Sitting of 7 December 1965

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  HERIOT-WATT COLLEGE ORDER CONFIRMATION
  Bill to confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936, relating to HeriotWatt College presented by Mr. Secretary Ross (under Section 7 of the Act); and ordered to be considered upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 24.]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

    Machine Tools
    Mr. Benceasked the Minister of Technology what proposals he has for encouraging the development and manufacture of highly specialised machine tools.
    The Minister of Technology (Mr. Frank Cousins): I have already announced proposals for supporting the development and manufacture of machine tools; these are applicable to suitable specialised machines no less than those of general application.
    Mr. Bence: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many small manufacturing concerns, particularly in development areas, find it very difficult and financially embarrassing to undertake new production processes with high-cost precision machine tools? Will my right hon. Friend do something, perhaps through N.R.D.C., to set in motion production projects in order to get over the teething troubles and thus help more manufacturers to adopt new processes?
    Mr. Cousins: Certainly the N.R.D.C. will be ready to examine these projects for small firms. Indeed, one of the main functions of N.R.D.C. is to consider problems which are not to be found outside of industry. If any worth-while project is brought forward, N.R.D.C. will look at it.
    Sir J. Langford-Holt: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the manufacture of these articles is only the first step? The most important consideration is the fact that they should be used, and used properly. Can the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that those people who are due to use them are giving the Government the fullest co-operation?
    Mr. Cousins: Yes. There are later Questions on the Order Paper which will bring this out.
    Dr. Brayasked the Minister of Technology what progress he is making in implementing the recommendations of the machine tool industry on manufacturing for stock during recessions.
    Mr. Dan Jonesasked the Minister of Technology whether, in view of the current phase of the machine tool ordering cycle, he will take action on the anti-cyclical policies proposed by the machine tool industry.
    Mr. Cousins: The working party I have appointed to examine the problems of the cyclical pattern of orders for machine tools is considering a number of proposals, including manufacturing for stock during recessions and I expect to receive its report very shortly.
    Dr. Bray: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it is more important to get a solution to this problem than to get the perfect one, in order to catch the machine tool cycle at the place where this kind of idea is important?
    Mr. Cousins: I think it is very important that we should get a solution and equally important that we should get the correct solution. Fortunately, despite the appearance that there was a turnback in orders in the early part of the year, they then climbed. We now have a little more time at our disposal, therefore, to find the correct solution.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smithasked the Minister of Technology what action he is

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    taking to ensure that the presentation of information on imports of machine tool components is in a form which can be used by the machine tool industry.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Technology (Mr. Richard Marsh): Apart from a particular case, on which the hon. Member has been in correspondence with the Ministry of Technology and on which we are already trying to help, I am not aware of any dissatisfaction with the present arrangements for the presentation of this information.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Would the Parliamentary Secretary not agree that many of the Board of Trade's classifications do not give sufficient detail? For example, what use is being made of computers for trying to break down classifications into a more useful and intelligible state?
    Mr. Marsh: It is not one of my responsibilities to answer for the Board of Trade.

    Regional Office (Scotland)
    Mr. G. Campbellasked the Minister of Technology if he has now established a regional office in Scotland.
    Mr. Marsh: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Campbell: Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the computer industries have found Scotland especially suitable for them? What is he doing to guide and assist them there?
    Mr. Marsh: This will be the main purpose of my right hon. Friend's regional office in Scotland, to co-ordinate these activities. For this reason the senior regional officer will sit upon the Regional Planning Board.

    Nuclear Power Industry
    Mr. Gregoryasked the Minister of Technology what plans have been made to publicise and promote the achievements of the British nuclear power industry, with particular reference to the advanced gas-cooled reactor; what steps he proposes to take to advance and utilise the technological resources available; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Cousins: The British nuclear power programme is by far the world's
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    largest, both by its generating capacity and by the vast experience it has accumulated, and our overseas missions are doing their best to make these facts widely known.
    Visits by overseas visitors to A.E.A. and C.E.G.B. installations are also encouraged; and the A.E.A. in collaboration with industry has participated in such important exhibitions as the recent one at Tokyo.
    Mr. Gregory: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask him whether he will take into account the fact that there is a very strong demand for his Ministry to combine its resources with those of the Atomic Energy Authority and the industry in order to make clear to the rest of the world what our achievements are in British nuclear power?
    Mr. Cousins: That is quite so. The Atomic Energy Authority is working to improve further the advanced gas-cooled reactor and is actually assisting the British nuclear power industry with its commercial offers to other countries overseas.
    Mr. Hogg: Would not the cost of large capital plant like the advanced gas-cooled reactor be greatly reduced if the Central Electricity Generating Board could be induced to issue repeat orders instead of asking for each station to be one-off?
    Mr. Cousins: There is no doubt that if there were long runs at each station there would be a possibility of a reduction in cost. This subject is under review by the C.E.G.B. and the Atomic Energy Authority. In the experimental growth period it is necessary to seek the best form of energy creation.

    Technological Advance (Public Purchasing)
    Mr. Hamlingasked the Minister of Technology if he will set up an inquiry into the uses of public purchasing in technological advance; and how far this would be in the public interest.
    Mr. Cousins: I have already arranged for an inter-departmental inquiry into this matter to be put in hand.
    Mr. Hamling: I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply. Is he aware that the Government spend very large sums of money each year, some of which could

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    surely be used for purchasing, which would help technological advance?
    Mr. Cousins: This is, of course, the whole subject of the exercise and the inquiry. Large sums of money are involved, but there is a good deal of complication about the variety of purchasing, which therefore needs detailed study.
    Mr. Biffen: Could the right hon. Gentleman answer the second part of his hon. Friend's Question, which was how far he thought this would be in the public interest?
    Mr. Cousins: I would not have set up an inquiry into the subject had I not thought that it was in the public interest.

    Government-sponsored Research (Information)
    Mr. Harold Walkerasked the Minister of Technology what steps he is taking to ensure the widest possible dissemination of information from Government-sponsored or Government-supported research establishments and associations.
    Mr. Cousins: I have established a strong regional organisation one of whose main tasks is to promote the more vigorous application by industry of new scientific and technical knowledge resulting from research financed or sponsored by the Government. Information on the very wide variety of means used to inform industry of their work is contained in the Annual Reports of my Department's Research Stations and of the Research Associations, which are available in the Library of the House.
    Mr. Walker: Would my right hon Friend ensure that the research associations, such as the Production Engineering Research Association, do not limit the supply of their information to those firms which can afford to make a financial contribution to their organisation, as in this way those firms which are most in need of the information would be prevented from getting it?
    Mr. Cousins: This is a valid point, and we are particularly examining it and the method by which we shall disseminate information through our establishments.

    Regional Advisory Offices
    Mr. William Hamiltonasked the Minister of Technology what progress has been made in the establishment of regional advisory offices.
    Mr. Marsh: The establishment of Ministry of Technology regional offices is almost complete. New offices were opened during October at Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Manchester and Nottingham. These join the former D.S.I.R. Branch Offices at Edinburgh, Cardiff and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, which have been strengthened and given wider responsibilities. One further office for South East England and East Anglia will be opened early next year.
    Mr. Hamilton: Does my hon. Friend recognise that this Answer will, in some measure, give the lie to the charge that his Ministry has been doing nothing? Perhaps he would spell out in greater detail than he has done hitherto the functions of his regional offices——
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must ask a Question.
    Mr. Hamilton: Can my hon. Friend say what functions the offices have in respect of co-ordination with the universities and technical colleges? Would he consider the laying of a White Paper to spell out in greater detail what he has announced today?
    Mr. Marsh: I will consider my hon. Friend's last point. The answer to his other question is that by the end of 1967 the Ministry will have set up a network of about 70 liaison centres, with the job of co-ordinating the activities of industry, education and the Government. The regional officers will be represented on the regional planning bodies.

    Screw Threads (Standardisation)
    Mr. Harold Walkerasked the Minister of Technology what recommendations he is making to industry to bring about the standardisation of screw threads.
    Mr. Cousins: I am giving full support to the statement issued on 23rd November by the British Standards Institution urging industry to use the metric screw thread system agreed by the International

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    Standards Organisation, and gradually to replace the purely British systems that are not recognised by many of our overseas customers. I do not consider that any further general recommendations to industry are needed at this stage, but, with permission, I will circulate a more detailed statement of the present position in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Walker: Is my right hon. Friend aware that, in 1949, the International Organisation for Standardisation, to which Britain was a party, recommended the unified inch system, in which industry invested vast sums of capital? What effect will this decision have on our trading relations with North America, which decided to stick to the British system?
    Mr. Cousins: I am aware of the decision in 1949, and of that taken in 1964 as a result of more than 10 years' study. We took the decision to change over because, on balance, it means that we shall be able to sell more in the countries where we normally do our trading. It is true that America is staying with the unified thread, but there is a strong feeling in British industry that we should convert.
    Following is the information:
    As announced by the President of the Board of Trade in the Answer he gave to the hon. Member for Oldsbury and Halesowen on 24th May, 1965, the Government consider it desirable that British industries on a broadening front should adopt metric units, sector by sector.
    The International Organisation for Standardisation (I.S.O.) has reached agreement on recommendations for general purpose screw threads, comprising a system of I.S.O. metric threads and another system of I.S.O. inch threads, the latter being the same as the existing Unified threads. These two systems have been published as British Standards, namely B.S. 3643—I.S.O. Metric Screw Threads and B.S. 1580 Unified Screw Threads.
    There are three general purpose screw thread systems used in this country today, namely Whitworth, B.S.F., and B.A.; these three systems are little used abroad. To perpetuate their use and maintain unnecessary variety must increase our costs and hamper our export trade.
    The British Standards Institution has recently issued an important policy statement urging British industry to adopt the I.S.O. metric system wherever possible in future designs. The statement has received strong support from industry. The decision to recommend the use of metric screw threads has my full support although, with the B.S.I., I recognise that
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    certain sectors of industry which now use the I.S.O. inch (Unified) system may find it necessary to continue to do so for some time.
    The implication of the B.S.I. statement is that Whitworth, B.S.F. and B.A. threads are now to be regarded as obsolescent, although their replacement will be a gradual process. Supplies of screws and tools to the obsolescent Standards will have to be maintained for many years for servicing existing designs and equipment already installed. I also support the B.S.I. view that these systems should be superseded by I.S.O. metric threads in preference to an intermediate change to I.S.O. inch threads. Over 80 per cent. of the world's population is in countries which have adopted, or are adopting, the metric system. The rate of expansion of our trade with metric countries is greater than with non-metric countries.

    National Research Development Corporation (Projects)
    Mr. Wallaceasked the Minister of Technology to what extent the work of the National Research Development Corporation has expanded in 1965; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Cousins: The main expansion has been in the number and value of development projects financed by the Corporation. At the end of June, 1965 the Corporation had in hand 95 such projects as compared with the 60 at the end of June 1964. Since then 17 new projects have been authorised and a further 120 are under assessment.
    The Corporation's forward commitments on development projects now amount to more than £8 million which is a six-fold increase on the corresponding figure last year.
    Mr. Wallace: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the public relations side of his Ministry needs improving and that those responsible must pull their finger out? Would he state the amount of advances in the previous year as against the current year?
    Mr. Cousins: The question whether the Department needs to improve its public relations is one upon which there may be differences of opinion. I have always thought that the more effective way of doing a job was to do it rather than talk about it, but this is a matter of opinion. As to the comparison between the advances, the total up to April, 1965, was £1,510,000, for the six months, and the total for the 12 months to June, 1964, was £710,000.

    National Computing Centre
    Mr. Maxwellasked the Minister of Technology what is his policy with regard to the establishment of a national computing centre; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Buchanan-Smithasked the Minister of Technology if he will establish a national computer programming centre in Scotland.
    Mr. Freesonasked the Minister of Technology whether he will now make a statement on the powers, functions and composition of the National Computer Centre.
    Mr. Cousins: I would ask hon. Members to await the statement which I hope to make following Questions.

    National Research Development Corporation (Contracts)
    Mr. Hugh Jenkinsasked the Minister of Technology if he will state the terms of the contracts between the National Research Development Corporation, International Computers and Tabulators Limited and Elliot-Automation; and what profit will accrue to the Exchequer under these contracts.
    Mr. Cousins: No, Sir. Details of its contracts are a matter for the Corporation and, in accordance with normal commercial practice, are confidential to the parties concerned. As regards the second part of the Question, any profit will accrue to the Corporation and not to the Exchequer.
    Mr. Jenkins: Would my right hon. Friend look at this again? Does he not agree that, even if profit accrues to the Corporation, that is an improvement on the practice of the previous Administration, who were in the habit of giving large doles to private enterprise with no prospect whatsoever of recovery? Will he take the matter further by considering the possibility of acquiring a share in the equity of these companies?
    Mr. Cousins: I suggest that the latter part of my hon. Friend's question is a different question. It is a separate one which needs a specific answer, and if one is to be given to it, it should be put down
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    separately. On the second point, I am not sure what I am being asked to look at again. Having said that it does not accrue to us but to the Corporation, if it is suggested that it should accrue to the Exchequer, it should be remembered that when the Development of Inventions Bill was going through the House, we agreed a Clause which said it would be possible for me to direct revenue back to the Treasury if this were really important.
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: In view of the answer which the Parliamentary Secretary gave to Question No. 10, would the Minister not agree that there is some danger of the N.R.D.C. being overloaded financially in respect of computers and perhaps not having sufficient money available for other projects?
    Mr. Cousins: I hope that there is no such possibility. One of the things we have to do is to strengthen the N.R.D.C. At the same time, we must make money available in order that it can cope with the projects. It must be able to deal with these things when they arise.
    Mr. Hogg: Would not the right hon. Gentleman confirm that, so far from the insinuation in the first part of the question by the hon. Member for Putney (Mr. Hugh Jenkins) being correct, the truth is that the National Research Development Corporation, to which the Question refers, has always had to make the best possible profit and keep it to itself?
    Mr. Cousins: The right hon. Gentleman will recall that when we were discussing the N.R.D.C., I paid a compliment not only to the right hon. Gentleman himself for the association he had with N.R.D.C. but to the fact that it was a very efficient organisation, which had done the best it could with the money. We were asking for more money.

    Hovercraft (Development)
    Mr. Roseasked the Minister of Technology whether, in view of the high turnover of staff and pace of work on Hovercraft development, he is satisfied with the management of this work; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Cousins: I assume that my hon. Friend is referring to Hovercraft Development Ltd., the subsidiary company of

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    N.R.D.C. The management of this is the responsibility of the company and the Corporation. I understand that they intend to maintain the level of development work generally and to expand it in some particulars, and for this purpose they are actively seeking to replace recent losses of staff.
    Mr. Rose: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the Hovercraft and Hovertrain may form some of the major transport facilities in the future? Will he ensure that there is no slackening of development and that adequate direction of design and construct on work is being provided? Will he also consider setting up a State-owned company to buy and operate this means of travel to ensure that we can cope with foreign competition?
    Mr. Cousins: Again, I must suggest that the last part of that supplementary should represent a Question in its own right, and perhaps my hon. Friend will put one down. It is certainly not a matter which one can answer in reply to a supplementary. On the question of whether we should set up a rival company, I am already on record as saying that where bodies of this kind fail the nation I would have no hesitation in bringing the matter before the. House, but that is an entirely different question. On the other part of my hon. Friend's supplementary, I am also on record as being in support of the hover-type movement itself and saying that we should he ready to give what aid is needed.

    Industrial Machines (Designs)
    Mr. Dempseyasked the Minister of Technology what steps he is taking to increase the number and improve the quality of designs of industrial machines in those industries which are sponsored by his Department, with a view to making the United Kingdom more competitive in world markets.
    Mr. Marsh: The Ministry of Technology is acting upon the recommendations of the Feilden Committee on engineering design, which have the aim of raising the general quality of design throughout British industry.
    Mr. Dempsey: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that in the printing industry, for example, machine supplies are dominated by Germany, due not to a
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    lack of material or skill on our part but to a lack of design? Will he try to do something about this?
    Mr. Marsh: My right hon. Friend is very well aware of this type of problem. Without being committed on the specific point mentioned by my hon. Friend, a great deal of work is being done, particularly in the sphere of machine tools, with increased research and development, pre-production contracts and numerical control. A great deal of assistance is being offered.

    Hovertrain (Development Programme)
    Mr. Atkinsonasked the Minister of Technology in view of the need to accelerate the research programme designed to give luxury electric rail traction at 200 miles per hour, if he will restrict the Hovertrain development programme.
    Mrs. Shirley Williamsasked the Minister of Technology whether, in view of the decision of Bertin et Cie to produce a working Hovertrain on a five-mile track, he will accelerate the Hovertrain development programme in Great Britain.
    Mr. Cousins: As the Question from my hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr. Atkinson) indicates, Hovertrains are not the only form of high speed tracked transport, and before we can decide what effort to put into this development, the various technical, economic and social factors involved must be evaluated.
    Mr. Atkinson: Would my right hon. Friend not agree that the development of electric traction in this country has been hampered to a great extent by a lack of research funds? Would he not also agree that the possible development of electric traction is far more exciting and revolutionary than anything yet known in terms of pneumatic vehicles? Should he not, therefore, be more decisive in giving the go ahead to electrical engineers to get on with the job of developing electric traction?
    Mr. Cousins: My right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport is considering proposals for conducting studies in this sphere. One is tempted to agree that there is, certainly in the short term, the possibility of there being a great deal

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    more likelihood of success in this sphere than with the Hovertrain within a densely populated area such as this.
    Mr. Deedes: Would the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind when considering these matters that there is still scope for technology in ensuring that trains which travel at 60 m.p.h. arrive on time?

    Extrusion Processes
    Mr. Atkinsonasked the Minister of Technology whether, in view of his decision to sponsor the development of hydrostatic extrusion techniques, he will sponsor the essentially related research and development of cemented carbides and ceramic extrusion dies.
    Mr. Marsh: My right hon. Friend is aware of the need for the development of dies which will withstand the higher temperatures which may arise in improved extrusion processes in the future and hopes shortly to make an announcement about further work in this field.
    Mr. Atkinson: I thank my hon. Friend for that constructive Answer. Is he aware that, in terms of hydrostatic extrusion development, this may prove to be an exciting development for the engineering industry and that we are not far away from the day when many thousands of engineering components will be extruded in this way like toothpaste? Will he, therefore, give an assurance that additional money—in addition to the £300,000 already allocated—will be made available for this work so that the development of the die part of the system can be completed?
    Mr. Marsh: I agree with my hon. Friend that this is an extremely important development indeed. It could be construed as being virtually nothing less than the development of an entirely new type of machine tool of considerable value. In Birmingham, to give one example, a great deal of research is being done. For this and allied research, contracts for research and development worth about £192,000 have already been placed. If we were successful in this sphere—and I think that we will be—Britain could lead the world in this development.

    Government Research Establishments (Staff)
    Sir J. Edenasked the Minister of Technology how many scientists and skilled engineers have at their own request left employment in Government research establishments since October 1964; how many of these have since been replaced by new recruits; and if he will make a statement about the nature of the work to be done in these establishments in the future.
    Mr. Marsh: Since October, 1964, some 200 members of the Scientific Officer, Experimental Officer and Works Professional grades have left employment in the research establishments for which my right hon. Friend is responsible. In the same period, about 240 new appointments have been made in these grades. These establishments will continue to undertake research, development and advisory work to assist industry and public departments.
    Sir J. Eden: If the hon. Gentleman and his Department are really anxious to assist in accelerating the modernisation of British industry, will they do nothing to interrupt the momentum of research in the establishments for which the hon. Gentleman is departmentally responsible? Does he not agree that basic research is basic and that it cannot be parcelled up as between military and civil projects?
    Mr. Marsh: I do not think that one need quarrel with the hon. Gentleman's proposition that basic research is basic. I assure him that it is the intention of the Ministry to assist the work of the research departments.

    Computers (Utilisation)
    Mr. J. H. Osbornasked the Minister of Technology if he will commission an independent study to report on the degree of effective computer utilisation in the United Kingdom and publish the evidence and conclusions such a study will reveal.
    Mr. Marsh: My right hon. Friend recognises the importance of computer installations being effectively utilised and he is already taking steps through the Computer Advisory Service and otherwise to promote this. But he considers

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    that a study on the lines suggested is neither necessary nor practicable.
    Mr. Osborn: While thanking the Parliamentary Secretary for that Answer, may I ask him if he is aware that the Mackenzie and other studies have shown that, due to managerial problems, there has been an ineffective use of computers in America? Since we cannot afford that sort of wastage in this country, would it not be wise to anticipate that problem before it arises?
    Mr. Marsh: We entirely accept the importance of looking at this matter and dealing with it. My only quarrel, if there be one, with the hon. Gentleman is on whether this type of inquiry is possible or necessary for this job. A great deal can be done in this sphere and a great deal is being done now.
    Dr. Bray: Would my hon. Friend assure the House that the training effort which is needed in all aspects of the computer industry is receiving the full support of his Department?
    Mr. Marsh: The training effort in this and in all other spheres is receiving the full support of the Government and the Ministry of Technology in particular.

    Firms (Technological Status)
    Mr. Biffenasked the Minister of Technology what proposals he has for assessing the relative competence and technological status of firms on the basis of readily available standardised information.
    Mr. Marsh: None, Sir.
    Mr. Biffen: Does the hon. Gentleman recall that on 13th November he himself suggested that this was desirable? If he thought that it was desirable on 13th November, why is he not now setting about doing it?
    Mr. Marsh: The hon. Gentleman must read my speeches more carefully. I said on that day:
    "Ideally what is needed is a method of assessing the relative competence and technological status of firms on the basis of readily available standardised information".
    I am sure that, on reflection, the hon. Gentlema a will agree that even the Labour Party takes some time before it can become entirely ideal.

    Computer Industry
    Mr. Biffenasked the Minister of Technology by what criteria he will determine what constitutes an independent British computer industry.
    Mr. Cousins: I regard an independent British computer industry as consisting of firms whose policies in respect of production, research and development are determined in this country.
    Mr. Biffen: If the right hon. Gentleman is satisfied that these criteria will enable him to determine individual companies, could he record these in the OFFICIAL REPORT so that we may trace their commercial fortunes since the arrival of the Labour Government?
    Mr. Cousins: Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Patrick Jenkinasked the Minister of Technology what steps he proposes to take to implement his policy of seeing that the British computer industry is not dependent technologically on foreign industry.
    Mr. Cousins: I would refer the hon. Member to my Answer of 30th November to the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Mr. Kenneth Lewis) in which I set out the steps the Government are taking to assist the development of the computer industry.
    Mr. Jenkin: Does the Minister not realise that the computer industry is one in which there will be a growing degree of specialisation, and that it is sheer pie in the sky to imagine that the British or any other country's computer industry can be independent of foreign technological resources?
    Mr. Cousins: Would the hon. Gentleman like to quote me any place where I have said that we could be completely independent of foreign technology?
    Hon. Members: Answer.
    Mr. Speaker: Order. The right hon. Gentleman has answered the supplementary question.

    Investment Incentives
    Mr. Sheldonasked the Minister of Technology what study he has made of investment incentives in the field of

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    technology; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Cousins: Investment incentives in the field of technology are part of the wider question of incentives to promote industrial investment and modernisation generally which is being examined by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. My Department, as sponsor for a wide range of engineering industries, is closely concerned in this examination.
    Mr. Sheldon: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that his Department has a particularly important rôle to play in this regard; that it is not sufficient just to have investment but that investment should also lead to modernisation, and that the view of the Department headed by him is surely of considerable importance in this respect?
    Mr. Cousins: I thought that I had made it quite clear that mine is one of the Departments most closely involved in this matter, and is engaged in discussions with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
    Mr. William Clark: Can the right hon. Gentleman say when the review will be completed? Can he assure the House that it will be completed before the next Budget?
    Mr. Cousins: Questions relating to the timing of the review should surely be addressed to my right hon. Friend.

    Programmers and Systems Analysts
    Mr. J. H. Osbornasked the Minister of Technology what is the estimated number of programmers able to design compilers and systems analysts able to design systems for the control of organisations and processes currently employed in the United Kingdom; and what is the expected rise in demand for these skills during the period outlined by the National Plan.
    Mr. Marsh: A precise estimate is not available, but the evidence in my possession suggests that the number is of the order of 100 or so. At least three times as many is likely to be necessary by 1970 to meet the expected demand.
    Mr. Osborn: The Minister said at Eastbourne that there was need to take special action. Is he proposing to take
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    special action to see that the supply is there when necessary?
    Mr. Marsh: Yes, Sir. The Government are taking special action on this matter. Following our initiative, an official working group is being set up by the Department of Education and Science to consider, as a matter of urgency, action to improve the supply of trained computer personnel at all levels in the educational service. It has to be made clear that people at this level cannot be trained quickly, and it is a great pity that the problem was not recognised earlier.
    Mr. Maxwell: Will my hon. Friend consider instructing this working group at the Department of Education and Science to enlarge the scope of its inquiry so as to include the possibility of providing computers at secondary modern schools, comprehensive schools and grammar schools? Unless we train our younger people in the use of computers, we shall never have enough people to use the new technology.
    Mr. Marsh: That is very much another question.

    Nuclear Power Station, Finland (Tenders)
    Mr. Varleyasked the Minister of Technology whether he has approved the decision of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority to enter tenders to build a nuclear power station in Finland; and if he will encourage further efforts to obtain export orders of this type.
    Mr. Cousins: Yes, Sir. Every encouragement will be given to efforts to obtain exports of this type.
    Mr. Varley: Can my right hon. Friend say how many tenders were submitted by other nations, what was the total cost involved, and whether he expects further orders of this particular kind in future?
    Mr. Cousins: There were seven tenders other than the tender put in by the U.K.A.E.A. I am not able to answer the inquiry on total cost because, at the moment, this matter is confidential to the parties concerned.
    Mr. Biffen: Is the Minister satisfied that this is a legitimate activity for the A.E.A., or does he not feel that the consortia, which have traditionally made this

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    kind of tender from the United Kingdom, should themselves be encouraged to go into exports?
    Mr. Cousins: I think it very much a legitimate activity of the Atomic Energy Authority.

    Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Industries (Orders)
    Sir H. Legge-Bourkeasked the Minister of Technology to what extent his new duties in connection with the mechanical and electrical engineering industries will involve prior consultation with other Government Departments seeking to place orders with these industries; and to what extent change will be necessary in the ordering procedure of the Atomic Energy Authority and the nationalised power industries, in particular, and the civil field in general.
    Mr. Cousins: As I stated in reply to the hon. Member's question of 29th November, the Ministry of Technology, as sponsoring Department, is prepared in appropriate cases to consult with other Departments over the placing of their orders. This practice will not be affected by the extension of my Department's duties, though the range involved will be considerably larger.
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Will the right hon. Gentleman recall that over the years there has been built up a very considerable confidence between the regional offices of the Board of Trade and the D.S.I.R. people working jointly with them in the regions? Is there not a great danger that all that will happen as a result of his activities will be that we shall have yet another Department coining into the picture, thereby causing further delay?
    Mr. Cousins: There is certainly no justification at all for any assumption that this will widen the range of consideration. We hope to be as close to the industries for which we are the sponsor as any previous Governments have been.

    Scientifically-Based Industries (Merseyside)
    Mr. Hefferasked the Minister of Technology what steps are being taken in the Merseyside development district to develop and expand scientifically-based
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    industries; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Marsh: My right hon. Friend has no proposals of this kind for Merseyside at present, but we have these problems constantly in mind and will inform Parliament of specific proposals as they arise.
    Mr. Heffer: Is my hon. Friend aware that his reply will be received with disappointment on Merseyside? Is he also aware that there is very great concern on Merseyside that the expanding developments in the technological industry are being siphoned away from Merseyside, and that we are being left with the minor, and to some extent the dying, parts of technological development?
    Mr. Marsh: I would not accept my hon. Friend's last point. I think he would agree that the right way of dealing with this is by the system of regional planning introduced by this Government. The Ministry's regional organisation has recently been strengthened and is playing a full part on the regional boards. I think that any proposals made on that basis would certainly have the sympathetic consideration of the Ministry.

    Government Departments (Orders)
    Sir H. Legge-Bourkeasked the Minister of Technology how many times his Department, as sponsor for the industry concerned, has intervened in the placing of orders by other Departments; what were the cost, nature and other Departments concerned in each case; and what are the circumstances in which, after his approval has been given, implementation is still dependent upon Treasury approval of the necessary expenditure.
    Mr. Cousins: The details of the consultations between my Department, the purchasing Departments and the Treasury are confidential to the Government and it would be contrary to well-established practice to give information of the kind requested.
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Even if the right hon. Gentleman cannot give me the number of times when the Treasury has interfered, surely he can answer the other half of the Question which is of considerable concern, as to how much he has been

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    brought into consultation, and what the projects were?
    Mr. Cousins: I am sorry, but it is not proper for the hon. Gentleman to say "even if I cannot give an answer on the number of times the Treasury has interfered". This is not the purpose of the Treasury. The purpose of the Treasury is to examine costings, and to discuss them with other Ministries in order to reach satisfactory conclusions.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Capital Gains Tax
    Mr. Grantasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will estimate the cost in a full year of excluding the first £500 of any capital gain from capital gains tax.
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. James Callaghan): It is not possible to make an estimate. The cost would depend on the extent to which taxpayers took advantage of the exemption by spreading their realisations of capital gains.
    Mr. Grant: Has the Chancellor studied the views of the London Stock Exchange on this issue? Does he realise that a concession of this nature would probably do more than anything else to encourage the flow of investments and savings which he says he so much desires?
    Mr. Callaghan: Everything that comes from the Stock Exchange demands my constant and earnest attention. I can promise the hon. Member that I will consider its memorandum with very great care. As to the flow of savings, the hon. Member will be happy to know that it is running at a very high level again this year.

    Temporary Import Charge
    Mr. Bessellasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when the temporary surcharge on imports will be finally removed.
    Mr. Callaghan: I would refer the hon. Gentleman to the debate on 29th November.
    Mr. Bessell: Is the Chancellor aware that the continued use of the import charge is providing artificial protection to British industry, is probably discouraging exports, and does not make credible
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    his own statement that the British economy is now on a safe footing?
    Mr. Callaghan: That sounds to me like a frustrated export from last week's debate. I assure the hon. Gentleman that, far from saying that the British economy is safe, I have been in the forefront, with my other colleagues in the Government, in insisting that we need a continual improvement in our balance of payments before we can say that the economy is wholly safe. I think that that end can be attained if we continue on the path which we have set ourselves.
    Mr. G. Campbellasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much revenue was produced for the Echequer by the temporary import surcharge in its first year.
    Mr. Callaghan: I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer given to the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr. Peter Walker) on 25th November.
    Mr. Campbell: Is not this now a half-concealed extra tax upon the consumer?
    Mr. Callaghan: The figure of £169 million is within the margin of error of last April's forecast, and clearly extra revenue must be of the nature of an additional tax, but this does not seem to me to raise any new point over and above those we discussed last April.

    Purchase Tax (Cricket Balls)
    Mr. Danceasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware of the adverse effect that the high rate of Purchase Tax on English cricket balls is having on this craft; and if he will reduce the level of tax.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Niall MacDermot): Representations have recently been made on this subject and my right hon. Friend will bear them in mind when Purchase Tax is next under review.
    Mr. Dance: Is the Financial Secretary aware that the price of a cricket ball now is £3 2s. 9d.—[Laughter.]—and that, as an ordinary cricket club uses two a day in a match—[HON. MEMBERS: "The hon. Gentleman's team would be out before that."]—it is extremely—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. This is a serious English question.
    Mr. Dance: Does not the hon. and learned Gentleman realise that the present price is quite prohibitive for some of the smaller cricket clubs, which are now being forced to import cheaper balls from abroad, and this is very detrimental to British trade?
    Mr. MacDermot: Any reduction in the rate of tax would have to apply to imported no less than to home-produced cricket balls. If I may put it in this way, cricket balls have to be Gattable as well as battable.

    Rating Valuation
    Sir C. Mott-Radclyffeasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is satisfied that, with new burdens being placed on the Inland Revenue valuation staff, it will be possible to undertake the rating valuation of property due in 1968; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. MacDermot: I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government on 2nd December to a Question by the hon. Member for Cleveland (Mr. Tinn).
    Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: Is not the real reason for the postponement of the 1968 revaluation the immense burden placed upon Inland Revenue valuers by the complications of the Finance Act, in respect of which many of them have had no adequate guidance whatever?
    Mr. MacDermot: There is no question of lack of guidance. It is right that there had to be an assessment of which were the most important priorities and, of course, there will be at least as important work for the valuers to do following both the Finance Act and the setting up of the Land Commission.

    Developing Countries (Treasury Guarantee)
    Mr. Patrick Jenkinasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards requests from Governments of developing countries in the Commonwealth for a United Kingdom Treasury guarantee in respect of a loan to be floated publicly in London by that Commonwealth Government.
    Mr. Callaghan: No such requests have been received, but I do not think that providing finance for the developing countries by way of Treasury guarantee would, on balance, present any advantage over the present arrangements.
    Mr. Jenkin: Does not the Chancellor realise that an approach has been made to his right hon. Friend the Minister for Overseas Development and that it has, so far, been turned down on the ground that it would create an undesirable precedent? Does not the right hon. Gentleman recognise that it might be a very good way of getting development funds to the developing countries?
    Mr. Callaghan: That seems to be a series of assertions without much argument behind it. So far, I cannot see what the advantage is.

    Estate Duty (Owner-occupied Houses)
    Mr. Stratton Millsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in view of the substantial increase in the market value of houses, he will seek to exempt the homes of owner-occupiers for Estate Duty purposes; and if he will estimate the annual cost of this relief.
    Mr. MacDermot: No, Sir. The cost might be £25 million.
    Mr. Stratton Mills: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware of the considerable increase in the value of owner-occupied houses during the past 10 years and of the hardship which can be caused, for instance, to widows who have to stay on in their houses after the death of their spouses? Will he consider a partial extension on, say, the first £5,000 of the value of owner-occupied houses?
    Mr. MacDermot: There is already an Estate Duty exemption in respect of estates not amounting to more than £5,000, and I understand that, historically, the reason for allowing it was the one to which the hon. Gentleman referred.

    Post-War Credits
    Mr. Pounderasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will make a statement on the repayment of post-war credits.
    Mr. Callaghan: I have no statement to make at present.
    Mr. Pounder: Does not the Chancellor appreciate that, 20 years after the end of the war, there is still £224 million worth of post-war credits, plus interest of over £36 million waiting to be repaid? Is it not time that he had some plans to hand this money back to the taxpayer?
    Mr. Callaghan: If the country's finances had been handed over to us in a better state, I might have been able to make more progress.

  EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
  Mr. Higginsasked the Prime Minister what decision has now been reached by Her Majesty's Government regarding the recognition of the competence of the European Commission on Human Rights to receive petitions within the terms of Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and if he will now declare, pursuant to Article 46 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, that he recognises as compulsory,ipso facto and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights on all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Wilson): Sir, the Government have now decided to accept, in respect of the United Kingdom and for an initial period of three years, the right of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights and the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
  Mr. Higgins: Will the Prime Minister take it that his Answer will give great satisfaction to all those who have the cause of human rights at heart? I thank him very much indeed.
  The Prime Minister: I thank the hon. Gentleman. The Council of Europe is being informed, and acceptance of these two optional clauses in the Convention will take effect from the date when we notify it to the Council of Europe.

  AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION (LETTER)
  Mr. Bessellasked the Prime Minister if he will publish his reply to the Automobile Association's letter to him dated 12th October regarding the high rate of accidents on the road.
  The Prime Minister: I have arranged for the reply sent on my behalf by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport to be circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
  Following is the letter:
  Ministry of Transport,
  Southwark Street,
  London, S.E.1.
  27th October, 1965.
  Before leaving for Rhodesia the Prime Minister passed to me your letter to him of 12th October, in which you argued on behalf of the Automobile Association that road construction schemes should be exempted from the Government's measures to slow down public expenditure on capital projects by postponing certain starts of work by six months. The Prime Minister asked me, in the circumstances, to reply on his behalf.
  Your letter says that the Government "has decided to make a heavy cut back in road expenditure amounting in all to £55 million." This implies that roads have been singled out for some savage cut in expenditure. This is not so. The six months' postponement applies generally to all non-industrial capital projects except houses, schools and hospitals. Projects in development districts were exempted and I have subsequently announced that a large number of road schemes will be going on as planned without deferment.
  The strength of sterling must be our paramount economic objective, underlying as it does the whole of our social and economic programmes. It is misleading, therefore, to dramatise the decision as indicating a callous disregard on the Government's part of the problem of road accidents. As you well know, road conditions are only one of the factors leading to road accidents. You would he doing poor service to the cause of accident prevention if you were to encourage the public at large and motorists in particular to shift the responsibility for the growth in accidents on to what you consider to be inadequacies in the road construction programme.
  The Government is no less concerned—indeed is more pressingly concerned than any-one—about the mounting toll of road accidents and we are playing our part in tackling the problem. Over the period 1965–70, public

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  expenditure planned on the road programme will be some £1,200 million. The deferment for six months of £55 million worth of road schemes must be seen against this background.
  (Signed) TOM FRASER.
  The Rt. Hon. Viscount Brentford.

  NUCLEAR DETERRENT
  Mr. Blakerasked the Prime Minister if he will define an internationalised nuclear deterrent, as the phrase has been used in explaining Government policy.
  The Prime Minister: I would refer the hon. Member to my speeches in this House on 16th and 17th December last.
  Mr. Blaker: Is it not becoming increasingly clear that the Government are unlikely to get either the A.N.F. or the M.L.F.? Will the right hon. Gentleman now give an assurance that he will continue to conduct such nuclear tests as may be necessary in spite of that?
  The Prime Minister: As regards the M.L.F., we always made clear our objection to the proposals which were being considered when we came into office, and we put forward our A.N.F. proposal as an alternative. Discussions will now be starting quite seriously within N.A.T.O. on this. The hon. Gentleman knows why they have not been carried out during the past few months. As regards testing, I have already stated the position.
  Mr. Heath: Will the Prime Minister give a clear undertaking, which he failed to give last Thursday, that he will in future announce the dates of tests in advance and make an announcement after they have taken place without actually being questioned?
  The Prime Minister: That gives me an opportunity to correct what the right hon. Gentleman said last week. In fact, the previous Government did not make an announcement before or after the test of September, 1964. We broke with that precedent by announcing afterwards in the House the test which took place this year and the result.

  NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
  Mr. Hefferasked the Prime Minisster what is Her Majesty's Government's policy on the draft recommendation con-
  238
  tained in Document 354 concerning the organisation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, presented at the Western European Union assembly in Paris recently; and if he will make a statement.
  The Prime Minister: This recommendation has still to be considered by the Western European Union Council, where the Government will discuss it with their allies.
  Mr. Heffer: Will my right hon. Friend agree that the idea of a supreme executive entrusted with the overall direction of the Alliance, both military and political, as advocated by the right hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), is a dangerous one and, if accepted, could make it much more difficult to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union in relation to a security pact for Europe?
  The Prime Minister: All we shall be discussing with the Western European Union Council will be Document 354, not the views expressed then or at any other time by the right hon. Member for Streatham.
  Mr. Ridley: But is not the Prime Minister aware that the recommendation also contained a suggestion that there might be a common European armaments board? As his own party representative voted for this report, can the right hon. Gentleman say what the Government's attitude to this will be?
  The Prime Minister: We shall study this, but in all our approaches to these problems of defence we believe that the right control should be on the basis of N.A.T.O., of the Alliance as a whole, and not on the basis of separate European arrangements.

  PAYMASTER-GENERAL (DUTIES)
  Mr. Gibson-Wattasked the Prime Minister what duties he has at present assigned to the Paymaster-General; and what duties he has removed from him since his statement on 12th November, 1964.
  The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to or subtract from the Answer I gave on 12th November, 1964 to a Question by the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw).
  Mr. Gibson-Watt: In view of recent speculation, will the Prime Minister now tell us what the Paymaster-General does?
  The Prime Minister: I am not responsible for speculation. The answer which I gave on 12th November pointed out that, traditionally, non-Departmental Ministers carry out such duties as are assigned to them by the Prime Minister, but it is not the practice, and has not been under any Government, to say what non-Departmental Ministers normally do.
  Mr. Heath: Why is the Prime Minister being so coy about his right hon. Friend's duties? Has he not heavy responsibilities which he carries out for the Prime Minister in watching over the Prime Minister's colleagues in the Cabniet, their political activities and the political activities of other Members of the Government? Is it not a fact that, each morning, when the Prime Minister looks at the newspaper and sees "Watch it, Harold", he turns round and says, "Watch it, Wigg"?
  The Prime Minister: That was not even funny, but, apart from that, the duties assigned by the right hon. Gentleman to my right hon. Friend are completely wide of the mark. Those are not his duties. Moreover, it is a fact—perhaps I was wrong in my answer to the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Gibson-Watt)—that there have been occasions when the previous Government announced the duties of non-Departmental Ministers. There were the two borne on the previous Government's payroll for looking after Tory Central Office.

  GOVERNOR OF RHODESIA
  Mr. John Pageasked the Prime Minister if, in view of the facts that the Governor of Rhodesia represents the Crown and that the only protection afforded to him is provided by a Government that Her Majesty's Government do not recognise, he will advise Her Majesty to recall the Governor to this country so that his person is not in jeopardy; and if he will only advise Her Majesty to re-appoint a Governor in Rhodesia when Her Majesty's Government is able to afford him protection.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I know that Sir Humphrey Gibbs feels that he
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  should remain in Salisbury at this critical time.
  Mr. Page: Is the Prime Minister aware that many people feel that it is quite irresponsible that the representative of the Crown should be left as a virtual hostage in Rhodesia, guarded by a régime which Her Majesty's Government do not recognise? Would it not be possible for him to recommend to Her Majesty that Sir Humphrey be recalled and that some other individual should be nominated who could act very importantly in the rôle of a go-between at a later stage?
  The Prime Minister: Fortunately, Sir Humphrey Gibbs does not take the view which the hon. Gentleman has expressed, and I think it is very important that he should remain in his post at this critical time.
  Mr. Hugh Jenkins: Would my right hon. Friend agree that the question just asked by the hon. Member for Harrow. West (Mr. John Page) is in itself an etxremely irresponsible one?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. I do not think that either the original Question or the supplementary question was irresponsible, because I thought that the hon. Gentleman was trying to express the concern that we feel for Sir Humphrey Gibbs. He was expressing a perfectly fair point that perhaps Sir Humphrey ought to be in this country. But that is not Sir Humphrey's view and it is not our view, and, therefore, I think that it would be wrong to pursue it.
  Mr. Gower: Is it not a fact probably Sir Humphrey Gibbs is in no great danger, as was evidenced by the sight of him playing crocquet?

  EUROPEAN UNITY (FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH)
  Mr. Blakerasked the Prime Minister whether the public speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to a meeting called by Socialist Commentary in London on 27th November about European unity represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.
  Mr. Blaker: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the ambiguity about the

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  Government's policy has only been increased by that speech and by the Foreign Secretary's explanation in the House yesterday? Has the time not come when the Government should reformulate their five conditions so as to make it clear to the Common Market countries where they stand?
  The Prime Minister: I think that our conditiors are clear, and I have several times referred to the difficulties about agriculture. The position is that entry into the European Economic Community is not open to us in existing circumstances and no question of fresh negotiations arises at present. But we shall work with our E.F.T.A. partners through the Council of Europe and Western European Union for the closest possible relations with the Six consistent with our Commonwealth ties.

  MIDDLE EAST (SALE OF ARMS)
  Mr. Tuckasked the Prime Minister if he will propose to President Johnson and Prime Minister Kosygin that there shall be an international agreement not to sell arms to nations in the Middle East pending the preparation of wider measures for arresting the arms race.
  The Prime Minister: I should welcome the opportunity of discussing these questions with President Johnson, but I am not convinced that the time is right for my hon. Friend's proposal.
  Mr. Tuck: Would my right hon. Friend agree that, however defensive the acquisition of arms by a country like Saudi Arabia appears to be, the arms would constitute a formidable addition to the striking force of that country and, therefore, create grave anxiety in places like Israel and perhaps even Aden, where they might be used against our own forces, and will inevitably start up a new phase of the arms race in the Middle East?
  The Prime Minister: I do not disagree with what my hon. Friend has in mind, and certainly in regard to the supply of arms from certain countries to, for example, the U.A.R. and the anxieties felt as between the U.A.R. and Israel, there is every case, if we could reach agreement, for getting some kind of ban on arms. But there are very great difficulties, not least the problem of the nuclear
  242
  question, missiles and so on. That is why I say that I do not think that the time has yet been reached when we should be trying to formulate this particular proposition.
  Mr. Heath: Can the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the Government are following previous practice in controlling the sale of arms so that the balance is kept in an adjusted form?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. That would be our hope. But as the right hon. Gentleman knows, it is not entirely within our control. The sooner we are able to move towards something on the lines suggested by my hon. Friend the better, particularly in regard to the critical balance between Israel and her neighbours, and the sooner we shall be able to relieve tension in that area. But our main aim in regard to the nuclear question is to get a general non-dissemination agreement.

  RHODESIA (OIL SHIPMENTS)
  Mr. Michael Footasked the Prime Minister when he expects to have completed the preliminary studies necessary for carrying out the United Nations Security Council resolution on the imposition of an embargo on oil shipments to Southern Rhodesia.
  The Prime Minister: This will inevitably take some time since any oil sanction must be comprehensive if it is to be effective.
  Mr. Foot: Does not my right hon. Friend think that this country should do everything in its power to expedite an agreement on this subject in favour of the resolution for which we, quite rightly, voted at the Security Council, and can he give the House any information about how this purpose might be assisted by dealing with the oil tanker which is now on the way to Southern Rhodesia?
  The Prime Minister: I know the concern—I share the concern—about this oil tanker. It would not help in this particular situation because, obviously—I think that this is right—any oil sanction must be multilateral and must be effective. There are other tankers stacked behind that one, and merely to stop that one

  243
  would make no difference to the supplies to Mr. Smith. Indeed, it might have an indirect effect in relation to possible oil supplies to Zambia. If it is to be done—we are hard at work on it—it must be multilateral and totally effective. A suggestion of the kind which my hon. Friend has in mind would not make any difference to the question of oil supplies at the present time.
  Mr. Sydney Silverman: Is my right hon. Friend not aware that at this very moment a British ship owned by a company in which the British Government have a controlling interest is carrying 12,000 tons of oil, sufficient for two weeks' fuel supply, to Southern Rhodesia? Will not he do something, while the investigations are going on about making the oil sanctions multilateral, to prevent this country, in anticipation of such a move, acting in plain defiance of a recommendation of the United Nations which the Government themselves accepted?
  The Prime Minister: The fact that I am aware of the existence of the tanker —I gave details about it—was, I should have thought, shown by my answer to my hon. Friend's supplementary question a moment ago. I am aware of it. Incidentally, I think it is worth noting that very many of the countries which are putting the greatest pressure on us at the present time about our actions in relation to Rhodesia are countries which have not yet begun to carry out the United Nations' resolution, which we have done pretty thoroughly. So far as the tanker is concerned, there are other ships stacked behind it. Our interference with the ship would not make any difference with the two others immediately behind it. I have said that we will study the matter and that when an oil sanction is introduced it will be fully effective. Merely to stop one ship out of three at the present time would be a moral gesture, but it would have no significance in creating an effective oil sanction.
  Mr. Grimond: Would it not, however, be an extremely effective moral demonstration? Would not the Prime Minister agree that if the British Government are going to say that they are primarily responsible for handling the Rhodesian situation they should make it perfectly clear that the action of a company which they control in sending an oil tanker
  244
  from a port in a country whose foreign affairs they also control should be stopped, and that, whatever indefensible action other countries may be taking, it is no excuse for us to do the same?
  The Prime Minister: As I have said, when we work out an oil sanction it must be fully effective. If all those who at the present time are resting on the doctrine of a moral demonstration would take as many effective measures as we have done in the past we might be much nearer an end of the problem.
  Mr. John Hynd: With regard to the United Nations' resolution, is my right hon. Friend aware that Iran is one of the countries which have applied a full embargo on the export of oil to Rhodesia? How does he reconcile his attitude with the initiative that has been taken by countries like Iran, and would not this gesture be of enormous psychological value in encouraging Iran and others to maintain the oil embargo?
  The Prime Minister: The problem is not one of supplying countries. As I explained a week ago, the problem is to make quite certain before we can get an effective oil sanction that we do not get privateers and others, who might divert ships in mid-ocean which have collected their oil from any part of the world, supplying Rhodesia through Beira and in other ways. We are working to ascertain whether it is possible to get a fully effective sanction so that when we apply it it will be effective. It will not be made effective, however much we welcome—and we do welcome it—the initiative taken by Iran, and now Kuwait, unless the holes are plugged, and we want to make sure that they will be plugged. As for a moral demonstration, here I must point out to my hon. Friend that it would be possible to get a moral demonstration which might be extremely harmful to Zambia before we have completed our arrangements for relieving Zambia of the consequences of an oil embargo.
  Mr. Zilliacus: Could not the Government, in addition to stopping the tanker, close the British-owned pipeline from Beira to Umtali and take the initiative in the Security Council by requesting that sanctions be made mandatory under Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter?
  The Prime Minister: I will bear in mind my hon. Friend's suggestion, but we are more concerned with the effectiveness of sanctions than with demonstrations or resolutions, mandatory or otherwise. This is an extremely difficult thing to do. More than any other nation, we have shown, by a very long chalk, our determination to deal with Rhodesia and I should like to see some of the other countries come into line with us. Meanwhile we are working in relation to the oil sanction but I insist that it must be effective.
  Mr. Biggs-Davison: Can the Prime Minister tell us whether the Foreign Secretary, when he was in Moscow, discussed the oil sanction with the Soviet Government? Did they give an assurance that they would fully apply it?
  The Prime Minister: There was a short discussion about Rhodesia. There is no reason, as far as I am aware, to believe that the Soviet Union intends to provide aid and assistance to the illegal régime in Rhodesia. That is not a possibility that we are afraid of.
  Mr. Thorpe: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I seek your permission to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 to consider a matter of urgent public importance, namely, the refusal of Her Majesty's Government——
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must raise that point of order at the appropriate time. Mr. Cousins—statement.

NATIONAL COMPUTING CENTRE
The Minister of Technology (Mr. Frank Cousins): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will make a statement about the establishment of a National Computing Centre.
A rapid increase in the use of computers is vital to the drive for greater efficiency on which our national prosperity depends. In order to encourage the greatest practicable use of computers, it is important to simplify and cheapen the preparatory work which the user has to perform before his job can he put on the computer. Furthermore, we must make the best possible use of systems
246
analysts and programmers trained in this work.
It was for these reasons that I told the House on 1st March last that I was exploring the possibility of setting up a National Computer Program Centre. Following consultations with computer manufacturers, users and others I have decided to set up an organisation with a rather wider scope, to be called the National Computing Centre.
The Centre should reduce wasteful duplication of programming effort. It will achieve this in two ways; first, by providing computer users with information about programs already available in its library or elsewhere. Second, by developing and sponsoring the development of programs designed to serve users having closely similar tasks.
The Centre will also provide and encourage training in systems analysis, programming principles and computer applications. It will promote research into methods of programming and operating computers and into the influence of these methods on the design of computers.
All these objectives will be pursued in close co-operation with the computer manufacturers and with users in industry, commerce, administration, science and technology.
The Centre will be set up as an independent non-profit making Company, limited by guarantee. I know that we can count on a wide measure of support for the Centre. I shall be inviting representatives of manufacturers, users and of professional and other interested bodies to become members of the Centre and to be represented on the Council which will run it.
Professor Gordon Black who is at present Technical Manager (Computing) in the Reactor Group of the Atomic Energy Authority and part-time Professor of Automatic Data Processing in the Faculty of Technology of Manchester University, has acepted my invitation to become the first Director of the Centre. The Atomic Energy Authority have agreed to release him from his present appointment for that purpose and the University have agreed that Professor Black shall retain his professorial appointment.
The location of the Centre is a matter of importance. I hope to announce

247
shortly that it will be built in Manchester on a site where it would be easily accessible to industry, close to the University with its traditional interest in computing science and close to the Business School.
I hope that the Centre will be built up during the course of next year and be fully in operation in 1967.
Mr. Biffen: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there will be a widespread desire carefully, critically and dispassionately to study the statement? To assist in that study, perhaps I might put some questions to him.
First, does he envisage that the Centre will require a number of highly qualified staff? If so, with what success will he be able to recruit the staff in view of the current demand for these highly qualified people when, I imagine, he will be obliged to apply the Civil Service salary scale to them?
Secondly, can he confirm that the Centre will itself have computers? If so, will they be the full range of computers generally and popularly being used throughout British industry?
Thirdly, will he tell us whether or not it will be the purpose of the Centre to advise on the choice of computers to those who seek its advice?
Finally, since the work of the Centre will apparently be parallel to that of the existing and growing body of computer consultants, and its customers will include those in commerce, administration and industry, will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the Centre will not only be non-profit making but non-loss making?
Mr. Cousins: The staff of the Centre will not be civil servants. It is likely that we shall require between 40 and 50 on the staff. They will need to be experts, and, of course, we shall need the closest possible consultation with the manufacturers, producers and users in order to get the right people. They will not all be required at first. The staff will grow as the Centre becomes fully operative.
The hon. Gentleman suggested that this might take staff away from other sources. One of the functions of the Centre, however, will be to assist in training methods, because we are well aware that this is not being done at the top level at the
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moment. I do not want to be offensive, but it is the case that it is easy to find low level programmers but not top level people.
It is intended that the Centre shall have a computer. The hon. Gentleman asked whether it would have the whole range of computers in general use in British industry. As I say, it is intended to have a computer in the first instance, but I do not want to go on telling the Centre what it requires. The staff will be composed of people who know what is needed and who will set out to get the instruments to do it.
The hon. Member asked for an assurance that this would be not only a nonprofit making organisation but also a non-loss making organisation. I want to make something clear. We must recognise that the country needs a computer centre. Both sides of the House and people outside have said that we do. People are not satisfied that the consultancy agencies in computer work have been altogether a proper method for training and getting the people required. If this reading of the situation is correct, then the question is not whether it will make a profit at first but whether the amount of money put in will be satisfactory to enable it to get off the ground and from then on become a self-supporting organisation. That is what we want. Self-support by the Centre will be of value both to itself and to the country.
Mr. Maxwell: Is my right hon. Friend aware that this very important statement will be most welcome not only to industry and computer firms but to all those firms, both nationalised and private, which are now examining the possibility of acquiring computers? Since the statement will, however, cause a certain indecision among firms as to whether they should await the advice they may be able to obtain from the new Centre, on what date does he expect that firms will be able to obtain advice from the centre?
Secondly, what preparatory work did my right hon. Friend inherit on this project from the last Administration? Finally, what has caused the delay in the announcement of this important statement?
Mr. Cousins: We did not inherit any procedures from the last Administration

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We had to create them ourselves from scratch. I suppose that that could be regarded as at least part of the reason for the delay. A second reason is that this is a most complicated subject which had to be carefully examined with all those who produce and use and want to use computers so that a satisfactory instrument could be created. We were not prepared to jump in without the fullest examination. I am sure that both sides of the House will welcome this announcement, even though it has been said that there will be critical analysis of the statement, which is understandable and acceptable. Bat, in principle, I am sure it is accepted that we should get on with it at an early date. We are hoping to have the Centre operative in the early part of 1967, but that is our expectation and I cannot say whether it will be fulfilled. We hone that it will.
Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I welcome the statement about the establishment of the Centre. However, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that there will be disappointment among many people in Scotland that the Centre is not to be situated in Scotland, especially when it is of a type particularly suitable for fitting into the work of the D.S.I.R. in East Kilbride and the new developments going on there and the establishment of new development industries in Scotland.
Mr. Cousins: I hope that the hon. Gentleman's pleasure at receiving the statement is not tinged with too much disappointment about the Centre not being established in Scotland. Of course we understand that whenever there is an opportunity for establishing a project such as this, Scotland wants to have it, as do other places. However, I had to have regard to where the Centre could do the most good for British industry, and Manchester already has a good deal of computer knowledge.
Mr. Freeson: I join with other hon. Members in thanking my right hon. Friend for his statement. So far, the questions and answers have dealt with the Centre in relation to industry, naturally enough. I want to ask a question about the public services. Is it the intention after the Centre has been set up in due course to allow it to provide services to local and other public authorities, apart from the nationalised indus-
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tries, bearing in mind the growing need for research into planning and other social problems which will come very much to the fore, certainly for planning authorities and local government generally? Is it the intention not only to advise such departments in public services, but also to provide a direct service to local government in future years?
Mr. Cousins: Whether it will be able to provide a service to local authorities in the coming years will depend on the size of the growth of the Centre itself. As was suggested by the hon. Member for Oswestry (Mr. Biffen) when he put his question about a whole range of computers, if the purchase of computers were extended, one would hope to use them over a much wider range, but the Centre is to be used as a medium for training people and encouraging people in the use of computers, making it possible for people to understand how computers can be of value to them, removing some of their difficulties about installation, and avoiding duplication of preparatory work by small bodies.
Mr. Lubbock: Now that the functions of the Centre are to be expanded so as to include the provision of training in computer science, will the right hon. Gentleman make sure that there is the closest co-operation between the Centre and the University of Manchester by establishing a degree course in computer science, for example? He said that he imagined that the Centre would require only one computer, but will he be guided by the Council when it is set up and not take that decision until he has had the fullest advice from the Council? If it says that it needs more than one computer, will he ensure that the use of those computers is free to the university as well as to those consulting the Centre?
Mr. Cousins: The simple answer is that we shall certainly take the closest possible advice from Manchester University. One of the reasons for putting the Centre in Manchester is that the University has this background knowledge. It is no good establishing a Centre to give advice and not putting it in a place where such knowledge is available.
Mr. Dalyell: Does my right hon. Friend intend to recruit staff from industry on a temporary secondment basis?
Mr. Cousins: Yes. We shall be delighted if such an opportunity presents itself. There are two reasons. First, that would bring in the right kind of folk and, secondly, they would have an opportunity to maintain their contacts with industry and remain fully abreast of industry's current desires.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose——
Mr. Speaker: Order. I must protect the business of the House. Mr. Thorpe.

RHODESIA (OIL SHIPMENTS)
Mr. Thorpe: On a point of order. I seek your leave, Mr. Speaker, to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9 on a matter of definite, urgent, public importance, namely,
The refusal of Her Majesty's Government to countermand the delivery to Beira, Mozambique, of 12,000 tons of crude oil, the property of British Petroleum Ltd., being carried by the British ship "British Security" which is now at sea and whose cargo is destined for delivery to Rhodesia within the next few days.
In my submission, there can be no doubt that the matter is definite—it is a fact that this cargo is being carried in this ship destined to this port, ultimately to be delivered to Rhodesia. Therefore, nothing further needs to be said on that count.
With regard to the urgency; this is a cargo which is likely to be delivered within a matter of three or four days. The case of urgency, therefore, speaks for itself.
With regard to the third limb, namely, the public importance of the matter, I urge upon you, first, that this is a matter which has occupied the attention of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House by way of Questions and in the course of debate; secondly, that it is a matter with which the Security Council of the United Nations has dealt and in respect of which Her Majesty's Government have already cast their vote; thirdly, and finally, the importance is that this is an indication of the determination of Her Majesty's Government by all means to end the illegal régime in Rhodesia.
In that connection, it is noticeable that an ultimatum has been delivered to Her Majesty's Government by an organisation, the merits of which may have different interpretations but whose result may
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be that nine members of the Commonwealth will seek to leave the Commonwealth if Britain fails to show adequate determination.
Therefore, in my submission, on all three counts the case is made out and, accordingly, I ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House.
Mr. Sydney Silverman Mr. Sydney Silverman rose——
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must resume his seat when I am standing. I am dealing with a point of order under Standing Order No. 9. I think that the hon. Gentleman can leave it to the Chair.
Mr. Silverman: All I wanted to do, Mr. Speaker, was to offer for your assistance a further point.
Mr. Speaker: Can I assure the hon. Gentleman that I do not need assistance? I have been addressed by the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) at some length and with complete clarity on the reasons why he seeks to invoke Standing Order No. 9.
The hon. Gentleman wishes to raise under Standing Order No. 9 a matter which he regards as definite, urgent, and of public importance, namely,
The refusal of Her Majesty's Government to countermand the delivery to Beira, Mozambique, of 12,000 tons of crude oil, the property of British Petroleum Ltd., being carried by the ship "British Security" which is now at sea and whose cargo is destined for delivery to Rhodesia within the next few days.
The precedents which bind the Chair in this show that if the matter was known the previous day and, therefore, not raised at the earliest opportunity, it falls on the count of urgency. A near parallel is to be found in the OFFICIAL REPORT for 22nd November, 1950, col. 343. In the present case, a Question by another hon. Member, the hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Hamling), was tabled yesterday and now stands on the Order Paper for answer on Thursday. The matter was thus known yesterday and should have been raised yesterday if it was to be considered under Standing Order No. 9.
Mr. Warbey: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Might I call your attention to the point made in the submission of the hon. Gentleman, that a new fact was that the Government have refused——
Mr. Speaker: Order. The House has given the Chair a very difficult task to do in the question of the application of Standing Order No. 9. I hope that when the House has come to a decision on Standing Order No. 9 it will not be questioned by hon. Members.
Mr. Michael Foot: On a point of order. Does not this also raise an important question for future occasions as well as for this one? Is not my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) perfectly correct in the sense that a new point his arisen, in that only today have the Government refused to take action in this matter, and that that raises an immediate question? It could not possibly have been known yesterday that the Government were to refuse the action. If the House were to accept your Ruling in this case, Mr. Speaker, with great respect, it would appear that it would govern many future decisions, in the sense that a decision by the Government which has only just been announced would not be regarded as a matter of urgent public importance.
Mr. Speaker: As a general principle, I think that what the hon. Gentleman has said is unexceptionable. There may be cases in which the argument that he has
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sought to address to me might be of validity. It is of no validity in this one and we must move on.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I draw your attention to the fact that only today has it become clear and admitted that this ship, which is carrying the oil to Southern Rhodesia, is the property of a company in which the Government have a controlling interest, so that the Government are directly responsible. This was not known until today.
Mr. Speaker: I do hope the hon. Gentleman will take note of what I have said. I must not allow him to argue what was in the mind of the hon. Gentleman who tabled the Question yesterday. He knows no more than I do what was in his mind. The Parliamentary facts are as I have stated; the Ruling is as I have stated, and I must ask the House to accept it.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE (SUPPLY)
Ordered,
That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[Mr. Bowden.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY

  SUPPLY
  [1ST ALLOTTED DAY]
  Order for Committee read.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair.—[Mr. Short.]

  COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS (REPORTS)
  3.55 p.m.
  Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I beg to move, to leave out from "That" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
  "this House takes note of the First, Second and Third Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts in the last Session of Parliament, and of the Treasury Minute on the Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts of Session 1964–65 (Command Paper No. 2845)."
  I am sure the House will appreciate that, although I speak from this Box in moving this Amendment, I do not speak on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends. The privilege falls to me of moving this Amendment to take note of the Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts because I have been Chairman of the Committee. It has become the precedent during the few years that these debates have taken place for the Chairman to initiate them. It is not my purpose to seek to initiate either a long or heated debate on this Amendment. The strength of the Committee of Public Accounts lies in its objectivity and in its non-partisan character. For myself, I will attempt to emulate those qualities, at any rate for the duration of this speech.
  It is the custom of the House for the Chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts to be chosen from the Opposition Benches. It was partly for that reason that my two immediate predecessors as Chairmen of the Committee, were, working backwards, the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister. I think I speak for the present Committee when I say that, whatever some of us may think of those right hon. Gentlemen in other capacities, they both discharged their duties to the
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  Committee of Public Accounts with very great zeal, diligence and effect.
  I am afraid, however, that the House has been rather badly served—and this is a rarity and I ask the Financial Secretary to take note of it—by the Stationery Office. The volume containing the Reports of the Committee was subjected, on its first publication early in October, to complicated errors of binding, resulting in part of it being out of numerical order and part of it being missing. I understand that there are now, as a result of certain initiatives taken, a supply of accurate and complete copies for the House.
  I would like to extend gratitude to the Financial Secretary for providing the House with the White Paper containing the Treasury Minute in reply to the Committee's Reports. Those familiar with the normal procedure will know that the Treasury Minute gives the comments of the Government Departments concerned with the Reports and normally comes before the House as an Appendix to the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts. This is in accordance with the normal and proper practice of this House, under which replies to Select Committees go, first, to that Select Committee, and are subsequently published by that Committee. In this case the debate takes place before there was time for the Committee of Public Accounts to meet in this Session and order publication of the Treasury Minute.
  I must, therefore, take the responsibility of having asked the Financial Secretary, for the convenience of the House in the course of this debate, to lay the Treasury Minute as a White Paper. This is a departure from precedent, but I hope that the House will feel that the circumstances justify it. I think it would have been unfair to the Government Departments concerned for the criticisms contained in our Reports to have been before the House without, at the same time, there being before the House the replies and comments made by the Department criticised.
  The custom of having a debate on the P.A.C.'s Report is a relatively new one. The first one in recent years took place on 19th December, 1960, in the rather special circumstances of the P.A.C. Report into the question of guided missiles. That debate was opened by the present Prime Minister, then Chairman

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  of the Committee, and it has been the practice in recent years, though not in every year, to have a debate of this kind on its Report.
  It might be helpful to the House, and also to people outside, if I were to begin by spelling out what it is that the Committee of Public Accounts does, or seeks to do. The strict terms of reference of the Committee are contained in Standing Order No. 79 which reads:
  "There shall be a select committee, to be designated the Committee of Public Accounts, for the examination of the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the Committee may think fit, to consist of not more than 15 members, who shall be nominated at the commencement of every session, and of whom five shall be a quorum. The committee shall have power to send for persons, papers and records, and to report from time to time."
  I should have added, when speaking of the composition of the Committee, that according to long custom, it also contains the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, whom I am very glad to see on the Government Front Bench. Equally according to long precedent, his attendances are restricted to a courtesy visit at the beginning of the Session and on any occasion on which he might feel that the Committee was criticising the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury. As the latter is in my experience a somewhat rare occurrence, so have been in my experience the Financial Secretary's attendances. That is the established practice and a convenient one.
  The Committee has passed a long way in the course of its long life—it celebrated its centenary in 1961—from the bare function virtually of audit or of seeing that the money voted by Parliament was spent in accordance with the way in which it was voted, into considerably wider functions. It now makes what I might describe as an efficiency audit and is concerned very much, as I hope the present Report brings out, with securing that the public, where there is public expenditure involved, secures value for money.
  Indeed, the function goes wider than that because, as appears from the Standing Order I read, the Committee can investigate not only appropriation accounts, but:
  "such other accounts laid before Parliament as the committee may think fit."
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  That includes, for example, the nationalised industries, and our present Report shows that in the last Session we examined the accounts of the Atomic Energy Authority and also that we examined the affairs of the Livingston New Town Corporation in Scotland, to which considerable reference is made in the body of the Report. The actual function, therefore, of the Committee goes a great deal wider and has developed considerably wider than might be judged outside from a bare reading of Standing Order No. 79.
  The Committee is unique among the Select Committees of this House in that it has the help of the Comptroller and Auditor-General and of the Exchequer and Audit department under him. This is a large and very ably staffed department with considerable powers of investigation. The Committee, the House, and the country are all extremely well served by the present Comptroller and Auditor-General, Sir Edmund Compton, an official of the very highest ability, as those who have served with him know well. Our reports to the House are very much on the basis of investigations undertaken throughout the year by the officers of the Exchequer and Audit department. This is of considerable advantage to the Committee.
  The Committee also has a special relationship with Her Majesty's Treasury. The Treasury Officer of Accounts attends practically all the sittings of the Committee at which evidence is taken, and the present Treasury Officer of Accounts, Mr. Platt, has given extremely good service to the Committee, which is very much indebted to this able and courteous officer for his help.
  I apologise to those of my colleagues who are present, but this might be of some general interest. The Committee proceeds on the basis of the material laid before it by the Comptroller and Auditor General and, of course, on the experience of its members, which is very wide, to examine the accounting officers of the Departments concerned, who are generally but not always the Permanent Secretaries, and such other officers as may accompany them, and the accounting officers of other bodies whose accounts we are examining.
  Having been Chairman of the Committee for only one year, I do not think

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  there is any immodesty in my saying that the authority with which the Committee's Reports are thought to be invested is in very large measure due to the fact that our conclusions, whether right or wrong, are based on evidence given before us, evidence which we subsequently, as this volume shows, publish. So that it is possible for any who disagree with any conclusion to see the evidence on which we came to that conclusion. All the evidence is published virtually in full, although it is our practice not to publish such items as could have security implications, or in such cases where there would be commercial disadvantage to the Government and the State. Apart from that, the overwhelming bulk of the evidence is published, and it is open to the House and public opinion outside to consider aye or no whether they agree with the conclusions to which my colleagues and I came on the evidence before us.
  The four Reports are embodied in one substantial volume. They are, the Special Report, which is largely formal; the First and Second Reports, with which I do not think I need trouble the House; and the main Report, which is the Third Report and occupies the whole of the volume from page XIX. The result of my attempting to deal with all the matters which we dealt with in the course of the year would be that I should talk out my own Amendment. That, perhaps it would not surprise the House to know, is not my intention. What I should like to do is to pick out quite arbitrarily at my own discretion—I have not consulted my colleagues about this—four or five items in this Report on which I personally should like to comment.
  I hope that the House will not feel if as Chairman I do—that I am indicating in any way any degree of relative importance or unimportance of any other of the items. It is simply that it would be of assistance to the House if I commented on some of the more important and some of the less important. By not mentioning any of the others, I am not indicating a view of myself or of my colleagues as to any lack of importance.
  The first I refer to is one of the references to the General Post Office which appear, in particular, in paragraphs
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  139 to 140 of the published Report. The item itself runs from paragraph 138 to paragraph 147, but the particular issue which I have in mind and invite the attention of the House to arises in its sharpest form in paragraphs 139 to 140. The reference is to what is called colloquially "the ring"—or the agreement, as the Report refers to it—under which the Post Office obtains a proportion of its requirements from contractors who are parties to an agreement, and a rather limited proportion from contractors who are not. The current agreement provides that 25 per cent. of telephone apparatus and 10 per cent. of exchange equipment may be so obtained.
  In 1963–64 supplies ordered under these reservation clauses by means of competitive tender amounted to £l·9 million for telephone apparatus and £270,000 for exchange equipment. It is therefore clear that the large bulk of this equipment within this sphere was produced within what I have described as "the ring". We therefore say in paragraph 140:
  "In view of the large savings obtained by competitive contracts under the provisions of the reservation clauses, Your Committee enquired whether it was possible to extend the field of competitive purchase and whether the prices obtained by competition cast doubt on the validity of the prices negotiated under the bulk supply agreements."
  If hon. Members look at the evidence on which that is based, they will see that in respect of purchases outside the ring prices were considerably lower. Explanations were given by the officers who represent the Post Office, but it seemed to me, as I think it did to the Committee, to be the fact that whatever the justification for this arrangement—this has gone on for a great many years—it has probably involved the Post Office in higher expenditure than is necessary in respect of equipment. We expressed the hope that when the Post Office next negotiates one of these agreements it will obtain a great deal more freedom in respect of freedom of this kind. I note that the Treasury minute is not unsympathetic to this point of view and that it is, as I understand it, the intention to bear this in mind when a new agreement is negotiated some years hence.
  However, this is not only an important issue in itself. It also has a bearing on the general line taken by the Committee in respect of a number of subjects. It was felt in

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  respect, for example, of certain Admiralty contracts that freer competition and a wider choice by the purchasing departments might result in the public obtaining better value for money and better equipment at lower prices. Hon. Members who have been good enough to study our Report will see that this theme runs through a number of the examinations of witnesses which took place before the Committee. I thought, however, that the question of equipment for the General Post Office raised this matter particularly sharply and that, while not attempting in any way to cast any particular criticism on the Post Office, this was perhaps one of the best illustrations to use in indicating a line of thought and development which I hope the present Committee will pursue and which I hope that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury will exercise his powers to secure that the Government follow.
  I come to the universities and to a very important issue indeed which arises on them. The paragraphs I have particularly in mind are paragraphs 83–85 of our Report. This refers to an old issue on which I would like to give one or two general thoughts to the House. It has been the practice for a long time for the Comptroller and Auditor General not to have access to the books of the universities and although the Committee, as will he evident from our Report, had a great deal of material before it in respect of the universities, that material was mainly hased on information supplied by the Department of Education and Science and by the University Grants Committee.
  The argument for the exclusion of the Comptroller and Auditor General from the books of the universities is, to sum it up in a sentence, that it would involve an interference with academic freedom. That is a serious matter and it has been the view for a great many years that that argument has sufficient force in it to justify the making of an exception in the case of the books of the universities to the normal practice in relation to voted moneys. No one would lightly wish to interfere with so long-established a practice. On the other hand, the whole aspect of the universities problem has changed since this practice developed. When this began, public provision for the universities was on a very modest scale and was
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  made directly, through the University Grants Committee, by the Treasury. It is today on a very large scale, running to over £100 million a year, as the Financial Secretary will confirm, and it is administered, not directly by the Treasury, but as part of the wide-ranging responsibilities of the Department of Education and Science.
  That at least constitutes a new circumstance, and that new circumstance caused my Committee to indicate that, while we certainly had not the time to go into this great issue properly last Session, we hoped that a future Committee, because we are only a sessional Committee and had so to express it, would be prepared to take this matter further.
  There is a very pertinent passage in paragraph 35 of our Report:
  "In recent years the Comptroller and Auditor General has had access to the books and records of the Colleges of advanced technology and the Scottish central institutions. This access will cease when these bodies attain university status. There have been no complaints from these bodies on grounds of academic freedom against the scrutiny either of the Comptroller and Auditor General or of the Committee of Public Accounts. Sufficient time has elapsed since the matter was last considered to justify re-opening the question whether the case still holds good for exempting the large and growing area of expenditure on universities from accountability to Parliament."
  Then the suggestion follows that a future Committee should investigate this.
  No one—let me say this bluntly—on the Committee or, I suggest, in the House, would tolerate for a moment interference with the academic freedom of the universities. Let us be absolutely plain about that. The question which arises is whether to allow the C. & A.G. to see the books and the P.A.C. to investigate the accounts would have that effect. It is significant that other institutions of education of very high status have been subject to this control and have not in fact found any diminution in their academic freedom. Curiously enough, the elevation of these institutions to higher status will take them out of the purview of the C. & A.G. and of the Public Accounts Committee and so add to the area which is not investigated.
  I do not want to pre-judge the views of a future Committee and I accept that there were powerful considerations which moved our predecessors for many years

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  against premitting any such investigation. All that my Committee has said so far is that this should be looked at again, and it would be very wrong of me to seek to pre-judge in any way what when we have the evidence before us we will conclude.
  I make only one general observation. It is probable that if a change were to be decided on there would have to be some understanding, some constitutional convention, governing the matter and it would have to be made absolutely clear that it would be considered no business of the Public Accounts Committee or, I would say with respect, of the House to question in what precise direction of academic effort the universities expended their money. Whether the study, for example, of Beowulf at Oxford should or should not continue is a matter that I would have thought should be left to Oxford to decide. It is certainly a matter on which I and, I would imagine, many members of my Committee would hardly feel competent to offer intelligent comment. There would have to be some understanding that there would be no interference of that kind.
  Whether a future Committee will recommend such a change to the House, and whether a future Chairman will stand at this Dispatch Box announcing it, I do not know. The only reason why I mention it today is that it is an important issue on which I think it would be useful that, before the Public Accounts Committee again considers the matter, opinion outside and, above all, opinion in the universities should have an opportunity to express itself and to crystallise. That would be a useful process and I for my part will not seek to pre-judge the issue. May I, with great respect, express the hope that the House will be disposed similarly not to do so. I hope that the House will not think that it is a mark of my inherent conservatism, spelt with a small "c" on this occasion, that I approach the question of changing the practice of many years with a certain measure of caution.
  I come now to a very different issue—that of the provision of service facilities on motorways. This is dealt with in paragraphs 36–42 of the Report. There is a comment on it in the Treasury Minute in reply. The issue seemed to my Com-
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  mittee to be one of ensuring that the public obtained full value for these concessions. As a former Minister of Transport, I am as conscious as any man of the immense cost of motorway construction. On the other hand, concessions for Service stations are very valuable and it was very much the view expressed by my Committee, and the view put to the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Transport when he gave evidence before us, that the approach to this problem should have a strong commercial tinge on the part of the Ministry. We were a little surprised to be told that the highest tenders for these concessions had not been accepted in one or two cases because the Ministry felt that the tenderer would not be able to carry out his bargain on those terms.
  I do not want—because they were properly excluded from the Report—to give the names of the tenderers concerned, but I assure the House that they were all organisations of great solidity and substance, and it seemed to my Committee that the Ministry had not been as zealous as it might have been in pursuing the desirability of maintaining a high return to the public. There was some discussion on the important issue of the extent to which these payments should take the form of a fixed rent or a royalty basis. The leases are long—in most cases for 50 years—and, judging without pessimism and without reflecting on the economic policy of any Government, it seemed reasonable to assume that over such a long period there would be a certain measure of inflation.
  It seemed to the Committee therefore that greater emphasis might be placed on the royalty basis. It seemed plain that traffic would go on increasing and that such a basis is a better hedge against inflation than a fixed payment with a long lease of this sort. I was disappointed with the Department's reply in the Treasury Minute, but I hope that it gives some indication that there will be exercised in future a greater determination to obtain an adequate return to the public for valuable concessions in respect of a very large measure of public expenditure.
  We had a considerable discussion on the defence side, but I propose to refer only to a number of items affecting the Army. I think that the impression was formed by my colleagues, and I confirm

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  it, that in some respects financial control in the Army Department requires improvement. Admittedly, those who formerly served in subordinate capacities in the Army may be rather surprised at that, since our impression at that time was that financial control in the Army was rigid to the point of ruthlessness, but the cases with which we dealt show that there is here a field for some improvement.
  I should like to take quickly one or two of these items. Work in Hong Kong is dealt with in paragraphs 107 to 114 of the Report. The ordering of accommodation stores for a hospital in Hong Kong before Treasury approval had been given for the construction of the hospital indicates, and I think it was generally admitted, some lapse in the system of control. The question of the soldiers' married quarters at Dills Corner, Hong Kong, is more difficult, since it is the perennial difficulty in all Service matters that forecasts of operational needs continue to change. On the other hand, it is clear that some money might have been saved if a little more foresight had been exercised.
  There is the matter in paragraph 119 of the arrangement made with the German Government in respect of what I can call our contribution to the German industrial injuries scheme for German civilian personnel employed by British Forces in Germany. This had the effect that payment was made in advance on a substantially larger scale than necessary to provide the Germans with an interest-free loan across the exchanges, for some time exceeding £1 million. The arrangement is one for which the Committee felt little enthusiasm since it involves British provision of money for a scheme in which we have no control over claims. It was agreed in discussion that the Treasury should have been brought into this matter at an earlier stage.
  The manufacture of the new machine gun and tripod is dealt with in paragraphs 120 to 125 of our Report. Here again there was a considerable increase in expenditure over what was estimated. It certainly appeared that the cost of manufacturing this weapon at the Enfield factory was a great deal higher than the cost if it were purchased from the manufacturers. I note that in the Treasury Minute there is apparently no question
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  at present, without prior reference to the Treasury, of the resumption of manufacture of this weapon at Enfield.
  On the other hand, having been slightly critical of some aspects of the Army Department, I am glad to see from the Treasury Minute that the Department has accepted our recommendation that it should consider the possibility of using commercial types of 10-ton vehicles instead of manufacturing a special type for the Army. On the evidence before us it appeared that the commercial type would cost about half the cost of the specially manufactured Army model. I am glad to see also that the Army Department has accepted our suggestion that it should consult, in particular, the oil and construction companies which use heavy vehicles of this kind in conditions probably at least as strenuous as those to which many Army vehicles are exposed and in at least as difficult parts of the world. There may be some economy to be obtained in this way. I should like to express my pleasure at the attitude which the Army Department has adopted towards this matter.
  In paragraphs 18 to 27 of the Report we deal with the Concord aircraft contract. The only point on which I should like to comment is that we were told that this agreement is likely to be the prototype of other agreements for the internationally shared manufacture of aircraft. This being so, its terms are more important even than its scale alone demands. My Committee was very much concerned with one point. We were told that in order to maintain roughly a balanced cost between the two countries some contracts for certain items were placed not necessarily with the best subcontractor but with the one who would most easily bring the general cost as between one country and another into balance. This may be a reasonable way of sharing the cost, but it has certain rough edges if it is to be the general practice as between countries in respect of future shared aircraft construction and I am glad to see that the Department has said that it will enter into discussion with the French—in my view very properly—on the question of this method of dealing with the problem.
  Those are the particular matters on which I thought that I might be of assistance to the House and of which,

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  no doubt, the Financial Secretary has taken note. However, I should not like to leave a false impression with the House. The Committee of Public Accounts, in the nature of things, has the duty of investigating matters where it seems, prima facie, that something, great or small, has gone wrong. Properly and naturally, the Comptroller and Auditor General and his staff draw our attention not to what is going right but to what has gone wrong or may have gone wrong. The fact that I have put to the House a number of examples where, in our view, improvement could be effected—and I am glad to say that in some cases it is being effected—we were told in evidence that remedial steps were taken in many cases some time ago—should not blind us or people outside to the fact that these are clearly exceptional.
  No one who has served at the Treasury—and I am sure that the Financial Secretary will agree with me here—or who has been Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee is complacent about the loss or waste of public money. In view of the present level of taxation, all concerned with the spending of public money have a special duty to make sure that it is not wasted. On the other hand, when one considers the scale of Government expenditure, the many thousands of millions of pounds expended under these different heads, the sums about which we have reported, and about which it was our duty to report, are perhaps not very large. I do not say that in any attempt to induce the Financial Secretary other than to conduct the control of the Department with the vigilance which his office demands. I am sure that he does that. I say it lest the fact that I have made a speech dealing with criticisms should induce hon. Members or anybody outside to get a wrong sense of proportion.
  On the whole, we can be very proud of our system of financial control in this country. We can certainly be extremely proud of the integrity of our Civil Service. We can be reassured that if, through errors of judgment or delay, some money has been wasted—and I suppose that for all our efforts some money will always be wasted—there was not a hint throughout our investigation of any irregularity of any other kind. When one considers
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  how detailed are our examinations, that can be a matter of very considerable reassurance to the House.
  I promised that I would not attempt to cover all the ground or to talk out my Amendment. I must, therefore, redeem that promise and resume my seat.
  4.33 p.m.
  Mr. Tam Dalyell: With the exception of yourself, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I find myself, incredibly, as the longest toothed member of the Public Accounts Committee present, having served under my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Member for Sowerby (Mr. Houghton). Therefore, perhaps I could take it on myself, on behalf of the Committee, to express our thanks for the non-partisan way in which the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) presided over us and to say, without being unduly pompous, that he measures up to the standards which we expect from a Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. He certainly has gone to great lengths to do his homework—not that I normally say such things to former Cabinet Ministers. Anyway, the right hon. Gentleman will know what I mean.
  I echo the remarks of the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames about Sir Edmund Compton, who is a great public servant, and the work which his Department does for the Committee. I should also like to acknowledge Dr. Taylor's work as Clerk of the Committee and that of Mr. Platt, who represents the Treasury during our deliberations.
  I wish to draw attention to the Treasury Minute on the Scottish new town of Livingston and to echo what it says, namely, that
  "Departments should fully utilise the existing arrangements for the interchange of information about contractors and have again drawn their existence to the attention of all the Departments which are involved in the letting of public contracts."
  The case of the Livingston New Town Development Corporation represents one example of the way in which this Committee is really effective. All the hours which we spend on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons, I suspect that we do not grudge because, at the end of the day, here is an instance of Westminster having some effect in Whitehall.

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  There is one item which I wish to raise, particularly as the Minister responsible is present. I refer to the question of the universities and the working of the University Grants Committee. I realise that this afternoon is not the time to go into controversial views on how the University Grants Committee might be reformed. I have not given him notice of this question, but I should like to ask the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames whether he would care to interrupt my speech to say how he thinks that the Public Accounts Committee should proceed in considering whether we should investigate university expenditure. He said in his speech that the universities should have a chance to put their views on this very controversial topic. I concur with this view. Perhaps the right. hon. Gentleman would care to interrupt me to say what his thinking is on this subject.
  Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: The hon. Gentleman has been good enough to invite me to intervene. I do not think that I can help him very much, because the new Committee for this Session has not yet met and it would be presumptuous of me, before discussion with my colleagues, to outline even tentatively a line of approach to the practical handling of this difficult matter. I hope that my own observations this afternoon, if reported, will start some discussion on this matter which I am sure would be of help to the Public Accounts Committee when it considers this matter, as no doubt it will. However, as I say, it would be presumptuous of me from this Box to lay down procedure for the Committee. The Committee must consider the matter itself, and I would rather await the advice and guidance of my colleagues on the Committee before committing myself to anything definite.
  Mr. Dalyell: May I then turn, finally, to a subject which may not come within the purview of the Public Accounts Committee as it at present exists but which is certainly of national concern. I refer to the increase in costs of research. Our understanding is that over the last five years the cost of research has increased annually by about 15 per cent. To use the picturesque example of the noble Lord, Lord Bowden, if this went on until the year A.D. 2,000 the entire gross national product of Great Britain would be
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  involved in research. This is clearly an absurdity. Therefore, somehow or other, we must, rationally one hopes, consider the matter of increasing research costs. The question then arises of the machinery by which we should do this.
  Perhaps the greatest difficulty is establishing any criterion by which the usefulness or otherwise of pure research can be judged. Much research is worth while for its own sake, but, clearly, we cannot go on expanding to the absurd point at which anything like a high proportion of the gross national product is involved in research. Therefore, either consideration of the increasing costs of research must come within the scope of a Select Committee of this House—perhaps a subcommittee of the Public Accounts Committee—or there must be a reform of the University Grants Committee.
  I should like to see a change made in the University Grants Committee so that for the expensive sciences at any rate there would be a small executive body of scientists seconded for two or three years dealing with expenditure on physics, chemistry, engineering and biology on a national basis. This would get rid of the absurd situation whereby one of the new sciences, perhaps developing rather on the fringe of one of the established sciences, has to compete for cash inside one university, possibly against the claims of mediæval French or of some other science or of mathematics. Surely, allocation of money between sciences should be done on the basis of a national decision, and this could in turn perhaps be done by a small number of people seconded for two or three years with a live participation in a particular science.
  I offer these thoughts because when, for instance, those responsible for C.E.R.N. came before the Public Accounts Committee, or latterly when the universities have come before the Public Accounts Committee, this has emerged as a considerable problem and one which is worthy of our attention. I hope that when we discuss the rôle of the Public Accounts Committee in looking at the universities, the problem of the expensive sciences will be gone into. It might be much more meaningful in our deliberations if we could follow the suggestion of the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames and have evidence from the universities produced

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  before us before we reach any kind of decision.
  4.42 p.m.
  Mr. John Biffen: I should like to echo the words of the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) about the felicitous chairmanship under which the Committee of Public Accounts operated last Session. The hon. Member has referred to himself as being the doyen of members and I am the most junior. It would, therefore, perhaps be fitting if I were to join him in saying with what pleasure we served under the chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) and how much we appreciated the work that was done to enable us to conduct our operations by the Comptroller and Auditor General and his staff and by Dr. Taylor, and the advice that was tendered by Mr. Platt.
  I should like to make a brief comment on one specific item which is referred to in the comments of the Treasury on the Committee's Report. It is on page 2 of the Treasury Minute in reference to the Concord project. This was touched upon by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston-upon-Thames and to some extent follows the remarks made by the hon. Member for West Lothian on the problems of research.
  The Treasury comment is that
  "While it is accepted that further studies in this field might be useful, it would not seem appropriate to undertake them on a purely national basis."
  The Treasury was referring to a suggestion to examine further the advantages and disadvantages of the cost-sharing system which was operating in the Concord project. We learn that
  "It is proposed … to invite the French authorities to participate at an appropriate stage in a review of the considerations relevant to the determination of cost-sharing arrangements and the different systems that might be practicable or desirable in particular circumstances."
  If I had arbitrarily to choose any item from the Treasury Minute and from the work of the Public Accounts Committee last Session, I would choose the examination of the Concord project, very largely for the reasons advanced this afternoon by my right hon. Friend that it could be the forerunner of a series of arrangements
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  which concern multinational work on large, complex technological projects.
  Very often, one is to some extent blackmailed by the argument that this is a great venture and pioneering work and that to criticise it would throw in jeopardy the whole future of Anglo-French relations. That kind of blackmail argument is one which must be guarded against with considerable vigilance. If the result of the Concord project is a complete inability to control costs, that project will not have laid the foundations for Anglo-French co-operation but will have laid the foundation for increasing recrimination between the British and French Governments as costs career out of hand subject to no meaningful control. Therefore, the recommendation made by the Public Accounts Committee could have real relevance for future relations, not merely in the procurement of aircraft, but in a great deal of other fairly advanced technological work.
  My anxiety on this point is sustained when one reads the whole story of the genesis and development of the Concord project. It seemed to me from the evidence which is available for all to read that some fairly primitive market research was conducted in a purely economic sense. I am still not clear whether the project was being developed for commercial reasons or for, as it were, technological investment in the future. I suspect that the argument that there will be fall-out from the project—I gather that if one is wildly contemporary, one now uses the term "spin-off"—becomes the ace of trumps and nothing can be advanced against it. I am highly suspicious of this situation.
  If a project which purports to be a commercial project is advanced on commercial grounds and it is argued that incidentally there are other benefits, particularly if they pertain to advanced technology, which is supposed to be fairly good in the arts of measurement, it is not unreasonable to ask for these advantages to be measured. The difficulty is compounded when more than one Government Department is involved—when, for example, there are two spending and two controlling Departments, namely, the Ministry of Aviation and its French counterpart and the French and the British Treasuries. This seems to me to be an acute dilemma.

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  Clearly, from the kind of developments of which we hear nowadays concerning the aircraft industry, whether we are pro-Common Market or not, there are indications that a great many of these developments will be European in character. This trend is likely to increase rather than to diminish. The Public Accounts Committee may feel that it has a special responsibility in this sphere because, for better or for worse, the whole Concord project came very much at the heart of political controversy about a year ago. One would hope that in the blinding heat of political controversy the crucial questions which are posed by developments of this kind have not been overlooked. Therefore, I shall look forward with interest to see what future revelations may come from an examination by the Public Accounts Committee of the Concord project in the light of the evidence that was gleaned last Session and in the light of the Treasury Minute.
  4.48 p.m.
  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Niall MacDermot): I rise to reply to the debate slightly earlier than I had anticipated. This is, I believe, the fifth debate on Reports of the Public Accounts Committee. It is the first one during the period of the present Government. The position last year was that as the main concern of the Committee had been with the Ferranti missile contract, which had been the subject of a separate debate, it was not felt that there was an occasion for a special debate on the public Accounts Committee Report.
  In any event, this occasion is also of significance as it is the first debate on a Report of the Public Accounts Committee under the chairmanship of the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter), to whom all hon. Members who have spoken have paid their just tributes. As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out, I am a member of the Committee, but I am a little peculiar in that I am an honorific and titular member, and so it is only through the printed word that I have been able to see how the right hon. Gentleman has maintained the very high standard set by his predecessors, to whom he paid tribute, and also has maintained the non-partisan approach which has existed for some time in the Committee.
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  The right hon. Gentleman is well qualified for his position. If he will allow me to say so, he has the mark of Cain on his brow because he has been a Treasury Minister. He was kind enough to point out to me on the first occasion that I stood at the Dispatch Box as Financial Secretary that I should find that I would never be quite the same again. I do not know whether he has yet recovered sufficiently to the point where he has learned how to say "Yes" again. If he has not, I can assure him that I am reliably informed that Treasury Ministers do, in the fullness of time, recover their full powers of speech.
  The transfer from the Treasury to the Public Accounts Committee certainly is not that of gamekeeper turned poacher but almost that of gamekeeper turned bishop, because my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister when speaking in his former Public Accounts Committee capacity referred to the holy inquisition of the Public Accounts Committee as compared with the secular arm of the Treasury. Be that as it may, there is a very close relationship between the Committee and the Treasury. Apart from my own membership, the Treasury Officer of Accounts, to whom the right hon. Gentleman paid a very generous tribute, is present technically as a witness but is there to render what assistance the Treasury can to the Committee.
  In general, the effect of the work of the Committee is much greater than perhaps appears on the surface. It is rather like the traditional iceberg. The reported minutes of proceedings and the Report itself of the Committee are the visible part. The invisible part which has perhaps by far the greatest effect is what is often called the deterrent effect of the Committee. I must say that I had not been long in the Treasury before I learned the effect in Whitehall of the words, "I hardly think that the Public Accounts Committee would approve of that". There are times when even a Treasury Minister may be tempted to try and break or stretch the rules, but the Public Accounts Committee is always there to keep us on the straight and narrow path.
  What makes the Committee so effective in its work is the long arm and the all-seeing eye of the Comptroller and Auditor General and his staff. To him again the right hon. Gentleman and other

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  hon. Members following him paid a generous tribute, in which I should like to join. He is a unique official in our constitution in being an officer of the House removable only on a Motion of both Houses of Parliament, and he has very considerable powers.
  Next year we are to celebrate the centenary of the Exchequer and Audit Department and, if imitation be the sincerest form of flattery, it seems that we are to pay a great compliment to him and his Department if the House sees fit to introduce legislation on the lines of the White Paper that has already been produced with proposals for a Parliamentary Commissioner, because it will not have escaped the attention of hon. Members that many of the proposals contained in that White Paper are modelled on the experience of the work of the Comptroller and Auditor General. The suggestion is that the House should bring into being a new officer of Parliament to assist us in our work and particularly to assist back benchers in their work as Members of Parliament in relation to the Executive. I say no more about that now. Perhaps we will have cause on another occasion.
  As I say, the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee have preserved their nonparty character. There was perhaps for some hon. Members an added incentive to do that this year because, although it is the first Report during the period of the present Administration, the expenditure which it has been examining was incurred under the previous one. The right hon. Gentleman must at times have found himself in a somewhat curious position in being the holy inquisitor on expenditure which he had already had a measure of responsibility for controlling at an earlier stage. I do not know if he felt himself in the position of the barrister in his dream of the hunting of the Snark. He was confronted with the Snark not only as prosecuting counsel and defending counsel but, when the time came for the summing-up, found that he was also the judge. The right hon. Gentleman will remember that on that occasion the Snark summed-up teh case so well that "it came to far more than the witnesses ever had said." It would not be becoming for me to suggest that at any point the Public
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  Accounts Committee could have achieved that in its Report. However, perhaps I am getting away from the subject of the debate, and I will now turn more to the contents of the Report.
  The field of the Public Accounts Committee's activities is continually widening. With its references to the position of the universities, the Committee has itself drawn attention to the possibility of further widening and this is the result of the great increase in the scope of public expenditure.
  In 1861 when the Committee was first set up on a Motion of Mr. Gladstone, the Appropriation Accounts totalled £69 million. For the year which the Committee has been considering, the sum was £6,003 million, which is not quite a hundredfold increase, but no doubt that centenary will also be achieved before long.
  "The object of the Committee would be to revise the accounts of the public expenditure after they had gone through the regular process of examination in the hands of the executive Government."
  Those are Mr. Gladstone's words when proposing the original Motion. As he said on a later occasion,
  "The Government had sought to ascertain what hon. Members were best qualified to undertake these duties, which were of a dry and repulsive kind."
  The rôle of the Committee is not to seek to control the level of public expenditure or its allocation between Departments but to see, as has been pointed out by the right hon. Gentleman, firstly that the moneys voted have been properly applied in accordance with accounting propriety and secondly that there has been effective and efficient financial control to see that the public gets the best possible value for money.
  In the early days of the Committee, its concern was principally with matters of accounting propriety, but nowadays increasingly the Committee is concerned with problems of efficient financial control. That is exemplified by the fact that, in its Report, out of the 22 items dealt with, 20 of them are dealing with such questions.
  I do not wish to detain the House by seeking to comment at length on these matters because, as the right hon. Gentleman has pointed out, we took the step

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  of laying the Treasury Minute in the form of a White Paper in time for the debate, as the Committee has not yet had time to comment on it in the ordinary way. Reference has been made to the Minute.
  May I first offer an apology on behalf of the Stationery Office for the error in the binding of the Report as it first appeared? I can assure the House that I was sufficiently diligent myself to have discovered that fact without anyone else pointing it out to me. The offending edition was withdrawn as early as possible, and properly bound copies are now available. I apologise that this should have occurred.
  Hon. Members have raised a number of specific matters on which I should like to comment briefly.
  First, the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames dealt with the passage in the Report and the Treasury Minute referring to the Post Office procedure for ordering telephones and various equipment. The House will have noticed that in the Treasury Minute the reply is in the name of the Post Office. This is because the matters with which it deals are solely within the scope and responsibility of the Post Office. The House will have noticed that in the reply my right hon. Friend and his Department say that they will take the views of the Committee fully into account in reviewing the procedure when the present contracts fall in. The only general comment that I would like to make on that in response to what the right hon. Gentleman said is to confirm that it is the Treasury's view that generally we favour competition unless there are good and specific advantages to be gained from non-competitive contracts.
  The question of the universities was raised in a very constructive way by the right hon. Gentleman. The Committee itself said that it would like to look further into this matter, and the House will not expect me to say a great deal about this much-debated, difficult, and thorny question. It is one which has exercised various Public Accounts Committees and also the Treasury and other Ministers in previous Administrations.
  We all have two common objects in view: first, to ensure that here, as elsewhere, there is the greatest possible value
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  for money, and, secondly, to ensure that academic freedom is maintained. The question is how we can achieve those objects and what is the most effective way of doing it; and we must not allow our judgment to be clouded one way or the other by emotive phrases.
  There is no doubt that we want to see that the most up-to-date techniques of control and management are employed. This is not always an easy matter, but real progress has been made in this field, and it does not follow—like the right hon. Gentleman I do not want to pre-judge the question at all—that these things would be better achieved by making the University Grants Committee accountable to Parliament, or that they ought to be gained—if they would be so gained—by any restriction of academic freedom.
  The last independent body to examine this question was the Robbins Committee which went into the matter very fully, and in particular studied the practice abroad and compared our practice with that of other countries. In the result, it attached the greatest importance to the maintenance of the existing freedom from detailed accountability. This advice was accepted by the previous Administration, and remains the basis of the present Government's policy. Clearly any change in the matter would have very far-reaching effects, and the House will not expect me to comment one way or the other. I do not want to give the impression either that I am slamming doors, or opening them. I wish to leave the door where it is, without specifying too precisely what that point is.
  The right hon. Gentleman suggested that as a result of the Committee as it were opening up this question there might be an opportunity for opinions to be expressed outside, for the matter to be discussed, and that this might help people in a dispassionate way, and without pre-judgment, to look again at the question. I am sure that we all welcome this in the spirit in which the right hon. Gentleman proposed it.
  Mr. Dalyell: Would the Financial Secretary accept that ever since the publication of the Robbins Report there has been quite a change in the climate of informed opinion on this issue, particularly in the serious magazines and journals

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  which deal with university affairs? In the light of this, can we take it that the Treasury will lend its good offices to make it possible for the Public Accounts Committee to follow up the suggestion made by the right hon. Member for Kingston-upon-Thames (Mr. Boyd-Carpenter) that at least we should seek university opinion on this?
  Mr. MacDermot: I do not think that it would be right for me to comment on a matter of that kind unless and until there is some official approach from the Committee, nor do I feel disposed to try to express a personal opinion on the state of public opinion on this matter.
  The right hon. Gentleman then turned his attention to the passage in the Report dealing with motorways and the service areas on them, and again he will have noticed that the views of the Committee have been noted on this topic. He expressed the view, which the Committee clearly shared, that the Ministry's approach should have a very strong commercial tinge. I think that the Ministry accepts that there can, and should, be a commercial approach to the fixing of the rent. It also feels that the rent should include a fixed element and the question is one of balance, of deciding the proportion which that element should be in relation to the whole.
  I would like to draw the attention of the House to a matter which is referred to in the Treasury Minute but which, as the evidence did not go into it, was not brought to the attention of the Committee, and that is that there are occasions when there is a positive advantage in having a fixed element in the contract, not only on grounds of ordinary prudence and caution in ensuring that there will be at least a certain return on the capital expenditure which the Ministry has incurred in fixed standings, and so on—I think this was dealt with in the evidence—but also because there have been occasions when contractors have been somewhat slow and dilatory in their work of getting the service area built up and getting it functioning. The advantage of having a fixed element in the rent is that it provides a real incentive to the contractor to get on with the job and to instal the service area as promptly as he can. I think that this is a matter of
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  judgment, and in exercising its judgment on it the Ministry will have the benefit of the views expressed by the Committee.
  The right hon. Gentleman then drew attention to a number of specific points in respect of which the Committee said that waste or extravagance in one form or another had occured in the Army Department. I do not want to comment on them except to say a few words on the very involved question of the German industrial injuries scheme, which I have sought to understand. I think that the difficulty arose over a decision which was taken by all the sending countries to seek to make a capital payment in respect of certain matters which, under the German practice, would be dealt with in the form of a pension or annuity. Later, the sending countries reversed that decision, and it was essentially this which led to the accumulation. The reversal of the decision did not take place until 1963, so this accumulation across the exchanges of more than £1 million occurred as a result of a decision which was taken jointly by the three sending countries and the opportunity to recover it arose only about three years later. I understand that the balance will have been reduced virtually to zero by the end of this year.
  On the question of the machine gun and tripod, I confirm the Treasury Minute. There will be no automatic resumption of production at Enfield. This matter will be examined when the time comes. As for the question of the 10-ton vehicles, I again confirm that consultations with both the oil and construction companies have already begun, and that certain commercial vehicles have been acquired. Tests are shortly to take place.
  One or two hon. Members referred to the question of the Concord. The right hon. Gentleman drew attention to one passage in the evidence which suggested that sub-contracts for the Concord were not necessarily placed with the best subcontractors but with those that would most easily bring the general costs into balance. I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman would not want to give a misleading impression which might undermine confidence in a matter as important as this. I concede that that can be an element in the decision, but it is only fair to point out that when the accounting officer gave evidence on the

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  matter, at Questions 660 and 661, and was asked to say how these two factors related to each other—that is to say, the requirement of efficiency and the requirement of achieving a balance as between the countries—his answer was:
  "One would hope to be able to reconcile the two factors, but ultimately it must be the division of work as between the two countries. I hope that in hardly any cases will there be a sharp distinction between the two factors you have mentioned."
  The next question asked him whether the predominant consideration was to keep the costs as easily divided as possible rather than the efficient discharge of the sub-contract, and he replied, "Yes". All that I wish to stress is that in practice these matters sometimes tend to work themselves out more happily and more favourably than might appear from a purely theoretical and analytical approach.
  The hon. Member of Oswestry (Mr. Biffen) referred to the specific point of the Public Account Committee's recommendation that an independent investigation should be made of the sharing system provided for in the 1962 Agreement. I agree with him that this was one of the most important suggestions contained in the Report. The Government accept that a study of this problem would be useful, but they do not think that it would be appropriate, in a collaborative project of this kind, to undertake it on a purely national basis. They therefore propose to invite the French authorities to participate, at an appropriate stage, in a review of the advantages and disadvantages of the different possible cost-sharing systems.
  In this connection the House will remember that other important co-operative projects have now been entered into with the French Government since the Concord agreement was concluded, and that lessons should be learned from these. It is clearly in our interests as well as in the interests of the French to compare the different projects to see
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  what lessons are to be learned from them. Under the Concord agreement there is an agreement to share the work, each country paying for the costs of the work of its own country. Therefore, it is for each country solely to devise and be responsible for the control of the work in its own country, because each has a common interest in keeping the costs as low as posssible.
  Under some of the other arrangements, while there has been an aim at sharing the work there has been an additional agreement about sharing the costs. Each country pays not only 75 per cent. of its own costs but also 25 per cent. of the costs of the other country. These are the sort of different arrangements which should be studied and compared, and we shall learn what lessons we can from them. That is what we propose to do.
  I leave the detailed comments there and conclude by welcoming and agreeing with the general comments made by the right hon. Gentleman at the end of his speech on the general management of public expenditure. As he says, it is the function of the Public Accounts Committee to find fault, to criticise and to point out what is going wrong. The result of this exercise over the year, while drawing attention to many useful points, has been to leave the right hon. Gentleman and, I hope, the Committee, with the general impression that we have a well-proven system of financial control, which is supported by a Civil Service of the highest integrity.
  Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
  Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
  Main Question again proposed.
  Mrs. Harriet Slater (Lord Commissioner of the Treasury): I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
  Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
  Committee tomorrow.

  COUNTY COURTS JURISDICTION
  5.17 p.m.
  The Attorney-General (Sir Elwyn Jones): I beg to move,
  That the County Courts Jurisdiction Order, 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 22nd November, be approved.
  This Order increases from £400 to £500 the jurisdiction of the county courts in actions founded on contract or tort and actions for money recoverable by Statute. It makes the necessary consequential amendments in the County Courts Act, 1959, and the Solicitors Act, 1957. The House will not need me to remind it that there has been a substantial fall in the value of money since 1938, when the upper limit of the jurisdiction of county courts in the actions that I have mentioned was fixed at £200. Taking the value of the £ in 1938 to be 20s., in 1955 it was worth 7s. 10½d. and now it is worth only 6s.
  The effect of this fall in the value of money has been to take away from the jurisdiction of the county courts cases which would formerly have been within their jurisdiction and to place a corresponding burden on the High Court. The problem was looked at in 1955, and in that year Section 1(1) of the County Courts Act raised the limit to £400. Section 1(5) of that Act enabled the jurisdiction of the county court to be further increased to £500 and provided for the necessary consequential provisions to be made by Order in Council, provided a draft Order was laid before Parliament and approved by Resolution of each House. This provision was replaced by Section 192 of the consolidating County Courts Act, 1959, and it is under that Section of that Act that the present Order is made.
  As I have said, the £ of 1938 was worth 7s. 10½d. in 1955 and at present it is worth 6s. The House will readily see that a greater increase than 100 per cent. would have been justified in 1955. Indeed, the jurisdiction would have had to be raised to £666 were it intended that it should keep pace with the decline in the value of the £ since 1938. However, the Administration at that time thought that it was desirable to proceed by stages, so as to give county courts time to absorb any additional work.
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  The increase to £500 now will therefore do little more than restore the jurisdiction of the county courts to what it was in 1955. The House may care to know that it is estimated that the result of this increase of jurisdiction will be about 200 cases more each year to be tried in the county courts.
  I now turn to the details of the Order. Paragraph 1 substitutes £500 for £400 in Sections 39 and 40 of the 1959 Act. Those Sections deal respectively with the jurisdiction of the county court in actions of contract or tort and in actions for money recoverable by Statute. In addition, Paragraph 1 makes several consequential amendments in other provisions of the 1959 Act and of the Solicitors Act, 1957. Perhaps the House will want me to deal briefly with those consequential amendments, although I cannot pretend that it is material for excitement.
  First, in Section 41 of the 1959 Act, which enables a plaintiff to abandon the excess of his claim over £400 in order to bring his action in the county court, £500 is substituted for £400. In Section 44 of the same Act, which enables a defendant to require a county court action for more than £40 to be transferred to the High Court on giving security for the amount claimed and costs not exceeding £450, £550 is substituted for £450.
  In Section 45 of the 1959 Act, which deals with the transfer of an action from the High Court to the county court where the claim does not exceed £400, £500 is substituted. In the important Section 47 of the 1959 Act, which provides that, if a plaintiff in the High Court recovers less than £300 he shall not be entitled to more than county court costs unless the High Court otherwise orders, £400 is substituted for £300.
  In Section 80 of the Act, which enables an infant to sue in a county court for wages not exceeding £400 as if he were of full age, £500 is substituted, in Section 136 of the Act of 1959, which enables an application for the attachment of a debt or for leave to issue execution in respect of a debt not exceeding £400 to be transferred to the county court, £500 is substituted for £400.
  In the entry in the First Schedule to the 1959 Act, which gives the county court jurisdiction under Section 136 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, to receive into court a debt not exceeding £400 where

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  there are conflicting claims to it, £500 is substituted. In Section 33(2) of the Solicitors Act, 1957, which gives the county court jurisdiction to allow an action to be brought out of time for the recovery of a solicitor's charges and to make an order for the taxation of a solicitor's bill on the application of the party chargeable, the solicitor or a third party, where the costs relate to contentious work done in the county court and do not exceed £400, £500 is substituted.
  It is intended that the draft Order should come into force on 1st January, 1966. The Schedule to the Order, as the House will see, contains transitional provisions authorised by Section 192(3) of the 1959 Act. These are modelled on the provisions contained in paragraph 3 of the First Schedule to the County Courts Act, 1955.
  In general, the amendments made by the Order will apply to proceedings begun before, as well as after, 1st January, 1966, but I must emphasise that the amendment made in Section 47 of the Act of 1959—dealing with the provision that if a plaintiff in the High Court recovers less than £300, he shall not be entitled to more than county court costs unless the High Court otherwise orders—and raising the figure to £400 will not apply to proceedings begun before 1st January, 1966. The result is that a plaintiff in an action brought in the High Court before that date who recovers judgment even after that date for a sum exceeding £300 but not exceeding £400 will not be restricted to county court costs.
  Paragraph (5) of the Schedule deals with the effect of the Order on the jurisdiction of the Mayors and City of London courts.
  The Order does not deal with the costs recoverable in cases brought in the county court under this extended jurisdiction. This is a matter for the County Court Rule Committee, which, at its meeting on 19th November, 1965, passed an amendment of Order 47, Rule 21(3) which will enable the registrar, when taxing the costs in such a case, to allow such larger sums as he thinks reasonable in respect of the principal items in scale 4 of the scales of costs.
  That seems to be a reasonable way to meet the problem of costs resulting from
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  the increase in jurisdiction. Accordingly, I commend the Order to the House as a useful and necessary measure.
  5.28 p.m.
  Mr. Peter Thomas: I am sure that the whole House will be grateful to the Attorney-General for his careful and lucid explanation of the Order. I have no doubt that the House will also wish to approve the Order. When the jurisdiction of the county court in actions founded on contract and tort was extended in 1955 from £200 to £400 by the County Courts Act, consideration was then given to whether or not the upper limit should be £500. However, it was then felt that to increase the jurisdiction so considerably at that stage might invite the risk of swamping the county courts with too much extra work, and, possibly, altering their traditional character.
  It was, therefore, decided that the upper limit should be £400, but that that figure should not be inflexible. Also, in case it was felt in future that an increase was justified, Parliament was given the right, by affirmative Resolution, to increase the amount to £500. That is what the Order is about. It is now more than 10 years since that Act came into force and I think it will be agreed that the county courts had responded efficiently and effectively to the increase in jurisdiction that then was obtained.
  The Attorney-General will, I am sure, agree that this increase in jurisdiction in 1955 would have been given much earlier to the county courts if the provisions of the Legal Aid and Advice Act could have been extended to the county courts earlier than was the case. Be that as it may, the case for increasing the jurisdiction to £500 is a strong one and the right hon. and learned Gentleman put that case most fairly as the fall in the value of money and the continuing trend in that direction. That means that this increase in jurisdiction does little more than restore the jurisdiction of the county courts to what it was in 1955. Since the Administration of Justice Act, 1964, many additional county court judges have been appointed and further appointments can be made under this Measure should the need arise.
  I am grateful to the Attorney-General for what he said about costs and the

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  decision of the County Court Rule Committee. County court scales have been out of date for some time. This increase in jurisdiction makes them even more so and while I do not want to say anything more at this stage on this matter, I merely point out that there is an extremely strong case for a review of these scales. It would not be helpful to the House if, at this stage, I went further into the Order, which is justified and for which a case has been made out.
  Mr. Daniel Awdry: I intervene briefly to ask whether the Government have any intention of lifting the figure of jurisdiction beyond £500 in the fairly near future. I realise that this would need legislation but, nevertheless, the question needs to be asked.
  The figure of £500 is, I suggest, far too low for some contracts, bearing in mind the change in the value of money to which the right hon. and learned Gentleman referred. I have had some experience of county court procedure. It is a good procedure because it is quick and fairly cheap for litigants. I am certain that greater use could be made of it. In my part of the world the court lists are by no means over-full and I am therefore sure that more use could be made of the county court.
  To give a typical example, I have had some experience of building disputes—arguments about building contracts. Often the amount in dispute in these cases is over £500 but a little less than £1,000. If these sort of cases could go to the county court instead of the High Court a great deal of help would be given to litigants. Let us face it, going to the High Court today in these cases is a rather long-drawn-out procedure, and there are complicated pleadings which do not arise in the county court. If these sort of building disputes—involving sums of between £500 and £1,000—could go to the county court a great deal of time would be saved.
  In their enthusiasm for law reform, the Government have increased the jurisdiction of the county court and I now ask the Attorney-General to let us know whether there are any intentions in the mind of the Government to increase it still further.
  The Attorney-General: I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Member for Conway (Mr. Peter Thomas) for giving a fair wind to the Order and for his remarks. I can reply briefly to the hon. Member for Chippenham (Mr. Awdry) by saying that I do not think that there is any present intention on the part of the Government to raise the jurisdiction beyond £500. However, this is clearly something which will have to be considered as part of the inquiry recommended by the Law Commission into simplifying the procedure relating to actions for personal injuries. Our minds are certainly not closed to this possibility, but the limit of £500 contained in the Order is all that is presently contemplated.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That the County Court Jurisdiction Order, 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 22nd November, be approved.

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Huntingdon and Peterborough (Amendment) Order 1965, dated 18th November 1965, [copy laid before the House, 25th November] approved.—[Mr. MacColl.]

  RATING OF INDUSTRY (SCOTLAND)
  5.36 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. William Ross): I beg to move,
  That the Rating of Industry (Scotland) Order 1965, dated 16th November, 1965, a copy of which was laid before this House on 18th November, be approved.
  The Local Government (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act, 1963, provided in Section 10 for full re-rating in Scotland at the time of the next revaluation—that is, next year, 1966. It also made special provision to allow the Secretary of State to postpone re-rating by Order if he thought it necessary. When the 1963 Act was going through Parliament the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Argyll (Mr. Noble), made it clear that in his opinion re-rating should not be introduced in 1966 if, after revaluation, the imbalance between industrial valuation and the

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  valuation of other subjects was not substantially redressed—in other words, if the share of the rate burden borne by other classes of property did not increase somewhat and thereby prevent an undue burden falling on industry.
  Before I could make a decision about whether derating of industry should be continued, I had to see the preliminary estimates made by the assessors of the total valuation of the various classes of property in the 1966 valuation, and I am grateful to the assessors for providing this factual information to me at a time when they were hard pressed with the work of revaluation. The provisional estimates for 1966 show that, in fact, the state of imbalance which led to the postponement of rerating in 1966 will not be redressed.
  On the basis of the assessors' estimates, rerating would increase the industrial share of the rate burden from 12·6 per cent. to 20·8 per cent. or, in money terms, from £14 million to £23 million on the 1964–65 figures. The House will agree that this is indeed a staggering increase which would considerably affect the ability of Scottish industry to meet competition. While there is no absolute way of deciding what the fair share of any one class of property is, there are good reasons for saying that this would have given Scottish industry at this particular time an unduly large share of the rate burden.
  But there is more to it than alleviating the absolute burden of rates. There is also the relative position of Scottish industry vis-à-vis industry in England and Wales, which we must always keep in mind. The share of the rate bill in England and Wales paid by industry is at present about 14·8 per cent. while, as I have said, Scottish industry's share if de-rating stopped now would be 20·8 per cent. Derating brings it down to 12 per cent. and, if account is taken of Scottish industry's structure, probably the proportionate burden on manufacturing industry would be about the same in both parts of the country. That is borne out by the investigations of the Scottish Council in relation to particular firms.
  This relation between England and Wales is important because the liability of rates is a marginal but, nevertheless, significant factor in determining the loca-
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  tion of manufacturing industry. The two-thirds increase in the rate bill of Scottish industry would put Scottish industry at a serious disadvantage and greatly discourage the settlement of new industry in Scotland. Therefore, the growth of new enterprise would be slowed down, and we would not wish to do this at a time when we are seeing an expansion and an industrial leaping ahead in Scotland. The position of Scottish industry as compared with industry in England will, therefore, be safeguarded by this Order.
  In considering whether it was right to make the Order, I also had to consider the other classes of property and how they would be affected by revaluation if industrial derating was continued. The most important point is that from the assessors' figures it seems likely that the main increase in valuation will be on commercial subjects as a whole—mainly shops and offices—where there has been considerable and buoyant expansion. As regards domestic ratepayers, the continuance of industrial derating would not lead to a further share of the rate burden, since the assessors' estimates of the 1966 revaluation show that even with derating the share of the rate burden borne by house property—both local authority property and private property—should decrease from 52·3 per cent. to 50·5 per cent.
  The other interest which I had to consider was that of the local authorities. We had full consultation with the local authorities, and they were unanimous that derating would have to be continued for a further period. It is only fair to say that the local authorities impressed on the Government that as a result of this decision they looked to the Government for additional financial help. That is not surprising—it is a fairly natural reaction, but not new—but on this occasion we were able to point out that the Government would later in the Session produce further plans in relation to the rate burden and the relationship between central Government and local government in financial matters. In the long term any Measures which attract industry, so providing additional sources of rating revenue, are, of course, beneficial to local authorities.
  To sum up, this Order is a measure to secure fair treatment for Scottish industry,

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  and to ensure that the efforts of Government and local authorities to assist industry in Scotland—which is so important if we are to be successful in reducing unemployment and in bringing new projects to Scotland—should not be harmed.
  5.43 p.m.
  Mr. Michael Noble: The Secretary of State for Scotland has said that in 1963 it was my view that the position should probably be renewed unless the imbalance which existed had changed. That is still my view, and I am confirmed in it by the figures of the present position that the right hon. Gentleman has given. I think that everyone in Scotland realises that our biggest single problem today is to maintain the impetus that has been started with new industries and expanding industries within Scotland. We are already aware of the high rate burdens that industry has to bear, so that this Order seems to me—and, I am sure, to my hon. Friends—to be just, sensible and right, and this is one of the rather rare occasions when, without any ulterior motives, we can congratulate the Secretary of State on bringing it forward.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Resolved,
  That the Rating of Industry (Scotland) Order 1965, dated 16th November, 1965, a copy of which was laid before this House on 18th November, be approved.

  RATING [MONEY]
  Resolution reported,
  That, for the purposes of any Act of the present Session to make provision for the payment by instalments of rates on dwellings and for the granting of rebates in respect of such rates, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of moneys provided by Parliament—
  (1) of any sums required for making grants to any rating authority equal to three-quarters of the aggregate net amount of any rebates afforded by that authority under the said Act in any financial year in respect of the rates levied in each half respectively of that year, subject to the limitation that—

  (a) any such rebate is afforded to any person only in respect of the amount by which that person's reckonable rates for the half year in question determined in accordance with the said Act exceed £3 15s.; and

  (b) any amount which would otherwise be payable to any person by way of such rebate in respect of the rates levied in the half
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  year in question shall be reduced or extinguished in accordance with the said Act if the reckonable income of that person determined as aforesaid in such previous period of six months as may be so determined exceeds the following limit or such other limit as may from time to time be substituted therefor by order made by statutory instrument, that is to say—

  (i) if at the date of that person's application for the rebate he is married and living with his spouse, £260;

  (ii) in any other case, £208;

  apart from any increase of that limit provided for by the said Act in respect of a child;
  (2) of any increase attributable to the provisions of the said Act in the sums payable out of moneys provided by Parliament under any other Act.
  Resolution agreed to.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS (SERVICES)
  Motion made, and Question proposed,
  That a Select Committee be appointed to advise Mr. Speaker on the control of the accommodation and services in that part of the Palace of Westminster and its precincts occupied by or on behalf of the House of Commons and to report thereon to this House:
  That the Committee do consist of Seventeen Members:
  That Mr. Herbert W. Bowden, Mrs. Braddock, Mr. Henry Brooke, Mr. Donald Chapman, Mr. Chichester-Clark, Sir Myer Galpern, Mr. William Hamling, Mr. Michael Jopling, Mr. Harold Lever, Sir Frank Pearson, Dame Edith Pitt, Mr. Edward Short, Mr. Sydney Silverman, Mr. David Steel, Dr. Shirley Summerskill, Mr. William Whitelaw and Sir Gerald Wills be Members of the Committee:
  That Five be the Quorum:
  That the Second Special Report from the Select Committee on Publications and Debates Reports in the last Session of Parliament be referred to the Committee:
  That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records; to sit notwithstanding any Adjournment of the House; and to report from time to time:
  That the Committee have power to appoint Sub-Committees and to refer to such Sub-Committees any of the matters referred to the Committee:
  That every such Sub-Committee do consist of Two Members of the Committee, together with not more than Five Members nominated by the House, after the Committee shall have made recommendations thereon:
  That Three be the Quorum of every such Sub-Committee:
  That every such Sub-Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records; to sit notwithstanding any Adjournment of the House; and to report to the Committee from time to time:
  That the Committee have power to report from time to time the Minutes of Evidence taken before Sub-Committees and reported by them to the Committee.—[Mr. Lawson.]
  5.48 p.m.
  Mr. Julian Snow: I seek elucidation on one point on the subject of accommodation. I understand that this Select Committee will be restricted to that which is at present occupied. Is there not a case for the examination of accommodation within the Palace that could be occupied but which is inadequately occupied at present?
  The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Bowden): The House will recall that when agreement was reached when Her Majesty advised Mr. Speaker that she was graciously pleased to divide up the Palace of Westminster, it was considered important that the Select Committee should look at the question of the House of Commons side of the accommodation of the Palace of Westminster, and the Report will deal with that. The Select Committee now to be appointed is purely to control the House of Commons side of the Palace.
  Nevertheless, it is hoped that a joint Committee of both sides—the other place and the House of Commons side—will be set up fairly soon to consider joint matters.
  Question put and agreed to.

  NORTHAMPTON AND COUNTY POLICE (AMALGAMATION)
  5.50 p.m.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: I beg to move,
  That the Northampton and County Police (Amalgamation) Order, 1965, a draft of which was laid before this House on 17th November, be not made.
  The purpose of this Order is to amalgamate the Northampton Borough police force with the county force. Northampton Borough has had a police force for a great many years—I think, ever since there were police forces. It is an extremely good force—no one has disputed that. Indeed, I think that the county's anxiety to get the borough police force amalgamated with it was in a certain measure based on its admiration and high assessment of the force it was getting.
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  I fully understand that there is a case for larger police forces. There is a case for bringing smaller forces into larger forces, particularly where the larger force is having considerable difficulties in policing its areas. I think that there is no doubt here that this amalgamation was in some measure for the benefit of the county at the expense of the borough.
  The matter was fought out. We appealed. We took a delegation to see my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary. My right hon. and learned Friend took a certain view. But then something else happened, a decision by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government that Northampton was to expand. From being a town of just over 100,000, it was to become a town of 220,000.
  A town of 220,000 would have a police force of something over 500, which would be ample for an independent police force. But this decision occurred after the original decision regarding Northampton's police force, after our appeal had been rejected, and after our visit to the Home Secretary. Thus, the position now is that Northampton's police force is to be abolished, but, in five, six or seven years, when the Minister of Housing and Local Government's plans have become a reality and Northampton is a borough, or probably then a city, of 220,000 people, we shall want to re-establish a police force of our own.
  The establishment of a new police force is always much more difficult than the enlargement of an old one. An old police force has its traditions, it has built itself up and won the confidence of the customer, in this case, the citizens of Northampton. Northampton has a most admirable chief constable whom everyone in Northampton will be terribly sorry to see go. Of course, he has a chance to become chief constable of the combined force, but, as far as that side of it goes, the county also has an admirable chief constable and I do not think for a moment that it has any intention of losing him.
  Thus, the Northampton borough force will be broken up for quite a short intermission and we shall then have to start again, without the tradition of our old force and without its continuity of over 100 years. All this is to happen just

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  for the sake of a short intermission. In the circumstances, I hope that my hon. Friend will think again and say that we should give it a year or two years; let us postpone it a little and see how the redevelopment of Northampton goes. Let us see whether it is really necessary to destroy this very good, effective and traditional force before we know for certain whether Northampton will in any event have to have a force of its own in the quite near future.
  That is the short and simple point. I shall not go over any of the matters which were dealt with in the discussions and at the inquiry. I am dealing simply with the new point, the decision to enlarge Northampton, a decision which seems to me to raise the whole question of timing.
  5.55 p.m.
  Mr. Julian Snow: I have hesitated to intervene in this somewhat narrow debate, narrow in the sense that it appears to refer only to Northampton and Northamptonshire, but the House will recall that a few days ago, in the small hours of Friday morning, we discussed the West Midlands Special Review Order, which I felt that I had to oppose. The significance of that Order was that Staffordshire was to be truncated and what is commonly known as the Black Country was to be detached, one consequence being that the police force of Staffordshire would to that extent be carved up.
  I intervene now because, although this debate is restricted to Northampton and Northamptonshire and it would be inappropriate for me to call in aid too much detail regarding Staffordshire, I want my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State to explain what are the rules or principles governing decisions to amalgamate or abolish police forces. The proposed abolition of the Northampton force seems to be strictly contrary to the action proposed to be taken in Staffordshire. In Staffordshire, a number of county boroughs are to be established under the Order. They will not have their own police forces, and, as I understood the Order and the speech of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government—though I should not charge him with too much specific comment on this—it was considered
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  desirable that in the carved off part of Staffordshire there should be an amalgamated police force for the so-called Black Country.
  I expect that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State may argue that there is merit in amalgamation, but this would seem contrary to what is proposed regarding the Staffordshire constabulary, in which case——
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Samuel Storey): Order. The hon. Gentleman must not discuss the Staffordshire case. All we are discussing tonight is whether or not this Order in respect of Northampton should be annulled.
  Mr. Snow: I thought that I was avoiding transgressing the bounds of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but, of course, I bow to your Ruling.
  I conclude by emphasising the general point of my remarks. Perhaps the Under-Secretary of State will comment on the rules prescribed in his Department for deciding when there should be amalgamations and when there should be carve-ups. It is as simple as that. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has been very cogent in his reasoning and, for my part, I hold the view that there may well be a case for taking account of the shape of things to come. The reverse is true in the other case which I have mentioned but which I shall not develop further. There seems to be confusion about the rules guiding the Home Office in these matters.
  6.0 p.m.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. George Thomas): In its long history Northampton has sent to the House many distinguished leaders, but I think that none has been a greater champion for it than my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). He has established for himself a great reputation in the House. Nothing happens to Northampton without his bringing our attention to the matter. He has rightly brought our attention tonight to the question of the amalgamation of the police force with that of the county.
  I join at once with my hon. and learned Friend in a high tribute to the Northampton Borough police force. There is, of

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  course, no question of its efficiency. However, I hope that the House will feel that it will help if I explain first of all the background to this amalgamation scheme in particular and the schemes that we have in mind in general.
  The Police Act, 1964, conferred on the Home Secretary wider powers to promote the amalgamation of police areas where he is satisfied that it is in the interests of efficiency that there should be a combined police force. The practice, introduced by the then Home Secretary in 1964, is to review the policing of the country in the light of the current review of local government areas. The order in which amalgamations may be proposed depends on the progress made by the Local Government Commission and the decisions taken by the Minister of Housing and Local Government.
  Everybody will agree—as indeed all parties in the House agreed during the debates on the Final Report of the Royal Commission on the Police, and on the Police Bill—that there should be amalgamations and that larger forces are in the interests of efficiency. I know, of course, that a great deal of anxiety is often caused by specific amalgamation proposals like this one, and that on the whole most local authorities think that amalgamations are right in principle, but that they should not occur in their own area. But the Home Secretary is satisfied that it is right, where it seems that more effective policing may come from a combined force, to press on with proposals for the amalgamation of police areas and, if necessary, to use the compulsory powers contained in the Police Act, 1964, which followed on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Police which reported in 1962.
  The Royal Commission heard a great deal of evidence and carried out what is unquestionably the most thorough survey of the organisation of the police in this country since it was first established. The House will recall that the Royal Commission was strongly critical of the present number of relatively small police forces and considered that such forces had a number of inherent disadvantages. For instance, first, operationally such forces are not flexible enough to meet all the demands that may be placed upon them and the help of neighbouring forces may
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  have to be called upon. Second, the employment of specialists is difficult and training facilities tend to be inadequate. Third, promotion tends to stagnate, and it is harder than in a larger force to ignore the claims of seniority in filling vacancies. I visited a small police force the other day where it takes 20 years for a man to become a sergeant. In the Metropolitan area there are sergeants with five, six or seven years' service. This is, of course, an important factor. Also, discipline is difficult to enforce impartially in the smaller force. There is a danger of undesirable pressure being brought to bear—I am not saying this about Northampton—on the police by local people where there is a small force.
  Finally, it is not easy to find for a small force a chief constable with the right qualities for that exacting office, but I join with my hon. and learned Friend in paying tribute to the two chief constables involved here.
  Mr. Paget: Is not the trouble here that because there are some small bad police forces—that is certainly true—the Government are on this occasion abolishing one which is outstandingly good?
  Mr. Thomas: I shall deal with that matter.
  The Commission also expressed the view that forces numbering less than 200 suffer considerable handicaps and that the retention of forces numbering less than 350 in strength is justifiable only by special circumstances, such as the distribution of the population and the geography of the area. It regarded a force of 500 upwards, serving a population of about 250,000, as the optimum size.
  The figures quoted by the Royal Commission are a general guide and they must now be viewed against the background that since the Commission reported police forces have been increasing their establishments, partly as a necessary consequence of the introduction of a five-day working week. Also, the tendency now is for the ratio of population to police to come down. The figures of 200, 350 and 500 that the Royal Commission mentioned must; therefore, be regarded as underestimates.
  The Royal Commission recognised that a balance must be struck between the advantages of size and the advantage of

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  retaining a direct local link; but it concluded:
  "the weight of police evidence was to the effect that where there was a conflict between the claims of operational efficiency and of the local connection, it has been resolved on the whole too readily in favour of the local connection".
  The Commission recommended an immediate review of police areas, and also that the law should be amended to strengthen the Home Secretary's powers to promote the amalgamation of police forces. In particular, it thought that there should be no restriction as to the population of the areas affected and that no new force should be formed without the permission of the Home Secretary.
  The Commission had already in an earlier part of its Report—paragraph 128 —made it clear that a number of its members thought that a national police force would prove to be a more effective instrument for fighting crime and handling road traffic than the present large number of local forces, each possessing more autonomy than the Commission regarded as appropriate.
  It is implicit in the Commission's Report that it regarded the elimination of the smaller police forces as an essential condition of retaining a system of local forces. In other words, without a programme of amalgations the case for establishing a national force might well have prevailed in the Royal Commission's mind.
  The Royal Commission's Report was debated in the House of Commons on 9th May, 1963. The right hon. Member for Hampstead (Mr. Brooke), who was then Home Secretary, made it clear that he agreed in general with the Royal Commission's views on the advantages of larger police forces in the interests of the efficient policing of wider areas. The case for amalgamations was strongly endorsed by the then Opposition official spokesman, who stressed the importance of not allowing any Home Secretary to delay the necessary task of carrying out amalgamations.
  Further opportunities were afforded for the expression of views on amalgamation from all parts of the House by the debates on the Police Bill in 1963. The then Home Secretary announced his intention of asking the Inspectors of Constabulary to review each area from a police standpoint after the Local Government Com-
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  mission had announced its proposals for the reorganisation of the structure of local government in that area.
  The right hon. Gentleman also stated that it was not his intention to work by any statutory yardstick or arithmetical formula and that geography entered into the matter as well as the size of the forces. This side of the House welcomed the intention of the Police Act with regard to amalgamations and the debates on the relevant sections showed a wide acceptance of the need for more amalgamations The present trend of crime, with the enormous number of offences against the person and against property, together with the increasing sophistication of criminals and their methods and speed of movement, make measures to increase the efficiency of the police service a primary duty of government.
  Where efficiency will be gained by the amalgamation of police areas, no Home Secretary should hesitate to take the initiative if the police authorities concerned will not willingly amalgamate their forces. I should like to emphasise that the need for amalgamation does not imply that a particular police force is in itself inefficient. Many small forces have a high degree of efficiency within the limitations of their size, and they also have a proud tradition. The crucial point is that amalgamation will lead to greater efficiency of policing for the whole of the areas affected and not just for the local area which is to lose its independent police force.
  The fact, therefore, that this particular amalgamation is proposed between Northamptonshire and Northampton does not cast any reflection on the present county or county borough police forces. Indeed, it was made clear at the local inquiry that both forces are efficient within the limits of size. The essential point is that greater efficiency is likely to come from having one larger force serving the areas of the county borough and of the county. It is not just the area of the county borough with which we are concerned, but the areas as a whole.
  I have outlined the background to the current review of police areas following in the wake of the local government review.
  Already this review has produced important results which the Home Secretary is satisfied are moves in the right

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  direction and in conformity with the views expressed by the Royal Commission on the Police and by Parliament. The county borough of Solihull, newly created on the same date as the county borough of Luton, obtained the agreement of the Warwickshire police authority to make a voluntary amalgamation scheme for police purposes. No fewer than five police authorities in the area covered by Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, the Isle of Ely and Peterborough decided, following discussions with the then Home Secretary, to merge their police forces; and from 1st April, 1965, the whole area has been served by one combined police force known as the Mid-Anglia Constabulary. The effect of these amalgamations was to reduce the number of separate police forces from 126 to 122.
  After a local inquiry the Home Secretary announced in March last his decision that the county borough of Northampton should be amalgamated with Northamptonshire—the subject of the present debate. Again after a local inquiry, the Home Secretary announced in June his decision to amalgamate the county borough of Luton with the county of Bedfordshire. The city of Bath and the county of Somerset are considering proposals by the Home Secretary that they might enter into a voluntary amalgamation scheme. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) reminded us, the five large county boroughs of Dudley, Smethwick—to be known as Warley—Walsall, West Bromwich and Wolverhampton are entering into a voluntary amalgamation scheme whereby the conurbation comprised by the areas of the five county boroughs will be policed by a single force.
  The Home Secretary has proposed the compulsory amalgamation of the county borough of Exeter with the county of Devon. The local authorities acting as a co-ordinating committee for the future county borough of Torbay, which will be constituted from 1st April, 1968, have decided in principle to continue to be policed by the county of Devon.
  Mr. Snow: I say this with great respect to my hon. Friend, but he is obviously speaking from a brief prepared before my speech tonight and he is calling in aid a voluntary amalgamation in the West Midlands. But there
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  is nothing voluntary about the truncation of the Staffordshire Constabulary.
  Mr. Thomas: It would have been better if it had been voluntary. Perhaps everyone would have felt better, but it is considered nevertheless that the proposals for Staffordshire are in the best interests of the area.
  As regards the amalgamation scheme now before the House, the then Minister of Housing and Local Government announced in December 1963 that the boundaries of the county borough of Northampton would be extended with effect from 1st April, 1965. As a result, the right hon. Gentleman who was then Home Secretary, after reviewing policing arrangements in consultation with H.M. Inspectors of Constabulary, reached the conclusion that in the interests of police efficiency it would be right to have a combined police force serving the whole of the county.
  This decision was reached in the light of the proposed boundary changes and of the probable future increase in population. The right hon. Gentleman told the county and county borough police authorities his view and had discussions with representatives of both police authorities. After considering Northampton's representations that they should retain their separate police force, he reaffirmed his view that an amalgamation scheme should be made and gave to both police authorities formal notice of a compulsory amalgamation scheme.
  An objection was made to the proposed amalgamation on behalf of the county borough watch committee and as a result a local inquiry was held, at which the watch committee developed their objections to the scheme. The report by Mr. Peter Stanley Price, Q.C., on the local inquiry found clearly that on merits the case for amalgamation was indisputable and that despite the arguments put on behalf of the county borough, the inherent disadvantages of small forces as seen by the Royal Commission on the Police existed in Northampton; and that both the county borough and the county force would gain by amalgamation.
  Mr. Stanley Price's report made certain recommendations as to the composition of a combined police authority, and as to the apportionment of the costs of a combined police force in the light of a

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  "without prejudice" agreement which had been reached between the two police authorities; and also recommended that any scheme should provide for the use of the Northampton police headquarters building by the combined police authority rather than for the transfer of that building to the new authority. The scheme meets all these points and, although the county borough remains opposed in principle to the idea of amalgamation, all the details of the scheme have been agreed with the two police authorities.Since the local inquiry and again tonight my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton has urged on behalf of the county borough that a recent Government decision to expand Northampton by 1981 had invalidated the bases upon which the local inquiry had been held; that in a few years' time the enlarged county borough would justify a police force of the size accepted as tolerable by the Royal Commission on the Police; and that it was unfair that Northampton had been singled out for the first compulsory amalgamation scheme under the Police Act, 1964.
  My right hon. and learned Friend received a deputation from the Northampton watch committee—I was there and so was my hon. and learned Friend—and also invited representatives of the county to be present, but he made clear to them subsequently that his decision to proceed with the amalgamation was unchanged.
  It was quite clear that the future development of Northampton was very much in mind at the local inquiry, as it had been very much in mind when the proposals for amalgamation were first decided upon; the subsequent announcement of a firm decision on the future development of Northampton only confirmed assumptions which everybody concerned had already made.
  The proposal for a combined police force took full account of a likely population expansion and one of the points that had been made at the local inquiry was that one police authority would be in a far better position to plan for future changes than two.
  We have to deal with the situation as it is now and as it is likely to develop; there is no point in waiting some years
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  in order to consider afresh whether Northampton should retain a separate police force because it may by then be a bigger place.
  As to the other point made on behalf of the Northampton watch committee, it has frequently been made clear that it is the general policy to consider the most effective policing arrangements in the wake of local government review.
  This was done in the case of Northampton as soon as the local government review had been completed and there is nothing sinister in the fact that the first local inquiry into a compulsory amalgamation scheme was held at Northampton.
  My right hon. and learned Friend is satisfied that the amalgamation scheme is right and should be proceeded with and that there are no considerations which justify changing that decision.
  Question put and negatived.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Lawson.]

  WAR DISABLEMENT PENSION (MR. GIRDLESTONE)
  6.23 p.m.
  Mr. David Weitzman: I am grateful to have the opportunity of raising the case of a constituent of mine, a Mr. Girdlestone, and the question of his pension. I have endeavoured to obtain what I consider to be justice for this man since the end of 1962. I will state the facts quite shortly.
  Mr. Girdlestone is now a man of 41 years of age, employed as a bank messenger and living with his wife and family. When 16 years of age, he joined the Royal Air Force, but he was discovered to be under age and he was discharged. In 1943, when 18 years of age, he volunteered for service in the Royal Navy. He was then a fit man in all respects and was graded A, Class 1. He saw active service for some time.
  In 1944, when aboard His Majesty's ship "Wyne", he was operating a signal lamp when an Oerlikon gun was fired and only the guard rail saved him from serious injury. This man, who had never suffered from ear trouble before, had the membranes of his eardrums shattered by being in close proximity to the Oerlikon

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  gun, a disability later diagnosed by a medical board as bilateral chronic suppurative otitis media. He received treatment for this and he was assigned to service ashore where a doctor would be available. He had previously been classified Grade A, but after his injury he was reclassified Grade 5. The condition was aggravated by service in a tropical station, as was confirmed by a specialist at the 58th General Hospital, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
  Before the accident, he had been accepted as a C.W. candidate for the Fleet Air Arm, but on arrival in the United Kingdom to commence training he was found to be medically unfit and he was classified Grade 6. He received treatment from time to time, but he continued his service ashore until 1946 when he was discharged. A medical board on his discharge marked him Grade 1.
  When he was discharged as Grade 1, he naturally assumed that he was cured and that there was therefore no question of any claim by him. He was not troubled for some years, apart from some visits to his doctors in the intervening years, but in 1955 his doctor sent him to Guy's Hospital where he has since been treated and is still being treated for his ear complaint. In August, 1962, a medical board found that his disability was aggravated by service, but that finding was clearly not correct and in November, 1962, on appeal, it was held that the disability was attributable to service. The net result was that from 4th June, 1962, he has been in receipt of a 20 per cent. pension.
  I have related the facts as simply as I can, and clearly on those facts this man's disability, attributable to service, existed at the date of his discharge on 16th August, 1946, and prima facie he is entitled to his pension from that date. Why, then, has he not been paid?
  I made representations to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance in the last Government, who, on 6th March, 1963, wrote to me to point out that it was a long-standing rule that a pension should be awarded only from the date of application and that discretion could be exercised in applying that rule only in exceptional cases. He cited a case where a claimant had been prevented from claim-
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  ing earlier by serious and prolonged illness. I made persistent efforts to move him, but without success.
  I thought that I would get more sympathetic treatment from a Labour Government and so I made representations again. But again I was met with the answer that the rule was that payment should not be made in respect of a period preceding the date of application except in so far as the Minister would direct. However, in his letter of 3rd March, 1965, the present Parliamentary Secretary said:
  "The need for a rule of this kind arises from the fact that we are prepared to consider claims without any time limits at all"—
  and he underlined the words "without any time limits at all"—
  "but by so doing we cannot accept an undefined and virtually unlimited liability for arrears".
  Then he went on:
  "The rule is waived only in exceptional circumstances; for example where a man is prevented from claiming by serious physical or mental illness, or by incorrect advice given by us."
  I attach a great deal of importance to those words—
  "by incorrect advice given by us."
  What is meant by the word "us"? Clearly it means the authorities, and that must include the medical board—in the case of this man the board which discharged and marked him Grade 1. He had to assume that that finding was correct and, apart from attending a doctor from time to time, did not suffer real trouble until 1955, when he attended a specialist at Guy's Hospital. He has attended ever since.
  It might clearly be said that this man was lulled into a state of acquiescence by the medical board's finding in 1946 that he was Grade 1. I should have thought that this was a reasonable inference to draw. The Ministry excuse is that he was informed of his rights on discharge. That may be so and I have no doubt about that. My constituent would not be warned on discharge, because he was told by the medical board that he was all right. Why should he bother about advice of that kind? His medical board had graded him Grade 1. It is said that there was considerable publicity thereafter, and again that may have been the case, hut, having been informed that he was all

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  right in 1946, there was no reason why such publicity should be drawn to his attention. On the facts of this case it was not until 1962 when Mr. Girdlestone, quite by chance, read a letter in the News of the World from an ex-Service man in similar circumstance, that he realised he could make a claim and immediately did so and the claim was allowed.
  I have six submissions to make. They are: (1) the Ministry itself recognised on the facts that Mr. Girdlestone was entitled to a pension from the date of his discharge in 1946; (2) if he had then made a claim it must have been allowed; (3) the medical board's action in marking him Grade 1 on discharge was wrong advice, given on behalf of the Ministry, and certainly had the effect of making Mr. Girdlestone assume, as would any reasonable man, that he was cured and had no claim; (4) there was no publicity which would have effectively drawn my constituent's attention to his rights in this matter; (5) it was only by pure chance that he discovered he had such rights; (6) most important of all, it would be iniquitous if, in the circumstances, he was denied something to which he is clearly entitled.
  I have pursued this matter for a long time, and I hope that at long last a Labour Government will do justice in this case.
  6.35 p.m.
  The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (Mr. Harold Davies): The issue which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) has raised tonight is a very simple one—the starting date of Mr. Girdlestone's pension. But it also raises an important point of principle. A charge has been brought against my Department that Mr. Girdlestone was penalised because he claimed late. During his speech—and I would like to pay tribute to the courteous and incisive way in which my hon. and learned Friend has made his case—he has sought to criticise both the general rule which governs arrears of war pension and its particular application to Mr. Girdlestone. I hope to satisfy my hon. and learned Friend and the House that not only is the general rule a fair and
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  essential rule, but that there is no foundation for the suggestion that the lateness of Mr. Girdlestone's claim was attributable in any way to a mistake or misdirection on the part of my own Department or that of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence.
  I should like to begin by restating the general rule, which is embodied in Article 65 of the Order in Council under which the starting date of Mr. Girdlestone's pension falls to be considered. There is a similar provision in the other war pensions instruments. The article reads:
  "Except in so far as the Minister may otherwise direct with respect to any particular case or class of case, payment of a pension shall not be made in respect of any period preceding the date of the application or appeal as a result of which the claim to the award of the pension, or as the case may be, to the continuance or resumption of the payment of the pension is accepted."
  This article reflects a rule of long standing which has been developed over the years by successive Ministers of Pensions as part and parcel of an integrated system under which claims can be accepted without any time limit at all and upon conditions which have been deliberately made as favourable as possible to the claimant.
  I would remind the House that claims to a war pension are still being made for the first time in respect of service which ended 10, 20, 30, or even 50 years ago. Mr. Girdlestone's own claim was made in 1962 in respect of service which ended 16 years earlier. Nor is it simply a matter of men who have not claimed at all. There is also the question of claims for review. For example, take a claim that was made in 1952. The evidence at that stage is all against the claimant and the claim has to be rejected. Perhaps 12 years later it is renewed with new evidence, and on that evidence, and giving a generous benefit of the doubt, it is granted. It is surely not suggested by my hon. and learned Friend that we ought to make the pension payable from the original claim 12 years before. Mr. Girdlestone made no claim of any kind before 1962.
  Mr. Weitzman: No one has suggested that in the ordinary way, if a person makes a claim 16 years late, and there is no valid reason for its lateness, that person should be given a pension for the earlier period. It is reasonable that he

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  should not. My case is based upon the fact that when this man was discharged in 1946, he was found by a medical board to be Grade 1. Any reasonable person would assume from that, "True, I suffered an injury two years before, but I am cured". When it comes on after that—
  Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman cannot make his speech again.
  Mr. Davies: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I take my hon. and learned Friend's point. Form MPB 281 clearly provides:
  "This form is to be used only if you claim to be suffering from a disability attributable to or aggravated by war within six months of war service…. After six months from the cessation of service pay, any claim to pension must be made on a different form to be obtained from the nearest office of the Ministry…".
  When a man was discharged from the Navy that form was given to him.
  My hon. and learned Friend made the point that Mr. Girdlestone was misled because of the medical category. Nine years went by in which there is no record of ear trouble. However, I must be fair to my hon. and learned Friend. He pointed out that there had been two visits to doctors through ear trouble. At no time, unfortunately, did Mr. Girdlestone make use of his right to appeal either through the local war pensions committee or through the British Legion to get the claim spiked down. Consequently, the only conclusion which one can make is that in that nine years his ear trouble was not serious enough to cause him great concern.
  We have to be realistic about this and to recognise that in the absence of some clear rule we would be faced by what would virtually be an open-ended liability in respect of all late claims or appeals, quite apart from the cost of meeting them currently. If we were, in effect, to be held to ransom in respect of arrears for every late or renewed claim, no matter how long after service they were made and irrespective of there being any good cause for the delay in making them, it is very questionable whether we could continue without invoking some sort of time limit, as was done after the First World War, or imposing less generous terms of entitlement. But we have no time limit whatsoever, and, as my hon. and learned Friend will know, only last
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  year we made the most generous war pension provision ever.
  One cannot have it both ways. We are handling public money which is to be applied to the payment of pensions and we have to be careful not to accept an unlimited liability which might endanger the financial arrangement of the whole scheme. I am in no doubt that the rule we now have operates, on balance, very much to the advantage of claimants generally; and this is, I think, well understood in ex-Service circles.
  There is also a very real practical objection to the automatic payment of arrears. Often it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make accurate assessments retrospectively. We should have to try to think up over past years from scanty and often non-existent evidence what the degree of disablement was. There could be periods when the disability in question was causing no disablement. It would clearly give rise to inequality of treatment with pensioners who can be given proper assessments based on current medical examination if we were to try and make some kind of notional assessment back over the past.
  All this does not mean, however, that we apply the arrears rule with absolute rigidity. The Order in Council, as I have said, gives my right hon. Friend a discretion to waive the rule, and, where there are exceptional circumstances, she does not hesitate to do so. These might be, for example, when a claimant is prevented from claiming earlier by some factor outside his own control, such as a serious illness or mental incapacity, or where there has been manifest official error or misdirection. But the circumstances must be exceptional. It is not enough that the claimant should simply be unaware that he could make a claim, or did not trouble to pursue it; and, with great respect to my hon. and learned Friend, this is really the position in this case. As he will appreciate, it can be said of virtually all late claims that, if the claimant had known he might have got a pension earlier, he would have applied earlier. To regard that as a justification for waiving the rule would really be tantamount to destroying it.
  My hon. Friend argues that in Mr. Girdlestone's case there were particular reasons, not of his own making, which led him to think he could not claim.

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  This was the nub of my hon. and learned Friend's argument, that Mr. Girdlestone was discharged in 1946 as fit for further service—he says in Grade 1—whereas he should have been invalided, and that this misled him. But for this, he says, he would have claimed earlier.
  In his letters Mr. Girdlestone has based the contention that he should have been invalided upon his having been downgraded to medical Category 6. He was not, in fact, put in Category 6 at all. When he was medically downgraded in December, 1945, he was put into Category 5. This meant that he was fit for shore and harbour service at home and abroad except in tropical areas. Even if he had been put in Category 6, however, there would still have been no question of automatic invaliding.
  Mr. Girdlestone has further contended in his letters that in August, 1946, he was discharged as Grade 1 and thought as a result that he must be ineligible for a pension. The service documents show that he was not discharged in Grade 1, but released in Grade 2. This was a medical category introduced in 1946, when the system of classification was simplified, to replace the earlier Categories 4 and 5. He was regarded as still fit for service, subject to the same medical limitations as before. The release medical report which was made in June, 1946, does in fact specifically draw attention to his permanent downgrading only six months earlier. I can only think that Mr. Girdlestone may have confused a Class "A" release with a Grade 1 medical category. The term "Class A" had, of course, nothing at all to do with medical categorisation; it simply meant that he was due for release in the normal way and not in any priority class.
  I must, however, go further and point out to my hon. and learned Friend that it is really irrelevant whether or not Mr. Girdlestone was Grade 1 on release. Even assuming he had been found to be Grade 1, this would still afford no ground for exceptional treatment. Many men incurred disabilities in service which cleared up and gave no trouble at the
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  time, but started to give trouble again later.
  This is precisely what happened with Mr. Girdlestone's ear trouble. On his own admission he thought he was cured. He had no significant disablement from his ears when he was released or for two years afterwards. His National Insurance records show that between July, 1948 and November, 1954 he had no time off for certified sickness. He himself signed a form when he was released to say that he was not suffering from any complaint. It was, nevertheless, made plain to him at the time that he could claim a war pension if he thought that any condition he was suffering from was due to service; the documents handed to all naval ratings on release, in fact, included among them a claim form for pension.
  The fact is that it was open to Mr. Girdlestone at any time to put in a claim. He said that he had a recurrence of ear trouble in 1948, two years after his release, and went to his doctor, though his doctor has not recorded it. He could have claimed then. He attended Guy's Hospital in 1955. He could have claimed then, but he did not make a claim until 1962. There is no evidence of any exceptional circumstances. This is the nub of our argument. I have already quoted from the article. We see no exceptional circumstances whatever in the history of Mr. Girdlestone's case.
  I have sought to explain the reasons for the rule. I hope that the House will be satisfied that there are solid reasons for it and that it is a rule that we could not abandon or relax without great hesitation. Mr. Girdleston's claim has been dealt with in accordance with the rule. His case affords no ground for special treatment under it. There is no question of the Department acting harshly. We have decided the claim, as we seek to decide all war pension claims, in the light of careful and sympathetic consideration of the facts. Having gone in depth into the medical history of Mr. Girdlestone's claim, I regret that I can see no other course than the one which we have taken.

  RHODESIA
  Mr. Speaker: Before I invite the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) to speak, may I ask whether he has let a Minister know that he proposes to raise a subject on the Adjournment?
  6.52 p.m.
  Mr. Eric S. Heffer: I have been in touch with the Prime Minister's Office, Mr. Speaker, and I am assured that that office is attempting to get a Minister to reply to the debate. I regret that the notice has been so short, but, as hon. Members will appreciate, none of us expected the business of the House to collapse as quickly as it has done this evening.
  I want to raise the question of the oil embargo against Rhodesia. I do this because we are in a difficult situation and because a matter of urgency has developed. Most hon. Members will, I think, have read in the Press within the last two days that a British-owned oil tanker carrying 12,000 tons of crude oil for Southern Rhodesia is now on its way. We ought to express our opinion in this House on this important question.
  A few days ago, the United Nations discussed the whole matter of Rhodesia and decided to put forward a resolution, part of which contained the proposition of an oil embargo. It seems ludicrous that we should be party to a United Nations decision concerning an oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia but at the same time cannot find ourselves justified in stopping the tanker which is at present carrying the crude oil to Rhodesia.
  This House should say clearly to the Government tonight that we feel without qualification that without waiting for the total oil embargo to be placed upon Southern Rhodesia the Government could at least take a decision and make a gesture to the rest of the nations involved by stopping this tanker forthwith. This suggestion meets, I think, with the general approval of most hon. Members—not all hon. Members, but those who want to bring this matter to a speedy conclusion. The most effective way of doing this is undoubtedly to impose the oil embargo and to take the step which I have suggested.
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  Everyone should know that the object of our Government concerning Rhodesia is to bring this matter to a speedy conclusion without bloodshed and without long-term suffering for the Rhodesian people. We have taken positive steps. We have stepped up the sanctions within the last few days. We have not, however, taken this final step in sanctions which is the very one of which the Rhodesian rebel régime is most afraid.
  It was reported by John Worrall in The Guardian a week ago that the one thing of which the rebel régime in Rhodesia was terrified was the imposition of oil sanctions by the British Government. Equally, we had a statement from a Rhodesian official who said that the one thing that was feared by them was the introduction of oil sanctions and that this would create the greatest difficulties for the rebel régime. This testimony comes from a journalist in Salisbury and from an official of the rebel régime. It is not somebody in this House of Commons who is arguing this. It is somebody out there who understands the effect of the decision which it is essential for us to take.
  I therefore urge the Government, without waiting for a study to be made, immediately to stop the oil tanker which is carrying crude oil to Rhodesia as a gesture to show the Commonwealth nations as a whole that we are determined to bring this matter to an end in the speediest manner without bloodshed. If we fail to do this, if we refuse to stop the tanker, the Commonwealth nations, particularly the African Commonwealth nations, will say that we are speaking with a forked tongue. On the one hand, they will say, we wish to bring down the rebels but, on the other hand, we are not taking the most effective method to bring down that régime at the earliest possible moment.
  We wish to continue to keep the Commonwealth together and to retain the support of the Commonwealth countries. I reject completely the argument used in the Sunday Express, which asked what it would matter if the Commonwealth were to fall to pieces. As far as I am concerned, the Commonwealth is a wonderful idea and we ought to develop it. We certainly should not take any step which is likely to bring the Commonwealth to an end.

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  I believe that if we as a Government decided to tell the company concerned that the tanker must be stopped forthwith, we should not only be carrying out effective sanctions against the rebel régime but we should be cementing the Commonwealth together and proving to Commonwealth countries that we are determined to bring this matter to a speedy conclusion.
  It has been argued throughout this Rhodesian issue that the basic responsibility is ours. I accept this argument. It is not a question of the responsibility being that of other nations. It is our responsibility. It is the British Government and the British people who are basically responsible and who must take decisive action to bring this matter to a conclusion at the earliest possible moment. If we do not do that, once again it will be argued that the only reason why we are talking about everyone else getting involved in oil sanctions is because we do not really want to do anything effective about it. I do not accept that argument, but I think that the real test for the Commonwealth countries will be whether we are prepared to stop that oil tanker.
  I do not want to detain the House very long, because it is quite obvious that a number of other hon. Members wish to participate. I appreciate the fact that we have got to concern ourselves with the effects on Zambia. That is a real problem, and no one is going to run away from the trouble and say that we ought not to consider those effects. It seems to me that the answer is to speed up the airlift in the same effective way that we were able to carry out an airlift to Berlin when the Soviet Union and the East German authorities closed the Berlin road. We did it then for Berlin, and it seems to me that we can do it now to Zambia. We have a precedent. The precedent is Berlin.
  It is quite probable that I shall be told by the Minister concerned that that is going forward. I am quite certain that it is going forward and that plans are being drawn up for an effective airlift. I am quite certain that plans are going forward for a total oil embargo. What I am asking the House is that whilst the plans are being prepared and whilst these longer-term effective
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  measures are being worked out, in the meantime we should stop that shipload of crude oil going to Rhodesia in order to prove conclusively that we are determined to bring the situation there to a speedy conclusion.
  7.2 p.m.
  Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: We are in the debt of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) for having raised this matter, and in the debt of the Leader of the House for having so arranged the business today that adequate time is left for debating what is an extremely important matter. Mr. Speaker, you in your wisdom, which I accept, did not see fit to rule that it was a matter which could be brought under Standing Order No. 9, but it is a happy fact that the Leader of the House has enabled us to debate it some fifteen minutes earlier than would have been possible had you seen fit to grant the adjournment of the House. Therefore, I can begin in a non-controversial vein by saying that we are in the debt of many people for the fact that at a quarter to seven we were able to debate this important issue.
  It is true to say that the whole House, with one or two unnotable exceptions, regard with abhorrence the régime in Rhodesia, not only for the illegal, unnecessary and stupid action which it took in November, but for all that it stands for in terms of repression and racial domination. For those of us—and I think it is the view of the majority of hon. Members—who are appalled at the prospect of violence and bloodshed, we have the hope that economic measures will be sufficient to bring the vast majority of those who have power and influence in Rhodesia to their senses.
  It is for that reason that Her Majesty's Government have adopted the economic measures which they have. I do not want to indulge in a play on words as to whether or not they are punitive ones. As has been constantly said, the test is whether they are likely to be effective, and by that presumably is meant whether they are rightly to cause opinion in Rhodesia to think that the Smith régime is something which can only lead to economic disaster for all sections of the community.

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  Therefore, the more one abhors the use of force, the more determined one is that the peaceful means of economic sanctions shall succeed, and that is the relevance of all the discussion about an oil embargo.
  I think it right to remind the House that on 20th November last a resolution was adopted by the Security Council to which, Mr. Speaker, with your permission, I will refer. It said in paragraph 8 that it called on all States to refrain from any action which would assist the illegal régime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products.
  That was a resolution for which Her Majesty's Government voted, and it is reasonable to assume that they were in favour of it. Now we have been told by Her Majesty's Government that it is a very complicated question and that it is going to be very difficult to make an oil sanction completely effective.
  I accent that. I must confess that if have a criticism of Her Majesty's Government it is that they have not done enough contingency planning, that they were so determined to avert a unilateral declaration of independence that they found it almost impossible mentally to adjust themselves to it as a possibility and therefore to plan what they would do in the event of U.D.I. I find it staggering that many of the sanctions now applied were not applied within a matter of hours.
  Be that as it may, there is a vast volume of information upon oil sanctions as a result of the studies which were carried out in regard to the Union of South Africa. I would say to Her Majesty's Government that even if an oil sanction is not likely to be a 100 per cent. effective, if it were only 50 per cent. effective and the immediate results were that oil rationing and petrol rationing had to be introduced in Rhodesia, with Europeans finding themselves restricted in the use of their motor cars and European employers having difficulty in getting sufficient oil to run the buses carrying their employees to their places of work, that again would be by peaceful means a pressure which would cause them to think again.
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  There is no doubt that oil can play a great part in causing the Rhodesian population, particularly the European population, to think again. So the first matter that I would pray in aid is that everyone who is averse to the use of force, with the exception of those few who secretly hope that the Smith régime will succeed—and some of them are perhaps not as secret as others—will be in favour of short, sharp and effective sanctions.
  Another point that I would ask the House to consider is the psychological posture of this country. The Organisation for African Unity has issued an ultimatum that unless we crush the Smith régime by 15th December they will break off diplomatic relations with us. What is far more serious is that anything up to nine African countries will leave the Commonwealth.
  I say at once that that is an extremely unreasonable and rather stupid request to have made. It is totally impracticable and could not possibly be achieved by that deadline. The reason it was made is that they are not yet satisfied with the determination of Her Majesty's Government to bring down the illegal régime.
  I do not want to bring an undue element of controversy into the debate, because I think that the Government should be supported up to the hilt on the matter, though it may be necessary to push them on and give them a little more courage to stand up to the Tory Right wing and some of the Empire Loyalists in the country, and not exclusively Empire Loyalists but supporters of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party who are hoping for a last imperial kick. I hope that the Government will have the courage to stand up to those people and do what is right, and not what the Prime Minister thinks is the maximum that he can do to maintain complete unanimity.
  Therefore, I think it is not surprising that they have taken the view that it is necessary to give an astringent message to the British Government. There has been the dither over the despatch of troops to Zambia, and they were not particularly placated by the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Commonwealth Secretary who, in a speech to Royal Air Force personnel at Ndola, referred to the Zambians as "noble creatures". I do not think that they were unusually flattered by that. I think

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  that the equivocation about the purposes for which British troops were being despatched has caused some heart searching and lack of faith as to the determination of Her Majesty's Government. For example, I should like to see a sealing off operation round Kariba, and I do not believe that there are the military objections which have been raised.
  Again, I think it is true to say that the Bank of England gave assent for Rhodesian pounds to be freely convertible into South African rands at an early stage after U.D.I., and this is why the Rhodesian pound, which had sunk to 5s., gradually climbed back to what I believe is now parity. Therefore, I can understand that in the minds of many African countries, not least our partners in the Commonwealth, there is some doubt as to whether Her Majesty's Government have determination to see this through.
  I want to be fair to the Prime Minister. I think that he is genuinely determined to see that the Smith régime is brought down. I believe that the Leader of the Opposition is genuinely determined to see that that régime is displaced, and in its place there is some political agreement which will lead towards a multi-racial society. At least I hope that is so, and if it is, I hope he will make it plain to his right hon. and hon. Friends on the Right wing who are displaying posters and stickers on their cars saying, "Support Rhodesia", and to the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery), that Her Majesty's Government are completely determined to bring down the Smith régime, that they are anxious to prove to our partners in the Commonwealth that although they wish to avert bloodshed, they will take all measures practicable to bring this régime to an end. Let us assume that the Leader of the Opposition, who I am sure the House is pleased to see at this unexpected debate, is equally determined to see that the illegal Smith régime is brought down.
  Against all those assumptions, how do we at this moment judge Her Majesty's Government? I think that we judge them in the terms of one ship, the "British Security". What a strange and coincidental name for a ship which has such a political significance. What has hap-
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  pened? This British ship, which at the moment is on the high seas, is carrying 12,000 tons of crude oil. It is being shipped not by some sheikh, not by some unknown oil company which is selling off its surplus, but by the British Petroleum Company in which Her Majesty's Government have a 49 per cent. shareholding. [HON. MEMBERS: "Fifty-one per cent."] That is even worse. Her Majesty's Government also have on the board of this company two directors who, on policy matters, have a virtual veto.
  There is no lack of Government influence on that company. There is no question of a free enterprise Socialist Government saying that they do not like to interfere with private commerce. There is nothing of that sort. This is a company in which the Government have a 51 per cent. shareholding, and two appointees on the board of directors. This British ship, carrying British oil, in which the British Government have a 51 per cent. interest, is to dock as Beira. The oil, I might say, emanated from Abu-Dhabi, a Trucial Sheikhdom, for whose internal affairs we are responsible. The oil is being sent, not to help our oldest ally, the Portuguese, in furtherance of democracy in either Mozambique or Angola, or any other centre of Portuguese oppression, but to be carried along a British-owned pipeline, owned by Lonrho, a firm of which Her Majesty's cousin is a director, and pumped to Rhodesia to give the Rhodesians another fortnight's oil supply.
  Does the Minister who is to reply to the debate think that this will give the impression that Britain is determined in her economic sanctions against Rhodesia, or the reverse? What is going to be the impression? It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge. Will this indicate a growing enthusiasm to bring pressure to bear on the Rhodesian rebel régime, or will it merely indicate that Her Majesty's Government are in a difficult world and that they really cannot overcome the complexities of the situation?
  The Prime Minister's remarks were well worthy of a Tory Government when he said that there were two or three ships stacking up behind, and went on to imply that if we did not get in the Kuwaitis or any other oil producing country that one might like to name might do so. I remember reading the question

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  which was put to Sir Thomas Inskip before the war when he was Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. He was asked why we were supplying Mussolini with spruce spars which would be used for his fighter planes, and whether he would cancel the contract. He said it was not possible to do so "because it would impede the course of normal trade".
  Her Majesty's Government have shown great commercial sense. I do not know whether the First Secretary of State, who has just arrived, thought that it was in the interests of our balance of payments that we should get in before the Kuwaitis or any other oil exporting country; that we had to get in first or the National Plan would be in jeopardy. I do not think that this nicely calculated less or more, this cynical argument that unless we deliver the oil somebody else will, allows one to forget the morality of the fact that we are responsible for Rhodesia, and that it is a British Government who now want to supply British owned oil on the basis that if we do not somebody else might.
  Then there is what might be called the humanitarian argument—"Yes, but some of it might go to Zambia". That is quite correct. Has anybody asked President Kaunda what his view is? Has anybody suggested that President Kaunda is not prepared to make every conceivable sacrifice to bring down the Smith régime? Has anybody suggested that Her Majesty's Government would of course like to turn this ship back but they feel that they must have some regard for the susceptibilities of the President of Zambia? Are they trying to hide behind him?
  President Kaunda has shown great courage, and not only in dealing with extremism in his own country. He has faced great difficulties and been under great pressures, and if he had given in he might now be the centre of a cold war in Africa. He has shown great skill and courage in resisting these pressures. On the other hand, he knows that sanctions could ultimately destroy the economic: life of Zambia. Yet he has said that he is prepared to face all the consequences of sanctions. He wants no special treatment for Zambia. Do not let us think that it is because of President Kaunda that we are trampling on our own principles.
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  It may be that we have not given adequate consideration to the question of shipping oil through Lake Tanganyika, or that we have not given adequate consideration to an air oil-lift, and that must do a lot of thinking very fast; that the roads from Tanzania into Zambia must be improved, and that we have to have a crash programme. All these things are proper considerations. It may be that it will be very expensive to underpin the economy of Zambia, but principles are assessed not by their cost but by their value.
  That was why I deplored the efforts of some people in this House to sell their principles for a packet of Woodbines. Fortunately that stage has been passed. We no longer hear any complaints about the intended tobacco sanctions. Of course this operation will be expensive. It will be expensive for our people, and it will be expensive to maintain the economy of Zambia. But are we to go on to say that it is too expensive for us to support? Are we really going to say that we must deliver oil to Rhodesia because if we do not somebody else might'? Are we really going to say that we must go into the mad economic scramble of the capitalist system, which I thought that many hon. Members opposite deplored? Is that what is now suggested?
  In my submission, if this ship is not turned back it will symbolise to the African countries and to almost every country in the world the fact that Britain is not determined to bring down this régime; that it is prepared to compromise and to temporise, and to hide behind facile arguments. There is an issue of principle here, and I say to the Prime Minister that even if this means that the unity that has so far existed in this House is shattered—even if the Tory Right wing mounts a campaign throughout this country—it is far better that the right hon. Gentleman should stick to his guns and do what is right than that he should try to compromise on principles with those who are not prepared to accept those principles as worth defending.
  This is the acid test: deliver this 12,000 tons of crude oil to Beira and the nine African members of the Commonwealth will be satisfied that we are not determined to bring down this régime—and face all the consequences, one of which

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  is that the idea of a multiracial Commonwealth will have to be scrapped and that instead there will be a white club. If that is what we want, that is the price that we are going to have to pay. But if we do as President Johnson did, when he said "Although these 6,000 tons of sugar are on their way to America I will not take them. I will turn round the ship," we will have shown that we are determined to bring down this régime by economic measures.
  If these economic measures fail we may have to contemplate what I believe could be a bloody war. It is because I want to avoid war and bloodshed, and because I believe the people want to avoid war and bloodshed, which could bring only misery to all the races in Rhodesia, that the economic sanctions must be effective. This is a case in which the Government must act.
  7.24 p.m.
  Mr. Michael Foot: This debate has arisen suddenly, but nobody can complain on that account, because one of the virtues of the House of Commons is that it has a certain flexibility. It is right that we should express our gratitude to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) for raising the issue, and included in our thanks should be the Ministers for having come here at such short notice. I do not know what dinners we have interrupted, but I am sure that the Ministers are much more profitably employed listening to us than they would be anywhere else. We are very grateful to them for coming along, although it is their duty to attend the House of Commons when matters arise here, since this is the most important function that they have to discharge.
  Although the debate has arisen suddenly, I agree with the concluding words of the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) that we are discussing an extremely serious matter. I believe that in the general discussions about Rhodesia, not so much in this House as in the country at large, people are not yet fully aware how far-ranging are the issues involved. I believe that one service that this debate can perform is to help to awaken people to a recognition of how deep are the issues at stake in the whole Rhodesian controversy, and how
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  necessary it is for us to apply our minds to them.
  I read the headline in the Daily Mirror yesterday quoting an interview with the Prime Minister and saying "No Invasion. No Bloodshed". I dare say that we would all like the situation to arise in which there was no invasion and no bloodshed—but nobody can guarantee that. The Prime Minister cannot, nor can anyone else. The events that are taking place in Africa are, unfortunately, not all within our control. We may wish that they were, but they are not. They can travel very much further, and we must therefore consider the best measures that we can take to avoid bloodshed and the spreading of bloodshed in Africa.
  The issues are extremely important, and the more the country is aware of them the better. The right place for these matters to be debated is the House of Commons. I therefore first of all want to add something to what has been said by the hon. Member for Devon, North, about the background to the oil sanctions. I hope that we may have from the Government a clearer statement of their attitude to an oil embargo. We have not had a clear statement from them on this subject.
  Before 11th November the Government must surely have considered the developments that would occur if Mr. Smith went ahead with his unilateral declaration of independence. We knew that that was always a possibility. Therefore, prior to 11th November, the Government must have made some examination of the kind of sanctions which would be effective. Before 11th November there must have been some estimate in the Government Departments of what status an oil embargo would have among all the other sanctions, and what steps would be necessary to make it effective. Some thought must have been given to the question of which countries would have to be approached. Before 11th November there must have been documents dealing with the subject in various Government Departments.
  On 11th November, when the Prime Minister made his first announcement, he said:
  "As for the economic sanctions, I think that it will be right for us to concentrate on trying to get other nations to follow our lead rather

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  than seeing them get too far ahead of us."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th November, 1965; Vol. 720, c. 361.]
  He did not mention oil sanctions at the time, but oil sanctions must have been a consideration. Even if the Government thought that they would be very difficult they must have known that the question of oil sanctions would be raised at the United Nations at a fairly early date. The Government have had a long time since 11th November to make up their mind about oil sanctions.
  What happened when the issue came before the United Nations? There was strong pressure by various nations to include oil sanctions among the sanctions which should be pressed. The hon. Member for Devon, North has quoted the United Nations resolution. Of course, there was a debate before the resolution. What happened in the debate was that the British Government urged upon the other countries that instead of including the exact reference to the oil embargo in the resolution, a study group should be set up to examine the question of an oil embargo. That was the British Government's attitude then, although they were not able to press that view because they apparently had little support from the other countries. Then the British Government not merely did not vote against the resolution but supported it, even though it was carried with arguments which the British Government did not entirely accept.
  However, that was the decision made on, I think, 21st November by the United Nations, a decision to which this country adheres. Ever since that date, several of us have been trying in the House to discover from the Government exactly what is happening about that United Nations resolution. On each occasion that the Prime Minister has answered Questions, Questions have been put to him about it, including the Question which I had on the Order Paper today. I asked the Government whether we should not be given some indication of the timing involved, of when they thought the discussions in the study group about these sanctions would take place, of what was the date they were aiming at and when they hoped to reach a conclusion on these matters.
  The Government have given us no indication at all. I should have thought
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  that, from every point of view, on every occasion that this question was asked of the Government, their answer should have been, "We wish to reach a conclusion in this matter as speedily as possible. We are taking urgent steps with all the diplomatic facilities open to us to try to get this embargo imposed as swiftly as possible. There are certain obstacles, but we want to overcome them." If the Government had answered in that fashion, it would have been much better and might have put in a different light their attitude towards the sailing of this ship.
  It appears to the House—certainly to me and, I should have thought, to anyone who has listened to the answers on this subject—that the Government have shown at any rate no great enthusiasm for proceeding with the oil embargo as swiftly as possible. That is most regrettable, for many reasons. Some of us wish to see these sanctions made speedily effective, but it is regrettable also because of the Government's desire to sustain support for their policies in Africa and elsewhere. If the Government had shown, ever since 11th November, that they were eager to get an oil embargo as swiftly as possible, they might have had less difficulty in some of their other controversies with African States.
  What I should like first of all from the Government is a much fuller statement than they have given so far of their general attitude to an oil embargo. Many of us who thought that the Government were proceeding much too slowly with the study of the oil embargo could hardly believe it when we read the report in the Sunday Times on Sunday about the sailing of the ship and the apparent attitude of the British Government to the whole proceedings.
  The report in the Sunday Times—some of us did not get our Sunday Times that Sunday but got it when we went out on Monday—not only gave the account of the ship sailing but also indicated, if not in so many words, that those responsible for the ship had taken all precautions before it sailed to try to make sure that they were acting in conformity with the desires of the British Government. I do not think that the Government have attempted to deny this, so it appears that the ship is sailing towards Rhodesia with

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  two weeks' supply of oil and with the full support of the British Government.
  I wonder what the Government really think will be the effect, not merely on their policy over an oil embargo but on their policy on other matters, if the ship gets through and no steps are taken about it. Do the Government really think that this will assist their diplomacy in dealing with the African States and others at the United Nations and in Africa? I read, in the same issue of the Sunday Times, a most interesting and, I believe, quite truthful account of an interview with President Kaunda, given to Nicholas Tomalin, in which President Kaunda expressed his attitude towards the British Government and his view of their dealings with Mr. Smith's régime generally.
  Those of us who have a great respect for President Kaunda, as, I am sure, the Commonwealth Secretary has, believe that one of the keys to the whole situation is how we are to make our policy conform to his desires. I do not mean that we have to agree to everything which he proposes, but the key lies in how we are to have a common policy with him. After all, he is the Commonwealth functionary most nearly concerned in the whole matter, and it must be the firm desire of the British Government to keep our policy and that of the Zambian Government in close alliance. If that is the case, the report of this interview made extremely melancholy reading for those of us who wish to keep the Commonwealth together and wish to see this business properly dealt with.
  President Kaunda expressed his doubts about the British Government's resolve in this matter. I should have thought that the British Government's desire would be to allay those doubts by every possible means. It may be said—it is, of course, an essential part of the debate—that, if the ship were stopped, this might create particular difficulties for Zambia itself. I think that the first answer to that point was given quite properly by the hon. Member for Devon, North—that we should be very interested to hear what President Kaunda himself has to say to that proposition.
  We should like to have a report to the House on what consultations have taken place with President Kaunda on this subject: whether he agrees with the policy
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  of the British Government over this ship, whether he has entered any dissent about it and whether he made any alternative proposals. We are entitled to have an indication, from the Commonwealth Secretary above all, about the view of the Zambian Government on this question——
  Sir Harmar Nicholls: Suppose that it proved to be correct after investigation that, on practical grounds, it would not be a good thing to stop the ship because it may injure the achievement of a unanimous decision of others to stop such ships too, and would injure Zambia. If the practical grounds on which the Government stood at Question Time were correct in their mind, does the hon. Member still think that they should ignore that in order to achieve this diplomatic effect?
  Mr. Foot: I am asking about three distinct matters, though the hon. Member for Peterborough (Sir Harmar Nicholls) may not be conscious of the fact. The first is the question which I am now discussing with the Commonwealth Secretary, the view of President Kaunda about whether this ship should be allowed to proceed. The second is whether, if the ship proceeds, it will or will not assist in a general embargo. The third is what will be the effect on Zambia's economy. I am dealing with the first question now, as to what is the Zambian Government's view of this ship being allowed to proceed——
  Sir Harmar Nicholls: The hon. Gentleman firmly asked whether the Government had considered the diplomatic effect which it would have on the African countries if they did not do something about it. Does he rate the diplomatic effect so high that he would ask the Government to disregard any practical considerations such as I put forward?
  Mr. Foot: The two matters would have to be balanced: one would have to be taken into account with the other. But we are, first of all, trying to sort out the facts. I am asking that the House should be given an account of President Kaunda's view on whether the ship should be allowed to proceed—and not only his view but that of the heads of some of the other Commonwealth countries. Since I believe that the other Commonwealth countries will be influenced in the whole

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  of this Rhodesian affair by what happens to the ship, I want to know what views have been given by those countries on this matter, because our view should be partly influenced—I do not say determined—by the views of other Commonwealth countries about it.
  Proceeding from that to the other question which the hon. Member for Peterborough raised, although it is obviously an aspect of the matter which must be raised anyway, I should have thought that the question which I put about the views of Her Majesty's Government on the effects of allowing the ship to continue raises, first, the important question of the attitude of the Persian Government. I say that because, as I understand it, the Persian Government refused to supply the oil originally. In other words, the Persian Government were abiding by the spirit of the United Nations resolution and it is to their credit, I should have thought, that they took that attitude. I should have equally thought that Her Majesty's Government would have been grateful to the Persian Government for taking that attitude. Indeed, the Prime Minister expressed some thanks at Question Time today.
  Therefore, what would be the effect on the Persian Government in future—and this has considerable importance on this matter, because the Persians can supply quite a lot of oil—towards their ban, they having refused to supply oil in this instance, and B.P. having gone elsewhere to get it, if the oil is delivered? I should have thought that the inevitable effect of the ship proceeding would be for the Persian Government to say, "We will not join in imposing sanctions in future. Why should we? We attempted to do so but Her Majesty's Government did not want us to proceed with them".
  We see, therefore, that another consequence of the ship proceeding might be for the Persian Government henceforth to say that they will continue to supply oil to people who bring their tankers in and who wish to take it to Southern Rhodesia. And will not the same apply to other countries? On that aspect, when one considers the question of getting common agreement to employ an embargo there would not appear to be much doubt that if the ship does go ahead the chances of getting an embargo later will be
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  infinitely reduced. If that is the case, this matter represents a serious policy issue. That is one reason why it is right that we should try to intervene.
  My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said today that he did not think that a gesture was of much importance in such matters. I should have thought that so complicated are the possibilities of getting an embargo that it is only by a series of gestures that one can make the embargo work at all. Only by getting a series of Governments to say, "We regard the United Nations resolution as being a matter of supreme governing importance" are we going to make it work. By allowing this ship to go ahead Her Majesty's Government are defying the United Nations resolution—or, at any rate, defying the spirit of it—and are, therefore, making it infinitely more difficult to get that resolution into effect later on.
  So I believe that this is a matter of such great importance that Her Majesty's Government should reconsider the whole of their attitude expressed on this subject and should, within the days which are left, come to the House of Commons—because I do not expect that we will get a full, fresh decision tonight; that is too much to expect, hopeful though we may be—and make a statement on this issue. It is only right that we should ask the Government to reconsider the whole matter afresh. They could make a statement to the House tomorrow, and I hope that this debate will show how widespread is the concern among hon. Members about the effect which the allowing of this ship to go through will have on the whole of our Rhodesian policy.
  The events which have taken place in the last few days, apart from the sailing of the ship, have, I believe, been greatly disturbing. We had a statement from the Prime Minister last week in which he said that we were taking further actions to enforce the sanctions against Rhodesia to make our attitude more effective. We were also told, in relation to the Kariba Dam, that in certain circumstances Her Majesty's Government could not stand idly by.
  I do not wish to probe into all the military details of these matters. I do not think that that would be proper. However, I must say that I was amazed when the official Opposition raised any objection to this proposition. I would

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  have understood it had the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) raised an objection. He has been against this policy since the beginning, even though he has not always voted against it. However, when the Leader of the Opposition protested, that was a rather different matter.
  We have had something even further than that. At the weekend we had the speech of the Leader of the Opposition carrying his objection to the Government's policies very much further. The right hon. Member for Preston, North has every reason to applaud the fact that his Leader is moving in his direction. I only wish that my Leader was moving in mine. The Leader of the Opposition, nailing his colours to the mast, said at the weekend in Bristol, "We would stand idly by". Is that really the policy of the official Opposition, whatever the Southern Rhodesians do; whatever they do to the dam for which we in the House of Commons are directly responsible now that we have taken powers under the Act, for which the right hon. Gentleman also voted? The Leader of the Opposition expressed the attitude that the official Opposition would stand idly by.
  Mr. Thorpe: I am listening with great interest and complete sympathy to everything the hon. Gentleman is saying. Would he not agree that one of the tragedies, if one is to place any credence on the interview which the Prime Minister gave to the Daily Mirror published on Monday, is that now the Prime Minister would himself stand idly by?
  Mr. Foot: Different interpretations may be placed on the Daily Mirror article. I hope very much that that was not the case and that the Prime Minister is not moving in that direction. It would be a very serious matter indeed if that were so.
  I am saying that nobody can doubt—whatever may be the interpretations placed on a Daily Mirror article—that what the Leader of the Opposition did at the weekend was to deliver a much stronger attack on the policy of the Government and to draw a deeper line of divergence between his policy and that of the Government than had been done previously.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: Which does my hon. Friend consider is the best way to preserve a power station—which is what we are talking about—fighting a battle over it or standing idly by?
  Mr. Foot: I understand that my hon. and learned Friend would have stood idly by from the beginning. He does not care what happens to the Commonwealth, to Southern Rhodesia.
  Mr. Paget: Answer the question.
  Mr. Foot: As the Prime Minister said in the House, there may be other ways of dealing with the dam. As I said, I am not going into the military ways in which it should be dealt with. I have held the view from the beginning that, in the last resort, military force would have to be employed if the Southern Rhodesia Government proceeded with their act of rebellion, but I know that my hon. and learned Friend takes the view that nothing should be done.
  Mr. Paget: I agree with the Prime Minister.
  Mr. Foot: Well, why is my hon. and learned Friend protesting against his policy?
  Mr. Paget: Only in this particular.
  Mr. Foot: I do not think that anyone can deny that the Leader of the Opposition made a strong attack at the weekend on what had been said by the Prime Minister about the dam. The Leader of the Opposition said, in effect, "We would standly idly by". He also said that the only way to solve this problem was by a process of conciliation. He did not exactly define on what there would be conciliation, but we were left to surmise it for ourselves—and I have little doubt that the policy of the Leader of the Opposition is not so different from that of the right hon. Member for Preston, North. They are both in favour of treating with Mr. Smith. They are both in favour of reopening negotiations with Mr. Smith—and so, I understand, is my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget).
  I am opposed to it. I am opposed to it, first of all, because it would tear the Commonwealth to pieces. We cannot have a British Commonwealth being maintained at all and have the Smith

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  régime, which is the fundamental issue. The right hon. Member for Preston, North called it a rebellion wrapped in the Union Jack; it is much more like a putsch under the emblem of the swastika, because it is imposing a police State on a country for which we are responsible.
  I know that many hon. Members and other people will say, "There are other police States—why do you not go and attack them?" The difference is that we in this House are directly responsible for Southern Rhodesia. We have assumed absolute authority, and I believe that when we do that we should exercise it. We should execute what we have done—and the right hon. Gentleman himself is implicated in that situation, because he did not vote against the taking of these powers. We are absolutely responsible for what happens in Southern Rhodesia, because we have assumed absolute powers in this House. Some may say that what was done was the wrong way to do it, but we have done it, and I am in favour of exercising those powers, and living up to our obligations to all the people of Rhodesia.
  If we can do it without bloodshed, so much the better, but if economic chaos is produced by effective economic sanctions we may get a moment when military forces have to go in. It is not right to disguise this from people. We must say it, so that people may understand the choice the country has to deal with. Of course, if the main operation can be done without bloodshed no one would like it better than I. If we are to do it, we must make the economic sanctions as swiftly and drastically effective as possible. How can it possibly be said that we are doing that when we are not even attempting to get an effective oil embargo? And how can it be said that we are trying to get an effective oil embargo if we let this ship go through?
  I therefore believe that the Government are faced with an extremely serious choice. If they stop the ship going through, it does not solve the problem. They have to go further. They have to take steps to get an effective oil embargo; take a whole series of other measures in order to execute the authority in Southern Rhodesia that this House has taken to itself. We have to face it,
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  because if we are not prepared to take these decisions—many of them very awkward decisions—we shall be responsible for establishing a new South Africa in British territory for which we are responsible.
  If this country, and particularly if a Labour Government under our aegis, were responsible for seeing the establishment of a new South Africa in South Rhodesia we would never be forgiven—we would have no right to be forgiven. If that were to occur, our whole reputation throughout Asia and Africa of Britain as a liberal Power would be destroyed. These are the kind of things that must weight in the balance when the Government apply their mind afresh to the question whether they are going to take effective action to deal with Southern Rhodesia, to deal with the embargo, and to deal with this ship.
  7.54 p.m.
  Mr. Edward M. Taylor: The hon. Members for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) and for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) have said that they are extremely grateful to the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) for raising this subject tonight. I do not honestly think that the hon. Gentleman has done a service to the House in having this matter discussed when the great majority of hon. Members are not here to take part in the discussion—[Interruption.]—or even to hear the arguments. It does not help us to solve the problem, or even to look for a solution, when we have a discussion like this with a good number of hon. Members unaware that the discussion is taking place.
  I am convinced that the main reason why this subject has been raised at all is, first of all, that it gives those on the Government side who disagree fundamentally with their Government's own policy an opportunity to have a full discussion, to express their disagreements, to criticise the Government and then, at the end of the day, not to have to voice their disagreement with the Government by voting against their own party. It has sickened me to see in this Chamber, time and time again, the same people on that side tearing their own Government to ribbons, yet not having the guts and the courage to say, "I disagree with this"—
  Mr. Paul B. Rose: Will the hon. Gentleman tell us how many on his own side followed him into the Division Lobby the other day?
  Mr. Taylor: The only thing I can deduce from that event is that I was the only member of my party who felt in that precise way that it was wrong in principle to have an Enabling Bill on these lines. Many people may share some aspects of my views on Rhodesia, but I am convinced after discussing the matter with many of my hon. Friends, that I was the only one who felt that way. But that in no way answers my challenge, and the hon. Member who has just interrupted me is just as guilty as many others of his hon. Friends in regard to many other issues where there is fundamental disagreement. In particular, the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale says that if a new South Africa were to be established on British territory—and, in particular, by a Labour Government—we would never be forgiven. The hon. Gentleman did not say what he and his hon. Friends would do about it if a new South Africa were established on British territory, and by a Labour Government. That is the first reason why hon. Members opposite are glad to have this present discussion.
  Their second reason is that in dealing with this slow, tedious, tortuous problem which, in the way we are going, will unquestionably take months or years to be concluded, we have in this one little ship a wonderful opportunity to bring the whole thing to a dramatic climax and say, "Here is the point of no return. Here is the point at which the fundamental decision can be made." It has been made quite clear by the Government, and admitted by those who have spoken tonight, that if this ship is turned back and sent elsewhere it will make no practical difference whatsoever to this Southern Rhodesia problem. More ships are to go. If the supplies do not come from this ship, they will come from other countries and from other ships. We are, therefore, discussing something that will make no practical difference to the real physical problem of Southern Rhodesia.
  It is quite clear to me that we are being asked to indulge in a massive act of international public relations to tell the world where we allegedly stand. Here,
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  again, we have the same point of view put forward by hon. Members opposite that we want to show the world something, without thinking of the consequences of what we are doing or whether it will ultimately be helpful to an amicable solution. After tonight, no one on the Government side of the House should ever have the impertinence to talk about disagreement on this side. Once again, it has been completely shown that there is a fundamental split on that side.
  Certain questions were raised by hon. Members opposite, and one was on the effect on Zambia. It was asked whether President Kaunda had been asked if he would agree to this ship being turned back, and what he would say if he were asked. It is quite clear what he would say in the present climate of opinion, particularly after the meeting of the Organisation for African Unity. He would probably say, "Go ahead and stop the ship". Nevertheless, I suggest that if President Kaunda and the other Prime Ministers who might be directly involved were asked, quietly and sincerely, what they really thought and not what they felt the world wanted to hear from them, they might have other views, because African leaders like that are essentially concerned with their own people, and bringing peace, security and harmony to their own countries; and, although such matters as this can influence their public announcements, I am sure that, were they asked the question privately and without all this great clamour, their answer might be different.
  The suggestion is that a great international storm might develop if we turned the ship back. I respectfully suggest that, were it not for the storm created in the House at Question Time today and this evening, this matter would not have had anything like the international significance which it now has.
  We are asked to indulge in a gallant act of international public relations.
  Mr. Norman Buchan: As there has been a unanimous United Nations resolution and a great number of States in Africa have taken an extremely strong line in this situation, what on earth does the hon. Gentleman mean by saying that, if it were not for what we were doing, there would not be an international storm?
  Mr. Taylor: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman can deny that, while the question of oil sanctions is an international matter taking up the time and attention of statesmen throughout the world, tie dramatic significance of this one little ship has been raised in the House today and its significance would not have had that dramatic intensity if hon. Members had not created it themselves.
  We must consider this matter in the light of the whole policy of sanctions which the Government are supporting. Certain Facts which have come to light within the past few days and weeks should make us think seriously about what the Government's policy has actually achieved and what it is likely to achieve. Before we take any further measures of sanctions along the glorious path of cutting off all supplies to Rhodesia, we should consider the effect of what we do.
  First, can our actions be effective when we have no assurance from nations as great as France, Spain, Japan, Portugal and South Africa about what their attitude will be? There is no real point in our pressing ahead with these particular sanctions unless, as the Prime Minister has said, we are convinced that they will work.
  Mr. Archie Manuel: It is time the House knew exactly where the hon. Gentleman stands on the question of Southern Rhodesia. What is his policy? Does he believe in any sanctions at all, or is he trying to ride two horses and to please the Right wing of his own party that he wants to crawl to by appearing to support Mr. Smith whenever he can?
  Mr. Taylor: The House will not be very interested in my personal views. That is to give them a significance and importance which they do not have. But I hope to have the opportunity, before I sit down, to say what I think should be done. It has been a great pleasure to me to see that the Government themselves seem to be moving largely in the direction which I should like them to follow.
  I cannot see the need or justification for going ahead with a policy of sanctions simply to satisfy the souls and consciences of hon. Members opposite if such
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  a policy will not achieve the object which they desire. It is clear, on the question of oil sanctions and this ship in particular, that there will be no successful result, or no kind of result that the Government want, if we do not have the co-operation of States which can make a real and practical contribution to the economy of Southern Rhodesia.
  What is worrying hon. Members opposite is that sanctions do not seem to be working and that they will take too long to bite—far too long from their point of view. Hon. Members opposite want to see things come to a dramatic conclusion, but it is more than clear that, if we follow this policy, there will be no dramatic conclusion. It will be a slow, tedious and miserable business involving a great deal of suffering.
  One question which has not been answered is what will be the effect of a policy of sanctions on Zambia and Malawi. We are told that we could organise an airlift which would take out 20,000 tons of copper and bring in millions of gallons of oil. Is this a feasible proposition? Can the Secretary of State or someone else assure us that this whole matter has been thought out carefully, has been costed, and is regarded as practicable? If there is complete severance of trade and economic ties between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia, can it be done?
  Mr. Paget: The hon. Gentleman has forgotten the flying in of coal.
  Mr. Taylor: Coal has not been mentioned at all, but I understand that the coal used in Zambia comes from the Wankie colliery in Southern Rhodesia. However, no one has explained how this coal is to get from Southern Rhodesia to Zambia.
  Mr. Thorpe: Is the hon. Gentleman in favour of sanctions only if they are likely to be effective, or does he feel that we should not have sanctions unless we have the good will and support of South Africa and Portugal? Is that his argument?
  Mr. Taylor: Certainly not. I was trying to point out that, as at present organised, sanctions will not work and, moreover, if they work only in certain directions, we shall bring misery and distress to many people not for weeks or a few months but for a long time. We

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  should think more about the human suffering which will be involved and we should not get our standards mixed.
  Mr. Stan Newens: Does the hon. Gentleman wish the Smith régime to be brought down or does he wish it to survive? Are his real considerations for the Zambians and others or for the Smith régime and its ability to survive? If the hon. Gentleman supports the Smith régime, why not come out and say so, instead of putting forward hypocritical ideas about the people of Zambia and the misery which might be inflicted on them?
  Mr. Taylor: It is quite delightful to hear allegations of hypocrisy and the rest. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] I am taking up far too much time, largely because of the interruptions, but I shall give an indication on that matter before I sit down.
  We should remember how greatly values are being changed. The extreme Left wing of the Labour Party, which has been calling for cuts in the whole of our defence expenditure, now says that we should think in terms of sending troops to Rhodesia. The same people who call for massive reductions in military and aircraft expenditure now call for a vast airlift to aid Zambia. Where would the aeroplanes come from if their demands had been granted? The same people who call for peace in Vietnam because of distress and suffering there do not seem to think of the distress and suffering which might well result from the policy of sanctions. Moreover, no one seems to remember that in the Sudan now more people are being killed daily than in the Vietnam war.
  We should reconsider our whole policy, particularly on the question of whom we should negotiate with and when. I say this particularly in the light of certain matters which have been brought out in the past few days with reference to the negotiations which actually took place. I am becoming more and more convinced that these negotiations did not take place in good faith. It is becoming clear that either the Prime Minister and his representatives were saying different things in different places at different times or the negotiations did not, in fact, take place in good faith.
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  We say that, first, because, just before the election, in a letter to Dr. Mutasa, the Prime Minister clearly stated,
  "The Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the Government there remains under the control of a white minority."
  What happened when negotiations actually started? That letter was more than clear, and I do not think that anyone has tried to deny it. Why, then, in all the negotiations and the exchanges of letters, did the Prime Minister consistently refuse to face this question or answer it directly?
  Mr. David Ennals: Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that the Prime Minister was wrong to make any concession during the course of negotiations or exchanges with Mr. Smith?
  Mr. Taylor: Certainly not, but there is a great deal of difference between concessions over a long period of time, having said on 2nd October, 1964, that independence would be given only on the basis of majority rule, and saying only one month later, in a letter of 27th November, when the point had been raised by Mr. Smith,
  "We have an open mind on the timing of independence".
  It is one thing to make concessions over a long period, but it is quite another thing to change one's point of view within a period of one month.
  On 21st September, when Mr. Smith again tried to get a firm commitment on this, what was said was:
  "I give a clear undertaking that we have an open mind on the timing of independence."
  Time and time again this has been repudiated.—Only this morning we had a report—not confirmed, I admit—that it was said clearly in public by Mr. Smith in Salisbury that he has heard of discussions which took place between Mr. Garfield Todd and the British Prime Minister in which it was alleged that the Prime Minister was playing for time and simply stringing Mr. Smith along. If that was so, and the Prime Minister had a firm commitment in his own mind that independence would be given only on the basis of majority rule, can we think that our record is an honourable one if months of negotiation went on when this whole point of view was completely changed and the Prime Minister was allegedly discussing the whole question of independence

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  in good faith? We should have regard to this particularly when considering the responsibility for U.D.I.
  This is one point initially on which I disagree violently with certain hon. Members opposite. It is the point of where the responsibility lies for U.D.I. It rests primarily on Mr. Smith for taking it, but it also rests upon the negotiations in which one side appears to have been negotiating from a position of bad faith, and it also rests to some serious degree on the African Nationalist leaders who, after welcoming the 1961 Constitution, refused to co-operate or to operate it.
  What should be our aim? Essentially, it should be to try to get to a situation whereby we can have gradual progress towards majority rule. Are our present policies going to achieve that in any way? They certainly do not seem to, judging by what has happened in the last few weeks. There has been a hardening of opinion in Southern Rhodesia backing up Mr. Smith, and even those alleged moderate elements who were supposed to be against his policies now seem to be backing him in face of what they consider to be a national emergency. The British Government were hoping that the people in Southern Rhodesia would stand up and indicate that they did not agree. Apart from some dubiety about the point of view of judges and apart from two policemen who appear to have come back to this country, there have been no mass resignations from the general, main stream of support for Mr. Smith. It seems if anything——
  Mr. Rose: What about the five Catholic bishops who made a statement on Rhodesia? Does not the hon. Gentleman include these as being with the main stream?
  Mr. Taylor: There have been individual citizens who have done this sort of thing. I have mentioned some, and the hon. Gentleman has mentioned others. However, I think it would be agreed that the British Government expected that on the basis of the opposition against Mr. Smith before U.D.I. a far more substantial body of opinion would have expressed itself as against his policies.
  Mr. Ennals: Would not the hon. Gentleman recognise that not only before
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  U.D.I. but since U.D.I. Mr. Smith's régime has tightened up the pressures upon every conceivable form of opposition and has created what is tantamount to a police state? Can he expect the sort of opposition that one would find in a free country to exist in the circumstances that he knows well now exist in Rhodesia?
  Mr. Taylor: I am afraid that I am taking up too much of the time of the House on these quesions, and I apologise for that. I intend to make the points that I had proposed to make. But, this point having been put to me, I suggest that as before U.D.I., in the future when the emergency disappears, no matter what Government is in charge, there will be more opportunity for freedom of expression in Southern Rhodesia than in many other countries in Africa. On the other hand, can we expect that when a Government have made a unilateral declaration of independence and are surrounded by régimes which are hostile to them, threatened with international violence and constantly thinking in terms of the danger of terrorism—from which they suffered before U.D.I.—it would not be reasonable for them in that situation, if they wanted to continue as the de facto Government, to take emergency powers? It is obvious that such a Government would.
  The hon. Member for Central, Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel) asked what I want and what I stand for. It is completely and absolutely essential that we should stop Southern Rhodesia going into the South African camp. I am convinced that the trend of our present policies is driving Southern Rhodesia in that direction. I believe that they will not surrender at any time. I cannot see them giving up so long as there is a possibility of their carrying on on their own. It is not easy in a country like Southern Rhodesia, when one has a small minority living at a high economic level, to ask it readily to accept the principle of majority rule if there appears to be a choice. On the other hand, there is an inherent decency. I believe, in all the people out there, and I believe that unless they are presented with only one alternative they will opt for majority rule as an ultimate aim. I believe that our present policies will drive them into South Africa's arms. I do not think that South Africa would be happy about having immediate majority rule proposed

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  in Southern Rhodesia just over its borders. Obviously, South Africa would take measures, admittedly as quietly as possible, to prop up the Smith régime.
  What we must do is to find some means whereby the principles of majority rule as the ultimate aim established in the 1961 Constitution can be made a reality. I recognise that the present policies will not operate in that way. Say we do overturn the Smith régime, as some hon. Members appear to think we can do, although I think that it would take at least 18 months. What do we do after that? Are we prepared to say that we will not insist on majority rule now? Of course, we say that, because the Prime Minister has indicated it, saying that we start off from the 1961 Constitution with some amendments to take account of the five principles. What will this mean? It will mean that the same body of opinion represented in the Rhodesian Front will be re-elected to office under the new arrangements. I believe that this will happen. On the other hand, say we insist on majority rule. This would be a straightforward practical answer. But the British Government do not say that. They say that they want gradual progress towards majority rule. I suggest that if we have that we shall have the same set-up after Mr. Smith has been overturned as at the present time.
  I should like to see us trying by negotiations—with anyone in any circumstances—to return to a situation whereby Southern Rhodesia can come back into the Commonwealth, perhaps as though nothing had happened. It is very easy to say that this is a silly point of view and that it might not work. But what I can say in all sincerity is that I am convinced that the obvious result of what the British Government are doing will be to make Southern Rhodesia follow the immediate policies of the South African régime.
  What would my suggestion mean in practical terms? It would, in effect, mean that we should put an end to our sanctions policy for a short period and send out a group of people to reside with the Governor, who is in our eyes and the eyes of the world the legal representative of the British Government in Southern Rhodesia, and put out feelers to see whether the effect of our ending our sanctions policy would be that Southern
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  Rhodesia would be prepared to come back to the path of legal government. If we remain in the present situation where neither Mr. Smith nor the British Prime Minister will budge, we shall not get anywhere. Someone has to make the first move.
  I suggest that in sending out a deputation to reside with the Governor we should not be recognising the Smith régime and not going back on any of our principles. I believe that it would have a real chance of success. I feel that the de facto Government in Southern Rhodesia must be terrified about the consequences of the policies which are at present being applied in Central Africa. Apart from that, I believe that they have a deep-rooted will and wish to remain united or associated with the British Commonwealth. In these circumstances, I am convinced that my suggestion would be well worth trying. At the present time our policies can only lead to two clear alternatives—the continuation of the Smith régime and its association with South Africa, or else it will inevitably lead to a blood bath. I cannot see any other course at the present time.
  For these reasons, we should look again at our policies. We are justified in doing so in the light of the correspondence about the Prime Minister's negotiations en the Rhodesian problem. Enough has been established to say that perhaps we made some mistakes, that perhaps some of our motives were wrong—that perhaps we made a small mistake, just as Rhodesia has made a great mistake.
  Mr. Cyril Bence: Does not the hon. Gentleman appreciate that the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) tried to do that for years and failed? The present Prime Minister was trying to do the same and he failed. If what the hon. Gentleman suggests takes place, and Mr. Smith and those who support him still refuse to give way on the 1961 Constitution, what will he do then?
  Mr. Taylor: It is easy to call these people traitors and rebels and threaten to send in troops. That was precisely what was done by the Government and that was a great mistake. The hon. Gentleman says that this has been tried time and again, but no Prime Minister from

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  this party has ever negotiated or appeared to negotiate from a position of bad faith. In particular, I cannot envisage any circumstances in which my right hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) would ever negotiate from a position of bad faith.
  What I am trying to explain is that these relevations about what happened in the negotiations are adequate justification for us to be prepared to admit that perhaps we have made some mistakes and that we are prepared to take this initial step which might result in a settlement which might prevent a South African-type régime in Rhodesia or the prospect of a blood bath that would affect all Africa.
  8.22 p.m.
  Mr. Stanley Orme: We have had an illuminating outline from the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor). First of all, he complained about my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) initiating this debate. Then he took up 30 minutes of it. He attacked certain hon. Members on this side of the House but he failed to stand up to the direct question put to him. Does he or does he not support Smith? He has not given an answer. We have had from him much about appeasement and suggestions for ways in which the British Government might try to crawl out of the present situation, but no direct answers.
  The debate has arisen at an opportune moment, at the very time when a B.P. tanker is traversing the waters of the Indian Ocean on its way to Beira. This is how we can, surely, in a democracy express our opinions to the Government and ask for certain actions and assurances. This tanker is being watched by the world. The British Government hold 51 per cent. of the B.P. shares, and are surely therefore in control of the tanker. We have a right to ask the Government in the name of their present policy towards Rhodesia to turn the tanker back. The Government have control of the company. If they have not, then there is something wrong with what we have been told about B.P.
  The momentum of the Rhodesian crisis is mounting. We are not 12 or 18 months from a solution. We are much nearer.
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  We are perhaps days from a solution if we step up the sanctions and the policy the Government have initiated. The stronger sanctions that have been taken by the Government have been whole heartedly supported on this side of the House and by the Opposition, though very much with tongue in cheek. Even so, many hon. Members opposite fully support these stronger actions. We are moving to the "crunch." with sanctions when we reach an oil embargo.
  Some months ago my hon. Friend the Member for Willesden, East (Mr. Freeson) asked the Prime Minister about oil sanctions against South Africa at the time when we cancelled the aircraft which were to have been sent to South Africa. The Prime Minister said that to implement oil sanctions on a modern nation was tantamount to declaring war on it. This is where we are moving now in relation to Rhodesia. We have to take this step. Those hon. Members who continually challenge hon. Members on this side of the House as to whether or not we are in favour of force know that our answer is that we should make the sanctions strong enough and swift enough to overthrow the Smith régime without resorting to force. That is the crux of the matter.
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations has had a very tough job under trying conditions. He is attempting to maintain the situation. But we have had indications from Persia and elsewhere that other nations are prepared to implement the sanctions. I hope that, if he cannot answer tonight, then the Prime Minister will be able to tell us tomorrow that oil sanctions are to be imposed and that we shall try to make them work. The way to do so is to put a blockade on Beira Port.
  I see that the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) has now gone. He nods his head and says, "Hear, hear", but does not get up and say what he would do. He was one of the leaders of the Suez rebels. He was the person who believed in gunboat supremacy. Last week the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) spoke very strongly against stepping up the action against Smith. But other quarters of the world are in favour of any action

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  to see that the policy he attacks is brought to a successful conclusion. Because it happens to involve Smith and a White Rhodesian minority, the hon. Gentleman is not prepared to go that far.
  The hon. Member for Cathcart talked about splitting and dividing the white Rhodesians. What about the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia? That is the issue which has the whole of Africa and Asia in turmoil. The British Government have to take firm control, for Rhodesia is our territory. Does anybody believe that if the Smith régime did not have a modern air force and a modern army equipped with modern weapons, we would not have moved into Rhodesia on 11th November when U.D.I. came? It is the possibility of using arms against a well-armed minority which is worrying people.
  Not many debates are held in such a dramatic form. If the Government believe that oil sanctions and other sanctions which I welcome are essential and are the answer to the problem, they must turn back this tanker, irrespective of what other tankers are coming and from where. We can settle that when the final decision is taken about the blockade and other action.
  My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations last week was in Zambia negotiating with Kenneth Kaunda. He has met many African leaders and we have all heard the rumblings from the African Continent about relations with Britain. I believe that my right hon. Friend is trying to hold a balance and to maintain a multi-racial Commonwealth—and there is no Commonwealth which is not multiracial. The world is not on an East-West axis, but on a North-South axis. We have to come to terms with people whatever the colour of their skins and we have to remember that coloured peoples constitute two-thirds of the world's population. How can we allow a tiny minority to twist our arm and flout, the changes of the twentieth century?
  We have seen an indication from the Smith régime that the initial sanctions are beginning to hurt—a very good sign. The Rhodesians are having to tighten their belts, and the Smith régime is trying to convince them and to bolster them up
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  with stories about our attacking pensioners and is saying what it will do about that. Our first actions are beginning to be felt, and the quicker we take other steps, the quicker will the Smith régime be overthrown. After what has happened, how can any hon. Member talk of negotiating with Smith and his Cabinet? Yet that is what the official Opposition are hankering for. A letter in The Times this morning is an example of the way in which the trend is going and I hope that my right hon. Friends will have no truck with these people.
  The debate is timely and important. We are asking the Government to step up the actions which they have already taken. If they do, in a matter of days we could see the end of the Smith régime, and that is what we want.
  8.33 p.m.
  Mr. Eldon Griffiths: As the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) has referred to my statements of last week, it might be permissible for me to put two things on the record. I hate racialism, and I have lived in a society in the United States where I have seen it in action perhaps a little more closely than the hon. Member has. There is no more obscene thing in human history than the application to a man, because of the colour of his skin, of the character of inferiority and I reject it and I hope that the hon. Member will accept my rejection. But, secondly, I hate war and in what he has said this evening the hon. Gentleman has seemed to suggest that, in order to stamp out the evil of racialism, he is prepared to espouse the evil of war.
  I do not see the equation so easily as that. I find it more complex, more delicate and more difficult, and it is for that reason that I sympathise—and I do not find that easy—with the position in which the Prime Minister and the Government find themselves this evening.
  The House is debating in the dark. There are facts which are known to the Government but not known to us about where the tanker is and precisely the reasons why it is difficult for the Government to interfere with its deliveries. Until we have heard those facts, we are not in a position to judge and I very much regret that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who has been

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  sitting on the Front Bench, has not felt it to be his duty to intervene in the debate and provide us with the facts about which we are debating. Until we know what the facts are and what is in the Government's mind, we are beating about in the dark. I very much regret that the Government have not seen fit to intervene in the debate, and put the House in possession of facts upon which it could make a judgment.
  This debate has moved into a general debate upon the Prime Minister's handling of the situation and I should like to add my thanks to those who have made the debate possible. In the handling of this delicate and dangerous situation the Prime Minister has got himself, and this country, into very grave difficulties. [AN HON. MEMBER: "Rubbish."] He has placed himself in the position of a wasp in a jampot, and the more he flaps about the more he is covered with difficulty and is incapable of moving.
  If there is any doubt about that let me point to two things which he has done. He has succeeded in having himself attacked by the white racialists who support Mr. Smith and by the black nationalists who oppose Mr. Smith. He is in a position where, in this House, he is attacked from the extreme Left and from the extreme Right. It takes genius to achieve this. The reason, I regret to say, is that the Prime Minister has spoken out of both sides of his mouth, and he has continued to do so. He began by saying that there should not be punitive action against Rhodesia, and the party on this side of House gave him its support on that basis. Only last week we had the punitive action over pensions. At the beginning he also said that force was ruled out. Now, in the Prime Minister's own words, there has been an intimation that force is not ruled out. He has spoken out of both sides of his mouth.
  One day he talks of an olive branch, and says that we are now going to have a new peace initiative. This was said within 24 hours of screwing up the sanctions as far as they could go and using this intimation of force. I do not complain that the right hon. Gentleman should follow either of these policies, but I wish that he would not follow them both together and expect the House of Commons to believe that he is being consistent, because quite plainly he is not.
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  We need to try to define what is common ground between both sides of the House over policy in Rhodesia. I would define the correct policy as an attempt to get that unhappy country back on the road towards a multiracial democracy, with safeguards for the white minority under the rule of law.
  If that is the objective that we are seeking, we have to measure everything which the Government do in terms of whether it is likely to be effective in achieving that result. That is the purpose of the House examining the Government's Rhodesian policy. We are told that the Commonwealth is likely to be broken up. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) both made much of this point. It may be so, but where is the threat to the Commonwealth coming from? It is coming mainly, I regret to say, from the African States themselves.
  It was not in this House that the threat to break up the Commonwealth arose. It arose in Addis Ababa at the meeting of the Organisation for African Unity. I regret this, but the Organisation has put down an ultimatum saying that unless this Government have crushed the Smith régime by 15th December they will break off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and leave the Commonwealth. Is there a Member of this House who seriously believes that that is a responsible way for a Government to act? I think that it is a measure only of the immaturity of those Foreign Ministers gathered in Addis Ababa that they were prepared to make that threat. Not an hon. Gentleman opposite will say that it was a responsible statement.
  Mr. Newens: Does not the hon. Gentleman agree that the attitude taken by many back bench Members on his own side of the House has greatly contributed to the attitude being taken by the African States to which he has referred?
  Mr. Griffiths: The Commonwealth has a long history, and it is extraordinary to me that any hon. Member should believe that it is responsible for a member Government to threaten this country with ultimatums on the ground of something which it may have heard in the House of Commons and not liked. [HON. MEMBERS: "Answer the question."] I am

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  answering the question. The answer is very precise. I do not accept that it is responsible for any Commonwealth Government to give ultimatums and to threaten to march out of the Commonwealth because of something which may have been said in the House of Commons or anywhere else. The interests of the Commonwealth are much greater than that.
  To that kind of irresponsible ultimatum there can be only one answer from a British Government, and it is an answer which we may have to regret. The Commonwealth is founded, above all else, on mutual acceptance of differences in our society. We do not like many of the things in other Commonwealth nations. I did not like the killings which accompanied the recent election in Western Nigeria, or the refusal of India and Pakistan to negotiate over Kashmir, and I do not like the dictatorship in Ghana. But this does not mean that I propose that we should immediately intervene or force them to bend to our will.
  If the Commonwealth is founded on anything, it is founded on mutual respect for differences. Therefore, our answer to this ultimatum from the African States must be this: "If you do not like the policy of the British Government, and if you propose to go all the way and to move out of the Commonwealth because we are not prepared to do what we believe would be disastrous in Central Africa—if you press the ultimatum on us for that reason—then on your head be it".
  Mr. Will Griffiths: I understand and sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman said about Western Nigeria and Ghana and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries of the Commonwealth. But, in drawing this analogy with Rhodesia, it must have escaped the hon. Gentleman's notice that we are directly responsible for Rhodesia.
  Mr. Griffiths: I was not dealing with our responsibility at the moment. I accept that. I am simply making a reply tc the ultimatum delivered by the African States. They are saying to us, "You must do in Rhodesia what we ask of you, namely, go to war". The British Government with the support of this House, have decided that they are not willing to go
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  to war over Rhodesia. On that point, the African States are saying, "If you do not go to war, if you do not do what you yourselves believe to be disastrous, we shall quit the Commonwealth." To that we can give only one answer, namely, that it is an irresponsible ultimatum, that we do not accept it and that we are not prepared, in the Prime Minister's words, to be pushed around in that fashion. We must make our decisions in the areas of our responsibility, which include Rhodesia. I take the hon. Member's point.
  The constitutional lawyers, above all else, have got us into a most absurd position over Rhodesia. The House is being asked to follow policies which many of us, perhaps most of us, doubt will work, against a Prime Minister whom we do not recognise but who has all the real power, on behalf of a Governor whom we all admire but who does not even have a telephone. By any measure this is absurd. It is not of our choosing, but that is the position, and it is because of the illogicality of the British position that we seem to have got lost. We have lost our purpose there.
  I come back to what I said. It is our purpose in Rhodesia to try to restore this unhappy land to the path of multiracial democracy. Of course, we want that, but I do not believe that we can achieve it unless we provide for the white minority as well as for the African majority a reasonable safeguard for their future. That was what U.D.I. was all about. It was about the fact that most of the white people in Rhodesia had fears for their future. Some of them are racialists—I have no truck with them—and others are ordinary British people. Whatever they be, they were fearful that Her Majesty's Government might be pushing Rhodesia too rapidly into the state of African democracy that has led in so many other countries to chaos. That was their fear.
  If we are seeking to resolve this matter and to attract the moderates whom we are told so much about, we have above all to tackle the problem of their fear for the future. I believe that the ways in which the Government have tackled the situation have so far proved themselves to be ineffective. If I believed that economic action against Mr. Smith would

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  bring the result which we all hope to achieve, I should support it to the hilt. If I believed that force would achieve the purpose which I have defined, I would support it to the hilt. My doubt is whether it will be effective. [An HON. MEMBER: "What does the hon. Member support?"] I will support what is effective in achieving our purpose. I have defined this purpose many times. I will come presently to the policy that I propose.
  The consequential actions that followed U.D.I. had the support of both sides of the House. The cutting off of Smith from the sterling area and the Commonwealth connection had the support of this House. Where we are getting into different ground is where we seek to find whether the actions that hon. Members opposite are proposing now will achieve the result we want.
  On the economic front, it is plain that we will not get a universal policy of sanctions against the Smith régime. We will not get it, because South Africa and Portugal have lined themselves up against it. To that extent, there is a gaping hole in any economic embargo that this country or its allies seek to impose. For that reason alone, it seems to me unlikely that the economic sanctions that the Government are imposing will work.
  There is, secondly, the fact of experience. The United States, with all its great power, imposed upon the tiny island of Cuba, 90 miles off its shore, the whole range of economic sanctions backed up by the power of the United States Navy. There was an island which had an economy just as precarious as that of Rhodesia. It had almost no trading partner and no common frontier, such as Rhodesia has. The result of two and a half years of tight economic squeeze on Cuba was simply to make Fidel Castro stronger than he had ever been before. Once again, therefore, one has to face the fact that on the record, this type of policy appears not to achieve the object which we wish to see.
  Then there is the third point. We assume that this policy, tightening the belt, producing unemployment, hunger, perhaps disease—this is what it means—will somehow or other make moderate men leave Mr. Smith, forsake him and come back to the British nest. I wish it were true, but I doubt it. I see no
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  evidence that unemployment, hunger, disease and a breakdown of the national economy will somehow restore these people to the British fold.
  I do not know what effect it will produce. It may well produce chaos. It has certainly produced suffering. There is no evidence on the record historically, however, that this will make those people forsake the Government which they have chosen and come back to the one they have thrown off.
  Mr. Scholefield Allen: I lived through the Abyssinia campaign. Mussolini declared that if an oil sanction had been imposed on Italy for a fortnight, he would have been on his back.
  Mr. Griffiths: Of what Mussolini may or may not have declared, I have no knowledge. I am looking at the facts as they exist. We have the facts over Cuba and China. The United States imposed upon the Communist Republic of China, year in year out, the tightest possible blockade and the result has been simply to fasten the grip of the Communists more tightly than ever on the people of China. That is not in doubt. I do not oppose economic sanctions if they will produce the result that we want to see, and it is for the Government to demonstrate that they will. But if they are not going to produce that result, one is entitled to be doubtful and sceptical, and I am both.
  Beyond that, what is the constructive policy that the Prime Minister is now edging his way into?
  Mr. Manuel: Will not the hon. Gentleman agree that the facts which he is quoting are historically wrong? He cites the case of China, but surely the great difference between China and Southern Rhodesia is that the mass of the people were behind the Communist régime in China and that is why they succeeded in the face of the massive American blockade.
  Mr. Griffiths: If the hon. Gentleman believes that, he can believe anything. Ten million people were executed by the Communists.
  I want briefly to detail some of the constructive arguments that I would ask the Government to consider. Having attacked the policies that the Prime Minister has been putting forward, it is

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  incumbent upon me to suggest an alternative approach.
  One would like to see the British Government offering the carrot of a conciliated settlement with extensive educational and economic advances, above all for the Africans in place of the stick of unconditional surrender which is virtually all that they can see in the Prime Minister's hand at the moment. [Interruption.] I will deal with the hon. Gentleman's point in the few remarks that I have yet to make.
  I am perfectly well aware that in the Prime Minister's conversations with Mr. Smith and in the offers of both the Conservative Government and the Labour Government there were extensive proposals for economic and educational advance. I think that that was what the hon. Gentleman sought to say, and I accept that. I know that the Prime Minister has reiterated it. I want to hear him reiterating it again and again, loudly and convincingly. I say that he has not done so. [Interruption.] I will deal with that point as well.
  I should like to see the British Government spell out a blueprint of how they see Rhodesia developing under British guidance over the next 10 or 15 years. Until we deal with the white population's fear of the future and the African population's ambition for the future we shall not get to the heart of the matter. I should like the Prime Minister to say that while we cannot recede in any way from the ultimate idea of one man, one vote—the multi-racial democracy—we cannot achieve that tomorrow. The Prime Minister has not said that we can, but I should like him to define the qualifications by which Africans shall come on to the electoral register in Rhodesia.
  It is reasonable to say that those Africans who wish to come on to the electoral register and participate in the future of their country should live up to at least four requirements. First of all, they should be literate. Secondly, it is right to ask that they should be of fixed abode and not nomads. Thirdly, I think it is right that they should be law abiding. [An HON. MEMBER: "Is Smith law abiding?"] These are the British views that I am putting forward. I am not putting them forward on Mr. Smith's behalf.
  Mr. Buchan: Do you say that these conditions should apply only to Africans?
  Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Roderic Bowen): Order. Would the hon. Gentleman please address the Chair?
  Mr. Buchan: Mr. Deputy Speaker, is the expression "law abiding" only to apply to Africans? We are faced with breakers of the law who happen to be Smith and his cohort.
  Mr. Griffiths: Perhaps I can put the hon. Gentleman's mind at rest by saying that, of course, I make no distinction when I say that people should be law abiding. Everyone should abide by the law. If hon. Gentlemen opposite wish me to say that I regard Mr. Smith as a rebel, I do so. He has broken the law. That is what this debate is all about. The debate is about how we can effectively put an end to the rebellion.
  If the British Government were to define the conditions on which they were prepared to move towards the multiracial society which we all want, they would go some way to assuring the white population of its future, which is what it is really concerned with. I repeat that I should like to see the British Government say that the qualifications required for going on the electoral register in Rhodesia are that a man, whatever his colour, must be law abiding——
  Mr. Buchan: That wipes out Smith.
  Mr. Griffiths: —secondly, that he must be literate; thirdly, that he must pay some tax——
  Mr. Heffer Mr. Heffer rose——
  Mr. Griffiths: I shall complete my speech more quickly if I am allowed to continue without constant interruptions. Nevertheless, I give way to the hon. Gentleman.
  Mr. Heffer: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that the point that he is making about literacy has arisen in the southern States of America? One of the difficulties is that the system there is administered by the white minority, and in the past some of the best negro scholars have been kept off the electoral roll, despite the fact that they were highly educated.
  Mr. Griffiths: I am trying to define what the British Government's position should be, and if Mr. Smith and his white cohorts in Rhodesia are not prepared to accept it, we shall be quite clear where we stand. I shall be quite clear where I stand. I am not clear at the moment.
  I ask that the electoral qualification should require of all men that they be literate, that they be law abiding, that they pay some tax, and that they be of fixed abode. If the British Government could make these things clear, they would go some way towards giving the white minority a little assurance that the Africans with whom, quite rightly, they are to be asked to share their future, will be responsible men, will be men with whom any of us here would be willing to share our future because they are literate, because they are law abiding, because they pay some tax to society, and because they live in a fixed abode.
  I ask that the British Government should not merely confine themselves to the qualifications for being on the electoral register, but should offer again—and spell out what it means—to provide an economic and educational crash programme in Rhodesia. I know that the Prime Minister said these things on the telephone. I want him to come to the Dispatch Box and say that during the 10 years while these electoral qualifications are being achieved, and the number of Africans on the electoral roll is growing, according to British policy, not Mr. Smith's policy, we as a nation will be willing to spend a large sum of money to bring 500 to 600 Africans to our teacher training colleges each year, to bring Africans to learn at our police academies, to bring them here to learn to be J.P.s., to learn to be sanitary experts, to learn to be all the things that go to make up the woof and the warp of a civilised nation and at the same time we should be willing to spend perhaps £100 million over the 10-year period on improving the whole social infrastructure of Rhodesia. If hon. Gentlemen opposite think that that is a lot of money, perhaps I might remind them that they spent more than that on abolishing prescription charges.
  We should try to give the white minority an assurance that the Africans with whom they are to share their future will be educated, responsible men, and
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  we should back this up by providing the wherewithal for Rhodesia to achieve this advance.
  The hon. Member may say that the Prime Minister has offered this, and that the last Government offered it, and that Mr. Smith would not accept it. Let us say again, clearly—and in detail, not in general terms—how much money and how many teachers we will supply, where they will come from and when they will go. Let us be as precise as possible and put our proposals up before the forum of world opinion as well as British opinion. If Mr. Smith rejects those proposals again, people such as I will be very much clearer about the way in which our policies should develop.
  I want to see the Government once again affirming and spelling out in detail what they are prepared to do over the next 10 or 20 years in Rhodesia, and spelling it out in such a fashion as to show both the white minority and the black majority that their futures are assured and that they will peaceably arrive at the multi-racial democracy that I want to see. But I want to see the Government spell this out rather than to move us step by step, inexorably, to the war that may well otherwise come, and that will more assuredly spell the end of the Commonwealth than anything else. Let them spell it out by publishing a White Paper on the matter, and offering this opportunity once again before they go over the brink, to war.
  9.1 p.m.
  Mr. A. Woodburn: I came in to listen to this debate, and I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) deliver a very reasoned speech. I cannot say that I found it all quite sound tactically, but it was a reasonable contribution to the debate and it put a case for the Government to answer. Since then, in the latter stages of the debate, there have been some of the most irresponsible speeches I have ever heard in this House.
  The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths), in a broadcast the other night, did the marvellous gymnastic trick of justifying both sides of Conservative Party policy as expressed in the recent debate on Rhodesia. That was a triumph of speechifying for the Conservatives,

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  because the hon. Member achieved what appeared to me to be the impossible; he reconciled the views of the right hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) with those of his leader and the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas Home). Anybody who can do that can obviously deliver the kind of speech that the hon. Member delivered tonight. He has said everything that could have been said on every side of the Rhodesian question. He has been for the blacks, for the whites, against everybody, for the Government and against the Government. It has been impossible to follow either his logic or his reasoning. I give him credit for the fact that it is reasoning, but he did not reach any reasonable conclusions.
  The hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor), with his usual university debating agility, managed to indulge in the maximum amount of condemnation of everybody without making any constructive contribution towards a solution of the terrible problem with which the country is faced.
  As a simple observer—I have no Government knowledge of the question—I want to tell the House some of the factors as I see them. During the period of Conservative Government the policy was continued of giving freedom to people who had previously been subject to our rule. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds talked about violence. Where could there have been more violence than in Kenya? He brought out all the arguments about the ignorance of the natives and their savagery. I must remind him that the natives of Kenya were pictured as savages during the Mau Mau period. Mr. Kenyatta was imprisoned for nine years, but we now find that he is one of the greatest African statesmen, and that the advice he has given concerning this crisis has been among the best. We have been told the same thing about every African country.
  It has been pointed out, however, that the white settlers in Kenya, although they have not got all they wanted, are now settling down in a multi-racial State. The other day President Nyerere, in Tanzania, told his people that they must not interfere with the harmonious relationships existing between whites and blacks.
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  The same thing is happening in Uganda. I found that there was no distinction among races there. The people mixed together as friends and colleagues, and there was not the slightest indication of the question of colour entering into relationships between the whites and the blacks.
  Naturally, when the people of these countries become the Government, they want to get good jobs for the people who are educated. There are few good jobs in a place like Uganda, and it is natural that the administrative jobs should pass gradually into the hands of the people who are native to the country. However, there is a university there with a black principal and a large number of white lecturers and professors. There is a medical school where black doctors and white work side by side. Even in the Congo, about 72,000 Belgians are still working there—some people may say that it would be better if they were not—and co-operating in the life of the country.
  Rhodesia was part of the Federation, which has now broken up Northern Rhodesia has formed its Government under President Kaunda. Malawi is ruled by Dr. Banda. Nobody has suggested that there has been any difficulty in these countries co-operating and making a multi-racial society work.
  Southern Rhodesia has been the exception. It had a Constitution which was designed eventually to lead to a multiracial society. It has been the policy of this country for 50 years that, in our trusteeship of these nations, we would educate them until they were able to govern their own country. We did this in the case of India, and by the time we left India the Indians had reached the stage when they were already running their country. Practically no British people held administrative jobs. It was not a question of being put out—we walked gracefully out and left the country to the people inhabiting it.
  A different problem arises in a place like Rhodesia, where practically the whole country has been built up round the economy created by white settlers. The same is to some extent, true of Northern Rhodesia. The Africans, realise, I am sure, that this economy is valuable to them as much as to anyone else. Until U.D.I. occurred, the Constitution of 1961

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  operated, under which there would be gradual progress towards majority rule. Who talked with them? Who could have interfered with the 1961 Constitution? The Constitution was there. It was their business to carry out its provisions. It is true that world moral pressure was exerted on them to speed up this process by bringing the Africans into Government, but, instead of that, I understand that they have been limiting the education of Africans and preventing them from going on beyond primary school.
  I heard the principal of the college in Salisbury, speaking on this subject, say that there was no doubt that the African children in Rhodesia were as capable of being educated to the same degree as white children in Rhodesia. Therefore, what can justify the Government of a country not allowing children who have the ability to be educated to their maximum potential? In other words, there is a policy of suppressing the education of the people and not allowing them to achieve the civilised state which the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds wants them to reach.
  The world today is no longer governed by force but largely by moral pressure. The one great triumph of the United Nations is that every country in the world has to justify, in the face of world opinion, its treatment of its own people and its behaviour towards other people. Therefore, how can Britain, which is responsible for Rhodesia, justify what is happening in Rhodesia if it seems to be a repressive policy?
  Mr. Smith has declared war on the whole moral purpose of the world. That purpose is to bring people up to the state of civilisation and equality which we all desire to see. Mr. Smith has declared—and I heard him myself—that it was their business to preserve white domination. He did not use those exact words, but he meant white domination of the blacks for time immemorial.
  This represents a challenge to the whole world, and not merely to Britain. It represents a challenge to the blacks in Africa, to India, to the United States, which is in the process of with great difficulty trying to bring its people to a state of complete equality, and to the world in general. Mr. Smith has declared
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  racial war on the black population of the world and, in particular, on the black population of Rhodesia.
  The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds and the hon. Member for Cathcart, merely say that we should do nothing.
  Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I did not say that.
  Mr. Woodburn: They propose nothing and said that anything which we tried to do would be futile. They said that nothing would work, which meant, in effect, that we should leave Mr. Smith alone to get on with his policy.
  I put it to hon. Gentlemen opposite that during 13 years of Conservative rule independence and majority rule was given under former Colonial Secretaries to several countries. It is to their credit that this was achieved. I repeat, that was done by Conservative Administrations and not by a Labour Government. Indeed, one of the former Colonial Secretaries has been denounced by his colleagues in the House of Lords for ruining the Commonwealth by being too smart by half. The former Colonial Secretaries did a great job in extending the freedom of home rule to the people of those countries.
  The only exception is Rhodesia and, therefore, when the right hon. Gentleman the former Prime Minister discussed the matter with Mr. Smith and when Mr. Smith asked for independence on his own terms, this country could not possibly, in the moral attitude of the world and with the attitude which has prevailed in Britain for the last 50 years, refuse to say that before handing over responsibility for self-government there must be the right eventually of majority rule.
  Hon. Gentlemen opposite have made a number of smart quips and university debating points about what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said about this or that on one occasion or another. Are they not aware that this is a serious matter and that we are not in a debating society at a university where somebody scores points? It is entirely irresponsible for the two hon. Gentlemen to whom I referred to give encouragement to Mr. Smith in his rebellion by saying that it is futile for us to do certain things, that those actions will be ineffective, that nothing can be done and that, in the long

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  run, Mr. Smith will win. If that is the case, God help the progress of that country and the progress of the world.
  Could Britain, in these circumstances, do nothing? Is that not what those two hon. Gentlemen opposite were suggesting? If not, they should have suggested what we could do. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will read the wonderful, simple sort of suggestions made by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds. Does that hon. Gentleman think that my right hon. Friend had not considered those facts previously or that he will, next week, be able to resolve all the difficulties by doing what the hon. Gentleman suggested?
  Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The right hon. Gentleman is obviously in high dudgeon. I must correct him. I wish to see Smith's régime come to an end, and I wish to see Rhodesia put back on to a multiracial path. The right hon. Gentleman must not misquote me.
  Mr. Woodburn: My hon. Friends approve of the hon. Gentleman's objectives, but none of us heard anything in his remarks that would enable us to achieve them. He said something to please everybody—and something which displeased most of us. I approve of his policy to bring Rhodesia back to the line of progress. This is our objective. Nevertheless, the hon. Gentleman made no practical suggestions for achieving that, except by giving us to believe that we should allow Mr. Smith to carry on with his policy of suppressing Southern Rhodesia for the next generation. Britain could not stand still and do nothing.
  France is a very logical nation. France refused to take any action at the United Nations to suppress Southern Rhodesia. Why was that? It was because General de Gaulle's representative said, "If we acknowledge that the United Nations has any right to interfere in this matter, we are tacitly accepting that Mr. Smith's Rhodesia is an independent nation and no longer part of the British Commonwealth. It is a matter entirely for Britain." He said that France would not interfere, and if we once accept the point that Mr. Smith has to be left alone this ceases to be a British affair and becomes
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  the affair of the United Nations and of every country, with Britain playing a very minor part in it.
  Britain has therefore accepted the responsibility. The hon. Member approves of that, and his leaders approved of it, and demanded it, but now they do not want to allow Britain to accept its responsibility and do the job in the best way she can. It may be that some of these steps will not be successful, but hon. Members opposite should not be quite so pessimistic.
  We have applied sanctions. Since the League of Nations days it has always been the policy of this party that the countries of the League of Nations—now of the United Nations—should try to avoid war if it were possible; that they should use every method short of war to bring rebels and rebellion into order. Had the other nations backed up sanctions in the case of Abyssinia, Mussolini would have come to heel, but the application of sanctions was blacklegged by certain nations and the whole policy collapsed.
  This is where I rather differ from my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale. Mr. Smith has declared war on the whole Commonwealth. He has declared war on the principles of his Government. That war has to be fought. How do we fight it? Do we allow every Tom, Dick and Harry to rush in prematurely and be beaten? Bernard Shaw wrote a play called "Lord Augustus Does His Bit." Lord Augustus was a terriffic leader in the Army. He was told to retreat. He would never retreat—being a true Briton—so he rushed forward and, of course, was taken prisoner. When the Germans interviewed him, he told them that he would not retreat and gave them his ideas on military strategy. So the Germans said, "You are the man we want. We are prepared to exchange you with any general in the British Army and we will send you back to help the British," because that kind of warfare where people put themselves out on a limb is just not winning a war or a battle.
  When we have people in charge of an operation, they have to handle it in the way that is best. As I gather, the Prime Minister said that the way to do it was to make sure that oil sanctions would be effective before imposing them. That is to say, we had to get agreement amongst

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  the oil-dealing nations to impose sanctions and not tackle it spasmodically by stopping a ship here and there. That was the policy declared last week, and I do not remember it being altered. I therefore cannot understand this excitement.
  I cannot appreciate why, until this policy is altered, someone should want to start a guerrilla war, stopping a ship here and there. If this policy is to be effective it has to be applied, as it should have been in the case of Abyssinia, by all the nations involved. I am not convinced about the part of Portugal and South Africa. They might be inviting too much trouble getting mixed up with Rhodesia. They should be careful. They themselves are vulnerable to world opinion and may also be vulnerable to other things that might reflect on them if they were to get mixed up in sanctions.
  It has been suggested that we ought to use troops. I have a certain sympathy with those who feel a measure of caution here. I remember Suez, when right hon. and hon. Members opposite used troops. The worst thing in the world for this country is to start to use troops without being prepared to make a job of it. The reason why the Africans are calling for us to use troops is that they know that their troops would be no match for the very effective Southern Rhodesian troops, who are well equipped and well armed. Obviously, the Africans would suffer terrible casualties if they entered upon war. They would do it if necessary, but they want Britain to do the job.
  If Zambia is not altogether willing to have our troops on its territory—this does not seem to he settled yet—how do the troops get to Rhodesia? I remember Suez and Cyprus. It is not so easy for a big army to curb a population. Therefore, those who have to decide these questions must think carefully and make proper provision before they start moving troops anywhere at all. The worst thing would be to move troops and make a mess of it. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will not attempt anything of this kind until they know what they are doing, where they are going, and what the result will be. Anyone who is prepared to take a gamble is a fool unless he knows the result, but if he gambles and knows the result he is a wise man. In my view, our Government must be
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  trusted to have a little common sense in this matter.
  The problem is to do what the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Preston, North has proposed, in his saner moments, and that is to try to get Rhodesia into the Commonwealth again and working on a proper basis. Some hon. Members tell us that everyone is behind Mr. Smith. But Roy Welensky is not behind Smith. Sir Edgar Whitehead is not behind Smith. Winston Field is not behind Smith. Garfield Todd is not behind Smith. The business men of Rhodesia are not behind Smith. The F.B.I. sent out a delegation, before all this started, to advise people there to get this man to stop his mad nonsense and be reasonable. That is what they wanted to do, but they had no power because of what Mr. Smith, not with his British colleagues so much as some of his Boer colleagues, wanted to do. We all talk about our kith and kin, but it must be remembered that some of these people are South Africans who do not have our outlook on these matters at all.
  We are talking about 250,000 people, about the population of Aberdeen, dominating 4 million Africans. They are having a fine time of it, of course. One can understand their reluctance to give it all up. But does anyone believe that they can perpetuate their sort of Government in a world in which people are moving towards freedom and in which it is the plain duty of the British Government to do what they can in the circumstances to secure what they know is the right end? No one can guarantee success. No one can guarantee that sanctions will succeed. Is the alternative to have no sanctions? This is what seems to be proposed by hon. Members opposite.
  As my hon. Friends have said, the Leader of the Opposition has become quite irresponsible in this matter. He is so anxious to play party politics and score little points that he is losing his dignity as party leader and is becoming a mere political hack. I hope that he will carry on no more like that. I give credit to the right hon. Member for Kinross and West Perthshire, who rose manfully at that Box, in spite of his colleagues, and confirmed that the Prime Minister was doing exactly as he had done in his offers to

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  Mr. Smith. When hon. Members condemn the Prime Minister for his actions they are automatically condemning their former Prime Minister who pursued exactly the same policy, the policy which we have continued.
  9.25 p.m.
  Mr. Peter Bessell: The debate was initiated to discuss one oil tanker, and it is upon that oil tanker that I propose to concentrate my remarks. It has been suggested by the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. Orme) that the eyes of the world are upon that tanker. I suggest that the eyes of the world are upon Her Majesty's Government and the decision which they will make about the fate of that tanker.
  This time last week I was in New York at the headquarters of the United Nations, and I had the opportunity of a number of informal and quite unofficial conversations with members of the delegations there. Two things impressed me above all else. The first was that Britain's sincerity in the matter of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia is under suspicion, that even our best friends are doubtful whether we seriously intend to take the measures that are necessary to overthrow the Government of Mr. Ian Smith. The other thing, which depressed me more than anything else, was the very obvious cynicism of the representatives of the Communist countries who believe that we shall take enough measures to save our face but not sufficiently strong measures to ensure the fall of the Ian Smith Government and that, consequently, we shall seek to please all sides of opinion while at the same time refusing to take the necessary steps to enforce the rule of law.
  In those circumstances, I believe that the issue of this one oil tanker assumes a very considerable proportion indeed. This afternoon the Prime Minister quite cordially and openly welcomed the actions of the Government of Iran in imposing oil sanctions upon Southern Rhodesia and carrying them immediately into effect, but in the very next breath he stated categorically that he was not prepared to turn back this one oil tanker, British owned and British controlled, whose contents will serve Southern Rhodesia. This is, in effect, saying that we welcome the action of one country in imposing oil sanctions but we ourselves are not pre-
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  pared to follow that example. Yet it is the British nation which has the prime responsibility for resolving the situation in Southern Rhodesia.
  The suggestion was also made by the Prime Minister that because there were other ships following the oil tanker it was not important to turn back that vessel, that Southern Rhodesia would, in fact, obtain her supplies from another source. That argument is absurd. It would be equally sensible to argue that we might today be supplying arms to the Viet Cong on the grounds that if we did not supply them somebody else would do so. If it is to be said that we must supply Southern Rhodesia with oil because if we do not another nation will do so, why are we imposing sanctions at all and why have we taken the measures to restrict the economy of Southern Rhodesia? It is quite probable that countries such as South Africa and Portugal will take steps to do everything in their power to assist Mr. Smith, and if one argument is logical then so is the other.
  I believe that the Prime Minister, whose handling of this situation I have until now admired profoundly, is wholly wrong in this matter. I believe that the eyes of the world are on the Government and on the decision which he has either made or will make in the days ahead.
  There has been reference to the position of the Commonwealth. My hon. Friend the Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) referred to the ultimatum issued from Addis Ababa. I share his view—a view expressed by other hon. Members—that the ultimatum is melodramatic and possibly absurd. But the fact remains that it was the result of a deep-rooted concern felt by the African states—a concern and fear that Britain will not take the measures necessary to crush Mr. Smith.
  It may well be, as the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) said, that the ultimatum is an indication of immaturity, but the fact remains that it was issued after long and serious debate by African Foreign Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa and that it was not an ill-considered or ill-judged move in their opinion, nor in the opinion of the countries they represent. It follows, therefore, that a decision of the Government about the tanker must have

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  a psychological effect upon the States concerned in that ultimatum—as, indeed, it will have an effect upon all other members of the Commonwealth who are anxious to see the Smith régime crushed.
  We are in danger—in serious and real danger—of a break up of the British Commonwealth. If that occurs it will be a profound tragedy, not only for Britain and not only for the member States of the Commonwealth but for the whole world—and if for no other reason we have to decide to take measures which are painful, which we ourselves dislike, in order to crush the Smith régime, then the fact that by so doing we shall preserve intact the British Commonwealth is to me a sufficient reason.
  Mr. Woodburn: Would the hon. Gentleman agree that in order to crush Smith, we should smash up the economies of the whole of Rhodesia, North and South? Or does he mean that we should get rid of Smith and try to preserve the economies of both countries for the benefit of the people who live in them?
  Mr. Bessell: Of course I want to see the economy of Rhodesia preserved if possible, but I do not think that the preservation of the economy of Rhodesia is the main issue in this matter. It may be an important issue but it is not of overriding importance. I am concerned, as other hon. Members have shown themselves to be concerned, to see that the interests of the white minority are preserved, that they are taken care of and that they are treated as fairly and as equitably as the indigenous people of that country. The real issue, the only issue in the eyes of the vast majority of the free countries of the world, is whether Britain really believes that she has a duty to uphold the rule of law.
  Mr. Daniel Awdry Mr. Daniel Awdry (Chippenham) rose——
  Mr. Bessell: I have given way once and I do not propose to give way twice because I know that many other hon. Members wish to speak.
  The issue is: does Britain intend to uphold the rule of law? Does she really care about the rule of law? That is the question in the minds of millions throughout the world. Or do we instead intend to permit the defiance of the authority of the Crown and of Parlia-
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  ment which has so far been expressed by the behaviour and the conduct of Mr. Ian Smith's Government?
  If we as a nation really believe in a democratic system of government for ourselves, it follows that we must believe in it also for those Colonial Territories for which we still have care. If we believe in the terms of the Charter of the United Nations and all that that means in terms of individual freedom and human rights, then we apply them not just to a few nations, but in all our relations with every nation on earth and in particular with those for which we still have a responsibility. If we really believe as a nation and as a people in upholding the rule of law, then the illegal Government in Southern Rhodesia must be crushed, and that is the first and, I believe, the only consideration in this whole matter.
  Mr. Awdry Mr. Awdry rose——
  Mr. Bessell: No, I cannot give way. Does this ship—[Interruption.]
  Mr. Speaker: Order. It is not in order for the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. John Harvey) to interrupt from outside the Chamber.
  Mr. Bessell: I wish to be brief because I know that a number of hon. Members wish to speak.
  Does this ship seriously affect the future of the illegal Government in Southern Rhodesia? I believe that it does, because it is the most profound single test of the sincerity of the intentions expressed by Her Majesty's Government and its resolution to restore the rule of law which it has yet had to face. As I have said, there is a widespread suspicion throughout the whole of the free world and among Communist countries that we do not seriously intend to take the measures which are necessary to ensure the defeat of the Smith Government.
  This one issue, as I have said, will have a profound psychological effect upon world opinion. I say to the Prime Minister that this is for his Government, in the eyes of the world, the moment of truth. I said at the beginning that I thought that the hon. Member for Salford, West was not quite correct when he said that the eyes of the world were upon the

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  tanker and I said that they were upon the decision which will be made by Her Majesty's Government. I will amend that further. I believe that after the remarks made at the Dispatch Box this afternoon by the Prime Minister, the eyes of the free world are now upon the right hon. Gentleman.
  9.38 p.m.
  Mr. David Ennals: The House is grateful not only to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) for initiating the debate, but also to the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Bessell) for bringing us back again to the small sharp issue which we are discussing this evening. This is not the time for a general debate on Rhodesia, and I shall be extremely brief in associating myself with a plea to the Government that they should take action which will prevent this one tanker from going to Beira.
  It will be said, as it has already been said in the House, that this would be only a gesture. I agree that it would be only a gesture. It is far more important that economic pressures should be effective and that oil sanctions should be organised and should work, but we cannot ignore gestures. The hon. Member for Bodmin was right to say that, rightly or wrongly—and I believe that it is wrongly—our sincerity is being questioned. If we ask ourselves why the African States at Addis Ababa issued their ultimatum, we would all agree that it was impossible for the Government to accept and that it was irresponsible and that it was calling for action which was unreasonable. But beneath it all was the question in the minds of some of these Foreign Ministers about whether they felt confident, totally confident, that though they might disagree with the methods being used by the British Government, come what may we would see this job through to the end. It is because, I think wrongly, they were not able to give an affirmative answer to that, that they have taken this decision. I would transfer the question to the Europeans in Rhodesia. I do not believe that we can ask the loyal European Rhodesians to come out against the illegal Government, to risk their livelihood and their futures if there is no certainty over what would be the outcome of this struggle.
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  While I have agreed with every action taken by the Prime Minister, and while I deplore the irresponsible and cheap jibes which came from one speaker on the other side of the House, what is required more than any other thing is a statement from the Prime Minister that, without question, and however long it may take, the task which this Government has set itself is not just to return Rhodesia to legality but to set in motion the process, however gradual, towards majority rule and that nothing will deter us from that task. It is in this light that I believe we must look at the incident of the ship. There is no question that people are asking about the sincerity of the British Government. One reason why they are doing so is because of statements that have been made from the other side of the House, not only from the back benches, where extremely irresponsible statements have been made, encouraging to Mr. Smith, but also from the Front Bench.
  We are looking not to the Opposition but to the Government. If they decide that the ship should go on, while in the long run, in terms of actual oil, the significance may not be very great, the fact that we do not take this gesture of stopping the ship, could lead to misunderstandings that are not only unjustified, but which could be profoundly important. It is for this reason that I want to add my voice to those who have made their appeal and ask the Prime Minister, if not tonight or tomorrow, to say that this ship, for which we can issue an instruction, should not arrive in the port.
  9.43 p.m.
  Mr. David Steel: When we are faced with a rebellion in Rhodesia there are only three possible methods of bringing it to an end. One is the use of economic sanctions, another is the use of force and the third is a combination of these two. There seem to be no other alternatives and these are the spheres of discussion which are open to us. Therefore, when the hon. Members for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor) and Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) come forward with varying suggestions, that in some form or another we can treat with the rebels, that we can in some way offer them various proposals, these proposals

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  must clearly fall into one of two categories.
  They are either a repetition of the proposals made to the Smith Government before U.D.I., in which case there is every likelihood that they will be turned down and there is no reason why we should offer such proposals after U.D.I., or else they are new proposals, in which case they must be a retreat from the five principles which successive British Governments have laid down as preconditions of the granting of independence to Rhodesia. There can be no question of accepting any of the suggestions which came from these sources. I believe that the British Government must declare themselves on two points. They must state what is their long-term objective following the bringing down of the Smith régime. This we have not had.
  The Leader of the Opposition has suggested that we can go back to the 1961 Constitution. I believe that this is not a possible solution and that it would not be acceptable to the majority of the people of Rhodesia. The right course is to say that the form of policy which the British Government should pursue would be, having brought the rebellion to an end, to impose a period of direct British colonial rule and to make steady progress towards the normal transition to majority rule such as we have experienced in all other territories under our control. This is a matter on which the Government have yet to declare themselves clearly in the eyes of the rest of the Commonwealth.
  The other matter on which the Government have to declare themselves clearly—and this is where the issue about the oil tanker comes in—is their immediate determination to bring down the régime in Rhodesia. We have had too many phrases like, "We shall not stand idly by", which are capable of one interpretation by the African Commonwealth, one interpretation by the readers of the Daily Mirror and another interpretation by the Conservative Opposition. These phrases must stop. We have to have phrases which indicate clearly to the African Commonwealth that the British Government and this House are absolutely serious and clear-cut in their determination that this régime shall be brought to an end.
  Mr. Awdry: May I put a question to the hon. Gentleman which I tried to
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  put to the hon. Member for Bodmin (Mr. Bessell)? Does the hon. Gentleman's party contemplate using force to achieve these ends?
  Mr. Steel: I think that I indicated what the possible courses of action were. The Liberal Party has never ruled out the possibility of circumstances which might involve the use of force. We do not believe that this should have been ruled out. We are not saying that this is a desirable course. What I am saying is that the British Government must, at every step, make absolutely clear and in unambiguous terms what is their determination and their policy.
  It is in this context that we come to the question of the tanker heading for Beira. We are told that it is vital to maintain oil supplies to Zambia. In the next breath we are told that there are other ships behind this one which will supply oil to the pipeline. These two statements seem to me to be contradictory. Either the oil flow to Zambia is imperilled by stopping this ship, or it is not. We should have this point cleared up in the reply tonight.
  In the course of Questions earlier today the Prime Minister said, with a note of pride in his voice, that Britain had done more in the form of sanctions than any other country. This is not a matter for pride. This was essential and natural. This was our responsibility. I do not see this as a matter for self-congratulation. It is not good enough that the Prime Minister should dismiss as an idle moral gesture the suggestion that this ship should be turned back. As many people have said, this is, if nothing else, a moral issue. It is not an issue on which it is easy to make practical suggestions. A moral gesture on this moral issue could be exceedingly important at this time, and that is the case of those of us who are urging the Government to take a swift decision on the diversion of this ship.
  The Organisation for African Unity and the whole African Commonwealth are concerned about our good faith in the present Rhodesian situation. To put it another way, they are concerned with their kith and kin who happen to represent the majority of the population in Rhodesia. May I end by quoting the statement of President Kaunda in an

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  interview which appeared in last Sunday's Sunday Times—and it seems to me that he was speaking not just for himself but for the whole of African opinion in countries throughout Africa:
  "I must be frank. It is a terrible problem for the Zambian Cabinet and me to decide whether Mr. Wilson is determined with sufficient singlemindedness to carry this through to the end. Mr. Bottomley explained to me at length the difficulties of the Labour Government with their tiny majority. I understood that difficulty. But what is good politics in England may be bad politics in Africa. Let us say I still remain to be convinced that Britain will be absolutely committed to help us."
  I believe—this sums up our case—that it is because they remain waiting to be convinced that we are absolutely committed to help that we must turn this ship back.
  9.50 p.m.
  Mr. Paul B. Rose: I wonder how many times the door has to be slammed in the face of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) before he realises the true nature of the Smith régime. A great deal has been said by that hon. Member and by his hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor) about the question of majority rule and the nature of the Smith Government. They seem to have overlooked the official documents relating to the negotiations, at page 72 of which Mr. Smith said that he must make it clear that the Government party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule, that they accepted that the 1961 Constitution would eventually bring it about, but that they would not take any action to hasten this process. In other words, they were quite prepared to frustrate the process.
  I did not intend to enter this debate until I heard the hon. Member for Cathcart, the cabin boy, so to speak, in the ship of which his right hon. Friend the Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) is the captain, but unfortunately, unlike some captains, he refuses to man the bridge. We had an example of this only the other day when the hon. Member for Cathcart was left wallowing in the sea while the rest of the crew of this peculiar ship were not prepared to follow him or to stand by their convictions,
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  which were easily expressed at the Monday Club or at rallies at Caxton Hall but not in the House of Commons.
  The hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart referred to this debate, which was so well introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer), as an exercise in international public relations. I can only assume that the hon. Member was indulging in an exercise in Glasgow public relations, which is something that we have witnessed from him for some time.
  Mr. Edward M. Taylor: The point I was trying to make was that hon. Members on this bench, and particularly the group occupying the benches behind the hon. Member, are not representative of the main strength of both their parties' points of view.
  Mr. Rose: On the contrary, strange as it may seem, I feel that on this issue I am very much a representative of my party's point of view, having supported throughout every action taken by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in connection with the Rhodesian situation. This is the very first time that I have felt any doubt, because up to now he has played it with remarkable coolness, ability and skill.
  My feeling is that there are hon. Members opposite who are willing to play appeasement in this dangerous situation as much as there were others who were prepared to play appeasement in another situation which was equally dangerous. When the hon. Member for Cathcart talks about opposition in Rhodesia, he should realise the extent to which the Government of Southern Rhodesia is willing to fetter opposition and to stop the expression of opposition. In spite of this, many brave voices have been raised in Southern Rhodesia and it is up to us to show those people that we mean what we say.
  A strange comparison was made with Cuba. The difference is that in this case we are applying economic sanctions on behalf of the great majority of the people of the country—four million of them—rather than against the majority of the people. There is a strange proposition inherent in the decision with regard to the tanker. The proposition is rather on the lines that it is legitimate to do an evil act if others also are prepared to do it. That kind of defence was rejected at the

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  Nuremberg trials as not being a defence. It is up to us to set an example of international morality, because this is where we have to see justice done. It is not good enough in this situation merely to know that we want justice, as many of my hon. Friends and a great many hon. Members opposite want it. We have to show the world that we are intent upon achieving it. All the more so in this particularcase—and it is not a frivolous point—when the Government have in a sense a majority of shares in the particular company which is sending oil to Rhodesia.
  I want to know why the Government feel it legitimate to give another two weeks' start, so to speak, to the Smith Government. There may be an explanation for it. I accept economic sanctions to the hilt. We have said that we reject direct military intervention at the present stage, mainly because of the geographical factors and the military factors involved apart from any other question of principle. If we accept that sanctions are the only way to bring this rebel Government to heel, surely we have to make them as effective as possible? If the Government of Iran can set an example, surely it is up to us in the seat of Government here purporting to have control over the Rhodesian situation to set an example to other countries.
  It may be that shortly we shall be imposing oil sanctions, but how foolish it would be to allow another two weeks' lease of life to the illegal government in Rhodesia by sending in that oil shipment, and how many countries may take heart from and be encouraged by our action if we refuse to send it.
  We are deeply indebted to what the Prime Minister has already done, but it is not for the Government to do the maximum consonant with support from the Opposition Front Benches. It is for the Government to decide what is right, and it is up to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition to decide which side he is on. Is he on the side of the civilised people in his party, or is he on the side of the lunatic fringe in the Monday Club? That is a decision that he has to make. The decision should not be made by the Government Front Bench.
  It is for us to show the world that we really mean what we say and that we are going to apply sanctions to the hilt
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  as quickly and as sharply as possible. They may hurt, and they will have to hurt if we are going to succeed, but it is the lesser of two evils eschewing, as we do, the use of force. It is the only way to bring the rebel Government to its knees.
  Our first consideration should not be how far we can take the Leader of the Opposition along with us, because the only result of doing that will be that we shall advance towards him and he will retreat, as we have seen happen before. The only way that we can resolve the situation is to stand firmly by our convictions, apply the sanctions necessary and not hesitate, because the march of history is on this side of the House and not that side.
  9.58 p.m.
  Mr. Stan Newens: I want to say how grateful I am to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) for raising the subject-matter of the debate. It is very important that we should have an opportunity to discuss it, and the debate has been timely and appropriate.
  I should be less than honest if I said that I am other than profoundly disappointed by what the Prime Minister said today. I am very proud of the way in which my right hon. Friend has stood up to Smith so far because, beneath all the conciliatory attempts which have been made to resolve the situation in the best possible way, there has been a firm determination to resist Smith, U.D.I. and the consolidation of a police state, and to resist the shilly-shallying of the Opposition. The determination which the Prime Minister has shown has had the overwhelming support of the majority of the British people and certainly a very considerable measure of support even on the other side of the House.
  The decision which has been made about the tanker contradicts the line which the Prime Minister has taken up to now. He has spoken out in favour of short and sharp measures which will bring Smith to heel. Unfortunately, the decision not to stop the tanker will spread despondency among the opponents of Smith and give satisfaction to his supporters.
  Just consider for one moment the position of those people in Rhodesia who

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  wish to be loyal to the British Government and who wish to see Smith laid low. Will this decision encourage them? I maintain that it will profoundly dismay them. Consider the position of those people in the African States who have been doubtful of the resolve of the British Government. Will it encourage them to trust in Britain's determination to go through with her policy? I think that it will encourage them to doubt British sincerity on this matter.
  It is not enough for us—
  It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mrs. Harriet Slater.]
  Mr. Newens: I consider that it is not enough to count the moral effect of such a move lightly, because basically what we must seek to do in this country is to win the support of the majority of the Rhodesian population against Smith. I do not think that permitting this ship to go through will help to win over that population to our point of view. I believe that all necessary measures, including force, should be used to bring Smith down. I hope very much that the use of military force will not be necessary, but it is quite clear that the need for military support will be the less the stronger the sanctions and the more clearly it is shown that we intend to impose them.
  Stopping the ship going through is not merely a moral gesture. I have been told that it will provide two weeks' supply of oil. If this enables Smith to hold on longer, I think that it will help to postpone the end that we are seeking to achieve. I believe that it will be easier to make oil sanctions effective if Britain acts now, and therefore, even at this late stage, I think that my right hon. Friend should go to the Prime Minister and make it clear how necessary we on this side of the House, and many hon. Gentlemen opposite, feel it is to revise the decision which has been announced today. We must remember that, with the wisdom of hindsight, it is easy to see mistakes a long time after they have been made. At this moment we are at a crucial point is history. We are at what may be a turning
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  point, and we must act with resolve now if we intend to see that Smith is brought down.
  I believe that many hon. Gentlemen on the back benches opposite are prepared to accept a situation which will lead to white supremacy being consolidated in Rhodesia. The hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor) refused to answer the question that I put to him, and I can only assume that he refused because he knew what the reaction would be to a clear statement of his true position with regard to Smith.
  I hope very much that my right hon. Friend will be able to discuss this matter with the Prime Minister, and that a decision will be taken to turn back this tanker, to speed up the agreement to stop other tankers going through, and to see that sanctions are made really effective. I am all for plugging the holes afterwards, but let us turn off this tap now.
  On this side of the House there is almost unanimous agreement that Smith be brought low. We want the Prime Minister and the Government to take all necessary measures to see that that aim is achieved. I hope very much that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations will realise the sincere feelings which have been expressed by the majority of hon. Members who have taken part in this debate, and that all necessary measures, including the one that I have suggested, will be taken to see that the Smith régime is brought down at the earliest possible moment.
  10.4 p.m.
  Mr. George Y. Mackie: Many speakers have mentioned the profound effect on world opinion of the lack of a British gesture in turning back this ship. I do not know what it would cost if the oil had to be pumped out into the sea—perhaps £100,000—but I know that the cost of landing this oil in Rhodesia would be infinitely more. I was profoundly shocked to hear the Prime Minister's reasons for not stopping the ship.
  I once saw a newspaper cartoon which made a deep impression on me. It was a picture of two torturers in a dungeon, in the Middle Ages. They were dressed in black, wore masks and were leaning on axes. They had instruments of torture such as the rack and thumbscrews,

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  and the rest, and one was saying to the other, "As I see it, Jack, if we did not do it someone else would." This is the reason twat the Prime Minister gave for not making a moral gesture which is supremely important. I say that this will have a profound effect on world opinion. The Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Secretary should consider the profound effect that it is having in this House, not least on hon. Members on this bench.
  10.5 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. Arthur Bottomley): This has been an interesting and useful debate. It would be dishonest of me if I told my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Heffer) that I welcomed it. I make that point not for personal considerations but because of my colleagues in the Department who, day in day out and week in week out over the past four months, have been heavily engaged with me in trying to solve the Rhodesian problem. Earlier today I told them, "Well chaps, you can have the evening off".
  But I accept what my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Michael Foot) said. The first responsibility of Ministers is to this House. When I heard that the debate was going to take place I hurried round at once. I am sure that it has not escaped the notice of my hon. Friends that, except for the Opposition Chief Whip—who, by custom, seldom speaks—the Members of the Conservative Front Bench have been noticeably absent; not only on this subject, but on any aspect on the Adjournment for which they have the right to challenge the Government, they have been absent.
  One thing upon which we can all agree, perhaps with one exception, is that we want to bring down this evil régime in Rhodesia in the shortest time. My hon. Friends and, I believe most hon. Members opposite, too, agree that it is preferable to do this by means other than the use of force. That is why we all agree that economic sanctions should be imposed. We may differ about the degree of severity with which they should be imposed, but my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister himself put the Government's view on record, in answer to a Question from the Leader of the Opposi-
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  tion, on 23rd November, when he said that
  "there is the position of Zambia to be considered, along with other countries. These matters will have to be very carefully studied, and while we must insist that whatever sanctions are applied must be effective, we do not want those which are damaging and ineffective, any more than we want to create damage or resort to ineffectiveness. It is very important that in this we proceed only in agreement with others principally concerned."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd November, 1965; Vol. 721, c. 252.]
  It is in this respect that I have been trying to work. My hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale asked what I discovered as a result of my talks with President Kaunda and others. President Kaunda has the responsibility to provide for his people, and he wants to do so in the best possible way. We must remember that he and his Ministers have had just over 12 months of full authority. We want to help them. We have a duty to see that Zambia develops peacefully and successfully.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Walton said that one way in which we could make sure of doing that was by an airlift, and he cited the example of Berlin. I ask him to believe me that this question has been considered, but that it is a different situation from that which existed in the case of Berlin. In Berlin there is a highly developed society, and there are airports, and so on. If an airlift were possible to save Zambia, it would have been put into operation already. This is not forgotten: we want to provide an airlift and it is one of the things which we have to look at. Indeed, one of the experiments now going on, which is proving successful, is an aircraft picking up copper from Zambia, taking it to Tanzania and bringing oil back. This is a beginning, but it will be a long time before we can say that it is successful.
  On the subject of oil, those hon. Gentlemen who have raised the matter should tell me what they really want. Do they really want to make a gesture, an isolated gesture, in respect of this ship—[HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."]—regardless of consequences, or do they want an embargo on oil and other goods going to Rhodesia with the least possible damage to Zambia and other African countries? The Government are trying to concentrate not on gestures alone but on the most effective

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  means which will do the most damage to the Smith régime and the least damage to the parties we represent—
  Mr. Heffer Mr. Heffer rose—
  Mr. Bottomley: My hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not give way: I have very much to say. If I gave way I would not answer every point put to me tonight and I must do that if I am to do my duty.
  As far as Africans generally are concerned, I am bound to tell the House that, with one or two exceptions, they take the view that, whether it is oil or other supplies, this will not do the trick. They do not think that economic sanctions will be effective. They have said to me continually—I have tried to destroy the argument—that, on the two occasions that sanctions were applied, they were failures. The first which they mentioned, of course, is that of Abysinnia. It was never intended that economic sanctions should succeed in that case. The other case is that of Cuba: I tried to explain to them that, in that case, there was one major country determined that the economic blockade should not succeed.
  However, in the case of small Rhodesia, as a result of the United Nations' decision, the whole world is determined—or they should be if they are to abide by that decision—to apply economic sanctions. I repeat that these economic sanctions, properly applied, will succeed. In these circumstances, we should not talk about force. I told my African colleagues, "It is easy to use force if you are not prepared to face the consequences, the economic deprivation, the misery, the loss of life, the bloodshed. Try my way first before you resort to those methods."
  Britain has applied strict economic measures, of which the House will be aware. We have stopped all aid, the export of arms—the list has already been given, and if the House accepts it, to save time, I will not go through it. Not only economic measures have been applied but stringent financial measures too. All these things have been done. Unfortunately, others have not followed that lead, except for the O.A.U. conference last Monday, which decided that it would apply economic sanctions. I am glad that that is so, because if economic sanctions are applied in this way, we shall get the required result.
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  I will now go on to talk about—[An HON. MEMBER: About the ship.]—I know about the ship and I will answer that, but I want to answer the points which have been put to me and I will do it in my own way—
  Mr. David Steel Mr. David Steel rose—
  Mr. Bottomley: No. I will talk about it. Leave it to me—[Interruption.]Do hon. Members want a reply or do they not?
  When I visited Zambia, the President told me that he wanted to be sure about safeguards against the illegal régime in Rhodesia. In the first case he said that he was afraid of the Rhodesia Air Force, which has very efficient and effective aeroplanes, and he wanted British aircraft to give the adequate defence he required. In this connection we assured him that we could meet his wishes. While being sorry that the Foreign Minister of Zambia doubts the efficiency of these machines, I can only say that they are the best machines available and that they will see any of the Rhodesian aeroplanes out of the sky.
  He next said that he wanted an opportunity to have troops not in Zambia—he could look after his own internal affairs—but on the Rhodesian side of the dam. He was afraid that the switch would be used and he would lose his power. I had to say to him, "If you put forces on the other side this would result in an armed conflict, resulting, without doubt, in the cutting off of power, or perhaps even the dam might be mined and blown up, in which case you would be deprived of the power".
  The next point is oil. He is concerned about oil supplies as well as other supplies. One of his troubles is the putting on of economic measures and the fear that they will make it more difficult for him to survive. He rightly says, "This is no responsibility of mine. To some extent it has been caused by the illegal régime in Rhodesia, but by the failure of past British Governments to do what was right in the case of Rhodesia".
  So I had to say, "We are anxious to keep you alive and we will do all we can to assist, whether it is oil or other things. We wish to meet your needs and we together will work out a contingency plan". I believe that until that contingency plan

  385
  is properly worked out and operated we should consider very carefully anything we do which might damage the economy of Zambia.
  I will now attempt to answer the other points put to me in the debate. The hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Edward M. Taylor) impugned the character and veracity of the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. It so happens that I was present at the interview with Mr. Garfield Todd and at the talks which we had. What has been said is a lie. I went out of my way on one occasion to say of Mr. Smith, the then Prime Minister of Rhodesia, that he was a man with some integrity and character, although in blinkers. It has been my experience since I have said that, in negotiations with him, to find, in fact, that what I have just said has been confirmed not once but more than once. He has lied not only to me but to others. This is one of the reasons why we cannot deal with Smith in any way—because he is not a man to be trusted.
  I will tell the hon. Gentleman what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I said to Mr. Garfield Todd. My right hon. Friend said, as I did, to him that we, the British Government, were determined upon unimpeded progress towards majority rule in Rhodesia on a basis acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. That is what we said to him. We stood by it and we still stand by it.
  The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Eldon Griffiths) put some questions to me and the one matter with which I wish to deal in particular concerns his remarks about our peace aims and how we might see a way of transferring power to Rhodesia in such a way as to give satisfaction to the people there as a whole. The hon. Gentleman wanted to know about electoral qualifications for Africans. He asked whether we might do something which might be on the basis of, say, literacy, law abiding, taxpayers or fixed abode. I understand from what the hon. Gentleman said that if something like that—some sort of standard of that type—could be reached, that would be a fair way of negotiating and saying that the Africans should be brought into discussions fully on such a basis.
  Mr. Eldon Griffiths Mr. Eldon Griffiths indicated assent.
  Mr. Bottomley: Naturally, this goes far beyond the 1961 Constitution and, in fact, would give immediate majority rule. If the hon. Gentleman really means that, then I am glad to find that he has come far ahead of any of his colleagues and that he joins with marry of my hon. Friends.
  One reason why the oil embargo is not fully on is because we have not yet got other countries following our lead. If everyone was to put on the oil sanction it would be very useful, but not as effective as the economic and financial sanctions that have already been applied. The amount of oil consumed in Rhodesia is relatively small—about 400,000 tons a year. If we were to stop one ship, there are between 400 and 500 other ships at sea, many of which could slip oil into Rhodesia very quickly. The other economic pressures are much more effective.
  One reason why the Smith régime is stronger than it ought to be is that hon. Members opposite, instead of backing the economic measures which the Government said were essential, have stated that the measures must not be punitive or effective. This has encouraged the Smith rebel régime—[HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish."] The hon. Member for Farnham (Sir G. Nicholson) has been very courageous and consistent throughout, and I do not associate him in an way with that comment. The right hon. Member for Enfield, West (Mr. Iain Macleod), who was perhaps more responsible than anyone in the House for the wind of change, has encouraged the rebel régime.
  Smith has said that a high rate of investment would come about and the standard of living would improve. He was encouraged to believe that by some hon. Members, but the way in which he has been putting it to his people could lead to his downfall. Mr. Smith said to his people, "Look, if we get our independence, we will get increased investment and our standard of living will rise." In fact, this is not happening, and there are people in Rhodesia who are getting discontended and discouraged. We should encourage that feeling. I think that we can do it in a way which, ship or no ship, will bring us the result that my hon. Friend the Member for

  387
  Walton wants, and which we all want, but it is a matter of judgment how to bring this about with the least discord for Africa and for our own economy.
  I sometimes wonder whether all hon. Members recognise how much damage we are doing to our own economy in order to carry this policy through. We believe that it is necessary, and it is far from being an empty gesture. It will hurt the British people. Hon. Members should face that and recognise their responsibilities in this respect——
  Mr. Thorpe Mr. Thorpe rose——
  Mr. Bottomley: No, I shall not give way. In Rhodesia——
  Mr. Thorpe: Answer the debate. What about the ship?
  Mr. Bottomley: If the hon. Member has not heard me referring to the ship, not once but two or three times, he and perhaps other hon. Members have not been listening or according me the courtesy I extended to them.
  I believe that our economic squeeze—in particular the recent very severe measures we took—is beginning to tell on Rhodesia. The white Rhodesians are now being compelled to face up to the hard facts of life. It is a dismal awakening for them. Mr. Smith has shown it to be so by his latest pained pronouncements. The House will not expect me to name sources, but I can say that I get constant information from Rhodesia and letters expressing disappointment with the Rhodesia régime. That kind of demonstration will grow. I want to be in a position to encourage it to grow and to get these people to co-operate. I think that mine is the best way, and I do not want to be told otherwise by the hon. Gentleman opposite who has not the responsibility—if he had, he might look at things in a different light.
  I want to refer to the decision taken last Friday in Addis Ababa. I am very glad that at last the African nations as a whole are following our lead on the question of economic sanctions. This will enable us, as I have said, to bring down the illegal Government. I hope that they will implement their resolution as speedily as possible. It has taken them a long time to come to it. The Common-
  388
  wealth countries have been very good on this. My criticism is not of them, but I have a criticism of other African countries who have not taken the opportunity to follow our lead. However, the decisions of the O.A.U. and of our Government are now identical. We all want the restoration of constitutional Government in Rhodesia and then, I hope, a peaceful transition to eventual majority rule in that unhappy country. I am sure that my hon. Friends and hon. Members opposite basically agree with me. We want to see that the British Government, who have this responsibility and who cannot abdicate it, are able to bring about the end we all desire.
  Hon. Members on both sides will, I think, acknowledge that, if there be any disagreement at all, it is about methods and timing. In this respect, I can tell the House that, whoever may be pressing us, whether it be the O.A.U. or hon. and right hon. Members of this House—and we welcome it—the right and the onerous duty to decide this issue rests nevertheless with myself and with the Government. We shall determine how we shall bring about the downfall of Smith and his supporters. As I said in Kampala on 4th December, the British Government and people are in no mood to be pushed about by anyone who believes that we ought to take irresponsible actions. We do not propose to take foolish or hasty steps which could result in plunging the larger part of Africa into a blood bath. But, naturally, we fully understand and sympathise with the passionate African feelings about the possibility of a second white supremacy State in Southern Africa. Britain's aim and the Government's aim is racial equality, but our hearts must not get the better of our heads. We shall restore constitutional Government in Rhodesia, but we shall do it in our way and in our time.
  I conclude as I began, by saying that I did not welcome the debate but I think that it has been extremely useful and valuable. The only reason why I did not give way to hon. Members occasionally was that I felt that I had an obligation to all hon. Members. I have tried to answer all the points that have been raised. If I have failed to do so, this is not because I chose that way but merely because the limited opportunity to take down all the points rapidly

  389
  and cover them in succession did not enable me to do so.
  The illegal régime in Rhodesia will not go on. It is our endeavour to bring it down and I believe that, if we bring it down, we shall win the support not only of the House as a whole but of all liberal minded people in this country and the world over.
  Mr. David Steel: The right hon. Gentleman has still two or three minutes left. He must realise that the object of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Haffer) and of most hon. Members in taking an interest in the debate was not to have a wide-ranging discussion on all points but to debate the particular question of allowing the oil ship to go in. If the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared to give us an assurance that the Government
  390
  will look at this again, and if they are quite determined that they will not intervene, we are entitled to ask the right hon. Gentleman to give a reasoned explanation of the grounds on which they have reached this unfortunate decision.
  Mr. Bottomley: I repeat that, during the course of my speech, I have endeavoured to cover all the arguments and points raised. If the discussion had been specifically on an oil embargo, I should have addressed myself to it, but that would have been discourteous to other hon. Members. I can only reiterate that I dealt substantially with the question of oil.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Ten o'clock.

TECHNOLOGY
  Industrial Development (Aberdeen)
  Industrial Development (Aberdeen)
  Strategic Embargo List (Exports to Eastern Europe)
  Strategic Embargo List (Exports to Eastern Europe)
  Radio and Television Sets (Price Increases)
  Radio and Television Sets (Price Increases)
  Computers and Machine Tools (Research Projects)
  Computers and Machine Tools (Research Projects)
  Goods and Services (Notification)
  Goods and Services (Notification)
  Computers (Universities)
  Computers (Universities)
  Scientists and Technologists
  Scientists and Technologists
  Technically Qualified Personnel
  Technically Qualified Personnel
  Computer Personnel
  Computer Personnel
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon (Visit to U.S.A.)
  Princess Margaret and Lord Snowdon (Visit to U.S.A.)
  3½ Per Cent. War Loan
  3½ Per Cent. War Loan
  Purchase Tax
  Purchase Tax
  United States (Portfolio Investment)
  United States (Portfolio Investment)
  Rhodesia (Pensions)
  Rhodesia (Pensions)
  Members of Parliament (Salaries)
  Members of Parliament (Salaries)
  Dogs
  Dogs
  Disabled Drivers (Road Fund Licences)
  Disabled Drivers (Road Fund Licences)
  Income Tax Rebates
  Income Tax Rebates
  Companies (Trading Profits)
  Companies (Trading Profits)
HOUSING
  Building Standards
  Building Standards
  Service Men's Houses (Possession)
  Service Men's Houses (Possession)
  Subsidies
  Subsidies
  Huyton-with-Roby Urban District Council (Planning Appeal)
  Huyton-with-Roby Urban District Council (Planning Appeal)
  Rent Assessment Panels and Rent Tribunals
  Rent Assessment Panels and Rent Tribunals
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Rates (Legislation)
  Rates (Legislation)
  Water Supplies, Vennington
  Water Supplies, Vennington
  Local Government Reorganisation (Tyneside)
  Local Government Reorganisation (Tyneside)
  Town Expansion (North Lincolnshire)
  Town Expansion (North Lincolnshire)
  Oxford Green Belt (Inquiry)
  Oxford Green Belt (Inquiry)
  Weymouth (Planning Appeal)
  Weymouth (Planning Appeal)
  Rent Tribunals (Staff)
  Rent Tribunals (Staff)
  Rent Assessment Committees
  Rent Assessment Committees
  New Town (Humber Estuary)
  New Town (Humber Estuary)
AFRICA
  Secretary of State (Talks)
  Secretary of State (Talks)
MINISTRY OF POWER
  Power Stations (North-East Coast)
  Power Stations (North-East Coast)
  Coal Prices (South-West)
  Coal Prices (South-West)
  Collieries (Output)
  Collieries (Output)
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT
  Zambia-East Africa Rail Link
  Zambia-East Africa Rail Link
  University College, Salisbury, Rhodesia
  University College, Salisbury, Rhodesia
  African Countries (Economic Aid)
  African Countries (Economic Aid)
  Colonial Development and Welfare Grants and Loans (Purchases)
  Colonial Development and Welfare Grants and Loans (Purchases)
BOARD OF TRADE
  Luxury Goods (Imports)
  Luxury Goods (Imports)
  Industrial Development (Blyth and Seaton Valley and Bedlington)
  Industrial Development (Blyth and Seaton Valley and Bedlington)
  Wool Textile Exports
  Wool Textile Exports
  Rolls Razor Limited
  Rolls Razor Limited
  Travel Agents
  Travel Agents
  Companies Act, 1948 (Prosecutions and Convictions)
  Companies Act, 1948 (Prosecutions and Convictions)
  British Motor Corporation and Pressed Steel (Monopolies Commission's Report)
  British Motor Corporation and Pressed Steel (Monopolies Commission's Report)
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE
  Medical Research
  Medical Research
  Universities Central Council for Admissions
  Universities Central Council for Admissions
  Primary Schools (Teacher-Pupil Ratio)
  Primary Schools (Teacher-Pupil Ratio)
TRANSPORT
  Transhipment of Goods (Docks and Railway Termini)
  Transhipment of Goods (Docks and Railway Termini)
  Unlicensed Vehicles
  Unlicensed Vehicles
  Farmland (Dual Carriageways)
  Farmland (Dual Carriageways)
  Road Accidents (Dogs)
  Road Accidents (Dogs)
RAILWAYS
  Retired Staff and Wives (Travel Passes)
  Retired Staff and Wives (Travel Passes)
  Lavatories and Cloakrooms (Hygiene)
  Lavatories and Cloakrooms (Hygiene)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  Reserve Forces (Reorganisation)
  Reserve Forces (Reorganisation)
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
  Wales (New Industries)
  Wales (New Industries)
MINISTRY OF AVIATION
  Aircraft Industry
  Aircraft Industry
  COLLIERY CLOSURES
  COLLIERY CLOSURES
  DESERTED WIVES AND FATHERLESS FAMILIES
  DESERTED WIVES AND FATHERLESS FAMILIES
  RHODESIA
  RHODESIA
  ZAMBIA (BRITISH FORCES)
  ZAMBIA (BRITISH FORCES)
  VIETNAM
  VIETNAM
  BRITISH ARMED FORCES (COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES)
  BRITISH ARMED FORCES (COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Ewes (Full-Rate Subsidy)
  Ewes (Full-Rate Subsidy)
  RHODESIA (TRADE)
  RHODESIA (TRADE)
  BRITISH COUNCIL
  BRITISH COUNCIL
HOSPITALS
  Northern Hospital Region (Health Service Schemes)
  Northern Hospital Region (Health Service Schemes)
  Building Projects
  Building Projects
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Moneylenders Act, 1927 (Prosecutions and Convictions)
  Moneylenders Act, 1927 (Prosecutions and Convictions)
PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  War Disability Pensions (Tuberculosis)
  War Disability Pensions (Tuberculosis)
POST OFFICE
  Stamps (Advertising)
  Stamps (Advertising)
TELEPHONE SERVICE
  Elderly and Housebound Persons (Emergency Communication)
  Elderly and Housebound Persons (Emergency Communication)
SCOTLAND
  Mentally Handicapped Children
  Mentally Handicapped Children
  Station Hotel, Alness
  Station Hotel, Alness
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Chronically Sick and Disabled (Treatment)
  Chronically Sick and Disabled (Treatment)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Coventry

INFLAMMABLE NIGHTWEAR
2.35 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in addition to the film on inflammable clothing issued by the Central Office of Information last July and the one called Guard that Fire, they will now sponsor one dealing with the dangers arising when flammable materials are used at home for making up nightdresses for children and old people.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (LORD STONHAM): My Lords, we are grateful for this suggestion, and shall certainly see if it can be adopted, although I should point out that the first film my noble friend mentioned already includes a warning of the kind she has in mind.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend if he is aware how grateful I am for that reply, particularly the first part of it? But may I ask him if he would stress to his right honourable friend the importance of this—because he will remember that on November 18 last he referred in this House to the tragedy of a child who had been burnt to death because it was wearing a nightdress made up by its mother from material at home. Will he do all he can to expedite this?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I had hoped that my Answer would indicate to my noble friend that we are doing so, but I can add that we are now looking
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into the possibility of producing a very short television film, using still pictures with suitable captions and commentary, because this kind of film can be produced quite quickly.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: I am much obliged to my noble friend.
LORD AIREDALE: My Lords, would the Minister have a look at an electric blanket which is referred to in this month's edition of the magazine Which? This is an electric blanket which, in the opinion of the magazine, is potentially dangerous and is apparently on sale in the shops.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I will most certainly look at the article to which the noble Lord has referred, but he will appreciate that, although in general it is on the same subject, this comes under a different set of regulations.

PROPOSED TUNNEL FOR A.40 ROAD
2.37 p.m.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what consideration has been given to the construction of a half-mile long tunnel beneath the escarpment near the Stokenchurch spur of the A.40 Motorway, in order to preserve the Chiltern woodlands from further road building and when this tunnel is likely to be completed.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD LINDGREN): My Lords, the Surveyor of the Oxfordshire County Council, as my right honourable friend's agent authority, and engineers of the Ministry have under consideration alternative proposals for future improvement of the A.40 road crossing the Chilterns. These include a tunnel. The cost and the implications of all the alternatives must be known before any proposals can be published, but it is unlikely that a major scheme could be started before the early 1970's.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his reply, so far as it goes, may I ask him whether he will confirm that this tunnel project is fully endorsed by all the local authorities in that area, and by many national organisations, such as the National Trust and the Nature Conservancy Board? And is it not a fact that, for a meagre increase of 3 per cent. on the original estimates for building this road, the risk of road accidents could be minimised and one of the loveliest stretches of our countryside preserved?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, one agrees that this is a most beautiful part of this country of ours, and, as the noble Lord has suggested, part of it is a nature reserve and another part belongs to the National Trust. There have already been meetings between the Divisional Road Engineer and the County Surveyor, and the views of all those concerned—the Nature Conservancy Board, the National Trust, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, the Chiltern Society and the Bucks., Berks, and Oxfordshire Naturalists' Trust—have been considered and will continue to be taken into consideration as the scheme progresses.
LORD SEGAL: Would my noble friend not agree that this project merits a far higher degree of priority than beginning in the early 1970's?
LORD LINDGREN: My Lords, the more objections there are, the more it will be delayed. On the A.40 there is the section from the Wheatley bypass to the Lambert Arms, which we are to start in 1968, and the High Wycombe bypass is already under construction. This stretch across the Chilterns will then be quite a bottleneck, because the other two sections of new road will have been completed. We are making progress as quickly as we can, consistent with taking into account the fact that this is a part of the country of natural beauty and that a considerable number of views have to be considered.

EGG MARKETING
2.40 p.m.
LORD HURD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to ensure that the financial operation of the contract scheme proposed by the British Egg Marketing Board will not seriously injure the established producers' cooperative societies with their own packing stations supplying eggs direct to retailers, and so conflict with the provisions of the marketing scheme, as approved by Parliament, and nullify, so far as eggs are concerned, the declared policy of the Government to encourage co-operation in agricultural marketing.]
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): My Lords, under present arrangements packing stations (some of which are owned by producer co-operatives) make payments direct to producers for the eggs they purchase on behalf of the Board. Under the new contracts scheme, the Egg Board will itself pay producers at fortnightly intervals. This was a matter for the Board to decide since, as Ministers have made clear, the detailed arrangements for the administration of the new scheme are the responsibility of the Board. I am not aware that this conflicts with the provisions of the marketing scheme or that it will nullify, so far as eggs are concerned, our policy of encouraging co-operation in agricultural marketing. I understand, moreover, that, following representations from packing stations on certain aspects of the scheme, the Board has announced that it is prepared to offer extended credit facilities to them for an interim period. The Board has also announced that the scheme will be subject to review in detail after it has been running for a reasonable time, and that suggestions from all sections of the industry will be given careful consideration.
LORD HURD: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply and for the reasonable terms of the assurances he gave us. Will he furthermore ask the Minister of Agriculture to give direct assurances to the producers' co-operatives that when one of the producers' Boards is

105
going to launch something fundamentally new which the co-operatives think is injurious to their interests, the producers' Board will always have full consultations before bringing forward the scheme? It is Government policy, is it not, to encourage the agricultural co-operatives? This scheme seems to be rather a stab in the back for some of the existing farmers' co-operative societies.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I cannot give a complete assurance on this, but it certainly is the desire of the Minister to ensure that these co-operatives should be brought into the consultations as and when it is possible. So far as the "stab in the back" is concerned, I have heard that phrase twice in the last two days.

THE BLACK ARROW SPACE PROJECT
2.43 p.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBORQUGH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the launching of the French three-stage rocket, Diamant, they intend to proceed with the next development stage of the launcher vehicle, Black Arrow.]
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD SHACKLETON): My Lords, as I stated in reply to the noble Lord's Motion on November 3, preliminary development work is going on, but a decision to proceed with a full development programme must depend on the wider consideration which is being given by the Government on our space policy. As I indicated on that occasion, it is hoped that decisions will be taken in the near future.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, which I feel does not take us very much further, may I ask whether he is really happy about the continuing delay in taking a definite decision on this matter especially in view of the fact that in our debate he said, after the quotation he has himself given, that it is extremely important that we should develop a capability in this
106
field and that decisions will be taken in the near future? That was said over a month ago, and in fact there is over a year's delay in this matter. Is the noble Lord also aware that industry itself is prepared to contribute to the cost of development to an appreciable extent— I think it was £1 million out of £8 million in the next three years—and is he also aware that, again, it is over a year since industry made this offer? In my view, the delay passes comprehension.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, it is certainly over a year since industry made the offer to the previous Government, which so far as I know did not choose to take it up. There is nothing that this Government could have done that would have got us ahead of French space research. It is the previous Administration's policy which we are now having to review, in the hope of getting better value for money than they succeeded in getting in the past. I agree that this matter is of importance. It is the subject of very thorough study, and I hope that decisions will be arrived at shortly.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, in view of the great number of Members of your Lordships' House who are to speak in this afternoon's debate, I think I should inform the House that dinners will be available between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m. this evening.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, what about breakfasts?

STATUTE LAW REVISION BILL [H.L.]
2.47 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD GARDINER): My Lords, I beg to introduce a Bill to revise the statute law by repealing obsolete, spent, unnecessary or superseded enactments. I beg to move that this Bill be read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1ª.— (The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 1ª, and to be printed.

CORPORATION OF THE TRINITY HOUSE OF LEITH ORDER CON FIRMATION BILL
Read 3ª(according to Order) and passed.

ARMY ACT 1955 (CONTINUATION) ORDER 1965
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, in moving that the Army Act 1955 (Continuation) Order 1965 be approved, I would remind your Lordships that the Armed Forces Bill, which has already been presented in another place, will be coming to this House and we shall therefore have a full opportunity to debate all the questions related to the Army and Air Force annual Acts. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Draft Army Act 1955 (Continuation) Order 1965, laid before the House on November 9, 1965, be approved.—(Lord Shackleton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

AIR FORCE ACT 1955 (CONTINUATION) ORDER 1965
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I beg to move that the Air Force Act 1955 (Continuation) Order 1965 be approved.
Moved, That the Draft Air Force Act 1955 (Continuation) Order 1965, laid before the House on November 9, 1965, be approved.—(Lord Shackleton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE (PRIVATE BILLS)
2.49 p.m.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF LISTOWEL): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Standing Orders Committee be appointed, and that the Lords following, with the Lord Chancellor and the Chairman of Committees, be named of the Committee:
108

M. Salisbury,

M. Willingdon,

L. Ailwyn,

L. Airedale,

L. Archibald,

L. Cawley,

L. Crook,

L. Douglas of Barloch,

L. Faringdon,

L. Terrington,

L. Tweedsmuir.—(The Earl of Listowel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMITTEE FOR PRIVILEGES
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That in accordance with Standing Order No. 65, a Committee for Privileges be appointed, and that the following Lords, together with the Chairman of Committees and any four Lords of Appeal, be named of the Committee:

L. Salisbury,

E. Attlee,

E. Dundee,

E. Longford,

E. St. Aldwyn,

E. Swinton, V.

Dilhorne, L.

Amulree, L.

Carrington, L.

Conesford, L.

Layton,

L. Rea,

L. Shepherd,

L. Silkin,

L. Strang.—(The Earl of Listowel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND CONVOCATIONS BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order).
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment: Report received.

RHODESIA
2.51 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE LORD COLERAINE rose to move, That this House, taking note of the economic measures imposed by Her Majesty's Government in relation to trade with Southern Rhodesia, greatly deplores the prohibition by Her Majesty's Government of the payment of pensions including war disability pensions, to which British subjects now residing in Rhodesia are entitled, regards this prohibition as a serious departure from the policy announced by the Prime Minister on 12th November, 1965, and affirms its belief that at the end of the day the problems relating to Southern Rhodesia can only be resolved by negotiation. The noble Lord said: My Lords, may I first of all seek your indulgence to make, in a sense, a personal explanation, to explain, if I can, the standpoint from which I am moving the Motion on the Paper and the standpoint from which I shall resist the Government Amendment?
I have never supported U.D.I. Before it came about I used such modest—such very modest— influence as I possess to try to prevent it. When it was a fact I deplored it with as much sincerity as any Member of your Lordships' House. I do not support the Government of Mr. Ian Smith. I think that in many respects it is a Government which is illiberal and repressive; though in fairness I think that one must admit that there is a little bit of humbug on our part. The rebellion having taken place, and this country having in everything but name declared war on Southern Rhodesia, it seems to me that there is an element of hypocrisy in it when we complain that ade facto Government of Rhodesia adopts repressive measures. It does; and the longer the British Government pursue their present policy the more repressive those measures and Mr. Smith's Government will inevitably become.
As I have said I do not support that Government, but where I think that I differ from some of my noble friends is that, unlike them, I recognise that it exists; and I will take no part in that sad charade in which we have been engaged in this Parliament, the pretence that the Government of Rhodesia is vested in Mr. Arthur Bottomley. That is
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as unreal as any children's game that will be played this Christmas.
My Lords, I wonder whether the reflection has ever passed through your Lordships' minds, as it has through mine, that in recent years we have become increasingly the victims of phrases which pass for thought and which act as a substitute for thought. One of those phrases is, "We owe responsibility to the African." I would ask some of my noble friends to face a question that I do not believe they have ever faced. It is this. How have we discharged that responsibility? I expect that your Lordships will have seen the leading article in The Times this morning, headed,
"Banda's Pioneers":
" Dr. Banda has taken a dangerous step in making his Young Pioneers immune from arrest by the police."
I think that if we were honest with ourselves we should admit that we have not discharged our responsibility to the African. We have slid out from underneath it. We have handed it over to this conjuration of tribal dictatorships masquerading as nation States, with their Presidential yachts paid for by overseas aid; with their jet flights to the Waldorf Astoria, or the Park Lane Hilton, paid for by overseas aid; while the unhappy people whom they are supposed to represent slide further and further back into that morass of misery and poverty from which for a hundred years we have been striving to raise them. We have not discharged our responsibility, my Lords; we have surrendered it unconditionally.
There is another of these catch-phrases which is on the lips of everyone to-day that: "Sanctions must hurt". That is not the question that we ought to be asking ourselves. We should not ask, "Do sanctions hurt?" We should not ask, "Whom do they hurt?" The only real question, and we are begging it all the time, is: "Do sanctions help?" Do sanctions help to restore peace and trust and honour again? It is my conviction that they do not. Sanctions hurt; sanctions are cruel. But need sanctions be sadistic? What are we to think of this prohibition on the payments to Government pensioners in Southern Rhodesia? We are invited by the Amendment to welcome the "humanitarian" action which the Government are taking to mitigate their initial blunder. I believe that the Amendment is on the Order Paper

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only because the Government realise that they made a most catastrophic blunder; and by this Amendment they are trying to do something to restore their tarnished image and the tarnished image of the Prime Minister.
How is this humanitarian action to be enforced? What control has Mr. Arthur Bottomley over any means test machinery that he may set up in Rhodesia? Of course it cannot be enforced. As for its humanity, within the last day or two, a retired member of the Colonial Service in Guiana received his usual cheque in payment of his pension in Rhodesia and it was endorsed, "Payable only in the United Kingdom". But this is not only a matter of human considerations. It seems to me to be a matter of elementary morality. On what basis of principle do the Government base this act, that they can deprive people of pensions which they have earned—which are not gratuitous, not acts of grace—in order quite openly, quite plainly, to influence their political views? We talk about a Police State in Rhodesia. What State are we sinking into here? I object to all these sanctions; I have done throughout; and the more extreme they become, the more I believe they will fail in their object.
If your Lordships would bear with me for a moment, I would call in evidence one who may be more eloquent and more persuasive than I. I have here a letter. I do not propose to read it through to your Lordships, but there are one or two passages which I should like to read to the House, because they seem to me to be most moving and illuminating. The letter is from a young man who emigrated to Rhodesia some years ago and he is writing to his family's local newspaper, trying to explain how he sees the situation:
" To my friends and family I plead that they do not judge me too harshly in what I am about to write.
" I have been in the intolerable and precarious position of divided loyalties. But when the Rhodesian Prime Minister announced to the nation that Rhodesia had assumed its rightful independence—on November 11—I knew where my loyalties must be.
" It is horribly painful to realise that our own kith and kin are against us, and that the very friends that I used to go to school with, the friends that I played soccer with and went to the youth centre with—it hurts to realise that they might very well be fighting
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on the opposite side to-morrow. That those friends will be, officially at least, enemies.
" To those friends I can only say that there is no wish within me to change your point of view even if I could. A man has to make up his own mind, but is there just a slight possibility that you have not truly examined Rhodesia's case? "
A little later he goes on:
" I became a Rhodesian citizen some years ago and I am very proud of it. This is a very proud nation to-day. There are no regrets and no hard feelings. The obvious hardships that we shall have to face in the future were expected and have been accepted. The people are behind the Government and are determined to defend, and only defend, what we believe is right."
Then, he finishes:
" I cannot prognosticate what the future will he. I only know that the people here are determined to make it work, no matter what the cost.
" We shall win through—we have to."
What are we to do with that young man? Are we to read him extracts from constitutional textbooks? Is that going to change his mind? Are we going to kill him? I suppose it is in our power to do so? Are we going to starve him, bring him to destitution? We can do all these things. But they will not alter the fact that these people, with whom we are at issue, regard themselves as a nation and not, as some of us seem to regard them, as a troop of schoolboys insulting the prefects or as a tribe on the North West Frontier to be quelled by force.
I know, and frankly admit, that what that young man has said represents not the whole picture, even in Rhodesia. I believe that there is a darker side, but I do not think that that makes any difference. There are those who realise that unless they win this fight they will lose their standard of life. All their possessions, all their assets, their only means of earning a living are in Rhodesia. From surrender they have nothing to hope for except virtual extinction. From resistance, even beyond any sensible point of resistance, they still have hope—the only hope they have. Do your Lordships realise, for example, that Mr. Joshua Nkomo has publicly stated that the land of every European farmer will be expropriated without any compensation? When these people are faced with that, what interest have they in compromise? How can they surrender? Surey they must go on.
I would maintain that my view of the efficacy of sanctions has been borne out by the record of the past three weeks and even by the record of the past three months. The Government have stumbled from miscalculation to miscalculation, and we are farther away from any acceptable solution to-day than we were three months ago. First, the Prime Minister uttered the most savage threats as to what would happen if Mr. Smith's Government made a unilateral declaration of independence. There were those of us who said that that was the one way to bring on his Unilateral Declaration of Independence. And I think we were right. Then we were told if that gallant man, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, with whom we must all sympathise deeply, stuck to his post in Salisbury, it would become quite clear that this was not a rebellion of the white Rhodesians as a whole but of only a ruthless and unrepresentative minority, and that the loyal Rhodesians would flock to support the Governor, and all would be well again. That just has not happened. Then we were told, "The sanctions that we are putting on are, as they ought to be, swift, merciful and final." They did not work. Now we have the savage sanctions which were, announced last week, and this contemptible measure regarding Government pensioners in Rhodesia.
What can we see coming from this? I know what I see. I see two ships on a collision course in a restricted channel steaming towards each other at ever-faster speeds. It is as though you had a 100,000 ton oil tanker laden with petrol steaming down Southampton Water, and approaching it a 20,000 ton freighter, from Rhodesia, loaded with high explosives. Nothing can avoid a collision unless the ships reverse their engines and take some measure to protect us all from a cataclysm. That is why, once U.D.I. became a fact, I for myself resisted the idea that national unity was essential. I believed, on the contrary, that it was highly dangerous, because it would encourage the Government to stay on this collision course, to accelerate the motors and to bring us day by day, and now almost hour by hour, nearer to disaster. In those circumstances, even the humblest deck hand is allowed to sound a note of warning, even if he should be tried for mutiny afterwards. My Lords, I am cer-
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tain that throughout this country there is a growing feeling that this situation can be settled only by negotiation and conciliation, and I should like to know just what is the attitude of Her Majesty's Government on that.
The Amendment asks us to support
" the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to work toward the re-establishment of a constitutional Government in Southern Rhodesia."
We have heard those words before, and they have meant unconditional surrender. Do they now, on this Order Paper, mean anything different? Do they mean that there is a door open for negotiation, even with Mr. Smith's illegal Government? Do they mean that if Mr. Smith broadens the basis of his Government, not through the Governor, but of his own act, Her Majesty's Government would not negotiate with that new Government? I think we are entitled to an answer to those questions before we make up our minds on the Government's Amendment.
There is another question that I have to put and which must be answered. For some months past there have been rumours that shortly before the last General Election the Leader of the Labour Party wrote to one of the Nationalist leaders in Southern Rhodesia saying that the Labour Party would never accept an independent Rhodesia except under majority rule, and that the Labour Party would do their utmost to change the 1961 Constitution. That letter was clearly of the first importance in the negotiations between the Prime Minister and the Rhodesian Government; and if your Lordships will look at Command Paper 2807, you will find references to it between pages 47 and 51.
On November 27, 1964, Mr. Smith wrote to the Prime Minister and said: "What faith can we put in your undertakings as long as this letter is on the record?" The Prime Minister replied to his message, but made no mention of this question; he made no attempt to give an answer. A few days later, Mr. Smith again wrote to the Prime Minister and said: "You have not answered the question that I put to you. How do you reconcile what you are saying with this letter?" And this time the Prime Minister did not answer the question, but made some evasive and quite equivocal reference, which might have

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been a reference to it or not. Again Mr. Smith wrote and said: "Still you have not replied to my question". And, so far as the record shows, there has been no reply ever since. As I was saying, so far as this country is concerned, that letter has been a rumour, a well-authenticated rumour. It is a rumour no longer, because yesterday, fourteen months afterwards, the Prime Minister tabled it in the Library of the House of Commons: and it is, broadly, just as I have described it to your Lordships.
My Lords, do we not begin to see why U.D.I. happened? Do we not begin to see that the Rhodesian Government had little trust in the good faith of the Prime Minister? But that is not the point I want to make now, and that is not the question I want to ask now. The question I want to ask the Government is this: What do they intend to do with that letter? Do they intend just to leave it lying in the Library of the House of Commons, or do they intend to withdraw it? If they do not withdraw it, I do not believe that they will find any white Rhodesian of responsibility and character who will be able to negotiate with them. Because for so long as that letter is on the record, any white Rhodesian must know that, whatever the protestations of Her Majesty's Government may be, they are determined to introduce into Rhodesia African majority rule. If that is not so, let the Government withdraw the letter. I would ask the Lord Chancellor whether he can give the assurance that the Government will withdraw forthwith this letter to Dr. E. C. Mutasa, which is now lying in the Library of the House of Commons. If the Government can give that assurance, I believe there is some hope of reconciliation. If they cannot give it, then I can see nothing but disaster and shame. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That this House, taking note of the economic measures imposed by Her Majesty's Government in relation to trade with Southern Rhodesia, greatly deplores the prohibition by Her Majesty's Government of the payment of pensions, including war disability pensions, to which British subjects now residing in Rhodesia are entitled, regards this prohibition as a serious departure from the policy announced by the Prime Minister on
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November 12, 1965, and affirms its beliefs that at the end of the day the problems relating to Southern Rhodesia can only be resolved by negotiation.—(Lord Coleraine.)
3.22p.m.
LORD CHANCELLOR LORD CHANCELLOR had given Notice of his intention to move, as an Amendment to the Motion, to leave out all words after "Rhodesia" in line 4, and insert:
"is of the opinion that they were a regrettable necessity, welcomes the statement made by the Government that the measures in respect of Pensions will be administered with due regard to humanitarian considerations, and supports the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to work towards the re-establishment of a constitutional Government in Southern Rhodesia."
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, we all know the deep feeling with which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, speaks on this question. and also his great sincerity. On the previous occasion when we discussed the question of Rhodesia, the noble Lord was good enough to say of my observations:
" … I listened to his speech this afternoon with the greatest admiration for its objectivity and its absolute fairness."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. Vol. 270 (No. 5), col. 374; 15/11/65.]
I shall hope to do nothing this afternoon to lose that reputation.
There are a great many speakers, and I thought that perhaps I could assist the House best if I started by reminding your Lordships of what I think are the four basic matters in relation to the Rhodesian problem. The first is that, ever since the war, it has been the policy of successive Governments that in relation to those parts of the world which we conquered by force and colonised, we should, to the best of our ability, develop them economically, bring them services of health and education and of law and order (and it is still the fact that two-thirds of the whole of the population of the world is governed by the law that came from England, and I hope I shall not be thought to be too prejudiced if I suggest that among the benefits which we have conferred upon our Colonies has been our system of justice), and, in due time, when they were ready for it, to give them freedom and the right to rule themselves on a Constitution approved by the people of the Colony as a whole.
This, then, has been our policy, and there has been no deviation with different

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Governments. As long ago as December 7, 1963, Mr. Sandys wrote to the then Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Winston Field:
"The impression seems to have been created that the British Government wish to lay down conditions for Southern Rhodesia's independence which are more exacting than in the case of other territories. As you know, that is quite incorrect. The present difficulty arises from your desire to secure independence on the basis of a franchise which is incomparably more restricted than that of any other British territory to which independence has hitherto been granted … ."
" If Southern Rhodesia were to be offered independence on a basis which was unacceptable to Commonwealth opinion, not only would Southern Rhodesia's application for membership certainly be rejected, but the unity of the Commonwealth itself might be seriously threatened."
That, and any other quotations I shall read from the communications between the two Governments, are taken from the published Record. I have had them typed only for convenience.
In September, 1964, the then Prime Minister of this country, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, wrote to Mr. Smith:
" While we could agree that we had hoped that, when the Federation came to an end, all its three constituent Territories would proceed to independence, this final step had to depend in each case on the consent of the peoples concerned. This fundamental condition could not he overridden or set aside by any prior contract, whether implied or otherwise. In fact, there had been no such contract in 1961; and Sir Edgar Whitehead, who had been the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia at the time, had explicitly confirmed this in a recent public speech … ."
" … there had been no pledge on the part of the United Kingdom Government to give Southern Rhodesia independence in return for the Territory's acceptance of the 1961 Constitution. Provided that this was clear, it would now be right to turn to the main question, namely, whether the Government of Southern Rhodesia, who already possessed most of the substance of independence, could claim to be given complete and formal independence on a basis acceptable to the population of the Territory as a whole."
On September 9, the Prime Minister said:
"… we did adhere to our previous statements that sufficiently representative institutions would be a pre-condition."
To which Mr. Smith replied
" that he would accept this. What he would not accept was a pre-condition requiring greater African representation in the Legislature, if the Africans themselves indicated that they did not want it."
The Prime Minister said:
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" … greater African representation in the Legislature was precisely what sufficiently representative institutions meant—unless the people of Southern Rhodesia made it wholly clear that they did not want this change. We continued to regard an increase in African representation as a pre-condition of the grant of independence … "
The present Government have throughout said exactly the same. The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has spoken of a letter, not written by the Government, but written by the then Leader of the Labour Party to a Mr. Mutasa, and said that there had been a great many rumours about it. I do not know why he says rumours: it is a well-known matter. Mr. Smith read it in this way. He said, in correspondence on November 25, 1964:
" I find it difficult to reconcile this assurance, welcome as it is, with a statement made by you in a letter which you sent as Leader of the Labour Party to Mr. E. C. Mutasa, Salisbury, on 2 October, 1964, in which you say that the Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia as long as the Government of that country remains under the control of a white minority."
The Prime Minister at once replied, making it perfectly clear that the Government were making no such conditions. He said:
" I have said that we lay down no prior conditions for the talks. It would appear that, for your part, you are seeking to lay down two. First, that I should make plain whether or not the British Government intends to insist on African majority rule in Rhodesia as a pre-condition of independence. Secondly, that I should recognise in advance that your position in the talks will be that independence on the basis of the present Constitution and franchise has been incontestably proved to be the wish of the majority of the population.
" We have an open mind on the timing of independence in relation to progress towards majority rule, to which, as I have said, we wish to see a peaceful transition, but the granting of independence must he on a basis acceptable to the people of the country as a whole."
Again, on December 21 he said:
" We are prepared to grant independence on any basis which we are satisfied is acceptable to the people of the country as a whole."
I do not know what the noble Lord means by asking that the Government should withdraw the letter. I do not know how you withdraw a letter. It was not the Government's letter; they did not write it. The policy of the Government is that for which the Government are responsible, and the Government have made it perfectly plain throughout that they are certainly not insisting on African

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majority rule before independence, that they went into the talks with no precondition but that the promise of independence must be acceptable to the people of the country as a whole—a policy which has, in relation to our Colonies, been the uniform policy of successive Governments ever since the war.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for giving way. He argues, fairly, that the letter was written by the Leader of the Opposition; and he asks how the Government can withdraw or disown something that was written by the Leader of the Opposition. The present Prime Minister, as the then Leader of the Opposition, was writing on behalf of the Labour Party. The connection between the Labour Party and the Government is well known. If the Government cannot withdraw this letter, will the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor use his influence with the Prime Minister to see that the Leader of the Labour Party withdraws it on behalf of the Labour Party?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I really do not know what the noble Lord means by "withdrawing" the letter. The Government have made it perfectly plain that they are not attaching, as a condition of independence, that there should be at the same time majority rule. They have said this throughout. Even since the illegal declaration of independence my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made it perfectly plain that he is not suggesting that there should be African majority rule, now or to-morrow; and he has made it perfectly plain—and he did so in correspondence to which I referred—that the Government were not laying down any such conditions.
The second important basic fact is that no British Government has ever threatened the Rhodesian Government with anything. Nobody has ever sought to interfere with the status quo. The status quo was one under which for a long time the Government of Southern Rhodesia has been internally self-governing and completely independent, in control in all respects, except foreign policy; with its own armed forces, its own police force,
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its own civil service and its own Legislative Assembly.
It is quite true, of course, that in law the Imperial Parliament could at any time have revoked the Constitution or substituted another, or altered it or instructed the Governor that he was not to assent to some Bill. But every Government in this country has made it perfectly plain to Southern Rhodesia that there is an unwritten constitutional convention by which, since she is self-governing, however much we might disapprove of her legislation, however much we might not agree with the Law and Order Maintenance Act (under which there is the mandatory death sentence for an African who throws a stone at a motor car), we should not interfere so long as Rhodesia acted constitutionally. Her Majesty would act on the advice of her Ministers in Rhodesia and not on the advice of her Ministers in the United Kingdom.
This was made plain by the previous Government. Sir Alec Douglas-Home in May, 1964, said this:
" Towards the end of your letter you ask me to explain why the British Government is unable to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia … Our reasons were set out clearly in the message sent by Mr. Sandys to Mr. Field on 7 December."—
of 1963.
" In this he said: ' The present difficulty arises from your desire to secure independence on the basis of a franchise which is incomparably more restrictive than that of any other British territory to which independence has hitherto been granted ".
" The franchise is, of course, a matter for your Government and legislature to decide. We have made it clear that we consider ourselves bound by the constitutional convention that Britain does not legislate in respect of any matter which is within the legislative competence of the legislature of Southern Rhodesia."
My Lords, the present Government again followed exactly the same policy as the last Government, and when my right honourable friend the Commonwealth Secretary and I went to Rhodesia we made it plain, not only to Mr. Smith and his Cabinet but to everyone we saw, that we had not come there with a view to trying to get African majority rule, either then or in the near future; that we accepted the constitutional convention, that nobody was trying to interfere internally with whatever the Government

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of Southern Rhodesia chose to do; that they had no reason to fear anything; that there was no crisis, unless there was one of their own making, and they could perfectly well continue with all the powers that were in their hands under the 1961 Constitution. Indeed, of course this was the whole of the policy of the Rhodesian Opposition, led by Mr. Butler, who said, "We simply want to go on as we are under the 1961 Constitution".
Having said all this, my right honourable friend, the Prime Minister, wrote when we came back, saying:
" … The two British Ministers have made it clear in Rhodesia that we do not contemplate the immediate imposition of majority rule, nor the advent to power of persons who have not served a political apprenticeship. We intend neither to impose constitutional change by force, nor to breach the convention that the British Parliament does not legislate for Rhodesia on matters within the competence of the Rhodesia Legislative Assembly except with the agreement of the Rhodesia Government."
That, my Lords, is the second point of great importance, that neither our predecessors nor ourselves were at any time threatening to do anything to Rhodesia or to interfere in any way with a status quo under which all the powers in Rhodesia were entirely in the hands of their elected Government.
The third important point is that this crisis has arisen simply and solely because, although they have all the powers in their own hands, they insisted on saying, "Unless we are at once given complete independence on our terms we are going to declare independence unilaterally and illegally", and here again they said just the same thing to the British Government. In September, 1964, Mr. Smith wrote:
" If confidence in Southern Rhodesia's future was to be restored, the question of her independence must be finally settled. One way of achieving it would be by means of a unilateral declaration."
The then Prime Minister—that is, Sir Alec Douglas-Home—repeated that
" Mr. Smith must try to go further than a mere indaba and must move towards something in the nature of a referendum. Perhaps both parties should now try to summarise the upshot of the discussions in the form of a communiqué which could he released to the Press. In addition, however, he felt bound to make two comments about the much publicised threat of a unilateral declaration of independence. He must make it wholly clear to Mr. Smith that, quite apart from the serious economic consequences of such a declaration.
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two constitutional results would inevitably follow. In the first place the United Kingdom Government would have to maintain that the declaration had no legal validity and that they were not prepared to recognise it. Second, they would have to emphasise that the Government of Southern Rhodesia would be in revolt against the Crown. There was no means by which that Government could, as they apparently hoped, maintain their allegiance to the Queen. There was no separate Queen of Southern Rhodesia. Her Majesty was Queen of Southern Rhodesia by virtue of being Queen of the United Kingdom and her other territories (which included Southern Rhodesia). It followed that only United Kingdom Ministers could tender advice to Her Majesty on the issue of independence for Southern Rhodesia; and they would be bound to advise her that she could not accept the position of Queen of a Southern Rhodesia which purported to be independent but would in fact be in revolt against the Crown."
My Lords, this Government of course was subjected to exactly similar threats by Mr. Smith and his colleagues, and it is to he observed that while the Rhodesian Front found that talking about a U.D.I. was popular, there was never, I think, any mandate for it. Your Lordships may remember the referendum which looked as though it was going to be a referendum on U.D.I., but a few days before polling day Mr. Smith covered everywhere with posters saying, "Yes does not mean U.D.I." One result was that nobody then knew what the referendum was about, but it was quite clear that it was not on U.D.I. Similarly, in the General Election he appealed for support on the ground that he would obtain independence, but he never committed himself to asking for a mandate for a unilateral declaration.
Then, fourthly, the Rhodesians were warned of the consequences. The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, says that that probably only made them more antagonistic to us than ever. One is in a dilemma about this. There have been many occasions in history in which it has been said that if only Britain had said what she was going to do in the circumstances the situation would not have happened. But again there is no distinction between this Government and the previous Government. As long ago as February 22, 1964, Mr. Sandys wrote:
" International reaction would be sharp and immediate. The issue would be raised at once in the United Nations; and we, of course, would not he able to offer any justification. The whole Commonwealth would be deeply disturbed and the attitude of the newer members would be extremely antagonistic.

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Commonwealth and foreign Governments, with one or two exceptions, would almost certainly refuse to recognise Southern Rhodesia's independence or to enter into relations with her. The African Nationalists in Southern Rhodesia would probably set up a Government in exile, which many countries would recognise. Thus isolated, Southern Rhodesia would increasingly become a target for subversion, trade boycotts, air transport bans and other hostile activities, organised in other African States.
" In particular. the relations between Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, which have made such a promising start with the agreements on Kariba, the Rhodesia Railways and the Central African Airways, would be in danger of serious disruption.
" A unilateral declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia would not, of course, make Southern Rhodesia legally independent. To take such action would be outside the Constitution which Southern Rhodesia Ministers are pledged to work. The British Government would, therefore, be bound to take the view that this had no legal or constitutional validity … I cannot believe that Parliament would be willing to vote financial aid of any kind. What is more, we should certainly be under heavy pressure to withdraw Commonwealth preferences and to reconsider Southern Rhodesia's membership of the Sterling Area … Ministers who have accepted office under the present Constitution and who were parties to any such declaration would be acting unconstitutionally and in breach of the obligations they assumed on taking office. Notwithstanding sincere expressions of loyalty to The Queen, it would incontestably involve a direct challenge to the authority of the Crown and Parliament."
Both in the autumn of last year and the spring of this year the present Government repeated these warnings even more forcibly. And on the four points to which I have referred it will be observed that this Government has acted exactly the same as the previous Government, and Mr. Smith's reaction has been exactly the same. I have been very struck, if I may say so, on re-reading the discussions, to observe that on any point, whether raised by this Government or the previous Government, Mr. Smith's answer has always been exactly the same, and usually in exactly the same words. I cannot trace that he has ever changed his view about anything at all from the beginning to the end.
It is always easy, it is said, to be wise after the event, and naturally one knows now more than one did then. But even in the light of after events, looking back, I cannot think of any single thing which the Government could have done to avoid an illegal declaration of independence that
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they did not do. Some of the consequences, of course, were obvious. It was because of the consequences that we leaned over backwards to appease Mr. Smith. One saw at once that most countries would not recognise the new régime; that Consuls would be withdrawn by other countries; that Commonwealth Preference would go; that their passports could not be regarded as valid; that the Governor's position would obviously be an extremely difficult one; that there was likely to be more or less an increase in internal disorder; that at the United Nations the position would be such that if we did not take the lead we were not unlikely to lose control of the situation.
I feel, if I may be permitted to say so, that my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary and my noble friend Lord Caradon are very heartily to be congratulated on their success at the United Nations. We had, on the one hand, to be seen to be taking a lead to obtain support, while, on the other, avoiding a resolution committing us and other countries to the use of force. Of course we do not write the resolutions, and we do not control the United Nations. It is easy to speak slightingly of the Afro Asian bloc, but when you get a vote like 101 to 2 that is the opinion of the world speaking. If one is to speak of the Afro-Asian bloc we should perhaps begin to remember that they are, after all, two thirds of the population of the world, and that it is we, the white people, who are in a minority. But when you get a vote of that kind at the United Nations it is not just the Afro-Asian bloc; it is the opinion of the world.
We had to bear in mind the views which had been expressed in the Prime Ministers' Conference. We had to hear in mind our kith and kin in other African countries besides Rhodesia and the likely effect on them—50,000 Europeans, for example, in Zambia. We had to contemplate the possible break-up of the African Commonwealth and possibly even racial war. It was for all these reasons—and we realised at the time their extreme gravity—that we were so anxious to leave no stone unturned to avoid this happening if we could.
I think even crities of the Government have been unable to make more than two suggestions about anything we could

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have done. Some suggested that my right honourable friends the Attorney General and the Commonwealth Secretary should have remained longer in Salisbury. What good that would have done nobody has ever suggested. The only other suggestion that has been made is that it was wrong to bring Sir Hugh Beadle here, and on the previous occasion the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, said:
" My Lords, was it not really a very extraordinary thing to invite the Chief Justice of a fully self-governing country, who had been apointed by a previous Rhodesian Government, to come to London for discussions, over the head of his own Government and against their wishes? Am I not entitled to make the assumption that when the Chief Justice was brought over here over the head of the legitimate Rhodesian Government, he was being used not so much as a channel for negotiation but as an instrument for coercion?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 12). col. 1247; 1 /12/65.]
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, those words were mine, not my noble friend's.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg your Lordship's pardon. The second passage was the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine's, and the first was the noble Lord, Lord Colyton's. That is, if I may say so, an absolute travesty of what happened. We did not invite the Chief Justice at all. I got to know the Chief Justice in Rhodesia. He is a man, if I may say so, of the highest integrity and of the greatest courage. They tell me he will be killed some time because he always waits until the elephant or the lion gets so close to him. But he is a man not only of great physical courage but of great moral courage, who says what he thinks. He is also a peacemaker.
When my right honourable friend the Prime Minister was in Salisbury the Chief Justice was, with everybody's approval, acting in a sense as a go-between, talking to the Prime Minister and then talking to Mr. Smith. Both Governments knew that and both welcomed it. They knew his integrity; they had confidence in him and knew he was seeking to arrive at agreement. That is why, when the Royal Commission was suggested, the one thing which both Governments could agree about was that he should be the chairman; they could agree because of the confidence they placed in him. After my right honourable friend returned from Salisbury we knew that Mr. Smith was going on having private talks with the
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Chief Justice. Ordinarily, I suppose, when you are in an arbitral capacity you do not go and discuss the subject with one party in private, but we took no objection to that. They had no objection to our talking to him privately in Salisbury.
The time came when it seemed to us that it might be desirable—as we knew that since they had to leave Salisbury he had gone on, quite properly, having discussions in private with Mr. Smith—for him to come here and give us the benefit of his opinion. One thing which was worrying us was that by that time there had been a declaration of a state of emergency. This was a matter on which we had checked with the Governor. When he was asked to sign the Order declaring a state of emergency, he asked Mr. Smith whether this was a prelude to a U.D.I., and he was assured that it was not. We know that the country was quiet at that time, but it turned out to be the prelude.
The Prime Minister, on the 7th November, wrote to the Government, not to the Chief Justice (we never wrote to the Chief Justice), and asked him here. My right honourable friend wrote to Mr. Smith:
" We have already agreed that the Chief Justice of Rhodesia, Sir Hugh Beadle, should be the chairman of the Royal Commission; and we have both expressed our full confidence in him. Since both you and I discussed with him in Salisbury how the Commission might work, and since I understand that you have had further conversations with him since my departure, I suggest that he should now come to London to discuss with my colleagues and myself how the Royal Commission will work in the light of your announcement on Friday"—
this was a reference to the state of emergency, because naturally we were not clear how, if people could be put into prison without trial for saying something against a Government, a Royal Commission, which existed to try to find out what people thought, was going to work—
" I should like at the same time to explore further with him the other issues of procedure which I have suggested in this letter, including the suggestion which I have outlined for dealing with the question of an interim report. I believe that after my further discussion with Sir Hugh Beadle it might be useful if you and I met again, preferably at some convenient meeting place, such as Malta. We could then decide not only the outstanding questions involved in getting the Royal Commission to work, but also the action to be taken after

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they have presented their final report, consistently with my own explicit undertaking to Parliament."
The Rhodesian Government told Sir Hugh Beadle about this. They thought it was not a good idea for him to go. He—and he is, I think, a peacemaker—thought it would be useful for him to come, and he decided to come. The Rhodesian Government lent him an aeroplane for him to collect his clothes from Bulawayo, and he came. In the result, before he returned to Salisbury, he sent them a cable begging them not to take any action before he got back; whereupon they declared U.D.I. two hours before his aeroplane arrived.
I invite your Lordships to consider, if these are the basic facts, why has all this happened. As I said on the last occasion, the only explanation given by Mr. Smith is that they were not getting investment money, but that a great many financiers had told them, "As soon as you are independent you can have all the money you want". I gave the reasons why I did not think that that was sensible; but I give him credit for believing that. But assuming that he believed it, then what it comes to is that all this was done in order that a small European population, of the size of Portsmouth, which already has a high average living standard of £1,250 a year, compared with the Africans' £150, and who mostly have one or two cars, swimming pools and so on, might have an even higher living standard if their already high economy rose even higher. On the previous occasion, I paid tribute to the magnificent job which I think the European Rhodesians have done in their economic development of the country, and particularly in their farming of it. But, of course, they could not have done it without the Africans, any more than the Africans could have done it without the capital and know-how of the Europeans.
But the whole of this exercise which has brought about the situation which to-day exists between us and the remainder of our African Commonwealth, which may, though we all hope not, yet develop into a racial war, has been done with the sole material object of increasing their already high living standard. Of course, they are quite entitled to think of themselves, and they may add that if their standards went up so would those of the Africans. But I do not think
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any of the small shopkeepers, artisans and small farmers who maintain the Rhodesia Front would suggest that they are doing so for the benefit of the African.
I would respectfully ask your Lordships to consider two observations. One was made by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, on the previous occasion, when he said this—he talked of the American rebellion:
" But the nub of the argument was the same two hundred years ago as it is to-day. It is simply this: that a people of British stock who had grown info nationhood were not prepared to submit any longer to the control of a Parliament 3,000 miles away in which they had no representation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 5), col. 376; 15/11/65.]
He said nothing, of course, about the 4 million Africans who were also growing into nationhood. I have stated the position of the Commonwealth as I see it, and the statement which I would contrast with that was one made last week in another place by Mr. Henry Brooke. I would invite the noble Lord to consider this. He said:
" Let me return to the subject of Rhodesia. The extremists who gained power at the last election there "—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, would the noble and learned Lord allow me to interrupt? I do not think it is in accordance with the Rules of this House to quote from speeches made by ordinary Members of another place.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I would not myself call Mr. Henry Brooke an "ordinary Member of another place". But I follow the point of the noble and learned Viscount, who need not interrupt again. I will merely invite the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, if I may treat these as my words, to consider whether it is not a fact of history, which we as the Mother Country of the British Empire have had to learn by hard and long experience, that a minority cannot indefinitely try to govern an indigenous majority, without provoking outbreaks which will in the end make it impossible to carry on government without using the methods of a Police State.
One looks at Southern Rhodesia to-day, where 289 children were caned without representation because they made what was a perfectly ordinary and peaceful procession against the Government; where a lawyer like Mr. Baron, who has

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never himself taken part in politics, and has committed the unforgivable sin of daring to appear for Africans—and not only daring to appear for them, but apparently appearing for them successfully—is now in solitary confinement, with no charge made against him at all, unable to write or to receive a letter.
Finally, as to sanctions—I am sorry to have been so long, and I do not propose to say much about the economic sanctions because my noble friend Lord Shepherd will be dealing with them—I submit that they must be effective. We know now that Mr. Smith ridiculed the original sanctions, and there were recently announced sanctions in the form of exchange control. It was said, quite simply, that in general terms they would include the cessation of payments of dividends, pensions and interest, and when any question of hardship arose it would be humanely treated. In point of fact, as I understand it, the pensions are being paid, which I think is really what we thought would happen. All we were concerned with was a transfer across the exchanges. Take service pensions. They are paid into Barclays Bank here to the credit of the people concerned, and are transferred from Barclays Bank here to Barclays Bank in Salisbury. The money is still being paid into Barclays Bank here. Anybody can take it out here and, as I understand it, anybody can go to his hank in Salisbury and draw against that credit and it will be repaid as soon as constitutional Government is restored. But if any difficulty arises or if there is any case of hardship, arrangements are being made under which the pension will be received in Rhodesian pounds from our Consul in Salisbury.
I do not believe that so far, if I have understood the position correctly, there is any real difference—any difference that matters—between the main British political Parties. I listened on Friday to the right honourable gentleman the Leader of the Conservative Opposition speaking on Rhodesia, and while one may always miss something, I did not disagree with anything he said. There may, of course, be a fair amount of room for difference of opinion—this I think is the real difference between the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and the Government—as to how far sanctions, particularly economic sanctions, may lead people to withdraw from the rebel regimé and how
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far they may lead them to support it. The object of the economic measures which have been taken is, of course, to make them realise that illegal action is not going to pay; that a country the size of Portsmouth cannot really defy the opinion of the whole world as expressed at the United Nations; that their position will only become more and more difficult unless and until they return to constitutional Government. The Government, as is perhaps natural, probably know more of what is being thought and said in Rhodesia than private sources, and the whole of our information from the loyalist Rhodesians is, "We do not mind what happens to us, as long as it is short and sharp. For goodness' sake do not spin it out." I myself have seen private letters and they are all to that effect.
Then, there is no difference between the Parties as to the use of troops. The action of the Government in sending at the request of Mr. Kaunda the troops and aircraft they had has met, I think, with general approval, as also has the Government statement that they do not intend to impose a Constitution by force. It has led to steps taken or announcements made by the Organisation of African Unity. Well, we must sympathise with them in the very strong emotions which they have. They feel that if this had been a coloured Government which had rebelled they would have been suppressed in no time. They feel that perhaps the object in putting troops into Zambia is to stop African troops from going in. They realise that they themselves have not really the forces which can command an army and an air force the size of the Rhodesian forces. They know that we have. They therefore cannot understand why we do not interfere by force, and they are making threats as to what they will do if we do not. Well, we have had clearly to say that, although we sympathise with and understand the strength of their emotions, we are not going to try to solve this problem by force and are not going to be pushed around by anybody.
Finally, it is said that this question must end in conciliation. I entirely agree with that. There are two objects, a short-term object and a long-term object. The short-term object is the restitution of constitutional government. My right

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honourable friend the Prime Minister said on November 23:
" … as soon as the people of Rhodesia are prepared to return to constitutional paths, as soon as the Governor feels that there is an opportunity of, perhaps, forming a Government among those who will act in a constitutional manner, we would want to deal with those people, without any recrimination or any rancour about the past, on the basis of a resettlement in Rhodesia, starting from the 1961 Constitution, with such amendments as, I think, the whole House would agree to be necessary to give effect to the five principles, leading up, I would hope, as quickly as possible to free elections in Rhodesia and then a discussion as to how we can give effect to the question of a gradual and unimpeded progress to majority rule." [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 721 (No. 11), cols. 258–9; 23/11/65.]
The question has been raised: Would Mr. Smith be able to make a proposal? Certainly. It is open to Mr. Smith, now, to put before the Governor any proposals which he has to make, and any proposals which he makes will be carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government. But what is quite wrong is to make statements—I think the noble Lord was not making a statement of his own but was repeating something which had been said in Rhodesia—to the effect that the Europeans have nothing to hope for except extinction. This is nonsense, and dangerous nonsense. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister has made it perfectly plain that there is still no question of African majority rule to-morrow or the day after, and the idea that a return to constitutional government means the extinction of the Europeans is wholly without foundation.
But, of course, if it came to dealing with the Rhodesia Front, it is no good forgetting, and it would not be right to forget, that Mr. Smith refused to accelerate the educational advance of the Africans in order to improve their political status and said that he, Mr. Smith,
" must make it clear that the Government Party in Rhodesia did not believe in majority rule "
At any rate, he has said, not in his lifetime; and that the reason why he would always oppose the entrenchment of this clause was that, if there was any actual danger of their getting an African majority, they would want to juggle with the Constitution and alter it backwards so as to stop them. He himself has said this quite frankly.
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I am sorry to have been so long. It is not my intention to move the Amendment which is on the Order Paper. I have given a good deal of thought to this, but any unnecessary Division in your Lordships' House has its affect abroad. The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has moved a forthright Motion of Censure on the Government for their handling of the Rhodesian affair, and I think that an Amendment as well might only complicate the matter. I am therefore going to ask your Lordships in all parts of the House, if you so think fit, to vote against the Motion. What is happening in Rhodesia is as tragic as it is unnecessary. We must take such steps as are effective to make a majority of the European Rhodesians realise that their rebellion was a mistake; that, as I have said, a population the size of Portsmouth cannot defy the opinion of the world; that they will have no peace until they return to constitutional government, but that when they do they will find us ready, without rancour or bitterness, to sit down with all sections of the peoples of Rhodesia to consider their welfare and their future. Of course, conciliation is the only possible end.
Perhaps the really serious thing when I was there was that when we said to Mr. Smith, "If Mr. Nkomo is prepared to meet you, will you see him? It will be a private meeting, no one will know you have seen him. He may of course say things with which you do not agree, but your back is broad, you can see what sort of man he is, and you can discuss Rhodesia together", the answer was "No": in no conceivable circumstances was he ever prepared to meet Mr. Nkomo. We said to Mr. Nkomo, "If the Prime Minister is prepared to see you, will you go along and talk to him? He probably will not agree with everything you might say, but you are a big man, you can explain what you think, and can discuss Rhodesia together." But no, in no conceivable circumstances whatever was he prepared to meet Mr. Smith. Yet this is a country for which, unless it becomes in substance multiracial, there is no real economic future. The African badly needs the capital and know-how of the Europeans. The Europeans' high standard of living exists because of African labour and the lowness of African wages. At the end of the day the future of Rhodesia can

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be determined only by men of good will sitting round a table. Let us not forget that apart from the many small artisans and shopkeepers, there are those who include all the more educated white and black people in Rhodesia, the leading businessmen, the churches, the universities, moderate Members of Parliament, both Europeans and Africans, for when the time comes for constitutional government to return I think we shall find from a large section, both European and African, that the will is there to start again and to set Rhodesia out on a road which leads to peace and prosperity.
4.10 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, it seems to me that this debate to-day has taken a very curious course. I hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will not think it amiss, if I remind him that the Question, "That this Motion be agreed to," has not yet been put. Certainly, it was with astonishment that I heard him say—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if the noble and learned Viscount will forgive me, that is entirely my fault. Of course, I should have put the Question after the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine. With the noble and learned Viscount's permission, I will now do so.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: My Lords, I drew attention to that point, to get the proceedings in order. However, I think that is really the least curious thing about this debate. We are now having a debate on a Motion moved by the noble Lord. Lord Coleraine, which is in precise terms, but the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor spoke for 35 minutes without making any reference to it at all. He had one short sentence about economic sanctions, another short sentence about pensions: and that was all. He treated us to a lengthy, but interesting, historical review to establish the proposition (if I followed his speech correctly) that this Government have acted in the same way as their predecessors did. No one has been challenging that. That is not an issue in to-day's debate at all.
Then the noble and learned Lord asserted that he could not see any single thing which could have been done, and which the Government did not do, to avoid U.D.I. We are not having an inquest to-day on the Government's conduct
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of those negotiations, which failed—and failed they did. In our last debate I did venture to make a criticism, not so much of what was done, as of the timing of it, and to that criticism there has as yet been no reply. But we are not discussing that to-day. What we are discussing, or are asked to discuss by this Motion, is the steps that the Government have taken since U.D.I. What I thought we were going to discuss—because, after all, the Amendment is tabled in the name of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—was the content of that Amendment. I must say that I find it extraordinary, having tabled the Amendment, that at the very last moment, at the very end of his long speech, the noble and learned Lord should tell us that he does not intend to move it as any unnecessary Division has its effect abroad. I cannot myself regard that as a satisfactory explanation for what I consider to be somewhat curious conduct.
If I may turn to the speech made by my noble friend Lord Coleraine in moving this Motion, I think that, although many will disagree with what he said, everyone will recognise the sincerity with which he spoke. I was glad to hear him say that he had never supported U.D.I., and deplored it, and that he did not support the Government of Mr. Smith. But then he went on to say that he objected to all the sanctions, and had done the whole way through. I must say that if his conclusion be that when U.D.I. came this country should not have done any thing about it, I entirely disagree with that conclusion, as I indicated when I spoke in this House the last time we had a debate on Rhodesia. Also, it is not right to say that we have declared war on Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia is still one of Her Majesty's Dominions. It is British; it is British territory, and it has not altered or lost its character in that respect because some individuals have usurped power in that territory.
My Lords, I have had to say that, because I think I should make it perfectly clear that I for one—and, I think, we who sit on this Bench—do not agree with the approach made to this problem by my noble friend. I take the view, as I expressed last time, that having condemned, as we always have condemned, and still do condemn, the illegal act of

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Mr. Smith and his colleagues, we simply could not have sat back and done nothing about it. I take the view, too, that it was right, and still is right, to reject the use of force. Therefore, the only step open to us to take was the application of economic pressure, in the hope and desire that it might lead to a change of view in Rhodesia and a return to lawful and constitutional government.
As I said in my speech on November 15, economic sanctions are a very blunt instrument. If effective—and, of course, if they are to serve any purpose they must have an effect—they hit not only Mr. Smith and his supporters but also loyal white Rhodesians and Africans. In the application of sanctions, my Lords (and this is the point which I thought this debate was really going to be about), it is therefore very important to apply only those which are not likely to lead to Mr. Smith's gaining more support in the country; and to apply only those which are likely to be effective and swift in bringing about a return to lawful government and an end to this usurpation of power.
I think that the Prime Minister recognised this in the Statement he made on November 11. If I may, I would remind your Lordships of his words. He said:
" The right hon. Gentleman "—
that was Mr. Heath—
" said that those measures which I have mentioned to-day and other measures which will follow should be examined on their merits and that the criterion in this examination should be the purpose which we all have in mind. That is absolutely right and absolutely fair. Our purpose is not punitive. We do not approach this tragic situation in a mood of recrimination. Our purpose is to restore a situation in Rhodesia in which there can be untrammelled loyalty and allegiance to the Crown and in which there can be, within whatever rules this House lays down, a free Government of Rhodesia acting in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 720, col. 359; 11/11/65.]
Then he said:
" Every measure has been judged and must be judged against its ability to restore the rule of law and the functioning of a democratic constitution in Rhodesia. They must be judged by this test."—[Col. 632, 12/11/65.]
That is a test of general application, and it applies to the stopping of pensions as
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it does to other economic sanctions. At the same time, the Prime Minister stressed that
" it is better for the action taken to be effective quickly than for it to be lingering and involve great and prolonged hardship."—[Col. 634.]
It was on this ground that he sought to justify the imposition of the ban on Rhodesian tobacco. Some doubts have been felt, and I dare say are still felt, whether that ban would be effective quickly. The Prime Minister went on to say—and I ask the House to note these words:
" It is our view that these measures will be effective, not least because of the financial considerations. As I have already said in answer to the right hon. Gentleman, we have no other measure in contemplation so far as we are concerned."—[Col. 635.]
Then came the announcement that the United Kingdom had voted for the United Nations resolution, to which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor referred. We voted for it. Perhaps we need not have done so. It was a resolution which asked us, and other countries, to cut off all trade with Rhodesia. Later, on December 1, we had the announcement of further economic measures. We were told that the embargoed items now account for over 95 per cent. of the Rhodesian exports to us. When this Statement was made, and repeated to this House by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, I asked whether this step had been taken in consequence of the United Nations resolution. To that, I did not receive a very definite answer. The noble Earl, Lord Longford, said:
" Certainly we are not taking these steps simply because the United Nations has called on us to take them … "—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 12), col. 1272; 1/12/65.]
Certainly there has been no attempt to justify these further measures in the light of the test by which the Prime Minister, on November 12, said they must be judged; and this debate to-day gives the Government the opportunity, which I was sorry the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor did not take, of justifying them in the light of that test.
Less than three weeks after he had told Parliament that, in his view, the measures imposed on November 11 would be effective, the Prime Minister announced an almost complete economic embargo. My Lords, I ask this—and I think we should be told: has he changed his views

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as to the effectiveness of the measures he announced on November 11? Does he now think that those measures, to be effective, require to be supplemented? Or were these further steps taken only in consequence of the United Nations resolution? If these questions are not answered, it is likely to be assumed in some quarters that the British Government, who have always emphasized—and rightly emphasised—that responsibility for Rhodesia is ours, have departed from the policy first announced, and have bowed to pressures applied to them.
On December 1 the Prime Minister said that that evening the Chancellor of the Exchequer would announce the details of further financial measures. He said—and I will quote his words:
"I will not weary the House with the details, some of which are highy technical, but … a stop is being placed on practically all current payments ".—[OFFICIAL REPORT Commons, Vol. 721 (No. 17), col, 1431; 1/12/65.]
to Rhodesia, and remittances, and that money due to residents of Rhodesia from Her Majesty's Government was being held hack for the time being. I do not believe that anyone who heard that statement could have had the slightest idea that what was proposed, among other things, was the stopping of the payment of all Public Service pensions and of retirement pensions; the stopping of all pensions to those who had served in the Forces, and the stopping of war disability pensions. It was only when the Chancellor's Statement was published that evening that that became known. I must say that I find it difficult to reconcile the contents and wording of that Statement, which I hold in my hand now, with the statements just made to your Lordships by the Lord Chancellor in the course of his speech.
The Lord Chancellor said that pensions are being paid. My Lords, so far as this Statement is concerned (it is dated December 1), I would read from paragraph 4:
" So far as Her Majesty's Government itself is concerned, money due to residents of Rhodesia for pensions or interest on Government Stocks will be held back for the time being, … "
I cannot reconcile that Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer with the statement made this afternoon by the noble and
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learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and I ask that we should have some elaboration of that. I think that the Prime Minister was being somewhat less than frank in not disclosing, when he made his Statement to the House, which was repeated here, that this was being done.
It was stated yesterday in another place, in a Written Answer, that there are 1,071 Public Service pensioners, payment of whose pensions had been stopped, 336 retired Servicemen and their dependants, and 1,542 retirement pensioners. My Lords, let us apply the test that the Prime Minister said should be applied. Is the stopping of payment of these pensions likely to be effective in restoring the rule of law in Rhodesia—pensions payable to people who have served their country, to those who have been disabled in its service and to those who, on account of age, have retired from active life? Is it really likely that any of these pensioners will have much influence on the course of events in Rhodesia? I find it difficult to regard this particular measure as anything but punitive. The effect of it will be felt not just by those who follow Mr. Smith but by those—and I suspect that there are a good many of them—who do not support this illegal régime.
I should like to know under what legal authority this is being done. Service pensioners are paid under Royal Warrant. Are the Warrants being amended? Will any Order come before Parliament in relation to this matter? What statutory authority is there for this action? Is it the enabling Act that we recently passed? What statutory authority is there for the other action that the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in his Statement of December 1? I have heard recently that two grandmothers went to a Post Office to buy two 10s. postal orders to send to their grandchildren in Rhodesia as Christmas presents, and that they were stopped. Is an embargo of that sort likely to bring about a change of rule in Rhodesia? I have heard it said, too—and I should like to know whether or not it is the case—that the claims made upon Lloyds' underwriters are now prevented from being discharged to compensate people for losses that they have established. Under what statutory authority, legal authority, is that being done?
My Lords, I must say that I think that these pension measures are a departure

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from the policy announced on November 12. I see that Mr. Smith has said that his régime will pay the pensions withheld, and the consequence of this action by the United Kingdom Government seems to me to be likely to lead to Mr. Smith's gaining, and not losing, support, to the contrary effect to that desired from the imposition of sanctions. In my view this action was a mistake; and the Prime Minister went some way to recognising that, I think, in saying that provision would he made for cases of hardship. What must that mean? It means the application of some sort of means test to these pensioners—a means test in relation to pensions to which they are entitled, and a means test apparently to be applied even if they do not support this illegal régime.
Now the terms of this Amendment today ask us to welcome the statement that the measures in relation to pensions "will be administered with due regard to humanitarian considerations." All we are told is that they will be administered by the Consul in Salisbury. My Lords, I cannot see that that will be in the least degree satisfactory. We have no Civil Service to administer these pensions and to issue them in Salisbury. Does it really mean that, to establish hardship, the pensioner will have to make an application, and perhaps go and see the Governor or the Consul, who may be many, many miles away? I cannot reconcile what has been said with the statement by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that anyone can draw against that credit for the pensions in Rhodesia. I do not believe that it will be possible to apply this means test without some of these pensioners suffering a very considerable degree of hardship.
But I come back to this. Is it really thought that the application of this measure is likely to change opinion in Rhodesia in our favour? I do not believe it is. I think it will not help to bring about the result we want but will help in the reverse direction. Therefore I say this in all seriousness to the noble Lord who I think is going to speak on this matter: I believe myself that it would bring not discredit but credit to Her Majesty's Government to say that in this regard they have gone too far, and they recognise it now on second thoughts; and that they will not
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impose a ban on the payment of war disability pensions, ex-Service pensions and pensions for the retired. The number is not large; the amount involved is not large. The effect that these individuals could have on the policy in Rhodesia cannot be great. Could the Government think again about this? At the end of this debate we shall be faced with a decision, if my noble friend persists in his Motion, whether to vote for his Motion or against it.
A NOBLE LORD: He will persist.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: That, I will say quite frankly, places me in quite a considerable difficulty, because I am in agreement with the terms of his Motion. It starts by referring to the prohibition on payments of pensions. It says that it is a "departure from the policy announced" at that time. We will, of course, listen to anything that is said; but it certainly would be a great departure from the policy announced at that time. The Motion goes on to speak about the difficulties at the end being resolved "by negotiation"—and I will come back to that, if I may, in a moment.
I am not so concerned personally here whether one votes or does not vote on that particular Motion. What I am concerned about is the position of the pensioners; and if the noble Lord were to say to me and to the House that he would certainly do his best to secure that this decision was rescinded, I, myself, should not like to make it difficult for the Government to take that course. If there is a vote on this particular Motion, presumably the Government would feel compelled to vote against it. The Government might or might not be beaten; hut, having voted against this Motion relating to pensions, it might be that they would find it much more difficult then to rescind that decision. That is one reason—although I agree with the terms of my noble friend's Motion—that I find it very difficult to say that I should vote for it.
My Lords, there is another difficulty to which I think I should refer. I will speak frankly to the House. My noble friend, in moving his Motion, in no way confined his arguments to the Motion. He went far wide of that. He developed a general theme expressing his views—and, it may be, not only his views—about the Rhodesian problem as a whole. As

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I said at the beginning of my speech, I do not agree with him on that. I should not like to be thought to be agreeing with him on that. If I vote for this Motion in the light of what he himself has said in support of it, I think that there is a very serious risk of this Motion, if carried, being regarded outside this House, in the country and throughout the world, as a Motion of sympathy for Mr. Smith. I should not wish to be associated with anything that would encourage, or would tend to encourage, Mr. Smith, in the course he is now pursuing. Therefore I am in a difficulty and I have stated it quite frankly: I agree with what is said in my noble friend's Motion.
It is not often a wise course to abstain from voting; but on this occasion I myself feel that it is the right course and the wise course for me to take. And I shall be encouraged to do it if the noble Earl will say—I do not ask him to give a positive answer now because I do not expect that he has the power or the authority to do it—that he will take up this question of the pensions again to see whether he can secure a change of that decision. I emphasise again that if the Government did that, then I am sure it would bring credit and not discredit to them. In deciding whether or not to take certain steps at this difficult juncture, in deciding whether or not those steps are more likely to encourge or to discourage support for Mr. Smith, it is very easy for misjudgments to be made. I certainly would not criticise the Government for vacillating—or on any other ground in relation to this—if they had a change of mind.
My Lords, may I turn to the Amendment that I came here prepared to speak about? I have been robbed of this opportunity. I am very hostile to this Amendment and if it had been moved I would certainly have voted against it. It asks us to accept that all the economic measures taken by the Government—including the stopping of the payment of these pensions—were "a regrettable necessity". But I do not think that applies to the pensions. The Amendment asks us to welcome the steps taken to administer the pensions "with due regard to humanitarian considerations". We have had a great statement of the object; but we have had no indication of how
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that can possibly be achieved if this ban on pensions remains.
I have left till last what I think is, perhaps, the most important criticism of the Amendment: that there is nothing in that Amendment which really holds out any hope for the future. There is no reference to conciliation; there is nothing to suggest that a way can be found for finding a solution to this problem in the future. I was glad to hear what the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, had to say about the possibility of conciliation. There must be conciliation at the end of the day. I think we are all agreed about that in this House. One does not know with whom one will be talking. I really think that in my noble friend's Motion, if I read it aright, the word "conciliation" ought to have been used instead of the word "negotiation".
As to that, I should like just to say this. We all want to see Rhodesia back in the Commonwealth. I think the Government must make it clear—and repeat it and make it as positive as possible—that they are not insisting on immediate African rule. I do not think it is really enough for the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to say, as he did to-day, that we are not insisting on African rule "to-day or to-morrow". My noble friend referred to the letter written by the Prime Minister when he was Leader of the Opposition. Anyone who has seen the record would, I think, come to the conclusion that Mr. Smith (I am not saying that he was right to be worried) was certainly worried about the contents of this letter and was worried about them despite the Prime Minister's statement. I am not saying that Mr. Smith was right to remain worried—that would be a different matter. What I am emphasising, as much as I can, is that I think the need still is to make it clear that this country is not insisting on African majority rule as a condition of the granting of independence.
My Lords, I think we have got to say what path it is that the loyal Rhodesians should follow. They must be told, it seems to me, what their country will revert to directly this illegal régime ends. Will they revert to internal self-government on the 1961 Constitution—I am sure that they want to know about this—with such safeguards to prevent its being tampered with as what has

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happened may have shown to be necessary, but basically on the 1961 Constitution, with a wide field of internal self-government? I think they should be told. I think it is the duty of the Government to tell them; and to tell them, too, that directly there has been that reversion to constitutional government there will be free negotiation and talks with all the people concerned with regard to the revision of the Constitution; so that independence can be granted, with Rhodesia in the Commonwealth playing her full part in the world. My Lords, I believe it is important that that should be said, and I think it is very important indeed that it should be said now.
4.41 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, looking at this paper in my hand it is impressed upon me more than ever that I should not break my own rule of addressing your Lordships very briefly. But I feel that I must rise to say that we in the Liberal Party feel that we cannot accept this Motion put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and that if it goes to a Division, we must vote against it. In some ways I am sorry to have to say that, because I think we all know the great sincerity with which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and his two or three colleagues have spoken. On the last occasion when the noble Lord spoke I found the way that he put his case most moving, and it was rather difficult not to be carried away by what I may call one's own sentiment about it. I think that, in a sense, the noble Lord has pulled out the same stop to-day; not only in his speech but in the words which he has put down on the Order Paper.
We are maintaining in this House that this subject is not a Party matter. We are all extremely anxious that the best should be done, irrespective of Party policies. We in the Liberal Party sit in opposition to the Labour Party because we do not believe in, and cannot support, their Socialist theories. But that does not mean that on a question such as this, where Socialism does not enter into it in the least, we cannot support in a large measure what the Prime Minister has done, though we do not think him as perfect as some of his followers do. Again we are with our friends of the Left—I call them "Left" though they are on the
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Right—who also differ on the Motion which is before your Lordships' House. As it is a non-Party matter, I think it should really be a matter of conscience and that we should let it be seen, not only by this country but by the world, that the British Parliament and all the nations of the world, are, for the most part, on the one side. There is a very strong opposition, a very small, strong opposition, to those who feel as we do. I think that it would be unfortunate, almost criminal, to give that opposition any more encouragement than is absolutely necessary; and a Division, my Lords, even a Division on this point to-day, I think would do so.
My Lords, in the discussion on this matter there have been used, loosely, phrases which I deplore. It has been said that we should bring Mr. Smith to his knees, or his Government to its knees. I do not want to do that. I do not believe any of your Lordships do. We do not want any humiliation or any recrimination. We do not want to see that Government on its knees. We want to see it on its feet, and behaving like a democratic Government. But it has been misled by its geographical and historical and inward feelings. It does not see, as the rest of the nations have seen, and shown, that the tide of self-determination in all countries is advancing all the time; and the lowest and most ignorant African black, almost the "out-of-the-tree" savage, is, nevertheless, advancing; and the time must come when he will have not only some form of self-determination, but, when the full time comes, full determination—one man, one vote, and majority rule. But, my Lords, this is obviously impossible in Rhodesia to-day, and we are only asking this rebel Government just to take a check; to look at itself again, and decide whether these 200,000 Rhodesian whites—I do not believe that they are all supporters of the rebel Government—for the short-term gain of getting a little more domination over the African population, or at least not letting that population get any more responsibility itself, are taking a very shortsighted view in going the way they are going.
Those 200,000 people are risking the lives and the existence of 200 million people, two-thirds of the world, if things go on as they look as if they might under

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this procedure, when racialism will really raise its ugly head and war will break out between friends and enemies, black and white, white and white, and black and black. And it is an incredible thing that these few people should have so much in their power and not be dissuaded.
That, of course, brings us to the question of these sanctions. My Lords, they are deplorable. Discussions were held, long discussions, and they failed. They failed for Rhodesia and for us, and I think that they failed for the world. The next step is sanctions. If those fail—my Lords, I hope they never will there is yet another step; one which we do not want to see taken; one we know that the Prime Minister is most unwilling to take, but one which may have to be taken on moral grounds, as was so bravely said by the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury.
I think it is foolish for any of us to try to arrest the momentum towards individual self-expression which I have described. I am not going into any analysis of the actual detail of the points on the Order Paper to-day, as they have been dealt with adequately. But it strikes me that this question of pensions, which of course touches our hearts, is a terrible step to have to take, but the primary responsibility for putting that right falls straight on the lap of Mr. Smith himself. My Lords, retrogression, Rhodesian or any other sort, will inevitably lead us to the extinction of civilisation, or set it back thousands of years. These well-meaning but misled people whom the noble Lord so gallantly and so rhetorically supports must, I think, be told clearly, from here and from all other countries, that their ideas of progress in their little way are, in fact, regression.
4.47 p.m.
LORD CITRINE: My Lords, I rise to a point of Order. I do not know to whom this point of Order is to be submitted, as I am aware that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has not the power of the Speaker in the House of Commons—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: To the Leader of the House.
LORD CITRINE: The noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, has intimated the withdrawal of the Amendment, I do not know whether an Amend-
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ment can be withdrawn without the leave of the House as a whole.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, the Amendment has not been moved. May I perhaps—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I explain to the noble Lord, Lord Citrine that I have not withdrawn the Amendment: in fact I have not moved it.
LORD CITRINE: I thank the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. I see the technical difference. It simplifies what I want to say. We are now left with the Motion as it stands, and the Motion expresses no opinion on the matter of sanctions or economic measures generally. It deals with one point only, and that is the action of the Government on pensions. I ask the House whether it is necessary to have 35 speeches, in addition to the one which has already been given, that deal with that simple question, and whether the noble Earl the Leader of the House is in a position to tell us the position of the Government in response to what has already been said.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I do not think that has ever fallen to the Leader of the House. Certainly, I do not think the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, or the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, would ever take it on himself to say in advance that speeches were not going to be necessary. I suppose, if one speech were to be left out it might be the last one, my own, which will not be until after midnight. The House, I am afraid, will have to grin and bear it, unless any noble Lord chooses to move that any particular noble Lord be no longer heard. That remedy is always open to the noble Lord, Lord Citrine.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, if I may intervene. It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Citrine has a point. With the greatest respect, the first two speeches we listened to this afternoon had remarkably little to do with the Motion before your Lordships' House. Neither the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, nor the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack really addressed themselves to the terms of the Motion. I should think that, if your Lordships agree with this, we might try to confine succeeding

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speeches to the terms of the Motion, rather than have a general debate on Rhodesia.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I sympathise very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has said. But I must defend my noble and learned friend here. If, by general admission, the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, made a speech far outside the Motion, I am afraid that it was inevitable that my noble and learned friend should reply in the same way. It was necessary to reply to the previous matter. However, let us all try to be relevant, if possible, bearing in mind the ultimate remedy of my noble friend Lord Citrine—the "H-bomb" which he has mentioned.
LORD REA: My Lords, we have listened to a most interesting and entertaining speech from the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, about an Amendment which has never been moved.
4.50 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, in spite of the admonitions which have been addressed to me, I propose to address a few observations to the House. Of course, the issues go far beyond the limit to which the noble Lord, Lord Citrine, referred. I should agree that if we were another place, we might be in some sort of technical difficulty. But my noble friend's Motion, while it refers specifically to pensions, does travel a good deal farther. It implies that an entirely new policy is being introduced in the sanctions which are now being imposed. In addition to that, the speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor largely dealt with the past, and I should have thought that, if there was to be criticism, that speech was a good deal more irrelevant. Yet he was justifying the Amendment.
One might indeed ask: When is an Amendment not an Amendment? I suppose the answer is: When it is spoken to and not moved, which is what has happened to-day. There is not the least doubt that the noble and learned Lord spoke to his Amendment, although he did not move it (if there were a vote, I should certainly vote against it) and his speech was a justification of the whole
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of the new set of sanctions. Therefore, I do not think that this debate can be as cabined as is proposed. I also think, votes apart, that these general debates in your Lordships' House, with speeches from people who have had great experience on the whole in these matters, are of enormous value, not just to the House, but to the country and to Africa as well.
The specific question of pensions, with which the Motion deals in the first instance, I can pass in a sentence because when the Order was introduced it appeared to me to be as mean as it was foolish and as foolish as it was mean. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rea, must be quite wrong when he said that the whole matter rests with Mr. Smith. I am not here to justify Mr. Smith, but it does not rest with Mr. Smith at all. The pensions, I understand, are British pensions, payable under British Warrant, and the obligation to discharge those pensions is on Her Majesty's Government and not in the least on Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has gone out of his way to say that he proposes to pay the pensions—and, incidentally, has gained a great deal of support in his country, for which he has to thank the Government's foolish and, I think, mean act. The imposition of these new sanctions is a change of policy, and one which I believe is profoundly unwise and calculated to defeat its own purpose, particularly at this moment.
Unlike the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, I propose, in anything I have to say to-day, to confine myself to the situation with which we are faced at present. When the Government proposed the original sanctions, I was prepared to support them, and said so, with some reservation about a tobacco sanction which appeared to me to be much more injurious to thousands of Africans than it was likely to be to the Europeans; but we were then told that those were all the sanctions the Government proposed to impose and thought necessary. They said that they were not to be penal, they were not to be vindictive, and they were not to be coercive. I think that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, quoted the Prime Minister as having given across the Floor of another place the assurance that the Government had no intention of imposing any further sanctions at all.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount quoted some words of the Prime Minister quite correctly, but they do not go so far, if they are studied in their context, as the noble Earl has just suggested.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I certainly do not want to misrepresent anybody and perhaps they did not go quite so far. No doubt, when he replies, the noble Earl the Leader of the House will tell us exactly what the Prime Minister did say, but I do not think the noble Earl would deny that the attitude taken by the Prime Minister was that he had no intention of imposing any further sanctions at that time. Well, we are not very far apart in wording, however far apart we are about the sanctions.
What has now been imposed is a complete embargo on all trade with Rhodesia, and cruel penalties on a number of needy individuals. There are now to be no remittances and no pensions, until the Opposition intervened and forced the Government into a very limited action, which is likely to be quite ineffective because there will be no machinery to carry it out. There is to be no interest paid on British securities for which the British Government are responsible, and there are penalties on banks and individuals who try to help the old, the poor and the needy—people retired and living on limited means—who are the people who are going to be hit most by these sanctions. I must say that they are singularly likely to fail in their purpose.
When all trade between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia is to be stopped, this is the time at which Rhodesia is told that she must give power and coal to Zambia and presumably carry the copper upon the Rhodesian railways. I do not believe that Rhodesia ever had the faintest intention of not doing all these things. I do not believe that there is the faintest risk to the Dam or to the power station, or the faintest prospect that Mr. Smith has the desire and intention of cutting off the current. Where the danger lies, as a matter of fact, is in sabotage far inside the border of Zambia. Already damage to the great trunk line of electricity has taken place, nowhere near the Kariba Dam but 150 miles north of the Zambesi on the edge of the Copper Belt—the work of some of those
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ill-disposed persons who want only to create trouble. I must say that if it is desirable that Rhodesia should continue to supply coal and current and to work the railways, to cut off our trade with Rhodesia seems an odd way to encourage or enforce trade between Rhodesia and Zambia.
One of the things that I complain about with this Government is that they never seem to think out what they are doing. I do not accuse them of being malicious, but I do accuse them of being frightfully muddle-headed. These sanctions which are being imposed now upon Rhodesia are going to hit Rhodesia. But they are going to hit Zambia far harder than they will hit Rhodesia. That has never been mentioned by any speaker on the Government side. It is, however, obvious. Zambia depends on re-exports from Rhodesia. If the exports from here, or from the rest of the world, to Rhodesia are stopped, how will Zambia get them? Of course, she will not. In human nature, the Rhodesians have to look after themselves first.
I would now ask the Government for a little clarification of what has not been clarified at all. What is their policy vis-à-vis Zambia? What advice have they given to Mr. Kaunda? Mr. Kaunda is, in my opinion—and I think most of the House would agree with this—one of the wisest and most responsible of African statesmen. He is certainly under great pressure from extremists on his own side, in Africa, and also from outside. It was quite right to give him the air support, when he asked for it, and to have a unit of the Air Force Regiment there in order to help provide security: because, as I said, there are plenty of ill-disposed persons ready enough to do sabotage.
But what should be the objective of relations between Rhodesia and Zambia? I ask this in the interests of the millions of people who live in both of those countries. This is what matters, not only in the long run, but in the short run. In this do let us he realists. This is not a Chancery suit, a sort of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce: this is—and nobody said it better than the noble Lord, Lord Salter—emphatically an occasion when it is necessary to face up to reality. Rhodesia and Zambia are economically mutually dependent. There is not only the power

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from Kariba, but the coal from Wankie; and it is only the Rhodesian Railways that can carry the coal and the Rhodesian copper. Interdependence is much closer; mutual export and import trade are vital to both of them.
One thing was agreed upon by the Monckton Commission, whatever else they did not agree about federation: they were unanimous that federation had brought enormous benefits to both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. And so it had. It is vital in the interests of both Zambia and Rhodesia that this should go on. Surely it would be wise for the Government to state these, what your Lordships may feel are self-evident facts. They have not been stated. Surely the Government should state those facts plainly to both countries, and urge both countries to have regard to them.
Let me now turn again to these new penal sanctions which the Government are imposing on Rhodesia. What is their purpose? Is it to starve Rhodesia; to bring the people of Rhodesia to their knees; to force unconditional surrender? I cannot conceive of anything more likely to unite all the people of Rhodesia behind Mr. Smith. It is said that there is a new situation, and that new dangers have arisen. I agree. And I do not doubt that Rhodesia, being a good deal nearer to them, is as aware of these dangers as we are. But in that new situation, what is the right course? Surely it is not at this moment to apply new sanctions. Surely what is necessary at this moment is to say to the people of Rhodesia: "Think again; reopen the doors to negotiation and conciliation" —and I am not ashamed of using that word "conciliation"; it is a better word than "coercion".
I may be asked: what would you do? And I do not think anybody who has had the experience that I have had, of having to administer these territories, is entitled to make criticisms without offering some constructive suggestions. I will therefore tell the Government what I think they should do. I think they should say at this moment precisely what are the changes they would require in the 1961 Constitution for it to be acceptable, on which to reach a settlement, and, indeed, to grant independence. They must know in their own minds. Why cannot
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they say this openly? If they will say it openly, then everybody in Rhodesia will know exactly where they stand; and, indeed, this would dispose of the "Zinovief Letter" for the time being—the letter to Dr. Mutasi. I do ask the Government to consider this.
There is, of course, great suspicion in Rhodesia, some of it ill-founded and some of it well-founded; but if the Government will say, absolutely clearly and straightforwardly, what are the alterations which are necessary in the 1961 Constitution to make it acceptable, with no generalities such as "Not to-day, and not to-morrow", the terms necessary to be put in the Constitution could be re-written in a few hours. Let the Government make it clear, and then we shall know where we stand. This is not the path of weakness, but, in my view, the way of truth, which may well prove the basis of lasting peace. I have little doubt what our policy should be, and it is what I have said to your Lordships, I hope at not too great length. I imagine that probably many of your Lordships have been thinking on the same lines.
I notice that a number of Members of another place joined together in a letter to The Times to-day. They are a very mixed bag of Members—though none the worse for that—who on other subjects hold differing opinions, as, of course, many of us do within our Party. But they were all united on this, and were asking for exactly what I am asking the Government to-day.
What should we do on this Motion? It is certainly right that we should all state our views fully and frankly; that is the value of this House, as has been shown in the last debate and in this one. The object of this debate, as of that one, is to persuade all those here—and not only those here but in Africa—to wiser courses. Frankly, I doubt whether that which I believe is the interest of us all, and is the desire of us all, is best served by Divisions or Resolutions in this House at this stage. If the Government had moved their Amendment, I should certainly have voted against it; and I should have hoped that it would be defeated.
My noble friend Lord Coleraine will appreciate from my speech that I am very much in sympathy with a good deal of

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what is in his Motion. But I cannot help feeling that my noble friend (if he will not think it impertinent of me to say so; and he was good enough to see eye to eye with me on certain matters in the last debate) will serve his interest and the interest of getting a settlement on honourable terms if he does not ask the House to divide. I believe that this debate, which will, I am sure, be of value outside this House, will be more effective if no Resolutions are passed though the debate stands on the Record.
5.10 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, in addressing your Lordships this afternoon, I will try to be as brief as is practicable, though I have a certain amount to say. I shall, of course, support the Motion which has been tabled by Lord Coleraine. I only wish it could have gone further. It deplores the decision of the Government to stop the payment of pensions to war and other pensioners who are living in Rhodesia. I do not imagine that there is anyone in any part of the House who has not deplored that decision of the Government, and does not pray most earnestly that it will be reversed—as a right, and not merely in cases of especial hardship. But the Motion only takes note—if I may emphasise those words of the other measures announced by the Government on December 1: and yet to some of us, at any rate, those other measures are equally deplorable to those that have been levelled against the pensioners.
Indeed (I say this with all deference to the noble Lord, Lord Rea, because I believe it is true), it is becoming increasingly clear that the whole approach of the Prime Minister to this problem—the attempt to bully the Rhodesians into submission, to proceed against them with all the vigour of the law, to beat them to their knees, to rub their faces in the dirt—has been mistaken from the start. Whether he felt morally justified in taking this line at the start, I do not know; I imagine, of course, that he did. But one thing is certain. In dealing with people of British stock, such action can only be calculated to rally all sections of the Rhodesian people to support their Government. I have confirmatory evidence of this from a letter I received only yesterday from a lady in Rhodesia. I should say that both she and her husband are
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over seventy, that they have both served their country in two world wars, and that he is crippled as a result. She says:
" We did not want U.D.I., and did not vote for Mr. Smith's Rhodesia Front. But Mr. Wilson should realise that the more he kicks Rhodesia, the more we will stand together and fight back. In fact, even we "—
that is, she and her husband—
"would vote for Mr. Smith now, but would not have done so four weeks ago. When one has served one's country of birth in two wars, to be treated like this is just not British '."
It is all very well for the Prime Minister to brand the Rhodesians as rebels and to claim that that has justified him in taking any measures, however extreme, however oppressive, to compass their destruction. But they do not regard themselves as rebels. They regard themselves as free Britons, fighting for their freedom, and each new twist that he has given to the rack has only strengthened their determination. And so he has been driven to further and further excesses, to measures not directed against the Rhodesian Government, but directed indiscriminately against the Rhodesian people whether or not they agree with Mr. Smith. He started with Rhodesian tobacco and sugar. He put an embargo on the export of them to this country. Those were her main products. Surely that should bring her to heel. He did that—and I personally find this especially insulting— under Regulations which had been brought into being 26 years ago for our fight against Hitler. But it had a completely contrary effect to that which he expected. It only stiffened their attitude.
Then on November 12 he found himself obliged to go further. But even then he thought it wise to give an assurance—I have the words here:
" We have no other measure in contemplation so far as we are concerned."
That is just under a month ago, and yet now, in less than a month, in a desperate effort to make his policy effective, he has gone yet further and put an embargo on asbestos, copper, iron and steel, chromium and a multitude of other things, amounting to 95 per cent. of her products, so that now, as he says proudly in his Statement:
"We, who were her best market, have virtually ceased trade with her"—
though whether this is anything to be proud about, I really do not know.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, can the noble Marquess say when Mr. Wilson, the Prime Minister, has ever said that he was proud of the action he was forced to take?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: All I can say is that he did not say it in a very apologetic manner.
LORD SHEPHERD LORD SHEPHERD: That is a different thing.
A NOBLE LORD A NOBLE LORD: Nor you.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: No, nor me I quite agree. It only means, after all, that Rhodesia will turn her trade to other countries instead of us, and those countries will be very ready, I can assure your Lordships, to assist over that. I know that the Government tried to prevent such a development by bringing the matter before the United Nations. But surely that, as it has turned out, has only made bad worse. For while we continued to maintain—as the Conservative Party to their credit have—that this is a matter purely between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia, we were in a strong position to resist interference from outside Powers. But by bringing the matter ourselves to UNO, the Government have opened a wide breach in our defences, and through that breach the Afro-Asians have been quick to pour, and are pouring through still.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, does the noble Marquess suggest that if we had not, as the United Kingdom, brought this up at the United Nations, nobody else would have done so?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Somebody else may have done so, but we should have maintained the position. It was a matter entirely between us and Rhodesia, and we gave away that position gratuitously.
Indeed, we are surely beginning to find ourselves in very queer company. There is one country, Tanzania, which has condoned or winked at the massacre of many thousands of Arabs in Zanzibar. There is another country, Ghana, which has treated its Opposition Party so roughly that the Leader of the Opposition, a man held in the highest repute, died in prison in circumstances for which no adequate explanation has ever been given. And
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none of those countries enjoy the least semblance of democratic government as we understand it here. These are things besides which, I submit, the worst misdeeds of the Rhodesian Prime Minister pale into insignificance. And yet the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who threw such tremendous emphasis on the injustices that were happening in Rhodesia, never mentioned what happened in these other States. In his eyes, therefore, and in the eyes of the Government, too, it appears that these States are still the pattern of all virtues, and Rhodesia alone is the arch criminal. This is indeed a strange position into which we have got.
Where do we go from here? What happens if even these severe measures fail to produce the required results? The Prime Minister has said clearly that there must be no resort to force, and I am sure we were all very glad to hear that. But what do the Government do? I repeat, what do they do if these measures fail, as is indeed possible? It must seem to many of us that they will have shot their bolt. It is not as if there were much other action, outside the realm of trade, that they can still take. A stop, we are told, has already been imposed on practically all the current payments by United Kingdom residents to Rhodesian residents.
Among these, of course—perhaps the most flagrant case—is that of those Service and other pensions due to men and women for services done for their country in the past. Even the Government seem uncomfortable about this, judging by the Amendment which they put down and have now withdrawn, and which made a belated attempt to ride off on that issue. But there are many other payments besides war pensions, payments owing by individuals to individuals, by firms to firms—payments in honour, due to be paid. These, we understand, are all to be held up except—and I quote "for a very limited trade still permitted." Whatever the hardship may be to the individuals concerned, and whether the individuals concerned support or oppose the régime of Mr. Smith, all alike are to be starved out if possible. It is true, we are told that the sums of money involved which, after all, belong not to the Government but to the recipients, are not

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going to be permanently confiscated—in other words are not going to be stolen from them. They
" are to be held back for the time being, and will be released as soon as constitutional government is restored in Rhodesia."
But what if constitutional government is not restored in Rhodesia? What if the present Rhodesian Government, as is quite possible, in spite of all the Government can do, remains in power? Are all the payments to these people, the monies that legally belong to them, to be held up permanently?
And what about the funds of the Rhodesian Reserve Bank which belong to Rhodesia, which are the fruits of Rhodesia's providence and industry: are they to be denied to their proper owners just because of the ipse dixit of the Prime Minister? We hear a great deal about the police state in Rhodesia, and I expect under the stress of the emergency a great many things are being done there of which we should none of us approve. But it seems to me—and here again I feel like the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine—that we are getting very near a Police State here, too. Things are being done which nobody would have considered doing two or three years ago.
If I am told that in putting these questions and expressing these doubts and anxieties, which are not held by me alone but by many thousands, and indeed hundreds of thousands, of people in this country, I am fostering the cause of rebellion, I would reply that I am supporting a cause which was championed in the past, nearly 200 years ago, in circumstances not so very unlike these, by such men as the Younger Pitt and Burke, only they called it by another name—"the cause of freedom ". It would be impertinent to refer to what I am now saying or to whatever any of us says to-day as clarion calls of the type made by those giants, but I am happy to think that our small toot is at any rate sounding the same note.
The Prime Minister once described the present Rhodesian Government as "a clique of small, frightened men". But in fact, my Lords, that Government, which Her Majesty's Government have pursued with such savage persistence, is a Government elected by a vast majority of the electorate of Rhodesia—indeed, a far larger majority than Mr. Wilson has.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Marquess for one moment? He may recollect that only last Wednesday the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, described the Smith Government as an "odious Government".
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, would the noble Earl allow me? I am afraid he misunderstood what I said at the time. I did not take him up then, because the questioning had gone on for a very long time. What I said was that if the sanctions succeeded they would produce a desert in Rhodesia and a moral and political vacuum; if the sanctions failed, they would be liable to foist on Rhodesia an odious Government. In other words, they would drive the present Government to greater and greater extremes. I certainly did not say it was an odious Government now.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: In any case, if I may say so to the noble Earl, his intervention was quite irrelevant. All I said was that the present Government of Rhodesia was elected by a vast majority of the electors of Rhodesia—a far larger majority than Mr. Wilson has himself. And what is more, it was elected under a Constitution approved by, nay, imposed upon them by, the Government of this country, And if Mr. Smith remains in power to-day, it is very largely, I believe, owing to the obduracy and lack of understanding of the present Government of this country.
Surely the time has come, my Lords, to stop slinging mud at the Rhodesians and to begin again to treat them as civilised beings, as indeed they are, and finally try to regain contact with them and see whether a bridge can yet be built from which a settlement of this unhappy dispute can be reached. There may be no personage, I recognise, in the world of politics here who would be of any use for this purpose, for personages of whatever political Parties are viewed with very great suspicion by the Rhodesians to-day. But there may be some person, highly respected, outside the world of politics, who can go out and sound opinion, both inside and outside Mr. Smith's entourage, in all sections of opinion in the country, and from that something might flow, and, at any rate, no harm would be done. If I may, with all diffidence, I should like to

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put forward that suggestion as an alternative to that already put forward to your Lordships by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton.
In the meantime, my Lords, it is, I believe, our duty to proceed with the more immediate task, which is to scrutinise closely the Motion which stands in the name of my noble friend Lord Coleraine and also the Amendment to it which has been tabled from the Government Benches. First, I should like to say a word about the Amendment, though I gather the Government have now decided not actually to move it. Nevertheless, I think one must mention it as presumably it represents Government policy and, after all, if I may say so, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said very little about it in his speech this afternoon.
At first sight, this Amendment may seem moderate and harmless. If I may use an old-fashioned expression, it may look "as if butter would not melt in its mouth". But such an appearance, as is well known, is often deceptive; and that, I am afraid, is so in the present case. There are, I suggest—and this applies to the whole of the Government policy—two serious, even fatal, defects in it. The first relates to the earlier portion which deals with pensions. This, if I may say so, rests on a false premise: to me, at any rate, even on an intolerably false premise. It says.
" Measures with regard to pensions will be administered with due regard to humanitarian considerations."
My Lords, it is extremely nice to know that; but it entirely misses the point. The reason why such violent indignation has been aroused throughout this country by this proposal is not that it is going to be administered harshly; it is that the pensioners have here, under the law, a right to their pensions, and the Government have no right to hold them up. To do that is a breach of faith with the pensioners, and I have never heard yet that for a man to say that for him something is a regrettable necessity has been generally regarded by itself as a valid reason for breaking faith. Nor in this case is it in fact a regrettable necessity; it is merely a question of policy. The Government could easily pay the pensions if they wished.
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That I believe to be the first defect in the Government Amendment; and the second defect I believe is as serious, or even more serious. The Amendment asks this House to support
" the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to work towards the re-establishment of a constitutional Government in Southern Rhodesia ",
but what the Amendment does not say is what these efforts are to be. There are, in fact, as your Lordships know, two types of policy that the Government can employ for this purpose. They could say, "Our attempts to beat Mr. Smith's Government to their knees by the imposition of more and more ferocious sanctions are not having the success we had hoped, It is merely consolidating the whole country behind him. The time has therefore come for us to try different and more gentle methods and to try to come to an agreement with him." That, my Lords, is one way to try to re-establish constitutional government.
But there is another, and very different method, as my noble friend Lord Coleraine has already said, which may equally be what the Amendment had in mind. It is to intensify the sanctions more and more, with the object, as I have said, of beating Rhodesia to her knees, whatever the suffering that may be caused to both Africans and Europeans in that country, and to get rid of the present Rhodesian Government in that way. That is the method which the Government have employed up to now. Do they intend to change it, or do they intend to continue it, however disastrous it may be? That is the essence of the whole matter. That is what we all want to know in this House, to whatever school of thought we may belong; and yet the Amendment told us nothing about that.
I strongly suspect, in view of yet further measures which have been announced this morning, that it is that latter method on which the Government have decided, in which case all they are asking the Opposition to do is to support the latest very heavy sanctions that were announced on December 1, and possibly more to come, although, as I understand it, the Leaders of the Opposition have already expressed the opinion that those measures go too far. We must all admire the dexterity with which this Amendment has been drafted, and I should like to

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congratulate the draftsman, whoever he be, on the skill with which he has performed his task. But I cannot feel it should commend itself to anyone on this side of the House, or possibly some noble Lords in other parts of the House either. I think, if I may say so with great deference, that the Government are being extremely wise not to move it.
Now I would turn for a moment to my noble friend Lord Coleraine's Motion. I cannot say that I regard even that as perfect. It "takes note"—I again emphasise those words—of a number of measures which many of us feel ought also to be deplored. It bears all the marks of compromise between divergent views. But it does, at any rate, one thing; it does clearly and definitely deplore the Government ban on the payment of war and other pensions. It asks the House in no uncertain voice to say that this is wrong, that it is a denial of pensioners' human rights; and for that reason I hope personally that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, will press his Motion to a Division.
LORD COLERAINE: I will.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I shall vote for it, and I hope that all those who love justice will do the same.
5.34 p.m.
LORD ALPORT: My Lords, I must begin by apologising to your Lordships for inflicting on you a second speech on the subject of Rhodesia within the space of a couple of weeks. I do so only because of a feeling of desperate anxiety to do what one can, as an individual, to help to find a proper and just solution to the problem that we are debating. I should like to begin, if I may, by adding my plea to your Lordships to those already put to you by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne and my noble friend Lord Swinton, that there should be no Division at the end of this debate. I do so in the interests, as I believe it, of the Europeans, as well as of the Africans of Rhodesia, and of Africa generally.
We who are able to regard the procedure in your Lordships' House with proper sophistication realise that a vote in this House on a private Member's Motion of this sort is merely a personal expression of opinion by those who
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take part in the Division. But the intricacies of our procedure are not readily understood by Europeans, and even less so by Africans living remotely in Rhodesia. They will regard it as a sign of Party divisions here, and of support by influential figures, who have ranked with honour and influence in our political history in this generation, for the Smith Government. It was precisely what Smith and his group hoped would happen. They acted, in part at any rate, upon the belief that they would find supporters here in the political life in this country, and by dividing counsel here in political Britain would eventually succeed in achieving their purpose of establishing independence under a form of Constitution which appealed to them.
It is against the interests of every European in Africa as well as of Africans as a whole in that country of Rhodesia, that anything should be done which is going to prolong for a day or a week more in power the present Smith régime. It is going to be against the interests of this country that we should be portrayed to the world at large that there is an influential section within our population who, not perhaps properly understanding the issues, are prepared to condone the illegality and unconstitutionality of the action done.
I cannot over-emphasise to your Lordships the extent of the evils for Africa as a whole, and for its European peoples throughout the Continent in particular, that will flow from Smith's action. Legality and constitutional practice are brittle, shallow-rooted things in that Continent. The only security which European communities, I would say right from the Mediterranean to the Cape, have for the future, depends upon the maintenance of constitutional propriety, respect for law, Paliamentary institutions and what we regard as the British system of equity and justice. Once these are eroded, as they have been already in many African countries, the prospects of European communities there are going progressively to decline.
It is not for nothing that letters asking for the early restoration of Rhodesia to constitutional relationships with the United Kingdom have been sent by leaders of British communities in Kenya and Ethiopia. They realise that everything they own and possess there, and

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perhaps their lives as well, depend upon the maintenance of the forms and practices which we regard as part of our constitutional and legal heritage here in Britain, and which we have left, to a very large extent, in many parts—indeed, the major part—of the African Continent. Once there is an example of a European-based Government such as the Smith Government carrying through a revolution which runs exactly contrary to constitutional practice and established forms of legality, there can be no future prospects of security for those who look to those forms for their safety in the future, indeed, for all the European communities and others in Africa who look towards our leadership for the proper conduct of our affairs.
So far as I can remember, Sir Edgar Whitehead and Lord Malvern, although on occasion they took very strong action against disruptive elements in Southern Rhodesia, always did so within the recognised limits of Parliament and the courts. I remember discussing this on many occasions with Sir Edgar Whitehead when he was considering the action that he required to take. Even in South Africa, although, as I think some of us would feel, they have acted against the spirit of the 1910 settlement, they have always been extremely careful to maintain constitutional forms and to maintain the courts, which stand, even to this day, very high in the scales of judicial integrity in that country. Once a country, and a country in Africa, throws legality overboard, the consequences are going to be endless, and can only in the end bring trouble and ruin to those who are affected by them.
I do not believe that this problem of Rhodesia will be solved by this Christmas or by next Christmas. This is going to be a much more long-drawn-out process than many of us had hoped, and this is the view taken by the present régime. Noble Lords who have spoken earlier in this debate have referred to the hardship which has been inflicted upon certain groups of pensioners by the sanction measures of Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government must speak for themselves in this. But I would remind your Lordships that the actions of Her Majesty's Government derive from the act that was taken by Mr. Smith and his colleagues in making a U.D.I.
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I think that this present revolutionary movement in Rhodesia is the most irrelevant revolution in history. They have taken on themselves the responsibility for the consequences of their action, and their action will certainly inflict hardships on the Rhodesian people. They have realised that it can only inflict hardship on the Rhodesian people. I happen to know that some weeks before the U.D.I., at a time when the date of that declaration was planned by the Smith Government to be October 23, a committee of civil servants in Salisbury were instructed to plan to absorb up to 10,000 white unemployed which they, the Smith Government of to-day, calculated would lose their jobs as a result of sanctions following U.D.I. This was at a time when Mr. Smith and his colleagues and their propaganda machine were asking the people of Rhodesia to believe that this was going to be a nine-days' wonder, and that they would be able to get through their difficulties without any hardships at all.
I have the same feeling as my noble friend Lord Coleraine, who moved this Motion, about the predicament and attitude of that young man. He is one of the dupes of Smith propaganda. He is one of those who have been led, over a long period of time, to disbelieve everything that comes from this country; to believe that Britain would never act, that it was effete, that it was decadent; to believe that Smith and his colleagues could get away with whatever they wanted, and that they would be able to achieve independence for what it was worth; and were made to believe that that would be the start of a new golden age for Rhodesia. He was led to believe all these things; and only now is he beginning to realise that it was all an illusion. Every effort was made over the period when I served in Rhodesia, and subsequently, to make certain that the burden of this, the responsibility for this, would be placed not only on the shoulders of a Conservative Government, or a Labour Government, but on the shoulders of the British people here.
Over a period of time there are going to be a great many other disillusioned young men, and old men and women, in Rhodesia. For not only did the Smith Government in that time plan for 10,000 European unemployed out of a total

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population of 220,000, but they also planned, since there is no unemployment pay or National Assistance in Rhodesia, to do two things: to absorb them, presumably, into Government service of various sorts, but also to make certain that they did not do what Rhodesians normally do in these circumstances, leave Rhodesia to find a job elsewhere. They had realised that they could not afford any loss of European manpower. They therefore made plans at the same time to keep these men in the laagar by putting an administrative wall round the country. Whether this will be effective or not remains to be seen, but walls elsewhere have failed.
The people who are likely to be hardest hit by the unemployment that is coming into Rhodesia—you can see it forecast already in to-day's papers—are going to be the artisan class, who form the backbone of the Rhodesia Front organisation. I am talking now about the Europeans. What will happen when they find themselves gradually being depressed in substantial numbers towards what I can only describe as a "poor white" category in the country is anyone's guess, but I have no doubt that they will become more bitter against the Africans. African interests will be regularly subordinated to those of the poorer European. Mutual bitterness and oppression will increase, and from there there can be only one outcome—namely, violence.
This is the price which Smith is costing the people of Rhodesia—decent, hardworking people and, in many cases, people unfamiliar with the complications of world politics. That is the price that he is inflicting upon them. The importance of this is that, although I have said to-day that I believe this is going to last a long time, there is no doubt that every effort should be made by the British Government to ensure that their actions operate on Rhodesia as quickly as possible, and that they are able to give to the people of Rhodesia who are going to be affected by what is happening at the present moment, and will continue over a period of time to be so affected, as my noble friend Lord Swinton said, a clear idea of what will be the conditions after the restoration of constitutional relationship with Her Majesty's Government and with the Crown of Britain. I fear that we cannot now go back, as I once hoped
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would be possible, the whole distance to the situation which existed on November 10. But we can make clear, in the interests of the deluded people of Rhodesia, what sort of future they will have when they return to legality.
There is one other small group in relation to this matter that I should like to ask the Government to consider. There are not only British pensioners in Rhodesia, but also Rhodesian pensioners here. To my knowldege, some of them gave up their jobs before U.D.I., having served in the Civil Service for a number of years, because they felt that they could not be accomplices to an illegal act, and were doing so because of their loyalty to the Crown and to the values of their home country. Some of them have forfeited their pension rights. They are but few in number, no doubt, but these men have preferred what they and I would regard, and your Lordships will regard, as the path of integrity as against the advantages of sitting on the fence and lending themselves to an illegal act.
I hope that the Government will consider their position. I hope they will also respond to the suggestion made by my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne in his speech, that they will look again to see how effective the particular item of pensions is going to be in relation to their general overall policy. I make it quite clear that I am in favour of sanctions, and in favour of effective sanctions. But as the noble and learned Lord Chancellor was speaking, and outlining the way in which these pensions were available—that is, that they could be paid in London—I remembered that one of the reasons which led to the great bitterness between Dutch and British (in 1815, I think) was the fact that the compensation for the slaves freed by the British Act was payable only in London. Memories go back a long way parallels are drawn. We must be effective in applying our policy, in which I believe the Government should be supported, but we must also remember that we are dealing with human beings.
My Lords, I would say one final thing. The speech of my noble friend Lord Salisbury referred exclusively to 220,000 Europeans. Apparently to him—and we know his views, because we have heard them on previous occasions—they are the Rhodesian nation. But they cannot be

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regarded as the Rhodesian nation when one remembers the 4 million Africans.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I know that the noble Lord was not in the House in those days, but for years I fought for multiracial government in Rhodesia—in fact I was one of the architects of the Central African Federation. Why I say what I now say is that I believe that U.D.I., under somebody—not necessarily under Mr. Smith, but under a perhaps more widely based Administration—is the best chance for the African as well as for the European. I should not like the noble Lord to think that I do not think of the Africans. I fought for them for many years.
LORD ALPORT: I accept, of course, what the noble Marquess has said, and I am not alleging anything against him. I am only saying that in his speech he made no conscious reference to the fact that there was anyone in Southern Rhodesia except 220,000 Europeans. But not only are there the Africans who follow Mr. Nkomo. There are also Africans moderate, sensible, responsible men—who have not given political support directly but who find themselves in close friendship and understanding with the present African Opposition in what I presume is still the Parliament. I know what their views are. They are these. "We can", they say, "endure twelve months of relative hardship. What we cannot contemplate is ten, twenty, thirty years as third-class people under a racial supremicist régime". I beg of your Lordships—and this refers particularly to my noble friend Lord Coleraine —when deciding what action to take at the end of this debate, to remember that by taking the wrong action, by dividing the House, by pressing this Motion to a vote, we can damage the interests not only of Europeans but of Africans as well.
5.55 p.m.
LORD GRIDLEY: My Lords, I know that your Lordships will give your usual consideration to one who is to-day speaking for the first time in your Lordships' House. I have been for but a short time a Member of your Lordships' House, a place so respected everywhere. I know this from having spent many years of my life in the Colonial Service overseas,
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meeting with races of all nationalities, people who discuss our history, our ancient traditions, and our institutions, including your Lordships' House. I should have preferred to wait a little longer before embarking on a maiden speech, particularly as I know my beloved father would have preferred me to wait; but what compels me to speak to-day is the events with which we are faced and my conscience in these matters.
I am a pensioner of Her Majesty's Oversea Civil Service. I served in the Colonial Service for thirty years, and it was only a few years ago that my active life in the country in which I served abroad ceased, but I still write to people in those territories overseas, and among my friends are many Malayans and members of the races of other countries. I want to say a word or two about pensions, as I consider this matter to be an extremely important one. The pensions of retired civil servants stand in a very special category. An officer on first appointment is on probation for three years. The authorities wish to make quite certain that he is in every way, by his ability, his conduct, and his character, a suitable person to be taken on to the pensionable establishment. It is only when all these conditions are satisfied that a recommendation is made to the Colonial Office for that officer to be included in the pensionable establishment. I should like to make a distinction here, for this is different from any other form of pension. It is not an automatic old-age pension: it is a pension for which an officer must qualify by loyal and efficient service.
What is the effect of pensionable status? A young officer, be he civil servant, school teacher or engineer, electing to serve his country overseas, accepts a smaller salary than he might get in industry for what he sincerely believes to be the security of a pension. Therefore he is not in a position to save very much for difficult times, for a rainy day. By colonial regulations, to which he must subscribe, he is not allowed to have shares in industry in the country in which he is serving lest his private interests might bring him into conflict with his public duties. Pecuniary embarrassment, from whatever cause, is held to affect an officer's efficiency.

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He is required to carry out the policies of Her Majesty's Government loyally and to give effect to them throughout his career whether he agrees with such policies or not, no matter what Government are in power. Failure to abide by any of these regulations could involve an officer in dismissal or loss of pension. I hope that I have made it clear that to be abroad in the Colonial Service is a dedicated career, and that a high standard of conduct and integrity is required for the security of a pension. Financial rewards which might be higher in industry or in another career are something which he must forgo.
What are the facts in Rhodesia as we know them to-day? It has been reported that there are 2,273 British pensioners in Rhodesia whose pensions are affected by the proposals of Her Majesty's Government. In regard to pensioners affected in the category which I have described—that is to say, ex-servants of the Crown—there are 116 of them in Rhodesia, including 14 who are widows. The action of the Government so far has been to deprive these pensioners of the supplements to which they are entitled under the Pensions (Increase) Act, 1962, and will be entitled under the Pensions (Increase) Bill which is now before Parliament. What have these loyal ex-servants of the Crown done to deserve this treatment?
The Prime Minister has stated that the Government will look into cases of individual hardship. How is this to be done, thousands of miles away from this country; and what is the basis upon which hardship is to be judged? How long would it take to rectify various difficulties? British Governments have always adhered to the principle that the pensioner must look to the Government he served for his pension. Nobody in Rhodesia can now be sure that he will get his pension, for overseas Governments which pay pensions may well follow the British Government's lead and apply sanctions against these innocent people. May I suggest that the pensions of loyal ex-servants of the Crown are sacrosanct, and that those who have loyally served their country should not be made to suffer because of a dispute between this country and the Government in a country to which they have retired.
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In the last war, Colonial Government servants, now pensioners of the Crown, lived up to the finest traditions of the Service. We were savagely attacked by the Japanese in Malaya in 1941, and in five weeks the country was overrun. The Governor and High Commissioner, the late Sir Shenton Thomas, ordered all officers to remain at their posts. No officer disobeyed those orders. At the surrender, we were made to march twelve miles to Changi gaol, and for four years 2,000 of us were incarcerated in a prison designed to hold 600 convicts. I shall never forget the English nursing sisters, now pensioners, marching into that gaol between their Japanese guards, with their heads held high and singing at the top of their voices a song popular at that time, "There'll always be an England".
It is people of this stature and character whose welfare we consider to-day. It surely cannot be beyond our capacity to see that administrative arrangements are made, not only to safeguard the pensions of retired loyal servants of the Crown living in Rhodesia, but also to make certain that they receive, as well as their pensions, the supplements to which they are entitled. It is morally right to do this. I would submit that to do otherwise, to interfere with pensions or deprive loyal servants of the Crown of their pensions, is completely indefensible.
I hope, therefore, that the Government will rectify these matters. "They have been under great pressure these past few weeks, and obviously it is only too easy for mistakes to be made. Somewhere, somehow, reconciliation with Rhodesia must be attempted. The name of this country still counts for something in this world, provided that we stand for things that matter. We have to start talks with someone in Rhodesia sooner or later. Let us be careful of our acts, so as not to exasperate opinion out there by any action which might lead moderate opinion to side with Mr. Smith. He has offered to pay pensioners who may suffer at the hands of the British Government, but I know that pensioners out there would prefer to be paid in the normal way.
6.5 p.m.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, my first and very pleasant duty must, I am sure, be to offer the universal congratulations of your Lordships to my noble friend Lord Gridley who has just

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delivered his maiden speech. It gives me particular pleasure to do this, because for many, many years in another place I knew his father, and I am sure that if he had been here to-day he would have been very proud of the maiden speech which has just been delivered by his son. I am sure that we all hope to hear him often; and perhaps I may add that the intimate knowledge with which he spoke of pensioners should bear great weight with us.
Earlier on in this debate it was said that the discussion had gone very much outside the terms of the Motion. I say this with some humility, but as an ex-Deputy Speaker in another place I should have found it extremely difficult to restrict this debate on a Motion which takes note of economic measures, which goes on to refer to pensions, talks about a serious departure from policy for the Government, and finishes up with a reference to problems being resolved by negotiation. I think it would be virtually impossible to restrict the debate on this Motion purely to the question of pensions. Having said that, I do not wish to detain your Lordships for very long, because I too, like my noble friend Lord Alport, have inflicted some remarks about Rhodesia on your Lordships on a previous occasion, and I do not want to repeat what I said then.
I have always taken the line that this unfortunate situation in which we find ourselves is partly our fault, and that we should bear that in mind when we are considering what we should do in future. I do not think it can be denied that for some years now Rhodesians have seen Britain constantly shifting her ground, as a result of pressure from the Afro-Asian group. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Africans in Rhodesia, having agreed to the 1961 Constitution, refused to take part in it was that they thought they could get much quicker advancement by going behind the Constitution to Her Majesty's Government. I think they were to some extent entitled to that view, and it bears out what I have said previously: that Great Britain has not for any length of time stuck to one particular theme with regard to Africa. That is one of the factors which enabled the Smith régime to obtain power. However, I developed that argu-
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ment before, and I am not going on with it now.
I want to come to what has happened since the U.D.I. In the space of four weeks we have seen a complete shift of Government policy. We have gone from the announcement of sanctions which were not penal, would cause no pain and were not vindictive, to the most punitive, penal and vindictive sanctions that one can imagine. There is the treatment of the pensioners which has already been discussed, there is the fact that 95 per cent. of the trade with Rhodesia is to be stopped, there are the financial measures and the rest of it. As I say, in a matter of weeks the Government have completely shifted their ground from what they were saying on November 12. Really, who is to trust the word of the British Government from one minute to the next in these matters if that can happen?
Here, I want to ask a particular question. I gave notice to the noble Earl, Lord Longford, that I was going to raise this matter, but, as I am speaking out of turn, through a private arrangement with my noble friend Lord Colyton. I did not necessarily expect him to be here.
LORD SHEPHERD: I will see that the noble Lord's point is conveyed to my noble friend.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I am grateful to the noble Lord. I want to refer to what was said in both Houses of Parliament on December 1 on the subject of military intervention in Rhodesia. In the House of Commons, at column 1438, Mr. Heath inquired of the Prime Minister:
" I ask the Prime Minister to say that, whatever other things he may have in mind, it is not his intention to use British Forces to invade Rhodesia". [OFFICIAL, REPORT (Commons), Vol. 721 (No. 17).]
That was the question specifically put by Mr. Heath. The Prime Minister replied:
" This is of the utmost importance, but I cannot give the right hon. Gentleman the assurance for which he asked, … (col. 1439.)
In other words, the Prime Minister came out absolutely flat that he would not give an assurance that British Forces would not be used to invade Rhodesia. Almost simultaneously in your Lordships' House (and I quote from column 1274 of the Hansard of your Lordships' House of

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December 1) my noble friend Lord Dilhorne said, referring to the noble Earl, Lord Longford:
" … I am grateful again to the noble Earl for his explanation, but he has not given the pledge for which I asked him—namely, that the troops we are sending to Zambia will not be used against Rhodesia. I did ask him to give that pledge ".
And the noble Earl, Lord Longford, replied (col. 1274):
" My Lords, I give an absolutely firm pledge that they will not be used for any offensive purpose against the Rhodesians ".
I am perfectly certain that the noble Earl, Lord Longford, gave that answer in absolute good faith; but it was given at practically the same time the Prime Minister was giving a different answer in another place.
My Lords, what are the Rhodesians, or anybody else, to believe when they are told, "You need not worry; you have only to trust us. You can go on as long as you like under the 1961 Constitution "? And even the noble Lord who sits upon the Woolsack said he could not understand why they did not take that from him. I am perfectly certain that he said that in good faith, but so much has happened in the past, and so much is happening now on which they cannot know where they stand, that we have reached the stage when any statement made by the British Government is suspect. It is a terrible thing to say, but that is the stage that we have reached, and it is half responsible for the situation in which we find ourselves. When the noble Earl, Lord Longford, comes to reply, I should like to know which answer is the correct one, the one that was given in the Commons or the one that he gave. No doubt he will deal with the point.
May I now come to the effect of these swingeing sanctions which have just been imposed? I am one of those who, like my noble friend Lord Coleraine and others, believe that the only effect they have will be to add support to Mr. Smith—and I will tell your Lordships why. I think the Government are making exactly the same mistake with the Rhodesians as Hitler made with us in 1940. Hitler then thought that his sanctions would topple the Churchill Government—and how wrong he was ! Perhaps I might remind your Lordships of what the late Sir Winston Churchill said at that time. Hitler had boasted that he
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would wring our necks like a chicken. Churchill went to Canada, I think it was, repeated that statement and said:
"Some chicken—some neck ! "
It is my belief that the Government will find exactly the same with the Rhodesians, because they are our people. They are of the same stock as ourselves, and they will react in exactly the same way. I believe that in this effort to topple the Smith Government the adoption of swingeing sanctions will have precisely the reverse effect. There will probably he some defectors—of course there will—but in the main the Rhodesians will react exactly as we did in 1940 in the case of Hitler's sanctions.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN: My Lords, will my noble friend allow me to intervene for one moment, as an old friend? And he has referred to the fact of his position as a former Deputy Speaker of the other place. Reading the terms of this Motion, I thought that we had come here to debate war pensions, and whether the Government were right or wrong in dealing with the pensioners in Rhodesia in the way they are doing. It seems to me, however, we are ranging over the whole field. I do not know whether there are any Rules of Order, or whether my noble friend is speaking to the Motion.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I do not think my noble friend heard me. I think he came in only after I had started my speech.
VISCOUNT STUART OF FINDHORN: No. I have been sitting here for an hour or more.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I beg my noble friend's pardon. Then I think he cannot have understood what I am driving at. In my view, the terms of the Motion are so wide that we can talk about almost anything; but perhaps we must agree to differ over that.
To resume what I was saying, I believe that the present measures of the Government are going to produce precisely the opposite effect to that which is desired. Your Lordships may say, "So what?" Of course, if swingeing sanctions are continued they can bring Rhodesia to her knees. It will take some time, because of the attitude which I have just stated; but of course 50 million people can

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crush 220,000, if they are prepared to go on. But, what happens at the end of it? I should hope that most people in this country would be filled with shame. But there is another alternative, and that is to resume contacts with the de facto Government in Rhodesia. I will say this to your Lordships, although you may well not agree with me: that if you reject, as I do, these methods of destroying Rhodesia (which you will have to do in order to get rid of the Smith régime), then you must be prepared to resume contacts with the de facto Government, the Smith régime, in Rhodesia. And I believe that most people in this country would far rather see that happen than see Rhodesia destroyed in order to keep Ghana in the Commonwealth.
My Lords, what I fervently wish would come about is that we in this country would say, "Look; we have made a mess of it", and that the Smith régime would say, "We have made a mess of it, too; we ought never to have made an illegal U.D.I." If only both sides were big enough to climb down, we could resume negotiations and get somewhere; and that is what I most fervently pray may happen. It could perhaps happen by the visit of a more or less independent body, perhaps not composed entirely of Parliamentarians, to Rhodesia. But we are going to get into the position that either we shall destroy Rhodesia or we shall have to resume communications with the Smith Government. That is the conclusion to which I have come.
In my final words, what about this Motion? If it is taken to a Division—and I imagine it will be—I shall certainly support it. I really do not see how one can possibly quarrel with a Motion which deplores the way in which pensioners have been treated. I cannot see, particularly after the speech of my noble friend who has just sat down, what anybody could do other than to deplore the mean way in which they have been treated. The last sentence of the Motion affirms the
"belief that at the end of the day the problems relating to Southern Rhodesia can only be resolved by negotiation"
and not by force. How can one vote against that? Therefore, if the Motion is put to this House I shall support it; and
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I would invite as many noble Lords as possible in all parts of the House to do the same. I believe that if the Rhodesians can see that there are, at least, some friends in this country who are not prepared to take the course of destroying their country, we are more likely to get some way with reasonable negotiations.
THE EARL OF LINDSEY AND ABINGDON: My Lords, I decided only in the late hours of last night to speak on this extremely explosive and controversial subject. The reason for this is that this unfortunate affair has occupied my mind for the last two months. I look upon Southern Rhodesia as my second home. Though I was not born there, I lived as well as in South Africa for thirteen years of the earlier part of my life, most of which was spent on my father's farm. That was some time ago, and times have changed, but I still have a lot of Rhodesian friends whom I meet when they come to this country and with whom I still correspond. The impression that I get is (if I may use the phrase) that they are not "with it". This disturbs me. One has only to read the newspapers to realise their complete and utter disregard of what the outside world thinks. Moreover, from the Rhodesians I have talked to, I get the impression that that country is now as England must have been forty years ago.
My Lords, we have to persuade them to think in modern terms. I have given this matter a great deal of thought and I do not think that sanctions are the answer. I hope the noble Lord opposite who is to follow me will not be too kind about my speech, and I hope that he will be able to persuade me that his argument is the correct one. From my earlier experience of living in Rhodesia and of knowing the people there, both European and African, I have discerned their indisputable loyalty to themselves. I cannot help feeling that the effect of outside pressures will only be to push them into a tight little clique. I feel they will resolutely go on fighting the economic consequences of sanctions or any other influence which we can bring on them. They will fight to the bitter end.
A NOBLE LORD A NOBLE LORD: My Lords, may I—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order! Order!
THE EARL OF LINDSEY AND ABINGDON: My Lords, what then are we to do instead of imposing sanctions? At this late hour I think there is one alternative; that is, to reopen negotiations. My position is this. I do not support the U.D.I. I was horrified when it was declared. I could not believe that the Rhodesian Government could be quite so stupid and narrow-minded as to declare But I still have a certain amount of reservations on both sides. I do not know the full story. I have read as much as I can on this situation and I think the only way to reconciliation is to reopen negotiations. But, my Lords, with whom? With Mr. Smith; or with somebody else, possibly a more liberal-minded person who might come forward?
I am going to finish by saying that I think that, with sanctions, it is going to be Mr. Smith who will wish to negotiate. I think there is nothing new in the British Government negotiating with rebels—the only difference with this one is that he has a white skin !
I will not keep your Lordships much longer. I am very glad that I have been able to speak to-day because I wanted to get this "off my chest". I hope I have not been too controversial. To sum up, I would say that I think gentle persuasion is the answer. I feel that the Government's idea of establishing a radio transmitter in Bechuanaland is likely to have even more effect on the Rhodesians than imposing sanctions and curtailing the pensions of the unfortunate people there.
6.27 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am sure the House will observe in the noble Earl a worried man—not worried in the sense that he had to come to this august House and make a maiden speech, but worried as we all are in regard to Rhodesia. We very much appreciate the way in which he expressed his fears and doubts. Whether I am able to settle some of them we shall have to wait and see; but I think I can say to the noble Earl on behalf of the Members of this House, that we give him a great welcome here and look forward to his coming here and speaking again. If I may say so, he set a very good example to all of us in the brevity and conciseness of his speech.
The noble Lord, Lord Gridley, also gave us a maiden speech. He is (or was,
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I am informed) a colonial civil servant, and is now in receipt of a pension. The noble Lord has served in Rhodesia. Again, I am sure the House will feel that they have listened to a speech of very great sincerity. It struck a chord of sympathy in all our hearts in regard to the question of pensions which are due to loyal civil servants. In a few moments I should like to answer some of the points the noble Lord made and also some that were made earlier in the debate.
If I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, the last time we heard him speaking was in a debate on a similar subject. Since then he has seen the sunshine of Australia and, with a degree of envy, I suppose, all Members of your Lordships' House will welcome him back—although no doubt he will feel sorry that he finds himself having to speak and wind-up on the same subject. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, referred to this debate as having taken a curious course. We had on the Order Paper the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and we had also an Amendment in the name of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. My noble and learned friend indicated at the end of his speech that he did not intend to move his Amendment. It is always open to the Government and to all Members to decide, on reflection, whether they should or should not move either an Amendment or a Motion.
My noble Leader decided that, since this sorry episode has started and since we seem to have been able to keep the three Parties, and I think public opinion generally, in broad agreement (perhaps there might have been a degree of criticism here and there, from one side that we were going too fast and from the other that we were not doing enough) and moving forward, it would be wrong, in the interests of the British Parliament, of the Commonwealth, of Africa and of the world, to force an unnecessary Division. It might have been a Division, as was suggested, on the question of whether a "t" had been crossed or an "i" dotted. It is not always possible to frame a Motion or an Amendment which embraces all the views of all Members of your Lordships' House. This is a case where it was not possible to do so, and we felt that it would be wrong for

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a Division to occur in your Lordships' House, the reason for which would have been understood by every Member of the House but misunderstood in quarters elsewhere where it really matters.
I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who said that we should not give any comfort to Mr. Smith. A Division in your Lordships' House (this is not a debate taking place at a university teach-in or in some village hall; this is the Upper House of the British Parliament) would be a message of comfort to Mr. Smith and an indication to Africa and Asia of weakness on the part of Britain. I should not like to hazard, no one could hazard, what would be the consequences of such an action. Therefore, although it may seem a strange thing to do, the Government, having tabled an Amendment, decided not to move it. It was done for the sake of retaining the broad unanimity which exists. While recognising the different views which exist and the small points of criticism, we felt that we should keep that broad unanimity and I believe that we were right.
The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, made one of his speeches which we all enjoy. It was full of punch and vigour. But I think that the noble Marquess showed the weakness of his case when he had to say that a Police State was appearing in this country. I am quite sure that the noble Marquess is not aware of the measure, in which my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has taken such an interest, for the provision of a Parliamentary Commissioner to act as a watchdog for the general public to prevent any abuses occurring within the State machine. I think that the noble Marquess over-stated his case, particularly when he said that Mr. Smith had a greater reputation in Rhodesia than Mr. Wilson—
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: He said a bigger majority, and that is a different thing.
LORD SHEPHERD: The one is true. Mr. Smith received, I believe, 60 per cent. of the votes of the known electorate. But the noble Marquess will know that the electorate that voted for him represent only 1·8 per cent. of the people of Rhodesia. My Lords, when we are talking in this situation, we are not thinking
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of white Rhodesians, or black Rhodesians; we are thinking of Rhodesians as a whole.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not wish to interrupt the noble Lord, but the Minister himself said that those others to whom he referred were not ready to vote, to-day or tomorrow.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am not aware of that. What we have said, and I propose to come to it, is that the Government do not accept at this stage, at this time, that there should be one man, one vote. The noble Marquess himself recognises that, because I believe it is the general policy of the three main political Parties that there should be an unimpeded progress towards majority rule. For the noble Marquess to suggest that Mr. Smith is in such a dominating position, when he commands only 1·8 per cent. of the votes of the whole of the Rhodesian people, is, I think, an exaggeration.
I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and the noble Marquess, and to other noble Lords who have expressed views with regard to colour, that I have been a white immigrant. For twelve years I lived in a British Colony, which was later a Commonwealth country, as a white immigrant. During that period I heard voiced the same feelings of fear and regret as have been expressed this afternoon, not only from whites, but in Singapore from Malays in relation to Chinese, and in Malaya from Chinese in relation to Malays. All Governments have tried to create a basis on which minorities, whether political, racial or religious, may have a voice.
I remember a debate on Malta which took place two years ago. We were particularly exercised then about giving equality and rights in respect of religion, and we have always felt this to be necessary. On occasions we may have not been successful, but I do not think that we need fear any criticism of what has been done within the British Commonwealth. Mistakes and errors have been made, but they were not of our making. We have done our best. I am quite sure that eventually, when all the passions have died, men of different colours can live together in peace, harmony and co-operation— and I stress the word, "cooperation"—because we know that for

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many years to come Africa will need the assistance of Europeans, not only in respect of capital, but for their skill and knowledge. I believe that this is possible. I have seen it happen in countries in which I have lived and in which I have had interests.
I suppose that when the issue of U.D.I. arose there were two courses of action open to Her Majesty's Government. They could have taken no action at all, and accepted it. That, I think, is the view of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine. But does the noble Lord really believe that countries in Africa and Asia, and other countries which we know are only too anxious to stir up muddy waters, would not have intervened?
LORD COLERAINE: I do not think that the noble Lord is justified in saying that I would have accepted that. I would have resisted the declaration so far as possible, but when it came I would have thought how best to meet the new situation. I would have thought that the best way to meet this situation was to play it slow and get to a position to be able to negotiate as quickly as possible, and not to rush into all this quickly, with all this offensive talk.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am glad of the noble Lord's intervention, because one thing has been clarified. He is not one of those who would have done nothing. Those of us who have studied the situation know that if we had failed to act, then all the muddied water would have been stirred up and we should have had a cauldron bubbling in Africa in which no white man's life would have been safe. If we accept that we had to take action, it had to be either military or economic. Wisely and rightly, we have turned our hacks on the use of military force. We turned to the only other sanction available to us to bring the illegal régime in Rhodesia back to constitutional government—that was, economic sanctions. The noble Lord said that we should have treated them lightly.
LORD COLERAINE: Played it slower.
LORD SHEPHERD: We made our position clear to Mr. Smith, both privately and publicly. If we had failed to react on November 11 and had done little or
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nothing, what would have been the effect, not only in Rhodesia but also in Africa? It would have been said that the British Government did not intend to act at all to meet the solemn obligation which they gave at the Prime Ministers' Conference and outside.
LORD COLERAINE: Is that not the effect anyway?
LORD SHEPHERD: We put on these sanctions. The noble and learned Viscount said that they have failed. The sanctions of November 11 were to have a psychological effect immediately, while their effect in terms of economics would have been long-term, but applying with increasing force. Those noble Lords who have said that we should have left it at that must realise that in twelve or eighteen months' time Rhodesia would have been the economic desert that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, referred to the other day. If we allow an economy to die slowly and rot, it becomes infinitely more difficult to resurrect it and relieve all the difficulties and hardships. The Government have taken the view, particularly because we have had information, certainly from letters I have received, that Mr. Smith merely laughed at the economic sanctions we had imposed on November 11, that further action was necessary.
The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, asked whether this action arose from the United Nations resolution. It is not for me to say whether that had an effect, but we were conscious of world opinion. We decided to take further trade measures. We have eliminated purchases from Rhodesia to a total of 95 per cent., but this will take some time to be effective. Therefore the Government thought it right to increase the number of financial measures announced on November 11. One of these has raised a considerable amount of debate this afternoon. On December 1, the Government decided to ban for the time being all payments of salaries, pensions, interest and dividends. This was not done in any spirit of vindictiveness against the people of Rhodesia. The object of a trade embargo is to deny to the Rhodesians foreign exchange—that is, British sterling. We have already stopped the flow of capital from this country into Rhodesia.
I think that I should say this seriously to the House, particularly to those who

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cry against the severe economic measures: that if these measures fail we shall have an increased demand at the United Nations and from world opinion for other measures to be taken. What is more serious is that Parliament and the Government have decided that the Rhodesian situation should remain a British responsibility. If we fail in these measures, how long can we retain this as a British responsibility? I think your Lordships must face up to this. I do not believe that there is any Member of your Lordships' House who wishes to see the Rhodesian situation taken out of British responsibility.
I must say strongly and sincerely to the House that the economic measures which the Government have taken have been taken to bring home to the people of Rhodesia that, as an illegal régime, unrecognised by all nations except South Africa and Portugal, they have no economic hope for the future. It is hard to say to a person who is being treated harshly that it is for his own good, but this is for Rhodesia's own good, because there is no future for Rhodesia as an illegal régime. Therefore it is right that this country, wishing to retain this as a British responsibility, should take such action to bring home their position to the Rhodesians.
The noble and learned Viscount asked me what statutory authority the Government had used to deal with pensions, interest and dividends. The statutory authority is the Exchange Control Act, 1947. Pensions fall into various parts: those of the military forces are under Royal Warrant and payment is permissive; Civil Service pensions are also permissive, but teachers' pensions are mandatory. Under the Exchange Control Act, it is possible for these funds to be held in suspension but, as the Government have already indicated, so soon as Rhodesia returns to constitutional government, these funds will be paid. I would stress that this is a question of denying valuable sterling to the Rhodesian authorities. I understand that these pensions represent a payment of some £500,000 a year. At the moment, this is a sizeable amount.
To meet the question put by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in
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regard to further action on pensions, I would say this. We recognise the point, and we sympathise with the concern that has been expressed this afternoon from all quarters. The Government are anxious to find an adequate scheme that will ensure that no hardship will be caused. Urgent consideration is being given to the administration procedures that are involved. But, as the noble Viscount knows, as Chief Whip I cannot speak with any special authority as to what might be the future attitude of the Government in the line of the noble Viscount's speech. But what I will say to him is this. I will see tomorrow that a copy of his speech, and that of any other noble Lord who has spoken in this matter, and particularly of the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, are handed to the highest authority in the British Government. I hope that will satisfy the noble Viscount.
But I would say this to him. There is not one of us on this Front Bench who is not aware of the hardships that can arise. I am quite sure the Government were aware of these when the sanction was imposed. This and other measures—the denying of dividends and the denying of interests, which can be equally hard on old or retired people—one has to put into line as to what is the long-term objective or the short-term objective in the light of hardship of men and women who by other measures will suffer unemployment.
Then there was the point, made again by the noble and learned Viscount, in regard to postal orders. I did not gather whether the person concerned was a friend of his, but if he is in contact with the individual perhaps he might like to know that the sending of postal orders to Rhodesia has been suspended under the Exchange Control Act 1947; but if the individual wishes to send £50 or less to Rhodesia he is free to do so through any bank.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, has the noble Lord left the subject of pensioners?
LORD SHEPHERD: Not quite. But it may be as well if the noble Lord makes his point.
LORD CARRINGTON: I shall be speaking later, of course, and I only mention this for clarification. I am not sure

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that I understood perfectly what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said about this matter. I understood him to say that there was some arrangement between bankers. I did not hear mention of this from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. Could he perhaps clarify or amplify what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said?
LORD SHEPHERD: I must admit that I had my mind on something else when my noble friend was speaking—noble Lords may laugh, but it is understandable in a long debate—but if the noble Lord would give me his point before he speaks. I will certainly see that a reply is made by my noble friend who is to wind up.
LORD CARRINGTON: It is not my point, but the Lord Chancellor's point, that money would be paid into Barclays Bank in England, and the pensioner could draw from Barclays Bank in Salisbury. I find that difficult to understand. I was asking for amplification or clarification of that point.
LORD SHEPHERD: I am grateful to the noble Lord. My noble friend Lord Longford has said that he will reply to the point when he winds up the debate. As I say, I did not hear what my noble and learned friend said, and I think it would be wrong for me to answer the point without having heard what was said.
May I say one last thing. I think it was the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who said it was the intention of the Government to beat the Rhodesians to their knees. This is far from the truth. What we wish to see is Rhodesia returning to the Commonwealth and returning to constitutional rule. There is no question of surrender. The moment the Rhodesian people are willing to return to constitutional rule, then all the measures that we have put in force—the economic and financial matters—can be raised immediately.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, is not that rather like an attacker saying to a man, "You can get out of your unpleasant position easily. I will not strangle you if you give in to my demands. If you will not give in to my demands, I will strangle you."? That is what I call beating somebody to their knees.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Marquess is surely aware that Mr. Smith and his friends have taken an illegal action. Whether the noble Marquess sympathises with it or not, the point is that they have taken an illegal action. When they return back to legality, when they are prepared to work under the agreed Constitution of Southern Rhodesia, then all the economic measures, both financial and trade, can be raised immediately. I must say to the noble Marquess that the sooner they do this, the less damage is going to be caused to the Rhodesian economy, for the Europeans and the Africans alike.
It would be wrong for Rhodesia to believe that the British Government in any way lacks determination to see that Rhodesia comes back within the Commonwealth and comes within constitutional rule. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has indicated that the Government are willing to receive representations, through the Governor, by Mr. Smith. Others in Rhodesia are free to do the same. There is no closed door at Downing Street, through the Governor. We are willing to listen; we are willing to find a solution. There is not one member of the British Government, nor, I am sure, of the British Parliament, who wishes to see an economic desert. The choice lies entirely with Mr. Smith and the Rhodesians.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Lord must understand that these people think they are fighting for their freedom. You are saying that the British Government will strangle them unless they give up their demands. That is the clear position. You say that they are doing something illegal; they say they are fighting for their freedom, just as the American colonies did two hundred years ago.
LORD SHEPHERD: The noble Marquess seems to get this wrong. The whites appear to be fighting for their freedom. They have no regard at the moment, it appears, for the freedom of Rhodesians as a whole.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: How on earth can the noble Lord say that? Will he explain it? He knows perfectly well that the policy of the Rhodesian Government, and of every Government in that country, has been gradually to

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train the African up to majority rule. The point is the pace at which it goes. The noble Lord must not say that they are against any form of majority rule. It is not true.
LORD SHEPHERD: If that is the case, why U.D.I.?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord again.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, may I ask one question? Could the noble Lord somewhat help the situation by giving an answer to a question that has already been asked by my noble friend Lord Swinton? When he says "return to a constitutional position", does that mean to the Constitution of 1961; and if it means to that Constitution as amended, how amended? I think it must make a great difference to any reasonable, moderate person in Rhodesia to know what is the Constitution to which he is being asked to return.
LORD SHEPHERD: I would reply to the noble Lord in this way. The 1961 Constitution is still in being. There is a general recognition, I think, in all quarters that the Constitution would need to be revised to ensure certain protections for the majority people who are to-day in an unfavourable position compared with their white brothers in Rhodesia. I do not think it right for any of us to go into any specific detail as to what the new Constitution should be.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, may I interrupt? This was my proposal, and it was accepted by a great part of the House as a practicable solution. My proposition is this. People in Rhodesia really do not know where they stand. The Government say, "We are prepared to come to an agreement with anybody of reason, including Mr. Smith." What I put—and I do not want to spell out the details now—simply in order that everybody in Rhodesia may know exactly where he stands, is, will the Government say what are the Amendments to the 1961 Constitution which would be necessary in order for them to accept that as a settlement? I do not ask for the details, but I do ask for an undertaking from the Government that they will do that.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl for the contribution he has made. He recognises that I could not answer in detailed terms. That is what I was trying to say to the noble Lord, Lord Salter. But I will certainly see that the point he has made is conveyed to the Prime Minister, and perhaps my noble friend the Leader of the House may be able to say a few words this evening. I recognise that the people of Rhodesia should have a clearer understanding. I should have thought that the Government had made their position as clear as communications make it possible.
I am afraid I have spoken a great deal too long, but I want to say this in conclusion, because this is the theme with which I started. This is a very important debate. A decision may be taken this evening which could have very serious effects in Africa and Rhodesia. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, will agree not to press his Motion to a Division, in the same spirit that the Government have decided not to move their own Amendment. There are words in that Motion to which we could agree. Certainly we should wish to see negotiations and conciliation; but the noble Lord in his speech gave us very little idea of the type of negotiation and conciliation he had in mind. My only idea of what he had in mind was the Motion he placed on the Order Paper the other day—negotiation between Her Majesty's Government and the de facto Government of Rhodesia. If that was understood in Africa, great difficulties would arise, and many of our friends in Rhodesia, Liberals at heart, would be very disillusioned. This debate will, I suppose, go on for quite a few hours yet. We shall all have the opportunity to express our views frankly and clearly. It will be within ourselves; we shall understand what we are saying, and we shall understand the man who is saying it. It is not so when it is read outside. In these circumstances, I would appeal to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, because I do not believe he would wish to see the things that might occur if Africa felt in any way that Britain was prepared to weaken its resolve in bringing Rhodesia back to the Commonwealth.
7.5 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, may I express the satisfaction it gave me that the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, should be making his maiden speech to-day? I knew his father in two Houses of Parliament, and I am very pleased that he has come to join us and speak here. May I say the same for the noble Earl, Lord Lindsey and Abingdon —not that I knew his predecessors. I was moved by his speech, and I want, if I may, to ask your Lordships a question which he was too modest to ask. Your Lordships will have noticed that he spent thirteen years in Rhodesia. How many others among us have spent thirteen days South of the Zambesi, I wonder? We should bear this in mind when we talk about this country so far away, and so difficult to understand.
With regard to the Motion on the Paper in the name of my noble friend Lord Coleraine, I want to say the briefest word about the economic aspects, and then to say a little more about war pensions. On the economic aspect, I will say that Lord Shepherd did his best to reduce the temperature and to make it appear that we are all friends and brothers in this House. No doubt we are, in some ways, but the differences are not just the crossing of a "t" or a dotting of an "i" (those were his words, I think), nor can they be so easily resolved by the argument that if you vote in this House you will upset the whole of Africa. I do not believe it for one moment. I think we pay too much attention to the Afro-Asian group, to the United Nations, and to what is called world opinion. We should do far better to manage our own affairs.
My last word on the general question is this. I apprehend that Britain will lose—I repeat, lose—this cold war with Rhodesia. The reason she will lose it will be either that she will give way in time, or else she will go on for so long that she loses her pound and her own balance of payments here in Britain, and will then be unable to finish the job. I think Mr. Smith and his de facto Government will "sweat it out". I think they will be successful. As I shall say at the end of my brief remarks, it will therefore be my hope that we shall start talking, and talking soon.
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Now regarding war pensions, I should like to ask some specific questions which I hope the noble Earl may be able to answer later. Have we withdrawn from the disabled ex-Servicemen in Rhodesia the services they have hitherto enjoyed as regards limb fitting and hospitalisation? Such men are supposed to have such services rendered to them by the Ministry of Pensions as a right. Have we withdrawn it, or have we withdrawn money to pay for it? That is a specific question. I have looked up the War Pensions Warrant. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said that many of these payments were made under different kinds of arrangements, and the war pensions are paid by Royal Warrant which he said was permissive. I have looked up the Royal Warrant, and I found that a war pension may be refused to a borstal boy or young man, to someone in a remand home, to a prisoner, and to a person who has been deported from this country or not allowed to enter it. Are those the categories in which we now place the Rhodesians who fought alongside us in two wars? No other persons are barred from receiving their war pensions, so far as I know. Those are the categories against whom the cruel deprivation can he exercised of taking away their wound pension: no other categories.
Now the ex-Service people in this country, and all those who have represented them from time to time, have looked upon the war pension as being payable as an inalienable right. The idea that it is permissive has long ago fallen into desuetude: the idea that it is paid at pleasure—I hardly dare say "the Queen's pleasure". It is an inalienable right, subject to appeals to a court of which the noble and learned Lord Chancellor is very well aware, and, on legal points, to the courts of the land. Therefore it goes back on the tradition of twenty years or more that it should now be pleaded to be permissive. Indeed, it is an offensive, hurtful suggestion to every war pensioner in these islands, and all others all over the world, and I ask that it be completely withdrawn.
Before I say what exactly I ask, let me now deal with exchange control. So the noble Lord has to fall back upon the power which he has used. It is not the permissive one, that is in desuetude; on the contrary, it is exchange control.

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What do countries properly give themselves exchange control powers for? Not to beat up a few war pensioners, but to protect themselves in case their own currency is in danger. Is that not the reason, my Lords? Each country takes the right, when it enters into contracts and bargains with other nations, to refuse or to delay or to withhold payment if the exchange control warrants it. There can be no application of the vast and enormous machinery of exchange control for so petty and small and disagreeable a task as that of depriving wounded ex-Servicemen of their war pensions.
The word "pensioners" appears in the words which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor read out, and they were repeated by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd. I expect it appeared because Her Majesty's Government did not know what they were writing down —and that would not surprise me. I do not suppose there are many men in the Cabinet who know much about war pensioners; certainly not about battles. They would know better than to talk about a man who was a war pilot as a "frightened little man", and they would know better than to put these words in if they had seen service. Not that seeing service in a battle is the only way of serving one's country in war time; I know there are people who do most useful things in the boffins' rooms and in Whitehall. But such words come with ill-grace from Her Majesty's Government in the circumstances. If I had to go lion shooting I would rather go with Mr. Smith.
With regard to the war pensions, the word "hardship" is used. It is an insult. These men do not have to go, as old and sick people unhappily have to do, to the National Assistance Board. And that is what you are saying: that if they are in hardship they will be cared for. After you have taken away their inalienable right to their war pension they may come and plead hardship and get something. "Oh", says the Lord Chancellor, shrugging it off, "Don't you worry; we have fixed it. It's all right. They can go to Barclays Bank ". When did he fix it? I bet it was after we started making a row in the other place and here, because if they had fixed it ab initio why did they put these words in and not explain them? Whether it is
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satisfactory or not I do not know; I can only guess it must be wholly unsatisfactory, because it denies these people their rights, and also because there is still the question of hardship. If the Barclays Bank stunt was all right, there would be no hardship. Will that be explained, please? I shall feel bound to vote for this Motion unless it is said that the pensions will be paid as of right and not on grounds of hardship, and unless, indeed, that word it taken out.
It is very hard to eat words—I know that—but I should have thought, with respect, that Mr. Wilson had a good digestion; and I suggest that when he eats that word it will help him. I also suggest that a little more eating of words takes place in relation to these matters as a whole, because in every dispute between nations, in every dispute between large groups of men, there comes a time when you sit round a table and talk, unless you are out for unconditional surrender. Otherwise there always conies a time when you sit down and talk. Why should that time be unduly delayed? In my judgment, the sooner the better. If they are to talk, it is quite obvious that there is only one person to talk to, and that is Mr. Smith, so that a little bit of word eating and the talks could start right now. That is what I recommend sincerely as the best course. Otherwise Her Majesty's Government will fail to win the battle or, if they win it, lose it. It is not a battle—call it a cold war, because that is what Her Majesty's Government is engaged in. So settle now is my advice, and my plea.
7.15 p.m.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, the House has listened to a very eloquent plea from the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, as far as the pensions are concerned, and I am sure the Government will treat his and other requests in this connection with the greatest possible sympathy. But on the general matter, I would say that in my view this debate is not about pensions; it is about Rhodesia. I would say also how much I welcome the encouraging and courageous speech which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Alport, who speaks from great experience. I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, who asked how many Members of the House have had even 13 days in Rhodesia, that I have been fortunate

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enough over the last 13 years to visit both Zambia and Rhodesia, and on business where we have interests, on no fewer than about twenty occasions.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, are treating this matter with a complete lack of realism. I want to make it clear that I am completely opposed to the Motion which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has put down, because I believe that not just the Motion but the attitude which he stands for in this country is designed to undermine the work of those who are trying to uphold the rule of law and justice in the international field. Whichever way one looks at it, the posture which is taken by that group, very sincerely, all adds up to sympathy for the illegal Smith régime and I do not think they can baulk that. As the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said, this is not a subject for a union debate. It is a crisis on a par with Munich; it is on a par with the Berlin Airlift, and those of us who were in the Lower House then, realised what a tremendous problem we were facing at that time. It is on a par with Suez, and I believe the facts speak for themselves. The Government of Rhodesia, as it then was, declared Rhodesia to be an independent nation. This is an illegal act, and they have now no power or authority to act. But one would not believe that this was the situation, after listening to the speeches of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and the noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale.
The reason Rhodesia declared independence was nothing to do with getting finance from overseas—the U.D.I. stopped them getting finance from mining and many other things, and this was within the knowledge of many people. The reason they declared independence was to make sure there would not be an African majority rule within the foreseeable future. By cutting themselves off from Britain they believed they could retard African advancement as they wished, and they could play around with the rules which govern the membership on the electoral registers. Their act was designed to ensure that white minority rule prevails indefinitely, and those who support the illegal Smith régime, both here and in Rhodesia, are also supporting the idea
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of a permanent white supremacy and a rate of African advancement which will eliminate the risk of eventual majority rule. I think it would be more honest for such people to state their views quite publicly on this matter, rather than try to undermine the actions of the Government and others of us who want to uphold the rule of law and see justice established as quickly as possible.
I should not like such people to make any mistake: no British Government could possibly turn a blind eye to what the Smith régime has done. If they did so, if they decided to chuck in their hand, as has been recommended from different quarters, certain repercussions are absolutely inevitable; and they cannot be barked. First of all, Britain's standing in the world would slump to its lowest depth. We have no less responsibility to the African and European peoples of Rhodesia than we had to Poland in 1939, and we did not shirk that responsibility because it was a moral responsibility and a legal one.
Secondly, I believe that the leadership in Africa would be assumed with relish by the mischief-makers in the Organisation of African Unity; and they are a very powerful lot, and a pretty nasty lot, some of them. I believe that Zambia would become the advance base for an inevitable black-white clash in Southern Africa from which no one has anything to gain. Thirdly, T believe that it would be the end of moderate and responsible African leaders like Kaunda, Obote, and Kenyatta, who would be replaced very quickly by extremists of the far Left. This is what is at stake when we are told only of the position of the 220,000 Europeans in Rhodesia. And no one, of course, is suggesting African majority rule to-morrow.
I recognise the weakness and the irresponsibility of the African Nationalist leaders in Rhodesia. I regret bitterly that there are not more responsible Africans, highly educated Africans, to take over. There are not, let us face it, at the moment. It will take many years before we get enough highly educated, fully qualified Africans, but it is our job, it is the Rhodesians' job, to see that these people are brought to advancement as quickly as possible.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord?

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He has raised a very important point. How many years? Everybody says, "Not to-day, not to-morrow". But how many years? The noble Lord just now said a great many years. How many years has he in mind?
LORD BYERS: The noble Marquess has enough experience of Africa to know that the rate of advancement is directly related to what is done in the form not of primary education but of secondary education, university education, assisting the Africans with technical know-how to get up their farming incomes so that they can make more than £150 to £200 a year. The rate of African advancement depends on us. If we are prepared not to tolerate the avoidance of putting up more secondary schools, if we are prepared to help them with their universities, I believe it can be done in ten to fifteen years—but not sooner, because of the fact that they have been held down so long; and the noble Marquess knows this.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: What is equally true is that Rhodesia has spent more on education than any other African State, even those under the Colonial Office. That was done without any assistance from us; it was done out of their own resources. I agree with every word the noble Lord says about the importance of education. I hope that we shall fork out large sums of money to assist it. But it is not right to say that Rhodesia has been backward in that respect.
LORD BYERS: The noble Marquess has still not got the point—and it is very important—and he has enough experience of African countries to know this. A great deal of money (22 per cent., I believe, of their budget) is spent on education, a large part of it on African education; but it is on primary education. You try to increase secondary education and university education, which is what is needed for civil servants and administrators. This again is one of the reasons why there was U.D.I. It was because they had to control the spending of the money. It is in secondary education, technical education, that the money is needed. I believe that in fifteen years, perhaps earlier, if the rate of advancement goes as it should, we shall see a responsible body of African people there
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and a multiracial society. This is what is at stake. There need not necessarily be African majority rule; there can be this multiracial society if we show that we are going to play fair by the Africans as well as by the Europeans.
The simple issue is whether the Government of Rhodesia is to be allowed to declare that Territory independent, in defiance of the Crown, so that it can preserve the privileges of the white minority for all time, or whether the British Government are to be given every possible support to bring about a constitutional Government in Rhodesia, a constitutional Government which will, among other things, safeguard the rights of the African majority while they are advancing to further responsibilities.
It is for this reason that we in the Liberal Party have said that action taken against the Smith régime must be effective; that it should, if possible, be short and sharp. I do not like saying this. I have many friends in Rhodesia, many people with whom I have worked and been in contact over many years. But I am absolutely certain that action must be effective, and that it must be short and sharp. A long period of attrition is quite wrong and will do tremendous damage to relationships and to the economy.
This is not a time for weakening the hand of the Government by criticising. If I were to make a criticism it would be one that would refute the arguments of the noble Marquess, because they are complaining that it is deplorable that the Government have altered their policy since November 12. The fact of the matter is that the first lot of sanctions that were imposed were only on sugar and tobacco, and were going to take a long time to bite. On the other side, there was prohibition of arms. For the rest it was a matter of very weak control by the banks and the Treasury of exchange regulations and the rest.
When I looked into this from a practical point of view, it was quite clear that it was "business as usual", and this led to talk in Salisbury that Smith was going to get away with it. Even people who had been against U.D.I. were saying, "I believe he is going to get away with it". My criticism is that the Government did not put on these financial

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sanctions right at the beginning, because we lost a psychological point there and gave the opportunity for people to believe that Smith was going to get away with it. By the same token, I believe that it must be right not just to have stiff sanctions, in the hope that they will be short and sharp; we should also go on examining the oil embargo. As I say, we do not want a long period of attrition. If an oil embargo would work, it should, in my view, be imposed. There may be technical reasons why it cannot be, but I think we should do everything we can to make sanctions effective.
When we talk about not standing idly by if power from Kariba is tampered with, let us not put it merely in the context of damage to the British economy. The people of Zambia want to know that we will not stand idly by, not just if Kariba is cut off but in other circumstances, too. In the future although none of us wants force, we cannot ultimately rule out the use of force if certain things happen. I believe it is absolutely vital that we should make these sanctions effective and sharp.
But it is also vital that the Rhodesian people should be able to see a credible alternative. I do not know how this can be done, but in simple terms we must be able to say to them: "You can have Smith and sanctions, or you can have X and the status quo ante". We have to show them what it means to get rid of Smith. While the illegal régime is there, there must be sanctions that work. Otherwise, we shall forfeit the leadership in Africa for years.
I am worried about suggestions that there should be negotiations with Smith. If you are going to do that, you must make it absolutely clear that you are not going to "sell the Africans down the river", because this is what they will think. Here is a régime which has been recognised by everybody as being illegal: and then, suddenly, after a month, we are going to have a deal with them. If you have to find an alternative which is going to become a constitutional Government there—an alternative with which we can properly negotiate on the basis of the 1961 Constitution as amended, to protect the rights of everybody there—you will, I am sure, have to write into the next Constitution protec-
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tion for the European minority if you do get to African majority rule.
This is the sort of matter that will have to be looked into. I believe that it is vital that the Government should stand firm now, and I hope, with the Government, that there will not be a Division to-night. But if there is a Division to-night, I implore the Conservative Party not to abstain. This is too important a matter. If we want a message to go out to the nations of the world, as we do, we need to have the smallest possible number of people on Lord Coleraine's side in the Division, and the maximum number of people upholding the rule of law and of justice.
7.32 p.m.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I should like to explain to your Lordships as briefly as I can why I intend to support my noble friend Lord Coleraine if he decides to take his Motion to a vole this evening. In his Statement to the House of Commons on November 11 the Prime Minister gave a long list of economic measures which it was proposed to take against Rhodesia, including the banning of further purchases of tobacco and sugar. Reverting to this matter the following day, he said, in answer to a supplementary question by Mr. Amery, that Her Majesty's Government had no other measure in contemplation so far as they were concerned. He went on to add that they would, of course, review the situation in the light of actions taken in Rhodesia and in the light of discussion in the United Nations.
On December 1 the Prime Minister announced another long list of savage economic sanctions against Rhodesia, now covering 95 per cent. of Rhodesian exports to this country. He also announced that a stop was being placed on practically all current payments from this country to Rhodesia; and then we learned later in the day from a Treasury statement that this was to include the payment of pensions to British subjects resident in Rhodesia, including war disability pensions.
Many of us regarded the original list of sanctions, and particularly the ban on tobacco and sugar, as harsh, punitive and calculated to fall, first and foremost. upon those who could least afford to bear them—I refer to the African employees in the tobacco plantations and in

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the cane fields. I myself asked in our debate on October 15 whether the intention of the Government was to create unemployment, chaos and ultimately revolution. Like almost every other question put to the Government in that debate, no reply was forthcoming. Can the noble Earl who is to reply give me an answer to-night?
Now we have this additional list. On what grounds do the Government justify these new measures? Were they introduced, as the Prime Minister said,
" in the light of actions taken in Rhodesia"?
I can hardly believe that that is so, for the de facto Government of Rhodesia have taken but few actions since November 11 which go any further than the original declaration of independence. Were these new measures introduced, again in the Prime Minister's words,
" in the light of the discussion in the United Nations "?
The noble Earl the Leader of the House, when questioned on this point by my noble friend Lord Dilhorne on Wednesday last, said
" Certainly we are not taking these steps … because the United Nations has called on us to take them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 12); col. 1272, 1/12/65.]
How, then, can they be justified in the light of the Prime Minister's statements of November 11 and 12?
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF LONGFORD): My Lords, I cannot recollect exactly what I said. The quotation that the noble Lord has given is different from that attributed to me earlier by the noble Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, so both cannot be right. I will look up my words and see what I said.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I was not able to hear my noble friend Lord Dilhorne speak, but I did take this extract from Hansard.
The Prime Minister has also shown a similar contradictory attitude in regard to action by force. On November 11 he said he did not think that the solution of the problem was one to be solved by military intervention, unless the troops were asked for to preserve law and order. He added that he did not contemplate any national action or any international action for the purposes of coercing even the illegal Government of
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Rhodesia into a constitutional position. I find it hard to reconcile this statement both with the subsequent harsh and vindictive sanctions which have been imposed and with the statement on December 1 in reply to a Question by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, that if there should be any interference with the Kariba power station on Rhodesian territory we should not stand idly by but would take whatever action was necessary in order to fulfil the deterrent threat which was involved. He went on to say that if that meant a limited operation we should be prepared to undertake that operation. It is those shifts in the attitude of the Government which have occurred from time to time since U.D.I. that cause many of us to fear, in spite of Mr. Bottomley's brave words on arriving back in London, that Her Majesty's Government will again be intimidated into taking actions which previously they have said specifically they did not intend to take.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, the noble Lord has asked me a number of questions, and as I shall not be speaking until after midnight it may be that I shall not be able to reply to them all. Can he tell us straight out whether he is in favour of any policy of genuine sanctions at all? Because if not, I am afraid to some of us these observations seem rather meaningless.
LORD COLYTON: Yes, my Lords, I am in favour of sanctions, but taken at discretion and applied in the way in which they will have the most effect but hurt the least people.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, does the noble Lord mean that he is in favour of sanctions provided they are not effective?
LORD COLYTON: Provided that they are not punitive and unfair.
I now turn to a matter which has perhaps shocked me more than any of the other actions taken by the Government in the last few months. I refer to the creation of a purported board to take over the functions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Rhodesia. I am really amazed that any British Government, presumably with the knowledge and approval of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, should have taken an

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action of such dubious propriety and of such damaging effect to the reputation and prestige of Her Majesty's Government and the City of London. Hitherto, money from abroad deposited in London, from whatever source, has been regarded as safe—as "safe as the Bank of England". Now we know that that is not so.
Under the Order in Council which we passed the week before last, the Government are admittedly in this matter acting legally from a technical point of view. But I am told that as far as international law is concerned, it is most questionable whether this would be regarded as legal. Certainly there can be no moral basis for it at all. The funds of the Rhodesia Reserve Bank, which have now been theoretically entrusted to a board in London, represent the accumulated savings of the people of Rhodesia, their overseas balances, their trading profits, the proceeds of taxation and so forth. These monies are the property of the people of Rhodesia alone and cannot by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as funds over which Her Majesty's Government is entitled to exercise any degree of control whatsoever. I have heard it described by one noble Lord as "legalised theft". He said that the Great Train Robbery looked like the work of amateurs compared to it.
THE EARL. OF LONGFORD: My Lords, a good example has been set me earlier to-night by perhaps the most revered member of the House; but I would ask the noble Lord, as he is making these remarks about "legalised theft", how is it that the former Chairman of the Conservative Party and other leading figures in the City of London have joined in this enterprise?
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, the noble Earl has anticipated what I was about to say. I was about to say that I cannot imagine what led my two noble friends Lord Poole and Lord Harcourt, as well as Sir Norman Kipping, to allow themselves to be associated with this dubious enterprise. I believe, with my noble friend Lord Coleraine, that the sanctions previously imposed, together with those now introduced I am referring to the ones I have already specifically mentioned in my speech—have had the effect of uniting the vast mass of Europeans in Rhodesia, together with all the coloured
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and many moderate Africans, behind Mr. Smith. That, at any rate, is the opinion of some Rhodesians whose letters I have seen and who were previously wholeheartedly against U.D.I. Some of the people whose letters I have seen included leaders of the business community in Salisbury, who were also wholeheartedly against U.D.I. The Government's actions have consolidated Rhodesian opinion behind Mr. Smith. I believe they have also had their effect in this country.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said again to-day that there was no difference between the political Parties on this subject. That may be the case in another place, and it may also be the case in this House, but I have no doubt whatever that a deep difference of opinion exists among the public in this country on this subject. From a large number of inquiries which I have been making over the past few weeks it appears that opinion in the factories, in the villages, in the shops, and in the streets, is now, rightly or wrongly, increasingly in sympathy with Mr. Smith. We must not forget that it has been calculated that there are at least 750,000 adults in this country with close relatives in Rhodesia, as well as many hundreds of thousands of others with close friends over there. Nevertheless, I believe that these harsh sanctions have played a great part in swinging opinion in this country over towards Mr. Smith.
There are, of course, many people, including the Churches and many eminent men and women in the world of education, letters, the arts, the Press, and so on, who feel strongly the other way. I respect their views, but I would say this. Tragic as it may be, I fear that a deep gulf is now being driven between large sections of our people. I believe that, little by little, as these matters unfold themselves, there is a greater bitterness growing between different sections of our people than has existed since the Civil War. If, therefore, these sanctions—and no doubt there will be more to come—are simply having the effect of consolidating opinion behind Mr. Smith and dividing opinion in this country, why are the Government pursuing this course? Is it simply and solely to appease the Afro-Asians, or the Organisation of African Unity, or the United Nations?

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The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor quite rightly referred to world opinion, but why is it that world opinion should be directed solely against one small British multiracial territory in Africa? Of course we all know what has gone on in Africa over the past ten years; we know all about "the wind of change"; we know the feelings of the African people. But why were not similar sanctions imposed against Fidel Castro, with 70,000 political prisoners rotting in the camps on the Isle of Pines and subjected to daily tortures and executions? Why were they not imposed against Zanzibar, whose legally elected Government asked Britain for troops, which were refused, and who themselves were then overthrown to the accompaniment of the slaughter of ten to twelve thousand Arabs and Indians?
Why are sanctions not imposed against Papa Doc Duvalier, of Haiti, who to this day allows or orders tortures and shootings to go on nightly in the cellars of his Presidential Palace at Port au Prince? Why, for that matter, were they not imposed against the Soviet Government for the overthrow of the legal Governments of Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia which we still recognize de jure and which are now held down by Russian force? Why is it that sanctions are imposed only against this last British territory in Africa where the Union Jack still flies, and nowhere do there exist more loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen?
I put these questions to your Lordships, and I will try to give you my answer. It is, I believe, because this whole question of race, or racism as the Americans call it, has now assumed an importance totally out of proportion to other world problems, many of them far more appalling, more widespread and more inhuman in their results. Nobody seems to be able to think straight on this matter any more. I say this not, Heaven knows ! because I myself am a racialist in any sense. On the contrary, I venture to believe that I have as many close personal African friends as any noble Lord in this House, including the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. I stay with them when I go to Africa, and they stay with me when they come to England. I believe that I fully understand their point of view.
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But in looking at this problem of Rhodesia, and all the dreadful consequences to which it may give rise, we must, I am convinced, try to keep a greater sense of balance than hitherto.
Whatever people may now say about Rhodesia having become a Police State, I can well recall the time, only five years ago, when they voted by a 60 per cent. majority in favour of the gradual advance of Africans into full equality in the country's political life. That was the opinion of Rhodesians five years ago, the view of the mass of the white Rhodesians, including the young artisans to whom the Lord Chancellor has referred this evening. These people are not basically anti-African. They have been forced into this position by the actions, or inactions, of successive British Governments in the face of external pressure from Africans, Americans and others.
Here I would venture to correct the noble and learned Lord Chancellor (I am sorry to see that he is not at the moment on the Woolsack), who told us that Mr. Smith had said he did not expect to see an African majority Government in his lifetime. Mr. Smith has again and again explained that what he meant by that was a purely black Government. He has repeatedly said that the policy of Rhodesia, unlike that of South Africa, is not apartheid, and that Rhodesians envisage the day when Africans will be playing their full part in the constitutional life of the country.
My Lords, if there is to be any question of conciliation, or any move towards fresh negotiations—and I devoutly pray that there may be—I beg that those who may undertake this task should approach the matter with the thought in their minds, not that Rhodesians are determined to resist African emergence to the last ditch, but that they are committed—as indeed we were committed prior to 1960—to a policy of gradualism, a policy under which Mr. Harold Macmillan, in his famous speech, said the criterion should be merit and merit alone.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am extremely sorry to intervene, but before the noble Lord sits down I should like to take up with him a small personal point. He quoted me and in a slightly different way from the noble

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Viscount, and in fact, as I supposed, the noble Viscount was correct. I have the copy of Hansard with me, and I see from it that the noble Lord quoted me incorrectly.
LORD COLYTON: If that is so, of course I apologise to the noble Earl, but we will both look at Hansard to-morrow.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I have it here with me, and will quote the passage if the noble Lord wishes.
LORD COLYTON LORD COLYTON: I will look at it to-morrow.
7.48 p.m.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, asked why do we not put right all the evils of the world by applying sanctions to everyone who is wrong. The first answer is, not the one he gave, but that we have a direct moral and legal responsibility in the case of Southern Rhodesia. The second is that we did not declare unilateral independence—they did.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I must take that point up with the noble Lord. Is he quite happy to ignore all these other appalling things that go on in the world and simply to concentrate on sanctions when there is a British interest which is involved?
LORD TAYLOR: Not a British interest, but a British responsibility—a moral and legal responsibility, particularly a moral one. We have had various prognostications as to what will happen when these sanctions are biting. The noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, said that Britain will lose the cold war with Rhodesia. The noble Lord, Lord Grimston of Westbury, said that swingeing sanctions can bring the Rhodesians to their knees. My noble friend the Lord Chancellor told us that many of the people of Rhodesia who do not support U.D.I. hope that action will be short and sharp. I hope that it will be short, sharp and effective, too; but I doubt it. My feelings are much more with the noble Lord, Lord Alport, in his fears that it will be a long-drawn-out process. I fear very much that it will be long-drawn-out, for a reason which I shall give in a moment. The noble Earl, Lord Lindsey and Abingdon, in his maiden speech said
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that the Rhodesians were not quite "with it"; they seemed to him to be forty years out of date. I think he was speaking very rightly and very correctly there, and when one speaks with Rhodesians that is exactly the impression one gets. I thought that for a young man to have observed that and recorded it made his speech of all the greater value.
This debate is about how we are going to make the white Rhodesians change their minds, and I am afraid that the great majority have to change their minds if we are to get peace. The difficulties, as I see them, are, first, that they think they have good reasons for their views; and, secondly, that it is always easier to make obstinate people more obstinate than less obstinate. The first essential, of course, is to understand the mind of the Rhodesians. One has listened to many intelligent white Rhodesians, and it seems to me that, given a single false premise, their views are almost entirely logical. They begin from the undoubted fact that they, the white Rhodesians, have built up from nothing in a short space of years a technically efficient and prosperous society. They point out that while they, the white Rhodesians, enjoy the first fruits of this prosperity, the black Rhodesians have enjoyed the secondary fruits in the shape of a high level of employment, relatively high wages, admirable free health services, and a wide measure of primary education; so that the black Rhodesians under them have increased and multiplied exceedingly. "Without us", they say, "these people would have had nothing".
Many good Rhodesians are paternalists. Lord Malvern, I think, was a paternalist and his biographers summed it up very well when they said:
" He now stands in danger of being remembered solely as the man who said that white and black partnerships should be like the relation between rider and horse. By a queer turn of fate, he was actually pleading the cause of liberal paternalism before white Rhodesians at an agricultural show. Remembering his polo playing days, he thought that rider and horse should form a perfect unit, and that they would rely on each other and win the game by mutual dependence."
We know from our own social history, that paternalism is not enough.
However, many white Rhodesians, whether they are paternalist or not, are also convinced that black Rhodesians are biologically inferior and that they always

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will be. This premise seems to them obvious as they look around them, and they are always quoting examples of it. They are practical people; they are not intellectually curious; most of them have travelled little in the new Africa. Many of them left Britain because they did not like our increasing equalitarian society, whether under a Labour Government or a Conservative Government. Given this premise of biological inferiority, it seems obvious to them that they should never—repeat never—hand over power to the biologically inferior races of their country. They are not very good at verbalising; not good at putting their thoughts into words. When Mr. Smith said that, despite all the long and patient negotiations, despite all the concessions that we had made, we and they were still as far apart as ever, he meant just that; that he would never accept any constitutional arrangement by which power in Rhodesia would in the foreseeable future be transferred to the majority of Rhodesians. One false premise, and all the rest follows apparently quite reasonably.
We know that things are not like that in the real world. We are learning rapidly that black Africans differ surprisingly little from ourselves. Even given education, not all Africans are capable of becoming doctors or politicians or trade union leaders or engineers or nurses or teachers, but this is true of every race all over the world. But those who do get the chance and have the aptitude differ surprisingly little, if at all, from ourselves, from their white counterparts.
The morally wrong part of the Smith régime is not their false basic premise, which is just silly, but their refusal to try to alter it; their determination to make their false belief come true, and this they do by denying to their African fellow citizens the right, as the noble Lord, Lord Byers, said, to full secondary, technical and university education. For what they are doing and trying to do is to build a technically efficient society with white free men and black serfs, healthy serfs, occupied serfs, serfs who know enough to operate the machines of technocracy, but not enough to build them or run them or to take over the country. They have one other false belief; that there is in this country a great number of people who, in
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their heart of hearts, agree with them. The noble Lord, Lord Alport, emphasised this point. This is quite untrue. One cannot help admiring the achievements of the white Rhodesians, but one cannot excuse or condone what they have done. The danger of such a Motion as the one moved by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, is that it will strengthen Smith and his group in their false beliefs.
How are we to crack this tough nut and to open up the minds of the white Rhodesians to the winds of common sense? I am sure it is wrong to fight them physically unless they cut off power to Zambia, and then I think we have a duty to fight them physically whatever nice phrase one uses about it. But a physical fighting war would solve their internal difficulties. Herd loyalty is extremely easy to get in war-time. I am sure it is right to fight them economically with every weapon which can be effective, for those in power in Rhodesia are greedy people. They are greedy for power, for physical possessions and for prosperity. Economic war is not pretty or nice since it falls on everyone, but it will soon begin, in fact I think it is already beginning, to make them think, and until this process starts there is no hope. Thirdly, we must fight them with a psychological war; a war to win their minds away from their false belief and their false moral judgments.
Here I think the directives for such a war are quite simple. First, there must be the certainty of defeat. We have to make it clear to every white Rhodesian that in a shorter or a longer time U.D.I. will be beaten because the things it stands for are basically bad. We intend to see this through to the end. Secondly, we have to make it clear that there is an alternative to U.D.I., and that Rhodesia need not move to black majority rule tomorrow; that we accept that the process may take a number of years. Thirdly, we must make clear that the alternative offers a fine future for Rhodesia, because Rhodesia can become the first truly multiracial society in Africa, and a real partnership of black and white.
For myself I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Byers. I think it will take at least ten years to do, and I think that until ten years are up it will probably be impossible for Rhodesia to enjoy independence. I think it will take this time,

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because both black and white Rhodesians have to change their minds and their hearts, and get into new ways of thinking and feeling about each other, and this means a great deal of education on both sides. So far, I must say that I support every step which Her Majesty's Government have taken. I think we all regret that it should be necessary to control pensions, to stop pensions from flowing, but if this is necessary then it must be done. I do not see how any men could have gone further to help the Rhodesian Government to see the light than the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Mr. Bottomley. Now I think it is war, a non-shooting war which must be won; a war to win men's minds back to decency and common sense and fair play. And, thank goodness!, there are many Rhodesians who, in their hearts, want to see this battle won. For the moment, theirs is the black and hard side of the road, but the harder we bite now the sooner will their ordeal he over.
8.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think that many of your Lordships are probably in the same difficulty as I am this evening, in view of the whole course of the debate and, in particular, the wording of Lord Coleraine's Motion. I think many of us would agree with much of that Motion, but as the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has said, there is no doubt that if we vote for the Motion it is going to give great comfort to the rebels. I believe that that must be the criterion on which we decide, regardless of the merits of certain parts of the Motion. I was interested to hear the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, say at the end of his speech that he thought we were at war—" a cold war, not a shooting war ". My Lords, nobody wins in a war, and I think it is extremely important that we should remember that.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, with due respect, somebody loses in a war. I think that Hitler lost his war—and a very good thing, too!—and I think that the Smith régime should lose this war.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I do not think any of us gains from war. Hitler lost the war but I believe that we were all the losers and have been for the last fifteen years.
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To-night, I want to put two propositions before your Lordships. One is that sanctions are not going to succeed, if for no other reason than that South Africa will not let them succeed. She cannot afford to have them succeed, because it will be her turn next. Having said that, I should not like it to be thought that I am against sanctions. I am for sanctions, because it will bring home to Southern Rhodesians how desperately seriously we take this matter. Sanctions will undoubtedly hurt them, but so they will us; and to believe that sanctions will enable us to succeed in winning a war is, I believe, wishful thinking. You cannot make sanctions effective when there is below Rhodesia the great area in South Africa represented by such people as the Portuguese and the South Africans.
My second proposition is this: that we are not going to succeed in bringing the Southern Rhodesians to their knees in the sense that they will be prepared to disown Smith; that they will be prepared to agree immediately to the restitution of constitutional Government—in a word, that they will be prepared to accept unconditional surrender. The fact is that the people in Rhodesia who have taken this course fear that their whole way of life is going to be changed. They fear that, very shortly, whatever the Government may say at the present moment, they are going to find the Africans in control, and that, in a desperate state, probably, they will have to leave the country. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said that this was nonsense. It may be nonsense to all of us, but I assure your Lordships it is not nonsense to the people of Southern Rhodesia. They believe that, given a chance, the Africans will come into power and their lot will be hopeless.
Now the Southern Rhodesians who have taken this decision to go their own way are people from this country. The great majority of them are people who have left this country during the last twenty years; the great majority of them are people who fought against Hitler; and they are not the sort of people who, at this time, are going to throw their hand in when once again they feel that their way of life is at stake.
My Lords, if these two propositions are acceptable then, of course, I come to the conclusion that what we must try to do

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is to reopen talks, even with the Southern Rhodesian Government as it is to-day. Perhaps it would be difficult for us to do that. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, suggested that some eminent statesmen might go out and start the ball rolling. That is certainly an idea. There are other possibilities. For example, there might be a Commission of eminent Parliamentarians from this country; or a Commonwealth Mission; and it might even include people from other nations, or the United Nations. But the important thing is to start talking, and sooner, rather than later, more particularly because we at this moment have the initiative.
We have shown that we are deadly serious on this matter. Of all the people who have suffered from the action that has been taken, apart from the Southern Rhodesians, we have suffered most. We shall have to get tobacco from the dollar area, and, of course, we are cutting off one of our most profitable areas of trade. It is quite right that we should do so: it shows our good faith to the world. But it also gives us the right to take steps which we know, though they may he regarded by others as a sign of weakness, are not necessarily so.
I would finish as I began. I hope desperately that there will be no Division tonight, because I know that it will be misunderstood and will encourage the Southern Rhodesians in their obstinacy and determination to carry on as they are now. At the same time, it would be easier for many of us if the Government would say that they are ready to consider talks shortly—and in this the timing is very important. We must do it before there is too much bitterness and suffering. Let us remember that it is not the white Southern Rhodesians who are going to suffer most from all of this: it is the black Southern Rhodesians. This, surely, is the reason why we should start sooner, rather than later. Again on timing, let us move before everybody has hardened to entrenched positions from which no retreat is possible except after bloodshed.
My Lords, I would repeat that it is up to us to take the initiative. We must not say: "First, we must have the Southern Rhodesians agree to constitutional government once again", because
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for them this is the same as unconditional surrender. Let us rather be prepared to do what may he taken as a sign of weakness but what is really a sign of strength —that is, to send out some people to talk, and to talk now.
8.8 p.m.
LORD WADE: My Lords, I propose to direct my brief remarks primarily to the subject of how noble Lords should vote on this Motion. I think we must assume from what we have heard that there may be a vote, although I would agree with the noble Earl, Lord Perth, that it would be very much better if there were no Division at all. But before discussing this subject of voting, I have only one general comment. I think it would be clearly unrealistic to regard Mr. Smith and his colleagues as a body of liberal-minded men standing up bravely for liberty and justice. They may believe that they are right and they may be very obstinate, but I do not think they are very interested in the principles of justice.
I have a letter in my pocket from a young man living in Rhodesia. In ordinary circumstances I would give his name and address, but I could not possibly do so in this case as the penalties for any criticism of the Smith régime are much too severe. I merely say that his parents are well known to me. After giving evidence, all too familiar evidence, of life in a Police State, he concludes with this comment:
" There are many small things I could tell you about—little acts of inhumanity and cruelty, complete disregard for accepted standards of behaviour, abnormality being accepted as so normal that no one notices it. Dr. Niemoller, who stayed with us a couple of months ago, said he had seen it all before in Germany ".
This is a sad state of affairs. I do not think it can be easily resolved.
I agree with my noble friend, Lord Byers, that it would be much better that this position should not drag on. If there are to be sanctions, it is better that they should be short and sharp. But I am also inclined to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alport, that this may be a long process. This quarrel may go on for quite a long time. I hope the public is not being misled by some of the inspired statements that have appeared in the Press and which give the impression that the settlement may be just around the corner. I fear that it may go on for quite a long time.

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But whether we reach a successful settlement or not, and whether it is soon or later, I am sure that much will depend on the resolution shown by Britain in standing firmly by the principle of the rule of law. That, I think, is really the crux of the matter.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, asked us to speak frankly in this debate. I will do so. In my view, a vote against this Motion does not imply a vote of confidence in the Government; and I hope that any Members on the Conservative Benches who are wondering how to vote will keep that in mind. I believe there are grounds for criticising the Government. I think that in the handling of the subject of pensions there are signs of some confusion. Perhaps if there had been greater thought before sanctions were introduced, it should have been possible on the day that they were announced to state precisely what their effect would be on those in receipt of pensions and what was going to be done to try to lessen the hardship so far as possible. I think it unfortunate that it was not made clear at the outset, although, of course, there are bound to be some who will be hurt in a situation like this.
In my view, the whole issue has been presented by wireless and television too much in terms of a confrontation between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith. That is not being altogether helpful. Furthermore, I am still not quite satisfied that everything possible is being done to make it clear to civil servants who wish to be loyal that they will not be let down. I am not sure that everything possible is being done to make it clear to some of the small farmers who would like to be loyal, that if and when U.D.I. fails the outlook for them will not be hopeless. These issues are important, but they are not overriding issues when we come to decide how to vote, if we have to vote, on this Motion to-night. I am sure that the point of real importance is that Britain is resolved to remain firm in face of that.
We must recognise that the implication of those who support the Motion which is before us is that they are ready to abandon sanctions. I am convinced in my own mind that a vote for the Motion would be taken as a sign of weakness. There are many Rhodesians who have
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been led to believe that Britain has gone soft. I believe that Mr. Smith is relying on that. In The Times yesterday there was a report from their correspondent in Salisbury which began with these words:
" Until this weekend, most Rhodesians had regarded British sanctions as through the wrong end of a telescope. They appeared distant and ineffective, something to be laughed at by the virile Rhodesian as the feeble retribution meted out by the effete British in lieu of anything more positive and direct."
The writer of the article goes on to suggest that there are signs of a change of attitude. I do not know to what extent there has been a change, but I think there is still a widespread feeling in Rhodesia that Britain is soft and will not stick it out. I do not think that talks will succeed until we have been able to show that this is not so.
I believe that a vote for this Motion, or even an abstention, will give comfort to the rebels and will be regarded as evidence that Britain is divided and uncertain in her intention. On the other hand, an overwhelming vote against the Motion —and I recognise the sincerity of those who put it forward—will help to show that Britain(and I say Britain and not just the British Government) having embarked on this unpleasant but necessary task of standing up to this act of illegality, will stand firm. By doing this I think we shall increase rather than diminish the chances of ultimate settlement. I have no hesitation in voting against this Motion and I hope that many other noble Lords will do likewise.
8.16 p.m.
LORD SOPER: My Lords, this has been a long debate, and possibly will be a longer one. I hope not to be repetitious. This has been an important debate. It seems to me that the importance has been, with respect, unproportionate to the direct terms of the Motion. I regard this Motion as impertinent. I am quite sure that to look at the present situation in terms of some constitutional peccadillo of which a number of our kith and kin are technically guilty; and to say that, because they are decent fellows, they should be treated in no way punitively, but should be treated with understanding and with the prospect that, because they are fundamentally decent people, they will quickly come to some agreeable terms, is

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untrue. This seems to me to be a criminal conspiracy on the part of Mr. Smith and his friends to bring Southern Rhodesia within the orbit of Afrikaner apartheid. That would be a presumptuous thing to say unless it could be substantiated. And I believe it can. I will briefly say something in substantiation of that in a moment. I will take some courage from the fact that this debate already has ranged very widely.
I am second to none in my appreciation of and recognition of the gallantry and needs, particularly, of war pensioners. At the same time, I think that in such a debate, at such a time as this, it might well have been considered that the condition of, perhaps, 6,000 who are inelegantly called "restrictees" in Rhodesia, and of whom I have quite up-to-date evidence, is more pertinent to our business and throws a much clearer light on the issue with which we should be engaged. I am informed by the Christian Council of Rhodesia that the number of those detainees or restrictees may by this time have increased beyond the figure of 6,000. It may not be within the knowledge of your Lordships that those who are detained have no means of livelihood; they have no money, and they are given a ration. They cannot support their families, who are left with what is called "10s. per mouth per head." They have no opportunity of getting into touch with their families, and their families are afraid to get into touch with them. No outside spiritual ministries are now available; and the process is increasing day by day.
I am, of course, sensitive to the needs of the pensioners. I am much more concerned about the calamitous condition in which so many people find themselves in Rhodesia and the accelerating process which will make it more calamitous as the days go by. I would bring to your Lordships' notice something from the evidence of the Christian Church in Rhodesia. The Bishop of Mashonaland has already demonstrated his courage. The Roman Catholic hierarchy has already demonstrated its unanimity in the utter condemnation of U.D.I.
The Christian Council of Rhodesia has pleaded that there should be no violence. But it has also said (which bears out
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what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said at the beginning of the debate) that many moderate people of many kinds in Rhodesia hope, even though it hurts them, that there will be the imposition of effective, quick and, if you like, punitive sanctions. For what, after all, is wrong with a sanction that punishes, provided that the end of punishment is reform and that punishment is not merely an end in itself? They think this to be the only thing that can ultimately demonstrate our intention to those who have been refused the abitriment of violence; that is to say, those who have looked to the violent West for the continuation of its age-long policy of dealing violently with such situations; and if we have not exactly encouraged them, we have not discouraged people in Africa from thinking that violence is a way out of the problem. It seems to the Christian communities in Rhodesia that the only way whereby we can retain respect is to make our economic sanctions comparably as effective as violence.
It seems to me that the real problem is not bringing back Mr. Smith to a more amenable frame of mind. The real problem is not to conciliate in the first place the Rhodesia Front which I believe to be bad. The real issue with which this House should be confronted now is this what is going to happen if all remnants of faith in this country are lost by an increasing number of African people, who may not have the ability to think particularly abstractly of economic or indeed constitutional problems, but see life for themselves as squalid and short and the prospect of hope and justice receding? This is the issue with which this House is, properly, engaged to-day.
It is quite right that when you create an omelette you have to crack and spoil eggs. It is true that when you use a blunt instrument, for there is no precise instrument here, not only do those who are guilty suffer but others suffer as well. I have been immensely moved, and were it not for the same kind of prudence that exercised the noble Lord, Lord Wade, in refraining from giving names. I could, from the sheaf of papers I have with me, give a considerable amount of evidence which would go to demonstrate that there is in Rhodesia among many people, not only the Christians, a deep desire that

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this country should stand firm on economic sanctions. They are willing and ready to be involved in some of the penalties which are occasioned by those sanctions, if indeed it can be demonstrated to their friends the Africans, and to Africans far outside the boundaries of Rhodesia, that this is a recognition on our part of an evil system and demonstrates our desire to put an end to it as quickly as possible.
8.24 p.m.
THE EARL OF VERULAM: My Lords, it is just forty years since my father started in Rhodesia a tobacco farm which is now quite a big, thing of its kind. He was a very practical Christian and laid it down from the beginning that in view of the immense and desperate poverty of the country, money made in Africa should stay in Africa. Since then not one penny in fees, dividends, interest or profit has been taken out. On the other hand, much money and much effort has been put in. I mention this only because it has frequently been said that those people with investments in Rhodesia are there to grind down the Africans. That is certainly not so in our case, and I know of many other cases in which it is not so.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, I find myself as one who for years has done his utmost to persuade his friends in Rhodesia not to support Mr. Smith and his predecessors. Yet, time and time again, we have seen his Party profit from what decent, intelligent men there regard as the unreliability of both Parties in this country. Right or wrong, that is what they think; and in those circumstances I ask, will sanctions be effective? This is the Motion which I think we are talking to. Will they be effective in toppling Mr. Smith, and in the short run? All my information is that it is having precisely the opposite effect. Those people who were doubters are now solidly behind Mr. Smith. Surprisingly enough, the African farmworkers are working better than they have ever worked before, which is some evidence that when Mr. Smith contends that the Chiefs do represent the people, or part of them, he may "have something", because the Chiefs were not impressed by the Prime Minister.
If sanctions are not going to topple Mr. Smith in the short run, what will they
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do? Some of them clearly will do absolutely nothing. The one prohibiting the export of copper is a nonsense. Copper is desperately needed everywhere in the world. It is freely saleable. It is an element. You do not get a Rhodesian copper element and a non-Rhodesia copper element, and it is laughably freely saleable in London on the London Metal Exchange. That kind of sanction may fool us. but it fools nobody else.
Another type of sanction, namely that on tobacco, will have devastating results, but they will be long drawn out. As has often been said before, the people who will suffer are the Africans. Tobacco is a crop which needs a lot of labour, and already farmers have turned over from later tobacco plantings to food crops. These crops need less labour and consequently there will be unemployment. Furthermore, there will be hunger and all that it will lead to. Rhodesia cannot be expected to be inactive while all this is going on. The prohibition of payments of interest works to the advantage of Rhodesia—they pay more than they receive—so that their reserves will benefit.
It is not only the Kariba power about which we should be concerned. This seems the least likely thing with which they will interfere. Far more important is the supply of coal from the Wankie Colliery. It takes one ton of coal to produce one ton of copper, and this coal serves both the Copper Belt and the Congo copper producers. So by simply raising the price of coal to what would be quite a modest amount in the circumstances, and perhaps raising the rail freight for copper which has to come back through Rhodesia, Mr. Smith could easily recoup himself for the entire loss of his tobacco crop. So we are going to transfer the effect of sanctions from the Rhodesians on to the Zambians, which will present President Kaunda, who in my view is far the best of the African Presidents, with immense problems. He will have to pay the price.
It is only one of the major tragedies of this situation that each side has the power to wreck the other, and it should be none of our aim or interest to promote this. I believe that while it was right to impose sanctions, we should not regard them as in any way being a solution. Indeed, after a short time I believe that

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they will become a positive danger to us all. If they can succeed only at crippling cost, then clearly the only thing we can do is to talk, and talk to Mr. Smith.
I will not go into all the details. This has been said many times already. But is there not something else that we can do? The noble Lord, Lord Byers, mentioned this. We have got to sell a change in policy, or what would be seen by the world to be a change in policy, to our African friends, and I believe we can do something practical here which would be extremely statesman like: namely, be far more forthcoming than we have been on the projected railway between the Copper Belt and Dar-es-Salaam. Economically this is a nonsense, but I think that nevertheless it is something the Africans are determined to have, because the one lesson which they have learned from this declaration of independence is their dependence on Rhodesia. Would not the use of large sums of money for the building of this railway be a constructive use of money which would otherwise be frittered away in strife?
8.30 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, as I have already spoken twice in previous debates on this subject I have no desire unnecessarily to repeat myself, and, in any case, at this late hour, with so many speakers, it would be superfluous repetition for me to be other than very brief. I shall therefore detain the House for a very short time. I want to begin by saying that I am in full agreement with the terms of the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and with all that he said in moving it. The difference between the wording of the Amendment, which is now not moved, and that of the original Motion, emphasises, I think, the difference between the mental approach of the Government and of those of us who realise the overwhelming importance of keeping the channels of communication open and of speaking in definite terms.
I believe that the initial steps of enforcing the loss of privileges as a Commonwealth member and the severe economic sanctions against tobacco, sugar and chrome, in particular, were more than adequate to underline the British Government's disapproval of U.D.I. and its desire
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to create a more temperate approach to the difficult problem of the political position of 4 million Africans. Since then the additional steps taken have partaken, it seems to me, of sheer determination to punish the illegal Government by wrecking the economy of Rhodesia and bringing disaster—perhaps irreparable disaster—to all alike, Africans and Europeans indiscriminately.
As has been emphasised over and over again, it all depends on what our aim really is. If it is to destroy utterly the position of the dominant European minority, then one must envisage the utter folly of creating a desert and calling it peace. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, in his speech earlier this evening, emphasised the dangers of the failure of sanctions; and, indeed, he did well to emphasise it. We cannot afford to fail in these. And into what terrible and disastrous alternatives is this sliding down the increasing severity of sanctions leading us? We have declared that we will not use force, but we are in danger of facing a situation in the future when nothing remains but force.
The Government have declared their desire to reach reasonable agreement. If this is a genuine desire and not mere words, then surely one must look at the situation with impartial judgment of what is best for Rhodesia as a country containing both Europeans and Africans, black and white alike. I have been asked what I think the Government ought to have done. From the beginning, I have had the temerity to think that the case has been mishandled—and I speak with a certain amount of administrative experience in that country, as well as in many other countries in the world. The tone of the Prime Minister's references to Mr. Smith and his Ministers seem to me rather to reflect the attitude of an angry politician than of a calm statesman, and if ever a calm statesman was needed in our history, now is the time when that need is only too obvious.
In my view, a genuine spirit of compromise could have ended in agreement without forcing a reluctant Government into U.D.T., in despair of a reasonable political approach to an ultimately dominant African position. The present de facto Government of Rhodesia have declared, and have made no secret of

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their declaration, that they wish to preserve for their country a civilised Government. And there is no qualification of that. All they seek is that, whoever takes on and is able to take on that Government, should be people who take a civilised view of life.
The African majority has been offered gradual qualification for responsible political power. I was impressed by what the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said. They emphasised that it is essential that the Government should stop talking about reasonable constitutional aims and things like that and say definitely what would be acceptable to them and how far they expect the people of Rhodesia to go in order to receive their approval of immediate independence. Do not let us delude ourselves. Immediate independence is a sine qua non of this position. It is no use offering now to anybody in Rhodesia a qualified position, whereby independence may be granted in future. It will have to be part of the settlement.
Any administrator can tell you that, in the circumstances of Rhodesia, it would take at least a generation before the African majority would be able to manage a dominant political position. I speak with a good deal of experience of this, and I have a great many African friends. Ample opportunities to qualify would he necessary. The increase of secondary educational facilities and the training of suitable Africans in responsible positions would be part of the process. After all, with all the educational qualifications in the world, there is needed practical experience in responsibility before these qualifications can mature in practice. We have had some experience of the need of that in this country. The present Government personnel, however, is learning; but I do not want them to learn too much at the expense of Rhodesia. The probable gap between the beginning of political adolescence and maturity would be something between 15 and 25 years. I have said that it would be at least a generation and I think that that emerges as a rational expectation. Then, why not say so? We all know that that sort of period would be necessary. Why not he honest about it? Honesty is still the best policy, even in politics. If the Africans of Rhodesia had not been misled and intimidated into declining to use even
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present facilities, they would have now been well on the road to the position they are said to be craving to-day.
I repeat that the position of the Prime Minister is still obscure. Is it a fact that he still excludes the possibility of independence for Rhodesia until there is an African majority in government? I have already said that independence is part of any settlement of this question now. We have reached that stage. And we must know the terms of it. The future, as we see it to-day, is indeed tragic and grim. I can only say that I hope it will not be necessary for me to suggest in this House—and I probably should do so—that the words of Tacitus, which I believe he wrote about Galba, can be applied to the present Government:
" censensu omnium capax imperii nisi imperasset "
—and in case there are any technological members on the Government Front Bench, may I roughly translate that as: "We all might have thought they could do the job if we had not seen them trying."
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD CHAMPION): What arrogance!
LORD MILVERTON: I appreciate that this is really no joking matter. Chaos and darkness indeed lurk in the wings of this position; and it is not a case of
" Chaos and Darkness heard
The Almighty word
And took their flight."
In this case, chaos and darkness is waiting on the words of the British Government to come in. I agree with the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, and I hope the noble Lord will carry this Motion to a Division, when I will have great pleasure in going into the Lobby to support him.
8.42 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, may I, on behalf of the technocratic Boeotians on this side of the House, thank the noble Lord who has just sat down for his approximate translation? It was courteous of him indeed. In opening this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, spoke of African countries where the white minority rule had been terminated too early as having slid back into a morass of tribal misery and poverty.
LORD COLERAINE: I said that they were sliding back.
LORD KENNET: Sliding back into a morass of tribal misery and poverty. I wish to detain your Lordships quite shortly, because during the last three weeks I have had the privilege of leading a Parliamentary Delegation for the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association to one of these countries which is "sliding back into the morass of tribal misery and poverty"—that is, to Nigeria. This is a country where there are half a dozen universities, two of them, at least, being of world renown, staffed entirely by "miserable tribesmen"; a country where there is a flourishing and developing modern industry, overseen and directed by "miserable tribesmen"; a country where there is not one bicameral Legislature, but five, making ten Chambers in all, entirely manned by "miserable tribesmen", some of whose debates I had the good fortune to hear. And I think that if any of your Lordships had been there at the same time you would agree that the standard compared favourably with our own here in Westminster. It was not the same, but it was in no way inferior.
Nigeria is a country laced by modern means of communication, driven and organised by "miserable" and ignorant tribesmen; exporting and importing a large quantity of raw materials and manufactured products, handled by these backsliding "miserable tribesmen"; a country whose Press is, in my opinion, better worth reading than the British Press for its independent spirit and its happy turn of phrase, all turned out with, presumably, parchment and quill pens by "miserable" backsliding tribesmen—and so on and so on. Nigeria has its faults: it is not the perfect democracy.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: If my noble friend will forgive me, he has not mentioned the Judges and the Bar, all of whom have been trained in England, the Lord Chief Justice, that very distinguished lawyer and an old Cambridge tennis blue, all of whom are "miserable tribesmen".
LORD ROWALLAN: It appears not to have been noticed that these "miserable tribesmen", so-called, have achieved the greatness they have done in Government from the fact that they were governed for a number of years by the noble Lord, Lord Milverton.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, may I also suggest that if my noble and gallant friend Lord Montgomery of Alamein were here he might remind us that there are a whole lot of "miserable tribesmen" North of the Border?
LORD KENNET: I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and to other noble Lords, for pointing out the full extent of the achievements of the "miserable tribesmen". It is remarkable indeed. I saw there not only the justices on the bench, but five Speakers and five Presidents of Houses of Chiefs, who, I think I may say, correspond to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack: all the most "miserable tribesmen", wearing the most miserable tribal wigs, and conducting their business precisely on the model set by us in this Parliament during the proconsulship of the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, and others—and they are not forgetful of this—over the past sixty years.
What I want to say about Nigeria is simply this. It is a country with five Governments, one Federal and four Regional. We visited them all, and every Nigerian we talked to, from the highest to the lowest, had this one subject on the top of his mind—Rhodesia. We had it ten times over; that is to say, twice in each seat of Government we visited. It was always in the same form: "What are you going to do? We are not telling you what you should do; what we are telling you is that we expect the Smith régime to be overthrown. What right have we to expect this? We have the right that we are part of a Commonwealth, which to us is not nothing: it stands for a certain tradition of human and political justice." The entire British presence in Africa during this century stands, to them, for a certain political and human justice; and in the case of the one territory, Rhodesia, they see the current of history dammed, reversed and pumped upstream the other way. In Rhodesia the entire Commonwealth development is going the wrong way, and they conceive, rightly or wrongly—I believe rightly—that as members of the Commonwealth they have the right to ask us to reverse that backwards movement and to bring Rhodesia once again into the stream of history.

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As I say, from the highest to the lowest this was put to us with eloquence and intelligence: by the Premiers in Nigeria; by the Governors of the Regions in Nigeria; by many Ministers; by the Speakers and Chairmen of Assemblies; by industrial leaders, trade unionists, university professors, taxi drivers, market porters, and by simple men who climb up palm trees in order to tap the wine at the top. There is complete unanimity. It may be important; it may not. I believe it is, because Nigeria, although only one Commonwealth country among many, is, nevertheless, eight times the size of Ghana, a neighbouring State, and something like twelve or fourteen times the size of Rhodesia, which is causing us all so much trouble.
If we stand back to look at the Rhodesian problem, I think that it comes to rest in the great question of the settler ratio. Where there are no settlers, independence is easily achieved, and black African Governments take over easily and run the country in a way which they like, although we do not always like it. But where there are settlers there are difficulties; and the higher the ratio of settlers to natives, the greater the difficulties will be. It would be surprising if it were not so; it is naturally so.
When we look at Rhodesia, we see a country with a very high settler ratio which, naturally enough, is having very great difficulties in the institution of the inevitable black majority rule. I think we should not be too downcast by this. There have been countries with a much higher settler ratio and I refer to the former French North African territories, where independence has been achieved (after long and bloody wars, it is true; which I pray God we may avoid) and where viable States have been set up. The ratio in Rhodesia is about 1 in 18. The ratio in Morocco was 1 in 19, in Tunisia 1 in 12, and in Algeria 1 in 6 or 7. The problem was therefore very much graver in both these countries of Algeria and Morocco. Yet it has been settled. The French never made the mistake of allowing full internal autonomy to settler Governments. This is where we went wrong.
I do not want, at this late stage of the evening, to cast stones backwards historically to a certain date, whenever it was—1953, 1961 or 1963. Mistakes were made
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at every stage, and it does not matter now. We are all in the same boat, and the mistakes have to be put right. It is obviously impossible that the Commonwealth should retain the meaning it now has, if we are attached to that; it is impossible that it should continue to mean the same thing, if Rhodesia is allowed simply to fall into the pocket of South Africa and become part of the racialist bloc on the Southern tip of the continents. What we must obviously do is to hope and hope, and work for the economic sanctions to suffice. If they do not, I agree with the Government that we must not start a war. If anybody else starts one there I think that our duty will be clear, and I hope that this country will be united in carrying it out, as many hundreds of millions of former British subjects throughout the Commonwealth hope that we do.
In conclusion, let me say that, of all the speeches I have heard this evening (I am sorry I was not able to hear them all), I was most impressed by that of the noble Lord, Lord Alport, who spoke out of a full knowledge of the matters he discussed, and whose words seemed to me to be in the true tradition, not only of the Commonwealth itself, but of the entire historical purpose of the British Empire as it was.
8.54 p.m.
LORD ROYLE: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships, like me, will have been tremendously impressed by the speech to which we have just listened. The fact that my noble friend has only just returned from Nigeria, and therefore, as it were, has his finger on the pulse as to the feelings there with regard to Rhodesia, must be of great value to our debate. I feel that he has completely exploded many of the things said during the course of this debate with reference to the inability of the dark races to take part in responsible Government.
The more often I hear the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, address this House, the more amazed I am. I can well understand that, having sat on the Benches so long to-day, it has been necessary for him to go for refreshment, but I am sorry that he is not in his place. But I am constantly amazed that a man with his experience of the Commonwealth, as a responsible Governor in so many territories of the Colonial Empire, as it was,

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can be so reactionary in his outlook towards the masses of dark people of this world. Every other Governor that I have met, particularly in recent times, has proved as a result of experience to be a liberal-minded person, with a full realisation of the difficulties and the handicaps of the masses of people in places like Africa. I frankly admit that when I listen to the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, I get completely out of patience, and I can hardly sit in my seat. So much for that.
I had prepared an impassioned speech for this debate, but as the day has gone by I have heard each point that I intended to make made by somebody else. My noble and learned friend on the Woolsack let me down straight away. I had carefully framed certain passages in the Command Paper which I wanted to quote to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, about the activities of his friends in 1963 and 1964 on this particular issue, and the very passages I had framed were trotted out by my noble and learned friend one after the other. So in that way I was let down.
The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, knows what my noble and learned friend quoted, and in the light of what Mr. Duncan Sandys said and in the light of what Sir Alec Douglas-Home said to Mr. Winston Field and later to Mr. Ian Smith, I will challenge the noble Lord with the question: Had he been Prime Minister himself in November, 1965, what would he have done? Whilst this has been mentioned previously in the course of our debate, with deep respect I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine. that he has never answered that point, unless he leaves us to assume that he would have done nothing at all and just let things drift on with the illegal Government of Rhodesia pleasing themselves what they did in the future with regard to the majority of the people in Rhodesia. This seems to he the only reply that he could possibly offer the House when he was challenged with it previously.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, I gave the reply earlier in the day, but I do not think the noble Lord was here.
LORD ROYLE: Yes I was here when the challenge came from this side of the House. I am saying with deep respect to the noble Lord that this seemed
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to be the only answer he could give—that he would have done nothing whatever about it.
LORD COLERAINE: No, my Lords. If I did not make myself explicit earlier on, I will try to do so now. I think this is what I should have done faced with U.D.I.—that is what the noble Lord is talking about, is it not?
LORD ROYLE: Indeed.
LORD COLERAINE: Faced with U.D.I., I should have applied those measures which automatically flowed from cession from the Commonwealth. I would then have waited and sought reasonably to resume negotiations. I would not have called people names. I would not have attacked them with savage sanctions which would have provoked an inevitable and immediate reaction. I would have tried to reopen negotiations, having done those things which naturally flowed from the cession of relations.
LORD ROYLE: I am much obliged to the noble Lord, but it does not answer the point at all. It would have meant that the whole problem would have extended into years and years instead of months, and in the meanwhile the majority of the people of Rhodesia would have been suffering under an illegal Government. At least at the present time Her Majesty's Government are really trying to do something about it to see that that situation does not exist for very long.
Because of what has been said, and said so often this afternoon, on the question of sanctions and tensions and the like, I do not want to detain your Lordships more than a moment longer. I wish to say something which has not been referred to, except very briefly in the admirable maiden speech, if I may say so, of the noble Earl, Lord Lindsey and Abingdon. I see that he is not in his place, but at the close of his speech he made reference to the broadcasting station which is being established in Bechuanaland. I regard this as being as important as sanctions. It seems to me that adding this to sanctions is a way, and probably the only way, in view of the censorship which exists in Rhodesia, of getting over to the mass of the people in Rhodesia the point of view of the British Government. I feel that this is

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not only desirable but necessary, and I therefore welcome the idea.
I am however, concerned about it in one regard. I have been talking to people who are well informed on this matter and they tell me that the probability is that if only the English language is used many thousands, and maybe millions, of people in Rhodesia will not understand these broadcasts and will never get the British Government's point of view on the present situation. That being so, I would ask my noble friend who is to wind up the debate whether the Government have considered seriously this question of language. I am informed, that half the population of Rhodesia do not speak English at all; that in Mashonaland alone, though there is some knowledge of English, there are two and half million people in Umtali and Gwelo who speak the language called Shona, and that one and a half million people in the Bulawayo area speak Ndebale. How do we get these broadcasts over to them by using their own language?
I understand that the illegal Government is broadcasting in these languages at the present time, and therefore it is necessary that we should broadcast our point of view to tell the real truth to the people in their own languages. I may say that there is no doubt that there are in Britain at this time numerous black Rhodesians who are anti-Smith and who would be very glad to serve as announcers in the languages which I have mentioned. I just throw out that suggestion.
I am right behind the Government in what they are doing. I believe that sanctions, and the like, are the only way of tackling this problem. They cannot be avoided. But I hope that action will be short and sharp, and will be completely effective. In conclusion I would say to those noble Lords who support the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, that a small section of white Rhodesians are driving the Commonwealth to disaster and holding it to ransom. It is they who started it, not the Africans and not Her Majesty's Government; and I sincerely hope that if we do go into the Lobbies tonight the Motion will be overwhelmingly defeated.
9.6 p.m.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: My Lords, I sincerely hope that if a savage from North of the Border for a brief
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moment refers to the Motion which is before us it will not be out of order to do so. I wish to refer only to the last paragraph, which says:
" and affirms its belief that at the end of the day the problems relating to Southern Rhodesia can only be resolved by negotiation."
One of the reasons why I dare to inflict a speech on your Lordships to-night is that I know that part of the world reasonably well. I worked up and down there as a contractor, tendering for engineering contracts in Rhodesia, South Africa, Nyasaland, and Swaziland, so I have a running knowledge of the place. I want to put to your Lordships a solution suggested to me by a very dear friend of mine, a black savage and a very wise African indeed. He is a very good friend of mine and I wish to retain his friendship and many other friendships of Africans and Europeans I have met out there and have kept up with, and therefore I do not wish to say anything tonight to upset them.
The fundamental problem in Rhodesia and in all the high-ratio settler countries, is the fear of domination. To me the domination by black over white is distasteful, but it is equally distasteful to have white domination over black. Any domination, so far as I am concerned, is out. Therefore surely one must have multiracialism, and to get multiracialism to work can be done only by real equality, not paper equality. The suggestion that was put to me, and I think is very wise indeed, is that the mistake that the white people are said to have made is counting heads without counting what is in them. The suggestion is this: that if you divide your total Parliament into, say, 60 white men and 60 black men, or whatever the numbers may be, but keep them equal, you then can do away with all your complicated sums which nobody understands, of who can vote for whom. You can have universal franchise and have it tomorrow. You have not got to be educated; you do not create a class of educated native who crows over his unfortunate brother who is not educated. You stick together, you rely on men of goodwill working together; and if you tell me there is not one black man or white man of goodwill, I do not believe it. You could run the country completely on that basis. There is another advantage, which

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nobody has mentioned: that, with the best will in the world, there is a large proportion of responsible Africans of the age of 40 to 45 who will never be educated; they will never have the opportunity. Therefore, under these complicated arrangements they are never going to get the vote. Why should they not?
As long as you work on that basis you could give Rhodesia independence within the Commonwealth to-morrow, and you would stipulate with their independence that we could not upset this ratio of complete and utter equality, this real practical working equality, unless they themselves voted for it on some formula such as two-thirds majority. I would say that this is worth thinking about, and this came not from me but from my black friend—and there is no reason why I should not name him he is the Paramount Chief of Swaziland, a very wise man indeed. I would leave that thought with your Lordships.
One other thing illustrates a little how cussed we savages North of the Border are. There are a number of us no longer North of the Border, but now in Rhodesia. I was urged not to speak to your Lordships tonight, and I nearly did not, but one of the reasons why I did was that I was urged not to. That is something you can apply in Rhodesia.
9.9 p.m.
LORD HAIRE OF WHITEABBEY: My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Stonehaven, should have been present on earlier occasions when perhaps his excellent suggestion might have had a better reception. Unfortunately, as we have heard to-day from many speakers, there are no longer men of good will in Rhodesia and consequently little hope of his suggestion succeeding.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: There is a Member of your Lordships' House who is a cousin of mine, and I guarantee he is a man of reasonable proportion—he is enormous—and of temperament, too.
LORD HAIRE OF WHITEABBEY: The noble Viscount should go on the Mission who may shortly go to Rhodesia, in the hope that he can convert Smith and his worthies to being men of good will.
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This has been a long debate and I do not propose to extend it unduly, except to say that to me the most notable speech from the opposite Benches this afternoon was that made by the noble Lord, Lord Byers, who, it seemed to me, with a good deal of fervour and House of Commons manner, enabled this debate of ours to focus. He did, in fact, give me the reality of the situation, because he made it clear that this situation we are discussing to-day is indeed a dangerous situation: it is highly critical, and we are indeed almost facing a near-war situation. The sooner we can get this realism into our discussion I think the nearer we are to facing up to the situation.
It is almost four weeks since U.D.I. was declared, since the Prime Minister made his last minute strenuous efforts, his courageous efforts, to try to save the white Rhodesians from themselves, and I think that in making these efforts he won the admiration of public opinion in this country and of the world. Unfortunately, he has not won the admiration of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine who has moved this Motion to-day. In the past four weeks the noble Lord, who I regret to see is not in his place, has asked many questions, each more unfriendly, each more resentful, each more damaging than the last, culminating in to-day's near-Motion of Censure, with his statement that the Prime Minister's reputation was tarnished and that all we were doing was engaging in a childish Christmas charade.
The approach of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has been a curious one to all of us on this side of the House. It has been curious because he has claimed that he is not a supporter of the Smith Government, and is not a supporter of U.D.I. Yet he has sought to paint the Prime Minister as deceitful, as a hypocrite, as insincere. He gave the impression that the Government are anti-white and for immediate majority rule; and now, to-day, that we are cheats of the rights of pensioners. Why does the noble Lord do all this? This was the question the noble Lord, Lord Byers, asked earlier this afternoon. Why does the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, do this in the face of world opinion, in the face of majority opinion within his own Party? Does he do it to bolster his reactionary friends in Rhodesia? Is he trying to boost the Smith Government, or is he doing just

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as Lord Byers hinted earlier, playing coloured politics? Certainly, the noble Lord's ill-judged interventions can only strengthen the rebel Government in Rhodesia, and can only do damage to Her Majesty's Government when, in all the circumstances, we should be showing to Rhodesia a united front—more especially as both Parties are committed to the stand we have taken.
As my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor pointed out to-day, both Parties are committed to oppose U.D.I. Both Parties are committed to oppose the use of force; both are committed to the use of sanctions, in total or in part. Both Parties are committed to the rule of law in Rhodesia. Both Parties accept the Constitution of 1961. Both accept the idea of a gradual progress towards a multiracial society for Rhodesia. We on this side have never asked for majority African control as a prerequisite to the settlement of the dispute.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, may I be allowed to interrupt the noble Lord, to suggest to him that there is also a further possibility—that both Parties might be wrong?
LORD HAIRE OF WHITEABBEY: My Lords, perhaps we shall have a Division to-night, and that will settle it in the meantime.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, a Division will not decide that both Parties are right.
LORD HAIRE OF WHITEABBEY: My Lords, it may not, but we are voting in regard to an ugly situation and we must make our judgment felt. We believe that self-government will come in Rhodesia based on majority rule, but only in the fullness of time and when the coloured people there have had political education and experience in Government and administration. We both believe that progress towards this goal has been delayed and deliberately down-played by the Smith régime. Rhodesia is moving towards being a Police State. For a lead it has turned its eyes to South Africa and not to Great Britain.
In the weeks and months before U.D.I. this process towards apartheid has been accelerated. It would be a blot upon the Commonwealth and all that it stands for if we were to stand idly by to-day and let these dictators in Rhodesia have their way. This was the justification for
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sanctions: to show, in the first instance, that we meant business, and, in the second phase which began last week, that, by keeping sanctions short and sharp, we intend to make sure they will be effective. I believe, with many of your Lordships, that the recent history of sanctions shows the need that they should be short and sharp. It is true that many of our supporters, many innocent people, many coloured people in Rhodesia, will also suffer—and pensioners too, which is partly what this Motion is about, though it is evident that administrative protection can be given in cases of hardship. I look forward to the reply of my noble friend the Leader of the House to-night to indicate what this will be.
If we can make sanctions effective we may yet avoid a conflict, a coloured clash in the heart of Africa. It seems to me, at least, that the Rhodesians are Hell-bent to bring about such a clash. Many say, "Let them express a death wish if they want to". But, say others, "Let us not get involved". There is so much inflammable material around Africa that the risk is too great. This last week-end we have seen a worsening of this threat. The 36 States of the O.A.U. are attempting to call the tune and threatening us as to what will happen if we do not take action. Some threaten to leave the Commonwealth. But must the unity of the Commonwealth be sacrificed for a few power-crazy fools in Rhodesia? Not that the power-crazy fools are all white. There are Nassers and Nkrumahs in Africa. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations did right when he said, on his return last week-end, that we are not going to allow anybody to push us around.
Nevertheless, the situation in Africa is now most delicately balanced. There are many fingers on the trigger there. It will take the utmost statesmanship to avoid a conflict. Another Congo might well be what some other nations—and not necessarily African nations—want. The humiliation of Britain might well be a joy to them. We are all anxious to avoid a shooting war, but the diplomacy and timing to avoid this may not be allowed 'us. If shooting breaks out and the situation becomes serious, the Security Council will no doubt assert itself. The United Nations may well want to send a peace-keeping force and may ask us to

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allow it to establish a legal Government. Thus, we should lose our British responsibility for Rhodesia, which is an outcome I am certain none of your Lordships wants. We can but hope that good sense will prevail among the O.A.U. and that we shall be given time to prove that the sanctions which we have rightly applied will be effective.
9.20 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, it is not often that such a large number of Peers wish to express their views as the number on the list of speakers to-day. This debate has certainly ranged widely and, in the main, it would seem that expressions of feelings on both sides of the House coincide—when I say "feelings" I mean those about what should be done in the present situation. Personally, I can understand the difficulty which faced the noble and learned Viscount. Lord Dilhorne, in the line he was to take. Hitherto there has been a generous bipartisan policy, but there are doubtless many of us on this side of the House who take some encouragement from what was said by the Leader of the Opposition in the other place, last Saturday, as to the wisdom of some new reservations. Personally, I do not feel that the debate has ranged too widely, or that there can be any justification for Viscount Dilhorne's view that he would not be able to vote for the Motion. I have hopes that my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition, having heard the debate, will be able to tell us something different.
The Motion affirms the belief that at the end of the day the problems relating to Southern Rhodesia can only be resolved by negotiation. Personally I dissociate myself from all "isms", whether racialism, Africanism, or any other ideology. I listened with great admiration to the brilliant speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, which was fluent, clear and factual. He did not give us very much encouragement about what was to be done now, but, if I understood him correctly, he at least gave us a crumb of encouragement to feel that talks with Smith were not necessarily ruled out. Personally, I dislike coercion. I am a Yorkshireman and I hate being bullied into anything. I can be led but not driven. I feel that punitive measures—and here I
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merely repeat what has already been said so often—are only going to intensify resolution. Generally, the more human beings are driven, the more resolute they become.
There are two points I wish to make, and at the outset I would associate myself with the human side of these problems. I read most carefully the last debate in your Lordships' House on Rhodesia, which I myself was unable to attend. I thought that the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, Lord Salter, and Lord Grimston of Westbury lifted the discussion out of the legalities of the matter into an examination of the human side.
There are just these two points to which I am going to refer. My mind goes back to an earlier debate when three past Secretaries of State for the Colonies —the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, and the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton—all testified to what was their understanding of the arrangements which had been made with regard to the Constitution. It is my recollection that at that time the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor took a view exactly opposite to that which the three past Secretaries of State held about the intentions on the Constitution.
I am puzzled about the fifth point, which requires that it be acceptable to the whole of the people of Rhodesia. I cannot see how that could possibly be implemented practically. Anybody who has been over the African kraals and seen the people there will know how impossible it is to get an impression. I come to the point about oppression. What a lot of humbug and insincerity there is on this matter! The people of Rhodesia are not being oppressed. Anybody who has been into the native locations in Rhodesia will know the conditions in which they live, with their gardens and shops, the automobiles and all the attributes of a developing society. If one has been near the factories, one will have seen the work-people who are not interested in making disorders but interested in their daily lives. They are not being oppressed, and I think there is an awful lot of humbug from many who just do not know the country and its habits.
I was impressed by what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, about doing

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something practical. Let us try to find a solution. I take it that one of the main difficulties is that even the Prime Minister could not get any agreement between the black leaders themselves. So I do not know how on earth anyone is going to make much progress until independence is granted, but let us hope that the problem will be surmounted. I was also impressed by an article in The Times the other day about the agreement on the independence of British Guiana, which is a multiracial society. It quoted the International Commission of Jurists, who said:
" We believe that until independence is achieved the community will not find the national self-reliance, the common purpose and the cohesion of nationhood that are necessary for the successful pursuit of a racially integrated society."
There are many who feel that if there had been greater trust in Rhodesia in what would have been a progressive evolution over the years, this disaster which we all so lament would not have occurred.
There is an angle to this to which there has not been much reference to-day. These measures which we have taken are going to have a disquieting effect on buyers of British goods all over the world. They are going to say, "If a Government can take this action against its own people, what might it do against us?" Before they buy capital equipment they are going to say, "We will have a try elsewhere. Is there going to be an attempted repetition of sanctions, a prohibition of exports to certain countries?" Goodness knows! we want to export. Then, with regard to armaments, we find that other countries are shipping armaments to belligerents all over the world, so why on earth should not we? We have got to live, and we have got to live by exports. At least, we are told that continuously, and I have some conviction that it is correct.
Then take the sterling balances. Mucking around with balances is a very dangerous thing, and will be remembered widely throughout the world. Many countries which might keep their balances in England might have second thoughts about it. I suggest that is one of the things which has been made more difficult by the action with regard to the Reserve Bank. One would think, without technical knowledge, that it is going to cause all sorts of confusion in the City on a wider
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scale. Incidentally, my Lords, I read with interest the other day that even in the War of Independence Britain paid the interest on George Washington's portfolio all the time; and in the case of Egypt at the time of the Suez incident we did not block the Egyptian balances. It is encouraging that in this debate there has been a moderation of language and an absence of that partisanship or great emotion which stirred us at the time of the Egyptian trouble with regard to Suez.
There was a reference—I forget who by; I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Rea—to minority government. Let us remember that, of course, a minority Government has been governing in Hungary, for instance. What a massacre there was there! And what did we or the United Nations or anybody else do to stop it, or to try to stop it? What about Poland? What about Czechoslovakia? They are all being governed by minorities. What is the true proportion of Communists in those countries? It is a very small one. I have just referred to Nasser. I was recently in Israel looking at the relics of the War of Independence. What futility! There is a continuing state of war between Israel and the Arab countries. Is that all the United Nations can produce? What has Nasser's attitude been? He has said, "Israel must be eliminated at all costs". Is that a peaceful attitude?
Now we have the African States threatening all kinds of things. If we look in yesterday's Hansard will shall see that £22 million sterling, free of interest, is being loaned to these African States that are telling us, Britain, that they will get out of the Commonwealth—£40 million in all. As I said the last time I spoke, before U.D.I., I was recently in Williamsburg, where I saw a film which showed the incidents at the start of the War of Independence. There was a unilateral declaration of intention by action. I do not recollect that there was much objection to taking assistance from the United States in the last two wars even though they had been rebels against us.
Again I return to the human side. Let us look at this matter from a wider angle. There are those who say it would be a mistake to go to a Division to-day, as my noble friend intends. If he does, I will certainly follow him into the Lobby. I say that because, if it is an

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adverse vote, as it may well be in this House, one may yet think that this House is representative of the feelings of the country. We have recently had evidence of a vote in this House—2 to 1 in favour of the abolition of the death penalty—which the overwhelming majority of the country was against. So I take with reservations, as my noble friend said, what the decision may he. Those people in Rhodesia are closer to the Congo than we are. They have the belief, wrongly, that a dislocation of the existing methods may well lead to another tragedy like that. If we disagree with them, let us at least be human enough to understand that it is possible that others who are nearer to it can have that concern.
My Lords, I well remember the strong feeling in March, 1914, when there was an attempt to coerce the Protestant minority of Northern Ireland. There was no moderation of language in Parliament, as those will realise who care, as I did, to read Hansard on the debates in March, 1914. I had hoped that the noble Earl the Leader of the House might be in the House at this moment. But in his absence I will not refrain from saying that his forbears through many generations have served Ireland well; and we in this House have great admiration for him. I should like to quote the following lines. I am sure he will like them.
" I met with Napper Tandy and he took me by the hand,
And he said how's poor auld Ireland and how does she stand? "
And now, my Lords, I will parody the remaining lines:
" And if the colour we must wear is England's cruel red,
Let it remind us of the blood that Rhodesia has shed.
But till that day, please God, I'll stick to the freedom of this land! "
That thought must be in the minds of many people in Rhodesia. Let us be human. Let us realise that they are of our flesh and blood. Negotiation surely is possible. Some solution, such as the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, suggested, should come. That must be the right solution. There should be no feeling that it would be undignified for a British Government to change its attitude. Let us have conciliation, not coercion; peace, not punishment.
9.39 p.m.
EARL HAIG: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Barnby, has spoken very eloquently and urged us to be human with regard to our approach to Rhodesia. I should like to support what he has said, but in a rather different sense, because I want to avoid being political in any way. Rather I wish to make a request to the Government on humanitarian grounds to be generous about war pensions. The noble Lord, Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, made an eloquent plea for war pensioners which I should like to support. I believe that those who allowed these pension prohibitions to take place have failed to understand the harm that they will do to the Commonwealth cause—harm which will greatly outweigh the small return in money. Among the war pensioners only 476 are receiving war disability pensions; there are only 84 war widows and only 14 dependants.
War pensions have been earned through service under the Union Jack. They have been given as compensation for suffering the ill-effects of war and in an attempt to mitigate some of the hardships which must inevitably be more difficult to bear as old age creeps on. They have been rightly regarded as an honour, and anyone entitled to them is proud to have earned the privilege of his award. In my view they should be continued, no matter what the political situation may be. It is, on principle, wrong that war pensions should be subjected to political vagaries. Once we adopt a wrong principle we shatter something of that precious faith shared by so many comrades in arms of many colours and creeds who put their trust in our leadership. That comradeship, I can say from some years' experience through service with the British Commonwealth Services League, is a tremendous power for good. Built up at a time of war, its spiritual quality rises above all matters affecting colour problems and the African national problem. It provides one of the few bridges between the Commonwealth African and British and those who live in Rhodesia to-day. I believe that the curtailment of pensions, even on a temporary basis, would be physically and morally wrong and would be a serious blow to everything for which the British Government and Commonwealth stands.

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I believe that the Government will weaken their position vis-à-vis British pensioners in other parts of the world. Recently the Burmese Government decided to discontinue the pensions paid to British pensioners who served in the Burmese forces during the last war. The British Government made strong representations to the Burmese Government for these pensions to be continued, and their representations were successful. Now the boot is on the other foot and the British Government are proposing to stop pensions to Rhodesians who served in the British Forces. If they do this, how can they expect to make representations in the future to other Governments on behalf of expatriate British people?
The offer of assistance to those who can prove that they need it seems to me at this juncture to be adding insult to injury. The Rhodesian Government has been very quick to assume responsibility for our pensioners, but I doubt whether anyone who will have been treated by us in a way which they may consider to be shabby will be so lacking in pride and dignity as to plead with us for support in the present circumstances. For these few reasons, my Lords, I hope that the Government will reconsider their policy. I cannot help feeling that this decision crept in through an oversight, and any mistake is best put right before it is too late.
9.43 p.m.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I have listened very carefully to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, as I did to his several other speeches on the Rhodesian crisis. Having regard to the seriousness of the situation, I think it unfortunate that the noble Lord should appear to be only too ready to seize upon any pretext to attack and criticise the Government's handling of the Rhodesian situation. I think that the noble Lord. Lord Coleraine, and those who support him, would do well to keep in the forefront of their minds the fact that the present crisis was not caused by the British Government. It is not of our making, and as your Lordships will know, because you have from time to time been reminded, it began when the Rhodesian Government demanded independence in the spring of 1963 and culminated in its illegal declaration of independence.
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I feel, and I know that many of my noble friends on this side of your Lordships' House also feel, that had not Rhodesia taken this course, it is unlikely that any British Government would have attempted to force immediate changes in the 1961 Constitution. But the Rhodesian Government decided to act, and it is from its action that the present situation and crisis stems. If the measures adopted by our Government—I say "our Government" because it is not quite clear to me on whose side noble Lords opposite are—are beginning to hurt, then the Smith régime has only itself to blame. The noble Marquess complained rather bitterly about the indiscriminate application of sanctions. I would ask the noble Marquess how one can apply sanctions without their affecting every one. Sanctions are like the natural things of this life they fall on everybody, and, unfortunately, the good suffer along with the bad.
The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, talks about the need for negotiation. What does the noble Lord think the Prime Minister, the Commonwealth Secretary, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General were doing in the weeks before the declaration of independence, if they were not negotiating to prevent what may well prove to be a disaster for Rhodesia? I doubt whether history records a more sincere or sustained attempt by any Prime Minister to bring about a happy solution to a problem than that attempted by the present Prime Minister—if I may say so, the best peace-time Prime Minister of this century. Let it be clearly understood that no one man could have done more than Harold Wilson.
The final outcome of this matter, so we are often told, will either be force or negotiation. While force is sometimes necessary, I think that all Members of your Lordships' House hope that it will be avoided. But negotiation will be possible only if sanctions are effective. It is for this reason that I advocated in your Lordships' House on Thursday, November 25 last, that sanctions must be not only punitive, but catastrophic. They have got to hurt. I derive no pleasure, no joy, no satisfaction, in saying that. Like the noble Lord, Lord Byers I have friends in Rhodesia. I have been to

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Rhodesia. It is true that I am not an authority or an expert on Rhodesia, but I was there about three years ago.
I think that we have to ask ourselves: Is it likely that the Smith régime will negotiate if they can continue to manage, as they may well be able to do, if we and other countries take half-hearted and ineffective measures? Certain noble Lords opposite—I think that it would be fair to refer to them as the Rhodesia Lobby, and I say, "certain" because I do not want to tar all noble Lords opposite with the same brush—must know this to be true; that sanctions have got to be effective. Or do they want the British Government to go cap in hand to Mr. Smith or to accept the present situation in Rhodesia as a fait accompli and do nothing whatever in the matter? If the Smith régime are really anxious to resolve the present situation successfully, it is difficult to understand why they have dismissed and replaced the Governor and have done their best to humiliate him. After all, he is the Queen's representative. I can well understand the difficulty in which certain noble Lords opposite find themselves, in view of their financial interests in Rhodesia.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order!
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: In case noble Lords did not hear that, may I repeat it? I can well understand the difficulty in which certain noble Lords opposite find themselves, in view of their financial interests in Rhodesia, their 19th-century colonial attitude and their obvious desire to placate certain business interests in Rhodesia. May I remind your Lordships that the speeches in this House, the approach to, and the handling of, the Rhodesian crisis, will have to face the judgment of history, and it is to be hoped that, when the time comes, the judgment of history will not suggest that financial interest and concern for profit were placed before loyalty, justice and the rule of law. Nor do I hope that the judgment of history will say that Mr. Smith had a fifth column in your Lordships' House. When certain noble Lords advocate the watering down of economic measures, I hope they will realize—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: If the noble Lord will allow me to intervene, he has made a very serious attack on the honour of certain noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. I would ask him this. Has he given them notice of the fact that he proposed to make an attack upon them, which I notice he is making in their absence?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I am only asking the noble Lord that question because I think it is a well-understood Parliamentary convention that, if a Member is going to attack a particular individual's personal honour, at least he ought to have the courtesy to give the other Member proper notice of that attack.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: I am obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. I was not attacking any particular individual.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
A NOBLE LORD: What were you doing?
LORD BARNBY: Did the noble Lord intend to convey that anybody who spoke with views different from his was a member of a fifth column in this country?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I feel that I should intervene. I think that in the ordinary way my noble friend has used language which is not often used here.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Yes. But may I also say that any old Member of this House must have been surprised, to say the least, that a number of noble Lords spoke to-day who are known to have economic interests which they did not declare. We did not raise it—may I be allowed to finish? In a previous debate, at least two noble Lords, I agree, declared interests; but they did not declare them to-day. I am afraid that this is what happens if noble Lords do not declare their interests. It may be as well if we move on to the grave question we are discussing.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I really must intervene. The noble Earl the Leader of the House has said that these interests have not been declared. I have been present when they have been declared.

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Is the noble Earl really saying that our memories are so short that they have to be declared in each debate? I should have thought that this was asking too much. But I come back to this point. The noble Lord who is speaking has really abused the privileges of the House by making these personal attacks on the honour of noble Lords without giving any notice at all.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am afraid that I disagree with the noble Viscount. I think it would have been more seemly if the interests had been declared again to-day. I do not think a declaration once and for all is sufficient. I did not raise it at the time, because we raise these things as little as possible. But since my noble friend has been attacked, I feel that I must make this point.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: The noble Earl's noble friend has not been attacked. It is the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, who has seen fit to make these imputations without notice, which I should have thought was contrary to the practice of the House.
LORD BARNBY: The noble Earl gave the impression that he rather thought that anybody who had special knowledge—
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: No such thing.
LORD BARNBY: —ought not to be listened to with the same respect. It reminds me of the feelings so often expressed during the war, of the danger of putting into office individuals who had great technical knowledge or large vested interests, because they must be considered not to be representative.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: Would the noble Lord name the members whom he is attacking for not declaring their interests?
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: Really!
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: They are perfectly well-known in this House. But it is more proper to declare them.
A NOBLE LORD: Name them!
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: When certain noble Lords advocate the watering down of economic measures, I hope they will realize—
NOBLE LORDS: That's right—walk out.
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: —that what might well happen if these sanctions prove ineffective, and if the rebel Government is not brought to heel, is that the Organisation of African Unity might well decide to take the matter out of the hands of the British Government. I think it would be advisable for your Lordships to realise that we cannot—
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether the estates which are taken out of British hands would have to pay up debts owing to-day—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
LORD WELLS-PESTELL: Do not let us underestimate the potential of the 36-nation organisation, and do not let us underestimate the militant mood that they are in—a mood which could easily give rise to a situation far worse than sanctions. If that organisation decided to take independent action, which we should all regret, the situation in Rhodesia would be far worse than any situation which sanctions could cause. Peace in Africa is much more certain—and I say this believing it to be so—if we pursue a policy of effective sanctions. This may be a bitter pill for certain noble Lords to swallow, but I would remind them that we have both a legal and a moral obligation to the Africans.
For generations the Church has taught, and in my view quite rightly, that Africans are equal in the sight of God. But more often than not our words, and sometimes our actions, have made it quite clear that they are not equal in the sight of mail. Our cause and concern must not be solely for the 200,000 Europeans, but also for the 4 million Africans. I believe that to be the heart of the matter, and the root of the trouble. For the past few years, Rhodesian Governments have moved further and further to the Right, and the future of the Africans under the Smith régime is less hopeful than under previous Governments.
We know the aim and purpose of Mr. Smith, so far as the African is concerned.

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He has made it quite clear, although many noble Lords opposite deny that he is against African majority. I want to remind noble Lords of what Mr. Smith said. He said this:
" If we ever have an African majority in this country, we shall have failed in our policy of trying to make a place for the white man."
Sooner or later Britain will have to establish a new political and social order in Rhodesia, and in this connection I hope the British Government will soon make known their plans. Whatever is finally proposed, I believe that the 1961 Constitution may well have to be scrapped. It is far from being a satisfactory basis for a realistic attempt to create a multiracial society. Meanwhile, until the Smith régime has seen the error of its ways, I hope the British Government will continue to deal with the situation with resolution, and not hesitate to take all possible steps to impose drastic and effective economic measures, which I trust will cause the Rhodesian Govern-to reconsider its position. May I say this in conclusion? I also hope that some noble Lords opposite will stop behaving in such a way as to cause some of us to think that they are bent in giving comfort and aid to the rebel Government.
10.0 p.m.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just resumed his seat has seen fit to add to such arguments as he put forward charges against the motives of noble Lords on this side of the House who have addressed themselves to the very difficult problem we are debating to-day. In 25 years in another place, and in some four or five years in this House, I can say truthfully that I do not recall any speech to compare with the one to which we have just listened, in attributing base motives to those with whom the noble Lord has political differences.
I would say that, although my speech to-day will not be in support of those who are advocating this Motion before the House, I have complete and absolute confidence in the complete moral integrity and rectitude, and the honourable motives, with which this Motion has been put forward. I should also like to add one thing to the noble Earl who leads the House. The fact that one who is the Party Leader is, at the same time, the
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Leader of the House imposes upon him a difficult responsibility. It is one of not necessarily supporting those who belong to his own Party but of trying to maintain the high standard of debate which is customary in this House, and I regret to say—and I say this of an old personal friend—that I think what he said to-day, in support of the noble Lord behind him, was not in accordance with the best traditions of the leadership of this House.
My Lords, I turn to the Motion before the House. It falls, I think, into three parts: the first dealing with the matter of pensions, the second with economic sanctions and the third with a future settlement of this difficult problem. I hope that the noble Earl, in his reply, will be able to say something with regard to the pensions, in amplification of what has already been said. I cannot think that to deny the payment of pensions which have been honourably earned by servants of the State, by people who have served in the Armed Forces, some of whom have been wounded in the service of the Crown, can be a useful, effective or honourable sanction. It is not, in fact. in line with what the Prime Minister himself said in an interview which he gave to the Daily Mirror last Sunday, from which I intend extensively to quote. The Prime Minister said:
" Our aim has been that sanctions should not punish or hurt for the sake of hurting, but make Mr. Smith's economic rule unworkable."
I cannot think that the application of that principle can possibly apply to the payment of pensions to ex-servants of the Crown living in Rhodesia.
I turn briefly to the matter of economic sanctions. No one who has spoken to-day has suggested that when there was the U.D.I. no action should be taken. Even my noble friend Lord Coleraine, when he was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, what he would do about it (I noted his words) said that he would not have ignored it but he would have "played it slow". My Lords, what is the meaning of "playing it slow"? Playing what slow? Really! My Lords, an answer of that kind to a clear question as to what he would have done is using comfortable words as a substitute for thought.

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Sanctions are of two kinds: they are either ineffective or effective. I have always thought that ineffective sanctions do no good and do untold harm. It is therefore essential, if you are going to have sanctions, even if you begin by "playing them slow", to follow them up and make them effective. That is not only my view; it is the view of a very wise and experienced Rhodesian statesman, Lord Malvern. In an interview with The Times on November 14, three days after U.D.I., he said:
" Half-hearted sanctions would have no effect on Rhodesia. The best hope is for sanctions to work quickly to give the régime a rude awakening."
I believe that that is the right course. I believe that is what the Government are doing. In the same interview with the Daily Mirror, the Prime Minister undertook that there would be no invasion, no bloodshed, and therefore the decision surely must come from the application of economic force.
I turn lastly to the matter of a settlement. I think the most valuable speeches that we have heard to-day have been those that are looking forward to the time when it will be possible, through negotiations, to bring this distressing matter to a satisfactory conclusion. Again, the Prime Minister, in that very remarkable and encouraging interview that he gave, said that these negotiations could be resumed "without fear, without surrender, without recrimination". Then he quoted Abraham Lincoln—" With malice towards none "and" Binding up the nation's wounds ". I believe that that spirit is the spirit that we all desire to see. It is the only spirit in which a permanent and satisfactory solution will be found.
But it is no use reopening negotiations at the present time if the almost interminable negotiations, of which this large volume is only one part, are to be resumed, and if Mr. Smith goes on saying, again and again, the same thing he has said to Conservative and Socialist Ministers successively. Nor, indeed, is it any use opening negotiations if his views are still the same as he stated them to be at page 105 of the Blue Book. Talking about when majority rule would be introduced, he said:
" He himself had estimated anything from 15 to 50 years. But 5 years ago Sir Edgar Whitehead had predicted a period as short
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as 12 years. The Rhoclesian Government must therefore "—
and the word "therefore", of course, refers to as short a period as twelve years—
" retain their powers in this field, since, if it appeared at a future election that an African Government was probable and the Rhodesian Government felt, in the light of developments in the countries to the .North of Rhodesia, that this would still be premature, they must have the power to delay such a majority by, for example, a reduction in the B Roll seats. In the last resort, this would he their only means of preserving their civilisation."
It is useless to reopen negotiations if that is in fact still the point of view of the present régime. Therefore, economic force will be needed in order to obtain such concessions on the other side as are necessary for the negotiations to have any chance of success.
I believe that this policy of economic force is necessary, first because it is right and, secondly, because if it is not effective then Afro-Asian countries will intervene, with the support, I have no doubt, of the Communist Powers. There is no idea at the present time of introducing "One man, one vote", to-morrow, but the new Constitution must be one that contains the support and enjoys the confidence of moderate Africans. Again I quote Lord Malvern in that most remarkable interview that he gave to The Times. He said about his own people:
" All that we had to do was to build up a strong African middle class and make friends with them."
I believe that there will emerge ultimately, as a result of this economic pressure, an authority in Rhodesia which will be willing and glad to return to the path of the Constitution, and that it will then be possible for negotiations to be reopened with the Government of this country—and we have been assured that they will welcome any such offer. I believe, too, that although neither Nkomo nor Sithole can have all that they are asking for, and that equally Smith and Dupont cannot retain all that they have at the present time, when this great operation by this country has been brought, as I am confident it will be, to a successful conclusion, there will be an opportunity for men of good will of both colours to come together, and for a biracial and satisfactory Constitution to be arrived at, and to be constitutionally brought into operation.
10.13 p.m.
BARONESS BURTON OF COVENTRY: My Lords, I shall not detain the House for long, but I want to make a brief contribution on behalf of many people who must be in a similar position to myself. It seems to me that millions outside this House, and several inside it, have no firsthand knowledge of Rhodesia. We are dependent for information on what we read, on what we hear, and on what we see on television. Noble Lords who come into this category have the privilege of being able to come to this House and to hear what takes place in this Chamber.
This brings me to the debate of November 15 last, when we sat here until the early hours of the morning. I think most of us were so interested that we heard most of the speeches that took place at that time. I can only say that at 2 o'clock in the morning, although I was weary, I was a great deal more knowledgeable than I had been when that debate commenced. I have not been in this House a long time, but I felt on November 15 that this was an occasion on which one could be proud to be a Member of your Lordships' House. Listening then, it seemed to me that the quality of the speeches, and the responsibility of those taking part, showed what your Lordships' House could do, and what I feel is coming more and more to be recognized, is capable of doing.
For that debate I had here in the Gallery some American friends who have still not got over the fact of inter-Party unity, and the responsibility which they felt was shown by speakers on both sides of the House, who came together on a national issue and did not allow themselves to be fragmented on Party political matters. This is something we always very much hope we can do in British politics, but to my American friends this was a complete surprise.
It seemed to me, following on that debate, that one of the greatest tragedies that could arise in this House would be if this inter-Party unity were to be destroyed. Those of us who have been in another place, or who have been Members of this House, for a long time know that it is not always easy for the Back Benchers, and certainly not easy for the Front Benchers. We have seen in both Houses Members who take an extreme position—I am not being derogatory
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when I use the word "extreme"—trying to prod their Front Benchers at Question Time or in debate into taking notice of their views. It is not always easy for the Front Benchers, bearing in mind the conflicting interests, not to be tempted into making some injudicious comment. The more the matter of Rhodesia becomes involved in Party politics, the greater the danger that we shall make a wrong decision. On Saturday, Mr. Heath said:
" We are trying to maintain national unity under difficult circumstances. I do not want to see this country split down the middle over Rhodesia."
He went on to say:
" There is a way of safeguarding the interests of all races. The public misunderstanding has been that the only alternative to Mr. Smith seizing independence was immediate African majority rule. This has never been the situation."
I think that we would all agree with the Leader of the Opposition that alternatives should somehow be conveyed to the people in Rhodesia. Equally, I think it must have been obvious to us all, even before the Daily Mirror was published yesterday, that the Prime Minister would launch such a campaign at a time when he, on information available to the Cabinet but not to us, felt that the moment of greatest effectiveness had arrived. I think it is also clear that if this type of campaign of peace talks, if that be the correct term, were launched too soon the tough supporters who surrounded Mr. Smith would take it as support for what they have done. I believe it is the last thing that the people of Britain want. I believe, too, that it is the last thing the majority in this House would want.
When I came to the House to-day I came here in a despondent mood because I regretted the support which I understood was to be given by the Opposition Front Bench to the Motion which was before the House to-day. Of course, the Rhodesian problem can be solved only by negotiation. This is what the Prime Minister has been trying to do. I think there are very few people in this country to-day who would not agree that the Prime Minister did everything in his power to prolong this period of negotiations. During these last few weeks, I, in common with other noble Lords, have listened to a number of people expressing

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their views on this matter. Usually I have listened to people who do not share my political opinions and who were not supporters of the Prime Minister. I am not exaggerating when I say that it has given me particular pleasure to listen to these people, far more than in listening to those who share my views, saying that they think the Prime Minister has done a superb job during these last few weeks, and that he has indeed revealed himself as a national leader.
What worried me today was that such a Motion should come from the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine. I know that he explained to us in the House today that he was not a supporter of U.D.I., but I am sure that he will agree that there must be very few people in Rhodesia who do not regard him as a supporter of U.D.I. This is not his fault, but this is how things tend to be reported. I felt that such a Motion coming, if I may say so without offence, from such a quarter and supported by the Opposition Front Bench could only bring comfort indeed to Mr. Smith. But when I listened to the speech of the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, I began to hope that what I had understood to he correct was in fact incorrect after all.
I do not know how the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, would feel about it—he would probably think that it was not for me to say—but I should like to say that I, for one, was enormously heartened by his speech. It seemed to me—again, I do not wish to sound presumptuous—to be an expression of responsibility, and I felt that what he said held out hope that we in this House today might be able to get somewhere on this particular matter. Also—something that has not been mentioned today—I felt that this inter-Party unity, if I may call it that, has been revealed by the names of those people who have agreed to serve as directors of the Bank of Rhodesia. This seemed to me to be very much an expression of all-Party agreement, and I thought before I came to the House today that those names, indeed, must provide no comfort at all for any of those people involved, willingly or unwillingly, in what could be, I think, a tragedy of the greatest magnitude, and that is the breaking of inter-Party unity on this explosive issue.
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Finally, my Lords, Mr. Heath said that this Government must realise that when people took independence illegitimately they would not change their views in the process of three weeks. I think that this is what the Government have tried to understand and have tried to make clear to everyone ever since this happened. I do not think there is a noble Lord in this House who is not glad that he is not today sitting in the terrible position of having to make a decision on this issue. I do not think anybody envies the Prime Minister his position today.
I think that the Government have had to pursue several contradictory aims at once. They have had to tighten sanctions, but as I go about among my Conservative friends—I say that very rashly —I find that most of them think that a tightening of the sanctions was long overdue. That is what I have found among all my business friends. I take the viewpoint that those who object to these sterner sanctions on the grounds that they are punitive would be more honest if they said that they supported Mr. Smith in what he has done, because it seems to me that if Mr. Smith's régime is to be brought down by economic means then there are strong reasons for choosing those that will work most quickly.
If the responsible members of all Parties will continue to refuse to be stampeded by people with extreme views, and if in spite of all these Party political difficulties Rhodesia can gather no grain of comfort for what has been done in her name, and if as I believe will happen at the right moment, the Government will state clearly and categorically what are their ideas for a political settlement capable of appealing to moderate Rhodesians, black and white alike, I believe a tragedy will be avoided. I would hope, speaking very humbly from these Back Benches, that we in this House can avoid a vote to-night. This would, indeed, demonstrate to the world responsibility in British politics to-day.
10.24 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, there have been some complaints during this debate that speeches have been related to a broader problem than that covered by the Motion. I was very interested to hear the speech of a noble Lord opposite who had some responsibility for

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guidance in the House of Commons, that, in his view, because of the reference to economic measures and the reference to the need for negotiation, this Motion did justify broader speeches. I want to devote my remarks to the last section of this Motion, which affirms the belief of the House that, at the end of the day, the problems relating to Southern Rhodesia can be settled only by negotiation.
I think we have to ask: by negotiation with whom? I have been a little disturbed, as I have listened to many of the speeches on the other side, that when the term "Rhodesians" has been used it has been quite clear that the speakers have been thinking only of the white Rhodesians; that they have been thinking of the minority of 220,000 in a population of 4 million. My Lords, the Government have laid it down quite clearly—and not only the Government of the present day but the preceding Government—that the conditions of independence for Rhodesia must include a Constitution acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. That involves the 4 million Africans as well as the 220,000 Europeans. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, asked the Government to state the terms of the acceptable Constitution for Rhodesia. I hope the Government will do that; but I hope that, when the Government do it, they will reaffirm the principle which has been accepted both by Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Mr. Harold Wilson: that that Constitution should be acceptable to the view of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
I do not suppose there is any Member of this House who has been present during every speech in this debate. I was deeply impressed, if I may say so, by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Alport, from the opposite Benches. I was equally impressed—and I am sorry there was not a larger House to hear him—by the speech of my noble friend Lord Kennet from these Benches. My regret is that I did not hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Byers, because from my conversations with Members who heard that speech I have learned that it was one of the widest in conception that had been delivered in this House. I want to try, if I may, to follow the theme which I
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understand was in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Byers, because in my view this crisis of Rhodesia is more serious and grave than most of the speeches which I have heard delivered have indicated to the House. It has now become not only a crisis for Rhodesia: it has become a crisis for Africa and a crisis for the world.
The Press of this country has been inclined to take lightly the decision of the representatives of 36 African Governments at Addis Ababa to withdraw from diplomatic relations with this country unless, by 15th December, the régime in Southern Rhodesia is crushed. I think that is an unrealistic attitude; nevertheless, we have to understand the depth of feeling that is behind it. I was very glad that when the Minister for Commonwealth Relations returned from his visit, not only to Rhodesia but to East African countries, he said:
" We must take a serious view of this threat ".
The reason for the depth of this feeling among African Governments is that they feel that the crisis in Rhodesia represents the crossroads of history between the two-thirds of Africa which has advanced to self-government and independence and the resistance to that principle which there is in all Africa South of Southern Rhodesia. They feel—and honestly I find it difficult to deny this view—that if an African Government in a Colony, before independence has been granted, had rebelled against the British Government, much sterner action would have been taken than has been taken, even by a Labour Government, against the white minority Government in Southern Rhodesia.
I believe that this crisis is one which will deeply affect our own Commonwealth. There are already suggestions from some of the African Governments that if the ultimatum of December 15 is not met they may be leaving the Commonwealth. I believe that would be disastrous to multiracial and inter-racial sentiments in the whole of the world. But I would say to this House that if we are to retain the confidence of the nine African members of the Commonwealth, we must appreciate the depth of their feelings in this matter. And the first proposal I want to make this evening is that the time has come when our Government should not be content merely

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with consultations with these Governments, but should call the nine African member-States of the Commonwealth into conference with them with a view to finding some common policy in order to end the Smith white minority dictatorship in Southern Rhodesia.
If we could do that, we should not merely gain the minds of the nine member-States of our Commonwealth, but they should be able to reflect the minds of all the Governments which were represented in Addis Ababa. One of the significant facts is that those Governments which have been regarded as moderate within the Commonwealth feel as deeply and strongly on this issue as those which are more radical. My noble friend Lord Kennet referred to Nigeria, which has been regarded as a country with one of the most moderate Governments. It is feeling as intensively over this issue as the more radical Governments in Africa.
The second point I want to make is this. Our Government is pledged to support the United Nations. I think many Members of this House will feel that the United Nations is the greatest hope of peace in the world; and even when we may differ from its decisions, international loyalty requires that we should pay respect to those decisions. The United Nations has carried a very strong resolution on the subject of Southern Rhodesia. Indeed, it required a great deal of persuasion not to include in that resolution stronger terms. Our Government have taken the view that the responsibility for Southern Rhodesia is ours and not that of the United Nations. May I put this thought to the Government? The situation in Rhodesia is now rapidly becoming not only an issue within a territory under the British Government, but a danger to the peace of the world, and it is quite clear that the United Nations will be involved.
The Prime Minister is intending to go to the United Nations early in the New Year. I would urge that, if possible, his visit should be expedited. I believe that during December and January, before the Prime Minister is likely to reach the United Nations, the crisis may reach a decisive point and, despite our desires, this may entail force and bloodshed. I know that the General Assembly of the United Nations is ending, but I believe
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that this crisis is so great that the Prime Minister would be justified in advancing his visit. I do not expect an answer to that question tonight, but I hope that the suggestion will be submitted to the Prime Minister.
The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, is not present in the Chamber, but he will forgive me if I say that I regarded his answer to the question put to him by my noble friend Lord Royle, about the policy he would have pursued when Mr. Smith carried out his act of rebellion, as entirely unsatisfactory. The noble Lord said he would have applied to Mr. Smith's illegal Government only the withdrawal of those privileges which belong to the Commonwealth, and he would have continued to negotiate with it. The implication of that statement is that the noble Lord would have been prepared to accept Mr. Smith's régime as an independent Government outside the Commonwealth. The only sanctions he would have applied would have been those which would have been applied to any Government which decided to pass out of the Commonwealth. I say that, despite his declaration of opposition to the declaration of unilateral independence, in practice, that kind of policy would have been an endorsement of the Smith Government in declaring its independence in that way.
I hope that if a Division takes place tonight there will be such an overwhelming majority of Members to defeat this Motion that it will be made clear to Mr. Smith and his Government in rebellion that we are behind our Government in declaring the authority of the British Government until such time as the majority of people in Rhodesia have the right to govern themselves.
10.40 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just resumed his seat has made a calm, effective and most sincere speech, repeating his performance of three weeks ago. I, for one, do not underrate the gravity of this situation and I shall do my best to shape my speech accordingly. Many speakers during this debate of some eight hours have mentioned the importance of maintaining Party unity and national unity when we are faced with the I Rhodesian problem.

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I should like to read a few words spoken by myself sometime ago. This is what I said:
" My purpose in rising this afternoon is merely to express a devout hope that when these subjects—
the subject was federation in those days—
" come before your Lordships, we shall bring to bear upon them an approach as nearly non-partisan as we can achieve."
I said that in November, 1957—eight years ago. So, after the speech I shall make to-night, if it is not palatable to all and I am reproached for not maintaining inter-Party unity, I shall reply, with the greatest politeness. Go and teach your grandmother to suck eggs."
The bane and curse of the Central African problem, and in particular the question of Southern Rhodesia, has been the lack of inter-Party unity over the past decade and more. If I may turn to the speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, it takes two to make an agreement and if we are going to have inter-Party unity, then that unity cannot be maintained on the terms and conditions that the Government have made. I thought that the noble and learned Lord's speech made it rather difficult to vote, as we have been asked to do, against the Motion. As the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, pointed out, the noble and learned Lord spent 35 minutes going over the past, justifying the Government's action, as though the Government were suffering from a very uneasy conscience, and trying to prove the utter unreasonableness of the action taken by Mr. Smith's Administration. As I listened to that long dissertation, I must say that I felt very depressed, because to me it showed that there was a fundamental lack of understanding of why this declaration of independence had occurred. I shall return to this later.
We are asked by the Government to vote against the Motion, but it contains words which are perfectly innocuous and perfectly acceptable, with the single exception of those deploring the Government's action in relation to pensions. As the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, pointed out—and I am glad to say that he dealt with this matter in detail—these people have a legal right
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to their pensions. Although we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, under which Statutory Instruments action has been taken, the fact remains that this is a legal right, of which in no circumstances should they have been deprived. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, was good enough to say that he would refer the strong feelings expressed in this House directly to the Prime Minister.
I do not believe there can be many Members, even on the other side of the House, who can support action of this sort. I would simply say that no normal, decent Englishman can tolerate this sort of thing. I would ask the Government and my noble friend Lord Carrington, who in a few minutes is going to wind up from the Front Bench, to take this matter further, and I believe it would be perfectly right and proper that one of the terms on which the official Opposition should co-operate with the Government in their Rhodesian policy is that this prohibition of payment of pensions should be withdrawn absolutely. I very much hope that my noble friend will put that to the Leader of my Party, and that it will be insisted upon.
I turn now for a moment or two to sanctions, but I am not going to discuss them in detail and waste the time of the House. I have, however, two questions to put in this connection. I take it that the Government hope and believe that they can bring down Mr. Smith's Administration and then negotiate a new Constitution. But, of course, they may be wrong; and many of us believe that they will never be in that position. Therefore, they will have to use sanctions as a bargaining counter in order to reopen negotiations, and have something to offer. I believe that this is what is going to happen. If that is the sense in which the Government are applying sanctions, not so much to bring down the Smith Administration or to bring about economic chaos in the country, as in order to have that lever with which they can negotiate a satisfactory settlement, then I think there would be few in your Lordships' House who would oppose the sanctions, although one may have reservations on certain particular actions which have been taken.

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My second question, arising from that, is this. If the Government should be in this second position, will the terms they try to negotiate, with whatever power it may be in Rhodesia, be the same terms as they would more or less dictate if they succeed in bringing the present de facto Government down'? I think that is important, because the terms should be the same. The point is to produce in Rhodesia a Constitution which is satisfactory to the people of that country, and I believe it would be quite wrong, having brought down the de facto Government, to impose terms harder than would he negotiated if our Government were put into the position of having to negotiate freely. I hope that we may have an answer to this point.
That brings me to the question of the campaign which is to be launched by radio from Bechuanaland. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, who had something quite specific to say about this. Although, unfortunately, I did not hear all the noble Lord's speech, I heard him outline a programme of what he called psychological warfare. But we have been given the impression that possibly the Prime Minister himself may launch an appeal over the radio. Here I should like to utter a word of warning. We in this country, of course, are familiar with the television, and we all know that the Prime Minister is a good performer indeed, I read in a national newspaper that he seems to have mesmerised the public. But the radio is an entirely different medium, and if the Prime Minister is going to launch a personal appeal to people 6,000 miles away, an impersonal voice arriving at that distance to a people who, whatever we may accuse them of, we cannot say have been mesmerised by the Prime Minister, then that appeal, in my opinion, will fall flat and do much more harm than any good it might achieve. I hope that this will not be done, and that the directive given to this radio station will be very carefully thought out and worked out.
That brings me to the two really constructive suggestions which I believe have been made during the course of this debate, the first by my noble friend Lord Swinton, who said that in time (and the sooner the better, I think) the precise changes in the 1961 Constitution which our Government require must be made
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known to the people of Rhodesia. And the second one came from the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who suggested that if necessary people outside political life could be used in opening lines of communication for making contact.
I believe there is an idea that a Parliamentary delegation may be sent. If it be a mission of good will, all right. But I do not see how it can be in a position to carry on the sort of negotiations and talks which are required. On the other hand, there are people, both in political life and, more particularly, outside it, who have an intimate knowledge and experience of Africa, and many friendships (I will take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway) not only with the white Rhodesians, but with the black Rhodesians and the Africans who live outside Rhodesia. I believe the Prime Minister would be ill-advised not to use people of that sort in reopening negotiations and, as negotiations go on, developing the sort of policy one might reach and get the Rhodesian leaders—in which I include the leaders of all races—to agree to.
I have referred to the suggestion of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, that the precise changes should be made known. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said that he did not think he could go into details. I certainly do not intend to adumbrate before your Lordships a complete new Constitution tonight, but there are certain matters which I think require very special attention because, as the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack reminded us, the Prime Minister has said—I think more than once—that he looks forward to the time when Rhodesia will return to constitutional rule (and from this point I quote)
" starting from the 1961 Constitution, with such amendments as I think the whole House would agree to be necessary to give effect to the five principles."
I want to direct attention for a moment to these five principles, because the Prime Minister has said, and quite recently, that he thinks these five principles are absolutely basic and that we are all agreed upon them. I think it is necessary to challenge that statement. I am not at all sure that we are all agreed upon them, and I hope that if the official Opposition are agreed upon them they will take another look. And, more important still,

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I hope the Government themselves will take another look at these principles. The first one is as follows:
"The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed."
The second one is:
" There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution."
It is really on those first two principles that the negotiations broke down.
I was really sorry and surprised when the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack in our debate three weeks ago said this:
" For some reason which I do not pretend to understand, the clauses which provide for the 50 'A' seats and the 15 'B' seats are not entrenched clauses."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 4), col. 231 15/11/65.]
Later in his speech he said:
" Mr. Smith indicated that he did not agree, and the reason why he did not agree really appeared only in discussions with the Prime Minister in Salisbury."—[Col. 236.]
My Lords, this very important matter was left to the eleventh hour, only ten days or so before the declaration of independence. This basic matter should have been discussed, I regret to say, years ago, and it certainly should have been discussed before now by the present Government.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, if the noble Lord will excuse my saying so, that is quite wrong. We did, of course, discuss it with Mr. Smith when I was in Rhodesia, and he simply said he would not hear of it for a moment.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I mean discussed in depth, and I will now develop this point, because it seems to me there is an absolutely fundamental misapprehension here on the part of the Government. a misapprehension into which my noble friend Lord Molson himself fell during our first debate, as to the purpose of the 1961 Constitution. The important thing was the franchise qualification, and it was on that franchise qualification that the Europeans in Rhodesia were looking towards majority African rule in due course. It was calculated, in their opinion, that that would come about in a certain period, based on a common roll, which is surely desirable,
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and that that common roll should be the "A" roll. The "B" roll was a purely transitional device to ensure that the Africans should have a minimum representation while they gained places on the "A" roll. That is why there was no entrenched clause affecting the actual representation and the proportion between the "A" and "B" roll, because the majority rule was to be gained on the franchise qualification, and it has always been the intention that as the numbers on the "A" roll increased, so the numbers on the "B" roll should decrease, not necessarily in strict proportion, one for one—I know Mr. Smith insisted on one for one, but that has not always been the idea. That has always been the principle, the formula worked out on that basis, and the "B" roll should fade out.
I know this is so, my Lords. There is no mystery. I have discussed it time and time again with politicians in Rhodesia, including no fewer than three Prime Ministers, and it is a surprising fact that this should come as a surprise to the Government and to Parliament. Therefore, looking to the future we are in this particular respect faced with a new development, an illegal Government which we cannot recognise. And therefore, because of the illegality of the act, in the future, when it comes to a new Constitution, I agree that we must insist on the blocking third—not even the blocking quarter, which was nearly arrived at. But that blocking third should not, I submit, be in a position to prevent the fading out of the "B" roll; and that, reading this Blue Book, is really what the Government have been insisting on—that the blocking third of Africans should be entitled to prevent the change and the fading out of the "B" roll. If that happened, obviously, requiring a majority of 33 out of a House of 65, the Africans, with 15 seats, would need to gain only another 18 seats out of the 50 on the "A" roll. One only has to say it like that to show that it is illogical and always has been unacceptable to the Rhodesians. I wanted very much to clear that point, because when in future the new proposals are worked out this matter must be considered in that light.
That brings me to the timing. In Mr. Garfield Todd's day it was considered

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that the Africans would come to majority rule in not less than 20 years. At the time of the 1961 Constitution, formulated under Sir Edgar Whitehead, it was generally expected that it would probably be about 15 years; it is now four years later, and that would make it not less than 10 years. I would say, after the Prime Minister's visit and his statements to the Africans, that this is probably the sort of time that even he has in mind. I think it is essential that we should be prepared to state a minimum time factor. I know this has always gone against the advice of our colonial advisers in the past; we want to retain flexibility. But we have got an absolutely unheard of situation; people want to know where they are. I think it would accord with the best development of Rhodesia, with what has always been acceptable by the majority of white Rhodesians until quite recently, and what would seem to be acceptable now to the Government, that the Africans should not attain majority rule in under ten years. If that is promised and the Constitution set out accordingly, I believe we shall get acceptance from the Europeans in Rhodesia, which is a basic and necessary element in the negotiations.
That brings me to the question of the franchise, which is the third principle embodied in the five principles and says —there would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. I take it that it basically refers to the franchise. What it seems to me has never been worked out is the relationship between the franchise qualification, the educational and economic standards of the African, and the rate of political advance arising from that relationship. When we have got that relationship right it is not difficult to work out the formula for fading out the "B" Roll—whether it should be two for one, or one for one, and so on. These are studies which could have been made, and should have been made, in the past, and if they have not been made—and I am afraid they have not—I suggest they really must be made now.
I would mention a few figures. The middle qualification for the "A" Roll, which is the average and the most important one, does not depend either on very high income or on a very high standard of education; it depends on
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having had a full primary course of education coupled with £480 a year income or £1,000 of property. On the educational side, in 1960 there were 33,000 Africans who had qualified for that standard. Now I believe there are 70,000. In five years' time, it is calculated, there will be 155,000. So it is doubling itself about every five years; and in ten years' it should therefore be not fewer than a quarter of a million people. If one can then work out the standards of living and the likely rise of prosperity, and tie that to the educational standard, one can see more or less how the new Constitution will work out, and can build up the formula for the fading out of the "B" Roll and tie the first three principles entirely together; and that is what has not been done in the past but I am sure must be done in the future.
I do not want to go on with the fourth and fifth principles; there is not time. But I felt I must bring up this matter because it seems to me it has been very much misunderstood in the past by the Government and by my own Party; and I think it is the only opportunity I have to put this matter forward and say that it should be gone into deeply and considered before these negotiations take place.
Just to recapitulate my main theme—first of all, inter-Party unity. I am for that. But, as I have said, it is not at all easy—I would say it is not possible—to vote against this Motion. It is not at all easy not to vote for it. The second thing I would say is that the Government really must give an undertaking to withdraw this prohibition on the payment of pensions, because as another noble Lord pointed out—I think it was the noble Lord who made such a well-informed and interesting maiden speech—there are other people in Rhodesia receiving pensions from other overseas Governments who might suffer as the result of our Government's action; and of course there are pensioners in this country who should be paid by the Rhodesian Government. What is going to happen to them? So this prohibition should be withdrawn absolutely.
Then I should like an undertaking from the noble Earl who is going to wind up that he and his Government are seized of the urgency for negotiations, and that they will pursue this by all means avail able, including unofficial contact with all

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the necessary races, and that they will, as soon as may be, put forward specific proposals based on accurate studies. If the Government can give such strong undertakings, then I do not know whether my noble friend Lord Coleraine, who has moved this Motion, will be inclined to withdraw it; but I do ask for a much more positive and constructive action on the part of the Government if they wish to maintain inter-Party unity and bring about the result we wish to see in Rhodesia, for the benefit mainly of that country, but also for our own benefit and for the benefit of the Commonwealth and of the world.
11.8 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, once again we have had a full day's debate on Rhodesia. It is late, and your Lordships have heard the Motion and a great deal more besides, discussed in great detail. I will therefore content myself with making only a few observations. Let me at the outset make it plain that I entirely agree with the terms of the Motion moved by my noble friend Lord Coleraine. It has, in effect, two parts: first, the condemnation of the Government's action regarding non-payment of pensions and war disability pensions to British subjects in Rhodesia. It is not necessary for me to repeat the points which have been made by my noble friends on this matter. Certainly all of us on this side of the House are agreed that measures of this kind cannot be considered in the same light as the economic sanctions hitherto proposed by the Government.
If—and I understand it to be so— the object of sanctions is to cause a change of heart in Rhodesia and to encourage the more moderate elements, and if at the same time it is not the object of the Government to cause unnecessary suffering or to be vindictive, then proposals of this sort cannot be justified on any grounds. Some of my noble friends have questioned its propriety and many more its morality. One must come to the conclusion that the statements announcing this really had not been fully considered by the Government before the announcement was made. All of us were at any rate glad to see the partial retraction by the Prime Minister of quite a lot of what was originally proposed.
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We have listened this afternoon to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, reiterating the intention of the Government to administer these measures with due regard to humanitarian considerations. I hope that they can go very much further than that. I really do not think what has been said so far is good enough. It is true that the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said that he would see that our view was taken into account at the highest level, by which I imagine he means the Prime Minister. I hope he will make it clear, when that view is taken into account, how very strongly we on this side of the House feel on this matter; and I must tell him that we shall certainly go on pressing him, and pressing hard, until something that we consider to be satisfactory is done. I hope that perhaps the noble Earl the Leader of the House will go further than the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, felt himself able to. I hope, too, that he will take the opportunity of explaining something which I think is inexplicable—namely, what the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had to say about Barclays Bank and Barclays D.C.O.
I greatly regret that the Government found it necessary to issue a statement such as the one they made on December 2. It cannot possibly further the aims which they have in mind. It can do nothing but dismay those who, though they have supported economic sanctions, have always had at the back of their minds the fear that measures such as these, which cause personal hardship and are morally wrong, do nothing but harm, and indeed create resentments against Britain among those who are still well disposed towards us. As I say, we shall continue to press on this matter until we are sure that justice is being done.
With regard to the second part of my noble friend's Motion, I should not have thought that anybody could disagree. We are all of us convinced that in the end conciliation is the only means by which the Rhodesian problem can be solved. I was interested to read yesterday the interview which the Prime Minister gave to the Daily Mirror. The headline says: "No Invasion. No Bloodshed." And it is quite clear that the Prime Minister, as he has done all along, has rejected force as a possible means of solving this

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constitutional issue. It follows, as the Prime Minister has said, and as the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack said again this afternoon, that some form of conciliation is inevitable. The Prime Minister said, and I quote from the article:
" Now the economic measures are in full force we shall devote more and more effort to telling the Rhodesian people the means by which they can return to constitutional government."
And, in another place, he said:
" Our measures are designed to make the illegally controlled economy unworkable and so bring the Rhodesian people back to constitutional measures."
I do not think many of us would disagree with this, but I should be glad if the noble Earl who is winding up would explain a little more fully exactly what the Government have in mind.
The Prime Minister has said that he wishes to impose sanctions only of sufficient severity to bring the Rhodesian people back to constitutional methods. How does he visualise this happening? Is he now satisfied that the sanctions he is imposing will do this, or is he proposing to go further, for he has already gone much further than he originally proposed. At what stage does he intend to intervene and make either an appeal or an approach to the more moderate elements? The economic sanctions he has introduced are very severe. I would have thought that ultimately they will bring about the complete collapse of the Rhodesian economy. Is this what the Government are trying to do? Is there not a very great danger that such a collapse will inevitably lead to a breakdown of law and order, and a situation which would be much more difficult for the Government to control?
All these matters must, of course, be very much in the mind of noble Lords opposite; and I, for one, and I am sure many of your Lordships, too, would like a much fuller explanation of how it is that the Government hope to bring about a change in the Rhodesian Government. What exactly do they see happening; what exactly do they want to happen; what sort of Constitution do they wish to propose; and what sort of amendments do they wish to see to the 1961 Constitution? I hope that noble Lords opposite will have taken account of the very constructive and helpful speeches which have
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been made, first by my noble friend Lord Dilhorne, then by my noble friend Lord Swinton and finally— a most notable speech—by my noble friend Lord Hastings.
It will be seen from what I have said that I agree absolutely with the words of the Motion of my noble friend Lord Coleraine, and it follows front that that I could not possibly have supported the Amendment which was tabled by noble Lords opposite—an Amendment widely advertised and dismissed in a few words by the Lord Chancellor, on the ground, it seems, that second thoughts made him convinced that one Division was enough. I should have thought that that would have been considered before he put the Amendment down. But I must never complain about this Government having second thoughts: I wish they had them more often.
My Lords, though I naturally welcome the statement which the Government have made about pensions, so far as it goes, I still greatly regret and deplore that they ever made their proposals. For that reason, I could not possibly have' voted for the Amendment. But I must confess to your Lords-hips that I find myself in something of a quandary. I would much rather that thee should be no vote at all. Whatever Motion is passed, implications will be read into it which are not necessarily contained in its words. Though we should not exaggerate too greatly the importance of what passes in this House, we can, I think, be quite sure that a vote will be taken as denoting either support or lack of support for the policies of the Government in matters quite outside and far beyond the terms of the Motion. And I should have thought the wide-ranging character of the speeches that we have heard throughout this afternoon and this evening make that inevitable.
It will be seen as the first occasion on which there has been a vote on the Rhodesian issue, I think, in either House of Parliament. It will be taken that this is the first time that the bipartisan approach to this matter has been broken. I confess that I think that would be a pity. After all, there is so much upon which all of us are agreed. There are so many conflicting pressures on us from

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outside—the attitude of the African States, the attitude of the Commonwealth, the attitude of the United Nations. All these things make it the more necessary for us to retain national unity if that is possible. We are all agreed that the unilateral declaration of independence by Mr. Smith was a calamitous mistake; all of us (except, for some curious reason, the Liberal Party) are agreed that force must not be used to restore the situation; we are all agreed that some economic sanctions are necessary; we are all agreed that, in the end, the situation can be solved only by conciliation and negotiation. Because some of us are quite genuinely disturbed about what the Government have done on this issue of pensions, I hope that we shall not give the impression abroad that we are disunited on the things that really matter.
I do not know whether, at this stage, it would be possible for my noble friend Lord Coleraine to say that he will not press his Motion to a Division. He has initiated a debate in which we have made abundantly clear the opinion of this House on the pension question. Indeed, we have had a very useful and, in many ways, constructive debate; and there have been many interesting suggestions made which, I hope noble Lords opposite will follow up. I very much doubt whether any purpose can be served by taking the matter further. So far as pensions are concerned, a vote might make it more difficult, rather than otherwise, for the Government to reverse their policy.
But, my Lords, if my noble friend does not feel able to do this (for I know that he and others who share his views feel very deeply on this matter; and I must say that its terms are quite unexceptional; indeed, I agree with every word), I would advise those who sit on these Benches to abstain from voting on this Motion. I say again that I believe the very fact that the House of Lords passed—if it did pass—a Resolution, in face of opposition from the Government, on an issue of this kind would be taken to mean very much more than the actual face value of the Motion. It would be taken as a defeat for the general policy of the Government it would be taken as an end of
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bipartisanship. That could give nothing but comfort to Mr. Smith and his friends, who would read into it far more than I, or, I think, many of us in this House, would intend it to mean. And such a vote would, I believe, dismay the moderate elements in Rhodesia.
I know that my noble friend will forgive me for saying this, since it is not a criticism of him. But although he is as entitled to his view as I am to mine, there is a major difficulty in the fact that it is he who has moved this Motion, he who is associated in the minds of the Press and the public with an attitude a great deal more critical of Government policy than I, for one, would share. He has made a speech this afternoon on the Motion in which he went much further—as he was entitled to do—than the Motion goes, and much further than I, for one, should be prepared to go. I think the very fact that we had agreed to a Motion which my noble friend had moved would be taken to mean that this House as a whole agreed not only with the terms of the Motion but with his general attitude on the whole Rhodesian question and with that of noble Lords who feel as he does. Therefore I must say again that I shall very much regret it if there is a vote at all. I should certainly not have supported the Amendment put dawn by the Government; as I say, I think it much better that no Resolution should be passed. But if my noble friend esses his Motion to a Division I must advise noble Lords on these Benches—much as it may go against their inclinations, and my inclinations—to abstain on this occasion from expressing an opinion.
11.23 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, we all welcome back the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to the fort which has been so well-held in his absence by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne. We on these Benches all greatly admire the noble Lord, Lord Carrington—and more than ever after the speech to which we have just listened. If I do not pay him any more elaborate tributes it will not be for fear that I may embarrass him but because I might he administering the kiss of death. I should like to join in the thanks that should be paid to the noble Lord, Lord

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Coleraine—and I say this in advance of any decision he may reach about his Motion—in that he has initiated a notable debate in this House on which he has expressed a great deal of heart and spirit. We respect him even where we disagree with him profoundly.
The debate was marked, maybe marred, by one occurrence which led the noble Lord, Lord Molson, to rebuke me, in the friendliest way. I feel that one is a very bad judge of one's own actions in these matters, and if I deserve rebuke I am quite ready to accept it and to express my regret to any noble Lord on any side of the House who felt any distress for this occurrence. There have been many notable speeches. If I may, I will take first those on the other side of the House and join in the nice things, the justifiably nice things, said by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, about some of his colleagues, But I must say that he did not mention two Members of his own side whose speeches aroused our greatest enthusiasm, the noble Lords, Lord Alport and Lord Molson. They were excluded from his pantheon; I am not sure why. But many people would feel that these were the great speeches of this debate.
I join the noble Lord not only in paying a tribute to certain other noble Lords, but also in what he said about the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, who has had, I suppose, a wider administrative experience than anyone here, except perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I shall come hack later to his main argument, but even if he feels that I do not spell out everything precisely, at 25 past 11 at night, his general point of view, I hope he will understand that it is one I think which has to be attended to with exceptional care. I felt that his was a most valuable contribution.
I should like also to congratulate the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and there was one suggestion from him, one point, with which I felt that I might not disagree—I may disagree, but I am not sure. The noble Marquess seemed to feel that at this juncture unofficial persons could play a useful part in Rhodesia. If he is talking not of politicians, but of business leaders, professional people, Church leaders and others of that kind, I am sure that he is right. But I do not suggest that politicians could be of great
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value at the moment in some kind of unofficial negotiations. That would not be our idea at all. I hope that, in saying what I have done, I have gone at any rate some way with the suggestion that fell from the noble Marquess.
There was one remark of his which I could hardly let pass. It is already widely publicised on the tape, and no doubt it will be in the papers tomorrow, with the great name and prestige of the noble Marquess attached. People all over the world may read it and take it more seriously, perhaps, than the noble Marquess intended. But on the tape (I take this first in order to tell the noble Marquess how he is adding to his fame) I read these words:
"Lord Salisbury said that the Rhodesian State could be called a Police State, and he added, ' Well, we are getting pretty near a police state too '."
I can only say that a more farcical suggestion I am sure never fell from anyone in the House; and, bearing in mind the great admiration we all feel for the noble Marquess, I can only recall the old saying that the step is short from the sublime to the ridiculous. I am afraid that I must leave my comment there.
There were, of course, notable speeches from my own side, but I have already been accused by the noble Lord, Lord Molson, of being too favourable to my own colleagues, so I will not run through all their names. I will merely mention the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, the noble Lord, Lord Soper, and the noble Lord, Lord Taylor.
Now, my Lords, we come to the question of sanctions generally, and about these there has not been any real dispute, did not want to trap the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, but I did ask him whether he was himself in favour of sanctions, and he said that he was. So there is hardly anyone here who is not, apparently, in favour of sanctions of some kind. But I am bound to tell the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, and others who think as he does (this, I am afraid, applies also to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine: I do not think he is in favour of sanctions at all, but I believe that he is almost the only one) that in our view it is nonsensical, to use a fairly mild expression, to talk of mild sanctions, or gentle sanctions, or sanctions that operate very slowly. I think that one must assume that sanctions are to be effective.

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That was the language used last time by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, in a notable speech, and the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, last time; and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Byers, and the noble Lord, Lord Molson, also stressed that point very strongly.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I think that what noble Lords on these Benches are really concerned about is that sanctions should not apply too hard on the Africans. That is the point that we have been trying to make.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No!
LORD LINDGREN: Are you sure about that?
LORD BOWLES: Nobody ever thought that you were.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am short of words. I am afraid that I must just carry on and leave posterity to study that observation. I hasten to say that I do not for a moment doubt the noble Lord's friendly personal attitude—he mentioned it earlier. But I am afraid that I cannot agree with his summing-up of his attitude to this great question. If the sanctions are to be of any relevance, if they are to be justified at all, they must be severe.
Without going into the matter at length, I think perhaps that a short quotation from the report from Salisbury, Rhodesia, in the Daily Telegraph this morning, illustrates the kind of point that we have to face. The writer says:
" Mr. Smith, the Rhodesian leader, may have lost his battle to establish an independent country in the past week,"—
that is, since the new steps were taken—
" according to some businessmen and industrialists. Pointing to growing external and economic pressure, they believe Mr. Smith is faced with the prospect of reopening negotiations with Britain or letting the country collapse."
I am afraid that that is very much the course events will have to take. It is no good hoping that sanctions can do their work without anybody suffering or getting hurt. It would be nonsense to imply that that could come about. But let me say that we all realise that some small gifts costs more in terms of humanity than they mean in terms of economic pressure. So, when we say that we must win this struggle, that does
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not mean that there are no holds barred. We have ruled out force and we do not rule out the possibility that, even on the economic front, there are some steps which, clearly, one would not feel were justified.
I have been asked whether I can say anything more about pensions. I hasten to say that I understand and sympathise with the very strong feelings that have been widely expressed this afternoon. It may have been that they would have been still more widely expressed, if more noble Lords had spoken, but I think that there were enough speeches as it was. Perhaps I should interpret the point made by my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, who opened the debate in such a notable way. I hope it is clear that at the moment these pensions are being withheld, but the whole machinery is under review, and I can assure the House that these regulations, even in their present form, will be interpreted very liberally indeed—and am speaking now deliberately and not without consultation. I think that this goes a little further. I have not been idle, though perhaps I have not been in the Chamber so often as I might have wished. The noble Lord, Lord Brecon, had a much better afternoon than I had, at Twickenham, but I have been working, rather than playing, all day.
My Lords, I want the whole House to know this. I shall be much surprised if the vast majority of those entitled to pensions do not receive them without undue delay. That is a statement which, at any rate, carries us beyond what was said earlier. So I hope your Lordships will not feel that all that has been said by them, and by others outside, has been wasted.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, would the noble Earl be kind enough to add to his answer, if he can? Will they get them as a right, and will they get them without a means test?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I am afraid that I am not able to add to what I have said. But the noble Lord will see that we are working very hard on this problem, and nothing that has been said to-day will be wasted.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Earl can say if there is a possibility of making a Statement on this subject in the House, when the matter has been gone into more fully?
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I could never refuse to make a Statement at any time, if I were asked; and, conversely, if I had something of value to communicate, I would take the earliest opportunity of telling the House. I cannot actually name a date when I could make a Statement, but I appreciate the great interest. I hope that the noble Lord will feel that what I have said distinctly advances the matter and does not leave it where it was this afternoon. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, for example, will feel that we have been trying to move towards him. So much, for the moment, for pensions.
Now, may I come to the other main topic—the question of what in the Motion is called "negotiation", but comes in the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, into the category of "conciliation". I do not want to quibble, but one could draw distinctions there. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, when saying in that very statesmanlike speech that he agreed with every word, said that he was in favour of conciliation; the actual word used in the Motion is "negotiation".
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Molson, and other noble Lords, have studied so carefully the report of the interview with the Prime Minister in the Daily Mirror, which the noble Lord, Lord Molson, generously described as "most encouraging". Short of reading it out to the House, I can only point out that it is available here should any noble Lords not have seen it. I feel that it is a document of great historic importance, and that as time goes on one will go back to this document, and it may mark something of a turning point in the history of this question. I am not going into it now, but noble Lords are aware that the Prime Minister insisted, above all, that when Rhodesia had returned to the constitutional path there should be no recrimination. There is no question of trying to make people suffer when the constitutional situation has been restored. I should like to emphasise that—and I could go on emphasising it again and again. I say this particularly, because I believe on an
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earlier occasion I gave the impression to one noble Lord, for whom I have a profound respect and who sits rather close to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, that I took some personal pleasure in trying to crush the Rhodesians. I can assure any noble Lords who may gain that impression that it would be due simply to my own inadequacy of presentation.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, if the reference is to me, may I say that I never said that the Prime Minister was getting pleasure out of it. I said that that is what he was out to do.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am afraid my articulation is even worse than I thought. I said a noble Earl sitting close to the noble Marquess; I did not say the noble Marquess.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I said it, too.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I was referring to the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. At any rate, I want to emphasise that none of us here obtains any pleasure from the thought of squashing Mr. Smith. Any operation which was undertaken in that spirit would be evil in its motivation and would not produce good results. We are anxious to secure one thing only, and that is a return to constitutional life in Rhodesia.
May I say to the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, that it would be impossible to-night—and I am afraid it would be unlikely in the next few days—to give a detailed statement of what might be called peace aims. A good deal has been said already about the Prime Minister's article, and in an earlier statement he emphasised that one would be prepared to talk to anybody who was recommended by the Governor, and talk on the basis of the 1961 Constitution, with certain amendments. The noble Earl says: what amendments?
THE EARL OF SWINTON: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: No doubt in due course that will be amplified. I should like to look once more, if I may, at the statement made by the Prime Minister in the Daily Mirror.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I have seen the Prime Minister's statement in the Daily Mirror, and it does not alter what I put to the noble Earl. This is in order to give the hope of negotiation succeeding. There is a great suspicion in Rhodesia—I am not apportioning praise or blame—as to what the intentions of the Government are. The whole of that can he swept away if the Government will make the simple statement: "These are the amendments in the 1961 Constitution which we regard as necessary, and upon which, if they are made, we will do a deal". If that is said—and what the amendments are can be said perfectly easily—then all the people of Rhodesia will know exactly where they are, and then they can trust the Government.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: Well, events may take that course, or they may take a slightly different course. I do not think that at this moment one could be dogmatic. It may well be that, as the pressure continues, leaders will before long be recommended to us by the Governor, and we will be prepared to talk about the future constitutional arrangements. There are many advantages—could I put this in all seriousness to the noble Earl?—in a settlement of the kind which I am now discussing, and one which would be genuinely negotiated, rather than a statement from on high which could take the form ultimately of a dictated settlement. I must put that clearly. Whether it is best to be too dogmatic in advance, or be prepared for talks with those who come forward from the Governor. I think is a matter which will have to be worked out as we move forward.
I want the noble Earl to realise that we are anxious to set minds at rest. I am sorry to say something nasty. I told myself that I would say nothing nasty about any white Rhodesian to-night, but I am afraid I must rebut the suggestion that in some way Mr. Smith's Government are more worthy of trust than we are, or the late Conservative Government were. I cannot accept that view. The Leaders of the two Parties are natural objects of suspicion. We have had endless talks—it is not just Mr. Wilson and Sir Alec Douglas-Homewith the leaders of that country, and I
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am afraid I must say that if they continue to suspect our intentions the blame must be placed fairly and squarely at their own door. I must say that. I could say a great deal more, and more strongly.
I am anxious to command the noble Earl's attention. I am not going to be very much longer, but I was trying to answer the general reproach which came from the noble Earl. My noble friend Lord Shepherd, who spoke so well earlier, has already set out things fairly clearly, and the Lord Chancellor still more fully. But may I return to something the Prime Minister said when he was leaving Salisbury—something to which I know he attaches great importance? I am quoting his words, which may or may not be familiar to the noble Earl:
" Although successive British Governments are deeply and irrevocably committed to guaranteed and unimpeded progress to majority rule, the British Government, who alone through the British Parliament have the legal power to grant independence, do not believe that in the present tragic and divided condition of Rhodesia that majority rule can or should come to-day or to-morrow."
He went on elsewhere in that statement to stress the necessity of time. He said:
" Rhodesia, with deep conviction and with all the emphasis at my command, is not faced with stark alternatives. It is not just a simple choice between two extreme courses, between an illegal assertion of independence to-day or an African majority to-morrow or next week. There are other courses open to us. They need to he examined, canvassed and assessed; not dismissed out of hand to letting impatience and fear take command."
Those words still stand. If, after the conflicts of recent weeks, anyone is in doubt whether there has been some retraction of those words, let me say clearly to the House that those words, which were said while it was hoped to avert U.D.I., stand to-day as clearly as they ever did. I want everybody here, and in Rhodesia, to realise that we are not trying to inflict a system of government on the white Rhodesian people immediately which they distrust and dislike. That must be said clearly.
My last words to the House must be slightly different. I hope they can be said without offence to anyone here, and I hope without offence to any white people in Rhodesia. I saw a television programme, a teach-in, not long ago, in which a lone representative of the white

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Rhodesians made a gallant showing. At the end of it all, he finished by saying, Of course you can squash us if you want to, but I do not think you would sleep very well at nights ". We in the Government—and I think this goes also for many outside the Government—have no desire, as I said earlier, to squash the Rhodesians. We have an ineluctable duty to the people of Rhodesia as a whole that we cannot avoid. We do not consider that the view which the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine holds with such intense conviction is one which, in the last resort, would give effect to those responsibilities. If we adopted his policy, we should, in the opinion of the Government, be betraying the vast majority of the Rhodesian people (I say that notwithstanding all the international pressures and any votes which there may or may not be anywhere), and therefore we must remain true to our trust.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine. I hope that he will not put his Motion to a vote; but that is for him to say. He has a very acute conscience of his own, and I am not going to have the impertinence to interfere with it. But I do echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. All over the world people are wondering whether this country is united in carrying out this policy of trying to bring Rhodesia back to constitutional powers as soon as possible, and if we adopted the motion of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, they would know that we had chucked in our hand, that we had turned back from the plough; and, as I said earlier, we should regard that as a betrayal. I must therefore ask anyone who pays any attention to my views, or those of the Government, to throw out this Motion if it is put to the vote; but I still hope it will not be.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: My Lords, I am sorry, but before the noble Earl sits down I must ask him to clear up a matter which I think is of considerable importance. He has been given notice of the question which I raised in my speech. On November 1 he gave the "firm pledge" to this House (and I quote the words) that they—that is, British troops:
" will not be used for any offensive purpose against the Rhodesians."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 270 (No. 12), col. 1274.]
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The Prime Minister, on being asked the same question, refused to give that pledge. I feel that this point should be cleared up because, I am sure in perfect sincerity, the noble Earl has given this House a firm pledge. Does he stand by that, in view of what the Prime Minister has said in another place? I think we should know.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: I am sorry that I was not in my place when the noble Lord was speaking. He will remember that he was promoted, no doubt against his will, in the order of speakers, and I must defend myself against the charge of not being in here.
LORD GRIMSTON OF WESTBURY: I was not complaining: I would simply like a reply. I told the noble Lord who was here that I quite understood the position, and asked for a message to be passed to the noble Earl.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I can only assure the noble Lord that none of my colleagues has found any inconsistency between my statement and that of the Prime Minister. Noble Lords may laugh, but I can only assure the noble Lord that if there had been any inconsistency, I would have heard of it.
11.49 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, it remains for me to thank those noble Lords who have participated in this debate and made such valuable contributions. In doing so, I would congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, and the noble Earl, Lord Lindsey and Abingdon, on two maiden speeches, each of which was notable in its own way. I, like others of your Lordships, was a colleague for many years, both here and in another place, of Lord Gridley's father, and I join in the welcome which we all give to his son. The noble Earl's speech impressed me deeply, I think perhaps because his reason and his experience seemed to be leading him to his conclusion against his preconceptions; and perhaps I felt the more attracted by that because the conclusion to which his reason and experience led him was the same as my own. I thank all noble Lords greatly, not only for their contributions to the debate but for having listened with so

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much attention and so much courtesy to views with which I know they did not agree.
Now I come to the point that I have been seeking to put off. I am in a very difficult position. Like most people, I do not like being awkward; I do not like getting on the wrong side of those whom I would normally regard as my friends. My difficulty to-night is that I am torn between what I should like to do and what my convictions tell me I must do. I listened with great attention and great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, to the noble Earl, to the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, when they appealed to me to withdraw this Motion.
I listened, naturally, to my noble friend Lord Carrington with the very greatest respect, and the very greatest regret that I did not see eye to eye with him. My noble friend says that because of my background—and what a pity it was that I did not get somebody else to move the Motion; because if I had done so he would have been able to accept it—it would be taken as a reflection of a lack of unity in this House. I see his point
of view. But my own point of view is that his point of view would be more valid if there were not, in fact, a lack of unity. There are, in fact, very deep divisions of opinion, very sincerely held, on all sides, and I do not believe that we do a service to our country, to Rhodesia or to anybody else, in pretending that those differences of opinion do not exist and that they are not real.
So much for the background of the Motion. I am afraid that I cannot accept my noble friend's arguments on that point. But as to the substance I cannot see that the Government have met us in any real way on the main point which concerned noble Lords. They have given no indication that they would withdraw this prohibition, and so, with the greatest respect, I must refuse to meet the requests which many of your Lordships have made to me. I cannot withdraw this Motion.
11.55 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 23; Not-Contents, 71.

CONTENTS

Baden-Powell, L.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Newall, L.

Barnby, L. [Teller.]

Greenway, L.

Salisbury, M.

Clitheroe, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Salter, L.

Coleraine, L.

Killearn, L.

Somers, L.

Colyton, L. [Teller.]

Long, V.

Strathcarron, L.

Effingham, E.

McCorquodale of Newton, L.

Verulam, E.

Ellenborough, L.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Waleran, L.

Ferrier, L.

Milverton, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Haire of Whiteabbey, L.

Rhodes, L.

Airedale, L.

Henley, L.

Rowallan, L.

Alport, L.

Hilton of Upton, L.

Rusholme, L.

Archibald, L.

Holford, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Arwyn, L.

Iddesleigh, E.

St. Davids, V.

Asquith of Yarnbury, Bs.

Kahn, L.

Segal, L.

Barrington, V.

Kennet, L.

Shackleton, L

Beswick, L.

Kirkwood, L.

Shannon, E.

Blyton, L.

Latham, L.

Shepherd, L.

Boothby, L.

Leatherland, L.

Sherfield, L.

Bowles, L. [Teller.]

Lindgren, L.

Snow, L.

Brockway, L.

Listowel, E.

Soper, L.

Brown, L.

Llewelyn-Davies, L.

Sorensen, L. [Teller.]

Burton of Coventry, Bs.

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Stonham, L.

Byers, L.

Longford, E. (L. Privy Seal.)

Strabolgi, L.

Carnock, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Strang, L.

Champion, L.

Mitchison, L.

Swanborough, Bs.

Chorley, L.

Molson, L.

Taylor, L.

Clwyd, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Terrington, L

Collison. L.

Peddie, L.

Wade, L.

Crook, L.

Perth, E.

Walston, L.

Gardiner, L. (L,. Chancellor.)

Plummer, Bs.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Gifford, L.

Raglan, L.

Winterbottom, L.

Goodman, L.

Rea, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Motion disagreed to accordingly.

RURAL WATER SUPPLIES AND SEWERAGE BILL
Brought from the Commons endorsed with the Certificate from the Speaker that the Bill is a Money Bill, within the mean-
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ing of the Parliament Act 1911; read 1ª, and to be printed.
House adjourned at five minutes past twelve o'clock.