Sitting of 1 November 1961

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

BRITISH HONDURAS (HURRICANE)
Mr. Dugdale(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether he will make a statement on the hurricane which hit British Honduras yesterday.
The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Hugh Fraser): I have been asked to reply.
Owing to the breakdown of communications information is still extremely scanty, but I regret to say that there is no doubt that a disaster has occurred.
Hurricane "Hattie" passed over Belize, the capital, and a tidal wave inundated the town. So far, only two deaths have been reported in Belize, but reports are, of course, incomplete. It is feared, however, that villages and townships in the Stann Creek district probably received the full force of the hurricane and no news has been received from this area.
Relief measures are being co-ordinated by the Red Cross in Jamaica. Two American destroyers are expected to arrive today and H.M.S. "Troubridge", who is on her way to Belize with relief supplies, is expected to arrive at dawn tomorrow.
The airfield at Stanley Field is reported to be usable, but without navigational aids. It is hoped that the first relief plane will arrive today.
The following message was sent yesterday from the Secretary of State, though it is not certain how soon it may be delivered:
"I am most distressed by reports that hurricane has struck. Our anxious thoughts are with you and everyone in British Honduras at this time. Am anxiously awaiting news when you can communicate and to know what we can do to help."
Mr. Dugdale: Is the Under-Secretary aware that we are very glad to hear that everything possible is being done? We hope that there may be one of Her Majesty's warships nearby which may be able to help. Will the hon. Gentleman say, in particular, whether the cost of a disaster of this kind—a natural disaster —is to fall on the Colony, or whether some help will be forthcoming from this country?
Mr. Fraser: I repeat that H.M.S. "Troubridge" is at this moment steaming from Jamaica to Belize.
We will look into the matter of costs when we have the full report, but I think that it is Undoubted that a Colony with an economy such as that of British Honduras will look to this country for assistance.
Mr. Marquand: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that we on this side of the House wish to associate ourselves with the expression of sympathy which he made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government? We are glad that relief is being rushed to British Honduras as quickly as possible.
On the question of further aid to the stricken Colony, will he bear in mind that this is the second time within a very few years that the Colony has been hit by a hurricane and that special aid will almost certainly be necessary beyond what is usual on these occasions?
Mr. Fraser: I thank the right hon. Gentleman. I will certainly bear those points in mind.

BILLS PRESENTED
  EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE
  Bill to continue certain expiring laws, presented by Sir E. Boyle; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 1.]

  TANGANYIKA INDEPENDENCE
  Bill to make provision for, and in connection with, the attainment by Tanganyika of fully responsible status within the Commonwealth, presented by Mr. Maudling; supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. R. A. Butler, Mr. Sandys, Mr. Iain Macleod, and Mr. Vosper;

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  read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 2.]

  COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRANTS
  Bill to make temporary provision for controlling the immigration into the United Kingdom of Commonwealth citizens; to authorise the deportation from the United Kingdom of certain Commonwealth citizens convicted of offences and recommended by the court for deportation; to amend the qualifications required of Commonwealth citizens applying for citizenship under the British Nationality Act, 1948; to make corresponding provisions in respect of British protected persons and citizens of the Republic of Ireland; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by Mr. R. A. Butler; supported by Mr. Sandys, Mr. Iain Macleod, Mr. Maudlin g, Mr. Hare, the Attorney-General, and Mr. Renton; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 3.]
  SOUTHERN RHODESIA (CONSTITUTION)
  Bill to provide for the grant of a new constitution for Southern Rhodesia, presented by Mr. Sandys; supported by Mr. Braine; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 4.]

  FAMILY ALLOWANCES AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  Bill to improve and extend the allowances payable out of the Industrial Injuries Fund in respect of injury or disease arising out of pre-1948 employment; to amend the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Acts, 1946 to 1960, and the National Insurance Acts, 1946 to 1960, as regards the circumstances giving a right to or affecting the continuance or rate of certain benefits, as regards the references in certain provisions relating to contributions to an income not exceeding one hundred and fifty-six pounds a year or to remuneration not exceeding sixty shillings a week, and as regards matters connected with the administration of the Acts and the making and operation of orders and regulations thereunder; to make further provision as to sums wrongly paid by way of benefit under those Acts or by way of family allowance; to alter the meaning in those Acts and the Family Allowances Acts, 1945 to 1959, of the
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  Word "child"; to provide for certain expenses of the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance; and for purposes connected therewith, presented by Mr. Boyd-Carpenter; supported by Mr. Iain Macleod, Mr. Hare, Mr. Sharpies, and Mrs. Thatcher; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 5.]

  FORTH AND CLYDE CANAL (EXTINGUISHMENT OF RIGHTS OF NAVIGATION)
  Bill to extinguish any right of navigation on the Forth and Clyde Canal, and the obligations upon the British Transport Commission to keep that canal open and to maintain it for purposes of navigation, presented by Mr. Maclay; supported by Mr. Brooman-White and Mr. Hay; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 6.]
  HOUSING (SCOTLAND)
  Bill to make further arrangements for the giving of financial assistance for the provision and improvement of housing accommodation in Scotland and for building experiments in connection therewith; to amend as respects Scotland the law relating to the permitted increase of rent in respect of improvements, to houses unfit for human habitation, and to the obligations of lessors and lessees as to repairs under short leases of houses; to make further provision for default of Scottish local authorities in their duties as to the fixing of rents; to amend in minor particulars the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1950; to enable the Secretary of State to acquire shares of authorised societies within the meaning of the Housing Act, 1914, and to dispose of moneys accruing to him from those and other shares; and for purposes connected with any of those matters, presented by Mr. Maclay; supported by Sir E. Boyle and Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 7.]

  LOCAL GOVERNMENT (FINANCIAL PROVISIONS ETC.) (SCOTLAND)
  Bill to provide in respect of the year 1961–62 for revision of the apportionment of expenditure and of general grants among local authorities in Scotland; to make further provision as respects Scotland with respect to the amounts payable in lieu of rates or by

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  way of rates by the British Transport Commission, Electricity Boards and Gas Boards, with respect to relief from rates of charitable and other similar bodies, with respect to sums borrowed by local authorities and with respect to Valuation Appeal Committees, demand notes for rates, and corrections of the valuation roll; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by Mr. Maclay; supported by Sir E. Boyle and Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 8.]

  EXPORT GUARANTEES
  Bill to increase the limit imposed by section two of the Export Guarantees Act, 1949, as amended by any subsequent enactment, on the liabilities which may be undertaken by the Board of Trade in respect of guarantees under that section and certain other transactions under the Export Guarantees Acts, 1949 to 1959, presented by Mr. Erroll; supported by Mr. Vosper, Sir K. Joseph, and Sir E. Boyle; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 9.]
  TRANSPORT
  Bill to provide for the reorganisation of the nationalised transport undertakings now carried on under the Transport Act, 1947, and for that purpose to provide for the establishment of public authorities as successors to the British Transport Commission, and for the transfer to them of undertakings, parts of undertakings, property, rights, obligations and liabilities; to repeal certain enactments relating to transport charges and facilities and to amend in other respects the law relating to transport, inland waterways, harbours and port facilities; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by Mr. Marples; supported by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Maclay, Mr. Hare, Mr. Erroll, and Mr. Hay; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 10.]

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Ordered,
That—

(1) save as provided in this Order, Government Business shall have precedence at every sitting for the remainder of the Session;

(2) Public Bills other than Government Bills shall have precedence over Government Business on the following Fridays, namely, 8th December, 26th January, 9th February, 23rd February, 9th March, 23rd March, 6th April, 4th May, 18th May and 1st June;

(3) on and after Friday, 6th April, Public Bills other than Government Bills shall be arranged on the Order Paper in the following order:—Consideration of Lords Amendments, Third Readings, Consideration of Reports not already entered upon, Adjourned Proceedings on Consideration, Bills in progress in Committee, Bills appointed for Committee, and Second Readings;

(4) the ballot for unofficial Members' Bills shall be held on Thursday, 9th November, under arrangements to be made by Mr. Speaker, and the Bills shall be presented at the commencement of Public Business on Wednesday, 22nd November;

(5) unofficial Members' Notices of Motions and unofficial Members' Bills shall have precedence in that order over Government Business on the following Fridays, namely, 1st December, 15th December, 2nd February, 16th February, 2nd March, 16th March, 30th March, 13th April, 11th May and 25th May;

(6) on Mondays, 11th December and 7th May, unofficial Members' Notices of Motions shall have precedence until seven of the clock, and if not previously concluded the proceedings thereon shall lapse at that hour and the House shall proceed with Government Business;

(7) on Wednesdays, 21st February and 4th July, Government Business shall have precedence until seven of the clock and if the Business has not been concluded earlier Mr. Speaker shall at that hour proceed to interrupt the proceedings thereon and the House shall then proceed with unofficial Members' Notices of Motions; and the proceedings on Business interrupted at seven of the clock shall be resumed either after unofficial Members' Notices of Motions have been disposed of or after the Question on any Motion made in accordance with paragraph (2) of Standing Order No. 1A (Exemptions from Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House) has been decided, as the case may be;

(8) ballots for precedence of unofficial Members' Notices of Motions shall be heid after Questions on the following Wednesdays, namely, 15th November, 29th November, 24th January, 31st January, 14th February, 28th February, 14th March, 28th

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March, 2nd May. and 9th May for the following Fridays, 1st December, 15th December, 2nd February, 16th February, 2nd March, 16th March, 30th March, 13th April, 11th May and 25th May, respectively, and on Tuesdays 28th November, 6th February, 17th April and 5th June, for Monday, 11th December and Wednesday 21st February, Monday, 7th May and Wednesday, 4th July, respectively; and no Notice of Motions shall be handed in for any of the said days on which unofficial Members' Notices have precedence under this order in anticipation of those ballots;

(9) until after Wednesday, 22nd November, no unofficial Member shall give Notice of Motion for leave to bring in a Bill under Standing Order No. 12 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of Public Business) or for presenting a Bill under Standing Order No. 35 (Presentation and first reading).—[Mr. Iain Macleod.]

ORDERS OF THE DAY
  QUEEN'S SPEECH

    DEBATE ON THE ADDRESS
    [SECOND DAY]
    Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Question—[31st October]:
    That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, as follows;—
    Most Gracious Sovereign,
    We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament:— [Sir R. Robinson.]
    Question again proposed.
    Mr. Speaker: I think that it would be for the convenience of the House if I were now to indicate what I believe to be the wishes of the House about the grouping of the topics in this current general debate.
    I understand that it is desired to concentrate attention today upon defence; tomorrow, upon foreign affairs; and on Friday, upon education.
    On Monday and Tuesday we shall be concerned with Amendments, but as I have not seen them yet, I cannot say any more about it now.
    2.42 p.m.
    Mr. George Brown: We are having this debate at a time when, wherever it looks, the nation is faced with very great problems; at home, in our domestic situation; abroad, in our international policy; in our economic situation, and in the defence arrangements we must make for our country. I must say that the speech we heard yesterday from the Prime Minister, presenting the proposals that he, as Her Majesty's chief adviser, had felt right to make to her, seemed to me far and away below the needs of the moment.
    There were times when I felt—and I had the pleasure of hearing the Prime Minister twice yesterday, unlike most hon. Members, who only heard him once—that we were very nearly back in the declining years of Mr. Ramsay

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    Macdonald. We did not exactly have "on and on and on" and "up and up and up," but we did have "seizing every problem" and "grasping every opportunity." We heard about the "penalties of failure," we heard about the "prizes of success," but we did not hear very much about any kind of specific ideas in any of the fields concerned, or about how this country at this stage seeks to deal with the tremendous problems that face her.
    My own conclusion was that we are now at the halfway stage of the life of this Government—a Government that is over the hill. There is the "double banking" about which we have heard so much, which produces two of everything. We now have virtually two Prime Ministers, two Foreign Secretaries, two Chancellors of the Exchequer—[HON. MEMBERS; "Two Oppositions."]—If the five or six hon. Members down there below the Gangway give the Prime Minister every comfort, he is entitled to it. We have two of everything and, as I am reminded, yesterday we even had two Queen's Speeches, which must be pretty nearly a unique achievement for any Government at any time. What I think we may now have is twice the muddle they made single-handed, and that is a most fearful prospect for us.
    If hon. Members would like to follow this through, I think they would agree that what stands out even more is that the proposals seem to be composed as though we were really unaware of the real problems that face our country. There is not one single imaginative attack on our difficulties. We have the purely destructive, as in the proposals to break up the British Transport Commission. We have the purely ingenious proposals, if the word "pure" is the right one to use in that connection, but as The Times describes them, to get over or try to get round our difficulties in (manpower in the Forces. We have many things that are wholly irrelevant, whatever may be their other claims on our attention. And then we have, in one simple sweep, the casual ending of a centuries-old tradition of which this nation has been proud—I refer to the proposals about immigration.
    There is, in that easy, casual decision, wiped out, I repeat, a tremendous tradi-
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    tion that we have built up literally over centuries. There is in the reference no attempt to deal with the real problems that lie behind this; no ability to recognise that they are social problems and welfare problems; that these are community problems that we provide for in this country communally, and that that is exactly the field in which Her Majesty's Government have chosen to make their most vicious cuts and most vicious attack on housing expenditure and provision.
    There is no recognition of that at all. There is an attempt, of course, to make it apparent that this is not a colour bar; that it has to do wholly with economic and social pressures. Well—I do not know. We have just recently had two issues which, whatever their intrinsic merits, are of enormous concern to every country in the Commonwealth, this great association of free and equal peoples. There is the Common Market and our decision to go there or to inquire about going there, and now there is the issue of the control of immigration.
    On neither of these subjects have the Government either started by consulting a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference or been willing to give an undertaking that they will not take a final decision before consulting a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. The fact that this is their attitude to the Commonwealth ought to shed a very great and gleaming light on what is moving there and on what their relationship to and their real thoughts about the Commonwealth are.
    When people say that colour is not at the bottom of this proposal, I must recall that the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne), who has played a very prominent part in this campaign, advocated in this House in 1958 a restriction on immigration into this country, particularly on coloured immigrants. The Daily Mail, earlier this year, reported the hon. Gentleman as saying:
    "This is a white man's country and I want it to remain so."
    The Government cannot easily dissociate themselves from the hon. Member for Louth, because that is where the campaign blew up; that is how it came about that the conference proved a wee bit too strong for the more liberally-minded members of the Government.

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    There is not a lot of difference between the claim that "This is a white man's country and I want it to remain so" and Sir Oswald Mosley's demand to "Keep Britain white".
    We are treated to facts and figures about this. They reveal that 95 per cent. of the coloured immigrants into this country find jobs soon after their arrival. Anyone who deals with essential but uncongenial, often lowly paid, services—and we do in the great trade union to which I am proud to belong —can inform the Government that there is little we could have done to keep transport and other essential community services going if we had not had that reinforcement over the past few years. This really should be taken into account.
    The failure to discuss this in advance with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers or to be willing to accept their views before coming to a final decision will have a much harsher result than the Prime Minister seems to understand. I gather that it is not the influx from the West Indies that is so much in the minds of hon. Members opposite and bothering them. I gather that they are concerned about the influx or movement from the Asian Commonwealth countries, particularly India and Pakistan.
    Yesterday, the Prime Minister paid tribute to some Commonwealth countries which have tried to help to arrange and regulate this from their end. In that, India and Pakistan certainly appeared. There is currently very great unhappiness in both India and Pakistan about the British Government's proposals. Do Her Majesty's Ministers think that they are making it easier to get co-operation and voluntary regulation by acting in this arbitrary fashion to appease their own less thoughtful supporters than had they frankly put the other side of the coin before them?
    I live in a borough in London where this, if there is a human problem, is a problem. I live in Camberwell amidst the problem. As I have told the House before, my brother is responsible for the housing and welfare of these people, and it is a problem. I do not deny that. People living there feel it, but they feel it because the Government will not give them any financial or other help to deal with the problem.
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    The proposal to take these powers is not really to solve the difficulties, and the real consequences of the proposal is to give themselves an alibi for what they are refusing to do, whether for brown, black or white, in boroughs like Camberwell in London, and in Birmingham and cities throughout the country. The casual way in which this is dealt with is a gross reflection on Her Majesty's Ministers, and if the House were easily to accept it, it would be on the House.
    I now turn to (the omissions from the Gracious Speech. The proposal of the Government to introduce the long-overdue Measure based on the Gowers Report is not mentioned. We have had many and solemn undertakings to do this, and I hope that a Government spokesman today will take up this point. May I say in parenthesis that one of the problems of our debates is that we divide them for general convenience but that this makes it easy for Ministers who wish to avoid making a reply to a question. The Prime Minister did not do it yesterday because he had other things with which to deal. The Minister of Defence did not do it, and so on. We are left, then, with the new Leader of the House. Will he tell us about Gowers? Does the Bill which my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich (Mr. Marsh) piloted through this House take legal effect from January next year in the absence of any proposals to do anything about it, and are the Government putting their resources, if required, behind it to see that the Bill is effective? Even though the Government said that they were not happy about it in Committee, it was carried without their support.
    What about the Weights and Measures Bill—the great shops charter? It took eleven days in the House of Lords and kept their Lordships sitting some longish nights. I understand that that has a different connotation for their Lordships. Nevertheless, they sat rather late. They considered 400 Amendments, for it was that important; yet now it is not mentioned, and I want to know what is being done.
    Then there is the Chancellor of the Exchequer's only real concession to those who are in favour of creating a climate for effective co-operation, not only

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    between management and labour, but between industry and the Government— a tax on speculative capital gains. That, too, is omitted. Has it disappeared, or are we to hear more about it?
    On the economic front, the full-scale debate when the House will turn its attention wholly to this, will come on Tuesday. There is time between now and then for the Chancellor—who is not with us today—to decide what, in fact, he did say at Leicester. As reported, we understand that he said that he was sorry. He took the blame for a mistake and he just did not think that increases in personal incomes would matter.
    This, of course, was rather a remarkable sin to be confessing, but on the other hand it was rather nice to find the right hon. Gentleman willing to go to the confessional. But yesterday the right hon. Gentleman said that he did not say that at all. He said that what he said was "It would not materialise". If he really did say "would not materialise", then he reduces what he said to sheer jabberwocky. It makes no sense at all. On the other hand, it may since then have occurred to someone that first of all he denied it but was then faced with the awkward point that the newspapers said that they had clear reports of it. He may then have concluded that the reporters' outlines for "materialise" and "matter" looked very much the same and that he might get away with it. He really cannot get away with it again. On the one hand, we have la frank confession and, on, the other, an attempt to explain it away.
    If the right hon. Gentleman did not mean it—and if that was not what he really thought earlier this year—we are still left without any answer to our allegation that neither the Chancellor nor the Prime Minister really understood then, or understand now, the real nature of the problem we are facing. On this subject I merely point out that the basic internal industrial problem is now to establish a climate for co-operation; how to make a reality of what the Prime Minister yesterday called "inter-dependence". Do the Government still not understand that the health charges of February plus the hand-outs of April— to other people, of course—plus the restrictions of July simply do not add up to a climate in which people can co-
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    operate with each other? The Prime Minister looks surprised, so let me spell it out for him.
    The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I was not surprised. I was looking at the right hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Brown: I was aware that the right hon. Gentleman was looking at me, but I thought that he was looking surprised. If he was not looking surprised, then I assume that he takes my point, that if the Government give money to people who are more than averagely better off in April—and before doing that place charges on people who are more than averagely poor—and in July they place restrictions on all the things that affect for the most part the less well-off, how can they secure a climate in which management and labour or industry and government are likely to be able to cooperate with each other and share a sense of purpose? This is the point.
    If we add to that the refusal to have a capital gains tax and the dropping out of this Queen's Speech of even the very minor suggestion that there should be a tax on speculative property deals, then in fact we are reinforcing the situation, and I assure the Prime Minister that if he thinks in that situation and with that background he is really going to get co-operation, which I desire as much as he does—I heard him claim it twice yesterday—between our members and their industrial management bosses as they call them, or partners as they ought to see them, he makes the most terrifying mistake. He ought not to kid himself or allow himself to be kidded that in that atmosphere that kind of co-operation is possible.
    If on top of that they start doing what the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Education are now doing and interfere with negotiating machinery, putting a ban on justified claims, preventing arbitrated and negotiated settlements from working, and solemnly breaking their own negotiated agreements, then at the end of the day they put a premium on militancy. They elevate the conception of fight as against that of co-operation. They provide an absolute incitement to take what one can when one can and how one can.
    This, I assure the Prime Minister, is what he is doing in the policy which he and the Chancellor are pursuing, whether

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    they realise it or not. In saying that, I repeat that this is not what we desire. There is a different road that this country could walk industrially, but it would require a very different background indeed from that which they are providing.
    I want to turn now to two other main subjects. I want to look at the position of nuclear tests, since that obviously must be at the back of all our minds in debating a Gracious Speech at the beginning of a new Parliament in October, 1961. There is no need, as the Prime Minister said yesterday, for any of us at this stage, speaking from these Dispatch Boxes, to enter into a competition to see whether we can find—I think I am using his words—new phrases to express horror, our detestation, and our absolute sense of shock in my case, that the Russians should have done what they have done.
    I would just add this. If there was any room for feeling fresh numbness, I was shaken yesterday to read that Mr. Khrushchev had told the Soviet Communist Party at its Congress that the Soviet scientists had miscalculated the size of the bomb which they had exploded and that, therefore, it was bigger than 50 megatons, but that he was not blaming them, and this was greeted with laughter and applause. I begin to wonder whether there is any feeling or understanding left in the Russian Communist Party, its leaders or its people, if that is their reaction to the explosion of a bomb of that kind with all the tremendous danger and, not only danger, but the actual consequences that it has.
    It is not my business to go to the Prime Minister's aid, and I think the House will understand that I am not particularly anxious to do so, but when I heard the Prime Minister yesterday being vigorously attacked—and properly so—on an undertaking by Britain not to do it in the future and being questioned on whether the Americans had taken the right attitude of not doing it now or in the future, I must say I could not help contrasting the concern that we in the democracies, to our eternal credit, have for what we will do and the conditions under which we will do it, with the levity with which the Com-
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    munist countries have actually done it. The comparison is enormous and outstanding.
    Having said that, there are some immediate problems on which I think the Prime Minister did not actually carry the House yesterday. One is on the question of protection—immediate protection so far as we, heaven help us, can give it to our children, and the other is to avoid worsening the situation, in both cases, so far as fall-out is concerned. On the question of protection, compared with what the Prime Minister said last week when he answered Questions in the House, it seemed to me that the Prime Minister yesterday did not give us satisfactory answers.
    Last week we were told that the Medical Research Council, prior to the explosion of the previous monster bomb, had made some calculations which took into account the explosion of the theoretical 50-megaton bomb. The M.R.C. said that the margin of danger would not be reached unless the "present levels"—I think that means after a possible 50 megaton bomb explosion—had been increased by further explosions. It went on to say that if there were additional explosions, as I understand it, the contamination of milk in the subsequent weeks might cause the annual mean level to approach the maximum level specified. What we have had is not one 50 megaton explosion; we have had a 30 megaton plus. We have had a number of small ones and we have had a 50 megaton plus, which might be anything between 50 and 100 megatons.
    It seems to me that if what the Minister of Defence said last week added up on the basis of the M.R.C. Report, as I believe it did, then with the subsequent explosions, while we may not have gone over the danger point, we must be over the warning line now. If we are over the warning line, is it not now time for the Government to take action? There is a distinction here between the warning line and the danger line, and this was carefully explained by the Minister of Defence last week. I am only using his words. There was a point at which we took action and there was a point at which we were actually in danger. I understand from the Minister of Defence

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    that we would take action on the warning line. It seems to me that the explosion since may well have taken us over the warning line.
    I ask the Minister of Defence to be much more specific than the Prime Minister was yesterday, and I want to put two points to him. Would it not be better, as I suggested before the last Parliament rose, in view of the additional fall-out and the additional charging of the atmosphere with these horrible things, now to tell mothers of young children that they can have the powdered milk if they wish it, leaving ourselves free to make the actual compulsory—if that is the word—issue later? I say this to the Prime Minister because if we want to avoid panic it is tremendously important that people should know that their safety or the safety of their own children is not committed to some gentleman making a calculation in Whitehall or elsewhere. Put it beyond all doubt.
    If that is what the Government really think, they should say, "We do not ourselves think we are really over the warning line"—though it would be hard to understand that in view of what the Minister of Defence said last week—but if they say that, then I do not see why they do not also say, "But if you feel a sense of insecurity, the powdered milk for your child is available and you can go and get it so that you can have an absolute feeling of comfort." On the basis of the M.R.C. report, does not the Prime Minister think it is time to do something now for those in the high-ground areas in Scotland, Wales and elsewhere who, the M.R.C. clearly showed, are probably already over the warning line and who must now be in danger because they will have had more than anybody else? Does not he think, since the Minister of Defence said that this could be a regional arrangement, that we should here and now take protective steps for those people?
    I am bound to say that I understood parts of what the Prime Minister said about the worsening of the situation but I certainly did not understand other parts. I hope that the House as a whole, including even those of my hon. Friends who disagree with me. is in no doubt about the facts. In 1958, Mr. Gromyko, putting it in so many words,
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    made it perfectly plain that, if any of the great Powers which possess these weapons were to explode more, then the others—I think he spoke directly of the Soviet Union, in fact—then the Soviet Union would feel free to follow suit in the pursuit of the security of the Soviet Union. In 1960, Mr. Khrushchev was much more explicit. He said that, if any one of the great Powers did it, the others would be forced to follow.
    At that stage, the Russians saw the problem with great clarity. It would not be intelligent—and the Russians would not allow it for a minute—to assume that there is not a problem for the rest if one of the great Powers goes ahead and explodes its own bombs and conducts a series of explosions. We are dealing here not only with 50-megaton bombs or 80-megaton bombs—if we were, I think I could face it a little more easily—but we are dealing with a succession of small ones, under the sea and in all kinds of places, which could very much change the situation. We must accept that; otherwise, we do not start the discussion from an intelligent point.
    On the other hand, I put it tc the Prime Minister—I think he ought to have been clearer about this yesterday —that it does not follow that the West should resume testing just because tests have been resumed somewhere else. It would be a terrible thing to do. The situation calls for a great deal of calm and calculated consideration. Nor docs it follow that, even if we do start again, which I hope we shall not, we need ever again test in the atmosphere. There was a stage when the West was prepared to have a test agreement and would have liked a test agreement which excluded the atmosphere and restricted any possible testing to sites below ground.
    Cannot we say, first, that we, Britain, do not intend as a consequence of what the Russians have done to resume tests? I say "we, Britain". Yesterday, the Prime Minister constantly spoke of "we" and it was not always clear whether he meant we, Britain, or we, the West. Trying to be as responsible as I can, I cannot see any reason why we, Britain, should not say that, in the light of out military posture and what we have.
    Second, cannot we say that we, the West, will not resume tests until it becomes clear to us that the Soviet Union

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    has broken through or is breaking through in some important new area, for example, in anti-missile defence? Cannot we say that we will not resume testing for any other reason, and that we certainly will not do so for any political reason whatever. I see no reason why we should not be able to say that. [An HON. MEMBER: "The Prime Minister said it."] I do not think that the Prime Minister did say it. If he will read what he said, I think he will find that it was not at all clear.
    The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman had better read it himself.
    Mr. Brown: With respect, it is no use the Prime Minister, in a slightly bad-tempered way, saying that I had better read it. If he cannot carry me with him in what he said, there are bound to be a great many people in the House and outside whom he is certainly not carrying, and he really ought not to take that view.
    Viscount Lambton: Do I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that, if there were some great Soviet scientific advance, he would consider that the Government were free then to make tests?
    Mr. Brown: I thought I had made it perfectly clear. I will try again. I believe that deterrence, that is to say, the knowledge that one side cannot use these weapons against the other side without a certain consequence which is not worth their while, is in present circumstances the way in which we keep them out of use. It follows from that belief, which is not a new one to me, that if one side knew the answer to the other side's way of delivery and the first side did not have the same knowledge, the whole point of deterrence would be destroyed.
    If we had reason to believe that the other side were breaking through in, for instance, anti-missile defence, that would create the very situation that Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Khrushchev had in mind. But it does not follow that the explosion of 50-megaton bombs at 12,000 ft., as the Prime Minister told us yesterday, bombs which he was careful to say had no military significance, gives us a reason for saying that we ought to resume testing. In my view, we ought to be very much more
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    firm about it than the Prime Minister was yesterday.
    These are matters which, quite properly, terrify many people. There is in the Gracious Speech a reference to disarmament, but it is a reference of the most perfunctory kind. It is said that the Government
    "will do their utmost to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control".
    They might easily have added that they were also in favour of an early spring low taxation, and all the rest. The reference to disarmament is really quite perfunctory.
    There are problems to be solved if we are to get disarmament negotiations going. The Disarmament Commission must be re-established. We must widen its membership. We must put a set of proposals before it. What I hope we shall hear from the Minister of Defence, which we wholly missed from the Prime Minister yesterday, is a reference to any ideas which the Government have and to some real enthusiasm for getting disarmament negotiations going again. We are all accustomed to say that disarmament is the great hope for mankind. It is extraordinary how perfunctory we sometimes are in our references to it.
    I turn now to what is said in the Gracious Speech about defence. As the House knows, the proposals appear to be to hold back in the Services some National Service men for a further six months and to call up some men who finished their National Service at various times during a quite long period in the past and compulsorily bring them back for another six months' service.
    The first comment I make about that is that I do not know what the proposals mean. I listened with great care to the Prime Minister yesterday. I have had a report—I did not hear it—of what the Secretary of State for War said on television last night. I am not clear about whom it is intended to call back or, indeed, whether it is intended to call anybody back. The Prime Minister said that we may not use these powers. I gather that the Secretary of State said both that and that he did not quite know even when the legislation was coming before the House.
    A proposal of this kind must at this moment be having its consequences on

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    many men in the Army and on their families. To launch it on the country and say that one does not even know whether one will want it or when one will want it suggests that the story that Mr. Gilpatrick suddenly bounced this on the Government a few days ago is probably right. If it is not right, and if it is nonsense, as the Minister says— it is for him to show that in a moment —how is it that we have such a half-baked proposal as this that no Minister, including the Prime Minister, really understands it?
    I should like to quote from what the Prime Minister said yesterday. He really must stand up for what he says. He stated that there would be no point in reintroducing National Service or selective service. He said almost immediately afterwards that
    "conscription would be a wasteful and inefficient method of solving a temporary problem."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st October. 1961; Vol. 648, c. 35.]
    What does he think this is? This is conscription.
    Mr. F. H. Hayman: Of a form.
    Mr. Brown: Not only of a form; it is conscription. A number of young men are being compelled to serve willy-nilly in the Forces. It is being done selectively. The Government are not taking the next batch of young men who are available. They are selectively saying, "We shall take that batch and compel them to serve."
    Neither of the statements of the Prime Minister to which I have just referred is even true, let alone a rational explanation of what is happening. This is not only National Service; it is not only selective service. It is a most grossly unfair form of selective National Service. It is not even being done by the ballot. The Government are picking chaps who are in and saying, "You stay." They are picking chaps who were in and saying to them, "You come back", regardless of their responsibilties. Many of those out of the Services will now be married men with considerable responsibilities. Regardless of whether they are young men who did their service early and are now in universities or technical schools, the Government are saying, "You come out".
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    They are doing it to many men regardless of the fact that they are now older men who deferred their service in order to finish their courses at university and to finish their apprenticeships. These are more mature men with important jobs to do.
    This is selective service and about as unfair a form of selective service as one could possibly devise. However, it is easier than others. It does not involve the same problems as others, and I am afraid that that is the reason why the Government have introduced it. Nor do I think that it has anything to do with Berlin or the German crisis. I think that that is just a convenient excuse for doing it. What has happened—and it is for the Government to disprove this—is that the notion that the figure of 165,000 men would be reached early enough in 1963 probably does not appear to the Government to be so likely now. Further, they have given up the notion that the job could be done with 165.000 men instead of 182,000 men. The convenience of this system is that we get 20,000 men for the next four years by taking 20,000 out of those who are in for six months and then calling up 20,000 continually for the next four years, therefore arriving at the figure of 180,000 over the next four years. I believe that this is the real attraction for the Government. It would have been much better if the Government had told the House that and then taken time to work out some sensible long-term methods of achieving the desired result.
    The refusal of Ministers to face facts —this continual dissemination every time we discuss the matter—has not only brought about a collapse of any defence policy but has left us with far more than manpower problems. The problem of the Army, as I well saw last week, is not only manpower. Indeed, it may not even mainly be manpower. The problem is the arms that our men bear, the equipment which they have and the strategy, the policy, behind which they are operating. These are things which we have not settled, and until we settle them we shall not put our policies right.
    I believe that we have to decide the last point first. We must decide what we did not even attempt to decide until 1957. We may look back on the Secretary of State for Commonwealth

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    Relations and say that he took all the wrong decisions. It may be said that some of us were tempted to support that which turned out to be wrong. That does not matter. Since 1957 there has been no attempt to deal with problems in the light of the developing situation. We have to decide and Ministers have to decide—and the Prime Minister is supremely responsible here—what we shall accept in the way of commitments. We have to decide those commitments which require national forces provided by Britain and those commitments which will be met by Alliance forces to which we provide only a contribution— it may well be an unbalanced contribution. We then have to decide the priorities within those commitments.
    My view is that the problem in B.A.O.R. will not be met by this hurried proposal of the Minister. The problem of B.A.O.R. is a clear failure to answer the question about commitments, priorities and purpose. In everything that I have said and written since I came back from B.A.O.R., I have been very careful not to be too precise, because here we have a problem. We have a problem of the morale of the men who are there and a problem of public opinion here.
    I have told the Minister that I will discuss with him my views about individual deficienies. I have avoided talking about them in public and I propose to avoid that now. This puts discussion in the House in some sense into blinkers. This is the problem of democracy. Everyone is listening to us, whereas no one is listening to the Central Committee or Secretariat in the Kremlin. This puts us in a difficulty. If we are to operate like this, there must be absolute understanding about terms between both sides of the House and those who have information on this matter.
    Yesterday, the Prime Minister—he does this again and again on every kind of subject, whether it is the Common Market, tests, Europe or defence with a tremendous easiness which horrifies me—spoke about things which I feel he had not seen until he read out the piece of paper in front of him. He said that there are, curiously but naturally enough, deficiencies
    "not in the teeth but in the tail."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st October, 1961; Vol. 648, c. 35.]
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    That means that there are deficiencies, not in the great fighting parts of the Army, but in the administrative parts. That is not so. A Prime Minister who does not know that is tremendously uninformed. [An HON. MEMBER; "Nonsense."] It is no good saying that I am talking nonsense. I have just come back from Germany after the most careful investigation. I shall be held to account for what I am saying because there are people who know whether I saw what I say I saw. [Interruption.] Does the Prime Minister wish me to prove it?
    The Prime Minister: I will answer the right hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Brown: I shall be answerable to those who brief me and to the units that I saw.
    Let me tell the Prime Minister that pretty well every unit and battalion in B.A.O.R. is short of its peace-time, present-day requirement, never mind about its war-time establishment. If he is talking about teeth, let me tell him this. The gunners are short, the signals are short—and I have the figures. I know what the tolerances and what the percentages are. The P.B.I. is short. One cannot go to a battalion and find the men there. If infantry, gunners, sappers and signals are not the teeth, what the devil is the teeth of the British Army? If doctors and medical orderlies are not in the teeth, I do not know what is—and they are much worse off.
    Do not let us deny the position. We must get it established, otherwise we will never deal with the problem and never produce a policy. All of them are short. I am talking of the present day and not the strength to be mobilised after things look bad. I am talking about present-day, peace-time establishment. Do not let us pretend about this. The Prime Minister ought to require much more information.
    Let me turn from men, because it is not only a question of manpower, to arms and equipment, again trying to do this very difficult job between presenting what I ought to make public and not going too far. In terms of arms, the situation is bad, is worrying and will be made worse if the Government increase the number of men, as was

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    made plain to me while I was in Germany. If the National Service men are held in and the flow of Regular recruits comes through, the position concerning equipment will be made worse, because it has to be spread around.
    We are short of a modern anti-tank missile. There is no secret about this. Our artillery batteries do not have the conventional aids which they ought to have. I do not suppose there is any question of the enemy not knowing this. We are short of other arms. I will specify them if Ministers wish. Even our nuclear weapons—there is no question of the enemy not knowing this; they have a mission this side of the line, as we have a mission their side of the line—are the oldest, the earliest and the most cumbersome mark of their kind.
    We are short of modern radio sets. As I have written this morning, I saw a unit in a crack armoured brigade, not one that had been at the end of the queue for re-equipment, but one which had a certain degree of priority. What did I find? I asked the fellows. They showed me their vehicles. I saw their sets. Some had one kind of set and some had another. Those who had the one could not talk direct to those who had the other. If the commander of the unit went out and was separated from his vehicles, he could not talk to any of them direct. I am not pretending that they could not talk to each other by a very roundabout route, provided he could get headquarters on his set and then headquarters, who had both, could get the other chaps on the other set. The other chaps could talk to headquarters and, provided that nothing had happened in the meantime, they could talk to him.
    That is unbelievable, but it is the situation. The Government will not improve it by putting more men there. That will make it worse. We all know— we have been told many times—that we have no modern cross-country armoured personnel carrier. I was not able to be present to see what the Minister showed off the other day at Chobham, but my hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) saw it and told me what a wonderful vehicle it will be, but we shall not have it in service until 1963 or 1964. To call up now more men who cannot be moved, because we do not
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    have the armoured mobility for them, will not make it any better if we still do not have the weapons until 1963 or 1964.
    There are other frightening things. Does the Prime Minister know about combat clothing? Does he know that we are not providing combat clothing for the personnel we have now? Does he know that we are using old Korean things, which used to fit ordinary-sized men but the more they are cleaned up, fit smaller and smaller men and are no good for the tall chaps, as one C.O. put it to me? I doubt—this I do not know, but I ask the Prime Minister—whether any of them have seen anti-contamination combat clothing for use in a nuclear war. There is much more I could mention.
    The Prime Minister's answer to all this is a hurried decision to hold back 20,000 men. This is all part of a whole problem that involves arms and equipment. We would do far better, as it happens—I believe this to be the view out there, although I hold responsibility for it myself and attribute it to nobody else—by solving the problem of equipping the men who are at present in the B.A.O.R. than we would by finding some way of adding another couple of thousand to them in the near future.
    Nor is the basic doctrine established. There have been some elaborate, sensational and inaccurate criticisms of the British Army. I think it wrong to suggest, as has been suggested, that we are prepared to go nuclear early in a conflict and, in that sense, we are out of step with our allies and with N.A.T.O. I do not believe that that criticism holds water and I offer it to the Minister happily. I am, however, now persuaded that the whole N.A.T.O. strategy of nuclear and conventional "when and how" is as confused as it has ever been.
    I do not believe that our generals clearly know what the intentions are, and I will say why. The strategy and the directives, I suspect, are what they always have been, or have been for a very long time, and I have reasons, which I included in my notes but which, on second thoughts, I will not mention, for saying why I think that this is so which I will discuss with the Minister.
    What has happened is that speeches have changed. Speeches from the

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    White House have changed. Speeches from S.H.A.P.E. have changed and speeches by Ministers have changed, but I do not believe that the equipment or the posture has changed and I believe that the early use of nuclear weapons in any conflict of any size is the doctrine, whatever we may say about it.
    The point is that it is leading to a most curious situation. Commanders are being led to say, "We do not want any more troops, partly because when we get them it will complicate our business of housing, it will complicate the use of our vehicles and our weapons. It will prevent us giving them welfare at all." They are saying all that, but commanders are also saying, "There is no point in it, because I do not know what they tell you at home, but in the kind of war we shall be in we shall not want that number of troops. "This is how the whole thing is getting disorganised. This is how "Spearpoint" came to look so ridiculous. Until the Government put right their strategy and their basic policy, it is the height of stupidity to do this kind of little thing, which comes so hard on individuals and contributes nothing to the overall position.
    Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: In the light of what the right hon. Gentleman has said about what he now believes to be the attitude of commanders towards the additional men coming into the Army, will he now say whether he still stands by his accusation against the generals the other day alleging that they wanted consoription?
    Mr. Brown: They are two quite different things, but I still stand by what I said the other day. There is a difference between commanders in the field, with whom one discusses their strategy, and the generals in the War Office who look at an altogether different problem. I still say—
    An Hon. Member: Can the right hon. Gentleman say which generals wanted conscription?
    Mr. Brown: These are two quite different things. There are generals and they are in the right hon. Gentleman's place, and I can name them, who want to go back to conscription and who briefed correspondents to display certain weaknesses in order to get it That is what I meant the other day. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] That is monstrous?
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    Yes, but just now, when I was being so careful to answer criticisms of "Spearpoint" to the benefit of the Government, did the Prime Minister have the grace to say "Thank you"? No. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Wait a minute. This is the whole problem with this right hon. Gentleman, that one is all the time taken for granted: we are the junior ranks; it is our duty to support them; but it is "monstrous" if we ever criticise them. This is the whole problem, and the Prime Minister must take the rough with the smooth in this. There are some respects in which I think the Government have been improperly criticised; there are other respects in which I think they have not.
    Let me say very briefly what I think ought to be done here. [Interruption.] Yes, the Secretary of State knows well who I am talking about. Let me now say what the Minister ought now to be doing.
    Brigadier Sir John Smyth Brigadier Sir John Smyth (Norwood) rose—
    Mr. Brown: No. [HON. MEMBERS; "Shame."] I am sure it is a shame, but it is also a shame if one takes too much time. [HON. MEMBERS; "Hear, hear."] The hon. and gallant Gentleman will have every opportunity to answer me, and I will listen and take note of what he has to say, with the respect I have for him, but now I should like to bring my remarks to a conclusion.
    But I feel I have a duty to say what I think we should be doing. First we should attack the real problems of the defence policy, and I will say what I think these are.
    First of all we should review—I think we have to review—'and change our overseas commitments. We must both cut some of our commitments out and we must alter the method of covering others. [HON. MEMBERS; "Which ones?"] One could in fact cover Far East commitments as easily seaborne as landborne, and it rather helps that the Navy and the Marines find it easier to recruit than the Army does. We have 20,000 soldiers or thereabouts in Singapore and Hong Kong. A lot of these would be an enormous help in other problems. We have blocks of soldiers elsewhere, and it is very difficult to seo what their real purpose would be if they had to do the job which, one assumes,

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    they are there to do. We should then establish the priorities of what remains. My view is in the present political circumstances that the European theatre must have first place.
    We should make great changes in the Army organisation. I believe the ratio of command to fighting men— not tail to teeth, though it is partly true of that, too—of command to troops in B.A.O.R., is quite out of what it ought to be. We have far too many echelons of command even (though the claim is that we may be more flexible. We should certainly review the organisation of the Army. We have more tail in each division than we ought to have. We should certainly get on with equipment even if it means getting it from elsewhere. I think the Americans have a great responsibility to answer for, for the way in which they have pressured our Allies not to take weapons and items of equipment where the British were in fact better than they had.
    But having said that, and saying to the Government that we get as tough as we can, the fact remains that in the end there is no point in having our men in the Army unless they have the equipment which is actually available. And if they are not going to have it till 1964 or 1965—and we are now in 1961 with a terrible gap facing us—then it would be sensible to see that they got it now.
    Not all that I have said will commend itself to everybody in the House. That is obvious, but I have given the House the best picture I can of what I feel to be the position. I have tried to suggest the bones of a defence policy. What is incontrovertible is that at the moment our forces are not properly deployed, and are not effectively armed or equipped, and that the basic doctrine behind which they are to operate is not the one which would give us a chance to fight conventionally and hold the pass. In defence, as in economic affairs, and in the country's whole social conditions, the Government, particularly the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister on the basis of yesterday, show an awful shortfall from what events and the country require.
    3.46 p.m.
    The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Watkinson): I do not think that I need spend a lot of time on what I thought the somewhat perfunctory remarks which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) made about general issues in the Gracious Speech, except just to say two things. First, about immigration. The right hon. Gentleman talked a lot about the Commonwealth aspects of immigration, and so did his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition yesterday. I must put this to the right hon. Gentleman. Does he think that it makes it any easier to solve what he himself recognises is a grave problem by prejudging it in this House before he even has all the facts?
    Secondly, may I say that I had the honour for four years to serve in the Ministry of Labour under Lord Monckton and with the late Sir Godfrey Ince, a very great Permanent Secretary, and I knew Sir Arthur Deakin, as the right hon. Gentleman did, and the rest. I know of the need of partnership in industry, but, again, I must say that what I learned in those four years, when I got to know—and I remember the friendships—both employers and trade unionists, is that this nation cannot take more out of the national not than it puts in. [HON. MEMBERS; "Oh."] It cannot; and when it tries to do it the Government are not fulfilling their duty it they do not put a check on that process. Everybody knows that that is the truth.
    Turning to the question of nuclear tests, the first announcement will be made today from the office of the Minister for Science, although it is put out by the Agricultural Research Council. The first results of the investigation which I and which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister promised into the levels of iodine 131 in milk—we promised that there would be regular announcements of this kind—will be issued later today.
    I think what the House will want to know from me at this stage is that it does show quite clearly not only as a countrywide average, but also as an average, in what we all accept are the most vulnerable areas, particularly Scotland and Wales, that the present levels

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    are still below, and, in some cases, well below, the warning level: not the danger level; this is the warning level. [HON. MEMBERS; "What are the figures?"] It is a complicated announcement. I think that hon Members had better read the announcement as soon as it comes out, but that, I think, is the main point which the House wants to know.
    I should say one other thing, because we must get the facts right in what is a very difficult and very technical matter. First, we are not yet sure what is the make-up of the monster bombs which the Russians have let off. We are not consulted about them, and have no means of telling what proportion of fission and fusion is in the explosive process. As I explained the other day, it will be some time yet before the monitoring of the radiations can tell us, and until we can tell this it is not possible to say whether the radioactive iodine constituent will be heavily deposited or not.
    Therefore, I think it right to take the line which the right on. Gentleman the Member for Belper took the other day, though I think he departed from it a little this afternoon, and say that there is no need at the moment for anybody to panic, or to feel desperately worried about this situation. Adequate warning will be given. I must make it plain that all the resources of science in this country, in America, in Sweden and other places cannot yet form a clear picture of how "dirty" these bombs are and, therefore, what kind of deposit will fall from them.
    During the next few days, or perhaps weeks, we may get a clearer idea. In the meantime, these regular announcements will be made from time to time and will show clearly, and, I hope, reassure all mothers who may be concerned, that at the moment, as I have said, we are below the warning level still.
    Dr. J. Dickson Mabon: Will the statements issued from time to time include some of the figures collected by the Royal Navy monitoring team working in Holy Loch? Will people know what the levels are there? This information has been refused, although my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and I have been told all the figures the Americans have.
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    This information is no secret to the Americans.
    Mr. Watkinson: That is quite another question. The general level, which certainly includes Scotland, will be put out and will be an accurate and faithful record of the position.
    All I wish to say about the question of nuclear weapons is that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister yesterday made it perfectly clear that we should not restart nuclear tests in the atmosphere for political reasons. I think that we all agree with that. Of course there is no military aspect in exploding a bomb such as the 50-megaton bomb which the Russians recently exploded. The development of nuclear weapons is most likely to lie in two spheres. One is probably the explosion of relatively small kiloton weapons under the sea. The other is the development, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper said, of an anti-missile missile. For the moment, I understand that American progress can be satisfactorily handled in these sorts of spheres by underground tests, and perhaps I should say again to the House that these tests do not allow any escape of dangerous radioactivity. Therefore, the next step is to do what testing may be necessary underground.
    As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made quite plain yesterday, the British Government's position is that if we at any time become quite satisfied on technical grounds that there is the possibility of a break-through in this sphere —and I think that the right hon. Member for Belper is not wrong and that it is most likely to come in the anti-missile missile field—and tests of this particular device, and I am giving this as an example, cannot be satisfactorily concluded underground, then, obviously, the West, for the sake of its own defence and the strength of the deterrent, would have to consider holding some sort of limited test in the atmosphere.
    Those who are interested in this should take account of another point. To test some sort of kiloton weapon under strictly controlled conditions is not any great hazard to health. The hazard to health comes either from a long series of tests which builds up a continuous process of depositing radioactive material, or, and most of all.

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    from the explosion of these enormous megaton weapons. Therefore, I do not think that the West is in any bad or improper posture in this and I do not think that we are open to criticism from uncommitted nations or anyone else for the stand we have taken. As to disarmament, whatever views the right hon. Member for Belper may have about my right hon. Friend's speech, nobody has tried harder to get disarmament than the British Government and the Prime Minister. Nobody in the world doubts that.
    I should like to turn now to the main theme of the right hon. Member for Belper, on defence. I say to him perfectly frankly, whether he can accept it or not, that I think he went too far and said things which, on reflection, he will feel and will find are damaging to the general effort. On the other hand, I recognise the difficulties we are all in. I must make a very straight speech, because most of what the right hon. Member said was inaccurate and I think that I can show that it was.
    Let us just recognise first and perhaps accept this discipline—and this flows very much from something which the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) said the other day. It is very difficult to debate these matters in the House of Commons for the very reason which the right hon. Gentleman gave—that everything we say becomes known to our enemies and everything they say very often does not become known to us at all.
    Therefore, I must accept this discipline. I think that here is a fair comment and a fair example of the difficulties that we shall get into if we are not careful. The right hon. Member for Belper wrote a very interesting article today in the Daily Mirror. He was fair enough to say, and this is true:
    "None of the units I saw could be said to be so undermanned that it could not give a reasonable account of itself."
    The right hon. Gentleman also said in the Observer when he came back, and this is true:
    "But what he had seen had convinced him that, compared with our allies in Europe, Britain was playing a full part in Germany."
    This, again, is true, but what I complain about is not so much what the right hon. Gentleman says and other
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    critics say, but that the conclusion drawn from the broad sweep of what they say is that we are not capable of doing either of these things. Therefore, let us at least start by recognising that we are capable of doing these things, that we do play a comparable part at the moment with our allies, and that the British Army of the Rhine is capable of giving a good account of itself as it stands.
    Viscount Lambton: With what weapons?
    Mr. Watkinson: I am coming to the question of weapons. My noble Friend has anticipated me. I will deal with that matter before coming to the issue of the Government's measures.
    The right hon. Member for Belper said in the Daily Mirror and he said it again today in the House, concentrating very much on communications:
    "I visited a unit where some men had one set and some another type. As a result they were unable to communicate direct with their commanders or with each other in the field."
    I think that the right hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that I have a report on this particular situation. Perhaps I should explain to the House that I accept with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War responsibility for seeing that B.A.O.R. is properly equipped and ready to fight. When I went to Germany before the right hon. Member for Belper one of the main purposes of my visit was to have an examination in the light of the deteriorating situation in Europe and to see whether we were doing the right things. I think that I should just read to the House the actual facts as put to me impartially when I called for a report.
    Mr. G. Brown: Impartial?
    Mr. Watkinson: I think that the right hon. Gentleman accepts that facts are facts. These are the facts and if he wishes to challenge them he can do so. I asked for a factual report and here it is. It says:
    "As far as wireless sets are concerned, there has been a great improvement in B.A.O.R.'s communications in the last two years, and, as a result of the re-equipment programme, the majority of regimental and lower formations now have modern equipment, although above regimental level we are still relying more heavily than we could wish on older types."

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    The right hon. Gentleman, I think, visited the Royal Engineer Squadron which still has No. 19 sets instead of C.13 sets, which have now replaced them for the majority of the B.A.O.R. In other words, the real answer to this—and, again, this shows how what seems to be a criticism, if one is not careful, turns into a damaging generalisation, which is not true—is that the general signals equipment of B.A.O.R. has been modernised and, in general, is up to date and comparable with that of our allies.
    Mr. A. Woodburn: Books on Suez noted that this was one of the great difficulties, not only in communications between our Navy and our Army but also between the allies. Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that communications are improving and are in existence between the different allies in the field?
    Mr. Watkinson: Yes, I am. One of the problems to which N.A.T.O. gives a great deal of study is to get comparable signals equipment, and the modern signals equipment of B.A.O.R. is fully comparable and interlocked in the general N.A.T.O. net.
    I now turn to the principal issues and the measures which the Government propose.
    Viscount Lambton: My right hon. Friend was going to answer my question about equipment.
    Mr. Watkinson: I shall have a great deal to say about equipment as my speech proceeds, so perhaps my noble Friend will be patient. As to the measures, they can only be seen against the general background of the policy not only for the B.A.O.R. but for the Northern Army Group of which it forms a part. I must say again that, although I accept all the difficulties, most of us in this House have seen two world wars start in our lifetime because of a miscalculation by an aggressor who misjudged the will and the ability to resist of those whom he was going to attack and who in the end defeated him.
    Today the greatest danger of war still lies in this kind of miscalculation; it certainly does. Therefore, to contribute to confusion of thought or misunderstanding about military problems in a critical period such as this is to take a very heavy
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    responsibility indeed. It is my duty to try to put the facts, as I have always done, to the House as clearly and plainly as I can. Although the British are very good at talking themselves down, it is a somewhat dangerous pastime when the balance between peace and war is as narrowly poised as we all know it to be.
    As to the general battle worthiness of the British Army, the poor old Army has always been subject to intense criticism. What are the facts about its capacity today? I do not agree for a moment with the right hon. Gentleman's contention that our responsibilities begin and end in Europe.
    Mr. G. Brown: I did not say that.
    Mr. Watkinson: Implying a major withdrawal from the rest of the world for the sake of Europe certainly seems to me to imply that our responsibilities begin and end there. They do not. In June, when it seemed there might be warlike operations in Laos, the Army made the necessary dispositions, and they were successfully made, to meet our commitments in the Far East. At the same time, Army re-enforcements were sent to Central Africa to stand ready in case the Congo emergency required them. In July, we had the operations in Kuwait, and I think that everyone accepts that the landing of the equivalent of a reinforced brigade in 48 hours averted what could have developed into a very ugly situation in the Middle East. By all estimates, this was a highly-successful military operation, and, what was more, it demonstrated that the British Army had learned the lessons of mobility and rapid movement even under the most difficult climatic conditions.
    Viscount Lambton: I think that this is a matter of the greatest interest to the House. If the strength of the British Army is not a source of worry at the present time, what is the purpose of the present measures?
    Mr. Watkinson: Perhaps my noble Friend will wait until I come to that. I have no intention of not trying to set this in its proper frame which is, first, to view the plans for our forces as a whole and, second, our world responsibilities, as well as our immediate responsibilities in Europe. Therefore, it is absolutely fair to say, for the sake

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    of the British Army, that it has in recent months carried through complex operations with the utmost efficiency and sense of military purpose. They are operations which would have been far beyond its capacity in 1939, for example.
    Mr. A. C. Manuel: We should hope so.
    Mr. Watkinson: Or a year or two ago, if the House wants to go further than that. They reflect great credit on all concerned and it is only fair that we should try to strike a fair balance where the facts clearly justify it. At any rate, so far as I am concerned, and perhaps I know as much about it as most people, the Army is not in bad shape and we should be proud of the job that it is doing.
    I now turn to Europe and Berlin. As I have said, Berlin must be viewed against the background of our world responsibilities. This is the issue—the right hon. Gentleman, I think, knows it, but he may genuinely have misunderstood and, therefore, perhaps he will allow me to explain it in some detail —that what the Berlin situation has done is to highlight the situation which has been obvious to all of us in this House for some time and which was clearly stated in the 1957 White Paper. It was this: when we take the right step of changing over from conscripts to all Regular forces, the change-over year when the maximum turbulence would be taking place and when the forces would be running down at their maximum rate would be in 1962. There is nothing new in that. What is new is that we now have to look at this year against a situation in Berlin of great gravity. Therefore, the first thing we have to understand, if we are to judge rightly what the Government propose to do, is that it is in the next twelve months that the full effects of the changeover from conscripts to all Regular forces will be most apparent.
    In answer to the right hon. Gentleman, I would say only that, we carefully looked again at the plans made in 1957. All I can say is that it remains the unanimous advice of all the Government's military advisers that the right decision is to press on with the concept of an all-Regular force. I am sure that that is the right decision. If the right
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    hon. Gentleman knows serving officers who, publicly, take a contrary view, perhaps he will be kind enough to let me know who they are, for I do not. know them.
    It is said as a corollary to what I have just explained—the right hon. Gentleman himself has implied it—that the measures which we have brought forward are brought forward because we are going to fail in this task, or that we are failing in it. I think that the House would like to know that Regular recruiting is now going better than in any period since the drive for recruits began. I know how hazardous prediction is in this field, but, as my right hon. Friend said yesterday, we still have every hope that our targets will be reached. For example, the figures for recruits from civil life to the Army over the last three months show an increase of no less than 35 per cent. over 1960. Therefore, there is no failure but every hope of success in the Government's plans for the changeover to all-Regular forces.
    That does not make any difference to the fact that the target is 165,000 in 1963, and, as everybody knows, it will not be a fully balanced force at that time. If Europe had been reasonably quiescent, if the world had been reasonably normal, that was a changeover period that we could have accepted. That was the fact. But I must make it plain that the change in the situation is the fact that the Berlin problem, with its associated problems, which certainly have not got any easier in the last day or two, has required, and rightly required, a stiffening of the whole of the N.A.T.O. alliance.
    Mr. George Wigg: So that those who wish to speak later may make the necessary comparison, will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what point since the war he would regard as normal?
    Mr. Watkinson: I appreciate why the hon. Gentleman has asked that question, but at what point since the end of the war, since the East German insurrection, has the situation in Berlin been as critical as it is today?
    Mr. Wigg: I was not asking specifically in relation to Berlin. The right hon. Gentleman is painting a picture of the Almighty planting on his plate a problem which he can do nothing about

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    For it to be absolutely fair, we should like to know what point during the last fifteen years he would regard as normal so that we can weigh our present commitments against the commitments in that time of normality.
    Mr. Watkinson: The hon. Gentleman says that we cannot do anything about it. What he apparently objects to is that we are to do something about it. I can assure him that it is the right thing and also our duty. I think I have explained that situation.
    Now we come to what we had to do with B.A.O.R. when the Berlin situation blew up at the end of July. Early in August, after consultation with the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State for War, I issued instructions that our forces in Europe should be held at their existing levels despite the substantial run-down which was already beginning owing to the end of National Service. I think that perhaps it is not generally realised that the level of forces which we are holding in Europe today is around 64,000 men, the Rhine Army contingent being around 51,000 men.
    During August, after a great deal of consultation with the Chiefs of Staff and Army authorities, we decided to begin a process of selective reinforcement of our forces in Europe which would seek to do three things: first, make existing forces more battleworthy; second, improve the whole posture for reinforcement; and, third, as I have said, compensate for the run-down owing to the ending of National Service.
    Announcements have been made from time to time about the progress of this plan. Much of it has still to be implemented, but perhaps I may give three examples. In Berlin, the British commander was given special reinforcements of armoured vehicles. In the British Army of the Rhine—this was the desire of the Commander-in-Chief, General Cassels—it was decided to give first priority for re-equipment to build up our anti-aircraft strength. As I say, this was the Commander-in-Chiefs own wish. That was why we allocated the first surface-to-air guided missile regiment for that purpose, followed by the Army's two most modern light antiaircraft regiments. The Royal Air Force
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    increased its existing strength and started to rotate Lightning squadrons into Germany.
    Therefore, we are beginning the steady process of the build-up of new equipment in B.A.O.R. at the same time as we are holding its strength at the figure at which the Foreign Secretary said we would hold it at the N.A.T.O. meetings which took place at the beginning of August. This is, of course, despite the steady drain of National Service men leaving the forces every day and every week. So that is the situation that we had got to by the beginning of September. We held the position and started a carefully planned re-equipment programme on priorities agreed with the Commander-in-Chief.
    I must deal with one other general point before going on to our measures. The right hon. Gentleman has talked a great deal about strategy, and he has implied, I think perfectly fairly, that he does not challenge British Army strategy. What he challenges is N.A.T.O. strategy. That is a matter which he can no doubt discuss with General Norstad. What I must make plain, first, is that General Norstad has recently produced a revised emergency defence plan.
    I am certainly not going to describe what it is to the House, but what I should say, because it answers some of these suggestions that the allies are out of line, is that this plan meets almost 100 per cent. British current thinking on the right balance between nuclear and conventional weapons and the right disposition in Europe. So we are certainly not out of line with current N.A.T.O. thinking, nor are we out of line with the balance between the nuclear and the conventional. As I have said previously in the House, we conform exactly to the latest N.A.T.O. directives, in this matter both for training and for operation.
    There is one last thing that I must make plain if we are to examine, as I think the House wishes to, this important situation against a factual background. The declared Brussels Treaty strength of the British Army of the Rhine is 55,000 men, but this, of course, is not, and never has been, its war strength. To achieve its war strength, the size of the force will have to be more than doubled. Detailed plans exist to do this. I received the personal assurance

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    of the Commander-in-Chief ten days ago that he is entirely satisfied that these plans are ready, up-to-date and efficient, and could be operated quickly. But the point that the House must face is that under present constitutional and legislative arrangements this substantial reinforcement can be made only after a proclamation and is, in effect, a mobilisation on the ground of an acute state of emergency likely to lead to widespread hostilities.
    To answer the question about the American Deputy-Secretary of State for Defence—it is not only concerning him —I can say that we have not been asked by our allies to take this grave step. But I want to make it plain that the Prime Minister and I certainly examined this during August to see whether we should take this step to call up 50,000 or 60,000 men from productive employment and plant them down in Germany with very little to do, at least at this moment. I think that it would have been wrong to do so. Also, I wonder what the Russian answer would be to a British mobilisation. I do not think it is in anybody's interest to start an accelerated arms race in Central Europe.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Hear, hear. The first words of wisdom.
    Mr. Watkinson: It is nice to agree with the hon. Gentleman on something. We so rarely agree.
    Mr. R. T. Paget: We have always understood that the object of the British Army of the Rhine was to be a stabilising force to prevent a sudden movement or a sudden overwhelming. It was never designed for a longer role. How is that role to be performed by a force which can be effective only after mobilisation, which Napoleon described as an act of war in itself?
    Mr. Watkinson: That fact is well known.
    The position is as follows, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper himself said in his article, and I entirely agree with him. The present B.A.O.R. force, as it exists, is capable of fighting and giving a very good account of itself, and the whole component of Northern Army Group in its present strength is designed to do exactly what the hon.
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    and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has just said, which is to try to hold a limited incursion or create a short pause in a major incursion in order to give statesmen time to make one more attempt to stop the world destroying itself.
    Mr. Paget: Without nuclear weapons?
    Mr. Watkinson: That is the programme and plan for N.A.T.O. As to the balance between nuclear and conventional weapons, the force conforms, as I have said, to SACEUR's latest emergency defence plan.
    Mr. G. Brown: What about the Air Force?
    Mr. Watkinson: As the right hon. Gentleman has asked me that question, he will have the courtesy to admit that, when he went to Germany with the Director of Military Operations, every question he asked was answered. He was given every facility. Why? Because B.A.O.R. has nothing to hide. This is a good, viable force, and I am perfectly willing for the right hon. Gentleman or any other hon. Member to have every facility to see what it is doing and to try to understand its functions and its difficulties. The Royal Air Force, as he knows, has both nuclear and conventional capacities, but the conventional capacity can only be produced, so to speak, after a pause for re-equipment. There is no secret about it.
    Mr. Shinwell: Is not there a great deal of confusion about this matter? Is not the Minister aware that even ten years ago—indeed, longer than that—it was not contemplated that we should have more than four divisions— never up to strength—on the Rhine, but that they were to be backed by the buildup of 12 reserve divisions, including territorial divisions? Is that the present position?
    Mr. Watkinson: As I think is known to the right hon. Member and to everybody else, the present position is that, behind the Proclamation, are reserves which total nearly half a million men, but they are not available until a Proclamation has taken place. These are the facts and I have to face them.
    Mr. Frederick Mulley Mr. Frederick Mulley (Sheffield, Park) rose—
    Mr. Watkinson: I must get on.

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    B.A.O.R., although it can give a good account of itself, rests on a mobilisation plan, and, therefore, we have had carefully to examine the status of our reserves. I have said that it is not feasible to mobilise the Territorial Army in a time of tension rathen than in a time of acute preparation for immediate hostilities. Unfortunately, the same thing applies to pre-Proclamation reservists. Although, legally, we could take them now, they all understand that, if they are called, a shooting war is due to start very soon.
    This was the situation which faced the Government, and we had to try to find what we thought to be the fairest and most sensible solution to it. As I have said, we are keeping B.A.O.R. at something reasonably near what I may call its Brussels Treaty figure. Of course, SACEUR would like us to increase the figure, as he would like any of the allies to increase their strength allocated to him. I must make it plain, however, that I very much doubt whether we can increase the Brussels Treaty figure without recourse to Proclamation and mobilisation, as I have explained.
    What are the alternatives? First, we might have returned to National Service. I do not think, as far as I know, that many hon. Members support that doctrine, so I will say only this about it: it could make no contribution to the present situation, because it would be nine months after we instituted conscription, whether we took one class of men or a whole body, before we could get from it a single soldier fit to be used in the field. In addition, it would entail an extra heavy training burden on the Army at a time when it was very stretched and needed its resources for other, more important duties.
    In addition, my right hon. Friend the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said, When this matter was originally debated—and I still agree that he was right—that a force of about 300,000 conscripts, which was what we had then, has very little more fighting capacity than our target of 165,000 all-Regular soldiers in 1963.
    Perhaps I have said enough to show that the immediate problem was, first, not in any way due to a failure in Regular recruiting, that, secondly, con-
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    scription was not the answer to it, and that, thirdly, it arose from Soviet actions in Berlin which, as allies in N.A.T.O., we must try to meet. Clearly, what we had to look for at this important point was a way of stopping the rundown of the Rhine Army due to National Service men leaving at the end of two years to return to civil life. We have to have a holding operation until the process of recruiting has gone further and until we have taken certain steps, which we would have undertaken anyway, to build up the reserve Army.
    That is why it was decided that the only way was to retain for six months a proportion of the last intake of National Service men. We should have been failing in our duty had we not done this. It is the only way out of our present, short-term difficulties, however much I regret doing it. This is an unpleasant and unpopular decision, and it is very hard on the young men who have just been caught on the wrong side of the dividing line. But we will not take a single man more than we absolutely need. No one will be taken at the moment, because the House have not given the Government power so to do.
    The men will be given the proper three-year Regular rate as soon as they are kept on. We will try to give as much warning to all the men who will be kept on, and will try to administer it as sensibly and reasonably as we can. Our allies are taking similar action. It is the only way to get the quick advantage of trained men, and, unpopular as the decision is, I consider that it is the Government's duty to see it through.
    To say that it is a form of selective service mis-states the position, which follows from Mr. Khrushchev's action in building up the Berlin situation into the worst crisis since the East German rebellion, and one which is perhaps even more dangerous than that.
    I now turn to the other matters. Of course, National Service men will only tide us over another six months. Let me come, then, to the long-term study which we have been making of our forces. We realise that an all-Regular Army needs a new kind of backing in a new kind of Territorial Reserve. It does not make sense that we should try to get an Army so large that it could meet every

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    kind of possible emergency which arose. To do that would be a waste of resources and would keep too many men in the Regular forces. What we need is a balanced and new kind of Army with a more flexible approach.
    After much thought, which has gone on for more than two years, we believe that the right answer to this situation is to have a pool of reservists who can come forward when needed and then be released when danger recedes—in other words, expanding and contracting the Army in conformity with changing demands upon it.
    This is, perhaps, a more novel conception than it may seem at first sight, because the conventional idea of the fixed ceiling for the Regular Army has not very much meaning, if we are to make this work at a time of tension— not of shooting—to strengthen the deterrent to war. These young men could be called forward to strengthen the Army in some part of the world where reinforcement was needed. Our present reserve organisation is unfitted to this task.
    I hope that the House will accept this as a sensible and practical way of trying to meet this need in a free country which is determined to try to have a volunteer Army, Navy and Air Force. If we do this, then the Regular Army will have behind it, without any need for proclamations or declarations of national emergency, a pool of young men— trained, efficient men—who can come forward quickly when needed. Certainly, to try to show how well worth it we think this is, the Territorial Army Advisory Council is now examining the matter. We are willing to pay these men generously and are thinking in terms of a gratuity and a sum when they are called up. I think that their training can be managed by the Territorial Army, and that, if we can succeed in this, it will turn a new page in the history of our Regular forces.
    This is important because, although we are going to take powers for what one might call the part-time National Service men—that is to say, the 140,000 men who, by the time we need them, will have done their National Service but still have a reserve liability—if the scheme works out, we shall need to make
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    little or no call on this third class of reservists. We must clearly take the power, but I hope that if this volunteer service is a success, we shall need to make little or no call on the National Service man who is now in private life, but who still has a reserve liability.
    I do not want to go over the details of this scheme. When he winds up this evening, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War will answer any queries. I think that it will be seen that we have taken every step to try to protect their jobs—which are now legally protected. I propose with my right hon. Friend to see the trade unions and the employers to see if we can work out a proper joint scheme which will give the men every chance to be seconded and for their return to civil life to be secure if it is necessary to call them up. On the whole, this is the best way of meeting the problem and of balancing the all-Regular Army.
    Therefore, the three measures which we propose to ask the House to support are these; first, a six-months' extension for a limited number of National Service men now serving; second and most important, a long-term measure to create this new volunteer reserve of people who would come forward from civil life for not more than six months in a time of tension and be well paid for so doing; third and only as a last resort, a call, again a very limited call, if it is necessary at all, on the National Service man who has done his service and now has a clear obligation for reserve service.
    Mr. F. J. Bellenger: Can the right hon. Gentleman give figures for his target?
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not want to be too precise, but the sort of figures which we are thinking about for the combined reserve—it may well be combined with A.E.R. (1) and Section A—are about 25,000–30,000 men.
    I want now to refer to the longer-term frame into which these measures fit. It is a three-Services frame, of course. Those who talk a great deal about the so-called failures of Army recruiting do not always note that recruiting for the other two Services is still going very well. I am sure that as we build up this new plan for the all-Regular forces, as we get greater

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    interdependence among them and try to share out their skills so that they can help one another, so we shall be able to make a viable and sensible force in which the three Services will play their parts, although still separately. I myself have no idea that it would be a good thing to merge the three Services merely to get them to work more closely together.
    I want now to refer to the views of the right hon. Member for Belper about pulling out major forces from other parts of the world. One must take note of the statements of Commonwealth leaders. As our former colonial possessions emerge into independent nationhood, so they have a very natural and proper desire to look after their own defence to a much greater extent, and I very much welcome that, and we must help them to do so. As this process develops, and it is not very quick, it must greatly relieve the strain on our Service manpower, particularly the strain on the Army manpower.
    But the corollary to that—and this is different from the point which the right hon. Gentleman had in mind—is that while that is going on we cannot abdicate our world-wide influence and give up our contribution to the containment of Communism outside Europe. We must devise a new strategic policy based on a flexible mobile force, more independent of the fixed installations on which we rely today. This will need some fairly revolutionary thinking and some evolutionary thinking.
    The first great steps towards this were taken more than two years ago following work which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had done in his time. It is not a very easy or quick task to recast the whole of British defence policy in a rapidly changing world, but, because we are now coming to the time when final decisions will have to be made, I have asked Field Marshal Festing, with the full support of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff, to come with a small staff of civilians to my Ministry to help me to try to make final progress on this plan. Perhaps the first outcome of these studies will be a subject for our defence debates next year. I do not want to say more about them now.
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    Anyone in my position must feel— and I certainly hope that Marshal Malinovsky feels—the immense burden of being a Defence Minister in a world which can quite clearly destroy itself. It is a difficult problem. It is the more difficult because in our arguments—and I support having arguments because democracy is trying to argue things out —we are hamstrung and handicapped when we try to get to the bottom of things. That is why I did not agree with what the right hon. Member for Belper said, much of it being misleading and dangerous. However, I will try to keep him informed and, if he wants to see me or General Cassels at any time, he is at liberty to do so.
    I do not know how we are to do it, but somehow we have to find a way of arguing enough and criticising enough while not destroying the picture in the eyes of an aggressor which may be the one thing to stop him launching us all into a major war.
    Mr. G. Brown: This is extremely important. Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that there is a Russian mission here, with a certain degree of freedom, while we have one in Russia? It is quite likely that they know all about our equipment. The people who do not know are hon. Members and the public.
    Mr. Watkinson: I am glad of the right hon. Gentleman's intervention, but that is not what I was saying. Of course there is a mission on our side and a British mission on theirs. That is a very good thing and I only hope that the missions will not be shut up.
    But, if we are not careful in these discussions, factual as we try to keep them, although I may be wrong—I do not think that I am—I always fear that if we go too far, it will not be a matter of the enemy not knowing a great many of these things, but of thinking that our will to resist is in the slightest degree impaired. That would be doing harm which might damage the whole of the delicate balance.
    Mr. Brown: We want to do it better.
    Mr. Watkinson: The right hon. Gentleman says that he wants to do it better. I am entirely with him in that.

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    As I said when I made my original statement on "Spearpoint", if there are deficiencies about which I do not know already, I shall be the first to welcome hearing about them so that I can seek to put them right as quickly as possible. On that basis the House of Commons can do business and should do business.
    So far as responsibility rests on me, these measures are the least we can do. They are unpopular, but it is my duty and that of the Government to try to carry them through, as it is our duty to try to see that we make it plain that we will play our part, and, if the worst comes, we will fight where we stand for the sake of the Alliance.
    4.39 p.m.
    Mr. George Wigg: Having listened to the right hon. Gentleman for almost an hour, I should like to begin with the point I made when I interrupted him. The problem now facing the Government is a problem which they themselves have created. The picture painted by the right hon. Gentleman of a wise and courageous Government struggling with adverse circumstances is fundamentally untrue.
    My mind goes back to the Whitsuntide of 1952 when, in conjunction with my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), I initiated an Adjournment debate on the necessity of getting rid of National Service. There were only three other Members present besides the Minister, and it was absolutely clear to anybody who had given five minutes' thought to these problems that if we were to have an all-Regular Army, it had to be a long-service Army.
    I remember the struggle I had to get the House in general and the Government in particular to accept the basically simple proposition that if we recruited one hundred men a year, the size of the Army we should ultimately have would depend upon the number of years for which they enlisted; on a three-year engagement, 300 men, on a six-years" engagement, 600 men. It took them until July, 1957, to accept this basic proposition and to get rid of the three-year engagement by introducing a long-service engagement. The Government thus made it absolutely certain that the Army was heading for a manpower shortage in 1960, 1961 and 1962.
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    I repudiate as an insult to my intelligence the idea that the situation with which we are now confronted arises specifically from the Berlin crisis. Of course, basically it has nothing to do with the Berlin crisis at all, and again I apologise in advance for wearying the House with facts which I have given over and over again. What was the commitment we undertook in connection with the Rhine Army? The Earl of Avon, Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was, when Prime Minister, signed an undertaking in Paris in October, 1954, to maintain four divisions on the Continent of Europe, in addition to the Second Tactical Air Force, until the end of this century, and he did that because the Government wanted to frogmarch the poor French, who had known three German invasions, into the acceptance of German rearmament.
    I opposed it, not because I was against German rearmament—far from it—but because I knew that long before the year 2000—although I must confess that I thought the honour of the Conservative Government would at least last a decade —they would "welsh on it". Before the ink was dry, the four divisions had become 77,000 men, and 77,000 was reduced to 64,000, that figure was reduced to 55,000 and then it came down to 45,000. On 28th July, 1958, the Minister of Defence revealed the truth, for he came to the House and said that the figure of 45,000 was too low, that our N.A.T.O. allies did not like it, and that it would have to be 55,000. That was what the right hon. Gentleman meant this afternoon when he talked about the Brussels figure.
    We have never had 55,000; up to a few months ago we had only 48,000. Then, the Secretary of State for War, on 14th September, made a statement to the Press, which was what is known by the Foreign Office as strengthening the hand of the Foreign Secretary when he went to Washington. He announced that three light antiaircraft regiments—the 22nd, the 16th and the 12th—had been ordered to go to Germany. Hon. Members who care to slip out and study The Times and other newspapers will find the announcement of this world-stirring step to strengthen the hand of the Foreign Secretary. If they do, they will believe that three light

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    anti-aircraft regiments have gone to Germany. I checked this morning and it is quite true that in order to save the face of the Secretary of State, who is a truthful man, the 16th has been ordered to go to Germany, but not until next April. It cannot go before, because it has not got sufficient strength.
    The Secretary of State said he wanted to strengthen our Rhine Army, and he believed that that was the way to do it. He has also ordered the 36th Guided Weapons Regiment of Thunderbirds, but omitted to say that he had wiped out the 37th Regiment to do it. It is this kind of living from hand to mouth that constitutes a problem of conscience. When one knows these things, should one come to the House and reveal them? My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shin well) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr Bellen-ger) and myself have suggested time and time again, and I repeat it again tonight, that the Estimates ought to be looked at not on the Floor of the House but in Committee in secrecy. We do not need to amend our Standing Orders in order to do that. The procedures are there, and we can do this if we want to do it.
    Turning to the practical problem that is facing us, when we come to examine in detail the Government's new call-up legislation, we shall need to be given the facts. At the moment, I cannot find the details of our reserves. Neither in the Army Estimates nor in the Defence White Paper is information given about them. There was a time when the Minister of Defence published in the Vote Office quarterly figures of the reserve forces, and recently I corresponded with the right hon. Gentleman because I anticipated this debate and wanted some information in advance. I got it in a form which was quite unintelligible, and I suggest that it was deliberately presented in that form. Perhaps I am wrong, but I telephoned to his office and to that of the Secretary of State for War, and I have not got the information I want.
    It is impossible for any interested or reasonably intelligent Member to understand the Government's proposals unless we have a breakdown in terms of Sections A, B, C and D and Categories 1, 2 and 3 of the Army Emergency Reserve. I understand the Government's
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    embarrassment and difficulties about security, but surely they should be frank during the Committee stage of the Bill and if there are security difficulties, why cannot they refer the Bill to a Committee of secrecy?
    What the House is up against is this. Of course, one ought to do nothing and say nothing to jeopardise the lives of those serving in our Armed Forces in any part of the world. Those who serve in the Armed Forces have a right to look to this House for protection and to expect that the House will not increase their danger. It is one thing to be conscious of the difficulties about security, but there is the fact that the Government for their own reasons, for political reasons, do not reveal the truth to us, and I suggest that there was quite a little bit of that this afternoon. In my charity, I do not blame the Secretary of State for War, and certainly not the Minister of Defence. I do not say that they are wicked men intent on concealing the truth.
    The simple fact is that I do not believe they know it. I believe that the Minister of Defence is utterly sincere, but I suggest to him that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) did him credit when he said that he would best serve as Her Majesty's Assistant Postmaster-General. That would be over-ranking indeed, for, of course, he is shown to be not fit for his job, when he comes here and tells us the story which he told us this afternoon. For who was it made a speech on 5th November, 1960, at Devizes, which ended up by saying that the Army might prefer 170,000 or 160,000 but it would have to manage? Who said it but the Minister of Defence! This is exactly what the Army is being asked to do. It is being asked to manage on the basis of 165,000 men, which every hon. Gentleman who has taken part in these debates knows, after all, is a "phoney" figure. Viscount Head told us on 28th July, 1958, and it has been repeated over and over again by the hon. Baronet the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean), that the figure of 165,000 was the figure which the Government Actuary told them they might be able to recruit. The real figure they need is 182,000, and the order of battle is related to that. In order to

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    bring all the units in the Rhine Army up to strength we need 32,000 individual reinforcements.
    I know what the right hon. Gentleman is going to say. He will say that that is the war establishment. It is nothing of the kind. The Government are committed politically to the four divisions, and the right hon. Gentleman has apparently overlooked the commitment into which the Government entered in 1954 and the nature of the planning arising from this commitment. Even with the ceiling of 182,000, there is another factor which the House must bear in mind, and that is that it contains no provision for third-line reinforcement, which means no establishment of base depots and the like.
    I have said that the arm of the Army about which one must be most concerned, and the one on which I have concentrated, is the Ordnance Corps. One of my right hon. Friends interrupted to mention Suez. What went wrong in Suez was that the General Staff suddenly placed a burden on the Ordnance services which they could not discharge. If ever again there is a problem of expansion, 90 per cent. of it will fall on the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
    I ask the House to bear with me while I give some figures. The original target for the Ordnance Corps was 10,000. The War Office cut it to 8,000. The present strength is 7,100, and the wastage is fantastic. The wastage in terms of discharge by purchase, in terms of men discharged as medically unfit, and wastage for other reasons into which I will not go, is incredible. It is clear that the target of 8,000 will not be reached in any foreseeable period of time, so even if the right hon. Gentleman goes through with these plans for the mobilisation of the reserves, they will break down because the equipment, even if it were there, and it is not, could not be maintained.
    Let us look at the alternative and face what hon. Members on both sides have refused to face. What was the alternative to doing something about the manpower problem? It was the easy, soft, option of putting our money on the independent British deterrent, and from 1957 until 13th April, 1960, that cock was fighting hard on both sides, although it was abund-
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    antly clear for at least a year that Blue Streak was not militarily viable. God knows what it cost in terms of security and money, but the strategy of this country was wedded to a weapon that was useless.
    What happened after that? Here both Front Benches share a measure of responsibility. They paid lip-service to atomic tactical weapons. They had to, because if they did not put their money on the atomic tactical weapon, conscription would have raised its head long ago. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) will remember the discussions we had in 1958. The House was asked to approve three British battalions with no support weapons taking on three Russian divisions. They were told that they had to stand and fight and, if necessary, would be supported with atomic tactical weapons. Those weapons did not exist then and they do not exist now. We have three composite artillery regiments in Germany; plus two regiments of Corporals. They are atomic tactical weapons, but the warheads are American, so the idea of putting the Union Jack on top of these weapons and thinking that gives prestige or that they are a substitute for a realistic defence is another cock that does not fight.
    What was the other argument produced by the Prime Minister and by the Leader of the Opposition? It was that we had to have nuclear weapons to make our voice heard in the council of the nations. If our dear old friend Nye Bevan had drawn a royalty of £1 for every time his phrase about going naked was used by multi-lateralists on this side and by those on the other side who wanted to find comfort in it, he would have been a millionaire. If a country has not got essential weapons there is nothing worse than going into a council chamber and saying it has. It is better not to go at all. If anyone thinks that the Americans who at the present time are calling up 25,000 inductees per month for the Army will listen to us when we are calling up none, we are living in cloud-cuckoo-land.
    Although I welcome the return of the prodigal son this afternoon in the terms of much that was said by the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), if he or anybody else thinks that we are to get away with the prestige argument, they are living in dreamland. In the meantime, we

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    have the spirit of Baldwinism marching through the land and brave speeches about standing on our rights in Berlin.
    The issue of Berlin was settled on 13th August, with no reaction from the West, for the simple reason that they were incapable of any reaction. My reading of these events is that at the time of the appointment of Marshal Koniev, and the appointment of reinforcements to the Russian forces they were terribly nervous, fearful and apprehensive about whether there would be any reaction from the West. There was none.
    The past is behind us. I hasten to tell the Minister that I find no joy in this catalogue of events. I find no pleasure in having been proved right. I want an all-Regular Army which can do its job. I have relatives serving in the Rhine Army. I do not need to go to generals to find the truth. Recently, through the kindness of the right hon. Gentleman, I was taken to visit married quarters occupied by my nephew. That was something which the Army did not lay on. It was just one of those accidents. One can find out what is going on without making visits to "Spearpoint". The right hon. Gentleman denies what was said by the right hon. Member for Belper, that "Spearpoint" did not reveal anything. This is true. We did not have to wait for "Spearpoint" to discover that the Rhine Army was under-strength and under-equipped. In January, The Times carried an able article saying this. Everybody knew these things if they wanted to believe them.
    That is water over the weir. We now have to try to put this right. What is the problem which faces us? Let us turn to the problem of manpower and the Government's proposals. I have seen the inevitability of this, and it gives me no pleasure, because the right hon. Member for Belper is right. This is a selective service, and the Government are trying to introduce a selective service by the unfairest possible way, because they are imposing an obligation on those who serve to excuse those who have escaped military service.
    I served my old friend the right hon. Member for Easington as his P.P.S. I would not have stayed with him for two minutes in 1950 when the heat was on and we had a majority of six if he had not done the right thing about the
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    National Service man and the Regular soldier. When the Labour Government, with its pacifist tradition, had to face this problem, how did they deal with it? They faced political obloquy with a majority of six and postponed the release of both Regulars and National Service men alike. To make fish of one and fowl of another is not the way to handle soldiers.
    Furthermore, what are the Government doing? Make no mistake. This is a major change in policy. They are tying their manpower policy to their reserves. If new men are called up, the reserve forces are strengthened, but if reservists are called back, one is drawing on all that one has left. What happens at the end?
    Where are the shortages? The Prime Minister said that, curiously enough, the shortages were in the tail. Why he should find this curious is beyond me. Presumably this is part of the Ministry of Defence brief, but it makes me again make the point that in the areas where we want to create good conditions we will create the maximum discontent, because if anybody thinks that we will hold back 20,000 National Service men and not get 20,000 bellyaches, he is making a fundamental mistake.
    It has also to be remembered that we are at the end of National Service. The men who will be held are those who have done their apprenticeships and technical training. Many of them are well into their twenties, with families and the like, and they have been counting the days when they could go back to civvy street to increase their earnings. They are now to be held. Nevertheless, this is a step, and an inevitable step— and it needs to be made clear—of the Government's policy. That fact must be faced.
    How are we to try to put it right? Again, the Secretary of State for War staggered me. I have great respect for him. He does his job with great vigour, and has not done too badly; certainly better than some Secretaries of State for War whom I have known, but that is not a very high class. He is doing his job not at all badly, but he must master his brief. He must not come here and start boasting about the September recruiting figures, having introduced the bounty in July. What did he expect to

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    happen if he introduced a bounty of £200? Did he not expect the recruiting figures to rise? Of course he did. The other factor to bear in mind is that the September recruiting figures are always the best.
    Apparently the Secretary of State wants to say something. No doubt he wants to give the external and the internal recruiting figures. But the Ministry of Defence recruiting return is based upon both. In any case, he is closing the gap to just about 500 a month—but he will be short at the end of the day. We have got tied up in arguments about 165,000 and 182,000, but the fundamentally important thing is that the forces should be balanced.
    In this connection I welcomed the statement of the Prime Minister. I thought that he got this problem dead right yesterday. He came here in sackcloth and ashes; the moment of truth had arrived. He admitted that whatever the size of the forces next year—and that means the following year, and the year after that—unless something was done there would be a state of imbalance. It does not matter whether the result is X plus Y or X minus Y; if there is not a balance we cannot fight.
    There is one other thing that has been done, of which the House is not aware. I think that it has occurred as a subconscious reaction to the emphasis on recruiting. The tremendous drive for recruiting has led to a lowering of standards. Here I must be very careful what I say. In my previous speeches I have shied away from this problem. I would ask all hon. Members to believe that I do not want to do anything that will damage the Army. I want us to have a good Regular Army—a contented Army, of a high standard. On the other hand, I have a duty to perform.
    At least I have the excuse that The Times correspondent went to Winchester, looked in at the Green Jackets' depot and reported on what he found. Not very far from my constituency there was another event this summer. On 18th August a group of 50 soldiers from the 17th Regiment, Royal Artillery went into Oswestry and smashed the place up. They went there armed with buckles and iron bars, and there was a free-for-all in the town. In the end there were unconscious soldiers lying all over
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    Oswestry, and some people awoke the next morning to find soldiers lying unconscious in their gardens. The soldiers were charged before the court, and the commanding officer of the regiment went down to the court and apologised on behalf of the Army.
    The point is that of those 50 men 14 had previous civil convictions, and one man alone had 13 previous civil convictions and had faced a charge of killing. In my day in the Regular Army, when we were regarded as the scum of the earth, that could not have happened. It is only in these enlightened days that we have recruiting on this basis. I believe that the incident to which I have referred was an exception, and I should not like any words of mine that go forth from here to be regarded as encouraging mothers or parents to think that this is universal, or that it is done with the Secretary of State's approval. But this happened, and the House needs to have a reassurance that this kind of thing will be stopped, for if there is one certain way of destroying morale in the Regular Army it is for troops of a crack artillery unit to be recruited from sources of this kind.
    I do not believe that in any foreseeable period of time it will be possible to recruit the 180,000 men, which number, to my mind, is the minimum required. On the other hand, I sincerely hope that I am wrong, and that the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for War will be heartened by the reception that their proposals have got, even from those who are critical of them and believe that they are unfair and misconceived, but believe that they are inevitable and to that extent are willing to give them a trial and try to improve them when they come before the House in a detailed form.
    Equally, however, I remind the Secretary of State of his responsibility to the Army. He should not leave the Rhine Army and exposed commitments in the Far East on the basis worked out by the Minister of Defence, that the Army must manage. That is not good enough. If he wants a real Regular Army he must be absolutely certain—if necessary, to the point of resignation, even if it means embarrassing his own side— that he will stand up and fight for those things which will enable the Army to do its job.
    5.5 p.m.
    Sir Fitzroy Maclean: I hope that the House will not think that I am being uncivil when I say that in the course of the twenty years that I have spent here I have seldom heard less impressive speeches than those made by both Front Benches this afternoon. There was certainly an opportunity for the back benches to redress the balance, and the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) has seized it. He is in a position to criticise the Government; his Front Bench is not. They have not only accepted the Government's defence policy but have encouraged them in it. They have accepted and encouraged the abolition of conscription, and it is quite clear that, apart from a few vague references to cutting down our commitments overseas—which I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend shoot down as impossible—they have no alternative policy.
    I was amused to see a letter in The Times from the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), in which he seized on one of these calculated leaks to which we are treated every now and then by the Minister of Defence about new ideas that he is cooking up to say that the Government had stolen the Opposition's clothes, and that the Opposition had always been in favour of reassessment, reallocation, reorganisation and the rest of it. What it comes to is that the Opposition Front Bench are so short of a policy that they have seized on what appears to be Government policy before they know what that policy is—indeed, before anybody knows, even the Government.
    Mr. Paget: I do not claim to know what the Government's policy is, but I do claim to know the policy which I have been supporting for the last seven or eight years, which has been that if we are going to have to abolish conscription we must reallocate our commitments amongst the forces, because those commitments certainly cannot be met by 165,000 men in the Army, whereas both the Navy and the Air Force are, for traditional reasons, doing many jobs which could very well be dropped. That is what we have been saying year after year.
    Sir F. Maclean: All I can say is that I share the view now taken by Field Marshal Templer, who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff when the present policy was introduced, but who admits that he has since had a change of heart, or of mind, namely, a way out of the present dilemma can only be found by adopting one of two alternatives. Either we must have a wholesale reduction in our commitments and responsibilities or we must reintroduce conscription in some form or other. That is what both Government and Opposition must face up to.
    Whatever view is taken of the measures which the Government are about to introduce, the one thing that is certain about them is that they mark the final failure of the policy of 1957. They mark the collapse of the Government's five-year defence plan, six months before it was due to end. In 1957 the Government put their money on an all-Regular Army of 165,000 men and now they have to admit that when it comes to the point, when things get a little more difficult than usual, it is not, in fact, the answer. We are told, we were told yesterday by the Prime Minister, that these latest measures, these latest expedients, were designed to meet what he called only "temporary difficulties", a "temporary problem".
    Today the Minister of Defence has spoken of "short-term difficulties". It seems to me that this is to misinterpret the whole nature of the present situation. It is not a question of a passing crisis. We are confronted with a cold war. This is all part of the cold war, and in the cold war one crisis succeeds another. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence seemed rather aggrieved that there should have been a crisis at an awkward moment just when there was a trough in his manpower figures. I do not believe that the Russians are infallible. They make mistakes too. But it should be possible for them to work out when this trough was coming and choose that moment to lay on a crisis or two just to tease Her Majesty's Government. That is exactly what will happen now. We shall go from one crisis to another, and I should say that in all probability this will continue for the rest of our lives. Even within the last day or two attention has been momentarily distracted

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    from the Berlin crisis by the emergence of a Finnish crisis which may turn out to be very serious too. Tomorrow, or next week, there may be a crisis in the Middle East, in Persia, in South East Asia or almost anywhere.
    This is the misconception which has lain at the root of Government policy from the first, this idea that we are poised between total peace, on the one hand, and total war on the other. In fact, there is not much likelihood of either. Certainly there is no likelihood of total peace, and so long as the West has an effective nuclear deterrent I do not believe that the Russians will risk an all-out clash.
    The Russians have been very cautious indeed. They were cautious under the late Generalissimo Stalin and they are also pretty cautious under his present successor. In fact, they have not had one soldier engaged since 1945 in active operation, so far as I am aware.
    Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: What about the Hungarians?
    Sir F. Maclean: Except for internal police operations.
    What they have done is to cause us the maximum of trouble wherever they could by indirect means, and I think that that is what they will go on doing. They will carry on with a policy which I should call vicarious nibbling. Wherever there is a sign of weakness they will take advantage of it. They will do it through the East Germans, through the Koreans—through anybody who may be handy.
    What we need in order to meet that policy, in addition to the nuclear deterrent, is a conventional deterrent at a dozen places at once. The cold war is largely a psychological war, and to show signs of weakness in it is to lose a battle. That is why we need men and that is why it is not as easy to reduce our commitments as hon. Members opposite seem to think. We must hope that they will not be engaged in action, any more than the Red Army has been —except in one instance which occurred to my hon. and gallant Friend, where their calculations were thrown out and they had to use their troops for police purposes—but their presence will be needed all the same.
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    Take Europe, for example. When in 1957 the Government decided on their present policy, or rather, as I prefer to call it, on their late policy, in order to make both ends meet, one of their ideas was to reduce our contribution to N.A.T.O. It was announced by the present Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in this House, I think in November, 1958, that since the Hull Report there had been this decision to reduce our contribution to N.A.T.O. and this would help to bridge the gap. We all know the result of that and the present state of the British Army of the Rhine, upon which the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) has thrown some light, though what the right hon. Gentleman did not do was to forecast that that would be the result of the joint Government and Opposition policy when the decision was first taken in 1958.
    Now, of course, instead of reducing our commitments in Europe as the Government hoped—personally, I think it would have been a disastrous move in any case—it has been clear for a year or two that we should have to increase our contributions to N.A.T.O. I do not know whether we have done it under pressure from our American allies or simply because we realised that we had to do so. But the fact is that instead of reducing our commitments we are increasing them, with the result that we now find ourselves with nothing like enough troops to meet our other commitments, even though the present strength of the Army must be round about 220,000 men. With even that strength we are still not able either to fulfil our existing commitments or cope with any future emergency which may arise.
    I do not believe that to resort to a temporary expedient, or a series of temporary expedients, is the right method for dealing with this situation. I do not believe that, in the long run, this is a problem which can be solved either by calling up reservists or by keeping men on in the Army after their time has expired. I think that that is simply a way of causing confusion and dislocation in the Army, in industry and in the family life of the men concerned. The present situation calls for an Army— whether a Regular or a conscript Army or a mixture of the two does not matter —an Army big enough and well enough

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    balanced and well enough equipped to cope with whatever emergencies are likely to arise and, particularly, to provide a conventional deterrent in the cold war. And owing to Government policy since 1957 that is exactly what we have not got.
    Recent statements by Ministers are full of contradictions. For instance, we were told last week by the Minister of Defence that there were "no major deficiencies in B.A.O.R." We were then told soon after by the Prime Minister that B.A.O.R. was "not up to strength," and "cannot wholly be balanced without mobilisation"—as if there were time for mobilisation nowadays. Then the Secretary of State for War has denied that Regular recruiting was failing. "Far from it" he said. But the next day a War Office spokesman said that recruiting had fallen short of expedients and as an expedient we were going to the Fiji Islands and the Seychelles for recruits, and I think that there they produce very good soldiers. But it seems rather odd that when we are about to keep citizens of the Commonwealth out of this country as a general rule we should be reduced to dragging them in in order to fight for us. And then there has been this all-round lowering of standards. Quite apart from the lowering of intellectual or physical standards, there is the appalling case quoted by the hon. Member for Dudley of the rioting in Oswestry. Obviously that was the work of men who were thugs, and not even efficient thugs, because in the event they were seen off by the citizens of Oswestry. Fancy scraping the bottom of the barrel to bring in men like that.
    I am prepared to accept, and always have been, the Secretary of State's statement that recruiting is, in fact, going fairly well. The Minister of Defence said today that recruiting was going better than ever before. I am also prepared to accept that the Government will probably get their figure of 165,000 men, or thereabouts, because we all know where that figure came from. It was from the Government actuaries, and the Government actuaries are pretty good at their job. The only trouble is that they were estimating the number of men we were likely, with luck, to get, not the number we needed. One hundred and sixty-five thousand men, although the
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    Minister of Defence says that we have to manage with them, are nothing like enough.
    The other trouble is that the present Army, or the Army of 165,000 we are to get, will not be a balanced Army. Only yesterday the Prime Minister said:
    "In the first place, whatever the size of the Army next year, it will not, and I admit it, be properly balanced."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 31st October, 1961; Vol. 648, c. 35.]
    That is an appalling admission and it is a danger which the Government should have been aware of ever since they first decided on an Army of 165,000 men. It is a bit late to tell us that now. The Prime Minister went on to suggest that the imbalance was in the tail rather than in the teeth. I do not believe that corresponds to the facts. I shall read to the House two brief sentences from the Glasgow Herald of 23rd October, an excellent newspaper which some hon. Members may not have the advantage of reading regularly. This is from an account of a reunion dinner of the Scots Guards Association on the previous Saturday. The paper said:
    "Brigadier Fitzalan Howard, who has been appointed to command the Horse Guards Brigade in Germany, said that because the 2nd Battalion of the Scots Guards has to go to Kenya shortly at a full strength of 750. it had been necessary to draft a large number of men from the 1st Battalion. That would leave this battalion very short of men and its strength would be reduced to about 400."
    If that it not a shortage in the teeth arm, I do not know what is.
    Those of us who served in other regiments have always admired the ability of the Brigade of Guards to get round difficulties. They have hardly suffered at all from the recent amalgamations and disbandments which have played such havoc with the rest of the Army. They also, and quite rightly, do very well in recruiting. They are very fine regiments and, naturally, they get lots of recruits. But when we find the Scots Guards have a battalion which is at barely half its proper strength because it has to give the rest of its men to another battalion going abroad things are going very badly indeed in the teeth arm. And, of course, we all know about the deficiencies in the tail.
    I believe that there is only one way to get the numbers and the balance which the Army requires. That is by some form

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    of conscription. I personally favour selective service on approximately the lines that the Americans have. It works very well there and there is no reason whatever why it should not work here. It would give us the balanced army we need. After all, we are the only country in the N.A.T.O. Alliance—except, I believe, Canada—which has not some form of conscription. We ourselves have had it, whatever may be said about it not being in character, for the best part of a quarter of a century. That goes back as far as many people can remember. Also, most of the countries against which we are ranged have it. I saw in a newspaper yesterday that the Albanians have just called up 120,000 reservists. Their total population is not much more than 1 million. If they can do it, surely we can do it. I do not myself believe that it would be any more unpopular than the stop-gap expedients to which the Government have been reduced. And they have certainly not been very well received. I do not think that the Government can have liked the Press which they got this morning. Every newspaper, from the Daily Telegraph, which normally supports them, to the Daily Herald, which normally does not, used the word "unfair" in reference to their measures, including the Guardian and the Beaverbrook Press. That is not what one would call a very good reception. But then they have gone out of their way to make things difficult for themselves. In my view, they should never have abolished conscription, but even if they were to reintroduce it now, I do not believe that it would be the political poison which everyone says it would be.
    In 1957 the Government took a gamble with our security when they decided to abolish conscription before they could be certain of getting the men they needed by other means. Surely the time has come for them to recognise that that gamble has failed to come off. Surely, instead of drifting from one expedient to another, the time has come for them to take without further delay measures which will give them a balanced Army, strong enough to enable us to meet our commitments and to carry out our responsibilities.
    5.26 p.m.
    Mr. F. Blackburn: I feel something of a fraud in following four such experts on defence, but it may be a slight relief for the House to have a short break and to be able to digest what the experts have said if for a few moments we get away from the detailed intricacies of defence.
    I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) covered a wider canvas in the early part of his speech. I appreciate that during this debate any hon. Member is entitled to make any points he wishes; yet most hon. Members would wish to fit in with the decision made by the two Front Benches. I understand, however, that defence was to be the opening subject today, but it was to be counted as one of the days for a general debate on the Address. Therefore, I feel we need have no inhibitions in widening the debate this afternoon.
    The Minister of Defence has now got three speeches he must answer in more detail than he did in his speech this afternoon. Possibly he was prevented to some extent because of security, but he did not satisfactorily answer the points made by my right hon. Friend, and since then there have been two other speeches which need an answer. It seemed to me that the Minister's speech followed the all too familiar pattern of so many Government speeches. When the Government find that something is wrong and put forward some suggestion to put it right, as soon as they are attacked their whole effort is concentrated on trying to prove that everything is all right. That was the pattern of the Minister's speech this afternoon. I do not know if he convinced anyone else, but he certainly did not convince me either that the suggestions in the White Paper were necessary or that they were just.
    It is most unfortunate for these young men. In the first place, they are unfortunate because their birthdays came at the wrong time and they have had to do two years service. They are again unfortunate in having to do an extra six months. I can see that Members of Parliament will get a greatly increased post in the coming weeks and months. As I have suggested, I am not an expert on defence,

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    but I think the Minister of Defence has a great deal to answer—possibly privately, because I agree that for security reasons many of the points could not be answered publicly.
    I often wonder whether the world can be considered as being civilised in this second half of the twentieth century. It is true that we can move rapidly on the surface of the earth, in the air, on the sea and under the sea. We have radio and television. We can put sputniks into orbit, and very soon, no doubt, there will be visits to the moon. But we have not yet learned how to live at peace with each other.
    Nobody in the House can be very happy either about the international situation or, indeed, about the domestic economic situation. Of course, the international situation is overshadowed by the senseless and wicked action of the Soviet Union with its more than 20 nuclear explosions culminating in the one of over 50 megatons. This is an action which is not easy to understand. Mr. Khrushchev's explanation that he was carrying out these tests in order to keep up with the Joneses of the West just does not make sense, because, otherwise, all the claims which the Soviet Union has made in the past about its strength are just nonsense. I cannot believe that the tests were necessary from that point of view. It is difficult to understand the reason for the tests unless they were carried out in the hope that they would create terror. But, of course, that would fail.
    I am very sorry that the reaction of the West was not different. I am sorry that the West did not say that, in spite of the action of the Soviet Union, it did not intend to have further tests, at least until further efforts had been made to reach an agreement for the banning of all tests. I am sorry that yesterday the Prime Minister did not say quite categorically that we would not carry out any tests, but I do not think that anyone who is not prepared to condemn Russia has the right to condemn the Prime Minister for the action which he is taking. I strongly condemn Russia in this matter, and I only wish, as I say, that the Prime Minister had said that we would not proceed with further tests until we have made greater efforts to secure agreement.
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    Russia, we know, is contemptuous of world opinion, as was shown by the Hungarian affair. It is a pity that just at the time when we had got the uncommitted nations and the so-called neutral nations supporting us we did not react in the way which I have stated. The position now is that the uncommitted nations are likely to say, "They are all the same. Russia started it and the others are following on". I think that we have been very unfortunate with the uncommitted nations and the so-called neutral nations. We always seem to be giving the impression that we are saying "No" to Russian propaganda. I think that we have failed lamentably. Here was a chance to have the uncommitted nations more behind us.
    Russia has been much more clever at propaganda than the West. It is rather strange that we are still looked upon by the uncommitted nations as an imperialist nation, we who have given freedom to over 600 million people since the end of the war and who, in the very near future, will be giving freedom to millions more, whereas Russia, after the war, got part of Finland, part of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and a stranglehold on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Eastern Germany. Yet in the minds of the uncommitted nations we are the imperialists.
    Our propaganda has all along been poor. It has looked as if we were saying "No" to Russian propaganda. I believe that there has been too much "gamesmanship" on both sides. Both sides have been putting forward suggestions knowing that they would not be accepted. Very often they look very good and feasible on the surface, but there is always some little point in them which it is known the other side will not accept.
    Coming to Berlin, the Gracious Speech states:
    "My Government will seek …to achieve by negotiation a settlement of the Berlin question …"
    But what are we going to negotiate about? Are we going to negotiate from the position as at the end of the last war, that certain agreements were made and that we stand by those agreements, because, if we are, we are not going to get any nearer at all? Or are we going to recognise facts? It is a fact, whether

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    we like it or not, that East Germany exists, and in the foreseeable future there is absolutely no hope whatever of achieving a united Germany. Therefore, we have to recognise the facts as they are.
    East Germany is there. Personally I think that the giving of de facto recognition to East Germany could be used as a bargaining power. I should like to see de facto recognition of East Germany and the whole of Berlin coming under United Nations government with no British, French, American or Russian troops among the United Nations force in Berlin. I speak of Berlin, but when Mr. Khrushchev talks about it he refers to West Berlin. Surely Berlin should not be divided in that way. I believe that if we we're prepared to go into these negotiations recognising the existence of an East Germany which is there, and which we know is a point on which Russia will not yield any more than we should yield on the question of Western Germany, then I think that there is a possibility of removing the greatest danger to world peace at the present time.
    I have spoken about Berlin coming into the United Nations, and I want to make just one reference to what the Government have to say about the United Nations. The Gracious Speech states:
    "My Government will continue to give resolute support to the United Nations."
    But it seems to me that if the United Nations organisation is really to do its job and is really to be an effective force for peace in the world, then it must be given teeth. I do not think that the United Nations can really become an effective force for world peace unless we have a permanent united force whose members are not responsible to any particular country and whose loyalty is owed to the United Nations.
    I do not mean that each time a crisis arises in the world, as in the Congo, we should raise another United Nations force. I believe that we should have a United Nations force capable of preserving peace, and I should like to see a British Government giving the lead on that matter as in every effort to make the United Nations a better instrument for preserving world peace. I never
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    believed that the League of Nations failed because it was not equal to its job. I believe that it failed because it was not allowed to do its job. The same danger is arising with the United Nations.
    I now come to the section of the Gracious Speech dealing with domestic affairs and the economic crisis at the present time.
    In view of the fact that there is an economic crisis, I do not think that anybody can be very thrilled by the wording of the Queen's Speech or think that we are to see a quick solution to the problems which face us. The Gracious Speech talks about "measures already announced". What are the measures already announced except measures which have been tried in the past and have proved to be only temporary palliatives? There is, perhaps, another measure—the pay pause and the breaking of freely-negotiated agreements.
    I do not think that it is generally known that Members of Parliament have been concerned in the pay pause. I had every reason to believe that the Government were prepared to make the salaries of Members of Parliament more comparable with those of representatives in other Parliaments and that they were prepared to make the salaries of Ministers comparable with those of their permanent officials, but when an economic crisis occurs, all that falls to the ground. It is difficult enough for Members of Parliament to talk about their own salaries in times of prosperity, and it is impossible for them to do so during economic crises, but if the Government delay long enough in making decisions, there will always come a time when there is an economic crisis and the matter cannot be pursued.
    It ought to be said that Members of Parliament are being made to make their contribution. I know that there are some people who think that we are worth nothing. The danger is that they may be right. But as long as they are being paid, I think that hon. Members are entitled to have a salary which means that they are not financially worried—and everybody knows that many hon. Members, particularly those with young children to educate and who are having to meet the heavy London expenses, are in difficulty. I will not go

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    into that, but I think that it ought to be on record that Members of Parliament, too, have been concerned in the pay pause, though we cannot say that they have been concerned in the breaking of agreements.
    In view of the action which they have recently taken, it is strange that the Government say that they will
    "continue to seek the co-operation of both sides of industry".
    I do not know about continuing to seek their co-operation. Perhaps they had better begin to seek it, and then, having begun, they can continue to do so. But the present is not the best atmosphere in which to seek the co-operation of industry when freely-negotiated agreements have been ignored and sometimes rejected by the Government.
    I refer next to the proposals to amend the law relating to teachers' salaries. I hoped that when the teachers agreed to the Government's offer of £42 million the Minister would decide not to go ahead with the Bill which he is to introduce, but I gather that it is only postponed until after the New Year, to give time for negotiations. I shall be very much surprised if that Bill is not already in draft. I appeal to the Minister to leave things as they are and not further to antagonise the teaching profession, to have second thoughts about it and to leave the Burnham Committee to function as it has functioned in the past.
    May I ask some questions about missing legislation? We deserve an answer from some member of the Government about this, although I do not know that we shall get it. Tomorrow we shall discuss foreign affairs, on Friday we shall discuss education, on Monday we shall discuss housing and on Tuesday we shall discuss economic affairs. Which Minister will tell us what has happened to the Gowers Report? We ought to have an answer. We ought to be given some reason for which the Government are not fulfilling their pledge. Which Minister will tell us what has happened to the Weights and Measures Bill? Even as recently as July the Government went to the trouble of reprinting the Bill, Weights and Measures (No. 2) Bill, and incorporating the Amendments which had been passed by another place. But there is no mention of the Bill in the Queen's Speech.
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    Anyone who has had much to do with local government or anyone in the House who has had much to do with Private Bills appreciates the great importance of the Weights and Measures Bill, quite apart from its importance to the ordinary consumer.
    We are entitled to a full explanation of why these two pieces of legislation, at any rate, seem to have disappeared from the scene. What about the House of Lords? I thought that we were to be given some suggestion for the reform of the House of Lords?
    Viscount Lambton: Hear, hear.
    Mr. Blackburn: I understand that in the main Conservative Governments are very keen on the present system, but by doing nothing they are probably encouraging more and more those people who believe wholeheartedly in single-Chamber Government and who believe that, with 630 Members of Parliament, it would be possible to alter their functions so that, if every one gave full time to the job, the work would be carried out. I am in favour of a two-Chamber system, but the Government are only adding ammunition to those who believe in single-Chamber Government. But whether they are to do anything about the House of Lords or not, they owe it to the House, in view of what has taken place in debate here, to do something about making it possible for someone who has inherited a title to reject it and to continue to serve in the House of Commons. These are Bills which seem to have disappeared from the scene. Perhaps some Minister will enlighten us about these matters, although I have not very much hope of it.
    In general, the Queen's Speech does not seem to meet the difficult situation which we face internationally or the situation which we face economically in this country.
    5.48 p.m.
    Mr. David Walder: I am sure that the House will forgive me if I do not follow the hon. Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Mr. F. Blackburn) but return to the rather narrow issue of defence raised in the Queen's Speech. This is a matter in which I have a personal interest, because some months ago my hon. Friend

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    the Member for Rochester and Chatham (Mr. Critchley) and I wrote a pamphlet on defence in which we called attention to a coming shortage of manpower and in which we advocated either some form of selective service or conscription. This was a Bow Group pamphlet, and I will not be so gauche as to say to my own Front Bench, "We told you so".
    There is another matter influencing my own acute personal interest in defence. It may come as a shock to my right hon. Friend, when he talks of his pre-proclamation reservists, to know that I am one of them. I do not know whether this will cause an acute and agonising reappraisal of defence strategy in the future, but I think that I am the only Member of the House who is a member of Class I of the Army Emergency Reserve.
    From this interested point of view I want to deal with the plans which were put to us today. I hope that my understanding of them is just on a level with that of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. George Brown). They are, first, the retention of certain National Service soldiers who are now serving in the Army; secondly, the possible call-up of others who have left the Service; and, thirdly, what must be the most revolutionary proposal, the formation of this new body of men who have already been christened "The Ever Readies"—the volunteer reserve which will be formed within the framework of the Territorial Army.
    I must contrast the position of such people with my own position as an ordinary run-of-the-mill reservist. When my right hon. Friend the Minister for War puts his signature to a piece of paper, I am taken away from the House and, even with the advantage of my annual training, I am put in my own regiment—a Regular regiment—which would very naturally shore up my position as an amateur. It would bolster me up and guide me. I am sure that that is my own regiment's view of my capabilities.
    On the other hand, as I understand it, the person in the new reserve will be functioning in a unit composed entirely of reservists. The framework of a Regular regiment can support and carry a certain number of reservists, but I am
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    in some doubt about "The Ever Readies" and their reliance upon the framework of the Territorial Army. I am not denigrating the courage and efficiency of the Territorial Army in two wars, but their approach is what I may call a domestic approach. They are geared to some form of slow mobilisation—the old-fashioned concept— whereas the essence of modern warfare is fire brigade tactics and speed in flying troops to an emergency in a matter of hours. I have very grave doubts about the concept of "The Ever Readies", with their kitbags in attics, in factory cloakrooms, or, since we are so short in our medical service, perhaps in corners of consulting rooms, and suddenly grabbing their kitbags and flying off to an emergency. I should certainly like to be reassured by my right hon. Friend about precisely how they are to be mobilised and within what limits of time they could be mobilised.
    This is the final move in the Government's policy to return to the ideal of the small professional army. I hope that it succeeds. I trust that the House will accept my sincerity in this matter, because I have, after all, signed on the dotted line in order that my right hon. Friend may in his turn sign on the dotted line, which act commits me to preserving the ideal of a small professional Regular Army supported by reservists. If the plan does not succeed and if we do not reach our target of, say, 165,000, which I think the Daily Mail has called "the minimum maximum", as oposed to the "minimum maximum", I urge the Government not to linger overlong with this compromise. We may have to accept that the affluent society cannot support or provide—
    Sir Cyril Osborne: Will not.
    Mr. Walder: I will take my hon. Friend's correction. We may have to accept that the affluent society will not provide a sufficient proportion of fighting men to protect itself. Both the appeal and the economic necessity which provided Kipling's soldiers have today disappeared. We must face that. My answer would be that we must have some return to conscription—conscription on a large scale. I am fully familiar with all the disadvantages of that. After

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    all, for some ten years I have served annually with the British Army of the Rhine and seen conscripts being trained. I have seen all their deficiencies. I realise that it is a wasteful and expensive system that trained men have to be put aside to look after conscripts, otherwise conscripts get bored. Regular soldiers must resent an influx of what I can only call unenthusiastic amateurs into the soldier's chosen profession.
    Despite all those disadvantages, I stress some of the advantages of conscription which I maintain are still valid. It is a familiar system to the British people. As there is no discrimination, it is a fair system. I am not certain that the present plans may not be regarded by the man in the street as a rather unfair system. The old system of conscription was not only fair but appeared to be fair. We must consider our own position as regards conscription as compared with the other armies of N.A.T.O. All save Canada have a system of conscription. The ideal of the citizen army may have to be introduced into Britain. It puts us at least on a parity with those nations which I hope I shall soon be able to refer to as our partners in the Common Market.
    To return to a perhaps rather more cynical note, conscription provides men for the duller jobs in the Army. Soldiers will volunteer to be parachutists and guardsmen, but I have never yet known a soldier who wanted to be a cook. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) tells me that he did not have cooks in his war. I can only say that either this surprises me or it does not surprise me, but I do not wish to be particularly offensive.
    We have deficiencies in the tail of our Armed Forces. This may well be because men who decide on a military career really do want to be soldiers either in an active form or in an Army that has an aura of romance. They do not want to do the dull jobs. Finally, conscription would at least provide us with a sufficient number of men to cope not only with one emergency but with two. Much has been said about the Kuwait operation, which was a nice little operation, carried out efficiently. It was a credit to all the officers and men who took part in it. However, it was a small operation which did not involve actual hostilities. [An HON. MEMBER; "Co-
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    existence."] No, hostilities. What would have happened as regards our Army if another emergency of the same sort as Kuwait had arisen at precisely the same time? Could we have carried out two such efficient operations? I suggest that we simply have not got enough men to carry out two operations, not even if we called up our Reserves. They would not be ready in time.
    Most important of all, an adequacy of conventional forces means that in an emergency we have not got to fall back on the appalling dangers of the nuclear deterrent. The danger if our conventional forces are inadequate is that in an emergency, in a panic, we fall back on our possession of nuclear weapons. Further, an over-abundance of conventional forces gives us one more bargaining counter in regard to disarmament. To hon. Members opposite that may seem a rather perverse argument, but one disarms only when one has more arms and men than one thinks one needs. I hope that it is not such a perverse sentence but only truth standing on its head to draw attention to itself—
    Sir John Maitland: Is my hon. Friend advocating the reintroduction of conscription at this moment? In view of the fact that a very large number of extremely efficient Regular officers and men would have to be taken away from our Forces to train with conscripts, is my hon. Friend advocating the introduction of conscription now, or as a general long-term policy?
    Mr. Walder: I am advocating a return to conscription if what I regard as this, the last experiment, fails. After all, we still have conscripts in the Army, and if we do not reach proper numbers by what I regard as the last scheme, I feel that it would be the Government's duty to recognise that we could not reach that target and had to provide a sufficiency of men. In my view, conscription would be the only means of doing it then.
    As I said at the beginning, I hope that this plan succeeds. If so, well and good, but, if not, I should like some reassurance from my right hon. Friend, because we are looking forward to the 1962 White Paper and another five years of defence planning. I understand that for financial and economic reasons there is a very great gap between what we would like to be able to do and what we

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    can do, but I should like some assurance from my right hon. Friend that if this plan fails we will, at least, approach the future with some realism and determination.
    6.2 p.m.
    Mr. F. J. Bellenger: I am surprised that the hon. Member for the High Peak (Mr. Walder), a member of the Tory Party, which is always supposed to have all the military experts that there are available, should have given, by way of illustrating his thesis, the Kuwait operation. If that is an element of Tory military thinking, I think that this country is doomed. The Kuwait exercise could easily have been mounted anywhere in the world, except for the sea. It could have been introduced on Salisbury Plain; there was such complete absence of opposition to the landings. It was a parade-ground exercise.
    The speeches made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and by the Minister of Defence were both ominous and reminiscent. The Prime Minister yesterday appealed to the memories of some of the older Members of this House. I am one of those Members, and I see at least one of my hon. Friends who will remember the circumstances and agree that they were almost similar to what we are now facing. The only difference was that we knew that Hitler was determined on war; we are not quite sure on what Mr. Khrushchev is determined.
    At that time, we had the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) constantly belabouring the Government on precisely the same grounds as my right hon. Friend did today—the grave deficiencies in our manpower, organisation and military equipment that were nothing else but disastrous. In fact, it is a wonder that we survived 1939. Fortunately, we had then a year or so to build up, but the Government have had at least ten years to make up their minds on military matters.
    It is not as though they have not known something about the Russian possibility. It is many years since I was at the War Office, but even in those days very realistic thinking was going on about the possibility of Russia not being the same ally in the future as she had been during the war. I accuse the Government, as my
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    right hon. Friend did today and as the right hon. Member for Woodford did before the war, of more than gross negligence; the situation we are now in is almost treasonable.
    Let us just consider for a moment what has been said by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Defence. They have said that we were on the verge of mobilisation of the B.A.O.R. on a war footing. According to the Minister of Defence, that would have meant doubling our manpower. Mobilisation would not stop at doubling the B.A.O.R.; if we were to issue a proclamation, it would be far more widespread. Where is the machinery for that?
    Before the First World War, there was what was called a "black book", in which everything was prepared for, down to the last button. That is why we got the first four divisions of the B.E.F. over to France in next to no time. Those divisions formed, of course, a valiant rearguard. Is it the Government's strategy today that our B.A.O.R. forces shall form a rearguard, withdrawing to behind the Rhine? It is significant, I think, that the headquarters are there.
    Those hon. Members on both sides of the House who consider military matters must know the sort of thing that would possibly—probably—happen if Russia were to advance. I only need to mention one thing. As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) remarked this afternoon, we cannot discuss these points in detail today, although I warn the Government that if they are not forthcoming with Her Majesty's Opposition it may be necessary to say on the Floor of this House things that will expose the Government's negligence. I do not believe that would do the country any more harm than it did in the days before the war when the right hon. Member for Woodford was doing the same.
    We all know the results of the disclosures of the right hon. Member for Woodford—and why nobody was impeached in those days, I do not know, especially the right hon. Gentleman the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, as he was then called; Sir Thomas Inskip, I think—
    Mr. Wigg: My right hon. Friend will parden me for interrupting him, but I am sure that he will have seen the official histories of the strategic bombing

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    offensive against Germany. I think that Sir Thomas Inskip was a much-maligned man, and if my right hon. Friend studies these official histories he will find that, in some measure, the fact that we had prepared in that way was due to Sir Thomas Inskip.
    Mr. Bellenger: I shall not cross swords or continue that discussion with my hon. Friend. I am more concerned to emphasise the challenge that my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper threw down today and which the Minister of Defence did not take up. I do not know the reason for that. I heard some remark by my right hon. Friend that the right hon. Gentleman would, perhaps, discuss these matters privately with him, but is that what hon. Members want? If so, why do they stay here? Why do they wait to take part in our debates? Why do not they go home and have a pleasant evening, as we are having now, in terms of what we used to have before the war—a pleasant Sunday afternoon gathering? We are not getting to grips. That may result from our not hearing some of the facts, because the Minister of Defence did not tell us the facts this afternoon.
    I noticed an article in the Sunday Telegraph. Perhaps my right hon. Friend also noticed it, because it referred to him. I do not know how true the report is, but I quote it in my right hon. Friend's presence. It stated:
    "Before arriving, Mr. Brown asked not only that journalists should be kept away from him in Germany but that ' no further information at all should be available to the Press on any subject into which I am inquiring'"—
    Mr. G. Brown: I am obliged to my right hon. Friend for giving way. He will find, I trust, in the next issue of the Sunday Telegraph a statement I sent to it denying completely, specifically and in every respect the statement attributed to me in that article. The only part that is true is that I asked journalists who wanted to accompany me not to do so, because I did not want my visit to be turned into a circus. But the rest of the article is absolutely and categorically untrue.
    Mr. Bellenger: I am glad to hear that, because I have something else to quote from this article and I am wondering whether the Secretary of State will deny, in the same categorical terms, what is
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    quoted as coming from Army Press liaison officers. It states:
    "The whole thing has become a political matter …
    Yes, indeed. It is a political matter and a serious one
    "…and is regarded as sub judice. Not only can we answer no questions at all, but no interviews can be arranged with officers at this headquarters or elsewhere."
    Then here is a further statement that one B.A.O.R. officer said:
    "The Minister of Defence has made an official statement, and Mr. Brown has come here to collect evidence to prove that he is a liar. You can imagine what our heads would be worth, if we got mixed up in that sort of business."
    The Secretary of State tor War (Mr. John Profumo): May I clear this up now? It might help the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), too. I have looked at this and can find no evidence whatever for statements attributed there, and if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Belper has been misquoted, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) may feel that the other part of the article is incorrect, too. If we were trying to hide something, would we have given every possible facility for the Deputy Leader of the Opposition to look at everything he wanted? I am not commenting on what he said—how this arose I do not know—but I should not like my officials to be accused of saying and doing something for which I can find no grounds at all.
    Mr. Bellenger: I know from my experience of military officers that they are very cautious when anything is verging on the political, and, of course, this is highly political. It is highly dangerous that the Government are denying this country, until a crisis arises, the means to defend ourselves.
    Hon. Members know what takes place when the Estimates are debated in this House year after year. We are not given the facts and many of us with experience of military matters, and I hope with responsibilities, should be brought in to give the benefit of our views, but at present we cannot do so.
    My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper went as far as he dared this afternoon in pointing to certain shortages, such as equipment. What did we get

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    from the Minister of Defence? The Minister admitted that we were changing over from one set of wireless equipment to another, but not a word from him about all the other articles of equipment. I therefore ask the Secretary of State to tell us, or to find out whether, if it is necessary to bring B.A.O.R. up to war establishment, have we got the equipment to do this up to the G.1098? The admission of the Minister of Defence today in one comparatively trivial detail shows the way his mind concentrates on the almost inessential.
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not think that the proper signals equipment is an inessential, and if the right hon. Gentleman will look at what I said he will see that I took the signals as an example and that I said that B.A.O.R. is now equipped with the proper signals equipment. There is just a limited amount of older equipment to be replaced. That is a reasonable answer.
    Mr. Bellenger: That is what the Tory Government told this House in 1939, when I was an hon. Member. It was not accepted by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford, and I am glad to say that he was supported by more of his own party than are likely to support any hon. Gentleman on the Government side who says what my right hon. Friend said today.
    The Minister of Defence merely answers my right hon. Friend with a specious statement—an impressive statement—that B.A.O.R. has its radio equipment down to the last button. What I want to know is; has it? I beg leave to doubt that and I would have hoped that many hon. Members with fair minds would also have doubted it following this afternoon's speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper.
    I have on more than one occasion in this House advanced an idea which most of the continental countries have adopted—certainly most of the Six, which we shall be joining presently— defence committees of their respective Houses of Parliament. In each defence committee there is high secrecy, and I believe that only on one occasion, in Germany, has any hon. Member of any party disclosed any of the secrets that
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    have been learned by the committee members. These committees are able to question Ministers, who are adept at evasion and who sometimes give almost misleading statements. We have seen that time and again. Hon. Members can see this if they read copies of the OFFICIAL REPORT concerning proceedings before the war.
    I recall the case of anti-aircraft defences before the war when the Minister of Commonwealth Relations, a subaltern in the Territorial Army, leaked some military information in this House and was threatened with court-martial for doing so. We hon. Members cannot be threatened with court-martial, but we are being threatened with silence. We cannot tell what we know, or think we know. Actually, we know very little. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper was given considerable facilities for going to B.A.O.R., and I have no doubt that some of the more senior hon. Members would get facilities for doing likewise if they sought permission from the Government. But other hon. Members should have facilities for going and seeing for themselves. They could come back and relate to the House what they had seen and, also, what they had not seen—like my right hon. Friend did today. In a committee such as I have suggested we could go thoroughly into most secrets and have officials present at our meetings—generals, too—like we have power in the other Select Committees to ask questions and get detailed answers.
    Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: While I agree that the Minister of Defence gave facilities to the right hon. Member for Belper, many hon. Members might desire similar facilities. Nevertheless, during the years 1945 to 1950 I do not think that the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) or his colleagues gave facilities to hon. Members on this side similar to those given by my right hon. Friend to the right hon. Member for Belper.
    Mr. Bellenger: I hope that the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) will develop that point when he makes his own speech. I do not wish to take up too much time. I wish merely to raise a matter about which I have always believed in strongly; the voluntary system.

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    When I was Secretary of State for War I had to put through this House a Bill bringing in conscription in peace-time and I did not like it. The reason was that in my younger days during the First World War I went off, like thousands of others, as a volunteer. In those days there was a feeling that one volunteer was worth three pressed men. I believe that. I fear that the Government are going to press-gang certain members of the Army—National Service men or reservists—into serving against their will. This is nothing less than press-gang methods.
    If we had the same situation now as we had in 1946 or 1947, or before the last war, it might be different. Then it would not be a question of calling up penny packets of reservists but of mobilising the whole nation for the crisis to be faced. Therefore, I think that there is either some ulterior motive in the Government bringing forth in the Queen's Speech, and later on in legislation, the request for powers to retain in the Army for about six months a certain number of National Service men who will have done their two years' service or that the Government are getting panicky. If the foreign situation is so serious as to cause the Government to get panicky, we need far different measures from those proposed by Her Majesty's Government.
    I would only say this about these small numbers which I understand are required. We have not got definite numbers yet. We had a clue from the Prime Minister when he said that 10 per cent. of the 140,000 Reservists might be wanted, or even fewer than that. That is 14,000. I do not know how many the Government are going to retain in National Service, but there are probably about 50,000. They cannot be wanting 50,000. So what do they want? The Minister of Defence also gave a clue in answer to a question of mine this afternoon. He wants 25,000 to 30,000 men on the reserve—all reserves.
    Mr. Watkinson: Pre-proclamation.
    Mr. Bellenger: Yes, I understand that. I have already said that if there is a proclamation we shall be in a crisis straight away. The right hon. Gentleman wants 25,000 to 30.000 men in all reserves that he can either retain or call
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    up. I would ask the House, is that what B.A.O.R. really wants? If that is all he wants, I should have thought that he could have got over this temporary difficulty in a voluntary way. Why bring to this House legislation that will, I can assure him, cause bitterness—partisan bitterness—and certainly will cause bitterness in the country, because for the first time in peacetime we are directing labour. There is no other force in this country—police, fire brigade or anything else—which is directed to do its job. It is only a few thousand men who have been unfortunate enough to be born in the year in which they were born and who are now going to be told, "You carry the burden and all the others who can draw their £15 or £20 a week in this country are going to escape scot-free".
    Mr. Brian Harrison: I do not quite follow the difference between directing labour in peace-time now and directing labour when the right hon. Gentleman brought in conscription in 1947. I should have thought that there was some similarity, and that it is not right to say that this is the first time it has happened.
    Mr. Bellenger: It is not the same similarity. Conscription was brought in after the war mainly to release hundreds and thousands of those who had been serving overseas. That was the main reason. Indeed, I am not at all sure that in explaining the Bill to the House I did not give those reasons. But today the situation is not the same as it was in 1945 and 1946.
    May I say that I agree, and have agreed, with the Government ever since they said that they would do away with conscription. What I disagree with them about is that they have miscalculated. Governments should not give pledges and ought not to give a false idea to young people if, later on, they are going to reverse it as they are doing now. If the nation is faced with a crisis the nation will respond. But merely to call up or retain a few thousand young men who have been making plans to come back to civil life is more than unfair. It is callous, and I think the present Government are a callous Government.
    I ask the Secretary of State or the Minister of Defence to say who are these people who are going to be retained or called up?—presumably specialists and

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    craftsmen. Do they include doctors among them? It is well known that the military forces have not sufficient medical services. The medical services are perhaps not quite so bad as the tail part of the military forces, but they are very bad. Why cannot the right hon. Gentleman do what civilian firms do when they have to send labour overseas? They pay them the rate for the job and they get their volunteers. Why cannot the right hon. Gentleman and the Government do the same with this paltry number—because that is what it is— that he is going to treat in this scurvy fashion?
    I am inclined to think that the "Ever Readies", as I believe they are going to be called, is a good idea. It goes back to the old militia idea. It is very deeply rooted in the Army. It is a good idea, for I believe that we shall get men to volunteer not only for the sake of the bounty but also because they have a spirit of adventure. If they think that their country is in need they will respond. They must have thought that, otherwise they would not be in the Territorial Army now. Therefore, we have a fine body of men who will respond.
    Why not carry this principle a little bit further instead of treating Service men in this fashion? Whatever hon. Members on both sides of the House may think about it, the country will say that Parliament has broken its word. I hope that some of my hon. Friends who may be inclined to support the Government in these matters will remember that conscription has always been hateful in the eyes of our people and that they put up with it because they thought it was really necessary. They cannot think it necessary after reading the right hon. Gentleman's speech this afternoon.
    I shall resist the Government, whatever my party agrees to do on this matter, and I do not think I shall be out of joint with them on this issue at any rate. I shall resist the Government when they bring in their legislation, for the reasons which I have given. I hope that there will be on the Tory benches some hon. Members who will speak up, as the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) did, because we are in a parlous state today so far as our defence is concerned, and we have not had all the
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    evidence in this Chamber this afternoon. The Minister of Defence has done his best to deny it to us. My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper has been cautious and has not given all the facts, but some of us on suitable occasions might give the House a few more. I hope that we shall see wat we saw before the war, some hon. Members on the Tory side at least abstaining from supporting their own Government.
    6.28 p.m.
    Brigadier Sir John Smyth: The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), as a former Secretary of State for War, speaks on these matters with considerable weight. I agree with some of the things he said, but not with others, and I shall be referring to them a little later.
    I wish to deny entirely that the Army is in a parlous state. I do not know where the right hon. Gentleman gets his information from, but I prefer to get my own information from the people in the Army whom I know and trust, and they would deny the suggestion utterly and completely. I can assure the right hon. Gentleman of that.
    I do not think many people would deny that we are today living in times that are potentially more dangerous and certainly more explosive than probably in all our history. Not only is there the deep division between the free world and the Communist world, but the Communist world is being led by men with no regard for solemn agreements and who show themselves utterly callous both to world opinion and, indeed, to the lives and health of children and of generations yet unborn.
    No one who has studied carefully the life of Hitler, as I have and as several hon. Members have, can fail to be impressed by the great similarity in methods and approach between Hitler and Khrushchev today. It seems to me at the moment that Mr. Khrushchev is almost a disciple of Hitler, particularly in the last approach he has made to Finland. There has been the same technique of threats, a show of force, "brinkmanship", lies and distortions that we saw in the days of Hitler. There are, however, certain clearly marked differences.
    Hitler definitely wanted a war, a war of revenge for Germany. I believe

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    that Khrushchev does not want war, however close to it he may be going at the moment. Hitler was a complete dictator, and mentally he was not quite normal. Mr. Khrushchev is not really a complete dictator; he is the mouthpiece of other people. There is a certain restraining influence on him. There is also the great difference that today we have the nuclear bomb, which undoubtedly is a great deterrent against war. Moreover, we have our system of collective security, which did not exist in the days of Hitler, with America particularly as a very great Power on our side.
    In spite of all that has happened recently and the explosions which have been made in the upper atmosphere, I am convinced, as is said in the Gracious Speech, that the British Government must persevere in every endeavour to reach an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. More than that, I believe that, despite everything that Khrushchev has done, we must try to reach an agreement about Berlin, without in any way surrendering what we feel to be the rights of the people of West Berlin.
    I have sometimes been criticised for saying that the only real alternative to total war is total peace, but I believe that there is more in that saying than meets the eye. I know that there are bound to be small wars, revolutions and upsets in various parts of the world, and we have to have forces to deal with these so-called brush-fire operations; but I sincerely believe that any war involving a major clash between the forces of the Soviet Union and of the West would be very dangerous indeed. One would never know where it would stop. I am sure that it would stop only in an all-out nuclear war.
    We must make every endeavour to ensure that no war of that sort ever starts. We must not let it begin. Once we let it start, there is no knowing where it may end. The nice little conventional war, which I hear people talking about in Europe, with just ten divisions on one side and ten on the other, using conventional weapons, with only about 10,000 casualties on either side, is just not on. It must be outlawed and deprecated with all the means in our power. How would such a war end? Would the Russians
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    acknowledge that they had been beaten after only ten divisions had been engaged? Of course not.
    Let us consider for a moment the present position in Europe as regards conventional forces. Under General Norstad's command there are probably 22 or 23 divisions. I cannot pretend to be exact, but I think that Russia could probably put 125 front line divisions into any sort of encounter in Europe, followed by 150 more. The idea that we are contemplating having a conventional war against Russia in Europe is not on at all, and it is not part of the N.A.T.O. plan. Nevertheless, I believe that the British people have never been more determined than they are today that they will not be dominated by any foreign dictator. I have felt that determination very strongly throughout the country.
    I turn now to examine the tools we have for the job of keeping the peace, the chief of which, of course, is N.A.T.O. The main object of N.A.T.O., which I think we tend sometimes to forget, is to prevent war by maintaining an effective deterrent against aggression. N.A.T.O. strategy is based on the strategic nuclear forces of the West, the Strategic Air Command and our Bomber Command, generally known as the retaliatory forces, and, of course, the naval forces in the Atlantic, together with the shield forces in Europe under the direct command of General Norstad. The object of General Norstad's forces is not to engage Russia in a full-scale conventional war. How pleased the Russians would be if it were, for that would be a war they would be bound to win. Certainly, if that were the object, we should have to treble the number of General Norstad's divisions, we should have to introduce at once full-scale conscription, and increase our B.A.O.R. very considerably.
    I have followed carefully everything that General Norstad has said over the years. I will quote just one of his statements in this context:
    "We do not contemplate the possibility of great land campaigns. Our task is to defend with relatively small forces, and using all weapons."
    He made it perfectly clear that by "all weapons" he means to be included tactical nuclear weapons, which were introduced years ago into the N.A.T.O. forces. He has stated time and again

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    that his plan is to hold a line well forward which will protect all the fifteen nations of N.A.T.O. He thinks that it would be suicidal to try any sort of Rapacki plan of withdrawal. All he says about that is that it would mean that the Americans would go back home to America, the Canadians would probably go back home to Canada and we should probably come back home here. [HON. MEMBERS; "Hear, hear."] Some hon. Members may think that that is a good idea.
    Mr. William Baxter: Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman agree with a former colleague of his, Lord Montgomery, who agrees with what we were saying "Hear, hear" to, that we should all go back to our own countries, taking our armed forces back to our own countries, so that there would then be less likelihood of war?
    Sir J. Smyth: I heard Lord Montgomery make his speech on that subject in the other place a few days ago. I thought that Lord Morrison was, perhaps, a little rough with him when he followed. I must say that I agree with General Norstad on this matter.
    Mr. Baxter: Then the hon. and gallant Gentleman does not agree with Lord Montgomery?
    Sir J. Smyth: No, not on this particular point; I definitely do not.
    I think that we must have a forward defence, and it would be suicidal—we have not a great deal of depth as it is —to reduce the depth that we have, when Russia has all the depth in the world. It would definitely not be in our interest.
    Mr. Paget: For the purpose which he described, does the hon. and gallant Gentleman feel that forces which reach their planned effectiveness only after mobilisation are suitable or capable of performing the task?
    Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: Would the hon. and gallant Gentleman use nuclear weapons?
    Sir J Smyth: I am glad that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) asked that question. My own opinion is that, for the role for which N.A.T.O. was designed, the present forces are perfectly adequate. In
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    fact, I think that General Norstad, like most Army commanders, who always require more troops, is exaggerating the importance of more men on the ground. We have had so much experience of that in our Army. Looking back only a few years to Korea and Suez, which I always quote, we had an Army of 400,000 men, and it was quite ineffective. It was not the sort of weapon that we wanted.
    Viscount Lambton: Is my hon. and gallant Friend saying that he is against the policy of Her Majesty's Government of reinforcing the forces which are in Germany at present?
    Sir J. Smyth: No, I am not against that at all. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton asked whether our forces could function before mobilisation. I think they could function perfectly well. I should like to say something more about that later.
    Mr. Paget: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has not entirely grasped the point. I can see that it may be said that we can do with smaller forces, but surely there is no point in having smaller forces who cannot man their weapons. Either we have smaller forces which are adequate to man their tanks and guns, or larger forces which are skeleton forces and can be built up after mobilisation. Does the hon. and gallant Gentleman think that the sort of force which can be built up only after mobilisation is suitable for the N.A.T.O. role?
    Sir J. Smyth: I do not think that is correct. The extra weapons are stockpiled over the other side. That I think is the best answer.
    It would be utterly wrong for anyone to suppose that our B.A.O.R. as it exists today cannot function. I very much deprecate what the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said today when he intimated that the B.A.O.R. was all washed up and could not operate. That is more or less what he said in his article in today's Daily Mirror. The role of N.A.T.O. is to call a halt after a so-called incident. It is difficult to define what is an incident. It might be a clash over Berlin. However, it would not be a major attack by fifty or more Russian divisions, which the right hon. Gentleman was envisaging. I think that it would be obvious to anyone who knew

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    anything about the circumstances of soldiering whether a major aggression was intended or not. The role of N.A.T.O. is to call a halt, to make a pause, so that both sides will have time to think, we hope wisely, and to decide that a major aggression is bound to lead to a nuclear war and stockpiling.
    Britain's contribution to N.A.T.O. is very much underrated. For the first time in our history we have a standing Army in Europe under the control of a foreign commander. Some hon. Members will remember what a tremendous thing it was when we put Douglas Haig's Army under Marshal Foch in the First World War. Many people thought that it was a dreadful thing to do. However, it was very successful, and we did it again in the Second World War when we put our Forces under General Eisenhower. A large proportion of our Navy, R.A.F. and Army is permanently stationed over the other side, and I maintain that they are doing a wonderful job in keeping the peace.
    I happen to know personally the commanders of our forces there—Sir James Cassels and Sir Charles Jones— and I have the highest opinion not only of them as soldiers but of their integrity. I am much more prepared to take their word for the efficiency or otherwise of our forces than any sort of canteen stories, about which we have been hearing a great deal lately.
    It is very easy to get some lovely stories out of the British soldier while he is on manoeuvres. He hates manoeuvres and always has done. Sometimes we talk about lobby fodder in this House. The British soldier feels that he is a sort of manoeuvre fodder. This exercise, "Spearpoint," was for the benefit of the higher command. We have to have troops to bring out the lessons, but the soldier does not see it in that way.
    Perhaps I might repeat the sort of story that the British soldier tells. Three chaps were being demobbed. They met for the first time in the canteen and started to swop stories over a glass of beer. The first said, "I have done thirty years in the Army. I have had a happy marriage and three sons, who have all gone into the legal profession. They are all solicitors. I was a sergeant-major. I had a distinguished career in the Army and I do not regret a day of
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    it. "The second said," I was also a sergeant-major. I have had a very happy time in the Army and a happy marriage. I have three sons who are all interested in politics." The third said, "I have had thirty years in the Army. I never rose above the rank of private. I never married, but I have three sons and they are all sergeant-majors."
    One can hear heaps of wonderful stories from the men in the British Army while they are on manoeuvres, but when it comes to anything worth while the British soldier will always fight. I am confident that our B.A.O.R. today is doing a marvellous job in very difficult circumstances. I feel very much that it is a case of united we stand, divided we make headlines for Pravda. Everything that we say in this House makes copy.
    As I say, I deprecate very much what the right hon. Member for Belper said. He would not give way to me during his very long speech, which was even longer than usual. All that I proposed to ask him was whether he could say one good thing about the Army which he had been visiting. I did not hear him say one good thing about it today. According to him, they had no equipment, were not trained, and everything was wrong.
    Mr. G. Brown: That is not so.
    Sir J. Smyth: I will not say any more. I am sure that many other people will have a lot of things to say about the right hon. Gentleman.
    I now turn to this wonderful question of establishment. I have had a certain amount of experience of drawing up establishments as a staff officer, more usually in carrying them out at the receiving end. My experience is that no formation is ever up to establishment. It is a lovely stick with which to beat a Government to say that a unit is not up to establishment. However, as soon as a formation goes into action and suffers a lot of casualties it is below establishment. It may be weeks or months before it is up to establishment again. What does it do? Does it send for the right hon. Member for Belper and say, "What do we do?" Of course not. It simply carries on. In a theatre of war like Burma, where one could not get reinforcements, one started on establishment. The first day we went into

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    action we had a lot of casualties and the battalions went down to 400, 300 and even 200 men, but they carried on and did a wonderful job.
    Of course, every commanding officer likes to have a lot of men in his unit —General Norstad likes to have a lot of divisions—but this question of establishment is becoming a sort of shibboleth. We in the British Army have always been ready to keep the peace in small places all over the world with small forces. I have mentioned before my little force, the Chitral force, perched on the roof of the world, keeping the peace in a large and mountainous country with a very small force. What everybody would criticise today was that I had only half a battery of artillery. Today, somebody would be sent out to me to say, "You cannot function with half a battery." We functioned perfectly well with half a battery. In that country, half a battery was better than a whole one. The other half of the battery was doing a similar job 600 miles away.
    The new measures announced by my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence in the present situation are thoroughly sound. They mean that in an emergency the Army will get some trained men. It will not, as in selective conscription, have to train entirely raw recruits, which the Army does not like doing and which is a waste of men.
    Lastly, I should like to say a word about the vexed question of conscription. I hope that this controversy is settled for the moment. Of course, it will come up again, but the Government have announced that they are going forward with their scheme for long-service, Regular voluntary forces. To my certain knowledge, that has the support of the Army Council and all the senior officers in the Army. All the ones I respect—particularly Field Marshal Festing and his successor, Sir Richard Hull—
    Mr. B. Harrison: Does my hon. and gallant Friend think it fair that one should name senior officers to back up one's argument? When the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a mistake, we did not hear him say that he had acted on the advice of Sir Frank Lee or somebody like that. Is it not a dangerous
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    practice that is now creeping in when generals are being conscripted, as it were, to back up politicians?
    Sir J. Maitland: Is it not better to do that than to make innuendoes?
    Sir J. Smyth: I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. B. Harrison). My right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence has mentioned, both today and before, that Field Marshal Festing, who is just giving up his job as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, has taken on another special job with him in the Ministry of Defence. There is no secret about that. I know what a sacrifice it is for Field Marshal Festing to do that. He has been looking forward to his retirement for a long time. He was one of Bill Slim's greatest fighting commanders. He had a hard war and he has had a hard job now. I am all for giving him kudos for it and I shall continue to do so, whatever my hon. Friend thinks. Furthermore, I certainly rely on his opinion in these matters much more than on some of the people who go round the canteens.
    We are mostly agreed, on both sides of the House, that we do not want to return to conscription. The people who are constantly campaigning in this House for conscription are in a minority. I may, of course, be wrong. It may be that all hon. Members opposite want conscription, but I do not think so. As I have said before, there are no better recruiting agents than Members of Parliament. We come in contact with young people in our constituencies. For goodness sake, let us try to make a success of this new long-service, voluntary defence force and try to avoid going back to conscription.
    The B.A.O.R. is doing the most important job that any British Army has ever done, because its role is to try to prevent another war from starting. We do not want to be party political over everything. I ask the House as a whole to give it a message of support and encouragement.
    Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Emrys Hughes.
    Mr. Arthur Holt: Give them a message of support.
    6.57 p.m.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Those of us who take part in these debates always listen with great interest to the hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth), knowing his great military record. We understand how much he has at heart the interests of the British Army. We certainly do not dissociate ourselves from any gesture of friendship to the people in uniform who compose our Armed Forces. The hon. and gallant Member was, however, rather unfair to Lord Montgomery. Strange things happen in politics, and I certainly did not think some years ago that I would have to defend Lord Montgomery against the attacks of a Conservative brigadier opposite.
    Sir J. Smyth: The "Conservative brigadier opposite" was not really attacking Lord Montgomery. Eighty per cent. of what he does I could not admire more. All I was saying—he has just written a foreword for my book, which is being published in a day or two, so I must be nice to him—was that one particular thing in which I disagree with him was in a speech he made the other day in the House of Lords. Probably he will disagree with the speech I am making today. It was no more than that.
    Mr. Hughes: I shall certainly read the hon. and gallant Member's book with great interest and certainly the foreword by Lord Montgomery. I hope that Lord Montgomery will use this opportunity of amplifying in more detail some recent views on strategy which he has outlined in another place, in the columns of the Sunday Times and over the B.B.C.
    The Minister of Defence has asked for revolutionary thinking and Lord Montgomery has supplied it. The moment Lord Montgomery starts his revolutionary thinking hon. Members say, "This is rather strange. Lord Montgomery is talking like a Communist." It has not come to that yet, but I know hon. Gentlemen on this side who before they go to sleep look under the bed for Communists. One night the hon. Member looked under the bed and found Lord Montgomery.
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    The very fact that Lord Montgomery is arguing from a purely military point of view for a general reappraisal of our whole strategy indicates that some very essential revolutionary thinking is needed. I did not think that I should ever be making this proposal, but I think it would be quite a good idea if the Minister of Defence brought Lord Montgomery back, because Lord Montgomery is pointing out, and to an ever more appreciative audience, that the whole idea of the old conventional war in the nuclear age is nonsense, is lunacy. It is suicide. To talk about making war over Berlin is something so absolutely stupid and senseless that to examine it for a few moments only shows its complete absurdity.
    I hope that the Prime Minister will welcome some revolutionary thinker too. There was not much sign of any revolutionary thinking, or, indeed, of any thinking at all, in what the Prime Minister said yesterday. I agree with what the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said, that the speech of the Prime Minister yesterday reminded him of the last political days of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, when Mr. Macdonald made the speeches in which he talked about going on and on and on and up and up and up. If the Prime Minister is going to talk as he did yesterday, he is not going up and up, he is going down and down.
    What do we do with Prime Ministers who have outlived their usefulness? In some countries—in Russia—they embalm their great military leaders and after a time they discover that the military leaders were not quite so good and they take them away. Of course, in this country we have sometimes done things like that. Oliver Cromwell's body was dug up and his head was placed on top of Westminster Hall. In politics and in history there are some very strange kaleidoscopic changes, which are very interesting to the historians. But the time has come for the Prime Minister to be embalmed—in the place where we embalm our Prime Ministers: in the other place. It will be only according to tradition, because the gentleman who was Mr. Anthony Eden is embalmed in the House of Lords and so is his predecessor, Earl Attlee. So I do suggest

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    that the time has come for the political embalment of the Prime Minister.
    We in this corner of the House seem to have annoyed him yesterday. I asked what I thought were perfectly relevant questions about this great outburst of moral indignation on the part of the Prime Minister and everybody else about the action of Mr. Khrushchev in announcing the explosion of the megaton bomb. It looks as though we have had today a repetition; it appears that the House of Commons is running out of adjectives. Mr. Khrushchev's action has been described as barbarous, as inhuman, as cruel. And we all agree.
    I do not know anybody in public life, I do not even know of any Communist, who supported Mr. Khrushchev's action, and certainly those of us who are here the outcasts of the House, who have not only been chucked out of the Labour Party but the Prime Minister wants us to be chucked out again—none of us in any way at all defends the action of the Soviet Union's Government. We repudiate it, and the first telegram of repudiation to the Russian Embassy came from the South Ayrshire Labour Party.
    We all do repudiate it, but we must carry our moral indignation to some logical conclusion—
    Mr. Sydney Silverman: No double standards.
    Mr. Hughes: —and if we say that the polluting by the Russian megaton bomb is evil, is inhuman, cruel, callous, then we must carry this to its logical conclusion and say, if we believe that, that it is cruel and callous and inhuman and against the interests of civilisation for us to follow in the same way and send our atom bomb into the air and explode it there and scatter pollution in the atmosphere with danger to children unborn. That is the logical conclusion of the argument.
    I say that those of us who are called unilateralists, in carrying this argument to its logical conclusion, do it with a great deal of support from people who are not obsessed with the politics of Westminster. After all, we know that those sit-down protests have been as much at the Russian Embassy as anywhere else, and Lord Russell has been
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    to the Russian Embassy and there have been protests to Mr. Khrushchev from Labour Members of Parliament.
    The argument seems to us irresistible, that after this outburst of moral indignation the duty of the Prime Minister was to say, "This was a horrible and dangerous thing to the future of the world but we are not going to pollute the atmosphere, we are not going to proceed on this path against civilisation." Of course, it caught the Prime Minister on a sensitive point. Hypocrisy never likes to be debunked, and so we had that tirade against the Members with whom I am associated. He said, "Yes, pro-Russians."
    Hon. Members in this House have been called pro-Russians before. There was a war in 1854, the Crimean War, when we invaded Russia, and there was a Liberal statesman called John Bright who protested against the Crimean War. What did they yell against him? "Pro-Russian." So precedents are followed in this House even after a century. I have been called pro-German, too, in my time; pro-German, pro-East and pro-West. I remember the First World War when Keir Hardie was called pro-German. In the Boer War Lloyd George was called pro-Boer.
    When anybody dares to raise his voice against the passion of the moment, even when he brings forward invincible arguments, there is always somebody there, an hon. Member or a political journalistic guttersnipe, who shouts "Pro-German" or "Pro-Russian". Horatio Bottomley did. Now a Prime Minister of whom we expected higher standards has used the political sneers of Horatio Bottomley. That is what the Prime Minister descended to. He combines the political smear tactics of Horatio Bottomley with the unctious hypocrisy of Uriah Heep.
    I do not deny that I am pro-Russian. I am pro the Russian people. I am pro the Russian people against the bomb, and pro the American people against the bomb. The greatest enemy of Russians, Americans, British and everybody else in the whole world, committed or uncommitted, is the hydrogen bomb. The Prime Minister is already preparing the way, he is preparing his apologia in advance, because in certain circumstances of the balance of power we shall

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    be prepared to do the same thing. We shall be prepared to start our explosions and we shall have the atmosphere polluted in the same way and the Russians will be saying, "Look at the hypocrisy of the British." If we are going to do that and if we are to argue for the balance of power and prepare to sacrifice humanity in the struggle for the balance of power, let us have no hypocrisy and no humbug about it.
    Before I turn for a moment to the background of all this, there is one other thing I should mention about the Prime Minister's attack on some of us. I was with the Prime Minister when he went on his expedition to Moscow and I heard him deliver a speech far more eulogistic of Mr. Khrushchev than ever I would have delivered. Pro-Russian! The House should be reminded of it, and the Prime Minister should be reminded of it.
    I heard the speech in the British Embassy in Moscow, and at first when I listened to it I could hardly believe my ears. I wondered whether it was the Caucasian wine or the vodka. So I went next day to the British Embassy for the hand-out copy and there it was in black and white. This was what be said—the address was to Khrushchev;
    "This is a truly constructive life's work which you have undertaken. The future before the Soviet people is one of expanding horizons. Across the steppes glows the furnace of industry beckoning to a promised land. This is no mirage which you see before you. It is sober reality. The rate and quality of your progress is indeed extraordinary and is—so far as I know—unparalleled in history."
    Who is the pro-Russian? When the Prime Minister uses these taunts against us, I say again that this is another example of unmitigated humbug.
    What is the background of all this? The Prime Minister says that this was a political decision. How does he know? It is very difficult. Military people would not say what is political and what is military, and it is very difficult indeed for those who are not in the inner circle to disentangle the trend of events and the motives of Russian policy at present. If it was a purely political decision, how do we explain the speech of Marshal Malinovsky in which he went into great detail about strategic and military matters? Not only did Mr. Khrushchev talk of politics but he talked of military
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    strategy, and he talked about the preparations of the West. We may disregard it as Mr. Khrushchev's type of hypocrisy, the Prime Minister in reverse, but there were certain military aspects. Critics and leaders of public opinion who have been trying to find out the strategic and military reasons for these explosions have dealt with certain military explanations.
    I commend to the House a very interesting and objective article in the last number of the Economist. The writer dealt with the military aspects of the decision to explode these bombs. He referred to the big warheads and he talked about rockets and then said:
    "On the same grounds the big warhead"—
    the megaton bomb—
    "might be used against prowling Polaris submarines, if their general whereabouts, but not their exact position, were known to Soviet intelligence; the extra hull-cracking pressure produced by the bigger explosion might make the difference between a hit and a miss."
    We have heard my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) in recent debates saying that Polaris was the most wonderful weapon which would go under the sea and nobody could find where it was.
    Perhaps Soviet military thinkers have been reading my hon. and learned Friend's speeches. If this is so, this is also the thinking of a certain section of military people in America. The argument for Polaris was that it could go undetected under the sea and from there destroy a dozen Russian cities in one salvo from its weapons. Who knows? It is logical enough, if anything military has any logic at all these days, that the Russians should say, "If we are to meet the menace of the Polaris submarine and we do not know exactly where it is we can explode one big bomb which will cover a large area and destroy the submarine whose purpose is to destroy Russian cities".
    When we argue that we are innocent in international affairs, that we are not preparing for war, that we are all interested in peace and are utterly blameless, that may be so, but it does not appear to be so to the other people. In Moscow recently I heard anecdotes which are passed from mouth to mouth but are not repeated in the Press. The current story asks why the Armenian Radio was suppressed and it is said that

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    it was because of its answer to a certain question. The radio was asked whether there would be another war and the answer was, "Certainly not. They will all be so busy fighting for peace that there will be nobody left to fight a war". And so we have international controversy going on against the background of the arms race.
    I say to the House that we are not winning the arms race and that there is no possibility of our winning it with the new technical generation that has arisen in the Soviet Union and that, instead of striking these melodramatic postures, we must do some real thinking or we shall be destroyed. It is because the Government have shown no signs of any constructive policy that we are entitled to attack them in this debate.
    The Opposition puts forward a proposal for disengagement, and I believe that on these lines we can find the possibility of successful negotiations. If we can have the Rapacki plan or the Gaitskell disengagement plan put in the forefront of our negotiations with the Soviet Union, I believe that there is a possibility of their saying "Yes", and that it is on these lines that we should be attempting to seek a solution of these difficulties.
    Then comes the question of N.A.T.O. The Opposition will have to make up their mind sooner or later whether they believe in "My N.A.T.O. right or wrong," because if they believe that the Gaitskell plan or the Rapacki plan is the way to international settlement, but the other nations say that they do not agree and America or General de Gaulle vetoes it and N.A.T.O. vetoes it and General Norstad says that it will not work, then the time will have come when in the interest of international peace the Government must think in terms of leaving N.A.T.O. and of establishing themselves on a different footing in international politics. If we say that it is impossible to be neutral in this world, we have only to look round the world to see that the great majority of the countries are neutral and would welcome some attempt to break through the wall of hate that divides East and West.
    Mr. Paget: Like Finland?
    Mr. Hughes: Finland is of strategical importance to Russia. We can certainly
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    look at the question of Finland, because if we had a Finland next door to us we would probably want to think in the same strategic terms, too.
    Mr, Paget: And Ireland?
    Mr. Hughes: Ireland is neutral Ireland enjoys the benefits of neutrality. In the Dail and in Dublin they are not thinking about conscription measures at the present time; their ideas are different.
    Mr. Paget: Would my hon. Friend think that they would feel as comfortable if they were Russia's neighbours?
    Mr. Hughes: I do not know if my hon. and learned Friend has been to Finland recently, but I have. In Finland, the capitalist system prevails. There is private trading, private newspapers, a free democracy in Finland, right on Russia's doorstep, because Russia does not attack any country which does not menace her and is not strategically dangerous to her. But my hon. and learned Friend and I can discuss that at another time. I want to discuss conscription.
    Here is a nice political position for both parties. The Opposition is up against a dilemma, too, and, judging by the sound and fury on the Opposition benches, the Labour Party is going all out against conscription. I agree with that. I am as strong an opponent of the extension of National Service proposals as anyone. I suggest to the hon. Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. Maclean) that he should try an experiment. Let him go to two or three places in his constituency, knock on the doors and ask the men to join the Army. What would happen? I know Ayrshire as well as the hon. Member. Ayrshire is one of the places lowest on the recruiting list. When the hon. Member advocates any kind of national service in that part of the world, I say that he is not expressing the views and interests of his constituency.
    We have had tension over Berlin during September and October. Did it give a boost to the recruiting figures? Not a very enthusiastic one. The Secretary of State, in reply to a Question by me, said that it was marginal. If there were any enthusiasm in this country, people would have been rushing to join the Army, and it would have been revealed in the recruiting figures.
    Mr. Profumo: I find it immensely difficult to get the sort of enthusiasm that I should like to see for recruiting in the hon. Gentleman's constituency, but that is a very special case. Recruiting is the country as a whole is shooting up.
    Mr. Hughes: If it is "shooting up" there will not be any problem, and the Government will have to shelve their National Service proposals. In Ayrshire, there is no enthusiasm for fighting in Berlin or anywhere else. I shall put down a Question on that for a Written Answer next week.
    I will try another place. What about Leeds? Having taken a typical agricultural constituency, I proceed to a typical industrial city, represented by the Leader of the Opposition, the spokesman for the Opposition on foreign affairs and hon. Friends of mine who said, "We must not say that we are not going to fight any war over Berlin". How many recruits joined in Leeds in September to fight for Berlin? The numbers were 56 in a big industrial city. I fail to find in this country any sign that the majority of young people who have been in National Service are likely to be attracted into the Army. They ask; Exactly what are we fighting for? Why is there all this movement of troops and trouble in Berlin and Central Europe when we can go into a hydrogen bomb war that can destroy everything in half-an-hour? They find all this talk about conventional warfare and enlistment in the Army for another twenty years—seeing the world and all that— so much irrelevance.
    What sort of people are being asked to make this Rhine Army efficient? The Army wants certain technicians. It wants electricians and people used to handling machinery. What are these people doing? Where are they now? It is probable, presumably because of their training as key men and mechanics, that they are in some of the industrial factories because if industry is to recover it must have trained people in the right strategic places. How can we capture foreign markets if we take the technicians from the factories? If we do so, we shall pose an isoluble problem. Instead of talking about conscription, we have to realise that the young people of this generation do not want to go into
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    the Army, and we have to base our defence policy and foreign policy upon that assumption.
    The Chancellor of the Exchequer recently told the House that we were in such an economic mess that we must cut down our national expenditure. One of the most notable things that he said was that we must cut down our overseas expenditure and spend less in Germany. But surely these measures will cost something? They will mean an addition to the War Office budget. Last week the Economist said:
    "Clearly, selective service would be needed if large conventional forces of this kind were to become (over British objections) the accepted N.A.T.O. policy. This would entail both the disruption of the present British Regular Army and vast new expenses in manpower and money. It would impose a major new strain on the British economy, and one that could not possibly be paid for by the small savings that might be derived from scrapping the antiquated parts of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent."
    We heard the attack on the Government by my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, who has been to B.A.O.R. and found a large number of technical deficiencies in the Rhine Army. It has not the right signals. It requires an enormous amount of new equipment. All this cannot be obtained without a vast expenditure of public money. If we devote part of our economy—some of our factories—to re-equipping the Rhine Army with complicated materials, we again meet the problem. Those men are now engaged on work which is essential to the export drive. One is once again up against an insoluble problem. Consequently, I say that we are drifting back to the fact that we cannot afford it.
    If a Labour Government returned to power as a result of a slide away from the Tories at the next General Election and came forward with a proposal to spend much bigger sums on the Rhine Army, they would have to find the money for the purpose. Where would they get it? The Labour Party is committed to spending huge sums on social reform, housing, education and the health service and yet at the same time we have it committed in a haphazard way like this to the idea of a programme which might result in heavily increased military expenditure. Consequently, I contend that we must base our policy not

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    on re-equipping the Rhine Army but on bringing that Army home.
    That is the policy of Lord Montgomery, and it has now become the policy of military realists. It is not just the airing of the thoughts of a pacifist theorist. The time has come when people who look at the situation from the military point of view say that the whole conception of N.A.T.O. must be changed. Therefore, I say that we must look more critically at N.A.T.O. and we must have entirely new ideas on defence and foreign policy, and until the Government realise that they are misleading the House and betraying the country.
    7.33 p.m.
    Viscount Lambton: I should not like to follow the argument of the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes). I have always listened to him with very great interest, and I think that one's affection depends upon not agreeing with him, but I must say that I was rather upset by the severe strictures which he passed upon the Prime Minister.
    I had hoped to make no recriminations of any sort today. It seems to me that affairs are far too serious for that. It is essential that one should look at what actually is the position in the country today and ascertain why Her Majesty's Government have been moved to adopt a course which they have argued and spoken against at every opportunity during the last four years.
    I turn my attention, rather reluctantly, to the manner and method of the speech of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth). I had hoped to give him warning that I would do so, but, unfortunately, he did not follow the tradition of the House and remain in the Chamber during the whole of the speech of the hon. Member who succeeded him, and that is why I have been unable to inform him that I would quote him. It seemed to me that his speech very much summed up the case for the Government at present. It was a most curious speech. He accused every one who disagreed with him of, as it were, getting their information from the canteens. Then he told a smutty story which I can only conceive he himself got from the canteen. I am very grateful to him for that, for I have heard him
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    speak on many occasions but never before heard him make a remark which was in any sense memorable. For his speeches have almost always been an echo of the Government Front Bench policy of the time, however many somersaults my hon. and gallant Friend had to do to achieve that end.
    What are the Government saying? They are saying that things are not serious at all, and, in order to emphasise that they are not serious, we suddenly get slipped into the debate—this is an innovation—the names of prominent generals as in a conversation—such as Frank Festing, Bill Slim and whatever the Christian name of Cassels is, and so on. The general assumption seems to be that these great soldiers are all pals with the people who know, are entirely behind the Government and are not in the least worried in any sense by the present situation.
    I turn from that to what really is facing the country today. It is fairly simple. We are part of the free world in opposition to the Russian Communist menace which is determined to win by using every method that is known, by subversion, by direct warfare in small places, by limited warfare, by political activity and by industrial activity. All these methods are being used, and the Russian Communists are determined to get their way by them in the end. We have to combat that, not only in Europe but in many other parts of the world.
    When I am told by some right hon. Friends that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to reduce the forces in certain bases abroad because they are not required in those places. I should like to know which of the bases are not required today and what forces it is planned to withdraw from them and what availability of men will be achieved as a result of this. The fact of the matter is that one cannot have a defence policy with 165,000 men and have by any means an adequate British force.
    The Minister of Defence seemed today to take credit, as other hon. Members have done, for the Kuwait operation. That was a success, but I do not know how many hon. Members know that it was a success mainly because by good fortune H.M.S. "Bulwark" happened to be in the vicinity. That is something

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    which will probably not occur again. But that gave the Government a little extra strength which they had not otherwise got What the Kuwait operation illustrated was not the strength of our defence arrangement but the weakness of it today, and we must face that
    What the Government are doing at the moment is belatedly admitting this and introducing a scheme of selective conscription. That is what it is. There is no doubt about it. A certain number of people are selected who have already served and are told that they will have to serve again. That is selective conscription, and, in my opinion, it is a doubly unfair selective conscription. But I do not want to criticise the Government too much on that measure, because what they are doing, in my view, is giving themselves a period of six months in which they can think again.
    During those six months I hope that they will look at things not as they would have them but as they are, and have regard for the fact that there is now a great battle being fought between East and West, and that it is absolutely impossible for us to play our part in that battle with an Army of the size which the British Army will be in two or three years' time. That is admitted.
    Will my right hon. Friend, when he replies, tell us of some long-term plan of the Government? The other day, when this matter suddenly arose, there was tremendous talk in the Press about the integration of the forces. We heard a great deal about it. We were assured that the answer to the situation was not conscription but the integration of the forces. What does that mean? The Minister of Defence spoke about it earlier. Are we to build more aircraft carriers, or scrap the present naval programme of building and launch a totally different type of vessel which is needed if the forces are to be integrated? Are we to scrap the R.A.F. Regiment? Or is integration just a word to throw critics off the scent?
    It must seem to me that the Minister of Defence brought more red herrings into this House today than were ever carried by any Grimsby fish wife. Again and again right hon. Members were pushed away from the main point, which is that we are weak and are getting
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    weaker, that we are too weak to fulfil our commitments. If that is not the case, then I ask my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to answer the question which I put to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence to begin with and which he shied away from and never answered. Is it possible for the British Army of the Rhine to take part in full-scale military operations without the use of nuclear weapons? That is the key question which my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence said he would answer. He has not done so, and I ask the Secretary of State for War for an answer.
    The last question is the all-embracing one: if things are as well as the Minister of Defence and others say—if Frankie Festing and Bill Slim and Uncle Tom Cobley and all are so happy with things today—why is it necessary suddenly to introduce this plan of selective conscription? What we have is a last-minute stop-gap. The Government too long refused to admit that they were wrong. They have refused to swallow the words that they have spoken. They have made promises which could not be kept, and, as a result, the country is in a state of unparalleled weakness. That must be realised. If the country knows it, it will react to it, but if we go on as we are, then nothing remains but the destruction of that influence which yet remains to us.
    7.43 p.m.
    Mrs. Barbara Castle: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Stalybridge and Hyde (Mr. Blackburn), I do not claim to be an expert on the technical details of defence, my military experience having been limited to a spirited participation in the air raid warden service during the London blitz. I have, therefore, always felt some diffidence in trying to take part in these defence debates, though I must say, after having listened to the Minister of Defence's speech today and to the devastating critique of it by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton), I find that some of my diffidence is beginning to evaporate. It seems that our defence strategy is in such a confused and parlous state that, from now on, every hon. Member had better be his own defence minister and we had better come to these debates

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    with our own "do-it-yourself" strategic kits.
    All the speeches from both sides today have made evident the close link that there is between foreign and defence policies, and almost every speaker has contributed his analysis of what Mr. Khrushchev's motives are, and, therefore, what exactly it is that we are having to contend with in defence. The hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth) ventured the view that Mr. Khrushchev is merely a disciple of Hitler. All I can say to that is that, if it be a correct analysis, the Government's defence preparations for this country are even more inadequate than they at present seem.
    Clearly, the whole of our thinking about foreign affairs and defence policy has been coloured by the explosion of the 50-megaton bomb—not by its existence, for I suggest that that is not the really significant thing which we have to consider, but its testing, which is an act which, experts have told us, is militarily quite gratuitous. I believe that it is essential that we should interpret this apparently wanton act correctly, as the starting point for the rest of our argument.
    As is well known, I and some of my hon. Friends sent a letter to Mr. Khrushchev protesting about the resumption by the Soviet Union of H-bomb tests and pleading that the 50-megaton bomb should not, in its turn, be tested. I must frankly admit that the long answer we have had to our letter, some 2,000 words long, is not of much help in the direction of understanding what the Russians are about.
    Mr. Khrushchev tells us that fall-out—and fall-out, quite apart from anything else, is obviously a matter of major concern to every citizen of the world—is no longer important. Events have now come to such a desperate pass between East and West that the real danger we face is not from fall-out but from the probable use of the bomb itself.
    Of course, that is no justification for the tests, because that test has itself helped to accelerate the arms race, and, therefore, the danger that the bomb will be used. So what on earth was behind this action of the Soviet Union, not only in producing 50-megaton bombs but in
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    advertising the fact so blatantly and so wantonly to the world? I do not believe that Mr. Khrushchev is so ill-informed about opinion in this country as to imagine that we would be frightened off our course by the big bang. Indeed, the effect is the very opposite, because to horrify is not to terrify, and nuclear disarmers, whether unilateralist or multilateralist, would be the last people to be impressed by a show of nuclear brutality.
    Indeed, if Mr. Khrushchev has been misled about the attitude and mood of the people of this country, the fault lies very much with those who, both in Press and Parliament, have consistently and sometimes wilfully misrepresented the attitude and policy of nuclear disarmers, labelling them as fellow-travellers and pacifists.
    The kernel of the case for nuclear disarmament is one which would lead to a toughening of resistance to the threats of Khrushchev, rather than the opposite, for that case is that nuclear weapons are futile as weapons of defence and are only weapons of mutual extermination and that those who rely on them are relying in the last resort on our willingness to commit not only suicide, but, to coin a word, cosmicide, for the deterrent is plausible only if the size of the destructive weapon is matched by the strength of the will to use it, in other words, to put it quite colloquially, is matched by sufficient bloody-mindedness to be willing to use the weapon and to be thought to be willing to use the weapon.
    The world of nuclear weapons is one in which it is every man his own Eichmann, being ready to be responsible for the extermination of millions of his fellow men. Therefore, reliance on nuclear weapons, by both East and West, creates a psychology which is inimical to peace. I agreed with the comment of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) when he said that he found something horrifying in the fact that Mr. Khrushchev could regard with delight the fact that Soviet scientists had made a slight error and that his explosion was not 50 megatons, but 75 megatons. But that is the attitude which is implicit in the whole nuclear arms race, for by their very nature nuclear weapons are anti-man. Therefore, any unnecessary contribution to the creation of this psychology is a crime against humanity.

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    That is one of the reasons why we indict the defence policy of our own Government, which adds to nuclear provocativeness in the world while making quite evident that the independent British nuclear deterrent is militarily totally irrelevant to any defence policy. Nuclear disarmers, therefore, would be the first to resist Mr. Khrushchev's threats of nuclear annihilation, because these threats fit the cosmic death wish of the nuclear world rather than support the principle of the sanctity of human life, for which we stand.
    Mr. Wigg: I take the point of my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) that the actual existence of the bomb creates a war psychosis. Would she not agree that the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—which I understand to be purely negative in character to the extent to which it has protested against a British deterrent, which, in my submission, does not exist —by its negative attitude has added to that war psychosis?
    Mrs. Castle: I am not speaking for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, but for myself, and I hope that when I have finished my speech, my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) will not think that I am so negative as he now does. What I am trying to do at this point is to interpret the Russian action, because unless we get our interpretation right, we shall embark on the wrong defence and the wrong foreign policies. I am trying to dismiss the easy assumption that it was a political action intended to terrorise us.
    Shocked as we are by it, there is an encouraging fact attached, namely, that Mr. Khrushchev gains nothing, either politically or militarily, from this test. We are not here faced with a possibility that in some clandestine way the Soviet Union is stealing a march on us. There was never any chance that this test could be disguised and hidden from us. Therefore, we are not up against a secret stealing of advantage by an enemy. We are up against a most flagrant defiance of world opinion, including that of the uncommitted countries, in pursuit of an activity which our own Minister of Defence has told us today does not make military sense
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    It does not make military sense because we have been told today that the West, that is, Britain and the United States, does not need to resume atmospheric tests. We can keep militarily abreast by underground explosions. This is to be the basis for the continuance, at any rate for a time, of the relative virtue of the West in not undertaking atmospheric tests. Moreover, as Congressman Rutherford of Texas has said only in the last few days, there is nothing for us to be afraid of in the Russian 50-megaton explosion, because the United States has far greater nuclear power than that with her B52s carrying 25-megaton bombs "tucked under each wing." Therefore, there is some rather more sophisticated explanation of the Soviet move.
    I suggest that there is one which gives us cause for great encouragement. It is clear that Mr. Khrushchev's tests are directed at an audience different from us. They are directed at an audience within the Communist camp rather than in the Western world. After all the epithets we have poured out about the Soviet tests, it is ironic to discover that there are some people, both in the Soviet Union and China, who label Mr. Khrushchev a pacifist and revisionist. It seems clear that the reason for Mr. Khrushchev's crime against humanity in these tests is that he wants to change course and that he wants to rival the United States in consumer standards of living, which can only enormously relax the mood of the Soviet Union and world tension as a result.
    Hence, as the Guardian correspondent has pointed out day after day in the past few weeks, Mr. Khrushchev's aim is to divert priority increasingly inside Russia from the heavy to the light industries. It is to enable him to win this internal argument that the big bang has been necessary—to prove that heavy industry which is the foundation of the conventional forces can be safely run down because the Soviet Union can overwhelmingly hold her own in nuclear power.
    This may be a distressing choice to have to make, but is it morally any different from the attitude of our own Government as outlined in the Defence White Paper of 1957, in which they announced that there was a need for a new approach, and for the whole

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    character of the defence plan to be revised? It stressed that
    "the only existing safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons"
    and announced that while building up the power of retaliation with the nuclear deterrent, we were also going to run down our conventional forces and our troops in Germany.
    Is there anything morally different between Mr. Khrushchev's test and our Christmas Island ones in support of this nuclear strategy? What could be more militarily irrelevant than the British H-bomb? We have not even got the justification that it is an effective contribution to defence. The reason for our developing an independent British deterrent was exactly the same reason as Mr. Khrushchev's for piling up the nuclear stress at this moment; namely, that the Government were seeking the political advantage of getting rid of conscription without paying any regard to the defence or peace consequences of that action. They wanted defence on the cheap, militarily, materially and spiritually, and I oppose both the British and the Russian policies when they lead to these ends.
    Our defence policy now stands in ruins. The "Bluestreak" fiasco has been followed by the "Spearpoint" revelations and we are now in the ironic position that the United States cannot reduce N.A.T.O.'s dependence on nuclear weapons to the extent that it would like, because we have let them down. Surely, it is quite clear from all the discussions which have taken place here this evening that there are only three choices before this country? One is to step up the dependence upon nuclear weapons in Europe and, therefore, the nuclear race in that highly explosive area; or, secondly, to have some system of conscription which is overtly and honestly fair, whether it be selective service or some other kind; or thirdly, to conclude a European settlement with the Soviet Union, and any Government doing their job honestly and courageously should put these three choices before the British people. Instead, they have been dragging their feet both in defence and foreign policy.
    The defence policy which we have had offered to us today adds up to the.
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    We have got the maximum nuclear provocation with the minimum nuclear strength. We have got partial and unfair conscription, and a total silence by the Government on their proposals for a European settlement. Surely, one would have thought that, because the Government's defence policy has so patently failed, they would have at least been trying to remedy this situation and to protect the British people against the danger to which they are undoubtedly exposed by taking a lead in trying to secure a political settlement? Instead, we are continuing in the foreign policy field to perpetuate the same myths that we are living among in the military field, and we are treated by the Prime Minister to a long homily about the resumption of British tests. How virtuous he managed to make it sound. It seemed to me that my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper, in dealing with this point, missed the kernel of the whole thing. We on this side of the House do not believe that the British nuclear deterrent has any validity or any military sense. If the British bomb is wrong and militarily irrelevant, how much more morally wrong are the tests of that bomb? Any testing of British nuclear weapons would be completely irrelevant to Britain's real interests. Sometimes, we have been told in this House that Britain has to keep her nuclear weapons because it is the only way in which we can offset the growing influence of Western Germany in European affairs. We have got our nuclear weapons, but where is our influence? Does anybody in this House pretend that the British Government have as great a say in the settlement of the Berlin problem as the Government of Western Germany? What sign is there that Britain's voice is listened to at all in the political councils of N.A.T.O.? Only in the last few days, the safety and perhaps the survival of the people of the British Isles have been at risk while American officials have been playing "chicken" at "Checkpoint Charlie". "Chicken", we are told by the Washington correspondent of The Times,is
    "a dangerous pastime played by some discontented young Americans: the point is to humiliate another by demonstrating that he is not courageous or foolish enough to accept a challenge to destroy himself."
    What are these forays by American officials across the frontier between East

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    and West Germany supposed to establish? Apparently, they are supposed to establish that we do not recognise the East German regime. We have had that dangerous game played of trying out each other's nerves even at the risk of nuclear war to establish that we do not accept the right of the East Germans to control their own frontiers. As The Times Washington correspondent pointed out, this has nothing to do with American interests, either.
    "The three vital American interests which the Administration is determined to defend",
    he wrote two days ago,
    "are concerned with West Berlin and do not go beyond the sector boundary."
    No wonder some of us are worried about the existence of American bases in this country, and have expressed that anxiety in an Amendment which we have tabled to the Motion for an Address.
    It is one thing to be told that we cannot hard-heartedly surrender the freedom of the people of West Berlin to Communist tyranny, but it is quite another for us to be told that war on this country should be risked by American officials refusing to recognise, even de facto, the existence of the Easl German regime. Yet, there has been no British protest about this matter, and no anxiety expressed by any member of the Front Bench or any person in this House about this lunatic and irresponsible game played in Berlin in the last few days.
    The irresponsibility of the "chicken' game has been followed by a far gravei statement by the American Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, who, in a speech on Sunday, announced that the United States ruled out completely the consideration of the creation of any "neutralised" or "buffer zone" as part of a settlement over Berlin.
    The West cannot have it both ways. We cannot on the one hand refuse to recognise the division of Germany by ringing the alarm bells at "Checkpoint Charlie" every day of the week, and then in the next breath refuse to enter into the only negotiations which would make the reunification of Germany possible. What we are doing, while at one and the same time the weaknesses of this country's defences have been
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    exposed, is to continue to live in the world of dangerous myths which are bedevilling a solution of the Berlin problem, because West Berlin only makes sense as a temporary expedient until either we have had an agreed reunification between East and West Germany, or we have had the liberation of East Germany by force of arms.
    West Berlin is an anachronism, and a dangerous one, as we all know, and some of the most outspoken things about it have been said by General Van Fleet who was shooting his mouth off in America only yesterday. He has written off Berlin as a dead loss. Be added that
    "any military leader who permitted himself to get caught that far behind enemy lines would be demoted."
    One of the tragedies of the post-war situation is that we in the West have been promising the West Germans integration with the West, and at the same time the reunification of their country. We have only just woken up to realise that the West Germans cannot have both these things without war. This is one of the sharp awakenings we have to face, and indeed there is now a dangerous mood growing up in Germany, a mood which only in the last two days, has led to the forced resignation of the Foreign Minister, Herr von Brentano, who has proved to be the stumbling block in the creation of a new coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats. In the statement he issued on his resignation, he said;
    "Behind the demand for a change of person there is a demand for a change of policy."
    Heaven knows that von Brentano was hardly a great liberal statesman. It was he who opposed the operation of the Rapacki plan tooth and nail. Nobody in his senses will imagine that that is why the Free Democrats wanted to get rid of him. Indeed, they considered that his policy was not tough enough.
    What is this new policy to which von Brentano refers as being the purpose of the coalition between the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats? Is it the pursuit of the lunatic dream of the liberation of East Germany by force? Or could it possibly be the determination to get reunification, if necessary by a deal with the Soviet Union? I suggest to the House that it is folly for us to ignore these possibilities.

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    Since the war this House, and the West as a whole, have deliberately chosen to pursue the integration of West Germany into the Western Alliance at the price of the perpetuation of promises we cannot deliver, and we have chosen to woo Dr. Adenauer rather than to explore the possibilities of a European security pact. The time of awakening has come, and I suggest that the grave exposure of the people of this country to dangers against which we have no defence, and the picture of our situation we have had given us today, make it clearer than ever before that the defence of the people of this country will not be found in any Defence White Papers, but by a realistic and revolutionary change in our approach to the foreign policy problem.
    8.15 p.m.
    Captain John Litchfield: I do not think that the hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) was quite fair in saying that the Government had been dragging their feet in trying to reach a settlement in Europe.
    A feature common to these defence debates is that they often turn out to be Army debates, and I hope that if I introduce some thoughts on certain other aspects of defence I shall not strike a discordant note.
    Since I was a student at the Imperial Defence College ten years ago, I think that our situation has deteriorated. Indeed, I think that our vulnerability at the moment is quite terrifying. I do not think that our vulnerability to nuclear attack can be placed at the door of this or any other Government. It is a question of the march of science, and particularly the march of Soviet science, and there is precious little we can do about it except to maintain the strength of the Western deterrent and to realise that without his deterrent on our side we shall either be destroyed or blackmailed into submission.
    There are, however, some things that are within our control, and I want to refer particularly to our position at sea. I am frankly appalled at our naval position at the moment. I am sorry that there is no one here to answer for the Admiralty. As no Admiralty representative has been here since the Front Bench speeches were made, and as naval
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    affairs were not mentioned in the Defence White Paper, I wonder if there is some lack of interest in naval as compared with Army affairs.
    I do not wish to discuss the nature of a future war. There is more than one school of thought on that. A debate on the Navy Estimates is the right time to argue the naval implications of that. I merely wish to make the point as emphatically as I can that we do not today possess the naval and maritime air forces necessary to secure our seaborne communications with any degree of certainty in the event of an Atlantic war.
    I believe that that applies not only to the Royal Navy but also to the N.A.T.O. navies as a whole, in which the British contribution in anti-submarine escorts is, I believe, one in six, which is hardly an adequate one for a great maritime nation. The Navy has no single antisubmarine vessel capable of dealing with a Soviet nuclear submarine.
    I do not think that our naval forces have ever been more efficient or that the spirit of the navy has ever been higher, but our weakness in numbers of ships is alarming, not only in itself but in its implications of quite another kind. We are an island people. We have an island economy, and our life is largely dependent on seaborne communications. If we cannot protect these lifelines, we have had it.
    What does this mean? Our vulnerability to conventional attack at sea is a standing invitation to an enemy to make such an attack on this flank, which is both vital and vulnerable. There is no substitute for seaborne communications. If we lose control of these lifelines we have only two alternatives before us; one is to submit and the other is to reply by initiating nuclear war, if it has not already been opened by the other side.
    My fear, therefore, is that we are steadily reaching the position—indeed, I think that we may have reached it— where the only kind of major war which we can contemplate fighting is a nuclear war, whether or not the enemy initiates nuclear warfare.
    I leave it to others better informed to continue the debate on the question of the Government's measures to reinforce the strength of the Army. All I want to

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    say on the subject of B.A.O.R. is that defence is not merely a question of Berlin and B.A.O.R., or even of overseas commitments; it is a question of national purpose and morale. I hope that my right hon. Friend will not entertain any suggestion that the strength of B.A.O.R. should be reinforced by making unacceptable reductions in our overseas commitments. This point has been made several times, and I understood my right hon. Friend to say that he would not entertain such a suggestion for a moment.
    The root of the trouble over the strength of the Army lies in the fact that we have taken on a far greater commitment in Western Europe, in the B.A.O.R., than we can sustain with our other overseas commitments. I doubt whether anyone can offer an acceptable solution, because we have treaty obligations which, presumably, we must keep. But our troubles spring largely from that fact, with the result that we are too thinly spread everywhere, and we are now faced with the dilemma of introducing measures which will clearly be unpopular, or making unacceptable reductions in our forces overseas, or leaving the British Army of the Rhine too weak. I feel that if we are faced with a choice between our overseas commitments and B.A.O.R., our overseas commitments should come first, by a long way.
    This Continental strategy is quite foreign to our historic military tradition. It is not usual for us to maintain a very large proportion of our Army as a standing army on the Continent of Europe in peacetime. There are many answers to that criticism, but, nevertheless, it is quite foreign to all our history and, I believe, to our true military interests.
    Whatever measures my right hon. Friend may decide to take in the way of reinforcing B.A.O.R., I hope that when he makes his reappraisal of our defence policy—which I understand from the newspapers, and not from him, to be under consideration at present— he will go into the question of reorientating our defence policy and military strategy by adopting a true maritime strategy. I hope that we shall hear more of this in the Defence White Paper.
    If my right hon. Friend is thinking on the lines of a highly mobile strategic
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    reserve, or whatever it may be called, I hope that he will remember that ships cannot float about the eastern oceans or anywhere else without a base. Not all our bases are essential, but we cannot do without some base in the area in which our ships are operating. Of course, if we take a realistic view of the political problems involved in retaining overseas bases in these days, it is obvious there are difficulties, but it is wrong to think that because things are politically difficult or embarrassing they are necessarily impossible. We have to make an assessment of priorities in these matters, and one priority is the security of our overseas interests. There are other political priorities, but that is a military priority.
    I do not want to be unduly depressing or alarmist, but for many years, going back to the days long before I entered this House, when I knew a great deal more about the true facts of our defence situation than I know now, I have listened to successive Governments of all complexions reassuring the country that all was well in defence. These statements have not been true for many years. I hope that I shall not be accused of furthering the interests of our enemies when I say that we are now living on bluff. It is not so much a question of what Ministers say—people do not reach the Front Benches in this House until they have learned to avoid saying anything which can be held against them later on—as of the aggregate impression derived from their speeches over a long period.
    I cannot remember any time since the war when any Government of this country has been as frank as they should have been about the true facts of our defence situation. In the Staff College we used to talk about "situating the appreciation", instead of "appreciating the situation", meaning that we were fitting the facts to reach certain conclusions. I have the feeling that some of our Governments have been guilty of that.
    Many years ago, when the great Admiral Jackie Fisher was First Sea Lord, he was able to say, when speaking at a Royal Academy banquet, in about 1905, that we could assure the people of these islands that they could sleep safely in their beds. I wish I

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    could believe that any Minister today could honestly say that that was still true. As has already been said by hon. Members on both sides of the House, we are carrying on this debate tonight at a moment of great international tension. The word "war" is bandied about freely at all levels, including that of senior members of the Government. Yet I believe that we are now relatively weaker and far more vulnerable than we have ever been at a time of tension.
    If I am exaggerating the dangers I do not consider that that is necessarily a disservice to this House or to the country, any more than the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was rendering a disservice by his exposures —I do not know whether he was exaggerating—regarding B.A.O.R. I think it right to discuss these things frankly. If one feels that there are dangers, then I think it right that one should talk about them. This is not the moment to be complacent or to try to soothe people with smooth words. On the contrary, I think that the Government should tell the country frankly the "facts of life" about defence, however hard and unpalatable they may be.
    Nor can I see any limit to the duration of this kind of situation. I think it would be quite wrong to give the impression that we are taking any measures today which we feel are necessarily short-term measures. I cannot see any end to the kind of situation in which we are living, or the necessity for maintaining our defences at a very high, costly, and, in a sense, a very sacrificial level.
    It may be that in ten years' or in twenty years' time, perhaps longer, it will not be Communism with which we are faced. One thing with which we shall be faced sooner or late—Communist or otherwise—is the danger and peril arising from the growth of population; from pressures which will arise in the world because of the expansion of world population which is building up—I am surprised that this is so seldom mentioned in this House—at a rate which is producing great pressures in various parts of the world but which as yet we ourselves have not experienced.
    If we are to live, let alone prosper and maintain our national life and in-
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    tegrity, in a world in which it is getting harder and more difficult to live, I believe that we must be ready and able to defend our national life and our vital interests. We need a call to brace ourselves to face a prolonged, severe and very trying endurance test. There were times when my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) spoke frankly to the nation about the perils which confronted us, not only during the war years but before. The response, at any rate during the war years, was certainly not lacking. I believe that there would be a good response to that kind of shock treatment were it imposed today. I believe that this is necessary. But there will not be any such response to complacent reassurances and promises of good times ahead. The only kind of response to that kind of treatment is a demand for jam today instead of jam tomorrow.
    If one needs an example as a warning, let us remember the locust years of the 1930s and what went on in this House in those days. What those years of evasion, escapism and reluctance to face hard and unpalatable facts cost us later in terms of blood and treasure, the effects of which are still with us today, is on the record for all time. I do not think it unfair to say that our failure then was due in a large measure to a reluctance to take steps—perhaps by this House, certainly by politicians —that were militarily necessary but politically embarrassing.
    I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence will give us an emphatic assurance that political considerations—I am making no accusations but perhaps one ought to say party political considerations—will never deter him or his right hon. Friends from taking measures which his professional advisers regard as necessary for our national security. I know that that would be so, but I should like it on the record.
    As I am sure hon. Gentlemen opposite, or the great majority of them, recognise, defence is not a party matter. I urge my right hon. Friends to be as frank as they can with this House and with the country and to tell us the facts about defence, however unpalatable, and what it is necessary to do about them. If the Minister of Defence will do that,

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    and throw lesser considerations overboard, I feel sure that he will receive the support of the majority of hon. Members in this House and of the majority of the people in the country.
    8.35 p.m.
    Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: I hope the Minister of Defence has been impressed by the deep concern in all parts of the House about the quandary into which this Government have got the defence of this country. No one could put it more strongly than did the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Captain Litchfield), who said that he did not believe that at any moment of tension in the history of this country had our defence been weaker or more vulnerable. That was a devastating statement coming from a supporter of the Government.
    I agree with the hon. and gallant Member also because I think that a great deal of the trouble has been due to the commitment, made by a Conservative Prime Minister, to have four divisions in Europe. That, to my mind, was a foolish commitment at the time. It was done in a hurry; it was rash and unbalanced. It was the presage of the rash and unbalanced attitude which eventually landed us in the Suez affair. But we have that commitment. We have tried to skedaddle out of it with that cleverness which is so typical of the Prime Minister. We have tried to say that it is not a commitment of four divisions. We have abolished the divisions and reduced them to brigades and said there should be seven brigades. Then we cut it down to five brigades. Protests were made, and we raised them to seven brigades. Only last June we had a firm undertaking that there would be seven brigades.
    We have been playing about with the numbers in B.A.O.R. because for political reasons—internal party political reasons—we did not want to carry out the commitments in Europe which this country had undertaken. It is one thing to say that the commitment should never have been undertaken—and I strongly hold the view that it should never have been undertaken—but it is quite another thing to say that when that commitment is there we should try to skedaddle out of it by draining the units in B.A.O.R. of the troops they ought to have. That is both deceptive for our allies and dangerous for ourselves.
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    What we have now is the complete collapse of the 1957 policy. This policy of reducing the numbers and having fewer troops with the excuse of firepower of four divisions instead of having four divisions has been bound up with nuclear policy. The nuclear policy was presented to this House as a cheap way of getting out of conscription and of the financial commitments in which the four divisions would otherwise involve us. It means that in Europe we have agreed to a nuclear policy for our Army; in other words, that we are relying on nuclear weapons for our defence. It means that we in this country will use nuclear weapons first in the case of a war breaking out in Europe. That is a wrong and, in the critical condition of the world as it is today, a barbarous and criminal decision.
    As my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) mentioned, we have three composite regiments and two regiments equipped with "Corporal". They are the vital artillery for B.A.O.R. All the matters I shall mention in my speech have been already mentioned in this House or in the newspapers following disclosures which have been the result of the recent exercise. This is the vital artillery upon which our troops in B.A.O.R. are dependent.
    The noble Lord rightly pressed for a statement from the Minister whether we could fight a war without nuclear weapons. As the newspapers have said —he has seen them and he must know— the troops in B.A.O.R. have been trained for nuclear war, they are deployed for nuclear war, they are equipped for nuclear war and that force is not an effective force except by use of nuclear weapons. If there is any kind of major operation in Europe and we fight, then either we use nuclear weapons or we are annihilated, or we do not fight at all. We are entirely dependent upon nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, and that is what caused so much flurry in the newspapers recently, because that is exactly what was brought out in the Press by journalists who went to Germany and reported.
    Mr. Watkinson: I know that the hon. and learned Member has been to B.A.O.R., and I hope that he saw there all he wanted. I hope that he will

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    accept it that the doctrine which we follow in B.A.O.R. is the doctrine of N.A.T.O. and not the doctrine of B.A.O.R. alone.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I do not gainsay that for a moment, otherwise it would not fit into N.A.T.O. But it was presented to the House with enthusiasm by the Prime Minister as a means by which we should save money and avoid conscription. Of course it fits into the N.A.T.O. pattern, but I am coming to the change in the American attitude and what we shall do about it. Subject to that addition, I gather that the Minister accepts what I have said about dependence upon nuclear weapons.
    Let me look for a moment at nuclear strategy and what it involves. If we have nuclear weapons and are deployed for a nuclear war, we have a nuclear strategy. If we apply nuclear weapons to the principles of strategy certain things follow. For the benefit of some hon. Members who think otherwise, may I point out that if we have a nuclear war, of course we use the nuclear weapons, in the same way as we use heavy weapons in a conventional war, to hit the enemy behind the lines before his forces can hit us. The first thing to do is to hit the enemy as far away from us as possible, behind the enemy lines, to prevent him from organising.
    In other words, the conception of the escalator and the graduated deterrent, the conception which has been presented to the House, is nonsense. That was a conception that one could start a nuclear war with small weapons, and rely on the little tiddlers first. Then, when the enemy retaliated, one used something heavier, and then the enemy used something heavier, and so on right up the escalator. That is not and never has been "on" at all. It is a complete fantasy, it is nonsense and always has been. I hope that we shall never hear more from either side of the House about that as being our nuclear policy.
    If one is to use nuclear weapons and has an army dependent on nuclear weapons, and if one is to hit the enemy behind the lines, how far behind the lines does one hit him? How heavy stuff do we use? When we hit, do we hit inhabited country in which civilians live? If we do, where do we draw the line?
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    We do not just do it for the purpose of aggravating the enemy when things like nuclear weapons are involved. We do not do it to incite him to hit us back with a nuclear weapon. If we are thinking ruthlessly and militarily, as the Russians think, we obviously let off our biggest stuff where it hurts most at once. If they would hit at London, we should hit at Moscow.
    It is silly to think of a petty, nuclear war confined to the Rhine area or Western Germany and not contemplate the immediate consequences if nuclear weapons are used on a full scale in a large, devastating nuclear war. In other words, it is not possible to fight a limited nuclear war.
    I thought that I heard the Minister of Defence say in an aside to my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) this afternoon—and if I am wrong I hope that he will correct me, because I may not have heard him correctly—that it was well-known that the idea was to use nuclear weapons in the early stages to hold up the enemy and then we should get our conventional troops mobilised on the Continent and then fight a conventional war.
    Mr. Watkinson: I certainly have no recollection of saying that and, therefore, I shall look with interest at my speech in HANSARD. I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows this, but the doctrine is: the short conventional pause first, hold it as long as we can and thereafter start on the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: It is not possible to have a pause at all unless it is a conventional pause. It is therefore ridiculous to have a B.A.O.R., as we have at the moment, which is dependent on nuclear weapons to create a pause which nuclear weapons cannot create when the only hope of creating a pause at all is by a conventional army. Therefore, the first consideration for the defence policy of this country should be the provision of a conventional army. That is the last consideration in the mind of the Government. It is exactly what the 1957 White Paper policy turned down and it is the opposite of what is in the interests of this country.
    If that analysis is correct and if we are to have nuclear warfare, the only

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    thing to have is all-out nuclear warfare from the word "go". Then tactical nuclear weapons are futile. Therefore, what we should concentrate on is the making of a conventional army.
    With this tactical nuclear set-up in B.A.O.R., can we fight a nuclear war?
    Mr B. Harrison: The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that we should concentrate on a conventional army. Does he favour conscription, or what method does he propose to get the men?
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: If the choice is between having conventional warfare with conscription or nuclear warfare without conscription, I would choose conscription every time. We shall not get that choice from this Government. We are to get both nuclear warfare and conscription. Can we then fight a nuclear war in our present position?
    Let me say a word or two about control. I acknowledge at once the great courtesy of the Minister of Defence in arranging for me to go to our B.A.O.R. I am extremely grateful to him and to the Secretary of State for War. This arose from my doubting how the control of nuclear weapons was exercised. I understood that immediately a war broke out it would inevitably be a nuclear war. That is correct.
    On the question of control, however, I was misinformed and quite wrong. I gladly acknowledge that the Minister of Defence was correct. The position is as follows, but it has led to some disturbing reflections. The control of nuclear weapons in British regiments is in American hands and it is operated in this way. With the British nuclear regiments, there are units of American troops who fulfil two functions. First they have the physical custody of the warhead. Secondly, and more important, the American units have the "knowhow" of operating the warhead. The British regiment, therefore, cannot operate this nuclear weapon at all without the co-operation of the American unit which is attached to it and which forms part of its figting formation in war.
    Apart from that, there is this control. When nuclear weapons may be used, the order comes down from N.A.T.O. through SACEUR to the Commander of the British troops, to the Commander
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    of B.A.O.R. or the Commander of the Corps. He is then free to use those weapons, but he cannot use them without the co-operation of the American unit.
    The American unit, however, gets the order not through the British Commander. It comes down from the President of the United States through exclusively American channels to the American unit attached to the British formation. We therefore have the position in N.A.T.O. that no nuclear weapons can be used without the American decision that they be used. But we have American troops which can use them without any veto from the other countries.
    When operations start, our troops in B.A.O.R. become part of N.A.T.O. They come under SACEUR and they are subject to his orders. There is no corresponding provision of which I know whereby those British troops can be prevented from operating nuclear weapons in the same way as the American Government can prevent the American unit attached to the British troops operating those weapons. In other words, we are expected to exercise a degree of confidence in the Americans which they do not reciprocate with us. I say at once that I would incomparably prefer American control of these nuclear weapons as now operated rather than have a European control in which the decision might be made by European Powers.
    But there is one aspect which the House should not lose sight of in this nuclear dependence. It is the morale of the units concerned. To me, it was a smack between the eyes to go to a British unit and to find there this utter dependence upon a foreign unit attached to it. It is not a healthy position. The Americans themselves were the most delightful people. The American officer whom I met in the British mess was a delightful and charming person. The British officers were excellent, understanding and altogether first-class, and the thing worked. The morale was excellent. We must not, however, run away from the knowledge that that is an undesirable situation which inevitably puts a strain upon those concerned.
    These nuclear weapons which they have—and I should say nothing about

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    this either, if it had not been published— include the "Corporal," a vast weapon requiring trains to move it, requiring lorry after lorry to move it. It is a tremendous affair altogether— ponderous; slow in getting into operation; vulnerable; taking too long to get into an operational position. To fire these weapons is, of course, to disclose one's position. It is not a weapon which can be fired time after time like an ordinary field gun. To my mind, as to the minds of other people who have been in National Service and who have seen this thing for themselves, it is an absolute non-starter. I cannot understand our depending upon a cumbersome weapon of this kind.
    What we are doing is putting our troops in a position where the whole of our strategy, the whole of our warfare, is bound up with these weapons and dependent upon these weapons. I simply cannot see any war taking place in which the enemy would allow such weapons to operate. It is utterly impossible. I think that what we are doing in placing these weapons there and depending upon them is utterly wrong. I do not believe that the strategy is well conceived, that this dependance on nuclear weapons is well conceived; nor do I believe that the nuclear weapons themselves are weapons upon which the Army should be dependent.
    I mentioned the American position and a change in the American attitude. There has been a change in the American attitude about this, and I myself think it has been due to the invention of the I.C.B.M. I think the Russians probably have the I.C.B.M. and the Americans probably consider that they have got it, and that means that New York and Washington are brought into the firing line. It means that they can be hit in the same way that London can be hit and could have been hit a few years ago. It seems to me that America has come round now to the view which some of us hold and have held that this country should always have had as its policy, and that is this. First, a conventional army. The Americans are now pressing more and more for conventional troops, a conventional army rather than a tactical nuclear army. Secondly, a deterrent, yes; but a deterrent to be used as a
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    deterrent and as a deterrent only; not as a first-strike weapon, but as a second-strike weapon. The Americans have now said they will not use the weapon first. We have had since President Kennedy has come into office, since the I.C.B.M. has become known to exist, this shift in American policy towards precisely the policy which some of us have for years considered should be the policy of this country, and they have come to that policy because they themselves now find themselves in exactly the same position as this country has been in since before 1957.
    We are deeply concerned about the defence position. What we are having is, after 10 years of Conservative rule, a repetition of precisely the same thing we had before the war. This is not just my own personal analysis. The hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Chelsea (Captain Litchfield) made exactly the same comparison. We are having it for exactly the same reason, and unless this policy is reversed the defence of this country is put in peril.
    9.0 p.m.
    Mr. Christopher Mayhew: The debate has followed the pattern of previous defence debates in that we have had one strong attack after another on the Government from both sides of the House. I believe that the Government's only defender in the debate was the hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth). I regret that I did not hear his speech, for to hear an intelligent defence of Government policy would have been an unusual and interesting experience. But there is a difference today inasmuch as the Government have at least conceded that something needs to be done. For years past everyone, except the Government, has acknowledged that the Army has been called upon to do too much with too little and now, at long last, the Government have reached the same conclusion.
    The reason they give is not that recruiting has disappointed them in any way, not that anything unpredictable has happened in so far as manpower, reorganisation of the Army or overseas commitments are concerned, but simply because of the extraordinary, surprising, unpredictable occurrence of a crisis over Berlin. This seems to me nonsense

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    as a reason for the Government's change of front. The suggestion that if there had not been a Berlin crisis there would not have been an Army manpower crisis was absurd. Everybody for years has known that this crisis was coming, and all the facts and figures have shown it.
    Why has the Berlin crisis taken the Government by surprise? Every hon. Member must have been seeing the Berlin crisis coming for three or four years past. It is no credit to the Minister of Defence that as recently as twelve months ago he was ignoring altogether, as it seems, the possibility of a Berlin crisis developing and declaring, as he did at Devizes at that time, that
    "A total of 165,000 will be sufficient to meet our world commitments."
    That was less than a year ago, and all my constituents could have predicted an acute Berlin crisis long before that date. It has been clear to everybody that an Army manpower crisis was on the way years before the Berlin crisis arrived.
    The truth is that we are in this mess because in 1957 the Government rightly abolished conscription but failed to take the essential consequential steps to balance manpower and tasks. Abolishing conscription was popular and easy, so they did that part, but reorganising Service manpower and cutting down our overseas commitments outside Europe was an unpopular and hard job and they shirked it, and that is why we are in this mess now.
    We are assured that recruiting has nothing to do with this manpower crisis. If it is true, as I take it—and the figures are not published yet—that the September figures are 50 per cent. above the previous September figures which were good, and if this trend is continued in October, that is very good news. The Minister, who has shown some enterprise in this direction, deserves our congratulations. May I put on record that this must be the first time in history that a social purpose has been served by television advertising?
    If it is also true, as I understand, that the rate of wastage has improved significantly, and possibly the Minister may have something to say about that, again it will be heartening news. Let us make no mistake about it. We wish the Minister well in his recruiting drive.
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    We want to see a strong, voluntary Regular Army and if we make criticisms it is quite genuinely because we have that in mind. The Government will not get 165,000 by 1st January, 1963, though they may not fall far short of that figure. Originally they expected 182,000 but let us forget that at the moment. If the Minister reaches his 165,000 target it will be a rather barren target, because he has had to have resort to the compulsion which he had hoped to avoid. Therefore, it is a slightly barren exercise now to argue about precise dates and precise figures.
    I said that the Government had come to the conclusion that something must be done, but this afternoon I was put in some doubt about this by the attitude of the Minister of Defence towards the B.A.O.R. It is difficult to make up one's mind on what the Minister of Defence really thinks the position is in relation to the B.A.O.R. Last week, he gave assurances that there were no shortages and no serious deficiencies, but this time he speaks more seriously about this matter. What must strike hon. Members on both sides of the House is why, if he is so satisfied about the B.A.O.R., do we now need this new scheme which is being pressed forward? If he is not satisfied, why did he attack so strongly my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) this afternoon on the very just and true criticisms that he made of the state of the Army?
    It is true that his attack on my right hon. Friend did not carry much weight. He picked on what he thought was the most exaggerated attack by my right hon. Friend on the question of radio sets in order to confute my right hon. Friend, but everything that he said in his reply absolutely confirmed what my right hon. Friend had been saying. I think he slipped out that a strong minority of B.A.O.R. was equipped with C.19 radio sets. I do not know if this can be the same radio set that some of us knew during the war. If it is, I hope that it has been improved since then because it was universally regarded as one of the most exquisitely-designed machines for keeping formations out of contact with each other that could be imagined. [Interruption.] If it is the No. 19 set that we used in the war, it is not all right. If it were all right, why so much haste to replace it by the new set? Now

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    it is said that the new set is very good indeed.
    My right hon. Friend, I thought, rather underrated some of the equipment shortages. He did not mention helicopters. Everyone will tell us, the same as they tell us in the higher level of the B.A.O.R., of the shortage of helicopters, particularly as brought out by exercise "Spearpoint". Our motive in saying these things is not, as the Minister suggests, to depress spirits in B.A.O.R. or to lead the Russians to doubt the will to resist either of ourselves or of the B.A.O.R.; it is definitely that we want B.A.O.R. to be strong and effective.
    I remember very well, as other hon. Members must do, the appalling shambles at the beginning of the last war, the lack of equipment, training and organisation. I sometimes claim to have been the worst-trained soldier ever to have been sent abroad on active service.
    Mr. Watkinson: I said to the right hon. Gentleman, and I meant it, on the basis of what the hon. Gentleman has just said, what I want to do.
    Mr. Mayhew: It is because many of us have had experience of this that we are determined that it shall not happen again.
    Mr Watkinson: With regard to the hon. Gentleman's claim, I would point out that I was in the 1914–18 war.
    Mr. Mayhew: I would argue the Minister's claim against mine of being the worst trained soldier ever sent abroad. It is because we want the B.A.O.R. to be strong that we make these criticisms. It is also, above all, because we were impressed by the argument developed so admirably by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) about the dependence on nuclear weapons in the B.A.O.R. We have discussed this on many occasions previously in this House. On those occasions, we made a very strong case on the lines indicated by my hon. and learned Friend about the control of nuclear weapons by formations and the need for a bigger conventional capacity for formations. Perhaps we can now deal with this rather different question,
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    although it is related, of what the Minister had to say about our aircraft and their conventional capacity. I understood him to say that our Canberras are geared for a nuclear strike and that before they are able to be used for conventional warfare they will require certain re-equipment. This is a very serious commitment. The whole point of having the aircraft in the conventional role is the first twenty-four hours. Can the right hon. Gentleman reassure us?
    Mr. Watkinson: First, the Canberras are equipped in accordance with N.A.T.O. instructions. Secondly, they can have a conventional role, but, obviously, they have to have a changeover, so to speak, for that purpose. There is another point that I want to make plain. I am talking about strike Canberras in the N.A.T.O. force. There is a large force of aircraft, including Valiants, which are equipped for the conventional role only.
    Mr. Mayhew: Nevertheless, for the tactical support in the field of a conventional effort to impose a pause, our Canberras are, in practice, useless. It is very important to bear that in mind. We all agree, however, that something requires to be done. We have now had produced to us this scheme, about which I hope the Secretary of State will tell us a great deal more when he replies. It has had a poor reception in the House today, and in the Press, and I am sure that our postbags will shortly show that it has had a poor reception among the National Service men who may be called up as a result of the Minister's policy.
    Already these unfortunate men suffer from an understandable sense of bad luck in being the last men to be called up. Now they will be penalised again, so to speak, in not having a fair basis for calling up, such as a ballot, which one could understand, or the American system, favoured by an hon. Gentleman opposite, which at least tries to weed out the men who are least tied by family and other responsibilities and so on. Our men are being selected in this purely arbitrary way so that those who happen to have been the last in will be the first to remain for another six months.
    Even worse in a way is the situation of the National Service man who has gone

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    back to civilian life, started a career, become reunited with his family and settled in again, for he is now faced with a sudden interruption of six months in his career. It is a great sacrifice. How would hon. Members feel if their careers were interrupted fox six months all of a sudden? There would be considerable personal disaster, if not necessarily disaster for the country.
    It is a real hardship for these men. I do not know the experience of other hon. Members, but when I speak to National Service men and question them about their service, the question which gets the quickest reply is, "How much longer have you to serve?" To that question the National Service man very often has an extremely quick answer exact to the number of days. It is very hard for him suddenly to be asked to add six months to the smaller number of days that he had hoped would be all that he had left before he settled down again in civilian life.
    I want the Secretary of State to give us more details about his scheme. We want a little reassurance about those who are and those who are not going to be affected by it. We want those who are to be affected by it to be given the maximum possible notice, for every possible reason. In addition, we want those who are not going to be called up to be given the maximum notice of that as well, because there is a great deal of unsettlement through the fear of being called up, and that is a serious hardship.
    Also, what arrangements are being made for exemption on compassionate grounds? Will any advantage be given to National Service men on account of family responsibilities, careers or other possible reasons? We should like to be told the maximum detail tonight. We should also like to know when full details of the scheme will be published.
    We may be asked: "If you dislike the scheme"—and we do—"what alternative is before us?" We say that the Government should do what they ought to have done four years ago. They should reorganise Service manpower as a whole and review the tasks of the Army overseas outside Europe. The Government have paid lip-service to both these things from time to time, and as long ago as 1957. If they had really carried out these two tasks which they set them-
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    selves in the 1957 White Paper, we should not now be called upon to adopt this compulsory scheme.
    The reorganisation is a matter of looking at Service manpower, not just in relation to the Army but to all three Services together. The lesson of the manpower crisis is that the Minister of Defence requires more authority as against the other Service Ministers. We need to look at Service manpower as a whole. That is the lesson of the "brush fire" incidents which we have had, each of which has been a combined operation in practice. Each, especially Kuwait, has been the clear responsibility of the Minister of Defence.
    This problem should have been looked at four years ago in that light. We should have asked ourselves about the role the Royal Air Force was playing, with thousands of men engaged on a useless independent deterrent who might possibly be used in bases to provide strategic airborne reserves. We should have asked whether naval manpower was properly being used in the overall picture, and whether we could not do better in providing mobile naval strategic reserves. We should not flinch from the possibility of further reorganisation in the Army—perhaps fewer armoured and infantry units.
    If we are told that this is bad for recruiting, we should realise that, even if it is sad for the men in these units and those who have left them, the man who has not yet joined is perhaps less worried, and to that extent it is not such a drag on the problem of recruiting. If these things had been done four years ago, when they should have been done, we would not now have been faced with this problem.
    Mr. Wigg: My hon. Friend has overlooked the fact that a White Paper in 1957 set about a reorganisation which had, I should have thought, disastrous results. If he is light-heartedly once again suggesting that the 60 battalions which were asked to do the work which 128 did before the war should once again be chopped up, without any thought but to make a politician's holiday, that would be disastrous.
    Mr. Mayhew: No one was against reorganisation, but the Government's policy was disastrous.
    Mr. Wigg: We are seeking to get at the truth. In July, 1957, there was a major reorganisation, and it is no good my hon. Friend saying now that we should not waste money and manpower on the deterrent. That is what we have been telling the Government. It was not until a year after Blue Streak proved to be a "dead duck" that we got anywhere at all. Now my hon. Friend wants again to reorganise. Does he know what he is saying?
    Mr. Mayhew: My hon. Friend should pay attention to what I am saying. I was talking about the Services reorganising manpower and roles inter-service-wise. That was mentioned in the 1957 White Paper. The Government have not carried out this reorganisation. If they had, a great deal of our present crisis would not exist.
    Also mentioned in the 1957 White Paper, and which the Government would also not face, were the tasks of the Army overseas outside Europe. The fact is that one can have a nuclear strategy and a world strategy but one cannot have a conventional strategy and a world strategy. We must, if we are to have an effective Rhine Army, review our commitments outside Europe. Everyone knows that this is not an easy matter. The troops overseas are not always the kind of troops one wants to fill gaps in the Rhine Army or in the home-based reserve. It is clear that awkward cross-posting would be entailed —crowded married quarters and all kinds of problems would arise. I do not deny that.
    There is a solution. The Prime Minister said yesterday and the Minister of Defence said today that it is the '"tail" rather than the "teeth" which is needed —a view contested by some hon. Members on this side of the House who feel that there is an urgent need for "teeth" troops as well as "tail" troops. If that is the case, however, then in overseas bases there is a very long "tail" and comparatively few "teeth". Thus, to the extent that we try to solve our problems by reducing our overseas base commitments, we shall, more than is understood, get the troops which we need in the home-based reserves and in B.A.O.R.
    When all allowances are made for the difficulties of cutting down the commit-
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    ments outside Europe, we on this side of the House still question whether we have an operational need for 40,000 troops in 16 different countries outside Europe. The argument that the mere presence of British troops in those places contributes to internal security and defence against aggression may have been true in past years, but it is not so self-evident today. With emergent nationalism and with a vigorous anti-colonial crusade throughout the world, it is no longer a safe assertion that the mere military presence of British troops in a former Colonial Territory contributes to either internal security or defence against aggression.
    The Government seem to be coming round to that view. I was glad that the Minister of Defence said this afternoon that Field Marshal Festing will assist him in a committee to review this question. It is a pity that this was not done four years ago. Why have we had to wait all this time? If these things had been done in time, we should not have needed to go in for this compulsion of the National Service men. We hope that Field Marshal Festing's committee will look at a number of questions.
    I have just returned from a trip to Singapore. The Government suffer somewhat in the short term from their generosity to hon. Members in showing them military establishments and formations abroad—in the short term. But I feel at liberty to make a few comments and to state a few conclusions which I have reached as a result of visiting Singapore. Militarily, it is undoubtedly very impressive when regarded from the point of view of the airman, soldier or sailor, but to a politician it does not present the same cheerful picture.
    One of the first questions which Field Marshal Festing's committee must ask itself is precisely what is the present role of the garrison based on Singapore. Is it the internal security role? If so, what are the likely political repercussions of the appearance of British troops in the streets of Singapore in support of the present Prime Minister, Mr. Lee? Is the role that of defence of Malaya and Singapore? If so, how real is the immediate threat of external aggression of those territories? Does it justify a vast and expensive garrison base and installations? Would it not be better

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    to do much more to shift the responsibility for local defence to local shoulders in Malaya and Singapore?
    Finally, it must ask itself whether the role which Singapore has to fulfil is a S.E.A.T.O. commitment. The Prime Minister of Malaya is shortly to visit this country and it seems that an effective agreement among the Federation and Singapore and other Malaysian countries will be dependent upon our not insisting on using the base for S.E.A.T.O. purposes. It would be quite wrong to undermine and jeopardise this very promising Federation by insistence on the use of this base for S.E.A.T.O. purposes.
    This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman mentioned Laos and took credit for some troops dispositions in relation to Laos. I do not know whether he had Singapore in mind, but, for political reasons, it is not possible for us to use that base in connection with the Laos crisis. This is another instance of the false sense of security, strength and usefulness which is sometimes given by these powerful military bases overseas. They do not fit the political realities there and often have far less power than we give them credit for.
    I was impressed by the security problem on the base of Singapore. How far is it possible to maintain warships, airports and dockyards which are worked by thousands of dedicated Chinese Communists? This is a major problem. One had the sense that the possibility that we were fighting the last war but two might have relevance to a grand, impressive military base maintained by very large numbers of dedicated Chinese Communists.
    Finally, while I was there I was able to discuss Hong Kong with the High Command. I hope that the Festing committee will ask itself some questions about Hong Kong and the role of the 10,000 troops there and the Hunter aircraft—and I believe that the tanks are still there. What exactly is their operational role? I was told that deterrence of Chinese aggression was the role of these troops, but is it sensible and realistic to adopt the theory that the Chinese will be deterred from aggression in Hong Kong by the difference in having a purely token defence and 10,000 troops there? In any case, in what circum-
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    stances could it be right or proper to ask those troops to fight to the last man against 35 Chinese armies and to ask four Hunters to go up against the Chinese Air Force? Those are questions which should be asked and answered quite firmly. The same kind of questioning would apply to Cyprus, Libya and Malta. Here we will find a great deal of manpower which could be far more usefully and effectively used in the home-based reserve and in B.A.O.R.
    The appearance has been given that these National Service men are being asked to serve another six months because of Berlin. The impression is given that the needs of B.A.O.R. and Berlin dictate the decision, but it is equally true that these men are having to be called up because the Government cling to this world-wide chain of static bases and to all the manpower now in them.
    Perhaps we cannot complain too much, because there are signs that the Government are learning. The establishment of the Festing committee is welcome and bears out what has been said from the Opposition Front Bench for years. A reorganisation of military manpower has been promised by the Minister of Defence in a recent speech, drastic reorganisation on an inter-Service basis. Today he even mentioned the need for a sea-based strategic reserve, something which has been urged from these benches for a long time past. The Secretary of State has actually sent a recruiting team to a British Colony, something which we have long urged on him.
    However, while the Government are learning, they are paying a very heavy price for their mistakes in their defence policy in recent years. They overestimated what they would get by voluntary recruiting. They underestimated the wastage of recruits. They did little or nothing effective to build up mobile strategic reserves. They flinched from the reorganisation of Service manpower as a whole, and they clung to the out-of-date strategy of worldwide bases. That is why we are in this mess now. That is why we are being asked to accept this thoroughly unpopular scheme of compelling National Service men to stay on, and that is why the Government's defence policy is condemned not only from these benches but by well-informed opinion all over the country.
    9.28 p.m.
    The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Profumo): The hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) put his finger fairly and squarely on one of the main reasons which Her Majesty's Government have in mind for sticking to their concept of trying to create an all-Regular Army. He said that whenever one has conscripts one finds that they practically always know precisely the day of their release. This is true, and this is one of the difficulties. However good National Service men may be during their period of service, it is only a transitory stage in their lives, and we believe that we must stick to the concept of trying to get an all-Regular Army for the purposes which lie ahead of us.
    That remains our basic aim, but my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence was correct when he said that we and hon. Members on both sides of the House have always realised that we would have to go through a trough period in the turnover from a conscript to an all-Regular Army, a period when there would be stresses and strains and shortages in the Army. We have always known this. It is not something new. It is not the fact that we have suddenly got ourselves stuck with something we had not seen, but it is correct, and one cannot get away from this, that the trough period is coinciding with a period of increased international tension.
    No member of the Government has ever sought to say that things are not serious today. One could not possibly sustain that argument with armies glaring at each other over what is called "Checkpoint Charlie" in Berlin and with our allies calling up and retaining men in the armed forces. Certainly this is a period of very acute tension. This is the problem to which we have to address ourselves in the short-time, whilst maintaining our idea of getting an all-Regular Army for the future.
    What opportunities are open to us? What courses could we adopt with regard to our Army? One possibility is that we might have a very large Army kept up to strength all over the world. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire (Sir F. MacLean) would have this, because in the course of his interesting speech he said that he believed that we ought to have a conventional deterrent in at least
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    a dozen places in the world. It may be that this is something which certain people would wish to have, but it would be immensely expensive in manpower and money, and, of course, it would mean conscription. Nobody would dream of suggesting that we could retain an Army of the size my hon. Friend wants without conscripting people in a major way, which is something we have decided we wish to leave.
    Viscount Lainbton: Can my right hon. Friend say in how many places we have a conventional deterrent at the moment?
    Mr. Profumo: "Conventional deterrent" was the phrase used by my hon. Friend, meaning the deterrent of manpower. He meant that there ought to be at least a dozen places in the world— bases, garrisons, and so on—where we kept men to deter people from starting a war.
    Sir F. Maclean: I meant what we had until quite recently.
    Mr. Profumo: Up to now we have had a conscript Army, but we have agreed— and I believe that the country is behind us—that we should turn away from that to an alternative which I will suggest in a minute. What my hon. Friend wants we could do, but if we want to do this we must accept permanent conscription and the immense cost of it.
    Viscount Lambton Viscount Lambton indicated assent.
    Mr. Profumo: The Government have decided that this would be wasteful and wrong, and I think that this view is generally accepted by both sides of the House. Also, I do not believe that the majority of the people in this country wish to return to conscription.
    What is the alternative? It is a smaller well-trained Regular Army backed up by reserves which are ready to function in response to present-day needs. This is what the Government are trying to do.
    Mr. Wigg: In the interests of honesty and truth, the alternative which the Government put in the 1957 White Paper was not the one which the right hon. Gentleman is now mouthing. The alternative was atomic streamlined forces, and the independent deterrent, which has gone bust.
    Mr. Profumo: I am trying to tell the House of the opportunities which face us

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    today. The hon. Gentleman made a very good speech to which I shall refer, and perhaps he ought to let me develop my argument in a way which I think is a fair balance.
    Our system will cost very much less than any other scheme. It will cost less to keep strong all-Regular forces backed up by reserves than to retain worldwide up to strength enormous quantities of men with all the paraphernalia that must go with the Welfare State Army of today. There is no question about that. I am now talking of manpower.
    Therefore, if we accept this, as the Government do, we must address ourselves to the problem of increased international tension which faces us for the time being. This is why we propose to take power—and the measures we seek will be purely permissive—to hold back, for a period of up to six months, people Who are at present doing National Service. We do not say that we shall do it. I want to make this widely known, as I tried to do in my television broadcast last night, to which reference has been made. No National Service man should be frightened that he will be retained, at least until we have made the Bill law. [Interruption.]The House should understand why I say that. I have been told of National Service men who are fearful that they will not be allowed out of the Army when their service has come to an end. There is no immediate intention of taking this action, and there cannot be any such action, until we have a law. We should like to have the Measure passed into law by the end of the year, but even then we shall retain only such people as we find absolutely necessary when the time comes, in the light of the tension which then exists.
    Let me take a case in point. If we decided to freeze the Army at the strength at which it will be next April, for instance, it would be at about 180,000 people. If we decided to do this, and managed to get 180,000 people, and were still able to cope with the problems of increased tension, it is not unreasonable to aim at an all-Regular Army of 180,000 people in the long-term future, to cope with the problems that arise then. I know that some of my hon. Friends think that 180,000 is too small an all-Regular Army to be able to cope with our inter-
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    national problems, but I do not believe this.
    If we have to keep some National Service men back we shall do it in as humane a way as possible. We shall give everybody as advanced notice as possible, and take special care to try to deal with administrative problems and compassionate cases that may arise.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Has the figure of 165,000 now been abandoned?
    Mr. Profumo: Of course not. We are aiming to get an all-Regular Army of 165,000 by 1st January, 1963, but the long-term aim is an all-Regular Army of about 180,000. All I am saying is that if we were to freeze the Army at its strength next April, it would be at about that level. Therefore, if we could carry on throughout the rest of this year, with the tension as it is now, with 180,000 people, surely it is not beyond the bounds of possibility to aim at an all-Regular Army of 180,000.
    It is wholly wrong to suggest that the measures we are proposing are as a result of the recruiting campaign having failed. It is not for that reason. Some hon. Members opposite have recognised this in their speeches. I know that they want to help in this matter. I believe that the hon. Member for Woolwich, East realises that the campaign has got into full swing. The figures that we shall endeavour to give the public shortly will bear this out. All that I have been saying is that the September figures of the fresh intake into the Army from civil life—and the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) may like to know this—show a rise of about 48 per cent. on the same month last year.
    This figure does not include those National Service men who have taken the bounty to continue in the Army. That offer stays open. Any National Service man who may feel that he might be retained and who wishes to be sure of his immediate future can take on for three years and get the bounty for doing so. I am not ashamed if the bounty helps to increase recruiting, because that is its whole purpose. I believe that it stands a chance of succeeding.
    I know that percentage figures are not altogether satisfactory, and I can tell the House that the net gain to the Army last September was 1,250, taking into

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    account all the wastage and all the people who bought out and left, as against all the people who were induced to enter. This does not bear out what the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) was saying to the effect that people today do not want to join the Army. I know that things are bad in his constituency, and I understand why it should be so, but the situation is not bad all over the country, and I refuse to believe that young people today are not prepared to devote themselves to a life of service, if we can show that it is worth while.
    The hon. Member for Woolwich, East said he understood that the figure for wastage was improving. I should like to see a greater improvement and I think there are signs that this figure is levelling out. I believe that wastage is the real problem. It is a crucial matter because an increasing improvement even to the amount of one-tenth would by 1st January, 1963, make a difference in the total manpower of something like 1,800 people. That is quite a big figure and so, through man-management and everything else which we do, we are trying to stop wastage.
    The hon. Member for Dudley and, I think, my hon. Friend the Member for Bute and North Ayrshire referred to the particular problem which arose following the occurrence at Oswestry. I will not go through the whole story again. I am sure that hon. Members will remember it. This was an isolated case and I think a very shameful one. The point which the two hon. Members were trying to make was that in order to get people into the Army we were scraping the barrel to such an extent, that we were taking criminals, people with bad characters—"bad hats. "That is not borne out by the facts and I should be ashamed if it were. I am glad of this opportunity to point out that it is not.
    Like any other employer, we cannot inquire into the background of all the people we take. We cannot go to the police and ask whether this man or that has a prison record. We have to rely on a signed statement that they have not been to prison and are of good character. Some of them may "welsh". We do not know. But why should I mind if a man who has a bad past decides to serve his
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    Queen by joining the Army, provided that after doing so he goes straight? The real point is that we have to take the rough with the smooth, like every other employer.
    If what the hon. Member for Dudley was trying to suggest were really true, surely we should note the difference in the figure of people discharged. The moment we find that people have been convicted, as was found art Oswestry, and that they have criminal records, they are discharged. We get rid of them at once. If what the hon. Gentleman suggested were true we should discharge a proportionately higher number of the people coming into the Army but I find no figures which would prove that, so I do not think that anybody can maintain that we are lowering our standards. I see no reason to believe that we are, and, what is more, everyone in my Department and throughout the recruiting organisation is keeping a close watch in this respect.
    Mr. Bellenger: The right hon. Gentleman has given us figures like a sleight-of-hand magician. What does he reckon he will have in the Regular Army by next April? Never mind about the 180,000; how many will be National Service men? Can the right hon. Gentleman tell us that?
    Mr. Profumo: I am sorry if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that I am doing conjuring tricks. I can assure him that I am not. My straight answer to him is this. If we allow for the normal wastage to go on, and by 1st April next year we have about 180,000 in the Army—
    Mr. Bellenger: All Regulars?
    Mr. Profumo: No. The number, including conscripts and so on, will be about 180,000. If we decide—
    Mr. Bellenger: Break that figure down.
    Mr. Profumo: —that on that figure we can get through the crises that may arise during the year, are we wrong in trying to aim at that figure for the long-term all-Regular Army?
    I come now to the criticism about imbalance in the Army. Of course this is a problem. It is no new problem. It

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    is possible even in an Army of 180,000 not to have a proper balance, as the hon. Member for Dudley will know. What are we doing about that? We are deflecting people as they come into the Army into the corps and services where we know that there are shortages. This is working well. Progress may not be dramatic but it is working well. We find that a lot of people join the Army without saying that they want to go into this unit or that. Where that happens we are doing what we can to deflect them into the corps where there are shortages. This is one of the reasons for the measures we are proposing. By retaining people in the Army we are retaining those who are already blocking posts in those corps where there are shortages. This is better than bringing in new men, because they have to be trained and we have to call up many more than we would want to use in order to train them. We would have to waste a lot of Regular manpower in the Army by so doing.
    The Prime Minister's reference to particular shortages in the tail were made against the background of this very point of imbalance. It is the shortages in the tail which cause the imbalance. He was not suggesting that it was only in the tail that there were shortages, but what is correct is that the majority of the shortages are in the tail. There are, of course, also shortages in the teeth arm and the new "Ever Readies" will consist of both teeth arm and administrative troops so that we can call on whichever we want at the time.
    Although the Army is not properly balanced, this would not preclude the Army from going to war. Let us get this into proper proportions. It is perfectly clear that B.A.O.R. could give a good account of itself tomorrow, and this is what we should make clear. The right hon. Member for Belper, the hon. Member for Dudley and the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw delivered themselves of a great attack and criticism about shortages of equipment of our forces in B.A.O.R. As I have been listening to the whole debate, I have not had much chance of seeing the evening newspapers, but I saw one which said;
    "Brown Lashes Out:
    B.A.O.R. Short of Arms."
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    It was also said that during the course of his speech the Secretary of State for War, seated beside the Prime Minister, "made angry mutterings". Of course I made angry mutterings. That was because of the effect which the right hon. Member's speech would have. [HON. MEMBERS; "On you?"] No, on the country. This newspaper report creates an impression that B.A.O.R. could not give a good account of itself, is full of shortages, and that those shortages would preclude it from active operations. What the right hon. Member says in his speech is reflected in the newspapers in this country.
    Mr. Manuel: Is it true?
    Mr. Profumo: No, it is not true.
    Mr. G. Brown: The Secretary of State said that what I said would give the impression to the country that B.A.O.R. could not give a good account of itself, but his right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence, quoting from an article by me which appeared this morning, said exactly the opposite.
    Mr. Profumo: The right hon. Member for Belper is always saying one thing in the morning and another thing in the evening. What I am saying is that this sort of thing must not be allowed to go unchallenged. No Secretary of State for War could at any particular moment be wholly satisfied with the equipment of the Army, because equipment is a continuing process. Those who saw the Army's demonstration the other day at Chobham would agree that the equipment we are to introduce into the Army —[HON. MEMBERS; "When?"]—is absolutely first-class. We are acting on a policy by which we can buy the best anywhere in the free world, but it must be remembered that we cannot have 1965 equipment in 1961. Of course some of the equipment is not of the latest type, but that is the case in every army in the world.
    The danger of the criticisms made this afternoon is that they might lead to the belief that B.A.O.R. is not ready for war. Signals equipment was referred to. It so happens that the right hon. Member for Belper visited a Royal Engineers' squadron and drew his story largely from there, but the fact is that

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    during the last three years there has been a major signals re-equipment through the whole of B.A.O.R. which will be concluded in the next few months, including the unfortunate unit the right hon. Member visited.
    Mr. G. Brown: The right hon. Gentleman chose it.
    Mr. Profumo: The right hon. Gentleman was free to go wherever he wanted.
    Armoured personnel carriers are another case. Of course we cannot guarantee the newest equipment every year. Of course we cannot do a 100 per cent. lift of the infantry at present, but that is a comparatively new concept, and the House should not be misled into thinking that we have not an adequate armoured lift for our troops. We certainly have, and we have enough to lift a fair proportion of the infantry even now.
    I turn to the question of anti-tank missiles. The fact is that the best tank destroyer is still another tank, because only in this way can power and mobility be fully matched. Our armoured regiments in Germany are, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, equipped with the latest marks of the Centurion. This is more than a match for any enemy tank which it is likely to meet. In addition, the infantry have high velocity anti-tank weapons.
    I will make one final point about equipment. It has been suggested that if we wanted to reinforce B.A.O.R. we could not produce the necessary equipment. This simply is not true. Enough equipment is held either in units or in stockpiles in Germany to equip B.A.O.R. right up to its war strength.
    We have also had much argument today, mostly from the benches opposite, that one way of curing our problem would be to alter our world dispositions, to withdraw our troops from overseas garrisons and so on. I made a note of it, and I am bound to tell the hon. Member for Woolwich, East that I marked the note "wet hen policy". I will explain why. Our overseas deployment is geared to the present strategy of our defence policy, and the forces which we maintain in any
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    of our garrisons or bases are the minimum which we believe we require for the job at any given time.
    Of course, we are always on the lookout for changes which may lead to a more economic and more realistic use of our overseas forces, but any such changes surely must be made against the background of carefully thought out strategic studies and not on the basis of cheap opportunism to try to cure a particular problem at any time.
    To react to every single change in international pressure by whisking troops all over the world would be to play straight into the hands of our political enemies, and that is why I call it a wet hen policy. It would not work. We cannot bring troops back from overseas stations in a hurry. The sort of people we might want in B.A.O.R. as administrative troops are equally necessary to our overseas garrisons. If we wish to carry on a recruiting campaign we must not suggest that we shall whisk our troops all over the world, changing them from here to there and sending them to places where there will not be accommodation for them, leaving their wives and families behind them. Anything of this sort which was done could not be of any short-term benefit in the problem which we face.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lamb-ton) put a specific and pertinent question: could B.A.O.R. be asked to take part in full-scale military operations without the use of nuclear weapons? The answer is, "Yes, Sir, for a limited period, and this is in line with current N.A.T.O. doctrine."
    Mr. Paget: How limited?
    Mr. Profumo: My hon. Friend asked me to say something about the long-term picture. I have not time to do so in detail, but I submit that we are faced either with a situation worse than it is now, in which case the Prime Minister has said that we should not hesitate to declare an emergency, or with a situation in which wiser counsels prevail and we shall have a calmer situation all over the world, in which case we can build on the 165,000 we hope to get from 1st January next year. Alternatively, we may have that interrupted by certain peaks of international tension, and this is where we can

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    use our policy of taking permissive powers to call back certain National Service men for periods up to six months, if we had to use it. If we had to bring any of those people back we should not consider doing this at any rate until the end of 1962, when there were no more National Service men. We should treat them as generously as possible and give them as much advance notice as possible, and we should treat all the compassionate cases which arose. But this is where the beginning of our new long-term policy for reserves comes in. If we are to stick to an all-Regular Army amounting to 180,000, we need reserves which are more radily "get-atable" than they are under the powers which we possess at present.
    That is why we propose—and it is an imaginative proposal; I noticed that hon. Members on both sides of the House have not objected to it—to give the Territorial Army, with all its great traditions, yet another and new task so that within it we can produce a category of men who will be paid a bounty—I hope a handsome bounty—for their services and for volunteering to be called up in times of tension. If called upon they would be paid a gratuity. They will be partially teeth arms and partly administrative arms. They will generally be called up singly, not in units, as one of my hon. Friends mentioned. But they might be called up in sub-units.
    These people, whom I have called "Ever Readies" for the sake of a better phrase, will form a very important part of our future policy. If hon. Members link this to the fact that, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, we are carrying out at the present moment a complete review of the whole of our reserve forces, I believe that it forms a good sound policy for the future. If there were—and some hon. Members have felt that this might happen—continued long terms of international tension even worse than we have now which proved that we could not reach our ideal of all-Regular forces, then the promises and declarations which we made in the 1957 White Paper still stand. But it is the Government's intention to see, if it is humanly possible, that we should bridge this difficult gap and transfer ourselves to a stance of all-Regular Armed Forces.
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    I think that the country is behind us in our attempts to do this, and although the powers which we propose to take may not be popular in many quarters of the country, none the less they are actions which will be regarded as realistic. If we interpret them in a humane way, as we intend to do, if hon. Members try to help us with our recruiting drive, and if the situation does not get worse, thereby meaning that we have to have a state of emergency, I believe that we shall get through this period of tension and that hon. Members opposite and on this side of the House who do not want National Service will be very thankful that we took a tough stand at this stage and were determined to carry on with our policy.
    I think that the Army will benefit by this. The longer I serve at the War Office, the more I become convinced that the right course for the Army is to have all-Regular forces. I am absolutely convinced that we are right in doing this. I do not believe that hon. Members need have any fear that, if we have to translate our proposals into actions, we shall not do it in a fair and sensible way and, what is more, that these actions will not be appreciated properly by our friends and allies in N.A.T.O., all of whom know that we are doing our utmost to live up to our reputation and to fulfil the pledges which we have given.
    In these circumstances, I think that the House should be asked to support the actions of the Government.
    Mr. Mayhew: This afternoon the Minister of Defence spoke seriously about the need to reduce our overseas commitments outside Europe and stated that he had asked Field Marshal Festing to help him in this work. The Secretary of State for War described this as the policy of the wet hen. How does he reconcile those two things?
    Mr, Profumo: I said that to try to achieve a solution of the short-term difficulties of manpower by moving our forces all over the world would be a wet hen policy. If the hon. Gentleman looks at my speech, he will see that I said that any changes of the sort that my right hon. Friend has envisaged must be as the result of careful long-term planning and not just ad hoc movements of troops in order to get a few more people into the B.A.O.R. to

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    strengthen, for instance, the signals sections. My right hon. Friend is doing this long-term thinking now. Whatever he decides will be part of next year's White Paper on defence. I am discussing what we should do about the short-term question of manpower shortage and changing to all Regular forces from conscript forces. I was not talking about a wet hen policy with regard to anything else.
    Debate adjourned.—[Mr. F. Pearson.]
    Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

EX-INDIAN CIVIL SERVANTS (COMPENSATION)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. —[Mr. F. Pearson.]
10.0 p.m.
Mr. Glenvil Hall: I desire to raise the question of ex-Indian Civil Servants and compensation. I am sorry that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury is not with us tonight, because I have corresponded with him on this matter over at least twelve months, I have had interviews with him and I have put Parliamentary Questions to him. I think I may say that, as a result of that, he would have been far more familiar than the Economic Secretary with what I have to say. In addition, when the Overseas Service Bill was before the House, a number of hon. Members raised this matter and, as most of us are aware, two days ago there was a letter in The Times from two distinguished ex-governors, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith and Sir Hubert Rance, which puts what I wish to say very concisely.
Briefly, the facts are that in 1947 large constitutional changes, with which we are all familiar, took place in India. As a result, the old Civil Service there was closed down. Some of the displaced officials received immediately permanent and pensionable employment in the home Civil Service or other Government services. Others, however, were not so fortunate. To compensate them, lumpsum compensation was granted for the loss of what to them was something which they valued and to which they looked forward, namely, a long career in the Indian Civil Service.
The only stipulation made at the time was that should they obtain a post under the Crown, they should inform the Accountant-General, Commonwealth Relations Office, in order that the question whether they should be required to refund their compensation should be considered. Later, however, an arrangement was come to with the First Division Association, which is the negotiating body in the Civil Service for higher civil servants, when the limit of time during which such compensation was to be repaid was fixed at two years.
That announcement was made by me —I happened at the time to be Financial

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Secretary to the Treasury—in the House on 24th Feburay, 1949. What I said then was that where a person displaced by the transfer of power in India obtained permanent and pensionable employment under His Majesty's Government within two years of leaving India, he should not receive compensation. Here, I emphasise two things. The first is that in that statement, which was made on behalf of the Treasury, the employment had to be permanent, pensionable and acquired within two years of leaving India. Nothing could be clearer or less ambiguous than that. Second, there were no party politics or policy in what I then said. It was an administrative act binding, I should have thought, on any subsequent Government.
One of the reasons for the two-years' rule was that the Treasury at that time felt that after a certain period the compensation money might presumably have been spent. This was not, if I may say so, an idle presumption on the part of the Treasury, because many of those for whom I now speak did not find work for 9, 12 or 18 months after they left India, and undoubtedly much, if not all, of the compensation money they received was then spent. It was also only if they got work under the Crown that this question of returning the compensation arose. If they were fortunate enough to obtain employment elsewhere, they, of course, kept their compensation money and nothing more was said about it.
Quite recently—actually in 1959—it came to light that the Treasury had not implemented its own decision, but no announcement was made of this fact to Parliament, which to me seems astonishing. I think that perhaps looking back now we can understand why; for all down the years since 1949 men who have been given permanent employment have been required to refund their compensation—even today, twelve years after the event. I find that a most astonishing thing. I do not know what would be said of a private employer who went back on his word in this way.
It is not the method which the Treasury employs when dates are prescribed in other directions. At one time I sat for the Central division of Portsmouth, and both in the Navy and in the dockyard men became from time to time entitled
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to certain payments, if they fulfilled certain prescribed conditions, and I remember quite clearly that if they failed through illness or for any other reason to complete the stated period which entitled them to such a payment they just did not get it. The Treasury was completely adamant in the matter.
What reason does the Treasury give for this high-handed action? It is the reason, I am positive, which the hon. Gentleman will give us when he speaks presently. The reason it gives for continuing to insist upon the return of the compensation money is that, as any temporary employment now counts for pension purposes, if and when a man is given permanent employment it is only right that compensation should be refunded.
Previously, of course, as we all know, temporary service only counted as to one-half, and it is one of the mysteries to me about this new rule the Treasury lays down that the Superannuation Act, as I understand it, upon which this new rule is based, was actually passed and received the Royal Assent in July, 1949. Therefore, in the earlier months, certainly at the time that the announcement was made from that Box by me, towards the end of February, the Treasury was well aware that it was contemplated that the rule as to only half of temporary service counting was to be abrogated. Yet now, although it must have had that knowledge in February, 1949, it turns round and uses it in this way.
The action of the Treasury ignores certain facts. It ignores the fact that the employment must be permanent within two years. The date when pension starts is surely quite immaterial. It was not mentioned when the rule was laid down, and there is no reason why it should be taken into account now. In any case, those who have been employed, even if they have been temporarily employed, have done the work, and they are entitled, surely, to such pension as may come to them under the Superannuation Act.
The Treasury also forgets, it seems to me, the long years of insecurity which those who have been temporarily employed have had to endure, the low rates of pay, and the inability to gain promotion—all things which anyone in temporary employ in the Civil

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Service has to accept. Therefore, it is quite wrong to say, as the Treasury now argues, that temporary service is much the same, if not exactly the same, as permanent service. I asked the Financial Secretary earlier when we were discussing this matter how much longer the Treasury intended to implement this change of rule. I understood from him that it was likely to go on until the last of those who had received compensation had retired or had become permanent. I suggested that after twelve years we should call it a day and that anyone receiving permanent appointment from now on might not have to abide by the new rule, but I was told that because some had had to refund all must.
I ask myself who is responsible. Surely it cannot be the Economic Secretary to the Treasury who will presently get up and read from the brief supplied to him. He was not there when the change was made. It cannot surely be the Financial Secretary whose jolly and rotund frame belies any inhumanity of this kind. It might be the Chancellor himself who, I know, acquiesced in the decision to continue to apply this change of rule, although one would hope that as he has been confessing to having made a number of mistakes he might confess to this one. It cannot be the permanent officials. Dog, surely, does not eat dog. From their comfortable positions they at least must have some sympathy with these unfortunate men, robbed through no fault of their own of an honourable and a useful career.
What worries and disturbs me beyond measure is that a great Department of State can break faith in this way behind the back of Parliament. It is action which plumbs the depths. I beg the Treasury, for the sake of decency in public life and for its own good name, to think again. I hope that it will not only stop the present practice but be big enough to acknowledge its mistake and not only do so but refund to the fourteen, which I understand is the number of those who have received permanent appointments since 1950, the sums which they have had to repay. I believe that it amounts only to about £20,000. I hope the Treasury will think again and will at any rate meet to this extent those of us who feel deeply about this.
10.13 p.m.
Colonel Sir Tufton Beamish: As the individual most recently affected by this Treasury ruling is a constituent of mine, and as this raises an important question of principle, I am glad to support everything that the right hon. Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Glenvil Hall) has said. The individual concerned finds himself in the perfectly absurd position that if he repaid the compensation which he received more than 10 years ago the pension he would be likely to earn would be less than the annuity that he could purchase with the compensation money. That is to me a perfectly absurd situation.
The Departmental decision, in my opinion, is a clear departure from the letter and the spirit of a reply to a Question which the right hon. Member for Colne Valley gave in the House on 24th February, 1949. Yet in the Answer to that Question, as the right hon. Gentleman may agree, there appears to have been a slight mistake, since it was said that Cmnd Paper 7116 made some reference to the two-year rule. In fact it did not, since that rule was not made known until 18 months after these compensation sums were decided upon. It seems to me that the Departmental decision also was a clear departure from the agreement made with the Association of First Division Civil Servants.
I should like to ask the Economic Secretary when the decision was made to depart from the two-year rule, why Parliament was not informed, and why the Association was not also informed. I do not know how many officers have suffered under this ruling, but their numbers must be pretty small. My information is the same as that of the right hon. Member for Colne Valley, namely, that if all the compensation repaid was given back to those who originally earned it, it would cost the Treasury only about £20,000.
This seems to me to be a particularly unfortunate time for pinpricks of this kind. We try desperately hard to persuade civil servants to stay overseas in developing countries, and it is little pinpricks like this which undo all the good in the legislation that we had a few months ago, which was so valuable and which is costing the taxpayers several million pounds annually.

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I may have got my facts wrong because I have had to be very brief. On the other hand, the facts were very clearly stated in The Times a day or two ago by Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith and Sir Hubert Rance. In a powerful letter they described themselves as having been dismayed by the inflexibility of the Treasury and pointed out how manifestly unjust was the decision that had been made. They stated:
"Compensation was granted not in consideration of the amount of a possible future pension but for loss of a secure, permanent career with prospects of advancement."
I think that puts it very clearly and simply. I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to announce today that he is looking again at this question, bearing in mind that this is not a party matter at all and that there is very strong feeling about it on both sides of the House.
10.17 p.m.
The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Anthony Barber): I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Colne Valley (Mr. Glenvil Hall) and to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) for giving me the opportunity of explaining to the House the Government's position in this matter. The right hon. Gentleman has already referred to the correspondence which he has had with my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary and I am sorry that my hon. Friend cannot be here this evening. I can, however, assure the right hon. Gentleman that not only has this matter been considered by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and by the Financial Secretary, but also when it came to me for the first time not so very long ago I went into it with the greatest possible care and I hope I can say with as much care as I know the right hon. Gentleman himself would have given to it had he been in my position.
To get the matter into perspective, I must first give a brief recital of the facts. The White Paper on Compensation for the Indian Services referred to was published in 1947, and stated that His Majesty's Government accepted the obligation to see that European officers of those services should receive compensation for loss of their careers and prospects consequent on the transfer of power. It added that where British
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officers of the Civil Service accepted appointment to another Civil Service under His Majesty's Government on a permanent, pensionable basis, they would receive no compensation but would be eligible for a resettlement grant of £500.
Similar arrangements were announced for British officers of the Burman Services. I believe that the constituent of my hon. Friend in fact served in Burma. These arrangements were applied, as I think the right hon. Gentleman knows, to a large number of officers who accepted permanent and pensionable appointments under His Majesty's Government in the period shortly after the transfer of power in India and Burma. Those who had already received that compensation were required to refund it as a condition of establishment, and I do not think anybody would deny—presumably not the right hon. Gentleman—that that was reasonable within the period of two years.
Mr. Douglas Houghton: Did previous service in India count for superannuation when these officers were given fresh permanent and pensionable jobs, or did they lose that?
Mr. Barber: I think I am right in saying—I cannot be quite certain without checking this—that they received their pension in respect of their Indian service even while they were serving as established officers in the home Civil Service and were in that respect in a different position from those who served with the Armed Forces.
The next event was the statement by the right hon. Gentleman on 24th February, 1949, when he was the Financial Secretary. He announced then what I think he meant to be a concession. Certainly it was I think taken as such at the time. He said in answer to a Question that if individuals obtained permanent and pensionable employment under His Majesty's Government—those words are very relevant—within a relatively short period, an alternative career had been provided and compensation for loss of career became inappropriate.
He went on to say that
"where a person obtained permanent and pensionable employment under His Majesty's Government within two years of leaving India, he should receive not compensation but only a resettlement grant of £500."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th February. 1949; Vol. 461, c. 2025.]

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My hon. Friend is quite right in pointing out, as I think the right hon. Gentleman would be the first to admit, that the right hon. Gentleman was in error in suggesting that the two-year period had been referred to in the White Paper.
Mr. Glenvil Hall: Perhaps I might point out that I was so briefed by officials of the Treasury.
Mr. Barber: Yes, Sir. I do not wish to be disrespectful to the right hon. Gentleman, but he will know as well as I do that it is up to a Minister to ensure that the answers that he gives are correct.
At any rate, that statement represented what has been called the two-year rule. The point raised by the right hon. Gentleman and also referred to by my hon. Friend tonight has really centred round the application of that rule. I do not think that anyone has seriously questioned the reasonableness of the rule itself or of requiring officers who accepted permanent and pensionable posts in the home Civil Service within two years to refund their compensation. Indeed, all officers who accepted permanent posts in the home Civil Service within that period were treated alike.
In the letter which has been referred to, which appeared in The Times on 30th October, it was suggested that until the right hon. Gentleman made his statement on 24th February, 1949, the existence of the rule had been kept secret for some ulterior motive. I have looked into this and am quite satisfied that any such aspersion upon the right hon. Gentleman or his colleagues is unfounded.
Shortly after that statement was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Superannuation Act, 1949, was passed, and Section 38 of it had the effect of making temporary service rendered since 14th July, 1949, reckonable in full for pension with retrospective effect if followed by permanent service. It was clear that if the former officers of the Indian and Burman Service in temporary employment under His Majesty's Government became established, they would count their temporary service in full for pension from July, 1949, a date within the period of two years in which refunds of compensation were required.
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There were really two alternatives open to the Government of the day as a result of the passing of the 1949 Act. One was to allow such officers to keep their compensation on the ground that they actually became established after the expiry of the two-year period, but this would, of course, have been to ignore the effect of the 1949 Act, which was retrospective.
Mr. Glenvil Hall: I am sorry to interrupt, but the hon. Gentleman has made one or two errors of fact. They were not established before that. All they got was restrospective pension.
Mr. Barber: That is exactly what I have just been saying. I repeat that this would have been to ignore the effect of the 1949 Act, which was retrospective in so far as the pension was concerned. Of course it was retrospective, because the Act put an officer who was subsequently established in the same position for pension purposes as if he had been established in 1949.
Mr. Glenvil Hall Mr. Glenvil Hall indicated dissent.
Mr. Barber: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but that is so. I have looked into it myself.
The second alternative which, I must point out, was adopted by the Government of the day in 1950, was to look to the date from which service became effective for pension purposes. If that date was within the two-year period, the officer should be treated in the same way as an officer who secured establishment within the two-year period, and, consequently, if a temporary officer wished to become established, but only if he so wished, he should be required to repay the compensation.
I am sure that this decision was not taken without careful consideration at the time. The matter was discussed in the National Whitley Council in 1950— and the First Division Association to which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Sir T. Beamish) referred is a constituent part of the national staff side—and the staff side agreed to the present arrangements.
The right hon. Gentleman talks about people going back on their word and about a new rule and so on. He referred to the fact that I was not there,

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and he is absolutely right. This was a decision taken in 1950 and I do not think he appreciated that. Nevertheless, this did not preclude me, nor my right hon. and learned Friend, from looking at the matter again, because, after all, there has been a considerable passage of time. But I think that it is important to know that the national staff side agreed that the compensation should be refunded in all cases where Civil Service employment came to be reckonable in full for pension within the two-year period, even though it was not actually made permanent until later.
It has been suggested that there was something clandestine about this interpretation of the two-year rule. That is not so. The rule applied to a number of officers who had taken up temporary employment under His Majesty's Government during the two-year period and who subsequently had the opportunity of being established. In all such cases the officers were informed quite openly that it would be a condition of establishment that they would be required to refund the compensation. Such a statement has been made in every case in which it has applied.
The gentleman in the case to which my hon. and gallant Friend referred was offered establishment in 1949, a year after he had gone to the Colonial Office as a temporary civil servant. He declined to be established. I do not know his reason. It may have been that he did not wish to return his gratuity.
I should like to have said a great deal more but I must now be brief. One point I should add, however, is that there are still twelve people making refunds by way of instalments. They chose, quite voluntarily, to become established on the basis that they returned their compensation, but because their cases were a little hard they were allowed to make instalments over a period of years.
Mr. John Tilney: Would my hon. Friend make it clear that this rule does not apply to those receiving compensation from some of the newly independent Commonwealth countries?
Mr. Barber: I cannot go beyond this case, but perhaps I may write to my hon. Friend on that point. I do not wish to mislead him in any way.
The argument now advanced is that these officers have remained in the employ of the Government for twelve years or more. The main point is that if they now secure establishment they will count their service from 1949 in full for pension in accordance with the provisions of the 1949 Act. In short— although there is a good deal more I should like to have said about the letter in The Times —I think that this application of the two-year rule in cases of temporary employment is reasonable in itself. It certainly appeared so to the National Whitley Council in 1950.
Furthermore, the position has been made quite plain to the officers concerned, and many of them have accepted permanent and pensionable employment on condition of the refund. As I have said, my right hon. and learned Friend, my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary and I have considered this matter with great care and have given particular weight to the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman, although I do not think that he was fully aware of the way in which the decision was reached in 1950. I must tell the House that we are satisfied that the present arrangements are fair.
The Question having been proposed at Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.

UGANDA
  Constitutional Conference
  Constitutional Conference
EMPLOYMENT
  Ex-Regulars (Resettlement)
  Ex-Regulars (Resettlement)
  Offices Act, 1960 (Implementation)
  Offices Act, 1960 (Implementation)
  Government Training Centres
  Government Training Centres

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Leicester

THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON
Robert Wright, Lord Bishop of London—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

ROAD TRAFFIC BILL [H.L.]
2.40 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT (LORD CHESHAM): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to make further provision as to road safety and road traffic, and for purposes connected therewith. My Lords, in so doing, I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that, when you receive your copies of the Bill, you will find that there is an Annex to the Explanatory Memorandum. This has been put in for the convenience of your Lordships and sets out the points of difference between this Bill and the previous Road Traffic Bill when it left your Lordships' House last Session. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(Lord Chesham.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

ADDRESS IN REPLY TO HER MAJESTY'S MOST GRACIOUS SPEECH
2.43 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Motion moved yesterday by Lord Melchett—namely, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty as followeth:
"Most Gracious Sovereign—We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal
28
subjects, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, beg leave to thank Your Majesty for the most gracious Speech which Your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament."
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH had given Notice of his intention to move, as an Amendment to the Motion, to add at the end of the proposed Address:
"but humbly regret the failure of Her Majesty's Government to take any effective steps to remedy the grave state of the economy of the nation".
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I am rather doubtful about which Bill the noble Lord, Lord Chesham, has just introduced. I hope that it was not the Bill that we passed through this House on the initiation of the Government and which was dropped at the end of last Session. I hope that the noble Viscount the Leader of the House will see to it—whether it is that Bill or the Weights and Measures Bill or any other measure on which we do all the "chores" in the beginning—that if the Government drop it and reintroduce it, the Bill should be introduced in another place. I have not had any word directly about this, though it may have been mentioned through the usual channels. But I think that after all the work this House has put into these Bills in the last two or three years, if they are not carried through, and are introduced a second time, they ought to be introduced in another place first.
It has been my custom, when addressing your Lordships' House on the gracious Speech from the Throne, to start by saying how much we always feel indebted to Her Majesty for the manner in which she opens Parliament for us and for the clear way in which she presents her speech. I also take the opportunity of saying how grateful we are to her and to her husband and to other members of the Royal Family for the great public duties they carry through and for their wise service to the State and to the people. I hope that I may be forgiven, and that I am not out of order in any way, if, in adding my tribute to those paid yesterday to the Royal Family, I say that we ought not to forget at this moment the great services of Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret. I should like to send a

29
general message of good will and best wishes to the Princess at this particular time, to let her feel that we are bearing in mind all the duties that she has carried out for the State.
In coming to the humble Address, the first thing I want to say is that I am in a little difficulty with the authorities of the House. There is an Amendment on the Order Paper to-day in my name, but the rule has been brought to my attention that no Peer can speak twice. In this House it is the usual practice, on official Motions or official Amendments, to do no more than put down the name of the Leader of the Party as the noble Lord who is going to move it. Unfortunately on this occasion, the Amendment was put down in my name and I shall not be moving it on Tuesday. The mover will be one of my colleagues. But in view of the Amendment having been moved by another noble Lord, I shall, I think, be entitled to wind up, and therefore to receive all the castigations which the noble Viscount the Leader of the House will no doubt have prepared.
I reckon that the gracious Speech from the Throne this year is either the eleventh or the twelfth we have had in the lifetime of the Conservative Government since the Labour Government came to an end, and therefore I think we are fairly entitled to say that it is an appropriate time for passing judgment upon the situation at which we have arrived at the end of an unbroken ten years of majority rule of a Conservative Government. No doubt my own contribution cannot cover the whole field, but I shall be supported in my criticisms by noble Lords who follow me from these Benches in the course of the debate.
I cannot help thinking of the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, who made such an excellent speech yesterday. He said [col. 6]:
"I feel that at no time since the end of the Second World War have your Lordships reassembled at Westminster to be confronted with quite such a menacing situation abroad and, at the same time, such challenging problems at home."
I entirely agree with that, but I wish that we could have been in better shape to meet the problems that arise. Some of my reasons for saying this will emerge shortly.
At the same time, we do not want to refrain from accepting those paragraphs in the gracious Speech with which we agree. We all support the first main paragraph on policy, in which the Government undertake to continue to give resolute support to the United Nations. We have always supported them when they do that, though at one or two different times we have had to criticise them because we thought that they were not doing that sufficiently well. If we can take it that it is their very sincere intention to carry out this paragraph, we can tell them that they can always count on our support in this direction.
I can say the same about the spirit which is expressed in the second paragraph, with regard to the desirability and the promise of effort to achieve better relations between East and West and to seek peaceful co-operation with all countries.
The next question—that of Berlin—is one which has now been with us, and causing great anxiety, for a good many months. As the Prime Minister said in the other place yesterday, there is not, perhaps, much more that can be said at the moment. But he recognised that the situation is changing and building up all the time. No doubt it will not be long before your Lordships have to come back to this matter with further Questions, seeking further information, and for further debate on the subject.
However, we feel that the situation is so menacing, largely as a result of the extraordinary behaviour of the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Khrushchev, that we have to be exceedingly careful not to miss any reasonable occasion for going into negotiation and we have to be careful that when we do go into negotiation we shall not at any stage repeat the mistakes of years ago, of merely offering appeasement. What we have to do to improve the relationships between East and West is to get down with them to hard facts, to argue them out and to publish to the world what is the result. I hope that it may be possible (I do not know what the noble Viscount, the Leader of the House, may think about this) to get across to the people of the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries more information about what the real situation is. After all that has been said, perhaps this is

31
not the occasion to go over the question of the bomb and fall-out, on which perhaps we may have more information next week from the noble Viscount, when he speaks to us on the subject in his rôle as Minister for Science. There is no doubt that it is a very menacing situation, and I hope that the machinery which has been announced for dealing with any of the more immediate effects, like the fall-out of radio-active iodine and so on, is absolutely primed to the very limit, ready for action whenever it is required.
I then come to the next paragraph:
"The North Atlantic Alliance is now more than ever essential for the continued safety of Europe and the world."
I think that is something upon which the House can be fairly unanimous, too. After all, it was the poor, wicked Socialists who initiated all the original negotiations which led to the building of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I wish that some of the aims we had then in objective could have been reached before now. But there is one thing upon which I think I should say a word, and say it rather strongly; and it is this: that whatever other conditions were obtaining in 1951 (and these we can debate at any time) we handed over to the Conservative Government then elected a very powerful Army, a very powerful Royal Air Force and a totally different kind of Royal Navy from that which we possess to-day. I wish that, militarily, we were, I will not say as strong, but nearly as strong as we were in those times.
My experience as a Minister for a good many years has been that our thinking as Ministers is completely lacking unless it is prepared to cover contingencies. Contingencies arise at all times in different places and for different reasons. But if we are to be a real influence in the world, we must remember that we need a backing, whether we are in alliance or, as in 1940, have to stand alone—alone because of our lack of preparation before—whenever our efforts are required. I have said this once before in this House, but as I think it is something worth thinking about, perhaps I might repeat it to-day. Some of us are getting old, like the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. I am sorry: we are merely partners in the same difficulty
32
there: I referred to the noble Earl because he has had a lot of experience of defence matters. But I look back over my long life, and I say this with conviction: I have never known a capitalist Government in this country with sufficient forces at the time of an emerging crisis to back the policy which they have been persisting in following in their foreign and Commonwealth spheres. Never once. That could not be said of the position when we left as a Labour Government in 1951. I ask Members of this House to keep that fact in mind.
There is this to be said, too, in regard to the announcement which is in another paragraph (it will save my touching on it when I come to it) as to the Government's plans for dealing with present difficulties in the Armed Forces. When it comes to making adjustments—making up if required, as the Prime Minister put it; I want to be fair—in the situation now, he looks, in the first instance, and in the first instance only, to what? —to extending the time of service of those who would not be there but for the National Service Act, 1947. And in the second place, he turns to a selective call-up from the reserves of National Service, both those who are in their most recent period there and subject to call-up and those who are in a lesser degree to be called up. No doubt the Prime Minister sometimes feels incensed by interruptions from certain quarters in the other place—interruptions which we certainly do not support, as we have shown by our actions—but it is just as well to remember that, when it comes to the test of defending the right and standing for our country, this country and Parties ought to stick together, determined to achieve a safe as well as a righteous end.
The opportunity will come for further reference to this question when the Bill, which I take it is to be presented on the military matters, comes before the House. You will have to take certain financial measures, among other things; and there is also a proposal generally to reorganise your system of reserve forces. The reorganisation, however, is not to wait altogether, apparently, because you are proposing two other things. The first, to begin late in 1961, is an attempt to form a reserve of Regulars on a voluntary basis. When

33
I look back to 1957, and remember the warnings uttered from various parts of the House upon the dangers in that White Paper, and how terribly our defensive aspect has changed since then, I begin to wonder, too, why it is that this idea of forming a voluntary reserve from the Regular Forces (which from that time on you ought to have prepared for and begun to put into operation) was not begun in these last four years.
I look at the next proposal which is coming along, and that is that the Government are going to turn to the honourable, well-tried, and patriotic Territorial Force. They are going to look to them also to form a special reserve. I sometimes hear suggestions of "Stop and Go" with regard to economic policy. Mr. Maudling, the President of the Board of Trade, said the other day (I forget whether it was Brighton or not; there was a lot said at Brighton) that they did not pursue "Stop and Go" for fun. But when I think of the necessity now to go to the Territorial Army and ask for them to have a special volunteer reserve for call-up, I wonder whether the Government were really thinking about that when they made such depredations upon the Territorial force in the last three or four years. What a pity it all is! All these things must be taken into account when you are considering the ten-year record of a Conservative Government. I hope we shall hear a little more about this from the Government.
The Government make a short reference to the situation in the East. I must say that at the end of last year I was greatly encouraged by the general report of the Foreign Secretary as to the policy he was pursuing in regard to Laos, and very much hoping that as a result some peaceful arrangement might have been arrived at. I am sure that he did his utmost to secure it. But, if my ears are right, when I listen to the home and foreign news and the reports from abroad it seems to me that we have reached a situation in Laos to-day which is more dangerous than it has been at any time in the last ten months. When I look at the very brief paragraph in the gracious Speech, I wonder whether we can have a little more information about the situation now. As I understand it, the position is that the guerrilla warfare has greatly expanded, and while it is suggested that the Laotian regular
34
forces are stronger than they were, and feel that they would be able to meet a massed onslaught from the North from their defended cities, the fact is, so it is reported, that the regular forces of the Northern Territory are likely now to follow up the extraordinary progress which has been made in the districts in that territory by the guerrilla warfare.
The next paragraph, on disarmament, I need not ponder about. The words that were added in the second copy of the gracious Speech are important. We can agree with them. Then I look at the top of the second page, and I should like to say a word of congratulation upon the progress made in providing independence for Tanganyika and Uganda. Of course, Mr. Macleod is no longer Secretary of State for the Colonies. One cannot but have been interested in the comments of various papers, including Conservative papers, as to the reason for the change; whether, as a Canadian paper said, it was a rebuke to a Minister who had not satisfied his Party in the Colonial Office, or whether it was an actual promotion to make him, as it were, the heir to the Prime Minister's throne of the future, in advance of others. But I think we 'are all agreed—those in the Labour movement, at any rate—that Mr. Macleod has conducted with great difficulties (because he was beset behind and before) what was literally a continuation of the Labour Government's colonial policy. In so far as that has been progressing in the years of the Secretary of Stateship of Mr. Macleod, he has always found us very largely in support. We are glad that Tanganyika and Uganda are ready, and we must have a special look at the constitutional changes proposed in the West Indies, When they are made. We cannot comment on them to-day because we do not know what they are.
I must say a word or two about the next paragraph, which refers to the European Economic Community. I suggested, perhaps in a rather light tone yesterday that the noble Lord, Lord Amherst of Hackney, might have been specially chosen as an agriculturist to put forward the European Economic Community case. In reading Hansard of another place this morning, I read that the Prime Minister himself said

35
literally the same thing about the honourable Member for Lowestoft. He said that the honourable Member was a noteworthy agriculturist, and that he had very much appreciated what he had said about the capacity for British agriculture to stand up to the competition of the European Common Market. I dare say that is so. But the credit for that ability to stand up does not lie with the Government; it lies with the 1947 Act, and in the whole pressing forward with continuous rehabilitation and increased efficiency which has been continued on the land.
When I look at some of the things which are being said by responsible Ministers from time to time, I begin to wonder whether agriculture will be able to stand up. I think perhaps the most biting and noteworthy thing in the Prime Minister's speech at Brighton was his promise of a "cold douche". That is what the European Economic Community evidently means, in the mind of the Prime Minister, and that is a curious situation. If we match it with the paragraph in the gracious Speech dealing with agriculture, there is the usual promise of the Government to give support to an efficient and prosperous agriculture in this country. However, when I go back to Brighton—I keep on looking at Brighton; I cannot help it—I must say that I was very interested in what Mr. Heath said. He said that the agricultural objectives of the Treaty were similar to those of the British Government. I wonder. Think it over.
Mr. Soames said at Brighton that even if we did not join the Common Market, we should have to change the present support system and bring it into line with the Continental method where the farmer got his return from the market rather than from the taxpayer. That may be a very worthy objective of Tory policy; but what does that mean to the consumer? It must, I think, mean much higher prices for the consumer or a much lower income for agriculture in this country; certainly not to be facilitated by the opening of home agricultural production and its market to competition from the European Economic Community. Perhaps a word or two in season might correct me if I am wrong,
36
but I think these things need a great deal of care.
We shall perhaps have to discuss agriculture specially later, but what I am disturbed about is that, whilst Parliament is agreed that for the time being it will support negotiations, we have now gone in with statements both by Mr. Heath and by Mr. Sandys that we do not desire in any way any amendment of the Treaty of Rome. In other words, in my view, that means that we are committed to the whole of the political programme of the European Economic Community before we go in—and I believe that that requires a great deal of careful consideration.
I think it is a great pity that that had to be said because (I go back to some notes of some weeks ago) it seems to me that the statement made by Mr. Heath on October 16 was just three days after the issue of a statement by the French Pan-European Union Committee, one of General de Gaulle's committees. What that statement said was this:
"In 1956 the British underestimated the virtues of the Economic Community project. In 1961 perhaps they have overestimated its merits. They have suddenly been gripped with panic in the face of a sick economy. They have flung themselves into the water for fear of rain."
Did Mr. Heath rush in, three days after that statement, in order to make sure that the success he was asking for would come because they had agreed in advance to accept the whole of the Treaty of Rome? I think those who are interested from one side or the other in the matter ought to be able to get to know the true facts of the situation.
I do not propose to say anything to-day concerning the fourth paragraph on the third page of the gracious Speech about the Government's policy for maintaining the stability of sterling, because I think that will best be covered in our debate on the Amendment next Tuesday, and I do not wish to weary your Lordships on the one thing, although I can assure you it is very much in my heart.
My Lords, the question of securing
"the co-operation of both sides of industry in the better co-ordination of the national effort"
is something which is of very great importance. Yesterday, in another place, Mr. Macmillan said something which

37
was very worthy on getting co-operation and good feeling, and that kind of thing, but I just could not understand how the Government could have thought their actions in recent months were likely to lead to that good feeling. Above all, the terrific precedent of the breach of faith with regard to the observance of contracts with public servants has certainly given no encouragement to those who organise such public servants, whether they be administrative, executive, clerical or industrial. I could give a number of instances which have been under consideration, but I do not wish to do so at this stage, because some of my colleagues will want to mention them next Tuesday. Perhaps, however, I may give a little personal experience.
There has recently been a holding back of an award of a tribunal for public servants of the Admiralty—that is, store-house men and so on. By the kindness of the present First Lord of the Admiralty, one of our own Members, Lord Carrington, I had the opportunity to visit the Portsmouth Dockyard in September and to see things for myself. What I discovered there was that when the Government talk about running away from the principle of comparability of wages, and how they are dealing with tribunals, they usually ride off on such words as "an average wage". I asked the Admiral Superintendent at Portsmouth whether I could see the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Whitley Council—after all, 22,000 employees work in the Portsmouth Dockyard. He said that I could; and we had a very friendly talk.
What was pointed out to me was that one of their principal troubles was that they cannot get labour. They are very short; they are losing labourers hand over fist. I think the total they have lost in the last two or three years runs into 800 in that one category. So I asked what the wage was. The wage of this Government labourer-employee, needing to have the know-how of the dockyard, is £8 7s. 0d. a week. It is true that the weekly hours of these men are 42, while those of the farmworker are 46; but a farmworker has a minimum labourer's wage of £8 9s. 0d., and in many cases in the agricultural industry there may be a free, or very low-rented, cottage and other facilities, with no travelling, or little travelling, and all meals at home. The farm worker is earning it
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and I want him to have it. But what about the man on £8 7s. 0d. a week in Portsmouth, with all the difficulties of rent, especially since the Government's Rent Act? Are you going to make him have a wage pause? I hope that the House will be willing to face up to detailed cases like that when it comes to consider the general principle.
And what is there to encourage the people in these industries in the Government's action in other spheres when they know that this follows within a few months of handing over tens of millions of pounds in prospect in the next 18 months for surtax payers? I want to see a getting together in our crisis in this country—a crisis which is foreign in origin; which may be (although I hope not) military, and which certainly is fundamental in our economy. Because, my Lords, if one's economy is not sound—and I agree with the Prime Minister on this—you can ill-afford to maintain the forces necessary to support your policy, your benevolent policy, your peace policy, against those who would destroy it. And so I am very anxious about the action of the Government.
I am even more concerned when I come to think of the remedies for getting an expansion of industry and when I see some of the actions taken by Mr. Brooke, who is already on the reduction path. And what I hate to see most of all about it is his mean reduction of the numbers of people to be trained, especially where people who would otherwise be wholly incapacitated, may be made useful by training, and the proposed cutting down of those to be trained in various classes of the Health Service. That seems to me to be fundamentally wrong.
The Conservative mind is always very strange to me, and I dare say that some would say that the Beaverbrook Press mind is the most strange of all. I saw a leader in the Daily Express directly supporting Mr. Brooke in all that he was doing largely to reduce Government expenditure, and in the same paper, the same issue, there was a tremendous plea for a very large increase in scientific training. "What is £5 million?", they say. I wish we could get a little more consistency in applying these things and I hope that the Government will not be led, by such

39
praise from that quarter, into a reduction of training of people who could help in the economy of the country and in the health of the country.
Then I want to ask, if I may, a question upon the paragraph about immigration. This is, I know, an exceedingly difficult question. But I want to ask, first of all, about the timing of it. Is it intended to introduce this measure at an early date? In the second place, has there been specific consultation with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers upon the kind of proposals which are outlined in the gracious Speech? If we cannot have answers to those questions, it is difficult to see how we can do anything other than gravely criticise the Government. We want to know the answers to those two points.
On the point about timing, it is a very peculiar time to talk of limitation of immigration on the basis which has always existed in principle: that a British citizen, wherever he might reside, should have free entry into the Mother Country, whatever his race or colour. That has always been the rule. Yet we now have this proposal: at such a changing time in what was the Colonial Empire, when the different forces and influences at work in that Empire, as country after country takes over, are having their effect; while we are discussing the future of the white settler in Kenya; while we are discussing whether there will be a block or not upon any new settlement; while we are discussing the various factors in the Central Federation in Africa. So I should like an answer on this point about the timing. I must say that we require something very specific to justify going back upon the great principles on which we have relied in the past. In the last war, all those of us who did any kind of job, ministerial or otherwise, knew what it meant to this country to have not only the immediate loyal, active, military support of the large Dominions but, from Colony after Colony, very valuable troops indeed, who did service in all parts of the world. I shall be interested, later in the debate, to hear on that particular point the testimony of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton.
If you are going on with a measure of this kind, then Parliament surely must
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be given some wonderfully good reason. Is it social? Is it industrial and economic? What really are the reasons? Or Ls it merely that at the very time when our immigration has largely increased, without which we could not have provided, in a time of full employment, the various services that are carried on, the Government have failed to provide houses and sufficient assistance to the local authorities in all the extra social charges upon them of accommodating new immigrants? I think we shall need a very full and a very wide explanation.
My Lords, I apologise for having spoken at some length, but may I just say two other things? First, I hope that during the course of the debate on Tuesday we may raise the question of privately-owned pipelines. I will not say any more upon that matter now. But I am concerned about the paragraph at the top of the last page, which tells us that the Government will propose what I gather are favourable amendments in the present position of workmen's compensation and industrial injuries benefits. I am not quite sure what
"alterations in the administration of the schemes for family allowances, national insurance"
and so on, may mean. One could read all sorts of things into that. Would some member of the Government tell us, in a fair amount of summarised synopsis, what is intended to be covered in those respects? Again I apologise for having been so long, but as I read the gracious Speech these things occurred to me again and again, and I felt that I ought to give voice to them. I miss other things which I think ought to have been in the Speech. I miss any specific terms about weights and measures. I miss anything to do with the Shops Act, which years ago was to be amended, and which would have been amended by a Bill that was passed by this House and sent to the other place. And then there is the outstanding need for protective measures for the staffs and the improvement of the accommodation in shops and offices. All these are missing from the gracious Speech. I hope that we may have some explanation of the omission, and, in spite of everything else chat I have said, I hope, for the sake of the country, that the Government's administration will improve.
3.28 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition opened his remarks with tributes to the Royal Family which I feel sure will be endorsed in every other quarter of the House. I do not propose to repeat what I said yesterday, words similarly used by other people, but I am sure we all agree with what the noble Viscount has said, and that our message to the Royal Family will certainly go forward with great sincerity and loyalty.
I was glad to notice that the noble Viscount made no bones about making a Party speech in this debate—indeed it is the usual thing to be done—and therefore it opens the gate for me to follow suit, up to a point. Like him, I feel that it is probably necessary to go back a little on immediate past history before examining in some detail the gracious Speech, in so far as one is dealing with specific points to-day. Parliament was recalled, as your Lordships will remember, in the middle of last month, during the Recess, to discuss the general international situation. We had quite an interesting debate, but personally I cannot feel that the tension of the international situation was greatly eased by our deliberations; nor that the recall of Parliament was more than a well-justified gesture on the part of the Opposition to emphasise that the present Government, in their third term of office, possess a declining confidence by the electorate which first returned them to power so long ago, as it seems now.
That diminishing confidence in the country seems to me to relate not only to their handling of foreign affairs in general—I must make a personal reservation here in respect of our Foreign Secretary—but also to home affairs in general, as well as to their curiously hesitant and woolly and, I fear, not very inspiring handling of the affairs of the Commonwealth and of all British dependencies whose prosperity and wellbeing were the cherished care of both Liberal and Conservative Governments during their emergence and development, for the most part in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
My Lords, I think a number of you will agree with me that it is dangerous and unsatisfactory for any Government to remain too long in power. Staleness
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and over-confidence are only two of the more obvious disadvantages. The crux of the matter is that public opinion, having recorded, but without overwhelming confidence, its preference at the last General Election, veers away, in the nature of things, from the unthinking devotion which it professed for the handsome lover of yesterday, who is apt perhaps to have become rather a bore to-day. We should be thankful that a General Election is not a religious sanctity in which man should not put asunder what only man has put together. I think it must be obvious both to the Conservative Party, now forming the Government, as well as to the Labour Party, that the strength of their support lies among those who basically and generally believe in the new progressive elements in their respective policies and tendencies, rather than the Tory and the Socialist elements of the old order.
What I find difficult to understand, and even to forgive, is that with the knowledge over ten years that this country is progressively-minded and, on the whole, with respect to noble Lords on my left, anti-Socialistic, the present Conservative Government buries its head in the sand and proclaims to the country "Us, however bad we may be; or else Socialism, which we know you don't want." My Lords, it seems irresponsible, knowing that they cannot remain in power for ever—or perhaps some of them think that they can!—that the Government do not take pains to ensure that when at last they fall, the alternative Government should be of that Liberalistic hue—I am not talking as a Party man at the moment—which to-day embraces the views of most thinking and conscientious people throughout the whole country, however they may vote now in fear of dogmatic Toryism or of dogmatic Socialism.
I speak, of course, as a Liberal. Our ideas, which are naturally unpopular during the waging of class war, are increasingly being adopted by Tory and Labour alike. We have little bitterness about that. There is, of course, a certain amount of wryness that we are still suppressed by condescending derision and also by an undemocratic electoral system, for it is interesting that approximately a 20 per cent. Liberal electorate

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has only a 1 per cent. representation in another place. But what we believe the country, in fact, wants is a general sort of Liberalism (with a little "1" if you like) which is slowly, but much too slowly, being adopted by the other two Parties. Every belated adaption of both their policies is really towards more Liberalism. Our clothes are being stolen right and left. But we welcome this belated larceny. All I would say is that if you must so dishonourably steal our clothes, for heaven's sake!steal them earlier, and in greater quantity.
I take the reference in the gracious Speech towards proceeding towards membership of a Common Market as a progessive decision. The Conservative and Labour Parties are split over this matter; the Liberal Party happens not to be. But, having taken this difficult and even adventurous decision, how is it that the Government are so negative and apologetic about it all? It is either a good thing or a bad thing. We who think it is a good thing for prosperity and progress, not only in Europe but ultimately for the world and certainly-for the Commonwealth after initial difficulties, cannot understand why the Government, after suppressing certain moans and gypsy warnings at their Brighton Conference, do not explain it to us with confidence and enthusiasm. They should be in a mood of jubilation, not of apology. Where is their enthusiasm? What has gone wrong? Cannot we be told frankly the resultant position of the Commonwealth countries, some of whom will, of course, need a period of adjustment before they see ahead the full light of greater prosperity under the new arrangement? Canada and Australia, being large countries, can doubtless adjust their own great economies in the long run. But what about the smaller territories—for instance, New Zealand, where we know there may be a great initial hardship in their agricultural disposals, and where, of course, we have a particular fraternal affection both for the people and the country, so like our own.
I admit it is not helpful to job backwards, but it is the opinion of many, I think, that in Empire affairs in general we have so far stumbled through by applying far too late principles which should have been applied earlier, and
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which had been often advocated from both Parties on this side of the House. Central Africa, of course, is an outstanding example of a political tragedy dating from the time when we entreated the Government to go more easily on federation. We did not oppose it. We said that we would support it when it was going through, but that it should go through with more restraint. South Africa is a problem on its own, where progressive opinion here and reactionary opinion there fell tragically apart and led to an impasse. Ghana is a sad enigma, in which both our hopes and our prayers are involved. But has the Conservative Government recently handled all the Ghana affairs very expertly? We do not know the full story.
What appears to have happened in the Commonwealth in general is, that over the years we have colonised with two worthy and creditable motives, whatever our adversaries may say. The first principle was exploitation in the very best sense of the word; the development, with justice and fairness, of the untapped wealth of new lands and primitive peoples, to our mutual benefit, theirs and ours. The second was the moral principles of giving education and of leading towards emancipation the less advanced races. These were not incompatible objectives. Of course, there were occasional failures, and admittedly a few gross breaches, but I am not one of those who denigrate the enormous advantages which we, as British colonists, gave to many backward peoples. Let us admit that on the side of profit and loss both we and our overseas friends have done pretty well over the last 200 years or so. But, unfortunately, that epoch seems to be drawing to a close.
On the educative and emancipation side how do we stand? I think we have succeeded here, too. But for some reason we are caught quite unprepared for the result of our success. We have wanted the backward native to be educated and to know the meaning of culture and civilisation. In two or three generations this has, by and large, come about, but not in full degree; and we are now faced with the superficially educated calling for full equality, even in the delicacy and intuition which are the fruit of century upon century of experience, which they have not got.

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An illustration of this crudity in an immature, though highly educated, nation is in the unforgivable and insensitive crime of the last few days of Russia, who has failed in three hundred short years to assimilate the refinements of any ancient civilisation.
We are not really prepared for this upheaval in national and racial balances, and I wonder whether in this predicament we are best represented by the most Right wing of our political Parties whose chief differentiation from the wild men of the Left is that the Conservative Party still contains, no doubt to their embarrassment, a few reactionaries who would, even now, confidently confront any foreigner with the outdated spectacle of Britannia—and, since nobody rules the waves, a rather notional and skeletal Britannia, possibly wearing nothing but a bent trident and a lunatic fringe.
As a general solution, I would suggest that Her Majesty's Government must bend towards national opinion in this country more than they have done. I would also add that they do not sit in power merely to represent the Conservative voters; they represent the whole nation. Their responsibility is also to make sure that our political machinery can, when the time comes, give us an alternative Government which truly reflects the wishes of the electorate. The two big Parties do not do this. The smaller third Party is, I suggest, a nucleus for thoughts and a possible basis for construction, even if old labels and cherished badges might have to be discarded in the bringing to birth of something much more representative than to-day's patchwork adaptations of a 19th century political machine.
My Lords, the gracious Speech seems to many of us to reveal a poverty of imagination on the part of the Government, and there is considerable scope, as the noble Viscount mentioned, for criticism and for suggestion. The references to giving support to the United Nations and to the North Atlantic Alliance would seem to me to override in importance every other single topic in the whole of the gracious Speech. With a strong and stable Atlantic Alliance, all is possible; without it, nothing is possible. There, surely, is
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the real basis of the survival of all the liberty and all the precious civilisation which passed into the trusteeship of Western Europe after the fade-out of Greece and Rome.
There are only two other subjects in the gracious Speech to which I shall refer, quite shortly. The first is an unfortunate reference, as I think it, to industry as being composed of "two sides"—as it were, in battle array. My Lords, it is time that these two sides were regarded as one side, since their aim of mutual prosperity is, of course, a common one. Industry does not exist for the benefit of proprietors and shareholders. It does not exist to provide gainful occupation for workers. These two interests are purely by-products. Industry exists, surely, because of and on behalf of the consumer, and it is the consumer interest which must predominate, however scared the Tories may be of the trade unions, and however shortsighted the workers may be about X being paid more money than Y.
The second point to which I would refer is the proposal to control immigration by legislation, which was touched upon by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. Personally, I fully support the suggested powers for the expulsion of the criminal element; but, without committing myself at this point, I confess to some unease about putting legislation on the Statute Book to debar our own British subjects from their age-old privilege of full access to the Mother Country. I should have preferred to see considerably more consultation with the territories concerned, with a view to a solution by examination and, possibly, by financial and local practical aid. But, my Lords, I do not prejudge this matter, and I readily acknowledge that it is a very real difficulty. In connection with immigration there arises the matter of housing—because they are very closely connected. The trouble here is, indeed, completely linked up. I am surprised that there is no mention in the gracious Speech of housing, which, of course, deeply affects our own people, as well as immigrants. It is surely well known that our housing situation is a serious one. Are the Government shelving or pigeon-holing this great social problem which once—and very rightly—they took so seriously?

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Finally, I would ask why there is no mention of the problem of old people, whom we know in many cases to be in dire distress. Scraping together every sort of assistance and pension and pitiably shrunken incomes, there are thousands in this so-called Welfare State whose plight would melt almost any heart. Cannot something be done for them, and done soon? I do not want to be ungracious. I do not criticise the Government for not being infallible; but I do ask them to be receptive to some of the arguments which we on this side of the House put forward in good faith and with hope.
3.44 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF DUNDEE): My Lords, the debate on the Address in reply to the gracious Speech provides us with an opportunity for a very general discussion on all kinds of subjects which we are likely to discuss in greater detail later on in the Session. I think your Lordships all admired the thoroughness with which the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition went through nearly every item in the gracious Speech. If I may say so, I did not think he was a bit too long, and I have always greatly enjoyed the dialectical vigour of the noble Viscount, upon whom the years sit so lightly. This is the first time I have ever heard him complain about anybody else's age. I hope he will never get to the length of complaining about his own.
I welcome, I think, everything he said about foreign affairs, which I thought was helpful to the country. On defence—which, of course, is always a matter of the greatest concern to all Parties—we applaud the noble Viscount's desire that we should be well-armed and strong: and I understand your Lordships are to have a debate on defence to-morrow. With regard to economics, I am delighted to hear that the noble Viscount intends to speak again on his own Amendment next week, and I shall not try to anticipate the castigation which he expects to receive from my noble friend the Lord President the Leader of the House.
The noble Lord, Lord Rea, expressed the not entirely unheard-of opinion that this Government have been in office for too long, and I dare say that it would
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be easy to persuade him that his own Party has been out too long. I should like to assure him that I have never thought of Liberals with anything like a condescending derision, and I have not the slightest objection to his pleasure in seeing me or anybody else wearing any old clothes which he may have left lying about from time to time. While the noble Viscount opposite suggested that we were too enthusiastic about the Common Market, and that we might even have put up, in both Houses, Members moving and seconding the Address to advertise it, the noble Lord, Lord Rea, thought that we were not nearly enthusiastic enough. I do not intend to pursue what either noble Lord said about that. I should have thought that when you are entering into negotiations of this kind the right thing to say is absolutely nothing. We have always sought and desired economic association with the Six. We have always equally desired to safeguard the economic needs of New Zealand, which Lord Rea particularly referred to, and other parts of the Commonwealth.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: May I ask a question? Would the noble Earl give this advice to Mr. Sandys and Mr. Heath, that they shall not go on doing such things as they have done, so giving away the case in advance, or the political issues of the Rome Treaty?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I thought the criticism was that they had not revealed anything which we were negotiating about, which I should have thought was the wisest thing to do at the present time.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: Oh!
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: But I know, my Lords, that it is the general wish of your Lordships to-day to have a wide discussion on external affairs—foreign, Commonwealth and colonial. We have already had a two-day debate on external affairs the week before last, during which the Foreign Secretary gave a very full picture of the situation abroad; and I think he did so to the full satisfaction of your Lordships in all parts of the House. Tonight, my noble friend Lord Perth will be able to answer at length any matters concerning the Commonwealth which may be raised to-day.

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But, my Lords, whatever part of the world we may be talking about, either in the Commonwealth or outside it, the broad, underlying question of our time is always the same. From time to time during the war, President Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill used to state the objectives for which they thought we and our Allies were fighting, among which were what the President once defined as, "the four freedoms"—freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of speech and freedom of religion. There were a few people in Great Britain, and a great many more in the United States of America, who hoped that our Communist Allies might help us after the war to build up those freedoms in all parts of the world. But, in fact, since the war ended the free nations of the West have been mainly on the defensive, struggling to save as much freedom as they can from the merciless aggression of Communist tyranny. And, my Lords, the pattern of this aggression has grown so familiar to us that we have long ago ceased to look on it as abnormal in this twentieth century world in which we must all live.
The organised perversion of justice as an instrument of totalitarian government; the practice of brain-washing of arrested persons: the mass extermination of inconvenient people; the concealment of truth from ordinary men and women from behind the Iron Curtain, and the dissemination of falsehood everywhere else are looked on as natural and, indeed, praiseworthy by the ruling class of Communism. These things are the common practice in nearly half the world to-day; and, what is perhaps even more regrettable in some ways, they are sometimes admired and imitated by people in the other half who worship power. The threat of nuclear war is a major instrument of Communist policy, together with the use of conventional weapons, wherever it is considered that local armed aggression may be successful. And no opportunity is neglected of promoting civil war or disaffection in any country which is not part of the Communist empire.
At the present moment the most critical areas of danger are Berlin and South East Asia, both of which were fully covered by my noble friend the Foreign Secretary the week before last.
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As for Berlin, we hope and believe that negotiation may produce a settlement, while we do not regard the freedom of the people in West Berlin, or their right of access to us, or our right of access to them, as negotiable. As for South East Asia, since the week before last the prospects of a peaceful settlement in Laos have improved: they seem more hopeful now than they were then. On the other hand, the situation in South Vietnam has become worse in the last fortnight—and I think that possibly the noble Viscount opposite, in speaking of organised terrorism and aggression, intended to refer to South Vietnam and not to Laos. As the noble Viscount no doubt knows, the trouble in South Vietnam is Communist-led and Communist-trained. The guerrillas there are using terrorism and murder and military force in an attempt, first, to disrupt and then to overthrow the established Republican Government of South Vietnam.
This campaign is organised by the Communist authorities at Hanoi, in North Vietnam. It is under their full direction and close control. The main features of the campaign are violence and subversion, and include widespread assassination of officials and supporters of the Government; the infiltration of guerrilla units from the North into the South; attacks on villages; violation of demilitarised frontier zones, and armed attacks on the territory of South Vietnam which are led by units officered by regular officers in the Communist army from the North. That all constitutes a gross violation by the Hanoi authorities of the Geneva cease-fire agreement for Vietnam, and it is a serious threat to the peace of South East Asia. I should like to add that we have noted with admiration the brave manner in which the people and Government of South Vietnam are standing up to the treacherous and violent attacks against them which have been unleached by the Communist authorities in Hanoi.
But, my Lords, Berlin and Vietnam are not the only places threatened by Communist aggression, or by Communist subversion. The strategy of Communism has always been to make us concentrate our attention upon one point in our defences while they prepare to

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attack another. To-day it is Berlin, tomorrow it may be Finland or Sweden. Or it may be the Middle East, as it was five years ago; or it may be Africa, where resistance is sometimes softer than it is in Western Europe. The peoples who are often most vulnerable to the deceptions of Communist propaganda are those who are removed by only a few generations from primitive savagery and from the practice of slavery; and the reasons for this are not at all difficult to understand. In our old and sophisticated Western society, whose wealth on both sides of the Atlantic is now growing at a pace which has never been known before, we are accustomed to blame ourselves, with some justice, for our preoccupation with material comfort and pleasure. But this charge cannot reasonably be brought against the hundreds of millions of people in Africa and Asia who are living near the border of starvation and whose numbers, thanks to the medical services and the freedom from war which Western Europe has brought to them, are increasing so much more quickly than their economic resources. It is our moral duty to give them economic help, not because we worship material things, but because their basic material needs must be satisfied before they can fully enjoy civilised freedom which we want them all to share with us.
Of course, what they need most of all is capital goods in order to develop their own resources, and the direction of this economic aid into the most useful channels is a vast problem which cannot be undertaken by one country alone, but only by the concerted action of Western Europe and the United States, Canada and other countries. I know your Lordships are glad to see that Japan has joined the Development Assistance Group advisory council on foreign aid, which is now holding its fifth meeting in Tokyo. The total amount of aid given to underdeveloped countries from the West, either bilaterally or unilaterally or through the International Bank, amounted last year to the very large sum of £2,500 million. If we compare that with aid given by the Sino-Soviet bloc, which started offering help seven years ago, in 1954, we find that the total amount of drawings by these
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underdeveloped countries from Sino-Soviet sources since that time has amounted to only £300 million; that is, an average of about £45 million a year. In fact, the aid given by Britain alone in 1960 and 1961 has been over £300 million, which is as much as the total amount of help given from Communist sources since 1954.
Your Lordships will probably remember the British estimate for 1961, excluding private investment. The total is, as I say, over £300 million; Government aid is about £180 million. This figure has been increasing by about £30 million a year for some time. As the Chancellor had to make clear, owing to the foreign exchange position we have to try to hold it to that figure for next year, and I think that that illustrates the need for us to take measures to put our economy in order and improve our balance of payments. I was very glad to hear yesterday my noble friend Lord Amherst of Hackney, and I should like to congratulate both him and my noble friend Lord Melchett on the most delightful speeches with which they moved the Address. I was glad to hear Lord Amherst of Hackney say, from some official figures he had, that in order to fulfil our obligations towards the Commonwealth and the rest of the world we needed to increase our balance of payments by £500 million a year.
In these new countries which we want to help in this way towards full civilisation, freedom is a very tender plant which needs to be carefully nourished. I know some of your Lordships feel that, in the case of some of the more primitive territories to whom we are giving political freedom, we have exposed this plant to the air a little too soon. Whether we take that view or not, I think we shall all agree that the gift of political freedom to a primitive people does not consist merely in the negative act of withdrawal; it means also educating the people and their leaders in the art of liberal government.
One of the measures mentioned in the gracious Speech is the Bill which will very soon be before your Lordships to give independence to Tanganyika. The date is advanced now to December 9, when His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh will be going there for the ceremony of independence. My Lords, whatever we think about the pace of our

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political advance in. Africa, I hope your Lordships will all agree in commending the statesmanship and common sense of Mr. Julius Nyerere in the negotiations which have led up to this legislation that is about to be introduced. The discussions which took place at Dar-es-Salaam this year were, I think, very encouraging to those who hoped that we were going in the right direction.
The Government of Tanganyika expressed the hope that the Territory's continued participation in the common services provided by the East Africa High Commission would be possible without any infringement of the country's sovereignty, and the delegations agreed that it would be in the interests of all the parties—that is, including Kenya and Uganda—to ensure that the common services which are now being provided by the East Africa High Commission should continue to be provided on an East African basis, whatever constitutional changes might take place in the future in East Africa. And arrangements were proposed for continuing the operation of these services, when Tanganyika becomes independent, in a way fully compatible with the sovereignty of Tanganyika. That organisation, my Lords, will come into being a day or two after Tanganyika's Independence Day as a result of an agreement to be concluded between Tanganyika and Britain, Britain representing Kenya and Uganda.
I think your Lordships will be glad to note the constructve agreement for our continued economic co-operation with East Africa which has also been arrived at. The financial undertakings have been accepted by the Government of Tanganyika as a generous settlement which will be of great help to them, to their programme of economic development. I have no doubt that my noble friend Lord Perth, when he comes to speak later in the debate, will have more to say about the future of East Africa. Meanwhile, I think your Lordships will agree that in Tanganyika, Nigeria, and other places, too, the events which have taken place in the last two years are a very fine achievement during his term of office as Minister of State for the Colonies, under two or more Colonial Secretaries.
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My Lords, what a contrast these things are with the relations between the Communist Powers and the subject peoples under their rule! If we take the steady progress of these territories towards freedom, leading, we hope, to a fruitful association between Britain and those territories to whom she is giving political liberty, but who are entirely free, as they decide, either to continue in association with us or not, how does that compare with the treatment of the Baltic countries under the dominion of Russia, where so many of the population have been deported, and where the leaders of society have been replaced by Russian managers? Or with the Moslem communities of Turkestan, who have no say in the administration of their country which is ruled by Russian force? Or in Tibet, where the innocent, inoffensive population, I am afraid, have been very largely exterminated in order to suit the designs of their Chinese oppressors? Or in East Germany, surrounded now by barbed wire, and with a wall in Berlin, in order to prevent the oppressed slaves of Communism from escaping to freedom? In the course of history there are one or two cases of great Empires, like those of Rome and China, building walls to keep invaders out. I think this is the first instance there has ever been of an Empire which has built a wall in order to prevent its own unhappy subjects from going somewhere else.
My Lords, the power and strength of Communism rests at home, in Communist countries, on oppression and on deceit. Abroad it rests on naked power and bullying threats. This explosion last week of the 50 or 50-plus megaton bomb is intended to terrorise the world so that other nations may acquiesce in the aims of Soviet foreign policy. The actions of Mr. Khrushchev are like the actions of the leading gangster whom we often see in a Western film, who goes into the saloon bar, pulls out a couple of revolvers, and starts shooting out all the lights just to show everybody what will happen to them if they try to interfere with his plans for robbing the bank. In these pictures you will often see half a dozen other people in the bar scuttle away and hide under chairs and tables. I think we must admit that Mr. Khrushchev's experience of the so-called uncommitted nations may occasionally

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have suggested to him that the more brutal and outrageous his own acts are, the more timid and uncritical these uncommitted nations are likely to be. That, at least, is the theory on which Mr. Khrushchev is now acting. But surely, my Lords, the true lesson of this monstrous explosion which took place at the beginning of the week ought to be that, in an all-out nuclear war, neutrals would suffer as much as the protagonists, and that the moral luxury of lecturing both sides at the same time is really not going to help anybody to avert this great catastrophe.
Our policy, which we intend to stick to in spite of the disappointments we have suffered, is to seek real international disarmament, accompanied by genuine and trustworthy international inspection. No one in his senses would ever think of agreeing to disarmament without inspection, especially when one of the countries concerned has deliberately kept us for two years at Geneva discussing the abolition of nuclear tests under a pledge not to start them again, while all the time it was secretly preparing to break that pledge and start the most powerful and dangerous succession of tests which the world has yet seen. Nevertheless, we intend to persevere with patience in our work for disarmament—multilateral, controlled disarmament. We also intend to pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence with Communist countries. What we mean by "peaceful co-existence" is mutual toleration, accompanied by the will on each side to learn from anything which it can find to be good in the social system of the other, as the Prime Minister tried to make clear in his Russian visit two years ago.
We are well aware that when the Russian Government speak of peaceful co-existence they do not mean the same thing as we do. I do not know if your Lordships have been following the proceedings of the twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party which have been going on in Moscow for the last fortnight and which came to an end last night. The main issue discussed there was whether their policy of peaceful co-existence ought to be reaffirmed. It appears to have been opposed by the Chinese, by the Albanian Communists
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and by Mr. Molotov and the Stalinist minority of the Soviet ruling class, who adhere to the Stalinist belief that nuclear war is inevitable. The advocates of peaceful co-existence, who are now dominant in Russia, use this phrase to mean not toleration but the subjugation of the world without nuclear war. These 28 nuclear explosions in the last eight weeks, the barbed wire round Germany, the prison wall in Berlin, the bullying and browbeating of Japan, of Iran, of Finland and Sweden; the world-wide campaign of lies in the Press and on the radio; the forged documents criminally fabricated and circulated in Africa to discredit British liberal policy, the censorship of news and the jamming of wireless—all these form part of the Soviet view of peaceful co-existence. As Mr. Khrushchev himself put it in his speech to the Congress on October 17-or at least in the speech which began on October 17; I forget how many days he took to finish it—he said:
"Peace and peaceful co-existence are not quite the same thing".
I think that that statement may be described as a masterpiece of delicate understatement.
Nevertheless, my Lords, we shall continue to work for peace and for peaceful settlements in all disputes. Let us do this with our eyes open and with knowledge of the truth about the people with whom we are dealing. If we succeed in getting a peaceful settlement, as we all hope, of the Berlin question, do not let us sit down and think that all our worst troubles are over. They may be only beginning. Our nerves as well as our brains must be trained to work and fight for freedom for as long ahead as we can foresee—perhaps it may be until long after the present generation of the Communist ruling class has passed away.
One of the subjects discussed by the Twenty-second Communist Congress last week was the Russian plan for economic and social development during the next twenty years, a plan with the purpose of which we can all sympathise—more abundant consumer goods, more leisure, better retirement pensions, free medicine and free bread. I wish that they had included a few more other free things besides free bread, which, after all, has always been provided for slaves all through history. Man cannot live by free bread alone. How much better

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would it have been if this plan had included a little free speech, free thought, free Press, free movement, freedom in choosing a job, freedom to travel and freedom to mix and talk with free people in other countries! I do not believe that there will ever be a truly peaceful coexistence between Russia and the West until there has grown up in Russia an educated and genuine public opinion which is spontaneous and not created by a small oligarchy of doctrinaire rulers.
In this country we allow free expression of opinion, which some of our country men use to agitate and demonstrate against the possession of the nuclear deterrent. Most of us believe that their activities make war much more likely than it would otherwise be. I believe, further, that if we all decided to be Red, rather than dead, then nuclear war in a world divided between two or more Communist blocs would be almost certain. Anyway, it would be a great deal more likely than it is now in a world where there is some free public opinion.
We all sometimes wish that our unilateralists in Great Britain would go and demonstrate in Russia instead of getting in other people's way here. A month or two ago, a small group of Western students who were protesting against nuclear tests, and whose spirit I greatly admire, did travel from California, by way of Europe, where they picked up a few more students, to Moscow. In London they were allowed freedom of expression. In Moscow, when a meeting was arranged at the University, the authorities tried to stage-manage this and to limit freedom of discussion. But the Russian students protested against this and plainly showed their eagerness to allow free discussion of their visitors' views on disarmament. I think that this small incident—and there are others we could quote—shows that many Russian people, and particularly the younger generation of Russia, are anxious for the free exchange of ideas, which their masters will not allow. We must be very patient, for we shall have to wait, on our guard, for a very long time. But it is not impossible that, one day, the 200 million of ordinary men and women in Russia may be willing to help us, as we should like to help them, to make a better world for all our children.
4.20 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the debate on the Address is the one occasion in the year, as your Lordships know, when any subject can be raised, and the speeches of the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition and of the noble Lord, Lord Rea, who leads the Liberal Party, certainly ranged, rightly, very wide; for, after all, they were making the principal speeches for their Parties in this debate. The speech of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, equally covered a broad field, for he was replying to them. But to-day I understand the debate is mainly to be devoted to the Commonwealth and the Colonies, and it is on one or two facets of that vast subject that I propose to concentrate my remarks. In particular, I want to refer, like the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, to one of the main trouble spots in the world to-day—what may be called a no man's land in the cold war, and that is, of course, the Continent of Africa.
The week before last, as the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, said, we had a debate on international affairs, in which there was much discussion of the international aspect of some of the more recent developments on the African Continent. I hope that perhaps at no too distant date we shall have yet another day devoted to events in the Congo, which to my mind, at any rate, remain very disturbing. To-day, however, the debate is likely to be concerned more with recent developments in those territories in Central Africa for which our own country is entirely responsible; and the purpose of the few words which I shall address to your Lordships this afternoon, at the risk of being dubbed by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, as a reactionary or perhaps a tassel on the lunatic fringe, is to appeal to the Government and, in particular, to the new Colonial Secretary, whose appointment I am sure we all warmly welcome, not indeed to alter their policy towards the emergent territories, for that policy I hope and think is common to us all, but to consider whether the pace at which it has been carried out during the last few years has not proved in practice to be unduly rapid and fraught with danger to the territories themselves. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, himself posed this problem very well, I thought, but he

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prudently refrained from suggesting any solution.
The late Colonial Secretary, Mr. Macleod, said in a recent speech that in these matters—I hope I do not misrepresent him—it was safer or better (I forget which word was used) to go too fast than to go too slow. And I rather gathered from what he said this afternoon that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, on the whole, shares that view. But I thought that rather wiser counsel, if I may be forgiven for saying so, was that given by the Foreign Secretary during the debate on the International Situation in this House the week before last, when he said this—and those of us who have had any experience of Africa will know how true these words are [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 233 (No. 122), col. 339]:
"…from my knowledge of Africans, I know that you cannot hurry them in their constitutional developments."
But that, my Lords, with all deference to the Government and, indeed, to the noble Earl himself, is exactly what the Government seem to many of us to have done; and we are, I am afraid, beginning to see the results. The White Paper which was published at the time of the Lancaster House Conference on Kenya last year described, as your Lordships will remember, the objective of the Government for their African territories as parliamentary government on the Westminster model. And they have indeed pressed forward, I think, in all their African territories to achieve as soon as possible just that: independence from this country and parliamentary government on the Westminster model.
But what I think the Government did not realise quite enough is that parliamentary government on the Westminster model is not an end in itself. It is merely a device—and I would emphasise this—for bringing about what the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, rightly described this afternoon as the fundamental aim of our policy, and that is the greatest attainable measure of liberty for the individual citizen to think, say and do as he wishes. That is why we like it here; and it is the only reason why we like it. If parliamentary government produces that result, it is a good form of government;
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if it does not produce that result, it is a bad form of government: it has failed in its primary purpose. In our own country we believe that on the whole it works, and I think this is partly, at any rate, because we are a very experienced and highly civilised people. But would anybody say that it has been an equal success everywhere it has been tried?
In one African territory, Ghana, we recently granted a constitution which was, broadly speaking, on much the same lines as our own—the noble Earl, Lord Lis-towel, will correct me if I have misrepresented the position. What has been the result? Already, within, a very short time, judging at least by the accounts we get from the Press, the Prime Minister has become virtually a dictator; some of the leaders of the official Opposition are in exile, and most of the rest are in prison; and liberty of speech and action for the ordinary man exists, I will not say hardly at all, but not to a very great degree. That has been the result in Ghana. Whatever may happen in Tanganyika—and certainly Mr. Julius Nyerere, by every account we hear of him, is a man of quite unusual attainments—we have no reason to suppose, judging by the present attitude of Mr. Mboya and the other African leaders in Kenya, that when that country get its independence the result will be very different.
Yet Her Majesty's Government seem determined to press on with their universal panacea of Parliamentary government on a Westminster model with a very wide electorate, just as here, even though the majority of the electors in those countries can neither read nor write and can have little or no understanding of most of the issues which are bound to face any Parliamentary electorate. Ministers have been warned again and again that to go too fast might mean disaster, especially in countries like Kenya, which has a white majority to whom the wealth of the country is mainly due.
What has happened? Just what has been predicted. First, a great majority of the white farming community, to whom, as I have said, the prosperity of Kenya is mainly due, has completely lost confidence both in Her Majesty's Government here and in the future of the country itself. Some, by all accounts

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I have heard, are already leaving for Australia, South Africa, or anywhere where they may hope to have that protection for the future of their farming operations and the security of their wives and families which they have regretfully concluded minorities will not be able to expect under the present African leaders when Kenya gets independence. And many other farmers, who for one reason OT another cannot leave the country, are ceasing to plough back their profits into the farms; they are getting them out of the country while it is possible to do that. According to my information, doctors and schoolmasters, too, are beginning 'to leave the country. And as the Colony of Kenya nears independence, that stream may well become a flood. Now, lastly, the Africans themselves are beginning to revert to their tribal divisions and their tribal animosities. Kenyan nationality is not something natural; it is something created by Britain, and it may well be that it will last only while Britain retains some control.
I often have it said to me, "All that may be true, or, at any rate, there may be a measure of truth in it. But things have gone too far. It is too late to do anything." Indeed, it is very late. But there are, I believe, things that could still be done which would help to restore the confidence which is being so rapidly lost. First of all, the white farmers could be bought out by Her Majesty's Government at some level of values which would have to be agreed, and they could be paid in bonds which would be guaranteed, not by the future African Government in Kenya, which is not likely to make the bonds very negotiable, but by Her Majesty's Government themselves in London. If the farmers felt that they had a nest egg outside the country which would be available for their wives and families if the worst came to the worst, I believe that, so far from their being encouraged to leave, they would be far more ready to take the risk of staying on now, either as managers for the Government or as tenants of the Government on farms which they formerly owned, and for which in many cases they have a very deep affection.
Secondly, an announcement could be made—and if it is to be made it should be made very soon—that while the next
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step, the step to full internal self-government, might well be taken as soon as there seemed any prospect of its being a success, the last step, the step to independence, ought not to be taken until Her Majesty's Government are fully satisfied that the Colony is ready for it. I hope that the new Colonial Secretary will at any rate consider the possibility of acting on these lines. It really seems the only way now of saving Kenya from something approaching economic collapse.
I should now like to turn for a few moments to another territory in Central Africa, the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Here, as well, is it too much to hope that, while of course constitutional advance must continue, the Africans, to repeat the Foreign Secretary's phrase, shall not be unduly hurried in their constitutional development—in other words, that they shall not be asked to run before they can walk? Many people, I am sure, not only in the Federation itself but in the United Kingdom, were startled and, indeed, rather shocked by a sudden announcement made a few weeks ago, in the very middle of the Katangan crisis, clearly implying that if violence ceased in Northern Rhodesia, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to consider modifications in the new Northern Rhodesian Constitution which had been agreed only so lately as the end of June this year. It is perfectly true that the Governor has announced to-day—it is in the evening paper, I think—that there will be no further general review of the Constitution. But he seems to envisage modifications; and I cannot help feeling that this in itself is deeply disturbing, for your Lordships will remember that this particular agreement was reached only as a result of very hard bargaining on both sides. It was an agreement negotiated, as it were, down to the last comma, and it was, I think, clearly understood at the time that it was to be regarded as a carefully balanced compromise, not subject to amendment.
If anyone has any doubts of that, I should like to quote some words from the Governor of Northern Rhodesia's Address which he gave to the Legislative Council in that country on June 27, words which, I submit, to any normal

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person admit of only one interpretation. This is what he said:
"There is no doubt that the months of uncertainty which have attended the formulation of a new Constitution for Northern Rhodesia have had damaging effects on the life and welfare of our people and have hindered the economic progress and development of the Territory. This state of uncertainty has now come to an end with the announcement yesterday of Her Majesty's Government's plans for our constitutional future."
He added at a later stage in his speech:
"That the new Constitution will not please everyone in all its details, I am fully aware. To have done so would not have been possible. But, taken as a whole, this new Constitution can be considered a significant step forward in the Territory's political progress and (what is no less important) I believe it meets our needs."
Those were the words quoted verbatim from the Governor's address. An address by the Governor to the Legislative Council on an occasion of such vital importance to the territory must, I think, have been passed by the Secretary of State. Not only did the Government allow the Governor of Northern Rhodesia to put that interpretation on the agreement, but they allowed Sir Roy Welensky to fight the battle of the referendum on the new Constitution for Southern Rhodesia—a battle which, I remind your Lordships, the Government here very much wanted won—on that assumption. It was only when the battle was won that the Colonial Secretary, on behalf of the Government, suddenly turned round and indicated that this was no hard and fast agreement but proposals—that was the word I think which was used—subject to amendment.
Is it any wonder, in those circumstances, that large numbers of people in the Federation, including the Federal Government itself, whose good name was directly involved through its support of the Northern Rhodesian agreement during the referendum campaign for Southern Rhodesia, felt that they had been badly let down? The Times, in an article last week, tried to explain away the Government's action by saying it was the result of serious disturbances in Northern Rhodesia. But there really is no substance for the use of a word like "serious". No doubt there were disturbances, and that was perhaps to be expected. But they were only, by all accounts I have had from that country,
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local and sporadic. Indeed, had they been so serious as to put in jeopardy the security of the State, the Federal Government had the right under the Federal Constitution to send in Federal troops, and they never found that necessary.
My Lords, I have been severely castigated in the past by Government spokesmen because I criticised the actions of the late Colonial Secretary and the Government in relation to Africa. But I ask them now: do not they feel just a little uncomfortable when they think of what they allowed the Governor of Northern Rhodesia to say in June last, and Sir Roy Welensky to say in the course of the referendum campaign, and then look at what they are saying now only three months later?
If that be true of the Government, what am I to say about some sections of the Churches in their contributions to this particular subject? I do not know whether other Members of the House have seen a resolution passed by the British Council of Churches on September 20 of this year which must, I think, be regarded as blessing a statement made by the Africa Committee of the Conference of British Missionary Societies, since they print it in full in their resolution and make no qualifications or reservations to it. That statement of the Africa Committee enters most violently and controversially into the position in Northern Rhodesia. Rather surprisingly, it appears to regard it as being absolutely legitimate for Governments to alter firm agreements if it is convenient for them to do so. It even seems to think that it is morally right in certain circumstances for them to do just that, and puts forward proposals of its own for amendment of the Constitution which go considerably further even than anything the Government have said or, I believe, contemplated. To quote the words of this statement—and here the British Council specifically support it—Her Majesty's Government
"should at once declare its intention to see an African majority in the Northern Rhodesian Legislature in the near future, and should grant an interim Constitution which must clearly lead to this result."
Nor is this all. Having gone so far and told the Government what to do now, at once, in a situation which is of intense delicacy—a situation, too, where they have themselves none of the grave

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responsibilities of Government—they go on further and say:
"Finally we"—
that is, the Committee—
"are of the opinion that the social and economic aims of Her Majesty's Government in Central Africa can no longer be achieved by the continuance of the Federal structure as at present imposed, and that the first step to achieve these aims (through a freely negotiated association of the peoples of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) is the attainment of representative government in Northern Rhodesia as well as in Nyasaland."
My Lords, that may seem very nice, but what does it in fact mean? What it means is the ending of Federation—Federation which has been emphasised by the Monckton Committee to have brought immense benefits on the country and peoples concerned—and the handing over of Northern Rhodesia now to a Government dominated by African extremists. That is what it means.
I recognise, of course, that it may very fairly be argued that churchmen as well as laity have a perfect right to express their own honest opinions. But what I have found startling, and I must admit rather shocking, is that they say in effect quite roundly that their view is the only Christian view. I am not going merely to make that statement; I should like to explain to the House what I mean. the only way I entirely agree, that they quote a resolution of the Christian Council of Northern Rhodesia, with which they indicate they agree and which runs as follows:
"The Council considers that the present proposals for the Northern Rhodesian Constitution will intensify racial antagonism and therefore fail to provide the basis for the building of that orderly, non-racial society which is the earnest desire of the Christian Church; and that they are therefore a burden on the Christian conscience, because it is clear"—
this is odd—
"that the proposals are unacceptable to the great majority of the people".
I speak, I can assure the House, with great humility on this subject, because I recognise the deep personal piety of the signatories and the high motives which I am sure inspire them. But the resolution, for which I think the British Council of Churches must surely, by publishing this statement, share responsibility, seems to me, frankly, a classic example of muddled thinking. For if everything is to be condemned which is, to quote the words of the resolution,
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"unacceptable to the great majority of people", why, my Lords, Christianity itself should never have come into being; for that most certainly at the start was "unacceptable to the great majority of the people". And to say that it is a burden on the Christian conscience not to hand over the country to people most of whom are of a very primitive type and in no way inspired by Christian principles, merely because there are more of them, really seems to me a very extraordinary doctrine. If the basis of the new Constitution is to be non-racial —I think nearly all of us agree with that—surely the criterion should be fitness to exercise a vote intelligently; and yet that is not even mentioned in either the statement or the resolution.
I hope your Lordships will forgive me for having raised a matter of this character, which goes beyond the scope of our usual discussions in this House, and I warned the most reverend Primate that I was going to do so; but I feel very deeply about it, for this resolution, no doubt, has gone out throughout Central Africa as the voice of United Christendom, and it certainly is not that.
My Lords, I know that those who feel as I do have been strongly criticised in many quarters for the views we hold but we have never in fact been reactionary. We have never believed in standing still; we have always believed —I certainly do—in a steady evolutionary advance for the peoples of Africa as elsewhere. But let us never forget why it was that Livingstone and people like him went to Africa. It was to preach ordered peace and ordered liberty in lands which had never known them. That was their crusade and it is a crusade which, as I think the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, said this afternoon, has been crowned with an amazing measure of success. But do not let us now become the dupes of our own words, and kid ourselves that the battle is yet won. By all means let us help the Africans to advance to greater and greater measures of self-government. That is the only way. I entirely agree, that they will learn what civilised government means. But to grant independence prematurely—and we had better face it—may mean a loss of all that during the last century we have taught them. Do not let us risk that. Let us make each

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foothold firm before we advance to the next, for only so shall we attain our goal. It is in that spirit that I hope the new Colonial Secretary, whom I am sure we all congratulate on his appointment, will approach his task. By doing so he will, I am very sure, carry with him the good wishes of all of us in whatever part of the House we may sit.
4.47 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I propose to follow the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, if in little else and certainly least of all in debating oratorical power, in dealing with certain problems arising at the present time in the Commonwealth and Colonies overseas, and I do so particularly because we have the great advantage of having the noble, Earl, Lord Perth, to wind up the debate this afternoon and to reply to our views.
First of all I should like to say this. We all read in the papers this morning that one of the most violent hurricanes in recent years has hit the town of Belize. I was in Belize some time ago and I remember both the vast number of biting insects and, alas!the dangerous fragility of most of the buildings. I should like to express our profound sympathy with those who have lost their homes, those who have been injured and those who have lost their means of livelihood in Belize, and also to express the hope that the Government will carefully consider the desirability of providing financial assistance towards repairing the damage that must have been done to the town. This has often happened in times past when the West Indies have been hit by hurricanes and by other catastrophies. Indeed, I well remember the rebuilding of the town of Castries after it had been burnt down. I hope the noble Earl will consider doing this at the earliest possible moment to bring comfort to those who have suffered this great affliction in Belize.
I should like next to refer to Africa, and, first of all, I know that we all, on both sides of the House, welcome the statement in the gracious Speech that Her Majesty is looking forward to her journey to West Africa. I am convinced from my own experience in that part of Africa that Her Majesty will receive as magnificent a welcome as any she has
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ever had on her visit to other Commonwealth countries. Prince Philip was the most popular visitor by far during my time in Ghana, but when he returns with Her Majesty from West Africa I feel certain he will realise that he has been taking part in the most popular visit in the living memory of Ghanaians. And I have no doubt, although I cannot speak with the same degree of certainty and personal assurance, that that will be the case in the other West African countries which Her Majesty will visit. I am quite convinced, too, that nothing could do more to strengthen the ties with these West African nations, between them and us and them and the Commonwealth, than this visit. Finally, I should like to follow noble Lords who spoke yesterday in expressing my immense admiration for the spirit in which Her Majesty is facing this tiring tropical tour, and respectfully wishing her and the Duke of Edinburgh every success.
To turn to East and Central Africa, which have been the main subjects of Lord Salisbury's speech, we, of course, all welcome the approaching independence of Tanganyika and Uganda. That is something that is most satisfactory to both sides of the House. But the political situation in other parts of British Africa is causing many people a great deal of concern, and that concern was shown by the the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. I noted that he dealt most fully in the course of his speech with the situation in Central Africa and in particular in Northern Rhodesia, and, if I may say so, although my views are different from his, I thought he was absolutely right in regarding that as the most difficult and important problem with which we have to deal at the moment. It may not be necessary—I hope it is not necessary; I do not think it is necessary, but I will do so all the same in case it is—to warn the Government that one wrong step at this time in Northern Rhodesia will plunge that country into grave disorder and racial strife. A stage has been reached where any further concessions to those Europeans—and, of course, only some Europeans are represented in this way—represented by the United Federal Party, will convince the African nationalists that they have no chance of gaining power by constitutional means.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, to be quite accurate, I was not suggesting any further concession. All I was saying was that the Government should stand by what they had agreed.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: If the noble Marquess will be good enough to follow what I should like to say, he will see that perhaps we put a different meaning or interpretation upon the word "concession" and, our view of what has actually been agreed is different. I fear, and this fear is shared by many people who live in Northern Rhodesia and who know it much better than I do, that the Africans will be driven to resist what they regard as a threat of permanent white domination by unconstitutional means unless they are shown at this time that they have an opportunity to achieve political power by the ordinary Parliamentary machinery which the Northern Rhodesian Government and Her Majesty's Government are proposing to set up. I venture to say that we cannot justify to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia the withholding of political and constitutional advance at a reasonable rate. We cannot justify the withholding of this advance, which we are giving to Africans everywhere else in British Africa.
The pace obviously must be different in countries that are multiracial, where there are several races, like Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, as compared with countries that are purely African, like Nyasaland or Uganda, but in Northern Rhodesia the Africans are beginning to doubt whether we mean them to advance at all to ultimate self-government as an African country, and they are beginning to believe that we want to keep the white minority in power by denying them a majority in the Legislature. At any rate, the United Federal Party, the two African Nationalist Parties and the Liberal Party of Northern Rhodesia interpret—and on this they all seem to agree—the latest constitutional proposals of Her Majesty's Government as giving the advantage in elective power to the 22,000 European voters. These June proposals are extremely complicated and almost impossible, I should think, for the ordinary voters to understand.
Where I differ, I think, from the noble Marquess—although I am going to leave to the noble Earl, Lord Perth, the defence of his case and I daresay the
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noble Earl, Lord Perth, will agree with me—is that whereas the broad outline of the proposals was agreed, it was also made clear at the time that machinery for implementing those proposals was subject to further discussion and that alterations in matters of voting and constituency boundaries, and so on, might well be made. However complicated these proposals may be, no one doubts that they are less favourable to the Africans and more favourable to the European than the original February proposals. The most disconcerting thing about the change in the Government's mind between February and June is that it appears to have been moved, to some extent at any rate, by the intervention of Sir Roy Welensky and the Federal Government. At least, that was what Sir Roy Welensky himself claimed in a speech in Bulawayo on June 30, and I should like to quote one sentence:
"As a result of our representations a considerable number of modifications were made"—
that is, modifications in the proposed constitution.
Successive Secretaries of State for the Colonies have said that the Federal Government has no right at all to interfere in the Constitution of the territorial Governments. If Her Majesty's Government yield again to what appears, at any rate, to be the pressure of the Federal Government, they will be yielding to what is clearly, according to the Constitution of the Federation, a form of unconstitutional pressure, because the territories are directly related to Her Majesty's Government in their structure and not to the Federal Government.
I am sure changes could still be made in administrative matters connected with these proposals which would secure the acceptance of the African Parties and the co-operation of all races in the government of the country. I do not want to be too technical, but it seems to me that the essential change is this. The Government have fixed a minimum percentage of votes or a minimum number of votes as one of the essential requirements for a successful candidate for a national seat, and your Lordships will remember there are going to be fifteen national seats, and those seats will hold the balance of power. This percentage of 12½ per cent. works out, in fact, far more favourably

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to the Europeans than it does to the Africans, because, of course, there are many more Africans than Europeans. What I am suggesting to the Government is that the percentage requirements should be lowered in order to give the Africans at least as reasonable a chance as the Europeans. I am not, of course, talking at this stage about a majority of Africans securing an African majority in the Legislature, but at least I think it would be highly desirable to have a good percentage which represented liberal opinion generally, both African and European.
I am sure the only way to avoid disaster in Northern Rhodesia is a reconsideration of the voting and constituency arrangements. I am very glad that the Government and the Governor have decided, now that order has been restored, to consider representations that either side may wish to make on this subject, and I hope that these representations will be considered quickly, so as not to leave Northern Rhodesia in suspense, and that the decision will be such as to ensure peace and orderly development for that country.
That brings us to the question, upon which the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, did not touch, of the next meeting of the Conference which was held last year to review the Federal Constitution. Even if this Conference has to be postponed until the second half of next year, I greatly hope that the Government will not re-convene it until all the territories are working their new Constitutions—until Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia have had their elections, and until both these new territories, together with Nyasaland, which has had its election, 'have a chance of working their new Constitution. Only in that event shall we see a genuinely representative Conference. I know, of course, that the Monckton Commission said that the Federation cannot continue in its present form: of that we are all acutely aware. But surely it is better that it should continue for another year than that superficial changes should be made now and the whole Constitution thrown—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: With all deference to the noble Earl, so far as I know the Monckton Com-
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mission never said that. They said that there might be a plebiscite after a certain number of years. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, will be able to answer that more fully than I can, because I am speaking without the book. But I do not believe that the Monckton Commission ever said that federation could not continue in its present form. All their argument was in favour of its continuing.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: The noble Marquess and I are both speaking without the book, but I myself am convinced, and I think many others agree, that that is what the Monckton Commission said, even though we cannot quote the words of the Report. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Molson, is not here because he served on the Commission and would be able to put us right. But I hope that the Government will not hurriedly reconvene this Conference until the political situation in Africa is much clearer and more stable than it is at the moment. Perhaps when he replies the noble Earl, Lord Perth, will be able to say something on that subject.
Before I leave Africa I should like to ask the noble Earl (and again this is a question addressed by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury) whether he can say something about the future of Kenya. The release of Kenyatta a few months ago was followed last week by his acceptance of the leadership of the K.A.N.U. Party. I hope that the Government will persuade the Kenya Government to remove the restriction on his entry into politics now that he has become leader of this most important African Party. Since his release he has not done anything that can be regarded as a politically dangerous tendency; and he has shown that he is a moderate influence in Kenya politically, especially from the point of view of racial cooperation. It may, of course, now be possible, although it will be even more difficult, for him to reconcile the tribes in Kenya. That is a big and difficult problem. But in any event he can surely do more on the lines of what he has been doing up till now, as a member of the Legislature, than he can outside it. Keeping him out will only add to the grievances of the African political Parties.
I also hope that the noble Earl will be able to say something about land

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in Kenya. I cannot agree with the noble Marquess that it would be a practical proposition for the United Kingdom Government to offer to buy out all the European farmers in Kenya. Moreover, I think that if they did it would be a disaster for the Colony of Kenya because the presence of these farmers is essential to its prosperity. But I think that something should be done about the small European farmer in Kenya. The small European farmer in Kenya has been made an offer of payment over a period of years from the Kenya Government for his farm. The terms are so unsatisfactory that it is impossible to expect him to accept. I believe that there has been a drought in Kenya for the last two years, and farmers are extremely badly off and to expect them to accept payment over the period of seven years, which is what has been offered, is utterly unreasonable. The other thing is that, as they are not willing to sell, the whole scheme of African resettlement, and the settlement of African farmers on Kenya's Highlands, will fall to the ground. I hope that the noble Earl may be able to say something encouraging about the steps that are being taken by the Kenya Government to meet the position of the European farmer.
I hope that he may also be able to say something about the future of Constitution building in Kenya. I know that the noble Marquess thinks that we are going too fast. I, on the contrary, share the view of the Government that we are going at about the right pace. I think it is far more dangerous to go too slowly than it is to go too fast in the achievement of self-government in Africa. Surely what is happening in Portuguese territory in Africa, and in Algeria, is the best example of what happens when you go too slowly.
My Lords, I should like, in conclusion, to follow my noble Leader in saying something about the proposed legislation to control immigration from the Commonwealth. I believe that we all deplore this proposal—and the word "deplore" was used, I think, by a noble Lord opposite. The Government call it deplorable, but they say that it is necessary. We find it deplorable, and we hope that it is unnecessary. Naturally the Government will try to convince us to the contrary and we shall certainly listen
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to their argument. We are also convinced that it will be extremely damaging to the Commonwealth. Everyone agrees that the influx of coloured immigrants has created serious social problems in this country, the most serious being probably that of housing. But the shortage of housing which results in overcrowding in some conditions is surely a national problem, and one that should be solved by a much bigger national building programme. Of course the local authorities have had to cut down their building programmes—that is part of the financial policy of the Government. We maintain that that, in turn, is due to a failure to adopt a policy which would have enabled this country to expand at a much more rapid rate. Surely the right, and the only, solution, without adverse repercussions on the Commonwealth, is to tackle this social problem as a social problem, and to try to meet the requirements of housing, education and so on in regard to these coloured immigrants.
What some people in this country fail to realise is that we are only one of eleven Commonwealth countries which will be affected closely by restrictions on immigrants, and that many of our sister nations will deeply resent these restrictions. We are proposing to give up our traditional policy of the open door, which has been one of the most important ways of showing that our relationship with the Commonwealth is something entirely different from our relationship with even our closest friends among foreign countries.
I should like to ask the noble Earl, following my noble friend and Leader, to what extent and in what way the other Commonwealth Governments have been consulted in this matter. As I am sure the noble Earl will agree, it is not sufficient that they should have been informed; they must have had the opportunity of expressing their views: they must have been consulted. I am surprised that a matter of this importance was not discussed at the last Prime Ministers' Conference—at least, we have no record of its having been discussed at this Conference. I do not think we should act in the way proposed in the gracious Speech without trying to get agreement, or at least acquiescence, at the highest political level. And the way to do that is not by exchanges between

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Governments—and I have no doubt that some exchanges have taken place; the noble Earl will tell us about them—but by face-to-face talks between Prime Ministers.
My Lords, I do not think that the Government could have chosen a more unfortunate moment, from the Commonwealth's point of view, to introduce this legislation. Although no doubt this legislation will not discriminate between the races, the practical effects of it will be to keep out coloured immigrants. It will appear to the new Commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa that we are, in fact, discriminating against their people, against coloured people. These new countries are precisely the countries where Commonwealth ties are newest, and therefore weakest, and where we think they most need strengthening. Nor will this be an encouragement to other British territories in Africa, at present on the way to self-government, to make the Commonwealth their home when they become independent.
But perhaps the most unfortunate mistake of timing is that these proposals coincide with our decision to try to enter the Common Market. This decision has already shaken and dismayed the Commonwealth. Yet we go on, in the same year, to propose the closing, or at least the part closing, of our open door to Commonwealth citizens. My Lords, everyone knows that the free movement of labour is one of the objects of the Treaty of Rome, so we are apparently willing to give free entry to foreign workers from the Continent at the very moment we are proposing to bar the door to workers from Commonwealth countries. Can we really say that we are more willing to have poor workers from Italy, Southern France or Germany than we are to have poor workers from the West Indies or Pakistan?
Of course, it is often said on the other side that Commonwealth countries do not open their doors to British immigrants, and that we should treat their people in the same way. Apart from the principle of the thing, I think there are two answers to this argument. One is this: that it is surely our duty to keep this door open even if others have failed to do it. There is one moral consideration here, I think. Our own standard of
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living has been built up in the past on cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from many parts of the world, including, of course, our own Commonwealth, and, in a sense, we are paying a debt by admitting our impoverished neighbours from the Colonies and from Commonwealth countries. There is also (and this is the second answer to this argument) a very practical advantage to us in having these people here. They take on the heavy, dirty, unpleasant jobs that British workers do not want to do. Without this addition to our labour force we should not have achieved the full amount of expansion in production that we have achieved in the last few years. Even if it is less than we expected or desired, at any rate it is some degree of expansion; and if, in the future, our economy is to go on expanding—and we hope much more rapidly in the future than it has done in the past few years—we shall need all the labour we can get.
My Lords, that is the sort of fear that we on this side of the House entertain about this proposal to restrict immigration. I am quite certain that it is causing profound concern in the Commonwealth. It seems to me, looking back over the years since the war, that it is a sad irony that the Conservative Party, which has always been the champion of Empire and Commonwealth, should have done more than any other Government in the past two years to strike vital blows at the fabric of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is not going to disintegrate. That has not happened, and I am sure that it will not happen, so long as new countries wish to continue to be in the Commonwealth. But the stresses and strains under which the Commonwealth is suffering, at the moment are certainly due to the policy pursued by the present Government.
5.16 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, as an old Colonial Secretary I should like to be associated with what the noble Earl said in sympathy to the people of Belize, and I am sure that that goes for all of us in all parts of the House. There are only two territories to which I had intended to devote the few observations I want to offer to the House, and Northern Rhodesia was not one of them. But, my Lords, having been pretty closely associated in the past with all these matters, and having heard

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to-day the speech of my noble friend Lord Salisbury and the speech of the noble Earl, I must give it as my considered opinion that I think the Government would make the worst of both worlds if they did not stand by the considered judgment on the Northern Rhodesian Constitution which they announced to both Europeans and Africans through the mouth of the Governor in such clear and precise terms, and which, indeed, they announced to us in both Houses of Parliament, where it received full endorsement. I do not pretend that it received that from the noble Earl, but it received it from certainly all their supporters in both Houses and, I think, a number of people of no particular political opinion.
My Lords, the two territories I want to say one word about are Kenya and (I make no apology for coming back to it in this debate, because it impinges on the whole of the African territory) the Congo. In Kenya the situation is in some ways, as I see it, more simple, but in others it is more serious. Politically, I think it is simpler because, as I gather from what I read, everybody in Kenya now accepts that before so very long Kenya will achieve independence. Economically, the position seems to be much more serious. Economically and financially, there has been a progressive and rapid deterioration. Anyone who knows Kenya knows that the whole of the economy of that country depends upon the European farmers, and uncertainty as to their future security has already produced an agricultural crisis in that country.
Production is badly down. The production of Wheat is far less than it was, and the production of maize is far less. This is partly due, it is true, to drought, but it is largely owing to a failure to farm in that intensive way in which Kenya has been farmed in the past. In recent months vast quantities of maize have had to be imported, for which the country really cannot possibly afford to pay. On these farms—and anyone who knows them knows how intensive and progressive the farming is—forward planning has become practically impossible. Indeed, men who have been some of the best farmers in any Continent are now, instead of developing the land and getting increasing production, tending to
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mine the land and get out of it just what they can. And, my Lords, it is not just because of agriculture, but because that is the key to Kenya, the decline has carried over into commerce and industry where there is serious and increasing unemployment.
Unless this trend can be checked and confidence restored, the country will be bankrupt. I am not sure that it is not on the verge of bankruptcy now, but it will certainly be bankrupt long before it attains independence. This is not a question where the interests of black and white conflict. It may be, when one comes to voting in Rhodesia, one can argue it this way or that. I do not think there is anybody in any quarter of the House who would contend for a moment that the efficient farming of Kenya is not just as much the interest of the African population as it is of the European population. There is, quite frankly, only one solution to this common problem, and that is to give security to the European farmers.
Many years ago it fell to me, as Colonial Secretary, to appoint the Carter Commission on Land in Kenya. It was an extremely competent body, and it conducted the most exhaustive inquiry there has ever been into Kenya land and Kenya land problems. Every claim, legal, equitable, or historical, was examined, and they recommended very large increases in the native areas. Over 1,470 square miles were awarded to various tribes and reserves. Another 1,150 square miles or more were given to meet present and future economic requirements, so far as they could be foreseen; and, in addition, something between 900 and 1,000 square miles were added for good measure, but not allocated to any particular tribe. In making those recommendations—and I venture to read these words to the House because I think they apply with as much force to-day as they did when Carter and his colleagues wrote them—the Commission said, in paragraph 1979 of their Report:
"These recommendations"—
these enormous accretions which were given—
"may perhaps give rise to a natural apprehension among Europeans that the extent of the Highlands may be again diminished. One of the main objects of our Report has been

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to frame recommendations which would is a really terrible problem for the instil a feeling of security in the minds of the natives with regard to their lands. If, in doing so, we had only transferred the feeling of insecurity from the natives to the Europeans, we should not feel that we have succeeded in our task. We therefore recommend that the boundaries of the European Highlands should be safeguarded by Order in Council, so that the European community may have the same measure of security in regard to land as we have recommended for the natives."
And in 1939, I think it was, an Order in Council was made giving effect to those recommendations.
Now I know that a year or two ago that particular 1939 Order in Council was revoked in order to facilitate further land planning in Kenya; but I am quite certain, and I am sure the noble Earl, Lord Perth, will bear me out, that there was certainly no intention—and my noble friend was in the Government at the time; perhaps I was too—that the security given by the Order in Council of 1939 should be undermined by the new Order. If Kenya is to be restored and is to be economically viable, the confidence of the farmers in their title and in their tenure must be re-established.
My Lords, I differ in method, though not, I think, in broad intent, from my noble friend Lord Salisbury. Compensation or financial guarantees—though there is certainly a strong equitable claim for those—I do not think will really afford a solution of the problem, a solution in the interests of the whole of Kenya. The skill and enterprise of these European farmers is essential. I am sure most of them want to stay there. That is where they have made their homes; that is where they have built up their remarkable achievement; that is where they have lived and want to go on living their lives. My Lords, we have countless constitutional conferences; Lancaster House is open every day to one or another. I do not complain of that. But surely the most urgent conference which should be convened now is a conference on land and to work out a charter, a charter which all need and a charter to which, I believe, now they are seeing more and more the realities of the position, all Africans and Europeans would be brought to accept and subscribe to. At any rate, I make that, I hope not un-
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constructive, contribution towards what is a really terrible problem for the future, because I cannot conceive of any worse heritage when you go into independence than complete bankruptcy and economic frustration for the whole of the future.
I want also to put one or two points to the Government about the Congo. In doing so, it is certainly no reflection upon Lord Lansdowne's admirable speech a week or two ago, and still less a reflection upon that mission which he conducted in the Congo and at Ndola, which was as plucky as it was practical. But events move so rapidly in that place, and reports are so uncertain and so conflicting, that I make no excuse for asking for reliable information and also for asking, if I may respectfully do so, for a clear statement, in the present situation, of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, how they are implementing it, and how they propose to implement it. As I understand it, the Government originally supported the United Nations intervention in the Congo in order to prevent what I may call a "Spanish situation". Indeed, I think that was the phrase used by at least one member of the Government, perhaps by the Leader of the House. By that I mean a situation in which there were warring factions and outside nations sending in arms and men to support one faction or the other. That was a most desirable thing to do and it was their hope, as it still is the hope of all of us, that the Congelese would settle their own future by peaceful agreement.
I think that to most of those who know the country and its infinite variety and diversity a federal solution would appear the most hopeful and the most practical. Surely the Congolese people will be wise to look North to the great country of Nigeria, also very diverse in its population, where a federal solution has been so completely successful and is working so well. But, of course, that is for the Congo to decide. What I think is utterly wrong—and I must say this emphatically—is that the United Nations Organisation should try to force a solution and coerce any of the provinces. I was profoundly shocked, as probably most of your Lordships were, by the armed intervention of the United Nations troops in an attempt, which nearly succeeded, to seize strategic

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points in Katanga. I have no doubt that they had the support of Dr. Nkrumah, but then, Dr. Nkrumah has made opposition a criminal, if not a capital, offence in his own country. As we know, it had been accompanied by some extraordinary calumnies by Mr. Nehru on this country, and the operations there had the support of Mr. Nehru. Again, that was not surprising, because it was precisely the technique which Mr. Nehru himself had employed in Kashmir.
But I am sure that the intervention—the armed aggression, I had almost called it—was not supported by Her Majesty's Government. That has stopped and there is a cease-fire, thanks largely to the expedition and skill of my noble friend Lord Lansdowne. But I ask the Government this: what is the present position? What did that cease-fire mean, and what does it mean? According to one United Nations official it means that Leopoldville can attack Katanga, but Katanga cannot have weapons or troops to defend itself. Really, cet animal est frès méchant: Oland on l'attaque il se défend. The Government will help us and certainly will help the Congo if they can speak out in this debate and say what are the facts and what are their intentions.
Having spoken on the Congo, I feel that I cannot close without a word about the many Belgian civilians who have been working there, because in the two years during the war in which I visited many parts of the Congo I saw the work of these men—administrators, missionaries, teachers, doctors, agriculturists, technicians and welfare workers, These men were not "alien mercenaries". These men were devoted volunteers, brave and devoted volunteers, who gave of their best in the high tradition of British trusteeship, of which we are so proud; and I think that there are many in your Lordships' House who would wish me to pay that tribute to these men to-day.
5.36 p.m.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, it is very appropriate that on this first regular day of the new Session we should devote the major part of our time to the Colonies and to Commonwealth affairs. The gracious Speech itself contained many references to the Colonies and to the Commonwealth. We have just con-
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cluded here in London a most successful Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, in which a number of Members of your Lordships' House took part as delegates. Finally, we have a new Colonial Secretary. And I should like to take this opportunity of wishing my old friend Mr. Maudling the greatest success in his difficult task. I should also like to pay my personal tribute to Mr. Macleod. In the two years during which he held the important office of Colonial Secretary, he has become a highly controversial figure. Whether or not one agreed with all he sought to do, it must always be said of him that he had the courage of his convictions. Certainly in the most recent negotiations on Uganda, he scored an outstanding success, which will be acclaimed by all.
I noticed the other day that when the present Colonial Secretary made his initial speech in the debate on African affairs in another place, he mentioned that Mr. Macleod had held office at a time of intense difficulty. While no one would dispute this, I wonder whether the difficulties of the past two years can compare in terms of magnitude with those which my noble friends Lord Chandos and Lord Boyd of Merton experienced when the emergencies of Malaya, Mau-Mau, Cyprus and Nyasaland were at their height. I can well remember the day when it was perfectly normal for the Colonial Secretary to have over 100 oral Questions down on the Order Paper in one afternoon.
It seems to me that the difficulties which the Colonial Secretary has to confront to-day are of a different character. We are up against the hard core of our Colonial problem—namely, the issue of the multi-racial society. This is something which, generally speaking, has defeated the efforts of the statesmen of many other countries. We have only to look at the Union of South Africa, Algeria or, I might even say, the Congo, to recognise this truth. To us in this country it presents a special challenge, not merely because of the debt which we owe to the British men and women who have been encouraged by previous British Governments of all Parties to go out to these territories and make their lives there, but also because the strength of our position as the leading member of the Commonwealth depends on the fact

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that the Commonwealth itself is multiracial and that we in the Commonwealth can show the world in miniature the pictures of what we should like to see in general application—the ability of countries of all races and creeds to understand one another's problems and settle them by agreement.
Having regard to this, it seems to me all the more unfortunate that at this time, as announced in the gracious Speech, Her Majesty's Government should be contemplating steps to deal with immigration into this country which, however the regulations may be worded, must in fact be regarded in the West Indies and, to a lesser extent, in India and Pakistan as directed against people of a different colour. I understand very well the difficulties involved in the social developments to which the noble Earl opposite has referred. I understand, and indeed I have always supported, the proposal that there should be some powers to deport undesirables. Not having yet seen the proposed legislation, it is impossible to comment on the measures which are to be introduced to restrict the entry of British subjects coming here for the purpose of working. No doubt we shall have the opportunity of debating these matters in due course, but meanwhile I would urge the Government to exercise the greatest care to avoid anything which can be construed as discriminatory in the matter of colour.
I see that immigrants from Southern Ireland are to be included in the scheme, and there seems to be some suggestion that they may be accorded special treatment. I feel most strongly that no preference whatever should be given to white citizens of what is, after all, a Republic outside the Commonwealth, as opposed, for example, to British subjects from the West Indies, whose economic prospects in their own country are hazardous in the extreme and certainly worse than those in Southern Ireland. Do not let us forget that one of the reasons why Fidel Castro was successful in his revolution in Cuba, just next door to Jamaica, was that he was able to exploit the distress and unemnloyment of the peasants and urban proletariat of Cuba.
This matter of emigration from the West Indies has assumed an even greater
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importance in the face of the, to my mind, tragic decision of Jamaica to leave the Federation of the West Indies. I hope sincerely that some way may still be found of preserving the valuable common services which have grown up between the West Indian territories concerned. What is certain, however, is that the reorganisation and constitutional changes resulting from Jamaica's decision, which are in fact referred to in the gracious Speech, are bound to be made more difficult by any increase in unemployment as a result of cutting off immigration into this country.
The gracious Speech states that
"Bills will be introduced to provide for the independence of Tanganyika and Uganda."
I think that we all welcome these developments. So far as Tanganyika is concerned, we were all pleased to see that the Government had had second thoughts about the amount of financial assistance to Tanganyika over the next few years. I hope that our efforts will not end there, and that in any future East African Federation, which in the nature of things is bound for many y ears to be economically weak and vulnerable, we shall continue to maintain our financial assistance. Personally, I have always felt considerable sympathy with the views of members of the Opposition, and, indeed, of some of my own Party, who have favoured the continuation of investment by the Colonial Development Corporation in new projects in territories which have become independent. We have in the C.D.C. an instrument ready to hand for continuing to give technical and financial aid to the emerging territories; an instrument which they know well, which is well established, and to which no strings are attached. I have never quite understood our Government's reluctance to reconsider their attitude on this matter, and I hope that they will do so now.
While Sir Patrick Renison in Kenya has still many difficulties and anxieties ahead of him, it is pleasant to be able to reflect that the last official act of Sir Frederick Crawford, the Governor of Uganda, yesterday was to sign a new agreement with His Highness the Kabaka of Buganda. This is, we hope, the end of a long chapter of unhappy relations between Britain, Uganda and Buganda. It is a settlement to which the good sense of all parties contributed

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but in which the Mission of my noble friend Lord Muster undoubtedly played the leading part.
So far as Kenya is concerned, we are going through a particularly difficult and anxious period. I myself was not one of those who opposed the release of Jomo Kenyatta, subject always to security considerations. Quite frankly, I never saw him in the light of a great new Kenya leader; but I did believe that his continued detention was an irritant in an already highly difficult and complex situation. All that has happened since his release does not convince me that he has shown any further signs of coming the great national leader the people were hoping for. He has apparently been willing to sacrifice his desire to become a national leader in favour of his relations with the Kikuyu tribe and with K.A.N.U., particularly now that he has accepted the Presidency. As he has said on several occasions, he is still the same old Kenyatta, and now he comes out as the leader of the Kikuyu.
But, my Lords, what is significant seems to be this: that a number of other former Mau-Mau leaders are now being received into K.A.N.U.: and from what they are saying one can only assume that, like the Bourbons, they have forgotten nothing and learned nothing new, Jomo Kenyatta has been cautious to the point of ambivalence over such matters as European land rights. But Mr. Paul Ngei, the Kamba ex-Mau-Mau leader, who surely would not have been allowed to speak on so many occasions in the presence of Kenyatta and other leaders without permission, has been openly demanding, in most offensive and threatening terms, the take-over of the farms of Europeans. All this, with the increase of trespassing and squatting on European farms, and the breakdown of the talks, has caused us the greatest anxiety, and it is no wonder that the Governor, in his broadcast the other day, said that he was dispirited and frustrated. He has just been over here for talks with the Colonial Secretary, but I suppose that it is too much to hope that the Government will be able to tell us anything about them this evening.
My own view is that in these circumstances, K.A.D.U who have shown great courage, should be encouraged to go on with the task of governing; and both
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parties should be told that when they are ready to resume constitutional talks around the table together we shall be glad to provide the necessary facilities. Any such talks, in my view, should certainly include consideration of K.A.D.U.'s recent proposals for regionalisation, or what one might almost call cantonisation, of Kenya. I have always felt that tribalism in Kenya constituted a far greater danger and stumbling block than the relations between Africans and Europeans; and certainly the truth of this is now being borne out by events. I noticed the other day that Mr. Mboya, during a recent visit to Addis Ababa, accused Britain and what he called other Imperialists "of seeking to divide and rule by encouraging political kliffercinces between the main Parties. That was a very different thing from what he said on arrival in London the other night, when, on the television, he expressed surprise that Britain, having implanted the two-Party system in her overseas territories, should now be seeking to secure a united national front in Kenya. He then added, in a way which I do not think bodes well for the future:
"I personally believe in a one-Party system".
I thought that rather sinister.
We are able this week to welcome the arrival in London of two remarkable men, both of whom, in their different spheres, are, I believe, seeking, with all sincerity, to find solutions to this vital problem of the multi-racial or plural society in Africa. I am referring, of course, to Mr. Michael Blundell and Sir Roy Welensky. Mr. Michael Blundell is already here, and I should like to take this opportunity to say that, in the face of the many criticisms to which he has been subjected, he has shown the greatest courage and self-sacrifice in working for what he believes to be the real interests of Europeans in Kenya and of Kenya itself. It has not been an easy task for him, and I am sure that at times he must have suffered greatly. I have no doubt that the Government will welcome this opportunity of drawing on his great knowledge and experience in deciding on the tactics to be pursued in the immediate future.
So far as Sir Roy is concerned, he is well known to many of us here. He, too, has been grossly misrepresented and

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maligned, particularly in the British Press, of almost all political denominations. In his case, of course, unlike Mr. Blundell, he is portrayed as a Right Wing ogre and a diehard whose only aim is to stem the pace of African advance. Nothing could be further from the truth. Sir Roy Welensky's aim always has been to push on with African political advance, provided that the government remained in the hands of responsible people. That is not really so far removed from the Prime Minister's definition, in his "wind of change" speech, that the criterion should be merit and merit alone—though that, I am afraid, is a conception which in some places has been wearing a little thin of late.
Here I should like to refer to the constitutional plan for Northern Rhodesia. I do not think that any of us who have been following events in recent years in Central Africa very much liked the February Constitution, or its elaboration last June. We should have much preferred to see the Lennox-Boyd Constitution of 1958, which of course was supposed to last for ten years, built up so as to increase greatly the African representation. However, the pass was in fact sold by the recommendation in the Monckton Commission Report that there should be an African majority in Northern Rhodesia forthwith, and this, as one prominent Liberal leader in Northern Rhodesia told me a year ago, pulled the carpet from under his feet.
The late Colonial Secretary, in his February Constitution, sought to arrive at a compromise. In its final form as set forth in the June White Paper, the scheme, though highly complicated, at least provided that nearly one-third of the candidates should have to draw support from all races in order to be elected. Although some enthusiastic supporters of the United Federal Party have claimed otherwise (and I think that was a claim which was mentioned this afternoon by the noble Earl opposite), in my view it is quite impossible to judge whether or not the draft Constitution would throw up an African majority. But at least it would afford a better chance of ensuring that those who are elected have the goodwill of all races.
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Therefore it was with considerable dismay that many of us learnt on September 13, from a Colonial Office statement, that there was some chance of the Constitution being watered down in the face of violence in Northern Rhodesia, inspired, undoubtedly, by the United National Independence Party. The Prime Minister's message to Mr. Kaunda, in reply to his letter of the 18th August, was quite categoric on the point of Mr. Kaunda's responsibility. There can, I think, be no doubt whatever that, had Mr. Kaunda wished to prevent these acts of violence and disorder, all he had to do was to say the word. The announcement, however, that subject to the cessation of violence and disorder further representations from the parties concerned would be considered, seems to me to constitute a deplorable concession to violence itself.
In the debate in another place on July 25 last, there was no suggestion by the Colonial Secretary that the arrangement announced in June was not final, in the sense that it was on this Constitution that the next elections would be held. There was, of course, no suggestion whatever of a permanent white domination of Northern Rhodesia. And, my Lords, undoubtedly the terms of the Northern Rhodesian Constitution played a considerable part in the favourable result of the referendum on the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia.
What took place in the meantime to make the Colonial Office have second thoughts? One can feel only that it was the rejection by Mr. Kaunda of the Constitution, and the launching of the campaign of violence and intimidation by his followers. I do not know what the Colonial Secretary has in mind to do when he receives in due course the written representations of the parties, but, from the announcement which I gather has been made to-day by the Governor, I understand that it is to be limited to matters of detail. I hope that that is so. But on the points to which Mr. Kaunda has taken exception both Mr. Macleod and the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack have been perfectly clear.
The present Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, when asked in another place on July 25 wheher he wholeheartedly supported that section of the Constitution which ensured that every candidate

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in the National seats must have 400 votes, replied. "Yes, indeed", and he went on to refer to the alternative of 12½ per cent. I understand that that is the figure which Mr. Kaunda would now like to reduce to 5 per cent. I would remind your Lordships that this very figure of 12½ per cent., though I agree in a somewhat different context, was in fact suggested for discussion by my noble friend on the Woolsack in his speech on March 7 last, in which he said that this might be taken as the amount on which people would lose their deposits—that is to say, one-eighth.
So far as the Asian and coloured seat is concerned, it has been suggested that this has been picked out of the rest of the National seats to take away votes from the United National Independence Party. Personally, I am inclined to think that the Asians are more likely to vote for a European if their votes are mixed up in a lot of other votes than if they are being asked to vote among themselves for a particular candidate. In any case, it was the Monckton Commission itself which advocated that there should be some form of separate representation for Asians and coloureds.
For all these reasons, my Lords, I hope that the Government will not give way to any form of blackmail by the United National Independence Party, even if, as Mr. Kaunda has recently threatened, they do decide to boycott the elections unless these changes are made. People in this country are sometimes apt to forget that U.N.I.P. is not the only African Nationalist Party in Northern Rhodesia. The African National Congress, under Mr. Katilungu, has great influence and many supporters, particularly in the Copper Belt. They are not stooges; nor should we wish them to be so. I have no doubt that, in a fair fight with U.N.I.P., the African National Congress would command a considerable measure of support. Again, the paramount chief of Barotseland has made it absolutely clear that he and his Ministers are not willing to subject themselves to African extremist rule. So if U.N.I.P. and Mr. Kaunda, with the encouragement they have received from so many quarters, from Belgrade to Accra, decide to boycott the elections, I am sure that there are many Africans who are perfectly willing and capable of filling their place. I have no doubt that, so far as
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the mass of the Africans are concerned, all they want to do is to get a Constitution in being, to get the elections over, and to get on with their own business in peace.
When one looks at all these problems, and their complexities, one is bound to sympathise with the new Colonial Secretary in his tremendous task. 'I was much encouraged by many of the things that he said in his first speech, and not least 'by the quotation in his peroration that, "before you can have justice you must have security". It would be a brave man who would make any firm prediction as to how these events will unfold themselves. But however great the difficulties, I cannot help feeling that, despite the great anxiety of Europeans, particularly, of course, in Kenya and in Northern Rhodesia, things in East and Central Africa do look a little better than they did six months ago. Some of the African leaders seem to have learnt something. More and more Europeans have come to realise the inevitability of genuine co-operation with the Africans, if they and the territories are to survive and prosper. The British Government have, I think, arrived at a more realistic understanding of the position of the Europeans, whose welfare I think they always desired, but whose feelings and fears were often discounted or ignored.
We are to-day watching the greatest conscious experiment in history in creating a non-racial society on a democratic basis. It is something far more difficult than has ever been attempted before, because of the vast differences of history and background of the races concerned; because of the comparatively short time, unlike the West Indies, they have lived side by side, and because of the dangerous effects and influences of the cold war, of Communism and Pan-Africanism. It is too early yet to say whether it can succeed; but at least there is some progress, and there is hope.
5.59 p.m.
LORD KILBRACKEN: I intend to occupy a very few moments of your Lordships' time on one specific matter in the gracious Speech, to which several noble Lords, including the noble Lord who has just sat down, have already referred; that is, the proposal to control immigration into the United Kingdom. I should like to go a little further, if I

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can do so without insubordination, than my noble Leader, Lord Rea, and express my full sympathy with what I think I may call the apprehension and suspicion voiced by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. Of course we do not yet know exactly what controls Her Majesty's Government have in mind, so that it is impossible to say a great deal at this stage. But my own opinion—and it is my personal opinion—is that it is lamentable that any controls on these lines should be found necessary.
The Prime Minister said in another place yesterday that a limit would be placed only on the number of immigrants who have not a place of employment or who have no special skill. I want to ask what kind of sense that makes when it is to the unskilled, or the relatively unskilled, occupations that immigrant labour is going almost exclusively, and when all immigrant labour has to date been fully and immediately absorbed. The number of unfilled vacancies in Britain to-day is still very nearly as great as the number of unemployed. London Transport alone, for which immigrant labour has shown itself specially suited, has a staff deficiency to-day of 4,500, and is recruiting workers direct from Barbados, as reported in The Times yesterday, at the rate of 100 a month. As the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has pointed out, nationals from Common Market countries will be allowed free entry into Britain if we join. Yet British subjects are to be restricted.
A great deal has been said in talks about the Common Market of the special considerations that will be allowed to Commonwealth countries, and I want to ask whether this proposal is an example of the kind of special consideration which the Commonwealth is going to receive. I feel that we here in Britain are responsible for the conditions in their own countries which forced these people to emigrate. They are our responsibility. A Jamaican does not want to leave home any more than, as I can vouch from my own experience, an Irishman wants to leave home. The remedy, I submit, lies in improving living conditions in the countries concerned, and not in destroying or abridging the vital
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and long-honoured rights of Her Majesty's subjects overseas.
6.3 p.m.
LORD FORBES: My Lords, to-day there is much talk of the United Kingdom's possible entry into the European Economic Community, and I was delighted to see in the gracious Speech that Her Majesty's Government are to maintain consultation with the Commonwealth in the coming talks. Surely the time has come when the ties between the Commonwealth and this country must be cemented even further than in the past. To achieve this, I believe it is essential that we should understand each other's differences because differences do exist even though we may speak the same language. In my view, this means that more Members from both Houses of Parliament should visit the Commonwealth, and that there should be more visits from the Commonwealth to this country. What, then, is at present hindering this? It is one thing, and that is expense. I have just come back with a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation from Canada, and now I can realise that that Association cannot send as many people to the Commonwealth as it wants to. I believe that in the past a delegation has been to Canada about once every five years, and now it is intended to send a delegation about every three years, but it will have to be curtailed in numbers. Therefore, all along the line the great hurdle is the cost.
One of the major items of the cost must be travel. I should like to suggest that, to get many more people flowing between the Commonwealth and this country, Service aircraft and ships might be used. There must very often be empty seats and berths on Service 'planes and ships plying between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Why should we not make use of them? Another suggestion is that, instead of accommodation being provided always in hotels—and, rather naturally, the accommodation is in the best and most expensive hotels—why should not more hospitality be given in the homes in the countries? The mere fact of staying in homes rather than in hotels helps to bring about, I believe, a better understanding. I venture to suggest that nobody can express a really informed view about the affairs of any country

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unless they have actually visited that country.
When I was in Canada I sowed the seed of this suggestion that service ships and aircraft might be used, and wherever I went I found that this suggestion was well received. So I hope that Her Majesty's Government will follow it up and try to work out a practical solution with the countries of the Commonwealth. If the Mother Country and our great Commonwealth are to pull together as a team, which they must, then it is essential that all of us in the United Kingdom and in the Commonwealth should understand each other's differences.
6.7 p.m.
LORD WALSTON: My Lords, in what seemed to many of us, and certainly to myself, a most admirable speech yesterday the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, said many wise things. One of them, if I may read from his words in dealing with the foreign situation, was this [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 235 (No. 1), col. 9]:
"So we have been driven back once again to the age-old method of keeping the peace by the balance of power."
That, surely, is right. I think we must look at all the proposals which are now being put before us in the field of foreign affairs, and of Colonial and Commonwealth affairs, in that light, to see just how we are setting about this job of obtaining the right form of balanced power: to put it perhaps rather more bluntly, how we are succeeding in keeping those who used to be our Colonials and are now part of the Commonwealth on the side of the free world, making sure that at any time, at any emergency, and during the long dreary period of a cold war, they are firmly on our side.
To-day the debate has dealt largely with different aspects of that question of what is going on in different parts of the Commonwealth. The only general comment I should like to make on that is that I wholeheartedly agree with what my noble friend Lord Listowel said in answer to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury: that there is far more danger in this respect in going too slowly than in going too fast. While I would not endorse in every respect everything the Government are doing in the matter of the Commonwealth, at least I would certainly support them in not going any slower than they are at the present time.
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I believe (and several of your Lordships who have spoken already clearly share this view) that one of the most retrograde steps we are taking or are proposing to take at the present time—and I hope it will be modified—and one of the steps which is going to have the most adverse effect on retaining the loyalty, good will and co-operation of the Commonwealth, is this proposal to limit immigration into this country. So far as I am concerned, this is a matter of deep principle. I believe it is wrong for this country, the Mother Country of the Commonwealth, physically to restrain other members of the Commonwealth from coming into it.
Even though the younger countries of the Commonwealth may do so, so far as we are concerned it is not for us to follow their example. It must be for us to give them an example. What is more, we consider ourselves, whatever our own individual religions may be, a Christian country. We consider ourselves governed by Christian ethics and we must remember that we are enjoined to love our neighbours as ourselves. And while it is too starry-eyed for us to think that that means that we must throw wide open the doors of this country to every other country that ever is, that is something we should aim at. We cannot achieve it to-day, but at least do not let us close even slightly such an opening as there already is in the door of entry into this country, particularly when it allows in those who are close members of the Commonwealth.
My Lords, it seems to me that there are three groups of people in this discussion on immigration, which has been talked about widely and very seriously and very responsibly throughout the country in the last weeks and the last months. There are those—and I am very nearly one of them, though perhaps not quite—who say that, come what may, we must never close the door to any member of the Commonwealth at all. No argument can be strong enough to allow that to happen. There are others, and I think they are the majority, who believe in unfettered immigration if it is possible, but because they consider themselves realists, because they are realists, they say there are certain occasions when restriction may be necessary for the welfare not

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only of this country but of the Commonwealth itself. There may be too few houses; there may be too few jobs; and there may be a whole series of reasons. Thirdly there is the group, and I say that they are a very small minority, who are basically anti-foreigners, who are basically anti-black—some with the courage to say so straight out, but others masquerading under the need to recognise the housing shortage and to prevent riots, and all the rest of it. They would support measures to restrict immigration which were far more stringent than in fact the present conditions demand.
My Lords, I could not help feeling while I was considering this problem this morning that there was something in The Walrus and the Carpenter which had some bearing on this problem and which was apt to-day. I have looked it up in the Library this afternoon and it is worth reading quite a lot of it. I shall not weary your Lordships by doing that, but. if I may, I will read two verses. You will remember that as they were walking along the beach they encouraged the oysters to come:
"And thick and fast they came at last,
And more, and more, and more"—
and so on. Then, towards the end:
"'It seems a shame ', the Walrus said,
'To play them such a trick.
After we have brought them out so far,
And made them trot so quick!'
The Carpenter said nothing but
The butter's spread too thick!'"
Whether he was a disgruntled surtax payer, or someone who had "never had it so good", I do not know.
"'I weep for you ', the Walrus said,
'I deeply sympathise.'
With sobs and tears he sorted out
Those of the largest size.
Holding his pocket-handkerchief
Before his streaming eyes."
Do not let us be like that. If we do not want these people in, let us say so. But do not let us say we should like to have them if only we could, but there is not quite enough butter to go round so they will have to go without. With those people, with that group, there can be no compromise. I think it is possible that those of us who are firmly convinced on the grounds of principle that there should be no restriction on immigration, and those who genuinely would like to
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see that situation but who feel there may be some need for it, can work together for what, after all, is the thing that we both believe in.
But before we can do that we must get these facts of the immigration problem abundantly clear. We must know why it is they are coming; we must know how many are coming; we must know how many are likely to come; how many are absorbed into work, and so on. I cannot give you those figures—I hope the Government can do so—but we know, and the noble Lord who has just spoken, Lord Kilbracken, made this clear, that at the moment in this country, in spite of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's restrictive practices, there is still no widespread unemployment. We hope it will go on; and we know that those immigrants who are coming in from foreign countries are, in the main still, able to get jobs. Many of them are unable to get suitable houses; that is quite true. But many of our own people are unable to do so. As my noble friend Lord Listowel and others have said, the answer to that must surely be to build more houses rather than keep some people out.
How many people is it thought that in fact we should be keeping out? How many people in fact are coming in? To deal with the present time—these figures are from The Times this morning, and many of your Lordships will have read them—for the whole of 1960 there were 61,400 immigrants into this country from the Colonies and Commonwealth. In the first nine months of 1961 that figure rose to 88,650. An estimate for the whole year might be 100,000, perhaps a little more. If these restrictions are not going to be unduly severe, if they are not really going to cut right across the whole immigration from the Commonwealth, we cannot expect to keep out many more than 10 per cent. of the people who otherwise would come in. Even if the number of 100,000 to 110,000 were to double in the next year, that would mean that we should be keeping out only 20,000 people, something like 6,000 or 7,000 families; and that cannot really have very much effect on the housing problem in this country. Do not let us use houses as an excuse. I know that there are indeed sad cases; I know that there are areas in London and in the provinces where we find great

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overcrowding, where we find perhaps the beginnings of racial prejudice in its worst form, just as in parts of Hampstead in 1938 and 1939 we found some beginnings of racial prejudice against the Jewish refugees from Germany. That was always bound to occur, but let us keep it in proportion and let us realise how many people are affected by this and how many would be affected by any proposed legislation of the Government.
When it comes to criminals, convicted criminals, by all means let us send them back to their home countries. I myself do not think we shall find any significant number of criminals coming from the more distant parts of the Commonwealth. I am told—I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Kilbracken, is not here, as fie might be able to refute this—that if we were to return convicted criminals from Eire to their country it would go quite a long way to solving the overcrowding of our prisons at the present time. I am not against that at all. I do not think it is a measure which would need any serious or far-reaching legislation.
Returning to some of these facts that we must keep in front of our minds, the Prime Minister yesterday in another place stated that the present rate of immigration was running at something like 4,000 a week. That, indeed, is a very high figure; it is a figure which does cause one a certain amount of alarm. But we must remember that two factors have contributed to making that figure a particularly high one. In the first place, this is the normal seasonal time for most immigrants to come into this country. In previous years there has always been a bulge in September and October, and there is no reason to think that this year should be any different; so that that is by no means the average figure over the year.
But there is another factor Which is of great importance. Naturally the people in the West Indies, particularly in Jamaica, have heard of this proposed legislation. They are "trying to beat the gun", crowding on to the ships, and the rate has risen rapidly, so that if this legislation comes into force they at least will be here. That is the second factor that has exerted itself on the figure of
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4,000. There is also a third factor. A large number of the people who are coming this year into this country are women and children coming to join their husbands and fathers who have, at any rate in their own eyes, made good, Who have got themselves a job, got themselves somewhere to live and who have enough money to bring their wives and families over here. That is a very great reason leading to the increased number of immigrants who are coming here at the present time. In fact, in the past six months 88 per cent. of the total of immigrants from the West Indies have been women and children coming to join their husbands and their fathers. Those I believe to be the actual facts, so far as we can ascertain them, and, as I said, I hope that the noble Earl, or at some later stage some other Government speaker, will give us more of these facts before we decide on what should be done.
I should like to take up a point which again another noble Lord has already raised, and that is why these people leave their homes. After all, it can be no very great joke for somebody, whether he be a Pakistani, an Indian or a West Indian, to leave the country, the village in which he has been born and in which he has been brought up, to leave the sort of community life that he is used to, the sort of work he is used to, above all the sort of climate he is used to, and come to this unknown Island many thousands of miles away, among people of strange and different habits. That is not a thing which is undertaken lightly and it is not a thing normally which is undertaken happily. It is undertaken on a large scale only if conditions in their own home countries are such that they can see no prospect either for themselves or for their children.
That must be our responsibility. What has happened in the past is our responsibility; and of that there is no need to talk now because we can do nothing about it. But we are responsible also for what is happening at the present time and what is likely to happen in the future. We have already had debates on this subject, and I was glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, mention investment by the Overseas Development Corporation in non-colonial territories. If we really want to tackle this problem of immigration we must tackle

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it at its source, and we must, to the best of our ability, make certain that the conditions in the home countries of these people are such that they can there lead a decent life and feel that there they have an opportunity of bringing up their children to get a decent education and have proper facilities for developing into better human beings.
We should, in my opinion, not only devote more resources, even though we are short of resources, to the provision of these facilities, schools, universities, roads, dwellings, services and all the rest; and here again I should like to take up a point which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett—I was about to say "my noble friend, Lord Melchett", because many of the feelings that he expressed might so well have come from this side. The point that the noble Lord made was the need for long-term contracts for the underdeveloped areas and, in particular, for our own Commonwealth territories. We can do more to help them, more to retain that balance of power, more to ensure that they are on our side in the years to come, by giving them security for what they produce—tin, rubber, oil seeds, or whatever it may be—than by any other means. That is something to which I hope we shall give far more attention, rather than to these purely short-term, ad hoc, restrictive measures of trying to deal with a short-term immediate problem.
I sincerely hope, for the sake of Commonwealth unity, and, above all, for the sake of the Christian principles in which we in this country believe and upon which the moral leadership which we still exert in the world and which, I hope, we shall go on exerting is based, that we shall give serious second thoughts to any suggestion whatsoever of restricting immigration from the Commonwealth.
6.28 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, before the noble Earl replies, may I put a point to him in regard to Commonwealth affairs? The country has been shocked with the continued explosions in the Soviet Union. I believe there have been two further ones since the big bomb was let off the other day. We in this country are most concerned with fall-out in our own
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country, and so is Europe. I should like to know from the noble Earl whether the information that is available to Her Majesty's Government has been passed on to the Governments of the Colonies and the Commonwealth. Many of those Colonial countries will have large numbers of people who will be vulnerable to fall-out, and I should hope that the information that is available to Her Majesty's Government, and I would say any resources that Her Majesty's Government may be able to make available to those Governments, should be made available to the people within our Colonies and Commonwealth.
I do not know the reasons why the Russians continue to explode these bombs. It may be to create fear in the Western camp. It certainly will create fear in the countries of the Commonwealth and the Colonies. Those people will be very vulnerable to fear, and I hope that Her Majesty's Government will see that the information they have, and, if necessary, resources, such as dried milk, will be made available to the peoples in our Colonies, if it is necessary. If the noble Earl cannot give me that information this evening, I wonder whether we can have it to-morrow when we have the defence debate.
6.29 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PERTH): My Lords, we have, on this first day of the debate on Her Gracious Majesty's Speech, paid most of our attention to Commonwealth and Colonial matters; and that, I think, is both right and proper. I recall that both the noble Lord, Lord Melchett and the noble Lord, Lord Amherst of Hackney, in one respect or another, touched on these Commonwealth affairs, remarkably in a non-controversial way. Indeed, they showed great skill in dealing with the subjects in a non-controversial way, yet keeping all our interest alive. To-day, of course—and I am not surprised—there has been more controversy; and that at this time is good. After all, these are things which deeply concern us, and if we were all singing with the same voice we should not get the right answers to them.
I recall also that this is the 50th anniversary of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which has been

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referred to by many noble Lords. I do not have to go into the value of this Association. As your Lordships know, its great value is that so many from so many parts of the Commonwealth all get to meet each other. I think it is worth recalling that 50 years ago there were six members of this Commonwealth Association. At the meeting the other day there were over 60; and of that number 12 were main branches—that is, territories which have achieved independence; another 12 were nearing that winning post; and another 12 were, if I may put it this way, in the straight.
That, surely, is a tribute to the policy we have been following in the colonial field over the years and, more particularly I think, for the last two or three years. Frankly, I do not understand the noble Lord, Lord Rea, who felt that over the last several years we had not done so well or as well as before. I am confident that our record in regard to this time will stand examination. I will, in defence, give a detailed exposition on that when I have done with the political or the economic events in the territories. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, I believe, made rather the same point. But again, I really cannot accept that in the last two years, somehow or other, our policy has failed or has been a blow at the Commonwealth.
The noble Lord, Lord Forbes, made the suggestion that we should do more to help in arranging visits to Commonwealth territories under the auspices of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Of course we, as a Government, already make a considerable grant, some £20,000-odd, to the C.P.A., and leave it to them to decide what is the best means of spending it. All the same, the further suggestion which he has made to-day is certainly well worth consideration, and we shall give it that.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, raised a point which I think we all agree is a most important one. I know that my noble friend the Leader will look further into it, but I would say just this about it: that of course the risks to so many of our colonial territories, in particular, and to many of the Commonwealth countries, is much less than for us because the latitude in which they are placed is broadly not in the same
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danger zone, if that is the right word to use, as we are.
LORD SHEPHERD: I was thinking in particular of Hong Kong which is, I think, more or less in the direct line of the fall-out.
THE EARL OF PERTH: Whether or not it is, I think that the suggestion was a most worthwhile one, and we will certainly look into it further.
There has been a great deal of discussion on whether there has been continuity in our colonial policy. In some respects I have no doubt that it is right that, whether it is Conservative, Liberal or Labour policy, there has been that continuity. I have been fortunate to serve under no fewer than three Secretaries of State for the Colonies—namely, Lord Boyd of Merton, Mr. Macleod and, now, Mr. Maudlin. I am not going to make comparisons between my experiences under Lord Boyd of Merton and Mr. Macleod. What I would say is that working with them has been fun; it has been inspiring, and it has been rewarding. I would also say that there has not been, nor is there, a change of policy because one man comes in and another goes out. All your Lordships know that it is not the policy of one man, it is the considered policy of Her Majesty's Government which always prevails in such matters.
As so many of your Lordships have said, the main problem that we live with to-day is in connection with some of the territories that are multi-racial. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, who said that these are the most difficult; and I agree. The problem that we face is not to go too fast (I think that perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, would say that we were going too fast), yet not to go too slow. I believe that the world as a whole, the Commonwealth in particular, and the people in Africa, trust us in our colonial policy. Further, I am quite sure that, while we must not lose that trust, we must at the same time ensure that no-one who is under our care is hurt. That is what we have tried to ensure, and what we shall continue to try to ensure.
How can I best help your Lordships in replying to the debate to-day? I think it is probably easier if I make, as

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it were, a tour d'horizon of the various countries, dealing with the various points that have been raised in that way. I am sure that the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, will not expect me to-day to touch on the Congo—no doubt that will come up at a later time. But let me start with the British Honduras.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I quite appreciate the noble Earl's point, but it would be of great help to the House to have an answer before this debate is over.
THE EARL OF PERTH: I am sure that that will be borne in mind.
Perhaps I may turn first of all to British Honduras, about which the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked a question. I am afraid that we have not at present all the information we should like, but there is no doubt that a disaster has occurred and that this hurricane passed over Belize and that a tidal wave followed. So far, only two deaths have been reported; but the reports are not complete and, as we have had no news from the area, it is feared that the villages and townships in the Stann Creek district received the full force of the hurricane. Relief measures are being co-ordinated by the Red Cross in Jamaica. Two American destroyers are expected to arrive to-day, and H.M.S. "Troubridge" is on her way, with relief supplies, and is expected to arrive at dawn to-morrow. I know that I am expressing all your Lordships' thoughts when I say how deeply we regret this disaster. As always, of course, we will consider what further help we can give in such a matter.
Then another tragedy has occurred in one of the Colonies in the last month or so—I have in mind Tristan da Cunha. Those poor people have all had to leave their island and are now on their way to this country in the "Stirling Castle" They will arrive at the end of this week and, with the help of the Army, arrangements have been made to put them temporarily into a camp. The Red Cross, the St. John Organisation, the Women's Voluntary Services and others are all working to ensure that they will be well received and comfortable there, Clearly, it is far too early for me to say what the future holds. One will want to have discussions with them on what
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they themselves would like. At that time, of course, we will consider all the suggestions which have already been put forward.
I will just touch on one part of the Commonwealth or the Colonial Territories which has not been mentioned—namely Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo and Sarawak Territories. As your Lordships know, Tunku Abdul Rahman is coming over here in a short time for talks with the Prime Minister and other Members of the Government on proposals for a Greater Malasia. As I have already said, in answer to a question a short time ago, these proposals were looked upon as constructive and were welcome.
Now perhaps I may turn on to the West Indies. Of course we all regret that the great experiment of ten years of federation has, so far as Jamaica is concerned, come to an end. But there it is. We always said that it was open to the people themselves to decide, and the referendum went against continuing with the Federation. The sequel to that is that we have agreed that we will be ready to give Jamaica independence some time, and as early as possible, in the coming year. What about the rest of the territories? My Lords, it is too early to say what may be the outcome there. Trinidad is shortly to have elections, and others of the territories have not expressed their wishes—and this is what counts. But I would agree very much with the noble Lord, Lord Colyton, and with him I hope all these territories will see that the common services which have been of such immense value to them will continue, whether the Federation, in its present form or amended, goes on or not.
So, my Lords, I come to Africa. In Africa we have the two main sources of anxiety, the two main areas which have been discussed at considerable length by various noble Lords this afternoon—namely, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the territories of East Africa. Let me first touch on the Federation and, in particular, let me talk about Northern Rhodesia. First, we have the unhappy fact that over the last several months there has been considerable unrest and, unhappily, there have been deaths. Some twenty people were killed and many were injured. While it is quite true, as the noble Marquess said,

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that events were, happily, local, none the less they were very serious in themselves. But, again, there is good news on that matter, in that the Governor has today announced that the various emergency measures that he had to take to control the situation can now be removed—and, indeed, he has removed them from today. That is a good sign of normal conditions having returned. Indeed, the only restriction that now prevails in Northern Rhodesia is the banning of public meetings without permission, and I am sure that nobody would think that, under these conditions, that was something to be wondered at.
That is a very happy state of affairs, and with it there goes into action, if I may put it that way, the sequel to what was announced on September 13-namely, that when normal conditions were restored it would then be possible to consider certain changes in what was announced on June 26 as proposals for constitutional advance in Northern Rhodesia. Before I touch on that perhaps I ought to make it clear to the noble Marquess, and to one or two other noble Lords, who felt very unhappy that we had suggested we were ready to consider changes, that What we announced on June 26 was not an agreement. Unhappily, there was no agreement between the parties concerned on what was the right answer for Northern Rhodesia. I wish there had been agreement. What Her Majesty's Government had to do was themselves to lay down certain proposals—and I would stress the word "proposals"—which they thought were the best compromise and the best steps to take to achieve a further move forward for Northern Rhodesia. But, my Lords, it would surely have been wrong to have stood on that absolutely pat. If somebody could make a good point on detail, it ought surely to be considered. It was precisely that which we said on September 13 we were ready to do, and it is precisely that which is to 'happen now.
The Governor has made a statement to-day on just what is going to happen, and it goes as follows. He announces the fact that there no longer need be an emergency, and he says:
"This opens the way for consideration to be given to representations on those aspects of the proposed Constitution for the territories which attracted criticism after the announce-
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ment of the 26th June which may now be the subject of representations to Her Majesty's Government. The opportunity now offered to the parties to the constitutional conference and discussions which preceded the June announcement to represent their views does not mean"—
and I would stress this—
"a further general review of the proposed Constitution."
It is going to be limited to one or two points which have caused particular anxiety—that, for example, of the percentage which should be necessary for qualification in the elections.
Various noble Lords have talked about that matter in detail. I am not sure that one wants to get involved in what is a very complicated and difficult issue here; but what is certain is that, whereas, for the European, qualification might have amounted only to less than 5 per cent. of the African vote, for the African the qualification would certainly be 12½per cent. There are certain reasons which may justify that, but it is the kind of point that surely one has to look at again. It is that sort of thing at which we want to look again. Or, again, there is the question of the Asian seat. I know very well that the Monckton Report came out in favour of it, but I must say that we were rather taken aback when we found that many of the Asians strongly objected to this proposal. I am not saying what we are going to do; I do not know. We are going to see what the representations may be.
But, surely, under those conditions, and on that sort of detail, it would be a mistake if we just said, "We will not even listen; we will not even look." It is not due to blackmail; it is not the breaking of any agreement. It is something which I am sure is the natural and right course to follow. Furthermore, the Governor is having talks at this moment with one or two of the Party leaders over there, and if, by any chance, those Party leaders, or the Parties in Northern Rhodesia, could themselves come to a conclusion in this limited field, and would so tell us, there is nothing we should like more. That, indeed, would be the ideal way of proceeding.
LORD LATHAM: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl whether that would be the case if Sir Roy Welensky disapproved?
THE EARL OF PERTH: I do not understand the purport of the noble Lord's question. I said that what would be the ideal thing would be if the Parties over there—and one of those is the United Federal Party—were together agreed on what was the right course to follow.
LORD LATHAM: If I may say so, the noble Earl said the Parties in Nyasaland.
THE EARL OF PERTH: If I said Nyasaland, I stand to be corrected. I think I said, or meant to say, Northern Rhodesia.
The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, talked about the British Council of Churches. I hardly feel that he would expect or think it was appropriate for me to try either to defend them or to support what he said. This is surely something which they will consider in its own light, and I can leave it at that.
On the question of the Federation, there was considerable discussion about, for example, just what the Monckton Report said. I think it was the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who made one point and the noble Marquess made another—or, if not made another, questioned what he said. On that, I am not sure that the answer is not a draw—some-where in between the two. I have had the advantage of looking up what the Monckton Report said, and there, of course, they come down strongly in favour of federation, but they say that it is too much disliked to survive in its present form.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl. That is exactly the quotation I had in mind but which I could not remember.
THE EARL OF PERTH: Well, my Lords, honours are about even. At any rate, we have now clarified the point.
There has been considerable discussion on whether the next step to the Federal Constitution should be taken before the elections have taken place in Southern Rhodesia and in Northern Rhodesia, or whether they should await the outcome of those elections which, with the best will in the world, cannot be before the summer of next year. I think I can best say what may be the
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Government's view by quoting what was said by the Commonwealth Secretary in another place, I think only last week. He said this [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 646 (No. 166), col. 483]:
"Theoretically and logically, it would be right to wait until the elections have taken place in the three territories and new Legislatures and Governments have been formed on the basis of a new Constitution. But that may be rather a long time, and I think that we must consider whether further steps should be taken in the interval."
In other words, my Lords, we frankly do not know at this moment.
Then another point was raised as to where we stand in relation to the Federation. Again I should like to quote. The Commonwealth Secretary said (col. 483):
"…I still firmly believe in the rightness of the concept of federation…But I must say what I have said before, that I believe that the Federation can continue only if it wins the general acceptance of the population as a whole within a reasonable time."
That, my Lords, perhaps helps as to the various points which have been raised by various noble Lords on the question of federation.
Now I turn to Tanganyika, which is an easy and happy matter to turn to. I can only echo what Lord Amherst of Hackney said: that one of the most striking things here is the harmony of the races, the way Tanganyika is going into its independence, with harmony among all races there. Remember, there are many European settlers with European farms—all in harmony. I should also like to pay my tribute to their Prime Minister, Julius Nyerere, who I am happy to say is a friend of mine, and who has done such wonderful things in leading his country to the stage it has now reached.
Let me turn next to Uganda, where suddenly there is daylight. We had clouds in Uganda for many years, and the problem there looked insoluble. There was anxiety in many parts of Uganda at the predominance of Buganda. They feared that at the time of independence Buganda would try to rule them all. On the other side, the same fears existed: Buganda thought that the rest of the territory, which is more in numbers by three times, would take away from them many of their old-established authorities and customs. So there we had the classic case of both

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sides fearing, and both sides, therefore, being extremely difficult and unwilling to consider sitting down and talking one with the other. Then, as I say, suddenly there is daylight. We owe great thanks to the Kabaka and to the leaders in I3uganda. We owe great thanks to the Kings of the other territories. We owe thanks to all the politicians who took part in that Conference. And, of course, all this would have been far more difficult if it had not been for the help we were given by the Munster Commission, the Commission of the noble Earl, Lord Munster. Having got to the round table, as I said, suddenly daylight comes, and we are able to announce that on October 9 next year there will be independence.
I am not pretending, my Lords, that there are not still one or two difficult problems to solve, but I think and believe that, with the expectation of independence next year, when they come to these problems they will find a solution. To me, it is a particularly happy event that the announcement of the end of this Constitutional Conference was almost the last act, if not the last, of Mr. Macleod, the Secretary of State; and it is, I think, a fitting finish to that very distinguished period that he had as Secretary of State, when so much was done to lead the colonial territories on into independence.
Last in my African tour, but not least, and perhaps most important, and most talked about by your Lordships, I come to Kenya. I cannot pretend that one is entirely happy about the situation in Kenya, but somewhere I have the same sort of hope as with what happened in Uganda—that suddenly the light will come. It is a curious thing, but in some ways the situation is not dissimilar. One had, as I said, these fears between various of the tribes and the Kingdom of Buganda. Here we have the fears of various of the tribes in relation to the Kikuyu. On the other hand, perhaps the Kikuyu are also afeard of what the other tribes may do—perhaps "tribes" is a bad word; a better word to use is "minorities"; and in these one would include the European settlers.
The Governor has been over here and is taking back a message from the Secretary of State to try to help the people
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of Kenya to solve the difficulties they have run into in the last month in their discussions on constitutional progress, and other matters. I cannot anticipate that message (I am sure your Lordships would not expect me to do that), but I can express the hope that all those in Kenya will study that message most seriously and act on it. For they really have the key to their future. We can only try to guide. The solution must lie with them. Too long, I think, have they taken the view: "Oh, well, if we don't agree we can turn to London and they will find the answer". But they have now reached the stage when that is not the right way to proceed. The right way to proceed—because they are, after all, in a more advanced stage; and independence must be something which one can see on the horizon—is for them to settle their own differences and to make up their own minds.
The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, I think quite rightly, said that the most important thing at this moment was the economic situation in Kenya, and he pointed out how, if one could not get security and get the economy built up, all this talk of progress towards independence would have little meaning. He is very right when he says that the economic situation is extremely serious. We are, indeed, having to make considerable grants in aid at the present time to enable the economy to go forward. I think it is worth while recalling what was said in a memorandum by K.A.D.U. (the Kenya Africa Democratic Union) and K.A.N.U. (the Kenya African Nationalist Union), a memoradum which they wrote, I think, in July. It was an agreed memorandum between the two of them, which they wrote before they went into these constitutional talks which so far have stalled. What they said was this:
"The Committee agree that land titles, including tribal rights and private property rights, shall be respected and safeguarded in the interests of the people of Kenya, and that fair compensation shall be paid for any land acquired by any future Government for public purposes—that is, schools, hospitals, and so forth."
That is a very encouraging statement. I know that this principle has not yet been put into effect, but I think that we have a fine base on which to work.

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Various suggestions were made in regard to the question of land. The noble Marquess suggested that we should buy out European settlers. Here I feel very much with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, that that would not be in the best interests either of Kenya as a whole or of the settlers, the great majority of whom are most anxious to stay in the country. The point was made—and I think it is a good one—that the land settlement scheme on which we have been working with the Kenya Government, in conjunction with the World Bank and the Colonial Development Corporation, and which we are supporting to the extent of £5 or £6 million, for buying land from European farmers who wish to leave and settling Africans on it, is not working quite satisfactorily. It has been found that the seven years over which payment is promised is too long a period. I am not sure that it is too long, but we have to find an acceptable basis, because it is important that we should go ahead with this scheme on which so much work has been done. So we are concentrating on the land question, and on obtaining security and confidence in the economic field, even more than on anything else.
I will not touch on what my noble friend Lord Dundee said about the East African High Commission and the Conference here a short time ago, beyond saying that at that Conference we had all the political leaders of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika, and a representative of Zanibar, and I am sure that noble Lords, had they been there, must have been been immensely encouraged at the spirit shown and the determination to work together in the economic field. Whether that, in its turn, will lead to federation is not for me to guess, but clearly such a move would be in the interests of the peoples, if that is what they chose.
I come to the proposed immigration Bill, on which many of your Lordships talked; in particular the noble Lords, Lord Kilbracken and Lord Walston, spoke on nothing else. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough asked about timing, about why we were introducing the Bill and whether there had been consultation. On timing, I am sure that he would not really expect me to give him an answer
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to-night. This is something which we have said is to come up and the timing is something which the Government must decide in consultation in the ordinary parliamentary procedure. Obviously, it must not be delayed too long, because that is a bad thing.
I think that the other two questions will best be dealt with when the Bill comes before us. Then is the moment to debate them in detail. Of course, nobody likes the need to bring in this Bill, because we all know how greatly we benefit from the people who have come from other Commonwealth and colonial territories into this country. That, of course, under control, will go on. But there has been a flood of immigrants in the last few months. As the noble Lord, Lord Walston, said, the figures in August and September were around 4,000 a week. It may or may not be right that there were special circumstances which led to that, but that is something which no Government can contemplate going forward unhampered. I reaffirm what has been so often said: that there is no question of discrimination for one race or another. I can best give our view on this question by quoting what my right honourable friend, the Prime Minister, said yesterday in another place. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 684 (No. 1), col. 43]:
"We do not contemplate a total ban on immigration or anything like it, but we have a scheme in mind under which there would be a limit placed only on the number of immigrants coming here for work who have not offers of employment in advance or have no special skill",
I would make only this one additional comment, because a noble Lord said that if people had no skill they could not come in, but if recruiting is going on from Barbadoes or elsewhere for a particular service over here, the recruits will have an offer of employment, so they can come in.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl whether between now and the introduction of the Bill the specific proposals which may be in the draft will be the subject of consultation with the Prime Ministers of the Governments affected?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I will see that attention is drawn to the noble Viscount's paint, but it is normal to have consultation, and I can tell the

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noble Viscount that in the case of the Colonies we asked for their views about this very difficult problem some little time ago. I cannot say that they came back with enthusiasm upon it, but various points they made were valuable and helpful.
I should like to touch on one or two other matters. Several noble Lords raised the question of whether we were doing enough to help the Commonwealth economically. I would make the point that in the last year the total of our help was over £180 million, the highest figure ever reached. Of course we should like to do much more, but your Lordships know the problem we face and the need for watching what we send overseas in the way of funds unless we can get more exports.
The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, mentioned a possible way of helping by commodity stabilisation. Her Majesty's Government have always been in favour of such schemes, provided—and this is a very important proviso—we are not expected to "go it alone", because we cannot. In such schemes it is essential to have the main consumers as well as the main producers involved. It is not sufficient for us to say that we alone will stabilise this, that, or the other product which may be of particular interest to a Commonwealth country. In that way lies disaster.
Others will be speaking about the European Common Market, but, speaking in a sense personally although it is the general policy of the Government, I am all for it, if we can ensure that the interests of the Commonwealth and of the E.F.T.A. countries are taken care of. I believe that it is exciting, both politically and economically. Taking the economic side, which is of particular concern to the Commonwealth, I am sure that if we are successful in our negotiation and join the Common Market there is every chance of great economic expansion, in the area of the Common Market, an expansion which in its turn must benefit the Commonwealth, which can export more to it. I should think they benefit not only in terms of further exports, but also in terms of the greater opportunity of getting capital from the countries which would then be covered. But naturally, each member of the Commonwealth is
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particularly anxious to safeguard its own interests.
I remember well that about three months ago I went to the West Indies to talk about this question of the Common Market and in each of the territories it was said that this, that and the other were vital. I then asked them for the list which I should bring back so that we should know just what items were of particular concern. There were some 25 items and broad heads, and I remember the first was arrowroot and the last was something called tonka beans—I am not sure what those are. But it shows how one tries to cover everything; and while it is important, one obviously cannot take care of all those things. I am not going to touch on agriculture; my noble friend Lord Waldegrave will be speaking on that tomorrow. But my belief has always been that in this country our agriculture is as efficient as any in the world, and if that is right, then I do not see why we should fear.
I would end on one general thought, which perhaps is inspired, as was the beginning of my speech, by the thought of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, and it is this. We give to our Colonies what we believe is best—namely, Parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model. We naturally give it to them, because over hundreds of years we have evolved this system and we believe it is the right and ideal one to go for. But I do not think we should be too sad if others of the territories when they become independent do no follow exactly the same pattern. I think that often we are apt to forget what a tremendous moment it is for one of these countries when they actually become independent. This is something quite different. There is a moment still when they can come back to us, and then there is the next moment when they are on their own. They have ahead of them development and so forth.
Naturally at that time we find there is an inclination to have one Party. We see that, for example, in Tanganyika. Or, to take the example of Sierre Leone, there they formed a National Front just before independence, and to-day they have a National Front Government.

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There may be one or two people in opposition, but, broadly, they work it that way. If that should happen, as I say, I do not think we ought to take it too tragically. They are striving at a most difficult time, and in that time we are continuing to give them what help we can, including the help of the civil servants who remain and who we are doing all we can to ensure will remain. What counts above all else is the independence of the judiciary and the independent rights of the individual. I have been struck how at every constitutional conference in which I have taken part—and there have been a great number—there has never been any question but that all those present have always said: "This independence of the judiciary and
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the rights of the individual we want entrenched in the Constitution, so that, whatever may come, it is very difficult if not impossible for them to be upset". We will continue on this path for those Colonies which are still in our care, in the belief that they will treasure and safeguard such freedoms.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adjourned.
Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Lord Silkin.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.
House adjourned at sixteen minutes past seven o'clock.