Sitting of 31 July 1963

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

ADJOURNMENT MOTIONS UNDER STANDING ORDER No. 9
Return ordered,

"of Motions for Adjournment under Standing Order No. 9 (Adjournment on definite matter of urgent public importance), showing the date of such Motion, the name of the Member proposing the definite matter of urgent public importance and the result of any Division taken thereon, during Session 1962–63."—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

CLOSURE OF DEBATE (STANDING ORDER No. 29)

Return ordered,

"respecting application of Standing Order No. 29 (Closure of Debate) during Session 1962–63 (1) in the House and in Committee of the whole House, under the following heads:—

1

2

3

4

5

6

Date when Closure moved, and by whom

Question before House or Committee when moved

Whether in House or Committee

Whether assent given to Motion or withheld by Speaker or Chairman

Assent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that Motion

Result of Motion and, if a Division, Numbers for and against

and (2) in the Standing Committees under the following heads:—

1

2

3

4

5

Date when Closure moved, and by whom

Question before Committee when moved

Whether assent given to Motion or withheld by Chairman

Assent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that Motion

Result of Motion and, if a Division, Numbers for and against"

—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

PRIVATE BILLS AND PRIVATE BUSINESS
Return ordered,
"of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders introduced into the House of Commons and brought from the House of Lords, and of Acts passed in Session 1962–63.
Of all Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which in
414
Session 1962–63 were reported on by Committees on Opposed Bills or by Committees nominated partly by the House and partly by the Committee of Selection, together with the names of the selected Members who served on each Committee; the first and also the last day of the Sitting of each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee sat; the number of days on which each selected Member served; the number of days occupied by each Bill in Committee; the Bills of which the Preambles were reported to have been

415
proved; the Bills of which the Preambles were reported to have been not proved; and, in the case of Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, whether the Provisional Orders ought or ought not to be confirmed:
Of all Private Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which, in Session 1962–63, were referred by the Committee of Selection to Committees on Unopposed Bills, together with the names of the Members who served an each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee sat; and the number of days on which each Member attended:
And, of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders withdrawn or not proceeded with by the parties, those Bills being specified which were referred to Committees and dropped during the sittings of the Committee."—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

PUBLIC BILLS
Return ordered,
"of the number of Public Bills, distinguishing Government from other Bills, introduced into this House, or brought from the House of Lords, during Session 1962–63, showing:

(1) the number which received the Royal Assent;

(2) the number which did not receive the Royal Assent, indicating those which were introduced into but not passed by this House, those passed by this House but not by the House of Lords, those passed by the House of Lords but not by this House, those passed by both Houses but Amendments not agreed to; and distinguishing the stages at which such Bills were dropped, postponed or rejected in either House of Parliament, or the stages which such Bills had reached by the time of the Prorogation."—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

PUBLIC PETITIONS
Return ordered,
"of the number of Public Petitions presented and printed in Session 1962–63 with the total number of signatures in that Session."—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

SELECT COMMITTEES
Return ordered,
"of the Select Committees appointed in Session 1962–63, with the Sub-Committees appointed by them; the names of the Mem-
416
bers appointed to serve on each, and of the Chairman of each; the number of days each met, and the number of days each Member attended; the total expenses of the attendances of witnesses at each Select Committee and Sub-Committee; and the total number of Members who served on Select Committees; together with so much of the same information as is relevant to the Chairmen's Panel and the Court of Referees."—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE AND BUSINESS OF SUPPLY
Return ordered,
"of (1) the days on which the House sat in Session 1962–63, stating for each day the day of the month and day of the week, the hour of the meeting, and the hour of the adjournment; and the total number of hours occupied in the Sittings of the House, and the average time; and showing the number of hours on which the House sat each day, and the number of hours after the time appointed for the interruption of business; and (2) the days on which Business of Supply was considered.—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

STANDING COMMITTEES
Return ordered,
"for Session 1962–63, of (1) the total number and the names of all Members (including and distinguishing Chairmen) who have been appointed to serve on one or more of the Standing Committees showing, with regard to each of such Members, the number of sittings to which he was summoned and at which he was present; (2) the number of Bills considered by all and by each of the Standing Committees, the number of Bills considered in relation to their principle and the number of Estimates and Matters considered by the Scottish Grand Committee, the number of Matters considered by the Welsh Grand Committee, the number of sittings of each Committee and the titles of all Bills, Estimates and Matters considered by a Committee, distinguishing where a Bill was a Government Bill or was brought from the House of Lords, and showing in the case of each Bill, the particular Committee by whom it was considered, the number of sittings at which it was considered, the number of Members present at each of those sittings and, in the case of Estimates and Matters, the number of sittings at which they were considered and the number of Members present at each of those sittings."—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  ROADS

    Parking (Obstruction)
    Dr. Glynasked the Minister of Transport whether he will make it an offence to leave a vehicle in a place on the highway where it obstructs access to and egress from a public or private garage, car park, or parking bay.
    The Minister of Transport (Mr. Ernest Marples): I hope shortly to introduce regulations making this a specific offence in the London Traffic Area. I am first consulting the local authorities and other bodies concerned about the draft regulations. Outside London, this is a matter for local authorities.
    Dr. Glyn: I thank my right hon. Friend for that very satisfactory reply, which will be welcomed by all garage and parking bay users and the police. Will it not also encourage people to use off-street car-parking facilities to a greater extent?
    Mr. Marples: I agree. If a person wants to park a car for long periods he must go off the street. If a person pays for a garage for his own use he should not be frustrated by other people parking free in front of it and preventing him from using it.

    Motor Rallies
    Mr. C. Johnsonasked the Minister of Transport when he expects to make an order bringing into operation Section 36 of the Road Traffic Act, 1962, dealing with the regulation of motoring events on public highways; and what is the reason for the delay.
    Mr. Marples: As I said in reply to a Question on 24th July by my right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Sir R. Nugent), I have appointed a committee to advise me on the regulation of motoring events on public highways. I hope with its assistance to be able to bring regulations into effect in the spring of next year.
    Mr. Johnson: I have seen that reply and the right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the appointment of the Com-
    418
    mittee was made subsequent to the tabling of this Question. Will he give an assurance that he will expedite the work of the Committee so that its advice will be available in time for him to make recommendations by spring next year?
    Mr. Marples: Certainly. The Motor Rallies Advisory Committee held its first meeting on 17th July, its second meeting on 24th July, and a working party met on 30th July. The object is not to control rallies out of existence but to produce a sensible and acceptable system of control which will enable them to continue without unreasonable nuisance. I will do my best to see that this is brought in by the spring of next year.

    Durham Motorway (Service Centre)
    Mr. Kitsonasked the Minister of Transport whether he intends to establish a service centre between Scotch Corner and the northern end of Durham motorway on either the motorway or the Darlington by-pass.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith): Yes, Sir, on the Durham motorway. It is essential to provide service areas on all major lengths of motorways.
    Mr. Kitson: Would not my hon. Friend agree that the Service Centre at Scotch Corner is very good and that if it is to be bypassed and new centres allowed some form of compensation should be considered?
    Mr. Galbraith: I cannot agree with my hon. Friend. On a length of motorway, which in this case is 32 miles, it is essential to have some sort of service area.

    Motorways (Staffordshire)
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Transport why the mileages open to traffic, under construction, for which tenders have been invited, and for which no line has been proposed, for the London-Yorkshire motorway and the M.1 from London to Carlisle, respectively, are greater than the comparative figures for the Lancashire-Yorkshire and Manchester to Preston motorways and the proposed new roads linking Staffordshire and the city of Stoke-on-Trent with these motorways and other principal

    419
    routes; and what action he proposes to take to speed up the construction of these motorways and roads.
    Mr. Galbraith: The motorway programme gives first priority to industrial north-south routes. Both the London-Yorkshire motorway and the M.6 motorway between M.1 and the North West fall into this category. The Hanford link to M.6 south of Stoke-on-Trent is open; the Talke link north of the city will be open next spring. We are pressing ahead with the preliminary statutory work for the Preston-Manchester and Lancashire-Yorkshire motorways. We hope to publish a draft Special Road Scheme for the very difficult Lancashire and Pennines section of the latter before the end of the year.

    South Circular Road (Clifton's Roundabout)
    Mr. Turnerasked the Minister of Transport what action he proposes to authorise to improve the traffic flow at Clifton's Roundabout at the intersection of the South Circular Road, Westhorne Avenue, A.305, and the Sidcup Road, A.20.
    Mr. Galbraith: We are considering the provision of experimental "Give Way" signs to improve the flow of traffic at this roundabout.
    Mr. Turner: Will my hon. Friend take advice from the Metropolitan Police about the traffic at this junction, particularly at this time of year when jams in all directions extend for as much as a quarter of a mile back up these important trunk roads?
    Mr. Galbraith: I will certainly consult the police, but my information so far is that we have not had any specific complaints.

    A.20 (Tunnel)
    Mr. Turnerasked the Minister of Transport when work on duplicating the tunnel under the railway on the A.20 near the Dutch House, London, S.E.9, will commence.
    Mr. Galbraith: I understand that the London County Council, which is the improvement authority, will shortly invite tenders for the bridge works and that the work is expected to start this year.
    Mr. Turner: In view of the time that has elapsed since my right hon. Friend authorised this improvement on this important trunk road, and the fact that within the last 14 days there has been another fatal accident there due to this not being a dual carriageway, I would be grateful if my hon. Friend would do everything possible to expedite this improvement.
    Mr. Galbraith: In fact there were some delays to do with the transfer of land—my hon. Friend probably knows about them—but I understand that tender documents are shortly to go out.

    Racing
    Mr. Longdenasked the Minister of Transport if he will take steps to define more clearly the offence of racing on the highway, which, if proved, causes automatic disqualification for at least one year.
    Mr. Marples: This offence, with the penalty of obligatory disqualification, has been on the Statute Book since 1930 and I am not aware that any practical difficulty arises over its definition.
    Mr. Longden: My right hon. Friend will agree, will he not, that when the motorist is faced with such a maze of rules and regulations it is necessary that they should be crystal clear? I do not know what racing on the highway means. Does it mean racing against some other vehicle?
    Mr. Marples: My hon. Friend is very well versed in legal matters. The offence as described in the Act is to promote or take part
    "in a race or trial of speed between motor vehicles on a public highway"
    and only the courts can interpret the law. This offence is very rare indeed. It is very difficult to prove, and the police would normally prosecute a person who might be said to be racing—I think that in the modern jargon they are called "ton-up boys"—for dangerous driving, but this has been with us since 1930, and it is one of the things that cannot be laid at my door.

    Speed Limits and Vehicle Lights
    Mr. Longdenasked the Minister of Transport what has been the effect on the accident rate of the imposition

    421
    of speed limits of 40 and 50 miles per hour in built-up areas; and whether he will now make it compulsory for motorists in such areas to dip their headlights rather than rely only upon their side-lights.
    Mr. Marples: From a sample survey in the London Traffic Area the Road Research Laboratory concluded that the imposition of a 40 m.p.h. speed limit on unrestricted roads reduced the number of personal injury accidents by 19 per cent. On roads previously subject to a 30 m.p.h. limit there was no significant change in the accident rate. No 50 m.p.h. speed limit has been imposed in built-up areas.
    With regard to the second part of the Question, I am now studying a report which the Road Research Laboratory have recently completed on the dipped headlight experiment in Birmingham.

    East Coast Ports (Communications)
    Mr. Priorasked the Minister of Transport if he will make a report setting out his proposals over the next five years for improving road communications between the East Coast ports and London and the Midlands.
    Mr. Marples: The information asked for has already been given in the five years' programme of trunk road major improvements for the country as a whole which I announced last year. I hope shortly to announce an extension of this programme which will include further improvement schemes between the places referred to.
    Mr. Prior: In that case will my right hon. Friend consider giving this greater publicity, because if we are to have closures of railway lines in East Anglia resulting from the Beeching Report, the public ought to be able to assess the position of road communications so that they can make up their minds whether railways ought to be closed or not?
    Mr. Marples: There are two distinct points here. The first is what will be the general improvement in road communications, and the second is what particular improvement will take place when a closure is proposed by the Railways Board? When a proposal comes to the Railways Board to close a line, my Divisional Road Engineer will look at alter-
    422
    native road services and report. That will be separate from the general road programmes in that area.
    Mr. Bullard: With regard to communications between East Coast ports and the Midlands—and I would add the North—will my right hon. Friend pay particular attention to the urgent necessity for a by-pass at King's Lynn?
    Mr. Marples: I should like notice of that question. I am aware of the importance of King's Lynn.

    M.5 (Twyning)
    Mr. Ridleyasked the Minister of Transport on what date he hopes to publish the draft scheme to establish the line of the M.5 motorway southwards from Twyning.
    Mr. Marples: I hope to publish a draft scheme for the length of M.5 from Twyning to Almondsbury at the end of August.
    Mr. Ridley: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that information. Is he aware of the immense urgency for this motorway? Further, will he give an undertaking that he will get his office to expedite all the statutory processes for the construction of this motorway because of its extreme urgency now?
    Mr. Marples: I am aware of the urgency, and within the limits laid down by Parliament I shall move as fast as I can.

    Trunk Roads (Lighting)
    Mr. Worsleyasked the Minister of Transport whether he will introduce legislation during the coming Session to enable him to pay the full cost of lighting on trunk roads.
    Mr. Marples: I am still considering the representations from lighting authorities that my contribution to the cost of lighting trunk roads should be increased and that I should contribute also to the cost of lighting classified roads. These claims have to be considered against other claims on the funds available for road maintenance and improvement, and I am not yet in a position to state my conclusions.
    Mr. Worsley: Will my right hon. Friend look very carefully into this matter? Is he aware that on trunk roads

    423
    there is an extraordinary variety of lighting at present?—witness a stretch of road in my constituency, just west of Keighley. Will he ask himself whether there is any difference, in logic, between the lighting above a trunk road and the surface of the road underneath?
    Mr. Marples: I am prepared to consider this, but with regard to the stretch of road to which my hon. Friend refers, he wrote on 1st March, 1962, about inadequate lighting, and in reply we said that the Ministry would consider paying 50 per cent. for the provision of such lighting if the lighting authority—the Skipton Rural District Council—put forward a proposal. We have not heard any more since then.
    Mr. Mellish: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he should take more interest in this matter, in the sense that many of these trunk roads have no lighting? I can show him a major trunk road not far from London, where for seven miles there is no lighting, because the county councils cannot agree who should pay for it. Is it not time that the Ministry did something about it?
    Mr. Marples: I am still considering representations from lighting authorities that my Department's contribution should be increased, but it is easy for lighting authorities to say, "We will do this if somebody else pays."
    Mr. Worsley: Will my right hon. Friend consider this question again in respect of the road that I have mentioned? Is he aware that the parish council—not a very large parish council—has to pay for lighting this stretch, and it is out of proportion to expect it to pay a large sum of money for a piece of road which is of no benefit to the occupants of the parish?
    Mr. Marples: I said in my original Answer that I was considering the matter. I also said, in reply to my hon. Friend's supplementary question—and I have great sympathy with him—that if the Skipton Rural District Council puts forward a proposal we would consider it.

    Keighley Bypass
    Mr. Worsleyasked the Minister of Transport whether he has finally approved plans for the Hard Ings Road bypass, Keighley; and when he expects work to start.
    Mr. Marples: I have approved the plans for this scheme but land acquisition is not yet complete. I hope it will be possible to start the road works in the current financial year.
    Mr. Worsley: Is the Minister aware that the news that the plans are completed will be welcomed in Keighley? Will he do everything he can to hurry up this piece of land acquisition? Is he aware that this bridge was started before the war, when it was delayed, and is now urgently needed?
    Mr. Marples: The plan is approved, and I shall do my best to see that it is expedited.

    Motorways (Land Prices)
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Minister of Transport If he will state, for each motorway so far constructed, his original estimate of the cost of the land required, the actual price paid, and the total figure by which his estimates have been exceeded on account of the higher cost of land.
    Mr. Galbraith: With permission, I will circulate a table of motorway land costs in the OFFICIAL REPORT. I regret that it would not be possible to calculate how much of the total increases of costs over estimates is attributable to higher land values without a disproportionate expenditure of time and labour.
    Mr. Swingler: Is the Minister aware that he did this for me in the case of the M.6 and it worked out that an extra £500,000 had been added to the estimate on account of higher land prices? Would he and the Minister therefore investigate this matter, because there appears to be good evidence that there is profiteering at the nation's expense?
    Mr. Galbraith: If the hon. Gentleman looks at the figures which are to be circulated, he will see that there is a lot more in land costs than just the price of the land. For example, there is the new basis of valuation and compulsory purchase under the 1959 Act. Sometimes additional land is required for hard shoulders, as for example on the M.1. Often there are wide and unforeseeable variations in the payments made for disturbance. All that is reflected in the land cost. But it is not necessarily the price of the land.
    Mr. Swingler: Is the Minister aware that my Question clearly asks what is the higher price which the Ministry has paid—which came to £500,000 in the case of the M.6—compared with what was estimated? That is the answer in which we are interested and may we have it?
    Mr. Galbraith: If the hon. Gentleman looks at what I propose to circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT, I think he will find that it answers his Question.
    Following are the figures:

    LAND COSTS OF CONSTRUCTED MOTORWAYS

    —

    Estimate before negotiations began

    Cost of Acquisition

    £'000 (a)

    £'000 (a), (b)

    M.1 London-Crick (Northants)

    211

    774

    M.10 St. Alban's By-pass

    80

    251

    M.2 Medway Towns Motor Road

    225

    311

    M.20 Maidstone By-pass

    89

    59

    M.4 Slough By-pass

    48

    220

    Maidenhead By-pass

    75

    91

    M.5 Lydiate Ash-Twyning

    175

    238

    M.50 Ross Spur

    72

    172

    M.6 Lancaster By-pass

    120

    66

    Preston By-pass

    98

    133

    Lancashire Section

    448

    698

    Staffordshire Section

    198

    304

    A.1(M) Doncaster By-pass

    106

    114

    Stevenage By-pass

    35

    98

    Totals

    1,980

    3,529

    (a) Neither estimates nor costs cover accommodation works, reinstatement of fences, etc.

    (b) Where final settlements have not yet been made the latest estimates have been included.

    Note.—In addition to higher land values other factors have contributed to the increases such as:—
    (i) New basis of valuation for compulsory purchases (Town and Country Planning Act, 1959).
    (ii) Certificates of alternative development (Town and Country Planning Act, 1959).
    (iii) Additional land required, e.g. M.1 hard shoulders.
    (iv) Obligation to buy whole properties.
    (v) Wide and unforeseeable variation of payments for disturbance.

    "Halt" Sign, Hucknall
    Mr. Whitlockasked the Minister of Transport why he has not approved the provision of a "Halt" sign at the
    426
    junction of Wighay Road and Annesley Road, Hucknall.
    Mr. Galbraith: "Halt" signs must be restricted to intersections where visibility is exceptionally bad. We do not consider that the visibility at this junction justifies a "Halt" sign. But safety will be increased here by the road improvements being carried out.
    Mr. Whitlock: Is not it a fact that over a period the hon. Gentleman has had representations from people in the locality who know the danger of the area; from the highway authority; from the police and from the Nottingham City Coroner? Will he not look at this again? Will he bear in mind that the combination of a junction, a bend and the beginning of a built-up area makes it absolutely imperative that, in addition to the "Halt" sign, there be warning signs further back on the main road in order that the excessive speeds attained there may be reduced?
    Mr. Galbraith: I agree with the hon. Gentleman about warning signs being placed further back. But I think that the visibility here is not bad. It is 240 feet in the northern direction and 700 feet in the southern direction. In view of the remedial measures which have been taken, I think that we ought to leave the matter for a bit and see how we get on.

    Abandoned Vehicles
    Mr. G. H. R. Rogersasked the Minister of Transport, in view of the increase in the number of unlicensed vehicles abandoned in the streets of North Kensington and other areas, which are causing obstruction and danger, if he will review the powers of local authorities and the Metropolitan Police to enable them to dispose of the vehicles more quickly.
    Mr. Galbraith: The police have adequate powers to remove vehicles which are causing danger or obstruction, whether abandoned or not. They and the local authorities also have power to remove and dispose of vehicles abandoned on the roads. A vehicle may not be disposed of in less than six weeks. My information suggests that this statutory limitation is necessary because many

    427
    vehicles left unlicensed are not in fact really abandoned and are reclaimed by their owners.
    Mr. Rogers: Is the Minister aware that his information differs from the experience of people in Kensington, where the police and the local authority agree that the powers are inadequate and that the number of abandoned cars in Kensington is so great that neither the police nor the local authority have adequate parking facilities for the period of six weeks? Should not the Minister's advisers look at this matter again, because we are not able to cope with the problem?
    Mr. Galbraith: I understand that it is not so much the question of six weeks being too long a period but the difficulty which arises after that in disposing of vehicles. I understand that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government is in consultation with the local authority on this matter.

    Parking, Leicester
    Sir B. Jannerasked the Minister of Transport if he has studied the report prepared by the chief constable of Leicester regarding methods of controlling parking, a copy of which has been sent to him by the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West; and if he will make statement.
    Mr. Marples: I was interested to read this report. I agree with the importance it attaches to the control of street parking in congested areas, and to the usefulness of traffic wardens and the fixed penalty system in making the control effective. Parking control without meters, as in Leicester and Blackpool, can work satisfactorily where local traffic conditions, the supply of parking space and the demand are suitable. Indeed, my recent pamphlet envisages its use in some places in the London Traffic Area. But I am satisfied that control with meters is necessary in the busiest areas of London and other large cities.
    Sir B. Janner: But, as the law now stands, it is impossible to have fair and effective enforcement. Is the Minister aware that in his Report for 1962 the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis stated that 70 per cent. of the meter cases called for inquiry; that 130,000 cases were investigated, and that the cost
    428
    of building had to go up? Who pays for all this? Is that taken into account in respect of the meters themselves, or is this heavy administrative cost in addition to the other costs which are incurred, with the result that there is no profit at all from the meters, but a very big loss?
    Mr. Marples: No, Sir. There is profit from the meters, and that profit from the meters must by law be applied by the local authority to the provision of off-street parking. The local authorities submit their accounts to me every four years, and those accounts have to be approved by me. I am quite satisfied that local authorities who have parking meters and revenue coming from them will, and must, apply that revenue to the provision of off-street parking.

    Speed Limits, Liverpool
    Mrs. Braddockasked the Minister of Transport when the Liverpool Corporation will be informed of his decision on the alterations to speed limits on roads in the city area, which were submitted to his Department 18 months ago.
    Mr. Galbraith: Agreement to one of the proposed alterations has already been given. In the other cases our divisional road engineer suggested a number of additional changes in speed limits, with which the Corporation did not agree. He also requested certain information which was given to him only on 16th July. A decision can now soon be reached.
    Mrs. Braddock: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that this approval was given only after I had put down this Question? Is it not the fact that quite a number of the suggestions made were agreed suggestions, although one or two were not? Is it not unwise to hold up agreement that can be reached between the Ministry and the local authority? Is it not better to get out of the way those things which can be agreed and then to discuss the others afterwards?
    Mr. Galbraith: Not necessarily. When doing these things it is perhaps better to do them on a comprehensive basis.

    National Parks
    Mrs. Castleasked the Minister of Transport whether he has studied the report on Motor Vehicles in National

    429
    Parks, a copy of which has been sent to him by the Ramblers' Association; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. MarplesMost of the recommendations in the Report, which I received on the 22nd July, are a matter for the local authorities concerned, and the National Parks Commission. But I will let the Association have some comments about those which affect my responsibilities and will send the hon. Lady a copy.
    Mrs. Castle: As a cyclist and walker himself, would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the growing invasion of the National Parks by motor cars should not be allowed to ruin the pleasure of those of us who are prepared to use our muscles? Will he therefore resist any applications for road widening and for the building of new roads in National Parks, and will he also take steps to divert commercial traffic from them?
    Mr. Marples: I have a great deal of sympathy with what the hon. Lady says, because there will be a great clash of interests between the motor car and amenities. Somehow, someone has to hold a balance. Whoever it is will be wrong, and I am afraid that it will be some future Minister of Transport.
    Mrs. Castle: Well, do your job.
    Sir J. Eden: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the great success in Germany, for example, and will he study what has been achieved there and try to emulate it?
    Mr. Marples: I have done that. I have been there myself. I have taken a car there, and I have walked a great deal in Germany as well as climbing rocks. I have done exactly the same in America, in the Rockies, where they are very fortunate in having different physical conditions—I only wish we had the same conditions.
    I am very disturbed about what might happen in the Lake District when, for example, the new motorway really links with Manchester. That will mean that millions of people will be able to get to the Lake District very speedily, and the question is what they will do with their motor cars when they get there. They should not destroy the amenities, or their enjoyment, by others.
    Mr. Warbey: If the Minister is so genuinely concerned about this problem, will he maintain access to the National Parks by railway trains, which do not require parking space?
    Mr. Marples: There is no point in doing that if everyone goes by car.

  TRANSPORT

    Motor Vehicles (History)
    Mr. Robert Cookeasked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that a motor vehicle that has been written off as a total wreck can be repaired and sold as roadworthy without its history being revealed to the purchaser; and whether he will take steps to rectify this.
    Mr. Galbraith: If the Question refers to vehicles for which a total loss payment has been made by an insurance company, the answer to the first part is "Yes". As to the second part, we have no evidence to show that existing legal safeguards against the sale of defective vehicles are inadequate. The Department is currently engaged in correspondence on this matter with the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders.
    Mr. Cooke: Is my hon. Friend aware that I am grateful for the researches he has obviously done? Will he keep this up and take note of a recent case, details of which I will send him?
    Mr. Galbraith: I shall be delighted to look into it.

    London Airport (Monorail Link)
    Mr. Dalyellasked the Minister of Transport whether, in addition to the motorway, he will now establish a monorail link between London airport and the centre of London.
    Mr. Galbraith: I would refer the hon. Member to the answer my right hon. Friend gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Clive Bossom) on 12th March this year, of which I am sending him a copy.
    Mr. Dalyell: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that it is the opinion of

    431
    Mr. J. A. K. Hamilton, resident engineer of the Forth Road Bridge, that this is now a relatively easy technical problem?
    Mr. Galbraith: I must admit that my right hon. Friend has not yet received any proposals that show great potentiality in this regard, but if the hon. Gentleman or the gentleman he mentioned would like to send him details my right hon. Friend will be delighted to study them.

    North-Western Area (Transport Needs)
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the Minister of Transport what reply he has sent, and what action he intends to take, on the request of the 60 local authorities concerned, at a meeting held in Manchester, that the Beeching proposals be held up pending a full inquiry by him into the transport needs of the North-Western area; if he will invite all representative organisations to give evidence and make proposals; and if he will treat this inquiry as a matter of urgency.
    Mr. Galbraith: My right hon. Friend has acknowledged and taken note of the resolution to which the hon. Member refers. We should be very ready to co-operate with local authorities in arranging a comprehensive transport survey in the Manchester conurbation and we shall be glad to send an official to consider with them how this might best be done. Any railway passenger closure proposals put forward by the British Railways Board to which objection has been lodged must, under Section 56(9) of the Transport Act, 1962, be considered, and reported on, as soon as possible, by the appropriate transport users consultative committee.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Has the Minister studied the excellent report published in the United States of America and based on the hearings of a Congress sub-committee which considered the United States problems? Does he not agree that within seven years we could be faced with a similar situation, unless an initiative similar to that in the United States is taken in this country? Will the Parliamentary Secretary undertake that his right hon. Friend will consider these points?
    Mr. Galbraith: I can give that undertaking. I will convey the hon. Gentleman's views to my right hon. Friend.

    Rural Transport
    Mr. Speirasked the Minister of Transport whether he is now in a position to announce new Government measures to assist rural transport.
    Mr. Moreasked the Minister of Transport whether he will now make a statement on the implementation of the recommendations of the Jack Committee.
    Mr. Marples: I am considering the results, which I have only just received, of the special studies I have had made of rural transport.
    Mr. Speir: Does my right hon. Friend realise that this prolonged period of gestation of this simple problem is getting very boring? Does he further realise that from year to year we have asked for Government action? Why is it impossible for the Government to take action on a comparatively minor problem? Are we to understand that there will be no decision until Parliament resumes in the autumn? Will my right hon. Friend write to me as soon as the Government have made up their great big mind?
    Mr. Marples: I hope that a decision will be made in the autumn.
    Mr. More: Does my right hon. Friend realise that this puts a great burden on very small independent bus companies which have been serving the countryside, and that a delay of three months may make all the difference in enabling some of them to carry on?
    Mr. Marples: I realise that there may be some hardship, but the implications of the various proposals arising from the study that we have made are difficult to assess. I do not consider that we are wasting time.
    Mr. Strauss: In view of the fact that some years ago the House had a very full and detailed report on the problems of rural transport, about which nothing has been done, and that the Minister is now having another study made for him which will no doubt be of great interest to Members of this House, especially those who sit for rural constituencies, will he make that study and report available?
    Mr. Marples: I will consider that. I would like to make it available. The

    433
    point is that I should like to make it available in an easily digestible form. I will consider that.
    Mr. Manuel: Will the Minister inform the House whether he has had any discussions with the Secretary of State for Scotland on the problems of rural transport—in particular regarding certain stretches of railway which, if closed, will aggravate a position that is already very bad—
    Mr. Speaker: Order. That question does not arise from the Answer about the Jack Report.
    Mr. Manuel: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In certain areas in Scotland the roads would be insufficient to deal with rural transport if the rails were closed.
    Mr. Speaker: I do not dispute that proposition. I merely assert that it does not arise on this Question.

    Road Transport (Abnormal Loads)
    Mr. Russellasked the Minister of Transport why permission was given for a load 19 feet wide and 65 feet long carrying a ship's propeller weighing 35 tons to travel by road from Birkenhead to Falmouth, in view of the inconvenience caused to other road users and other difficulties; why he did not require the load to be sent at least part of the way by sea; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Galbraith: I would refer my hon. Friend to the Answer which my right hon. Friend gave on 24th July to the hon. Member for Oldham, East (Mr. Mapp).
    Mr. Russell: I read that reply which was adequate so far as it went. Would my hon. Friend agree that a load which is 19 feet wide is too wide for any kind of road, even a three-lane motorway? Can he say how loads like this were sent before the invention of Scammell lorries and vehicles which are able to carry such heavy loads, and should not such loads be prohibited?
    Mr. Galbraith: I do not know the answer to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question. I am sure he realises that sometimes it is necessary to get a propeller to a ship quickly and sometimes it appears that
    434
    the quickest way to do that is to send it by lorry. However, in view of the difficulties which occurred on this occasion, my right hon. Friend, as he said on 24th July, is reviewing the best method to deal with future loads of this size.
    Mr. Hayman: May I ask whether the Minister is aware that there is a regular shipping line operating between Birkenhead and Falmouth and that when this huge load came by road the Cornwall County Council was not informed although the vehicle bad to travel over 60 miles in Cornwall on the busiest roads at the height of the tourist season? Will not the Minister look at this again?
    Mr. Galbraith: I am surprised to hear what the hon. Gentleman tells me about the county council because it is necessary to give the police two days notice.
    Mr. Mellish: Is not it a fact that we cannot possibly give instructions about loads of this sort unless we have a publicly-owned co-ordinated transport system?
    Sir K. Thompsonasked the Minister of Transport what action he has taken this year to ensure that large and unwieldy loads are transported by the most suitable routes, other than by road.
    Commander Keransasked the Minister of Transport whether he will introduce legislation to prevent very heavy loads going by road where port facilities in the United Kingdom are adequate, and thus prevent congestion on the roads.
    Mr. Marples: From 1st November last year the Regulations governing the movement of abnormal loads by road were strengthened giving me control over all loads more than 14 feet wide, more than 90 feet long or more than 150 tons in gross weight. These Regulations have been applied with progressively increasing effect throughout this year. There has been a steady decrease in the number of applications for movement by road, attributable to the use of other means of transport and also to the steps being taken to reduce the sizes of loads for transport by road. Availability of port facilities is not the only factor in the use of sea transport. Journey time, cost and liability in some cases to damage must also be taken into account.
    Sir K. Thompson: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that, as he has said, there is available coastwise shipping for the transport of this kind of load? Will he pursue with vigour his determination that the roads shall not be cluttered up with large and unwieldy loads which ought not to be on the roads at all?
    Mr. Marples: We have said that we are reviewing the matter. The number of applications to the Ministry has been reduced because of the announcement of new Regulations. Over all, there are fewer large loads going by road.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Will the Minister consider the suggestion of his hon. Friend? Is he aware that great difficulties are created for the manufacturers of large-scale plant? Rather than that such plant should be conveyed by road, with the need to redesign it in order that it may be so conveyed—and thereby affect the production costs—would not it be better if large-scale plant were conveyed by sea?
    Mr. Marples: A number of organisations representing heavy engineering industries, in which I know the hon. Member is interested, have set up Abnormal Loads Committee to consider the increasing problem of the transport of heavy, oversized loads. It is all linked up with the design of the machinery we are trying to export. In many cases, people say without thought that the machinery should go by rail, but in some cases that would mean knocking down about a hundred bridges. There are also difficulties about transport by sea. In many cases it is technically not possible for it to go by sea. All these things have to be taken into account, and we should try to put it all into its proper perspective.

    Drivers (Drink)
    Mr. Boardmanasked the Minister of Transport if he proposes to continue his campaign to discourage drivers from drinking.
    Mr. Marples: I shall continue to take every suitable opportunity to draw attention to the dangers of driving after drinking.
    Mr. Boardman: Does not it strike the Minister as very odd that while large sums of public money are being spent
    436
    on this laudable campaign, public houses are competing with each other in the provision of bigger and better private parking facilities for customers whose purpose it is to drink? If the Minister has no direct influence regarding the provision of private car parking facilities, will he use his influence with those who have?
    Mr. Marples: The hon. Gentleman must not make the mistake of supposing that all the people who call at public houses are drivers. The vehicles contain passengers as well. I am concerned with those who drive, and what I have said—I think as often and as emphatically as anybody—is that people should not drink if they are to drive.
    Mr. Ross: Is this one of the matters in which the Minister would advise young people to disregard the advice of their parents?
    Mr. Marples: It depends on who are the parents.

    Driving Tests
    Lieut.-Colonel Cordeauxasked the Minister of Transport what was the percentage of successes in all motor-car driving tests carried out in the United Kingdom in the years 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962, respectively.
    Mr. Galbraith: The percentage of passes in all driving tests conducted in Great Britain in these years was 53, 51, 50 and 50. Figures for motor car tests only are not generally available. But a recent survey, conducted over two weeks, suggests that the pass rate for car candidates would probably be about 3 per cent. lower.

    Provisional Driving Licences
    Sir B. Jannerasked the Minister of Transport what representations he has received from the Licensing Officers' Association about the wording and the size of the print on the summary of restrictions to be inserted in provisional driving licences for persons between the ages of 17 and 21; what reply he has sent; and what consultations he has had with the Association regarding them.
    Mr. Galbraith: We do not know of the association to which the hon. Member refers, and we have certainly had no

    437
    such representations from local authority associations. I understand that licensing officers regret, as to some extent we do, the small size of the print, but appreciate that circumstances make it unavoidable. As I told the hon. Member on 17th July, the conditions follow Regulations. These were circulated in draft to many bodies, including local authority associations.
    Sir B. Janner: Has the Parliamentary Secretary attempted to read these restrictions himself, or is it because he has not been able to read them that he does not realise that they are incomprehensible? Will he get a magnifying glass and read the restrictions, and then decide to alter them so that people can understand what they mean?
    Mr. Galbraith: The hon. Gentleman raised this question with me a fortnight ago, when I told him that, although I sympathised with and understood the difficulty, I had been able to read the restrictions without a magnifying glass. The point here is that only a few people are affected by these restrictions and the headlines are quite easy to read. The hon. Gentleman, I am sure, will appreciate that it was necessary to have this sort of label as, otherwise, it would have meant reprinting 12½ million new licences, which simply could not have been done in the time.

    Channel Crossing
    Mr. Costainasked the Minister of Transport whether he is yet in a position to announce his decision on the channel crossing.
    Mr. Marples: I regret that I am not yet able to add to the Answer I gave my hon. Friends the Members for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) and Brighton, Pavilion (Sir W. Teeling) on 24th July.
    Mr. Costain: Is my right hon. Friend aware that Folkestone is the second largest passenger port in England, with over 800,000 people now using it, and that it cannot make the improvements it wants to make as long as this matter remains unresolved? Will he use his powers of decision to get some progress made?
    Mr. Marples: I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that I will move as fast as possible both on the publication of the Report and on its considera-
    438
    tion, but as I have to consult my French colleagues I am really not able to make a decision myself.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: In considering this very important matter, will not the Minister consult the President of the Board of Trade, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of Labour with a view to determining what the effects of the implementation of this proposal will be on the undesirable drift south of trade, industry and commerce and, consequently, cm employment in Scotland and the effect on industry there?
    Mr. Marples: Any decision will be a Cabinet decision, which has collective responsibility, and all the Ministers referred to by the hon. and learned Gentleman will be consulted.
    Mr. Strauss: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the opportunities for postponing any decision on this matter are infinite, because there are very real difficulties? Can he, therefore, give us any idea when he hopes that some final decision will be made by himself and his French opposite numbers on this very important matter?
    Mr. Marples: I wish that I could, but I cannot give a definite date. That is quite impossible as there are so many things to be considered, including another country—France—and the French may play it long or they may play it short. For myself, I realise that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Costain) has said, a number of ports are delaying improvements and the provision of new shipping facilities pending this decision, so, obviously, the quicker we can arrive at a decision the better.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Would my right hon. Friend agree that he has had the Report of the Anglo-French Committee in his hands for quite a long time—a very long time? Can he at least give an undertaking that he will publish the Report early in the Summer Recess so that we may know what it says?
    Mr. Marples: I have had the Report only a few weeks, and I really cannot unilaterally say that it will be published. This is a joint venture with the French; and I must consult them, otherwise foreign relations would become impossible.

  RAILWAYS

    Transport Users' Consultative Committees
    Mr. Mathewasked the Minister of Transport how many officers and members of transport users' consultative committees are railway employees or ex-railway employees; and if he will give a direction, under Section 56(16) of the Transport Act, 1962, that these committees should not hold inquiries into proposed branch railway line closures on premises which are railway property.
    Mr. Marples: The present secretaries of all the transport users' consultative committees are all either former or serving railway officials who have been assigned to the committees in accordance with Section 56(16) of the Transport Act, 1962. Under that Act the membership of the committees no longer includes nominees of any of the nationalised boards. Any member of a committee who is a railway employee is not appointed to represent railway interests, and I know of only two such members. I have no power to give directions about where committees shall meet, but they do not normally hold meetings about closures on railway premises.
    Mr. Mathew: May I thank my right hon. Friend for that reply, which clarifies the position? Will he bear in mind that, although there is actual independence of railway influence, it is very important during the coming months when the T.U.C.C.s will be meeting to ensure that the apparent independence is also understood by the British public, who are a little suspicious when these committees meet on railway premises?
    Mr. Marples: I agree. It was for that reason that during the Committee stage of the Transport Act I said that any consideration should be in offices away from railway premises. That we are trying to do, and I think we have succeeded. The other point is that although railway men are secretaries of these committees, which is very useful because of their great knowledge of the subject, they do not take part in decisions. The decisions are taken by the committee and not by the secretary, who merely provides the information.
    Mr. Mathewasked the Minister of Transport in considering proposals for
    440
    railway closures put to him by consultative committees, what consideration he gives to whether or not the objectors had been allowed rights of legal representation and cross-examination.
    Mr. Marples: I expect to get from a transport users' consultative committee, in accordance with Section 56 of the Transport Act, 1962, a report on the hardship which it considers will be caused by a proposed rail closure together with any proposals which it wishes to make for alleviating hardship. In general the Section provides that committees shall determine their own procedure. I understand that committees in fact permit objectors to be legally represented and allow questions relevant to matters within the scope of the committees' functions to be put to representatives of the Railways Board. I have no reason to think that committees will not carry out their statutory duties in a fair and proper manner.
    Mr. Mathew: While I accept what my right hon. Friend has said, will he bear in mind that there has been public criticism of the T.U.C.C. procedure in the past on the ground that the tribunals were apparently not sufficiently judicial? In dealing with this matter, will he bear in mind that it is very difficult to get at the truth of a matter without the right of cross-examination and that it would be very unfortunate if the British public got the impression that these closures were being steam-rollered through without a proper judicial tribunal?
    Mr. Marples: One of the recent decisions should dispel that illusion. Under the Statute, when reporting on hardship and proposals to alleviate it, the committees will normally be shown hardship by the evidence of the objectors; but if a representative of the Railways Board gave evidence about hardship I would expect questions about it to be allowed, as well as questions about information given by the Railways Board for alternative services. I do not think it wrong for objectors not to be able to question or cross-examine on matters not relevant to the essential function of the committee.
    Mr. Bowles: Has the right hon. Gentleman ever been present at a hearing of a consultative committee? It is extraordinary that I have and he has not.
    Mr. Marples: No. As I am in a quasi-judicial capacity, it would be improper for me to be there. What I have done is to read the evidence in full.

    Discontinued Services (Advance Notice)
    Mr. Mappasked the Minister of Transport what directions he has now given to the Railways Board in respect of public advance notice for the discontinuance of passenger or goods services as provided for by Section 54 of the Transport Act, 1962.
    Mr. Galbraith: My right hon. Friend has now given the Railways Board, under Section 54 of the Transport Act, 1962, directions and determinations about the publication of advance information of their plans for the discontinuance of passenger, goods and shipping services. With permission I will circulate a copy in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Mapp: Will the Parliamentary Secretary fill in the other data in this respect? The Section speaks of advanced notices as to manner and place where notices shall be exhibited. Would he be more forthcoming, as this Section maybe somewhat contradictory of Section 56?
    Mr. Galbraith: If the hon. Gentleman reads what I am circulating in the OFFICIAL REPORT, I think he will find that that point is covered.

    Transport Act 1962
    Directions and determinations by the Minister of Transport under section 54 relating to the publication of advance information of plans by the British Railways Board for railway and shipping closures.
    The Minister of Transport (hereinafter referred to as "the Minister") in exercise of his powers under section 54 of the Transport Act 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") hereby directs and determines that the information to be given by the British Railways Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") in pursuance of the said section 54 with a view to giving the public advance notice of their plans for—

    (a) the discontinuance of railway passenger or goods services provided by them (hereinafter referred to respectively as "passenger closures" and "goods closures"), and

    (b) the discontinuance of shipping services which are, or are deemed for the purposes of the said section 54 to be, so provided (hereinafter referred to as "shipping closures"),

    442
    shall be such information, and shall be published in such manner and in such places in the United Kingdom, as is hereinafter provided.
    A—Passenger closures
    1. The information to be given as to the passenger closures comprised in the Board's plans shall include particulars identifying—

    (i) the stations to be closed to passenger services, and

    (ii) the lines from which all passenger services are to be withdrawn.

    2. The information mentioned in the last foregoing paragraph shall be published in the following manner and places—

    (a) the information shall be published and made available on sale to the public, and

    (b) except as respects information published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office and available on sale to the public at the date of these directions and determinations, notice that the information has been so published and is so available shall be published in not less than two national newspapers and, in the case of passenger closures relating to stations or lines in Scotland, also in at least one newspaper circulating particularly in Scotland.

    Provided that if the Minister so consents having regard to the limited number or extent of the passenger closures of which the said information falls to be given at any particular time, it shall be sufficient for the said information to be published in such newspapers as are mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph.
    B—Goods closures
    3. The information to be given as to goods closures comprised in the Board's plans shall be given by means of general notices in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 hereof and of local notices in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 hereof. References in these paragraphs to "sidings" do not include private sidings.
    4. General notices of goods closures shall be given as follows:—

    (a) they shall be published in not less than two national newspapers and, in the case of closures relating to stations, depots and sidings in Scotland, shall also be published in at least one newspaper circulating particularly in Scotland;

    (b) they shall include particulars identifying the stations, depots and sidings which are to be closed for the purposes of railway goods services, and the Regional Railway Board responsible for each;

    (c) they shall give the approximate or estimated dates when the closures are planned to take place, any such date to be not less than one month from the date when the notice is published;

    (d) each general notice shall include all the closures other than closures of which general notice has previously been given which are planned to take place within a period of three months or more starting one month after the date of its publication.

    5. Local notices of goods closures shall be given as follows:—

    (a) they shall be displayed at the stations, depots or sidings affected or, in the case of a siding, at a station or depot which in the opinion of the Board is most appropriate for the purpose;

    (b) they shall give the date when the station, depot or siding as the case may be is to be closed, and so that such date is not less than four weeks from the date when the notice is first displayed.

    C—Shipping closures
    6.—(1) The information to be given as to shipping closures comprised in the Board's plans shall include particulars of all shipping services which are to be wholly discontinued in respect of the carriage of passengers, the carriage of road vehicles by a vehicle shipping service or the carriage of goods, and of any train ferry service which is to be wholly discontinued and such particulars shall identify the ports or places between which any such service is to be discontinued and shall state whether the service to be discontinued is a service in respect of the carriage of passengers, or of vehicles by vehicle shipping service or of goods, or is a train ferry service and the approximate date when the discontinuance is planned to take place.
    (2) "Vehicle shipping service" in this paragraph means any shipping service for the carriage of road vehicles with their drivers and other persons travelling with the vehicles.
    7.—(1) The information mentioned in the last foregoing paragraph shall be published in the following manner and places:—

    (a) the information shall be published in not less than two national newspapers and, in the case of shipping closures affecting services to or from any port or place in Scotland or Northern Ireland, shall also be published in at least one newspaper circulating particularly in Scotland or in Northern Ireland, as the case may be, and

    (b) notices shall be displayed at any port or place in the United Kingdom to or from which the service to be discontinued is provided, containing such of the said information as relates to that service, and where a shipping closures involves the discontinuance of a shipping service which is not provided to or from a port or place in the United Kingdom, notices containing such of the said information as relates to that service shall be displayed at such ports or places in the United Kingdom as the Board may consider appropriate.

    (2) Publication of the said information in accordance with the provisions of both sub-paragraphs (1) (a) and (1) (b) of this paragraph shall in the case of any closure be not less than three months before the approximate date of discontinuance included in the information relating to that closure.
    D—General
    8. The provisions hereof shall have effect subject to any further direction or determina-
    444
    tions which the Minister may give under the said Section 54.
    Signed by the authority of the Minister of Transport on the 29th July, 1963.
    D. R. SERPELL,
    A Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Transport.

    Liner Trains
    Mr. Mappasked the Minister of Transport, in exercise of his financial powers under the Transport Act, what amount he has authorised to the Railways Board for the provision of liner trains; and what is the expected profitability of the investment he has allowed for this purpose.
    Mr. Galbraith: The Railways Board has not yet sought our approval for any proposed capital investment in the provision of liner train equipment.
    Mr. Mapp: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that on pages 44 and 146 of his Report, Dr. Beeching contemplated, I think within a few weeks, a trial costing £2,100,000? As some of the data and commercial prospects about liner trains are, to say the least, doubtful, will the Minister be careful in any finance which he may authorise in this respect and have some costings made of the existing Condor train services, the pre-runner to the liner trains?
    Mr. Galbraith: I think I can give the undertaking that my right hon. Friend will look very carefully into any figures and costs put before him.

    East Lincolnshire
    Sir J. Maitlandasked the Minister of Transport why he accepted the conclusions of the Beeching Report before a detailed and precise case for the rationalisation of the East Lincolnshire rail services had been made out.
    Mr. Marples: The Government have accepted in principle that the railway system needs reshaping on the lines proposed by the Railways Board. But we have made it clear that decisions on individual passenger closure proposals will be reached on their merits. This applies to all the Board's passenger closure proposals including those in Lincolnshire.
    Sir J. Maitland: But is it not a fact that this part of the Beeching Report is coming to be seen more and more as

    445
    an inspired guess? Is it right to jeopardise the economic considerations and amenities of perhaps half a million people in this matter? Further, has he considered the effect which the deliberate reduction of traffic on lines such as this is going to have on him when he has to decide between the relative merits of the economic importance of closing the line and the hardships which will result to the people who live near it?
    Mr. Marples: Nothing is jeopardised by the proposals in the Beeching Report. They are purely proposals of the Railways Board. Previously the Board was criticised for presenting its proposals piecemeal. It was said that it should have a plan. Now it has produced a plan, and it is said that it jeopardises the position. It does not. In the case of passenger closures it can only propose; the decision lies with me, and I shall take into account any questions of hardship. The transport users' consultative committees have been appointed purely for the purpose of assessing what the degree of hardship is.
    Sir J. Maitland: But the trouble is that at the end of the story the Minister will have to decide between closing a line which has been completely denuded of its possibilities of being efficient in the meantime, and which is then completely uneconomic, against possible hardship. Could not he stop the railways diminishing the efficiency of the lines until he has been able himself to balance up the economic viability and the hardships involved?
    Mr. Marples: The railways cannot stop anything. All they can do is to make proposals, which are considered on their merits. Objections can be made. My hon. Friend can make what objections he likes about any proposal when it comes forward, and I hope that he will. But I shall decide each case on its merits, to the best of my ability.
    Mr. Ross: Is it the Minister's intention to make these controversial decisions during the next three months, when Parliament is not sitting?
    Mr. Marples: Under a Statute that has been passed the Railways Board will put its proposals forward, as and when it thinks right, to the transport users' consultative committees, which will consider
    446
    the proposals on their merits and report to me. I will make my decision according to the merits of each case.
    Mr. Strauss: Does not the Minister think that when there is a proposal for a large-scale closure, affecting a very large area, it is an important matter which should be considered by this House? Does the Minister propose that when such a large-scale closure is proposed, before he makes a final decision there will be an opportunity for Parliament to express an opinion on it?
    Mr. Marples: When the proposal is made by the Railways Board it will go to the transport users' consultative committees, which will make their report and recommendations. They will consider proposals in public. Objectors, whoever they may be, can appear before the committee and explain what hardships will be involved and what alternative services should be provided. The transport users consultative committees will report to the Minister. It is then up to me to take into account what has been said about hardship and alternative services, and about any other point that anybody wishes to make. I hope that local authorities and other interested people will send in their submissions. Any Member who wishes to make a point can do so after a transport users' consultative committee has made its recommendations to me, and before any decision is made.

  SHIPPING

    New Cunarder
    Mr. Benceasked the Minister of Transport (1) what consideration has been given to the amendment of the North Atlantic Shipping Act to meet the new proposals submitted by the Cunard Company;
    (2) what consideration has been given to the proposals by the Cunard Company to construct a replacement for the "Queen Mary" with financial assistance from Her Majesty's Government; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Marples: I refer the hon. Member to the Answer that I gave to him and other hon. Members on Wednesday, 24th July. In the circumstances, no question of the amendment of the North Atlantic Shipping Act arises.
    Mr. Bence: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in his statement he said that nevertheless the Government have been anxious to consider all reasonable means of bringing a new and modern British ship into this important service? Will the right hon. Gentleman take the initiative to give expression to that anxiety and fulfil a pledge made at the General Election of 1959? Will he get in touch with the Cunard Company and see whether it is possible to come to terms, if not within the framework of the North Atlantic Shipping Act, then under an amended Act to meet new terms which can be agreed with Cunards?
    Mr. Marples: The question asked is whether I will amend the North Atlantic Shipping Act. The answer is "No", because the 1961 Act was tailored to fit the Q3 proposal which came from the Cunard Company. We honoured our election pledge. We gave terms which the company wanted, which it asked for and to which it agreed. It subsequently decided not to accept them. That was not our fault as a Government. The decision was taken by the Cunard Company. I do not blame it for that, but, having so decided, it cannot say that we have not kept our part of the bargain. We did keep our part of the bargain.
    Mr. McMaster: Is my right hon. Friend aware of the great subsidies given by the United States, France, and Italy to passenger services on the North Atlantic run? Is he further aware of the large hole which will be created in the £60 million he so proudly announced if the Cunard Company is to rely on this alone for assistance?
    Mr. Marples: The Cunard Company, if it wishes to apply for money under the recent scheme I announced, must go to the Committee under Lord Piercy and put its proposals before it. The proposal will then be considered on its merits, in the same way as any other proposal will be considered. As regards other countries subsidising their ships, if they decide to subsidise something which they think is in the national interest, we must look at our position and not necessarily be moved by what they have decided.
    Mr. P. Williams: Most people who have the interests of all British shipping and not just one company at heart are pleased that the Government have taken the decision to allow Cunard to come into the scheme on equal terms with everyone else.
    Mr. Marples: I am sure that that is so. Every company which runs ships should have access to the scheme on equal terms. The point is that it will be extremely difficult to distinguish between different companies. If we give extra favours to one company the other companies will be peeved.
    Mr. Bence: The right hon. Gentleman said that he was anxious to maintain this service in the North Atlantic. Will he, therefore, open negotiations with the Cunard Company to see whether some amicable arrangement can be made?
    Mr. Marples: As I have said several times, if Cunard have another proposal, we shall keep an open mind and consider it. If I may say so, it is silly of the hon. Gentleman to think that somebody who is running a shipping company does not know his business better than any Government Department does. If the company wants any terms, and if it has any proposals, the initiative lies with the company to make them known.

    Nuclear-powered Merchant Ship
    Dame Irene Wardasked the Minister of Transport what progress has been made towards reaching a decision on the building of a nuclear-powered merchant ship.
    Commander Courtneyasked the Minister of Transport whether he is now satisfied that technical considerations justify the placing of an order for one or more British nuclear-powered merchant ships; what progress has been made in his consultations with British ship owners; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Marples: The technical and economic studies are continuing according to plan. Shipowners and shipbuilders are taking part in them. I still expect that we shall be able to decide before

    449
    the end of the year whether to embark on developing a reactor and building a ship to install it in.
    Dame Irene Ward: May I ask my right hon. Friend how he interprets "according to plan," because am I not right in saying that we were promised that we would hear the answer before the House rose for the Recess? I think that that was the last promise. May I ask my right hon. Friend whether he noted yesterday that the Minister of Defence said that he could not have a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier until we had experimented with surface ships on a smaller scale? May I ask whether my right hon. Friend's Department is in touch with the Minister of Defence, and may I ask whether there can be a general speeding up on this matter? Government Departments are getting terribly slow.
    Mr. Marples: I very rarely disagree with my hon. Friend. She frequently disagrees with me, but I rarely disagree with her. But we never said that we would make a statement before the Recess, and it is wrong of my hon. Friend to imply that we did. We have always thought that by the end of this year we should be able to say something definite, and we are working according to plan. If we are to have a nuclear ship, the first ship has to be of a reasonable size and not a major ship which may lead to difficulties. To build such a ship would be complete nonsense, and, with due respect and humility, I am surprised that my hon. Friend suggested it.

NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES (QUESTIONS TO MINISTERS)
The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
Sir ERIC ERRINGTON: To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster if he will make a statement on the practice of answering Questions relating to the nationalised industries.
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): With permission, I will now answer Question No. 45.
Yes, Sir. I have been considering this matter with my right hon. Friends who answer for the nationalised industries.
Questions can at present be asked on a Minister's exercise of the power he has
450
to give a general direction in the national interest to a nationalised board, provided that the direction is one of general and not of local application. There is, however, no corresponding rule about the admissibility of Questions seeking general statistical information. Answers to many Questions of this kind have been refused and this has brought into operation the rule against repeating in substance Questions to which Answers have already been refused by the responsible Ministers.
Against this background the Government have decided to adopt the following practice. Ministers will consider sympathetically giving answers to Questions seeking statistical information on a national basis about a nationalised industry. The new practice should allow some Questions to be asked that cannot be asked now, and should not disallow any Questions that are now allowed, so I hope that it will be regarded as a useful improvement.
Sir E. Errington: I should like to thank my right hon. Friend for this extension in respect of Questions, but there are two matters to which I should like to refer. The first is that my original Question dealt with the mileage of disused railway lines. Would that be a Question which would now be answered under this new ruling? Secondly, would Questions arising out of the closure of railway stations be answered by Ministers?
Mr. Macleod: As my hon. Friend fairly said, the whole of this matter arises from a Question which he put to which an Answer was refused. He objected to that and he had an Adjournment debate to which I tried to reply and in which both sides of the House joined. It is as a result of that that I have made my statement today. The answer is "Yes". My hon. Friend's original Question, under these new suggestions, would have been answered and so would any others in a similar category. This, therefore, is a clear illustration of a specific advance.
As for Questions on closures, this new practice does not affect the ordinary rules which have grown up in relation to policy. What the change does is to enable hon. Members to obtain from Ministers, without being pushed off on to the board, general statistical information on a national basis.
Mr. Strauss: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I am sure that all of us on this side of the House will welcome this change in the practice? The old situation was obviously an anomaly and it was high time that it was altered. This is a step in the right direction. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his Answer appears to be somewhat qualified? He says that
"Ministers will consider sympathetically giving answers to Questions seeking statistical information cm a national basis about a nationalised industry."
But should he not tell the House that Ministers, wherever possible, will give such information? Has the qualification any hidden meaning? As it stands this is rather strange.
Mr. Macleod: No, Sir. I would be quite prepared to adopt the words which the right hon. Gentleman has used. I view this as the meaning of "sympathetically"; but it is possible to envisage circumstances, for example, where there was a dispute about wages and conditions of service, where this procedure might be inappropriate. I am prepared to say that I mean the word "sympathetically", which I used, in exactly the same sense as the words which the right hon. Gentleman used.
Sir H. Legge-Bourke: While wholly welcoming this change, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he will clear up the point about consumer consultative councils in relation to nationalised industries? Are we to be allowed to ask Questions about the work of these councils?
Mr. Macleod: No, Sir. I should not have thought that that came within the ambit of my statement, which confines itself to general statistical information in relation to a nationalised industry. It does not relate to a consumer council.
Mr. Bowles: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that no decision has ever been taken by this House, even since the time of the Labour Government—and I think that it was Herbert Morrison, as he then was, who was responsible for the present position—by which we have been prevented from asking Questions on the day-to-day running of a nationalised industry? We have had two debates on this matter and I hope that now we shall get back to the fundamental principle
452
of being able to ask Questions about anything, as we can about the Army and the National Health Service, and so on. The nationalised industries must not be put into a category by themselves.
Mr. Macleod: I personally take the view that that goes too far. I should have thought that if we put the House in the position of being able to natter day by day at the nationalised industries, those industries would not be able to run in a way that commercial undertakings are run. If I remember the quotation aright, and I think that it comes from Tennyson, about broadening down "from precedent to precedent", that is exactly what the House does, and I thought that this was the right follow-up to the anxieties which hon. Members on both sides of the House have expressed.
Sir J. Duncan: Did my right hon. Friend hear the Minister of Transport answer a Question this afternoon on closures of stations? Will it be possible, under this new procedure, to ask the Minister whether he will be closing a line or authorising the closing of a line or station?
Mr. Macleod: As my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport hissed in my ear as I got up, "You can always ask". I do not adopt that as my answer. I think that my hon. Friend takes the whole sense of my answer much too far. I ask my hon. Friend to study the words I used.
Mr. T. Fraser: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what he means by making available statistical information on a national basis? May I give the right hon. Gentleman an example? The Secretary of State for Scotland is responsible for electricity in Scotland, whereas the Minister of Power is responsible for it in England and Wales. I understand that neither of these Ministers could give information for the whole of Great Britain. I assume, therefore, that responsible Ministers would give information for the areas for which they were responsible, but that would not mean on a national basis.
In any case, hon. Members from Scotland and Wales often apply themselves to the consideration of questions of some importance to their respective countries and they wish to have information on a

453
Scottish or Welsh basis from a United Kingdom Minister. Will they get that information and only on a national basis?
Mr. Macleod: The hon. Member is defining "national" a little too narrowly. There is a phrase which appears frequently in the public Statutes dealing with the nationalised industries. We talk, for example, about the "national interest". We do not mean that in terms of Scotland or Wales, or even England, or Northern Ireland, as the case might be. It is a general basis, and I rest my answer on that.
It would be wrong for me to attempt to give an answer on any individual case, because the right thing to do is to proceed, as I have said, by precedent, and on the basis of whether the different Questions which hon. Members might wish to put are accepted by the Table and answered by the Minister.
I have given the specific instance which led to all this. The Question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Sir E. Errington) was out of order, or, rather, was not answered under the procedure which has appertained up to today, but from now on that sort of Question will be answered.
Sir K. Thompson: We look like losing some of our present rights, in view of what my right hon. Friend has said. I understand from the Minister of Transport that railway closures would require his final approval. There is, therefore, clear Ministerial responsibility. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the House has now said that the Minister will not reply to that kind of question. That seems to me to be wrong.
Mr. Macleod: May I repeat a sentence from what I said?
"The new practice should allow some Questions to be asked that cannot be asked now"—
and I have given an example of that—
"and should not disallow any Questions that are now allowed".
Any Question, whatever it may be, which is now allowed, will be allowed under the new practice. Obviously this is an extension, otherwise it is meaningless.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate this now.
Mr. Wigg: On a point of order. There is a point which comes within your Ruling, Mr. Speaker. The Leader of the House has used the word "allowed". The question whether a Question is allowed is not one for the Leader of the House, but for the Chair. It is for the Minister to please himself whether he answers, but it is an odd constitutional doctrine when the Leader of the House gives a ruling which governs the Chair. Perhaps we may have your advice on this, if not today, then tomorrow.
Mr. Speaker: Nobody governs me but the House. We are slightly affected in which Questions are properly admitted to the Order Paper, because in circumstances which are well known to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who knows the practice, the practice of Ministers in refusing to answer Questions in a certain category affects the way in which we have to act.
Mr. Wigg: Further to that point of order. I take the sense of your reply, or I believe I do, Sir, but I still assert that it is an odd constitutional doctrine for the Leader of the House to say to hon. Members, as coming from him, that a Question will be allowed. It is possible for the Chair to allow or disallow a Question in the light of what is the practice of the Government, but it is wrong for the Leader of the House to use the word "allowed". I should have thought that that was the prerogative of the Chair alone.
Mr. Speaker: Sometimes words are very apt and sometimes words have ambiguous meanings. I did not take it as something which the Leader of the House should not have said. I thought that he was obviously referring to what is the practice in a respect which we all know about.
Mr. Wigg: Further to that point of order. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] If hon. Members opposite do not care about how this House works, I do. It is not a question of an exercise in semantics, or of what you happen to think today, Mr. Speaker. It is a question that what is now said, unless it is challenged, will enter into our normal practice, and in three months' time or six months' time we shall be confronted with a statement by the Clerks behind the Chair, only doing their job, on the basis of what the Leader of the House said.

455
I am not trying to make a captious or carping point, but submitting that the Leader of the House ought not to be permitted to use the word "allowed", or, if he uses it, it should not pass unchallenged. If he will be good enough to say that what I have suggested is not what he said, then I shall be entirely satisfied. But if he will not say that, then I shall challenge it and continue to challenge it today and on every possible occasion, because the matter of allowing Questions is not a matter for him.
Mr. Macleod: It seems a thorny road to pursue trying to make a relaxation which is designed to help hon. Members, and which I genuinely believe will help hon. Members. The word "allowed" was not used in relation to a dictum from me in any way. May I repeat the sentence:
"The new practice should allow"—
this is not me saying this, but the authorities of the House—
"some questions to be asked that cannot be asked now…"
I believe that the illustration which I have given, which led to this statement, will show that a number of Questions in future will be answered by Ministers which up to now they have not answered. This must be for the general advantage of the House.
Mr. Speaker: The House will be grateful to the hon. Member for Dudley and the right hon. Gentleman. Let us now try to deal with the law of defamation.

DEFAMATION ACT 1952 (AMENDMENT)
3.45 p.m.
Mr. T. L. Iremonger: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Defamation Act 1952.
The general anxiety underlying my proposals has already been expressed in this House by my hon. Friends the Members for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) and Carlisle (Dr. D. Johnson) in Parliamentary Questions. It has been widely and authoritatively expressed outside in a first leader in The Times of 18th June of this year, in a main article on a centre page by the editor of the Sunday Express on 16th June, by Mr. Cecil King, the chairman of International Publishing Corporation Ltd. in his speech to the Guild of British Newspaper Editors, at Bath, and in the Sunday Times editorially in the previous week.
The Defamation Act represents an attempt to strike a fair balance between licence and repressiveness which the House should not lightly be tempted to amend. However, there is one respect in which its operation is proving unsatisfactory, and I shall give a precise example, in detail, of that to the House directly. Meanwhile, I would explain my Bill as follows: it seeks to do two things: first, it requires the amount awarded as damages to be related to the actual damage which the plaintiff can show that he has suffered; and, secondly, it makes the assessment of those damages the function of the judge instead of the jury.
I shall now give the House the detailed example of the way in which the law works at present which leads me to believe that it requires amendment. I want to declare, at the outset, that I have a deep personal involvement in the events which I am about to narrate of which I shall make a full and frank disclosure. However, I shall merely narrate the facts to begin with.
On 19th December, 1961, an article appeared in the early edition of the Evening Standard which questioned the London County Council's policy of using its own employees instead of the independent district valuer to value property which it compulsorily acquired. The wisdom of that policy was questioned in

457
the article on the ground that the London County Council might appear to be acting as judge in its own case and that public confidence might thereby be impaired.
The article made it clear that it was the policy and not the officials employed to carry it out which was open to criticism. It contained the following phrases to that effect:
"Personally, I am convinced that these honourable men do their best to be fair", and:
"This s a nasty situation. It is unfair to the owner….It is even more unfair, let us not forget, to the officer placed in this invidious position."
This article was founded upon submissions made to the General Purposes Committee of the London County Council by an elected member of the London County Council who is also a member of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and an estate agent. These submissions were made in support of a motion under Standing Order No. 84 calling for a report to the council on the London County Council's valuation methods which had been moved by that member.
The motion was seconded by another member of the London County Council who had had complaints on this score from constituents. That other member is the author of the article to which I have referred. She is also my wife, and you, Mr. Speaker, said in this House, if I may respectfully quote your words, in connection with your own lady wife, "Her cause is my own". For my part, my wife's honour is my honour. I want to affirm my absolute certain knowledge of the sincerity of the words used in the article which I have quoted absolving individual officers from criticism.
I also want to quote from the covering letter which accompanied this article when it was sent to the editor of the Evening Standard:
"You will appreciate, I know, the vital importance of the exoneration of the officers in question from any possible imputation of improper conduct."
The words "I know" in that quotation from the letter referred to a telephone conversation which the author had had with the editor, in which she stressed that she was passing the responsibility to the newspaper to ensure the absolute impeccability of the article in this respect.
458
The article was then cleared by the newspaper's legal department. I can say here, incidentally, that I intend to deploy the whole argument, incorporating the text of the article, together with supporting evidence in this House at the first opportunity I can make and, if any horn. Members want to have notice of my intention, I shall see that they have it.
In view of what I have said, the House may imagine the sense of outrage and shock experienced by all concerned when the 134 valuation officers of the L.C.C. all threatened to sue the author on the grounds that the sincere belief which she had expressed in their honesty was "sarcastic" and the criticism of the L.C.C.'s policy constituted a libel on each and all of the 134. The Evening Standard and the author immediately offered to publish a generously phrased letter to eliminate any possibility of the article being so misinterpreted by readers. This offer was arrogantly refused and the valuers demanded £2,000, their legal costs and a grovelling statement in court so phrased as to brand the author of a wilful and malicious attack on public servants employed by the authority of which she was an elected member, and a writ was eventually issued.
Such is the operation of the Defamation Act, which I am seeking leave to amend in this respect, that the upshot was that, in theory, here was a classic textbook case to defend on grounds of no identification of each and all of the plaintiffs and fair comment on a matter of public interest. But we were advised—I think that I can best put the advice in the words, used as recently as the 3rd of this month—
"You cannot always rely on winning a case, however right you think you may be."
Those words were used by the Lord Chancellor.
Apart from that, we were also advised that, whatever the theory, in practice juries have been showing themselves so fantastically prejudiced against newspapers and that the damages which juries have been awarding tend to be so beyond all reason and so astronomical—the House will have in mind the award made against Associated Newspapers of nearly £¼ million—and that, as there were 134 valuers suing who could get, say £134,000 because, never mind the theory, in current practice each could get, say, £1,000, it

459
would be better to settle. The sum involved could mean ruin for the newspaper.
That was the sum and the practical risk. Therefore, the newspaper decided to settle the action on the terms demanded, and the author's case was thereby irretrievably compromised. Therefore, the action was settled in court on the terms dictated: first, the payment of a punitive fine, equivalent to that imposed for a criminal offence—the House may reflect that a brigadier accused of cowardice in the face of the enemy recently settled an action without demanding money; but, then, he was a soldier—and, secondly, colossal legal costs; and, thirdly, the publication under duress of a statement in court in terms to which reasonable amendments were adamantly disallowed and which was a travesty of the true situation, and which itself constituted a grave libel on the author.
In other words, what happened in this case was that as a result of the way the Defamation Act works, as viewed in harsh reality by leading counsel, the bullying tactics and legalised blackmail of the instigators of a political conspiracy—and I shall explain exactly what I mean by that in a moment—paid off. They had their way. They silenced a great newspaper, they punished with a fine of an amount reserved for serious crime, an elected member of a great local authority for doing her public duty in a responsible and particularly circumspect manner.
I will explain what I mean by "conspiracy". What I am about to say depends upon a source which, if challenged by an hon. Member, I will be prepared to reveal in confidence to an agreed third party who will vouch to that hon. Member for its authenticity without revealing it. I cannot without express permission, which I have not sought and cannot anticipate, go further than that here and now.
I believe, with many others, that this action for libel and the exploitation of the Act I am trying to amend was the result of a political conspiracy for the following reasons. The writ was issued eventually in the names of the Chief Valuer of the London County Council and the four next senior valuers. However, the Chief Valuer, before he died recently, conveyed to me through a
460
private channel of utmost responsibility and integrity, to which I have referred, that he had had no wish that this thing should be done and that he had been "pushed into it". Hon. Members may ask—
Mr. R. T. Paget: On a point of order. Is it in order that this procedure should be used in order to disseminate gross libels on a series of officials of the London County Council when those libels, when made on an unprivileged occasion, have already been withdrawn and apologised for? It seems to me an outrageous abuse of our procedure.
Mr. Speaker: On the last factor, which affects the matter, it would, of course, be an abuse of the privilege of asking the leave to introduce a Bill to use it for some purpose of that kind. On the other hand, the hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Ire monger) is clearly entitled to urge what he suggests is the undesirable manner in which the law can be made to operate now which causes him to ask the House to give him leave to amend it. We are journeying along that line at the moment, but we are getting rather near the limit.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: On a point of order. The hon. Member is making particular allegations against particular officials of the L.C.C., and is purporting to introduce a Bill, but is, in fact, making personal attacks of a grievous character on certain officials in a case which has already been settled. I cannot see how that can be in order, or a proper use of procedure for the introduction of a Bill.
Mr. Speaker: Of course, if it is not for the purpose of introducing a Bill it would be an abuse, but I am not to presume that some such purpose is to be attached to the use of our procedure when an hon. Member rises to address me asking for leave to introduce a Bill. I have been listening carefully because of the anxieties which enter my head, as they do the heads of other hon. Members, but I have not yet reached the stage at which I can say that it is out of order to give an illustration of the reasons why the hon. Member thinks that he ought to have leave to amend the law.
Mr. Frank Bowles: The hon. Member has had ten minutes already.
Mr. Speaker: It is only fair to say that some of the time has been taken up by points of order. Nor is ten minutes a prescribed time.
Mr. Iremonger: I am obliged to you Mr. Speaker, for your Ruling and I say with great respect to the hon. Members who have interrupted that I understand their concern.
I hope that what I am about to say will persuade the House that those considerations were not absent from my mind. If I may say so with great respect, in regard to your Ruling, hon. Members have to use their experience to illustrate points which they are trying to make in respect of legislation. That is what I am trying to do.
I shall resume the argument by saying that the House may ask itself, "Who did the pushing and who were the pushers pushed by?" Because who, indeed, can push the head of a great department? I believe that the whole action was originated by a conspiracy of a small number of political opponents of the author to deflect an attack on their policy by misrepresenting it as an attack on the persons employed to carry it out.
However that may be, legalistically one might say no one has any right to complain, and I take the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) on that. The valuers merely shrewdly assessed a technical and tactical advantage arising out of the way that the Defamation Act is seen to operate in practice, but this House has a duty to look behind the legalism to the realities of justice. I have thought deeply whether, in using Parliament's privilege to voice my suspicions and misgivings, I should be performing genuinely a public duty. I have sought no advice on this, for this is the sort of decision which an hon. Member must take for himself. I can only say that two of the things I care most about in this world are involved in this debate.
One of those two is the honour of this House. I am quite sure that if this is not a proper and responsible use of the privilege of this House, then the privileges of Parliament have no use and no
462
meaning. Of course, the truth that I have spoken can be "twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools". I can only answer such attacks, if they come within this House. Incidentally, I intend to meet the 133 surviving valuers privately—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman must not use this procedure, under which he may ask the House for the privilege of being allowed to introduce a Bill to amend the law, in order to answer some attack. That, clearly, would be an abuse of procedure.
Mr. Iremonger: If I may respectfully say so, Mr. Speaker, any man worth his salt who saw his wife's arm being twisted by a gang of bullies would want to go to her defence.
Mr. Speaker: The question of defence does not arise under the Standing Order.
Mr. Iremonger: I was about to say that, with great respect, and I hope that I shall be believed when I say it, that that particular motive, however understandable, is not—and I repeat, not—my motive for seeking leave to introduce a Bill. My motive is my outrage at seeing the disgraceful abuse of what I consider to be a defective Act of Parliament being exploited against the public interest.
Under the present operation of the Defamation Act, what newspaper will now dare to criticise the valuation methods of the London County Council? What elected member will dare to express publicly anxiety on this score? The member in question will be stripped, by reason of the settlement of this action, of her qualified privilege even in her place on the council chamber. It is my submission that, in the light of what I have said, the law of libel is defective in its operation, and for that reason I am seeking leave to introduce my Bill.
4.2 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: We in this House are granted certain formidable privileges. Those privileges should be used with the utmost restraint. We are granted the privilege of saying things here which may be deeply injurious to individuals. That is a privilege which should be confined strictly to circumstances in which the public interest is pressingly and clearly in issue.

463
The hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger) has said that he feels a natural desire to defend his wife. That is something which we can all respect, but it is not something which should be done by using the privilege of this House to libel other people. If the sort of speech which we heard is in order on this sort of occasion, we should reconsider our rules of order.
The general proposition, that in matters of defamation the question of damages should go to a judge and not a jury, is one which I would very strongly oppose. Freedom of the Press is certain a great principle, but it is justified only in the sense that the Press is the expression of the voice of the people. Where one has a jury, which is the people judging the Press, and the Press finds that that jury takes large opportunities to punish the Press, then the Press should look to itself and see what in its conduct has so antipathised the public whose
representatives judge it so harshly. The Press should look to itself and its own conduct, and not seek to change the law.
Right throughout our history juries have been the instrument of the public freedom; it may be freedom from the conduct of the Press as well as of Governments and judges. While juries take that attitude in our general defence and in defence against some aspects of Press conduct, we should be grateful to juries and applaud them for so doing.
I ask the House most emphatically to reject the principle that juries should be taken away from this very essential civic function.
Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 12 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business):—
The House divided: Ayes 33, Noes 106.

Division No. 183.]

AYES

[4.6 p.m.

Bourne-Arton, A.

Gurden, Harold

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Bullus, Wing Commander Eric

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)

Cooper-Key, Sir Neill

Hiley, Joseph

Russell, Ronald

Cordle, John

Iremonger, T. L.

Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

Errington, Sir Eric

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Kitson, Timothy

Webster, David

Farr, John

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Foster, John

Linstead, Sir Hugh

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Glover, Sir Douglas

Longden, Gilbert

Woollam, John

Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)

Nicholson, Sir Godfrey

Gower, Raymond

Ridley, Hon. Nicholas

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Gresham Cooke, R.

Robinson, Rt. Hn. Sir R. (B'pool,S.)

Mr. Skeet and Dr. Johnson.

NOES

Awbery, Stan (Bristol, Central)

Gourlay, Harry

McBride, N.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Grey, Charles

McCann, John

Bence, Cyril

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

MacColl, James

Benson, Sir George

Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.

Mallalieu, E. L, (Brigg)

Blackburn, F.

Hamilton, William (West Fife)

Marshall, Sir Douglas

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Hart, Mrs. Judith

Mason, Roy

Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'r)

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Bowen, Roderic (Cardigan)

Hayman, F. H.

Mellish, R. J.

Bowles, Frank

Healey, Denis

Mendelson, J. J.

Brockway, A. Fenner

Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)

Millan, Bruce

Brown, Alan (Tottenham)

Herbison, Miss Margaret

Mitchison, G. R.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Hilton, A. V.

Neal, Harold

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Houghton, Douglas

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Carmichael, Nell

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hn. Philip (Derby, S.)

Cary, Sir Robert

Hunter, A. E.

Oram, A. E.

Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)

Hurd, Sir Anthony

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Crosland, Anthony

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Pargiter, G. A,

Dalyell, Tam

Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas

Parker, John

Darling, George

Johnson, Carol (Lewisham, S.)

Redhead, E. C.

Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)

Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Diamond, John

Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)

Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)

Ede, Rt. Hon. C.

Kelley, Richard

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Fernyhough, E.

Kenyon, Clifford

Ross, William

Finch, Harold

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Foley, Maurice

Kitson, Timothy

Silkin, John

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Lawson, George

Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)

Gibson-Watt, David

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Small, William

Ginsburg, David

Lipton, Marcus

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)

Litchfield, Capt. John

Snow, Jullan

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Lubbock, Eric

Steele, Thomas

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Wainwright, Edwin

Wilkins, W. A.

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Weitzman, David

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Thornton, Ernest

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Thorpe, Jeremy

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Winterbottom, R. E.

Tomney, Frank

Whitlock, William

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Wigg, George

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Mr. Crossman and Mr. Paget.

DEFENCE (CENTRAL ORGANISATION)
4.15 p.m.
The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): I beg to move,
That this House takes note of the White Paper on the Central Organisation for Defence (Command Paper No. 2097).
The debate will give the House an opportunity of commenting on a piece of administrative machinery which is of interest to all parties. I propose to open the debate as shortly as I can. Then, because I have given a good deal of personal thought to this matter, with the permission of the House I should like to wind up shortly at the end of the debate and try to answer any questions which are asked by hon. Members.
Last March, we had a defence debate. I said then that we would reorganise the central machinery into a single Ministry of Defence. I make no claim that this is an original idea. Indeed, everybody thought of it before I did. Both sides of the House of Commons, Field Marshal Montgomery, and everybody, have had this idea. It is one thing to have the idea. It is another thing to translate it into legislative form.
What we, the House of Commons, are engaged upon today is a consideration of these proposals. It is more than a party issue. It is a bit of machinery which all of us would have to use if we were in office. Therefore, it is right that all of us should look at it as a House of Commons matter. I promised a White Paper in the summer. This I have been able to produce. Our programme would be, subject to this discussion and the views of the House, legislation in the autumn and a vesting day next April. On any count this is a major administrative reorganisation involving historic Ministries, boards and offices. It merits close examination. I am sure that it will receive close examination.
I want to start by setting it in its historical and political contexts. Defence cannot be considered in isolation. It is
466
central to our foreign and overseas policy. It should be the servant and not the master of events. As long ago as 1888 the Hartington Committee recommended that there should be a co-ordinating committee for defence to examine it in these rather wider contexts. In 1895, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was established, in what might now appear to be a rudimentary form. Those of us who have recently been studying the life of Arthur Balfour will recall the part he played in that Committee in those days at the turn of the century.
Following the Esher Committee, the Defence Committee was strengthened and established on a formal basis in 1904 as the Committee of Imperial Defence, as it was then known. The Committee of Imperial Defence had a long and great history, and some very distinguished men have served on it. To mention but one, all of us would pay tribute to Lord Hankey. It was reviewed again after the First World War when the Chiefs of Staff Committee was created in 1924 for the purpose of providing Ministers with co-ordinated military advice.
The next really important development happened under the pressure of events. That was in 1940, when the Chiefs of Staff worked directly under my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and advised him on strategic matters. The House will no doubt agree that something happened then which never really altered afterwards, namely, that inevitably, at that stage, the Service Ministers assumed responsibilities which were concentrated more on the provision of men and materials. These were very great and important responsibilities. They were different in kind from the responsibilities that Service Ministers had adopted in the previous periods.
In 1946, the Ministry of Defence was established but, in the main, it was a co-ordinating body and in 1958 it was felt that it should be strengthened in some way. Its functions were redefined

467
and the House will remember this from a White Paper that was published in that year. It was to decide major matters of defence policy, size and shape, organisation and disposition of the forces and it was to take a leading part in decisions on weapons and warlike equipment. That system, which I emphasise was mainly co-ordinating, was essentially based on four separate, independent Service Ministries. Indeed, it can be supported in argument, and other arguments can be adduced, for maintaining that system. However, I believe that only those, of whom there are quite a number in the House, who have tried to work it or who have seen it at close quarters can recognise the nature of its shortcomings.
I do not say that everything was wrong with it, or that great achievements were not made with the system under all parties. But there were, and there remain, three main criticisms. The first is the control of defence spending. One can say that under the existing system this is not fully effective. A separate, independent Ministry may reveal the strength of its arguments to the Ministry of Defence, but it is unlikely to reveal the weaknesses.
Central responsibility is not enough unless one has heard the conflicting arguments in the early stages, before the policy has been defined. One has, if one is to judge properly, to see an idea when it is growing and not the sort of final, polished object with all the flaws suitably obscured, which normally comes about if it is being worked out by a fully organised Ministry—and I speak in the hearing of right hon. and hon. Members who have had experience of the way in which Ministries work.
There is, secondly, apart from money, the formulation of an integrated defence policy. I say this meaning no reflection upon anyone, but one is hampered by the very natural tendency of three proud and great Services to consider problems of national defence from separate, individual points of view. This is natural and, indeed, inevitable, but it is quite easy to end up with three different kinds of policy being pursued simultaneously.
Thirdly, there is the great and difficult problem—and this will probably be discussed a lot during the debate—of
468
managing the defence research and development programme. No fully satisfactory solution has so far been found to the consideration of operational requirements on a defence rather than a single Service basis or the putting into operation of cost effectiveness studies.
Attention was drawn to these defects by the Select Committtee on Estimates in its Eighth Report of 1961–62. I am grateful to that Committee for pinpointing the need for investigation. As often happens in relation to Estimates Committees, they have a rather prevaricating answer in the first place and later we tend to carry out in rather more detail what they recommend. In a way, they have got rather resigned to that treatment. In this case, the main thing was that something should happen. No one should underestimate the contribution which the Estimates Committee has made to these things being worked out.
Towards the end of 1962 my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister asked that a major review of defence organisation should be instituted. In this review I received most valuable assistance from Lord Ismay and Lieut.-General Sir Ian Jacob. Following a decision on principle, which was announced in March of this year, we have been able to go into these matters in considerable detail. I would like, at this point, to express my thanks to my right hon. Friends the Service Ministers, their staffs and the Ministry of Aviation for all the help that has been given to me in what is a difficult and, inevitably, a somewhat controversial sphere of administration.
The best way for me to approach this is to say something about three main aspects. The first is the principles involved; what they are and how they have guided us in these reforms. The second is how we propose to fit this new organisation into the Cabinet structure, including the wider context of defence in relation to overseas policy and the rest. The third is to outline, as shortly but as concisely as I can, the structure that we suggest to the House.
There are really six main points of principle to which I shall refer. The first principle which has guided us is that we should have a single, unified Ministry of Defence and that we should not bring a lot of separate units under one roof and

469
call it a new organisation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch), who always puts some point into his speeches, has pointed out that if there were four quarrelling barrow boys one did not necessarily bring their quarrels to an end by moving them to the same pitch. There is something in that approach.
Certainly, the first principle we have followed is that we were determined to have one, single, integrated Ministry. We have established this Ministry under a single Secretary of State with clear lines of authority and responsibility throughout. He can intervene at any point he wishes, whether on policy, administration or finance, but he is not compelled to intervene. In other words, it is a matter of judgment.
This brings me to the second point of principle. It would be easy to work out a system by which one could have all power and responsibility centralised, but in doing so one might place such an overload of work at the top—not just on the Secretary of State but on his principal advisers—that one would bring all useful consideration of major policy to a standstill. For this reason machinery must exist to enable decentralisation, particularly that of day-to-day administration, to be quietly and smoothly carried out.
This leads me to the third point, which concerns the Ministry of Aviation. I have had some experience of this, for I have had the honour to serve in both the Ministry of Aviation and the Ministry of Defence. Let me say at once that there are very good arguments for either bringing it in or keeping it out. Here again, I have tried to take what advice I could. I have had some useful discussions with a very great public servant, Sir Frank Lee, who is one of the most experienced administrators in Whitehall. I felt that discussions with someone who had left Whitehall for a little while, and could look at us from the outside, might be useful.
There is a good case for separating the two. The Ministry of Aviation has close links with both the civil and the military side of aviation in aircraft and in electronics. The research which it does benefits both. An enormous amount of detailed research into problems of laminar flow, solid state physics, and the rest goes on. It may be said that
470
it is very difficult to run this from a Defence Ministry. Against this, of course, it can be said that by far the bulk of its money at present is really defence money. The Ministry of Defence is far and away the largest customer of the Ministry of Aviation today.
I say, frankly, that the argument which influenced me most is that, if one brings aviation in, one will put an enormous extra load upon the Secretary of State. I shall come to what his job will be in a few minutes. It really is quite a big job to accept ultimate responsibility for three Services and three Service Ministries. Adding on top of it the whole of the Ministry of Aviation side would put a tremendous further burden upon him. There is the European Launcher Development Organisation, the supersonic transport, and so on. It has been done in America. They are centralised there. On the other hand, let us remember that we are two years ahead of anyone else in the world with the supersonic transport. I wonder whether we should have been if an overworked Minister of Defence had had to add all the thought on this side to the other thoughts which normally occupy his mind.
As I say, there is no perfect answer to this question. There is no tidy administrative answer. One has to decide one way or another. On balance, after listening to the best advice I can and after taking into account what is, at least, I suppose, as much recent personal experience on it as any Member of the House has, I have come to the conclusion that the Ministry of Aviation ought to be maintained as a separate Ministry. I am sure—Sir Frank Lee was most emphatic to me on this—that we must secure much closer co-operation between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Aviation.
I am sure that he is right, in particular, in expressing to me the view that the Minister and his top staff who arc principally concerned with military projects must be sitting right in with the Secretary of State for Defence and his top officials in the same building. We must have even greater interchange of staff. There must be full access to research establishments. While this is not the perfect solution, I think that it is the

471
best solution we can come to, at least at this stage.
Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the aspects where the Ministry of Aviation and the Ministry of Defence are likely to be concerned is research and development? Will he say something about what the Government's views are about the part which would be played in this matter by the Minister for Science?
Mr. Thorneycroft: There are all sorts of possibilities opening out for the future in how one organises the whole of the technological side of Government, but I think that one of the great principles in the reorganisation of administration is that one should proceed at a pace which is manageable. One has to keep the shop open while all this is going on, above all in defence. I think that my task is not only to keep an eye on the horizon, but to keep my feet rather firmly on the ground and to make proposals which I think are practical in the existing circumstances. I think that this is the right and practical answer in the situation in which we find ourselves today.
The fourth point of principle is that any organisation we set up should be flexible. We are bound to change as we grow. We must create machinery whereby we can identify fields in which we think that rationalisation could be carried further and in which we can make alterations in that direction as and when we think necessary. In other words, one must build into the organisation the necessary machinery to enable the fields of growth to be identified and the impetus to be put into them.
Fifthly, in defence we have to be careful to keep a proper balance between the military, the administrative and the scientific. This branch is quite different from most branches of Government. There are the three quite different types of men involved, the military, the administrative and the scientific. Particularly in these days, when the scientific is becoming ever more important, it is necessary so to lay down the lines of administration that one gets co-ordinated advice at every level from the soldier, sailor or airman, the administrator and the scientist. This is more easy to say than to do, but, in a few
472
moments, when I come to the lay-out of the organisation, I shall describe how we seek to do it.
Sixthly, and by no means least important, one must preserve the individual loyalties and traditions of the fighting men themselves. Look at it how one will, when men are on the field of battle they do not have too high a regard even for the local staff, and very few, I am sure, are thinking about the War Office, the Board of Admiralty, or anyone else like that. Their loyalties are very much more to their ship, their regiment or their squadron. Men have done very great things for loyalties of that kind. We have, therefore, been at great pains to demonstrate throughout all this that in the central organisation we do not seek, and we shall not attempt, in any way to cut across these loyalties and traditions. Indeed, we should seek in every way to fortify them.
So much for the principles which we have followed. I turn now to how they fit into the Cabinet structure. As I said earlier, defence is the servant of foreign policy and defence policy is closely linked with the work of the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office. I have already sketched in the history of how this developed through the Committee of Imperial Defence and the like. What we now propose—it is in paragraph 16 of the White Paper—is to establish a new Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, which is really a merging of two Cabinet Committees.
Mr. E. Shinwell: Surely the right hon. Gentleman is wrong there. The supreme authority has always been the Cabinet itself, responsible for policy. The Defence Committee consisted of a number of members of the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and the several Ministers for the Services being brought in from time to time. The Defence Committee was constituted in that way and it dealt not only with policy and carrying out the policy and with general administration, but also with all matters relating to overseas policy.
Mr. Thorneycroft: No. There were two Committees. One was for defence and one was for overseas policy. What we now propose is the merging of these two Committees. This new merged Committee will be ministerial and it will

473
consist of the small fixed membership, which is set out, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.
The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) is quite right, of course, in saying that all these matters are subject to the ultimate authority of the Cabinet. Other Ministers can be called in as necessary. The Chiefs of Defence Staff and Chiefs of Staff will be called in as the nature of the business requires; they are not members. Other officials such as, for instance, the permanent under-secretaries and the Chief Scientific Adviser could be called in to attend as required. This Committee will be served, as is natural in these circumstances, by an appropriate official committee, not from the Ministry of Defence, but from the Cabinet Secretariat.
The Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff, under this set-up, remain the professional military advisers to the Government. They retain their traditional right of access to the Prime Minister, which I am sure is right. But, even more important, they retain their position as heads of their Services. I attach importance to this because I believe that we require advice on this matter from men who have the responsibility of being heads of their Services and who speak not in some detached way, but with personal experience of what that Service represents.
Mr. George Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman has ignored one point which I regard as being of major importance. The old Committee of Imperial Defence was advisory in character. I always thought that it gained enormously from that fact and from the fact that hon. Members of the Opposition could serve on it. Balfour was a member of the Committee. Perhaps I misunderstand the right hon. Gentleman, but it seems to me that he is talking as if what is proposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 is a legitimate heir to the Committee of Imperial Defence, whereas I think that there is a fundamental difference in approach.
Mr. Thorneycroft: The hon. Gentleman is right about that; there is a difference. I took it in chronological order. Balfour was a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, or the Defence Committee as it was originally,
474
when he was a member of the Opposition. That is an absolutely accurate statement of fact. While we should value the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) as a member of any committee, our proposal is that this should be a Cabinet Committee. I know his views about the organisation for defence, but I am merely describing the present proposal, which is that the Overseas and Defence Committees of the Cabinet should be merged into this new Committee. If the hon. Member would like to develop his point further. I will try to answer it later.
Mr. Wigg: I hope that we will have a serious debate. To make the thrust back at me that I was thinking in terms of my membership—[Hon. Members: "Oh."] That is what the right hon. Gentleman said. I am concerned with the much wider issue. I have always been impressed by the fact that before the First World War we managed to get some value for our money. It is my belief that Lord Haldane was able to do what he did because there was an advisory committee.
Mr. Thorneycroft: We all respect the hon. Member's interest in and knowledge of these matters, and I hope that he will have the opportunity to develop his point. As I said, I am willing to reply to him at the end of the debate, when I will try to deal seriously with his points, which are important.
I turn to the outline of the organisation, which is shown in skeleton form in the chart at the end of the White Paper. On the ministerial side, the Secretary of State is assisted by three Ministers of State. The point that I want to make is that he has no Under-Secretary or deputy peculiar to himself. These three Ministers of State are responsible for the whole of the defence field. Their task is to answer on any aspect of defence, not simply a single Service, and to represent the Secretary of State whenever he so desires. They will also have a responsibility for the Royal Navy, for the Army and for the Royal Air Force and they will be assisted, as now, by three Parliamentary Under-Secretaries.
Mr. Anthony Kershaw: Suppose that one of the Ministers of State is in the other place. How will the matter of answering Questions in this House be

475
divided between the two Ministers of State in this House?
Mr. Thorneycroft: We manage to do this with the three Service Ministers at the moment. This is so in the case of the Admiralty. I do not think that we have any difficulties. If my hon. Friend will develop that point later, I will try to answer it when I reply.
On the professional side, the Secretary of State will have three advisers—the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Chief Scientific Adviser. The Chief of the Defence Staff, with the Chiefs of Staff, heads the military staff structure of the Naval, General and Air Staff. I ask hon. Members to note particularly paragraphs 32 to 41 of the White Paper which indicate certain changes—for instance, in the form of greater integration in the formation of a Defence Intelligence Staff, a Defence Signals Staff, a Defence Operations Executive, and a Defence Operational Requirements Staff.
The Chief Scientific Adviser heads the scientific side, which is of growing importance every year. Apart from anything else, he has the responsibility for bringing some outside advice into the Ministry and to try to tap outside technological, scientific and academic opinion. I think that some ideas from outside are of real value if they can be brought in and, of course, tested against the professional opinions which are now widely available in the Ministry. The chief scientists of the various Departments are, of course, responsible to him.
I ask the House to note particularly the formation of two Committees. One deals with research in its purer forms and the other with the more advanced stages of weapon development. Both are under the Chief Scientific Adviser and have a strong representation from the Ministry of Aviation on them. The Permanent Under-Secretary will be assisted by four Second Permanent Under-Secretaries for the Royal Navy, for the Army, for the Royal Air Force and for the Defence Secretariat.
Among the responsibilities of this last-named official will be the job of identifying areas of administration which may be dealt with better on a defence rather than a single Service basis or on the
476
basis of one Service acting as an agency for the others. The Defence Secretariat is the main co-ordinating body incorporating civilian staffs from the present Service Departments and bringing the whole of this expert knowledge into the closer central decision-making point.
I draw particular attention to finance. The key here is the Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Programmes and Budget), who will be the centre from which the costings will be drawn up and will control programmes and resources, or the general cutting up of the cake. Finance can be divided into the central control of the main programmes, on the one hand, and the accounting, on the other. We have centralised and strengthened the central control of finance. We are decentralising the accounting into four accounting officers, who will be the four Second Permanent Under-Secretaries. They will account for how the money has been spent, which is an important sanction for effective management.
It is necessary to break this down into manageable blocks. A budget of something in the neighbourhood of £2,000 million is involved here and it is a bit unrealistic to pretend that one man will be able to account in detail to the Public Accounts Committee for the spending of £2,000 million. I believe that this arrangement of dividing it into four blocks will be the more effective. But the Permanent Secretary will, of course, have the general supervision and control of these activities and will be the clear administrative head of the whole Ministry. The Second Permanent Under-Secretaries will be subordinate to him.
Mr. Wigg: Will Vote A, which is a very important part of the Parliamentary control of Service Departments, be put separately as it is now or will the Ministry of Defence have a Vote A to cover all three services?
Mr. Thorneycroft: The Secretary of State will accept responsibility for the Defence Estimates, but the procedure will enable the House to have separate debates, as we do today, on the Navy, Army and the Royal Air Force. However, I should like to make a few suggestions as to how we may deal with the matter in the House. It is not for me to decide; it is for the House.
There is one other aspect which I

477
might mention, and that is the question of security, which is referred to in paragraph 88, and which, of course, must be the final responsibility of the Secretary of State. As indicated there, an officer has already been selected from the security services and has been appointed to the Ministry of Defence to start carrying out these functions.
On the committee structure, the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council all disappear and their powers are vested either in the Secretary of State or in the new Defence Council, the membership of which is shown on the chart. The Defence Council will, of course, properly allocate certain responsibilities, particularly for management and discipline, to the three Service Boards, the Navy Board, the Army Board or the Air Force Board, but they will be in all repects subordinate to the Defence Council, and the Secretary of State will be chairman both of the Defence Council and of each of the Service Boards, although obviously he will normally delegate responsibility to a Minister of State for taking the chair at the Service Boards. These reorganisations have involved the loss of a number of distinguished titles, but we have kept the First and Second Sea Lord, and Her Majesty the Queen has graciously consented to assume the title of Lord High Admiral.
The problems are obvious. The problem is to strike a balance between the mere grouping together of great independent bodies, on the one hand, and, on the other, a centralisation so monolithic as to be unworkable. I hope that the House will not underestimate the scale of this reform. There are 25,000 men and women engaged in four Ministries and all of them are in some degree affected by this, and many of them will move. To suggest that we can turn the whole lot over by a stroke of the pen from a Service to a functional basis is utterly unrealistic.
The task of an administrator with a turnover of £2,000 million and with 800,000 people within his ambit is, in any event, not an easy one, and I think that he is entitled to ask his critics to consider carefully the speed at which he can move or the number of moves that he can accomplish at any one time, bearing particularly in mind that during the
478
whole process he has to keep the policies in action, the programmes developing and the men housed, fed, clothed, and paid. It is very easy to say that some reforms do not go far enough, but I think that the critics are under an obligation to state not only in what respects they want to go further, but how they propose to keep the whole show going during the transitional period.
I am satisfied that these proposals, which have not been altogether uncontroversial, are the right ones. They present in themselves a massive reform in structure, they greatly strengthen the administrative control, particularly financial control, and they give the centre an access to knowledge hitherto denied it. What has been done in this machine is to build into it machinery for smooth development and further change, and we certainly intend to use this machinery.
Of course, all machinery is an instrument of policy, and Mr. Speaker indicated yesterday that we might perhaps touch on policy if only as an illustration of what we were doing in organisation. I hope that no one will protest if I do so, because I am doing so mainly to give the Opposition spokesman a chance of doing so, too.
The British defence policy is based, as I have often said, on the deterrent, upon the rôle in Europe and upon military presence east of Suez. These are rôles of the first importance, all of them, and they have markedly increased our influence in the world and enabled us to play a very important part in the world, including the recent participation in the nuclear test ban agreement. They are based on a balance of forces, nuclear and conventional, land, sea and air. But these forces are increasingly interdependent and this is a major reason for reorganisation at the top. The announcement yesterday, for example, of the adoption of a common aircraft for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force is a significant indication of the new approach in which all Services play a rô1e, the Navy with carriers and Polaris submarines, the Army with Chieftain tanks and new equipment and the Royal Air Force with a vertical take-off strike fighter aircraft, the tactical transport, and, importantly, the TSR2, which the right hon. Gentleman sought to ask me about yesterday.

479
The TSR2 plays an essential part in our strategy. It is intended to complete its development and to bring it into service with the Royal Air Force. It offers every prospect of being a fine aircraft and a worthy successor of the Canberra. It recently passed a milestone in its development when an initial production order was placed, as announced by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation on 29th July. It is our intention to place production orders for aircraft for the squadrons at the appropriate stage, which will probably be towards the end of this year. So policy and organisation proceed together, in the main upon a Service basis.
But it is increasingly apparent that emphasis for the future will be partly on the Services but increasingly on missions, on the inter-relation between Services on common activities, and on interdependence, and it is a matter of judgment about the areas which one selects for deciding where we want closer integration and the speed of advance, but the general direction, I think, can no longer be open to doubt and, indeed, in the outfields in all the commands overseas, has already been adopted.
In all this the House of Commons has a very big part to play. One must be guided by what are the wishes of the House of Commons on some aspects of this matter. At present, hon. Members themselves are organised in the House upon Committees divided upon a Service basis. We have our debates. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) said the other day that we have our debates on the Army Estimates, then on the Navy Estimates, and then on the Air Estimates. I am not saying that this is wrong, or should be stopped, but I would say that if we could have a debate on the deterrent, on our rôle in Europe with all Services, on the whole problem of all the Services, on what our defensive position is in those great areas of the world between Aden and Singapore—matters which merit a major debate in the House—it might attract a somewhat larger attendance than some of the defence debates that we have had in the past. In any event, these are matters for the House of Commons to consider, but this organisation is certainly a prelude to any
480
reform and I hope that the House will give it general approval.
5.0 p.m.
Mr. Denis Healey: When Ministers in the present Administration introduce new steps of policy to the House, I have noticed that they tend to follow one of two patterns. One is to recount the historical series of events which led up to the decision and to assume that the conclusion of a temporal sequence is as good as the conclusion of a rational argument—and I thought that when the Minister of Defence started his speech, he would adopt that pattern. He adopted, however, the other one of presenting an abstract argument in general principles, with which nobody, on either side of the House, can disagree and then simply asserting that the proposals which he was making illustrated the general principles which he was putting forward.
What one missed in the right hon. Gentleman's speech was any indication of the almost inexplicable tangle into which our defence organisation and policies have fallen and how the precise proposals which the right hon. Gentleman was putting to the House will help to get us out of it. Indeed, we are still in some confusion and uncertainty as to why the Government produced the White Paper at this time.
When he went through the historical sequence, the Minister of Defence might have reminded us of the last White Paper on defence reorganisation which was presented to the House in 1958 on the same glowing assumption that it would lead to a correction of all the mistakes from which our defence policy had suffered since the present Administration first came to power.
Six and a half years ago, the then Minister of Defence, who is now Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the House that he had been given a directive by the Prime Minister and that it read as follows:
"Subject as necessary to consultations with the Cabinet and Defence Committee and with the Treasury, on matters of finance, the Minister"—
that was, the Minister of Defence—
"will have authority to give decisions on all matters of policy affecting the size, shape, organisation and disposition of the Armed Forces, their equipment and supply (including

481
defence research and development) and their pay and conditions of service. He will similarly have power of decision on any matters of Service administration or appointments which, in his opinion, are of special importance."
It is clear from that that since 1957 Ministers of Defence have had all the powers which they could conceivably require. The question to which we want to know the answer is why they have used these powers so badly, or failed to use them at all, in the last seven years and how the proposed reorganisation, which does not increase the powers of the Minister of Defence, will lead to better decisions being taken and a more proper and intelligent use of the powers which Ministers have possessed for the last seven years.
One other point that the former Minister of Defence made in 1958, when he told us about those powers which he had been given, was that he thought it a great mistake for the Minister of Defence to take over responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the individual Services, because, he said—incidentally, almost five years ago to the day:
"The Minister of Defence is responsible for formulating the policy which determines the spending of about one-third of the whole of the national Budget. I would say to the House that he needs all his time and energy to discharge that task. It is, therefore, quite essential that he should remain free from the time-absorbing preoccupations of Departmental administration."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1958; Vol. 592, c. 955–6.]
I will come later to my own views about the statement by the then Minister of Defence, but it seems to me to have been an important and a plausible one which he was making.
The essential change proposed by the Minister of Defence today saddles the holder of that office with the type of Responsibilities which, in the view of the present Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary, were bound to make it impossible for him to fulfil his primary rôle of the formulator of defence policy.
The extraordinary thing is that as late as last November, the present Minister of Defence, when asked to accept the recommendation of the Estimates Committee for the consolidation of the headquarters of the higher staff of the three Services, rejected the proposal. As late as 18th December, 1962,
482
the former Secretary of State for War poured scorn on the proposal of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) that there should be an integrated headquarters for the Ministry of Defence, by saying:
"He seemed to think that we should have an enormous great Ministry of Defence to run our organisation. I want to ask him one practical question….I do not know where else in London the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks we might house such an enormous organisation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 18th December, 1962; Vol. 669, c. 1206.]
Of course, the Minister of Defence knows the answer now. It shows, however, a lack of liaison in the present system if the Secretary of State for War could give that answer to a proposal last December and three months later the Minister of Defence, his boss, says that he is prepared to do precisely what the Secretary of State for War and he himself had rejected a month or two before. The result is the White Paper which we are today considering.
Of course, we have the answer to the question in paragraph 5 of the present White Paper, where the Minister of Defence states:
"The arrangements set out in the 1958 White Paper…have not in practice secured the degree of central control over defence policy which is necessary in the national interest. A unified Ministry of Defence is essential if the defence budget is to strike a proper balance between commitments, resources, and the rôles of the Services."
We have not had a convincing answer from the Minister of Defence to the question which must be perplexing us on both sides: that is, what happened between the middle of December last year and the middle of February to make the whole Government decide that a system which, it was said, was working admirably for the previous five years had suddenly become totally unsuitable, and a major revolutionary change in the whole organisation of our defence was therefore required.
When the Minister of Defence first put that proposal forward, many of us on this side suspected that it was a smokescreen to divert attention from the total vacuum of policy revealed by the White Paper which he presented to the House. The answer, however, is clear enough. The Government have come to a complete dead end in their defence policy. Over 11 years, they have spent £18,000 million,

483
but we simply have not had value for money. We still fail to produce forces adequate to fulfil the commitments which we have accepted. We have failed to formulate a strategic policy which makes sense.
If the right hon. and hon. Members opposite will not accept this from me, let me quote the words of the defence correspondent of the Sunday Times, who is certainly no friend of my party and whose newspaper is very friendly with the party opposite—[Interruption.]—Mr. David Divine. I am surprised that the Minister of Defence does not know his name, but it is typical of the ignorance of the present Administration of the facts of life. Nobody tells anybody anything.
In commending the White Paper to the public a few weeks ago, the defence correspondent of the Sunday Times said:
"The total inadequacy of the existing system is widely ignored and it is hoped that the gigantic task of bringing order to the present chaos of overlapping, duplication and inherent inefficiency will begin this week. The necessity for this dynamic change has been apparent to inquiring laymen for some time."
Those inquiring laymen, incidentally, can include many right hon. and hon. Members of this side of the House. He went on:
"It is implicit in recent military history. The record of weapons and material demonstrates the total inability of the existing system to keep pace with technological advance. Evidence of muddle, duplication, and inefficiency is abundantly available. The position of the British forces in the field of missiles alone is more than sufficient to justify the proposed reorganisation. The qualitative state of the Navy is profoundly disquieting. Army re-equipment is unsatisfactory, both in quality and quantity."
This is the real background. These are the concrete facts of the national situation to which this reorganisation of the defence institutions has to be proved relevant if it is to justify itself to this House, and the question to which we have to have an answer, and which the Minister of Defence has not answered, is whether this new machinery is going to put it right. Of course, the answer is "No"; because the basic responsibility for what the correspondent called the chaos in our present defences is that of Ministers and Ministers alone. It is the responsibility of the Prime Minister, the responsibility of his Cabinet as a whole and, of course,
484
the responsibility of the man who holds the office of Minister of Defence.
I put the Prime Minister first because I think his is the major responsibility, in that it is due to him that there has been no continuity of office in the Ministry of Defence during the last 12 years. We have had nine Ministers of Defence in the last 12 years. Each of them presented at least on new strategic concept, and some of them more than one during their periods of office, and may I say to the right hon. Gentleman that, whatever we think about him, and we do criticise him, we hope that there is not to be yet another Minister of Defence before this Administration collapse into their grave.
As the Minister of Defence—was it the fifth or sixth before now?—said in 1957, the Minister of Defence has had for the last six years all the powers he needs to decide what should happen about the Armed Forces. The trouble is that the only one to use those powers was the one who presently is Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, and it was a misfortune that he used them wrongly in almost every case, but he did at least, while he was still there, take decisions and use his authority given him by the Prime Minister and later confirmed by decision of this House in 1958.
I believe myself that behind the failure in organisation and control of our Armed Forces there is a more fundamental failure on which the right hon. Gentleman touched in his speech, and it has been the fundamental failure to relate our defence policy to our foreign and colonial policy, to have the sort of integration which is required between the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Colonial Office, and the other Departments concerned with overseas affairs.
We had, incidentally, an interesting example of this only two days ago. There was a big earthquake in Skopje in southern Yugoslavia last Friday. The following day, on Saturday, the United States army flew in an armada of 27 planes with a 170-bed hospital, 19 doctors, 30 nurses, 209 other staff, X-ray equipment, a laboratory, their own water and petrol for their ambulances for 30 days. In addition to that, the Americans sent in 20,000 tons of medical supplies, 5,000 tons of blankets and 40,000 lb. of

485
Red Cross supplies and 25 ambulances. This is a major military operation carried out for purely political and humanitarian purposes. The British offer—we will not discuss this now—in the view of hon. and right hon. Members on this side of the House is totally inadequate—£10,000, two tons of baby food and a few hundred weight of blankets.
The point I am trying to make here is that when the Lord Privy Seal came to the House and announced this on Monday, three days after the earthquake had taken place in Skopje, he did not know whether in fact the supplies had been flown out or would be flown out. All he was able to say was that the Foreign Office was still trying to arrange for the Royal Air Force to fly out those two tons of baby food.
We had another example a few weeks ago when the right hon. Gentleman told us that we had spent £6 million on building an Army base in Kenya, although all hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House knew, and nearly all the European inhabitants of Kenya knew from the word "go", that this base would never be used, and all the right hon. Gentleman could say in reply was that it would be a nice thing if we could always predict the future. But if this future was not predictable by the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, what sort of future is? There is absolutely no excuse whatever for the sort of lack of liaison and co-ordination of policy revealed by the waste of money in building a base in Kenya.
Much more important than this is the continuing failure of the Government to relate their major programmes in the field of defence with their major programmes in the field of foreign policy. I think that many of us on both sides of the House felt it almost impossible to understand, for example, why the Prime Minister should have made the Nassau Agreement for the supply of Polaris weapons and to provide for the continuation of the independent British deterrent just at the very moment when the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market had reached what everybody knew to be their most critical stage. Opinions may differ as to whether General de Gaulle would have vetoed our application in any case, but I do not think that anybody who has followed
486
events could have doubted that it was certain that he would veto our application once we had made this particular agreement.
Or, to take another example, in 1956 the Soviet Government accepted the proposal made by Her Majesty's Government for general and comprehensive disarmament, and Her Majesty's Government were compelled immediately to withdraw their proposals because it turned out that the Chiefs of Staff had not approved them and that if in fact those proposals had been carried out in practice they might have involved serious damage to our defence position.
This sort of lack of co-ordination between our defence and our foreign policy could be particularly disastrous at the present time, because all of us hope—and I do not think there is disagreement between the two sides on this—that the test ban agreement which has recently been made in Moscow marks not the end of a process but the beginning of a new process. Indeed, I go so far as to say that the test ban agreement, limited as it is, will be worth very little unless it leads to a basic shift in the policies of the major Powers, and I believe that there must be increasing co-operation between the West and the Soviet Union to achieve military security by co-operation to halt the arms race rather than by competition to win the arms race, and for this; reason co-ordination of our defence policy with our foreign policy is going to be particularly urgent and important in the years ahead.
Many of the extremely formidable problems now facing N.A.T.O., particularly facing our own troops in B.A.O.R., could be made much easier to solve if there were effective agreement between Russia and the West on preventing surprise attack on the ground and to limit the forces on each side of the Iron Curtain under some effective form of inspection and control. Indeed, my impression is that there is no other way than such an agreement with the Soviet Union to give B.A.O.R. the 72 hours it needs at present to reach its forward positions in case of war.
If we are moving, as, I think, all of us must hope, into this new period in which we try to solve our defence problems by co-operation with our political opponent rather than by competition

487
with him, it is going to place a great strain on our alliance, and yet the maintenance of the solidarity of our alliance will be the precondition of success both in reaching a political settlement with the other side and in reaching a more suitable basis for our mutual security.
Here I think the Government must begin to think again about their policy towards the independent British deterrent. I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that there is no chance whatever of getting lasting German agreement to measures which are required to stop the spread of atomic weapons if the United Kingdom refuses absolutely, as it has done so far, to consider putting itself on the same level in this field as Western Germany.
I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that there is a real choice here which this House and the country should debate—the question of whether Britain should continue to attempt to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent. It is possible that when this debate is carried on in the House and in the country the House and the country may opt for the Gaullist policy. I do not believe it will, in that there is evidence that even the French people are turning against that policy if we are to judge by recent opinion polls in France.
I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman—I make this suggestion very seriously—that it is no good Her Majesty's Government using Gaullist slogans for electoral advantage in this country if they are not prepared to show Gaullist will. My own belief is that by playing with the vocabulary of Gaullism in the nuclear field, Her Majesty's Government are doing damage which may prove irreparable to the basic aims of their foreign policy, with results which will be catastrophic to the United Kingdom and to the alliance as a whole.
Brigadier Sir John Smyth: We hope that the hon. Gentleman is going to say something about the White Paper before he sits down.
Mr. Healey: I am sorry. I had hoped that the right hon. and gallant Gentleman would be able to hear what I am saying. It is clearly evident that he was not able to understand it.
488
I pass now from the question of what is basically wrong to the question of whether the changes in organisation proposed by the right hon. Gentleman will help to produce the integration of our defence and foreign policies which he regards, as I do, as absolutely essential. I think we might as well be clear about one thing at the start, and that is that no changes in the machinery of the Civil Service are a substitute for Ministers in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence who have the ability and will to work together.
I believe that the proposed new Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy should work better than the Defence Committee of the Cabinet set up in 1958 because it is smaller, but I doubt very much whether it will, in fact, work better unless it is very much better serviced than the existing Committee. I deplore very much the fact that there is no suggestion whatever in the White Paper of strengthening the staff of the Cabinet secretariat in order to produce the right sort of agenda for this Cabinet Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy to discuss.
I am not suggesting—I think it is far past that—that we should go back to the old sort of Committee of Imperial Defence. I think that if we are going to make a reality of co-ordination of our defence and foreign policies, this new Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet will require servicing by a staff of the calibre and quality which Lord Hankey produced to service the Committee of Imperial Defence. I hope that in reply the right hon. Gentleman will be able to say something about how it is proposed to provide the type of expertise behind the new proposed Cabinet Committee which will enable it to perform the rôle which, frankly, the last Committee has not performed, and I have given examples of how it has not.
The second thing which I think this Committee will have to do is to make a far more rigorous study of the real economic and political importance to Britain of the overseas commitments she carries at the present time and of the cost of protecting those commitments by force rather than by protecting them exclusively by diplomatic means. This is an extremely difficult problem. Again, I doubt very much whether at the present

489
time there is an adequate machinery inside the Government system to provide Ministers with the evidence on which they will have to take decisions. Besides integrating policy as between the Ministry of Defence and other Government Departments, there is the equally important problem of integrating British defence policy and organisation with that of the allies, without whom our own efforts have little meaning. Again, there is no sign here of any machinery which will enable us to co-ordinate our own efforts with those of our allies and avoid the appalling chaos in some fields of allied co-operation which we can see everyday in N.A.T.O. and other alliances at the present time.
The main concern of the White Paper is the decision to integrate the three Services at the top, and, quite rightly, the right hon. Gentleman devoted most of his time to discussing how it was proposed that this should be done. There is no doubt that it is very badly needed, especially in the field of evaluating and producing weapons and weapon systems, because at the present time competition between the Services has produced one bad decision after another: the choice of the wrong weapons, particularly in the field of deterrents, for example. First, we had Blue Streak, and then Skybolt, because the R.A.F. wanted to prolong the life of the V-bombers, and the Navy, Although Polaris was the better weapon, did not really want to accept this for fear of losing its appropriations in fields which it regarded as more fruitful and important. Then we had the choice of two weapons where one should do: the R.A.F. wanted the Bloodhound and N.A.T.O. the Hawk. The Army wanted the Thunderbird and the Navy the Sea-Slug. The Navy has now got the Buccaneer, and the R.A.F. is now getting the TSR2.
I do not feel totally convinced by what the right hon. Gentleman said to us on the subject of the TSR2. The impression that many of us have is that this project has already cost well over £200 million and that it is falling further and further behind schedule. Many of us have the nasty feeling that on this issue, as on so many others, Her Majesty's Government will fail to take a clear decision to cancel the project when cancellation is clearly necessary, because they are frightened to
490
take the political consequences of such a decision, and that this, as with so many other things, will be a mess which they will leave to be cleared up by the Labour Government when they come into power next year.
Mr. Thorneycroft: I know that it is part of the hon. Gentleman's policy largely to phase out the R.A.F., but I think he ought to make it plain whether it is part of his party's policy to cancel the TSR2.
Mr. Healey: There is a very strong case so far as the TSR2 is concerned for a committee of inquiry to investigate the cost of the project so far, and what it is likely to cost if it is carried to completion, and what the actual value of the weapon will be when carried to completion in the light of present knowledge. I myself certainly would not be prepared to take a decision on such a matter without having the information of this nature which is already available to the right hon. Gentleman.
Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: The hon. Gentleman asserted that the TSR2 had fallen behind schedule. Would he explain on what that view is based? Is he aware that at the moment the Australian Government have sent people over here to investigate this aircraft? I believe that some progress has been made. Surely he ought to weigh his words before deprecating an aircraft which some of us believe is going along reasonably well.
Mr. Wigg: Would my hon. Friend give this undertaking on behalf of a Labour Government which may come into power next year, that if when we come into power it is discovered, after investigation and in the light of the full knowledge, that it was only for political reasons that the Conservative Government have carried on with the project, the Labour Government will consider impeachment?
Mr. Healey: I should be unwise to to give a firm undertaking on that matter, as on the one raised by the right hon. Gentleman earlier.
Sir A. V. Harvey: Would the hon. Gentleman answer my question?
Mr. Shinwell: Let us get on with the White Paper.
Mr. Healey: I think it would be a good idea if I got on with my speech.
These are the questions to which we want to know the answers. I suggest to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen that it is, frankly, quite impossible to discuss the relevance or efficiency of proposed changes in institutions unless we know whether or not they are likely to correct mistakes from which our policy is at present suffering.
I raise these matters now because I want to deal with the question of precisely how the proposals the right hon. Gentleman is making will affect these issues. No one in the country or the House should care a damn about the institutions as such. The only thing that matters is whether they help to produce the weapons and forces we need and the sort of policy the country requires. The right hon. Gentleman failed in his duty to the House when he completely failed to relate the information he gave us about the institutions to the problems of policy and organisation and military strength which are their only justification.
Sir A. V. Harvey: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Healey: No, I will not. I have given way far too much already. I should be allowed now to get on with my speech.
I suggest, in addition, that at present we are wasting money by trying to produce two weapons where one will do. I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman, as I did yesterday, on having at last persuaded the Navy and the Air Force to accept the same aircraft as a replacement for the Vixen and the Hunter. But the Army still lacks the air and sea lift it needs, because provision for it is not carried on the Army Vote but on the Votes of the other Services. There is still waste in training separately technicians of the various services who could do at least some of it together. We still have separate organisations to do what are essentially the same jobs in far too many cases, although some progress has been made in this case.
I ask these questions because we must now consider whether the proposed reorganisation will help to answer them. In the Press, and, I think, among most people who have studied the reorganisation, the general feeling is that it is something that is a move in the right direction
492
because it is one in the direction which the United States followed many years ago, when it put its Services together in the Pentagon.
There is no doubt that the present American system does seem to be producing the sort of results which the Minister hopes to produce by his reorganisation. The American Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, was able to tell President Kennedy a few days ago that, in the last two years, he has cut defence expenditure by £360 million while increasing combat ready divisions by 45 per cent., tactical air squadrons by 30 per cent., air lift by 60 per cent., and anti-guerrilla forces by 200 per cent.
If we could expect this type of improvement in value for money from the reorganisation here we would welcome it unreservedly. But it is important to realise that these achievements in the United States were not produced by setting up the Pentagon. Indeed, the civil war between the American Services went on if anything more fiercely after they were put into the same building than it had earlier, and the joke of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch) about four barrow boys on the same pitch has very great relevance here.
The breakthrough to efficiency in the American organisation first came four years ago when President Eisenhower decided to have single accounting throughout the Services. But much more came of it when President Kennedy appointed as Secretary of State a man of immense energy and organisational skill, assisted by outside teams, and when this man had the strength of character to impose his will on the individual services.
Quite frankly, there is very little sign of this type of change in the White Paper. Indeed, it is not even clear whether the organisation proposed will produce a Pentagon or a penthouse. What is quite clear is that the battle continues over these proposals. As the right hon. Gentleman himself said, this is a compromise proposal and everything depends on whether it is the first step towards further co-operation between the Services or whether, like so many other reforms in the past, it simply produces a new framework to which the vested interests which obstruct progress very quickly adapt themselves.

493
I want to say something about the dangers of that unpopular word "integration". Very often it is taken to mean that the three Services should lose their separate identities, that we should have one single Service, and that everyone should wear a uniform of the same indeterminate grey colour. I do not feel convinced by the arguments for a single Service. On the other hand, if anything would convince me that those arguments have sense, it would be the argument against a single Service in paragraph 10 of the White Paper, which says:
"…all experience shows that the fighting spirit of the individual man in battle derives largely from his loyalty to his ship, his unit, or his squadron. The traditions and battle honours of the individual Services are a vital factor in morale and fighting efficiency. This must be preserved."
Certainly. But this has nothing to do with the question of whether or not we have three Services or a single Service. The right hon. Gentleman was quite right in saying that soldiers fighting in a war are inspired by loyalty to their unit or to their regiment. They do not give a damn about the War Office or whether they are commanded by a thing called the War Office or a thing called the Ministry of Defence. The essential loyalties, on which the morale of fighting men depends, are loyalties to those men with whom they directly serve. One cannot inspire this type of morale by putting units against one another from different Services. It is competition from other units of the same Service of the same type which build up morale.
No Army has had its morale increased by the thought that it was doing better than an Air Force or a Navy unit, even in combined operations during the war, of which I have experience. But I do not think that that argument has anything to do with the question of whether or not we should have a single Service. The problem is to try to persuade the men in the Services to think and act together, and here the problem boils down, in the end, as much as anything, to the problem of joint training.
I have been enormously impressed by the impact on officers of all three Services of the training they do together in combined institutions like the Imperial Defence College and the Joint Services Staff College, and I believe that the same is true of some of the new joint organisa-
494
tions like the Joint Warfare Establishment which was recently set up.
I have never known, in my experience, any difficulty whatever in officers and men of different Services acting as one when they are able to act together. The problem here is entirely at the top among the senior officers, who have vested interests in the size and rôle of their own Services. This is a problem in which younger, more junior officers are very little involved. The problem arises when future promotion or, indeed, loyalty by a senior officer to the interests of his Service, begin to take precedence over loyalty to the conception of defence as a whole.
The question is whether the proposed reorganisation will help to overcome what is essentially a psychological problem among senior officers of the three Services. This is where, I confess, that the more one looks at these proposals the more they seem like a penthouse than a Pentagon. They seem to consist much more of putting a new bureaucracy on top of the existing ones than of really combining and integrating the three Services at the top.
Although, unfortunately, we have to rely for these things on leaks from the Cabinet, I understand that there is likely to be a substantial increase in total headquarters staff as a result of the early implementation of these proposals. Many of the joint organisations to which the White Paper refers are, as far as one can tell—I refer to paragraph 34—not so much an integration of existing organisations as the creation of a new organisation, perhaps parallel with, perhaps on top of, the existing structures.
I have no doubt that the right hon. Gentleman is prepared to accept an initial increase in headquarters staff hoping to effect a reduction later by streamlining, but he must be as aware as I am that this has rarely happened in the past. Indeed, I believe that Professor Parkinson first formulated his law on the basis of a close study of what had happened in this respect in the British Admiralty. What we have seen ever since the Second World War—and, I suspect, ever since the First World War—has been a steady increase in the number of civil servants in the Defence Ministries against the number of military and, among the Services themselves, a steady

495
increase in administrative tail personnel as against fighting, teeth personnel. In 1498, we had only 128,000 civil servants along with 1 million Service men, but now that we have only 400,000 Servicemen, the number of civil servants has risen to 134,000. There are 8,171 civil servants and 634 Royal Navy personnel in the Admiralty Headquarters staff to look after only 273 ships, most of them pretty small.
It might be possible to justify this trend were it not there there is continued evidence of appalling waste as a result. We had a new instalment of evidence of this waste in the extremely interesting and impressive Report of the Estimates Committee published yesterday—more than £46,000 to produce a house for the Admiral at Aden and £6,000 each for flats as married quarters in Malta and continued heavy expenditure in Malta on projects which were later abandoned. I do not think that any of us can be happy with this trend to increase the tail at the expense of the teeth, civil servants at the expense of the military, when it is obviously accompanied by this type of waste.
Have we any real grounds for believing that the proposed reorganisation will remove this? To take a phrase used by the Minister of Aviation the other day, we have what might be called the propinquity fallacy—the idea that if people are made to work in adjoining rooms, they are more likely to agree than if they are working in rooms a mile apart. As the right hon. Gentleman has confessed, there is nothing in this. One of the oddest examples of the propinquity fallacy is the attempt to justify doing nothing about the Ministry of Aviation by putting some of the staff in the same building as the Ministry of Defence, although not in any sense under the Ministry of Defence. The old argument that barrow boys will quarrel as much if they are on the same pitch has meaning in this connection.
We have a lot of combination at the level of headquarters staffs, but, unfortunately, in most cases old staffs continue to exist alongside the joint staffs. The right hon. Gentleman put his finger on the central issue when he said that what we really needed in our defence organisation was a switch from a Service to a functional or mission basis for the organisation and financing of our defences.
496
There is no sign of that in the Defence White Paper. So long as the essential power in the Services themselves lies with the Chiefs of Staff—as is clear from the White Paper, because not only do the Chiefs of Staff continue to maintain their right of access to the Prime Minister, but each of them can compel the Chief of Defence Staff to transmit his views to the Defence Council if he does not agree with his colleagues—the old battles are likely to continue. There may be a new building and new institutions, but it is likely that senior officers will achieve progress by the old system of log rolling—"You back me on this, and I will back you on that". The result is that we never get that essential singleness of contact and control which it is ostensibly the purpose of the White Paper to produce.
I should feel happier about the White Paper if it had some sign of a purposive attempt to move towards a functional from a Service basis in our organisation and accounting, and I hope that the Minister of Defence will be able to give us a little more information on this subject when he winds up than he did in his opening speech.
What seems to be implied in this new organisation is a tremendous concentration of power at the top of the three main pyramids in the New Ministry of Defence—the Civil Service, the military and the scientific pyramids. Parallel with that is a great weakening of the possibility of Ministerial control. This is the issue on which many of my right hon. and hon. Friends have the most serious anxieties, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to do something to allay those anxieties.
I readily admit that the concentration of power at the top depends very much on the personalities of the individuals who hold the top jobs. If there is a weak Chief of Defence Staff, he will be the tool of his Chiefs of Staff and not their master, if it is intended that he should be their master. The same is true of a weak Permanent Under-Secretary. So long as these posts are held by people like those who now hold them, enormous power in the Civil Service and military side of the Ministry of Defence is held by the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chief Scientific Adviser.

497
There is a real danger that if these three men agree, the Minister will have no alternative but to agree with them. The Minister accepted in his own speech that of all aspects of organisation and policy, it is in defence that it is most important that alternatives should be offered for decision to a man who is politically responsible to Parliament and to the people. He said himself that it was very important that the Minister of Defence should be aware of divergencies of opinion right from the word go. Under the reorganisation as set out in the White Paper, there is no guarantee that alternatives will be put forward unless they are alternatives which happen to raise the old traditional differences of interest among the various Services. I do not think that it is desirable or necessary that differences of opinion should be institutionalised in the old Service framework, because more and more disagreements will tend to cut across Service boundaries, or certainly should.
I am not at all clear how it will be possible for the Minister to be aware of the possible different courses which might be followed if the Chiefs of Staff agree and the Chief of Defence Staff puts forward their common opinion for the Minister's decision. There is still room for argument as to whether it is wise to have the Chief of Defence Staff with his present position and power. There is a case for arguing that a person with the sort of function which Lord Is may used to perform, interpreting Service opinion and putting alternatives, would be better than a man whose main job was to prevent alternatives from being put and to put forward a single Service viewpoint.
I confess that one must have similar reservations about the post of Chief Scientific Adviser, because all the experience of the last world war points to the grave dangers when only one single source of scientific authority is available to the man who is Minister of Defence. There may not be complete unanimity on this, but I am sure that most hon. Members do not want to see another man with the sort of rôle and functions which Professor Lindemann performed in the wartime set-up.
Perhaps at this stage, in spite of these reservations and doubts, there is a case for this type of centralisation on the
498
military and Civil Service side to make the problem manageable at all. The most serious doubt that we have about these proposals is how the Secretary of State will cope with this colossal weight of new responsibility which will fall on him when he is deprived of any effective ministerial assistance. It is proposed to downgrade the three Secretaries of State to Ministers of State, and yet leave the Chiefs of Staff with a right of access to the Prime Minister. In spite of what the right hon. Gentleman said, it is inevitable that under these circumstances the three Ministers of State will become public relations officers and welfare officers for what is left of the three services. The right hon. Gentleman may give them jobs outside their Service responsibilities, but we all know how little weight Ministers of State carry with civil servants in the Departments for which they are responsible, and I am sure that the Secretary of State for War will bear me out on this.
I do not blame the Minister of Defence for dodging the problem of the Ministry of Aviation at this stage, because, whatever one's view may be about the ultimate rôle of the Ministry of Aviation, it is far too big a business to cope with that—and I agree with the right hon. Gentleman here—on top of the other tremendous new responsibilities which fall on him in the three Services. I think that the same goes for the Ministry of Works. There is a strong case for putting the works services of the Services under the Ministry of Defence and taking them away from the Ministry of Public Building and Works where they now lie, but whether that be so or not, in principle, I do not think that the Secretary of State can cope immediately with this responsibility on top of all the others.
The real problem is the one to which the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations referred when he spoke in 1958, and I shall quote the right hon. Gentleman's words again because they are very important, and in many ways go to the crux of the whole question. He said:
"The Minister of Defence is responsible for formulating the policy which determines the spending of about one-third of the whole of the national Budget. I would say to the House that he needs all his time and energy to discharge that task."

499
I think that is true. He went on to say:
"It is, therefore, quite essential that he should remain free from the time-absorbing pre-occupations of Departmental administration."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1958; Vol. 592, c. 956.]
That is not necessarily true, but what is true as that if we put the Services under the Minister of Defence and make him responsible for their administration and reduce the standing of the Ministers who have direct Service responsibility, we must lighten the load falling on the Secretary of State to enable him to carry out his policy function at all. We must give him the time and energy to think.
I do not believe that the Ministerial structure proposed in the new organisation will give the Secretary of State this time, and the result is that policy is liable to be made by the arbitrary play of power between the chief military and Civil Service advisers of the Minister. The Minister will not have the time or the energy to take the basic decisions. There may be a case for retaining the existing rank of what I call Service assistants to the Minister of Defence, but it is no answer to this problem simply to upgrade the Ministers of State back to Secretaries of State if their functions remain as envisaged in the White Paper.
The real problem about the whole reorganisation is the one to which I referred earlier, that of ensuring that this reorganisation is the first step in a continuing process; the transformation of Service organisation towards co-operation on a functional basis rather than the old Service institutional basis. This can be achieved only if we build into the new machinery some sort of institutional pressure for continuing change, otherwise the new system will rapidly petrify and we shall be left with something very much the same as we have now.
At present, the only responsibility which is clearly allocated in the new set up for continuing pressure for change is vested in the Second Permanent Under-secretary who is supposed to identify fields where further integration will be useful. I suggest that this is not enough. We must have a senior Minister under the new Secretary of State for Defence whose job it is to continue to try to cut out overlapping between the Services and
500
to promote common services on a functional basis wherever possible.
I believe that the most useful way of performing this function is to make this senior Minister responsible to the Secretary of State for the preparation of the defence budget, because it has been shown in the United States that budgetary control is the most powerful instrument of integration. I should like to see a senior Minister—I should not at the moment like to pronounce on his title or rank, or whether he should be in the Cabinet, but above the rank of Minister of State who would be a sort of Minister of the Defence Budget, with a rôle and responsibility rather analogous to that of the Assistant Secretary Defence (Comptroller) in the defence system under Mr. McNamara in the United States. This would help to take care of one of the major fields of policy for which the Secretary of State is responsible, and a field of policy which I believe is bound to require continuous Ministerial attention.
The other weakness of the new proposals is the lack of institutional pressure for the integration of policy with other Ministeries concerned with overseas affairs, security, foreign affairs, Commonwealth relations, and disarmament, and for the integration of British policy with allied policy. It seems that there is a strong case for having another senior assistant to the new Secretary of State, who will be primarily responsible for what we might call the international policy aspects of British defence organisation and policy, a man with the type of responsibility which in the new American system is carried by Mr. Paul Nitze.
I would not be dogmatic about the rank or title of this Minister, but if the changes proposed in the White Paper are to be meaningful, they must be seen as a first step in a continuing process, and they will not lead to further action along the same lines unless there is some built-in Ministerial pressure for continued movement. Unless there is, I think that this great juggernaut which is being created in this White Paper will slowly grind to a halt. Unless the Secretary of State has Ministerial assistance in integration, he will be so overloaded that policy will emerge as a result of arguments and struggles for power, and perhaps as a

501
result of bargaining among senior officers and senior civil servants.
Unless those who control this tremendous machine which is being built up have the physical capacity to remain effectively responsible to the people, one of the things which distinguishes our democracy from totalitarianism and military dictatorships—which are developing all over the world, in Europe as well as elsewhere—will disappear. It is essential in this new organisation to assert and strengthen this political responsibility. Unless we do, this vast, costly, complicated, apparatus which the Minister of Defence proposes to build to preserve the political and social values on which our society is based may prove to be the instrument of their destruction.
5.59 p.m.
Mr. Harold Watkinson: I shall not detain the House for long. I hope that the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) will forgive me if I do not follow the first half of his speech, which may have been a great contribution to the party political arguments which go on, but was not addressed to the particular problem in front of us, which is a very important one, which the people—and, I hope, hon. Members on both sides of the House—feel is one in respect of which it is in the national interest for us to get the right answer.
When the hon. Member addressed himself to the White Paper his main complaint was that it was some kind of quickly hatched out plan with no special reference to what had gone before. My contention is that it is a logical growth of defence policy. It is part of the kind of silent revolution which has been going on in defence policy over the past years, which has gradually grown towards the point where, in my view, the present proposals are not only right but logical, and are the necessary next step to giving this country the kind of defence which it has had, which has kept the peace, and which, on the whole, has been very good value for the money spent on it.
Looking back to just a few of the things which led up to this, one can see what a logical development this is. I am not saying that it is perfect. I do not imagine that my right hon. Friend would claim that nor—

ROYAL ASSENT
6.0 p.m.
Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:
The House went:—and, having returned;
Mr. Speaker reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Finance Act, 1963.

2. Appropriation Act, 1963.

3. Oaths and Evidence (Overseas Authorities and Countries) Act, 1963.

4. Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1963.

5. Local Authorities (Land) Act, 1963.

6. Statute Law Revision Act, 1963.

7. Weights and Measures Act, 1963.

8. Public Lavatories (Turnstiles) Act, 1963.

9. London Government Act, 1963.

10. Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, 1963.

11. Malaysia Act, 1963.

12. Deer Act, 1963.

13. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963.

14. Water Resources Act, 1963.

15. Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1963.

16. Commonwealth Development Act, 1963.

17. Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act, 1963.

18. Dog Racing (Betting Days) Act, 1963.

19. Animal Boarding Establishments Act, 1963.

20.Wills Act, 1963.

21. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963.

22. Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act, 1963.

23. Limitation Act, 1963.

24. Peerage Act, 1963.

25. Contracts of Employment Act, 1963.

26. Television Act, 1963.

27. Land Compensation (Scotland) Act, 1963.

28. Public Order Act, 1963.

29. Performers' Protection Act, 1963.

30.Loch Turret Water Board (Hydro-Electric Development) Order Confirmation Act, 1963.

31. Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Leeds) Act. 1963.

503

32. Pier and Harbour Order (Gloucester Harbour) Confirmation Act, 1963.

33. Pier and Harbour Order (Yarmouth (Isle of Wight)) Confirmation Act, 1963.

34. Pier and Harbour Order (Bembridge Harbour) Confirmation Act, 1963.

35. London Transport Act, 1963.

36. Medway Conservancy Act, 1963.

37. Great Yarmouth Port and Haven Act, 1963.

38. Port of London Act, 1963.

39. Factory Lane, Warrington (Level Crossing) Act, 1963.

40. Dover Harbour Act, 1963.

41. London County Council (Money) Act, 1963.

42. Clywedog Reservoir Joint Authority Act, 1963.

43. Salvation Army Act, 1963.

44. Killingholme Jetty Act, 1963.

45. City of London (Various Powers) Act, 1963.

46. London County Council (Improvements) Act, 1963.

47. Felixstowe Dock and Railway Act, 1963.

48. Durham County Council Act, 1963.

49. Bath Corporation Act, 1963.

50. Lucas Estate Act, 1963.

And to the following Measures, passed under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919:
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure, 1963.
Cathedrals Measure, 1963.

DEFENCE (CENTRAL ORGANISATION)
Question again proposed.
6.20 p.m.
Mr. Watkinson: I resume my remarks, Mr. Speaker, in a rather quieter atmosphere than I remember on the last occasion when I was interrupted by this ancient and honourable ceremony.
I differ entirely from the contention of the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) that the White Paper sets out, as I understood him to say, some rather hastily considered, quite new plan with no particular logic and development from previous policy in it. I do not understand that contention at all. For
504
example, over the past years a great number of things have been done by successive Ministers and their advisers which have led, with complete logic, to this development. I do not say that in my view everything in the White Paper is exactly right—it could not hope to be so.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman opposite does not place too much reliance on the new Defence and Overseas Policy Committee because that, to me, does not look very different from the Defence Committee in which I served for quite a number of years. However, that is a detail—
Mr. Wigg: A detail?
Mr. Watkinson: It is a detail in this respect. If some of the institutions, perhaps, are somewhat the same, there is no harm in this, because my point is that it is essential that if these defence and Service matters are to carry the support—and, more than that, the enthusiasm—of those who have to work them, they must be seen to be a logical process of growth and development.
We can look back then, first, to the creation of all-Regular forces which, in itself, implied, in the end, a new control of those forces. We can then consider the development of the control of operations in the Ministry of Defence which was built up during the Kuwait operation, and which rightly remained there. We can then consider the creation, not without some controversy, of unified command in all major overseas commands, and the development of the three-base concept, meaning Britain, the Middle East and the Far East—incidentally, one laid out in the White Paper of 1962, which goes some way to answer the hon. Gentleman's point that we were not thinking of getting out of the Kahawa base a long time ago. We can look at the increased control of research and development built up in the Ministry of Defence, and the concept of the mobile assault force.
I mention these things only to show that these are all processes that have grown quite logically into this new plan for centralised control—because every one of these developments implies centralised control. I therefore look on the White Paper as the logical next step.

505
Its details will no doubt be examined when we deal with the Bill that implements it next Session, but, as a general principle, I think that it is right and sensible, and I hope that it will carry the Services, the House and the country with it.
Being no longer a Minister, I am not inhibited from occasionally mentioning Service advisers, something that a Minister is rightly always inhibited from doing. I should like to mention three men whom I always used to think of as the Ministry of Defence "Troika," and who played an important part in all these developments. They are the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Mountbatten, the Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Solly Zuckerman, and the Permanent Secretary, Sir Robert Scott. I name then here, and say that in my estimation, and as I saw them, they gave the greatest and most devoted service to their country. I should like to put that on the record, as I now can. Nor do I think that one can absolve some of the credit from the chairman of the Defence Committee, who is, of course, the Prime Minister, and who provided the essential continuity and support for all these developments.
What about the future? I agree with the hon. Gentleman that, whatever plan we make, it is not the plan but how we use it that matters. Here, I shall differ from the hon. Gentleman, because in my view the essential part of the plan has grown, as I have tried to show, out of past acts of Government. This plan clearly means that the British Government—at least as long as it is formed by the Conservative Party—is determined to fulfil our rôle as a world Power with world responsibilities.
This is something that should be far above the narrower form, at any rate, of party politics. It is something which, as the centre of the Commonwealth, we are bound to do if we are to play our part in the Commonwealth—and, again, it is not to wage war that we do this, but to try to keep the peace; and no one is better fitted to do that than is this nation, which has seen too much of war in its history. But it is an immense task, and it is nonsense, if I may say so, for the Opposition to imply and claim that immense sums of money have been wasted on defence, or that we can have future defence on the cheap.
506
To fulfil this rôle will not be a cheap job, and if my right hon. Friend, with any assistance he can get, can manage to contain it within 7½ per cent. or 8 per cent. of our gross national product, he will do as much as anyone can ask him to do. That would mean about £2,000 million on the defence budget—and money well spent if it will do the essential job that no one else can do—
Mr. Wigg: Can the right hon. Gentleman give just one reference to any member of the Opposition Front Bench ever saying that the job could be run on the cheap?
Mr. Watkinson: Mine was a double-barrelled remark. First, I said that it cannot be claimed that immense sums have been wasted on defence. Equally, nobody would be more delighted than I—and in this I am with the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)—if the right hon. Gentleman who winds up the debate for the Opposition tonight will say quite firmly that the Labour Party would spend 7½ per cent. or 8 per cent. of the gross national product on defence. That is the right approach—the bipartisan approach, at least on defence—
Sir H. Legge-Bourke: My right hon. Friend has mentioned 7½ per cent. or 8 per cent.—or 6 per cent. or 7 per cent.—of the gross national product as being the desirable figure for defence expenditure. I welcome the opportunity of asking him whether he can tell us how this figure was ever arrived at, and what the magic in it is. To me, it is much too low.
Mr. Watkinson: There is no magic in it. It is probably the best bargain a Minister of Defence can drive with the Chancellor of the Exchequer—but I must not get into these matters now.
If we accept the concept that we have this world job to do and also accept the concept—and I believe that N.A.T.O. accepts it, General Norstad certainly did, that it is just as important to defend the flanks of N.A.T.O. as it is to defend N.A.T.O. itself, in which we play no mean part ourselves—that we have to cover the vast void of the Indian Ocean when no one else can do it, and keep the peace round Malaysia, which will be very necessary as this great and new concept comes into being, we must accept that this task can only be carried out by

507
this sort of firm central control. I have no shadow of doubt about that.
Although there may be differences and difficulties to be worked out, this is, after all—and I do not say this in any criticism of my right hon. Friend—to perpetuate, in a very good plan on which I congratulate him, the powers mentioned in the 1958 White Paper which successive Ministers, with success or lack of success, have attempted to carry out. These are now formalised and set out, and I believe that, at the right time, they will receive general acceptance by the country and by the Services themselves.
There is one particular point that I want to make about research and development. I agree that the Chief Scientific Adviser has an immensely difficult task to carry out and an immensely heavy burden to bear. Declaring an interest which the House knows already, I can say that it has been a considerable discipline to me, having left industry and spent some years in the Government and having returned to industry, to find how strongly British industry feels that it has not a close and satisfactory contact with the Ministry of Defence.
I am as much or a good deal more to blame for that than the present Minister, but it is so. It is not because industry is necessarily seeking to make larger profits, but merely because it feels that it could do its job better and more efficiently if somehow, within proper measures of Parliamentary control, there could be this closer and more sensible contact. I agree with the hon. Member for Leeds, East in saying that perhaps we should bring in more outside people. This might help. This must be done because it is my belief that this will o' the wisp of interdependence, which we have all honestly chased and must continue to chase, is not practicable until in N.A.T.O., for example, we have an agreed N.A.T.O. Chief of Staff project from the beginning, for instance for a tank or for V.T.O.L. aircraft.
Until that happens there is nothing wrong with British defence policy in seeking to work together with British industry. We might actually be as wicked as occasionally to seek British
508
interests first and not be obsessed always with being a good customer for other people's projects and then finding that they do not buy ours. If this were done, relations with British industry would be closer and we might help to spark off new developments, for instance, in solid state physics, as my right hon. Friend mentioned, which would be immensely valuable for us in the civil export field.
I hope, then, that in building new machinery for research and development a careful look is taken at closer and better working relations with industry. I want this to be done in such a public way that there cannot be the slightest attack or charge that this in some way is giving British industry an unfair advantage. I am sure that we could do this, and that only in this way could the thing be done in a proper constitutional form. It is worth study, and in the long term it would be of great value to our export trade.
I hope that I have said enough to try to show that, first, what is right about the plan is that it is a logical development of long-term Conservative defence policy. I hope that I have shown that what is right about it, in my view, is that it is a very firm and clear indication of the way in which we intend to fulfil our proper rôle in the world as only we can. The commissioning of another Fleet carrier, which cannot have been an easy decision, is a sign in that direction. The fact that the carrier is to have light blue and dark blue aircraft is very much welcomed by me, and, I am certain, by the Services as well. Good luck to them, and to my right hon. Friend, who has solved what could not have been an easy problem.
I hope that the House will try to give the new plan the consideration and the help it needs in the form of constructive criticism and will try to build on an all-party basis a sensible defence structure which can bear the great strains which will be placed upon it. The strain on the Minister, in my view, will not be unbearable, though it is very nearly so, but this is how the Minister must work. He is only formalising in this White Paper the duties originally placed upon him by the Defence White Paper.
There is a last point which worries me. My right hon. Friend the Minister

509
of Defence, with the disappearance of the old Secretaries of State, is now the heir to the hundreds of years of tradition of bravery and devotion which the Armed Forces have built up. This is a difficult pinnacle, and whether or not it would have been wiser to retain Ministers for the Army, Navy and Air Force is, perhaps, still worth thinking about. Whatever we may argue, and whether a man's loyalty is to his platoon, his ship or his aircraft, there is a kind of corporate loyalty which these regular forces corning into being again will be able to build up to the idea of serving their Monarch in this old and honourable way.
Somehow, in this new structure, I hope that this will be borne in mind and that it may be possible for a man to have a kind of chain of loyalty starting with his immediate command and going up to the Service head of his Service and, at the same time, to a Minister and, through him, to the Minister of Defence. On the whole, these men do a first-class job. They are defending the peace in a way no other country can do in many areas of the world. The last time I spoke for the first time as a back-bencher I said that they were fully entitled to all the support that the House can give them.
6.37 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: There is little doubt that during the first twelve years under nine Conservative Ministers of Defence an attempt has been made to formulate a rational defence organisation. During that period those Ministers have met with only moderate success. In my judgment, that is attributable to vested interests in the Service Departments and largely to tradition. I agree with what has been said by previous speakers about the evolutionary process which has led to the production of the White Paper.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) devoted a considerable part of his speech to foreign policy. I do not deny that one cannot dissociate foreign policy from defence. The relationship is obvious, but what happens in practice? The Cabinet is responsible for the determination of policy. It considers all the factors, the potentialities, the probabilities and the obstacles, relations with other nations, our alliances, and the like. Then policy is adumbrated by the Cabinet and is carried out and administered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.
510
The Defence Committee consists of a number of Cabinet Ministers and is chaired by the Prime Minister, who is the head of our defence organisation—among them the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and other Ministers who are called in from time to time. Ordinarily, the policy and the administration work efficiently. The question which we are debating today is whether the policy already in existence requires to be made more efficient, if that is possible, and, if so, what should be the nature of the new defence organisation.
As far as I am concerned, in this debate I dismiss what might be described as partisan considerations. I do it for this reason. Of course, there are ideological differences in this Assembly. We do not always agree on foreign affairs and matters pertaining to defence. The question which we have to consider—and it requires an assured and definite reply—is whether we need a measure of defence. If the answer is in the negative, obviously from the point of view of some hon. Members the White Paper is of no value whatever. But I proceed on the assumption that some measure of defence is essential. In the presence of international tension, despite efforts which are made to reduce it, obviously it is desirable to proceed as expeditiously as possible in the direction of rationalisation of our defence organisation. That is the purpose of this debate.
The right hon. Gentleman is not introducing legislation. He has produced a White Paper and is seeking to collect the voices. I presume that we shall have an answer at the end of the debate that his mind is not finally made up on every item in the White Paper. If, however, his mind is quite definitely made up, there is not much need for debate, but I presume that there are items in the White Paper which are capable of modification, and I propose to make various suggestions to the right hon. Gentleman along those lines.
When I first saw the White Paper I remarked that the theme met my complete approval. Why was that? Because when I was Minister of Defence we were ourselves considering a more efficient and rational organisation. We were

511
conscious of the defects, but we overcame them only because of complete cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and the respective Service Departments. Let me give an example. I hope that hon. Members opposite will not take offence when I say that the only successful military operation which we have undertaken since the end of the last war was Korea. That occurred in the time of the Labour Government.
Mr. David Webster: Kuwait.
Mr. Shinwell: Surely no one would go so far as to suggest—leaving aside the political implications—that Suez or Kuwait could be regarded as successful military operations. But I do not want to enter into that. If the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Webster) believes that Kuwait was a successful adventure, I leave him to cherish that notion.
Korea was a successful operation. How did it come about? There was a decision by the United States, subsequently endorsed by the United Nations—but before that decision had been endorsed by the United Nations we had already taken action to provide a headquarters brigade in Hong Kong in preparation for eventualities. When the United Nations endorsed the action of the United States, although there were many murmurs on this side of the House at the time and, presumably, in the country and elsewhere, we proceeded to build up our brigade.
It was despatched to Korea certainly more expeditiously than in the case of the despatch of troops to Suez. Naval vessels were sent out. Hon. Members will recall the "Theseus", which was responsible for many achievements in both defensive and aggressive operations in Korea. They will recall the gallant stand by the Gloucesters and other units of the Army. All these facts are familiar to hon. Members and are recorded in the pages of HANSARD.
But that successful operation was undertaken only as a result of effective co-operation. There was no legalised basis for our activities. The Service Ministers were brought into contact with the Minister of Defence and Chiefs of Staff, and all the paraphernalia associated
512
with the Ministry of Defence at that time.
My case against the White Paper is not on the ground that it is proposed to create a centralised and unified defence organisation. I think that that is essential, and I will state the reasons briefly. The concentration of the military personnel and Permanent Under-Secretaries with the financial elements, and in particular with research and intelligence, is essential. I heard what was said about bringing a number of barrow boys together only to find that they quarrelled with each other. No doubt there will be some controversy in the Ministry of Defence under the unified scheme, but it is far better to have the quarrel under one roof than scattered all over the place, where it is impossible to control it.
That is one of the advantages of the White Paper, but there are certain defects to which I direct attention. I should like the right hon. Gentleman to satisfy me that my criticism is unfounded. It appears to me that the military personnel are likely to subordinate the political personnel, and to that I take very strong objection. When I read in the White Paper that it is proposed that the Chiefs of Staff should have access to the Prime Minister, I accepted that. It is the existing situation. It was the position in my time and always has been the position. They had ready access to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet as and when required.
But that the Ministers of State, as they are now defined, should not be included in that category and should not have access to the Cabinet, I do not understand. It was unnecessary to state in the White Paper that the Chiefs of Staff would have access to the Cabinet unless it was intended to pin-point the fact that Ministers of State would not have that privilege.
I come to the designation of the three Service Ministers. Why Ministers of State? Why not Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Army and Secretary of the Air Force? The reason I make that suggestion is that in the White Paper the right hon. Gentleman has made it abundantly clear that we cannot isolate policy from administration. Let us suppose that we have to carry out a policy. A decision is reached with the Cabinet

513
and is referred to the Defence Council. In this instance, under the White Paper proposals, it would be referred to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee. Policy has to be carried out. What do we mean by that? Administration alone? Of course not. Decisions have to be taken for the deployment of weapons and the terrain to be occupied. All the factors have to be considered by those responsible for administering policy, for policy cannot be dissociated from administration.
In those circumstances, I claim that the three Service Ministers should not be demoted and certainly should not be subordinated to the military personnel. After all, the three Service Ministers have got to operate along with the Chiefs of Staff, and the right hon. Gentleman himself pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff would be associated with the Ministry of Defence and also with their respective Ministries. If that is to be the situation, I cannot understand why the Service Ministers should not have an appropriate r—le to play instead of being completely subordinated to the Secretary of State for Defence and, what is even worse, being subordinated to the Chiefs of Staff. These are my objections.
I come now to the nature of the organisation. Of course, it is proper that the Chief Scientific Adviser, with his research staff, should be closely integrated with the Ministry of Defence. I recall that, when I was Minister of Defence I had close consultation with Sir Henry Tizard, who was then the Chief Scientific Adviser, on precisely this question. At that time, research was concentrated in the old Ministry of Supply. As hon. Members know, that Ministry was abandoned a few years ago, and I supported its abandonment because I no longer regarded it as an essential Department. But now, if research is to be closely integrated with the Ministry of Defence, I believe that to be a most desirable arrangement and one which is bound to be of inestimable value to the whole of our defence organisation.
I do not enter into the controversy about the position of the Ministry of Aviation. I think that, in the course of evolution, this problem will resolve itself. The question of research may give rise to some difficulty. It is not easy to decide about space research, whether it
514
should be concentrated in the Ministry of Defence or left to the Ministry of Aviation. I cannot say. But a sensible Ministry of Defence is, it seems to me, capable of dealing with a problem of that sort without raising too much controversy. So I do not worry about that.
On the question of policy, I say just this. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East was right to criticise the Government because of what has happened in previous years. He spoke of waste. He referred to the fact that many projects had to be abandoned. This is perfectly true, but I do not think that it was possible to avoid it for the simple reason—my hon. Friend stated it himself, and I think that it is generally accepted—that policy is very closely associated with administration, and, unless the policy happens to be right—and policy must be adapted to the international situation as it exists from time to time—obviously, some projects which are begun have to be abandoned.
I suppose that that was the reason for the abandonment of Blue Streak. What was the reason for the abandonment of Skybolt? I do not believe that we had all the power vested in the Ministry of Defence or the Government to decide whether we should proceed with Skybolt or not. These are matters which require international discussion and agreement before we can proceed.
Having listened to the debate so far, and having given some thought to this question of the rational organisation of the defence of the United Kingdom, I come to the conclusion that the central theme in the White Paper is agreeable and acceptable. How it will work out is another matter. Much will depend upon the kind of Secretary of State for Defence who is appointed. I presume that there is a likelihood that it may be a Labour Secretary ofState. I presume, also, that it certainly will not be me, so it creates no embarrassment in my mind. But I confess that I am exceedingly anxious about the person who is likely to be appointed.
This will be a task requiring tremendous ability and—some people may not like the term—ruthlessness. If the policy is to be carried out, with all the paraphernalia of committees, the duplication of effort, the concentration and the

515
evolutionary processes which may lead to further concentration, particularly having in mind the time when we may, perhaps, face a military adventure, not speaking in terms of nuclear war, but in conventional military terms, we shall require a Secretary of State for Defence who, in my judgment, must be equal in rank, or, rather, equal in ability, to the Prime Minister himself. He will occupy a very important place in the Government.
I doubt that the right hon. Gentleman will occupy that place. I regret this. He has done very well so far, but the time will come when, electorally speaking, he will be no longer in a position to deploy the defence policy and administrative organisation. We shall bear that with our customary fortitude. From my own experience, I am convinced that, even in spite of the legalistic basis contained in the White Paper, co-operation is essential, co-operation with the Chiefs of Staff and co-operation with the Chief Military Adviser. We may have a very powerful person appointed to this latter position, someone who regards himself as superior to the Minister himself because he possesses the military knowledge. But let it not be forgotten that it is not the Chief Adviser who is responsible to the House of Commons and the country; it is the Minister of Defence. The Minister of Defence must be prepared to stand up to him.
I speak with some experience. I was at the War Office for some time. I had also experience at the War Office way back in 1929. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that, no matter how he concentrates the Service Departments, integrates them, rationalises them and all the rest, he will discover, very often, that there are two generals, one of the R.A.S.C. and one of the Ordnance, who do not like each other, who will hardly speak to each other, because they have vested interests. On the boards which he is setting up he may find that the First Sea Lord does not agree with the Third Sea Lord or the Fourth Sea Lord. He will, therefore, require to be firm, even defiant, in the face of the vested interests if the organisation its to be effective.
Here, I add a final word about the boards. There is a French proverb—I cannot pronounce it in French very well, though I have tried several times—"The
516
more things change, the more they remain the same". When I read in the White Paper that the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council were to be abandoned, a thought ran through my mind. By the way, there was a time when I recommended in this House that the Board of Admiralty should be abolished, but the Prime Minister would not have it.
Now, the Minister of Defence believes that he is abolishing the Board of Admiralty. Of course, he is doing nothing of the sort. He has got the First Sea Lord, the Second Sea Lord, the Third Sea Lord and the Fourth Sea Lord, all with their special functions. The Army Council is to be abolished, but we have still got the Chief of the General Staff. Incidentally, this is one innovation for which I am very grateful. I have advocated it in the past. We used to speak of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The "Imperial" has gone and we are left with the Chief of the General Staff. There will be the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy, the Vice-Chief of Staff. There will be the Master General of the Ordinance, the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that he is providing something original? Of course he is not, and he is very wise.
The right hon. Gentleman is probably a little mistaken in appearing to demote these bodies—the Board of Admiralty, the Army Council and the Air Council—but he is very wise in retaining the same personnel, for the simple reason that unless he does he will find that the organisation at the Ministry of Defence is top heavy. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East spoke about it being too bureaucratic. Unless the right hon. Gentleman is careful he will not be able to handle the organisation. Before he knows where he is either the three Service Ministers will give him trouble, or, what is much more likely, the Chief Military Adviser will give him trouble, and the Chiefs of Staff will lend a hand.
I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that he makes the best of this job and that when he brings forward his legislation he takes into account some of the criticisms. Let him proceed with the concentration and we shall help him all we can. Rationalisation is better than

517
this confusion, this disintegration. As I say, let him consider some of the criticisms. There will be more criticisms. When the legislation comes forward let him provide this rational scheme of defence reorganisation and let him take into account the feelings and sentiments of the respective Services and of their Departments and staffs so that we avoid anything in the nature of acute controversy.
7.2 p.m.
Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: The House has listened with great interest to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who always makes a very practical speech. When he was Minister of Defence, I think that although we sat on opposite sides of the House he impressed a great many of us with his ability and the way that he ran his affairs under great difficulties. I am sorry if he has lost his political ambitions. He said that he did not think he was likely to be Minister of Defence in the unlikely event of hon. Members opposite coming to power. All that I can say is that I should much prefer to see him in charge than the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who made a speech for 60 minutes—and it was a long 60 minutes. It was only in the last 15 minutes that the hon. Member got on to the matter which is important to this debate, namely, the White Paper, although I recognise that he is versed in foreign affairs.
We arc discussing the setting up of a central organisation. The hon. Member for Leeds, East made one remark which I tried to question. He would not give way to me the second time—I do not blame him for that—but, if I recall correctly, he said that the TSR2 had fallen behind schedule. I do not know how the hon. Member can substantiate that remark. There are wide differences on both sides of the House about this aircraft, which is a very complicated machine. Hon. Members on both sides have had the privilege of going to Vickers to see it. Having been cleared, we were given a fairly broad picture of its progress and capabilities.
I think that it is beyond any of us, however many years we may have been connected with aviation, to look at an aeroplane today and to say that it is
518
good or bad, All that we can say about the TSR2 is that progress is being made and that it will be only a very short time before it makes its first flight. I do not think there is any harm in saying that. We hear that representatives of the Australian Government have been over to evaluate this aeroplane. There is a reasonable prospect—I put it no higher than that—that they will purchase it if a substantial order is given to Vickers by the British Government. I do not think that the remarks made by the hon. Member for Leeds, East, are helpful.
We talk about the gross national product being 7 or 8 per cent. The money which the Services, even the central organisation, need, will be obtained only by our exporting. Every one of us should bear that in mind throughout this debate. If we want to defend this country as we think it should be defended, the money must be found by exporting and hard work on the part of the people of this country.
In evaluating a piece of complicated equipment like the TSR2, I should like to see my right hon. Friend have at his disposal a body of men drawn from all sections of the country—the universities, engineering, the scientists—capable of advising him, whether it be on the TSR2, the Belfast in Northern Ireland or on any other piece of equipment, even radar. He must draw on the very best advice obtainable. One thing which disturbed me in my right hon. Friend's speech was that he, with vast responsibilities, is relying on one or two people who, with all respect, have not very much experience in these matters. This requires consideration.
I am in favour of the TSR2. I think that it will be a great weapon for the defence of this country. It will be revolutionary. It is certainly at least three years ahead of anything the Americans are trying to do.
Mr. Wigg Mr. Wigg indicated dissent.
Sir A. V. Harvey: The hon. Member disagrees with me. May I say without boasting that I think that I know as much about this matter as he does.
Mr. Wigg: I am ready to concede that the hon. Member knows more about

519
it than I do, but I have no vested political interest in keeping a white elephant longer than I need to keep it.
Sir A. V. Harvey: The hon. Member talks about a white elephant, but is this aircraft a white elephant? I suggested to him privately the other day that he should go and see it. I do not think he will mind my saying that on the Floor of the House. He might at least get better information if he talked to the scientists and engineers who are building it rather than read about it in the magazines.
Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman has said that ordinary people cannot evaluate these matters. I am not so presumptuous as to look at this horse and say that it is a Derby winner. I am judging it on form. I was right about the Belfast and about a few other things. I was confident that they would be cancelled, but I am a thousand times more confident that this aircraft will be cancelled in due course.
Sir A. V. Harvey: One is not capable of evaluating these matters, but at least one would have a better idea about the aircraft if out of courtesy to the British workers who are putting in a tremendous effort on it one went to see it rather than read about it in magazines and listened to gossip.
All of us are somewhat inhibited in these debates. The Minister is well armed by his advisers who advise him and give him briefs. The rest of us have to look round and get our information from wherever we can and to make the best contribution we can within the limits of secrecy. It is a difficulty in which every back bench Member is placed. It has always been the same in debating defence matters.
I wish that something could be devised so that hon. Members on both sides—I know that my right hon. Friend does not agree with me—could be better advised on the state of affairs in defence. The American Government have a system for doing this, but here we are, the elected representatives of the people, trying to speak on these complicated matters. From where are we to get our information? Must we take an old friend, say an Air Marshal or an Admiral, to lunch and get something out of him? One can only get bits of information, like Lobby
520
correspondents try to do from the 1922 Committee. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That is a fact. That is what has happened in recent months. We have seen it. As I say, we are faced with a difficulty in making our contributions to defence debates.
Personally, I welcome the measures contained in the White Paper. It is certainly revolutionary in peace time for such a move in the three Services. However, very great administrative changes are involved. There is a very large administrative task ahead and certainly a tremendous job for the Secretary of State for Defence. I often wonder what would happen if we had an indifferent Secretary of State for Defence.
Mr. Wigg: We have plenty of those.
Sir A. V. Harvey: I am not being personal. My right hon. Friend has had the initiative to introduce these measures. It could happen, however, that we had a bad or indifferent Minister responsible for defence. As the right hon. Member for Easington said, the Secretary of State for Defence will have three Ministers of State under him without the right of access to the Prime Minister. Suppose he is ill or is on holiday. What happens? I do not think that this is too good.
I should like these three Ministers to be not Secretaries of State but Secretaries. It is like a holding company in industry which has three companies under it. The managing directors are the men to whom the workers look. They must have someone to look to as their master and boss. It is essential that the Army, Navy and Air Force should have a Minister who is not less than a Secretary, but not a Secretary of State. Are we to demote these three men and knock £2,000 a year off their salary? It is all very well to disregard these things, but it will happen to someone next April. I do not think it can be done like that.
The term "Under-Secretary of State" is bad. I would rather see it go and have the lowest rank as Minister of State so that the political heads have a better standing with the Civil Service. One result of the White Paper is that we shall get rid of an anomaly that exists today. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty who answers for the Navy in this House sits at the bottom of the conference table below all the Sea Lords. He is the

521
junior one. Why that has never been altered I do not know. At any rate, that anomaly disappears, and I imagine that he will sit at the top of the table or somewhere near the top.
The ordering of equipment is a big problem. We can think up all the committees and plans we like, but it will still be a very difficult problem. I should like to see something very similar to the organisation in the United States. It is easy for the hon. Gentleman to talk about the saving made by Mr. McNamara in the last two or three years, but look at what they are spending. It is a colossal sum. In my opinion he should save far more.
Today we have three surface-to-air guided weapons. The Navy has the Sea-slug, the Army the Thunderbird and the R.A.F. the Bloodhound—all doing the same job. Since the war when these projects were started they have become more and more difficult and complicated. No one is available to say which one is to be scrubbed out. I believe that today, with the complexity of military weapons, only one in five or six or even ten will eventually see life in the Services. It is recognised by all the great Powers today manufacturing this equipment that there must be failures. We have to have a policy, but the answer if we see that a project will fail is to scrap it as soon as possible, save the money and get on with something else in which the know-how that we have gained can be passed on to the Services.
I would say to my right hon. Friend that there is a need for rationalisation in the three Services. The Army today has an air force of a kind, the Navy has an army and the R.A.F. has the R.A.F. Regiment. This is a crazy situation. The Army has these vessels which we see in the Solent. They are not very well kept and they are not a credit to the Army or to anyone else. Surely the Navy's job is to look after the ships. The R.A.F. Regiment did a good job during the war in guarding our airfields, when the Home Guard had no weapons and had to use pikes and so on. It was a necessity then, but it is not so today. This should be a military rôle carried out by the Army. My right hon. Friend will save money if he tackles these things which ought to have been tackled long
522
ago. If a body of man is required for these extraneous duties let him enlarge the Royal Marines. Let them carry out these various rô1es.
I do not think that there will be contraction in the staff organisation when this all gets going, but I think that my right hon. Friend has to be very tough indeed. He has to do what big concerns in Britain are doing today. Shell, I.C.I. and all the big firms are putting a fine comb through their organisations. Everyone is doing it in the United States. They are doing it to eliminate waste and duplication of jobs. My right hon. Friend would do well to consider taking on some expert consultants like McKinseys who have been advising these great corporations on this aspect.
Mr. Shinwell: Might I fortify what the hon. Member is saying? If the right hon. Gentleman decides whenever it is practicable—it is not always practicable—to adopt a system of common service, for example, common depôts, common storage and the like, he will effect a vast saving in manpower.
Sir A. V. Harvey: I agree, but it cannot be done overnight. If we try to do it too quickly we shall upset people and probably get worse results. I suggest to my right hon. Friend that he must start as he means to go on. He must not stand any nonsense. I remember the right hon. Member for Easington saying when he was Secretary of State for War that, when he had trouble with a couple of generals, he knocked their heads together, and he probably did so very effectively. My right hon. Friend has to show that he is master and is not going to stand any nonsense from vested interests. The Departments may in the early stages resist this organisation and not like it. Nobody likes change but it must be done. Surely many economies could be made, one of them being centralised buying for clothing, equipment and small arms. This has been done already to some extent but we could go much beyond that. As I suggested earlier, my right hon. Friend should take expert advice from outside on these complicated matters.
I should like to address myself briefly to the question of the Minister of Aviation. I have a feeling that he is not

523
being absorbed into the Ministry of Defence because that Department knows quite well that it is not capable of absorbing him or his Ministry at the present time. Therefore, he has been left out of it. The Government, however, have gone as far as they can and have brought him in on the upper floor and given him an office for 50 or 60 of his staff. As I said when asking a question earlier this week, that is the thin end of the wedge. My right hon. Friend will be a Minister who is not in the Cabinet. There will be three Ministers of State all of them, I imagine, with bells in their offices and with a terminal bell for the Secretary of State. Had I been Minister of Aviation I should have resisted this to the hilt. I will try briefly to explain why I consider that my right hon. Friend should be entirely separate.
The Minister of Aviation controls thousands of technicians and scientists. He is probably the largest employer in the world as one head of so many highly-trained men. If he takes 50 or 60 of his senior staff into the Ministry of Defence those very men will be separated from their Departments. Those Departments will be without leaders. One thing that they must have is leadership. I know, of course, that arguments can be made both ways. If the Minister comes into the Ministry of Defence he will be there and close liaison is possible; they all get round the table together and iron everything out. I do not however accept that. It can be said also that enormous sums are spent on military research and only a small sum in comparison on civil research. As I have said earlier, however, the country lives by exports and the aircraft and aviation industry is a leader industry. Nobody can put a value upon what goes into that industry or the fallout of know-how and technology that goes into the whole of the engineering industry.
One firm which makes undercarriages for aeroplanes has now developed a hydraulic pit prop. This is only one small example but it can be repeated throughout the whole of industry. I am told that Soviet Russia do not work in any other way. They regard their space and aviation industries as leader industries and constantly give to them orders that will help the technology of their industries.
524
What is required is that the Ministry of Aviation should be the Ministry of Technology and Science, or Science and Technology. It should be built up to cover automation and it should look into these wider aspects of modernising Britain. Much, I believe, could be done in that direction. I do not accept that liaison would not take place; it could. We have got to have research. It must be shared and there must be mutual understanding of the problems.
Together with France Britain is building a supersonic airliner another order for which has been reported only this morning. Real progress is being made in spite of the language problem and the English Channel between us. If two countries can do this two Ministries under the same Government should be able to do it—although they might do it better if they had the Channel between them; I do not know.
To give one example about exports which are tied closely to the matter of defence and making of equipment, the Vickers 111 is being sold almost daily throughout the world. We are told by Sir George Edwards who has been responsible for its development that there is a market for 1,000 of these aircraft and he may well sell 500 or 600 of them at nearly £1 million each. That would have a tremendous impact on our whole engineering industry and defence requirements. It would bring down the price and we should then be able to afford the 8 per cent. of the gross national product of which hon. Members have been speaking today.
I beg the Government before the new legislation as introduced in the autumn to look at all these matters and to weigh them up carefully in the intervening period to see whether some at least of them cannot be incorporated. Operational research must be more closely co-ordinated and the chief scientific officer staff strengthened with suitable qualified scientists and engineers.
I should like to see more done about space in this whole set-up. Britain is lagging behind badly in space. Surely, out of the £2,000 million a year, £20 million a year could be allocated to space in our defence system, because in the years to come all of us will be criticised for having said or done so little about it.

525
A centralised Ministry is the right thing. It is only the beginning. Tremendous effort will be required on the part of my right hon. Friend the Minister to gain the good will of the people concerned. It is a system which must be made to work. My right hon. Friend must see that it works, the staffs must be allowed to get on with their task and I hope that we, as Members of Parliament, will do what we can to help, because it is a tremendous task, which can improve our defence system only if it is made to work.
7.21 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Henderson: I hope that the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) will forgive me if I do not follow him into his reference to the working of the Ministry of Aviation. I hope, however, that as one who served on the Army Council for four years during the war and on the Air Council for four post-war years I may be allowed to make a number of comments upon the plan which the House is tonight discussing.
Speaking for myself, I warmly welcome the basis of the White Paper. In the nuclear era on which we have entered, it is inevitable that our defence system moves towards a central basis. There may be some who are disappointed that the White Paper has not gone a step further and provided for the complete integration of the three Armed Services. I consider that that would have been quite impractical and, indeed, unnecessary, because I see nothing inconsistent with the main theme of the defence plan and the retention for the time being of the separate identities of the three Services.
It may well be that during the next 20 years we shall completely enter the rocket and missile era, in which case it will be a normal evolution to move from three separate Armed Services into one unified defence Service. For the time being, however, we must accept the inevitability of retaining the three separate Services.
Having said that, however, I share some of the criticisms which have been levelled both by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and by the right hon. Member for
526
Woking (Mr. Watkinson), the former Minister of Defence. I believe that the structure that is proposed in the White Paper is top heavy. It is almost monolithic, and I am anxious about the effect upon civilian control. It seems to me that the principle of civilian or political control is in danger of being undermined by the proposals set out in the White Paper.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington referred to the position of the Chiefs of Staff. I have had sufficient experience to know how difficult it will be for a Minister who does not have sufficient status to deal with a Chief of Staff who retains his existing status. I cannot help thinking that the Minister of Defence is undertaking a greater responsibility than he can bear.
It is true that the Minister of Defence proposes to appoint three Ministers of State, who, in a sense, will take the place of three Secretaries of State. Each Chief of Staff is not only to retain his right of direct access to the Prime Minister but has also to remain the responsible head of his Service. On the other hand, each Minister of State will be only a subordinate Minister of the Ministry of Defence, while each Service Minister was the head of his Department. He will not even be the chairman of the departmental board. I cannot understand why it is proposed that each Minister of State should only be the vice-chairman of his departmental board. The Minister of Defence is undertaking responsibilities which he will find he is incapable of bearing.
There are only 24 hours to each day and not even a superman would be able to accept the responsibility of day-to day administration of three great Service Departments, because however much the control may be altered at the top, it does not alter the fact that these three great Departments of State will remain. I hope that the Minister of Defence and the Government will reconsider their proposals in this respect.
I should like the Minister of Defence to consider again the system which operates in the United States. In that country there is a Secretary for Defence with three Departments, with a secretary each, for the Navy, the Air Force and the Army under him, responsible to him and subject to his authority, his

527
control and his direction. At the same time, they are on more or less level terms with the Chief of Staff of their own Service.
According to the White Paper, that will not be the case here. The demotion of the three Service Ministries is dangerous. It undermines the principle of civilian control and it is not necessary for the purpose which the Minister has in mind. I believe that the work, responsibilities, activities and co-operation of the three Ministers of State is essential to the successful working of the plan which is put forward in the White Paper, but I do not believe that those three Ministers will be able to carry out their responsibilities if they are to be subordinated to the status of Ministers of State and if they are to be only vice-chairmen of the departmental boards.
I see no reason to regret the passing of the Army Council, the Air Council or the Board of Admiralty except for historic or, perhaps, sentimental reasons. Apart from certain statutory functions, the work that they have carried out can be equally well performed by the departmental boards. Neither the Army Council nor the Air Council—I cannot speak for the Board of Admiralty—was ever concerned with operations and planning. They were, in effect, what I understand the new boards are to be, merely boards of management responsible for the day-to-day administration of their Service.
I believe, therefore, that just as it was necessary to have the political head of the Department as chairman of the Air Council or the Army Council, it is equally important to have a Minister as chairman of the new departmental boards. I was not sure whether the Minister of Defence was suggesting that the Ministers of State might be changed around. That would be most undesirable. In my opinion, he would be compelled to designate each of his three Ministers of State, as is suggested in the plan, to be fully responsible to him for a particular Service. If that Minister of State is going to carry out his responsibilities effectively and properly, in my view he will have to be designated as chairman of the departmental board. I hope, therefore, that the Minister of Defence will realise that many of us
528
who wish him well in this great experiment which he has brought to the House are very concerned that it may be in danger of falling apart unless he can institute the changes to which I have referred.
Finally, I want to say a word about financial control. For the first time we are going to have this great Department of State responsible for the expenditure of £2,000 million a year. I must say that I find myself attracted to the proposal of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that Parliament will have to be much more a watchdog here after than, possibly, it has been in the past and wil have to scrutinise very care fully this vast expenditure. I believe there is a great deal to be said for the proposal that a committee of some kind—I am not sure whether my hon. Friend has given it a name yet—
Mr. Wigg: Yes, I call it the committee on defence expenditure.
Mr. Henderson: The committee on defence expenditure. I hope that the Government will give it serious consideration, because it seems to me to be complementary to the great changes which are adumbrated in this White Paper.
Mr. Harold Davies: This watchdog principle is one that must be of concern to hon. Members on both sides of the House for we are all concerned, or should be, to preserve the right of the watchdog principle and the right to watch taxation. It must be maintained. Here the Estimates Committee is only going by grace and favour to investigate overseas expenditure. It is absolutely necessary that on the Floor of the House of Commons we should preserve the established right of watching expenditure as the taxpayers' representatives.
Mr. Henderson: My hon. Friend, I am glad to say, is endorsing what I have just said, and said in agreement with my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley.
Mr. Wigg: I am very glad to have support, but at least it must be on the right grounds. The constitutional principle of whether a Select Committee can operate outside the Kingdom is one thing; a defence committee on expenditure which would take over the job of

529
the Estimates Committee and look at policy as well as economy is quite another.
Mr. Harold Davies: Both principles must be maintained.
Mr. Henderson: I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley will agree to leave it where I stated, that it is well worth the consideration of the Government, and I very much hope that it will receive that consideration.
I notice in the White Paper that the proposals are to be regarded as being flexible and therefore capable of modification in the light of experience. That is something which we welcome, but I finish by earnestly repeating and emphasising to the Minister of Defence that I hope that in the interregnum, before the new concept really gets into operation, he will realise the weaknesses and remedy them, and certainly seek to strengthen the plan by safeguarding the status and position of the Ministers of State, who, I am sure, are an essential part of his team and without whom this plan, in my view, is doomed to failure.
7.34 p.m.
Mr. James Allason: I think the real problem, as my right hon. Friend said, is the allocation of resources in circumstances of inter-Service rivalry. At times when there is no rivalry we do not have the difficulty, but once there are two Services or three Services bidding for limited resources the situation becomes extremely difficult for the Minister of Defence to look after. During the war the Joint Staff system was working pretty well, but we all know that it had to contain many compromises, that if the Air Force wanted some particular resource the Navy took that as a chance to get in a bid as well for something on its own account and constantly the total bill which the Joint Planning Staff put up to the Chiefs of Staff contained a lot of padding, and it then required a very firm hand at the top, which was usually administered by my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), to cut that padding out, but, unfortunately, under the Joint Staff system it still crept in. So we saw the introduction of the Chief of the Defence Staff, who was put in
530
over the Chiefs of Staff to try to bang their heads together and cut out this little bit of padding. But still we have this problem of the pyramid going up to the top and a very firm man at the top who has to be able to decide circumstances of inter-Service rivalry.
All the lessons of Government in the past have been that where we centralise we must also learn to decentralise. As the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) was saying, the Minister will tend to clutter himself up with every sort of problem unless he decentralises, and yet in this system the first thing he does is to take over the chairmanship of the three Services boards. I know he says he does not intend to go to preside over those boards regularly, but nevertheless the mere fact that he is chairman of the boards means that he must be the ultimate man to give a decision. The deputy-chairman sitting in there must always feel, "I cannot give the ultimate decision on this", and the members of the board will also feel that. They will say, "All right, we have had that decision, but let us go round behind the deputy-chairman's back, and let us go to the chairman and see if we cannot get that decision changed." Therefore, we have complete duplication of effort in this system by allowing the Minister of State, of a Service Department, to be only the deputy-chairman. I can see no reason at all why he should not become the Chairman.
The Minister of Defence under this system has still got complete control: he is the boss, because these are boards within the Ministry of Defence. But for him to be chairman means that he will constantly have disputes referred to him, and not only disputes but complaints and petitions. He will find that all the detailed work which at present falls on the Secretaries of State will fall triply upon him. All the commissions which have to be signed by the Secretary of State before being submitted to Her Majesty, and all of the appeals and petitions and the like, will have to go to the Minister of Defence, and he is going to clutter himself up—and he is doing it deliberately—with a tremendous amount of detailed work which I do not regard as in any way necessary.
I should like to know about the position of science in this pyramid. I can

531
understand military advice and civil advice being submitted to the Minister of Defence—politicians are taught to judge between those two systems of advice coming up to them—but here we have a third tier, scientific advice. I cannot understand how a simple politician, if he is not scientifically trained, can judge the advice of a scientific adviser given to him alongside military or political advice, because the scientific adviser's position in having direct access to the Minister must imply this. I accept that he would undoubtedly plough his advice in at various levels.
Nevertheless, the military or civil advice which comes to the Minister surely should have that scientific advice already grafted in. Otherwise it seems to me that the Minister is put in the position of saying, "I have received some military advice. I will call in the chief scientific adviser and we will have a look at it." He will then say to the Chief Scientific Adviser, "What do you think about it?", and the Chief Scientific Adviser may say, "Tear it up", and the Minister then has to make up his mind whether to tear it up or not. Surely the advice should come up properly integrated from either the military side or the civil side.
I intend no disrespect to the present Chief Scientific Adviser, but it seems to me that because of his very eminence, his position has become exaggerated in this strange pyramid which now appears in the Ministry of Defence.
Mr. Tam Dalyell: The hon. Gentleman says that it is not a question of personalities, but is it not rather strange that the two people concerned are both very eminent biologists?
Mr. Allason: I understand that they are zoologists.
Mr. Dalyell: They are biologists.
Mr. Allason: Perhaps they are biologists with a keen interest in zoology as well. However, I think that the hon. Gentleman is tempting me away from my point.
I very much welcome the White Paper because I believe that it is necessary to put my right hon. Friend in a position where he can really decide to cut out the additional and unnecessary demands which may be made upon him by the
532
Service Ministries. Nevertheless, I should like to be satisfied whether or not the criticisms which I have made are justified.
7.43 p.m.
Mr. George Wigg: I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman a question about the legislative programme and the manner in which it will be carried out. One assumes that when we come back in the autumn, the Government—if still in office—will introduce a Bill. I want an assurance that the Bill will be taken on the Floor of the House.
I should also like an assurance that the Government, when considering the content of the legislation, will take into account the findings of the Select Committee on the Army and Air Force Act, which now finds a part in our procedure in the Army and Air Force continuation Act. When the Government do this, perhaps they will be good enough to look at the timing. There was some controversy at the last quinquennial review whether the continuation Act should come in the autumn or at another time of the year.
It is perfectly clear that the nature of our debates is extremely unsatisfactory. We have a kind of defence season which starts in the last days of February; we then have the Army Estimates, the Navy Estimates and the Air Estimates and then the Committee stage, and then off it goes and we have no further opportunity unless, by a bit of private enterprise, one raises the subject on the Consolidated Fund Bill. This is wholly unsatisfactory. I wonder whether, when they are framing their proposals, the Government will have a serious look at this to see what can be done to give the House an opportunity to keep itself abreast with events through periodical debates because we form a very important link between the Government, on the one hand, and public opinion on the other and this link must be kept in constant use if it is to be fully effective.
I am one of those who believe that we cannot get our defence policies right unless we can do it against the background of an informed public opinion. The Americans have been able to do what they have done and to carry through very drastic measures because in almost every university there now is a

533
group studying the impact of strategy and working out its consequences. There are all sorts of institutions, like the Rand Corporation engaged in the task of formulating policy and informing public opinion. Also, they have a dynamic President and Secretary of Defence who themselves understand and realise that the background against which they can act is and must be an informed public opinion.
It seems to me, therefore, that when they consider their legislation the Government should perhaps take American experience and practice into account. Certainly, as one who laboured for 2½ years, even through Recesses, in respect of the Army and the Air Force Act—and it taught me the tremendous lesson that difficult problems in relation to defence can be defined and solved with good will and unpopular decisions on defence matters can be brought to the House and put into operation. I think that if the Government look at the defence problems which face them with this purpose clearly in mind they will find solutions much easier to find.
Before I come back to the White Paper, I want to say one or two things about the general nature of the debate that we have had today. It has produced a clue to what is wrong. Let me say at once that I do not impugn anyone's honesty or integrity if I say some hard things—I would point out by way of exchange that hard things are often said to me. When one listens to what has been said from the Government benches, it is clear that hon. Gentlemen opposite believe, and the former Minister of Defence certainly believes, that it is merely a matter of detail, that the Committee of Defence and Overseas Policy is a continuation of what the former Minister of Defence knew when he was at the Ministry of Defence.
Such an opinion indicates what is fundamentally wrong with our defence policy. Surely it is that firm decisions on world strategy which lasted more than a year have never been taken. Thus the situation into which the Chiefs of Staff are supposed to fit their Services policy is constantly fluctuating and changing. The one reason why I advocate reverting to the old Committee of Imperial Defence—I give it the name which upsets my right hon. Friend
534
the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell); perhaps he can find a new name for it—is that the advantages of a committee of that kind, advisory in character, which contained not only the Leader of the Opposition but in these days, I would have thought, the Shadow Foreign Secretary and the Shadow Minister of Defence, are so obvious that the proposition has only to be examined objectively for something to be done about it.
It is perfectly clear, it seems to me, that the late Lord Haldane could never have carried through his Army Bill before the First World War and never have laid the foundation of the best force that ever left these shores—the old Contemptibles—had it not been for the support of the then Mr. Balfour against that Left Wing hamperer of the Services, the present right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), who, in his radical days, was against expenditure on the Armed Forces. It was the support of Mr. Balfour against the Left Wing of the Liberal Party in those days that enabled that Measure to be carried through.
From a reading of Lord Haldane's experiences on the one hand, from my attendances at this House over the last eighteen years and from my service on the Army Select Committee for two and a half years, I have become convinced that one should endeavour to elevate defence above the level of party controversy.
There is another reason. I believe that the die has been cast and that before many months my right hon. and hon. Friends will be sitting on the other side of the House. But I should be a charlatan and humbug if I assumed that merely by that translation our problems will be solved. Of course not. Defence policy now is so complicated and defence systems take so long to plan and evolve that nothing that can be done in the life of a single Parliament can ever put it right. We are talking here in terms of a decade. We are now reaping the rewards of 12 years of Conservative administration.
I make no party point about it. I say it in the interests of both parties. It is in the interest of the country that we should endeavour not only to elevate the

535
policy above Party but also the organisational approach and the problem arising there from. Having said that, I will not be mealy-mouthed. I am a member of the Labour Party, and proud of it, and I am quite prepared to argue from the Party point of view.
If it is a weakness that I advance the Labour Party's point of view, and if I am a humbug in doing so, then I am a little less of a humbug than hon. Members opposite who advance the Conservative point of view, because I am slightly more intelligent and at least I know what I am doing. One cannot be a successful humbug unless one believes one's own humbug, and I quite believe that hon. Members opposite—including the right hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson)—are really and honestly convinced that the Conservative Party's defence policy enables us to maintain our position as a world power—strong and powerful.
"Come the four corners of the world…"
and we will do our stuff.
I am quite sure that the Prime Minister honestly believes that it is because we have a V-bomber force that we got to Moscow. I want to examine that proposition. I will have to do it against the background of the charge, made by the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), that if one says anything about any subject at all one is attacking the workers or exports or if one says anything about our manpower one is attacking the Forces.
Yesterday, the Minister of Defence raised full-troated roars of approval from the benches opposite when he announced that the Government had taken the decision to build another aircraft carrier. Unfortunately for them—and it is an esential attribute if one backs horses that one remembers form—my memory has been well-trained. I turned to paragraph 41 of the Report on the Navy in the Statement on Defence, published six months ago. There it was stated:
"The design of a new aircraft carrier to replace H.M.S. Victorious is making good progress."
So yesterday's announcement, made to keep the 1922 Committee quiet, is a repetition of a decision already six months old.
Sir A.V. Harvey: No.
Mr. Wigg: That is what the Defence Statement said. We are to have three aircraft carriers on the Navy's strength, and that was announced last February. It was also said then that we were to get the P.1154 and today a lovely picture was conjured up. They will be painted light blue and dark blue. But here was supposed to be a new vista introduced yesterday with the announcement about the P.1154. But paragraph 14 of the Memorandum on the Air Estimates six months ago said that the Government had decided
"…that the replacement for the Hunter should be based on the Hawker P.1154."
If the Government have not convinced me—and perhaps I am so insignificant that they have not tried to—they have, by covering themselves with this succession of confidence tricks, convinced their own back benchers and the Press throughout the country. One can read all today's papers and find that they all write about the two major decisions the Government have taken, although those decisions are six months old.
Let us turn to the question of manpower. I have taken a stand on this question for 12 years. I have often found myself at variance with my right hon. and hon. Friends. But, as with so many other subjects, the more I went into it the more I nurtured myself with the thought that tomorrow was another day and that I could wait to prove simple arithmetic. The test of manpower is not the number of men enlisted but the number of years for which they enlist. For years I attacked the three-year engagement and then, in 1957, seven years too late, the Government abandoned it. We were told in the last Statement on Defence that the manpower problem was solved, and that I was wrong again. I then engaged in correspondence in The Times, a battle which I did not lose. I can quote two Written Answers in my support.
In January, I asked about the teeth arms in the Army and received the following reply:
"In all arms the position will improve substantially in the next few months."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st January, 1963; Vol. 670, c. 234.]
I put the same Question down for Written Answer today, and the situation is either about the same, or overall slightly worse than it was.

537
In February I put a similar Question about the Services in the Army and was told:
"Most of these deficiencies will be made good in the next few months."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th February, 1963; Vol. 671, c. 144.]
The Written Answer I got today to a similar Question is that the shortages are still there and have not been made up.
Let us turn now to the V-bomber force. This is great fun, if such a subject can be fun at all. We have 180 V-bombers. During the recent Foreign Affairs debate the Minister of Defence said that our bombers were faster than any comparable aircraft in the world. I tried to interrupt him, but, as usual, he did not give way because he knew that it was an awkward point. However, I could afford to wait.
What about the Hustler? Our V-bombers cannot beat the speed of sound and fly at Mach. I. The B-58—the Hustler—has a speed of Mach. II. for a 300 mile dash. Who are the Government trying to kid? At weekend garden parties at Woking and Macclesfield hon. Members opposite get away with it. They tell the story of our strong, powerful Forces deployed all over the world. They say, "Here we are going to Moscow because of our strength". Do they deceive anyone in the United States Air Force, Mr. McNamara or Mr. Khrushchev? Of course not. They know the speeds of the V-bombers and the Hustler. We are told that we are a nuclear power. We are told of our V-bombers armed with Blue Steel—we have no Skybolt now. But Blue Steel has a range of only 100 miles and our V-bombers only have the capacity to drop a free-falling bomb over the target. That is the limit of the V-bombers.
In Germany we have not one single Army atomic missile on which the Americans have not got the lock and key. Two regiments in Dortmund have Corporals with a range of 70 miles. I would sell the Corporal to the ironmongers as soon as I could find a Steptoe & Son to buy it. We have three regiments at Senelaagger armed with Honest Johns and atomic artillery. We have no medium artillery of our own in Germany but all the missiles we do have with their American warhead are simply scattered where our barracks happen to be, with
538
little relation to any operational plan. Again, who do the Government think they are kidding?
Let us turn, for good measure, to what I have read before. Experience shows me that one has to raise a thing 47 times in this House before it produces any result and I have read this only 45 times. It is from a report presented to the United States Senate Committee on the European Economic Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The Report was made on 14th September, 1962. I hope that hon. Members opposite, when they talk at their garden parties and make the bosoms of Tory ladies rise with passion above the singing of "Land of Hope and Glory", will also read this to them. This is what the Americans think about our V-bomber force:
"The British strike force is already approaching obsolescence. Its credibility as an instrument of British policy is steadily declining."
Yet we have debate after debate and the same old, sorry, weary tale about our strength. If an hon. Member says anything about manpower, he feels that he ought to go and blow his brains out because he is a Quisling, and if he tells the truth about the TSR2, he is stabbing our export trade in the back.
These words are directed to the hon. Member for Macclesfield: I believe that a viable, thrusting and up-to-date aircraft industry is a. prerequisite for this country to keep in the forefront of the industrial race. I believe that we could do a lot better with much less manpower than we now have. But I look round and see that never at any time has a ballistic missile of British manufacture been launched from the territory of our Sovereign Lady the Queen. The air-to-ground missiles which we have are either American or French. I think that we ought to do much better than this.
I have served my apprenticeship in opposing the Government's defence policies. I opposed the three-year engagement and I opposed Blue Streak. I remember with some bitterness—not bitterness now remember, because my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington always removes the bitterness from my heart—that as recently as March, 1960, I ventured the opinion that Blue Streak was a dead duck. Within six weeks it

539
was. I followed this up by opposing Skybolt. As usual, I had to go through a period of denigration and then I had the ultimate satisfaction of knowing, "George, you are right again". I was 100 per cent. certain in the cases of Blue Streak and Skybolt; now I am 10,000 per cent. certain in the case of the TSR2.
The TSR2 is a dead duck, and it is a dead duck despite the fact that it is a triumph for British industry, just as Blue Streak was. The fault with Blue Streak was not that industry failed or that the manufacturers and the technicians had slipped up. The fault rested with the Government Front Bench. They were too late with the basic policy decisions and the result is that, with the F4H, on the one hand, and the F110 on the other, the Americans will make certain that we do not sell the TSR2 abroad and the cost will ultimately be of the order of £500 million. At the moment the Belfast is leading the field as the most expensive aircraft in the world, but close behind it follows the TSR2.
I have reached the conclusion that the TSR2 will be cancelled purely on grounds of overall cost. Nobody in this game can blame somebody else for making a mistaken decision. If he does, he is a charlatan or a fool, and the odds are that he is both. I took no part in the anger of my hon. Friends when Blue Streak was cancelled, although I had opposed Blue Streak. The crime was not to have been wrong about Blue Streak. The charge against the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations is that although Blue Streak was adead duck in 1959, under the patronage of the Prime Minister, the right hon. Gentleman put his party interest before the interests of his country for one year. That is also the charge about Skybolt. Anyone who studied the Skybolt complex knew very well that it was running into grave difficulties in the early part of 1962, but the Prime Minister did not have the guts to come here and face not the country—because he could manipulate the Press—but the 1922 Committee.
We keep going through the same process and we have arrived at it again. The Prime Minister dare not go to the 1922 Committee—he is already hanging on by the tips of his fingers and the
540
skin of his teeth—and tell his own back benchers the truth about the TSR2. That is my charge against the Government Front Bench and that is why I use the words I did this afternoon. It is not a crime to be wrong. There was nothing dishonourable in the Prime Minister and the party opposite, mistaken as I believed they were at the time, backing the 1957 White Paper. What is wrong, evil, cowardly and disgraceful is to persist long after one knows the truth because one does not have the political guts to tell the people the truth.
Let us now turn to the White Paper.
Mr. Norman Cole: Hear, hear.
Mr. Wigg: Why not? Why should I not ram down the throats of hon. Members the lies which they have told themselves and the country? Whether they like it or not, I am going to do it again, and I hasten to add that I enjoy doing it.
The White Paper is a fascinating document. The first thing I did when I had read it was to read it again, and then I went to listen to the Minister of Defence on the radio. My memory took me back to what was said in 1957. I will not mention his name, but a right hon. Gentleman opposite and I had a talk about about this White Paper. I was willing to have a little bet, and I wish that I could have found someone to take me on. I said that the Government would describe this organisation as streamlining. This is the sort of word which they cannot avoid. It sounds wonderful and it gives Tory back benchers a cosy feeling of modernity. I knew that it would be described as the British Pentagon and that, as in the 1957 White Paper, it would be said to save money. The Pentagon, save money, streamline forces—this is exactly what was said in the 1957 White Paper. Here we are again, absolutely true to form. If any hon. Member doubts what I am saying, I will lend him a copy of the transcript of the broadcast free of charge.
There is a fundamental difference between the Pentagon and the Government's new approach. As soon as President Kennedy was elected, he decided that he did not know about the aviation position and so he told Mr. Hallaby to come forward with proposals in 90 days

541
and to lay down the frontiers of the aircraft industry for the next decade. He appointed Mr. McNamara, a man of tremendous ability and terrific understanding of the workings of industry, and told him not as the Minister of Defence in 1957 was told, "There is the 1957 White Paper; it is politically inconvenient to maintain conscription; here is the policy; you go and carry it out". The President said, "Make an appreciation of the facts and come back with a plan". Mr. McNamara came back with the plan and brought in the "Whizz Kids" and the computers and tested the plan. They got the President's approval and then they started to carry it out from there.
What do we do? After Suez, living up to his famous motto. "First in, first out", the Prime Minister decided that his position was very grave. He had to take a trick. The Prime Minister is a politician and a politician only, albeit a superb and very great politician. He produced the 1957 White Paper to save money and to get rid of the bomber and to get rid of the fighter and to have atomic streamlined forces, and he appointed the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to carry out that policy. All the time it was clear that the cock did not fight. Later Blue Streak was out and so the Prime Minister sacked the chap to whom he had given the job and gave it to the right hon. Member for Woking. The money on Blue Streak having gone, the bet was now on Skybolt. As soon as Skybolt was done, the Prime Minister did not cut his own political throat but sacked the right hon. Member for Woking. We now have the present Minister of Defence. He will be saved by the gong, because the Prime Minister will be "done" before he "does" the right hon. Gentleman.
To suggest that the new organisation is the British Pentagon is nonsense. This afternoon we heard the right hon. Gentleman's humorous explanation of how the new proposals were the logical outcome of the policies of the right hon. Member for Woking. What does he take us for? Does he think that we cannot read? From the 1958 White Paper on the Central Organisation of Defence and, above all, from the 1961 Defence White Paper we find a very
542
important quotation. I will not weary the House by reading it. Hon. Members, if they wish, can see how the claim is made. Only two years ago it was said that the Minister of Defence had all the power that he wanted; that he could do what he liked; that he could impose his will. The only difference is that it has been demonstrated beyond any shadow of doubt that if he had powers he has not used them.
The Government have now got into a tremendous muddle, and they have to carry out a major diversion. The Prime Minister relies very successfully on the stupidity of hon. Gentlemen opposite. That stupidity can always be counted on not to fail him. Coupled with that there is the fact that people go away for their summer holidays in early August. We had this operation put across us a year ago. The Minister, under the shadow of the previous year's White Paper, said that everything in the garden was lovely. But then the PT428 was cancelled and the Army was left with the L70 and no Bofors replacements.
And what happened last year? Again there was a crisis. It always comes up at this time of the year, because it is at this time of the year that they start to look at the defence Estimates for the following year. What happened when they looked at it last July? These honourable, straightforward, caricatures of English gentlemen wait until the House has risen and no questions can be asked, and they rely on nothing being done about it when we come back. On 10th August there was a handout from the Ministry of Defence saying that Blue Water was cancelled. No medium artillery were provided to take its place. This was a catastrophic blow to the whole concept on which the planning of the army was based. It was Blue Water last year, and they are running into the same sort of difficulties this year.
That is why we had questions on Defence yesterday. That is why the Minister of Defence came down to the House and spoke as though he was saying something original in announcing the successor to the "Victorious". That is why he said what he did about the P1154. He wanted to get the Government supporters off to their summer holidays without them asking any awkward questions. So he came along and told the House

543
something which in fact he announced six months ago.
We are up against the fact that there is a rising level of costs. Both parties bear their share of responsibility for this defence problem. The Prime Minister spelt this out in 1957. Why did he go for the nuclear concept? The answer is that he wanted at all costs to get rid of conscription. But once somebody tries to get rid of conscription by putting up rates of pay, by improving barracks, and by raising the general standard of amenities, there is little money left for the cost of equipment. The cost of manpower is rising all the time, and therefore if we go in for this policy, as other countries have done, we get the men in—though not necessarily the right kind of chaps—but then the Forces get out of balance and remain so because we cannot afford to buy equipment to enable them to fight.
And then of course there is a limit on the amount that can be spent on pay and allowances. As I have tried to tell my hon. Friends, this is a different game from debating the Budget or foreign policy. There one can juggle with Motions, Amendments, colons and commas, but in this game there is a logic all of its own. If we do not have the right kind of fire power in the right place at the right time when the chips are down, the occupying forces will march up Whitehall. I am reminded of Corelli Barnett's book "The Desert Generals". He says that defeat in battle is no accident; that it does not come like a thief in the night, but after a prolonged period of national decadence.
Look what happened in France. They hid behind the illusion of the Maginot Line. We hide behind another illusion, and the Minister of Defence bears a great responsibility for this. We hide behind the illusion of a non-existent deterrent which, when the chips are down, is worth nothing.
I have said this before and I do not apologise for saying it again. The Government refuse to tell the British people the facts. The only way they can put this matter right is to tell the British people the truth, but to do that they must recognise the truth themselves. To do so would, of course, be fatal to hon. Gentleman opposite because, being
544
honourable, they would blow their brains out if they were brought face to face with the facts.
This White Paper is being carried through under pressure from one source, and one source only. This bears the imprint of one hand, and one hand only, that of the Prime Minister. I happen to be an ex-Regular soldier, though a humble one, having served as a military clerk, and spent some of my time amending regulations. I happen to know what this White Paper means. I invite the House to look at paragraph 68 which deals with the organisation of the Principal Personnel and Administrative Officers Committees. A Committee of Principal Personnel Officers is to sit down and work out the manpower policy for 375,000 or 400,000 men. What tommy rot this all is, and yet we have not heard a single bleat from the Benches opposite.
Do not hon. Gentlemen opposite realise that to do this, and to make the system effective it will be necessary to carry out a major internal reorganisation of the three Services In the Army, the Adjutant-General is responsible for the soldier as a man. In the Navy, the Second Sea Lord is responsible for the sailor as a whole person, including his training. In the Army this responsibility is split. The Director of Military Training is responsible for a soldier's training. I am not suggesting which method is best, but if somebody writes this stuff and presents it to the House of Commons in the hope that it will be accepted, he must think that we are a lot of mugs, because quite clearly this is merely putting dummies in the shop window in the hope that they will get away with it.
I know that this is the genius of our race and that if the White Paper is accepted we shall start working on it and deal with the difficulties as they arise. Somebody will say to the First Sea Lord, "What about this?". He will say, "I shall have to talk to the Adjutant General". The Adjutant General will reply, "This is nothing to do with me. This is a matter for the General Staff". They will go away, there will be a flurry and a hurry, and the matter will be put right.
I hope that the right hon. Member for Woking will not tell me that this doctrine will work out because we have able staff

545
officers. Nobody has begun to think about this problem. This will unquestionably increase the demand for staff officers, and one of the major problems in the Army at the moment is the lack of regimental officers even in a crack regiment like the Green Jackets. All the time the pressure for the best staff officers becomes even greater, and this is the very point at which the position needs to be strengthened.
I share the views, and some of the joys and happiness, of my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington. I am certain that this is a step in the right direction. I am sure that this White Paper, like the announcements from the Government Front Bench yesterday, is borne of political expediency. Rising costs have forced the right hon. Gentleman into a corner, but I hope that when we get to power we shall do better than this.
The essential requirement is honesty in our thinking and presentation. If I bore hon. Members by saying once again the thing that I have said in every defence debate in which I have spoken, I cannot help it. We cannot get over defence problems by conducting them on the basis of a sham fight, because the one characteristic of a sham fight is that nobody can win. The only way to get this right is to have honesty in thinking and honesty in presentation. We must trust the British people. We must tell them the truth.
If, when we get back, we find that, awkward as it may be from an economic point of view, that the TSR2 is in difficulties, the honest and straightforward thing to do will be to come clean and cancel it. In the meantime I invite the Government to do what they have never done so far, namely, to produce a defence policy which will serve the interests of the Armed Forces and this country.
8.21 p.m.
Captain John Litchfield: I am glad that I am speaking after the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), because when I spoke before him in the Select Committee on Parliamentary Elections the other day he began by referring to me as a reactionary and ended by calling me a Liberal. Neither term is one that I like to have applied to me in this House.
Mr. Shinwell: It is the same thing.
Captain Litchfield: I will not enter into a dispute with the right hon. Gentleman about that. I do not disagree.
I have a great respect for the knowledge and industry of the hon. Member for Dudley in Service matters, but I was sad to hear him say that he honestly believed his own humbug. He does not always talk humbug. He did not even talk a great deal about the subject under debate this evening. Only towards the end of his speech did he make one or two references to the White Paper, but I want to concentrate on that subject.
My first reaction to it was one of relief. If I do not give an absolutely unqualified welcome to it I hope that my right hon. Friend will not think that I do not appreciate the magnitude of his achievement and the immense difficulties and resistances that he and his professional advisers—and, indeed, the whole Government—had to overcome in reaching the agreed proposals on reorganisation which we now have. My right hon. Friend is to be congratulated, as, also, are his senior professional advisers and the senior officers and officials in Whitehall. They deserve great credit for having reached these agreed proposals, which will undoubtedly involve the surrender of many cherished positions in Whitehall.
Although there are potential dangers in some of the proposals, I have no doubt—and I have had a certain amount of experience at the working end of these matters—that, on the whole, they represent a great advance. I was glad that at the end of his speech the hon. Member for Dudley agreed that the White Paper is an advance.
There has been conflict, whatever the hon. Member for Dudley may say, about the decision on the aircraft carrier having been taken six months ago—there has been a conflict in Whitehall in recent weeks, or even in recent days—and it may be that this conflict would not have been so bitter or prolonged if we had had in force today an organisation such as that which we are to see under the new proposals.
I suspect that these proposals are something of a compromise between what one might call the Germanic concept of a defence organisation and the traditionally more flexible British

547
system. I am thankful that my right hon. Friend resisted pressures to go for anything like the German O.K.W. system, although in some cases it may be that even in these proposals he has gone a little further than I would be altogether happy about. There are attractions in tidy diagrams and highly centralised control and chains of responsibility, but there are also perils in concentrating too much absolute power and responsibility in too few hands—or even in one pair of hands.
Military strategy is always an easy thing for the amateur who is not in close touch with the realities of life and logistics, and has no responsibility for execution. In much the same way, politics always seem a much simpler problem for the political commentators and even back benchers, and certainly for members of the Opposition, than they are for those with responsibility for taking decisions, who have to take account of the hard facts and capabilities of political life. Perhaps in a future decade right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite will appreciate the force of this—although I doubt whether that will be as soon as they expect.
I am thankful that some of the essential checks in the existing defence organisation—especially the Chiefs of Staff organisation—have been retained in this more centralised organisation. I am glad to see that the Chiefs of Staff Committee will be preserved in its present form, and that the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff will continue as professional heads of their Services, with undiminished status, and will retain the right of personal access to the Prime Minister. Above all, I am thankful that the Services will retain their identities and their individual loyalities. This was a matter in respect of which I had some fear. I believe that these proposals go as far as they can to meet this problem satisfactorily.
One other marked advantage which has not been mentioned this afternoon is that under these proposals defence will at last speak with one voice on matters of finance. The ability of the Treasury to play off one Service against another will be very much diminished. From the point of view of the Services, that is important and good.
548
Nevertheless, before I go on to make one or two little criticisms I must refer to one thing that I am sad about, namely, the passing of the Board of Admiralty—the Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral. I have no doubt that this is inevitable in any scheme of this nature, but it is fitting for the House to remember with gratitude a body which, through the centuries, has not only honourably discharged the highest responsibility for the security of these islands but has consistently maintained the highest standards of duty and public service in Whitehall.
I now turn for a moment to one or two points about which I am a little less happy. In a debate of this kind on proposals which will affect the future life and loyalties of the three Services we must be careful to say nothing which would be likely to weaken the confidence in and loyalty of the Services to this new organisation when it comes about. What I propose to say is not intended as specific criticism, but is designed to focus the attention of the House on points which I regard as important and which I hope that my right hon. Friend will take into account when preparing, in the autumn and maybe early next year, the detailed legislation which will be brought before the House.
First—this was mentioned by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)—there is the question of the political control of this gigantic accumulation of power and responsibility, unparalleled in peace time. It is a responsibility, in round figures, for 400,000 men and women in the Services and 400,000 men and women in various grades of the Civil Service, with a budget of about £2,000 million. These powers are being exercised in peace time, and in some ways I think that they exceed the power which my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) assumed in time of war. I am not criticising, I am drawing attention to them, because these are things which, in future, must be watched by hon. Members op both sides of the House.
To me, it seems almost inconceivable—I think that my right hon. Friend will admit this—that any one man could possibly handle a task of this magnitude in any personal sense. There must be—and rightly so—a wide measure of

549
decentralisation, and with the de-grading of the Service Ministers to Minister of State level, is not there a risk that political control will be seriously weakened? That is a point which we must watch in the future. We must recognise that there is a price to be paid for a reorganisation of this kind. I think that hon. Members on both sides of the House are in favour of some reorganisation and centralisation. But we must recognise that there is a price to be paid for it, and probably rightly paid, in an accretion of power in Whitehall and a corresponding loss of authority in this House through Ministers.
In effect, this power will be exercised, in practice, by the triumvirate of permanent officials, under my right hon. Friend, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Chief Scientific Adviser. The point which I wish to leave in the mind of my right hon. Friend on that aspect is that this danger might, I believe, be somewhat reduced by up-grading the Ministers of State to Cabinet rank—not as members of the Cabinet, but with Cabinet rank. I am not an authority on this sort of problem. But I consider it one which we should think about. We must be careful not to surrender more political control than is absolutely essential—and by political control I mean direct political control in this reorganisation.
The second point I wish to mention is the position of the scientists in this organisation. Here again, there is an immense increase of power and influence. It will be seen that the Chief Scientific Adviser is a member of the Defence Council and Chairman of the Defence Scientific Staff. His subordinate chief Service scientists are now raised to board level. In effect, this means that the authority of the Chief Scientific Adviser will stretch down through every level of this organisation, and he is thus raised to a position of very great influence on both the policy-making and the management sides.
I have no wish to belittle the importance of scientists. Far from it. I think it right that their status should be raised and that the Chief Scientific Adviser should be one of the triumvirate at the top. But my point is that the scientists, by profession, training and experience, are not managers. I think that
550
the proposed inclusion of the chief scientists of the Service at board level should be reconsidered.
I do not express a very definite view on this, but I do not see the argument for including them at board level. They are at present, and perhaps might be in future, departmental heads working immediately underneath the board, but to put them on the boards puts them into management. If too little importance has been attached to scientists in the past, I am not sure that a little too much is not being given to them now.
It is important that the new Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy should not be a head without a body, and I entirely support the arguments from the other side that this Committee, which fills a very definite gap in the integration of defence policy with foreign and colonial policy, should be served by a very select, competent and permanent staff.
I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation is present to hear my remarks on the difficult question of the position of his Ministry. I appreciate from the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence that there are strong arguments both for and against including this Ministry in the new organisation. But, although knowing far less than does my right hon. Friend about the problem, I think that I would come down in favour of including it within the Ministry of Defence. I believe that it should have been possible to separate what might be called the "Farnborough" side of the Ministry from the "London Airport" side; to include the Farnborough side, which is very wide and big and, of course, goes far beyond Farnborough itself—I use that only as a descriptive word—and to hive off the commercial or London Airport side to the Ministry of Transport.
Whatever reasons of convenience there may be in favour of treating my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation within the Ministry of Defence, I think that this is a serious mistake in principle and in organisation. After all, if he holds his present office and the Minister of Defence still holds his when this reorganisation bikes place, the Minister of Aviation will be the second senior Minister in the building—he will be well

551
above the Service Ministers of State—yet, outside his own Ministry, he will have no responsibility for defence policy. To put it mildly, I can see all kinds of difficulties arising from that. At any rate, it is an untidy arrangement and a thoroughly bad principle, and I hope that it will be looked at again.
There are many points to discuss in these proposals, but I will mention only one about which I am a little unhappy, though it is comparatively minor. I refer to the proposal to appoint a Defence Secretary in place of the Naval, Military and Air Secretaries we now have. This new officer will be drawn from one of the existing Services, and will be responsible for advising over a very wide range of patronage. There are dangers in the appointment, and I should prefer to leave the three Secretaries as they are.
Having offered certain rather critical but, I hope, not entirely unconstructive criticisms, I will end as I began, by congratulating my right hon. Friends—and, indeed, the Government and the Services as a whole—on their initiative and courage in bringing forward these agreed proposals. There will be many details to be looked into by the House when my right hon. Friend brings forward specific legislation to implement the proposals next Session, or perhaps in the next Parliament. I wish him well in putting through this mammoth reorganisation, modified as I hope it may be in one or two respects.
There is much in our traditional British system which, I hope, will guide him in future. There is much in past German experience which, I hope, will warn my right hon. Friend. And there is something in the words of the defence correspondent of The Times this morning which, I hope, will give my right hon. Friend cause for thought—the description of the Pentagon in Washington as combining
"the activity of an ant hill with the apathy of a penitentiary."
8.41 p.m.
Mr. Tam Dalyell: As a member of the Public Accounts Committee I am concerned solely with a number of points which are raised in paragraphs 64 and 65 of the White Paper. Are these four Second Permanent Undersecretaries of State to come before the Public Accounts Committee altogether or
552
separately? If separately, I would have thought that this was in antagonism to the whole object behind the White Paper, because if they come separately there will be a compartmentalised conception of thought and the whole concept of the White Paper may be destroyed.
I am worried that if the Public Accounts Committee is to operate at all efficiently we cannot go on as at present discussing the trivialities of the Services. What, after all, did the Committee discuss this year? We had the Permanent Secretary of the War Office before us and we discussed the accommodation at Alanbrooke Hall, the question of hired transport in the United Kingdom, and whether it was right that 24 per cent. of the vehicles at Catterick Camp should be off the road. We discussed in detail and at some length the question of surplus land at the Woolwich Arsenal and, finally—and this was our main discussion—we talked about the loss of stores involving cast-iron cases for 3-in. mortars.
Having said that, can we then accept at the beginning of paragraph 64 of the White Paper that
"All the Defence Votes will be accounted for to Parliament by the new Ministry of Defence."?
If it is to be accounted for to Parliament at all, it is presumably through the Public Accounts Committee. I know of no other way. If it is through that Committee, let us not deceive ourselves, because this is a purely illusory control. I therefore ask for some sort of mechanism which will allow both sides of the House to have a much clearer idea than we have at present of how the astronomical sum of £2,000 million is being spent. I assure the House, from my brief experience of the Public Accounts Committee, that that Committee is not the vehicle for that purpose.
8.45 p.m.
Mr. Anthony Kershaw: The hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) put his finger on a most important point. One of the difficulties about the vast new Ministry which we are discussing is how it will attend to the details he has mentioned. We shall be better able to judge how this is to be done when we see the Bill before us, and perhaps after the first year or two, when we see how, in practice, this

553
gigantic Ministry is working. Nevertheless, the danger is clearly there.
I will deal with only a few items in a field which has been adequately covered in the discussion, because there is at least one other hon. Member who wishes to speak, and I will try to give him time to do so. I congratulate my right hon. and hon. Friends. I firmly believe that the principle of the reorganisation is right. It is, after all, the case that our Armed Forces operate together, and it is, therefore, surely logical that they should be organised basically in a way to reflect this co-operation which takes place in the field. There can be no doubt that the principle of the reorganisation is good.
In contrast to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chelsea (Captain Litchfield), I welcome the way in which the scientific officers are being brought into the machine at different levels—far more than is the case at the moment. It is particularly important in these days when weapons are so expensive and it is so easy to make an error—and we have had many errors, through nobody's fault—that the scientist should be brought into the picture as early as possible, not to advise after a project has got off the ground but to give advice before the project is even begun. I do not see why the scientist should be, as my hon. Friend suggested he was, a worse manager than anybody else. I believe that some of the most successful firms in the country, such as I.C.I., consistently promote scientists and have found no harmful effects from doing so.
Combined with the extra scientific emphasis in the White Paper, I wish there had been more room for academic or perhaps strategic thought in the Ministry than appears to be available. Scientific officers must extend their activities far beyond the technical evaluation of weapons or weapon systems, because with modern weapons it is clear that the political consequences which flow from their use are so formidable that they are part and parcel of the evaluation of the weapons system. I have no doubt that a mind so far ranging as that of the present Chief Scientific Officer takes fully into consideration all aspects of weapons systems, not only technical, but it is a pity that there seems not to be in the central organisation a place for academic study
554
of the problems of the defence Ministry. I hope that a place will be found for it.
As I have said before in the House, the Americans do this rather better than we do. They may do a little too much academic thinking and advice, but I am certain that we do too little, and it would be a sound idea if there were in the organisation, not dependent on individuals who were holding a post from time to time, an opportunity for this type of academic advice and reflection.
There are two points on which 1 am not happy. The first is the continued existence of the Chief of Defence Staff after the reorganisation is complete. I fully accept that at the moment he is a very necessary person, but it seems to me that after the reorganisation is complete the value of his post diminishes. What will he do? He will be filtering to the Secretary of State for Defence the advice which comes from the heads of the Services. He will be choosing which of the three sets of advice he should pass on.
In my right hon. Friend's words, he will be polishing the advice and hiding the flaws in the advice in order to present a finished product and not to allow the Minister to see how the advice was built up from the start. He will have great but rather indefinite power, and, if we were so unfortunate as to have a weak or inexperienced; Secretary of State for Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff would become a very important person indeed, and, of course, he would not be answerable to the House.
It is not to be expected that we can be sure that the Chief of the Defence Staff will be the best man available for the job. In the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Flint, West (Mr. Birch), he will be chosen on the principle of "Buggins's turn" from each Service. If anyone doubts this, it can be tested by guessing now who the Chief of the Defence Staff will be under the new reorganisation. There is no doubt who the first one will be, and I am prepared to say who the second and the third will be, too, by which time it will be the turn of the Navy again. It really will be Buggins's turn. While, of course, they are all admirable gentlemen—there are no personalities involved in what I say—it is the fact

555
that turns will be taken between the Services and, therefore, we shall not necessarily get the best man.
It is said that we need the Chief of Defence Staff during operations. Why? Will he be running the war? I am not sure that this is sound. Even Bismarck, who was a very military gentleman, said that war was too important a matter to be left to the generals. The generals should do the tactics, but the strategy should be under civilian control, of course, with military advice.
In my view, therefore, the Secretary of State for Defence should deal direct with his heads of Services, see their conflict of advice and see their difficulties. I believe that, although one cannot be categorical about it, this would be better than the proposal before us. It would be necessary to have a secretary of the defence staff on a sort of Is may model, and I wonder whether that might be better.
The second matter which gives me some misgivings has been raised already. I refer to the status of the Ministers of State. On one aspect of this, it seems extraordinary that each Service should not have a sort of political head to whom it can normally look. The Secretary of State for Defence will not be the head of the Army or of the other Services particularly, and it is odd that there should not be civilian Ministers to whom the Services can look.
I believe that we are right to keep the Ministry of Aviation separate. The civil responsibilities of the Ministry of Aviation are very great and very important for the future; they alternate and impinge upon military responsibilities in a way one cannot easily foresee. What starts as a military project ends as a civilian project, and vice versa, and one cannot be certain which way a project will go. Therefore, I think that it is right to keep the Minister of Aviation out, though I think it odd to write into the White Paper that the Secretary of State for Defence must have the right to send for the Minister of Aviation's officials and ask their advice.
Of course, on a casual, "old boy" basis there could be no difficulty about the Secretary of State discussing technical matters with whomever he pleases and with whomever is qualified to give
556
him advice, but it is odd formally to write into the White Paper that he must have this right to send for the officials of another Ministry and inform the Minister that he is doing so. If he were on such distant personal terms with the Minister of Aviation, I think that it would be unfortunate.
Now, two rather detailed points. It is said in paragraph 23 that there will be reorganisation of the Army and Air Force Acts, and I wonder whether it is proposed, under the new organisation, to have a Navy Act. We have not got one at present, and it is not necessary to renew the mandate of the Navy as it is to renew the mandate of the Army and the Air Force every year. This has certain practical consequences because Treasury control over naval expenditure is much less strict than over the detailed expenditure of the other Services. I wonder whether this situation will persist in the future or whether it is proposed to make the Navy go exactly pari passu with the other Services.
Finally, a small and, perhaps, even more academic point relating the office of Lord High Admiral. Under the new arrangements, the Sovereign will be the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The Sovereign is not Commander-in-Chief of the Army or of the Air Force. Why should the Sovereign command the Navy? It may be thought that this is not of great importance, but it is not entirely academic. I recall that the King of the Belgians was Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army in 1914 and in 1940 and that this had, although with opposite effect, the most extraordinary consequences in international politics. It is possible to imagine that the Sovereign, who commands the Navy, may find himself in a different position with regard to that Service, while not being able to issue legal orders to the Army or Royal Air Force. I hope that the constitutional lawyers will consider this point before we get the Bill.
8.55 p.m.
Mr. Harold Davies: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) who obviously cut out very many interesting things that he wished to say about the White Paper in order to give me the opportunity to speak for five or six minutes. I, too, will try to keep to the White Paper instead of discussing,

557
as has been discussed, the broad points of strategy. I am sure that the House is grateful for this opportunity to discuss the White Paper. We know full well that this is a preliminary discussion and that before what is proposed can be enacted there will be ample opportunity for us to discuss it in the form of a Bill.
The elementary purpose of the White Paper is to set up a unified Ministry of Defence and to vest in a single Secretary of State the authority and responsibility for defence. As has been said, unparalleled powers in the history of the British Parliament and in peace time are being given to a Minister. According to the Statement on Defence, 1963, Cmnd. 1936, it was estimated that £1,838 million would be spent on defence. It is now more. We were told that that was equal to about 13s. 1d. per head. The figure per head in 1949–50 was 5s. 8d. Whatever party were in power, I am sure that it would be faced, if it was honest with itself, with this problem of increasing defence costs.
What is the purpose of giving these powers and what opportunity will the House of Commons, whatever party is in power, have of acting as the watchdog of the people and as the protector of the people's rights? It was very apt that my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) should quote paragraph 64 of the White Paper. His experience on the Public Accounts Committee enabled him to quote it with authority. That paragraph states:
"All the Defence Votes will be accounted for to Parliament by the new Ministry of Defence."
Paragraph 61 says:
"As in the past, the Secretary of State for Defence will present to Parliament an annual White Paper giving information about the Defence Budget as a whole."
To come to the nub of my argument, I have had the privilege of serving on the Estimates Committee for a long time. We have been investigating military expenditure overseas—and the report on our investigations came out yesterday; my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) referred to it. We went overseas and saw the real expenditure. We did not merely deal with chairs or buses. We had a real opportunity to
558
examine how the taxpayers' money is being spent in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. We were unable to publish some of the details, but one thing which should be made clear is that, because of the difficulty which seems to have cropped up in the last few years, before we could go abroad as an Estimates Committee we had to be invited by the Ministry of Defence, and we went by the grace and favour of the Minister.
Whether a Liberal, Labour or Tory Government are in power, the rights of a House of Commons Committee should extend wherever the writ of Parliament extends. I argue that whenever the taxpayers money is being spent, whether by the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Health or any other Minister, on a group of people overseas doing a job of work for us in looking after people's welfare that enables the Committee to examine those accounts.
Let me be fair to the Minister of Defence and to the commanding officers of the forces that we met. We met with honesty and courtesy and were given all the documentation that we needed. I want the Minister of Defence to understand that I am not making any personal criticism of the commanding officers or the forces overseas. This is a constitutional position. We were given all the material that could be required by the Estimates Committee of this House.
With these new powers which are proposed I am wondering whether the power of the House of Commons will dwindle and whether all kinds of answers will be given to the Estimates Committee so that it may no longer be able to apply the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, particularly in connection with Standing Order No. 90A, in which I am interested. I give a précis of Standing Order 90A which is for the protection of the taxpayers' money and the rights of the House of Commons. It says:
"There shall be a select committee, to be designated the Estimates Committee, to examine such of the estimates presented to this House as may seem fit to the committee and report how, if at all, the policy implied in those estimate may be carried out more economically and, if the Committee thinks fit, to consider the principal variations between the estimates and those relating to the previous year…."

559
It goes on—I hope that the House will mark this—
"The committee shall have power to send for persons, papers, and records, to sit not withstanding any adjournment of the House, to adjourn from place to place, and to report from time to time."
We should be quite clear with regard to this White Paper—and this is no criticism of the Minister—that we retain on the Floor of the House the right to delve into figures on the various aircraft and nuclear weapons which are being produced, not so much for criticism as for the need for co-ordination and examination.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has ingeniously introduced on to the Notice Paper an Amendment to Standing Order 90A. He wants to set up a Select Committee to deal with expenditure on defence. He considers that it should
'….consist of fifteen members, who shall be nominated at the commencement of every Session, and of whom five shall be a quorum…"
and
"It should be at the discretion of the Committee to require every parson not being a member of the Committee to withdraw."
In other words my hon. Friend, though he said that he did not want support unless it was for the right reason, must recognise that this is a much more important reason than the one that he gave and that the entire House must have the right of investigating this expenditure. This may be the formula.
I hope, however, that the Minister of Defence will realise that on both sides of the House we are still the watchdogs of the taxpayer, whichever party we represent. We want to ensure that when the White Paper is implemented, the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee are by no means by-passed with any new set-up in this uncontrolled power that will lie with the Minister. Time does not allow me to develop this theme. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Stroud for concluding his speech when he did to give me the opportunity of getting this on the record.
9.6 p.m.
Mr. Gordon Walker: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) for
560
curtailing his interesting remarks, to which we have listened with great attention. I wish that he could have gone on longer, and I am grateful to him.
This has been a debate about very serious matters which has been conducted seriously. Running through all the speeches, divergent as they have been, has been the consciousness of the great difficulties involved in trying to get a unified or more centralised form of defence. When one tries to get a single defence system or policy, one cannot move men around as if they were chessmen. We are dealing with human beings, loyalties and morale, and this must not be forgotten. On the other hand, one cannot go too far this way. We must state clearly that we cannot organise the country's defence policy or its organisation for the custom, the convenience or the continuity of the Services. The Services are services. They must serve the nation and serve the policies of the nation as interpreted by politically responsible people.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said, it is essential that, we should maintain political and Ministerial control over our defence policies. This is not only important because it is part of our democracy. It is also important to maintain vigour and movement inside the profession. If it managed to get shot of or to loosen political control, it would suffer and ossify.
My main criticism of the White Paper is that one of its great defects is to weaken Ministerial control. Although it looks as if it will create a great dictator it will, I think, weaken effective political control over our defence services. One reason for this is that one of the major conclusions of the White Paper rests on a fallacy. A great deal turns upon paragraph 10 of the White Paper, which makes the case for the preservation of distinct and autonomous, or nearly so, Services. It rests on this sentence, which has been quoted by several hon. Members, including the Minister
'…the fighting spirit of the individual man in battle derives largely from his loyalty to his ship, his unit, or his squadron."
That is largely true and there is no question about it, but it does not support the major conclusion, which it is made to support, that
"The Services must preserve their separate identities."

561
These two things come in the same paragraph, as if one leads automatically to the other, but it does not follow from the truth that a man's loyalty to his unit is an extremely important factor in the Services. It does not follow there from that his loyalty to his unit must go on all the way up into the innermost interstices of the Services in Whitehall. This is just a simple fallacy. It is just assumed. It is not even argued in the White Paper. It is just assumed, and it is an assumption which does not hold.
Loyalty to one's unit is not affected by whether there is a greater merging between the Services or not. I wish that there had been in the White Paper a remark like that which the right hon. Gentleman made in his speech, when he said that a fighting man did not give a damn whether it was the War Office or the Admiralty and so on. That is perfectly true, but this—does the right hon. Gentleman not see?—destroys the apparent logic of paragraph 10, because if that is so, it men do not mind whether it is the War Office or the Admiralty and so on, it does not follow, because the loyalty of a man to his unit is important, that we must therefore keep the separate identity of the Services. This is just stated; there is no argument; there is no link between these things; and all this I find is a great defect in the White Paper from which many other things flow.
It means that the White Paper evades what I regard as the basic issue—how to get the Services thinking, and, indeed, acting, as one. I find, having read the White Paper extremely closely, that on the whole we are going backwards in this respect. I think that the three separate Services are going to be stronger now than in the past, and this arises out of the fundamental concept of the White Paper. Because this is really what is done. The previous Secretaries of State are down-graded. They become Ministers of State. The Chiefs of Staff remain exactly the same. This is the only point in which the two White Papers, with the same title, "Central Organisation of Defence," the White Paper of 1958 and our present one, are the same, and that is where they talk about the rôle of the Chiefs of Staff. There it is, almost word for word the same, the description of the position of the Chiefs of Staff in 1958
562
and today. But if the first thing we do is to demote the Secretaries of State, if we down-grade them and leave the Chiefs of Staff the same, we are in fact upgrading the Chiefs of Staff, and this I think is what has been done in this White Paper.
In these changed circumstances of down-graded Secretaries of State, many of the old traditions, which the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Captain Litchfield), for instance, was speaking about, the traditions which were suited to the openly, frankly, tripartite system which we had, if now maintained in the new circumstances where the Secretaries of State are being down-graded, increase the powers of the Chiefs of Staff, and, therefore, of each Service. I think this is true of the right of access of the Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister. I think it also true of the right of any Chief of Staff to have divergent views reported to the Chief of the Defence Staff. These were appropriate to the old, openly tripartite system. I am not at all sure that they are appropriate to this new system under a single Secretary of State, with three intermediate Ministers, who were superior or at least equal to the Chiefs of Staff, being down-graded below them.
There seem to me other essential instruments for maintaining political, Ministerial control over the Forces and Services which have been weakened in this White Paper as a consequence of the sort of arguments I have put forward already. It seems to me that if Ministers are going to have real control over the Forces they must have effective control over the career structure. This is a very large part of effective political control. I think that what is going to happen is this. The Ministers of State are not going to have the same control over the career structure as they used to have. They are down-graded; they are not going to have that sort of control, and it does not seem to me that the new Secretary of State for Defence is really going to acquire instead the proper, appropriate control over the career structure.
Paragraph 69 is important here. I do not think it has been mentioned in the debate. This says, in effect—I am paraphrasing—that the proposals for the promotion of senior officers above a certain rank, two-star rank, shall be "referred" to the Secretary of State. This has been

563
a carefully written White Paper. This word has been carefully chosen. The paragraph is deliberately not saying "decided" by the Secretary of State but "referred" to him. These are words we must take very carefully. This White Paper has been carefully gone over again and again and reflects different views, and this careful phrase means that this matter is not going to be decided by him. This again seems to me to give too much power to the Chiefs of Staff.
Another great and vital part of Ministerial control is financial control—and financial control right down to a fairly low level in the Service Ministries and the Services. This seems to have emerged out of the White Paper as a control which is less effective than it is today. There is the question of the four accounting officers. I hope that the very important question by my horn. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) will be answered by the Minister—whether or not the three or four accounting officers will go severally or together to the Public Accounts Committee. That is a very significant and important question.
What does the right hon. Gentleman think about the following point? The budgetary control inside the new unified Ministry of Defence will be exercised by a relatively junior man when one thinks of the high level about which one is talking—by a Deputy Under-Secretary of State who is—I can never work out these wretched graphs and charts and never understand what the dotted lines mean—three, if not four, rungs below the new Secretary of State. This is the point from which the attempt to get budgetary control throughout the new Ministry will be exercised. This, again, will be a man who is too low down in the heirarchy to make effective financial control possible.
I am afraid that we shall get an even worse form of the old problem of the Services cutting up between themselves, on agreed principles, the cake which they are able to get out of the Treasury. I am afraid that this will all be dressed up in the end, but instead of having three slices of the cake presented to us in the old way, the cake will be presented to us still already cut up but with the
564
slices wrapped together in cellophane. The old process will still have been going on.
The basic defect of the White Paper is that the Secretary of State will be in lonely eminence, divorced from proper Ministerial support. He will be very high. His nearest Ministers will be Ministers of State—very low down. He will have professional heads of Departments between himself and his Ministers, in effect. He is the sole means of enforcing the vital principle of political and Ministerial control over the Forces and other Services, each of which will retain its top structure intact. I think he will lack the power to do it; I mean not the right hon. Gentleman personally, but the holder of the office.
The right hon. Gentleman rightly said this afternoon that civil servants, if they are not properly under political control, tend to present polished, finished articles, with all the flaws covered up or filled in. Military men do this even more than civil servants, and for a good reason. Military men are trained to prepare agreed and settled policies and put them forward. This is what they are trained to do from very young in the Services; it is a very great military virtue. They tend to put forward agreed and worked out policies, working out their compromises between themselves. In this set-up where the Secretary of State is in this lonely eminence—this is the very problem which he foresaw and told us about this afternoon—this problem will present itself in an almost insoluble way.
The Chiefs of Staff, we are told, will remain the professional heads of the Services. I think they are simply going to become the heads of the Services. This worries me. I want them to be the professional heads of their Services and that implies that there must be some other heads of the Services. But the Ministers of State are not to be the heads. The Chiefs of Staff are to be the heads and will be less subject to political control than ever before, I think, in our history. This I find very disturbing.
I do not want it to be thought that any of us want to stop divergencies of opinion. Indeed, we do not want to stamp them out. It is extremely important, in vital matters of defence, that there should be divergencies of opinion all the way up to the Cabinet. But it

565
does not follow that such divergencies must always be between the Services. That is not necessary.
I noticed that the right hon. Gentleman took it for granted that the only way to decentralise was through the Services. But equally it has been taken for granted that, if the Chiefs of Staff are to be the heads, divergencies will tend to go on as between the Services. As I have said, we want differences of opinion but in the main these should be about strategy and should cut across the Services and should not all the time arise between them. Although the situation is not as bad as it has been sometimes in the past, it seems to me that the White Paper will entrench the Services too much.
These are grave defects in the White Paper and the right hon. Gentleman can fairly ask what we think should be done, pointing out that it is hard to get these things right and that we have to compromise. This is a fair question, but an Opposition cannot give a detailed answer. We have not had access to all the advice and discussion which has been going on for many months. But it is right to state, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) did, the broad lines along which we think these things could be improved.
First, we think it right that the present offices of the Secretaries of State and First Lord of the Admiralty should be downgraded, but there are consequential changes from that which have not been taken. We have to tackle more fundamentally the question of the dual responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff in the new political circumstances to their own Services and to the new, integrated Defence Department. If the political heads of the Services are down-graded, then the Chiefs of Staff should be downgraded somewhat, otherwise political control will be out of balance and out of proportion. This is a matter of very great difficulty.
I think that the new Defence Secretary's own political authority should be strengthened. As my hon. Friend said, we think that he should have two new Ministers, of full rank but probably not in the Cabinet. Each of them should be responsible for a particular aspect of defence, cutting across the Services. We must stress more the functional division
566
as opposed to the straight division between the Services. For instance, one of these Ministers might be in charge, among other things, of the Defence Budget, as was suggested by my hon. Friend.
I do not mind getting rid of the Parliamentary Secretaries, if the right hon. Gentleman wants that. I am quite prepared to get rid of some Ministers but if we down-grade the present political heads of the Services we must put someone alongside the new Defence Secretary so that he can exercise proper Ministerial control. He must control the appointment and promotion of senior officers above certain rank on a single list, cutting across the Services.
We think that the White Paper can be regarded only as an interim measure. It has great defects, but it is a step in the right direction. We are worried that these defects will make the next step harder to achieve than it should be. We believe that built into the chain of command are obstacles and difficulties which will stand in the way of taking the next step of progress, just as we had to take one after the 1958 White Paper.
The right hon. Gentleman quite rightly said that the essence, in the end, was the policy of the Government and how it was exercised and made to work and how conclusions about it were reached. There are very difficult problems which have not been mentioned in the White Paper, perhaps rightly. Somehow we have to get the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence geared together on armament and alliance policies. This is very difficult with our kind of ministerial and Civil Service set-up, but it has to be done.
In the last resort, what counts is the policy of the Government and world events can have a very great effect on the structure of one's defence organisation and on policy, such things as the conclusion of this limited nuclear test ban agreement about which I should like to say a few words.
I am very sorry that the Prime Minister chose to take so early an opportunity to make political advantage out of a political success, which we all welcome, regardless of party, and which, to some extent, was achieved by both parties and for which we were and

567
still are prepared to give the Prime Minister his due. However, for political reasons his rôle has been stupidly over-played. The Leader of the House went so far as to say in a speech that this test ban agreement was due to the Prime Minister more than anyone else in the whole world. To play up things like that is to make not only the Prime Minister but the whole country look a little silly. It looks as though we are so uncertain of ourselves that we have to boast like this, and it makes us laughable.
Valuable as our rôle was in this, the essential fact is that the United States and Russia came to the conclusion that it paid them and was in their common interest to come to this agreement. The Prime Minister also made the clear implication in the first speech he made outside the House after the test ban agreement was reached that our rôle in the discussions was due only to the right and authority of our nuclear power and he suggested quite clearly, as the right hon. Gentleman is now suggesting, that the Labour Party would throw it all away.
It is perfectly true that so long as our V-Bomber force lasts, we have a nuclear weapon and we are a nuclear Power, not of enormous importance, but of importance. The Labour Party would not throw away the V-bombers if we came in tomorrow, which is the implication which the Prime Minister and the right hon. Gentleman always make. We would certainly not replace them if we could get agreement with the Americans which would give us a proper share in the control with them of nuclear strategy and weapons. If the Prime Minister is now claiming that Britain can buy its way into the world conferences and councils simply with the Polaris missile which we are getting by the grace and favour of the United States and simply by describing it as an independent nuclear weapon after the V-bombers have gone, he is deceiving himself and deceiving all of those who cheer him.
When the Prime Minister says that the United Kingdom's place in Moscow was due to the right and authority of our own nuclear power, he is directly inviting France to copy us and to refuse to accede to the treaty and sabotaging the most
568
important clause in the very treaty in which he claims to have played so large a part.
Britain will keep its place in the councils of the world by the rôle it plays, by its vigour. It will do so because Britain is a very great Power, alongside super Powers, which has many unique advantages in the world and it will do it by the command of weapons which are indispensable to the Western Alliance.
By these means we shall keep ourselves in the councils of the world. By these means, and not by illusory independent deterrents after the V-bomber has gone, which will deceive nobody in the world, not even right hon. Gentlemen opposite when they are on this side of the House though it deceives them while they are on the benches opposite, the Labour Government will keep Britain in her due place in the councils of the world.
9.30 p.m.
Mr. Thorneycroft: We have had a valuable debate, and I give this assurance. I have listened to nearly all the speeches, and I shall have them all closely studied. The right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) specifically asked me whether my mind was made up. The object of this debate is to get the opinion of the House on this matter. It is helpful to hear the points of view that have been put forward.
As always in these debates, one tends to be criticised from two flanks. One argument is that this is far too monolithic, that I have taken too much power into my hands, and that I am over-burdened. I am grateful for the consideration that hon. Members have shown for my future health. The other argument is that I have made no effective change, and sometimes these opposing comments are made in the same speech. The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said one thing at the beginning of his speech, and the other at the end, but I think that towards the end of his speech he had rather forgotten what he said at the beginning.
I shall seek to persuade the House that I have done neither of those things; that what I have sought to do is to outline a central organisation which, on any count, is the largest administrative change that has taken place, or is proposed to take place, in Whitehall for many a year, and which provides a single,

569
unified Ministry of Defence, but, at the same time, has built into it opportunities for change, and wide opportunities which I regard, as, I think, everyone does, as necessary for decentralisation, because without it my task would be impossible.
The right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) was anxious to strengthen my position, and I thank him for that. It is good to have a friend. But whether I or any other Secretary of State really would be strengthened by the presence of eight Ministers round me, I beg some leave to doubt, and I think that hon. Members who have held office and had this responsibility know that it is possible to have a superfluity of assistance of this character.
One does not really strengthen a Minister by putting other Ministers of Cabinet rank beside him, but I agreed with one thing which the right hon. Gentleman said, and I should like to make it plain that any Secretary of State in charge of this Department must have, as one might say, patronage in his hands. He must be responsible for honours, awards, and promotions at least of two star rank and above. This is intended and will, in effect, be achieved.
Mr. Gordon Walker: Why is the phrase "referred to the Secretary of State" used in the White Paper?
Mr. Thorneycroft: If one refers something to the Secretary of State, one runs the risk that he may make up his mind about it. This will certainly take place. I give the right hon. Gentleman that undertaking.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East and other hon. Members made the point that the 1958 White Paper gave all the necessary powers, and asked what this White Paper does to help, Of course, the 1958 White Paper gave great powers to the Minister of Defence, but there is a marked difference between four Ministers with four Permanent Secretaries all seeking to arrive at one policy, and one Secretary of State and one Department trying to arrive at that policy. These differences may be subtle. They may be difficult for people outside the House to understand, but I think that everybody in the House understands them all right. The difference is very marked between these two positions. I am sure that we are right to advance from one to the other.
570
The hon. Member also gave a series of alleged examples of failure to co-ordinate, but these were really arguments in favour of a new organisation and for better means of co-ordination—although I do not accept the hon. Member's factual background. He said, in passing, that we should abandon the British independent deterrent, on the rather curious ground that unless we put ourselves in exactly the same position as Germany, Germany would break her treaty obligations I thought this was rather disrespectful to the Germans, and a curious basis on which to found a British defence policy.
I was asked by the hon. Member and others whether the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee would have official support. It certainly will. It will be supported not simply by the new Ministry of Defence, but the Cabinet Secretariat, which is drawn from the Foreign Office, the C.R.O. and the rest. It is absolutely vital for a proper integrated defence and overseas policy.
The hon. Member attacked alleged inadequacies in British equipment. This is the House of Commons, in which fair comment can be made on all sides, but these attacks on British equipment are increasingly resented by our forces in the field, and they provide a substantial encouragement to our opponents. The hon. Member also asked about the TSR2. I had hoped that he would ask me for a reassurance. He advanced a great deal of criticism of a very fine aircraft. I admit that any Opposition can attack any Government on any subject. That is the way we live, and quite rightly. But attacks on the TSR2 and the Buccaneer are doing untold harm to the aircraft industry. It may be that it is necessary and right to make these criticisms, but I ask the hon. Gentleman to weigh carefully the question whether there is any political advantage whatever which he can get from this which is comparable to the damage which he is doing to the country.
The hon. Member then turned to the White Paper—and it was with a slight sense of relief to hon. Members on both sides when he did so—and asked whether we could save the same amount of money as was saved by the United States. We shall do our best. We must be a little careful about these figures. The United States has had a

571
sharp increase in defence spending. It has risen by £3,000 million, or 10,000 million dollars, in the past five years. It is true that its very able Secretary for Defence has said that he would have spent £400 million more if he had not had economies. I have tried that argument on the Chancellor of the Exchequer here, but it does not go with quite the swing that might be imagined. Nevertheless, I applaud the economies which the United States has made. I would only say that those economies are made possible only if one has an organisation such as this, and real central control of finance.
In some respects we go further in these proposals than the Pentagon. Their proposals have built-in arrangements whereby not much more can be amalgamated between the various Services. Our scheme proposes built-in arrangements specially designed to enable us to go on in that process wherever possible. The hon. Member said, and I believe that the right hon. Member for Smethwick took the same line, that the morale argument has nothing to do with the question whether we have a single Service. I rather think that it has. I do not believe that people would feel quite the same about the Fifth Battalion, Corps of Infantry, as they would about the Lovat Scouts, the Grenadier Guards, or the Rifle Brigade. These things matter.
The right hon. Gentleman for Smethwick said that integration would all happen at a higher level. The prospect of seeing admirals, air-marshals and generals all in a mud-coloured uniform does not appeal to me. Although it may be modelled on the old German General Staff I doubt whether it would serve the interests of United Kingdom defence.
The right hon. Gentleman talked, as others did, about numbers. The numbers will, I admit, be about 25,000 in the future if we take all the Service Departments together. We shall have to study whether we can reduce staff but the number will start at about the same. I attach importance to reductions of staff where they can be achieved. But the savings there are nothing like as big as the savings which could be secured if we get the operational requirements right and get real control over cost effective-
572
ness studies, estimates and the rest. I did not see much sign of economising in Ministers. There, the right hon. Gentleman was a little more lavish.
I have been criticised about absence of control and about concentration of power. I do not think that we can have it both ways. If we are to have a stronger central control, we must allow for the fact that someone is to have rather less power than the Secretary of State. There is no other way of organising the thing. I am sorry about it, but I am afraid that is the way it must be in an organisation which gives more power at the centre.
The right hon. Gentleman said, and other hon. Members have said it, that the three Ministers of State would become mere public relations officers for the Services. It is my intention that they should not. But if they are not to become mere public relations officers for the Services it is very important to give them a rôle which is wider than that relating to a single Service. This is the whole point, that we entrust these Ministers of State with responsibilities analogous to those carried out by the Secretary of State himself.
In other words they should, on occasions, be asked to answer, and at all times be required to participate in decisions which are not solely concerned with the Royal Navy, the Army or the Royal Air Force, but are concerned with the interests of the defence of this country as a whole. I think that that is better secured if we allow them to be directly responsible to the Secretary of State and do not interpose between them and him two other Ministers, however senior or well-intentioned.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Watkinson), who speaks with great knowledge said—I quite agree—that this was a logical growth in our policy. I think that he is absolutely right, and that he was also drawing the right conclusion when he said that it indicates that our rôle is played on a world stage. Of course, we cannot play that rôle cheaply. Of course it is costly. But I am sure that it is right that all of us, I hope, hon. Members on both sides of the House, should make it plain that we intend to continue playing our rôle upon that world stage.
My right hon. Friend also mentioned a subject upon which he is peculiarly

573
fitted to speak, and that is the relation between industry and the Ministry of Defence. I wish to see more outside advice brought in and I am particularly anxious that we should secure this. One of the principal rôles of the Chief Scientific Adviser is to ensure that it should be so. I realise that we can bring in not only scientific advice, but, increasingly, technological advice into the Ministry from outside. It does not end there. I think that we may learn a great deal about matters like purchasing techniques, for example.
In the Ministry of Defence we certainly do not have closed minds about what we can learn from the experience of people outside as well as in Whitehall. If we can do anything to advance that relationship we shall certainly try to do so. The right hon. Member for Easington went to the root of the matter. He asked: did we require a measure of defence? His answer was "Yes", and I devoutly hope that he carried with him the majority of hon. Members. Most of us, I think, feel that we do require a measure of defence.
As I have already told him, I am seeking to collect views, not only about the legislation that may be introduced to implement this organisation, but, perhaps even more important, the way that machine should be used once it has been established. We are talking only about a machine—what matters is the way we use it, and it is on that aspect that the advice of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen is just as useful as the technical advice on the administrative set-up itself.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington supported—and I am glad that he did, because he speaks with great experience—a centralised Ministry of Defence. I agree that that will not end our quarrels, and it would be a great pity if it did. It would be a very dull Ministry if nobody argued inside it, and I do not imagine, nor does anyone else, that when it is set up there will not be the most violent disputes. At the same time, those disputes will go on under one roof but, more important, I hope that they will go on with more knowledge, as everyone concerned ought under this arrangement to know rather more of what they are arguing about than, perhaps, they do at the moment in four separate and embattled fortresses.
574
The right hon. Gentleman then wondered whether military power would overshadow the ministerial power and, as I understood him, even went so far as to say that the Ministers of State should not be subordinated to the Secretary of State. I do not think that the military power will for one moment overshadow the political power. The Chiefs of Staff have access to the Prime Minister, it is true, but, let us be frank, nearly everybody has. What is far more important is that they remain the chiefs and heads of their Services. That is the really vital matter.
I attach great importance to this. It would be possible to have three men, devoted advisers with long experience, but out of all contact with everyday life in their own particular Service. I do not believe that their advice would be worth half as much as that of the man who was head of a Service, who might argue to the point of distressing me from time to time, but who, nevertheless, had a solid view with some Service support behind it. I think that that is right.
I am not concerned here with titles, and still less with salaries, though anybody who proposes an advance for any Minister will receive at least a quiet hearing from me—I will go no further than that. But the two things are quite different. It is perfectly clear that whatever arrangements we make about these Ministers and by whatever name we call them—we could take the American example and call them Secretaries—they still have to be subordinate to the Secretary of State, and it is quite clear that unless we are to leave the thing exactly as it is today, we cannot have them as political heads of equal Departments, all arguing together, as can happen at present. These things are not possible if, at the same time, we wish to say that we have made a real advance.
The right hon. Gentleman said, with great truth, that we cannot do this on a legalistic basis, and I am sure that that is true. A reorganisation of this kind does not consist of lines upon a chart; it is a human problem, it is a problem of power and, as the right hon. Member for Easington said, it is a very difficult problem of organisation and administration. He had a French

575
proverb—"The more things change, the more they stay the same". I think it right to keep these titles. Perhaps I may give him another French proverb—"Paris is worth a Mass". To try to achieve our administrative reforms by smashing all the old titles, loyalties and traditions is not a good way of proceeding, and we do not even get the administrative reforms. I believe that, on the whole, we will gain more than we lose by keeping some of these great titles.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) referred to the TSR2, which is right in the front of development in this field. He asked me to draw on advice as widely as possible. I agree with that. Arrangements are made and built into this organisation to see that we can take advice. The advice we shall have will not be united. If I have any experience of it, it will be very diverse in its character, and all the better for that.
As one or two hon. Members have mentioned, the Americans have carried this system of getting outside advice very wide indeed. One can get as much of it as one likes, but one has to test that outside advice against the professional advice also available to one. We need both, and it is often in the clash of opinion which then follows that we have a better chance of arriving at the truth.
My hon. Friend also urged me that we should press on with rationalisation. I am sure that that is right. It is certainly our intention to do so. It would be quite impossible to do so, however, unless we had centralised power, at least to the point we have in these proposals. I should not like anyone to think that the working out of these proposals has been all a pathway of roses without any controversy whatsoever.
Twelve months ago I do not think that anybody would have said that these were all the right answers, by any manner of means. But if we are to get through rationalisation proposals, many of which touch important and respectable vested interests at many points, we must have the power to do it. I hope that whatever else we decide we will not decide on proposals which will whittle away the power which is concentrated at the centre.
576
My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield also said that the Ministry of Aviation should be separate. I agree. He held out possibilities for the future of a Ministry of Science and Technology. There is much to be said for that, but I have to deal with the situation as it is today. My Ministry is by far the largest customer of the aircraft industry. It really is in the industry's interest, as well as that of everybody else, to study the interests of customers, and there is a difference between having two Ministries in battle positions on either side of the road and having people living in the same corridor in constant touch with one another and able to interchange ideas as easily as Members of the House of Commons can do. This is quite different, and I am sure that it is the minimum advance that we must make if we are to improve in a field which is central to the control of defence spending.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) also suggested that the new organisation would be monolithic. I think that I have dealt with that in some degree already, but he touched also and importantly on the financial control. One or two other hon. Members, including the hon. Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) touched on this and on the Estimates Committee. I value the work of the Estimates Committee and I think that its members would agree that I have not been backward in giving them all the facilities for which I have been asked for visits, not only in this country but outside. I value the reports that the Committee has sent me, because even if they are critical they help me.
It is not in my interest to waste defence money. I have so much on which to spend the money. I am grateful to the Estimates Committee for the work it does and the help it gives. Even in these proposals I have been following, perhaps a little tardily, some of the advice which the Committee has given. I shall certainly continue in that way.
I am doubtful whether we ought to rush into some of the proposals put forward on various sides for an all-party committee.
I can see the arguments for and against this, but it is a very big departure in the proceedings of the House and it is a

577
proposal which goes much wider than defence. It was raised the other day. The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) asked me to do it, and I wrote to the hon. Member for Leeds, East and we both thought that this would not be a very good arrangement. I offered to meet a party Committee and—I am not complaining—he thought that even that was probably not right. These things need to be thought out rather deeply before we apply them in one field in our deliberations in the House. Some typical questions are, "Should it be in private?"—in which case it will certainly leak; or, "Should it be in public?"—in which case we are taking over one of the major functions of the House itself. These are wider matters.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. Allason) asked me particularly about the position of the scientists. To all hon. Members who asked whether they should be on the boards, I would say: this is 1963, and we are in an age when the advice of scientists is year by year becoming more crucial and more important. I am particularly anxious to ensure that the three main supporters of my Ministry—the military, civil servants in administration and scientists—should be on the same level. I think that it is essential that I should build into this machinery from every point of view the facilities which will ensure that there is a meeting of minds between those three at every level. I am sure that this is right. It means some rather new and sometimes controversial arrangements, and I do not say that everybody agrees with them, but unless we do this we shall not get the right advice. This is true today, and it will become increasingly true in the years that lie ahead.
The hon. Member for Dudley asked me some questions about legislation. It is our intention to introduce a Bill in the autumn to bring this organisation into effect, but I am not proposing to reform the whole of the Army and Air Force Acts. That is a much wider question, and if he is interested in it I should be happy to discuss it with him.
My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Chelsea (Captain Litchfield) asked
578
whether a Permanent Secretariat would be supplied for the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy. The answer is, "Yes, it will". He was anxious about the position of the scientific advisers. I have dealt with that point to some extent, and I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) lent me his support in the matter. My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud also mentioned the question of outside advice which was available in the United States system. I agree with that, and I think that we should make it available here, too.
In conclusion, I promise that we shall give full consideration to all the points which have been raised in the debate. This is a massive and important reform. While I will study these things, I want to do nothing which will weaken the system set up here and make me less able to do the many things which I am urged on all sides of the House that it is necessary to do. I accept the general view of the House that this is only a machine and that it is what we do with it that will matter. But let us not weaken it before we start, otherwise we may find it difficult to carry out some of the objectives which are urged upon me.
This is an important moment in our defence policy. Magnificent equipment is coming in. We have just announced a new carrier. We have just announced a new common aircraft, which is important not only in itself but because it marks that spirit of co-operation which is necessary for all of us. We now have a new organisation for defence which I hope in general principle will be supported.
Mr. Healey: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to take this opportunity to tell the House whether he will be able to make a statement on the Yemen incident before the House rises for the Recess?
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House takes note of the White Paper on the Central Organisation for Defence (Command Paper No. 2097).

MEAT INSPECTION REGULATIONS
10.0 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Peart: I beg to move,
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Meat Inspection Regulations 1963 (S.I. 1963, No. 1229), dated 11th July 1963, a copy of which was laid before this House on 18th July, be annulled.
In moving this Prayer, it is our purpose to probe the matter and find out from the Ministry more details of the arrangements which they are making for meat inspection. We are sorry that this is the only way that we can raise the subject, so late in the Session and, indeed, so late in the evening. We should have had a major debate on the subject because it is essential that we should have a proper system for inspecting the meat which forms such an important part of our national diet. There should be a satisfactory system of inspection at the abattoir stage and, also, there should be suitable arrangements for the trade.
Mr. Speaker: Will the lion. Gentleman be good enough to help me? I do not know, but I think it possible that the House might wish to discuss at the same time the Prayer relating to Scotland:
That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the Food (Meat Inspection) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1963 (S.I. 1963, No. 1231), dated 11th July, 1963, a copy of which was laid before this House on 18th July, be annulled.
If this is not so, I do not wish to suggest it.
Mr. Peart: Yes, Mr. Speaker, I think that that would be very convenient. My hon. Friend the Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross) concurs in that suggestion and, no doubt, will intervene on the Scottish aspect. If we can deal with them both together, hon. Members from Scotland will be able to participate as they wish.
We all agree that the aim should be 100 per cent. inspection, and this is really what the Minister is seeking to achieve. We want this inspection to be accomplished in two years. But this raises the main question whether or not the Ministry can provide adequate staff. The Minister is not thinking in terms of proper staff in the sense of having veterinary surgeons supervising the meat inspectors and playing a major part in the administration. I am a little prejudiced here,
580
being a lay member of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, but I believe that the Minister will accept that our aim should be to have in charge of the inspectorate the men who know most about the handling of animals and who can carry out ante mortem as well as post mortem examinations. Why have the Government taken the attitude of not seeking to establish a proper inspectorate controlled by veterinary surgeons?
In England and Wales we are lagging behind Scotland and, more than that, we are lagging behind many other countries. The Minister has had a memorandum from the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons on this subject. The statistics reveal that there are better arrangements in Europe and elsewhere. Australia has 400 lay inspectors supervised by 25 veterinary inspectors. In New Zealand there is a similar story. In the United States there are 3,000 lay inspectors supervised by 800 veterinary inspectors. In Western Germany the emphasis in meat inspection is on a veterinary inspectorate. We have the same story in Holland and Denmark. Spain also has veterinary lay meat inspectors. Why do not we have them here?
I should have thought that any forward-looking Ministry would have specific proposals on this matter. There is no indication of them in the Regulations, although I admit that the Minister has sent out a circular to local authorities, which would be responsible, about the need to secure the services of local veterinary surgeons. Paragraph 3 of the Ministry circular FSH9/63 issued on 18th July deals specifically with meat inspection and the responsibilities of local authorities. It says that local authorities
"…if they have not already done so, are urged to make arrangements with neighbouring authorities or to secure the services of local veterinary surgeons."
What is behind the Government's policy? Are they seeking to create a real inspectorate service? As long ago as 1922 a Departmental Committee recommended that we should have this. The Inter-departmental Committee on Meat Inspection, in its Report in 1951, came down in favour of it. It said:
"Whenever practicable veterinary surgeons should be appointed as senior inspectors responsible for groups of non-veterinary meat

581
inspectors. Non-veterinary inspectors should be encouraged to seek the advice of veterinary surgeons as professional consultants."
Detailed instructions are given in Schedule 1 about the inspection of car-cases, offal and blood. Schedule 2 deals with what an inspector must find out. There is there a formidable list of diseases and conditions. This work can be done only by a trained man, a veterinary surgeon.
Many bodies and many local authorities would be responsible for this work, but many of them do not have the staff. We have just over 3,000 slaughterhouses in different parts of the country. This is too many. I should like to see a greater concentration. I am glad that the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Prior) agrees with me. We need to rationalise our slaughterhouses in order to create greater efficiency and in order to have the necessary inspectorate service. I have argued this before on many occasions. I stress this because if we have too many abattoirs and if we have inspectorate control by small authorities, there is a danger that we shall not have a proper inspectorate service.
I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will tell us tonight what is in the Government's mind. Are they seeking to create something which will grow so that we may have trained people not only to protect our meat but to make certain that animals which go for slaughter are free from disease. A veterinary officer, through an ante mortem service in a proper abattoir, would be able to trace a disease right back to the farm from where the animal came and to find out how the disease occurred. I have the impression that the Ministry accepts this in broad principle, but I do not see any awareness of it in the Regulations. I know that the veterinary surgeons as a profession are worried about it.
One could argue for a long time about post mortem regulations and meat hygiene in abattoirs. This is important and this is why we wish to know from the Ministry what it seeks to do. I should like to see a national service, a special veterinary section dealing with meat inspection and created by the Ministry supervising the whole of inspection throughout our slaughterhouses.
582
I know that hon. Members who have detailed knowledge of the industry and trade wish to speak, so I shall not take up much more time. I stress the importance of inspection. I am not satisfied that the Regulations go far enough.
There is also the other view put forward by the trade. If we are to create a national system, then the charging of it should be the responsibility of the nation. The Regulations throw the onus now on the trade. I think that is wrong. After all, cleanliness and meat hygiene are the concern of the nation, and I believe that the trade which has put up objections through its national organisations—the Meat Federation, for example—has a good case.
I think that we are making a mistake in making the trade responsible. The fees will be paid to the local authorities by the trades concerned. This is wrong in principle. It should be a national responsibility. There is a danger that if this system operates in the end the consumer will pay, prices will rise and these will have a chain reaction. I would rather that the Exchequer were responsible. We are creating something which is controlled by the central Government. It should be the central Government's responsibility and the financing of it should also be the responsibility of the State.
For these two reasons, I think that there are defects in the system for the administration laid down by these Regulations. These are two important points, and I hope that they will be elaborated by other hon. Members. We do not propose to divide the House, but, on the other hand, if the Minister gives a very unsatisfactory reply, we shall have to reconsider our position. We are seeking to use this procedure tonight to probe the Minister and to find out what is in his mind.
10.13 p.m.
Sir Anthony Hurd: I welcome the bringing forward now of these Regulations. It is a step forward. We have not been all that in advance of the rest of the world in our meat inspection arrangements. When one goes to New Zealand and other countries that supply the British market, one cannot feel but

583
impressed—the same is true of the Argentine—by the great care exercised in passing meat for human consumption, particularly when it is coming to Britain.
These Regulations and the means by which they are financed—that is, by a modest levy per beast of one-tenth of a penny—is not a very substantial charge, even if it is to be borne half and half by the consumer and the producer and the meat trader does not bear a fraction of it. If this will give us a uniform system of meat inspection throughout the country, it will be an advance that we must all welcome.
We must all be concerned with the good reputation of home-killed meat. I sometimes have my doubts when I have been overseas whether we are keeping pace as we should do on the hygiene and inspection side. Now we can move forward. We are getting a good many more modern slaughterhouses put up, and, happily, there is a greater concentration of slaughter coming. That is a move in the right direction from the point of view of economy and hygiene. It will enable local authorities responsible for the meat inspection service to do the job more thoroughly, employ more skilled men, and pay their inspectors better than they have done hitherto. I have been concerned in the past—I hope that my hon. Friend will say something about it—about the smaller authorities which have a number of slaughterhouses dotted about their districts. It has been difficult for them to get around and to give a really effective meat inspection service.
Then there are the bigger groupings of what is almost the factory abattoir, where a large number of animals are going through. If there were a hold-up in inspection because, for example, of illness or at holiday time, it might be a great embarrassment to the trade. If everybody has his slaughtering and, therefore, his meat channelled through one central abattoir and there is a hitch in the inspection arrangements, the whole meat supply for an area could be seriously upset. There will be need for a reserve of inspectors qualified to take on this work.
The Regulations are a move in the right direction. Ante mortem inspection is something that we should like to see, but more obvious offences are spotted
584
and will be spotted still more effectively when there is 90 per cent. and 100 per cent. meat inspection. That will come, but I think it better to try to get our meat inspection on the post mortem side done thoroughly. Then, we will move on to the veterinary or ante mortem side a little earlier.
For these reasons, I hope that there will not be any hold-up, either in this side or in another place, in putting the Regulations into effect. I hope that every local authority will determine to make them work 100 per cent. efficiently and that meat traders, farmers and the public will have good reason to think that we have taken the right action in blessing these Regulations on their way.
10.17 p.m.
Mr. Charles Royle: I am in complete agreement with every word uttered by my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) and there was very little in what the hon. Member for Newbury (Sir A. Hurd) has said with which I could not also agree. I want, however, to approach the matter in a rather different way in and in respect of people whose voices are not often heard in this Chamber.
There is one section of the community which is concerned with the trade and associated with agriculture who are more deeply concerned about the Regulations than almost any other section. I make no apology for expressing the view of the meat trade with regard to these matters. As the House knows, I have been associated with the trade most of my life, although I am in no way associated with it financially these days.
Perhaps it is not a bad thing that any section of the community might have its voice heard in this Chamber. I say with respect to the hon. Member for Newbury that there is a pretty strong N.F.U. lobby in this House.
Sir A. Hurd: Not as far as the hon. Member for Newbury is concerned.
Mr. Royle: I said it to the hon. Member and was not including him. At least, he does not contradict that it exists. Let it be said also that there are trade union lobbies. There are all manner of lobbies and all manner of expressions are made in the Chamber in support of them. Therefore, I do not apologise for feeling that I should

585
express the view of the meat trade towards these Regulations.
First, I protest that this great question is being resolved tonight by Regulations. I regard the matter as so important as to have justified a Bill. By the Regulations, we are approaching completely new principles which have never been approached before along the lines envisaged in certain of the Regulations. This new principle would certainly have justified the introduction of a Bill.
I bow to nobody in my desire for 100 per cent. meat inspection. It is something that we should attain and ultimately can attain. I am on the record in this matter at great length. I remember the days we spent in Standing Committee on the Bill which became the latest Act about slaughterhouses. The present Secretary of State for War played a prominent part in the Committee, and we gave him a pretty rough time over two months. I expressed myself then as wholeheartedly for 100 per cent. inspection. I am doubtful whether these Regulations will produce that 100 per cent. even in the two years which are being allowed. My hon. Friend the Member for Workington has expressed himself fully on this, and I repeat my agreement with what he had to say. I want to come to these points in the Regulations about which I am most deeply concerned, as, I know, the meat trade is.
I come straight to Regulation No. 12. This is a new principle which is compelling a trade to pay for the inspection of food. I repeat, "a" trade. There is no question of the milk trade being asked to do it; there is no question of the fish trade making a contribution; canned goods are not mentioned in the Regulations. I wonder why the Minister picks on one trade and says that it must pay for inspection? When in the milk trade or in the fish trade, as in other trades, products are seized or condemned, the local authority will continue to pay for inspection. Why pick on this particular trade and say that it has to pay for the inspection?
This is the adoption of a new policy, and I want to say as strongly as I can that if the State, quite rightly, says that all meat must be inspected for disease, for the protection of the general public, then the State, or the local authority,
586
acting for the public as a whole, should pay for that inspection, and not the distributor. Why does not the farmer contribute?
Sir A. Hurd: He will do.
Mr. Royle: Not under these Regulations.
Sir A. Hurd: The stock market price.
Mr. Royle: I am getting under the hon. Gentleman's skin—
Sir A. Hurd: No. The hon. Gentleman is not.
Mr. Royle: —but I am stating the facts of the situation. After all, it is the farmer who produces the animal whether it is sound or whether it is deseased.
What is in the interests of the people should be paid for by authority. This is the old, old story, an agitation which has been going on since I was a boy, of compensation for confiscation. The butcher buys an animal in absolute good faith. At that point the farmer seems to wipe his hands completely of the beast. If the carcase is condemned the butcher loses everything, but the farmer draws all. This can be ruinous for small butchers in some of our rural areas. If an animal is condemned alive because of foot-and-mouth disease some compensation is paid to the producer, but on change of ownership, and the death of the animal under condemnation, there is no compensation at all.
With these Regulations the State is saying to the butcher, "We will not compensate you for the loss in case of condemnation, and in addition, we now say you must pay for the inspection which may result in the cutting down of the meat." The butcher has to say, "Here is the inspection fee. Now condemn my meat." Is this British justice? Inspectors and butchers, I hope, are honourable men, and I should not like to suggest in this place that this system will throw the door wide open to graft and bribery.
The other principle I am concerned with is that this is another shift from the taxpayer to the consumer. It may well be that wholesale butchers in a big way of business can pass on their inspection costs to the retailer, but the retailer is not in the same position with the fluctuation in prices going on in the main as a result of the Government's

587
policy of deficiency payments. It is now going to be in the lap of the gods whether the retail butcher himself pays the inspection charges or passes them on to the consumer. It has been estimated that in the latter event the charges would amount to 10d. per head of the population over a year. I cannot see that getting into the schedule of the cost of living under the Ministry of Labour. It will be completely ignored.
As a last word on the possibility of 100 per cent. inspection, I have two quotations from a Ministry memorandum dealing with this matter:
"It is therefore proposed that the regulations should allow meat to be removed from a slaughterhouse without inspection six hours after the time of slaughter…subject to the limitation that if these six hours should expire between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. the meat may not be removed until 7 a.m. This provisions would operate for two years only and would be coupled with a requirement that the local authority should notify the Ministry immediately they had reason to believe that inspection could not be carried out. The Ministry would then, if possible, offer the services of a Ministry veterinary officer to make the inspection. There would, however, be no guarantee that an officer would always be available as animal health duties would have priority. Authorities would, however, be expected to make their own stand-by arrangements and to draw on them before notifying the Ministry of their inability to carry out inspection."
It goes on:
"During the two-year period, local authorities will be expected to make stand-by arrangements to deal with emergencies, but where, in spite of these arrangements, they have reason to think that they will not be able to inspect any meat, they are required to notify the Ministry immediately. This will enable the Minister not only to find a permanent remedy for their difficulties, but also to deal with the immediate case by offering in the last resort…the Ministry's veterinary staff…"
What confidence does this give that at the end of the two years we shall have 100 per cent. inspection? The Ministry itself has no confidence in the Regulations which it is bringing before the House. By the introduction of the Regulations the Minister is widening the price gap between the farm gate and the consumer. The butcher still has the onus placed upon him as to the whole-someness of his meat. No responsibility is placed on the farmer; in no way does responsibility lie on the producer. Ail the risk lies with the meat trader,
588
and, in addition, he is now being asked to pay for the inspection.
I say as strongly and as firmly as I can that the Regulations are unfair and unjust. My only regret at the moment is that the House has not an opportunity to debate full legislation instead of delegated legislation. The Minister should take back the Regulations and bring forward a Bill instead. If he did so, I believe that not a single inspection would be lost in the delay. I protest against the introduction of the Regulations in this way and against the unjust methods and new principles which are being brought into being.
10.30 p.m.
Mr. J. M. L. Prior: Last night, in our debate on the White Fish Authority's levy, I regretted the absence from the Opposition front bench of the hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart). If I caused him any embarrassment I apologise to him, for I now understand what I should have understood then, that he had a perfectly good reason for not being here.
I did not intend to say more than that in this debate but I have been a little incensed by the speech of the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. C. Royle). I think that he has been a little less than fair to the farming community and that he has greatly overstated the butchers' point of view. Butchers came to see us about this the other day and even in a private Committee Room upstairs they did not state their case with anything like the force or vigour that he has stated it. It is ridiculous to say that the trade alone will pay for the inspection of these animals because, in the long run, this is bound to come out of the farmers.
That will be so for the simple reason that the butchers will pay rather less for their animals than before. That is perfectly obvious. I do not want to get involved in arguments we have from time to time as to who is making most or least money, whether farmer or butcher. Every butcher will tell us that the farmer makes the money, while every farmer will tell us that it is the butcher. As a whole, the balance is reasonably well maintained between the two.
It would be unjust to say that the butchers alone will have to pay for this

589
inspection. Those who say that meat alone is inspected and that no other category of food bears any cost of inspection need only go to a Wall's sausage factory or to a bacon factory or to a frozen food factory to see the amount of trouble and expense they have to go to to see that the products are fresh, clean and healthy. They are paying for that and in due course they pass the cost on to the consumer. I see nothing wrong in that. The consumer is perfectly prepared to pay for a good fresh article and it is quite right that he should do so.
I do not think that this is a job for the Government to undertake. I am certain that it would cost a great deal more if they did undertake it than if it is done by making Regulations and leaving the trade to undertake it. I am certain that that is the right way.
The hon. Member also mentioned the question of the butcher buying an animal and finding that it has some disease and is worth no money. Surely butchers run an insurance scheme to cover this sort of eventuality. If they do not, it is time they did so. If they do run such a scheme, what is all the trouble about?
I hope that, in stating a case for 100 per cent. inspection which will be of immense value to the farmer, the butcher and the consumer, we shall not get this subject out of proportion. I do not believe that we need a Bill to do this. It is quite reasonable to act by regulation. A debate like this amply brings out all the relevant points.
I hope that the House, will reject this Prayer and that we shall not hear too much from now on as to where the actual cost will lie, whether on the producer, the butcher or the consumer. This is something the butcher cannot afford not to pay. I am certain that these Regulations should stand.
10.35 p.m.
Mr. Cyril Bence: In view of the remarks made by the hon. Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Prior), I rise to defend my hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West (Mr. C. Royle). The hon. Gentleman referred to certain meat distributors who paid the costs involved in seeing that their customers received a decent product. Surely the hon. Gentleman realises that the butcher pays for the cleanliness of his establishment. He pays attention to
590
hygiene in his shop, and he pays for the cleanliness of his refrigerator.
A butcher, after buying an animal from a farmer, may find that part of the animal is diseased. Butchers operate an insurance scheme to cover themselves in the event of a whole carcase turning out to be diseased, but the point is that only part of it may be diseased. Only the liver may be diseased. If it weighs 12 lb., and would normally be sold at 2s. per lb., that means a loss of 24s. to the butcher. He receives no compensation, even though he is not to blame for the liver being diseased.
A butcher is involved in a heavy risk in distributing a farmer's products to the housewife. He may buy a carcase, and the local inspector may decide that considerable parts of it are not fit to be sold. The butcher has no redress. He has to suffer the loss, and now he is to be asked to pay for the inspection that may lead to that loss. If an inspector tests the butter in a grocer's shop, the grocer is not asked to pay for that inspection. If an inspector tests the milk on a dairy farm, the farmer is not asked to pay for that inspection. Why should the butcher be asked to pay for an inspection that is carried out on his premises? This is a shocking example of injustice to one class of distributor.
It must be remembered that if a butcher sends offal to be kept in cold storage, it will not be stored free of charge. It may be stored for as long as three weeks, following which, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Schedule 2, the inspector may condemn it. The butcher will then not only have to pay for the offal being stored for that length of time, but will not have the opportunity of reimbursing himself by selling the liver, or whatever it is. The butcher is the only purveyor of goods who is being placed in the position of having to pay to have his goods inspected, and I regard this as extremely unjust.
I am certain that one old gentleman I know who is now retired would say on reading these Regulations, "Cyril, thank God I am out of the trade." My hon. Friend the Member for Salford, West is probably saying the same thing and is glad that he has retired. This provision may not be a tremendous financial burden to butchers. I do not know how many of them kill in central

591
abattoirs. They may be handling a great deal of money, but the principle embodied in these Regulations seems to me to be a rotten one.
The hon. Member for Lowestoft, who quoted Wall's factory, was completely mixed up. People go round to ensure that the meat is properly handled and that there is cleanliness everywhere. The same applies to the butcher. He sees that his shop is clean, that his assistants wear clean clothes and that the slabs and rails are clean. But this has nothing to do with inspection. No one is asked to pay for this cleanliness, except perhaps the consumer in the price he pays for the product.
I cannot understand the provision in these Regulations. If a butcher buys two calves from a farmer and the farmer has had to call in the veterinary surgeon to deliver them, the butcher is not asked to pay the vet's fees. Here, however, we ace asking the butcher to pay a charge for the inspection of the farmer's product. I do not know whether I am in order in mentioning the Scottish Regulations, but Scottish butchers will not like all this. I do not know about the Scottish Regulations but I certainly see that the English Regulations can be varied by the Minister of Agriculture.
If there is a slaughterhouse a long way from where the meat inspectors operate, will the local authority appeal to the Minister to increase the charge for inspection in that area because it is difficult to reach the place? The Weights and Measures Act provides that a local authority can make special charges where an inspector has to inspect a weighing machine at a place which is some distance from where he normally operates. If a slaughterhouse is 20 miles away from Inverness, Glen Afric or Ballater, can the local authority make representations to the Secretary of State for Scotland to increase the charges laid down in the Regulations for the inspection of these animals?
If the charges could be varied on representation made by the local authority, a very serious and conflicting situation could be created in rural places. When something like this is laid down in Regulations, time passes, and the local authority begins to think, "We're losing money on this." We have heard
592
before in this place of great Departments like the Post Office losing money and then putting up their charges from 6d. to, say, 4s. If local authorities find that they are losing 2s. 6d. on a horse or a bovine animal—I do not know whether people eat horse flesh here, but I have done so, and I like it—I can quite see the charge going up to 7s. 6d.
We are given in these Regulations details of what an inspector must look for, and it would appear that he needs an honours degree in biology to do his job. He has to test parts of animals that nobody eats—why, I do not know—
Mr. Harold Davies: Perhaps there is a psychosomatic effect on the carcase.
Mr. Bence: The inspector will be highly qualified, hard to get hold of, and expensive to employ.
Knowing Governments as we do, and knowing their tendency always to increase their charges for everything they provide, I am very much afraid that the principle laid down in here that local authorities can make representations to the Minister to vary the charges will mean an increased burden on the butchers. I whole heartedly support my hon. Friend's protestations against putting this charge on the meat retailer of the farmer's product to the ultimate consumer—a charge that no other food distributer bears. It is a gross injustice to the meat trader.
10.48 p.m.
Mr. William Ross: Of these two Statutory Instruments one relates to Scotland, and it is a very small and limited one. The simple reason for that is that the main Regulations here being applied to England and Wales were applied to Scotland in 1961. England is speeding up a little; it now takes her only two years to catch up. It might not be so bad if she were catching up. The hon. Member for Newbury (Sir A. Hurd) said that this was a forward step, but judging by the criticisms of my hon. Friends the Members for Workington (Mr. Peart), Salford, West (Mr. C. Royle) and Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence), it is a rather unsteady and uncertain step.
My first question is: why have we these Scottish Regulations at all? We had 20 Regulations in relation to Scotland introduced in February, 1961, which

593
came into force in March and September, 1961, and I presume that from that time we have had inspection of all the various listed items and the rest of it. And then, suddenly, we have this part relating purely to charges. Why have we got it? I am sorry that the Secretary of State for Scotland is not here. He might have been able to tell us.
Is it because we have English Regulations and because the English local authorities, with their rather haphazard organisation of the abattoirs and slaughterhouses in England, wanted some "come back" in relation to this new and desirable service and therefore the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food—although I think I am right in saying that it is the Minister of Health who designs these Regulations, am I not?—or both Ministers, insisted that if it was going to apply to England and Wales, then the charging part must apply also to Scotland? I think that this is what has happened.
The more we examine these English Regulations the more they savour to me of haste and of trying to do something which the Government promised to do a long time ago. I think that they are slipshod, shoddy and patchwork and do not meet the situation. We are not concerned with the butcher; we are not concerned with the farmer. The Food and Drugs Act was concerned with the consumer. I can well remember the legal discussions which we had on that Bill. The reason why we had two sets of Regulations was because we had two separate Measures. I can remember the Committee stage of the Bill. We had a far better Food and Drugs Bill for Scotland, and that is why we have better Regulations.
What was the big point about that Bill? It was the point mentioned by my hon. Friend, that far too much was being dealt with by Regulations that should have been in the Bill, and that although we were passing a Bill with the best intentions and all the rest of it the power really resided in the Minister to bring into the legislation by his delegated powers what really mattered.
What happens is that we deal with this matter by way of a Prayer that has to end by half-past eleven. We cannot amend the Regulations and we can only vote against them and express our dis-
594
satisfaction in that way. But it means that if we vote against the Regulations and the vote is carried in our favour we shall be in a very much worse position than we are at the moment. We shall have nothing. Yet somebody said that it was a step forward.
What has been happening to the English Regulations proves the case. I do not think that the House would have been satisfied and that we would have had a long discussion on the matter in Committee if this had been presented to us. We have only to compare what is here proposed with what was passed for Scotland in 1961 to see how unsatisfactory these English Regulations are.
The local authority is not only fully in control but the obligation is laid upon it to record everything that happens in relation to any slaughterhouse in its area. There is a Schedule setting out what records it must keep. It must state in how many cases a carcase has been condemned. Indeed, it must state in how many cases part of a carcase has been condemned.
There is a very important section of which I should like the Secretary of State's minion to take note. Paragraph 5 of that Schedule states that an indication must be given of how meat was disposed of which was dealt with under an instruction that it be set aside. This is a weakness of the Scottish Regulations in that there were supposed to be regulations for disposal and I have not yet seen them. I should like to know what has happened to them.
In relation to every one of these items, the local authority is in control and there is 100 per cent. inspection, not only post mortem but ante mortem, except in specific areas related to matters which my hon. Friend mentioned. I wonder that we have not had amending Regulations taking some of these areas off the list. I think it is in relation to Argyll, Bute, Ross and Cromarty, Orkney and Shetland, and small burgs, New Galloway and Langholm, that because of the expense which would be involved for the local authority, no responsibility is laid upon it for mandatory ante mortem inspection.
But there is no wonder that people in England prefer Scottish beef. The meat inspector in Scotland must be qualified. Since 1st January this year

595
meat inspectors in Scotland have had to carry a certificate from the Royal Scottish Sanitary Association. They first inspect the animals alive. If they suspect anything, the animal is set aside, and they send for the qualified veterinary meat inspector. That is followed in the post mortem examination, too. Will the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland tell me how many unqualified meat inspectors we still have who have been given the Secretary of State's approval to carry on though they do not hold the necessary certificates? We want to know, because it will give an idea of the progress which we have made in taking the first step to a full standard in Scotland.
Why have we not laid down in the English Regulations the qualifications which are in the Scottish Regulations? It is most unsatisfactory. Do we take this seriously in England and Wales? I have just been released from a long battle on criminal justice in Scotland. I do not know how many sittings there were in Scottish Standing Committee, and we had Recommittal, Report and Third Reading in the House last week. One reason I have made such an exhaustive study of this important subject is that on Tuesday of this week, for the first time since November, Scottish Members have been released from Committee work. Every Tuesday and Thursday, and in some cases Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, since early November, we have been locked in controversial battle over important matters.
It is important to note that penalties are laid down for the contravention of the English Regulations. Having given careful study to the wording of the Scottish Regulations, and to these Regulations, I have no doubt that there was a certain amount of cribbing, but I should like to know why the discrimination in England and Wales in relation to penalties, comparing Regulation No. 16 with Scottish Regulation No. 21.
In England and Wales, anyone who contravenes the Regulations or fails to comply is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months or a fine of up to £100. In Scotland it is £100 or six months' imprisonment. For continuing the offence, after conviction, it is
596
in England and Wales £5 for each day. In Scotland, it is £10 for each day. There, the English drop their concern. But not in Scotland. These penalties in Scotland relate only to summary conviction. It is an indictable offence in Scotland, and on conviction on indictment the fine is up to £100 or one year in prison, and for a continued offence it is £50 per day.
Is it that the English Minister is not so concerned about this matter as we are in Scotland? Is it because our reputation as producers and providers of good beef and other meat is such in Scotland that we insist on far more severe penalties? There must be a reason. Is it just that, in England and Wales, we are not really serious about it but we have to put something before Parliament because it is a long time since the 1956 Act was passed?
I am concerned also about some of the let-outs in the English Regulations. I shall not go into them, but there are provisos there which are not found in the Scottish version. Even in the long lists of anatomical or geographical terms there are some strange omissions and additions. I discussed these matters very exhaustively with Mr. Robertson, the sheep expert at Auchencruive Agricultural College, because they are so important—though the fact that he lives next door to me has something to do with it. I have considered and discussed it from the butcher's angle, too.
I hope that we shall have answers from the Under-Secretary of State to the questions which I have put. I emphasise also the questions which have been put by my hon. Friends from English constituences. What the Government have put before us is very disappointing. They should have taken a little longer and produced something far better.
11.2 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. James Scott-Hopkins): Hon. Members on both sides are agreed that the object of the Regulations is welcomed by everyone, that is, 100 per cent. meat inspection. There is nothing between us on that. The hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) asked what was in our minds. The answer is quite simple. We want to attain 100 per cent.

597
meat inspection in Great Britain, and we want to do so as soon as we can. These Regulations are the first step towards that end. We are convinced that it is necessary and we shall do our utmost to attain it.
I think that I can best help the House by describing, first, the main provisions of the Regulations.
Mr. Peart: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will deal with the kind of inspection and the rôle of the trained veterinary surgeon. Is it the aim of the Ministry to establish a veterinary staff?
Mr. Scott-Hopkins: I shall deal with the various points which have been raised. I wish to begin by explaining to the House the main objects the Government have in mind.
The first point of importance about the Regulations is that each local authority will be required to inspect all meat produced for human consumption at slaughterhouses in its area. Secondly, whenever slaughtering is to be done in a private slaughterhouse, the local authority must be given 24 hours' notice of the intention, unless it agrees to a standing notice of regular slaughter.
Thirdly, no meat must be removed from a slaughter house until it has been inspected, and, if found fit for human consumption, it must be marked with the stamp of the authority concerned.
Fourthly, local authorities are authorised to make a charge for each carcase they inspect, up to 2s. 6d. for a horse or cattle beast, 9d. for a calf or pig, and 6d. for a sheep, lamb or goat.
A lot of play has been made by hon. Members about the cost of the charge. It is important that we should keep a sense of proportion over this. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Mr. Prior) and other hon. Members have said, the maximum charges are about one-twentieth of a penny per lb. of beef and pork and one-tenth of a penny per lb. of veal and mutton. This is not a vast sum. I am sure that even the hon. Member for Salford, West (Mr. C. Royle) will agree that this is not a vast amount. I agree with him that this is a new charge and to a certain extent a new principle.
Mr. C. Royle: If it is so small a charge, is it not something that the local authority or the taxpayer could carry?
Mr. Scott-Hopkins: This is where I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Gentleman. It is small in proportion to the carcase per pound, and, therefore, it is no burden. I will not enter into the controversy about whom the burden falls—the farmer, or the wholesaler or the consumer. We all know what differences there are on this point. Although the amount is small, it is important because in aggregate for a local authority or the Government there is a fair sum of money involved.
The hon. Member for Salford, West calculated that it would cost about l0d. per person per year. That is about double what we calculate it might be—about 5d. per person per year. If one takes the cost as £1 million, we have about 50 million people, and so that is about 5d. per person. That is roughly what I think the cost will be. So we must keep a sense of proportion, although I accept that it is an important point.
The next point is that each authority must publish its scale of charges, and the Minister has power to direct it to vary its charges if he thinks they are unreasonable. My right hon. Friend does not have power to increase the charges, but will have the power to ask local authorities to vary, and make them vary, the charges if he thinks they are unreasonable in relation to the cost which the authority has to bear. It is not the object of the regulations that local authorities should make a profit out of the meat inspection charge. The object is that the local authority should be able to recompense itself for the expense incurred by its inspectors in carrying out 100 per cent. inspection of meat throughout the local authority area.
If representations are made to my right hon. Friend and he thinks that they are justified, he has power in the Regulations to ask the authority to vary the charges. There is no power for my right hon. Friend to increase the charges unless he comes back to the House with amending Regulations.
Mr. Ross: Why is the local authority in Scotland under an obligation to consult interested parties—butchers, and so on—before fixing the charges while there is no

599
such obligation in England and Wales? Further, why is it, since we have a much more exhaustive examination in Scotland—ante mortem as well as post mortem—that the local authority should be tied to exactly the same scales as in England and Wales?
Mr. Scott-Hopkins: On the first point, consultation has taken place with the trade concerning the maximum level of the charges to be imposed. If my right hon. Friend decided at any future date in any particular circumstances that there was a case for altering the Regulations and laying new Regulations, consultation would take place with the trade.
As to the difference between Scotland and ourselves, there is not a vast amount of difference on this point, although it is written into the Scottish Orders that consultation is an obligation on the Scottish local authority.
Mr. Ross: On the local authority.
Mr. Scott-Hopkins: On the local authority. That is quite correct.
The Regulations also contain standard procedure and criteria for inspection based on an advisory booklet which has been an accepted authority for years, and there are a number of minor provisions continued from the present Regulations.
These Regulations come into effect on 1st October this year, except in one important respect. This has been mentioned by various hon. Members. Some of the local authorities have expressed doubts about the feasibility of changing over immediately to a position where every local authority would be required to inspect every carcase in all circumstances—in other words, from 90 per cent. inspection as we have it at the moment to the 100 per cent. which is the intention of the Regulations after the two-year period. We must achieve 100 per cent. inspection, but my right hon. Friends have thought it prudent and reasonable to allow time for those authorities which have difficulty to work up an effective organisation. It would be wrong to make mandatory provisions without being satisfied that they can be observed universally.
The Regulations include, therefore, a transitional period during which, for two years, meat for which inspection
600
cannot be provided within six hours after slaughter may be taken away uninspected, subject, as now, to a bar on removal between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m. This provision is coupled with an obligation on local authorities to notify the Ministry locally whenever they find themselves unable to inspect any particular consignment of meat.
The hon. Gentleman says this is shocking, but surely it is a sensible provision for the particular circumstances of the moment that where local authorities find it impossible to inspect meat they should notify Ministry officials as quickly as they can so that we may be aware of the position and take what action we can. My right hon. Friends expect that local authorities will wherever necessary make arrangements to cover such foreseeable events as holidays, or sickness, possibly by arrangements with other authorities, or by retaining local veterinary surgeons. If, in spite of this, they still cannot inspect the meat, they must inform us.
This will help us in two ways. First, we shall be able to give practical help over the inspection. Here I thought the hon. Gentleman was a little unkind and I think he had not taken the point. We shall be able to give practical help over inspection if our other veterinary work permits. Secondly, and more important perhaps, we shall be able to hear in good time what the difficulties are and so be in a better position to help local authorities to get over the difficulties which have made it impossible for them to inspect a particular consignment at a particular slaughterhouse at a given moment.
I think that this is the correct procedure. When local authorities are in trouble we will do our utmost, if they find it impossible to inspect, to help them. If we can, we shall help, and, at the same time, with their help and co-operation, see that a similar position does not occur again. I think that I have described the Regulations and explained why they have not been brought fully into force this year. The hon. Member for Salford, West asked: why charge? The main reason why some of our home-killed meat is not inspected is the financial difficulty which local authorities have in providing full meat inspection.
The amount of meat which a local authority has to inspect often bears no

601
relation whatever either to the needs of its population or to that authority's financial resources. I know this particularly well, coming from Cornwall. I have in my constituency large rural areas whose rateable value is small and which have a vast amount of meat going through for export. I know the difficulties which they have had. We have had grants in the past, but it was sometimes necessary for them to stretch their resources to the limit. This is the point which was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Sir A. Hurd). Some authorities have limited resources and large slaughtering establishments which export a lot of meat to other parts of the country.
In 1958, we introduced a temporary Exchequer grant to help in those cases, but it has not been effective. In any case, it is against our general policy to make direct grants of this kind for a specific purpose to local authorities. Therefore, to provide the authorities with the resources that they must have to inspect the meat, the only solution was to allow them to impose a charge for this service; and we have imposed the charge after full consultation.
The hon. Member asked why the meat trade should be singled out from the rest. The relevant point is that we have not, in this instance, singled out the meat trade in comparison with other trades. There is a great difference between meat inspection and the general inspection of food under the Food and Drugs Act. The latter is done by sampling, whereas, with meat every carcase is to be inspected at all times.
Once again, I must emphasise that the amount of carcases to be inspected bears no relation necessarily to the size or resources of the authority through which they pass at slaughter. Every carcase has to be inspected. Other products, including milk, are in a different position under the Food and Drugs Act.
I was sorry that the hon. Member referred to graft and bribery. I did not understand what he was hinting at. I hope he was not hinting that because of the difficulties which he foresaw, there will be graft and bribery. That could be a mischievous suggestion and I am certain that it will not come about. I have the utmost confidence in those concerned,
602
both in his own trade and also the inspectors.
Another point made by the hon. Member for Workington concerned the inspection staff. It is the local authorities' responsibility to recruit and to provide the staff for meat inspection. I was a little disturbed by the derogatory remarks made by various hon. Members opposite about the quality of the meat inspectors who are doing the job and those who will be trained. I am certain that those who have done, and are doing, the course will be perfectly capable of inspecting meat and interpreting these complicated Regulations and Schedules, as they have done in the past and are continuing to do with perfect satisfaction to the trade, the consumer and the producer.
It is impossible to say exactly how many staff will be required for meat inspection or how far present resources fall short, but meat inspection is often shared with other public health duties. The matter is best put into perspective if I say that the inspection of all meat would require roughly 800 full-time inspectors. We already have 90 per cent. inspection in Great Britain. Therefore, we have to find the equivalent of about 80 meat inspecting officers. It is a matter of finding these out of the large body of public health inspectors, and the growing number of inspectors who are being trained for the sole purpose of meat inspection and who will qualify under the recent Regulations.
I am, however, confident that when the Regulations come into operation, an adequate supply will be forthcoming during the two-year period which the Regulations allow for 100 per cent. meat inspection to be brought in. I have every confidence that at the end of that period, there will be sufficient inspectors and the local authorities will be able to provide this service.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newbury made an important point concerning the factory-type abattoir and the difficulties which could be encountered. At present, some of the staff at private slaughterhouses hold qualifications in meat inspection. It is for the local authorities to decide whether or not they wish to authorise such staff to help solve any staff shortages which may arise. I

603
imagine that this type of arrangement may well be necessary in establishments where a breakdown in slaughtering and throughput could have serious consequences.
There is also the question of hours of slaughtering. The local authorities have urged that the problem would be solved if they controlled the hours. Having heard their representations, however, we considered that the disruption of the trade that would have resulted—and I am sure that I carry the hon. Member for Salford, West with me on this—would not have been worth it.
The hon. Member for Workington spoke of the number of slaughterhouses. Since 1958, in accordance with Government policy, we have reduced the number from 4,500 to about 2,500. We can expect a further reduction. This is a help in inspection. But there is another side to it. The fewer the slaughterhouses the greater the throughput, and, therefore, the more difficult it can be sometimes to get the inspection done.
The hon. Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross) referred to the difference between the English and Scottish penalty clauses in the Regulations. This covers the difference between the English and Scottish courts.
The hon. Member for Workington also advocated ante mortem inspection. Of course, this is desirable, but we are taking the first step here. We are giving a two-year period to allow post mortem inspection to become fully efficient. I accept that north of the Border they were a little ahead of us on this. We are, in fact, putting into effect in England some of the Regulations our Scottish friends have had for some time.
For a two year period we are allowing some meat to go out uninspected. After that, there will be inspection by local authorities who will be able to call on private practice. The Ministry will always be available if they need advice. We are taking the first step. Meat needs to be inspected, and the House and the country want it to be inspected 100 per cent. It is right that it should be inspected 100 per cent. and that we should begin by these Regulations. I am confident that the Regulations can be carried out. I am certain that there will be sufficient staff available at the end of the
604
period. Let us wait and consider later where we move on from there.
A national inspection service has been suggested. I do not think that we should have such a thing. This type of work is public health work, and the inspection of food has traditionally been undertaken by local authorities and not by the central Government. Indeed, the Food and Drugs Acts specifically lay down that meat inspection should be the responsibility of the local authority. My right hon. Friend has not contemplated removing this responsibility from local authorities who are, and will be, capable of carrying out this duty, and who have a full sense of their responsibilities in this matter.
I believe that local authorities will be able to overcome any difficulties that arise in the initial stages of the scheme. I am sure that the proposed procedure is the correct one, and I ask the House to reject the Motion.
Mr. Ross: The hon. Gentleman said that he would deal with my question about penalties, but he has not done so. We in Scotland have had inspection for two years without any charges being imposed. Why is it now considered necessary to make a charge for this inspection?
Mr. Scott-Hopkins: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the charge for meat inspection is at the moment borne partly by the rates and partly by grants to local authorities. It is now considered right that the charge should be borne by the trade. The service is provided by the local authorities, and the proposed procedure will mean that the cost will not be borne by the rates and by the Exchequer, but by the trade.
Though this is a side issue, it is important to remember that this will bring the position in Scotland into line with the position in the rest of Great Britain. There is an important point of principle here.
Mr. Peart: Although we are not satisfied with the Minister's reply, we do not wish to press this matter to a Division, or prevent the coming into effect of Regulations which will improve the present position. We are anxious to have meat inspection, and I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

EARLY POTATOES (IMPORTS)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Mac Arthur.]
11.28 p.m.
Mr. John Brewis: I am grateful for the opportunity to raise the subject of imports of early potatoes, which is of great concern to a number of people in the potato-growing areas, and I am particularly glad that my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary is replying to this debate because, representing as he does a Cornish constituency, the matter must be one of great moment to him.
Over the last few years the Government and the Potato Marketing Board have developed an excellent system for the orderly marketing of main crop potatoes. The elements of the system, as is well known, include a total prohibition of imports of ware potatoes unless there is fear of a shortage. At the same time, the acreage quota plus price-support buying ensures that potatoes make an overall average price near to the guaranteed price of £13 15s. per ton.
Even with these powers, regulating the market is no easy task for the Board as there are many variable factors. For example, potatoes can suffer great wastage in the clamps through the winter, and the public may decide to eat far more or far less potatoes in any one month than might be predicted. The supply position of earlies and second earlies also has a significant effect on the main crop position, and the price of earlies at the beginning of their season is affected by the hang-over of ware potatoes stored from the previous year.
Yet our present system is to treat the early crop in an entirely different way from the main crop. In contrast with the careful statistical evidence collected in connection with the main crop, and the complete prohibition of imports, the Government have no idea what quantities of earlies will be imported between May and August and only a sketchy idea of how many acres are to be harvested as earlies in this country. Therefore, if home supplies are short or foreign supplies are affected by Colorado beetle or other plant health troubles, prices may soar to £80 a ton or more. Equally,
606
the opposite may happen and home-grown potatoes may become virtually unsaleable, as is the case this year. This situation is obviously quite unsatisfactory to consumer and grower alike.
I do not want to waste much of my time in describing this year's early crop. The facts about the glut are well-known. At the annual sale at Girvan, on 2nd July, prices were so low that all but three lots were unsold. In Cornwall, prices are as low as £8 a ton and in Pembroke even lower. One experienced potato merchant told me that he could not remember such a bad year for over thirty years. At the prices I have quoted growers are suffering great losses. Five to six tons an acre is a good yield for earlies dug in June, but the costs of digging and growing are about £125 an acre or even higher. Even today the Cornish crop is not all dug up—a month later than usual.
My hon. Friend will know the effect of this on the next crop, such as broccoli, which is usually grown in this area. In Ayrshire, little more than 50 per cent. of the potato crop has been dug so far. The early potato fields in this area are light land and the fertility will not stand the heavy crops now being dug. Heavy infestation by eel worm is also to be feared and, therefore, many farmers will not be able to grow early potatoes again for four years or more. Yet Cornwall, Pembroke and Wigtownshire are extremity areas, critical areas of depopulation, and any blow to their prosperity should be of as great concern to the Government as the decline of shipbuilding on the Clyde and the Tyne.
I welcome the decision announced this afternoon by the Potato Marketing Board that it will commence support buying of earlies tomorrow, using its own funds. Will my hon. Friend tell the House that the Board will receive Governmental financial support when it has to start support buying? The effect of this buying on the following main crop supplies will be to limit the guarantee payments which will be needed from the Government later in the year.
The main cause of the collapse of the early potato market this year is seasonal. There has not been the fortuitous phasing out of the crop, starting in Jersey in May and ending with Lincolnshire and Kent in July. The crop has been late and there

607
has not been the usual frost early in May. There is, however, one contributory factor over which the Government have control. In Spring, 1962, there was a shortage of ware potatoes and prices went very high. In January this year the Government feared another shortage and authorised imports of ware potatoes under open individual licence up to 30th June. When the shortage did not materialise the Government did not recall the licences.
As a result, there was too much ware imported and over-hanging the market, and the earlies never got a proper start. In future, when it is necessary to import ware potatoes from abroad, it should be a condition of granting an import licence that it can be recalled at short notice. This is how the French treat our lamb exporters, and there is no reason why we should not treat them in the same way. Apart from that, it is ridiculous to be importing old ware potatoes at the end of June. I hope that my hon. Friend will explain why it has been necessary to import a record 31,068 tons of old potatoes in June of this year.
There have not been so many imports of early potatoes this year as last, but the Government can claim no credit for that; the price has been too low to tempt the French and Belgians, while the Plant Health Regulations have kept out the crop of large areas of Italy and Spain which are affected by Colorado beetle. Even so, in this highly volatile trade, a small increase in supplies can break the market. We saw this in 1960, when the acreage quota for main crop was exceeded. A total of £213,000 was collected in acreage penalties, but the excess crop cost the industry as a whole £3½ million in lower prices. Into the witch's cauldron which was the early potato market in June this year, the importers cast an estimated extra 60,000 tons of unwanted and unneeded early potatoes from abroad.
Imports come from many sources. During the last eight years we have imported from 26 different countries. Far the most important of the Commonwealth producers is Cyprus, and Belgium, Spain and Morocco are extensive foreign sources. Let us look for a moment at how imports have crept up over the last few years. In 1955, Cyprus sent 26,000 tons, in 1960, 51,000 tons, and
608
in 1962. 70,000 tons. Belgium sent 19,000 tons in 1955, and sent 42,000 tons in 1961. In 1955, Spain sent 22,000 tons, and 73,000 in 1961. Morocco sent 1,000 tons in 1955 and 7,000 in 1961, and 24,000 tons in 1962. Of course, some countries have dropped off, but the total tonnage of imports has a rising tendency—195,000 tons in 1955, 270,000 tons by 1959, 360,000 tons in 1962, and even in this year of unparalleled glut, an estimated 265,801 tons, which is nearly the highest total ever.
Can the home producer increase his output and his share of the market like the Cypriots? He cannot. He is tied to an acreage quota, and must pay a penalty of £10 for each extra acre—and next year it may well be £25. No such quota affects the Cyprus grower. This year he bought 50 per cent. more seed potatoes than he did last year and, as a Commonwealth member he enjoys the privilege of tariff-free entry into the British market. I must say to my hon. Friend that a system in which our home producer has his hands tied by quota restrictions while the Cyprus grower can increase his exports to this country to an unlimited extent as he pleases cannot be justified in logic or allowed to continue in practice.
Cyprus has a considerable climatic advantage as a Mediterranean country. If, in a normal year, Jersey can send the bulk of her supplies in May, Cyprus can do so even earlier if necessary. My hon. Friend and the President of the Board of Trade must inform the Cyprus Government that we can provide a market for their crop if they dig early in April and May, but that the heavy consignments sent in June in recent years must stop, because it is neither in their interest nor ours to glut the market.
We should seek to establish an imports consultative council like that which controls the marketing of bacon imports, with representatives of Cyprus and other Commonwealth growers such as Eire and Malta, and the E.F.T.A. countries. If common sense does not prevail, my hon. Friend's inspectors should read very carefully the definition of an early potato before allowing Cyprus potatoes to be landed in June and July, because they are by then nearly mature ware potatoes.
Having said that, I think that we must be prepared to give priority to the

609
interests of our Commonwealth trading partners, and Cyprus is a good customer of ours. But I see no reason why we should be so tender with highly developed foreign countries like France. The potential competition for the Jersey and Cornish growers from Brittany is enormous. There may well be as much as 30,000 acres of land there suitable for early potato crops. The French will soon be able to circumvent the Plant Health Regulations by installing washing machines and rebagging potatoes from areas at present affected by Colorado beetle and tuber moth. In any case, these regulations were never intended as quantitative import controls.
The present tariff from 1st to 16th May is only equivalent to 1/10th of 1d. per lb. and is quite negligible to protect our growers. If the tariff is not bound by G.A.T.T. it should be raised substantially, and also as an incentive to Cyprus who enjoys free entry to send her potatoes when we want them. I think that the tariff of £9 6s. 8d. a ton from 16th May to 1st July is reasonable. Although it is only equal to 1d. a lb., in the interests of the housewife it should not be increased. Unless potatoes are "dumped", 1d. a lb. should be ample for our growers.
At 1st July the tariff drops to £2, or less than ¼d. a lb., and once again there is a standing invitation to foreign exporters to glut our market, just when our potato lifting is in full swing. This tariff has not been raised for about thirty years and should now go up to about £7 to reflect the falling value of money over the period. I understand that this is in no way contrary to G.A.T.T.
While I cannot pretend that these suggestions are a complete substitute for import control, they should help producer and consumer while in no way being impractical or distorting the present system. There are several minor ways in which the Government can help the hard-pressed industry. Money should be available through the Board to assist in research into marketing and presentation. Both the Ayrshire growers in their area and the Pembroke growers with their "Pepgal" brand name have made a promising start. The use of a 1¼ in. riddle should be strictly enforced and outlets such as potato silage and pig feeding should be sought for the brock.
610
Lastly, many growers this year have been prevented from digging by 15th July when the Board's levy goes up from £1 to £3. The Board should be encouraged to postpone this extra payment from early producers to at least 1st August, as circumstances outside their control have made it impossible to harvest the crop at the usual date.
11.43 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. James Scott-Hopkins): I am very grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Galloway (Mr. Brewis) for raising this subject tonight. There is no doubt whatsoever that this has been a very difficult season for our first early growers, as he pointed out. At the same time, there has been a great deal of misunderstanding about the reasons for the situation, and I am glad to have this opportunity not only of dealing with the specific points which my hon. Friend has raised, but of giving some facts about the general background of the situation. I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree that it is better to treat the matter on a national basis rather than on that of a particular region or a particular part of the country.
As my hon. Friend knows, the prime cause of the present state of the market is due to the circumstances of the season. I have studied the available facts on production and on imports and it is quite clear, as he says, that the present low prices are due to our home supplies coming on to the market from the different early potato growing districts all at once instead of arriving in succession.
The result has been high prices for the greater part of June when too few of our home supplies were available and very low prices now because there are too many. On average, we would expect our home first early crop to produce about 150,000 tons in June—sometimes more, sometimes less. And our minimum requirements of potatoes of all kinds in that month—home grown earlies, imported and maincrop—amount to about 300,000 tons.
My hon. Friend will understand, of course, that much depends on quality, rate of consumption, and so on, but, given fairly normal circumstances, this is a reasonable minimum requirement.

611
This year, marketings from our home early crop amounted to only about 50,000 tons in June. We had, of course, more available from Jersey this year in June—35,000 tons—because their crop, too, was late. Normally, it is earlier than this. Nevertheless, in the first half of this month we had to depend almost entirely on imports for our early potato requirements.
Even in the last week of June, when we would expect home supplies to be quite heavy, total availabilities from the home and the Jersey crops combined were less than they were even in the last week of June, 1962, when there was a shortage, and about a third below availabilities in the last week of June, 1961, when, although supplies were plentiful, prices were not exceptionally low.
What, then, was the position over June? This is important. Although my hon. Friend took the whole position, this month is extremely important. Supplies consisted of 35,000 tons from Jersey, about 50,000 tons of new potatoes from the rest of the country, together with about 75,000 tons representing the residue of the main British crop. Total home supplies were thus about 160,000 tons. Given that we normally need around about a minimum of 300,000 tons of potatoes of all kinds in June, if we are to have reasonable supplies, this leaves about 140,000 tons to be covered by imports from various sources.
Imports of earlies in June this year were much less than in June, 1962, but still they were quite heavy, and it is also true that imports of main crop potatoes were free to come in until the end of the month because of the shortfall in supplies from the 1962 main crop. About 78,000 tons of earlies came in during June, and about 37,000 tons of main crop potatoes, making about 115,000 tons altogether.
Thus, roughly speaking, total supplies were 115,000 tons of imports plus 160,000 tons from the home and Jersey crops, making about 275,000 tons altogether against a normal requirement figure of 300,000 tons. I hope that I carry my hon. Friend and the House with me. I looked into this very carefully. We have the position of a gap between normal requirements and the actual amount available.
612
As for prices, the main wholesale price range for what little of our first early crop was available in the first half of the month was from £60 to £90 a ton, and even in the second half it was from £24 to £60 a ton. These are high prices for June—no comfort, as I am fully aware, to our growers who missed the very early market through no fault of their own but because of the season and the weather, but a clear demonstration that the imports which we had were needed if we were not to have sky-high prices for the housewife. My hon. Friend will agree that we did not want that.
The situation has changed drastically this month. Because of the lateness of the season, liftings recently have been well above normal with a consequent collapse in prices. In the last week of this month, for example, liftings were probably about twice the amount lifted in the last week of July, 1962, and more than 25 per cent. higher than in the last week of July, 1961. But here again, I cannot see that imports have had any appreciable effect, because from all that I have been able to ascertain they have been very small indeed in July, partly perhaps because of the price factor.
My hon. Friend mentioned one or two specific points, and I will try to deal with them. I fear that he has underestimated the difficulties in forecasting the avail ability of early potatoes. Essentially, this crop is lifted and marketed at once. It is not, as in the case of main crop, stored for use in the remainder of the season. Therefore, however good our information about the acreage of first earlies, it can rarely be much of a guide to the quantity of earlies which will be available in May, June and July. Although one knows the acreage, it is difficult to forecast with any accuracy the quantity or the time when they will come on the market.
In the years 1955 to 1962, marketings from the first early home crop before the end of July varied between 320,000 tons and 500,000, which is a very wide variation indeed. It is this uncertainty about the quantity of new potatoes which will be available in the early season, combined with the fact that the season is of limited duration, which is the basic cause of the uncertainty in any forecasts which one can make. This is something which simply canot be controlled by the Government, and it cannot be laid at our door that we have not done better.

613
Now, the question of total imports. I think that my hon. Friend estimated that total imports this year would be about 260,000 tons. Of course, I cannot say exactly how many new potatoes will be imported in the year as a whole. So far, up to the end of June, 208,000 tons have come into this country, which is appreciably lower than imports in the first half of 1959, 1960 and 1962, and only a little above the level in the first half of 1961.
Mr. Brewis: Will my hon. Friend say whether that includes the Cypriot figures? I have fairly official information that it was 213,000 tons plus 52,000 from Cyprus.
Mr. Scott-Hopkins: I am taking total imports up to the end of June. Perhaps my hon. Friend's figures are a little later. As he knows, imports of new potatoes during the rest of the year are, on the whole, very small indeed. It is all very well for the hon. Member for Kilmarnock (Mr. Ross) to smile, but he must know that imports are very small, and there is only a trickle of Mediterranean supplies before Christmas. If he thinks for a moment, he will understand why. Our main crop comes in and there are no imports available.
My hon. Friend is quite right when he says that imports from Cyprus have tended to increase over the years, but up to the end of June this year they were 45,000 tons compared with 66,000 tons up to the end of June last year. Up to the end of June, 1961, they were 45,000 tons and in 1960, the same period, they were 48,000 tons. There was, therefore, a drop from last year, and about the same as in the previous year. The Cypriot crop was late this year, too, and growers there have a considerable quantity left on their hands.
My hon. Friend made a point about the definition of early potatoes. I assure him that we have consulted all the interests concerned in the proper way, and I do not think that we can go much further. There would not be much purpose in setting up a committee. Cypriot growers have their own difficulties because they have been left with part of their crop on their hands. However, I note the points which my hon. Friend
614
made about this particular crop. I think that they have some relevance.
As my hon. Friend said, maincrop imports are only allowed in during years when they are needed. They were certainly needed, this year. I hope that I have shown the House that, up to the end of June, on the figures of total requirements and of the home crop, they were needed. I assure my hon. Friend that the situation was such that all concerned accepted that we were justified in continuing imports up to the end of June this year.
As regards French potatoes, I do not want to labour the point about the extension of the import period because, as the House knows, this has been explained by me at Question Time and on other occasions. The reason for the decision was based purely on plant health grounds, and the application was made by the French authorities. We are parties to the International Plant Protection Convention of 1951, and it is in our interests to see generally that it is observed.
We have undertaken not to restrict imports under the plant protection legislation unless it is necessary to do so on plant health grounds. We judge the period during which we can import potatoes safely from our past experience of imports from that country and our knowledge of the seasonal incidence of pests and the measures taken by that country to control them.
Therefore, we were bound to base our judgment on plant health grounds alone and we were bound to accede to the French request this year. No Colorado beetle has been found in potatoes imported from France during the past ten years. Our plant health regulations do not ban the importation of potatoes from all areas where Colorado beetle is found. What they do is to require that the exporting country should adopt certain safeguards, including washing, rebagging, and so on, to ensure that the Colorado beetle is not a danger to this country.
There is no reason for me to enlarge on that point, which has been covered previously. It will become obvious when I say that in the whole of June, French imports wore only 4,700 tons out of total imports of 115,000 tons. This illustrates their importance.

615
As my hon. Friend has said, an announcement of great importance was made by the Potato Marketing Board this afternoon, that it was entering upon a buying programme with its own funds from 1st August to 14th September in respect of first early potatoes. I understand that the Board will buy at £10 per ton. Neither the Government nor the Board, however, can possibly say at this early stage of the season whether there will be a surplus from the coming main crop season, but we are prepared to carry out the obligations under the terms of the agreement which was negotiated with the producer reptives. But the agreement does not provide for retrospective effect, and I certainly cannot give an assurance that any such arrangement would have retrospective effect. I cannot say more on that point.
I hope that I have made it clear to my hon. Friend that the peculiarities and difficulties of the early potato market this year had their root in the unusual seasonal circumstances and I am most sympathetic to those growers who have suffered from them. I am sure that the leaders of the industry fully recognise this. We appreciate that consequences have been serious to our own early growers. I should like
616
my hon. Friend to know that I have assured the industry that we are ready to discuss with them any views which they might want to put to us against this background.
I accept that this has been a difficult season; indeed, it still is. I am glad that the Potato Marketing Board is entering the market and trying to bring stability at this stage. I hope that what I have said will reassure my hon. Friend that we are alive and sympathetic to the position.
11.57 p.m.
Mr. William Ross: Whatever the Joint Parliamentary Secretary has said will not reassure my constituents in Ayrshire who grow early potatoes, or the constituents of my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), who, had he been present, would have been putting the point forcibly—
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at two minutes to Twelve o'clock

SHIPPING
  Lighthouses (Administration Costs)
  Lighthouses (Administration Costs)
  Whiting Bay Pier
  Whiting Bay Pier
  Laid Up Ships
  Laid Up Ships
  Merchant Shipping Act
  Merchant Shipping Act
  "Queen Mary" (Replacement)
  "Queen Mary" (Replacement)
  Cuba and South America
  Cuba and South America
TRANSPORT
  Road Safety
  Road Safety
  Road Traffic Act, 1962 (Section 7(2))
  Road Traffic Act, 1962 (Section 7(2))
  Goods Vehicles (Permissible Gross Weights)
  Goods Vehicles (Permissible Gross Weights)
  London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee
  London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee
  Diesel-Engined Vehicles (Fumes)
  Diesel-Engined Vehicles (Fumes)
  Victoria Station Area
  Victoria Station Area
  Abnormal Loads
  Abnormal Loads
  Accidents (Ice-Cream Vans)
  Accidents (Ice-Cream Vans)
  Inland Waterways
  Inland Waterways
ROADS
  Lichfield-Stonebridge Road (Traffic Census)
  Lichfield-Stonebridge Road (Traffic Census)
  Road Junction, Cardiff (Traffic Congestion)
  Road Junction, Cardiff (Traffic Congestion)
  Eastern Bypass, Cardiff
  Eastern Bypass, Cardiff
  New Road Signs (Manufacture)
  New Road Signs (Manufacture)
  Tower Bridge (Replacement)
  Tower Bridge (Replacement)
  Tyne Tunnel
  Tyne Tunnel
  New Road Signs (Colour)
  New Road Signs (Colour)
  Potteries D Road
  Potteries D Road
  M.5 (Remotely Controlled Illuminated Warning Signs)
  M.5 (Remotely Controlled Illuminated Warning Signs)
  Road Traffic Signs (By-passed Towns)
  Road Traffic Signs (By-passed Towns)
  Frost Damage (Repairs)
  Frost Damage (Repairs)
  M.1 (Sheffield-Leeds Section)
  M.1 (Sheffield-Leeds Section)
  Barry-St. Athan Road
  Barry-St. Athan Road
  Road Junction, N/
  Road Junction, N/
  Cardiff-Barry Road
  Cardiff-Barry Road
  Roads, Cornwall (Expenditure)
  Roads, Cornwall (Expenditure)
  M.1 Construction Work (Dust Nuisance)
  M.1 Construction Work (Dust Nuisance)
  M.4 Motorway
  M.4 Motorway
  Cardiff-Pontypridd Road
  Cardiff-Pontypridd Road
  Barry-Penarth Road
  Barry-Penarth Road
  St. Fagans-Peterston-super-Ely Road
  St. Fagans-Peterston-super-Ely Road
  Cardiff-Pontyclun Road
  Cardiff-Pontyclun Road
  North-East
  North-East
  Barry-Bonvilston Road
  Barry-Bonvilston Road
RAILWAYS
  Proposed Closures, Scotland
  Proposed Closures, Scotland
  Five-Day Weekly Tickets
  Five-Day Weekly Tickets
  Proposed Closures (Woodside-Sanderstead Line)
  Proposed Closures (Woodside-Sanderstead Line)
  Garston Docks
  Garston Docks
  Proposed Closures (Aberdeen)
  Proposed Closures (Aberdeen)
  Proposed Closures (Broad Street-Richmond Line)
  Proposed Closures (Broad Street-Richmond Line)
  Level Crossings (Warning Bells)
  Level Crossings (Warning Bells)
  Safety
  Safety
EMPLOYMENT
  New Towns, Erith Marshes
  New Towns, Erith Marshes
  School Leavers, Airdrie and Motherwell
  School Leavers, Airdrie and Motherwell
  Bricklayers and Plasterers
  Bricklayers and Plasterers
  Building Industry
  Building Industry
  Employees, Slough (Trade Union Membership)
  Employees, Slough (Trade Union Membership)
  Commonwealth Countries
  Commonwealth Countries
  Railway Workshops, Swindon (Redundant Workers)
  Railway Workshops, Swindon (Redundant Workers)
  Young People, Fife
  Young People, Fife
  Automation
  Automation
  Aircraft Workers, Coventry
  Aircraft Workers, Coventry
  Elemore Colliery (Redundancies)
  Elemore Colliery (Redundancies)
  Redundancy and Severance Payments
  Redundancy and Severance Payments
  Workshops for the Blind (Working Party's Report)
  Workshops for the Blind (Working Party's Report)
  Factories Act, 1961 (Accidents)
  Factories Act, 1961 (Accidents)
  Commonwealth Immigrants (Vouchers)
  Commonwealth Immigrants (Vouchers)
  Madrid (Labour Attaché)
  Madrid (Labour Attaché)
  CUBA
  CUBA
  UNITED NATIONS (SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL)
  UNITED NATIONS (SOUTH AFRICA AND PORTUGAL)
  YEMEN
  YEMEN
  SOUTH AFRICA (SUPPLY OF ARMS)
  SOUTH AFRICA (SUPPLY OF ARMS)
  TIMOR
  TIMOR
  UNITED NATIONS (PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS)
  UNITED NATIONS (PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS)
  GEORGES BANK, NORTH ATLANTIC (SOVIET FISHING VESSELS)
  GEORGES BANK, NORTH ATLANTIC (SOVIET FISHING VESSELS)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Argentine Meat (Imports)
  Argentine Meat (Imports)
  Horticultural Improvement Scheme
  Horticultural Improvement Scheme
  Milk (Antibiotics)
  Milk (Antibiotics)
  Milk (Guaranteed Price)
  Milk (Guaranteed Price)
  Charollais Cattle
  Charollais Cattle
  Small Fishing Vessels
  Small Fishing Vessels
  Food Imports (Canned Meat)
  Food Imports (Canned Meat)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  Carrier Force
  Carrier Force
  Buccaneer Aircraft
  Buccaneer Aircraft
  Nuclear Weapons
  Nuclear Weapons
  Missiles and Aircraft (Research and Development)
  Missiles and Aircraft (Research and Development)
ROYAL NAVY
  Royal Dockyards
  Royal Dockyards
BRITISH ARMY
  Establishment Shortages
  Establishment Shortages
  Public Path, Whittington Heath (Obstruction by Gate)
  Public Path, Whittington Heath (Obstruction by Gate)
  Madeley Depôt
  Madeley Depôt
PUBLIC BUILDING AND WORKS
  London Buildings (Floodlighting)
  London Buildings (Floodlighting)
  Mission to Canada (Report)
  Mission to Canada (Report)
  Housing (Preferred Dimensions)
  Housing (Preferred Dimensions)
NYASALAND AND NORTHERN RHODESIA
  Police Forces
  Police Forces
NYASALAND
  Law and Order (Maintenance)
  Law and Order (Maintenance)
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Tonsillectomy
  Tonsillectomy
  Spectacles (Binocular Type)
  Spectacles (Binocular Type)
HOSPITALS
  Emergency Facilities (Rotherham and Mexborough)
  Emergency Facilities (Rotherham and Mexborough)
ZANZIBAR
  Overseas Officers (Compensation Scheme)
  Overseas Officers (Compensation Scheme)
HOUSING
  Slum Clearance
  Slum Clearance
  Housing Societies Finance
  Housing Societies Finance
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Sandown Park
  Sandown Park
  Animal Fat Melting Works, Mossley
  Animal Fat Melting Works, Mossley
  Reclamation of Spoil Heaps, Denby Dale
  Reclamation of Spoil Heaps, Denby Dale
PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  Retirement Pensioners (National Assistance)
  Retirement Pensioners (National Assistance)
TELEPHONE SERVICE
  Shared Lines
  Shared Lines
  Residential Telephones (Outstanding Applications)
  Residential Telephones (Outstanding Applications)
  Car Radiophone Service, London
  Car Radiophone Service, London
POST OFFICE
  Bulk Supply Agreements
  Bulk Supply Agreements
  London Radio Tower Restaurant (Catering)
  London Radio Tower Restaurant (Catering)
WIRELESS AND TELEVISION
  Television Relay Services
  Television Relay Services
  Microwave Radio Stations
  Microwave Radio Stations
SCIENCE
  Reactor Policy Committee
  Reactor Policy Committee
  Atomic Energy Authority, Capenhurst
  Atomic Energy Authority, Capenhurst
  Atomic Energy Authority (Uranium Stocks)
  Atomic Energy Authority (Uranium Stocks)
  Nuclear Tests
  Nuclear Tests
  Euratom
  Euratom
SCOTLAND
  Marriages (United States Airmen)
  Marriages (United States Airmen)
  Hospital Building
  Hospital Building
  Sheriff Courts (Committee of Inquiry)
  Sheriff Courts (Committee of Inquiry)
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Tea and Tropical Hardwoods (Suspension of Import Duties)
  Tea and Tropical Hardwoods (Suspension of Import Duties)
TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION
  Basic English, Cyprus
  Basic English, Cyprus

Preamble
The House met at two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Coventry

PENSIONS OF OFFICERS' WIDOWS
2.5 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have yet been able to give further consideration to the position of widows of Regular officers in the Armed Services who were bereaved before November 4, 1958, and if so, what action they propose to take.]
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD CARRINGTON): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government regret that they are not in a position to make any statement on this question at present.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that many people in this House and outside attach great importance to justice being done to Service widows, and would therefore like to express the hope that the Government will give the matter urgent study with a view to making an announcement during the next Session?
LORD CARRINGTON: Yes, my Lords, the Government are very well aware of what my noble friend says. A review has begun, but I do not think I can say now when it will be completed.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I am much obliged to my noble friend.

ARMY RECRUITMENT OF APPROVED SCHOOL BOYS
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is the case that those who have attended approved schools are no longer accepted as recruits in the Regular Army; and, if so, why.]
LORD CARRINGTON: No, my Lords. Boys from approved schools may be considered for the Army six months after their release, and those who are judged suitable are accepted.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, in thanking my noble friend for that reply, may I say how glad I am to hear it?—because, as I am sure that he and the rest of the House know, about 20 per cent. of the boys who go to approved schools have committed no offence at all but are sent there for their own good. The loss of those boys to the Army, if they wished to join, would be considerable, and the possibility of joining the Army is a great opportunity to those boys.
LORD CARRINGTON: Yes, my Lords; and those are, of course, the reasons which the Army have had under consideration.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: I am much obliged to my noble friend.

UNUSED RAILWAY LAND
2.8 p.m.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can state the number of acres existing in Great Britain within urban or city limits under the control of the nationalised railways that are not now in actual use and for which no definite use has ben assigned; also, whether they can state the number of acres in rural areas within the control of the nationalised railways which are not now being used, and for which no definite use has been assigned.]
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD CHESHAM): My Lords, I am informed by the British Railways Board that while details of individual sites may

1137
readily be obtained from the Regions they do not keep a central register of land owned by the Board which is not required for the purposes of their business, and the information required by my noble friend is not therefore available.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for what I may call that lack of information, may I inquire as to the areas which will be reviewed in due course, and which are already nationalised property and obviously are not needed by the railways, whether there is any reason why Parliament cannot acquire these lands again for housing sites where desired—"where desired" is a most important qualification—at the price which the public originally allowed for these lands when the railways were nationalised?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I think that raises another question. But my noble friend is aware, I am sure, that the Railways Board are naturally concerned to make the best possible use of any land that they have which is surplus to their operational requirements, in order to bring in the maximum revenue they can get. It is perfectly open to any concern, whether public or private, if the necessity so arises, to approach the Railways Board, who, I am sure, will be glad to talk to them on this basis.
LORD BOSSOM: I thank my noble friend for that comment, but is he aware that what the Railways Board or their representative, or whoever it may be, is attempting to recover on this land is infinitely more than its original value when the railways were taken over and compensation was paid, and that it would be very unfortunate if the public were denied the use of this land, which is so obviously necessary if the railways cannot use it, at a fair price?
LORD CHESHAM: My noble friend is aware, of course, that the Railways Board are not a housing authority, and, furthermore, that they are under a duty imposed by the Transport Act to make the best possible use of their assets.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that this problem of unused railway land is one which is important in Scotland, and that a good many opportunities are going abegging
1138
through the delays in making approaches and getting replies in regard to the use of such land?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I infer from that that my noble friend is suggesting that the Railways Board are tardy in dealing with such negotiations.
LORD FERRIER: That is the case.
LORD CHESHAM: If that is so, I am sure that what the noble Lord has said will strike home.
LORD FERRIER: I thank my noble friend.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, would it be possible for the Railways Board to give a list of the available properties? No one can find out that information unless such a list is given. They are the only ones who have that information.
LORD CHESHAM: I have already told my noble friend that they do not keep a central register. It is a matter for them to decide in what form their property records are kept. But I have also told my noble friend that all this information, on an individual site basis, is readily available from the Regions.
LORD BOSSOM: I thank my noble friend for that answer, but I hope that in due course the information will be made a little more lucid for the people who want to try to help the nation.

HOUSING SITES OVER MARSHALLING YARDS
2.12 p.m.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can state the approximate acreage now employed by the nationalised railways for marshalling yards or below-ground-level railways, which can be covered and used for housing sites in the immediate years ahead.]
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, I have asked the Railways Board whether they could supply the information requested by my noble friend. They tell me that they cannot do so. To attempt to provide it would entail an extensive survey

1139
and inquiries, the results of which would be unlikely, in the Board's view, to yield any advantage commensurate with the cost of undertaking them.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, while again thanking my noble friend for his comment, the answer is quite obvious—
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord, but is he aware that the loudspeaker apparatus is not working?
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, I am aware of that, and I have already taken steps to remedy it, if possible.
LORD BOSSOM: May I thank the noble Viscount the Leader of the House for that kindness? But, as my noble friend has just remarked, while it is all very well to say they have no list, this is public property which was nationalised some years ago. Is the noble Lord aware that a concrete raft could be put over these places? We are in great need of housing sites. Could not an investigation be made into the costs of putting up these concrete rafts, and of the land that would have to be acquired in other places in order to house our people? I am sure that it would be helpful if we could get this information.
LORD CHESHAM: I take my noble friend's point, my Lords, and I agree on the necessity for housing. But again I am bound to say that the Railway Board are not a housing authority and their duty is only to develop their own assets to the best advantage. If my noble friend will think over the terms of his Question, he will realise that if they were to answer it accurately it would involve them in a very extensive and costly survey—simply in order to answer a question on a matter for which they (and I am not concerned with anybody else's responsibility) are not responsible.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, is it not a fact that that survey has to be made by someone? Could the noble Lord tell me who will make it, so that this land can be used? We are wasting thousands of acres.
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, may I say that if it is thought necessary by anyone who has an interest that a survey of any site should be made, then it can be made? What I am saying is that the survey required by my noble friend's Question is not a starter for the Railways Board.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, is the noble Lord telling us that the Railways Board do not know the acreage of land involved? If that is so, how is it that they manage to produce the figures for their Annal Report?
LORD CHESAM: No, my Lords, I am not telling the House anything of the kind. If the noble Earl will look at the Question on the Order Paper he will see that it refers to the acreage which can be covered and used for housing sites. The survey of the whole of the Board's acreage, to determine whether or not it could be covered and used for housing sites, would be an extensive and costly one, as I think the noble Earl must agree.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for trying to help me. Will the Railways Board give the right of making a survey to anyone who wants to try?
LORD CHESHAM: My Lords, if anyone can approach the Railways Board with a proposition that will interest them, then, in view of the duty that they have, I am sure they will consider it to the full.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his answer, I must say that it is rather nebulous.

THE YEMENI BORDER INCIDENT
2.17 p.m.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I desire to ask the Question of which I have already given Private Notice: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a statement to the House, before the adjournment for the Summer Recess, as to the result of the Inquiry which was ordered into the facts of the crossing of the border between the Yemen and the Federation of South Arabia by British troops.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence has only just received the very full and detailed report of the Court of Inquiry into the Yemen border incident. There has not yet been time to give the report the careful study that it deserves, and there is a possibility of disciplinary proceedings. For these reasons I am sorry that I am not yet in a position to make a statement.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I must say, on behalf of Parliament, that this is most unreasonable. This House is adjourning to-day, and the other place will be adjourning to-morrow or Friday, until the last week in October. In the meantime this Inquiry, which was ordered weeks ago, on a single, simple incident, is available to the Government but is not available to this House. I think that is quite an impossible position for the Government to take up. I think they ought to make a statement to this House to-day.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Earl should feel that way. The difficulty is that the report was received by my right honourable friend only very late on Monday night, and in the circumstances I think it would be right that he and his Ministry should have the chance of looking into it and coming to their own conclusions. But as soon as that detailed study has been carried out, I will naturally inform the noble Earl of the result.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for the last offer; but I do not think that it meets the point of view of Parliament.

HOUSE OF LORDS' OFFICES COMMITTEE
Order of the Day read for the consideration of the Third Report from the Select Committee.
The Committee reported as follows:
1. PICTURE OF THE HOUSE IN SESSION
The Committee considered the progress of the painting of the picture of the House in session, and have placed the further implementation of the proposal in the hands of the Sub-Committee on the pictures.
2. REFRESHMENT DEPARTMENT
The Committee authorised an extra Housemaid for cleaning additional rooms used by the Department to be on the staff of the Lord Great Chamberlain for purposes of payment.
3. NAUTICAL ASSESSORS
The Committee considered the payments made to Nautical Assessors attending an Appeal in the House of Lords in an Admiralty action and sanctioned the application to this House of the revised scale of fees laid down in Statutory Instrument 1963 No. 683 (L.7), The Rules of the Supreme Court (Trinity Masters' Fees) 1963, with effect from 23rd April, 1963.
4. REVISED SCALES OF PAY
The Committee sanctioned the application of the following Establishments Circulars:—
E.C. No. 7/63 Central Pay Increase;
E.C. No. 8/63 Between the Principal's maximum and the Assistant Secretary's minimum
to analogous grades of the staff of the House of Lords.
The Committee also authorised revised rates of pay for the staff of the Accountant's Office with effect from 1st July, 1963.
5. RECORDS OF THE HOUSE

(a) The Committee were informed of the completion and reconstruction of the record repository in the Victoria Tower and of the opening by the Leader of the House on 3rd July, 1963.

(b) The Committee authorised two posts of Record Office Assistants on the staff of the Clerk of the Parliaments in the place of two Paperkeepers.

6. HANSARD REPORTING STAFF

(a) The Committee were informed of the increasing pressure of work of the Hansard Reporting Staff and accordingly authorised the appointment of two additional Reporters. The Committee sanctioned a special payment to the Editorial and Reporting staff in respect of additional duty performed during the period to the end of July 1963. The Committee also authorised the payment of Attendance fees to Reporters when the House of Lords sits after 10.30 p.m. with effect from 13th May, 1963.

(b) The Committee reviewed the agreement with Haynes Secretarial Services for the supply of typists for the reporting of debates and approved an increase in the rates of pay from 1st April, 1963.

7. DOORKEEPERS
The Committee sanctioned a special payment to the Doorkeepers for extra duties.
8. RETIREMENTS
The Committee sanctioned the payment of the following awards under the Superannuation Acts:—

(a) revised pension and additional allowance to Miss Lilian Katherine Hammond, Personal Assistant, who retired on 8th June, 1963;

1143

(b) revised gratuity to Mr. Edward Bern-ham Weeks, Custodian, who retired on 25th May, 1963;

(c) pension and additional allowance to Mr. George Charles Searle, Inspector of Custodians, on his retirement on 29th September, 1963;

(d) gratuity to Mr. Edward George Herbert, Custodian, on his retirement on 7th August, 1963;

(e) gratuity to Mrs. Elsie McCarthy, Housemaid, who retired, on 25th May, 1963.

9. AIR-CONDITIONING IN THE CHAMBER
The Committee recommended that air-conditioning be provided as a matter of urgency for the Chamber and asked the Lord Great Chamberlain to request the Minister of Works to take the necessary steps to implement this recommendation.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now considered.
Moved, That the Report be now considered.—(Lord Merthyr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords I do not think there is any particular point in this Report to which I need draw the special attention of your Lordships, but if any noble Lord wishes to ask a question I will, of course, do my best to answer it. I beg to move that this Report be agreed to.
Moved, That the Report be agreed to.—(Lord Merthyr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

LOCH TURRET WATER BOARD (HYDRO-ELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL
Considered on Report (according to Order).
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to the Resolution of July 23), Bill read 3a, and passed.

DEFENCE REORGANISATION
2.20 p.m.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH rose to call attention to the proposals of the Government for the central organisation of defence; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
1144
I hope we shall all recognise this afternoon the importance of the issues raised in this White Paper on the Central Organisation for Defence. I think there is in paragraph 5 of the Paper a very frank admission that the hoped-for improvement in co-operation which was foreshadowed in the 1958 White Paper has not really been effective. I am not surprised.
The idea of having a separate Minister of Defence in peace time came from the Labour Government, after their associated experience under the Ministry of Defence in war and the organisation of staffs, production and research and everything else, so far as it had gone then. I believe that in the period from early 1947 until October, 1951, the main objectives of setting up that Ministry were successful. However, I should not like to be the judge of that, because I was the first of two Ministers of Defence in that period. I leave further comment to my noble friend Lord Attlee, who not only had the great experience of being Prime Minister throughout the period from 1945 to 1951 but also had served right through the premiership of Mr. Winston Churchill (as he was then) in the course of the war; and I think there is no one in this House with a greater and broader knowledge of the facts of the situation, which was continually changing with the changes in strategic considerations and weapons.
I come to the general question which is raised in my mind by paragraph 5 of the White Paper. The history of the Conservative Government since they took over in October, 1951, in regard to defence plans is quite extraordinary. I have been looking back through the volumes issued by the Government over the past two or three years. Not the least noteworthy was the last, which was issued last February in its new form, in its coloured jacket, containing the Estimates for the three Services and about 80 words of comment by the Minister of Defence upon the general work of the Services and, I suppose, the whole work of the Ministry of Defence. Not another thing was supplied in print at that time by the Minister of Defence. In dealing with that during the debate at the time, I made the comment that when, in the debate in another place, the Minister of Defence referred to the number of inquiries to be made as to the greater co-ordination of Ministry of

1145
Defence operations, it was a sort of smokescreen to cover up in the course of the debate all the faults that were in this volume, the explanation of which was contained in only 80 words. I think it is pretty clear that that was a smokescreen.
The admission of failure in paragraph 5 is, I think, something which can also be deduced from the comments which have been made from all parts of the House in the course of the last eleven or twelve years with regard to the Government's policy. If there has been any departure from the kind of success that we as a Labour Government wanted in the working of a Ministry of Defence in peace time, has been largely due to ministerial incompetence, in the series of nine Ministers of Defence in eleven and three-quarter years. The necessity to attempt this major reorganisation and reconstruction of the Ministry of Defence is largely due to the incompetence either of the Prime Minister or of the Ministers of Defence in arranging the conduct of the control of defence in general.
There are certain important questions which arise out of this. First of all, I suppose it is clear to everybody that this general proposal means the formation of one Ministry, and one Ministry only, for defence. It does away with the Parliamentary responsibility of the Ministers in charge of the three separate Services to both Houses of Parliament. That is a very important decision to take. It is easy to put that down on paper without considering all the detailed things likely to happen, from the point of view of the actual conduct of operations, of administration, production and research, as they arise; and above all, from the point of view of the maintenance of Service discipline.
I remember that we had a terrible naval mutiny at Invergordon in 1931. Because the other Cabinet Ministers concerned at that time are dead, I can say now what happened without revealing very great secrets. When certain very severe cuts were proposed, including the breaking of pledges to the pre-1925 naval enlistment, I said to the meeting of the Cabinet which was dealing with this matter, "If this is the line you take, then I cannot answer for the discipline of the Navy." One of the other members said,
1146
"Well, what has that to do with you, anyway? You are not responsible for the discipline of the Fleet." I said, "The discipline of the Fleet is in the hands of the first officers of the Fleet, but I have to be responsible to Parliament." Do I understand that the new proposed Chief of the Defence Ministry is going to be responsible to Parliament for the discipline of each of the three Services? I should like a specific answer on that point fairly early in the debate—perhaps the First Lord, who has himself some experience of this matter, will give me an answer. Is it going to be at third-hand or second-hand? If the Chiefs of the Service staffs are to be responsible to the Minister of Defence alone, will that relieve entirely the actual Service Ministers from any responsibility?
I now come to the point of the management which is to be carried on in future. If we go through the White Paper—and perhaps your Lordships will be good enough to have it in front of you as we go along—we see that the first heading is "The New Approach". Apparently the new approach is to be fastened down through a line from the Minister of Defence—or, rather, the First Secretary of State for Defence: I must give him his proper title—and to be maintained on the lines therein set out. I am anxious to know how far it is going to work. In the first place, he is to work with the Chiefs of Staff; and the Chiefs of Staff, who were changed in their actual control and composition by this Government some seven years ago, will be made permanent by, I suppose, legislation, which is what I think is proposed here. That Committee of Chiefs of Staff will have what is so frequently referred to now as a Supremo, who will be the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. For how long that will be, I do not know. We used to have rotation of the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, one from each of the Services in turn.
The principal of the Chiefs of Staff will sit in the chair, and when there is disagreement he will report to the Minister; and it is specifically stated that he will also tender to the Minister his separate advice. I find it difficult to see how that will be fully acceptable to all the Services concerned. A great deal will depend on the origin and training of the Supremo for his high office,

1147
and which Service he comes from, whether the dispute is settled or sent to the Secretary of the Ministry for settlement with the special advice of one who has the support of somebody of his own training in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. That Committee may be comprised of two Navy representatives, two Army and two Air staff. I must say that I never found it necessary to have this sort of thing when I was Minister of Defence; nor was it found necessary in the case of my immediate successor. Nor should I think it was necessary at any time, until it was brought in in about 1956. I hope this is going to be looked at carefully, because it might lead to far more trouble than appears likely on the surface.
I want to make it clear, so far as my noble friends on this side of the House are concerned, that we are very much in favour of all real efforts to increase co-operation between the three fighting Services. It is to be noted that in paragraph 10, on page 1, it is specifically required that the Services should be kept separate. Apparently, there is some anxiety in the mind of the Secretary of State for Defence—I suppose it must be through him—that there is a great job yet to be done in settling their plans and programmes and the like which will cover the commitments and the rôles of all three Services. I must have read pages and pages in the last eleven and a half years upon the rôles of each of the Services, which are stated in the Defence White Papers. I still find it difficult to understand why, in the minds of a Government who have been in office for nearly twelve years and had nine Ministers of Defence, the rôles of each of the three Services have not yet really been settled. It is perfectly true, as they say in the White Paper, that the loyalty of each man in each of the Services is very much due to the history of his particular Service, his unit or its battle honours and the like, and it is necessary to keep these Services separate in organisation. But will the kind of organisation set up under this White Paper provide the best way to maintain that situation?
As I say, we are in favour of anything that will increase co-operation between the three Services, whether it is in the
1148
nature of streamlining to avoid unnecessary additional expense, cutting out delays—if that would be so—having more concentration upon particular and urgent problems than has perhaps hitherto been the case, and maybe preventing some of the grave errors which have occurred, in the last seven or eight years especially, and which have led to such considerable waste of public money on the development of weapons or methods of equipment, or whatever it may be. The real factor, however, is this. There is a widespread feeling in the talk one hears that you must not leave out of account the sort of thing that is often said about similar operations in industry and the like. Is this set-up, of one Ministry of such a size, of such importance and with such equipment as to make it slightly top-heavy, likely to produce the kind of results which are spoken of in connection with what is known as Parkinson's law, because of constant expansion?
In this connection, let me take the history of the Ministry of Defence itself up to date. It was started early in 1947 as a result of the decision we took in the Cabinet under Mr. Attlee (as he then was) to set up a peace-time Ministry of Defence. Its expenditure in the first year was about £500,000, and in the next year about £600,000. In the third year—I have a copy of the accounts which were the last I was responsible for preparing, published in February, 1950—the total cost was under £800,000. Now you have a Ministry of Defence organisation, not very different from the organisation which was formulated in 1947, which, according to the Estimates for the current year, costs£20 million. Anybody quietly commenting on that would say that it was a piece of evidence supporting Parkinson's law.
Is that going to be the experience in this one complete Ministry set-up, the expenditure of which, in the mind of the Secretary of Defence and again clearly set out in the White Paper, is likely to reach a little below£2,000 million per annum? Having regard to the projects now in front of us, with such objectives as the new nuclear submarines equipped for the operation of Polaris, or the development of aircraft of the type of the TSR.2—its history and its future project

1149
—and the great work still to be done upon other projectiles, is it not much more likely that the expenditure will be considerably above the estimated £2,000 million per annum which is referred to in the White Paper as a possible maximum?
There are to be about 400,000 men in the Services, and they are to be matched on the other side by 400,000 civil servants of different kinds; and these are all to be under one Ministry in which the Secretary of the Defence Department will be the only man responsible to Parliament. This is a very big project indeed. I am suggesting that unless the work is very carefully organised, you are likely to have less efficiency rather than improved efficiency.
I see a reference to the appointment of three Ministers of State for Defence, to be designated as Ministers of State for Defence (Royal Navy), (Army), and (Royal Air Force), as the case may be—not a very nice way in which to publish their particular activities and their position in these very important matters. Take, for example, the abolition of the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, which has been there for over a couple of centuries, and take his new position as Minister of State for Defence (Navy). What will it appear to be in the eyes of the various servants of the Admiralty all over the world? I suppose that with the personnel of the Fleet and the Civil Service, including industrial workers in different parts of the world in naval yards, there must be some hundreds of thousands. At present, they all feel that they have the right of access to the principal Minister in charge of the Navy. It is true, of course, that the three separate Departments under their present title managements are being abolished. You abolish the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; you abolish the Army Council, and you abolish the Council of the Royal Air Force. But what takes their place? Boards—the Navy Board, the Army Board and the Air Force Board, which will meet in the Ministry of Defence, and are described as Navy, Army or Air Force, again in small brackets. It seems to me that unless the management is very efficient and economical, you will do worse under this arrangement than under the present one.
It does not seem that tradition is altogether being wiped out by the Government,
1150
because, although they abolish the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, for some reason or other they keep the two special reserve titles for the two first naval members of the Lords Commissioners at present. You still call the Chief of the Naval Staff First Sea Lord—"Lord" of what is not clear, because there are no Lords Commissioners left. And in the case of the Second Sea Lord, you call him still the Second Sea Lord—(Personnel), I suppose, although there are no Lords Commissioners left. It does not seem to me to be very effective to have just a slight bit of tradition left only for two senior sailors in those circumstances. I feel that something ought to be done to try to get a proper recognition of the importance of the nomenclature all the way round for the three Services if the members of the Services are to feel that they have the same full right of access to the various Councils which they have at present.
There is another point that I want to raise. In the course of the White Paper it is clear to several of my colleagues, at least (I do not know that we are all 100 per cent. agreed), that there is likely to be a good deal of duplication in what is set out therein. Of course you will have your Defence Staff. You are going to put them down to a certain level, all within one building. You are going to do the same, apparently, under the operations of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, through the machine which he will set up with the help of his Assistant Under-Secretary of State. It seems to me that you are going to house in the central building not more than about 700 or 800 of the staffs of each of the Departments, comprising both their actual military sides and their actual civil sides, and that you leave in the rest of the buildings the work which is going to be carried on; and unless you duplicate by having a sufficient number at every stage, in both the military and the civil services, of somebody able to direct the course of the work in carrying out the main policy decided in the main building, then you will have very widespread and possibly growing duplication.
Speaking by and large, I would say from my consideration of the White Paper that, so far from there being any

1151
likely economy in costs as a result of the working of this White Paper, at the start, at any rate—I will put it in that qualified way—there will be a considerable increase of cost. On this point I think Parliament has a right to complain that on this matter there has not been a word of advice from the Government. Here is this great project, and there is not the slightest idea in the White Paper whether there is to be an expected reduction of cost or what—not the slightest. We do not know. All we know at present is that we are paying £1,838 million a year for our defences—which, with regard to personnel, are less than half what we handed over in 1951; and, with regard to a good many other matters like equipment and development of new weapons, we have been thrown out of stride and are not properly equipped for the next five years to meet the possible commitments that will arise. We really ought to be treated in Parliament with far more respect than that, and in an important matter of this kind we ought to have had some rough estimate as to whether there is going to be an actual economic effect; whether there is going to be a saving in money, in time or in what direction, in setting up this proposed organisation.
The other thing I want to say is this. In all these things coming along, as we take them stage by stage we can see some that are quite new and also likely to be duplicated. There is the paragraph in which it is stated quite specifically that four new organisations are to be set up. I should like the First Lord of the Admiralty to take that up and to tell us whether it will mean that nothing of a similar kind will still be done afterwards in the Service Department concerned. If you take the same sort of question with regard to actual planning, it is quite nice to read about the hopes that they have in joint planning for the future. But this is not the first time we have had a joint planners' organisation. Yet in all the Departments concerned we have always found it to be fundamental that each Department should have its planners. And very often, before a Chief of Staff can go to his own meeting with the other Chiefs of Staff to deal in discussions of joint operations he has to have some idea from his
1152
own planning staff how they will be affected in their own office and he will have to make up his own mind what he will have to say about it. There are many things to be done after that by joint planners with regard to the joint operations of the Services; and something also will have to be said about the method of communicating.
There is one thing I should like to be cleared up—and it will fall to experienced staff officers, like the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, and others to comment upon it. There is one favourable line which shows that the Chiefs of Staff in the end will have retained the right to issue their orders to their own Services. But I also see there is to be set up a joint operational Department in the Ministry of Defence, and it reads to me in its context as if there would be some question whether or not the actual instructions with regard to operations would be sent direct from the Defence Department.
There is also the suggestion in the same section that there could be more co-operation with regard to signal services. I should like some assurances about that; what really it is expected to achieve and what will be the economic effects of more co-operation in dealing with signals. A good deal of signalling to-day has been rationalised, but I suppose that, by and large, if one looks at the almost worldwide basis that each Service Chief has to face, one realises that he will want his messages at all times to be fairly quickly despatched and to reach their destinations in the shortest possible time. But what economies could be effected in that direction? Is there any danger of there being a reduction in the number of networks? Is there going to be a suggestion that one network only would be in operation for the Services? There must be at least three now in operation. What economies can be effected, therefore, in the sort of set-up they are going to make in that respect? The same applies to the other Departments which are referred to in the section to which I am referring.
There is one other thing I should like to say. I am very pleased to see the emphasis placed upon the research and development which is so much under the control of the scientific adviser and his committee; that is very good indeed.

1153
But I am sad to see—and I do not know how this will strike other Members of the House—that the only profession which is never mentioned, yet which to me has always been important in dealing with the Services, especially with the Navy, is that of the engineer; and the engineer, as well as the scientist, the professional soldier, sailor and airman, is fundamental to all three Services. I should like to know how it is that in this connection there is no mention at all in the White Paper of the engineer. When I ask this I am not charging the Government with being the first offenders in this respect; I am not putting them in the dock in any way about it; but I should like to say a word of encouragement, at any rate at this time of reconstruction of this organisation, to the engineers, who have done magnificent work for all three Services. Theirs is a service which I have always very greatly valued.
The other matter to which I want to pay some attention is the question of concentrating Intelligence under the Secretary of State for Defence. Apparently he will be the only one responsible to Parliament for Intelligence in connection with defence. I do not know how closely this matter has been looked at or exactly how it is going to be worked. Intelligence and security are matters which spread quite widely in the Services and the Government—not only the military Services, but in the foreign service and home service. There is also commercial and trade intelligence of very great importance. This proposal, I take it, is to apply solely to defence, although, when the Admiralty were very much under discussion with regard to an espionage case, I think called the Vassall case, common remarks that I heard from the ordinary public and which I read in the Press were rather to the effect that if anybody ought to be sacked it was the Ambassador in Moscow at the time. The Government did not sack him because he was already retired; but your Lordships can see how widely this question, both of Intelligence and of security, goes.
If the Secretary of the Defence Department is going to take full responsibility for all the things which are set out in this White Paper, and is unable even to achieve the amount of successful delegation which any Prime Minister has to make, then I should think he
1154
will be quite in danger of what is called "going round the bend", because there is a concentration here which might do more harm than good. I hope it will do good; but I think that until we have had much further explanations we shall still have to wait before we can make up our minds. I beg to move for Papers.
2.55 p.m.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friends on these Benches and myself, I should like to say that we welcome the White Paper and the statement of policy it contains on the Central Organisation for Defence. We believe that it is essential in these days to have a unified Ministry of Defence with the absorption of the present Service Ministries. We think that this plan is right; that there will be central management in the Ministry of Defence with the structure of the individual Services retained. There may, of course, be criticisms as to detail; there are always differences of view as to detail. I think there is a justifiable criticism that this reform has come in rather late, but we think, "Better late than never", and we do not wish to impede the progress of the new Ministry.
We believe that it is right because it forms part of the pattern of defence requirements in modern times. We think that this pattern consists, so far as the military forces are concerned, of the security obligations for collective defence; that is, our responsibilities to NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, both in conventional forces and, so long as the Government retain their view on nuclear weapons, the V-bomber force with its missiles and, later on, the Polaris submarine. Secondly, we think that it ably provides for the sort of problems that we have called the "bush fire" problems, such as were found to be present in Kuwait and Brunei. Thirdly, there is the question of the Strategic Reserve, which is probably quite as important as any of the others. There, we need fast, mobile airborne and seaborne forces with bases in Britain, Malta, Aden and Singapore, and garrisons in those places, together with garrisons in Hong Kong and the West Indies, and possibly now in Mbabane in Swaziland, because very soon the High Commission territories are going to be pretty well isolated. We also need a task force east of Suez. This is one reason why we gave

1155
such a warm welcome to the advent of the decision to build a new aircraft carrier, which was announced by the First Lord in this House yesterday. This means that up to 1980, at all events, there will be three fast carriers in service, two of them East of Suez, and we regard that as a very important matter indeed.
But it is not only in military questions that we feel the need for this Ministry of Defence. There is also the economic question. The noble Earl, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, pointed out that the new Ministry will be responsible for the spending of something like £2,000 million a year, which is about half of the total expenditure of this country. It will control 400,000 men in the Forces together with 400,000 civilians. These are vast sums. Such expenditure is probably necessary, unhappily both on the conventional forces and on the deterrent—there is a difference of opinion on the deterrent, but I do not want to go into that to-day—but, while these commitments are maintained by the Government, they must impose an immense strain upon our national resources. This defence requirement, £2,000 million a year, together with the manpower it takes up, must compete with the export trade, with home requirements and particularly with our research facilities, which are very definitely limited. One Ministry, we believe, should be able to oversee this problem with its effect on manpower, taxation, and the balance of payments, far better than the system hitherto.
The noble Earl, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, talked about the expense of the Forces and compared it with the expenditure in his day. Of course, these expenses of armaments, like all other expenses are going up the whole time—in fact more than anything else. Mr. Lloyd George said in 1909, or thereabouts, that one Duke cost as much to keep up as two battleships. He would not say that today. He could not even compare a Duke to a sloop, leave alone two battleships. This aircraft carrier is costing £60 million to build, and I do not know how much it will cost a year to run—some fantastic sum—and I do not think any Duke can compare with that.
So far as the structure of the individual Services is concerned, we think the need
1156
for interdependence is highly important. The days when the war seemed to be not between Britain and the enemy but between the War Office and the Admiralty have gone. But there is no doubt that the loyalty of the individual in the individual Service is often to his Service, and to an even greater degree to his regiment or ship or squadron, as the noble Earl pointed out and as is pointed out in paragraph 10 of the White Paper we are discussing. I think that when making these vast plans we ought never to forget that; we must remember that so far as the man in the regiment, particularly, is concerned, it is a question of the historical continuity of the regiment, which he knows all about, and the sort of shadowy comrades that lie behind him, possibly back to the days of Marlborough.
There are only one or two further points I should like to make. The first is with regard to Commonwealth defence. I think that in future we shall have to give much closer attention to Commonwealth defence than in the past. It is going to be a rather different type of defence. We have two cases looming up at the moment. I hope neither will come to fruition, but there is a possibility and a danger. The first is the threat to India by China. That will possibly call for more aid, and I was very pleased indeed to see how promptly Her Majesty's Government offered aid on the previous occasion to India, and I hope we shall do so if the need arises in the future. The other case is perhaps different, perhaps not so different, but certainly of another type. I refer to a case such as that in Borneo, the new Malaysia. It will be quite impossible for the new Malaysia to defend its frontiers, those enormously long frontiers running through bush and across the tops of mountains and so on, without aid from the rest of the Commonwealth. I hope that that will be looked at by the new Minister of Defence, and that he will realise that Gurkhas and irregular troops, and all the rest of it, may be very important in those areas.
The only question I would ask the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who is replying, is with regard to recruiting. However good the paper plans are, unless there are enough men and women to carry them out they are not going to have much effect. I have been very disappointed to

1157
see in the latest figures given to us by the present Minister of Defence, which are for April this year, that the all-Services recruiting as compared to April, 1962, has gone down, so far as men and boys are concerned, from 6,543 to 3,093, which is a drop of more than 50 per cent.; and so far as women are concerned, from 703 to 368. That is a very sharp decline indeed, and I do not know the reason. Perhaps the noble Lord will be able to enlighten us. It may be, so far as the Army is concerned, that they made rather a mistake in appearing to decline the services of married men and those who desire to get married; and there may have been other reasons as well.
One point which has not been mentioned yet but which comes up on this reorganisation is the fact that the Ministry of Aviation is not to be part of the new Ministry of Defence. In our last debate on Defence on March 13 last I urged the Government to retain a separate Ministry of Aviation, and I am very pleased they have done so. On all occasions when there has not been a separate Ministry of Aviation, civil aviation has suffered appallingly. It is an absolutely right decision, and I hope the Government will stick to this through thick and thin. Of course, there must be very close liaison and co-ordination, as indeed I understand there is going to be. But I feel that civil aviation is so different from the Service aspects of the Ministry of Defence that to put it in, and to have it controlled by, the Ministry of Defence would be quite wrong, and in this very difficult time through which civil aviation is passing it would perhaps do it irreparable injury.
We welcome the nuclear test ban agreement which is to be signed by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary quite soon in Moscow. We are delighted to hear that, and we urge upon the Government, and we will support them in, every possible and proper measure of disarmament they will be able to achieve.
I have an apology to make to the House. As your Lordships know, I never, if I can possibly help it, avoid being present throughout the debate to the end; but it so happens that to-night I have an important meeting which I must attend, and it may be that I shall have to leave before the conclusion of the debate. I apologise to the noble
1158
Earl, Lord Home, and all speakers whose speeches I shall not be able to listen to. With those few words, I would extend to the Government, on behalf of my noble friends and myself, our very best wishes at the launching of the new Ministry for a smooth and successful voyage.
3.8 p.m.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I think all of us are very grateful to the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition for having put this Motion down and given your Lordships the opportunity of debating this White Paper. I think it would be also true to say that while the noble Earl has given the Government's plans a rather lukewarm welcome, that was made up for, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, who welcomed them wholeheartedly. In fact I think he had only one criticism: that they were not put into effect sooner. I have noticed that if the Opposition ever agree with anything the Government propose they always ask why it was not done years ago, so I do not take that criticism too much to heart. Perhaps I may answer at once one question which the noble Lord put to me—because I do not want to be diverted into questions of equipment and manpower and so on. He asked about recruitment. I would say this: my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War acknowledges that the present situation is unsatisfactory. He is taking a number of steps to encourage recruiting and also to ensure that the needs of the Army are kept in the public mind.
I should also like to apologise to your Lordships if I leave a little time before the end of the debate. I think I have explained to most of your Lordships that there is a very special naval occasion this evening in Portsmouth which I think it would not be proper for me, as First Lord of the Admiralty, to miss; and I hope your Lordships will forgive me.
The noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition has spent very many years in Defence Departments, twice as First Lord of the Admiralty—on the second occasion during a very critical period in the history of this country, then as Minister of Defence—so anything that he says must be listened to with great attention and with great care. I intend, therefore, this afternoon to explain as best I can why the Government have decided to

1159
reorganise our defence organisation and on what principles we have tried to base our proposals.
Before doing so, however, perhaps I may be allowed to say one personal thing. It is, I suppose, rather unusual for a Minister to introduce, or to support, proposals which will entail the disappearance of his office and of the Department over which he has presided for a number of years; and it would be foolish to deny that there are those of us in the Admiralty—and I am sure, too, in the War Office, and in the Air Ministry—who are sad to see the disappearance of traditional offices and institutions which have been valuable in their time and played a great and honourable part in the history of this country. The Board of Admiralty has a long history, and it and the Royal Navy, as your Lordships know, have served the country more than well; and no one could be more proud or more honoured than I am to have held the office of First Lord for nearly four years. I should not, therefore, contemplate coming to your Lordships' House and advocating the abolition of these time-honoured institutions if I did not believe strongly that the time had come when we should take a step forward in our defence organisation.
We should not be afraid of altering our policy because we look back too much on the past. No country or Government can run its defence policy, or indeed any other policy, on nostalgia. I also was at one time at the Ministry of Defence, not in the great capacity of the noble Earl opposite, but as Parliamentary Secretary. I served three Ministers—first the Prime Minister, then Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and, finally, Lord Monckton of Brenchley. I came to the conclusion during that time, which was between the years 1954 and 1956, that if our defence policy was to be cohesive and if our resources were to be used properly, it was necessary for the Minister of Defence and the Ministry of Defence to have greater powers.
As your Lordships know, we went some way along this road in 1958, at the time when Mr. Sandys was Minister of Defence. I think that the time has now come when we should take another step forward. I think this mainly for two reasons. The first is that since the war we have been living under a sort of
1160
armed truce. It has been quite out of the question to follow the pattern which we usually follow, of starving the Armed Forces of resources in peace time until forced to reverse the trend by the threat or the reality of war. We have had to maintain carefully balanced forces over these last years, and the balance is necessarily a delicate one. It is political, it is military and it is economic.
The second reason—and it is closely related to the first one—lies in the cost and complexity of modern equipment. Prices for aircraft and ships and tanks have gone up out of all proportion to the general rise in industrial and consumer goods. I agree with all that the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, said on that point, though I should hesitate to say that my noble friend the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations was not more valuable than a sloop. But as the price of equipment soars, so does the competition for scarce money from the Defence Budget become more intense. Of course it is the business of the Royal Navy to state the case for sea power, as it is for the other two Services to state their cases. I do not believe that unless there is a strong central control by a Minister of Defence it is possible to balance the three forces and their requirements properly, all, of course, subject to the overall political, military and economic considerations. As each of the Services becomes more and more interdependent, and as they co-operate more closely, the need for a single responsible Minister in a unified Ministry of Defence has become stronger—not of course to stifle opinion and comment in the individual Services or to stifle differences of view. The idea is that the new Secretary of State shall have access to all the facts and all the interpretations put upon them. But the decisions must be his and those of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee and the Cabinet.
Having got so far, the Government then had to decide how this was to be brought about. There were two possible ways, I think, in which this could be done. They could either unify the three Services and administer them as one in a single department on a functional basis, or they could retain the separate identities of the Services, unite them in a common headquarters building, under the single control of a Secretary of State for Defence, delegating

1161
such duties as he himself would not have time to perform. As your Lordships know, the Government chose the latter alternative; and I am quite sure that they were right. I do not believe that at this point of time it is possible or desirable to unify the Services. Sailors are sailors; soldiers are soldiers, and airmen are airmen: they chose their ship; they chose their regiment, and they chose their squadron. Their loyalties are to their Service. Ever-increasing demands are placed upon their skill and their ingenuity by the increasing complications of modern weapons, and that of itself imposes greater demands for specialisation and not integration. I am quite sure that it is vital that the Services should retain their own distinctive traditions and identities.
Nor do I believe that functional organisation is possible. Ninety-five per cent. of the time of the Second Sea Lord in the Admiralty (as your Lordships know, he looks after manpower in the Navy), is spent necessarily on single Service matters, and only 5 per cent. on matters which affect the other two Services. And this is even more true of the Controller, who looks after production and equipment, whose time is spent almost entirely on naval issues. That of course is not to say that there are not fields in which it may be possible to integrate; but as a generality, that is certainly not so. It will, however, be necessary for the new Ministry of Defence—and this is embodied in its structure—to delegate.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I just say that there is no reason why you cannot get good co-operation between the particular kind of senior officers, the production officers, about whom you are talking. We did have some body which met in a hotel just the other side of Cockspur street, at the bottom of the Haymarket—it was called the "Plumbers' Club". It really comprised the Controller of the Navy and the man in charge of production for merchant shipping and repairs, and the men in charge of production for the other two Services. They did a lot in the war; they got together and did the job.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am sure that is true. I am trying to explain the reasons why we have decided
1162
to create this kind of organisation. I think that as I go along the noble Earl may perhaps be more convinced that the Government are right in what they are proposing to do.
I was saying that it was necessary in this new structure to delegate. The advantage of this new system will be lost unless the Secretary of State for Defence can devote the time required to policy questions and to overall direction of policy, which should be his prime function. If he became involved in the day-to-day administration of the three Services, he would be lost in a mass of detail and so overworked as to be unable to do his job—and I think the noble Earl recognised that fact in his speech. Of course, it will lie within the Secretary of State's authority to intervene whenever and wherever he may think it necessary, but in practice he must delegate much of his authority for the management of the Services, and this delegation, to be effective, must be understood both by Parliament and by the Departments and the men and women of the Services themselves. In the words of the White Paper, efficiency, leadership and morale require a focus for the management of each Service and for safeguarding the career interests and the welfare of all ranks and all civilian staff.
It is proposed that this requirement should be met by the Navy, Army and Air Force Boards. A Minister of State who deputises for the Secretary of State will be identified with each of these Boards and with the management of a particular Service. And the Chiefs of Staff, as the professional Heads of each Service, will remain the senior Service members of each Board, and their position, as I hope to explain a little later, is extremely important.
The Government then had to consider the question of the Ministry of Aviation, mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, about which there have been a number of different views and comments outside your Lordships' House. The main reasons why the Ministry of Aviation cannot readily be absorbed in the new Ministry of Defence are the indivisible character of the Ministry's responsibilities for civil as well as military research and development, and the gross overload on the Secretary of State for Defence which would result from the transfer of these

1163
responsibilities. This is a factor which we regard as overriding the arguments which can be advanced on other grounds, both for and against retaining the Ministry of Aviation as a separate Department.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, does that mean that the Minister of Aviation has won his way clear from what was intended to be thrust upon him?
LORD CARRINGTON: The noble Earl must not go back too far in his experience of what happened in the Labour Government. We attach great importance to the strengthening of the existing links between the Ministry of Aviation and the present Defence Departments.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: The noble Lord has not answered my question.
LORD CARRINGTON: The White Paper explains a number of steps which are to be taken. I did answer the noble Earl's question. I was saying that the Government, having weighed the arguments carefully, had on balance come down to feeling that we should leave the Ministry of Aviation outside the complex. I was going on to explain exactly how it was going to be tied into it, if the noble Earl will be a little patient.
The Minister of Aviation and the appropriate senior officials will be accommodated in the main Ministry of Defence building in Whitehall. The Minister of Aviation will attend the Defence Council whenever matters affecting his Department are being discussed. His Ministry will be fully associated with the new arrangements for the formulation of operational requirements, for the control of defence research and development and for weapons system evaluation. The Secretary of State for Defence will have ready access to the Minister of Aviation's establishment and staff. The normal arrangements for the conduct of inter-departmental business will be developed to provide for the fullest possible representation and inter-communication as between the Ministry of Aviation and the new Ministry of Defence.
Lastly, my Lords, the Government set out to retain as great a degree of flexibility
1164
as they could. My view is that the proposals in the White Paper should not be regarded as final but as part of a process of continuous development which has gone on since the war. As I mentioned earlier, although the management of the individual Services will be decentralised, we intend to try to encourage rationalisation of administration and the integration of management organisations wherever possible and we hope to extend a good deal the practice of one Service undertaking a task for another Service, or the other two. The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Personnel and Logistics), a new appointment, and a Second Permanent Under Secretary of State have a particular responsibility for advances in this direction and for identifying what sort of thing might happen. These changes must be reflected in the organisation, and the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Administration) shown in the chart under the Second Permanent Under Secretary of State will preside over central establishment branches and over a Defence Establishments Committee.
My Lords, there have been outside—and I suspect there will be this afternoon—those who believe that the proposals for reorganisation should have been even more radical. I think that we have gone as far as we reasonably can, consistent with our responsibility for maintaining efficiency in spite of the inevitable temporary disruption. These, then, are the reasons behind the decision taken by the Government and my right honourable friend, the Minister of Defence, with the help, I may say, of two notable figures in the defence field, Lord Ismay and Sir Ian Jacob, who played a conspicuous part of their own in the defence machinery during the war years, who investigated the question and made a report to my right honourable friend. I think all your Lordships will be grateful to them for the hard work they have done and for the advice they have given.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, before the noble Lord leaves that point, could he tell the House whether in fact those two distinguished officers are in agreement with the Government's Defence White Paper proposals?
LORD CARRINGTON: I think I ought to leave that to the two distinguished officers. What I was saying was

1165
that they have been very helpful to Her Majesty's Government in making up their minds. That does not necessarily mean what the noble Lord is laughing about. I was being very non-committal.
There are one or two more detailed issues which I should like to touch upon. First of all, there is the question of the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy which is to be set up under the Prime Minister. It has, I think, for some time been apparent that it is very difficult to separate these two functions: when we talk about our overseas problems and commitments we inevitably include defence, and vice versa. It has therefore been decided to amalgamate these two separate committees to examine questions of defence policy, not in purely military terms but in relation to foreign and economic policy as well. Though the regular membership will be small—the Prime Minister, the First Secretary of State, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary—other Ministers will attend as necessary and so will the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff. So too if necessary will other officials and the Chief Scientific Adviser.
I should like to break off for a moment to say how much I agree with what the noble Earl said about the engineers. The fact that this White Paper concentrates in some paragraphs upon scientists does not mean that the Government do not believe that the engineers are important, and I know in my own Department what important work they put in.
Your Lordships will have noticed in all these new arrangements that the position of the Chiefs of Staff has remained unaltered. They remain the professional Heads of their Services and I believe that this is of great importance to each Service. There must be a focus and a Head. Sailors, soldiers or airmen must feel that there is someone who has a special duty to represent their interests and I am particularly glad—and I am astonished the noble Earl is not—that in the case of my own Service it has been found possible to retain the titles of First Sea Lord and Second Sea Lord, both of which are so well understood and well known throughout the Royal Navy. The Chief of the
1166
Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff will attend at full Cabinet meetings when appropriate and their right of access to the Prime Minister is preserved in the new organisation.
As the noble Earl and the noble Lord. Lord Ogmore, have said, we are setting up a Department which is very large indeed and of unprecedented size in this country. For this reason, and because of the delegation about which I have already spoken, the Secretary of State will be assisted by three Ministers of State for Defence. I stress "for Defence" since they will discharge whatever responsibilities the Secretary of State may delegate to them from time to time over the whole of the defence field. Their terms of reference will thus be different from those of the present Service Ministers, though I must say that I have found myself talking for the other two Services as well as the Ministry of Defence on a number of occasions in the last four years. At the same time, these new Ministers will have a special responsibility for a particular Service since it is necessary for the purposes of good administration and political control that there should be a Minister closely identified with the Boards of the Services and their general conduct. The noble Earl opposite asked whether the Secretary of State for Defence will be responsible for the discipline of the Forces. Yes, he will, but the day-to-day management will be delegated to the Ministers of State and the Boards.
Our general approach, therefore, is that there should be integration of the Services consistent with the maintenance of the essential individuality of the Services. This has been the approach, too, in the Defence Council and in the three Boards which supersede the present Councils. Policy concocted in a vacuum tends to be neither responsible nor realistic, and we have tried to avoid this. Management must be inspired by a proper appreciation of policy issues. The Department is unified by the Secretary of State being Chairman of the Defence Council and also titular Chairman of each Board, even though he will normally delegate this responsibility to the appropriate Minister of State. There is in addition a degree of common membership of the Boards and of the Defence Council itself, inasmuch as the Ministers of State and the Chiefs of Staff are members of both.

1167
There is one matter which I have not yet mentioned and that is the relationship between the Sovereign and the Services. There is to be no change whatever in the relationships and traditional links, except in the one case of the Board of Admiralty and the Lord High Admiral, and it is a particular pleasure to my colleagues on the Board of Admiralty and myself, who have been commissioned by Her Majesty to execute the office of the Lord High Admiral, that the Queen has graciously consented to assume herself that ancient and honourable title. So it will be that, although the
"Silk Flagg Red with a yellow anchor and cable in the Fly"—
as the Lord High Admiral's flag is described in Narborough's Journal of 1672—will be lowered from the Admiralty, it will continue to be hoisted by Her Majesty when she goes to sea and on other naval occasions.
To sum up, I believe—
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I do not recollect that the First Lord answered my question in connection with those four new organisations to be set up. I dealt specifically with Intelligence and with Signals.
LORD CARRINGTON: I did not answer that in detail, my Lords, and I apologise if I overlooked that. But I think that the noble Earl himself overlooked that, in paragraphs 35 down to 41, we do go into fairly full detail as to what we propose to do in these matters, and that is as far as I can take the subject this afternoon. Of course, these things have still to be worked out in final detail, but I think if the noble Earl will read these paragraphs he will see that they give him a very good idea in general terms of what is proposed.
My Lords, I believe we have effected a major and timely reform in our central organisation for defence which gives us the opportunity to improve the central control of defence policy without detriment to the efficient management, the fighting efficiency, the morale and the contentment of the fighting Services. I believe that we have created the means for achieving the objective laid down, to strike a proper balance between political and military commitments, resources and the rôles of the Services. The Secretary
1168
of State for Defence will be able to do this by gaining access to all the facts and all the experts, and through his mastery of a strong central organisation for administrative and financial control. I also believe that the new organisation, while it preserves the necessary unity of policy and management, does not preclude further progressive development in the direction of integration and rationalisation, wherever such development may be seen to be profitable. For all these reasons I believe the proposal to be worthy of your Lordships' approval.
My Lords, I know there are those in the Services and outside—and I think the noble Earl is one of them—who are anxious as to how this organisation will work. They look back, as I said at the beginning, with regret at the passing of some very familiar institutions. I do not believe that under the Government's plans those in the Services will notice that there has been any change. They will still have as their professional Head the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the General Staff or the Chief of the Air Staff. They will wear the same uniforms; they will owe their loyalty in exactly the same way as they do now, to their Service, to their ship, their regiment, to their squadron. Their pride in their Service should be unaltered. For those who work in Whitehall there will be some change, a change of scenery for two Services and the Ministry of Defence; some new neighbours for the Air Ministry. To begin with, they will have to learn the new organisation and get to know their opposite numbers even better than they do to-day—and they know them well to-day. If, as we profoundly believe, these proposals will make for better defence planning and better budgetary control, then everybody in all the three Services will benefit.
The other day my colleagues in the other two Services and I, and the Minister of Defence, sent a personal message to the Services and in it we said this. Ultimately organisation is not a matter of lines upon a chart. It depends upon people. The proposals now before Parliament create a framework for the new organisation. But in its growth and development the major part will be played by those who serve in the new Ministry of Defence, and those who from time to time join it for a tour of duty

1169
from the Services. My Lords, these are the people who are now engaged upon the massive task of implementing the proposals before you in the White Paper. I ask your Lordships to support and encourage them by endorsing these proposals.

TELEVISION BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.
PEERAGE BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.

PUBLIC ORDER BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with an Amendment.
3.38 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (EARL JELLICOE): My Lords, I beg to move that the Message from the Commons be taken into consideration forthwith.
Moved accordingly, and on Question, Motion agreed to.

PUBLIC ORDER BILL [H.L.]

  COMMONS AMENDMENT
  Clause 1, page 1, line 8, after "1" insert "(1)".
  EARL JELLICOE: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment. It is a Government Amendment designed to make absolutely clear the effect of the Bill upon the Public Meeting Act, 1908. It is a very small matter, and I think I can explain the purpose of this Amendment to your Lordships very briefly. Under Section 1(1) of the 1908 Act it is made an offence to act at a public meeting in a disorderly manner, for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the business for which the meeting was called. In 1936 a new subsection (3) was added and this empowered a constable, on the request of the chairman of the meeting, to require a person reasonably suspected of committing an offence under the earlier provision of the section to declare his name and address. This new subsection made it a summary offence, which was punishable by a fine not exceeding 40s., for such a person to refuse or fail to give his name and address, or to give a false name and address. We have never proposed
  1170
  that the increased penalties provided for under the Bill should apply to this relatively trivial offence in Section 1(3) of the 1908 Act, and we had not thought, and we still do not think, that the Bill as originally drafted had this effect. Nevertheless, there may be some ambiguity here, and in fact it was argued by a Member in another place during Second Reading that the Bill did increase the penalty under subsection (3) of Section 1. We have accordingly felt it right to make the position absolutely clear by substituting a reference to subsection (1) of Section 1 of the 1908 Act, for the reference which was in it until yesterday to Section 1 as a whole. My Lords, I beg to move.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(Earl Jellicoe.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

DEFENCE REORGANISATION
3.38 p.m.
Debate resumed.
VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN: My Lords, I have certain experience of the subject under discussion in Lordships' House to-day, first, as Commander-in-Chief of great armies in war-time, and, secondly, as a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Whitehall. I should like to say at once that I give a general welcome to the Government's proposals as being a step in the right direction. Ever since 1948 I have advocated this step to ten successive Ministers of Defence—ten, not nine—but all declined to grasp this very prickly nettle. But now at long last we have the organisation.
I think it must be admitted that the organisation which we are to have from April 1, 1964, is a compromise between what is the right and proper organisation, and what the Government reckon will be acceptable in the Whitehall square mile for the time being—and I would emphasise "for the time being". The move over towards a centralised Ministry of Defence is revolutionary so far as we British are concerned. We are the only nation in the Free World, and, so far as I know, in the world not so free, which does not have this organisation. But that

1171
by itself is not the reason why we should adopt it.
The reason why we should adopt this organisation is, to my mind, quite clear. We learnt in Hitler's war, the late war, that no one Service can do any good by itself. In the campaigns in which the armies under my command took part we always had one flank on the sea—always; in the early stages of the campaign in Italy, in September, 1943, we had both flanks on the sea; and above us always was the mighty weapon of air power. Without sea-power and air-power we on the ground could have achieved very little. Therefore, any changes in organisation which tend towards making the three Services act as one close-knit fighting machine is right. It has come very late; but better late than never.
My Lords, to-day Service loyalties are divided, dependent on whether the fighting man wears khaki or whether he wears a particular shade of blue. I read with great interest in a London newspaper on July 17 a leading article on the new organisation. In that article were these words—and I quote:
"Inter-Service squabbles will continue, and it is right that they should do so".
I reckon it is not right that they should do so. We have suffered too long from inter-Service rivalries, each Service fighting for its own corner when money is tight. The result has been compromise all down the line, and never the right solution. The three Services must now learn to pull together as one team, and the proper way to ensure this is to train the officer to be completely inter-Service from his earliest days. With the organisation proposed, that would mean tri-Service cadet colleges—as they have in Canada, for instance, which I have seen and which are extremely good. It would also mean integrating the three Service staff colleges. Without those steps being taken, I do not believe that this new organisation will ever develop its full potential.
Now it is not clear to me whether the War Office is to retain its name or become the Army Office. That is not clear: but I hope the latter. The story is told of a lady who, during the war, wanted to go to the War Office to ask for some information about a relative. She knew it was somewhere in Whitehall, but was
1172
not quite certain where it was, so she said to a policeman at the top of Whitehall, "Officer, which side is the War Office on?"; and the "copper" replied, "Ours, I hope".
My Lords, there will come a time eventually when we shall have one fighting Service—eventually—some of whom serve on the sea, some in the air and some on the land. We cannot turn over to that system to-day; it would not be accepted in Whitehall and it would not be accepted in the nation. But it will come, and my guess is that it will come after the next world war. Now I have a certain sympathy with some of the remarks made by the noble Earl, the Leader of the Opposition, but I would add this to them. I do not think that, to-day, it would be right for the Government to produce a completed, final blueprint for the organisation we are now discussing. It is a revolutionary change, and the details must be evolved step by step. Where the present outline is proved to be wrong, changes must be made. I would say that it will take some years to get exactly the right answer.
I should like to mention a few points which, in my view, need very close examination—and the first one is manpower. A study of the White Paper leaves me with the impression that the manpower employed in the four Ministries is going to increase under the new, centralised organisation. I asked for the present figures, your Lordships will remember, last week, and they were published in the OFFICIAL REPORT. The grand total of the manpower in the Service Ministries in Whitehall is just under 24,000. That is quite a sizeable army. My Lords, the new organisation must result in a decrease in manpower at the top. If it does not, we shall have failed. I hope that the First Lord, or maybe the Foreign Secretary, will recommend to the Minister of Defence that, when the new organisation comes into being there must be, in the Service Ministries, an intensive use of weed-killer. I think the Minister of Defence should go into production with weed-killer pretty quickly. It will be needed in heavy and concentrated doses. In fact, I think that the whole question of manpower in the Ministries in Whitehall demands the closest scrutiny by Parliament at all times.

1173
The next point is what I would call political control. I have learnt in my military career that the higher direction of war and the direction of the military machine in peace time must always remain firmly in political hands. The allegiance of the fighting man in war and in peace must be given to the State. It is not open to the fighting man to change his allegiance because of any political views he may hold. Similarly, defence should be a non-Party matter, divorced from Party politics. But it is not, which is a very great tragedy. My Lords, the danger is this. From a study of the White Paper, it will be seen that under the new organisation the three Service Ministries have been downgraded; and so has the P.U.S., the Permanent Under-Secretary, in each Ministry. In fact, political control has been weakened. Very great power is now to be concentrated in the hands of two men: the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief Scientific Adviser. Under the new organisation, the Minister of Defence will need to be a pretty good guy. It will be fatal if he is to change frequently. Your Lordships will recall that we had ten Ministers of Defence between 1947 and 1962; and, during the two years from October, 1954, to October, 1956, we had four Ministers of Defence—Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Monckton of Brenchley and Mr. Head. If that sort of musical chairs is to go on, the new organisation cannot possibly succeed. The higher direction would then get into the hands of the Admirals, the Generals and the Air Marshals, with fatal results.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, before the noble and gallant Viscount leaves that subject, may I put this point to him? When we last debated these matters he favoured the downgrading of the Service Ministers. Does he still favour that, or not? I am not quite clear from what he said.
VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN: I do not. I recommended that they should be called the "Secretary to the Army", the "Secretary to the Navy", and so on. What I mean now is that this question of political control must be carefully watched. That is the point. You were quite right.
Now, my Lords, I come to the question of the right of access to the Prime
1174
Minister. In the Defence debate in your Lordships' House on March 13 last I suggested that the three Service Chiefs must not be allowed direct access to the Prime Minister. I now see in paragraph 17 of the White Paper that this right is to be given. I consider it to be entirely wrong that they should be allowed to lobby the Prime Minister. How can the head of a department in Whitehall or, for that matter, in business have any firm authority if his subordinates are allowed to lobby a higher level when they feel aggrieved, or when they disagree with some decision given by their immediate boss? How can he have any full authority?
To allow such action is to encourage disloyalty; and that paragraph in the White Paper robs it of much of its value. If a Service Chief disagrees vehemently with some decision or some proposal—or if all three do—it will be the duty of the Chief of the Defence Staff to lay the matter before the Minister of Defence, who will presumably see the Service Chiefs concerned and give a ruling; and, if he thought fit, he would take them to see the Prime Minister. It will also be the bounden duty of the Chief of the Defence Staff to inform the Minister of Defence of differences of opinion among Service Chiefs; and I would add that he should always give his own opinion very firmly at the same time.
The next point is the choice of the Chief of the Defence Staff. I do not think we should adopt a system by which the appointment of Chief of the Defence Staff is held by each Service in turn. The present Chief of the Defence Staff is Admiral Mountbatten. It will be his task to get the Service side of this business what I would call properly "run in". If the best man to succeed him in due course is another Admiral, let him be appointed. We must always have the best possible man for this responsible job, and we must avoid "Buggins's turn". The issues at stake are far too serious for that. I should like to say one word about simplicity. When you look at the table at the end of this Paper you get the feeling that it is rather complicated; and it may be. What I would say, generally, is that tremendous administrative problems are going to arise; they will be really terrific. Therefore I am glad to see that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, is to speak

1175
shortly. I reckon that he has more knowledge of administration in war time than any other Member of your Lordships' House.
My Lords, I should like next to say a word or two about war in the nuclear age. The defence council, in my view, will need to embark on a serious study of this subject, because their thinking will affect the shape and size of our Armed Forces and of the Civil Defence organisation in this country. Let me give one example. I find it quite impossible to visualise a war of the future being supported by our present logistic or administrative organisation; but your Lordships will know very well that the British army in Germany is to-day being trained for a nuclear war with our existing administrative set-up. We have a vast complicated organisation for the distribution of material all over the world. There are hundreds of committees in peace time—there would be more in war—receiving millions of reports; and they issue thousands of instructions every day. No communications system would carry that load in war time. Anybody who thinks that the present administrative system will work after thousands of nuclear weapons have been exchanged is absolutely barmy. After the first nuclear exchange, nothing of any size or quantity will move on land in the area in which these weapons have exploded or are exploding. Only on the sea will surface movement of any size be possible. That is a very important factor.
The lesson is, I think, that the side which maintains its maritime strength in peace time is the one that will succeed in the reconstruction period which will come when the fighting has ceased. Hence the importance of sea power. Time will not allow me to develop the subject further. It is sufficient to say that the most intensive study is essential in order to get out of the logistic morass in which we are plunged to-day. There is also that very well-known NATO disease called "committee-itis"—a disease not unknown in Whitehall. It reminds me of the story of the boy who said to his father "Father, what is a camel?" The father replied "My son, a camel is a horse designed by a committee."
Let me conclude by saying that the new organisation is better than ever before.
1176
The way ahead may seem to bristle with difficulties. To those who think thus I would quote Metternich's observation,
"No matter is so easily settled as that which appears to present overwhelming difficulties."
My Lords, I know that very well. In the spring of 1944 I could have written a paper to prove that it was quite impossible to land our armies in Normandy. I could also write a paper to prove that it could be done successfully—which, in fact, I did. I accept absolutely the statement by the First Lord that the new organisation goes as far as is possible for the time being; but there is one point to consider. If we are not careful there will still be the danger of promoting individual Service interests over those of the nation. It has happened too often in the past; it must never be allowed to happen again.
3.58 p.m.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, it is one of the advantages of your Lordships' House that on subjects such as this we are able to hear distinguished members of the Fighting Forces. It has been remarked that it has taken a long time for this Government to produce anything. It they had produced it earlier we might have had the advantage of hearing the views of Lord Alanbrooke, Lord Cunningham of Hyndhope and others. I shall not be accused of standing against any integration of the Services; the question is how best it can be done. I recall advocating a Minister of Defence in the House of Commons as long ago as 1936. For many years we carried on a campaign for that; we got it in the war, and we set up that Ministry after the war.
A point always made against the idea of a Minister of Defence is that he will have far too powerful a Ministry—one man wielding immense power. Of course that was imagined by the Conservative Government, who would not allow anybody to stay in the Ministry of Defence for more than a few months in case he became too powerful. It had an unfortunate effect. We had not had what the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, demanded—a strong hand at the top. We had not had the strong personal contact that we should have had. It has been a great disadvantage all through that the Minister of Defence has been treated as a kind of siding in which Ministers were put, either on

1177
their way up or on their way down, and that no one put there has remained long enough to deal with these problems.
We are now to have an exaltation of the Minister of Defence and a downgrading of the Service Ministers. I do not like that. I always believed that the Minister of Defence should be a very important person; but I believed that he should have a definite sphere of operations, and that there should be a definite sphere for the Ministers of the Fighting Services. It is true that it was due to me that the Service Ministers were taken out of the Cabinet. I believe that that decision was sound, because the tendency used to be to make people heads of the Services just because of their status in the Party or in the House, and so they had to be Cabinet Ministers. We got rid of that principle. We also reduced the number of Ministers in the Cabinet by putting in the Minister of Defence and by that making the Ministers Ministers of Cabinet rank, but I never dreamed that we should de-grade them now by making them mere glorified Under-Secretaries. The title Minister of State was an invention of Sir Winston Churchill and merely gave a sort of extra status to an Under-Secretary. The title was used particularly for the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, but Ministers of State are little more than Under-Secretaries. And the heads of the Fighting Services are now de-graded down to the level of Ministers of State. I believe that that is a mistake. I do not know how it will affect the Services.
A second thing I never approved of was the interposition between the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence of the Chief of Staff of Defence. I think that that was a mistake. What the Minister of Defence required was not another "high-up", but an adviser, a helper, a co-ordinator. In fact, what he wanted was another "Pug" Ismay—very rare, but a man of that status—to assist him in his job of dealing with the Chiefs of Staff. I do not believe in having someone put over the Chiefs of Staff. Our view at the time (I think it was a general view) was that the three Chiefs of Staff were a Chief of Staff in commission, and, provided there was co-operation, it worked very well. I am told that it did
1178
not work well before the Second World War, but it certainly worked afterwards. We had very wise and skilled Chairmen, like the noble Lords, Lord Alanbrooke, Lord Tedder and others, and we were getting the kind of co-ordination we wanted, without the interposition of somebody else. Now we are to have a Minister in charge of all the three Fighting Services. He will be too powerful, and he will have too much work.
I do not like some of the set-up here. I do not like the idea in this chart of the Ministers, nominally at all events, having to preside over the Army Council under a different name, and over the Lords of the Admiralty, with a different name, and also over the Air Council. It is only a matter of nomenclature. There is an awful lot of "eyewash" in this White Paper. We are not changing the substance of anything by changing the name. In practice, the Minister will delegate the work to the Service Ministers. That is what it amounts to, after all. Unless he is going to be submerged in detail, he must leave this to the Service Ministers, who are now to be mere Ministers of State. It does not seem worth while to go to this degradation of these Ministers merely to put a purely nominal point, in which the Minister of Defence is to preside over all these Committees.
I do not care much for the set-up here. I think there is an awful lot of harness and too little horse. New Committees of all kinds are being set up. I welcome some of the changes, such as the new position given to the scientists. But all these things were in process of being done, and would have been done, and we should have had the necessary co-ordination, if we had had one Minister of Defence instead of nine. After all, the question is largely one of personality. The set-up works well if we have the right people. An immense amount of power is to be given to the Chief of Staff of the Defence Ministry. That is all right if we get an exceptional man, such as we have at present; but in legislation we must cater for the ordinary man. We shall not always have people with the kind of experience we have at present—like the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, for instance, or some of his predecessors.
I think that the idea behind this organisation is right. There is no earthly reason why we should not have had it before.

1179
It may need some slight changes. But I am not very enamoured of this setting up of a Pentagon in Whitehall—assembling there, so far as I can see, a whole mass of staff officers from the various Ministries. I think that it will lead to duplication. We shall have the same kind of officers duplicated in the Service Departments. The idea is that we shall integrate the three Services in one building, but separate the heads of the Services from their administrative units. I do not think that that is a good idea. Altogether, I do not care very much for this elaborate organisation here—all these different executives with staffs. I do not see that they will show any improvement on what we had before. I think that the Defence Committee of the Cabinet as we had it, ensured the right amount of co-ordination between the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Fighting Services. I do not see why we want these extra Committees. I think that the Chiefs of Staff, as the noble and gallant Viscount said will be suffering from "committee-itis".
Fundamentally, the matter rests on personnel. Who are we going to get to run the show? If we are not going to get an effective Minister of Defence, then the show will be run by his Chief of Staff, who may or may not be good. I should beware here of what I think is a real danger—the loss of ministerial control. Some people like the American system. I do not. You have the Pentagon. In my experience, anything less co-ordinated than the American system could not possibly exist. In war time, we had Admiral King fighting one war and the soldiers fighting another war; and with their system of only one Executive, the civilians had not much control. I doubt whether they have it to-day.
I think it is essential, as the noble and gallant Viscount said, that you should have adequate political control, and I do not think you get it. In Defence matters the Prime Minister should be constantly involved, and he must have the last word. In these days, when you are nominally at peace and do not have too much trouble, he must personally look into these Defence matters. I have always regarded a Minister of Defence as a Prime Minister's alter ego for Defence purposes; not an independent power, but working closely with him. That I think
1180
we had. I think it was proved by the way it worked when we had the sudden question of sending a force to Korea. We had no difficulty. It was worked out; the three Services co-operated, and it was all done in a very short time. We had our headquarters out there at Hong Kong, we brought in the Canadians and Australians, and we had the Commonwealth Division. All this worked very smoothly.
It depends on the men and their training. If your Air Marshals, Admirals and Generals are taught in the modern way in the Defence colleges, and so on, to work together and look at all Defence questions from the Defence angle, then they will work together. I cannot conceive anybody nowadays thinking that there could be a separate war without taking into consideration the necessary interdependence of the Services. It seems to me that the statements here, far from announcing some wonderful new gospel, are merely stating the obvious of what has to be done. Over-elaboration here merely means that they find it necessary to set out in great detail what used to be done, and what should have been done during the last twelve years. It is the spirit of the thing and the personnel that matter, not elaborate paper constitutions.
I do not think this should be put in force at once. It ought to be taken back and looked at again, preferably by a new Ministry. I do not think our present Prime Minister is really very good at administration. A Minister never seems to do his own job. A Foreign Secretary or Commonwealth Secretary is always liable to be superseded in any crisis by one of these peripatetic Pooh Bahs, Mr. Butler or the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I do not think the general set-up is good. I feel that we should get back to a good deal more simplicity, and more responsibility should be given to the people who ought to have the responsibility. As I say, I hope this will be taken back and looked at again, and preferably brought in by a new Government who understand the subject and know something about administration.
4.15 p.m.
LORD TEYNHAM: My Lords, I feel honoured at following the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. He must have had considerable experience in Defence matters, and I somewhat hesitate to criticise his

1181
views. I must say I am rather inclined to agree that the Ministers of the Fighting Services should remain of Cabinet rank, and perhaps the Government will give further thought to this point. I do not agree with the noble Earl that these points and others should be considered by a new Government. On the whole, I should like to congratulate the Government on this scheme for the central organisation of Defence as a compromise basis of the many conflicting interests. I am sorry that, as yet, it has not been possible to debate the Service Estimates for this year, which have a great bearing on the matter we are discussing to-day. Many of us realise the reasons for this.
I feel sure that the bringing together of strategic planning, direction of operations, intelligence and communications is all to the good and should make for better efficiency in the conduct of war. I am glad that the views of the extremists have been resisted. We have heard of recommendations in some quarters for a single, unified Defence Service, with even a common type of uniform. I suggest that any move in that direction would be quite unrealistic for this country. We have strategic needs and obligations which require the maintenance of at least two individual Services, and probably three, for a long time to come. But I think it is possible that in the not too distant future we may see the merging of the Royal Navy and the Air Force.
There is no doubt that the real reason behind this Central Organisation for Defence is financial, and it is hoped that Defence expenditure will be reduced. But I cannot help feeling that Parkinson's Law will very quickly become operative and little money, if any, will be saved in the great Civil Service establishment which will arise in Whitehall Gardens. I hope that the new central organisation will not mean that the Services are to be directed by a series of interminable committees. This could very well happen, and it is a danger we must guard against. I think it is a pity that the time-honoured names of Board of Admiralty, Army Council and Air Council are to be done away with, and these bodies are to have the new names of Navy Board, Army Board and Air Board. Surely this was unnecessary. But I suppose it was a sop to the extremists.
1182
In spite of what has been said by my noble and gallant friend, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, I am very much in agreement with the proposal that the professional heads of all three Services, the Chiefs of Staff, are to retain the right of access to the Prime Minister. I am sure this will have a steadying effect on the Services as a whole; I am certain it will for the Navy, for which I can speak. I think the officers and men will feel that they will have a degree of protection from the great octopus in Whitehall. Integration is very much a state of mind, and I suggest that if this plan is to be a success we must start considering the integration of initial training. I entirely support what has been said by my noble and gallant friend in this direction. It must mean the integration of training at an early age with the three Service colleges, and, in fact, a joint Service cadet college. I suggest that something of this nature must come about if the process of integration is to continue more closely in the future.
I do not mean to suggest that the Services should lose their separate identities, but in action they are increasingly interdependent. This will undoubtedly grow, and therefore some form of integration in training at an early age is, I feel, of the utmost importance. I think it is true to say that some of your Lordships are worried that integration may bring in its wake more and larger staffs and smaller actual fighting units. I am sure we all hope that this will not happen, although the danger is ever-present. On the whole, I welcome the plan of Her Majesty's Government. I feel sure it can be made to work if Service rivalries can be forgotten, and a great step forward can be taken in the provision of joint Service weapons which, in the long run, should save the country a great deal of money.
4.20 p.m.
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: My Lords, I should like to start my remarks in the same was as I intend to end them, and that is by saying that I warmly welcome these proposals. During the course of my speech I shall have some criticisms to offer, and even some suggestions, but the real impression I wish to leave with your Lordships is that I welcome the proposals. I will talk of them briefly under the four headings, political, military, financial and scientific.

1183
On the political side, the proposals strike me as being simple, clear and right. I am glad that the title "Ministers of State" has been considered the right one for the four subordinate Ministers who are to have special responsibilities in relation to the individual Services. I am even more glad that they are to be regarded as deputies, as it were, to the Secretary of State, with responsibilities over the same defence field. I am afraid that in this respect I am expressing an opinion that is contrary to the opinion expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and that is a very awesome thought. But I am bound to say that I differ from him in this and one or two other matters in regard to this field, and if I express myself in moderate terms I trust that he will not think me impertinent or that I have forgotten my very great respect for him.
I have only one query about the political set-up, and that is this: who will represent the Government on defence in your Lordships' Chamber? Any of your Lordships who heard my speech in March will know that I personally consider that this Chamber should be the main forum for the debating of the great strategic and defence issues, and I feel that the Minister of Defence, with his responsibilities for over-all control, with a need for him to stand back, could do his work best if he were in this Chamber. But he might not be; I know that. If he is not, who will represent the Government here? I hope that it can be arranged that the Government will be represented here by someone of Cabinet rank. If that seems to imply a recommendation for promotion of the present First Lord of the Admiralty, well, why not?
I now turn to the military side of the organisation, and I use the word "military" in its widest sense. Here the critical decision forecast in the proposals put before us in March has been maintained; that is to say, responsibility for tendering professional advice to the Government on strategy has been placed collectively with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. All four Chiefs of Staff may be present at Cabinet meetings, and all four are to have the right of direct access to the Prime Minister. One hears it often said that this is the arrangement we had in the last war, and that it worked
1184
well then. That is probably so, but I think those who say this must also agree that no organisation, however well it has worked in the past, can ever be regarded as static, sacrosanct and immutable. If conditions have changed, the organisation may have to change, and I urge your Lordships to believe that conditions have changed enormously, as is brought out in the White Paper. What we need to-day, surely, is an organisation which will take account of what the Green Book on Defence (I think it is Cmnd. 1936) calls
"the essential unity of our defence forces".
We need an organisation to take account of the essential unity of our defence forces.
The noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, gave his reason again to-day for objecting to the right of direct access being given to the Chiefs of Staff. He supported his argument mainly with the idea that these Chiefs of Staff should not be given an opportunity to lobby over the head of the Chief of the Defence Staff. I agree with that, but I have another concern in this matter. It is that, under such an arrangement, it seems to me that professional military advice will be all too easily ignored. Picture the scene round that well-known baize covered table when some very awkward and tricky defence problem is being discussed, and all four Chiefs of Staff are present. They come into the room, having agreed upon their compromise advice to the Government, and it lies now before the Ministers. After half an hour or so of cross-examination of this individual and then that, it is my suggestion that their agreement will very clearly be shown for what it is, and all their previous disagreements, doubts, and fears will be laid bare, and then the professional military advice which ought to ring out clear for all to hear will be completely confused and irreconcilable. That is my fear about it.
The late Lord Grey of Falloden in his book Twenty-five Years, which I was rereading recently, ascribed many of our troubles of the First World War to exactly this tendency on the part of Governments—or the Government of that day, at least—to seek a variety of military advice. I will give your Lordships the page to show that this is a

1185
genuine quotation. On page 74, volume 2, he used this expression which stuck in my mind:
"The highest military opinion cannot be divided."
In this White Paper the Chief of the Defence Staff is referred to as the principal military adviser of the Government, and it is good at least that he is "the principal". But the very fact that that qualifying adjective is there shows that he is not the only one. Very deliberately, the highest military advice in this plan is being divided. So when the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, looked very hard in my direction and said that there were some people who thought these proposals did not go far enough, he was altogether right if he thought that I was one of them, because I certainly am.
On the other hand, what is being done is a great advance on what we have got already, and that I readily accept. In parenthesis, in March I made one suggestion in this field—namely, that perhaps it might be considered wise to give the Chief of the Defence Staff a higher rank than that held by any of his colleagues, and I have wondered since whether that recommendation appealed to the Government at all. Before I leave the Chiefs of Staff, I noted the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, about the second title of the Chief of Naval Staff. I had noted that point myself, and thought it was a little hard on the soldiers. Could we not find a second title for the Chief of the General Staff? Perhaps he could be called First Land Lord. Landlords are not very popular, but he could be First Lord of the Land, and his colleague First Lord of the Air. That might be going too far. This is not, of course, a serious point, and I know that well enough. The Government have apparently agreed to this title, and it would ill become a poor "Pongo" like myself to appear to be jealous of it. But I should like to assure the Senior Service that their position in the high esteem and deep affection of all of us does not depend on a title of this sort.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? I am following his arguments about the Chiefs of Staff with great interest. Is it his
1186
understanding that the Chiefs of Staff are never likely in the future to meet under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Defence which was, of course, provided for explicitly in the 1958 White Paper, and not in this? I was wondering whether that was his understanding.
LORD ROBERTSON OF OAKRIDGE: My Lords, I had imagined that meetings of that sort would continue. The actual structure of the committee working which is proposed is given in the White Paper, but I had certainly imagined that that kind of meeting would continue. The only point I am making is that I think it is a mistake to allow the individual Chiefs a Staff to be separate military advisers to the Government.
The White Paper does not tell us much about what is going to happen on the administrative side. I feel that is probably inevitable. This is detailed stuff and there is a great deal that obviously cannot be dealt with immediately. One feature which I welcomed very warmly was the appointment of a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Personnel and Logistics. That, I am sure, is absolutely right, and I hope that he will be given plenty of authority.
I was also very interested in the solution adopted for defence signals. Maybe I am reading too much into this, but it seems to me that this is the first attempt to organise a technical service on a functional and professional basis. In using the adjective "functional" I hope I am not going against the disapproving voice which the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, used in regard to functional organisation. He did, I think, agree that there might be some cases where such an organisation would be appropriate. I personally hold the view that in due course we shall come to a more functional and professional organisation for all the engineering services, which will give us an organisation parallel to what exists in civil life. I am thinking of civil, mechanical, electrical and transportation engineers particularly. I think there is hope for great economies and for gaining efficiency; and, especially by working on the same lines as those adopted in civil life, it would facilitate expansion in war greatly. I looked in the White Paper for something to be said about other administrative services, notably supply, contracts and

1187
movement control. They are not there, and one can understand that, for they are detailed matters; but I hope that the fact that they are not mentioned does not mean that progress in their rationalisation has become bogged down.
On the financial side the decision is that there should not be one Vote and one Accounting Officer, but four Votes and four Accounting Officers. That is a matter of Treasury mystique, and I am not going to argue the point. There are only two things, it seems to me, that matter in this field. The first is that the authority of the Minister and of his Permanent Under-Secretary must not be qualified by measures herein proposed for decentralisation. In other words, he and his Permanent Under-Secretary must have the right to ask for any information from anybody inside the organisation at any time they like. The other point which I think is important is that the authority of the Minister and of his Permanent Under-Secretary shall not be, as it were, interfered with by the Treasury, but they must deal through him and not on any account deal direct with the individual Services. If the Minister could give assurances on those two points I certainly should feel satisfied about the financial provisions.
The correct organisation of research and development, as I think we have all recognised from the start, is one of the most difficult, tricky and urgent parts of this whole business. The existing organisation, it is generally accepted, is a flop. That is one of those brash statements unsupported by any evidence of which speakers are sometimes rather fond, but, I think, in this instance few will contradict me. Reading what is proposed in section X of the White Paper, which starts on page 7, I had the feeling of getting lost in a labyrinth of committees, working parties and panels. Committees are very good things, of course; we all have committees; they are very necessary. But I think noble Lords will agree that they are a menace in the absence of a clear chain of personal responsibility and personal authority, and that is what I do not find in this section of the White Paper. I think that the Government may like to have a look at it again and ensure that in the final draft of the Bill and whatever else goes out it is
1188
made more definite and more sharp. I hoped to find, for example, something like this:
"The Chief Scientific Adviser is responsible for all defence research and development. The scientific staffs of the present Ministry of Defence and the present Service Departments will work together under the Chief Scientific Adviser as the defence scientific staff."
I did find it there, but it was all tied up with qualifying adverbs and adjectives until the impression left in my mind was a very blurred one. I think it could be sharpened up.
The decision has been taken to retain the position as regards the Ministry of Aviation, which is responsible at the moment for the most important and most vital part of research and development for our fighting Services. The White Paper tells us, as we know already, that the Ministry of Aviation also has civil responsibilities. It tells us that these responsibilities are indivisible, which is no doubt right. If they are indivisible, they must stay with one Ministry. It might be the Ministry of Aviation, who will then act as agent for the Ministry of Defence; or it might be the Ministry of Defence, who will act as agent for the Ministry of Aviation; or it will have to be some new Ministry who will act as agent for both. The choice has been made that things should continue as at present, and that these responsibilities should continue to rest with the Ministry of Aviation. This decision is an odd one. I say "odd", because the work which the Ministry of Aviation does at the moment for the Defence forces is by far the larger part of its work and, by comparison, what it does for civil aviation is quite subordinate. The only justification I can see for this arrangement is that when such an immense piece of reorganisation is being attempted one cannot do everything at once, and it may be that the Government are maturing further plans for the better organisation of research and development generally.
This brings to my mind the chief criticism which has been levelled against the reorganisation—and it has been levelled this afternoon by the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition—namely, that this is a tremendous reorganisation. It will create a monster Department; the Secretary of State for Defence will be overburdened; and the Chief of the Defence Staff (and this is the most horrible

1189
thought of all), in the words of that eminent journal which we read and whose wisdom we imbibe every Thursday, the Economist,
"will become eventually the most powerful salaried, unpolitical figure who has ever had the privilege of spending the largest part of our income tax for us."
This is a serious matter. I quite recognise that. But in all humility, I offer my (what shall I say?) philosophy in this matter to you. When there is a job to be done which clearly requires a single directing brain and a single controlling hand, then that job must be given to a single individual, and it does not help, and does not solve the problem, to split the job up between several men.
One must, however, take precautions in the matter. The first precaution, obviously, is the choice of the individual; and here, as regards the Minister, I entirely endorse what has been said about changing men round every few months as a question of political convenience. I entirely endorse what was said by the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, about the Chief of the Defence Staff: we must have the best man available regardless of his Service and origin. That is the first essential. The second safeguard is that the man in question must be provided with an organisation to which he can decentralise without losing his grip on essentials. The third safeguard is that the men in question must be made accountable to his superiors, and in the case of the Chief of the Defence Staff that of course means his political superiors. In the case of the Minister, there is no problem; he is accountable to the Cabinet. The Chief of the Defence Staff is a difficult case, but I suggest his position is a little akin to those at the head of the great nationalised industries. There the matter of accountability, as I am perhaps in some position to know, has been a puzzle; but I think that we are in a fair way to settle it, and I believe if care is taken we can settle it satisfactorily in this case also.
Now I will end, as I started, by saying that I welcome these proposals warmly. In my view, they are a very important step in the right direction; they do the Government credit and I hope that the Government will pursue them, and that any Government that may come after the
1190
present one will pursue them also, because I believe they are fundamentally right. I have said I do not think they go far enough, but then one must recognise that Governments have difficulties in these matters. There were proposals of a similar nature matured not so very long ago, and such violent fanatical resistance was put up against them that they had to be completely dropped, and the clock was set back for some years. Therefore it is understandable if the Government feel they have to move by stages. I think that when these proposals have gone in and bedded down they will prove their own best argument for their development, and people will say, "This is very good. We ought to have done this before, and now we must carry it to its logical conclusion". And it is in that hope that I commend these proposals to your Lordships' approval.
4.42 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I can be quite brief, because I gave my views pretty fully in our debate in March when we had the statement on which this White Paper is founded, but I should like to give these proposals, now we see them in print, a very warm welcome. I think that in most essentials they are thorough and good. What I regard as the first essential is emphasised, and that is this: that the Minister of Defence shall be the author and originator of policy, and not an arbiter, as he has far too often been in the past. And there, quite frankly, I take issue entirely with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. I think it is essential that the Service Ministers should occupy within the Ministry of Defence the subordinate position which is assigned to them now. It will remain a pretty important position. But if you try to get the best of both worlds in the way the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, suggested you will, I think, end by getting the worst of both worlds; you will make the Ministers the originators of policy and not the collaborators under the Minister of Defence, and you will turn him again into an arbiter.
The other matter which was not quite clear when we debated it before and on which I expressed a very strong opinion was that it is essential that the Minister of Defence should have control of research and development. That is

1191
now made clear in the White Paper, and I am very glad to see it, because I think it very important. The Minister will be assisted by the best staff which can be assembled from the three Services, and they will work together as a unified and integrated body; and he will also have a first-class scientific staff with a call on outside scientists. All this is to the good. Inevitably this central combined staff will be large, although quality is more important than size the more important the work is. But I should like to support the noble and gallant Field Marshal in his appeal that this large, centralised staff will be counterbalanced by a very considerable reduction in the staffs of the individual Services. Not only is this a necessary economy but—and this is a point that has not been taken but I think it is a sound one—unless there is economy by a reduction of the individual staffs I believe there is a real danger that those staffs, continuing on an enormous scale, may breed resistance to the spirit, and practice of integration.
Frankly, I like the plans and I like the machine, but I have one criticism—an important criticism, I think; certainly in Parliament it is important—and a constructive suggestion to offer. The Ministry and the Minister must obviously cover a huge field: the whole field of defence policy, long-term and applied scientific research and development, strategy and operational planning, and intelligence. That, indeed, is a full-time job. But, in addition, the Minister of Defence is responsible for the whole financial side: he must be. He has to present a single, combined Defence Estimate covering the whole of the activities through all the Services, and on the scientific side and the research side for which he is responsible. He is responsible for estimating for all three Services; he is responsible for all expenditure; he is responsible for placing orders and for all supplies; he is responsible for accounting; he is responsible for seeing that he gets economy in the staffs of the three Services. It is quite right that this financial, administrative, accounting responsibility should be vested in the Ministry and that it should be integrated in the same way as the rest of Defence, but it seems to me that while that is right, it requires the same
1192
centralised supervision and control as policy and strategy and research.
My suggestion is this. I know that the Permanent Under Secretary is made responsible for presenting these Estimates and I suppose he is the man who will appear before the Public Accounts Committee. But he is a Civil Servant and he cannot in any way be responsible to Parliament. Yet it is through the whole of this expenditure that Parliament ultimately exercises its control. Would it not be a good idea to have in this Ministry a Chief Financial Secretary, as you have in the Treasury to-day? It has been found desirable and, I think, necessary in the Treasury, with the enormously wide field that a Chancellor of the Exchequer has to cover, the whole of economic policy and finance as well as the mass of detail, that he should have a man of Cabinet rank, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury: and I believe that is working well in the Treasury to-day.
Would that not be equally desirable in the Ministry of Defence? Certainly, it would relieve the Minister of Defence of what would otherwise be an intolerable, and I think an unbearable, load, and I think it would be most acceptable to Parliament. That is the one practical suggestion I want to make to the Government. I hope that it may be carefully considered, because I believe they would find it a useful counterpart to their proposals and something which would greatly ease their administration and the relationship of the Minister to both Houses of Parliament.
4.51 p.m.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, there is a great deal of high power taking part in this debate. I have already counted two First Lords, one past and one present. We are to have another First Lord. We have had an ex-Secretary of State for Air; we have an ex-Secretary of State for War and the Chief of Staff. Therefore it is rather difficult for someone who was but an humble officer during the war (although, fortunately, I served on the staff of my noble friend Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, which was quite an education) to deal in these high-powered matters. But it is a fact that towards the end of the war, and indeed after the war, many people, at all levels, were discussing the need for a more unified approach to defence;

1193
and many of us at the most painful level of all, the level where it hurt, saw some of the consequences of inter-Service rivalry.
I start off, therefore, by advocating, as indeed I have constantly done since I first entered Parliament, when I was in the Air Force, an approach to a greater degree of unification of defence. The question is whether the Government's proposals help us in the right direction, whether they go far enough, or whether they are merely a device to cover up failure. There is no question that there has been failure. Whether or not we wish to blame the Government for it, the fact remains that they have been responsible for a failure—and they admit this in paragraph 5 of their White Paper, when they say that the arrangements have not secured the degree of central control necessary, and so on. It is quite obvious that, for reasons which several noble Lords and in particular, that non-political and gallant noble Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein (who always makes a plea to take defence out of politics), have pointed out, one of the main reasons was this continual chain of Ministers of Defence marching in and out of the Ministry, with a certain degree of continuity supplied by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, when he was Parliamentary Secretary. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, outlasted several Ministers of Defence, and, quite clearly, is far more qualified to be Secretary of State for Defence than many of those who passed fleetingly by.
It is curious with what almost frivolity and lack of seriousness the Conservative Government have taken Defence questions. I do not want to make too much of this point. Most people would expect a Labour Government not to be particularly interested in Defence. Instead, my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lord Alexander of Hillsborough are passionately interested in Defence, in a way that Conservative Prime Ministers have not been. Quite frankly, if Defence is to be taken seriously (this is really what we are facing up to in this White Paper) it is quite obvious that there must be much more continuity in the future, and Secretaries of State for Defence will have to occupy their position for a considerable time: not because I do not believe that political heads of Ministries are not in some degree interchangeable, but because
1194
it is obvious that, with the greater complexities and with the responsibility of dealing with as many high-powered professionals as there are in the Defence Services, we need not only a Secretary of State who will have an astute mind and great strength of character, but one who slightly knows his way around.
It may be that we are fated always to make gross errors in Defence and equipment, but the serious mistakes that have been made in recent years in the operational requirement field may spring from either a failure of man or a failure of system. It is not my object to-day simply to attach blame to the Government, beyond pointing to these failures. Now we hear a rumour that yet another cancellation is to take place—I refer to the TSR 2. Five years ago, we had a certain period of continuity in Defence and, when Mr. Duncan Sandys was in the office, a strong-minded Defence Minister. He imposed a strong and carefully thought out policy on the country. Unfortunately in the event it happened to be totally wrong—I refer to Blue Streak. I must confess that I was inclined to support him at the time. After that, we had Skybolt and Polaris, both afterthoughts in a way—Polaris "cooked up" in a couple of afternoons at Nassau. Now I think that TSR 2 is to go.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I think I must interrupt the noble Lord. I do not know why he should say that TSR 2 is to go. There is no question of its being cancelled.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, I am delighted. I only hope that this denial does not follow the usual pattern of other denials that we have had from Ministers. I remember challenging the First Lord, whom I regard entirely as honourable in these matters (I hope he will not take this personally) on the subject of Skybolt and getting rather similar remarks. But while I am delighted at the moment to know that TSR2 is still included in the programme, I must say that whether it will be still there when the new Ministry of Defence is set up and we have the joint weapons for the Navy and the Air Force, I do not know.
But I was going on to say that we want to know whether this White Paper is primarily just a Paper of rather anodyne remarks. I see that there is the

1195
usual reference to flexibility. During the war I served under another officer than my noble friend Lord Douglas of Kirtleside—in fact, a rather more junior group captain who, whenever he was confronted with what was to him a totally incomprehensible situation, used to keep silence for half a minute and then said, "We must have flexibility". There is just a slight touch of that about the White Paper in this matter. But I am hopeful, in spite of the Government's abysmal record. As I say, it may be the fault of the system, or it may be the fault of the man. To a large extent I exclude the First Lord, who has done rather well. We have some anxieties as to whether the policy, to which, as I have already explained, I am emotionally disposed, is going to work. I should like to ask the Government some questions on this aspect. The Foreign Secretary has had to leave the Chamber, but with that usual courtesy for which he is noted, he was kind enough to tell me that he would not be able to hear my speech—a fate probably of no loss to him. But I should like, if possible, an answer to some questions, even though the Government may not have worked out the central organisation for defence, but simply produced a sort of prospectus.
My first main criticism is that, unlike the 1958 White Paper, in the present Paper they have their opening emphasis wrong. It is arguable that this is a debating point, but I assure the noble Lord—and I hope that the Foreign Secretary will confirm this—that it is unfortunate that the second sentence firmly says
"Authority and responsibility will be vested in a single Secretary of State for Defence"—
when in the other White Papers it has been made clear that the overall responsibility is vested in the Cabinet and in what is now to be the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy. To this extent the emphasis is wrong.
The Government have not learned all the lessons of the past. They have ignored the very real virtues that existed in the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Defence Committee system; and, instead of strengthening this Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy, they
1196
are proposing merely to give them some more Committees to support them. There is a Committee and a Committee supporting that; and then, outside, is the new super-fortress—as opposed to the three smaller, but very impregnable, fortresses of the Service Departments. So there will be a super-fortress, and beyond that the Cabinet and the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy. I believe that the emphasis is wrong, and I ask how far this is in accordance with the proposals put forward to the Government. The noble Lord raised the names of Sir Ian Jacob and Lord Ismay. He used them in the context of expressing appreciation, while being careful not to say that they approved it; but his words were rather inclined to lead us to believe that this is their plan. I should like to know how far this is their plan and how far the emphasis is right in regard to this.
Still on the question of the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy, it appears to be the same as the Committee that existed before, the Defence Committee. The same people are invited to it, except the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and the Secretary of State for Air. And I suppose these wretched Ministers of State will now be included among others who will be invited to be present. Furthermore, the new Defence Council takes the place of the old Defence Board. Council and Board switch from one to the other. The new Defence Council has the same composition as the old Defence Board, except, again, that the Ministers of State have been down-graded. We are going to have a pretty gigantic instrument in the Ministry of Defence, and I should like to know how far some of these new joint organisations have in fact been tested in any way—how far there has been a dry run to see how they will work in certain conditions.
There are certain parts of the proposals of which I am entirely in favour. I think it has been an absolute nonsense in regard to Intelligence that there was a Joint Intelligence Board, but that the more important functions of intelligence were separated out; and, although there was close co-operation through the J.I.C. and certain other bodies, this type of functional unification is very desirable. Where I begin to get anxious is in relation to

1197
the Defence Operations Executive. I am sorry to go into this detail, but this is really the nub of my concern. It is proposed that the former operational Chiefs of Staff or Assistant Chiefs of Staff, A.C.N.S., A.C.A.S. (Ops.), and the Director of Military Operations, shall now all be brought together in a Defence Operations Executive. I suppose that under operational conditions, or even under exercise conditions, orders will go straight to Commands. Or will they go in some way through the rumps of the old Admiralty and the Air Ministry? This is a matter of some concern.
We know that the new Ministry of Defence is going to be every bit as large as the old Ministry of Defence, plus the three Service Departments, because that we have already been told. I may have misunderstood the answer to the question asked by the noble Viscount, and also to the question in another place. I think there should be room for economy here, and I shall be delighted if I hear that the orders will go straight to Commands. This would seem to be logical and would be equivalent to a joint headquarters at the highest level. There will of course be a certain loss. The Operations Executive and the Operational Staff will not longer be quite so closely linked to the Operational Requirements Staff. Here there is clearly room for some loss of efficiency.
I may say that generally I support the proposals in regard to operational requirements, and I think that the proposals in regard to the Ministry of Aviation are pretty good. But it is a pretty frightening picture of bureaucracy. I see that I have written down the word "nightmare". I hope it will not be a nightmare, although I suspect that the Secretary of State for Defence, whoever he is, will have a few. Despite the firm statement of the Government that they wish to make a real distinction between policy setting and management, I do not believe they have yet succeeded in doing this. The analogy is always taken with civilian activities, with businesses, for example; but, of course, the degree of policy and operational control that will rest in the centre is vastly greater than in any large-scale organisation which otherwise tries to decentralise. I am not sure that there is not some confusion between function and management.
1198
The same argument can be applied to the attempt to draw up balanced pictures of the three Services. Who for the Royal Air Force takes the place of the Chief of Naval Supplies and the Master General of the Ordnance? In paragraph 27 there is a list of officers. I realise that these Services are of a rather different nature, but here again we have the Staffs of the Principal Administrative Officers of the Royal Navy, Army and the Royal Air Force; the Staff of the Controller of the Navy; the Staff of the Master General of the Ordnance and again the R.A.F. left out. There may be a perfectly good reason.
LORD CARRINGTON: These are very difficult detailed points to answer at the end of a debate, and perhaps the noble Lord would like an answer now. The reason for that is that while the Royal Navy, and the Army, to a lesser degree, are both responsible for their procurement, the Royal Air Force is not. There, procurement rests with the Ministry of Aviation.
LORD SHACKLETON: Who, then, does the procurement? We see that we are going to have the staffs, but there is no mention of the Ministry of Aviation. I am a little alarmed about this—I am sure the Navy would be far more alarmed if they lost control of certain of their procurement. Is the operational requirement going to be handled purely by the joint staffs—of whom, I take it, there is at the moment a member of the Air Council—and not by someone who specially has this responsibility? I do not wish to press this point too hard, but these are the questions that will need to be answered.
The same thing arises when we talk about the Joint Signals Organisation. In principle I can see a good case for this, but the signals requirements for certain purposes may be very different indeed. What worries me is that we shall see the separate Services fearing that they are not getting precisely what they want, and building up secretly, or if not secretly, by hook or by crook, their own organisations to make sure that they do get what they want. It is clear that the most ruthless control is going to be needed to make this work, and the ruthless control may be of a kind that will make the Ministry of Defence a rather heated Kremlin-like centre.
Against this is the difficulty, I think, that there is going to be a good deal of

1199
political weakness. I am sorry in a way that it has not been possible to have the debate, which I had arranged with the noble Viscount the Leader of the House that we might have one day, on the subject of the structure of Government, because it is very difficult to see how you can gear these high-powered complicated structures into our Parliamentary system. But one way by which you are not going to succeed in doing so is by weakening the political content, and I think we all wonder—and I suspect there are anxieties in the Government itself about this—whether the substitution of Ministers of State for the First Lord of the Admiralty, or whoever it is, is correct. Probably one of the reasons why they are called Ministers of State is that no one has been able to think of a different name. I think the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, suggested they might be called Secretaries, which is quite a good suggestion. Perhaps we might even call them Commissioners. I am sorry myself that we cannot retain the title, First Lord of the Admiralty. I agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough when he says that it really is a bit of a nonsense to keep the position of First Sea Lord and not to keep the First Lord, because they are both equally historic titles.
It is for consideration whether we ought not to have gone a good deal further. It is for consideration, also whether there ought not to be further Ministers of a functional kind with responsibility not necessarily direct to a particular Service, but to some particular aspect of the total responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Defence. I do not want to press this now, but what really worries me is that I think the Government have advanced towards a halfway house, and a halfway house which is not really going to be habitable for very long. We had the same curious error from the First Lord as we have had on other occasions, and which the Government keep on pressing—I think the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, emphasised this on another occasion—in that they confuse Service loyalty with loyalty to a unit, to a ship or to a squadron. One totally incorrect remark
1200
I heard from the First Lord—and he is very rarely wrong—was that a sailor is a sailor, a soldier is a soldier, and so on. If there is one thing that is true of a sailor to-day, it is that he has always been liable to be a soldier, and now he is also an airman.
It is for consideration whether we might have tackled this whole problem not by setting up a unified Ministry of Defence, but by gradually unifying the Services themselves and preserving their existing Service structures. There has been this interesting suggestion, which has been advocated on previous occasions by Sir Ian Jacob—he has written a book on it, although I do not know whether it formed any part of his present proposals—that all officers above unit command level should in fact belong to a defence service, and no longer be members of the Army, Navy or Air Force. It is possible to give loyalty to a unit or to a concern without being a member of a particular Service. One of the most devoted supporters in battles with the Navy during the war—and I may say that his battles with the Navy were on the Allied side—was in fact an officer very well known to the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Kirtleside: a Naval captain who had served with the Royal Air Force for a long time and had managed to understand their point of view.
It may well be that this super-Pentagon, which emotionally, as I say, I should like to support, is not going to work as well as it should do. There is the danger of over-centralisation, of the distinction between the functions of policy and day-to-day management not really being clarified, and I would still urge that there is not enough emphasis in it upon overall strategy, on economics and not merely on defence. The Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy should be a real centre of power, and it should be possible to break up the Service vested interest. I wholly agree that the case for breaking up the Service vested interest is still a strong one, but I am not satisfied as yet that the Government have really worked this out. We shall watch with a good deal of interest to see what their more detailed proposals are going to be.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, could I ask the

1201
First Lord to give us a little more information on the point my noble friend has just raised, about the Air Force not being included on the procurement side in that set-up? Because although the Minister of Aviation has, as it were, taken the place of the old Minister of Aircraft Production, it is only really on that side that they could be left out conveniently. They have all the other business of procurement.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords, I think I used the wrong word. I think I should have said "production" and not "procurement", the point being that the Royal Navy produces everything of its own other than aircraft and some guided missiles; the Army produces now—after the Ministry of Supply has broken up—quite a lot of its own equipment; but the Royal Air Force relies for its aircraft and guided weapons and missiles on the Ministry of Aviation.
LORD SHACKLETON: I think it might be drawn in on this beautiful blueprint.
5.17 p.m.
LORD SAYE AND SELE: My Lords, I myself agree entirely with the views which the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, put before you so simply and so shortly. I even have the temerity to agree with much that the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, said to your Lordships. But I have to confess that I have always avoided and disliked the Staff work, and I am therefore at a very considerable disadvantage when I find myself confronted by this symposium of organisation.
As a regimental officer I see in this White Paper a very wide river to cross, and I hope that we shall manage to cross it and change horses either on one bank or the other, and not in the middle of the stream. Once again as a regimental officer, my recollections of Staff work make me very anxious. I wonder why it is called a Paper on Defence. Why not call it a Paper on War, and have done with it? That is entirely what it is. Every one of these Services has to do with war, except Civil Defence, and of course they come in in the background to war. The only one of the Services with no offensive part to play is Civil Defence, and so far as I can see it is not mentioned in this White Paper. I
1202
fail to connect it in any way with the diagram at the end, unless indeed it is where the word "Budget" comes in. I was delighted just now to hear the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, speak up for Civil Defence, and the Civil Defence services will be thrilled to get support from such a high level. I have no doubt whatever of that.
Now is not the time to question the results of the new Civil Defence organisation, but it is the time to ask where and how this fourth arm fits into the new central organisation. Civil Defence is a most complete system affecting ten or more Government Departments; and being, as we were told, an integral part of our defence plans, I hope that we may be shown where and how the Civil Defence functions of these ten Departments are integrated into the new war machine and where the Civil Defence authority gains touch with the Secretary of State for Defence. This information will increase very greatly the interest in the Motion on Civil Defence which has been waiting for debate since last March.
I cannot help feeling that the authors of this new organisation have paid little attention to the fourth arm of the organisation; but, if it is indeed to be an efficient arm, it must be granted some equality of central planning and status with the other three. If its importance is recognised, it must also be seen to be recognised. That I do not find in this White Paper. Finally, if I may bring your Lordships down to earth for a moment, if one turns to the middle of page 11 of the White Paper it will be seen that a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is to be of three star rank. I presume that that means an Army captain.
5.22 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Saye and Sele, will, I hope, excuse me if I do not follow him immediately, although I mean to do so in a few moments' time. Before I do that, however, may I turn to what is, perhaps, one of the main subjects of to-day's debate? That, I think, is this: that, notwithstanding what noble Lords opposite have said, I feel that this subject is, in the main, a bipartisan subject—or, with the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, there, a tripartisan subject—if there ever was one. The criticisms which have been uttered by noble Lords opposite have been not

1203
so much against the principle of making a further advance in the centralisation of Defence as to the way in which it has been done, and certain fears as to whether the thing is going to work out as we all hope and as my noble friends here intend. But historically, my Lords, this is a non-Party subject. After all, the root cause of the White Paper of 1946 lay in the experiences of the war; and that White Paper was (very rightly, as I think) brought in by the then Government in order to prevent the organisation operated by Lord Ismay, which was set up by the Coalition Government under Sir Winston Churchill, from being broken up.
When I looked at the debate in 1946 I saw that my noble friend Lord Swinton supported that White Paper in principle, and we have supported that principle from that day to this. In fact, everything that has happened from that day to this has made to-day's step more and more irresistible. It is not merely that it was planned, I think, originally, that the 1946 White Paper should be only a first step, but that everything has happened to lead us on to further steps like the present one as the years have gone on. After all, the development of nuclear weapons has come about very largely since 1946 and has contributed vastly to the argument for doing what we have done now. Outside the Services, in civil life, the arguments for integration of businesses and for larger units have become more and more powerful. So I think it is fair to say that if there are criticisms of the actions of the Government in this matter, they are perhaps that we have been unduly held back by certain loyalties and by the need to take the Services step by step towards progressive integration without destroying those loyalties and that spirit of service without which no integration would be of use.
But, my Lords, we have paid quite dearly in the process. We have paid for quite a number of operational muddles, from Suez downwards or upwards, or whichever way you like to go. Therefore, we are perfectly right in saying, in the White Paper, that the references to the 1958 White Paper are fully justified and that the thing has not worked out. You can sum it up by saying that no one in his senses who had any experience in any of the Services could possibly imagine any operation of any size being conducted
1204
except as an inter-Service operation. If you take the Army, which I know more about than the other two, Services, it is inconceivable that there should be an operation for a brigade group without certainly the Air Force coming in; and so you cannot in fact deal with operations or intelligence, or, to a large extent, training, on anything but an inter-Service basis.
This point has brought up in the debate a number of thoughts which have been expressed much better than I could express them by noble Lords who have spoken already, so I shall be very short in what I say about them; but I think that one very important point indeed is to ask ourselves whether the present system of selection, initial education and further training for Service officers is going to lead us to produce the type of officer with the background, the experience and everything else, that we want to fill these high positions in the Ministry of Defence as reorganised, from the Chief of Staff downwards. My noble and gallant friend Lord Montgomery of Alamein says that the Minister has to be "a pretty good guy"—I think those were his words. Believe me, my Lords, the Chief of the Defence Staff has to be "a pretty good guy", too.
We are coming to the period when we shall no longer be able to rely, as we have done since the end of the Second World War, on choosing people not so much on their paper qualifications but on the grounds of their practical experience and achievements in command or on the Staff in actual operations; and unless we have our third world war (I think my noble and gallant friend Lord Montgomery of Alamein was going to make certain progress in this integration after the next world war: I am being a little more optimistic and am saying "unless we have our third world war") we shall have to rely entirely on something much more like paper selection for our Chiefs of Staff, and we shall be pitting them against senior civil servants and senior scientists who, under present arrangements, will have much more continuity of tenure of office. That is something which, if we want this new system to work, we shall have to think about very seriously; because, as my noble and gallant friend said (or I think he said something like this), it cannot

1205
be taken for granted that Dartmouth, Sandhurst or Cranwell, or our present staff college training, will produce the right answer or the right man.
But I agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend Lord Carrington that we could not at the moment have gone any further in the integration of the Services than is envisaged in this White Paper. While I say this, I feel very strongly that this is only a stage and that further stages of integration are bound to take place as and when the time comes and common sense dictates that they should be undertaken. And, of course, each year that goes by removes certain personal problems. Personal problems have been present in this question of reorganisation of the Defence Services, and each year that goes by sets those personal problems back and makes the problem easier for those who have charge of it.
There is one personal problem, however, which will never disappear, and that is the power held in any Cabinet by any Minister of Defence who is worth his place and is fit for the task. There is no way out of that. All one could possibly say would be that, in times of war or the threat of war, the system must be adopted that was adopted in the last war—namely, that the only person who could be Minister of Defence under those conditions must be also the Prime Minister. But I think it would be a great mistake if we were to accept the converse and to say that because there is danger of too much concentration of power in one hand we must deliberately leave the Ministry of Defence and the Minister less efficient and with less power than he should have.
So may I look at one or two of the points which were mentioned by other noble Lords, particularly by my noble friends, Lord Robertson of Oakridge and Lord Swinton? The first one is the question of Treasury control. There is nothing in the White Paper to show whether the Treasury are, in fact, going to exercise the same measure of control over what are now the three Service Votes, or whether they are going to control the main Vote and leave the detailed control to the Minister and his advisers in the Ministry. That is why I think the point made by my noble friend, Lord Swinton, was very important. His point was that the financial
1206
control exercised by the Minister must be equal to the task of dispensing with interference—and I use the word deliberately—by the Treasury. Otherwise a lot of brave new words in those paragraphs which deal with the matter will not be fulfilled.
Those brave new words do, I fear, include rather more clichés to the square inch than one would like to see. I do not want to set myself up as a literary critic; but one looks at paragraph 47 which says:
"Judgment will play a major part, and for this reason it is essential to call upon the best advice from whatever source."
This rather makes one wonder whether this Grandmother of Parliaments is being properly taught to suck her eggs which we are sucking this afternoon. A good many noble Lords have said that unless there is real control and cutting-down of staffs, and if Parkinson's Law is allowed to operate, we shall not get full value for money. We are reaching a point where, instead of talking about the unwisdom of having too big a tail and too few teeth, we are coming to the point of saying that we are getting too big a brain and too few teeth. I do not think that would be a good thing; because, at best, it would be a great waste of national brain power.
Now I come to the other matter mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, on the relationship with the Ministry of Aviation. I will not deal with that at length, because it has been covered by the other noble Lords; but the crucial point is, who has the last word? Those who know the story of why we had no combat tanks in 1939, and those who know of the drunkard's course steered over the production of guided missiles since the war—and I am sorry that my noble friend, Lord Caldecote, is not here—will know that these matters will never be right when two Ministries have a share in any undertaking of this sort unless it is clearly laid down who has the last word and settles when to go into production. So I will say no more on that because the hour is late.
May I just come back to what my noble friend Lord Saye and Sele said—and I knew he was going to say it—about Civil Defence? I agree with every word he said. Everybody knows that

1207
Civil Defence and its relationships with the civilian Ministries form a great and increasing part of our Defence undertaking. You cannot shirk the problems of the relationship of this strengthened Ministry of Defence with the civilian Departments, particularly the Home Office, by failing to say one word about it in the White Paper. Those problems are with us; and, whether they are written about or not, they will come back like the blood on Bluebeard's key; and, whether they are in the White Paper or not, the newly-reorganised Ministry will have to get down to them.
5.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I should in any case count it a privilege to take part in a debate on Defence initiated by my noble Leader, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, who has done as much as any man for the defence of this country, both in the dark days of the war and in the hardly less difficult times of peace; but otherwise I should be as diffident as the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, about taking part—and with much more reason; for he has seen gallant service in the war. We have listened to Field Marshals, ex-Prime Ministers and other great heroes of the conflagration. I myself began the war as a private in the infantry, and finished it as a private in the Home Guard. I doubt whether any Member of your Lordships' House can improve on that record—in its own way, of course.
I am emboldened, however, when I think of something that was once said to the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, by Sir Winston Churchill in my hearing—and I say at once that I shared the view of the noble and gallant Viscount expressed in a review of his book in the New Statesman by a well-known writer who said that, however controversial his utterances, nothing would ever diminish the gratitude we owe him for his services to the nation or the respect we feel for him as a man. But at the same time (I am sure the noble and gallant Viscount does not mind a lighter note), I can recall something said to him by Sir Winston Churchill in my presence. The noble and gallant Viscount pointed to me, as Sir Winston Churchill approached us, and alluded to the
1208
fact that, though I had no hair on top there was an unmilitary cut in other places. Pointing to me he said, "Do you not think his hair needs cutting, Prime Minister?" Sir Winston Churchill replied, impromptu, "Your head, my dear Field Marshal, requires to be compressed under a military cap. He needs his for speaking in the House of Lords." I am sure that the noble and gallant Viscount remembers that great saying. But now that the noble and gallant Viscount has become a politician, we are all equal and can take part in debates on a level footing.
I have some qualifications, because I have occupied these curious positions not perhaps held by everyone in your Lordships' House. I was Under-Secretary for War; I had the status of a Minister of State with special responsibilities when I was Minister for Germany; I was Minister for Civil Aviation outside the Cabinet and First Lord of the Admiralty for a few months and a member of the Defence Committee, still outside the Cabinet. So when we are talking about the fine shades of atmosphere between different levels, I have experienced them all and understand the nuances as well as any man. When I was speaking on this subject in March last I suggested that there was an inherent difficulty in finding the right organisation for defence, because defence, we all agree, ought, if possible, to be unified; and yet, if we unify it, we finish up by placing greater responsibility on one man—the Minister—in theory, and on the Chief officer in practice. Inevitably we are tempted to place on one man, politically, more responsibility than one human being is likely to be able to sustain. That is inherent in the problem.
There is another inherent snag that I did not mention then, and it has come out to-day: that we are trying to unify in one sense or other three Services while retaining their separate identities. That means putting on top of them a co-ordinating machinery which may, in fact, use a great deal of manpower. The question arises whether, if we retain separate Services, as is proposed, it is possible to co-ordinate them in this way without adding to the total manpower. Most of us feel that in the foreseeable future these proposals in the White Paper are likely to increase rather than diminish the number of men and women

1209
employed. That is certainly the view of the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, who said quite definitely that he thought the total civilian manpower would be increased. And the same point has been made by various speakers, including my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. I would ask the noble Earl, Lord Home, if he can throw any light at all on how the Government propose to reduce instead of increase manpower. There is no indication of it, I think it is fair to say, in the White Paper. I do not think that anyone can extract any clues from the White Paper as to how manpower is to be reduced. Most of us have formed the opinion that it is to be increased. I would ask the noble Earl whether he can give us any help at all in our anxieties about the increase of total manpower that seems certain to result.
The other great problem is the over-loading of the central Minister. It seems to me that there are two difficulties here, but for want of time I will treat them as though they were one. On the one hand it seems to me almost certain that this Minister will have more decisions to make than he can make efficiently if he is not to have any Ministers of rank superior to that of Minister of State to help him. That would be quite apart from the problem of the civilian control of the military; but the problem is greatly added to when we agree, as we all seem to, that in the last resort civilians must be placed in a position where they can effectively control the military. It was noticeable that to-day the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, insisted rather more strongly than on previous occasions that this problem must be tackled; and I share his view that this problem of the civilian control of the military is not adequately dealt with in the White Paper.
VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN: My Lords, I hope that I did not give a false impression. What I meant to say was that there is a danger there, and I think that it must be watched.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I do not think that I disagree with that; but I would say that the danger must not only be watched but be dealt with. So I go a little further than the noble Viscount.
1210
I may be asked what difference does it make whether the Secretary of State of War, or at any rate the civilian who is the temporary head of the Army, is called a Minister of State or a Secretary of State, bearing in mind that in any case and for some years he has been outside the Cabinet. This is the area, so to speak, in which I have lived; where my ambitions and all the rest of it have been reflected at every stage of progress. I understand all these little shades as well as anybody. The real point is that the Minister of State has no independent authority of his own. He is simply a representative of the top Minister. As my noble friend Lord Attlee said, he is simply a glorified Under-Secretary. I do not think that there is a great deal of difference.
I turn for a moment to the tasks which he has to perform. I am going to deal only with one or two of them. We shall have these Boards responsible for the routine management of the Navy, Army and Air Force respectively. The Secretary of State for Defence will nominally be the head of every Board but he will normally ask the appropriate Minister of State to act for him as chairman of each Board, and therefore we shall have a Board, which will not be wildly unlike the present Army Council or Board of Admiralty, presided over by somebody who has no independent authority of his own at all. That is the essential point, whether we like it or not.
I presided over the Army Council when I deputised for the Secretary of State for War at the time I was Under-Secretary. But one had no great status in that capacity, and, of course, as First Lord of the Admiralty I presided over the Board of Admiralty and a very different thing that is, if you are the First Lord, even if you are not a member of the Cabinet. I would submit that it will be very difficult, unless some steps are taken to enhance the authority of these Ministers of State (or whatever you like to call them) to perform these tasks appropriately. I should like to put another question which I am sure that the noble Earl will be able to answer, one way or the other, when he replies. What is going to happen to the promotion of the senior staff officers of the three Services? Who will appoint these officers? When I was

1211
First Lord these names would come up before me—and in the highest cases I would go to the Prime Minister. But who will now be responsible for making all these appointments, which ordinarily come to the Service Ministers? I hope that the noble Earl has made a note of this point. No doubt there is an answer available; it is a point of great importance. These are certain aspects of the problem.
I might be told, on the other side—and I recognise the force of this—if we are to unify the departmental side of the Services, and therefore abolish the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry as separate bodies, we cannot continue to make use of the three Service Ministers; because if we do, each Service will retain its own champion and many of the virtues of integration would be lost. That is really, I think, the main reason for down-grading the Ministers: the Government want to deprive the Services of their strong ministerial champions. That may or may not be the reason. But if that is so, may I suggest that there is something at least to be done, even if the Service Ministers cannot retain their existing status, to strengthen them beyond what is proposed in the White Paper?
The suggestion is that they should be called Secretaries, and get more pay than other Ministers of State. I do not know whether pay is essential, but in Whitehall pay seems to carry more prestige than it should. They should be seen to be different from the ordinary Ministers of State, who are regarded as glorified Under-Secretaries, and be clearly identified with the work they are being asked to do. I was a Minister for State and co-operated in that capacity when I was Minister responsible for Germany, but I had perhaps rather more status than the average Ministers of State because I was called Chancellor of the Duchy and a large staff regarded me, for good or ill, as in some way specially connected with them. I was essentially an agent of the Secretary of State—I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, would agree—but we can give the Minister of State that bit of extra authority if we call him by a title other than Minister of State and link him closely on paper with certain responsibilities
1212
for which he will be expected to answer to Parliament. This is clearly an essential point.
We were told by the First Lord that it was going to be essential to make sure that the Secretary of State for Defence was not himself bogged down with administrative detail. If that is so, the question at once arises: how he is going to avoid this administrative detail unless he can find somebody else from whom Parliament will accept an answer? So it is vital to make sure that these Ministers are gentlemen from whom Parliament will accept an answer, and in that sense exercise an authority far different from that exercised by the present Ministers of State. I end, because I know that there is a Royal Commission to come in a moment and many speakers afterwards. I was very much interested—I must read Hansard more carefully—by something the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, said at the end of his speech. I think that he was envisaging an additional Minister who would help the Minister of Defence on the financial side.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, he would be exactly like the First Financial Secretary in the Treasury.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, without wishing to tie myself—let alone my Party, which may have other ideas—to that particular solution, I do see that a solution on that line is possible and, on the other hand, that we could have more than one Minister, not necessarily in the Cabinet but with a status comparable to that of the present Service Ministers, who could assist him on a functional line. In other words, there are ways in which it would be possible to disperse a little this over-heavy responsibility which is likely to fall on the Secretary of State for Defence. I am not at all dogmatic; I think it could be done in various ways. I agree with all those noble Lords, and particularly my noble friends on this side of the House, who say that at present this does not provide adequate Parliamentary and political control over defence arrangements. I welcome the move towards integration, but it is not, in my opinion, a complete document, and I would say that before it can be fully acceptable to the nation it must be strengthened in the ways I have indicated.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
6.0 p.m.
The following Bills and Measures received the Royal Assent:

Finance,

Appropriation,

Oaths and Evidence (Overseas Authorities and Countries),

Oil in Navigable Waters,

Local Authorities (Land),

Statute Law Revision,

Weights and Measures,

Public Lavatories (Turnstiles),

London Government,

Rhodesia and Nyasaland,

Malaysia,

Deer,

Children and Young Persons,

Water Resources,

Criminal Justice (Scotland),

Commonwealth Development,

Offices, Shops and Railway Premises,

Dog Racing (Betting Days),

Animal Boarding Establishments,

Wills,

Matrimonial Causes,

Local Government (Financial Provisions),

Limitation,

Peerage,

Contracts of Employment,

Television,

Land Compensation (Scotland),

Public Order,

Performers' Protection,

Loch Turret Water Board (Hydro-Electric Development) Order Confirmation,

Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (Leeds),

Pier and Harbour Order (Gloucester Harbour) Confirmation,

Pier and Harbour Order (Yarmouth (Isle of Wight)) Confirmation,

Pier and Harbour Order (Bembridge Harbour) Confirmation,

London Transport,

Medway Conservancy,

Great Yarmouth Port and Haven,

Port of London,

Factory Lane, Warrington (Level Crossing),

Dover Harbour,

1214

London County Council (Money),

Clywedog Reservoir Joint Authority,

Salvation Army,

Killingholme Jetty,

City of London (Various Powers),

London County Council (Improvements),

Felixstowe Dock and Railway,

Durham County Council,

Bath Corporation,

Lucas Estate,

Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure,

Cathedrals Measure.

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

DEFENCE REORGANISATION
6.20 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I should like to add a few words of welcome to this important and far-reaching proposal, and congratulate the Government on having at last had the courage to grasp this particularly spikey nettle. I think it was the American author Bret Harte who said that the saddest words in the English language were, "what might have been". If that is so, the happiest words are undoubtedly, "I told you so". I am happy to recall that in my maiden speech on Defence, in your Lordships' House over fifteen years ago, I proposed a scheme almost identical with the one we are discussing this afternoon. It has taken some time to move towards it, and it has not been an entirely smooth movement, but we have at least achieved it. I do not, like some speakers, regard this proposal as a compromise. I regard it, on the other hand, as getting the best of both worlds. We have here in this plan realistic control at the centre, and yet we preserve the value of Service loyalty at the perimeter, and I have been very happy to hear this afternoon with what vehemence your Lordships have subscribed to this view and deplored any attempt to tamper with Service loyalties. Those who are closest to this problem know exactly how valuable these loyalties are. Outside the circle of those with practical experience they tend, I think, to be undervalued.
I should have said that over the last ten years we have achieved a great deal

1215
more integration than is commonly realised. There has been integration of the three Services overseas to a marked degree; there has been integration to a marked degree in Supplies and Services and, lastly, in staff training. Here I would endorse the remarks of the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, when he stressed the need for integration of training at even the lowest levels; and I would go further and say that should be common throughout the entire Service at low and high levels, too.
We have heard mention to-day of Parkinson's Law. I am afraid that for a short time, until this scheme gets into its stride, we are bound to have a proliferation of staff appointments at high levels, and I do not think we shall be able to look for much economy for some time. We have heard talk this afternoon of bottlenecks. In my experience of bottles the neck is usually at the top. This is where I think we shall find the bottlenecks in the new Ministry of Defence. But we have at least got some savings already. In 1953 there were ten politicians in the Ministry of Defence and the three Service Departments; now we are reduced to seven. So at least there is a saving there to start off with.
The noble Earl, Lord Longford, in his interesting speech made reference to the fact that the new Secretary of State, the Minister of Defence as was, now has no Parliamentary assistant, as his Parliamentary Secretary has vanished from the graph. It was always said that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, being an assistant to what was essentially a planning Minister, was not really of much use as little responsibility was given him. Exactly how useless an animal he was was pointed out by your Lordships, firmly but kindly, when I myself was posted to the job in 1957. We, of course, regret some of the changes.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? I am sorry if I did not make myself plain. I was really raising the question of how the Parliamentary Questions which are now answered by Service Ministers would be dealt with when they no longer had the standing which, on the
1216
face of it, would enable them to give the answers.
LORD MANCROFT: I took that point, and I should like to deal with it later on. I was saying we of course regret some of the changes that have taken place. I do not regret the departure of the Secretary of State for War, which I always thought too bellicose a title. But I share the universal regret at the departure of the First Lord of the Admiralty, particularly as on this occasion it involves one of the best and best liked Ministers the Service has had for a very long time. To turn to the noble Earl, Lord Longford's, particular point. Constitutionally we are not allowed in this House to ask questions about the late running of the 8.20 from Norwich, because that is part of the day-to-day administration of the railways and comes within the purview of a statutory body appointed for that job. But we are entitled to ask questions about Gunner Buggin's pension, because it is the job of the Secretary of State for War constitutionally to answer. I should like to know, if my noble friend the Secretary of State can tell me, whether that is still going to exist and where the line is going to be drawn; how important a question concerning Army affairs is going to be left to the Minister of State for War and when will it go to the Secretary of State for Defence.
That this is going to be an immensely important new Ministry there can be no doubt—£2,000 million and 800,000 bodies. It is therefore essential that the Secretary of State himself, his advisers, Civil Service scientific advisers, and Service advisers, be of the highest calibre. If I make no other point to your Lordships this evening save this, it is that it is essential that this Ministry should be held in the highest regard, not only in Whitehall but here in Westminster, abroad, among our friends and Allies, and by the man in the street. It should be a Ministry of great efficiency, great power and great prestige. It is therefore essential, to my way of thinking, that the relationships between politicians, civil servants, industry and science, all of whom are embroiled in this Ministry, should be as good as possible. One thing I have learned in the last two or three years is that most politicians and civil servants are much more knowledgeable of and sympathetic

1217
to the problems of commerce than businessmen are knowledgeable of and sympathetic to the problems of politicians and civil servants. I should therefore like to see the inter-staff training to which the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, referred, extended to include those engineers and industrialists who will have to work closely with the Ministry of Defence. We must make certain that they are all thinking sympathetically of each other's problems.
Of the importance of the Secretary of State himself there can of course be no doubt. Noble Lords have criticised the changes that have occurred so often—too often—in the last ten years. Of course they are understandable, though nevertheless regettable. We never quite reached the speed of change among senior politicians that the French used to achieve before the days of General de Gaulle. There was, I believe, one drowsy afternoon in the Chamber of Deputies when a senior French politician nodded off and woke up to find he had been Prime Minister twice. We have fortunately not quite reached that stage. But let us in the future have at least greater stability than in the past.
Let it be an understood thing that the Secretary of State for Defence should frequently find himself on the Front Bench in the House of Lords—and, naturally, I would say on the Front Bench on this side. We have seen for ourselves in the presence of our present Foreign Secretary what a blessing it is to have a very senior Secretary of State untrammelled by day-to-day political and constituency matters. It is quite untrue to say that a senior Minister cannot be examined and cross-examined in this House. Of course he can. Technically he can be asked twenty Questions in any one Parliamentary week. And they can be addressed to a Secretary of State for Defence from a most informed body of questioners, unhampered by any rules about the number of supplementaries they can ask, or by any strict addiction to Order so far as the nature of those supplementaries is concerned. So much for the Secretary of State.
With regard to the Civil Service, there is, I believe, some hierarchy, whether written or merely conventional, about
1218
the Departments: certain Ministries are more favourably looked on by the young entrant to the Civil Service. The Treasury and the Foreign Office, of course, come very high, and wild horses on bended knees would not drag from me the Ministry that I think should come bottom. I very much hope that the Ministry of Defence will rank very high and that it will be an honour for civil servants to be posted to that Ministry. So, equally, Service officers—and we are fortunate in having about as high a standard of senior staff officers in the country to-day as we have ever had—should regard it as an honourable stage in their career, to be posted to serve at the Ministry of Defence.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: May I ask the noble Lord a question? It does not invalidate his argument; it rather supports it. Is he aware that, out of 21 members of the Cabinet listed in Whitaker, the present Minister of Defence is listed No. 19?
LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, if you talk long enough, by the natural taws of statistical progression you will eventually say something sensible. That has just happened to the noble Earl, Lord Longford: he has made my point for me. That is exactly what I am trying to say. If I may, I should also like to voice some small doubts. I hope that those who have given so much thought and care to this matter have looked across the Atlantic to the Pentagon and profited a little by some of the mistakes, some of the teething troubles which they had. I myself at first would have liked to have the Ministry of Aviation within this Ministry, but I realise that it would place an intolerable burden on the Secretary of State, and I think at this moment it is as well to keep it out. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, I have some apprehension at the right, still maintained, of the Chiefs of Staff to have direct access to the Prime Minister. I have always disliked that. I cannot see how any business, any organisation or any Ministry can hope to run smoothly when the technical advisers can go behind their Chief's back to a superior authority. With the best will in the world, it leads to difficulties and to lobbying. Until you have seen a couple of Admirals with their daggers drawn you do not know what lobbying means.

1219
My next doubt centres on paragraph 35 of the White Paper. This Ministry is going to become an operational headquarters. Hitherto, the three Service Ministries have all been operational headquarters, and could come into action almost as field headquarters if there were trouble in Ruritania or some "bush tire" blew up. It states clearly in paragraph 35 that that rôle now devolves upon the Ministry of Defence. Again, I share the apprehension of many of your Lordships at the number of committees. You really cannot control operations through committees. If Moses had been a committee, the children of Israel would still be in Egypt. I am unhappy about this plan for operational command, and although the paragraph is full of pious hopes I do not think that this will work if anything were to go seriously wrong.
The noble Lord, Lord Saye and Sele, mentioned, in another respect, the three-star officer. This is the first time that I have seen the use of three-star rank in an official Paper. I think it leads to the next observation that I want to make—namely, the clumsiness of our nomenclature and the need for a tidying up all round. It will take a lot of time to do this, to get clarity so that we are not always translating our defence language from our own Service into the other two. Supposing, for instance, the Secretary of State wished to seek advice on supply, he would send for the Controller of the Navy, the Quarter-Master General and the Air member for Supply and Organisation. Old King Cole sent for his fiddlers three. That is nearly what is happening here. I wish there were more clarity in language and nomenclature generally in the graph at the end of this White Paper.
That is all I wish to say to your Lordships, except once again to welcome this scheme, to hope that this Ministry of Defence will rapidly become as efficient and as respected throughout the country as possible. I have one more point to make, to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, who mentioned the "change of scenery". He was describing what will happen in Whitehall when the Ministry of Defence moves into the Board of Trade, and the Board of Trade move out and half the Air Ministry and the Navy move along. I can tell him what will
1220
happen—chaos! Some wag in Whitehall has decreed that this is going to start happening on All Fool's Day, 1964.
The chaos will be unequalled by anything that has happened in this country for the last nine years—I refer to September 12, 1954, at 2.30 p.m. At that precise moment I was changing a tyre in the centre of the cathedral City of Salisbury. Slightly to my surprise, Mr. Bertram Mills's circus entered the city from the north-west. Even more greatly to my surprise, two minutes later Mr. Chipper-field's circus entered the city from the south-east. The resulting chaos was indescribable. There was a summit meeting of baby elephants outside the Deanery, which is still the subject of lively recollection in the police and sanitation departments of the City of Salisbury. But that scene will be nothing to the scene which will occur in Whitehall on April 1, 1964. The last question I should like to ask of my noble friend the Secretary of State is, can he tell us exactly what time the move will start?—because I should very much like to be there.
6.35 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, in considering whether this reform is a well conceived one, we should surely glance for a moment at what has gone wrong. Clearly, things have gone wrong, or the Government would not have been tempted in the first place to turn the defence house upside down as they are doing. I think things have gone wrong in two fields; first, in research and development. There have been so many rockets called "Blue" this and "Blue" that which have been cancelled, that one even forgets their names. The Americans can perhaps afford this kind of trial and error, partly because they are richer, anyhow, but more particularly because they are pushing at the frontiers of technology. What they do is new. We are not so rich, and in general we are not making absolutely new things. This is not to deny merit to British weapons designers; only to say that it is on the huge economic base that you get the spectacular advances, and can afford multiple cancellations of weapons projects, not on medium sized economic bases like ours.
The failure of "Blue" after "Blue" was a piece of living beyond our means. On top of this came the spectacular failure of Skybolt, where the central staff

1221
of the Ministry of Defence had known for months that the Americans would probably cancel it, and yet the Air Ministry was allowed to swing Government policy behind its totally mistaken impression all that time: Skybolt, leading to Nassau, leading to de Gaulle's veto on Britain's entry into E.E.C., leading to the abortive multilateral force—in other words, to the failure of President Kennedy's so-called "Grand design". These things are obviously best prevented from recurring by inter-Service integration, and even more perhaps by the integration of weapons planning, and research and development.
The second great way in which our defence policies have gone wrong since the war is exemplified by the Suez operation. The defence planners were not then, and still are not, getting a clear lead from foreign policy planners about what Britain is for at all. That operation was a Palmerstonian gunboat operation; it was a hundred years out of date as a piece of realpolitik. Is Britain a country in the last resort apt for castigating uppish Arabs; or is she a decent and law-abiding member of her alliances; or is she a pacemaker for detente and disarmament? We can hardly be all three; yet at times the Government have tried to be all three. This shows a sad lack of basic thought about our position in the world, and it shows also a sad lack of co-ordination between the Forein Office and the Defence Ministry.
I think we all know how it came about. Sir Winston Churchill was Defence Minister as well as Prime Minister; the rôle of Defence Minister was therefore able to be exercised in the only proper way, from the centre of power, in full knowledge of everything that went on and was planned, and as an integral part of the basic policy of the very identity of this nation. But then we found that having an animal called a Minister of Defence, we might as well give him an existence of his own, and so the poor creature—I am not speaking of individuals; there have been good Ministers and bad ones; I am speaking of the office—this poor creature of an office was sent into the wilderness to exist on its own, out of touch, insufficiently supplied with power, with planning machinery, and with liaison with other Departments
1222
of State. The result has been that to take this office has proved political suicide for more unfortunate Ministers than one can remember. When you see a yearly turnover of Ministers in charge of a Department, you surely know that reform is due.
Another reason why we should have this integration is that the Americans have it. I am, as I think the House knows, no partisan of slavish imitation when it comes to Washington. But it is difficult enough, anyhow, to co-ordinate our policies and actions with those of an ally so vastly our superior in strength, and in the resources of planning and buying. We have been hard put to it to keep in touch, to keep in sensible step, and we shall be yet harder put to it if we allow the central control of Defence in this country to be any weaker than it might be. No dog can run easily beside an elephant; if it suffers from voluntary locomotor ataxy, it has no right to complain if it gets forgotten, or even trodden on.
So I, for one, welcome this change. I contend that it does not go quite far enough in integration—not so much in integration of the three separate forces, the three super-fortresses as they have been called, as in the integration of Defence as a whole with the body politic itself. It seems to me that Defence is still too much of a specialist excrescence in our national planning. For instance, take the new Committee of the Cabinet for Defence and Overseas Policy. This is the key to the whole thing. It expresses, to the insufficient measure of the Government's intention, the new integration of Defence into general policy.
This Committee has no real staff to call on. It has only, to quote the White Paper, "A committee of senior officials to back it." Is this enough? Why cannot the Secretary of the Committee, like Lord Hankey in the old days on the Imperial Defence Committee, be entitled to a large and qualified staff who can prepare proper planning papers, and provide Ministers with clear alternatives saying, "You can make Britain this, that or the other thing, but you cannot make her all three"? Who will be responsible—and I ask the Government this, not rhetorically, but in the hope of an answer—when the new system comes into force, for long-term

1223
studies of national security? For relating traditional Defence with new concepts of Defence by arms control? For laying out the various alternatives between which the politicians have to choose? It used to be done under the system which is now being reformed, after a fashion, and with insufficient resources. But who is to do it now? This is not clear in the White Paper. I do not mean the sort of thing the Joint Planners do, but looking far ahead, forecasting the state of the world, its ideologies, and its balance of power between nations so that Britain may define herself in a realistic way.
Again, in regard to intelligence the White Paper mentions a Defence Intelligence Staff, which will go some way to reducing the three separate fortresses in this field. But in intelligence there have unfortunately been at least four separate fortresses. Besides military intelligence proper there has been the flow of intelligence directed by and absorbed into the Foreign Office. We have a Cabinet Committee that groups the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Office—and a good thing too. But, unless the senior officials are to be called upon to work for 24 hours a day, we have no co-ordinating body worth the name which can relate the two sides of positive intelligence.
The Joint Intelligence Bureau, as I understand it, is more of a clearinghouse than a true joint estimating agency. I foresee that, as hitherto, it may be easier for Ministers to find out what weapons systems the Chinese and Russians have than to be realistically informed of what they plan to do with them. I was recently told during a briefing at a certain N.A.T.O. headquarters that the most likely form of Soviet attack was held by the Intelligence Staff of that headquarters to be an all-out thermonuclear assault on the West as a whole. If anybody thinks that the Russians could do that with their inferior nuclear arsenal, I say that intelligence assessments of the adversary's probable intention are no more than crude and stupid horror stories. Can this not be remedied during the general turmoil by the setting up of a truly integrated and truly independent intelligence assessment agency, quite divorced from the
1224
control of any policy-making Department?
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, may I interrupt my noble friend, because I am interested in the discussion on this point? The intelligence staffs will be mainly concerned with appreciation. They will not be primarily intelligence collectors, except in a field which it is not really open to us to discuss. I do not quite see how the appreciation can be made except within Services which are closely familiar with the weapons and their operational use. Is the noble Lord proposing that this might be taken entirely outside the Services? It is quite an interesting concept.
LORD KENNET: I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. It is an intensely complicated field, and one with which none of us, by definition, can be familiar. I have the impression, though, that the collecting of positive intelligence (I do not mean only secret intelligence, but overt matters, too) in this country is done very well. But when the data arrive they are too often assessed and interpreted, and forced into a pattern maybe, by a Department which has an interest in pursuing its own policy. What I hoped one might see developed in time was a complete intelligence agency, which did not collect the intelligence but which saw it all; which was responsible to no one Department more than to any other, and which could not be advised or swayed by any executive organ of the Government. In other words, something that was completely independent, and on which there might be outside help, perhaps from the universities.
May I turn now, to the Chief Scientific Adviser? I am glad that the present colourful holder of that office has been given a "leg up", for he has a more realistic idea of what nuclear weapons can and cannot do than some of the "popgun soldiers" who are still, unfortunately, to be found around Whitehall. Is it a long enough "leg up"? I understand from the White Paper that if the Secretary of State wishes to take technical advisers with him to the Cabinet, he has the right to go surrounded by no fewer than four Chiefs of Staff, yet he has not the right to take even one little scientist with him. May this not be a mistake? It is surely high time that the scientist

1225
in general was redeemed from the status of an oily-handed, forelock-pulling mechanic, where there is still too much tendency to keep him in the Civil Service, and admitted to executive responsibility as automatically as any Hellenic humanist of a Permanent Under Secretary. That word "adviser" is a sad anachronism, is it not? We do not think of calling the Permanent Secretary the "administrative adviser to the Minister".
There are separate paragraphs in the White Paper devoted to the Meteorological Office and to the Public Relations Staff. This is very good. Everything should be thought of. But there is no mention of disarmament. Is this less important than the correct administration of weather forecasting? Is it less important than the job of the charming officer who will provide you with a sundowner and let his hair down in such an affable but fundamentally uncommunicative manner to the worried Defence correspondent? It seems so. It appears that in the White Paper the Government hold that this is less important.
I think the worst that can be said of this White Paper is that it shows that the Government have still not grasped the basic fact of this age: that though the responsibility of the Defence establishment is still what it always was—namely, to keep the people of this country alive and free—this responsibility cannot any longer be exercised by the former expedient of engaging in an arms race with the probable adversary. Security—national security—is now a two-faced thing: defence and disarmament; arms and arms control; deterrence and detente. We are in transition; we must relate these two faces rightly to each other. The White Paper shows a sublime insouciance about this. Disarmament is still to be left to the spirit of Metternich and Curzon, in a Foreign Office without one single scentist to call its own. Surely now—at the time of a great and, I do not doubt, painful upheaval—would have been the time for the Government to take this new world seriously, and to emerge from the dreams of Britannia invincible, of Albion booted and spurred, into the graver, less boyish realities of a complex world.
But that can be put right later. So, too, perhaps, can another matter—and this will be my last complaint. The Service Ministers have been demoted;
1226
and, sad as that is, it is right. But the new Secretary of State for Defence is thereby left, as many noble Lords have already remarked, in rather a forbidding and lonely eminence. One may doubt whether any one man can efficiently control so vast a machine and at the same time keep alive and supple in Parliament. May he not need help?—I mean functional help, not departmental help on the vertical pattern given him by his Ministers of State.
The American precedent may help us here, also. Although they often, as it seems to me, get the wrong answer, their machinery in this field is very good. The American Secretary of Defence is flanked by two powerful assistants. The present incumbents are Charles Hitch and Paul Nitze. Both have devoted many past years to the study of the matters they are now called upon to administer. Dr. Hitch is the Comptroller of the Defence Department. He is responsible, under Mr. Macnamara, for the defence budget, and for the general economic effects of the vast American arms industry. Mr. Nitze is responsible for international security affairs. He, under Mr. Macnamara, handles relations with allies, with adversaries and with neutrals, in so far as those relations have a military content; he handles liaison with the State Department, and he is responsible for disarmament within the Pentagon. For this last he has a full-time deputy, who is also a political appointment. This system works well.
I repeat that the policy decisions which come out of it often seem to me mistaken, but there is no doubt that they do come out of it; and they are adhered to and they are consistent, which is more than can be said of the present British practice in the defence field. There is control and effective control. Might not our own new Secretary of State for Defence benefit from some such system of assistance as this? One might even, perhaps, also consider an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development to keep an eye on the scientists, and to foster, when necessary, their particular way of looking at things. But that is more questionable.
My Lords, I think that we should welcome this reform and blame only certain shortcomings, which no doubt are more due to the difficulty of changing the

1227
ingrained habits of Conservative hierarchies than to basic misconception. I hope that the new system works, and that things will be carried further forward, either by this Government or by another.
6.52 p.m.
LORD AMPTHILL: My Lords, I rise to give, as briefly as I can, my general support to the Central Organisation for Defence proposed by the Government in the White Paper, Cmnd. 2097. I think this is a step, and a very long step, in the right direction. I said "general support" just now, because I have certain fears and certain criticisms, but these have been so well expressed by noble Lords on both sides of the House that I will not delay your Lordships by repeating them here.
My noble friend Lord Teynham referred to the danger of Parkinson's Law operating here, and I must say that I agree. Other noble Lords have spoken about the tremendous responsibilities and the great burden of work which will fall on the Secretary of State for Defence in this new set-up, and on his Secretary. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, who referred to the weakness in the research and development organisation, and I must say that I am very much with him in the remarks he made there. I also have a great deal of sympathy with the remarks made by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, on the question of the position of the Ministers of State. I listened to his remarks on that with the greatest possible interest, and I hope that noble Earl, Lord Home, will be able to tell us who will approve the promotion of senior officers.
My noble friend Lord Mancroft and the noble and gallant Field-Marshal both mentioned the vital need for inter-Service training for junior officers, and with that I heartily agree. That is in fact a matter to which I drew attention in the Defence debate three or four years ago, and I really think we must get down to it. Of course, I dislike a great many of the proposals in this White Paper, but I regard them as a necessity. But whatever feelings of nostalgia I may have at the disappearance of so many historic offices, particularly at the Admiralty—and I have plenty—I expressed these when I
1228
spoke in the Defence debate last March, and I do not propose to weary your Lordships by repeating them now. However, I must just refer to the disappearance of the post of the First Lord of the Admiralty. I am sorry that the First Lord had to leave us for an important appointment at Portsmouth (which I am sure he will find very pleasant) because I was just going to say some rather nice things about him. Tradition apart, I fear that with the disappearance of the First Lord the Navy will lose the services of the present occupant of the post, my noble and gallant friend Lord Carrington. He has endeared himself to serving and retired officers alike, and I know of no one in naval circles who does not regard him with the greatest affection and esteem.
The first First Lord with whom I ever had contact in my naval career was Sir Winston Churchill, then Mr. Winston Churchill, when he arrived at Dartmouth in that lovely yacht the "Enchantress" and came up to the college to inspect us cadets. He came into the classroom where my fellow cadets and I were studying the differential calculus, under a character well known to generations of naval officers as "P.T.H.". I do not suppose the then First Lord had any more clue about the differential calculus than I had then or have now, but as he progressed round the classroom looking at each boy's work he came to my desk, which was in the corner, and said, "Out of my way, boy." They are the only words that great man has ever addressed to me. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has never said, "Out of my way, boy", and I do not suppose he will, but I shall be quite prepared to say, "Out of his way" to quite a number of people, if there is any chance of his becoming our Minister of Defence.
I must turn now for a very short time to the White Paper. Like my noble friend Lord Mancroft, I immediately noticed that the inception of this great reorganisation was going to take place on All Fools' Day, 1964. Whilst I cannot recount to your Lordships an amusing story of circuses on a collision course in Salisbury, as the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, did, I must say that I was reminded of a new submarine to which I had been appointed. Soon after I arrived I found that the shipyard proposed to launch this ship on a Friday,

1229
and the 13th of the month to boot! My captain and I, knowing our sailors' susceptibilities in this sort of matter, went to the shipyard people and said, "Tides or no tides, this date has got to be altered"; and it was altered. I would recommend someone in the Government to go to the organisers of this great move and shift the date from April 1 to April 5, which, after all, is the beginning and ending of the Government year.
I also rather dislike the very clumsy title selected for the so-called Second Permanent Under Secretary of State. I suppose these titles all stem from the Civil Service ranking, pay and emoluments—including the size of desk, of course, and carpet, if any. I suggest that if the Permanent Under Secretary of State to the Defence Board were called merely "Secretary to the Defence Board", then we could have Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of the Navy, Army and Air Force Secretariat and so forth, which, for one thing, would considerably simplify paper work. After all we have had a Secretary to the Admiralty for hundreds of years—since the days of Pepys, in fact, the real founder not only of our Admiralty organisation but of our Civil Service. For pay, emoluments and so forth, I have always imagined that the Secretary to the Admiralty has ranked with a Permanent Under Secretary of State.
My Lords, with other noble Lords, I am not at all happy about the decision to leave the Ministry of Aviation, or at any rate its defence responsibilities, outside the Defence Ministry organisation. I can quite see the difficulty of carving the Ministry of Aviation about and putting its civil responsibilities somewhere else (I do not wish to go into any details in this debate), but, with the ever-growing interdependence of our fighting Services, it is not only the Royal Air Force which is closely concerned with aircraft development for military purposes, but all the other Services. In particular, the Navy, in its pursuit of the maritime strategy so vital to this country, must rely more and more on suitable aircraft being available. The announcement last night, which I particularly welcome, of the decision to build a new aircraft carrier adds point to what I have just said.
I believe it is essential to keep this question of the Ministry of Aviation under review, and I will repeat here a
1230
suggestion that I made in the recent Defence Debate. That is, that the Royal Air Force should have—really needs—a Royal Corps of Aircraft Constructors on the pattern of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors which has served the Navy so well and for so long. Perhaps when the position of the Ministry of Aviation comes under review, as I am sure it will, that suggestion may be given at any rate some thought.
Finally, my Lords, I have a small point on paragraph 68 on page 11, which discusses the organisation of the principal administrative officers and the principal personnel officers. Personally, I dislike the reference to an officer "of three star rank". There is no such rank in any of our official Navy, Army or Air Force lists, and I think that this is an Americanism which could well be omitted. The real criterion is ability, not rank. I had the honour to serve on the staffs of three great Naval Commanders-in-Chief in the last war—Andrew Cunningham of Hyndhope, John D. Cunningham and Bertie Ramsay. They all held very strong views on this subject. I will not repeat exactly what they said, for some of their views, if repeated verbatim, would be too strong meat for your Lordships' House; but they were all very insistent that ability and suitability were the sole criteria, and not rank. Andrew Cunningham in fact held the view that if a naval commander could not represent him satisfactorily at a committee, of whatever exalted rank, then the individual in question was not worthy to wear three stripes on his arm.
If this new organisation is to work satisfactorily—and, what is more, is to get into top gear quickly—ruthless selection of the right men for the right places, irrespective of rank or service, will be necessary. There is no time for a policy of, "It is Buggins's turn now", or for putting square pegs into round holes. My Lords, I wish the new organisation all success, and I think this will be assured if it starts on April 5, and not on April 1.
7.2 p.m.
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, I think it would be fair to say that it has been made clear by the course of the debate to-day that the House as a whole approaches the problems presented by this White Paper in a spirit of bipartisanship. We may have—we have—differences of opinion on this point or

1231
that, but they are differences of opinion which are capable of being resolved with a view to making the scheme work better than at first sight it looks as if it might.
With your Lordships' permission, I shall begin with something which will, I believe, meet with the approval of the whole House. Reference has been made to the First Lord of the Admiralty, and to the high regard in which he is held, which view, of course, I share with all your Lordships. He has asked me to apologise for the fact that he is not here for the conclusion of the debate. He has just recently left to proceed by helicopter to Portsmouth to attend a dinner there on H.M.S. "Victory" at the dining out of Admiral Sir Caspar John on his retirement. I told him—I hope with the approval of your Lordships—that he might tell the Admiral on behalf of your Lordships' House that we all salute him and wish him well at the conclusion of his long and distinguished service.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, to come more closely to this White Paper, as has been said in this discussion earlier, I think it bears some fairly close relationship—not too close, but some fairly close relationship—to the American organisation. And I do not think it is any the worse for that so long as we keep our eyes carefully open to those points where the American organisation does not seem to fit in with the requirements of us here in this country and with our responsibilities. The fact that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is to close this debate on behalf of the Government shows that, as is made clear by the White Paper, there is a close relationship, now openly recognised and made clear to all, between defence and foreign policy, and that foreign affairs will have a due place in the consideration of our responsibilities in the Defence Council and on the Defence Committee.
I am glad that the principle of the Chiefs of Staff organisation is being maintained, though with one questionable change to which I will refer in a moment; that the Chief of Staff will be the senior officer of his own branch of the Services; and that there will be access by the Chiefs of Staff, in the event of differences of opinion, to the Defence Committee and to the Prime Minister
1232
But there is one new aspect of affairs in connection with that organisation to which I think full attention is due, and that is the position of the Chief of the Defence Staff. That is a position of high authority, and it is a position in which there is one person who has direct access to the Secretary of State, by whom differences of opinion among the Chiefs of Staff will be resolved. Then there is the rather curious statement in the White Paper that, having referred those differences, and expressed his opinion upon them, to the Secretary of State, he will then give his own advice. I was under the impression that, when differences of opinion are expressed to a Minister, it was for the Minister to form his opinion about those differences and to make his decision: but here it looks as if it is going to be the Chief of the Defence Staff. I think that may be open to objection, and may present difficulties, not only between the three Service Chiefs of Staff (if I may use the old nomenclature) and the Chief of Defence Staff, but also in relation to the Secretary of State.
We are in the rather odd position, which is unique in the nature of the case at the moment, that, by some strange alchemy of fortune, we have as the Chief of the Defence Staff one who has himself, as your Lordships will remember, served as a Supreme Commander-in-Chief of a great command in time of war, the South-East Asia Command. That carries manifest advantages in respect of the one who happens to have that qualification and, at the same time, to be Chief of Defence Staff. That is not a situation which can recur in the nature of the case; and it is, I think, a question that deserves full consideration as to whether there is likely to be in the Ministry of Defence anyone who carries the same unusual qualifications and is competent to present an opinion to the Secretary of State where differences arise between the Chiefs of Staff. He will be chief professional adviser to the Secretary—and that goes without saying by reason of the office he holds. But, when there are differences of opinion, I wonder whether the Ministry will be producing men who are capable of exercising the authorities suggested in the White Paper in the same way as is the case with the present incumbent of that

1233
office. I think this question is worth consideration; and also whether the old system did not work sufficiently well for us to avoid all the differences of opinion and discussions that may arise among the Chiefs of Staff by puting one head over them. I put that to your Lordships because when we have to deal with the legislation this is a subject that may be one for our consideration.
The position of the Chief of Defence Staff is, in one sense, very different from the position of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State and the Chief Scientific Adviser. The Chief of Defence Staff is there for only a term of years—short or long. I suppose usually it will be for from three to five years. In the case of the present incumbent there is now an extension to 1965, but the situation is unusual and I doubt whether a future incumbent will be given the same length of service. In the case of a Permanent Under-Secretary and the Chief Scientific Adviser, there is normally no term of office except, of course, anno domini, which, no doubt, will apply in their case as in the case of others in the Civil Service. Those who are there permanently, when the Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the various Services are all birds of passage, come to occupy a position of the greatest possible responsibility and authority. The question is whether, in an office so complex as this and covering so wide a range of responsibilities, that is altogether a sound and safe position.
Secretaries of State will come and go—but I hope they will not come and go too often. Here you have a Secretary of State who will be dealing, so far as finance is concerned, with almost the whole of the proceeds of income tax gathered by revenue—£2,000 million a year—and within whose jurisdiction are 450,000 Service personnel and 450,000 civilian personnel. He will have responsibilities so wide, so complex and so important that, in the nature of the case, notwithstanding the long history and tradition attached to many offices, he is bound to be the most important Minister in the Government. He carries great responsibility; he spends more of the national income than any other Minister; and he has the responsibility of the defence of the nation. Having regard to all that, I believe it is no
1234
exaggeration to say that he will become the most important Minister.
Is it right that such a Minister should hold office for only a short period of time and be subject to all the changes of opinion that may exist? In the first year he will be learning his job; it is difficult enough, I and many of your Lordships, know from experience, for any Minister of a Department to learn his job; and it takes a year or so to do it. Here you have the head of a great organisation of the utmost complexity. It is not one job; it is indeed many jobs all rolled into one. It is like being the head of one of the greatest business organisations we have in this country and carrying enormous responsibility. I wonder whether it is right that such a one, being a relatively temporary incumbent of office, should have to rely very much upon a civil servant and a scientific adviser who, in contrast to himself and the Chief of Defence Staff, are permanent and with a very high remuneration—and I do not begrudge them that—and who are full of the learning of the Department and the experience and tradition that has grown up during the past. It is difficult for any Minister, however well-intentioned, however skilful, to stand up against those who have been there all the time and have all the knowledge and know-how. I think that is a matter that requires enormous consideration in a Ministry of this vast size and importance which is, if not designed, calculated to be the most important in the State, subject only to the Prime Minister himself.
I should now like to deal with some relatively minor points, but not so minor in importance. Under the terms of the White Paper manpower plans are to be drawn up on a defence basis. I should like to know what that means. Recruiting for the Army, as we know (and as the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, mentioned earlier this evening) has gone down to about 50 per cent. of what it was this time last year. Who is to decide, and by what criteria is it to be decided, for whom recruiting is to be undertaken? I should like to know the answer to that question. The Army certainly needs powerful reinforcements in the way of recruiting.
There is also the question of promotion. Is there to be a single Ministry

1235
of Defence list or are there to be separate lists for each Service, or are there to be four lists altogether, one for the Ministry of Defence and one for each of the Services? That is important, for what is the hierarchy to be by which relative entitlement to promotion or high office in any branch of the Ministry may be gauged? We want to know something about that and also by whom selection is to be made, which was a point to which my noble friend Lord Longford referred. Who is to make the appointment and with whom will the actual decision rest? I gather from the White Paper that for all appointments over major-general and equivalent ranks a decision will be made by the Secretary of State. That will be on some recommendation made to him; and I do not know by whom; and I do not know whether it is on the list of the Defence Ministry or on the list of each of the individual Services. I think we want to know a good deal more about that.
I do not want to weary your Lordships or detain you after this long debate. I do not think that I have a great deal more to say. There has been a good deal of reference to-day to Parkinson. I believe that we shall hear a good deal about Parkinson in this whole outfit. That troubles me a good deal. This White Paper provides for a veritable proliferation of committees; and every committee will throw off a sub-committee. I wonder whether anybody has sat down and worked out a timetable—how many committees there are; how many times they are going to meet, and how these committees will be planned so that nobody is required to attend more than one committee at the same time. My guess is that we shall be surprised. We shall find that the whole of the working day, five days a week, fifty weeks a year, will be occupied by people attending committees and unable to get on with the job. I think that it is very important to exercise a firm hand on this growth of committees. It is easy to say, "We cannot decide now, because there is a slight difference of opinion; so let us refer it to a committee"; whereas, if somebody were to take a strong line and say, "Yes", or "No", the other people concerned would accept it.
I would add that my impression is that this new organisation is going to cost more. There will be no economy
1236
at all events in the early stages. Noble Lords, like the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, who have experience of business on a great scale, know, as I do, that when there are great amalgamations, whatever the hopes held out for economy, at the beginning, at least until the new organisation shakes down, it is always more and not less expensive. Here we have few of those inducements that apply to the uniting of great industries, and I suspect that it will be found, at least for some years, until the whole thing shakes down to a reasonable size, that the expense will be much more than that prevailing at the present time. It is only fair to say—and I say it openly—that I do not read the White Paper as holding out any hopes of immediate economy. I am not suggesting that it is in any way misleading: I am merely expressing my opinion, that there will be a larger and not a smaller expense.
I believe that there is something to be said for this great orgnisation having a properly set up public relations office. I think that the public relations of the Services leave a great deal to be desired and need to be looked at. Such large and important Ministries, touching so many points of national life, should be in a position to get the very best service in this regard, and to make a proper impact upon the public mind. I agree also with my noble friend Lord Kennet, who said just now that there is room for a Central Intelligence Office, including, I should hope, first-class intelligence from the Foreign Office. I am not speaking here of security: I put intelligence and security in entirely different positions. So far as intelligence is concerned, I think that a Central Intelligence Office—not a Ministry, but an office, a special department of the Ministry—might be all to the good.
So far as the contents of this White Paper are concerned, that is almost all I have to say, and I am grateful to your Lordships for having listened to me with such patience. There will be opportunities after the Recess to discuss some of these matters in greater detail, either on legislation being presented or on some Motion being brought forward for the purpose. I should like to say a final word about the position of the Labour Party, on whose behalf I speak here at this Box to-day, in connection

1237
with the whole question of Defence. I think that there is often, perhaps among your Lordships, but certainly in the public outside, some misunderstanding about how the Labour Party stand in regard to Defence. There is a sort of suggestion, here and there—perhaps not only here and there—that the Labour Party are uninterested in defence; that they are opposed to it, rather than in favour of it.
My Lords, I think that I personally am in a pretty good position to speak on this question, because I have spent a great deal of my time and interest in connection with it, in a very minor way, it is true; but one cannot do more than give one's interest and activities to the matter which interests one. I think that it is worth noting that when my noble friend Lord Attlee was Prime Minister, it was he who produced, for the first time in peace time, a Minister of Defence—the Minister being, in fact, my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. I think it is worth quoting that, when I was at the War Office, I presented to your Lordships' House, from the Box opposite, the National Service Bill. And I think that it is worth noting that when there was a question of intervening in the difficulty in Korea, we were ready, because of the arrangements which had been made by the Government under the Premiership of my noble friend Lord Attlee and when my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough was Minister of Defence. I think that in all this post-war period the Labour Party have a record which is entitled to respect. They have in every way played their part in seeking to secure the defence of the country in all the ways that were open to them. And I may say, on behalf of my noble friends, that we hold the defence and the honour of the country as high and as warmly as do any Members of your Lordships' House.
7.27 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, for the way one opened the debate and the way in which the other has concluded it, from their side of the House.
1238
Let me say at once that of course I accept that the Labour Party have played their full part in giving security to our country. From time to time we shall no doubt differ on various issues of policy—for example, it may be on the organisation of nuclear defence—but I hope that one Party will never accuse the other of in any way neglecting the defence of the country. Certainly, so long as I am at this Box I shall try to conduct foreign policy and defence policy, because the Foreign Secretary has an important influence on defence, which is the broad concern of both Parties and, I hope, the majority of the nation. I join in the generous and well-deserved tribute the noble Lord paid to Admiral Sir Caspar John. All of us who have worked with him are very sorry to lose him from our company. I hope that he and my noble friend the First Lord will have a very happy evening, as no doubt they will.
There is one principle which I think should be enunciated at the beginning of every Defence debate in Parliament, and repeated at the end. The noble Lord, Lord Nathan, expressed it this way: that there must be a recognition of the relationship between Defence and foreign policy. I would put it, I think, that defence is the means to political ends, and that political considerations and aims must always dictate the basis of defence structure, and not the other way round. Not unnaturally, therefore, a number of noble Lords have taken a very close look during this debate at those sections of the White Paper which deal with political direction and control.
The White Paper makes it absolutely clear that the responsibility for making sure that the Defence forces and the weapons systems are geared to political requirements falls firmly on the shoulders of the Prime Minister and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet. If anything were needed to emphasise that, it is the change of name from that of the Defence Committee to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee of the Cabinet. This clearly indicates that the Government fully accept the relationship, as the noble Lord put it, between foreign policy and Defence.
In these days, of course, the Committee almost chooses itself, and overseas political Ministers—the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth and Colonial

1239
Secretaries—must be members. They have the unenviable task of gazing into the crystal ball and trying to indicate to the Cabinet (because decisions depend on this) what British interests will be ten and twenty years from now; what obligations we should expect, and what weapons systems and forces may be necessary to fulfil the political interests of Britain at that time. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has the still more unenviable and thankless task of estimating costs, perhaps ten or even twenty years ahead, so as to keep the Defence Budget within bounds. The Minister of Aviation is responsible for weaponry, and the Home Secretary for the security of the home country. If the noble Lord, Lord Saye and Sele, had been here, I should have told him that the reason, good or bad, for not mentioning Civil Defence in this particular White Paper is that the present organisation is not affected at all.
I have a good deal of sympathy with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, when he says he wants simplicity in Defence organisation. But I do not see how one can simplify this part of the machinery, or how the Defence Committee of the Cabinet could be simplified. There is no one Minister, either the Secretary of State, or indeed the Prime Minister, who could possibly keep in his mind all the varied considerations which have to be taken into account when you are determining long-term strategy and the weapons systems needed to sustain that strategy. I remember that in a previous debate one noble Lord (possibly it was the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, or the noble Earl, Lord Longford; but I cannot remember which) suggested that it would be valuable if, parallel to the Ministerial Committee, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, there was an official committee under-pinning the Ministers. That idea is adopted and included as part of this White Paper, and I think it will be most valuable. It will preserve continuity and it will do a good deal of lone-term planning, which I think was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet. That is part of the plan.
The Cabinet structure at the top is, then, absolutely of the first importance. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is quite right in saying that it is the key to everything that goes on below that level. Within the main principle, and the political
1240
structure, therefore, stemming from it, the theme of the White Paper—and, naturally enough, the theme of this debate—has been the interdependence of the Forces. Every experience in actual military operations (and the House may be interested to know that there have been 46 occasions on which the Armed Forces have had to go overseas since the war) has underlined the fact that to-day the Services are absolutely dependent one on another. One must agree with the noble and gallant Field-Marshal when he says that as a result of our operational experience anything which aims to knit the Services together must be right. So the object, as the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, rightly said, is not in dispute. It is how to achieve the maximum benefit of central direction under a Secretary of State for Defence without sacrificing the loyalty and pride of each Service, which must be preserved if the nation is to have a Fighting Force of the first quality and the first efficiency.
The debate has revealed, I think, a dilemma in which we are bound to find ourselves when we are searching for a solution of this kind. A number of noble Lords have said that they are afraid that the solution adopted in the White Paper would reduce the political influence of the Defence Services and the Defence set-up as a whole in the councils of the Government. We could have retained three Secretaries of State, as there are to-day: Ministers of Cabinet rank; Ministers, let us remember, in present circumstances all competing for short supplies; and Ministers, as anybody knows who has sat with them in Cabinet, who have considerable forensic ability and make their cases extremely well. There is no doubt that that gives considerable political influence, and it could be said that if we had adopted this setup the Services would have more political influence. On the other hand, I think that our experience has shown beyond doubt that the existence of three major autonomous Departments of State militates against the integration of Defence policy, which is, of course, our agreed aim and which the great majority of your Lordships have supported in the House to-day.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl? Has he finished with the question of political influence?
THE EARL OF HOME: No. I was coming later on to some of the points the noble Earl raised. As in every human institution, of course, it depends very much (I think the noble Earl, Lord Longford, said this) on what the Secretary of State's method of working will be. If he is wise, he will devolve a great deal on the Ministers of State. Indeed, it is absolutely essential that he should do so, since he must give himself time to grasp the larger issues of policy and to give decisions on them, because he must be, as I think the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, described him, the author of policy. The Ministers of State must obviously be given a Defence rôle in addition to their primary responsibility as members of the Service Boards.
One of the great problems of Government—and the noble Earl, Lord Longford, put his finger on this—is how to achieve decentralisation while keeping a proper overall control. One of the problems of Government, as I have seen it in the last few years, is that, however exalted the deputies given to a senior Minister, the tendency is for the clients to want to deal always with the top man. Yet, if the wheels of Government are not to be hopelessly clogged, two things must happen: a senior Minister must decant work and responsibility, and, what is more, the clients must accept that position. When the noble Earl, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, talks about "merely a Minister of State", I rather wish he would not do so, because I think that the answer must be to give Ministers of State a status which will enable them to command respect, attention and authority, both in the individual Services and in Parliament. I have had quite a lot of experience of this in the Foreign Office. For instance, one of my Ministers of State practically takes charge of disarmament. It really is wrong to think that Ministers of State cannot be given very wide responsibilities under the supervision of a senior Minister; in fact, it is right that this should be so.
My feeling is, therefore, that on balance—and I think that probably this view is shared by the majority of your Lordships, although there are legitimate doubts on this question of how much political influence the Services and the Defence set-up should acquire—we have probably achieved a fairly correct
1242
balance between central control and direction and practical and decentralised management. I think we have it about right; but the noble and gallant Viscount the Field Marshal was absolutely right. We cannot at this moment tell how it is going to work, and, therefore, it must be kept under the closest watch and must be adapted if defects are shown. We can really only tell by experiment.
If the Secretary of State is to come to right conclusions, I think there must be no danger that he is ignorant of the points of view of the individual Services. Quite a number of your Lordships concentrated on this point. The noble Lord, Lord Nathan, in particular drew attention to it. This is secured by each Chief of Staff being the professional head of his own Service; by the Secretary of State having direct access to experts of all three Services as he requires any information; and by the collective responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff to the Defence Committee through the mouthpiece of the Chief of Staff himself; and by the Service Chief in the last resort having the right to be heard by the Prime Minister. It has been questioned whether this was wise. This would happen only if there were a difference of opinion and a dispute within the Chiefs of Staff Committee of such a kind that it simply could not be settled, either by them or the Chief of the Defence Staff or, indeed, after consultation with the Secretary of State. If you get that kind of difference between the heads of the Services and the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Secretary of State, then it is much better to have it out in the open and not try to hide it. I think there is, therefore, a case for the Chiefs of Staff being able to go direct to the Prime Minister.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Earl to ask what he does when there is a dispute between the Assistant Under Secretary of State and the Foreign Office? Is it not parallel?
THE EARL OF HOME: I win the argument, my Lords. But, of course, if there is a dispute which I cannot resolve, I take it to the appropriate Committee of the Cabinet and, if necessary, to the Prime Minister. So I think there is a case here, if disputes

1243
of this sort arise, for them to go to the highest fountain head of wisdom. But it must be hoped that not many disputes of such a serious character will arise that under this set-up, with the co-ordinating powers of the Secretary of State, there should be fewer even than there have been in the past.
There is one other considerable matter of organisation which claimed your Lordships' attention: that is, whether the Ministry of Aviation should be included and put under the authority of the Secretary of State for Defence. I think it was broadly accepted that, while this Department should be under one roof in the Ministry of Defence, it could not be transferred to his authority, at any rate at the present time. With his responsibility for civil aviation research and development, and for the sponsorship of the aircraft industry, the Minister of Aviation has a lot to do. I think a number of your Lordships said that to put this additional burden on the Secretary of State for Defence would be questionable at any time, and at the present time really right out of the question. The main attention of your Lordships this afternoon has been concentrated on problems of organisation and administration, and very formidable they are. I think the noble Earl very fairly asked some questions earlier to-day and raised some points, because this new Minister is going to have authority over some 800,000 personnel, civilian and military. There are going to be some 3,000 persons in the main building, and an operational headquarters has to be created which will have to work round the clock.
It is here that your Lordships have presented to me to-day the longest catalogues of anxieties—and perfectly properly. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, did not ask a question so much as pose to us the problem as to how, in modern conditions, you get the officers of the highest quality and experience, which undoubtedly will be required in the Services. The noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, asked about the Defence Operations Executive. Perhaps I might say a word about that. Within each of the existing Service Departments the senior officers who are listed in paragraph 36 of the White Paper, are senior executives in an emergency of the Chiefs of Staff and the
1244
Vice-Chiefs of Staff. The Defence Operations Executive has been set up to give formal expression to the growing interdependence of the Services by establishing in Whitehall a regular body of responsible officers for the better co-ordination of the Services in action. These officers will be able to function more efficiently than under present arrangements, because they will be provided with fully up-to-date facilities in the shape of the new Defence Operations Centre, and the facilities described in the White Paper: and, of course, they will be acting in accordance with well-established procedures. That, at any rate, is an interim answer to one question which the noble Lord asked. He then asked about the procurement of weapons and machines. This is more complicated, and I think I will ask my noble friend to reply to him by letter.
My noble friend Lord Swinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, raised matters of accounting and economy. One particular proposal which was made by my noble friend Lord Swinton and which certainly I will have considered is that there might be established what he called a second Financial Secretary, a Financial Secretary for Defence. To anybody who runs a spending Department even of the kind I run, which is a modest one, the thought of two Financial Secretaries is daunting and rather terrifying. How a Financial Secretary for Defence would work in with the Chief Secretary to the Treasury who has an overall supervision in matters of finance, I am not so sure, but certainly we will examine this question.
My noble friend Lord Mancroft asked how Parliamentary Questions would be asked and who would take them, the Secretary of State for Defence or Ministers of State. I must not lay down rules for either House, but if I may take the analogy of the Foreign Office I would say that the Secretary of State by and large tries to keep himself for the broader matters of policy and answers questions on them, and the Ministers of State and Parliamentary Secretaries take the other matters.
The noble Earl, Lord Longford, and a number of noble Lords asked who would be responsible for the higher appointments in each Service. I take it that the Secretary of State for Defence would make the appointments on the

1245
recommendation of the individual Chief of Staff of the Service concerned. I have not been able to consult my right honourable friend, as noble Lords will understand, and if the question is asked whether he will also consult the Minister of State connected with the Service—Army, Navy or Air Force—I feel sure that he would be consulted. But I should have to confirm that before I could give an absolutely firm answer to noble Lords.
LORD NATHAN: My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he can say anything with regard to a Defence Ministry list, and how the hierarchy will be arranged between the Defence Ministry and the Services to look after seniority—in other words, whence the future officers of the Defence Ministry will be selected?
THE EARL OF HOME: I think I will get my noble friend to communicate with the noble Lord by letter on that matter. It is fairly complicated, and I should like to get it correct if I am going to answer him at all. It is impossible to answer a good many of the questions asked to-day, but I will ask my noble friend Lord Carrington or my right honourable friend to deal with any points I am not able myself to answer this afternoon. Having heard the whole debate, and all the questions that have been asked, I come to the conclusion that we have probably been right not to try anything more ambitious in the way of reorganization; that really we have already bitten off just as much as we can chew.
On the question of economies, the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, and others have put the point very fairly. I think he was very fair when he said, in effect, that economy is not the object of this exercise; the object of the exercise is to get the best possible defence structure and service for the nation. Certain new posts have to be created and certain new staffs have to be built up—for instance, the staff of the control of the defence budget—and I agree that it is difficult to see economies in the early stages of the transition. But noble Lords have been perfectly right, if I may say so, to remind us of Parkinson and of what the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, said, that the Minister of Defence ought to acquire some weed-killer. I was more apprehensive about
1246
that as I was not quite sure who, in the mind of the noble and gallant Field Marshal, were the weeds. At any rate, I think I would put it this way: while we cannot anticipate any substantial economies in the early years, nevertheless the object of the whole exercise is efficiency and, with efficiency, economy.
What then are the hopes of this new plan? The hope is that the new planning machinery, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, and the Cabinet will lay down the policy requirements with clarity; that the Secretary of State for Defence—and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, made this point—will be able to exercise authority and oversight which is effective, because this is a job which essentially can be done by only one man, which is what I think he said, and which I think is true, and, as a result of his oversight, authority and foresight, he will be able to propose to the Cabinet the shape of the Forces and the weapons systems which the political strategy requires.
The noble Lord, Lord Nathan, raised a number of other points about planning which would bring me back rather to the number of operations which have been conducted overseas. The contingency planning which has to run all the time and which was mentioned, too, by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, is very important, perhaps more important than ever to keep it absolutely up to date when speed in military movement is absolutely the essence of success of any operation. I should think that our planning machine is certainly capable of planning for military operations, taking into account, as one noble Lord asked us to, the problems of the Commonwealth, of Europe and the problems of limited war in any other part of the world. Our Forces must be made interdependent, but it has also to be realised that all strategy and tactics everywhere are inter-related, and I think we should want, therefore, planning staff for them all. I do not intend to say anything on security, except that I hope we shall always be preserved from a Ministry of Security. I do not like that idea at all and, mercifully, it has not featured in this debate of your Lordships.
All in all, while we should never be complacent, I think that the Government may be reasonably satisfied with the reception of the proposals we have put

1247
forward. If I can judge from the tone of the debate as a whole, while many noble Lords want many of the problems to be considered, yet, with the principle, I think there is no quarrel. The noble and gallant Field Marshal rather suggested that we should never see unification of the Forces until there was a third world war. I can assure the noble and gallant Field Marshal that it is my job to stop that, and I shall try to do it so that when we come to the next stage of unification we may do so in peace. I am very grateful to your Lordships for the trouble that you have taken to help my right honourable friend in the consideration of these very complex matters, and I think we have had a most useful debate.
7.55 p.m.
EARL ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, first of all I desire to thank all the Members of your Lordships' House who have assisted in this debate to-day. It is a vastly important subject; it is projected in a White Paper which, obviously from the debate which has taken place, is unable to give us all the information that we require in order to form a final judgment, but we are told that we shall be having legislation submitted in the autumn. I hope, from the tone of the speech that the Foreign Secretary has just made, that the points made in the debate will be very carefully examined before there is anything like final drafting of legislation.
What also concerns me a great deal is this. I may be regarded by some people as wrong, but, with the enormous growth of the Budget to the present figure of £1,838 million, and estimated now to go up nearer to £2,000 million, we are yet fundamentally at the present moment so far behind in getting the modernised equipment that is really required in present circumstances; and if there is going to be any considerable delay in, say, putting the kind of plan which the Government think is the best into operation, and it requires legislation, that will be a very great pity. Decisions have to be taken pretty quickly about some of these things. We shall already wait until 1968 for a Polaris. We have had tremendous disappointments with missiles and rockets and are now holding back on
1248
questions connected with them. We are not in the position which we ought to be in at this moment, and if there is going to be any considerable delay in getting this thing going, that would be a great pity. If we could obtain an assurance, perhaps before the other place rises, that there is going to be steady, hard work now in the Ministry of Defence to get these other things on the way, then we should be more happy.
Another thing I should like to say is this. I have seen a little of big business myself, and I have seen organisations which have succeeded and some which have failed, and I am bound to say that when you have formed a big top structure to an organisation with a great increase in expense and cost you do not necessarily bring greater success to the operation as a whole. What really is needed is the growth of the spirit within the Services themselves really to co-operate as they have done over and over again. The Foreign Secretary mentioned in his reply to-night about the co-operation of the Services, and I had the thought running through my mind when the noble and gallant Field Marshal said, "All will be one eventually". I have seen no real difficulties in the military command, and I am quite sure from what he said about the African campaign and other things that he must feel the same: that a military commander has never had any real difficulty when operations are on in absorbing a naval brigade into his joint force. This was so even as far back as Ladysmith.
There has never been any difficulty in getting co-operation as is going on now in the Federation of South Arabia, of having Royal Marine Commandos working side by side with Army Commandos under an Army commander. Really, it is just fulfilling the proper spirit of co-operation that needs to be pressed, and I still think there is a great deal in what my noble, and very experienced, friend Lord Attlee said: "You can have a fault in more harness than horse". I hope that will always be remembered. I have great pleasure in saying again that I am much obliged to all Members of your Lordships' House who have taken part and those who have replied for the Government, and I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  B.B.C. PROGRAMMES AND SERVICES TO SCOTLAND
  B.B.C. PROGRAMMES AND SERVICES TO SCOTLAND
  EGYPT: DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN COMPENSATION FUND
  EGYPT: DISTRIBUTION FROM FOREIGN COMPENSATION FUND
  NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
  NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES
  QUESTIONS ON NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES
  QUESTIONS ON NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES
  TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES AND LISTS OF CHARGES
  TELEPHONE DIRECTORIES AND LISTS OF CHARGES
  APPEALS AGAINST RATING REVALUATION
  APPEALS AGAINST RATING REVALUATION
  UNITED STATES' WORK ON MULTILATERAL NATO FORCE
  UNITED STATES' WORK ON MULTILATERAL NATO FORCE