remember that, when I introduced a Motion on this subject on April 7, 1964, I said that at approximately yearly intervals I proposed to put down either a Motion or an Unstarred Question, in order to draw your Lordships' attention to what, in my view, would become more and more a burning political necessity. In asking this Question I am therefore simply fulfilling my undertaking.
May I say at once that the last thing I want to do is to get this issue mixed up with Party politics? In April, 1964, I sat on the Cross Benches: now I am a Liberal. But I do not see that this debars me from speaking occasionally on technical matters, as I think this is, which do not involve Party politics and on which it is quite possible that even my own Party does not have a unanimous view. So I hope that your Lordships will consider what I have to say quite dispassionately and on its merits. So far as I can see, indeed, no Party issue is involved here: no Election pledges will be violated, whatever line your Lordships may take this evening. I trust, therefore, that, though the Government are no doubt obliged to have a line on what is, after all, an important matter of administrative reform, the official Opposition, at any rate, will be free to say what they like. Surely this is a matter on which the House might live up to its already great reputation as a body of impartial experts. I am all for Party politics; but everybody agrees that on some issues noble Lords should be encouraged to express individual views, and I must say that I should have thought that this was one of them.
My Lords, a year and a half ago I made the very simple point that the expert and distinguished signatories of the Plowden Report on Representational Services Overseas were unanimous—I repeat, unanimous—in holding that what they called the "unique feature of Britain's method of handling her external affairs"

1013
—namely, "one mechanism for dealing with Commonwealth affairs and another for dealing with foreign affairs"—was, as they said, "inconvenient, wasteful and at times inefficient". The most serious of these shortcomings—the shortcomings of our then existing system—was the division of the world, they thought, for representational purposes, into Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries, which, as they rightly said, "impeded the development and execution of a coherent foreign policy". The Report continued:
"Membership of the Commonwealth is only one of the factors which helps to shape the policy of a Commonwealth country and it is rarely the decisive one. We need a system which recognises that individual Commonwealth countries have developed regional interests and relationships of their own and cannot regard their relationship with Britain as paramount".
Nor could we ever, as Lord Plowden and his colleagues believed, work out a coherent foreign policy unless we were able to take fully into account the non-Commonwealth interest of Commonwealth countries and deal with them in their regional and world contexts.
"With two Ministries"—
and here again I am quoting the Report—
"the process of trying to hammer out a sensible world-wide policy is…a wasteful and time-consuming process. At times of crisis these shortcomings can prove disastrous. The division of responsibility is becoming an anachronism. The logic of events points to an amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office."
All this, my Lords, was the unanimous —I repeat, unanimous—conclusion of the authors of the Report, including the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, and Sir Percivale Liesching, ex-Head of the C.R.O. Only one reason was advanced for not recommending an actual fusion of the two Ministries:
"To take such a fundamental step now could be misinterpreted as implying a loss of interest in the Commonwealth partnership."
No other argument of any kind was brought forward in support of a conclusion which clearly contradicted all the available evidence and, to put it bluntly, represented the triumph of emotion over reason. It was quite frankly an effort to appease an unthinking majority who had not studied the question and who instinctively felt, I imagine, that the creation of a Ministry of External Affairs meant that there would in some way be less red on the map. As I said at the
1014
time, I could understand such a decision being taken by Party politicians on the eve of an Election, but I have never felt that it was worthy of the experts who in all other respects had produced a wholly admirable Report on a matter of great administrative importance.
Now, my Lords, what is the position to-day? When we last discussed this question my suggestion that the Government should do what the Commission obviously thought was the right thing to do—or, at least, to name a date by which the amalgamated services would be followed by an amalgamated Ministry—was supported by only two noble Lords: the noble Lord, Lord Strang (whom I am very glad to see in his place), and the late Lord Killearn; and to some extent, I rather think, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge.
A great many of your Lordships held that I was a pretty subversive fellow. One noble Lord accused me of having written an article in The Times describing the Commonwealth as a farce—a suggestion which I said, unlike Mr. Enoch Powell, I could formally deny. I received a tremendous castigation from the noble and learned Viscount who then sat on the Woolsack—and I am sure that he has not changed his views in the interval, for, as we all know, the noble Viscount seldom does. He insinuated—quite unjustifiably, I thought—that I was out to abolish the Commonwealth, which in his view was, as he said, a "growing and developing" reality. The noble Viscount, Lord Amory, said that he had always admired my apparent ability to succeed in foreign affairs without ever really trying, which I thought, on the whole, was a rather back-handed compliment. Indeed, I almost began to doubt the rightness of my thesis, such was the tremendous weight of contrary opinion. But, my Lords, let us look for a moment at what has happened since April, 1964.
Since your Lordships last discussed the Plowden Report we have experienced intensive and prolonged armed hostilities —a virtual war—between two Commonwealth members; the collapse of a scheme for Commonwealth mediation in Vietnam; the rupture of diplomatic relations between ourselves and several other members of the Commonwealth; an apparent plot by one Commonwealth member to annex another; the virtual, if

1015
temporary, expulsion or exclusion of yet another member; and the creation of a situation within the Commonwealth which brings us, unfortunately, to the verge of racial war. I need hardly say that all these events closely concern our general foreign policy, and none of them gives any grounds for supposing there was such a thing as a Commonwealth which was a political entity.
Just think, my Lords, at the moment when we are so concerned with Rhodesia, how much less difficult a solution of this problem would have been if for the last few years it had been handled by one Minister of External Affairs and had not been confused (as I think) by largely irrelevant considerations connected with a vanished Empire and our own so-called "kith and kin". Yet we still have a system whereby there are two Ministries, with all their attendent panoply of Ministers and officials, for dealing with one aspect of our relations with other countries and one great Ministry with another.
This is an absurd and increasingly dangerous anomaly: not so much, of course, because it gives rise, as I think it must, to administrative confusion. That can no doubt be ironed out, with good will, however great the cost in general frustration and the lack of efficiency. Our Byzantine system of Interdepartmental committees and Cabinet sub-Committees groans on, like a rather elementary computer, but nevertheless grinds out pretty sensible conclusions in the end. The fusion of the two services, which was the result of the Plowden Report, is clearly a help; and, likewise, the fact that the Prime Minister himself does most of the real work in all these Commonwealth crises. The real danger is less here than in the fact that the perpetuation of the present system tends to preserve a very dangerous illusion, if not, as I think, a kind of living lie. This is that the Commonwealth, whatever its merits as a sort of multi-racial club, has any political or any considerable economic content. So long as this illusion persists, we shall never be able to get our foreign policy straight. And the very existence of a separate Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations is one of the best ways to preserve it. I believe, incidentally, that the conception of the Commonwealth as an inter-racial club
1016
would be strengthened, and not weakened, if the Commonwealth Relations Office were abolished altogether.
A section of the Labour Party which in so many respects and so touchingly represents our great Victorian past may indeed still believe that illusion is reality; but I cannot imagine that this view is shared by the Party's younger and more intelligent members. Nor can I seriously believe that it is the dominant view in the Tory Party, now moving in its mysterious and instinctive way towards an acceptance by this country of full European responsibilities. How long, then, will it take this great and ancient country to come to terms with reality? I do not know. But when the Leader of this House gets up on the Front Bench and reads out a Statement made by the Prime Minister in another place, to the effect that, perhaps as a result of yet another Report, the Government have decided to set up one Ministry for dealing with all external affairs I shall feel that it has really done so. But not before. Always supposing, therefore, that the Government are not yet prepared to follow the dictates of reason, I again give notice of my intention to put down a similar Parliamentary Question approximately one year from now or, alternatively, to try to get a debate arranged, and to move for Papers.
6.25 p.m.
LORD CACCIA: My Lords, I do not wish to detain you for long as I have already declared my interest in this subject and have urged this theme in this House. Indeed, long before that I had given evidence to the same effect to the Plowden Committee, when it was sitting, on the representation of services abroad; and to my mind the arguments against the present system were decisively stated by Lord Plowden when he presented his Committee's Report about two years ago. None of those arguments was in any sense against the Commonwealth. And none of them sought in any way to diminish its significance or the importance we should give to relations with it. Quite the contrary, I would here declare another interest in that my mother was born in New Zealand. Far be it from me, therefore, to stand up here and say anything which would seem to imply that I wish to diminish those interests in any way.

1017
Lord Plowden only hesitated, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, reminded us, to recommend the establishment of a single Department of External Affairs at that time, at the time his Report was published. Of course, I accept William Penn's dictum that there is a time and place for everything; and it is right under our system of Government for the Executive to choose the time. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to some reflections on timing in the confident expectation that this is the only issue and that Her Majesty's Government do not have any lingering doubt about the wisdom of the long-needed change at some time.
First, has anything happened in the last two years to give weight to the arguments for delay? Surely not. The crises that have had to be dealt with have not been neatly divided into those areas which are handled by the Commonwealth Relations Office and those by the Foreign Office. Confrontation in Malaysia has necessitated, in fact, the setting-up of a joint Commonwealth Relations Office—Foreign Office Department. Even with the best will in the world and much corridor-bashing, nothing else would possibly work. In Cyprus and Rhodesia, the story is the same. Even over Kashmir the external elements, in so far as they did not involve relations with the British Government or with other Commonwealth Governments, had to be dealt with by the Foreign Office; that is to say, with regard to the United Nations, the U.S.A., Russia and China, as well as CENTO and SEATO. In a sentence, external affairs, like peace, is not now divisible.
Secondly, is this pattern likely to change? We cannot know everything about the future and we should always allow a margin for the unknown quantity. But having said this, one of the things that can be foretold with a degree of certainty is that the areas of instability and concern in the coming years are going to be Africa, Southern and South Eastern Asia, and Latin America. The impact of the population explosion alone is reason enough for this. Its trends for the next thirty-five years are already plainly foreseeable. These are the areas where we should work out a policy towards Africa, Asia and the Southern American hemisphere within a single Department; and we only handicap ourselves by dividing these areas artificially between two Departments of State. If we
1018
do it to impress ourselves or others, I am clear from my own experience that we only delude ourselves and that we fool nobody else. Beyond these shores, at least, we give the impression by such continuing acts that we have not yet learned —and seem determined not to learn—the time of day.
Imagine yourself a representative of the U.S.A. or United Nations coming to this country wishing to discuss, say, Cyprus. You arrive and announce your intent and you ask whom you should see. You have to be asked, "What aspect of Cyrus? Do you want to talk about internal affairs of Cyprus or the relations of Cyprus with the United Kingdom? In that case, please turn to the right. If, on the contrary, you wish to talk about the Cyprus problem as it affects Greece or as it affects Turkey or the United Nations, would you please turn to the left." "But", your interlocutor would say, "I want to discuss this thing in the round and I wish to discuss it on its own merits as a problem." You would have to say, "That is a splendid thing to want to do, but we in London run our affairs somewhat differently. We divide them up in order to deal with them." I assure your Lordships that any foreigner faced with this state of affairs would say to himself," Well, it looks to me a crazy way to run a railroad. I only hope that there are no collisions and no injuries".
All is well, even so, provided that we go from success to success, from triumph to triumph. But it is against human probability that any country in dealing with foreign affairs can have undiluted success. We should not expect this. So when inevitably we run into difficulties, foreigners say, "Well, we thought there was something funny about the way in which things were done. Now we are sure. Now we understand a little better why, for instance, this great country occasionally has to come forward and ask for something of the order of £1,000 million to keep afloat." The simple question is: Do we want our organisation of Government to be geared to what is and what we know to be coming, or do we want it to remain an outdated model built to deal with a world which ceased to exist twenty years ago at the end of the war?
My Lords, this Government set off to modernise Britain. This Government, like the last, properly conceives it to be

1019
the duty of Government to urge us all, in business and in unions alike, as a matter of national survival, to discard outworn lines of demarcation and to cut out waste, particularly of skilled personnel who are in short supply, and streamline our affairs. I agree. But does this not apply equally to the organisation of Government itself? Is not example the best precept?
Many of your Lordships will have read the Thurber and White classic, Why You Feel the Way you Do. In it there is a tale of a child back from summer camp where the boys were issued with pets. He arrives agog at home to tell his parents about his pet. They kept putting him off with such excuses as, "Not now"; "Not at meal times", and so on. Finally, in exasperation, this otherwise dutiful child explodes with the phrase, "What in the blank is the matter with right now?" May I, in conclusion then, and without disrespect, ask the Minister who is to reply the same question—whether he can explain to us, "What is the matter with right now?"
6.33 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I hesitate to take part in a debate in which most of the noble Lords who have spoken have done so with great experience of life in the Foreign Service. In fact, this is not really a technical matter: it is an extremely simple matter. I believe that the Plowden Report has been fully implemented, or at any rate substantially implemented, except for one recommendation which, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said, stands out as clear as crystal. It is whether the amalgamation of the Departments should he carried out now, or whether that would be misinterpreted. My Lords, it is clear that those who would misinterpret it are the people of this country and not other members of the Commonwealth at all. This is the only question which remains from this Report, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, has said, recommends this urgent administrative reform.
I looked through the debate in January, 1964, to which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, referred. In that debate, two points were made. The first was that such a Ministry would indicate a loss of confidence in the future of the Commonwealth. The second was that it would be too much for one man. I believe
1020
that it would be the opposite so far as the Commonwealth is concerned; that, far from being the slightest indication of weakness, it would serve to blow away many of the cobwebs which have gathered round the Commonwealth and it would remove misconceptions which are actually weakening the Commonwealth at the present time. In the second place, as has been said, nearly all the Commonwealth countries are intensely interested in their neighbours. It is inevitable that they should be, and in many ways they are more interested in their neighbours than in this country; and it is proper that we should have one Department to look after these matters.
May I take your Lordships on a short journey round South and East Asia? I start at Saigon, in a country that is the concern of the Foreign Office; Kuala Lumpur is the concern of the Commonwealth Relations Office; Manila comes under the Foreign Office; Singapore under Commonwealth Relations; Jakarta under the Foreign Office and Canberra under Commonwealth Relations. My Lords, it is impossible to have one coordinated policy in those circumstances. It is a sheer anachronism which should be abolished as soon as possible. It is the duty of Parliament to see that the Commonwealth with which we are associated works through the easiest possible machinery, and this machinery clearly is not easy. The Commonwealth affairs are an integral part of the foreign policy with which every member of the Foreign Service should consider himself personally associated and concerned; he should not be concerned simply with foreign relations.
The other point made was that this work would be too much for one Minister. If one reads the paper, one finds that half-a-million letters and 150,000 telegrams are received at the Foreign Office every year. Clearly, that is too much for one man, and any man, I imagine, could easily kill himself at the Foreign Office as it is at present. I sincerely hope that the Secretary of State will not be overdoing things with his visits to Tokyo, Moscow, Germany, Washington, and now to South America. It is easy to do that. But I do not think it would be any more difficult if the Commonwealth Relations responsibilities were fully added, because it would make for a more coherent and

1021
convenient system of working. If another Minister were required, it would not be difficult to find one. We have had many new Ministers appointed recently, and whatever appropriate status was required would be given to him. The Minister must know what is going on in Commonwealth Relations, and it is proper that he should; but if a division is to take place and if the Department is too big or clumsy, let the division be geographical. I am not recommending that, but if anyone says that the Ministry is too much for one man, that is a far more rational and proper division.
May I emphasise that the Commonwealth would not be affronted by this policy? As long ago as 1925 Vincent Massey wrote this to Mr. Dawson of The Times:
"One essential step towards better understanding is to bring Dominion representatives into direct contact with the Foreign Office itself."
Ten years later he wrote in his diary:
"What good purpose does the Dominion Office serve? Could not its functions be better performed by a Dominion section of the Foreign Office with a Secretary of State to be known as the Secretary of State for Foreign and Dominion Affairs?"
It is for that reason that I am quite certain none of the Commonwealth countries would regard this amalgamation as in any way an affront. Indeed they would want to do what they have always wanted to do, which is to go to see the head man. Any head man can, of course, see only a limited number of people according to his time. For that reason I hope that this urgent step of modernisation may be undertaken soon. I know that the noble Lord may say that it is a little awkward and that there are a number of things happening currently which make the present not the most expedient moment at which to do it. We shall excuse the noble Lord an element of equivocation when he replies, provided that we may have a real indication that a further step is being taken in this matter, which I agree is one of urgency.
6.38 p.m.
LORD INCHYRA: My Lords, if it were not that I feel strongly on the subject, I should prefer not to take part in this debate. It is rather embarrassing that nearly all the speakers so far have been connected in one way or another with
1022
the Foreign Office, and it rather gives the impression that some intrigue or plot is afoot for a takeover bid by the Foreign Office of the C.R.O. That is not the case. All that I am concerned with, as I am sure all my former colleagues are, is the efficiency of the governmental machine at Whitehall.
At the moment, the machinery for dealing with overseas affairs is quite intolerable. As the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said, it is plumb crazy. At the end of my career, I had five years in the middle of that machine. It was bad enough then, and I have no reason to suppose that it is not worse now. It was quite hopeless, when one tried to deal with questions like Cyprus or South-East Asia or the Congo, to have two Departments dealing with different aspects of the same problem. I imagine that it is even worse now with regard to Rhodesia and Malaysia.
I have no doubt at all that something must be done to put this situation right before much longer. It is not only inefficient and time-wasting, but also calculated to arouse serious misunderstandings between the two Departments primarily concerned—I am glad to say that friction between them hardly ever occurs— and also with other Government Departments in Whitehall, who never quite understand why it is that two Departments should be dealing with virtually the same problem. And, as the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, said, foreigners are absolutely defeated by the whole business.
As various noble Lords have said, the noble Lord, Lord Plowden and his Committee, of which I had the privilege of being a member, said definitely that in their opinion amalgamation of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office should be the ultimate aim. They went on to say that they hesitated to recommend that this step should be taken forthwith. The reason for that was not altogether, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, suggested, appeasement. It was really that the Committee felt that, if they were to make such radical recommendations which would entail structural alterations of the Government, this proposal would inevitably cause a good deal of controversy, entail prolonged debates in Parliament and elsewhere, and would distract attention and

1023
hold up the implementation of the Committee's other recommendations dealing with the more practical aspects of the future of the Diplomatic Service.
These recommendations, the Committee felt, were really of the very first importance if the new Diplomatic Service were to be in a position to fulfil the increased and more complicated duties which the Committee foresaw they would have to undertake in the coining years. We were very concerned that these practical recommendations of ours, about conditions of service, recruitment, training and so forth, should be implemented with the minimum delay, otherwise we faced the possibility of the Diplomatic Services of the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Service, as they then were, running into the sand. Therefore, we attached great importance to ensuring that these recommendations got the best possible wind from the Government and public opinion when our Report was presented. That, I think, was really the main reason why we thought it would be a mistake to complicate matters' by recommending the immediate amalgamation of the two Government Departments.
The second consideration—and one which certainly I had very much in mind —was that the Committee felt that if and when a single combined Department of External Affairs was set up, it would have a better chance of making a good start, and the transitional period would be likely to be smoother, if the officers who were to serve in that Department—that is to say, the members of the existing Foreign Service and Commonwealth Relations Service—were by that time to be members of a combined service. We thought that the first step was to amalgamate the two services and subsequently come on to the amalgamation of the two Ministries.
My own feeling is that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn that—times have changed. This recommendation was made about two and a half years ago. Circumstances have altered since then. First of all, the Foreign and Commonwealth Services have been amalgamated, and to the best of my information that process is going ahead very satisfactorily and perhaps more smoothly than even the most optimistic expected. Furthermore,
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the other recommendations about terms of service, pensions and so on, to which I referred, have been accepted in principle by Her Majesty's Government and are, I hope—or most of them, at all events—now in process of implementation. So, from both those points of view, there is no reason why amalgamation of the two Ministries should be any longer deferred.
I suppose that the considerations which now have to be taken into account are, first of all, the attitude of public opinion in this country, and then, the probable attitude of the Governments of the Commonwealth countries, or at least of such of those Governments as still attach importance to their relations with this country. As regard public opinion at home, I would not venture to express any opinion, but I should have thought that informed opinion was more and more coming to realise that all major questions affecting relations between this country and the Commonwealth countries were really the great questions of foreign policy, not affecting only Commonwealth countries, but affecting the world at large. It is really quite illogical to continue a system which divides these things into two watertight compartments.
As regards the attitude of the Commonwealth Governments, I would venture to share entirely the view of the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, who said that they would welcome a change. I could quote a few examples to support that statement. I can say that even five years ago, when I was in the Foreign Office, it was common for some of the Commonwealth High Commissions in London, when they wanted information about the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards an issue of particular interest to their Government, to come direct to the Foreign Office. Very often they would come to me and say, "What instructions are you going to send your man at the United Nations about this point?" or, "How do you look at this problem which is likely to arise in NATO next week?" They wanted to get information from the source, from the man who drafted the instructions. They did not want to get a hashed-up version at second hand from some other Government Department. They wanted to discuss matters in detail and to ask such questions as, "Why put in that paragraph?" and, "What is the meaning of that sentence?" They did not

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want someone to say, "Oh, well, the Foreign Office drafted that. We do not quite know—perhaps you are right." No doubt that system still goes on. If that is so, I feel sure that the Commonwealth Governments would welcome the changeover to a single Department.
The second point I would make is this. When on a tour as a member of the Plowden Committee, to look at our missions in some foreign countries, I remember asking a distinguished Commonwealth Ambassador, who had previously spent several years in London, what he thought about our ideas for reforming the Diplomatic and Commonwealth Relations Services. Immediately, without any hesitation, he said, "But, my dear chap, you are going the wrong way about it. You have got the wrong end of the stick. You are putting the cart before the horse. For goodness' sake, begin at the other end and set up one Department for External Affairs in London, and then you will solve the whole problem." I feel sure that that attitude will be shared by a great number of officials in Commonwealth Governments.
I know that it is frequently said that if we had one Department of External Affairs, Commonwealth Governments would somehow lose the special treatment which they get and the special relations which they now enjoy through the existence of the Commonwealth Relations Office. I do not think that that suggestion really holds water. After all, the Foreign Office do not treat all foreign Governments on a level. We have special arrangements for our NATO allies. We talk in rather different ways to our EFTA friends and some others. We do not equate the United States with China. If the Commonwealth Governments had to deal with one Department of External Affairs, there is no earthly reason why they could not enjoy just the same preferential treatment and good terms as they do now.
Then, again, I think it has been said that one of the privileges which the Commonwealth Governments enjoy at the moment, and which they might lose, is that of their Prime Ministers being able on occasion to communicate directly with our own Prime Minister. But I see no reason why the substitution of a Ministry of External Affairs for the Commonwealth Relations Office should have any effect on that. It is not abnormal at the present time, or it used not to be in my day, for
1026
our Prime Minister to receive messages direct from other Heads of Government.
Again, we are told—I remember hearing this argument several times—that the Commonwealth Governments would be most unhappy if they no longer felt that they had a special Minister sitting in the Cabinet, and in a position in the Cabinet to advance, if necessary, not the Commonwealth point of view, but Commonwealth considerations. That may be quite a good point. But it should surely not be impossible in a Department of External Affairs, where the Secretary of State would certainly have to have several Ministers to help him in his day-to-day work, for one of those Ministers to be given, if it were thought desirable, Cabinet rank. We had the same sort of system under the late Government, when the present Leader of the Opposition was Lord Privy Seal and sat in the Cabinet and was in a position, when the case called for it, to explain particular points on the European questions with which he was dealing. I should have thought that it would be quite simple to have some similar arrangement for a Minister to sit in the Cabinet and, so to speak, be responsible for advancing particular considerations affecting the Commonwealth.
My own view is that really the time for change has come. Apart from the question of timing and not making a change when both Departments are overloaded with work, and possibly also paying some attention to the future of the Colonial Office, my only doubt about making an immediate change is whether it would or would not be wiser to allow the amalgamated Diplomatic Service—that is to say, the amalgamation of the former Foreign Service and Commonwealth Relations Service—a little longer in which to settle down. That is a point on which I would not press to know the answer. But, subject to that, I would certainly endorse the proposal which has been made, that the sooner the Government can fix a definite target date when the two Departments should be combined, the better: and not only the better for the machine in Whitehall, but, I think, the better for our relations with foreign Governments and with Commonwealth Governments.
6.54 p.m.
LORD SHERFIELD: My Lords, I am moved to join the queue of former Permanent Under-Secretaries and Deputy

1027
Under-Secretaries of State and to intervene in this debate, partly because I have in the past been involved in two attempts under two Secretaries of State to bring about the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations and Foreign Services into one External Affairs Service. The first attempt was under Mr. Bevin. The second attempt was under Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was. So I have an impeccable bipartisan experience of this subject. These attempts failed for reasons with which I will not weary your Lordships. The circumstances were not propitious, though I still do not think that the attempts were premature.
However, the arguments for amalgamation finally prevailed in the Plowden Committee Report, and having, if I may say so, made a faultless round of the course, they blundered into the last fence for reasons which have not been very clearly explained. As the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, has suggested, this probably did not flatter too much during the period in which the amalgamation of the two Services in the field and the streamlining of administrative arrangements at the centre were being undertaken. But now this process is, I imagine, almost complete, and there appears to be no reason, either in practice or in logic, why the amalgamation of the two Offices need be further postponed.
I do not see why a single Office should not be so organised as not to put an additional burden on the Secretary of State. I know that policy is made in Cabinets, and that its threads are in the hands of the Prime Minister. But, however closely the working arrangements are between the Departments, some polarisation is inevitable when there are two Ministers of equal status operating in the same field: because it has become the same field. There are two Permanent Secretaries of State, two Accounting Officers and two channels up which the files flow. So that on grounds of policy-making, financial control, and administrative practice the arguments are in favour of amalgamation.
There remains the one reason given by the Plowden Committee—namely, the possibility of misinterpretation of the action as showing a loss of interest in the Commonwealth partnership. Noble Lords who have preceded me have given many
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reasons why this argument has very much lost its force. I would add just one more: that if there is any misunderstanding of this kind in Commonwealth countries, then the recent formation of a Commonwealth Secretariat should reassure them that they have a channel in London through which their views can be represented. I think that in every other Commonwealth country there is a single Ministry for External Affairs. If the reason given is that it is necessary to keep the two Departments because amalgamation might lead to misunderstanding in this country, then I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and other noble Lords who have said that it would be a pity to perpetuate what in fact is an illusion in the present circumstances.
I could dilate a good deal further on all these points, but fortunately the case was put for me in a nutshell by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday, when he gave as a reason for speaking on the Rhodesian issue in the Foreign Affairs debate in another place the fact that this was much more than a question between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia. It was a question, he said, on the solution of which would turn the vital matter of relations between the different sections of mankind in the future. I can give no better ground for ending the existing dichotomy in the field of external affairs between two Secretaries of State.
6.59 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I apologise for intervening so late in this debate, but I should like to add one or two points to the strong arguments which have already been raised. I believe, as has been urged, that some such measure as this is necessary for the most efficient conduct both of our foreign affairs and of our Commonwealth relations. Personally, I am a European, and I think that the United Kingdom ought somehow to enter the Common Market, with its associates. On the other hand, I believe that it is essential not to lose sight of realities.
For some reason the Commonwealth does not seem to be very fashionable in some quarters at present. But the fact remains that it contains 25 per cent. of humanity, about 730 million people, almost all self-governing and independent.

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It does 25 per cent. of world trade, and I believe that it is still of great importance to this country. We do about 35 per cent. of our trade with the Commonwealth. We live by trade, and I do not believe that we can afford to prejudice that important section of our economy. It is true that that trade has not been growing, but that is our own fault, because our economy has been so extremely soggy. If we had put our economy in order years ago, as in my opinion we should have done, then I believe that our trade with the Commonwealth would not have been soggy either, and that we should have proved a more attractive market to members of the Commonwealth who would not feel it necessary to deal so extensively with other markets.
I believe that this situation could still be put right, but in any case I think it is essential that our Commonwealth relations should be taken into account perhaps in a greater degree than was the case last time, when we again begin negotiations one day for entering the Common Market. For that purpose, it is desirable that there should be a well-unified consideration of both Commonwealth and foreign affairs. Therefore, in spite of all the difficulties in the Commonwealth, it is extremely important, in my view, that we preserve it as much as we can.
One of the features of the period into which we are entering is going to be the difficulties and the developments in the relations between the developed countries and the underdeveloped countries. The Commonwealth represents in many ways a remarkable mechanism, or a system—it is more of a system—for contacts between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, because the Commonwealth includes a number of highly developed countries and a large number of underdeveloped ones, and a very large population in some of them. I believe that that system of contacts is essential to the new Europe which is undoubtedly going to come about. I believe that Europe without such a system of relations with the outside world would be a rather futile area, and that the system which has been developed in Brussels is of great interest to anybody interested in Commonwealth relations. But this is just a way of saying that these things ought to be considered together, and I entirely agree with what the noble Lord,
1030
Lord Sherfield, said: that the formation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London is of particular importance in that connection.
In my view, it is very important that, whatever system we arrange when this is done—and I am sure that it will be done —we should not overload the Foreign Secretary. I have been Private Secretary in the past to a very well known Foreign Secretary, and I must say on behalf of the Foreign Service that we very nearly killed him. So it was with other Foreign Secretaries with whom I have been closely associated.
If the Foreign Secretary had to go around Africa and other parts of the Commonwealth, and not only sort out the futile and absurd difficulties which occur in some of these areas, as well as the futile and absurd difficulties which occur in the United Nations, not at all in the Commonwealth connection, but including Commonwealth countries, I think that we should prejudice the health of our Foreign Secretaries to an unreasonable degree. Therefore, I am sure that, if we made this change, a system would be necessary whereby there would have to be an extra Minister in the Foreign Office. Perhaps he ought to attend the Cabinet—but that may be looking too far ahead. I only want to say that, in supporting this proposal, I do not want it to be thought that I have not thought of the difficulties.
7.5 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, this has been a remarkable debate, for two reasons. One is, I think, that even in your Lordships' House, with all the men of distinction who customarily speak here, it is rare to find in one short debate two Permanent Under-Secretaries of the Foreign Office, one Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, one Commissioner General for South-East Asia, two Ambassadors to Washington, one Ambassador to France and one Ambassador to Bonn—positions formerly held among many other distinguished positions—taking part in this debate. No wonder the standard of the debate has been high!
It is also, to my mind, rather peculiar in that one generally expects the champions of change to be the politicians without a full knowledge of all the difficulties, while those who counsel caution

1031
are the permanent officials who know all the problems that any change entails. Today the rôles seem to be somewhat reversed. Here we have the three Graces —if I may so call them—sitting on the Cross Benches, and others, all speaking with their mighty experience in favour of almost immediate change, whereas you find the one (if I may so describe myself) professional politician among the speakers giving the reasons why this change cannot take place immediately.
The arguments for the change I think fall roughly under two heads: first, the Commonwealth reasons, which were the burden of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn; and the others, which were emphasised more by later speakers, although not in any way ignored by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn—the reasons of efficiency. With regard to the first, I unashamedly align myself with those whom the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, described—members of the Labour Party who still suffer under the illusions of our great Victorian past. He felt possibly that those illusions were not shared by the younger and more intelligent members of my Party. That being so, I am afraid I cannot be either one of the younger or more intelligent members. But I would say that I do not consider myself under any illusions. I was glad that in particular the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, also mentioned the value of the Commonwealth and its importance, in addition to the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, in his valuable last minute intervention.
I think we derive many practical advantages from the Commonwealth, albeit that it suffers from the difficulties we are seeing at the present time. We ourselves should be the losers if the Commonwealth were to disintegrate. Therefore, we must look with great care at any action which might tend to loosen the bonds of the Commonwealth.
I am somewhat open-minded in this matter of how a co-ordination of the two Offices would affect this aspect. I know perfectly well that there are many Commonwealth countries which would in no way be upset about the merger. Some of them would positively welcome it. Some of them would prefer to be regarded, in this context, at least on a par with any other foreign country, although in other respects they believe they have a special
1032
relationship—just as, as was pointed out, we can have special relationships with certain of our special friends among foreign countries. There are others, I know, who value the existence of the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, to whom they can speak directly and in a somewhat different way than they can speak to a Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, or of External Relations. So that is, I believe, a reason to which we must pay a great deal of attention. It is a contra-indication to any hasty move in this matter, and the reason why any move towards the closer integration of the two Offices could be done only after close consultation with our fellow members of the Commonwealth.
When we come to the question of efficiency, I think that those who propose this move are on very much stronger around. I say quite frankly that when this subject was last debated in April, 1964, I took a very strong Commonwealth line and a very strong line opposed to any further amalgamation than that which was put forward by the Plowden Committee. Having had now something over a year working in one of the two Departments concerned, I am well aware of the need for the closest possible co-operation and co-ordination in the work of the two Departments. I have no doubt that in many ways efficiency would better be served if there were simply one Department of External Affairs, but there are many difficulties attaching to this, not the least being the one which has been mentioned with engaging frankness by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, namely, the strain which would be put on the Secretary of State. There are ways of overcoming this. Noble Lords have suggested that there might be two Ministers of Cabinet rank, one senior and the other junior. But, for all that, there can be only one man ultimately responsible, and the wider his sphere the greater is his responsibility and therefore the greater the strain put upon him. I do not say that rules it out completely, but it is something which has to be borne in mind.
The other reasons against a hasty move, I do not say an ultimate move, are simply the practical problems of carrying out this merger. I know that from the point of view of the outsider looking at it objectively— the foreigner—as the noble

1033
Lord, Lord Caccia, mentioned, we seem to have a cockeyed system. I think the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, said that foreigners must be defeated by it. Some people would say it is the job of the Foreign Office to defeat foreigners. Although it is confusing for them I think they get by all right. But I do not want to give the impression that we are resolutely turning our faces against any further progress along this line.
The Government of the day and the Opposition, as it then was, accepted and supported the Report of the Plowden Committee, and the main recommendations have now been put into force—that is, the creation of an integrated Diplomatic Service. That has been operating under one head who at the moment is at the same time the Permanent Secretary of the Commonwealth Relations Office. It has been operating since January 1, and during that time there have been 88 members of the former Foreign Service who have been posted to Commonwealth Relations Office posts and 42 members of the Commonwealth Relations Office who have been posted to Foreign Office posts. A total of 130 in less than twelve months have been cross-posted in this way, which I think is a significant achievement in a relatively short space of time. As that works out and makes itself felt increasingly, as the noble Lord, Lord Inchyra, pointed out, it will make any later, closer integration of the Offices very much more effective.
That is not the end of the unification which has taken place. There have been some relatively minor changes. There has been the unification of the communications system and of the cyphers, which has added greatly to efficiency. There has been unification of the information services in the two Offices. There are now joint resident clerks for both the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office. All these, though they are not epoch-making or shattering in any way, are moves towards integration and towards greater efficiency.
However, there still remains the actual operational, efficient policy-making and the implementation of policy. Here, too, significant progress has been made. The noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, taking us quickly around South-East Asia (though I felt that he went on somewhat a roundabout way, when he went from Malaya
1034
to Manila and then back to Singapore: it might have been easier to go from Kuala Lumpur to Singapore and then across to Manila), rightly hit on the most important nonsense of the present situation: that when we have a situation such as has been going on, with confrontation between Indonesia, a foreign country, and Malaysia, a Commonwealth country, the two Departments are very closely involved.
In the present situation in Rhodesia, Rhodesia is the responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations Office, Addis Ababa, which is an O.A.U. country, and the United Nations are the responsibility of the Foreign Office, and there is clearly a very great interest to both Departments. At the highest level it is, after all, Cabinet decisions which matter, and there we have both Secretaries of State sitting in the Cabinet with their colleagues, jointly responsible for the highest policy.
At the lower levels there have been set up, and are working extremely well, both a Malaysian Committee and a Rhodesian Committee—joint Committees of officials in the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office—in order to work out the day-to-day problems and to promote far greater cohesion and efficiency. At the junior Ministerial level, while there is no official organisation, there is very close co-operation between the junior Ministers in both of those Departments on a purely informal and day-to-day basis. This means that the apparent divisions between these two Departments are very much less than would appear to the foreigner, or even to some of our own people.
I have, in fact, a brief here from the present Permanent Under-Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office in which there is an indication of how well this "getting together" is now working. For, whereas in the days of (as he writes) Sir Harold Caccia, they used to exchange letters, now there is no need to do that with Lord Caccia's successor. Whether that means, as one might take it, that there is no communication whatsoever, even by letter, or, as I suspect, that in fact they are so close together there is no need for letters to pass backwards and forwards, because they will think with each other and communicate with each other in an informal way,

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this is a very good indication of the way in which progress has been made.
My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, an assurance that when next year comes round and it is time for him to put down his Question again there will be no need to do it because the merger will already have taken place. But I can assure him, and other noble Lords who have spoken to-day that the points they have made have been fully taken and that already, in advance of this debate, as I have attempted to show, a great deal has been done in a practical if unspectacular way to bring these two Departments closer together. Whether they will ever eventually become one, and if so when, is not for me to say; but the inefficiencies which appeared to be inevitable in this system are gradually being removed, and we are working towards an organisation in which, whether or not there are two Departments of State and two Secretaries of State, at least the co-operation between the two is such that the inefficiencies and the illogicalities have very largely disappeared.

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