Sitting of 20 December 1961

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  ROYAL NAVY

    Reserve Ships, West Hartlepool
    Commander Keransasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty when he expects to complete the run-down of the Reserve Fleet at 'West Hartlepool; and if he will make a statement.
    The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing): The run-down of the Reserve Ships Sub-Division at West Hartlepool is being carried out in accordance with the Admiralty's policy of reducing overheads by concentrating reserve ships in fewer ports. We have now reluctantly decided to withdraw the remaining ships from West Hartlepool in the course of 1962.
    Commander Kerans: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for keeping the Reserve Fleet in my constituency for as long as he has, but is he aware that we have the highest unemployment in the North-East? I hope that he and his colleagues will do all they can for the re-employment of those who are left high and dry next year.
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am aware of the unemployment problems of West Hartlepool and I have been in touch with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade and with the Ministry of Labour about them. It is not Admiralty men but contractors' men who will be redundant, but we must face the fact that this concentration of the Reserve Fleet will save us some £70,000 a year.

    Anti-submarine Vessels
    Captain W. Elliotasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty (1) what was the highest number of anti-sub
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    marine vessels in commission at one time during the war of 1939–45;
    (2) what is the number of anti-submarine vessels in commission at the present time.
    Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing: The greatest number of vessels employed in a predominantly anti-submarine rôle in the last war was 916. The number of predominantly anti-submarine vessels in commission at the present time is 100.
    Captain Elliot: Is my hon. Friend aware that the contrast between the two sets of figures he has given is alarming, particularly as the potential submarine threat today is at least as great as at the height of the last war? Can he undertake to see that the most earnest consideration is given to this problem when the Naval Estimates are being considered?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: We are giving very high priority to our research and development of anti-submarine devices. We must remember that in any major conflict we are unlikely to be fighting this battle alone and will be fighting it with our N.A.T.O. and other allies.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: What steps is the hon. Gentleman taking to increase the number of these vessels, and how is he to distribute the orders for the new vessels which he expects to have built? In particular, is he sending any orders to Aberdeen where there is increasing unemployment in the shipyards? Will he see that some orders are sent to Aberdeen?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am afraid that the many claims on the Admiralty Votes for nuclear and amphibious warfare weapons and carriers mean that the numbers are unlikely to be increased. We are trying to increase the capability of each ship now at sea by the effort we are putting into research and development. To date, with competitive tendering, the Aberdeen shipyards have not been successful in winning any orders.
    Commander Courtney: Will my hon. Friend clear up three points? Is it correct that the Soviet and United States fleets between them now have about twenty-five nuclear submarines in commission? Would he agree that this type

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    of ship possibly represents the most formidable and versatile ship of war which the world has ever seen? Thirdly, is it a fact that the Royal Navy, assuming normal conditions of Atlantic weather, does not have a single anti-submarine vessel capable of catching and killing this type of submarine?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: I would not want to quarrel with the estimates of my hon. and gallant Friend in the first part of his supplementary question, although I have no figures about the Russian nuclear submarine fleet. It is true that these are formidable weapons, but my hon. and gallant Friend should not underestimate the capability of our antisubmarine forces and their high degree of operational readiness through considerable exercise in this rôle. As we showed in our list in the White Paper accompanying the Estimates last year, we are giving tremendous priority to this phase of naval warfare.
    Mr. Paget: Surely the hon. Gentleman does not suggest that any of these anti-submarine ships has the slightest chance against an atomic submarine. What is the point of going on expanding capacity against an obsolete weapon, which will not be used, in order to protect ships going to ports which cannot be defended?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: The hon. and learned Gentleman is not right in all his assumptions, but the Board of Admiralty recognises the formidable threat which these new nuclear submarines represent, and that is why we have laid down two nuclear submarines already, and I hope that in due course we will lay down more.

    Widows' Pensions
    Commander Keransasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty why it is necessary for widows to apply for pensions, when the Admiralty is already in possession of all the facts on receipt of the death certificate; and what steps his Department will take to reduce delays.
    Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing: Unfortunately the Admiralty has to ask for other evidence, in addition to the death certificate, in order to establish the widow's eligibility for an award. There is sometimes delay in forwarding this evidence,
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    which constitutes the application to the Admiralty for pension.
    A further application for issue of pension has to be made to the Paymaster-General's office. I am consulting my right hon. Friend to see if there is any way in which that procedure can be simplified.

    Polaris Submarine Base, Holy Loch
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty if he will give the total cost and details of the expenditure incurred in connection with the Polaris submarine base at Holy Loch from its establishment up to the end of November, 1961.
    Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing: The expenditure incurred on facilities and services is estimated at £356,000. This sum includes £205,000 capital costs, the principal items being moorings and improvements to piers and the buildings. The remaining £151,000 is for running costs—the largest items being tugs, water boats and additional personnel. The United Kingdom will be repaid most of these costs.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the Minister aware of the statement last week that the Polaris submarines are now going to cover a greater number of targets in Eastern Europe for the purpose of destroying them? Is he aware that this means a greater possibility of retaliation, against which we have no defence? Does not he think that it is time we revised this agreement with the United States of America?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: I think that the more effective the Western deterrent is, the less likely we are to have a nuclear war.

    Assault Ship (Messrs. Harland and Wolff)
    Mr. McMasterasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty when he expects the keel of the assault ship ordered to be built by Harland and Wolff to be laid.
    Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing: Messrs. Harland and Wolff are now working out the programme for building this ship. The date when the keel will be laid will be announced as soon as possible.
    Mr. McMaster: Is my hon. Friend aware that over 8,000 men have been laid off by Messrs. Harland and Wolff in the last six months and that others are under the threat of redundancy, and that the sooner the keel is laid the greater the relief will be to those in the black trades who are under the threat of redundancy at the moment?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: I am aware of these facts, and that is why I was particularly delighted that Messrs. Harland and Wolff won this contract.

    Civilian Employees, Belfast Area
    Mr. McMasterasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty what are the number of Admiralty civilians employed in the Belfast area.
    Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing: On 1st October, 1961, the number was 1,199.
    Mr. McMaster: This will give some pleasure in Northern Ireland, but is my hon. Friend aware that, in view of the very difficult situation facing our shipbuilding yards, it is important that the work of these men should be maintained and if possible increased?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: We are increasing the activities at the Royal Naval Aircraft Yard at Sydenham so that the numbers there, which make up the greater part of that total, are likely to increase rather than decrease over the next few years.

    Artificer Apprentices
    Mr. R. Carrasked the Civil Lord of the Admiralty how many artificer apprentices had been recruited into the Royal Navy in 1961.
    Mr. C. Ian Orr-Ewing: Four hundred and ninety-four artificer apprentices, about 45 per cent. of whom are grammar school boys, have been recruited this year. This number exceeds the annual target of 480.
    Mr. Carr: May I congratulate the Admiralty on that recruiting, and ask my hon. Friend whether he expects to be able to keep it up in future years? May I also ask what is the total number of artificer apprentices under training in the Navy at the moment, and what their career prospects are?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: We have in all 1,803 artificer apprentices under training in the Navy. I think that we shall keep up this rate of recruiting which is extremely encouraging at the moment. As regards career prospects. about four-fifths of the artificers now serving are chiefs or the equivalent, and, as regards those who have a desire to become commissioned, about fifty of these artificers are commissioned every year, so that career prospects are excellent and recruiting has been going extremely well.
    Miss Vickers: In view of the higher standard of education of these artificers, may I ask whether there is any intention to shorten the apprenticeship course?
    Mr. Orr-Ewing: No, Sir. There is no intention of doing that at the moment. This is a five-year course. They start with one year at H.M.S. "Fisgard", then have three years in various specialist establishments, and a final year with the Fleet. We have not found that we can shorten the course because we are demanding ever-higher standards. I would say that these important men are now getting something over £1,000 a year by the time they reach the status of chief, and therefore it is not surprising that good boys are coming forward, and we are making them into a fine national contribution even if they decide at a later stage to leave the Navy.

  BRITISH ARMY

    Court Martial, Malta (Sergeant Atkinson)
    Mr. Pentlandasked the Secretary of State for War whether he is aware that 23237377 Sergeant Atkinson of the Military Provost Staff Corps, who was charged on five counts of making false accusations at a court martial in Malta on the 5th and 7th January, 1961, was subject, as a result, to considerable financial outlay; and, in view of the fact that he was acquitted by the court martial on all charges, if he will consider paying compensation to cover the costs of his defence.
    The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Profumo): Yes, Sir. Arrangements have been made to refund to Sergeant Atkinson the costs of his defence at the court martial.
    Mr. Pentland: I very much appreciate the right hon. Gentleman's reply, but will he look further into this case? Is he satisfied that Sergeant Atkinson has not been subjected to a certain amount of provocation and victimisation over the past twelve months? Will he have another look at this case to see exactly what has happened?
    Mr. Profumo: I have looked into this case very carefully, and so has my hon. Friend. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that in so far as his character is affected—I mean the character of the sergeant and not the character of the hon. Gentleman—all records relating to this incident have been expunged from his documents. He should, therefore, have nothing to fear on that score.
    Mr. Paget: Will this be a general principle, that where people are acquitted by courts martial the War Office will hold itself responsible for the costs incurred by a man found innocent? It is certainly a principle which we should welcome.
    Mr. Profumo: I think that that is hypothetical. Each case would have to be considered on its merits. It is sufficient to say that this is a case which satisfied that criterion.
    Mr. Paget: Have not they been judged by a court martial?

    Vigilant Anti-tank weapon
    Mr. Kershawasked the Secretary of State for War (1) for how long he has now been considering the project of the Vigilant anti-tank weapon; and when a decision may be expected;
    (2) when he expects the Vigilant weapon to be in service with troops.
    Mr. Profumo: Trials of Vigilant and the assessments of other light anti-tank missiles began in November last year. I have now decided to adopt Vigilant for the British Army. It will be in service in 1963.
    Mr. Kershaw: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I was a little surprised to read the substance of that reply in the Press after I had put down the Questions? Secondly, does he consider that the rather long time which elapses before the adoption of a weapon which is generally agreed as being necessary is harmful to the Service, to the equipment
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    concerned, and occasionally to export possibilities to other countries?
    Mr. Profumo: I think that the more sophisticated the weapons become the longer must be the period between the time when we think they are necessary and the fruition of our plans. I saw the report to which my hon. Friend referred. It did not come from official sources. As my hon. Friend already had a Question on the Order Paper, I thought it right that my Answer to him should contain the first official confirmation of this order.
    Mr. Kershaw: I am very much obliged to my right hon. Friend.

    Military Aircraft, Yateley Common
    Mr. C. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for War in what circumstances, and for what purposes, military aircraft were using Yately Common in Hampshire on 26th October last.
    Mr. Profumo: An official demonstration was held by the Household Brigade on 27th October, to explain to officers of the Brigade the importance of flying within the Army and to encourage them to learn to fly. There were lectures and films in the morning, and in the afternoon a flying demonstration was given on Blackbushe airfield.
    Mr. Johnson: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that permission to use this common for flying purposes has been refused by the local authority and is the subject of appeal to the Minister? In those circumstances, does he think it right for the War Office to be allowed to flout the general law?
    Mr. Profumo: I think it fair to say that the organisers of the demonstration were not aware of this controversy of the time, but I understand that Air Vice-Marshal Bennett is entitled to give permission for the use of his ground for flying provided that this does not extend to more than twenty-eight days in the year.

    Overseas Stations (Compassionate Leave)
    Mr. Thorpeasked the Secretary of State for War what are the regulations relating to granting of compassionate leave for active Service men abroad in the event of the death of their parents or other near relatives.
    Mr. Profumo: Compassionate leave with travel at public expense may be granted to officers and other ranks on the imminent death or dangerous illness of a spouse, child, parent or other recorded next of kin. For those serving outside the United Kingdom and North-West Europe, compassionate leave is not normally granted on the death of such relatives unless there are special circumstances which make the soldier's presence at home necessary.
    Mr. Thorpe: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on 30th October his Under-Secretary said that compassionate leave would be granted only in order to make funeral arrangements or if there were other exceptional circumstances? Is it not possible for the Service Departments to take a slightly more humane and compassionate view of these questions? Does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that, however many dependants there may be, a soldier whose father, mother or wife dies while he is abroad should be allowed to come home to attend the funeral and be with his family at this time? Will not he look into this matter again, to see whether it is possible to take a more humane view?
    Mr. Profumo: I understand the views of the hon. Member. I can only say that each case which comes to my attention, or to the attention of my Department, is considered on its merits. The rules to which I have referred have been enforced for many years, under the Administrations of both parties, and I cannot hold out any hope that I can relax the general rules, which I believe to be flexible enough for us to be able to administer them in a humane way.
    Mr. Thorpe: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is quite clearly stated that the only two cases in which a Service man serving abroad can return are to make funeral arrangements or if there are exceptional circumstances? Is he further aware that, in the case to which I have referred, the fact that there was another brother and sister meant, in the view of the War Office, that there were no exceptional circumstances? Surely the rule is far too rigid.
    Mr. Profumo: As I have said, each case is considered on its merits. By and large, in stations outside the United
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    Kingdom or in B.A.O.R.—which is regarded as a United Kingdom station—these are the general rules which have pertained for a very long time. I can give the hon. Member an undertaking that I will have another look at the matter, but I do not want to hold out any hope that there will be a change in the general rules, which I believe are right.
    Mr. Driberg: Should not the right hon. Gentleman at least look again at the position in B.A.O.R.? It may he quite difficult for men to get home from there at their own expense.
    Mr. Profumo: The B.A.O.R. arrangements are the same as for home stations, and are different from those in respect of which the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) put down his Question. When the hon. Gentleman reads my answer he will see that there is a difference between home stations and overseas stations. I have given an undertaking to look into the point referred to in the hon. Member's question, and if the hon. Member for Barking (Mr. Driberg) has another Question to ask me perhaps he will put it down.
    Mr. Thorpe: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the answer, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Disturbances, Portsdown Hill (Statement)
    Dr. Bennettasked the Secretary of State for War by what authority a spokesman for the Army Southern Command made a public statement, communicated to the Press, that there would be no Parliamentary inquiry into the disturbances caused by the military in the early hours of Sunday, 3rd December, on Portsdown Hill, about which the hon. Member for Gosport and Fareham has written to him; and if he will instruct his officers not to make statements which impinge on the authority of Parliament.
    Mr. Profumo: No such statement was made. The spokesman was asked to make a statement about this incident. Before doing so he quite properly ascertained that no letter or notice of a Question had been received from any

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    hon. Member. He told the newspaper that no Parliamentary inquiry had been received. He did not say that there would be none.
    Dr. Bennett: I am relieved to hear that, but does my right hon. Friend know that the statement reached the public in an extremely large-scale way, in the local newspapers, on the basis that there will be no Parliamentary inquiry into the Portsdown Hill "war"? This was stated by a War Office spokesman. Does not my right hon. Friend feel that it would be wise if his spokesmen did not make statements which might be wrongly interpreted?
    Mr. Profumo: As I have told my hon. Friend, our spokesman did not make that statement. What he said may have been garbled before it reached the Press. The answer is that there has been a Parliamentary inquiry.

    British Army of the Rhine
    Mr. Shinwellasked the Secretary of State for War to what extent he intends to increase the numbers of British ground troops in the British Army of the Rhine in 1962.
    Mr. Profumo: Apart from the formation of the reserve division in the United Kingdom, which is now in hand, it is unlikely that we shall be able to increase our contribution to N.A.T.O.'s land forces in 1962, except in an emergency.
    Mr. Shinwell: In introducing the Army Reserve Bill, was it not the intention of the right hon. entleman to fill up the large number of gaps in B.A.O.R.? Was not the impression created in the House and in the country—and certainly in the Press—that he intended to send to B.O.A.R. another 10,000 or 15,000 men?
    Mr. Profumo: If the right hon. Gentleman will read the words I used in the Second Reading debate he will see that I made it quite clear that Clause 1 does not add anything to B.A.O.R. What it does is to enable us to maintain the strength of B.A.O.R. throughout the course of next year, roughly at the same strength as it is at the moment.
    Mr. Shinwell: Does that mean that the Secretary of State, with the approval of the Minister of Defence, will resist
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    the pressure of Mr. McNamara and the United States Army authorities to increase the number of men for N.A.T.O.?
    Mr. Profumo: That question should be put down to my right non. Friend the Minister of Defence.
    Mr. Paget: Is the Secretary of State really telling us that he is satisfied to leave B.A.O.R. in the state of undermanned impotence which it demonstrated itself to be in in the "Spear-point" exercises?
    Mr. Profumo: It would be very much more undermanned if the hon. and learned Gentleman and his colleagues did not let us get through the Army Reserve Bill.

    National Service Men (Retention)
    Mr. Shinwellasked the Secretary of State for War if he will state the rates of pay for National Service men who are retained for six months; and whether the Service grants for families will be increased correspondingly.
    Mr. Profumo: National Service men who are retained for six months will receive the same rates of pay and marriage allowance as Regular soldiers on a six-year engagement.
    Mr. Shinwell: But is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that there are many other emoluments—for example, efficiency pay and additional pay because of association with certain technical grades? Does not that mean that the men who are retained for a further six months will be entitled to these additional emoluments? Will it not mean some increase in the National Service grant?
    Mr. Profumo: The right hon. Gentleman asks whether this will mean an increase in the National Service grant. That grant will vary, as it always does, with the requirements, and according to basic pay. I could not give a categorical answer showing how each soldier will be affected by the National Service grant, or by the increased emoluments; I can only give a general answer. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to ask a specific question I shall gladly either write to him or answer a direct Question if he puts it down.

    Missing Soldiers (Next of Kin)
    Mr. V. Yatesasked the Secretary of State for War if he will now make regulations raising the age of soldiers in respect of whom commanding officers should inform the next of kin when they are missing.
    Mr. Profumo: I am examining this question.
    Mr. Yates: I appreciate the Minister's Answer, but will he bear in mind that parents of soldiers aged 18, 19 and 20, particularly if they are serving overseas, feel that the military authorities are the guardians of their sons, and feel great distress when they are not informed for four or five months?
    Mr. Profumo: I wholly recognise what the hon. Member says. That is why I am examining the matter. But the case which he has in mind was a very exceptional one. It is very easy for us, sitting here, to condemn the decisions of the man on the spot. I am convinced that the regulations as they are cover the sort of point that the hon. Member has in mind.

  ROYAL AIR FORCE

    The Wrekin (Warning Light)
    Mr. W. Yatesasked the Secretary of State for Air the purpose of the red light, for which he is responsible, which is situated on top of The Wrekin.
    The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Julian Amery): The purpose is to warn aircraft at night and in periods of bad visibility of this isolated high ground.
    Mr. Yates: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the week before last the light remained permanently at red, and could not be distinguished from a bonfire or anything else? I cannot see what purpose it could have served.
    Mr. Amery: I can assure my hon. Friend that the object of the light is to prevent accidents, and that there is no symbolic significance about it.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the Minister tell us whether there is any connection between this red light and the decision of the Coal Board to buy a new aircraft?
    Mr. Amery: That is strictly a question for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Fuel and Power.

    Nuclear Disarmament Demonstrations (Precautions)
    Mr. Martenasked the Secretary of State for Air what was the estimated cost of the special precautions taken by Her Majesty's forces, and any ancillary forces, to cope with the nuclear disarmament demonstrations at Brize Norton, Ruislip and Wethersfield air bases, respectively, on Saturday, 9th December.
    Mr. Amery: About £18,000, the greater part being for precautions at Wethersfield.
    Mr. Marten: Many hon. Members would like to congratulate my right hon. Friend upon the steps that he took to protect these operational airfields. Does he agree that the great thing is to keep expenditure down to a minimum? Further, does he agree that one way of doing this might be to use fewer airmen—who had to have their weekend passes cancelled—but to station behind the perimeter, to avoid a breach in it, a deterrent in the shape of a few fire hoses?
    Mr. Amery: We were anxious to make sure that nobody got hurt, and in this we succeeded. I am sure the House will agree that it is wrong that a few irresponsible young people should put this burden on the taxpayers' shoulders and—what is in many ways worse—spoil the weekend arrangements of several thousand young airmen and policemen.
    Mr. S. Silverman: Does not the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that although the charge on the taxpayers is no doubt very regrettable, these young people are not irresponsible, even if the right hon. Gentleman thinks that they are mistaken? Far from being irresponsible, they are actuated by a deep and conscientious conviction, and feel utterly frustrated in making any other kind of protest. Was not it a perfectly peaceful and orderly demonstration? Would any harm have been done if it had been allowed to continue undisturbed?
    Mr. Amery: Had the intention of the demonstrators been fulfilled by their

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    walking on to the airfields considerable harm might have been done to them, among others.
    Mr. Manuel: Can the Minister tell the House how many of the ancillary forces which he mobilised at the various places mentioned in the Question were not used at all?
    Mr. Amery: I am glad to say that a great many of those mustered for the occasion did not have to be used. Our object was to ensure that nobody got hurt and that there were no regrettable incidents, which could easily have happened.

    Ocean Weather Service (Pay and Leave)
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for Air to what extent fluctuations in the Merchant Navy scales of salaries for officers apply to the Ocean Weather Service, and why he has failed to operate the agreement on parity of pay and leave as between the two services reached on 29th August, 1960.
    Mr. Amery: Changes in the Merchant Navy scales of pay and leave do not automatically apply to officers of the Ocean Weather Service and so there has been no failure to operate an agreement.
    We do, however, take Merchant Navy scales into account.
    Following upon the National Maritime Board's agreement of 29th August, 1960, we adjusted the pay of our officers.
    We did not on that occasion alter leave scales, but these are now under review in the light of a more recent agreement by the National Maritime Board.
    Mr. Rankin: The right hon. Gentleman is telling me that what I say is correct, that there was an agreement reached on 29th August, 1960, to try to establish parity between these two services. Is he aware that yesterday we had a succession of statements from hon. Members opposite pointing out that intimations of increased dividends had been made before the pay pause and they had to be paid after the pay pause because those concerned felt in honour bound to do so? The right hon. Gentleman has made a promise with regard to parity. Is he not equally bound by the same code of honour in view of the fact that the
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    job of these men is much more arduous and dangerous than that of the average shareholder?
    Mr. Amery: I think that the hon. Gentleman may have misunderstood me.
    Mr. Rankin: No, I did not.
    Mr. Amery: We are not bound by any agreement concerning the National Maritime Board's scales. We take its scales into account, but, of course, the promotion structure and various other aspects of the ocean weather ships are different from those of the Merchant Navy.
    Mr. Rankin: In view of that further reply from the right hon. Gentleman, will he tell me why he has partially recognised the agreement by giving an interim award to the weather ship officers in order to try to bring them a little nearer to the pay of the Merchant Navy services?
    Mr. Amery: I was trying to explain to the hon. Gentleman that we do take the Merchant Navy scales into account, but that we are not bound by any agreement to follow them exactly, either in pay or leave.

    Officers' Married Quarters, El Adem
    Mr. Tilneyasked the Secretary of State for Air how long it will be before married officers stationed at El Adem and now waiting to get quarters will get them.
    Mr. Amery: In general we expect officers now on the waiting list to move into married quarters or hirings by October next year.
    Mr. Tilney: While we welcome a limit to the period of compulsory separation of serving officers from their wives, may I ask whether he agrees that the Royal Air Force has been at El Adem for about fifteen years, and that this lack of married quarters must be detrimental to recuiting? Can my right hon. Friend say what percentage of serving officers who are married are denied married quarters at El Adem?
    Mr. Amery: I think that I am right in saying that there are only eight officers on the waiting list at present who have

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    not got hirings or married quarters. I speak subject to correction, but I think that is the correct figure.
    Mr. Thorpe: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some hon. Members are not only concerned about officers' married quarters but about non-commissioned officers as well, and that some hon. Members have received correspondence from non-commissioned officers who wish their wives to join them? Can he tell us whether the officers and noncommissioned officers are put on an equal basis, or do the N.C.O.s have to go further down the queue?
    Mr. Amery: I think that I can express the situation fairly clearly when, I say that our present plan caters for eleven officers' quarters and ninety airmen's quarters.

    Meteorological Office (Fog Forecasts)
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Secretary of State for Air why the Meteorological Office were unable to forecast the sudden lifting of fog between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. on 15th December in the outskirts of London; and why forecasts of fog remaining dense till the morning of 16th December were given to the public in the early evening of 15th December, to the inconvenience of the public.
    Mr. Amery: There was some indication during 15th December that fog, which had been forecast and had formed, might thin near London that evening.
    There was, however, insufficient evidence to allow this optimistic view to be published and in fact the fog remained dense in areas north-west of London during the night.
    This being so, it was consistent to forecast the fog continuing the next morning although in the event this proved to have been over-cautious.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I listened to the broadcasts carefully throughout the day, that at 6.45 p.m. I was told by WEA 2211 that the dense fog would remain until eight the next morning, and on that I altered my arrangements? Is he further aware that at Twickenham at 8.30 that evening a fresh breeze was blowing
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    through the constituency? That wind blew the fog away, but the Meteorological Office made no mention of this wind of change, to the great inconvenience of the public.
    Mr. Amery: Hindsight enables many of us to see more clearly.
    Mr. Mulley: May we infer from that exchange that a new candidate has been adopted for Twickenham?
    Sir G. Nicholson: Whatever may be the circumstances of this case, there is something wrong with this service. Is my right hon. Friend aware that there was an occasion in the summer when there was a wind of gale force blowing in the channel and that, between 12 and 24 hours after it started, the service knew nothing about it? I think that either something went wrong in London or that the percolation of the news from the Channel area was faulty.
    Mr. Speaker: We cannot go back over the year.
    Mr. Shinwell: If the right hon. Gentleman is to make himself responsible for answering questions of this sort and I put down a Question asking him whether on Saturday afternoon I can safely go to a football match because the weather will be fine, will he answer it?
    Mr. Speaker: That is an hypothesis.

  SCOTLAND

    Forth Road Bridge (Tolls)
    Mr. Gourlayasked the Secretary of State for Scotland which local authorities or other organisations he has consulted and intends to consult, before deciding the respective toll charges for the Forth Road Bridge.
    The Secretary of State for Scotland (Mr. John Maclay): When the schedule of proposed toll charges is submitted to me by the Forth Road Bridge Joint Board, it will be published. All interested parties will have an opportunity to submit representations. If there are any objections which are not withdrawn, there is provision for the holding of a public inquiry.
    Mr. Gourlay: Is the Secretary of State aware that many local authorities and

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    many people in the east of Scotland are completely opposed to the principle of toll charges, and that many people in the east of Scotland, particularly in Fife, are very alarmed and disturbed at suggestions that the toll charges may equate the present ferry charges? Will he give an undertaking that these charges, if he must impose them, will be of a purely nominal character?
    Mr. Maclay: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the principle of tolls was accepted in all the original arrangements and he will not expect me to go back on the discussion at that time. If he will read carefully what I said in my original Answer, he will see that the position is that there may be a public inquiry, and, therefore, I cannot commit myself in advance in these circumstances.
    Mr. Gourlay: Is the Secretary of State aware that many authorities were prepared at that time to discuss the question of toll charges because of the pressure that had been put upon them to get the Forth Road Bridge started? Now that the bridge is nearing completion—I notice that the Secretary of State is giving an indication of horror, but the fact is that he sometimes brings pressure to bear on local authorities when he is consulting them. That is the reason why many accepted the indications of his office at that time—
    Mr. Speaker: We have to stick to questions, and questions which do not constitute an argument.
    Mr. Gourlay: May I finish my supplementary question, Mr. Speaker, by asking whether the Secretary of State would not reconsider his position this afternoon and give an undertaking that the charges will be clearly of a nominal character and not in line with the present ferry charges?
    Mr. Maclay: I cannot add to what I have already said.
    Mr. W. Hamilton: Can the Minister add a wee bit? Can he indicate that the charges will not be permanent but that there will be a time in the not-too-distant future when they will be eliminated?
    Mr. Maclay: I am afraid that I cannot add even that wee bit.

    Demolished Theatres (Site Development)
    Mr. Hannanasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that where theatres are demolished there is no effective planning control within existing legislation to prevent change of use on the cleared site; and if he will introduce legislation giving further statutory powers to local authorities to control such developments.
    Mr. Maclay: Planning permission must be obtained for any material change in the use of land, whether or not there are buildings standing on it. Although land which has been in use as the site of a theatre can be used for certain kindred purposes without further permission for the change of use, the plans of any new building involved would have to be approved.
    Mr. Hannan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the local authorities do not understand the position to be as he has outlined it? Is he aware of the diminishing number of theatres in Scotland, particularly in Glasgow, which is causing concern to theatre lovers, to amateur dramatic societies and operatic societies? If the right hon. Gentleman is not prepared himself to introduce such legislation, will he make facilities available to those of use who wish to pursue the matter?
    Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member has leapt a large number of stiles in the course of a short supplementary question and I should like to study carefully what he has said. But I think that I have given the answer to the Question on the Order Paper.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the proposed reconstruction of a very important site in Union Street, Aberdeen, which is now the site of the music hall? Will he see that the planning authority in Aberdeen has ample power to consider not only the utilities but also the aesthetics of this very important site?
    Mr. Maclay: Until a short time ago I was not aware of the project to which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred. But I think that the planning authority probably knows full well what powers it has.
    Mr. Driberg: What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by "certain kindred purposes"? Is he aware that some theatres are now used as warehouses in England—and, I suppose, in Scotland also? Is he aware that when a London theatre is demolished the L.C.C. usually insists that a new theatre shall be incorporated in any block of offices or whatever is to be built on the site? Could not the same example be followed in Scotland?
    Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member has asked what are "certain kindred purposes". These are defined in an Order made in 1950 which specified certain uses to be regarded as kindred to a theatre, including cinemas, music-halls, dance-halls, skating rinks, swimming baths, Turkish or other vapour or foam baths, gymnasia or buildings for indoor games.

    Uncertificated Teachers
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to enable uncertificated teachers in Scotland to become fully-qualified teachers.
    Mr. Maclay: Any uncertificated teacher may apply for a grant under the Special Recruitment Scheme to enable him to acquire the qualifications necessary for recognition as a certificated teacher. An uncertificated teacher who already has qualifications, training or experience which might justify his certification in Scotland may apply to the Scottish Council for the Training of Teachers, who will recommend whether he can be recognised forthwith or requires further training. In appropriate cases the normal course of training may be shortened.
    Mr. Thomson: Is the Secretary of State aware that these arrangements have proved quite inadequate? Will he put more energy and urgency into having consultations with universities and colleges of education about vacation courses and evening courses to enable all the untrained teachers who have the capacity to become trained teachers? Will he also try to rid Scottish schools of those teachers who are untrained and have no capacity to become trained teachers?
    Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member has gone very wide of the Question. I am not aware that the arrangements have proved unsatisfactory. There are 220 students, who have been uncertificated teachers, at present receiving training under the scheme.

    Commonwealth Education Conference, Delhi
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland which Scottish Minister and other members of the Scottish Education Department are to be members of the United Kingdom delegation to the Commonwealth Education Conference in Delhi in January, 1962.
    Mr. Maclay: Her Majesty's Senior Chief Inspector of Schools will be a member of the United Kingdom delegation, which will not include a Scottish Minister.
    Mr. Thomson: Is the Secretary of State aware that that is a very unsatisfactory Answer? Is he not going to fight for more adequate Scottish representation on a very important delegation to a very important conference? Is he aware that the Scottish tradition of education is world-famous and that the Scottish contribution to Commonwealth education is very great? Will he look at this matter again and consult the Minister of Education?
    Mr. Maclay: For a variety of reasons it was not practicable to include a Scottish Minister in the delegation. But I am satisfied that Scotland's contribution to the conference will still be a valuable one.

    Land Prices
    Mr. W. Hamiltonasked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he will take steps to control land prices in Scotland, in view of the adverse effects which such prices have on the cost of 'building houses.
    Mr. Maclay: No Sir. I consider that land prices in Scotland generally are reasonable and the best way of keeping them so is to ensure that enough land is zoned for building in the right places.
    Mr. Hamilton: Is the Minister aware of the recently announced enormously

    1351
    increased prices, particularly in Edinburgh, and no doubt there will be others announced shortly in other cities? Does not he agree that this is bound to jeopardise future house-building at prices which people can pay, and can he say whether there is any connection between this development and the newly acquired interests in Scotland of Messrs Clore, Cotten and Macmillan?
    Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member must appreciate that one cannot argue from an isolated instance. There have been one or two oases reported recently, but the information I have given is correct.
    Mr. T. Fraser: Will the right hon. Gentleman say how many times land prices have to be multiplied before they become unreasonable?
    Mr. Maclay: That is an entirely hypothetical question.
    Mr. Manuel: Will not the right hon. Gentleman become seized of the idea that land prices are going very high? Is he aware that if he intends to achieve success with his housing measures in redeveloped town centres and other places where sites are in private hands, he will have to exercise more control, or the local authorities will be impeded in redeveloping those areas?
    Mr. Maclay: The hon. Member will be aware that once the area of comprehensive development has been approved, compensation for acquisition excludes any extra value created by the redevelopment proposals. I think that that is what he has in mind.

    Redevelopment Plan, Glasgow
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for Scotland what steps he is taking to ensure that the escalation of property values now taking place in Glasgow will not prejudice the redevelopment plan which he has approved for the city.
    Mr. Maclay: I have had no representations that there have been undue rises in property values in Glasgow which might hinder redevelopment.
    Mr. Rankin: Will the Secretary of State acquaint himself more closely with what is going on in Glasgow? Does not he realise that at the weekend we were
    1352
    given quite a number of examples of extremely sharp rises in the value of property in the centre of Glasgow, and that the reason for the gambling is the redevelopment plan envisaged for the city? Is he telling us that in fact he has frozen, or will he consider freezing, property values at the point in time when he approved the redevelopment plan for Glasgow?
    Mr. Maclay: No, Sir, I will not say that in answer to the supplementary question put by the hon. Gentleman. I find it difficult to follow what he wants, but I think that I covered the point in my answers to Question No. 31. I am not convinced that, so far, values have risen unreasonably, but we shall watch the position and see how things go.
    Mr. Rankin: If the right hon. Gentleman is not convinced that values have risen very sharply indeed, is he aware that not far from where I live one-sixth of an acre of land was purchased by an oil distributing company for £14,000—that is, £84,000 per acre? Is not that a sharp rise in land prices?
    Mr. Maclay: I was not aware of the price about which the hon. Gentleman spoke.
    Mr. Speaker: Mr. Wingfield Digby.
    Mr. Rankin: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Surely—
    Hon. Members: No.
    Mr. Rankin: May I have your guidance, Mr. Speaker, about putting this point? In his second reply the right hon. Gentleman said that he was not aware of any sharp increase in property values in Glasgow. I have given him one, which is one of many. Will he now act on the information which I have given to him?
    Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman rose to a point of order. Will he be good enough to indicate what is his point of order?
    Mr. Rankin: I changed it to seek your guidance, Mr. Speaker, which is more valuable than any point of order.

  TRANSPORT

    Safety Harness
    Mr. Wingfield Digbyasked the Minister of Transport whether he has yet received the Report of the Working Party of the Economic Commission for

    1353
    Europe, on which a United Kingdom representative served, on the Construction of Road Vehicles, with regard to an international standard for safety harness; and whether he will now make a statement.
    The Minister of Transport (Mr. Ernest Marples): Draft rules for the approval of safety harness have been prepared by Sweden, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. These were considered at the October meeting of the Working Party and are now being revised in the light of its comments. The Committee reviewing the interim British Standard will be made aware of these developments at its next meeting.
    Mr. Digby: Will my right hon. Friend do all he can to reach an early decision in this matter, in view of the very great expense at the present moment of installing the various devices of safety harness because there is no standardisation?
    Mr. Marples: Yes, Sir, I will.

    Channel Tunnel
    Mr. Lindsayasked the Minister of Transport when he expects to be in a position to make a further statement about the proposed Channel Tunnel or Bridge.
    Mr. Teelingasked the Minister of Transport whether he will give details of the machinery which has been set up for the examination of the Channel Tunnel project and whether he will give an assurance that basic principles will be dealt with in the first place, so that an early decision thereon can be given.
    Mr. Marples: As I explained on 22nd November, a joint official study of both the proposals now before the British and French Governments is being undertaken. All relevant aspects of those proposals will need to be examined and I cannot say when this work will be completed. I am confident, however, that, under the arrangements which have been agreed, early attention will be given to the basic questions on which the Governments' eventual decision must depend.
    Mr. Lindsay: Will my right hon. Friend hear in mind the great importance of getting an early decision in view
    1354
    of the material difference a bridge or tunnel will make to our competitive power when we get into the Common Market?
    Mr. Marples: Yes, Sir. But the proposal for a Channel bridge was received only in October, 1961, so there is a great deal of work to be done on it.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that many of us, and large numbers of people outside, believe that large-scale capital expenditure of this kind should not be undertaken until the urgent needs of our own people have been dealt with?
    Mr. Marples: We propose to study the problem. It raises technical, financial and economic questions, as well as international considerations. The hon. Gentleman's point will certainly be borne in mind.
    Mr. Costain: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate that development at Folkestone is being held up pending decision on a tunnel?
    Mr. Marples: That is why we will try to get on as quickly as we can, but we must examine the problem thoroughly.
    Dr. King: Will the Minister arrange for an exhibition in the House of Commons in the New Year of the excellent models prepared by the B.T.C. for a two-way tunnel on the principle of a moving stream of traffic?
    Mr. Marples: I should like to consider that, but it would be very difficult if as Minister I had an exhibition of a tunnel and not of a bridge. Otherwise I should be in great difficulty and I know that the hon. Member would not like that.

  ROADS

    Pedestrian Crossings (Accidents)
    Mr. Walkerasked the Minister of Transport how many accidents in England and Wales in 1960 involved pedestrians attempting to use a pedestrian crossing; and if he will experiment with the use of double white lines at the approach to pedestrian crossings.
    Mr. Marples: During 1960, 1,285 people were killed or seriously injured

    1355
    at the 10,000 uncontrolled pedestrian crossings in Great Britain. For the reasons given in the reply to the hon. Member on 22nd November, I do not consider that an experiment with double white lines on the approach to pedestrian crossings would be more effective than the present restrictions in preventing accidents. I am considering what else could be done to improve safety on crossings.
    Mr. Walker: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it is quite probable that a large number of these deaths and serious injuries were caused as a result of vehicles overtaking on the approaches to pedestrian crossings? Is he also aware that four road safety committees which I have consulted are in agreement that it would be a good idea to carry out such an experiment, and that the Droitwich Borough Council would be quite happy to have the experiment taking place in the town? Will he reconsider this matter?
    Mr. Marples: I think that my hon. Friend's assumption has not been proved by the available statistics, because in 1958 the Road Research Laboratory examined the reports of 216 accidents and found that 18 per cent., and only 18 per cent., were due to overtaking. I agree that this was not a very big sample, but, so far, the evidence does not show that most accidents are caused by overtaking. But I have asked the Laboratory to look at this again, and pending its advice I do not think that I can add to what I have said already.

    Newcastle-Tynemouth Coast Road
    Mr. Montgomeryasked the Minister of Transport when it is proposed to make a start on the scheme for a second carriageway on the Newcastle-Tynemouth coast road.
    Mr. Marples: The Newcastle City Council has been told that I am prepared to consider an application for grant in the current financial year for the improvement of the section of the Coast Road within the city. Until that application has been received and considered and the necessary land acquired I cannot say when physical work will begin.
    Mr. Montgomery: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that work was expected to start last October on this road? According to information I have been given, all the plans are with the Ministry, however, and until it has approved the designs, no work can begin. Does not my right hon. Friend also agree that this is one of the worst roads in the country for accidents and that the sooner something is done to improve it, the better?
    Mr. Marples: I agree. But I cannot do anything until the application has been received. Once it has been received, I will move as fast as I can.

    Traffic Signs (Review Committee)
    Mr. Kitsonasked the Minister of Transport whether he is yet in a position to announce the composition of the independent committee which is to review traffic signs.
    Mr. Langford-Holtasked the Minister of Transport what his plans are for a review of road traffic signs.
    Mr. Marples: I am glad to say that Sir Walter Worboys has agreed to become chairman of this Committee which, as I announced on 2nd August, the Secretary of State for Scotland and I are setting up to review traffic signs. I am making good progress in appointing the other members, and hope to announce their names within the next few weeks.
    Mr. Kitson: Does my right hon. Friend agree that it would be a good thing if traffic signs were the same all over the country instead of varying from town to town and county to county?
    Mr. Marples: I certainly do agree. The object of the Committee will be to get standard signs which are consistent and are the same all over the country, because a motorist on the North-East Coast should see the same signs when he goes to the South-West. The signs should also be legible. At present, too many of them, in my view, are not. I hope that we shall also see aesthetics taken into account in the designs.
    Mr. H. Hynd: Will my right hon. Friend also consider standardisation with the Continent?
    Mr. Marples: That will be taken into account. The motorway signs are excellent and I hope that the same signs will be seen on all roads.
    Mr. Peyton: Can we have some really short-sighted people on the Committee, so that the signs will be easily read?
    Mr. Marples: I will bear my hon. Friend's application in mind.
    Mr. Slater: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what purpose he expects the Committee to serve? Why does not he call in his divisional road engineers? They could give him all the necessary information about road signs and he could make up his own mind instead of depending on a committee.
    Mr. Marples: Divisional road engineers will be giving evidence to the Committee.

  RAILWAYS

    Tube Service, New Cross Hammersmith
    Sir L. Plummerasked the Minister of Transport what are the results of the consultations he is having with the London Transport Board with a view to the reopening of the Tube service from New Cross to Hammersmith.
    Mr. Marples: I am having no consultations with London Transport on this subject. Such a suggestion would be entirely one of management for London Transport to consider.
    Sir L. Plummer: Will the right hon. Gentleman reconsider this? Is he aware that this line served a very useful purpose in enabling people from south-east London to travel to west London before the war? It was closed at the outbreak of war and there seems no reason why it should not be reopened. Would not this make a valuable contribution towards getting people off the roads?
    Mr. Marples: It is not a question of my looking at this again. This is a matter for the London Transport Executive. It tells me that the direct line from New Cross to Hammersmith, via St. Mary's Junction, was closed in 1936 due to the need to route the direct trains through to the Barking line, where traffic was steadily increasing, and that there is no
    1358
    spare capacity to permit the running of through trains to New Cross. I have no doubt that the London Transport Executive will see this exchange of views and will take note of the hon. Member's Question.

    Branch Lines (Closure Proposals)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Minister of Transport if he will give a general direction to the British Transport Commission to obtain from local authorities in the areas served by uneconomic branch lines estimates of future building developments in those areas before proposals to close those lines are made.
    Mr. Marples: No, Sir. I understand that, before submitting closure proposals, the Commission takes full account of any known prospective developments in the area. All proposals to close railway branch lines are referred to the appropriate 'Transport Users' Consultative Committee, and local authorities thus have opportunities to draw attention to future developments when closures are being considered.
    Mrs. Castle: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is not enough to give the Transport Users' Consultative Committee this information or the chance to present its point of view? Is it not an integral part of planning that the transport system should be further developed in areas where building development is taking place, as is happening, for instance, on the Blackburn-Hellifield line, which the Transport Commission is proposing to close, although it affects an area of future development? Will the right hon. Gentleman give a general direction that future development must be borne in mind by the Commission before it makes closure proposals?
    Mr. Marples: I thought that the hon. Lady would have that line in mind and I asked the Commission for information, knowing how keen she is about it. I understand that the Commission considers future developments before submitting proposals for the withdrawal of its services, and that such development was taken into account in this case.
    Mr. J. Hynd: Is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied about the power and the part which consultative committees

    1359
    can play in matters of this kind? Whilst the interests of the travelling public they are intended to represent are concerned, wider interests are also involved in the closing of these services. Is not too much being made of these committees in regard to that aspect?
    Mr. Marples: That may be so. We have proposals before the House in Committee upstairs about this matter, but so far we have reached, after five meetings of the Standing Committee, only Clause 1. When we do come to the Clause dealing with these Committees, no doubt we will examine the matter carefully.

  SHIPPING

    Trans-Britain Seaway
    Mr. W. Yatesasked the Minister of Transport if he will seek to hold discussions with the shipping industry and British industrialists concerning the need for, and the estimated cost of, a trans-Britain seaway from the area of The Wash to the Mersey.
    Mr. Marples: No, Sir. So far as I am aware, neither the shipping industry nor British industrialists have shown any interest in the construction of such a seaway.
    Mr. Yates: Is my right hon. Friend aware that he is one of the more go-ahead Ministers in the Government? Will he consider the fact that industries are concentrated in this area and that great experimentation is going on with hovercraft? Is it not time that he looked at this problem, for this proposal would mean that our industries would be in direct communication with industries in Europe and the United States through a trans-Britain seaway?
    Mr. Marples: No interest has been shown in this proposal. I have looked at its merits and I am not satisfied that it should go ahead.
    Mr. W. Yates: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am not satisfied, and I beg to give notice that I shall seek to raise this matter on the adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business of the House for the first week after the Christmas Adjournment?
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): Yes, Sir. The business for the first week after the Christmas Adjournment will be as follows:
TUESDAY, 23RD JANUARY—Second Reading of the Criminal Justice Administration Bill [Lords], and Committee stage of the Money Resolution.
Consideration of the Motion on the Wool Textile Industry (Scientific Research Levy) (Amendment) Order.
WEDNESDAY, 24TH JANUARY—Supply [4th Allotted Day].
Motion to move Mr. Speaker out of the Chair, when a debate will arise on an Amendment to take note of the Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates, 1957–58, the Seventh Special Report, 1958–59, relating to Treasury Control of Expenditure, and the Report on the Control of Public Expenditure (Command No. 1432).
THURSDAY, 25TH JANUARY—We shall ask the House to consider a Timetable Motion for the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, and the Army Reserve Bill.
FRIDAY, 26TH JANUARY—Consideration of Private Members' Bills.
The House may have noticed the Government Motion on the Order Paper, relating to today's debate, which would have the effect of extending the time available for debate of the Motion for the Adjournment by one hour.
Mr. Gaitskell: Is the Leader of the House aware that the imposition of the Guillotine upon these two vital—short, but important—Bills, the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill and the Army Reserve Bill, is a gross abuse of the power of the majority? What conceivable reason can there be for this? Would he not agree that, although, of course, the Government of the day must have this power, it should be used only when the Government are in great difficulty about getting their legislation through

1361
in time, or when there has been unreasonable obstruction by the Opposition? How can he possibly claim that either of these two things apply in the present instance?
Mr. Macleod: I think that the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition are meant for consumption outside this House. If he looks at HANSARD he will find that he addressed almost identical questions in March this year to my predecessor on two different Bills.
These two Bills, as every hon. Member in the House knows, are of the first importance. In view of the Amendments on the Notice Paper, and the progress that has been made so far, the Government have only two choices. The Government either have to ask for these powers or drop the Bills. We have no doubt about which we should do.
Mr. Caitskell: How can the Leader of the House possibly say that there has been any serious obstruction by the Opposition? Is he aware that the greater part of the first day in Committee on the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was spent on the important Amendment to exclude the Colonies, which deserved a full day's debate by itself? Is he aware that the second day was concerned with the question of Ireland and that the Closure was moved in opposition to the wishes of a number of hon. Members opposite?
Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that the time spent during two days on the Army Reserve Bill has not been a matter of obstruction by the Opposition, but of genuine criticism by hon. Members on both sides of the House? Is he aware that, to say the least, it is extremely unusual to apply the Guillotine to a Bill such as the Army Reserve Bill, which concerns the manpower of the Armed Forces?
Will the right hon. Gentleman please seriously think again about this matter? Does he not realise that the Government actually rejected proposals made from this side of the House which would have enabled the Committee stage of the Bill to proceed faster? How can he possibly justify what he is proposing to do now?
Mr. Macleod: On the question of precedents, on the Territorial and
1362
Reserve Forces Bill, 1907, the Military Service Bill, 1918, and the Military Training Bill, 1938, similar procedure was applied. No one can say that there have not been precedents of this sort. The Leader of the Opposition knows perfectly well that what he has said is a complete distortion of what has happened.
Mr. Gaitskell: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that what the Leader of the Opposition knows perfectly well is that the Guillotine is a crude device to hide the lack of confidence in the Government Front Bench about their own supporters?
Mr. Grimond: What is all this urgency about these Bills when, in each case, we have been assured by those in charge of them that they may not be needed? Has not a great deal of time, particularly on the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, been taken up by hon. Members opposite? Has the right hon. Gentleman any precedent for a day such as yesterday, in which the Government first had to vote down one of their Motions and then announced the Guillotine on two Bills, one of which was not then before the House at all?
Mr. Macleod: It frequently happens procedurally, and to all Governments, that they vote against a Motion which they have put down. The most usual case is the Motion for the Adjournment. The right hon. Member knows that this has happened a considerable number of times. I hope to table the timetable Motion today, when I think that the House will find that the time allowed for the future stages of the Bills will not be ungenerous.
Sir R. Nugent: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is nothing very novel about a timetable Motion? It is for the general convenience of the House and this is an occasion on which it is very much for the convenience of the House.
Mr. Macleod: I entirely agree.
Mr. Shinwell: Why is the right hon. Gentleman showing so much indignation about the Army Reserve Bill? Can he furnish a precedent—he has made some reference to Bills of this character—for the inability of the Minister in charge of the Bill to clarify the Money Resolution,

1363
which forced him to arrange for a Motion to be moved for the Chairman to report Progress? Is he aware that much of the discussion yesterday could have been avoided if there had been clarification of the Money Resolution?
Mr. Macleod: In answer to the right hon. Gentleman, and in answer to an earlier question by the Leader of the Opposition, I mentioned earlier three very similar Bills in connection with which allocation of time Motions had been moved. I do not accept for a moment the strictures on my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War.
Mr. Dance: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that the activities of some hon. Members opposite have made it virtually impossible to accede to the request of the Leader of the Opposition for a full day's debate?
Mr. Jay: Would not the best way to expedite business after the Recess be to get a new Leader of the House?
Mr. Wigg: Is the Leader of the House aware that the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill, 1907, and the Military Service Bill, 1938, are the only two examples there have been since 1881? Is he aware that since the war a tradition has grown up, and become a convention, that no Government would move the Closure on Vote A and that that was because of the desire in all quarters of the House to keep defence matters above party? Would he not, even at the eleventh hour, reconsider entering into discussions through the usual channels to avoid the use of the Guillotine and, if necessary, to have, by formal agreement, a timetable to meet the Government's convenience?
Mr. Macleod: In the last few words of our exchanges last night we dealt with this point. Naturally, the timetable Motion will allow for this point to be discussed by the Business Committee.
Mr. S. Silverman: Does the Leader of the House recall exactly why the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill is having its Committee stage on the Floor of the House? Does he remember that his original intention was to send it to Committee upstairs because he was doubtful whether this was a Bill of great constitutional importance, but that on recon
1364
sideration he decided that it was and that for that reason, and that reason alone, the Committee stage was brought on to the Floor of the House?
Does the right hon. Gentleman know of any recent precedent on a Bill of grave constitutional importance, which is not urgent, in which the Government, because they object to the activities of hon. Members of the Opposition, have seen fit to introduce a Guillotine Motion? May I ask him whether he knows of any precedent in which a Government has told the House of Commons that they propose to apply a Guillotine Motion to one Bill because they object to the proceedings on another?
Mr. Macleod: I did not say that. If the hon. Member wishes to study the precedents he will find them on pages 490–91 of the 16th edition of Erskine May.
Mr. Marsh: Will the Leader of the House tell us why the Government have got themselves into this sort of difficulty only since he has been Leader of the House? They managed quite well before.
Mr. W. Hamilton: When are we to have a debate on the outrageous Supplementary Estimates for the agriculture subsidies? Is he aware that there is a great deal of feeling among consumers and among the farmers that this money is going to middle men? When will this scandal be stopped? If there is a debate, may we be assured that there will be a spokesman from the Scottish Office to answer for the scandalous goings on in Scotland?
Mr. Macleod: I understand the feeling on that matter. Perhaps I should have explained the position in more detail in answer to questions on business last week. The agriculture Estimates will require a special Consolidated Fund Bill. That will mean that there will be opportunities of debate, and we shall no doubt be discussing this sort of matter through the usual channels. I think that a few days after we return it should be possible to find an opportunity for this.
Mr. Gaitskell: Can the Leader of the House explain his earlier supplementary answer to me that the Government had to choose between either introducing a Guillotine Motion or abandoning the Bills? Is he seriously suggesting that it

1365
was impossible for the Government to go through a number of days in Committee on these two Bills, during which progress would be made, as it has been made? What does he mean by saying that the Government would have to abandon the Bills altogether? Why does he suppress the views of the House of Commons in this way on these two vital Bills? Will he please think again about this matter before he commits himself to a course which he will bitterly regret before long?
Mr. Macleod: I am not very impressed by threats. Every hon. Member, on both sides, knows exactly that what I said is the correct position in relation to these Bills.
Mr. Thorpe: Is the Leader of the House aware that the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill has aroused very real bitterness and opposition, particularly in one respect, from his own party? Is he aware that this has caused the Government to have second, if not third, thoughts on the question of the Irish immigrants? Are we to take it that the Government consider that a full discussion of our future relations with our Commonwealth and Empire is to take an inferior place to the need to ram through this legislation by a Guillotine?
Mr. Macleod: No, Sir. That is not the case. The right position is for the Government to put in the allocation of time Motion what they consider to be a reasonable time. That will be put before the House and we shall discuss it on the Thursday of the week in which we return.
Mr. G. Brown: In view of what the Minister repeatedly says about these two Bills, does he not agree that on the Army Reserve Bill, on the first day in Committee, we agreed from this side of the House to the request which the Minister made—the only request that he made—on the point when we should finish the day's discussions? We agreed to the Amendments which he said that he wanted before that day's discussions finished. Is he further aware that on the second day, last night, we made an offer from this side of the House that further Amendments than those already considered should be taken, and that all discussion or all consideration of that offer was brusquely and rudely refused by the Leader of the House?
Mr. Macleod: With respect, that is not wholly the position. In yesterday's business, one group of Amendments—a number of Amendments taken together—was obtained, and that by the Closure. What the Deputy Leader of the Opposition suggested was that we should take just one more and then leave the Bill. On that basis, and with the number of Amendments which there are on the Notice Paper, it would be clearly impossible to finish the Committee stage of the Bill on the Floor of the House.
Mr. Brown: But the Minister admits, does he not, what I said about the first day? We gave him what he asked for on the first day. On the second day he made no counter-proposal and had no conversations with us. He just rewarded our offer with the Guillotine.
Mr. Macleod: That is not so, because on the first day, although at a late stage an agreement was reached, the Minister in charge of the Bill expressed himself as disappointed with the progress.
Mr. Lindsay: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill is eagerly awaited in the big cities, which are relying on the Government to get it through as soon as possible and are only amazed that the Opposition are so out of touch with public opinion?
Mr. Hector Hughes: Does the Leader of the House realise that the Christmas Recess gives him an admirable opportunity of consulting the other realms in the British Commonwealth of Nations about the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill? Will he take advantage of that opportunity to have those views discussed in a leisurely and proper way, without the Guillotine, when the House resumes?
Mr. Macleod: That is a very good point. Consultation on these matters by the Ministers who are most concerned with them is continuous.
Mr. Callaghan: Is it a fact that when the proposals for last night's business were made by my right hon. Friend, the Leader of the House made no reply at all?
Mr. Macleod: This was a Motion to report Progress, which, on all Bills, is a matter for the Minister in charge.

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[HON. MEMBERS: "It is for the Leader of the House."] It is not for the Leader of the House. It is for the Minister in charge of the Bill in all cases. The Secretary of State for War said that he was not prepared at that stage to set a limit to where we should go, but that we should make further progress.
Mr. Callaghan: I was here last night and heard some of the proceedings. Is it not true that after that exchange between the Secretary of State for War and the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, my right hon. Friend put proposals forward about the amount of progress which should be made, and that they were neither rejected nor accepted, nor was any reply given to them except after the Leader of the House had 'walked out of the House, when he returned and announced a Guillotine? Does he think that he will lead the House of Commons in that way?
Mr. Macleod: Both the Secretary of State for War and I made it clear that we thought that the proposals made by the Deputy Leader of the Opposition were entirely inadequate.
Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: Is the Leader of the House not aware that the uncertainty caused by the delays on these two Bills is creating the utmost uneasiness and unhappiness amongst very many people outside the House and that the sooner we come to fair and proper resolution of these two Measures, after a proper discussion of them under the terms of the timetable, the greater will be the satisfaction given to the great majority of people in this country?
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. I feel that in discussing the business for the week when we return we ought to leave some content for the debate on the allocation of time Motion. I am anxious to move to another topic for a moment.
Mr. Callaghan: May I put one further point? So that we may get the debate straight when we resume, may I ask this: if the Leader of the House thought that the proposals made last night by the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, which were concrete proposals, were inadequate, why did he not make a counter-proposal?
Mr. Macleod: That is for the Minister in charge of the Bill to decide in the first instance. It was quite clear, as anybody who was here last night must have seen, that the Opposition had no intention whatever of meeting us.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: If the Leader of the House is not open to threats, is he open to peaceful persuasion? Is he aware that there is considerable anxiety in Scotland about pit closures and cutting down railway services? Is he further aware that a strong deputation of miners is coming here from Scotland to lobby Members early in the New Year? Does he think that he can now give us a satisfactory answer as regards providing time to debate this question?
Mr. Macleod: I assure the hon. Gentleman that I can respond much more readily to that approach. I cannot, on the business statement for the first week after the Recess, which I have announced, give any undertaking on those matters. We have had a number of discussions in one way or another—on Bills recently before the House, on Adjournment debates, and so on—on pit and railway closures in Scotland.
Mr. Lipton: Will the Leader of the House explain why he made an announcement about the Guillotine last night and another announcement about the Guillotine again today? If he is to duplicate efforts in this way, he himself will waste the time of the House to a very considerable extent. I ask him to remember that saying the same thing twice does not make it twice as effective.

BILL PRESENTED MARRIAGE (WALES AND MONMOUTHSHIRE)
Bill to extend certain provisions of the Marriage Act, 1949, to Wales and Monmouthshire, presented by Mr. George Thomas; supported by Mr. James Griffiths, Mr. Raymond Gower, Mr. Donald Box, and Mr. S. O. Davies: read the First time: to be read a Second time upon Friday, 2nd February, and to be printed. [Bill 51.]
SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE
House to meet Tomorrow at Eleven o'clock; no Questions to be taken after Twelve o'clock; and at Five o'clock Mr. Speaker to adjourn the House without putting any Question.—[Mr. Iain Macleod.]

ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS)
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd January.—[Mr. Iain Macleod.]
3.53 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: On a point of order. Mr. Speaker, you will appreciate that the Motion we are about to debate appeared on the Order Paper for the first time today. There was, therefore, no previous opportunity to table an Amendment to it. I should like to move an Amendment to delete "23rd" and insert in its place, "9th". I ask your leave to move a manuscript Amendment to that effect.
Mr. Speaker: If the hon. Gentleman will bring his Amendment to me in writing, I will think about it and let him know. For the moment I have proposed the Question.
3.54 p.m
Mr. George Brown: I rise to invite the House to oppose the Motion, in the light of the developments of the last 24 hours. It must have been quite apparent to you, Mr. Speaker, as it has been to us, during the exchanges of the last half an hour, that there is a feeling on the other side of the House, not least in the mind of the Leader of the House, but also given expression to by other hon. Members opposite, that there is some form of discussion in Parliament which they are prepared to tolerate as being proper, to use a word which has already been used, and other forms of discussion which they are not prepared to tolerate because they regard them as improper. The Government have made up their mind that they are entitled to lay down conditions and circumstances in which we may debate two important Bills, namely, the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill and the Army Reserve Bill.
We take the view that, unless there is very great urgency, a Guillotine Motion ought not to be moved when we return after Christmas. Very great urgency means great urgency relative to the amount of time available. The Government are, on the one hand, proposing to guillotine two Bills, presumably because they are very urgent, and, on the other, proposing a Motion that
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the House should go into recess until 23rd January, thereby taking from itself time that it could use. We submit that these two proposals, taken together, whatever the merits of either of them separately are, do not make sense, unless there is a prior determination by the Government to prevent free, open and full discussion.
I am not clear, even now, what is the urgency for these Bills. The Leader of the House has again declared himself to be of the view that the Government could not get them if they allowed free and full discussion of them, the amount of free and full discussion which we presumably could have if we came back earlier and had more time for it. By what right does the Leader of the House claim to decide whether it is possible to finish discussions of Bills? By what right does he claim to decide the only circumstances in which a free Parliament can do its job?
The real point is that, so far, we have not had sufficient time to do the job. On the basis of our progress so far, it is impossible to say that these two Bills could not be got through in sufficient time. What we have had so far are days on which the Government have successfully obstructed their own business. If we come back early and devote more time to the Government's business for the purpose of enabling the Government to have their business, but to have it under proper terms of Parliamentary debate, there will have to be an absolute condition that the Government give up obstructing their own business and that Ministers cease to move to report Progress before a debate starts and spend three hours explaining, rather unsuccessfully, what they thought they had explained the day before. If that were to go on, even if the House came back earlier, it would obviously still be very difficult, even if my right hon. and hon. Friends displayed all possible good will, to prevent the Government successfully preventing their own business going through.
Equally, the Leader of the House, without showing the anger he showed last night and seemed to be showing again today, would have to begin to understand both the rules of the House and the part the Opposition are entitled to play in the House. If we returned

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early and offers were made from this side of the House, as they might again be made, with a view to getting more progress than the Government could by their own efforts get, the Leader of the House would have to prevent himself being so upset and so out of humour with himself and the House as to refuse even to discuss them.
It is a fact that some Amendments which could have been disposed of last night were not disposed of because the bad temper of the Leader of the House prevented him from accepting our offer. It equally prevented him from making a counter offer to us and suggesting further progress. It would have to be a condition of our return that those things did not happen again, because if the Leader of the House is determined not to make progress but to shut the House down there is nothing the Opposition can do to save him, because he has a majority at his disposal. If he decides to shut the House down, it is a corollary of that decision that no more business is obtained.
We contend that the failure to make greater progress with the Army Reserve Bill and the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill rests on the shoulders of the Government and not on our shoulders, and that if we returned early this factor would have to be changed. It may be in the right hon. Gentleman's mind that we do not now need more time because he can provide all the time necessary under a timetable. Indeed, he said at one stage that we would find that the time provided would be—I think that he used the word "adequate", but it was, in any case, a word indicating that our time would not be cut unduly short.
If there is sufficient time for us adequately to discuss the Bills it might be a case against us coming back earlier, because we would not need any additional time. But if we do not need any additional time, neither do we need a timetable—except that some hon. Members and, apparently, the Leader of the House himself, prefer to have Parliamentary discussion in circumstances where it is "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd" rather than to have it in our time-honoured traditionally free way.
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That is the rake's progress to dictatorship. It is the rake's progress to a Reichstag. Once one gets to the state of mind of saying, "The only kind of discussion I, as Leader of the House, could really permit is one where I know that the chopper will fall at a given time and where, therefore, it does not matter how much time is wasted or by whom, or whether Ministers are competent or incompetent, or whether things run properly or improperly; that does not matter to me or to anybody, because the chopper will fall at a given time and the Bill will go through," we are well on the way to going further and saying that we do not need Parliament at all or that we can work by other methods. That is an extremely dangerous path on which to embark. To impose the Guillotine is something which, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has said, a Government should do rarely, and then only because it is clear that they lack time or have been obstructed.
In this case, the obstruction has come from the Government side. The Leader of the House did his best to avoid giving a straight answer either to my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) or to me, but the fact is that we did accept the Government's own offer on the first day. They could have asked for more, but did not. We made no objection to finishing at the point they wished, even though many of us had expected to go much later. Again, last night, we made an offer, to which the Government did not respond at all, either by asking for more, by commenting on it, or in any other way. The obstruction has been theirs.
If we come back earlier, more time will be available. I do not want to see either of these Bills come under the Guillotine. It is shameful to put either of them through the House in that way. The long-term effects of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill and the vital principles involved in it ought to be accepted by this House—because of their impact on the Commonwealth and on our people at home, and because of our own ages-old traditions—only after the fullest discussion.
Equally, I think that the Army Reserve Bill, the "National Service Bill", as I believe it to be ill-named, should not be allowed to go through—affecting as it does, and unjustly as many think,

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but certainly very harshly, the liberties, rights and family lives of a group of young men who have no redress at all—without the fullest and most open discussion in this House. It is a unique Bill. National Service is not unique, but it is unique to say that only 20,000 men, out of the total population, shall bear the whole burden. We should not do that without full debate and discussion.
Discussion under a Guillotine is not full and free debate, because it is impossible to arrange it in that way. All sorts of things happen in the course of full and fair debate. Things crop up in its course, and should be answered, but that is impossible under a Guillotine. It is no use saying, "We can control that. You can choose which things you want to talk about." The answer is that in full debate one cannot do that, because no one can foresee what issues will arise. That is what debate is for—that issues should be dealt with as they arise. That cannot be the case with a Guillotine. However much time the Leader of the House provides, it will not be a full and fair debate.
The merits and demerits of the Guillotine will be fully debated when we return after the Christmas Recess, but, inevitably, the steam-roller majority on which the Leader of the House relied so heavily when showing his muscles half an hour ago will be relied on again. We therefore have to see what we can do now, and the only thing we can do, inconvenient as it would be to many hon. Members, and to many of us who have political duties in the country in January, is to oppose the Guillotine Motion so as to make it perfectly plain that, rather than have the Guillotine imposed on these two Measures, we would prefer to come back sooner and so provide the Government with more time for really full discussion, only asking that the Government make better use of time than they have in the past, and not to obstruct.
I beg the right hon. Gentleman to listen to this argument a little more free from the prejudice, irritation and bad temper that he showed last night. He may take what view he likes of me as a political opponent, but the fact is that we cannot conduct the business of this
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House if leading Ministers are to get so quickly out of humour with their opponents—
Mr. Speaker: The rules that I apply to the right hon. Gentleman must affect all the debate, and he is getting rather far, at the moment, from the proposition that we are at present discussing.
Mr. Brown: I hope not, Mr. Speaker; but I take your point, and will move on.
I make the offer to come back earlier in order to provide more time, in a fair, frank and, I believe, a Parliamentary spirit, without any calculation of its party advantage or personal inconvenience. That offer, if accepted, would provide the Government with more time. If they were willing to respond in the same way it would enable them not to proceed with the Guillotine Motion. I think that many hon. Members on both sides of the House will feel it a rather bad thing if the Leader of the House does not respond to this approach today. If he does not, many people outside will be very much aware that it is not the Opposition who are trying to prevent full and frank discussion, but, on the contrary, that it is something inherent in the present Conservative majority in the House that does not wish it.
I hope that the Leader of the House will now feel able not to proceed with his time-table Motion. I hope that he will try again, with more time at his disposal, to do the job mare competently; and if he resists us today, I ask the House—and not only my hon. Friends but all those on the other side of the Chamber who care for Parliamentary discussion—to divide with us against it.
4.9 p.m.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: My contribution to the debate will be rather shorter than that of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown); and I only ask the indulgence of the House for a few moments because I think that there are more than the conventional reasons of Parliamentary dingdong why, before the House passes this Motion, it should receive very definite assurances from the Government about its being called together before 23rd January should the national need so require.

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We are to go away until 23rd January at a time when the state of the world continues to worsen, when international law and order is being more widely trampled underfoot, and when British interests are in ever-growing danger and decline. Indeed, the West as a whole is in disarray, and the Commonwealth is in disorder. That same Indian Army that many of us learned to admire is at this moment engaged in two acts of aggression—one of which may, we hope, be drawing to a close.
There is what the Prime Minister described as the United Nations war on the Katanga people and, more recently, there has been the rape of Goa, which, for centuries longer than the existence of a single Indian nation, has been a Portuguese province, and recognised as such in the judgment of the International Court of Justice at The Hague in the case of the two enclaves of Dodra and Nagar Haveli. And now, following suit, President Sukarno is rattling his sabre. The enemies of Europe are closing in on her.
It is the duty and the right of the Executive to carry out diplomacy and hon. Members do not always serve the national interest best by calling, at every turn, for explanations and statements. But in recent days we have seen the democratic Parliamentary process really working. We have seen the vigilance of private hon. Members—at least on this side of the House—succeed in diverting the Government from a course of acquiescence in United Nations enormities in the Congo at the sacrifice of our principles as well as our interests.
I believe that in so doing my hon. Friends, who have been smeared by hon. Gentlemen opposite as members of the Katanga lobby—though, speaking for myself, and others of my hon. Friends, I have not one penny of personal financial interest in the whole Continent of Africa—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The difficulty about this is that we are discussing how long the House should adjourn. The fact that some hon. Members have been called members of the Katanga lobby does not seem to relate to that question.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I was just drawing attention, Sir, to the very desperate state of the world and of our interests.
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I urge hon. Members to consider what might have happened if we had been in recess when it was proposed that Royal Air Force bombs should be contributed to the raining down of death and devastation on the civilian population of Katanga? I do not expect that hon. Gentlemen opposite will agree with my views on Katanga, but many of them will agree that British foreign policy and, indeed, the conduct of government, should not be an esoteric dialogue between the two Front Benches.
Those hon. Members who have put their point of view forcibly in recent days have been expressing the views of their constituents and my belief is that my hon. Friends and I are more in touch with our constituents than are some hon. Gentlemen opposite. We have expressed to the Government the feelings of our constituents; their abhorrence that Elisabethville should have been turned into a Budapest.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman cannot, on this point, debate Katanga. It is right for the hon. Member to address his remarks to the reasons why hon. Members should or should not go away for a given period, but otherwise the debate would be going too wide.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: I apologise, Mr. Speaker.
We are glad that the Prime Minister's appeal has been harkened to. Many of my hon. Friends are, however, alarmed lest what is now happening in relation to President Tshombe's meeting with Mr. Adoula—my fears on this may be unjustified; I certainly hope so—may be the preparation of a Munich. It was an ill-omen that Thursday's debate ended with a piece of paper.
I therefore ask the Government to given firm assurances that if the situation both in Africa and the world as a whole continues to deteriorate, whatever inconvenience may be caused to hon. Members, we shall be called back without delay.
4.13 p.m.
Mr. J. Grimond: While I do not agree with all the views expressed by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) on all the matters he raised, I agree that there are matters which must be of great concern to all

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hon. Members. We are going away at a time when we see considerable disagreement between the leaders of the West about Berlin. No doubt we shall hear more on this subpect this afternoon. We are going away when we certainly do not know the outcome of events in the Congo, when we have just witnessed the attack of India on Goa and when a further attack is threatened in the Dutch East Indies.
I appreciate that the Lord Privy Seal may touch on many of these matters later this afternoon. I do not want to delay the House, but I must impress on the Lord Privy Seal that we shall require to have the views of the Government on all these matters and the most up-to-date information on how they stand. The position of the United Nations is an overriding matter. Grave disquiet has been expressed by Mr. Adlai Stevenson, among others, about the effects of these events on the United Nations.
There is also the question of the finances of the United Nations. I hope that we shall hear more from the Lord Privy Seal about the instructions given to our representatives there and that as soon as we return after the Recess he will make arrangements for a full discussion to take place on the United Nations and of our policy towards it.
As soon as possible after we return, we should discuss again the various aspects of foreign policy. I join with the hon. Member for Chigwell in hoping that the Government will give something more than the usual formal assurances that should anything serious happen hon. Members will be recalled. Unfortunately, it so often happens that we are not called back until the events have made our return too late.
I hope that the Government will think again about the Guillotine Motion on the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. There have not been great complaints about any undue delay or filibustering during the passage of the Bill. Many hon. Members opposite have already expressed great anxiety about the proposed curtailment of the debate, particularly regarding the Irish question. It is surely unusual for a government, after, presumably, prolonged considertion, to introduce a Bill which they say is of great importance but when it
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comes before Parliament to say that on one of the most pointed aspects of it—its effect on Ireland—they must change their mind completely. That is itself a reason for prolonged debate, especially since we are sure that even the Government do not know the effect the Bill would have on Ireland, should it be enforced.
I will not discuss the other Bill, except to say that it has been the custom, as far as possible, to treat any subject affecting the call-up of men as a non-party matter. On the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, however, there are special considerations and I hope that the Leader of the House will either think again or, if necessary, find some means to provide extra time to discuss the matter. Only then, if really necessary, should the Guillotine be used.
4.18 p.m.
Mr. Charles Pannell: I hope that the House will not adjourn on a very narrow point—while the present Leader of the House holds his position. He has shown a curious insensitivity to the House since he was appointed to that post. I do not necessarily think that that is a denigration of him. There have been great predecessors to that post who have also not been good Leaders of the House. Someone said to me earlier that the present Leader of the House is the worst since Sir Stafford Cripps. His mind is too intransigent.
The present occupant of that office might have been a great Departmental Minister, but he is certainly not great in his present job. It certainly is not synonymous with the chairmanship of the Conservative Party. That is the hon. Gentleman's dilemma, and we cannot go away knowing that in office is a Leader of the House who thinks that his one object is to win the next General Election for his party. It has often been said—
Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the ingenuity of the hon. Member, but he must explain to me how that affects the period of time for which hon. Members should adjourn.
Mr. Pannell: I think that will be fairly easy to do, Mr. Speaker, if you will allow me to continue.

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I wish to recall some recent House of Commons history which has brought us to this pass, when it is suggested that we adjourn with the Order Paper in the most hopeless mess at this time of the year that I can ever remember. This has been brought about by a series of errors on the part of the Government themselves. If I may recount this history, it will, I think, show why we are short of time, why a Guillotine is necessary for two Bills, and why it is necessary to have a new Leader of the House.
First, we had the matter of the B.B.C. Charter, when the appropriate documents were not put before us. We had the question of the Mace. Only this week, we had the question of the Swiss loan, when it was said that this country was so hard-up that it must have f18 million within three days. We have not knocked at the Government. They are knocking at themselves. They say, in effect, that they can do away with the Ponsonby rule and do away with protocol which has stood for thirty-eight years because there is complete contempt towards the House by the Government and, particularly, by the Leader of the House. There is no question about that.
Things cannot all go wrong like that. It is no use Conservative Members mentioning in the Lobby the name of Sir Charles Harris, who has recently left the Whips' Office. The responsibility rests on the Government Front Bench to order the business of the House. The Government have slipped up in every possible way. Anyone watching the Leader of the House during recent times has seen how he has behaved. He has not had a clue. All he has been doing is swotting up the precedents. He has spent far too long out of the country to know what has been happening in the House. He is a bad choice for the job. There is no doubt about that. The House does not work in that way. Consider the way in which the right hon. Gentleman started. He did not occupy the proper room of the Leader of the House.
Mr. Speaker: It is essential to address these observations to the Question, which, in substance, is: how long do we go away for, if at all? I am listening to the hon. Gentleman with great care,
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but, with respect, I do not follow how exchanges of rooms have a bearing on the matter.
Mr. Pannell: I think that they do, Mr. Speaker, if I may address you quite seriously on the subject. If the right hon. Gentleman places himself so far away from the Chamber that he gets breathless coming up the stairs to us, he will not know what is happening inside the Chamber.
Mr. Speaker: Is it the argument that hon. Members must come back earlier to give them more time to go up or down stairs?
Mr. Pannell: I am not being facetious when I say that you have made quite a point there, Mr. Speaker. The point is that we have not had from the Leader of the House the service which should have been given in the way it ought to be given. He is completely insensitive to the House, and we really cannot go away for the Christmas Recess if someone so insensitive is in that position.
I wish to keep in order, of course, and I shall finish on this note. Whatever nature intended the right hon. Gentleman to do—to be an able Colonial Secretary, or whatever it may have been—nature never intended him to be Leader of the House. He has shown himself completely insensitive to the demands of the House and the values which it places on many matters. A Departmental Minister can say, "I have made up my mind". The House of Commons will not have its mind made up for it by the Leader of the House in the authoritative sort of manner we have seen today. For the good of the House, it is time that we had another Leader.
4.25 p.m.
Mr. Leslie Hale: It is not often that I agree with the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison), but I agree with nearly every argument that he put. The views he holds on many questions are very much opposed to mine, but no one doubts that he holds them with sincerity, and no one doubts that the issues he raised are world issues of real importance.
Those of us whose faith has been pinned to the United Nations have seen

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things happen in the last few days which give us very grave anxiety, real concern and doubt about whether the organisation in its present form, at least on its security basis, is likely to function well in the future. The Prime Minister is at present in Bermuda. Perhaps his conference there with the President of the United States may be postponed for a time because of serious personal reasons which we all deplore, but, in the sixteen years in which I have been a Member of the House, there has never been a time—I am not saying this for political reasons—for more anxiety, day-to-day anxiety, about foreign affairs and about economic affairs.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) said, only yesterday we heard that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is going round with a begging bowl trying to restore our depleted finances. There is a state of complete uncertainty in industry. What is more important, the reputation of Parliament as a whole is involved in this Motion.
It is only eight weeks since we were recalled, after a ten-week Recess which would have been eleven weeks but for the action of the Leader of the Opposition and those who supported him in this party in demanding the recall of Parliament. Indeed, I think that it was first brought up by the Leader of the House.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: The Liberals.
Mr. Hale: I am quite sure that there was some support from the Liberal Party. I think it fair to say of the Parliamentary Liberal Party that there has never been a Motion during the last few years which it has not supported on both sides.
No one looking at the position seriously today would say that the reputation of the House stands as high as it did in the past. I do not think that anyone would say that the deliberations of the House of Commons command the attention that they used to do. People just cannot understand our saying that we will sit here for eight weeks, discuss a few matters formally, put down a few Amendments, and then go away again for five weeks.
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A few moments ago, Mr. Speaker, if I may venture to say so, you made a slight emendation of some importance in what you said as to the purpose of our debate. Previously, you had said that we were discussing for how long the House should adjourn, and a little later you said that the question concerned how long it should adjourn, or whether it should. Why should the House adjourn? People in Oldham will go on working until the eve of Christmas and they will resume work the day after Boxing Day. Is there any reason at all why Members should go away for five weeks, an exceptionally long adjournment?
Perhaps not all hon. Members will accept that, but I ask them to consider carefully. Everyone recognises that the exigencies of Parliamentary debate and discussion, getting business through on the Floor of the House, upstairs in Committee and in our own various committees, impose a certain need to bring issues to a conclusion. Even the Parliamentary Labour Party has recently had to make some decisions about the limitation of debate—which I hope were taken reluctantly by those concerned; I voted against them. The exigencies are there.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) put the point perfectly fairly. The Leader of the House says, "I must get these Bills through. Therefore, I propose an adjournment for five weeks while we do not discuss them". It is really monstrous. Then the right hon. Gentleman says, "The moment you come back from your five weeks' holiday, I shall table Motions which will effectively prevent your discussing them". Let there be no doubt about that. No one has yet seen a Guillotine Motion which presented fair possibilities of debate. Everyone knows that the House, which has a certain amount of collective conditioned reflex in its composition, will probably spend more time discussing a Guillotine Motion until the Closure is accepted than it is likely to spend discussing any other Question.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is not this the first occasion on which a Guillotine has been offered to anyone as a Christmas present?
Mr. Hale: That I would not know. My hon. Friend will recall that in the end the inventor of the guillotine benefited from its curative powers.
Surely the Leader of the House should at least say one or two words on this subject and tell us why he makes this proposition. My hon. Friend, or ex-hon. Friend, the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) tabled an Amendment to the effect that we should reassemble fourteen days earlier than is proposed. That is a reasonable, sensible and proper compromise. It permits hon. Members, who can afford it, to go home for Christmas and to spend Christmas in the bosom of their families and enables us to reassemble at an earlier time.
We are in a situation of chaos. One of my hon. Friends mentioned the Post Office Charter. I have not seen it yet. I do not know what has happened to it. Possibly whatever has happened to it occurred while I was at home in the bosom of my family. Has it been discussed? This was an urgent matter. It was tabled as a matter of business. I challenge any hon. Member on either side of the House to tell us what is really the intention of the Secretary of State for War on the Army Reserve Bill. Does he propose to table Amendments to Clause 7? Does he propose to table Amendments to the Money Resolution? Will they be in order if he tables them? Will a Guillotine Motion be tabled—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche): Order. The hon. Gentleman is getting rather far from the Motion.
Mr. Hale: I am obliged to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The last thing that I wished to do was to range over too wide a field. I am merely expressing general uncertainty and, indeed, with respect, Sir Gordon, suggesting that the House should not adjourn until it has had elucidation of some of the problems which confront us.
I do not often emerge into the West End of London, but even there the activities of Her Majesty's Ministers are becoming really alarming. No one I meet knows what is the law at any given moment of the day or how soon the Minister of Transport will amend it. When the Minister of Transport and the Home Secretary co-operate in their
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efforts—the Home Secretary in cleaning up London and the Minister of Transport in regularising London—the results are doubly destructive. I was invited—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I find it difficult to relate what the hon. Gentleman is saying to the Motion about the Christmas Recess.
Mr. Hale: I apologise, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. The trouble is that I was trying to be brief and, therefore, perhaps did not explain in detail the relevance of what I had adumbrated in my remarks.
We should not adjourn for Christmas unless we have an undertaking from the Minister of Transport that he will not publish a new series of parking schemes for London, a new series of regulations and make a new series of one-way streets on the day that we rise. I could give in detail the evidence of this sort of thing happening if the House wished it.
Every time that we adjourn for a Recess, all the dirty little controversial Measures that can be put through by Statutory Instrument are "bunged" through on the day after the Adjournment on the principle that if they fail they can be withdrawn and rescinded before we reassemble. If they succeed all is well. In any event, with a bit of luck, they will be forgotten if they are not of very great importance before the House reassembles.
I made one of my very few visits to the West End a few days ago. I was invited by my publishers to go to a lunch to celebrate the publication of a book. I always find it difficult—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am sorry to interrupt this lunch, but it does not seem to have any relation to the Christmas Recess.
Mr. Hale: I was not going to advertise it at all, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I was only going to describe the effect on me of this situation. I was driving with my wife, following all the signs that the Minister of Transport had put up. I found myself two or three times back in the same place.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Motion is concerned with when the House should adjourn.
Mr. Hale: I really could not hear what you said, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I will leave the subject in case I gathered that it was some expression of dissent from the relevance of my observations. Although I did not hear your precise words, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I will leave that subject with pleasure, although it was a rather sad story. [An HON. MEMBER: "What about the book?] I would not think of mentioning the book.
The Leader of the House should tell us why he wants to impose a Guillotine on two vital Measures, one of which will cause grave hardship to all our constituents and both of which have excited the reprehension of the great majority of decent-thinking people in every constituency. There is the feeling that something is wrong, the feeling that we are abrogating principles about which we have been able to boast over the centuries. Why does the right hon. Gentleman say that we must adjourn for five weeks, come back and shorten discussion on important Measures? Why cannot we return a week beforehand and discuss them freely and frankly and produce the Amendments and improvements, or even rescind the intention, which are necessary?
Finally, will the Leader of the House tell us why the Army Reserve Bill is urgent? The Secretary of State for War has said time after time that he intends to take no steps about it for many months. We were told that it arose out of the situation in Berlin. That situation has been altering constantly day after day. Dr. Adenauer has taken quite different measures concerning the German forces since the Bill was introduced. It may well be that the Bill will never be enforced. I ask the Leader of the House to make a statement on these important matters.
4.37 p.m.
Mr. R. H. Tartan: I should like to reinforce the request of my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) for an assurance that, if the situation in Central Africa deteriorates during the Recess, the House will be recalled. I can understand the attitude of the hon. Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) and that of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), who has
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not yet moved his Amendment, but I find it hard to understand the attitude of the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown).
What would happen if we voted down this Motion? It would mean that we would be sitting on Friday with no business and again on Christmas Day with no business, which might be enjoyable for some right hon. and hon. Members, but would be highly inconvenient for the staff who serve us here in the House of Commons. I should like further consideration to be given to the question of the Recess. Like the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond), I do not like the idea of a Guillotine being applied to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill if it can possibly be avoided.
The right hon. Member for Belper gave an undertaking which, I think, requires a little clarification. I understood him to say that if the Government would reduce the period of the Recess the Opposition would co-operate in securing the completion of the Committee stage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill and, possibly, of the Army Reserve Bill. If the right hon. Gentleman can clarify his undertaking in that way, I hope my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House will consider the matter. Certainly, there are different views about the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill on both sides of the House. For instance, I do not entirely share the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne).
It would be helpful—and I should have thought that this was a way in which Parliament could rise to the occasion—if the Opposition said that if we came back a week early they would guarantee that in that week they would assist in getting the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill through the Committee stage. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] If they did that, they would show that they were genuine in their attitude on this Motion. It would be very much appreciated in places like the West Indies, where the Guillotine on the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill would be regarded as a rather obnoxious process. If the Opposition do not do that, then it means that they are really not quite sincere in their attitude on this Motion and in their opposition to the Commonwealth Immigrants

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Bill. I hope that before this debate is concluded we shall hear from the Leader of the Opposition the kind of offer he can make to secure the completion of the Committee stages of those Bills.
Mr. S. Silverman: I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman thinks that he is quite fair to my right hon. Friend in the comment which he has just made. It does not necessarily follow that because we ask to come back earlier we therefore alter our attitude to the Bills that we wish to discuss. [An HON. MEMBER: "There was an offer."] I know that an offer was made, but the point is that if we came back a little earlier the Guillotine would be unnecessary and we could have full discussion without resorting to an anti-democratic device.
Mr. Turton: As I understood the right hon. Member for Belper—I am sorry that he is not now present—he gave a sort of undertaking about the passage of the Bill. It was not at all clear. I recognise that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne perhaps did not understand what the right hon. Gentleman was saying, as I did not. I ask the Leader of the Opposition, when he intervenes, to make the position clear.
Mr. Arthur Lewis: It was last evening that my right hon. Friend asked the Leader of the House whether he would discuss the matter or suggest what he wanted, when the Opposition would be prepared to discuss it. The Leader of the House, however, walked out.
Mr. Turton: The hon. Member probably was having tea and was not here when the right hon. Member for Belper, in opening the debate today, gave his vague sort of undertaking.
4.42 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I support my right hon. Friends on the Opposition Front Bench on the issue of the Army Reserve Bill. Their position is perfectly clear. We say that we do not want to adjourn because we object to the Government's Guillotine proposal and we are prepared to come back earlier, if necessary, for adequate discussion of the Bill.
Since we were warned of this late last night, some of us have been enabled to
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look up the precedents. I do not know whether the House realises how unusual it is to have a Guillotine Motion on an Army Bill. I cannot find a single case since 1945. In the time from 1885 to 1939, I have been able to find only two occasions when any kind of Bill to do with the Services has been guillotined in this way.
We must be given overwhelming reasons if the Government are to guillotine a Service Bill, but I have not heard from the Leader of the House any suggestion of a special reason for breaking the convention under which we in this House discuss important Service matters without interruption and are allowed to say our fill on Service matters. We all know that traditionally on Vote A we are allowed to go on to a finish. I should have thought that on a Bill of this nature that precedent should be observed. This in itself is full justification for refusing to grant the Adjournment of the House.
On the Army Reserve Bill, it is difficult to explain to the Leader of the House why some of us feel the degree of indignation that we do. It is not as though the delay was due to us. We all know that the Bill was awkward for the Government and that it was a half-prepared Bill spatchcocked into the Queen's Speech, and we know the pressure from outside which made the Government do it. They spatchcocked it into the Queen's Speech; we did not. They have not adequately prepared it.
The Secretary of State for War made a mess and wasted three hours of our time yesterday and had to be caught out and told his business by back benchers on this side. We are almost to blame, apparently, because my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) had to point out the inadequacies and the ignorances and the way that the Secretary of State had misled the Committee so as to prevent us putting down Amendments on the vital issues of the bounty, which, we believe, should be paid to National Service men who have to serve the extra six months. All that had been prevented.
After that degree of muddle from the Government side we had a debate in which twelve Amendments were taken together. We did not squabble and waste time by demanding, as legitimately

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we could have done, extra Divisions on at least four of those Amendments. We took them altogether and had an admirable debate. That debate was closured before it was finished, and then we had a discussion about progress. After that, we were suddenly told about the introduction of a Guillotine Motion. Having walked out, the Leader of the House came back half an hour later, having been instructed to announce a Guillotine on the Bill.
The Bill was not being criticised in a party manner. The striking fact about the discussion of the Bill was how cross-bench it was. There are genuine differences in the House about it, not all of them from one side or the other. Whatever we do, we know that although this is a small Bill, it is a Bill with important principles. It is a Bill by which people are to be called up selectively, overtly for the first time. It is a major departure. It also includes transferring to the War Office responsibility previously held by the Ministry of Labour for many of the facets of the Bill, which, however small, even though only 15,000 men are being called up—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I hope that the hon. Member will not go too far into the merits of the Bill. We are discussing the Adjournment Motion.
Mr. Crossman: Our opposition to the Adjournment and our belief that we should come back earlier is largely due to our conviction that the Bill needs adequate discussion. I am going through the Government's behaviour to see whether their Guillotine can be justified or whether we are not right in saying that we should come back earlier.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There will be an opportunity later for discussing the Guillotine Motion.
Mr. Crossman: It seems to me, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that on the question of the date of the Adjournment of the House we have a right to put forward these views. I am merely following up the reasoning given from the Opposition Front Bench that instead of adjourning now and having a Guillotine Motion when we return we should come back earlier to have discussion without the Guillotine. I am stating why, in my view, this is not a party issue. It is an
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issue for the House of Commons and for the nation, for this little, miserable, pettifogging Bill involves the principle of 15,000 young men being called up selectively, without adequate classification, by the arbitrary decision of the Secretary of State for War.
Last night, we were trying to write into the Bill classifications that would enable us at least to know the principles on which the selective call-up would take place. The debate was closured. After the Closure, the Leader of the House announced that there would be a Guillotine Motion. He said that hon. Members on this side were simply obstructing. I do not know how any human being who sat through yesterday afternoon's debate, when hon. Members on both sides had a passionate interest in the Bill, can suggest that they were concerned with obstruction.
Mr. A. Lewis: Is my hon. Friend aware that at five o'clock yesterday, before the debate on the Bill had started, I was informed by members of the Government that they had already prepared to have the Guillotine Motion before, in fact, discussion had begun?
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): May I say straight away that that is not true.
Mr. Lewis: That is what I was told.
Mr. Crossman: I dare say that five o'clock was a little early, but 6.15 was not.
Mr. William Yates: Would it not be correct for the hon. Member who made that statement about the Guillotine having been decided before the Leader of the House mentioned it now to withdraw?
Mr. Lewis: On a point of order. You will recollect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that what I said was that I was told at about five o'clock yesterday by one of the members of the Government that they had already prepared to bring in the Guillotine. I was told that there would not be an all-night sitting, because the House would be getting up at about twelve o'clock. I was told that and I will not withdraw it.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: There is no occasion for the hon. Member to withdraw it.
Mr. Crossman: My hon. Friend has confirmed the rumour which I also heard.
Mr. Lewis: It turned out to be true.
Mr. Crossman: My view is that when the Leader of the House had to walk out of the debate and have his mind made up within half-an-hour, he got confirmation of something which had been previously decided.
It would be a mistake to misjudge the House in the way that the right hon. Gentleman's speech implied. It is wrong to suggest that the debate yesterday was a filibustering or obstructive debate, or that those of us who were present to discuss the Bill were concerned to delay proceedings, when I have seldom heard a debate that was more serious and, because it was serious, prolonged, largely by right hon. and hon. Members on the Government side.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I should be grateful if the hon. Member came back to the Motion before the House.
Mr. Crossman: I do not need to come back, because I am on it. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] The cheers of my hon. Friends show that I am expressing reasons why we on the back benches support our Front Bench in opposing the Adjournment. We want a full discussion of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill and of the Army Reserve Bill on their merits as a serious House of Commons, and we resent the lies told about us that we were filibustering and obstructing.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must ask the hon. Member to withdraw the word "lies".
Hon. Members: Withdraw.
Mr. Crossman: I withdraw the word "lies", but I cannot withdraw the feelings with which I have spoken.
4.50 p.m.
Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: There is one reason why I believe that we should not adjourn for five weeks. I confess that it is a reason which I thought I would hear widely canvassed from the Conservative benches, but the only Member opposite who put forward this reason from the whole of the Tory
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Parliamentary Party, and he did it to his credit, was the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton). He referred to the proposed Guillotine measures which will be applied to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. The Leader of the House has told us that if we come back on 23rd January it will be necessary to have a Guillotine in order to get the Bill through.
It is not in order to discuss the merits of the Bill, but I think that it is in order to say that I think it is a Bill which departs from all previous precedents in the matter of our policy towards our Commonwealth and our Colonial Empire, and it is a Bill which has aroused acute controversy not merely across the Floor of the House but throughout the ranks of the party opposite. For 17 years my grandfather sat on the Tory benches opposite. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] The greatest honour that he had at the hand of his fellow Tory Members was to be called "Empire Jack". The reason for that was that he believed passionately in an Empire, belonging as he did to a party which always claimed to be the great party of Empire. Today we are faced with the proposition—[Interruption.] If the hon. and gallant Member for Northern Ireland would wait—
Captain L. P. S. Orr: Not the whole of Northern Ireland.
Mr. Thorpe: Fortunately not. If the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South will wait, he will see the relevance of this. If we come back on 23rd January it will be necessary to have the Closure. The Leader of the House said, and the hon. and gallant Member for Down, South should remember this, that the Government would decide for how long it would be proper to discuss any series of Amendments. If previous practice be any precedent, it means that Amendments as important as those, touching the whole future of the Colonies, which were dealt with on the first day of the Committee Stage will be dealt with in four to five hours. It means that Amendments touching the whole future of the relationship of this country with the Commonwealth will be disposed of in a day. It will mean that matters as important as those relating to the Irish, on which the party

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opposite had three opinions—they were in, then they were out and then they were in again—will be disposed of as a result of the Closure, which is so severe in its application that it drew violent opposition from members of the party of the Leader of the House himself.
This is the procedure which we are invited to follow because if we come back on 23rd January, Her Majesty's Government will not be able to provide time to have adequate discussion of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. There was a significant remark by the Leader of the House which was taken up by the Leader of the Opposition, and this touches on the relevance of our return on 23rd July. [HON. MEMBERS: "January."] Perhaps if the Government were put into cold storage until July it might lead to some result. The Leader of the House said that unless the Guillotine were applied the Government would probably have to drop the Bill. I do not know whether that was recognition of the likely opposition from the Opposition benches or of the potential danger from his own side if his hon. Friends had adequate opportunities to oppose the Bill. Perhaps we shall never know.
I should like to suggest, particularly to hon. Members opposite who have paraded not only their patriotism but their imperialism year in year out, that it would be preferable to spend an extra fortnight debating a Bill which will vitally affect the future relationships of this country with its Commonwealth and Colonial territories than that we should take five weeks vacation in order to come back for a Guillotine to be applied and the Bill rammed through in the teeth of opposition from all quarters of the House.
Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order. It is nearly one and quarter hours since I asked Mr. Speaker's leave to move a manuscript Amendment, which would not have the effect of limiting the debate, because the argument whether the date of our return should be 9th January is obviously just as wide as the argument whether it should be 23rd January. Mr. Speaker was good enough to say that he would give me his Ruling a little later on when he had had time to consider it. Would it be possible, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, for you to indicate
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whether it is the intention to call the Amendment and, if so, at approximately what stage in the debate? You will have seen that there has been considerable support for the Amendment, including the exact date, even before it has been moved, and this might perhaps influence you in deciding at what hour it should be moved, if at all.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Mr. Speaker has decided to call the Amendment and he has suggested that I should call the hon. Member after some others have spoken.
4.56 p.m.
Sir Cyril Osborne: I want to make two points, if I am allowed, on the Motion, which I support. In the sixteen years in which I have been in the House I have heard Oppositions almost every time say that the Adjournment was too long and that we ought to come back sooner, and it has been the function of respective Governments to say that the Adjournment was necessary and the function of the Opposition to say that it was not necessary. To that extent history is repeating itself, and I think it fair to say that if the suggestion made from the benches opposite were accepted, that we should have practically no Adjournment at all, nobody would be more shocked than hon. Members opposite. [HON. MEMBERS: "Try us."]
My second point is that the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition said that unless some great emergency arose the Guillotine should not be used. During the discussion many references have been made to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, and one of my hon. Friends said that the Bill ought not to be pushed through because of feeling in the West Indies. I want to bring the House back to the feeling of the people in this country and especially of the homeless in London, who feel that to allow unlimited immigration into this country—
Hon. Members: Rubbish and humbug.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I would remind the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) that we are discussing the length of the Christmas Recess.
Sir C. Osborne: This has to do with the length of the Christmas Recess. The

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Deputy-Leader of the Opposition said that to have a long Recess and then to apply the Guillotine was unfair and unwise. As for "humbug" from a white-livered Liberal, I reject it.
Mr. C. Pannell rose—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must ask the hon. Member for Louth to withdraw that phrase.
Sir C. Osborne: I will withdraw that remark, and I beg your pardon for having used it.
Mr. C. Pannell: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Can you enlighten the House why you asked the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) to withdraw the expression "white-livered Liberal"? So long as the word was "white" and not "black" surely the expression cannot be offensive in this context?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: In my view, it was unparliamentary.
Mr. F. A. Burden: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) to call one of my hon. Friends a wicked little man?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I did not hear that observation.
Sir C. Osborne: I was trying to urge the point that while I agree that views about the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill are held deeply overseas, hon. Members opposite shout me down when I try to make a point about the English people. They do not want to hear about the English people. I submit that the people in London and in the Midlands who are most directly affected by unlimited immigration regard the Bill as a great benefit—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I must ask the hon. Member to keep more within the context of the Motion before the House. It deals with the Adjournment of the House.
Sir C. Osborne: May I remind you, Sir, if it is in order, that the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition—I wrote the words down as he uttered them—said that unless some great emergency arose the Guillotine ought not to be used when
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we return and that the length of the Recess is too long. It is with that point that I am trying to deal.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is a legitimate argument, but the hon. Member is going much further than that.
Sir C. Osborne: I am trying to rebut the argument. If the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition was in order in advancing his argument, surely I am in order in rebutting it? All I am saying is that whilst hon. Members opposite say that the Guillotine ought not to be applied to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, people outside this House who are mostly affected by it feel that it ought to go through as quickly as possible.
Mr. A. Lewis: Then let us come back earlier.
Sir C. Osborne: If the hon. Gentleman came back earlier and had a shorter Christmas Recess he might lose some weight.
5.3 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: I beg to move, to leave out "23rd" and to insert instead thereof "9th".
I agree with the hon. Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) that for a number of years it has been common form to oppose the Adjournment Motion at Christmas, Easter and, indeed, in July in order to have a general debate about the state of public business, and that on those occasions those hon. Members who have formally opposed the Adjournment Motion were not intending to be taken seriously or literally, and—the hon. Gentleman is right—would have been rather appalled if the opposition to the Motion had been successful.
However, I think that the hon. Gentleman, who has been a Member of the House for a long time, will also agree that on those occasions there has never been a proposal to substitute another date, and that has usually been one of the factors in the debate, because hon. Members have said, "What do you intend? You are not really serious because you are not making any alternative proposal". The reason that they made no alternative proposal was that they were merely using a Parliamentary occasion in a traditional way for a perfectly legitimate objective, but without

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intending the vote to be carried in the sense which they were apparently supporting in their speeches. There is nothing unusual about that. The Secretary of State for War did that very thing yesterday afternoon. There is nothing very surprising or dramatic about it.
On this occasion there is such an Amendment, and I am moving it, with Mr. Speaker's leave, because I really cannot believe that the state of the country or of the world as it is today justifies the House in laying down its responsibilities and retiring to the country on holiday for five weeks. I hope to explain why in a few minutes, and I hope that the House will have patience with me. I shall be as brief as possible, but it may take a few minutes.
My right hon. Friend the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition spoke very strongly against the Motion. If the Motion were debated there would be one of two results. Either the House would not adjourn for Christmas or the House would never come back. As we have already decided by the previous Motion, which was accepted without a Division, that we shall adjourn at five o'clock tomorrow, the first of those alternatives is probably, though not certainly, not open to us. Therefore, my right hon. Friend must be interpreted as merely taking part in what has become this traditional exercise to which I have referred.
I am moving to substitute 9th January because I think that in existing circumstances that gives a long enough period for the House to adjourn at this time. My hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) has already pointed out that it is barely eight weeks since we finished a ten or eleven weeks' Recess. We are now proposing, if the Government's Motion is carried, after a period of eight weeks' session in twenty weeks, to adjourn for a further five weeks. As I say, I can see nothing in the condition of the country, and certainly nothing in the state of the world, which justifies us in doing that.
If my Amendment were accepted, the House would adjourn for Christmas—and why should it not? The House would have a reasonable pause in its labours—and why should it not? Members would have a sufficient opportunity of going to their constituencies and con
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sulting their constituents on a variety of problems on which the Government do not seem able to make up their minds at all. Why should they not? In addition to all that, in the twenty days that my Amendment will allow, there would also be sufficient time for reasonable rest and recuperation in anticipation of the Guillotine Motions and the business on which we are to embark when we come back.
I ask any responsible Member of this House—and I am not making any kind of party point—why, in this situation, should three weeks not be sufficient for the House to adjourn? Is it because we have not enough to do? We only have to listen to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House telling us the business for the first week when we come back to realise that not merely is it not true that we have not enough to do, but that we have so much to do that we have not time to do it properly. That is why he is moving his Guillotine Motions. There can be no other reason for moving a Guillotine Motion, can there? One does not move a Guillotine Motion for spite, does one, or for revenge or to recover one's lost self-esteem? A person does not do it because he is afraid of the opposition that is raised against his proposals, does he? Surely not. It is not because the Government do not want the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill or the Army Reserve Bill to be properly examined Clause by Clause and properly amended, if Amendments are necessary. It is common ground that there is anxiety on both sides of the House on both these Measures.
If what I have suggested as not being the reasons really are not the reasons, then what are the reasons? I am quite aware that all Governments move Guillotine Motions from time to time. I am well aware that all Oppositions, whatever their party colour, oppose Guillotine Motions whenever the Government of the day move them. I am not prepared to say—I am too old a hand—of any Government that there are not or may not be times and occasions when, however objectionable, a Guillotine Motion may, nevertheless, be justified. My right hon. Friends did it in their day, and I have no doubt that when—I hope it will be soon—they

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have the opportunity of doing it again, they will do it again when they are so advised.
But there is only one legitimate reason for moving a Guillotine Motion, and that is that one has not the time to give the Measure proper discussion and proper amendment. That is what the right hon. Gentleman is saying—that we must have the Guillotine Motion because we must get the Bills through earlier than we could without the Motion. It is not, therefore, that we have not enough to do. By the right hon. Gentleman's confession—indeed, it is the basis of his case—we have more to do than we can properly do in the time.
Therefore, how can one justify two weeks beyond the three weeks proposed by my Amendment for the Christmas Adjournment? Why? What for? Who else gets five weeks' holiday at Christmas? I know of nobody among what one might call the working-class professions. If the teachers do not mind my including them in such a description, I think that the longest holiday that they ever get is five weeks in the summer.
We, however, are proposing to take five weeks at Christmas only two months after we have finished an eleven-weeks' holiday. We do not need it. Most of us do not want it. It is convenient only to the Government, because the longer they can get rid of the House of Commons the more justification they will have for abbreviating its time to discuss things when it comes back. By shortening the time, they provide themselves with what would otherwise be lacking—a legitimate justification for the Guillotine Motion. In principle, it seems to me that, even if nothing else were involved, there is a very powerful case, which would be accepted by three-quarters of the House if it were put to a free vote with the Whips off, for limiting the Christmas vacation to three weeks, which most of us would regard as ample.
But the argument does not stand there. I am sorry to take a little time about it, but I think that this is important. I suppose that, both domestically and in international affairs, no Christmas adjournment has come at a time when our affairs were in so precarious a condition. I shall have something to say
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about international affairs in a moment. I must add that I endorse and agree with all that has been said about the state of domestic affairs in the debate so far as it has gone.
I want to make one additional point about domestic affairs at this point in my argument. I do not see the Home Secretary present, but I took care to let him know that I would make this point, and I think that the Leader of the House is aware of what I am about to say. There are today in our prisons a number of young people. Though I am not seeking to give a judgment upon it—that is not my function, and I am not qualified—I have very serious doubts indeed, for reasons which I have communicated, whether they are even legally detained.
If they are not legally detained, the Home Secretary is responsible for their illegal detention. I am not saying anything about the courts or criticising them in any way. That is not my business. It would be out of order, anyhow. Also, our penal system provides rights of appeal, and one can—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but I find it difficult to connect what he is saying with the date of the Recess.
Mr. Silverman: I hope, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that you will have a little patience with me. I have given considerable thought to this and hope in the next few sentences to persuade both the Government and you that my remarks are strictly in order.
I repeat that if there were anyone illegally in any gaol in this country, not in the sense that judgment was appealable, but in the sense that the sentence was beyond jurisdiction, then a writ of habeas corpus could be directed to the Home Secretary as being the person responsible for the detention. Indeed, the Home Secretary, quite apart from that, has ample powers under the Royal prerogative to release anybody on a recommendation to mercy. Therefore, I think it is perfectly proper for me to address the appeal which I am about to make to the Home Secretary in these circumstances.
As to the circumstances, I am concerned not with the generality of the cases but only with those who are a

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little more than children. I think the House realises that I am talking about young people now imprisoned as a result of their participation in various demonstrations over the weekend of 9th December. Many of them were charged—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman again, but I hope that he will help me by showing how his remarks are connected with the Adjournment Motion.
Mr. Silverman: What I am saying, in short, is that I am not willing that the House should adjourn at all while these people are in prison.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Gentleman cannot, on those grounds, debate the case in detail.
Mr. Silverman: I am saying to the Home Secretary, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that he is responsible and that he can bring their detention to an end by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative, if by nothing else, at any moment that he likes. With very great respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, it seems to me that there cannot be anything objectionable in my making that plea.
I make that plea, and I explain the circumstances not by way of criticising anybody but so that the Home Secretary shall know what it is that I have in mind. I am talking of young people between the ages of 17 and 20 charged with offences for which the maximum penalty is 40s. Some of them refused to pay, and when they refuse to pay there is an alternative of imprisonment, and in many cases the alternative has been fixed as high as twenty-five days—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The hon. Member cannot go into all this detail on the Adjournment Motion.
Mr. Silverman: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I cannot ask the Home Secretary to release somebody without tell him all the details.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member cannot make that plea on this Motion.
Mr. Silverman: I hope that I am not going beyond the Motion at all, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I am giving the reasons
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for saying that I am not prepared to vote for so long an adjournment as the Government have proposed, and one of my reasons is that I do not want, at a season of peace, to go home and celebrate the season of peace and think of the Prince of Peace while children are in prison for no greater crime than their devotion to peace. It would be most unworthy if the House were not ready to listen to such an argument.
In 1948, we passed a Criminal Justice Act—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. The hon. Member is going far beyond the Adjournment Motion.
Mr. Silverman: In 1948, we passed a Criminal Justice Act—
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am surprised at the hon. Member. He is going far beyond the Adjournment Motion. Does he intend to speak to his Amendment?
Mr. Silverman: With great respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I say that it is not possible to judge whether my argument goes beyond the scope of what is permissible until the argument has been stated. I will be very short about it. What I am saying, and I hope you will allow me to put it to you, even as a point of order, to you and to the Government, if they will listen, is that by Section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, it is provided that nobody shall be sent to prison before the age of 17, and that up to the age of 21 no one shall be sent to prison if there is any other reasonable course.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. That goes far beyond this Adjournment Motion.
Mr. Silverman: It you would be good enough, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, to explain to me why I am not entitled to use this imprisonment—to which I object and which the Government can end, as they have complete administrative powers to end it—why I am not entitled to use their neglect or refusal to do so as an argument for no adjournment until they do, I will bring this part of my argument to an end. At the moment, I am utterly unable to see—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Gentleman can argue as a reason against

1403
the Adjournment that this matter has not been debated, but he cannot debate the merits of this matter now.
Mr. Silverman: With respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I accept that fully. I am not seeking at all to debate the merits of it one way or the other. I quite appreciate the merits of the conviction are not debatable, in any case, and I would not seek to offer any arguments for or against or make any comment whatever about what any court has done in a criminal case, and I am not doing it. I am saying that mercy begins where justice stops, and—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I hope that the hon. Member will confine himself to the Motion.
Mr. Victor Goodhew: On a point of order. Is it not a fact that it has already been agreed by this House that we adjourn at five o'clock tomorrow? Therefore, are we not in the position that, as we have already agreed to that, the question at issue is merely on what day we shall return—
Mr. Silverman: With great respect, that is what I was talking about.
Mr. Goodhew: Further to that point of order. The hon. Gentleman himself said earlier that the House had already agreed that we should adjourn tomorrow, and that, if we did not accept this Motion to return on 23rd January, we should not came back at all. If he has accepted that we have already agreed to adjourn tomorrow at five o'clock, surely there is no question now of suggesting that we should not adjourn.
Mr. Silverman: I am sure that I would be out of order, and certainly extremely unpopular, if, for the benefit of the hon. Gentleman, who either was not here or was not listening, I were to repeat the whole of my speech so far. I have no intention of doing that. I suggest—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I understand that the hon. Member has moved an Amendment to leave out "23rd" and to insert "9th". I cannot connect the hon. Member's observations with that Amendment.
Mr. Silverman: Then, I must make myself clearer, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. I
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think that most hon. Members did understand, and if I have not made myself clear to you, I must make another attempt. It seems to me that I have sufficiently made, perhaps over-laboured, the point I was making—that one of the reasons why I am not willing that the House should agree to be away far five weeks instead of, as I am proposing, three weeks, is that if I were to agree to that, I would have to wait another two weeks longer before I could raise the point again, unless the Government are prepared to deal with it now. It is, therefore, directly addressed to my proposition that we should not adjourn for five weeks, but only for three.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Member is entitled to say that he wishes to vote for his Amendment because the matter has not been debated, but he cannot debate it now.
Mr. Silverman: I am not debating it, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. Surely, there must be a difference between asking the Government to do something and telling them what are the circumstances in which they are being asked to act and debating the rights and wrongs of something outside the Question before the House?
The Question before the House is whether we shall adjourn until the 9th or the 23rd January. I am giving reasons for preferring the 9th, and one reason is that I want the Government now—not to wait until the 23rd January, but now—to deal with a situation, which I think most hon. Members, whatever their opinions and whatever views may be taken on the merits, about which I have not said one word and do not propose to say one word, would regard as quite intolerable, in which children of this age, contrary to public policy, should remain in prison over Christmas in these circumstances. That is the point I am making.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I hope that the hon. Member will confine himself to the Amendment.
Sir Derek Walker-Smith: The hon. Gentleman says "remain in prison over Christmas". May I remind the hon. Gentleman that if his Amendment is carried it would merely mean that instead of being able to raise this matter, at the earliest, on

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23rd January, he would be able to raise it at the earliest on 9th January, and, therefore, that proposition at least does not seem to be a valid one.
Mr. Silverman: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has not followed the point. I want to raise this question, not on 23rd January and not on 9th January, but now. That is what I am doing. It is one of my arguments for resisting the Government's Motion. I have no desire to labour the point, because I have drawn the Minister's attention to it and I hope that he will be kind enough to say a word about it, because I know that he understands the point. I think that he appreciates that there is no politics or malice in what I am saying. I am saying that, in the interests of what is commonly accepted public policy on both sides of this House, and has been for almost a quarter of a century, every effort should be made to keep young people out of prison, even when they are criminals, and, a fortiori, when they are not.
Mr. C. Pannell: Especially at Christmas.
Mr. Silverman: I leave the point now. I have said enough, and I have directed the right hon. Gentleman's attention to it. There is another side to it, but I will not prolong this part of my speech by dealing with it.
I want now to deal with the state of international affairs. I cannot imagine that any hon. Member of this House can be easy in his mind about what we have been told for a dozen years or more now—that the safety of Western civilisation depends upon the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. I do not know that I ever accepted that view, but a majority of Members of this House did accept it.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I do not see how that affects the Motion that we should adjourn to 23rd January, instead of 9th January, as is proposed in the hon. Gentleman's Amendment.
Mr. Silverman: What I was about to say in my next sentence, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, shows that it directly affects the Motion, only, of course, I have to say it before anyone can understand it.
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At present, as a result of the recent meeting in Paris, N.A.T.O. is in complete disarray, and, therefore, on the Government's own showing, we are being asked to adjourn for five weeks at a time when the last bulwark of Western civilisation has been destroyed. I am saying that if N.A.T.O. is not what is claimed for it, and if it has broken down utterly, with complete disagreement on every major point of policy, we ought not to tolerate adjourning at all. We are not to have, this afternoon, a general foreign affairs debate, a wide ranging tour d'horizon, but an Adjournment Debate without any specific question.
I am saying that I, for one, take altogether too serious a view of the international situation, contributed to, if not brought about, by the vagaries and vacillations and infirmity of purpose of the Government until we have more assurances about what is being done for our safety, and this, particularly in view of the fact that, without consulting his colleagues, without consulting the country or consulting anybody, the Foreign Secretary has just told his colleagues in Paris that the British people have made up their minds to allow themselves to be blown into atomic dust—his words, not mine—unless we can get our way in Berlin, although he did not know what our way in Berlin is.
It seems to me that this was a fantastic statement for the Foreign Secretary to make. It does not represent the feeling in the country, or in any part of it, and if the Government are really conducting their policies on the lines solely indicated by the Foreign Secretary then we ought to sit here all day and all night until we get a new Government, a new Foreign Secretary and a new policy. [Laughter.] I do not quite understand what hon. Members opposite are laughing about.
Sir D. Walker-Smith: We thought that it was the hon. Gentleman's peroration.
Mr. Silverman: I should have thought that that would have led hon. Members to heave a sigh of relief rather than burst into laughter.
May I ask hon. Members to come back to the point which I am trying to make? I am sure that they appreciate its seriousness and importance. I am sure that when the Foreign Secretary made his speech he would not have said

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what he did lightly, or without consideration. I am sure that he would not have said it without appreciating what the results of it would be if people took him at his word. This is not a laughing matter. Either the Foreign Secretary was really declaring the policy of the Government, in which case I repeat that we ought not to allow ourselves to adjourn while the Government remain in office and in power, or he was not declaring the policy of the Government, in which case we ought not to adjourn until the Government have openly and publicly declared that the Foreign Secretary is not, at any rate in that respect, expressing any policy of theirs.
This is all the more true when we look at other parts of the world—I am not proposing to debate them, or even to refer to them—but Goa and Katanga have been mentioned. Indeed, the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton, in a sincere and impressive speech, made the point that we ought to have an assurance about the recall of Parliament in certain eventualities. I say that a recall would not be enough, because, by then, the damage would have been done. Surely hon. Members opposite must agree that, even in matters about which they have more anxiety than I have, matters in which they are more opposed to the Government's policy than I am and even though they do not agree with the other points I have made, they, too, would prefer to come back on the 9th and resume their criticisms, arguments and representations rather than wait another fortnight.
Although we look at these matters in different ways and have different views about them and would like different policies with regard to them, nevertheless we are at one in regarding them as serious matters and in deploring the attitude of the Government towards them, and we are at one in wanting much more opportunity for the House of Commons to bring adequate pressure to bear on the Government until either we persuade them to change their policy or to give up office.
5.34 p.m.
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): You, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, have just read an Amendment which has been moved to
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the original Motion, and I think that it would probably be for the convenience of the House if I expressed a view on the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and on some of the points raised.
The original Motion before the House is to the effect that at its rising tomorrow—and that we have agreed—the House should adjourn until Tuesday, 23rd January. A suggestion was made for a short while by the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition that we should not accept the main Motion at all. I do not think that that is a proposition that would commend itself to the House. What we are discussing now is a matter which one can reasonably debate.
I should like to put forward reasons why I do not consider, in spite of the arguments advanced, that 9th January is a more appropriate date than 23rd January. First of all, on the question of the length of the Recess, the length proposed—that is, to 23rd January—is thirty-two days. That is exactly in accord with precedent over a great number of years, examples of which I have here but will not quote. So the real question is that, granted in normal circumstances we would adjourn for thirty-two days, are the circumstances sufficiently abnormal to justify us taking a fortnight off that time?
If the suggestion of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne were adopted, with Easter as it is at 22nd April—extremely late this year—we should then have a period between the Christmas Recess and Easter of fifteen Parliamentary weeks.
Before I come to the two main streams, as it were, I wish to make reference to two more or less side issues which have been raised. First of all, the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) made some amiable remarks about me which I took in good heart, as I am sure he meant them. But I am bound to say that his facts, from beginning to end and almost without exception, were quite wrong. He produced, first, as an instance of why, as he put it, we are in this position, the question of the B.B.C. Charter.
With great respect, if the hon. Gentleman would read the very generous statement which Mr. Speaker made on 12th

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December he would see that Mr. Speaker made it abundantly clear that the Minister, the Postmaster-General, and, therefore, the Government were not at fault and had, in fact, carried out precisely the procedure laid down by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, if my memory serves me right—and I think it does—on 17th July, 1956. The hon. Gentleman is wrong.
The other instance which the hon. Gentleman gave was of the Swiss Loan Agreement and the Ponsonby Rule. But the hon. Gentleman is wrong on that, too, as the Lord Privy Seal will say later in the day. All I want to say to the hon. Gentleman is that the facts show that the basis of his case is wrong.
Mr. Richard Marsh rose—
Mr. Macleod: Is it important?
Mr. Marsh: The right hon. Gentleman said that my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) was wrong. I was present during the debate on the B.B.C. licence. Can the right hon. Gentleman explain why it was he who originally decided that the House should not adjourn but who, subsequently, moved the Adjournment himself?
Mr. Macleod: It was, of course, because Mr. Speaker thought that the B.B.C. Charter of 1952 should be in the Vote Office. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will see this perfectly clearly from Mr. Speaker's statement made a day or two ago. In fact, the obligation on Ministers laid down was to reprint and this was done in the case of the B.B.C. Charter. With respect, it was really the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends who were at fault in not following the procedure. [HON. MEMBERS: "No.''] That is so, and the statement from the Chair makes it perfectly clear.
There are two main parts to this discussion which suggest that we should not have a Recess of the length proposed. One of them we could call the broad international issues, and that was brought forward, first of all, by my hon. Friend the Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison), by my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) and by the Leader of the Liberal Party and others.
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They asked for an assurance in relation to the recall of the House. The words of Standing Order No. 112 are, I am sure, familiar to the House, but I should like to read them for they are of great importance at this time:
"Whenever the House stands adjourned and it is represented to Mr. Speaker by Her Majesty's Ministers that the public interest requires that the House should meet at any earlier time during the adjournment, Mr. Speaker, if he is satisfied that the public interest does so require, may give notice that he is so satisfied, and thereupon the House shall meet at the time stated in such notice."
Naturally, in such representations made by the Government the wishes of hon. Members in the whole of the House are given the fullest possible consideration.
Before I come to the main point to which hon. Members asked me to reply perhaps I could say one word, trying hard to keep in order, to the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne, who did me the courtesy to give me notice. I was prepared to reply to him in great detail on this matter, but I think that all I can say within the bounds of order is that, as he knows, it is not for Ministers to express an opinion on a matter of law or to comment on the validity of the action of the court; and any question of the power to make a particular order can be determined only by a superior court, and if any persons consider the court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction the ordinary channels of appeal are open. That is all I can say. If I try to say any more I should be stepping—
Mr. S. Silverman: The right hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I was not asking him to comment upon the matter or to come to any judgment about any legal question. I was asking about the administrative powers of the Home Secretary to intervene so as to apply what is accepted as public policy by the exercise of his own powers, not the court's.
Mr. Macleod: I understood that, and if I cannot reply in detail because of the Rulings of the Chair I will represent it entirely to my right hon. Friend.
Let me take up the main argument, which really concerns the announcement made at business today. The right hon. Gentleman the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition started it. He and I have debated many times and

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said a lot of rough things to each other. He will allow me to say that, really, for him to accuse me of irritation is a little like Satan rebuking the Archangel Gabriel.
On the argument as to whether it would or would not be right to take a different course from the one which is proposed, let me direct my attention to some of the remarks of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). I tried to deal with them in reply to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) last time. I know how much he cares about the Army and that he wants to see the Army Reserve Bill debated in full and in the proper way with all the people really concerned about it taking part. That I entirely accept. I do not accept that that is a process which is impossible under an Allocation of Time Order.
Indeed, I am certain that the House can remember examples. I recall one with particular vividness upon almost the first debate of any importance in which I took part in the House, in the Session 1951–52. There was a Guillotine on the National Health Service Bill when after weeks no progress whatever had been made—on about two lines at the most. [HON. MEMBERS: "After weeks."] That allocation of time Order was introduced, and from then on the matter was discussed by those whom we may call the "health Members of the Club". [HON. MEMBERS: "After weeks."] Hon. Members opposite say "after weeks". That is perfectly true. The debate went on under the Guillotine. There is an example of a Guillotine set up by their own side of the House, which sets a precedent for introducing the Guillotine before a Standing Committee has begun to meet. These questions of procedure can be tossed backwards and forwards. We all know one another's speeches on these matters.
I want to take up the point of the hon. Member. Of course, the allocation of time is not decided by the Government. The outline is decided by the Government, but the detail is decided by the Business Committee, which is a rather different thing. I do not accept that any such discussion is necessarily inadequate in any way, and it will be necessary, I am afraid, for the hon. Member for Coventry, East to study the Allocation
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of Time Order when it is available. I will try to see that it is decided as soon as possible.
Mr. Crossman: I put a second point, which I thought a serious and important one. The whole custom of the House has been that whatever else we Guillotine we do not Guillotine Service Bills. Such Measures have been left outside that procedure. I should like to know what the hon. Gentleman says about that.
Mr. Macleod: Yes. The hon. Member said there were two precedents. I count three, but we will not argue about that. The general sense is the same. Taking up that point, and linking it with what the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. A. Lewis) said, I assure the House—and I give my personal assurance on it—that when we started business yesterday I had no plans for a Guillotine. That is, in fact, true, and it was the progress of business yesterday which convinced me that this had become necessary.
Mr. Crossman: I want the right hon. Gentleman to understand this. What he has now said makes the situation far, far worse. What he is saying is that the sole justification for the Guillotine was what happened yesterday afternoon and evening when for three and a half hours yesterday afternoon the business was entirely held up owing to the inadequacy of the Secretary of State. Then we had one group of Amendments. There was no kind of delay. Then there was a period of discussion on reporting progress. Which part of all that does the right hon. Gentleman say justifies his almost unprecedented decision to guillotine the debate on the Bill? Was it the first three and a half hours?
Mr. Thorpe: And we took twelve Amendments together. Was it that?
Mr. Crossman: Was it the time spent on the group of twelve Amendments taken together? Or was it the one hour sixteen minutes in the course of which the right hon. Gentleman walked out and lost his temper? Now that he has said it was only yesterday afternoon's business which convinced him, we really want to know which part of the business he means.
Mr. Macleod: The hon. Gentleman is very adroit, but I did not say it was only yesterday's business at all. What I said was yesterday's business taken together with previous progress convinced me, as, I think, it convinced the whole House—I really do think so—that it was necessary.
The immediate Question before the House is raised by the hon. Member for Nelson and Caine, that we should come back two Parliamentary weeks earlier—on 9th January. I suppose we should take that with what the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition said, that we could well spend the intervening time debating those two Measures. Nobody, of course, would accept that the duties of a Member of Parliament are entirely within the Palace of Westminster. We all have many duties in our constituencies, and abroad as well, which hon. Members wish to carry out.
However, I do not think that my right hon. Friend the Member for Thirsk and Malton was right—indeed, he was contradicted by many Members on the other side of the House—when he suggested that the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition had given an undertaking that we would complete that business. I would not accept that, but I think that my right hon. Friend misunderstood, to some extent, what was said. The proposition was that if we met we could talk on, and, no doubt, in course of time some progress would be made.
Mr. Turton: I made quite clear that I asked the Deputy-Leader or the Leader of the Opposition to clarify what appeared to be a vague sort of undertaking.
Mr. Macleod: Yes, I was trying for some clarification. I think that if the right hon. Gentleman will reply he will make the position clear, but that is how I understood it: he thought we should meet and take matters onwards, but without an undertaking from him.
I agree that if the Opposition bitterly detest one or two Bills, it is their business to oppose them by all the ordinary Parliamentary methods at their disposal—and this is a matter which arises on every Guillotine Motion. Nor is it the business of the Opposition to help Government business on—and on that I agree with the doctrine of the Leader
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of the Opposition who, when a Guillotine Motion last came before the House, said:
"It is not the business of the Opposition to reach agreement for facilitating Government business which, in our view, is extremely unpopular and quite unjustifiable as a matter of policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1961; Vol. 635, c. 1753–4.]
I agree with that as a matter of doctrine, and it is a fair statement of the ordinary point of view of an Opposition. But, having that in mind and having the progress so far made with the Bills in mind, I cannot think that it would be a profitable exercise for the House to accept the Amendment. Therefore, I think that this period of recess, which we propose exactly in accordance with precedents over the years, should be accepted and that we should reject the Amendment.
5.52 p.m.
Mr. Gordon Walker: The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House started by asking what there was abnormal in the situation which would justify our returning earlier than the Government propose. What is abnormal is that we are now to come back to a Guillotine on two major and, constitutionally, extremely important Bills. The right hon. Gentleman spoke almost as though a Guillotine were a little thing which convenienced the House and did not stop debate, and so on. That is not the way to talk of these things. A Guillotine on Measures of this kind is extremely abnormal, as I will try to show. In the one case it is very nearly unprecedented in modern times and in the other, affecting Commonwealth opinion as well as opinion in this country, it is excessively unwise.
The right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton (Mr. Turton) misunderstood what my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said. My right hon. Friend did not offer any sort of deal. What he was saying was that to go away for so long as the Government propose and then to return to a Guillotine was quite wrong, and that we ought to come back early in order to be able to have time to discuss these things and so avoid the Guillotine. That is sensible and that is what we are arguing.
The two Bills which the Government propose to guillotine are Bills which should not be guillotined. Let us take,

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first, the Army Reserve Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) said, in modern times it is unprecedented for Service Bills to be pushed straight into the middle of party politics in this way. The only precedents are to be found in the time of Liberal Governments and Lord Haldane's Measures, when there was a Tory Opposition, of course, and when Service Bills were three times obstructed and there was a Guillotine. Since then, under both Labour and Conservative Governments, that has ceased to be the practice. We have prided ourselves on not using the Guillotine on Service Measures, because we wanted to keep the great Service Issues out of politics.
The right hon. Gentleman made one extraordinary statement. He said that he had not made up his mind to impose the Guillotine, at any rate on the Army Reserve Bill, until late in yesterday's proceedings. If that is what he now tells us, he has no case for imposing the Guillotine. We were not holding up the Bill, and the evidence for that is overwhelming. Through some confusion—and we are getting used to this kind of procedural confusion—the Secretary of State for War himself had to move to report Progress in the middle of his own Committee stage to enable my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) to get him out of trouble. That was extraordinary and we took three hours over it.
The right hon. Gentleman will agree that on the first night of the Committee stage we reached a mutually satisfactory agreement with the Government. On the second night, my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper proposed that we should get ahead with the next batch of Amendments, which we would certainly have reached by the time we finally broke off last night but for the Motion of the Secretary of State for War. There is no evidence whatever that we have been holding up the Bill, or that we intend to hold it up.
If the right hon. Gentleman tells us that he made up his mind after listening to yesterday's debate, I could understand his being impatient after listening to the three hours' debate which was launched by his right hon. Friend, but he has abandoned any proper argument for taking an unprecedented action, to which
1416
many hon. Members opposite object and which will not be understood and accepted in the country. Now he tells us that he made up his mind only late, apparently in a sort of fit of temper.
Mr. Iain Macleod indicated dissent.
Mr. Gordon Walker: I cannot understand how else the right hon. Gentleman could have done it. He could not have done it from a rational consideration of what we had done in Committee. He practically told us that he got into a fit of temper and decided to clap on a Guillotine, maybe having already decided to guillotine the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. Having done that and realising that the Guillotine Motion for the two Bills could be taken on the one day and that he would not lose any more time, he decided, without a proper reason, to slap the Guillotine on a Service Bill, thus making a major departure from modern precedent which was not in the least necessary.
The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill should not be guillotined for different reasons. As the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton said, to guillotine it will be misunderstood in the West Indies and elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Rightly or wrongly, the Bill makes a major departure—which will affect all Commonwealth citizens, from Australia, Canada, the West Indies and elsewhere—from our traditional policy, a policy which we have never altered ever since there has been a Commonwealth. The Government should not guillotine a Bill which alters our policy towards Commonwealth citizens and Commonwealth Governments and Commonwealth countries, publishing to them that we cannot find time to debate the Bill in the House without a Guillotine because of the way the Government have muddled their own programme. The Government are giving the impression of turning against the Commonwealth in a rather shabby way.
Mr. Turton: The point I was making, and to which the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) is not addressing himself, is that in the past, when we had important Bills affecting the Commonwealth, the Opposition have co-operated with the Government so that there could be a voluntary arrangement of time. If my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House is saying that

1417
he has not made sufficient progress, it is for the Opposition to give an undertaking so that business can be done—and it is that undertaking which I thought the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was giving.
Mr. Gordon Walker: I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman can quote me a precedent for this kind of Bill, for it is wholly unprecedented. Because the Government allege that we are not going fast enough does not mean that there is an obligation on us to consider a voluntary agreement. We have been discussing a Clause of vital and radical importance in that Bill, and we are about to come to another to which the right hon. Member for Thirsk and Malton himself has put down a very important Amendment, which may not be properly discussed because of the Guillotine.
if we came back a week or two earlier, we could get through all this discussion. Even if we were obstructing—and we are not—it is fairly exhausting to sustain a whole week's debate. We would unquestionably get along and the Government would probably save time in the end by having a whole week's debate in that way. I do not think that we can be asked to come to an agreement merely because the Government say that we are not going fast enough.
I think that the right hon. Gentleman is making a grave error of judgment. I can understand that things have not been going too well for him. Grave errors have been made, and I do not think that he carried the House with him when he tried to persuade us that these errors had not been made. The Government are like a Harry Tate car—something falls off every day of the week. We can forgive this. This is the kind of thing which happens. One runs into a patch of bad luck, but it is a major error of judgment to decide to keep us away for all this time and then to bring us back to guillotine these two Measures.
I did not like the arrogant way in which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House intervened last night and waved aside my right hon. Friend. This is not the way to lead the House. It is not an easy House to lead. The right hon. Gentleman has not yet hit on the right way of doing the job. Since he has been Leader of the House, I can-
1418
not remember him gracefully bringing off anything that he has done.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: What has this to do with Christmas?
Mr. Gordon Walker: It is an example of the right hon. Gentleman's lack of tact, and a lack of the feeling of the House that he is asking us to stay away for all this time and then to come back to guillotine these two Measures. One has to take these two things together. This is a grave error of judgment on his part, and I hope that he will think about it again.
The Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) mentions a specific date for our return. We hope that he will not divide the House on this Amendment. We do not feel that it is for us, as an Opposition, to fix a particular date.
Mr. Michael Foot: Is there to be an act of grace towards those who support us in the Division Lobby? My right hon. Friend has said that hon. Members must not support the Amendment.
Mr. Gordon Walker: I said that I hoped that my hon. Friend would not divide the House. We shall divide the House when the main question is put.
Mr. S. Silverman: I thought that my right hon. Friend would welcome my Amendment. If one does not mean business, one should not vote at all. But if one does mean business it surely is a little unrealistic to vote against the Government's proposed date and not propose an alternative one? To do this is an unrealistic way of approaching the matter. Surely the realistic way is to say, "You are going away for too long. Let it be shorter," and make a proposal.
Mr. Gordon Walker: I can understand that my hon. Friend thinks that his suggestion is the right one. I do not think that it is. I do not think that my hon. Friend is as innocent as he said he was. He said that he was approaching this in all innocence. The truth is that we as an Opposition have no way of telling whether the 7th, the 8th, the 9th, or the 2nd is the right date.
Mr. S. Silverman rose—
Mr. Gordon Walker: I can put my argument if my hon. Friend leaves me alone for one second. It is logical, sensible, and proper to say that the Government have decided on too long a Recess. The evidence for that is that they have decided that when we come back they will guillotine two important Bills because they have not the time in which to discuss them. We therefore say that we should come back early enough to avoid the Guillotine. The Government must decide what date is early enough to avoid the Guillotine.
It cannot be done by means of an Amendment which seeks to specify the date. [Horn. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because we think that we should come back early enough to avoid the Guillotine, and we cannot determine—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] There is only one person who can answer this question. The Government alone know what would be the proper time to come back to avoid the Guillotine. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House can easily work this out and tell us whether we should come back five days, seven days, or nine days, earlier than is proposed, to avoid the necessity of the Guillotine. It is impossible for private Members or the Opposition to determine, so to speak, out of the air, what is the proper date to come back. That is why we do not think that the Amendment before us is a sensible one. That is why we will oppose the Government Motion.
We think that it is monstrous to bring us back to guillotine two major Measures when the Government, by altering the date of our return, could avoid the necessity for it. This procedure is undesirable in the interests of the House, of the Army, and of the Commonwealth. The Government ought to say that we shall have a shorter Recess, and that they will call us back in time to avoid the use of the Guillotine.
6.8 p.m.
Mr. William Warbey: I oppose the Motion, and, I regret to say, the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), not because I do not want to see us come back
1420
earlier—I do—but because I want to cut the Recess short at the other end.
I do not think that the House ought to adjourn tomorrow. I do not think that we ought to adjourn until Friday or Saturday. Most of my constituents will be working Friday, and many of them will be working on Saturday. I do not see why we should not work a similar period.
I am astonished at the way in which the right hon. Gentleman has handled the business of the House and has rejected the perfectly reasonable offer by the Opposition Front Bench. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House has so far surpassed his predecessor in only one respect, that is, in getting the business of the Government so congested and so jammed up that he is unable to relieve the log-jam without taking exceptional measures. We have given him the opportunity of getting out of his dilemma by suggesting that the House should come back a week earlier so that we can have adequate discussions on these important Bills.
Mr. S. Silverman: My hon. Friend said that the Opposition's proposal was that we should come back a week earlier. Where did he get that from?
Mr. Warbey: I thought I heard the suggestion made that it might be a week earlier. I do not care whether it is a week, ten days or a fortnight. I do not want to enter into this private quarrel between the Opposition front bench below the Gangway and the Front Bench above the Gangway. The issue is too serious for that. The real issue is whether or not the House has adequate time in which to discuss Bills of major importance; whether the Leader of the House is trying to find adequate time for discussion of Government business or is trying to inflict a punitive measure on the Opposition. His behaviour this afternoon has demonstrated clearly that the latter is the truth.
He was given his opportunity; we offered him adequate time for discussing the Bills. He rejected that, and wants to retain his Guillotine Motion. In so doing he has demonstrated that he is trying to take revenge upon the Opposition for the way in which he has distinguished himself as a mismanager of

1421
Government business in the last two or three weeks.
I want to say a word about this end of the Recess. It would be quite improper for the House to adjourn tomorrow—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche): That point does not arise on the Amendment.
Mr. Warbey: With great respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I am speaking to the main Motion, as amended. As far as I know, the debate which we are having is taking place on the main Motion, as amended. Is not that so? We have not yet dealt with the main Motion.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That is quite correct.
Mr. Warbey: In that case, I am quite in order in arguing why we must not adjourn tomorrow.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: We are now on the Amendment.
Mr. Gordon Walker: Is not the Question before us, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question"? If that is so, we must surely be able to discuss them.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The Question is, "That '23rd' stand part of the Question."
Mr. S. Silverman: Is not the real point that the decision to adjourn tomorrow at 5 o'clock has already been taken, on the Resolution relating to sittings of the House, and that what we are now discussing is the question when we should come back, and not when we should adjourn?
Mr. G. Brown: I rise to support my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey). Surely the position is that on the Motion concerning the sittings of the House, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has referred, what we decided to do was to adjourn at 5 o'clock tomorrow, that is to say, we fixed the hour of adjournment. We did not fix the period of Adjournment. It is the Motion relating to the Adjournment which reads:
"That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn …"
1422
Therefore, I submit that my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield is quite in order in discussing the whole question of what period of Adjournment, if any, there should be after the House rises tomorrow afternoon.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: At the moment we are on the Motion for the Adjournment, and the Question before us is to leave out "23rd" and insert "9th".
Mr. Warbey: Now that you have resumed the Chair, Mr. Speaker, may I submit that the Motion that we have already carried earlier affects only tomorrow's business, and nothing else. It has nothing to do with the adjournment for the Recess. Secondly, the Motion which we are now discussing is still debatable, because it can be put to the House. In any case, the Amendment as moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne proposes only to delete "23rd" and not the words:
"at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn …"
It is those words to which I am objecting. Although you were not in the Chair, Mr. Speaker, when the point was raised, I am saying that I think that the House should not adjourn for the Christmas Recess tomorrow. There are many extremely important matters, of both domestic and international concern—
Mr. Speaker: I understand that the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has been moved, in which case the only matter for discussion would be the Question whether we insert "9th" instead of "23rd", namely, the date on which we should return.
Mr. Warbey: With great respect, Mr. Speaker, I rose in my place when the main Question was put by you at the beginning of the afternoon, and I have risen in my place at every opportunity since then. I have been called, however, only after the Amendment has been moved.
Mr. Speaker: That has the effect of enforcing upon the hon. Member the rule as I have just stated it.
Mr. Warbey: Since you have ruled that at this moment we can discuss only the date on which we should return,

1423
would I be in order in suggesting that when the Amendment has been disposed of we may return to a debate on the main Question, and that I may then be given the opportunity of addressing the House on the main Question?
Mr. Speaker: I cannot forecast what will happen. All I am doing at the moment is stating the rule as it applies to the hon. Member, as he is now speaking.
Mr. Warbey: May I ask for a Ruling on this point, Mr. Speaker? If I participate in the debate on the Amendment, may I take it that I am not thereby debarred from participating in the debate on the main Question?
Mr. Speaker: No, certainly not by that debarred.
Mr. Warbey: In that case I will continue very briefly, because I am debarred from raising a number of very important matters to which I had wished to call attention, about which we should have had statements in the House and elucidations from the Government. I am now debarred from doing that, although a number of other hon. Members were able to do so. Nevertheless, I accept your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and I will conclude simply by making a further plea to the Leader of the House to recognise that what we have had from the Opposition in this debate has been a quite genuine offer to facilitate the proper discussion of two of the most important and controversial Bills that have ever been submitted to the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rubbish."] Did an hon. Member say "Rubbish"? Is it rubbish to say that these Bills are important or controversial, or that we have not made a quite genuine offer to discuss them?
The right hon. Gentleman knows that we have made this offer. He knows that we have made every attempt to facilitate the proper discussion of these Bills. It is not because we like them but precisely because we detest them that we want them to be properly discussed. If the right hon. Gentleman persists in refusing to accept the offer that has been made he will only be demonstrating to the House and to the world that he does not care in the least whether there is a full democratic discussion, according to
1424
Parliamentary principles, of matters of great constitutional significance and that what he is concerned with is being not the Leader of the House but the leader of his party.
Mr. C. Pannell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. It refers to the Ruling you have given to my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey). I have been in the Chamber for most of the time and it must have been within your recollection that the speakers who preceded my hon. Friend were two Front Bench speakers, the Leader of the House and my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker). They both spoke after the Amendment had been moved and they did address themselves to the main Question. I feel sure, Mr. Speaker, that had you been in the Chamber then you would have thought that the Ruling you gave—I am sure in good faith—against my hon. Friend must, of its nature, be discriminatory.
Speakers from both Front Benches have addressed themselves to the main Question and not to the Amendment. If I may say so, the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) himself referred to it. I am sure that in the exigencies of moving to and from the Chair that fact has been lost sight of and that the Ruling discriminates against my hon. Friend, which I am sure is something you would not wish to do.
Mr. Speaker: I do not want to. The point is that I am bound by the rules of the House and our rule is that when an Amendment has been moved we can discuss only the Amendment. That is my difficulty. I have no power to waive the rules of order.
Mr. Tom Driberg: But Mr. Deputy-Speaker waived them.
Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I think, perhaps, that I ought to let you know what I did say to Mr. Deputy-Speaker on this point when he was in the Chair. I submitted to him that this was not a limiting Amendment in that the arguments for and against the date of 9th January must be of the same nature as the arguments for and against the date 23rd January and, therefore, the proposal to substitute one date for the other did not have the power of narrowing the debate.
Mr. Speaker: I follow the argument. What it does, of course, is to narrow the debate as to the terminal date. It does not give rise to a discussion about the beginning date. That is the difficulty.
6.22 p.m.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: I wish to support the Amendment moved by my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) because I think it concise, logical and definite. If the Amendment were accepted, the House would meet on 9th January instead of 23rd January. That has the advantage of giving English Members the opportunity of going home for Christmas and Scottish Members the opportunity of being home for the New Year.
I heard with some dismay the proposal of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) that we should meet a couple of days after Boxing Day because his constituents would have finished celebrating Christmas on that date. In Scotland, of course, we celebrate Christmas in a perfunctory sort of way and then we celebrate the Hogmanay holiday, which is on 1st January. The Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne makes it perfectly clear that we could allow festivities in England and in Scotland to be over and have a week to recover and then we could go—
Mr. Hector Hughes: The hon. Gentleman knows that there is a very great difference between England and Scotland, yet he talks about "1st January". Why does not he use the Scottish expression "Hogmanay".
Mr. Speaker: Order. Our rule is that the House should be addressed in English.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: I am not proposing to deal with that point, Mr. Speaker.
In suggesting a later date, the Leader of the House argued that it was necessary for hon. Members to be in their constituencies for the full length of time of the Recess. I think that the right hon. Gentleman exaggerated. It is, of course, a time of the year when hon. Members go to parties for old folks and
1426
parties connected with Christmas Day and the New Year. But surely that period is finished by 9th January. I do not know whether the Leader of the House really thinks that the constituents will be anxious to see their Members of Parliament between 9th January and 22nd January. Even if there are big meetings of people interested in politics at this time of the year—which is contrary to my experience—and if questions are asked of Members of Parliament, inevitably, the first question will be, "Why are you not at Westminster, doing your job?" So I suggest that 9th January is the reasonable and logical date for our return.
I could not follow the argument of the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker), who devoted his speech to explaining why he had very little confidence in the judgment of the Government in this matter and then said that he would rely on the judgment of the Government regarding the exact day on which we should return. I believe that the House should try to avoid looking upon the Amendment with a certain amount of prejudice simply because it is moved by a combative and persistent hon Member, my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne. If we reject the Government's proposals—and overwhelming reasons have been given why we should condemn the actions of the Government—the logical thing is to fix a date and carry it to a Division.
There are a large number of reasons which I cannot enter into why we should come back on this date. The argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne seems to be absolutely conclusive. There is no section of the community, neither the miners nor the railwaymen nor the teachers, who need this very long holiday at Christmas time. The miners in my constituency would certainly ask why there was a need to continue the Recess from 9th January to 23rd January. They would, of course, give a certain amount of latitude, say, between 1st January and 4th January, because one of the usual questions asked at this time in Scotland, two or three days after the New Year, is, "Have you sobered up?" Surely we shall all have sobered up by 9th January and be able to return to the House of Commons having rested ourselves and come in contact with our constituents.

1427
There is a special reason why I, as a representative of a Scottish constituency, am anxious that the return date should be fixed and that it should not be a later date in the month. We in Scotland are concerned about pit closures and the closing of railway branch lines. My constituents will certainly ask me what need there is for me to be at home for a fortnight when no one goes to public meetings and when the festivities are over. They will want to know why the House of Commons is not talking about the things which are principally affecting their lives. I therefore suggest that we could profitably employ the time of the House between 9th January and 23rd January in discussing the various subjects which are pertinent, both in the national and the international sphere and, especially so far as Scotland is concerned, to the whole economic future of our country.
The Leader of the House, when pressed recently on the question of pit closures, was asked to refer the matter to the Scottish Grand Committee, and that would be one way out of his difficulties. Unfortunately, the Committee cannot sit when the House is not in session, and so, Mr. Speaker, I am driven to the conclusion that the Amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne should be supported. I shall have very much pleasure in joining him in the Division Lobby.
6.30 p.m.
Mr. Richard Marsh: I intervene very briefly, but I want to say that one of the impressions given by recent events is that the Government seem determined to filibuster and restrict their own business. The discussion that we have had this afternoon arises, almost in its entirety, on the statement made by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the House earlier in the afternoon. Had he not made that statement, the points that have been raised would not have been made.
I would not normally oppose the idea of the length of this Recess just because I think that it would be a pity that it should go out from the House that hon. Members just bowl off for a longer holiday in comparison with people out- side, because that comparison is not entirely accurate. There are many hon.
1428
Members of this House—I am not one of them because I have a London constituency and a London home—who spend the whole of the Session living in "digs", some of which may not be of a particularly salubrious character, or in hotel rooms, and they are perfectly entitled, during the Recess, to go back to their families for as long as they possibly can. They have also other work to do in their constituencies. But that is not the issue. We are complaining this afternoon that a Recess of this length is unjustified in the circumstances in which the House finds itself at the present time, circumstances which are not normal and not usual.
In the course of his remarks, the Leader of the House made a number of comparisons, with precedents, as is sometimes done on these occasions. There were occasions when the Labour Government in 1950 and 1951 also introduced Guillotine Measures. There is, however, a very serious difference between a Government with a majority of six and a Government with a majority of 112 introducing a time-table Motion—

ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS)

  ROYAL ASSENT
  6.31 p.m.
  Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:
  The House went:—and, having returned;
  Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

  1. Export Gurantees Act, 1961.

  2. Expiring Laws Continuance Act. 1961.

  3. Coal Industry Act, 1961.

  4. Family Allowances and National Insurance Act, 1961.

  5. Glasgow Corporation (Parking Meters) Order Confirmation Act, 1961.

  6. Edinburgh Corporation Order Confirmation Act, 1961.

  7. Rothesay Burgh Order Confirmation Act, 1961.

  8. Argyll County Council (Scalasaig Pier, etc.) Order Confirmation Act, 1961.

ADJOURNMENT (CHRISTMAS)
Question again proposed, That "23rd" stand part of the Question.
6.35 p.m.
Mr. Marsh: Before the interruption, Mr. Speaker, I was making the point that it was wrong of the Government to try to claim, as an analogy to the present situation, the circumstances under a Government with a majority of only six.
Mr. Macleod: The hon. Gentleman is wrong. I cannot think of any precedent in the period to which he refers. The analogy I used today was from 1947, when the Socialists had a very large majority.
Mr. Marsh: I apologise. I thought that the right hon. Gentleman mentioned the later period. But he did use in evidence the debate on the B.B.C. Licence and Agreement. He made the point that the difficulties which arose that night were not the result of his actions. This is germane to the issue and is one of the reasons why it is unjustifiable to ask the House to have such a long Recess. We find ourselves short of time now because of the direct actions of the right hon. Gentleman since, on the night of the debate on the B.B.C. Licence and Agreement, he began by opposing the Adjournment and finished by moving it himself. We find ourselves in the same difficulty today, because of the situation which arose last night.
I support the suggestion that we should come back on an earlier date it is quite wrong and illogical for the House to say that it has not sufficient time to discuss issues when it is to go away for five weeks. A timetable Motion should not be used as anything other than as absolutely the last resort. In addition, we are now in a situation where the Foreign Affairs debate is in jeopardy. That means that we have lost another day. We keep on losing days like this, but the answer is not to put down a timetable Motion. The problem is not helped by having a Recess of the length proposed by the Government. The difficulties arise entirely out of the actions and decisions of the Leader of the House.
Mr. Speaker: The Question is—
Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I think that, perhaps, I have a right to say a word in conclusion. I should like to explain to my right hon. Friend the Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) why I cannot accept his invitation to withdraw my Amendment.
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has moved his Amendment and that has the effect of his having spoken once to the main Question. He cannot speak again now.
Question put, That "23rd" stand part of the Question:—
The House divided: Ayes 172, Noes 3.

Division No. 43.]

AYES

[6.48 p.m.

Agnew, Sir Peter

Carr, Compton (Barons Court)

Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)

Allason, James

Channon, H. P. G.

Freeth, Denzil

Ashton, Sir Hubert

Chataway, Christopher

Gardner, Edward

Atkins, Humphrey

Chichester-Clark, R.

Gibson-Watt, David

Barber, Anthony

Cole, Norman

Gilmour, Sir John

Barlow, Sir John

Cooke, Robert

Glover, Sir Douglas

Barter, John

Cooper, A. E.

Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)

Bell, Ronald

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Godber, J. B.

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Corfield, F. V.

Goodhart, Philip

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)

Costain, A. P.

Goodhew, Victor

Berkeley, Humphry

Craddock, Sir Beresford

Grant-Ferris, Wg. Cdr. R.

Bidgood, John C.

Critchley, Julian

Green, Alan

Biffen, John

Cunningham, Knox

Gresham Cooke, R.

Biggs-Davison, John

Curran, Charles

Grimston, Sir Robert

Bingham, R. M-

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Gurden, Harold

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Deedes, W. F.

Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)

Bishop, F. P.

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Bossom, Clive

Drayson, G. B.

Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

Bourne-Arton, A.

Eden, John

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Box, Donald

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vers (Macclesf'd)

Boyle, Sir Edward

Elliott, R. W. (Nwcstle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Hastings, Stephen

Brown, Alan (Tottenham)

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Bryan, Paul

Errington, Sir Eric

Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward

Buck, Antony

Finlay, Graeme

Hendry, Forbes

Butler, Rt. Hn. R.A.(Saffron Walden)

Fisher, Nigel

Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)

Campbell, Gordon (Moray & Nairn)

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Holland, Philip

Mawby, Ray

Skeet, T. H. H

Hornby, R. P.

Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.

Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)

Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)

Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

Smithers, Peter

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John

Mills, Stratton

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Hughes-Young, Michael

Montgomery, Fergus

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

Hubert, Sir Norman

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Studholme, Sir Henry

Iremonger, T. L.

Osborn, John (Hallam)

Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

James, David

Page, John (Harrow, West)

Temple, John M.

Jennings, J. C.

Partridge, E.

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth

Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

Johnson Smith, Geoffrey

Pike, Miss Cervyn

Turner, Colin

Kerans, Cdr. J. S.

Pitman, Sir James

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Kershaw, Anthony

Pitt, Miss Edith

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Kirk, Peter

Pott, Percivall

Vickers, Miss Joan

Langford-Holt, J.

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Leburn, Gilmour

Prior, J. M. L.

Walder, David

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Profumo, Dr. Hon. John

Walker, Peter

Lindsay, Martin

Proudfoot, Wilfred

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek

Litchfield, Capt. John

Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin

Ward, Dame Irene

Longbottom, Charles

Renton, David

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Longden, Gilbert

Ridley, Hon. Nicholas

Whitelaw, William

Loveys, Walter H.

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Williams, Dudley (Exeter)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

McLaren, Martin

Roots, William

Wise, A. R.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)

Woollam, John

McMaster, Stanley R,

Russell, Ronald

Worsley, Marcus

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

St. Clair, M.

Maddan, Martin

Scott-Hopkins, James

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Maitland, Sir John

Shaw, M.

Mr. Noble and Mr. Peel.

Marten, Neil

Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir Jocelyn

NOES

Holt, Arthur

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Mr. Emrys Hughes and

Thorpe, Jeremy

Mr. Michael Foot

Main Question again proposed.
6.58 p.m.
Mr. Warbey: Now that we are free from the restrictions of the debate on the Amendment, I wish briefly to refer to the question of whether or not this House should adjourn tomorrow for the Christmas Recess. In my view there are a number of reasons why we should not adjourn for the Recess tomorrow—a number of very substantial matters of both domestic and international importance on which we ought to hear statements from members of the Government and which this House ought to have an opportunity to debate.
I do not intend to range over the whole field, but for illustration I mention merely two. One is the question of the further developments in the Congo. I raise this matter because it is an urgent one. It is one which has to be dealt with immediately by the Government and one on which the Government have a responsibility. I feel quite sure that the Lord Privy Seal will say that he will not be able to deal with this matter later this evening, if we ever reach the debate on foreign affairs, because it has been agreed on both sides that that debate—
1432
particularly in the short time which will then be available—shall be limited to Berlin, to international discussions between the great Powers, and possibly to disarmament. Therefore, as we cannot expect any statement then from the right hon. Gentleman about the Government's further intentions in regard to the Congo, we ought to have one now.
In particular, I ask the Lord Privy Seal this question. Since the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations has rejected the appeal for an immediate cease-fire which was made by the Government last week and has continued the operations in the Congo with the object of achieving the United Nations objectives there, what steps do the Government now propose to take? That is the first question which the right hon. Gentleman should answer.
There are a number of hon. Members on his own side of the House who have already told the Government that if there were not an immediate cease-fire the Government should withhold their contribution. Do the Government intend to do that? The Prime Minister, in his effort to win back the support of his rebellious hon. Friends,—
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must direct his observations to the Question now before the House. We cannot debate Katanga at length on this Question.
Mr. Warbey: I will endeavour to do that, Mr. Speaker. I was indicating the statement that we ought to have and the questions that should be answered by the Government before we adjourn for the Recess, and I was giving that as a reason why we should not adjourn. Certainly, the Government are morally bound to tell, not only hon. Members on this side, but also their own Members, who rallied around them last week in response to a Government pledge that they would seek an immediate cease-fire, what they now intend to do since the Acting Secretary-General has rejected their request.
The other matter about which we should most certainly have a statement in the House before we adjourn is on the question of the Government's action in relation to Goa. That may be a matter partly for the Lord Privy Seal, but it is probably rather more a matter for the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. No doubt, the Lord Privy Seal or the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs will be in a position to answer on behalf of their right hon. Friend.
Before we adjourn for the Recess, the House is entitled to know why the Government have sided with the other members of the Western military bloc in denouncing a member of the Commonwealth as an aggressor. That is what happened yesterday at the Security Council of the United Nations. We have had no report to this House on the actions of the British representative in the Security Council, no report on the way in which he voted on the resolutions put before the Council and no defence by the Government of the way in which they have abandoned a Commonwealth country in a difficult position to side with their allies in the Western military bloc.
It should be remembered that those allies include a country like Turkey, which recently murdered its political opponents—
Mr. A. Lewis: On a point of order. I do not know whether you can hear,
1434
Mr. Speaker, but a terrific noise is going on in this part of the Chamber. Could you call to order any of the hon. Members who may be making the noise so that my hon. Friend may continue his speech?
Mr. F. M. Bennett: Before you deal with that point of order, Mr. Speaker, could you also understand that the applause from the Opposition Front Bench to this contribution to the debate is so overwhelming that we cannot hear either?
Mr. Speaker: I hope that hon. Members will preserve the rule of the House, keeping silence while others are speaking.
Mr. Warbey: We ought to hear from the Lord Privy Seal or from the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations whether they made any serious attempt to induce the Portuguese Government to observe, not only common international decency, but also their obligations to the United Nations. The Portuguese Government were bound—
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member is departing from the Question before the House. He may properly ask for a statement about something if he wants it, but he must not argue the reasons about it in detail.
Mr. Warbey: I bow to your Ruling, Mr. Speaker, and I should like to ask the appropriate member of the Government to tell us whether they ever said bluntly to the Portuguese Government that they should get out of Goa. We are entitled to know whether they did that. We are entitled to know whether the Government, when taking the decision to support a resolution, in effect, condemning India as the aggressor, took into account that this would sound curiously like hypocrisy coming from the same men of Suez and the men who had supported American intervention in Cuba.
Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member must bear in mind what is the Question before the House.
Mr. Warbey: With respect, Mr. Speaker, I was saying that these were matters on which there should be a statement to the House before we adjourn, because they are of great

1435
interest. They are matters which are urgent because they are in action at the moment and under discussion by the Security Council. Secondly, they affect not only the relations of this country with foreign Powers, but they affect the whole of the internal relationships within the British Commonwealth.
I want to know whether the Government intend to try to develop the Commonwealth association or whether they intend to scrap it, as their actions appear to be designed to do. I want to know whether they are aware, or will tell the House before we adjourn, which members of the Security Council voted with them against India and which members voted in support of India and against the motion moved by the United States. We ought to know whether the reports given in the Press on this matter are correct.
We ought to know whether it is true that the Government were associated
with the Governments of France and of Turkey, as well as of the United States and Nationalist China, in this matter and whether they were opposed in the vote, not only by the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union, but also by Liberia and Ceylon. We ought to know whether the Government have taken into account the reactions that there will be and there have already been in other member-countries of the Commonwealth, not only India itself, but Ghana and Nigeria, as well as Ceylon.
These are the matter on which the House should be informed. We ought to know whether the Government are persisting not only in weakening the Commonwealth in this way, but also in denigrating the world's greatest statesman in order to perpetuate their own hypocrisy.
Question put:—
The House divided: Ayes 168, Noes 92.

Division No. 44.]

AYES

[7.9 p.m.

Agnew, Sir Peter

Ellington, Sir Eric

Kershaw, Anthony

Allason, James

Finlay, Graeme

Kirk, Peter

Ashton, Sir Hubert

Fisher, Nigel

Langford-Holt, J.

Atkins, Humphrey

Fletcher-Cooke, Charles

Leburn, Gilmour

Barber, Anthony

Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)

Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry

Barlow, Sir John

Freeth, Denzil

Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)

Barter, John

Gardner, Edward

Lindsay, Martin

Bell, Ronald

Gibson-Watt, David

Litchfield, Capt. John

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Gilmour, Sir John

Longbottom, Charles

Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos & Fhm)

Glover, Sir Douglas

Longden, Gilbert

Bidgood, John C.

Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)

Loveys, Walter H.

Biffen, John

Godber, J. B.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Biggs-Davison, John

Goodhart, Philip

McLaren, Martin

Bingham, R. M.

Goodhew, Victor

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Grant-Ferris, Wg. Cdr. R.

McMaster, Stanley R.

Bishop, F. P.

Green, Alan

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Bossom, Clive

Gresham Cooke, R.

Maddan, Martin

Bourne-Arton, A.

Grimston, Sir Robert

Maitland, Sir John

Box, Donald

Gurden, Harold

Mawby, Ray

Boyle, Sir Edward

Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)

Maxwell-Hysop, R. J.

Brown, Alan (Tottenham)

Hare, Rt. Hon. John

Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.

Bryan, Paul

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Mills, Stratton

Buck, Antony

Harrison, Brian (Maldon)

Montgomery, Fergus

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A.(Saffron Walden)

Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)

Noble, Michael

Carr, Compton (Barons Court)

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Channon, H. P. G.

Hastings, Stephen

Page, Graham (Crosby)

Chataway, Christopher

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Page, John (Harrow, West)

Chichester-Clark, R.

Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward

Partridge, E.

Cole, Norman

Hendry, Forbes

Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)

Cooke, Robert

Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)

Peel, John

Cooper, A. E.

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Holland, Philip

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Corfield, F. V.

Hornby, R. P.

Pitman, Sir James

Costain, A. P.

Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)

Pitt, Miss Edith

Craddock, Sir Beresford

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John

Pott, Percivall

Critchley, Julian

Hughes-Young, Michael

Prior, J. M. L.

Cunningham, Knox

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho

Curran, Charles

Iremonger, T. L.

Profumo, Rt. Hon. John

d'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Proudfoot, Wilfred

Deedes, W. F.

James, David

Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin

Drayson, G. B.

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Renton, David

Eden, John

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Ridley, Hon. Nicholas

Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Elliott, R. W. (Nwcastle-upon-Tyne, N.)

Johnson Smith, Geoffrey

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Kerans, Cdr. J. S.

Roots, William

Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)

Summers, Sir Spencer (Aylesbury)

Walker, Peter

Russell, Ronald

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek

St. Clair, M.

Temple, John M.

Ward, Dame Irene

Scott-Hopkins, James

Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret

Wells, John (Maidstone)

Shaw, M.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Williams, Dudley (Exeter)

Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir Jocelyn

Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Skeet, T. H. H.

Turner, Colin

Wise, A. R.

Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd & Chiswick)

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Woollam, John

Smithers, Peter

van Straubenzee, W. R.

Worsley, Marcus

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Vickers, Miss Joan

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES

Studholme, Sir Henry

Walder, David

Mr. Whitelaw and

Mr. Gordon Campbell.

NOES

Albu, Austen

Holt, Arthur

Prentice, R. E.

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Houghton, Douglas

Randall, Harry

Bowden, Herbert W. (Leics, S.W.)

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Rankin, John

Brockway, A. Former

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Reynolds, G. W.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hunter, A. E.

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Buller, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Robertson, John (Paisley)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Hynd, John (Attercliffe)

Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)

Cliffe, Michael

Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Grossman, R. H. S.

Janner, Sir Barnett

Skeffington, Arthur

Darling, George

Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)

Small, William

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Kenyon, Clifford

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Dodds, Norman

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Sorensen, R. W.

Driberg, Tom

King, Dr. Horace

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Edelman, Maurice

Lawson, George

Steele, Thomas

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Evans, Albert

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Fletcher, Eric

Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)

Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)

Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)

Lipton, Marcus

Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Thorpe, Jeremy

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. Hugh

McCann, John

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Crmrthn)

Mackie, John (Enfield, East)

Warbey, William

Ginsburg, David

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Gordon walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Marsh, Richard

Whitlock, William

Gourlay, Harry

Mayhew, Christopher

Willey, Frederick

Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.

Mendelson, J. J.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)

Millan, Bruce

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Mitchison, G. R.

Wyatt, Woodrow

Hamilton, William (West Fife)

Oliver, G. H.

Zilliacus, K.

Hannan, William

Oram, A. E.

Hayman, F. H.

Owen, Will

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Herbison, Miss Margaret

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Dr. Broughton and

Holman, Percy

Peart, Frederick

Mr. Ifor Davies.

Resolved.
That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd January.

PLANNING CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT
7.18 p.m.
Mrs. Joyce Butler: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to enable local planning committees to make conditions with regard to the satisfactory rehousing of displaced tenants and leaseholders in approving schemes of private redevelopment.
My proposed Bill is concerned with homeless families, families who are made homeless as a result of schemes of private redevelopment. Strong feelings are held about the respective merits of public and private development, but in all that has been said on the subject very little reference has been made to
1438
one factor which is very important, namely, that where a local authority carries out redevelopment it is obliged under the Housing Act, 1957, to make provision of residential accommodation for the reasonable requirements of the families displaced.
But a private developer is under no such obligation. He cannot, of course, displace a controlled tenant without providing alternative accommodation, but there his obligation ends. It seems to me indefensible that there should be one rule for local authorities carrying out essential redevelopment and another for private developers many of whom are carrying out speculative developments. Moreover, the lack of obligation on the private developer throws a heavy additional burden on the local authorities which are very hard pressed already.
Redevelopment, or urban renewal as it is now called, is, as we all realise, an essential way to prevent our cities running down and to bring them abreast

1439
of modern conditions, but what is intolerable is that redevelopment should be allowed to push out of their homes, without alternative accommodation, families who are essential to the life and work of our cities and whose activities have contributed to the very community values from which the developer is reaping the benefit. I seek, by means of the Bill, simply to enable planning committees to put an obligation on private developers to provide for the rehousing of displaced families before they are given planning approval.
This is an entirely reasonable procedure. Private developers do not undertake redevelopment unless the scheme is financially advantageous to themselves. Where they are rebuilding for housing purposes, and they cannot find accommodation elsewhere, they could offer a displaced tenant a flat in the new block at a reasonable rent, without any financial hardship to themselves. Where private developers are building shops or offices to replace residential accommodation it is already the practice of some planning authorities to require that lost residential accommodation to be replaced in the new scheme. Here again, there should not be any unreasonable difficulty in offering accommodation to the displaced tenants.
Where the time lag between displacement and rebuilding is a difficulty it should be possible for the local authority to nominate tenants from its waiting list for flats in the new development equivalent to the number of displaced families which it has rehoused. All that the Bill does is to add one more condition to those which planning committees can already require of developers with regard to such matters as daylighting, parking facilities, flow of traffic, and so on. It will be left to the individual planning committees to work out with the private developers the way in which the conditions should apply in a particular case. This is already very much the practice of planning committees with the other conditions which they have the power to impose.
The previous Minister of Housing and Local Government has said that such a requirement would hamper private redevelopment, but I believe that the very opposite is true. It is precisely because
1440
they lack the power which I seek to give them in the Bill that planning authorities have hesitated to approve schemes of private redevelopment. They know that homeless families or pressure on themselves as housing authorities will be the result.
This problem was first brought to my attention by the tenants of 12 houses in Tottenham, where the owners have decided to redevelop because the houses are old and too large for the district. Some of the tenants have managed to find other accommodation, but the others, either because they are too old and cannot secure a mortgage or have not the means to buy a house, will become homeless unless the local authority, which already has 3,700 families on its housing waiting list, can do something to help them. How can two elderly spinsters, who live in one of these houses on their old-age pension, possibly be expected to buy a new home? How can families with children and earning the average wage of workers who keep London's services going, be expected to buy a house? There is no alternative accommodation to rent.
Since this case was brought to my notice I have had a number of others put to me in my constituency, in other parts of Middlesex, in the area of London County Council, and in large cities in the North of England and in Slough. These cases vary from large-scale redevelopment, such as is undertaken in the L.C.C. area at present, to very small schemes where only one or two houses are to be pulled down and one or two families displaced.
Such is a case in Slough, which my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) mentioned to me, where an elderly couple who have lived in the property since 1912 will be rendered homeless by this kind of development. Clearly, this is a problem which is confined to those parts of the country where development is highly profitable, but in those parts it is a growing problem.
Some of the best private developers are already co-operating with the local planning authorities in the way which I have indicated as desirable, but, even so, there is nearly always a residue of families left homeless by this kind of voluntary arrangement. I seek, by

1441
means of the Bill, to make the condition which is voluntarily accepted by the best developers an obligation on all and particularly on those property speculators who buy and demolish bricks and mortar without any regard for the future of the families living in them. Already, local authorities are being left to redevelop the unprofitable areas. Surely it is unreasonable that they should be expected to add to their burdens the rehousing of families displaced by profitable schemes undertaken by private redevelopers.
Sir Bruce Wycherly, managing director of the Abbey National Building Society, in urging building societies not to finance evictions in the interest of property speculators, drew attention recently to the fact that some of London's 3,000 homeless are in their present plight because they have been evicted in the interests of property speculation. The Bill does not and could not attempt to cover the whole problem, but I am assured by those who are particularly concerned that it will be a very welcome step in the right direction.
We are in grave danger, in the London area, of creating a Metropolis in which, increasingly, elderly people and families with children can find no place because of the housing problem. Local authorities are already far too heavily overburdened in trying to cape with their waiting lists and the problem of the homeless. In seeking to place some small responsibility on private developers, I hope that the House will share my view and will not oppose the Motion.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mrs. Butler, Mr. Allaun, Mr. Cliffe, Mr. Key, Mr. Mapp, Mr. Marsh, Mr. Pargiter, Mr. Skeffington, Mr. G. Thomas, and Mr. Weitzman.

PLANNING CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT
  PLANNING CONDITIONS FOR PRIVATE REDEVELOPMENT
  Bill to enable local planning committees to make conditions with regard to the satisfactory rehousing of displaced tenants and leaseholders in approving schemes of private redevelopment, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Friday, 23rd February and to be printed. [Bill 52.]

SWISS LOAN AGREEMENT
7.29 p.m.
Mr. G. R. Mitchison: I beg to move,
That this House declines to approve the ratification of the Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Swiss Federal Council for a loan by Switzerland to the Government of the United Kindom.
The Motion relates to what is only one of the minor peccadilloes of the Government and I trust that it will draw satisfactory comment from the Government and, in due course, be withdrawn. Meanwhile, it is our only method of raising a matter which is of importance from two points of view.
First, the Agreement between the British and the Swiss Governments was made as long ago as 20th October, and in connection with it there have been two breaches of what is commonly called the Ponsonby rule. This is a rule which is followed, save in exceptional cases—and this is no exceptional case—a rule which prescribes that a treaty, however unimportant or however apparently important, shall be laid for twenty-one days in order to give the Opposition—this was the reason given by Mr. Ponsonby himself on 1st April, 1924—or any party the opportunity of getting a discussion on the treaty in question.
Mr. Ponsonby in stating this, which has been the practice ever since, stated it as an alternative to legislation and made it perfectly clear that the Government would not presume to decide which treaties were important and which were unimportant, and would provide debating facilities accordingly. We have been unable to get any opportunity other than by putting down this Motion, and we have, therefore, by the delay in laying this treaty before the House—laying it actually after the last business statement relating to this Session had been made—been deprived of what we were intended to have under the Ponsonby rule, namely, time to consider and, if we so chose, time to debate.
That is a point of real constitutional importance. I was present in the Chamber the other day when the Lord Privy Seal was here, and I hope I am not doing him any injustice when I say that he appeared to me to recognise its real importance.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath) indicated assent.
Mr. Mitchison: I am glad to notice the right hon. Gentleman's assent.
On the merits of the matter, we asked one essential question which the Lord Privy Seal was naturally unable to answer in the very short time available then. I hope that we shall now shortly dispose of the matter because I am well aware that my right hon. and hon. Friends, and I believe hon. Members opposite, too, wish to get on to the much more important—if I may say so without any derogation to the Swiss loan—matter of Berlin.
What appears to have happened is this. We all know that on 25th July the Government, for reasons which were explained by the Chancellor at the time, requested the International Monetary Fund for a loan, and facilities were granted in August and September for drawing 1,500 million dollars in various foreign currencies—hard currencies, if I may put it that way.
There was, in addition to that, a standby arrangement. On 31st October, after these drawings had been made to the extent of some £450 million, £100 million was actually repaid. It was at about that time—on 20th October actually—that the Swiss loan about which we are now speaking was negotiated. It was not put into effect because it had not been ratified. The Swiss loan for a much smaller amount seems, therefore, at first sight to have been wholly unnecessary, and one wonders why it was required at all. That question was put by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and by myself when the Lord Privy Seal made his statement the other day, and it is substantially the question that we want answered tonight.
The Economist of 23rd September, 1961, in connection with the meeting at Vienna of the various governors of the International Monetary Fund, had this comment, and I put this to whoever is to answer for the Government:
"One rumour to be heard in Vienna is that there may even be special arrangements to draw off surplus money from the Swiss;"
A sort of financial blood-letting was apparently contemplated.
"the World Bank has found that Switzerland's non-membership is no barrier to its raising
1444
money there, and the same should be true for the Fund."
It was said the other day that the reason for this loan being separate was that Switzerland was not a member of the Fund. But nor is Switzerland a member of the Bank; and yet very substantial advances in borrowings in Swiss currency have been made by the Bank.
The comment made by the Economist in the form of quoting a rumour from Vienna was that if the Bank could provide Swiss currency, then surely arrangements could be made for the Fund to do so, too. In order to make matters as clear as mud, I ought to explain that I think it was the late Lord Keynes who said of the Fund and the Bank, that the Fund was the Bank and the Bank was the Fund, which makes their respective functions even clearer than they were before.
I think it is quite clear that the Fund's loan was in connection with our currency difficulties and in connection with the sterling exchange position and that, of the two bodies, the Fund rather than the Bank would be the body to meet any difficulty of that sort. Therefore, one says to oneself: Why were there no arrangements of this sort? Why was what is possible in the one case found to be impossible in the other? Was this merely a blood-letting operation?
I have to point out to the Minister that though one can see very good and clear reasons for it, in fact borrowings from the Fund carry no interest charges.
Mr. Heath indicated dissent.
Mr. Mitchison: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. I wonder if he is right in this connection. On 7th November, 1961, the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave an answer about United Kingdom debts to public bodies. I have mentioned a drawing of £450 million and a repayment of £100 million. They come out of this sum in the form of sterling interest-free notes. I understand that the money lent is re-lent and that really what one is borrowing is one's own subscription in one form or another. At any rate, if there is a rate of interest, let us hear what it is. There is no doubt that the Swiss loan carries a rate of interest of 3 per cent.
I am not saying that this loan is unnecessary. I am not saying that it was

1445
not made for the common good of Europe by the proper and very fine collaboration of the Swiss Government. I do not wish to detract from what I am sure was a well-intentioned effort for the common good. But I do want to know why the money was required, in the light of the almost contemporary repayment of a large sum of money out of the Fund borrowing, and I want to know why, if Swiss francs had to be borrowed, they could not have been borrowed through the Fund. I think I have made my point clear enough.
I notice that a similar loan, not of 215 million Swiss francs—that is between £17 million and £18 million—but of 200 million Swiss francs, was made at roughly the same sort of time by the Swiss to the United States Government. It therefore appears to be a case of some operation for the benefit of both sides at any rate.
I have made my inquiries. I trust that they will be answered in the spirit in which they are asked, and I hope that we shall not take too long to get on to the next business.
7.40 p.m.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: I rise to ask a brief but, I think, pertinent question. Is the interest rate in this case 3 per cent.? How does it happen that the Government can get money at 3 per cent. from the Swiss Government whereas local authorities in Scotland have to pay a rate of 6¼ per cent. for the money which they borrow from the British Government? Are the finances of Switzerland so good? Also, if it is possible for the Government to borrow money elsewhere at 3 per cent., can they not relend it to the local authorities in Scotland at 3½ per cent.?
7.41 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath): I am very grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) for the way in which he has raised this matter and for the indication that he has given that he might be prepared to withdraw the Motion at the end of this short debate.
I explained the situation in my statement to the House on Monday. The hon and learned Gentleman has mentioned that I said that the Government adhere to what is known as the Ponsonby rule. I told the House on
1446
Monday that this agreement was signed on 20th October and was laid in the House on 15th December. This did not, therefore, give the usual twenty-one days' notice—perhaps I might point out to the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) that they are parliamentary working days and not calendar days, as he supposes—before the date of ratification, which was intended to be 31st December, but which, by a later exchange of letters, is now to be 29th December.
I came to the House and said, frankly, that this was due to a mistake in the Foreign Office. It was due, in fact, to a human error. The document arrived in the Foreign Office on 1st November, and, to conform with the Ponsonby rule, it should have been laid by 23rd November. This left rather less than about three weeks for the formalities to be gone through, and the normal formalities for dealing with treaty documents take considerably longer than that. I regret that the need to give urgent priority to this treaty was overlooked, and it became necessary to ask for the indulgence of the House.
The delay was particularly unfortunate in the case of this treaty because, as the hon. and learned Gentleman will have noticed, Article VI stipulates that it shall enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification, and that was to be as soon as possible. But it becomes urgent when one reads with that Article II, which says that the proceeds of the loan shall be made available to the United Kingdom by 31st December. As I have already mentioned, it is now to be 29th December.
This error took place because the urgency was not noticed, in part because of a change of staff in the department concerned. I have given the House a very frank explanation of what happened. We have made the necessary inquiries in order to ensure that such an event shall not happen again.
When this matter came to my notice, I decided that there were three possible actions which one could take. I wish to mention these because the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to the "breach" of the Ponsonby rule. I mentioned that there had been, as far as

1447
we knew, nine cases in which the Ponsonby rule had been waived in particular circumstances. In fact, the hon. and learned Gentleman is not quite correct in saying that it has been continuously in operation since Mr. Ponsonby made his speech to the House on 1st April, 1924. It was not in operation between 1924 and 1929, after the change of Government, but it was then reaffirmed by subsequent Governments, including the present one.
With regard to the three courses, Lord Attlee said at Preston in 1950, over the Anglo-United States Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, that in that case what he did was to consult the leaders of the Opposition. He brought the agreement into force without laying it before Parliament at all. He had to do that because he had decided at the time to have a General Election without realising that it would not give him sufficient days to carry out the Ponsonby rule in the case of that agreement. So he adopted that method of consulting the leaders of the Opposition.
The second course was to give the House the opportunity of discussing the agreement in a general debate. I mentioned this in my statement. I said that I hoped that the House would find that the economic debate last Monday or the foreign affairs debate today would provide a suitable opportunity for any hon. Members who wished to express their views. This, again, was covered by precedents. There are several cases where this has been the method for dealing with early ratification, including the Austrian Loan Protocol of 13th July, 1932, and the Protocol of 17th October, 1951, for the accession of Greece and Turkey to N.A.T.O. So we were amply covered by precedent in suggesting that the House might like to take the opportunity of these two debates to express views.
There was a third course. It was to inform the House of the Government's intentions by means of an Answer to a Question, or by a statement to the House. There are precedents also for doing this. It was done on 25th October, 1939, for the Tripartite Mutual Assistance Treaty between the United Kingdom, France and Turkey, and there was a Private Notice Question on 24th June,
1448
1942, relating to a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union. There was ample precedent for doing both these things.
The hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell)—he is not in his place at the moment, but he was earlier—has said on two previous occasions that we had treated the House with contempt. I regret to say that, obviously through not having studied the matter closely, he is ill-informed and his judgment is completely wrong. We adopted a course for which there was ample precedent on previous occasions when the Ponsonby rule had been waived.
I decided that, because of the closeness of the Recess, the best course would be to make a full statement to the House and explain the situation. It became apparent in the exchanges across the Floor that the House wished to have an opportunity to debate the agreement, and, therefore, this opportunity has been provided.
I would, however, also point out to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the mere fact that it is now being debated is, in fact, an operation of the Ponsonby rule machinery. It was what Mr. Ponsonby intended. Therefore, it is no longer necessary for the treaty to lie for the twenty-one days, and, in fact, the Government are not in any way now in breach of the Ponsonby rule because the House has taken the opportunity of debating this issue. I hope that that has explained the situation about the operation of the rule and the precedents which exist for it.
Mr. Mitchison: The right hon. Gentleman is defending himself a little too much. According to the Ponsonby rule, the Government ought to have provided a time. But the Opposition have had to provide it by putting down a Motion in the nature of a Prayer, as it were, refusing ratification.
Mr. Heath: But today is a Government day, and time is being taken out of Government time. The putting down of a Motion is the only procedure available, unless the hon. and learned Gentleman prefers to use the other means that I suggested, that of taking part in a general debate.
Mr. Mitchison: What was contemplated by the Ponsonby rule was that if

1449
the Opposition asked for a debate, the Government would put down a Motion confirming the proposed ratification.
Mr. Heath: We are providing Government time. I understand that the procedure which has to be followed in these cases is that the Motion should reject ratification.
The hon. and learned Gentleman has raised the question of the practice. Perhaps I may confirm again that the Government adhere to the rule and that we have every intention of adhering to it. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be satisfied with that. The position was last stated by the late Mr. Ernest Bevin in the House on 7th November, 1945—no doubt this will be remembered by the hon. Member for Woolwich. East, who was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the time—and reaffirmed by the Conservative Government in 1954 and by ourselves tonight.
Concluding this part of my remarks, I should like again to offer our apology to the House for the error which has occurred, which made it impracticable to follow the usual convention.
Mr. Bruce Millan: Before the right hon. Gentleman leaves the question of procedure, will he answer this question? Article II says that the proceeds of the loan should be available on 31st December. But the right hon. Gentleman has already said that the date has been changed to 29th December. A change of two days in this case may not be terribly important, but are there not some other instruments which might have been entered into where a change of date is involved? What is the procedure for laying such instruments? After all, if this date had been changed very substantially, the agreement would have been a different agreement. Also, surely it is rather odd that we should now be discussing this agreement when it is not even yet a final agreement?
Mr. Heath: The change from 31st December was made because that day is a Sunday, and from the point of view of banking convenience, it was better to do it on 29th December. This was done by exchange of letters. If the hon. Gentleman wishes, I will arrange that the exchange of letters shall be laid in
1450
the House so that hon. Members may be informed about it.
To turn to the other questions—
Mr. Emrys Hughes: What about the rates of interest?
Mr. Heath: I shall be coming to those matters, because they have been raised. This loan wil replace part of the temporary credit which the United Kingdom has had from the Swiss National Bank since the spring of this year. It is not, therefore, a new loan. It is replacing an existing loan from the Swiss National Bank. The borrowing from the fund, to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred, that was deliberately spread over a very wide number of countries and in their currencies, and for the reasons which I explained on Monday—because Switzerland is not a member of the Fund—it was arranged that Switzerland should provide the credit in this other way. This, therefore, replaces that loan which we had from the spring of this year.
Why it was not done through the Fund is very largely a matter for the Fund, but, as Switzerland is not a member, it was found more convenient to do it in this way, and that has been confirmed for this period by this agreement, the details of which the hon. and learned Gentleman will have seen in the treaty itself.
The reason why I did not reply to the hon. and learned Member on Monday when he asked about the rate of interest was because I thought he said "three" when referring to the International Monetary Fund when, in fact, he said "free". I am told that the statement he read out about sterling notes referred to our own money with the Fund, but did not refer to the borrowing I have already mentioned—the drawing on the Fund. The rate there amounts to a sliding scale, because it is nil per cent. for the first three months, it moves up to 2 per cent. for the next nine months—the rest of the year—and afterwards moves up to a figure of 3½ per cent. at the end of the third year, and, of course, it goes higher if the loan goes on for a longer period.
If it is compared with the 3 per cent. of the Swiss loan, we have to average the I.M.F. rate over the whole period for

1451
which we are borrowing. We cannot take a simple comparison, as the hon. and learned Gentleman would obviously wish me to do, if that were possible. If we average it up to three years and add on another 50 million dollars, which is the same as 215 million Swiss francs, or £17·7 million sterling, it would work out at slightly under 3 per cent., but that is a very small difference indeed. The interest on the Swiss loan is roughly comparable to the average Fund rate which we now get. I hope that that answers the point about interest rates.
Mr. Mitchison: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman, but it does not answer it. This is extremely complicated, and I do not propose to take up the time of the House about it. The answer given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer referred to sterling interest-free notes. It referred to drawings on the Fund of £450 million in August and September, 1961, and to a repayment of £100 million on 31st October, 1961. I think, therefore, that this must be the debt by the United Kingdom to the international institution which we have been talking about. I know what the right hon. Gentleman has in mind about fluctuating rates of interest, and there is no point of substance in trying to get the very complicated details of this matter thrashed out now.
Mr. Heath: I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman was referring to interest-free notes, and not to the rate at which we draw from the Fund. That is a little different. Perhaps we could clarify that by correspondence, if there is any further point.
Mr. John Rankin: Will the correspondence be published in HANSARD?
Mr. Heath: I will write to the hon. Gentleman as well, if he likes.
Mr. Rankin: I thank the right hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Heath: Now that we have examined the points about the Ponsonby rule in this particular instance and in these documents, I hope that the House will agree that our debate shows no lack of appreciation to the Swiss Government, the Swiss National Bank, or the Swiss people for the arrangements they
1452
are making for us. I know that the House would not like there to be any misunderstanding in that respect.
Mr. Mitchison: May I associate myself with the last words of the right hon. Gentleman which put more clearly and more fully what I had intended to say on my own behalf. In view of what has been said—I repeat that this was only a minor peccadillo on the part of the Government—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. G. Campbell.]
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray): Mr. Heath.
Mr. John Rankin: On a point of order. I am asking you for your guidance, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. According to all the advice which I receive as a Member of this House, I understood that today was to witness a debate on foreign affairs. We are now left with three hours in which to deal with a subject which is pregnant with danger for civilisation itself. If we allow an hour, as we are well entitled to do—
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I appreciate the hon. Member's point, but the position in which the House finds itself is that a Motion has been moved, That this House do now adjourn. I have no option but to put that Question, and I have called a representative of the Foreign Office, so that it would seem to me quite reasonable to expect that a debate on foreign affairs is very likely to take place. Mr. Heath.
Mr. Rankin: Further to my point of order—
Mr. Arthur Holt: I want to speak, too.
Mr. Rankin: So do I.
Mr. Holt: Well, let us get on.
Mr. Rankin: I appeal to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker. So far as we can visualise what may happen within the next three hours, it would seem that

1453
ordinary back bench Members will be almost completely excluded from the debate which is to follow, and, therefore, we are not going to have, on either side of the House, that expression of view which we ought to have on these occasions.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I must proceed in an orderly fashion. I called a representative of the Foreign Office to speak on the Question, That this House do now adjourn, and the House must proceed along those lines.
Mr. Rankin: Will you proceed with my protest in mind?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: What the hon. Member has just said will no doubt be reported in HANSARD.
7.58 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath): I had intended to start by saying that those of us who are concerned with and interested in foreign affairs in the House could not at the moment complain about any lack of debate, because this is the fifth that we have had in rather less than two months. Although we are now having a rather truncated day, I can quite appreciate the hon. Gentleman's anxiety, and if he is able to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, no doubt he will be able to make his point. I will endeavour to make a rather shorter speech than I would normally do on such an occasion in order to give a further chance for hon. Members to take part.
Last Thursday, we debated the Congo, and today it is foreign affairs, with particular reference to Berlin, although I know that many other hon. Members want to touch on a number of other subjects. It seems rather ironical at this season of goodwill when the House is about to adjourn for its Christmas festivities that we should see so many conflicts across the world. The House is accustomed to trouble spots and to talking about them. Berlin, the Congo, Laos, and Viet-Nam have been before us now for a long time, and today we think particularly of Katanga, Goa, and Indonesia, and right hon. and hon. Members may well add others.
Of course, some hon. Members, with great skill, during the preceding four hours, have already made their foreign
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affairs speeches, and I watched with admiration how they did it. When I used to occupy the corner seat on the Front Bench, my admiration for their particular skill was rather less, but today I was interested in the way in which they got their foreign affairs speeches over.
If I have felt the temper of the House aright, that sense of growing anxiety at the moment about the difficulties which confront us in the foreign field is not so much because of the individual difficulties which we face but because many hon. Members sense that there is a great danger at the moment of what one might term a slide into the use of force to settle disputes in foreign affairs. I think that that is the point which is causing great anxiety to all of us at the moment in the difficulties which we face, and foremost in our minds must be the recent attack on Goa.
I think the House was of one mind when the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations made his statement about this. The Secretary of State said we deplored it. The House almost unanimously agreed with that. At the same time we recognise that we do so with the utmost regret that such should have happened with a Commonwealth country.
There is little that I can tell the House about this because we have no consul in Goa; so we have no direct reports. We only know what hon. Members have read in the Press. But Mr. Nehru has given instructions, we understand, that British lives and property be protected.
The matter was taken to the Security Council the same night. There, as has already been mentioned today, a resolution was carried by seven votes, the necessary number in the Security Council to carry a resolution. It deplored the use of force and called for a cease fire and for the withdrawal of troops. It was, as hon. Members know, vetoed by the Soviet Union. It was a very interesting resolution which the Soviet Union cited in order to do so. This resolution was put forward by Ceylon, Liberia and the United Arab Republic. The point is that this resolution invoked Resolution 1514 of the General Assembly, and that, hon. Members will recollect, is one which deals with colonialism and calls for

1455
immediate steps to be taken, without any reservations, for independence to be granted.
So I think that the fact that that resolution should have been prayed in aid, so to speak, by the Soviet Union in its attitude at the United Nations shows that the emphasis there was an anti-colonialist one, and that this was at the back of the minds of those who voted for it. I think it is also perhaps a warning to all those who have said in this House from time to time, "You must not worry about the wording of United Nations resolutions but vote on the general sense of them." But this is a case where it is brought home to us how a resolution of this kind is now being used by the Soviet Union, and by others who support it in this particular instance, to justify the action which is being taken. This, I think, is a matter of fundamental importance, the approach of these countries to the United Nations.
So we see that the action taken in the Security Council can have no effect on the situation in Goa. The Leader of the Liberal Party earlier today asked whether I would mention the effect on the United Nations. That, of course, is bound to be serious. One cannot foresee exactly what the implications of this are.
He also asked about the financing of the United Nations. My hon. Friend the Minister of State, who has just returned from the United Nations, will have something to say about that in his winding-up speech, but I can just here mention that when the general financing resolution for the Congo operation as a whole came before the United Nations the United Kingdom supported it, and that resolution was carried.
The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the bankruptcy of the United Nations. There has since been a resolution which was put forward as a result of various talks held between certain Governments and the Secretary-General to the United Nations giving the United Nations power to issue bonds as a means not of financing the peace and security operation but as a means of bridging the gap between the cash available and the deficit. We supported it, pointing out at the same time that the obligation of individual countries to pay their dues to the United Nations really must be carried out, and
1456
the United Nations should find ways by which that can be done.
When one is thinking of the implications of recent events, hon. Members have this afternoon already mentioned the question of Indonesia and West New Guinea. We have seen today the speech of President Soekarno in which he called for his troops to be ready to liberate this territory. Again, these are grounds which are anti-colonialist. These are of the same form as those which I have just mentioned, which were quoted in the Security Council. There is, as hon. Members have indicated, an apprehension that the Indonesians will look to the same support in the United Nations from those who feel that force is justifiable in this particular respect.
Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: The right hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that there is any sort of comparison between the situation in Dutch West New Guinea and Goa, is he? The issues in Dutch New Guinea are totally different from those in Goa. The Goans are Indians.
Mr. Heath: I am not making any comparison at all between the two situations. I was very carefully not doing that. What I was doing was emphasising the anti-colonial aspect which is causing apprehensions in hon. Members' minds.
But I want to go on to say something more about this and the view of the Government. We believe that it is essential that force should not be used to solve this dispute between Indonesia and the Dutch over West New Guinea. We have said this before and we have always used our influence to that end. We see no reason why it should not be settled by negotiation. The Netherlands Government are our allies in N.A.T.O. and the Dutch are our close neighbours. In the debate in the United Nations a resolution was put forward on which the Dutch Government spoke and which received considerable support, some 53 votes, and in which the Dutch Government offered to give up sovereignty and to hand over the administration to an international body till a final decision could be taken that would be a means of offering self-determination to the Papuans.
Indonesia is one of the most important new countries. It is the sixth largest

1457
country in the world. The British Government have been working for good relations with Indonesia. There is growing trade. There have been many visits in the past years of Ministers, and others from Indonesia and, as the House knows, it has been arranged that the State visit of President Soekarno should take place next year. So we have our close neighbours the Dutch involved; and also we have been trying to create good relations with this very large, fundamentally very rich, and newly emerged country; and it will obviously be of the greatest regret to the British Government if all this is jeopardised at some stage by the use of force.
The Indonesian view is that the Papuans should become part of the Indonesian State and that any emergence of a Papuan State should be prevented. We believe this ought to be discussed and negotiated about in the light of the principles expressed in the United Nations Charter, and that it should be possible to find a settlement of this. In this we would support an appeal already made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
It is perhaps encouraging that President Soekarno limited himself to the command order which I have already mentioned, and so the matter is still open to negotiation, and we hope that he will make it clear that the Indonesians have no pre-conditions for such negotiations and that fruitful talks can be held.
After all, in that part of the world, we think particularly of developments which are now taking place within our own territories, in which discussions are being held in order to create a Greater Malaysia, as many hon. Members are aware.
It is with the anxieties of hon. Members about the spread of the use of force in mind that the Government have been so anxious to limit the force used by the United Nations itself and to concentrate particularly on negotiation and on conciliation. We debated this at some length on Thursday. Therefore, I do not want to go over the whole ground again. I want only to recall briefly two events since then.
When we put forward a Motion on Thursday to the House it had two objects; first of all, the call for a cease-
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fire; and secondly to enable conditions to be created in which conciliation might be carried out in which there could then be a basis for co-operation between the Government in Leopoldville and the provincial Government in Elisabethville.
We were heavily criticised by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. In fact, that cease-fire request to the Secretary-General undoubtedly focussed the world's attention on that situation. It received much more support than right hon. and hon. Members opposite were prepared to admit. As the House has been told, two of the Secretary-General's colleagues are in the Congo now. The Secretary-General said in his letter that they were there in order to seek a conciliation of differences between the Central Government and the provincial authorties.
Mr. Christopher Mayhew: The right hon. Gentleman says that it received more support than we made out. Is it not the fact that it was unanimously rejected by the United Nations Commission on the Congo, including all seven Commonwealth members of that Commission? There could not be a greater weight of opposition.
Mr. Heath: The hon. Member has dealt with foreign affairs long enough to know that there are other means by which support and action can be carried out in such cases, and I propose now to go on with them. There has been close co-operation between a number of Governments concerned, who are anxious to bring about conciliation, and the United Nations Secretariat. In fact, at the moment both objectives have been achieved. In the Congo there is now at any rate a hold-fire and talks are going on between Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula. So we have reached the stage, which was our objective, of bringing the two leaders together. They are now brought together, for Mr. Adoula has gone to Kitona instead of remaining in Leopoldville, one of the difficulties which I have explained to the House. The Minister of State in New York was in close touch with the United States delegate. I think that the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) will himself now agree that Anglo-American relations have not been fractured as a result of the action we took

1459
with the Secretary-General. In fact, they are as close as they have ever been.
On 14th December, the President of the United States received a message from Mr. Tshombe about his wish and preparedness to negotiate with Mr. Adoula. At this point, the President nominated the American Ambassador in Leopoldville, Mr. Gullion, to bring about a meeting, and the British Government, through their representative in Elisabethville, were able to assist with arrangements for that meeting and also with arrangements for the terms on which it would be held, including the suspension of fighting.
So Governments have been working closely with the United Nations Secretariat to bring about this situation. The United Kingdom and the French and the United States consuls went with Mr. Tshombe to Ndola, from whence he went to Kitona, and at the same time as he left Elisabethville fighting stopped. The talks began yesterday, but we have not as yet received any reports about them. The important thing is that negotiations should be going on and that the fighting should be stopped while they are going on. We hope that they can be successful. As I mentioned to the House before, we made an analysis of the public statements of both Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula, and we believe from that that an accommodation is not beyond the bounds of possibility, and we sincerely hope that, with skill and persistence, it can be brought about.
Mr. Rankin: Is the basis of the negotiations to be the recognition of Katanga as a State which has seceded from the Congo?
Mr. Heath: Her Majesty's Government have always made their position plain. They have never supported secession by Katanga from the Congo as a whole. But the basis of the negotiations is a matter for Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula to arrange between themselves. They have now been brought together and we hope that they can reach agreement.
Before coming to Berlin, I turn to another aspect of foreign affairs. One situation in which patience and restraint
1460
have succeeded in producing results is in Laos. The prospects for a settlement at Geneva are fair. It is true that the forces still face each other in Laos and there have been incidents in the ceasefire, but restraint has been exercisd and the situation has been held despite those incidents. The conference at Geneva has reached agreement on all but two of the differences which existed when the conference started. It is not possible to make further progress on those two until a united Laotian delegation arrives in Geneva. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that a united Laotian Government should be formed. The three princes are now to meet on 26th December, and we hope, with the utmost sincerity, that they will form a national government which can then send a joint delegation to Geneva to take part in the final negotiations.
When one looks at the difficulties which have been faced in different parts of the world, and faced by the United Nations, the situation, at Geneva and in Laos, shows that if restraint is exercised and there is patience and skill one can gradually work towards an agreement. If the three princes can be persuaded to form a national government, then there is a chance of reaching a final settlement at Geneva.
In these circumstances, in which there are United Nations problems, in which force has been used, in which there are apprehensions that force will be resorted to again, the N.A.T.O. Ministerial meeting took place in Paris last week. I think that the greater part of the House will accept that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is an indispensable link between North America and Europe, and that it is the surest instrument of collective self-defence of the Western European countries. It is and has long been one of the corner-stones of Her Majesty's Government's foreign policy.
But it is a defence alliance and it cannot act outside the N.A.T.O. area. There is no N.A.T.O. bloc in the United Nations, but the countries which are members of N.A.T.O. and which have interests spread right across the world are affected by the situations which I have been mentioning—if only briefly, for the reasons I explained earlier. Many of their interests do not always coincide,

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as is natural with interests which are world-wide. The N.A.T.O. Ministerial meeting was a good opportunity for a frank exchange of views about these problems which, if they cannot be discussed and reconciled, are bound to lead to strains within the alliance itself. It is right, therefore, that there should be this frank discussion and that the consultation should be as full as possible.
Secondly, we need to increase the military effectiveness of the alliance as well as the political effectiveness in the form of the consultation I have just mentioned. In the past year, the review of strategy, which we discussed exactly a year ago in a defence debate, has been carried out. It has not yet been completed and it will be intensified therefore early in the new year. However, this is not a defence debate and hon. Members will not expect me to deal with that in detail.
The third thing the N.A.T.O. Ministerial meeting did was to give an opportunity for a full discussion of the situation in Berlin. The position of Her Majesty's Government on this issue has been stated a number of times. It was described very fully in our debate here on 2nd November. The position is that the Government wish to see a settlement of this problem by negotiation. That has been our declared attitude and it remains so.
We have also set out what we believe to be the essentials in any settlement. I think that there is general agreement in the House about them. We have been criticised by some hon. Members who have said that by putting them forward we have left everything else to be negotiated. Other hon. Members have said that by setting forth the essentials we have left nothing for negotiation. In fact, there is a great deal for negotiation, accepting the essentials which we have set out, and which are, first, the freedom and viability of West Berlin; secondly, the maintenance of the Western allied garrisons; thirdly, the right of unrestricted access to West Berlin. I think that those three things have the general support of the House.
Since we last debated this subject on 2nd November, a new German Government has been formed. In our last debate hon. Members appreciated the difficulties which confronted the Western
1462
Alliance in the absence of a German Government. This has given an opportunity to increase the pace of allied consultation about Berlin. There have been the visits of the German Chancellor to the President, of the French President to the Prime Minister, and of the German Chancellor to the French President. In addition, the four Foreign Ministers have had the opportunity of discussing this immediately prior to the N.A.T.O. meeting.
In discussing this, the Foreign Ministers were dealing with delicate issues of the greatest importance affecting the vital interests of all the Western countries, and I think that the House will agree that if there are to be successful negotiations, then what is of prime importance is that there should be allied unity about them, and, therefore, the N.A.T.O. Ministers were right to concentrate on working still further for Allied unity in this situation.
The second thing which is necessary is to see whether a basis for negotiation does in fact exist. There were earlier talks with Mr. Gromyko in New York during which the Secretary of State of the United States and my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did their utmost to convince him that interference with allied rights would be extremely dangerous for the world as a whole.
The indication which Mr. Khrushchey has given that he is prepared to negotiate with the West before signing a peace treaty with East Germany does, I think, indicate that he now recognises those dangers which were pointed out to Mr. Gromyko, but those hon. Members, or those outside the House, who have doubts as to whether this is a propitious moment for negotiation, or whether a basis does exist, could have had their doubts reinforced by the speech which Mr. Menshikov made a week ago in New York. They could say that one could deduce from reading his speech that the Soviet Union believes that Western rights could be ignored, or wiped out, or dispensed with without further ado.
It was agreed at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, and supported by the North Atlantic Council, that contact should be renewed with the Soviet Union. It may be that the best way of

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doing this is by diplomatic means, perhaps in Moscow, or it may be that there are other means which can be used. This can be discussed between my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the President in the talks for which my right hon. Friend has just left, and so in the new year it may be hoped that contact will be renewed with the Soviet Union to carry matters further than did the talks with Mr. Gromyko. It may be that in exploration of this kind matters of substance will have to be dealt with, but we must all hope that progress can be made. Her Majesty's Government recognise the need to enter into negotiations as soon as it is practical and fruitful to do so.
Sometimes there are expressions of impatience in the House, but I think that on reflection the House will agree that to enter on negotiations which then break down because there is no satisfactory basis, or which have to be postponed or interrupted because they have not been sufficiently prepared, would not lower tension but would raise it at the moment of breakdown and leave the situation worse than it was before. We have the support of the N.A.T.O. Council in this action. The House has sometimes discussed subjects which ought to be included in the negotiations, and of course any expression of view by right hon. and hon. Members is of great value.
A great deal of work has been done by the Western allies in preparing the agreed positions which should be established for negotiation. That work continues. The House has been very fore-bearing and understanding of the limitation on the Government in discussing publicly the matters on which they are trying to establish an agreed position with their allies, who have equal rights and who will also be engaged in these negotiations. It is one of the advantages of Mr. Khrushchev that he has no public discussion of his position, and he has no pressures to make public the position that he would take up, or the moves he might be prepared to make, in negotiations
Judging from past experience, I think that perhaps it should be our aim to reach agreement first, if we can, on the most pressing and potentially the most dangerous problem, and that is really
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the question of the allied rights of access to West Berlin. If a solution to that could be reached, then tension would be reduced and it might then be possible to move on to wider problems. Mr. Khrushchev's removal of any time limit for the signature of a treaty with East Germany makes the further contact which I have mentioned possible, and we must now await the outcome of such further contact as can be made with the Soviet Union.
At the same time, we must—
Mr. Holt: The right hon. Gentleman keeps talking about allied rights of access to Berlin. Does he consider that this is the only right of access? Have the West Berliners no rights of access? Are the allies not prepared to defend those?
Mr. Heath: Yes, indeed, That is surely an integral part of the freedom and viability of West Berlin which I mentioned first of the three essentials earlier.
At the same time, we must recognise that the gap which is seen to exist between the two positions is still wide, and any negotiations, if a basis is found for them, are bound to be tough. Her Majesty's Government believe in a peaceful settlement which takes account of the proper interests of ourselves and our allies, and of the people of West Berlin. We will work with our allies to find out whether a basis for negotiation does in fact exist. If it is found to exist, then we will do our utmost to achieve a settlement of this problem.
8.26 p.m.
Mr. Harold Wilson: After the bitter controversy of last Thursday's debate and the Government's handling of the Congo problem, and before I turn, as the right hon. Gentleman did, to some of these sombre problems that are before us in today's debate, it is pleasing to feel that there is one matter on which I can unequivocally congratulate the Government. I am referring to their vote in the United Nations General Assembly in favour of the entry of the Government of China to their right and proper place in the United Nations. Although this has been a long time coming, it has been welcome and timely, and in the circumstances of the past few weeks it cannot have been altogether easy.
Mr. Harold Davies: I am not so sure about the two-thirds racket, though.
Mr. Wilson: I am concerned only with the Government's vote. The Government voted for the admission of the Government of China. This is something for which we have pressed in debate after debate, and I want to make it clear that I would be among the first to recognise the difficulties of the United. States Government on this issue.
Public opinion in that country is very strong, and at a time when the President is having to guide his country, in the face of very strong political pressures, into acceptance of a policy of negotiation with the Soviet Union over Berlin, it is, I think, understandable that the President may feel that a total reversal of America's China policy is not a political possibility at the moment.
Moreover, he has shown great firmness and vision in scotching the neo-McCarthyite movement almost at its birth, and so we can sympathise with his difficulties in perhaps having to face a third problem if he reversed American policy on China. But, at any rate, Her Majesty's Government were right to vote as they did.
The prospects of peace, difficult enough, are made immeasurably more difficult when the Government responsible for about one-quarter of the world's population are denied a place in the forum of world affairs. And those who set such great store by the need to conclude a world disarmament convention must obviously recognise the importance of China, which is now no doubt on the threshold of atomic achievement, being a party to the negotiations and a signatory to any nuclear disarmament settlement.
I turn now, as did the right hon. Gentleman, to the tragedy of this week's action in Goa. On Monday my right hon. Friend stated our position. It is a matter for deep regret that the Goa problem could not have been settled by peaceful means long before this. It is undeniable that there has been provocation, terrorism and suppression—all the familiar accompaniments of Portuguese colonial administration—in this territory. It is obvious that the poison has spread from Angola, in Africa, across into Asia,
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and that this has very much affected the situation.
I say right away that India, over the years, has been very patient about the Goa problem. When we consider that the French were prepared to negotiate a settlement in respect of Pondicherry six years ago, and remember that Portugal has been intransigent not only about the problem of the Indian occupation of Goa but about providing for self-government by the Goans, we can measure the tremendous provocation and feeling of the Indian Government on this matter. Nevertheless, we profoundly regret that the disciples of Mahatma Gandhi should settle this issue by the use of force.
In the action that they have taken—I do not deny the strength of their case; I have tried to give some of the background to it—we must admit that they have not only sullied their own record, both as keepers of the peace and peacemakers, in which they have played an historic rôle in the past few years, but, at the same time, have delivered a serious blow against the United Nations at a very dangerous hour in its history. For the record, we commend the actions which the Government took to urge restraint on both parties in the week preceding the outbreak of fighting and equally we support the line taken by the Government at the Security Council. We only regret that the Government's dismal record in relation to Angola last year robbed us of any prospect we had of acting as mediator between India and Portugal in an effort to settle this matter peacefully.
I now turn to the question of Berlin. Despite the explanation which the right hon. Gentleman has given tonight—I know that, inevitably, there was a long period in which there was no German Government—there has been a general lack of urgency on the part of the Western Powers that to my mind seems to date from the moment when Mr. Khrushchev made it clear that his deadline was not necessarily final and irrevocable. We get the impression that the Western Ministers heaved a sigh of relief at that moment, and began to act as though the crisis, although still with us, was in a sense postponed sine die.
This question, however, simply will not wait. Two months and more ago we

1467
all recognised it as a matter of pressing urgency. The House was recalled to consider it and other problems. Today we are no further forward than we were two months ago. I wonder whether the sense of urgency in Paris last week—which does not seem to have been as great as it should have been—was in any way diminished by the need, as the Government saw things, to keep on the right side of President de Gaulle on the question of Katanga. President de Gaulle's views about the Berlin question are no secret, and I wonder how far he was able to play off disagreements between Britain and the United States over the Congo in the United Nations.
It is fair to ask how far Britain's position over the Common Market and Britain's dependence on France—and it is widely believed that France holds the key to our entry to the Common Market—are holding us back from a clear statement of our views on Berlin.
Mr. Heath indicated dissent.
Mr. H. Davies: It is no use the right hon. Gentleman shaking his head; it influenced him.
Mr. Wilson: I thank my hon. Friend very much. As the right hon. Gentleman fairly said, there is no basic disagreement about our objectives over Berlin. My right hon. Friend has stated them, and I once more repeat them. The people of West Berlin are entitled to live under the system of Government which they choose. This is not and cannot be negotiable, as far as the West is concerned. Equally, we stand firm on the question of physical links and access between West Berlin and the West. Even a temporary solution of the Berlin problem, by which I mean a settlement of the question of Berlin ahead of the wider problem of German unification, is not viable unless it embodies guarantees of access, and by that I mean guarantees not limited merely to words which can be broken.
Nor can any settlement be regarded as durable or defensible which does not provide for the dismantling of the wall. The wall is an affront to the twentieth century, and to the so-called civilisation in which we live. I wonder how long it will be before the Eastern Powers recognise that their wall is regarded by the rest of the world—as perhaps, one
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day, it will be regarded by archaeologists who dig up its foundations—as the most concrete expression of a desire not to keep people out but to keep people in; in other words, not a bastion but a prison.
Having said that, I repeat that the inalienable democratic right on the part of the West Berliners to choose their system of Government and the provision of physical means of access are essential conditions of a settlement. As my right hon. Friend has argued, in order to get such a settlement we should be prepared to make at any rate some recognition that East Germany exists as a fact, whatever the strength of our desire may be for a united Germany.
We should be equally prepared to be realistic about Germany's Eastern frontiers with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Let me say right away also that the prospect of a satisfactory and defensible settlement will, I think, be heightened also if the West makes it clear, by word and by deed, that we are prepared to renounce the use of Western Berlin as an advance battle headquarters and centre of provocation in the cold war. The price we pay, in terms of suspicion and ill will, for insisting on keeping West Berlin for Radio Free Europe and similar organisations, and as a centre for spies and provocateurs, is out of all proportion to any value that may be thought to derive from these activities. In saying this we recognise the use to which East Berlin is being put by the other side, but our chances of a satisfactory settlement would be enormously heightened if we could persuade our allies to stop using West Berlin as they are at the moment.
Since the House debated this last, I think seven weeks ago, there has been nothing to encourage complacency or procrastination, and if there is any doubt about that I think that the statement referred to by the right hon. Gentleman by Mr. Menschikov on 11th December should have dispelled any such complacency. The deadline may have been pushed off a little into the future but, nevertheless, time is running out. Once the U.S.S.R. reaches the conclusion that the West is not prepared to negotiate, or does not wish to negotiate, or is too riven by division and mutual distrust to negotiate, then a peace treaty will be signed and the problem of freedom for the civilians of West Berlin

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and of access to the city will be greatly worsened. Once again, we shall be negotiating from weakness and under duress. No blustering, minatory speeches by the Foreign Secretary, including the quite childish outburst last week, will be of any help there. In fact, such speeches will have quite the opposite effect.
Since we last debated Berlin, we have had the Kennedy-Adenauer talks, which made useful progress, the Birch Grove talks, which made no progress at all, and the de Gaulle-Adenauer talks, which were little more effective. We have had the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and of N.A.T.O. What is worrying is not only the desire of President de Gaulle to interpose a veto against productive negotiations, but, in the past fortnight, some signs at least that Dr. Adenauer was moving in his direction.
I know that the whole thing has been overlaid, not only by Katanga but by Franco-German disagreements about the Common Market, especially on agriculture. It was a bad time for a meeting. Our fear is that progress on Berlin has tended to become the residuary legatee in all these discussions, and although the outcome of the Kennedy-Adenauer talks appeared encouraging, Dr. Adenauer's considered views after them, as read for him by Dr. Erhardt in the Bonn Parliament, seemed almost as intransigent as they had been before. How far this was a matter of placating West German political opinion—we know his difficulty; his position is not so strong in Parliament as it was before—and how far this really represents his view, I think that we should find it rather hard to guess. The Guardian did not over-state the position in its leading article when it described the policy as "unworkable and dangerous." First, there was his demand for what he called a German policy to be pursued by the Western Powers entailing the nonrecognition of the East German régime, the postponing of the frontier question until an all-German peace treaty and efforts to reunify Germany. This is a much more restrictive bargaining position than anyone really thinks adequate for getting the essential conditions of the West on Berlin.
The whole House will have noticed the contrast between this and the interview which President Kennedy gave to
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lzvestia two or three weeks ago. In my first supplementary questions from this Box in my new sphere I described it, I think not unfairly, as a welcome and long-awaited act of leadership in the West. I am sure that the whole House will agree with that. He re-emphasised clearly that the Western Powers would stand by their commitments to the people of West Berlin in respect of their freedom and the question of access. It is a great service to peace that not only the German people but the Soviet people should be left in no doubt about this. But he was equally clear about his willingness to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union. I think that especially imaginative was his statement about the two military blocs. He said:
"I think it would be helpful if N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment to live in peace with each other. I certainly believe that we should take every conceivable step to prevent surprise attack."
I think it rather a pity that the Prime Minister, when we pressed him to associate himself clearly with this statement—which I believe means a great deal in the way of reassurance to people on the other side of the Iron Curtain—was a little bit slow, a little bit cagey and a little unforthcoming.
Perhaps the most dangerous part of Dr. Adenauer's Bundestag statement was the clearly expressed demand for greater German participation in nuclear weapons. I shall come to that aspect in a moment. But, once again, I point the contrast here with President Kennedy's clear repudiation of any desire that Western Germany be supplied with nuclear arms. In vain have I pressed the Prime Minister to be equally clear. I hope that when the Minister of State winds up this debate he will show that the Government fully support President Kennedy in this very important declaration. It is at any rate to be welcomed that Herr Willy Brandt in the Bundestag debate expressed a very different point of view. I quote The Times:
"Herr Brandt was reserved but not completely opposed to the idea of a N.A.T.O. atomic force. He feared it might bring about American disengagement in Europe or cause the Warsaw Pact countries to take a military step."
It is idle to talk of negotiations with the Soviet Union while this cloud, this fear of atomic weapons for Germany,

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still remains. I suppose that I have visited the Soviet Union as much as any hon. Member on either side of the House, both as a Minister and, in the past few years, as an opposition Member. I have had many serious discussions with, I think, all the principal Soviet leaders. Right hon. Gentlemen should not be in any doubt about the Soviet feeling regarding Germany. It is a strange psychological feeling about which I could not accurately use the phrase a "love-hate" relationship. Certainly it is a compound of respect and fear.
For many years the Russians have had a phrase to describe a job which has been really well done upon a house or on a ship or something like that. They call it a "German job". It goes back to the days before the Revolution when the Germans had to do most of the practical work in Russia. They have that healthy respect for what the Germans can do. At the same time, they remember—this is said by everyone to whoever visits them by the ordinary people in the streets—that they had 17 million dead in the last war as the result of Nazi invasion. Is there any wonder, therefore, that irresponsible suggestions about giving nuclear arms to West Germans rouse the deepest and most violent passions and suspicions in the minds of Soviet leaders and. I believe, among ordinary Soviet citizens. So I hope that the Government will come out clearly about this and that there is no question of nuclear arms for Germany. If they do not, I fear that the negotiations will be much more difficult if not entirely doomed from the start.
Last week, with President de Gaulle still obstructing with the proposals he wanted to put forward and with Dr. Adenauer less than enthusiastic, it was left to the United States and the United Kingdom to continue diplomatic probings. For the two Anglo-Saxon Powers to be left to do this is less than satisfactory, although we welcome the fact that they are going to do so. It would be far better if there could have been a common approach. But, at any rate, if there is to be probing let it be thorough and constructive. Let it explore the one positive point in Mr. Menshikov's statement, when he referred to the advantage of in some way recognising the international status of West
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Berlin through the United Nations and the possibility of garrisoning a token United Nations force in the city.
The suggestion of a United Nations presence in Berlin has been very much canvassed. If we could get one or mare of the specialised agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation or the World Health Organisation, in Berlin, so that visitors from all over the world went there, that might be one of the best possible guarantees of good behaviour by all concerned. If, indeed, we could get the establishment of a new international disarmament agency and could locate it in Berlin, then that could be of very great value. I think that it was Mr. McCloy who, a few weeks ago, linked a settlement on disarmament with making progress in the negotiations on Berlin.
I wonder if it is quite fanciful to consider the construction of a new motorway from West Germany to Berlin. I know that this would be very expensive, but the finance could be provided through the United Nations, to which we would, no doubt, pay our full contribution while others would not, as the right hon. Gentleman said. No doubt the control could be in United Nations hands, and while the annual cost would be heavy it would be a small price to nay for peace in this part of the world. I hope that this will be considered.
The big question to be settled by the Moscow probings is that of the scope of negotiations. I agree with Herr Brandt, who said in the Bundestag that the common German standpoint of recent years, that there must be no isolated Berlin solution, remained the right one. That is not only a statement of what should be but it is also highly realistic. We shall not get a solution of the Berlin problem alone. It cannot be divorced from the wider German question, and, above all, of the limitation of armaments in Central Europe.
Year after year, we have pressed for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe which would include Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, with not only the removal of nuclear weapons but an adequate system of inspection. In the short-lived mood of commonsense which coincided with his Moscow visit nearly three years ago, the Prime Minister

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undertook to set on foot studies of this problem. We have gone on urging that these studies should be made, and we would like to know what has happened to them. I hope that they have not been delegated to the one man and a boy who form the Government's disarmament staff in some musty corner of the Foreign Office. We hope that they will be given much higher priority, because they are relevant not only to a solution of the disarmament problem but also of the Berlin problem.
Now I turn to the wider N.A.T.O. problem, which Ministers were discussing in Paris last week and to which the right hon. Gentleman referred. I will refer to it only briefly now, but we shall want to discuss it further, certainly in the Defence debate but not least in its foreign policy aspects.
I have referred to the question of nuclear arms for Germany in the context of Berlin and in the wider context of East-West relations. In our view, the strength of N.A.T.O. is imperilled by excessive dependance on nuclear weapons already. That is not only our view. We understand that last week Mr. McNamara made one more appeal to Britain and France not to proceed with their own nuclear deterrents but instead to integrate with the American system in the West as a whole. But prestige politics obviously mean more to the Prime Minister and the Government than considerations of the defence of the West. That has been the position ever since the famous Defence White Paper of 1957.
I do not know if it is necessary to repeat this, but as a party we reject a neutralist rôle for Britain. We believe firmly in N.A.T.O., and it is right to remind the House that it was a Labour Government which first conceived N.A.T.O., and it is precisely because of this that we have repeatedly stressed the improvements we want to see in N.A.T.O., militarily and politically. Speaking for myself, I do not think that N.A.T.O. will ever be able to play its full part in the world and the defence of freedom as long as it has to look over its shoulder to see the denials of freedom in dependencies of some of its members. That the Government should speak more strongly than they have done to Portugal, and also to France about the terrorism in Algeria, is essential if
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we are to have clean hands in N.A.T.O. I do not apologise for saying that.
The perilous inadequacies of conventional forces in N.A.T.O., for which I think this country bears the heaviest responsibility, heighten the danger that a conventional attack could at any time be converted into a nuclear war withouout the holding operation which adequate conventional forces could make possible. This is the implication of the Government's policies. Britain's military weakness, due to the vain searching for nuclear prestige, combined with our economic weakness, not only means that we are a drag on our allies but that we are contributing unnecessarily to the risk of a false step or an over-adventurous Eastern military move being transformed into nuclear war. We are told, too, that the N.A.T.O. High Command has been pressing us to fulfil our military commitments in Europe. Our failure to do so is hastening the day—as I believe the evil day—when pressures Dither to supply nuclear arms to Germany or to bring into being six or more additional German divisions will be found to be irresistible with all that means for peace in Europe.
I turn, finally, to a question which we ought not to have to discuss tonight but which I am afraid we must—the question of whether Britain really believes in the United Nations. I am not going back over last week's Katanga debate. Like the right hon. Gentleman, we welcome the fact that talks are taking place. I do not think it would be easy to counter his claim as far as that is concerned, but, in addition to the tragic loss of life and the setback to the economic viability of the Congo, there have been two other major casualties of the past fortnight. One is the loss of British prestige in the world.
The Prime Minister's dramatic gesture in producing U Thant's letter at the end of last week's debate failed to impress even his own supporters. They were not taken in by it. As soon as he read it I pointed out that the statement of United Nations principles and objectives was exactly the same as before the Government's manoeuvre over the ceasefire and that the decision to send eminent United Nations negotiators to the Congo had been taken days before. The Prime

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Minister's little pantomime fooled no one, but what it did was to outrage a great many nations who put world peace above party manoeuvre.
Once again, the abstention over the South-West African Resolution has led to grave doubts about our position. Our representations over Goa would have come better from a Government who themselves had shown more respect for the fundamental principles of the United Nations. If it is true that because of Suez our voice was muted over Hungary, it is equally true that because of Katanga it has been muted over Goa.
The second thing is that over the past few weeks the Government—perhaps sotto voce and their supporters double fortissimo—have done a great deal to discredit the United Nations. The acceptance of every story put out—there was a good account in the Observer last Sunday of the way in which lies were manufactured—by that poison factory in Elisabethville and the equivocal answers to demands that they should declare public support for the United Nations operation, have done immeasurable harm. The world is asking, what rôle do Her Majesty's Government see for the United Nations? Are we on our road back to Sir John Simon over Manchuria or to the Hoare-Laval Pact? Do they think of the United Nations as a rather costly debating society meriting lip-service on every United Nations Sunday, and certainly before every election, but strenuously to be cut down to size—or below size—if British sovereignty or British strategic or financial interests are thought to be in danger?
Dag Hammarskjoeld in his last Reports, contrasted what he called the static and dynamic concepts of the rôle of the United Nations. This is the debate now going on in this country. Some hon. Members opposite think of the United Nations as being little more than a concert of high contracting parties. Hon. Members will have seen the leader in last week's Sunday Telegraph. I quote it, not with the idea of advertising or perpetuating it, but rather to show how the paper seeks to rationalise it, and perhaps the Government do too. It says:
"The United Nations, in the ambitious form in which the late Dag Hammarskjoeld conceived
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it, is dead. Whatever may happen now in Katanga, the notion of a supranational body, exercising power independently of the interests of individual nations, cannot for the future be entertained. Mr. Macmillan read the funeral oration in the House of Commons on Thursday … Without the wholehearted support of Britain and France, the U.N. Secretariat must abandon its claim to intervene autonomously in the world's trouble-spots. No matter how many more half-civilised nations join the General Assembly, the facts of international life make it impossible for the United Nations to act without Europe … The lesson of the Congo is that the Western Great Powers should never hesitate to use their Security Council veto when their national interests are seriously threatened."
We could not have it put more nakedly than that. How many hon. Members opposite, including some distinguished Members and noble Lords who are absent, really believe this statement about the United Nations? There we have the nationalist view.
Against that, we have the view, which at least we support, that the United Nations and its Secretary-General must be free to take actions which, as Mr. Hammarskjoeld once said,
"unavoidably may have to run counter to the views of at least some member States"
and that it is necessary for this country and other countries to support the United Nations even when it is against our own national interest, particularly when it is against the national or financial interest of companies located in this or allied countries.
In our view, that is the only road to peace. Only if we regard the United Nations as dynamic, as developing and as broadening from precedent to precedent until internationalism becomes the nucleus of world government—only if we can look at it in this way can we see peace coming to the world.
There is in particular one direction in which the United Nations must be given special responsibilities and that is disarmament. Here, the lowest common denominator of nationalist interests will not add up either to disarmament or to peace. Last week I quoted in a different context a speech made by the Prime Minister as long ago as in the defence debate of March, 1955. I make no apology for quoting it again. Referring to disarmament the Prime Minister said:
"The control must provide effective international, or if we like supranational, authority invested with real power. Hon. Members

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may say that this is elevating the United Nations, or whatever may be the authority, into something like world government. Be it so, it is none the worse for that. In the long run this is the only way out for mankind."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd March, 1955; Vol. 537, c. 2181.]
Those words by the Prime Minister six years ago are still of lasting significance.
I hope it will be in that spirit that the Prime Minister goes to meet the President in these vital talks that, we hope, will not in any way be affected by the sad news we have received about the President's family. I hope that the Prime Minister is briefing himself by rereading the President's imaginative address to the United Nations Assembly on 25th September calling for a new initiative for world disarmament, including, which is very important, a treaty forbidding the transfer of control over nuclear weapons to other nations.
It is true that since that speech we have had a number of grievous blows—the nuclear tests and the breakdown of the latest effort at Geneva. There have been, perhaps, one or two more hopeful signs—for example, the statement of agreed principles signed by Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin and the agreement on the composition of the new disarmament commission—but there still remains the basic obstacle of Soviet refusal to allow inspection to go beyond the arms destroyed and to cover those that remain and the Russian insistence that we do not get complete inspection until we have complete disarmament.
In this context of disarmament, there is a strong case for suggesting that a senior Minister should be appointed permanently and full time to deal with the question of disarmament, with experts charged with the study of the whole question of disarmament and control, including the economic implications of disarmament and control. This should be a full-time job. The United States has not only a powerful disarmament agency, but has a distinguished advisory body of people who can help from outside. We have in the Foreign Office, I understand, one man and a boy.
Heaven knows, we have a proliferation of Ministers all over the place. There are far more Ministers in the present Government than in any previous one. I am not quite so sure about the productivity which has resulted from this
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proliferation. There is a very strong case, in the interest both of getting the job done and of our image in the world, for appointing a senior Minister full time charged with responsibility for the armament.
The Prime Minister and the President of the United States are meeting this week, as the Lord Privy Seal said. They are meeting, despite the right hon. Gentleman's optimism, in an atmosphere clouded—in our view, unnecessarily clouded—by suspicions generated by last week's events over Katanga and by our votes on Angola and on colonialism. For all that, I think that everyone in the House will wish the Prime Minister well in these talks. Too much depends on these talks for any partisan attitude to be adopted concerning them.
It will be a long road back—via an understanding on Africa, on Berlin, on N.A.T.O., on the appropriate rôle for Britain to play in N.A.TO., and the contribution we must make towards making that rôle a reality, towards real agreement on disarmament and on the dynamic development of the United Nations as a world authority. This is the extent of the road which has to be travelled. I hope that this meeting in Bermuda will mark real progress on that road. The tragedy is that all that we heard last week and again this evening seems to suggest so little appreciation of what we have to do for our part to make that possible.
9.1 p.m.
Mr. Gilbert Longden: It is with much greater pleasure that I follow the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) this evening than I would have felt if I had followed him, as I tried to, in the debate on Katanga last week. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not follow him, except on the question of Berlin and perhaps a little on the question of the United Nations, because time is so short.
What rather depressed me about the right hon. Gentleman's approach, and, indeed, that of Her Majesty's Government, is that they seem to be quite prepared to accept the status quo. To my mind, a divided Berlin is a time bomb which is set to explode no man knows when. Mr. Khrushchev has described West Berlin as a bone sticking in his

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throat. It was a bone sticking in his throat for three reasons. First, it was a shop window through which the unfortunate people on the other side of the Iron Curtain could gaze at the benefits of a capitalist system. Secondly, it was an escape hatch through which they could fly to the West and, as we know, 3½ million of them did so before 13th August. Thirdly, it was a reminder of reunification. Therefore, this bone has to be either eliminated or assimilated.
The Soviet Government and people will not tolerate a reunited Germany. We heard from the right hon. Member for Huyton, who certainly has no doubts as to their sincerity, the reasons why the Russians feel that way about the Germans. Whether their views are genuine or not—I am quite prepared to accept them as such—there is no question but that the Polish views are absolutely genuine and sincere. They fear beyond anything else the reunification of Germany. I very much doubt if there is anybody on the Continent of Europe or in this country who, in his heart of hearts, wants to see a reunited Germany, except, of course, some people in Germany. The Soviet Union might agree to the reunification of Germany on condition that the whole of the reunited Germany was neutralised.
Sir Kenneth Pickthorn: Will my hon. Friend give way for a moment?
Mr. Longden: Yes, for a moment, but we have not much time.
Sir K. Pickthorn: My hon. Friend has more time than I have. If he makes public assumptions about who does or does not want to see Germany reunited, I think that it will be necessary to interrupt him. I have stopped as many German bullets as most people, but I want to see Germany reunited.
Mr. Longden: I am sure that my hon. Friend will agree that it is open to me to express my awn views in the House of Commons.
Sir K. Pickthorn: My hon. Friend did not do that. He said that it was the view of everybody.
Mr. Longden: My own view is that most people on the Continent of Europe—I said that, and I repeat it—do not
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want to see Germany reunited. That is my view and I am perfectly entitled to say it in the House of Commons.
If that is so, what is the West's position? First, they cannot conceivably abandon the West Berliners to the Communist world. If we were to do that, the word of the West would be worthless in all the uncommitted nations and, indeed, in N.A.T.O., where there are several countries whose populations are not much larger than that of West Berlin, we should lose a great many adherents.
Secondly, the West cannot contemplate a neutralised, reunited Germany. Why? I do not believe that it is practicable to neutralise and to treat a great nation of 80 million people in that manner, as, for example, Austria was treated. I do not believe that it is practicable to deprive them of that essential element of sovereignty which is the right of self-defence. I do not think that it will be practicable to begin it or just to go on with it. Why should the German nation as a whole be relieved of the responsibility of bearing their fair share of the defence of Western civilisation?
If we have these two views opposed to each other what shall we do? I do not believe that it is possible for the status quo to remain for very long. This is a task for diplomacy, but my view, which I have expressed before now, is that the West should give up its ultimate object of reunifying Germany. That is what I would advocate most strongly that it should do. I advocate most strongly that we should treat the Soviet zone of Eastern Germany as Austria was treated, and that zone should be an independent sovereign State whose neutrality was guaranteed by the four Powers, with a reunited Berlin as its capital.
I believe, also very strongly, that the Eastern frontier of that State should be on the Oder-Neisse Line. The penalty for losing wars is to lose territory, and Germany has lost two wars in this century. The main advantage of that scheme would be that the people of the East would have the freedom to chose their own Government. The corroding process of Communism in that zone of Germany would cease, and it is only eighteen months ago that Dr. Adenauer said to a Press conference:
"If we can help them"—

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that is, the people of East Germany—
"to live better and more freely, then that is more important than anything else."
If their plight was bad eighteen months ago, how much worse is it today when the wall to which the right hon. Member for Huyton referred now exists and which I saw a fortnight ago? But I must make it abundantly plain that that solution, too, is out of the question unless, first, the Federal Republic of Germany can be persuaded to agree to it and to release their allies from their pledge, which otherwise they are bound by, to go for reunification.
This is the only alternative to a prolongation of the stalemate. We must not offer concessions to the Russians to maintain our existing rights, but our present policy should not be, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, unalterable. If I am asked whether the Kremlin would agree I would say that it is not for us to say "No" for Mr. Khrushchev. He is quite able to say that for himself. Let us give him the chance to say "No". The Russians would be getting something out of it if they are sincere in their fear of a reunited Germany. They would get a neutral cushion between Poland and the West which some day might be prolonged southward to join Austria, and at the end the new State might invite the United Nations to set up its headquarters in Berlin.
I should like to say something about the United Nations, to which I believe my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs will refer when he winds up the debate. I should like to express my thanks to Her Majesty's Government for having voted the way they did on the admission of China. I have advocated this ever since I was there myself. Now at last we have come out into the open and we have to face the reality, which is that the Communists rule China and Chiang-kai Shek does not. I hope that it will be made abundantly clear by the Government that Formosa shall not be taken over by the Chinese, but that it shall remain an independent sovereign State in its own right as a member of the United Nations.
What can be said about Goa? As the right hon. Gentleman has said, this is another blow at the United Nations. I think that the only faint satisfaction that we can possibly get out of this
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utterly unwarranted aggression is that perhaps from now on the world will be spared more sermons from the Indian pulpit.
My right hon. Friend said that Her Majesty's Government had decided to look more closely at the resolutions for which they voted or on which they abstained from voting. I think that he said that the general sense of the resolutions was not enough and that in future we must worry about the wording. I respectfully hope that that will be so, because I believe that we made a mistake on 24th November in abstaining on the Katanga resolution, for the reason that that resolution for the first time permitted the use of force to eliminate military and para-military personnel, political advisers and mercenaries.
I do not see why we should prevent Mr. Tshombe from having his European advisers, technical and political, since that is precisely the policy that we try to follow in those parts of Africa for which we are still responsible, namely, the building up of a multi-racial society in which each race contributes what it can to the general good. I do not think we ought to have voted for the use of force to prevent that. It would have been better if we had voted against it.
As members of the United Nations, we accept and carry out resolutions of the Security Council, but if we abstain, those resolutions, to be carried, have to carry the affirmative vote of seven members and the concurring vote of five permanent members. Is abstention the equivalent of concurrence? If it is, we must honour that resolution. I tell the Opposition once again that it is no good talking about the Katanga lobbies and diehards on this side of the House. The whole of these benches were united on that occasion because we believed, rightly or wrongly, that the United Nations was exceeding the mandate that had been given to it.
I should like to know whether the right hon. Member for Huyton wants Heir Majesty's Government to forgo the veto altogether. The veto was deliberately put into the Charter to give nations the right to vote against a resolution if their national interests were affected.
Mr. H. Wilson: I think that the view of us all is that we want to see reforms in the United Nations so that vetoes are much rarer, even if they do not disappear altogether. This country should never use the veto in the United Nations purely to satisfy our own real or imagined financial and nationalist interest.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Really?
Mr. Wilson: Yes, really. I go beyond that. I would say that although the hon. Gentleman has said that the United Nations exceeded its mandate in the Congo, if it had not done what it has, I believe that by this time the Congo would be a cockpit for a conflict between all the major Powers.
Mr. Longden: There must always remain two views on that subject. There will be great opposition in this country to the right hon. Gentleman's suggestion that we should forgo the veto. We have used it on very few occasions. Out of 103 times, I think that Russia has used the veto on 96 occasions, leaving the rest for the West. If that is not sparing enough, I do not know what is.
I must say that in the present state of political sophistication of most members of the United Nations, the majority of whom between them can contribute less to the United Nations than this country does alone, we should be unwise to forgo the right of veto. In any case the question is academic, because if we did, Russia would not.
9.15 p.m.
Mr. John Hynd: I was shocked when I heard the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) list the concessions that we ought to make unilaterally to Russia prior to the negotiations that he advocated over Berlin. I noted them. The first was that the West should give up its claims for the reunification of Germany. The others were that we should recognise the East German Government, recognise the whole of Berlin as the capital of the East German Government and recognise the Oder-Neisse Line. What would be the point of negotiations after we had done all that? We should have given up everything.
I think I got an inkling of the reason for this strange attitude on the part of
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the hon. Member when he said that he had advocated recognition of China's place in the United Nations ever since he was in China—
Mr. Longden: I must correct the hon. Gentleman. I made this suggestion 18 months ago in this House.
Mr. Hynd: This is also the main point that disturbed me about the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson). This issue is not one that can be dealt with in terms of slogans or the old bogies trotted out from time to time from one side or the other. My right hon. Friend spoke of the veto that President de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer had in negotiations. But they have no veto.
It is an unfortunate fact that the West is divided on whether we should enter into negotiations; if so, when and on what conditions. It is a natural state of affairs that a number of independent powers grouped together in a democratic alliance should have different views, and be in a different situation from that of a totalitarian power which rules all its satellites and can speak with a single voice. But because there are these differences of view, and one or other may be right—I should not like to give a final judgment on which is right—it is a little unhelpful to describe the attitude of other members of the alliance as that of exercising a veto when we know that neither Dr. Adenauer nor President de Gaulle has any veto at all.
On the general question of Berlin, and whether and why and when we should negotiate, one could speak for a long time. In view of the time available, I would just remind the House why we are there and under what conditions. This was the result of an act of faith in the course of the war when we agreed that we would share with our allies the administration of Berlin and the administration of Germany on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement, because we were hoping—we believed that it was possible—that after the war we should be able to maintain the co-operation which existed during the war between the West and Russia.
In these conditions, we set up a Control Council for Germany, a four-Power authority which was to be responsible for the administration of

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Germany under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement with the object of treating Germany as a single economic unit under central German administrations. The Control Council was made responsible also for the administration of Berlin—in this context not East Berlin and West Berlin, but greater Berlin. Every agreement that we have made with the Russians since has been in terms of greater Berlin and not a divided or separate Berlin.
That the Russians themselves decided at one stage to withdraw from their responsibilities under this four-power agreement and also to withdraw from the Berlin city authority the Communists, who had been elected in a minority, and to set up a separate city in the east, in no way absolves us from our own responsibilities in respect of the whole city. Legally, the position is that we are jointly responsible with the Russians for the administration of all Berlin until there is a final settlement, and that state of affairs has existed for sixteen years.
In the last two years we have been faced with a couple of crises, and ultimata have been addressed to us by Mr. Khrushchev, the first since the Berlin blockade of 1958–59. The question that we must ask ourselves is why after sixteen years of this situation we suddenly find ourselves again in the midst of a crisis. Everybody knows that the crises of 1958 and this year were deliberately manufactured by the Russians. That is the first fact. We have not created the crisis. We have tried to maintain, pending negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the whole position, the status quo. The Russians, for their own reasons, created two crises which threatened to bring about the final breakdown of the whole position with the risks of world war. That is what created the danger.
What were the reasons for Russia creating those crises? One can only make guesses, but it is conceivable that the Russians may themselves be conscious of the danger of the continued existence of a divided Berlin. They may also be conscious of the liability, financial, economic and otherwise, of maintaining these long lines of communication and the tremendous occupation forces necessary to control that kind of territory, just as they did in the case of
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Austria, when, after all the disappointments and disillusionments of years of the Palais Rose negotiations, they suddenly swung round and got out of Austria, giving the Austrians practically everything they had asked for. The Russians may also have in mind their experience in Hungary and the experience of 17th June, 1953, when East Germany rose in revolt.
There are many substantial reasons why Russia might want to bring about an end to that situation. The Russians are not the sort of people to come to us and say, "We want to get out; will you let us go gracefully?" Of course, not. Therefore, they are taking other methods to try to bring us to a final settlement of the whole question. We have the evidence that, in November, 1958, Mr. Khrushchev issued his first ultimatum, telling us that unless we were prepared to agree to his terms he would sign by 1st January a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He did not do it. Why not? There was nothing to stop him doing it, but he did not do it. He repeated the performance this year, and again gave an ultimatum to expire at the end of this month, and he recently told us that we need not worry about it because he was not going to press it.
Why is it? The reason probably is that the Russians have very substantial reasons why they should get us into a conference to settle the whole German problem. I do not believe, for the reason suggested by my right hon. Friend and an hon. Member opposite, that it is because the Russians are afraid of Western Germany. Mr. Khrushchev made a series of speches in the last several months, in which he spoke with contempt of little Britain and France, which he said were hostages which he could blot out in the first two seconds of a war. Why should he be worried about the still smaller and easier to attack Western Germany, when he is not worried about Britain and her Commonwealth and France?
It is a very convenient element of propaganda for Russia in Communist countries to arouse fears of Germany when trying to maintain populations under the control of the Communist Party, but I do not believe for a moment that the Russians who know and who

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matter have any fears at all of any unilateral action by West Germany. If they have, why on earth did they start by arming East Germany, long before West Germany armed? Is it only West Germany of which they are afraid? Did only Germans from West Germany take part in the invasion of Russia during the war? I believe that this is complete nonsense, that it is not a factor in the situation at all, but that the tactics are very much our concern.
There are 3½ million refugees from the East who have come into West Berlin over the last several years. Naturally, the Russians are worried about them, because many of these refugees are professional people—doctors, dentists, scientists and people of that kind, as well as farmers, young people and qualified workers—to the extent that even the West Berlin authorities and the West German authorities themselves were trying to discourage these refugees, because they were afraid that Eastern Germany was being denuded of qualified and democratically-minded people.
This concern of Western Germany about this flood of refugees is evidence of the real importance of this loss of qualified workers to the East, and therefore there is a good reason why the Russians and the East German authorities should be concerned about this and should try to bring an end to it. Their answer was the building of the wall, with barbed wire entanglements and all the rest of it. What does it mean? Did they think that this would stop West Berlin from being a centre of espionage, as they and my right hon. Friend allege it is; a centre of propaganda, a thorn in the flesh of Mr. Khrushchev, and an enclave of the West in the middle of the Communist world? Was the wall to stop that? If so, it is surely a failure from the start, because the wall divides Eastern Berlin from West Berlin, and therefore makes a permanent division of the city and thus makes permanent the opportunities for espionage and propaganda from Western Berlin. But the creation of the wall was also to prevent the reunification of Berlin, although one would surely assume that unification, not division, the best way to bring to an end any allegations of
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espionage and counter-espionage and the rest.
What I am worried about is that there was no positive reaction on the part of the Western Powers in connection with the wall. As I said earlier, the whole of the agreements which exist between the Western Powers and the Russians have reference to our responsibilities in East and West for the whole of Berlin, and in creating this wall and dividing the two parts of Berlin permanently, as they did, the Russians were not only cutting off free access, which the Berlin people and the allied people in Berlin are entitled to have, but they were doing something very much more. They were in fact engaging in the military annexation of a territory for which we, the Western Powers, are still equally responsible. And we did nothing about it.
I well remember the blockade in 1948 and 1949. The blockade was defeated because we took resolute counteraction against it. What has happened since? There has been irresolution and compromise on every occasion. When the Russians restricted free movement in Berlin we in the West did nothing about it. We protested when they first armed the East Germans, but we did nothing else until we responded by creating rearmament in West Germany and bringing West Germany into N.A.T.O., but we did nothing to prevent the rearmament of Eastern Germany. Then we came to 13th August and the creation of the wall, a military annexation in territory over which we still have responsibility.
I do not know how far people realise the effect this permanent division of Berlin has had. Herr Willy Brandt in Paris only last week explained that in the last few months there had been a series of cultural exhibitions held in West Berlin for which the West German authorities issued no fewer than 10 million tickets of entry to those exhibitions to people in West Germany, and those people came freely over. On 13th August that finished. There was no more access. Before 13th August there were 500,000 crossings of the sector frontier between East and West every day until 13th August. Now there is none.
These are the facts, and now, to crown it all, we find that in spite of all our

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commitments to the Berliners and our allies, under agreements under which we are made responsible for maintaining order in Berlin, we have the East German police shooting down men, women and children as they swim across the river or climb out of windows to their friends on the Western side.
The other day I read in the British Press how a young Austrian student was shot. I confess that I was not particularly impressed by the report I read. Here was just another poor victim, but I was told the other day by Herr Lemmer in Paris what really happened. The young Austrian student was shot when still on our side of the wall. Those who know Berlin know the trick. The official markings are within the Eastern sector and one can easily walk into the sector thinking one is still on the Western side till one comes up against the markings. That young Austrian student was shot on our side of the wall, but he was lying two metres inside the Eastern territory, although it was not marked. He lay there bleeding to death and crying for help for a solid hour—dying for an hour—while the might of N.A.T.O. stood by and watched. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] No one lifted a finger to help him. Not even the Red Cross was called in to help as they do even on the battlefield in a war. But there was the collective might of N.A.T.O. and there was our responsibility in West Berlin. That is the kind of thing which we are now standing by and seeing happen.
What kind of reply ought we to make in this new situation? By their own actions, the Russians have created an entirely new situation, a new situation in which they have destroyed the fiction of Berlin being a four-Power area under four-Power control. They have created the fact of an East Berlin which they have made the capital of Eastern Germany. We now have every right to pronounce that West Berlin is now part of the West German Federal Republic. That is the fact, and when people talk about recognising the fact of the Oder-Neisse Line and the fact of the existence of the D.D.R., let us also recognise the fact that by their own action and their own policy the Russians have made East Berlin entirely dependent upon the Federal Republic for its economy, its communications, its
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social life, its cultural life and everything else. If we are recognising facts, let us recognise that one too and start by saying that in this new situation West Berlin is part of the Federal Republic.
It may be said that the Russians, through the D.D.R. officials, would interfere with our rights in the corridor. Would they? Why have they not done so up to now? And if we were to negotiate a new treaty, such as Khrushchev suggests, in which we would merely rewrite the things we already enjoy—access to Berlin and maintenance of our troops in Berlin and the freedom of West Berliners to move about in West Berlin only, what difference would that make? Those agreements already exist. Until now, there has been no attempt, since the blockade, to interfere with freedom of access. Would the writing of the same terms in a new agreement, which is all that is proposed, make it more easy or more difficult to interfere with that access?
I am not suggesting for a moment that we should ask simply for the status quo. We do not want the status quo in Berlin. We do not want the status quo in Germany—but neither, apparently, does Khrushchev. Hence the reason why he has made repeated demands for negotiations for a peace treaty for the whole of Germany. Hence the reason why he has made gestures from time to time, either threatening or offering discussions. No one on either side wants the status quo and that is precisely the kind of situation in which negotiations become possible.
I know the attitude, again expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton and by the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West, that there are certain things which we cannot expect the Russians to agree to. We cannot expect Russia to agree to the reunification of Germany or to free elections. But can the Russians expect us to agree to the continued division of Germany and no free elections? There are certain things which we cannot expect them to agree to and there are certain things which they cannot expect us to agree to. But surely that is a situation which makes negotiation necessary. If one can agree without negotiation on things of that kind, negotiations are not necessary, but when one reaches deadlock, whether

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it be in industry, in foreign affairs, or wherever it may be, that is when negotiations are necessary.
Therefore, we should have negotiations and in those negotiations we should state our demands from the beginning. We believe in the reunification of Germany and we believed in free elections. Let us ask for them. If the Russians believe in a divided Germany and a recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line and all the rest of it, let them ask for those things. That is where negotiations begin.
It is no good for me or for any other hon. Member to suggest a final solution, stating individual points on which we should be ready to make concessions or the Russians should be able to make concessions. That can be done only when we see what they are demanding and they see what we are demanding. Only when the negotiators get together and see in which directions they can find agreement can concessions and counter-concessions be made.
Therefore, in saying that we ought to react firmly to what happened in Berlin on 13th August and the policy now being pursued by the Russians and the D.D.R. authorities, I am not saying that we should either refuse to have negotiations on Berlin, or on a final German settlement, nor that we are satisfied with the status quo. But if we want negotiations about a general peace treaty, or even about Berlin alone, we must not start from anything other than the status quo. That is the important thing.
Sir K. Pickthorn: I am not trying to be tiresome but to follow the argument with which I agree almost 100 per cent. What does the hon. Gentleman mean by status quo? Its meaning used to be the state of things as they were before the war. I am not sure whether in his argument it does not mean the state of things as they are. I think that the hon. Gentleman ought to tell us what he means.
Mr. Hynd: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman did not understand me. Generally, the term status quo in this context refers to the continued division of Berlin, the continued division of Germany, the maintenance of troops in Berlin, and the maintenance of communications with the West. I am saying that
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if we are to go into negotiations with the Russians for a final peace treaty, or for a general settlement of the German position, or of the Berlin position, we should make it clear, as I think the Minister himself said, that we start from that status quo—from the situation which existed before 13th August, if the hon. Gentleman likes—and that we are not going to accept the situation which has come about by the unilateral accession of territories—the unilateral action of 13th August last.
While welcoming the opportunity far negotiations, which I believe the Russians want, and while withholding our fire and not giving away all our concessions in advance over the radio, we should make it clear that we will start not from the present position, but from the position of an open Berlin, the position which existed up to 13th August under the agreement between ourselves and Russia. I believe that in the Berlin situation we are facing a final test at this period of world history of the will of the West to survive.
9.37 p.m.
Mr. Forbes Hendry: I hesitate very much to speak about Berlin, or, indeed, about Germany, after the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd), who is such an expert in these matters, but I feel that I have something to contribute to this debate. I shall be brief, but like the hon. Member for Attercliffe, I feel that we must look at the background of the situation in Berlin.
I was in Germany as a Military Government Officer at the end of the war. I had been taught to believe in the Potsdam Declaration, that the allies would together build up a new Germany to take its place in the community of civilised Western nations, and I remember the horror on the faces of our soldiers when they stopped looking at German machine guns and found themselves looking at Russian ones. That was immediately after the war.
Since then the Russians decided that they would annex the Eastern part of Germany. They bled that country white deliberately, and they have built up an impassable barrier between the Eastern and Western parts of Germany, so that free movement between the two parts

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was impossible except in one place. That one place was in Berlin where the East Germans could go perfectly freely. Having got there they could pass over the boundary into West Berlin, and into freedom. No less than 3½ million people have left East Germany in the last ten years. I used to think that they were political refugees, but I have discovered that that is wrong. They were ordinary Germans, and the best of them.
During the last few years no fewer than 2,000 school teachers have passed from East to West Germany for the pure and simple reason that they refuse to stay there and teach the children of the country things in which they did not believe. Several hundred doctors, hundreds of skilled men, lawyers, university professors, and so on, have left everything which they would normally value in life, and have gone into the West, to freedom, and to a way of life in which they believe.
Three and a half million people out of a population of 18 million people is more than any country can stand. It is for that reason, I suggest, and for that reason only, that this diabolical wall was built on 13th August across Berlin.
Mr. Edward Gardner: Does my hon. Friend also agree that it is significant that, of the 1 million refugees who have crossed over from East Germany to West Germany in ten years, 50 per cent. have been under the age of 24 and 50 per cent. have been industrial workers?
Mr. Hendry: I agree. To sum up, East Germany has rapidly been developed into a country of old-age pensioners and children. It is hardly viable, and I suggest that it was for that reason only that the East German authorities and the Russians had to build this diabolical wall against West Berlin. That wall has been likened to the Chinese Wall, but it is nothing like it. The Chinese Wall was built as a fortress. The Berlin wall was never built as a fortress; it was built as a prison wall to keep the East Germans in.
I was there three weeks ago and I saw the wall. The right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) spoke about its foundations, but there are no foundations. It is a flimsy wall, useless as
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a barrier except where it is covered by fire from the Eastern side. There is a strip of death on the Eastern side. Our people ought to know what the wall is like. It is a jerry-built wall and for some ten yards behind it on the Eastern side there is a clear strip covered by fire, which nobody can cross except at the peril of his life. In one place the wall was originally a cemetery wall, and the gates have been built up. Behind the cemetery wall there is a barbed wire fence running across the graves to prevent people from getting to the wall. Anybody getting between the wall and the barbed wire is shot. When there is a funeral, the coffin is taken and buried in the cemetery, but the mourners cannot go through. It is heartbreaking to see the wreaths placed against the outside of the cemetery wall.
The wall is now the frontier between Western civilisation and the most evil barbarity this world has ever known. Our people should know what the wall is like, and the reason why it was built. Not nearly enough of our people realise the purpose of the wall, and that, instead of being a defiance to the West it is a positive and visible symbol of the failure of the Communist way of life. It is obvious that the Communist authorities in East Germany—whether Russian or German—have failed to keep their own people in except by the use of this horrible wall. They have made sounds of defiance, but the wall is a confession of failure, and we must reinforce our demands on the Russians and the East Germans. We must not give in. The wall is our frontier. If we let the Russians or the Communists get one yard on this side we are giving in.
My right hon. Friend ought to negotiate to get rid of this inhuman situation in Berlin, but he must negotiate from strength and not from weakness. He must not give way one inch. It is not for me—a person with very little experience of these matters—to offer a solution when my right hon. Friend has not done so and the hon. Member for Attercliffe, with his vast experience, cannot offer a solution. But the situation cannot go on as it is. We cannot have these 60,000 people who live in East Berlin and used to work in West Berlin being prevented from doing so against their will. I spoke to one man with a sick wife in East Berlin who could not visit her

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or send his wages to her. That sort of inhumanity must stop. In order to stop it we must negotiate, and I urge my right hon. Friend with great respect to negotiate, in the interests of humanity, not from weakness but from strength.
9.45 p.m.
Mr. Woodrow Wyatt: I am quite happy at the attitude of the Government and Opposition Front Benches on the question of Berlin. Their attitude is commendable, as is that of the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, West (Mr. Hendry) and of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. H. Hynd). It is not that attitude that I want to try to influence tonight; what I want to do is to make a plea to both Front Benches to change their attitude on Goa.
The Lord Privy Seal explained that he knew nothing whatever about Goa except what he had read in the Press. He said that we had no consul there. I suspect that that is the position of my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson). This is why there has been so much misunderstanding about Goa, and so much unfortunate misrepresentation of the Indian case. To be served by the British Press on this matter has been to be served by a very bad instructor. We know what to expect from the vile and malevolent Daily Express. We know that it has nothing good to say about Nehru and many other people. But we do not expect bias and incomplete reporting from newspapers like The Times and the Guardian, or even the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph. They are not all of my particular persuasion, but one does not expect to be so misinformed, and not to be given any of the basic facts.
It seems to me that the basic mistake that we have been making is to talk as though Goa was some kind of independent country which has just been invaded by this monstrous bully, India, without any reference to the United Nations. This has apparently thrown the whole of the United Nations into confusion, if not more or less brought it to an end and sullied the good name of India. Many hon. Members opposite did not think that India had a good name before, so I am not clear why they are so concerned now.
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The population of Goa is approximately 650,000. In 1950, the Portuguese took a census, when things were not quite so "hot". They published it in 1951. They themselves only claim that 517 Portuguese lived there and about 336 people of mixed descent; and these people were all the administrators and, of course, the Portuguese were transient administrators and had no being or home there at all. There was no suggestion that there was a kind of Portuguese settlement in Goa. It was not even like Kenya, where there are many settlers with homes or businesses, or something of that kind. Every one of the 650,000 other people in Goa were officially described by the Portuguese as Indians. There was no suggestion that, somehow, they had been assimilated to Portugal and in some mysterious way had become Portuguese nationals.
In fact, there were only 600 students in Portuguese schools in Goa. Most of the 12,000 students are in English schools and I hope that hon. Members will be proud of the fact that the Goans preferred to go to English schools, all run from Bombay University, rather than to Portuguese schools. Any suggestion that there was no connection between Goa and India is absurd. The Goans have regarded themselves as an integral part of India. One-fifth of the people of Goa or Goan origin live in India. Only 5 per cent. of the people speak Portuguese; 25 per cent. speak English and the rest speak Concanim. It is a language similar to the Marathi language and it is spoken in Southern India.
There is no suggestion that there is a peculiar kind of Goan nationality or racial origin which makes it distinct from the rest of India. This local language continues to be spoken in Goa despite the fact that many laws were passed by the Portuguese making it illegal to speak that language. But after 450 years they have been unable to persuade more than 5 per cent. of the population to learn to speak Portuguese.
Goa was seized by force by Albuquerque in 1510. He proceeded to massacre the entire Mohammedan population of Goa at that time, so I do not think that it is for the Portuguese to complain if Goa is being returned by force to India with the loss of about eight lives. Goa is as Indian as Bombay.

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There is no difference between Goa and anywhere else in India. For fourteen years the Indian Government have pleaded with the Portuguese to negotiate on the subject of Goa. They even established diplomatic relations with the Portuguese for four years between 1953 and 1957 to try to create some kind of negotiation between the countries because they wanted to settle this matter peacefully.
In 1956, a non-violence movement was severely squashed by very brutal methods on the part of the Portuguese police. Even then India took no action except to prevent Goan nationals from taking arms into Goa. Many Goans were gaoled by Mr. Nehru because he thought that they were taking too violent action and going back to Goa to try to stir up trouble there. India's policy was continually to appeal for negotiations to Portugal. During this time 3,000 Goans were arrested, I think that about 1,000 Goans were found to be in gaol when the Indian troops marched in yesterday.
The Nationalist movement of Goa has been suppressed and at least 87 Goans are known to have been shot and tortured to death by colonial administrators in Portugal. Last June, when some Nationalist leaders in Goa asked the Portuguese whether they might be allowed to take part in the deliberations or the advice given by the legislative council they were arrested and put in gaol. This council is not, of course, a Parliament, or anything of that kind. It is simply allowed to suggest to the Government the path of a new sewerage track, or something like that.
There have been a series of resolutions at the United Nations about the attitude and behaviour of the Portuguese in Goa and elsewhere. Remarkable though it may seem, the Government actually voted for one of these resolutions which required Portugal to give information about Goa to the United Nations. Despite that, the Portuguese took no notice at all. They disregarded the resolution. They said it had nothing to do with the United Nations. I wish to ask the Government whether they implemented that part of the resolution for which they voted which required
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those who voted for the resolution to use their best influence with the Portuguese to obey the resolution, and what was the nature of the way in which the Government tried to bring their influence to bear on Portugal? What was the answer? We have heard nothing about that.
There were two other recent resolutions about Portugal. There was the resolution which was quoted by the Lord Privy Seal, demanding immediate independence and the working for an independent colonial territory. Naturally, this was rejected by Portugal. More serious was the one on Angola on which we abstained. It set up a committee to investigate the situation in Angola and requested Portugal to give the Committee every facility. Portugal refused permission for the committee to go into Angola.
Why should it have been supposed that it would have been any good for India, in the face of these objections by Portugal to resolutions about Goa, to go to the United Nations prior to the police action which they took in Goa the other day? Had they done so, are the Government seriously saying that they would have supported India at the United Nations and demanded that Portugal should abandon Goa? Is that their case? Is their defence of their unfriendly action towards India and Goa that if India had gone to the Security Council they would have promoted and voted for a resolution demanding that Portugal should leave Goa? Nothing of that kind has been done or said before. If they are prepared to say they would have done so, it would have been very interesting. But the Government did not vote even for the resolution for an inquiry into Angola.
What was India supposed to do? Should she have waited? But waited for what? For a Cyprus situation to develop, an internal revolt with the loss of many lives? Should India have done what other people have dishonestly done elsewhere—promoted internal trouble by sending in arms and guerillas? Did the Government want India to do that? Do they only bow to force? Did they take any notice of the appeals for negotiations and to the United Nations?
It is untrue to say that India has not raised this matter in the United Nations. She was one of the sponsors of the

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resolution demanding that Portugal should give information about Goa to the United Nations—a resolution totally ignored by Portugal. I think that Mr. Nehru took a more honourable course. He did not try to fake at all. He simply went in and "cleaned it up" in 24 hours, treating the operation as a police action.
I would have thought that that was an action which would have commended itself to Members opposite. The expedition was carried out with a great deal more efficiency than their misguided action at Suez. Perhaps that is part of the reason for their envious reaction to what Mr. Nehru did. But this is, after all, an internal matter for India. One cannot invade oneself, and Goa was, and always had been, an integral part of India until it was taken by force by the Portuguese. To go on pretending that it was a part of another country, and that this action jeopardises the United Nations, is hypocrisy, and is thought to be so in India. One cannot say that 517 Portuguese administrators amount to a country because they happen to be sitting in somebody else's territory.
This was really a case of clearing out some brigands who ought not to have been there. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Indeed it was. These brigands had said that it was nothing to do with the United Nations in any case, and had refused to discuss it there. So why is India supposed to go to the United Nations about something which Portugal says has nothing to do with the United Nations?
This action might, of course, cause some unfortunate consequences. I think that some Members opposite hope that it will. But one good consequence will be that, for the first time in history, there will be free elections in Goa; and if the people of Gao decide that they would like to rejoin Portugal I am sure that no obstacle will be put in their way. Indeed, it would not be illegal, under the Indian Constitution, for a pro-Portugal party to set up shop and advocate a return to Portuguese administration. I am sure that it would not be prevented from doing so.
Mr. W. R. Rees-Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman answer this direct question? Within three to four months he will find that the gates
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of India are closed entirely to her own citizens leaving the country. Is he prepared to suggest that I am wrong? They will have to stay inside their own country because they will not be allowed to leave. At least part of the purpose of the take-over of Goa is to prevent the Goans, too, from being able to leave their own country.
Mr. Wyatt: I do not know whether that is supposed to be a consequence of the Government's Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. Nor do I know where this mysterious information has come from. I cannot possibly say, and I can give no credence to it of any sort.
It is said that India's action may harm the United Nations. It is not for Members opposite to use that argument. They who perpetrated the misdeed of Suez, and who have been busy sabotaging the United Nations in Katanga, quite shamelessly, certainly cannot accuse somebody else of harming the United Nations. [An HON. MEMBER: "They can."] Well, they can, but they cannot do it with authority.
It was also said that perhaps it would damage India's capacity to mediate between the great Powers. I really cannot see that. [Laughter.] It is unfortunate that hon. Members get their information only from the Daily Express and that they are so misinformed as the Lord Privy Seal, who said that he knew nothing about Goa except what he read in the Press.
It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
Proceedings on any Motion for the Adjournment of the House moved by a Minister of the Crown exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House) for One Hour after Ten o'clock.—[Mr. Godber.]
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Godber.]
Mr. Wyatt: The position about India's mediatory capacity is that the action which India took in Kashmir never prevented her from being effective as a mediator in Korea or Indo-China. Yet I would not defend the action India took in Kashmir. I happen to think that Pakistan was in the right about that. I

1501
think that it was a highly controversial and questionable action to accept the accession of a Hindu ruler trying to keep his throne and governing a Muslim State. That was a questionable action, though hon. Members opposite did not think India's mediatory capacity had been destroyed by Mr. Nehru's handling of that matter, but they do over the question of Goa when the occupying Power has refused to negotiate.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: What worries me about this argument is whether the hon. Member would concede General Franco's claim to Gibraltar.
Mr. Wyatt: That is a very interesting point. I thought that the hon. Member for Chigwell (Mr. Biggs-Davison) might raise it. I think that General Franco has a perfect claim to Gibraltar, but I hope that we are strong enough to resist him.
Hon. Members: Ah.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: The Portuguese were not strong enough.
Mr. Wyatt: Indeed they were not. This certainly makes a difference. I will not pretend that I think General Franco has not a perfectly good legal claim to Gibraltar. I think that he has. On the other hand, I think that at present it would be unsuitable for the peace of the world to hand Gibraltar over to a Fascist dictator in Spain; and so long as we are strong enough not to have to do that I hope that we shall not do it. I do not think that there is anything illogical in my attitude over Gibraltar and my attitude over Goa.
I am making the same claim about India. She has been strong enough to take over Goa, and, anyway, I do not like dictators. There has been no possibility of two nations endangering the peace of the world by an operation in which eight people were killed in Goa and an anomaly was tidied up. I think that the only criticism to make of Mr. Nehru is that he ought to have done it long ago instead of leaving this absurd anomaly to exist so long.
Another question is whether it will be a bad example for the Dutch over West New Guinea.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: A good example.
Mr. Wyatt: I do not agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). The inhabitants of West New Guinea are of quite a different racial origin from the Indonesians. They are separated by a big stretch of water and a long sprawling archipelago. I cannot think that the Indonesians have more right to run West New Guinea than have the Dutch. I do not think that either has that right. The Dutch, however, have agreed to negotiate about West New Guinea and have, in fact, put forward suggestions—unlike the Portuguese in Goa—that there should be a plebiscite, supervised by the United Nations, to allow the people to decide whether they want their country to be run by Indonesians, or by Dutch, or to be independent. It is, therefore, a rather different situation from Goa, where the Portuguese refused to take any notice of anybody.
The reason for the attack made on Mr. Nehru in this country—an unfortunate one and damaging for the Commonwealth—is twofold. First, as I mentioned earlier, the Conservative Party is, perhaps understandably, riled that he pulled off such an operation successfully in Goa in a way that they could not do at Suez. It is always irritating to find somebody doing something more efficiently than oneself.
The second reason is the not very agreeable motive of thinking "Hooray. We have caught out a moraliser doing something naughty. This is splendid."
Sir K. Pickthorn: They always do.
Mr. Wyatt: The hon. Member is a moraliser—
Sir K. Pickthorn: I am a moralist.
Mr. Wyatt:—and is always moralising. I am sure that he and Mr. Nehru have a great deal in common.
Mr. Michael Stewart: People listen to Nehru.
Mr. Wyatt: There is the feeling of glee, of childish delight, that the good boy of the class has a snotty nose. It is a feeling that should be restrained. In the first place, I do not think that Mr. Nehru has done anything wrong. Secondly, it is not very helpful to our relations, not only with the Commonwealth, but with the Afro-Asian nations. Hon. Members should not suppose that

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the world has condemned Mr. Nehru. A tiny section of the world has condemned him. The rest of the world has not had to rely on the British Press as its sole source of information, as the Government have done. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Perhaps the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Smithers) and some of his hon. Friends were not here when the Lord Privy Seal said that he knew nothing about Goa, we had no consul there and he knew only what he read in the Press. The hon. Member, who has been to India, will know the kind of inaccurate information which is being conveyed in the Press.
Mr. Peter Smithers: Where did the hon. Member get his information?
Mr. Wyatt: I have looked up some facts and made inquiries. Unusual, I know. I apologise.
At the time of the Cabinet mission in India, it was always intended that Goa should become independent or a part of India. I happened then to be personal assistant to Sir Stafford Cripps on the British Cabinet Mission and it was always assumed that, following upon the arrangements made between ourselves and India, automatically France and Portugal would follow suit with Goa, Pondicherry, etc. The French followed suit about Pondicherry, but the Portuguese refused to do anything about it and would have continued to refuse to do anything about it until the end of time. They would have taken no notice of any United Nations resolutions. They have not done so over Angola or over the previous resolution over Goa, so why should it be supposed that they would take notice of any future resolutions?
Mr. Nehru may have performed a great service to the world. He may have done two things. He may have made it impossible for the Portuguese to sustain their repression in Angola, because the spirit which sustained them was a mythical notion that they had a divine right to run colonies and this has now been completely dissipated. Mr. Nehru may have weakened a dictator in his homeland. I am referring, of course, to Salazar.
Mr. Arthur Holt: Would the hon. Member suggest that
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Mr. Nehru has done good to the future of the United Nations as well?
Mr. Wyatt: Certainly, yes. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] If he has sharpened their appreciation of the realities of the world in which we live, he may have done a great deal of good. Certainly, he has done no harm to the United Nations. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I appeal to hon. Members to look at the facts. We ought not to be governed entirely by blind prejudice.
Mr. Edward Gardner: Does the hon. Member believe in sophistry or morality in politics?
Mr. Wyatt: I believe in trying to discover facts and then stating them rather than in taking up a position of prejudice and trying to make the facts fit the prejudice, which is what hon. Members opposite have done.
India's action may have done much to destroy the myth that Portugal can continue an outdated colonial approach. I think that it may have weakened Portugal's whole will to fight in Angola, and I think that it may have struck a very severe blow against the dictatorial régime of Salazar.
I hope that the Government will now stop their rather lofty and unbecoming disapproval of what Nehru has done. They may think that he has come off a pedestal on which, in fact, he never stood, but he has certainly sunk no lower than they have. It is not for them, while they are engaged in sabotaging the United Nations' activities in the Congo, to pretend that a police action in Goa, which lasted 24 hours, with practically no loss of life, is on the same scale as their own wickednesses. They also ought to consider, when they are using arguments against the Common Market on the ground that it may weaken the Commonwealth, that their wholeheartedly unfriendly, unsympathetic, blindly prejudiced attitude towards India over Goa does much more harm to the Commonwealth than any number of Common Markets.
10.11 p.m.
Mr. Stephen Hastings: I have had the privilege of listening to the hon. Member for Bosworth (Mr. Wyatt) surprising the House before now, but perhaps never more so

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than this evening. I do not intend to follow him in his astonishing defence of what has happened in India. As he says, he has obviously spent a lot of time looking things up. To me the facts seem perfectly plain. Goa has been a Portuguese Colony for 451 years, as the hon. Member said, and now that state of affairs has been altered by a military conquest which has been carefully prepared at a time when Mr. Nehru was being urged by Her Majesty's Government, by the Americans, and by the United Nations to settle the matter peacefully if possible. That seems to me to be the whole story, and I cannot possibly concede that there can be any sensible defence of this action. The picture of the Indians encouraging a Portuguese political party I can only describe as piquant.
Mr. Julius Silverman: There have been negotiations for fourteen years. The matter has been twice brought before the United Nations, but the Portuguese have treated it with contempt. What prospect was there of a peaceful settlement of this issue or a settlement by United Nations intervention?
Mr. Hastings: Whatever the past history is, I cannot see that the action which has taken place can possibly be justified in modern times.
In intend to turn hack, with an apology to the House, very briefly, because there is little time, to the question of the United Nations in the Congo. I have no wish to cover, if I can avoid it, any of the ground which was gone over last week. I raise this question for two reasons—first, because of its manifest importance, not only to the future of the United Nations but to that of Africa, and secondly, because of certain revelations which have been made since the debate took place last week, and which I think have not attracted the attention they merited.
I should like by way of preamble to cite something my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in answer to a supplementary question on 12th December. He was talking of the United Nations Force. He said this about it:
"It does not operate in the ordinary way which countries would follow with forces in
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the field. There are all kinds of forces working in it and, alas, the great contest in the world is reflected in the Security Council and in the Assembly."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th December, 1961; Vol. 651, c. 218.]
The principal disagreement between the two sides of the House on the question of the United Nations is that right hon. and hon. Members opposite, perfectly genuinely and sincerely, believe in what I regard as a dream, an idea, a theory, of what the United Nations should be, whilst many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, equally sincerely—this has to be conceded to us—believe it to be not only our right but our duty to look for faults if they are there and to speak up about them. It is in that spirit that I go back to this question tonight.
I spent a short time in Elisabethville not very long after the first bout of fighting finished. I formed two firm impressions. I did my level best to find out and judge how the situation was going and these are the two principal impressions I brought away with me. The first was gained from going about, talking to people about what had happened, and trying to see for myself. I was impressed by the inevitability of a second clash, for various reasons, but principally because of the feeling—and it is unpalatable to say this, but it was manifest—of the loathing which existed among Africans and the white people for the United Nations force. I am not saying that that feeling was right or wrong, only that it was so.
Secondly, I had this impression because of the physical position of the United Nations troops in Elisabethville, which constituted to troops lacking the discipline of normal Western forces, a provocation which was bound to end in trouble. Thirdly, I had that impression because of the dreadful situation in the Baluba Camp, where 50,000 Africans are crowded together in conditions of indescribable qualor, filth and misery under the protection, it is said, of the United Nations force consisting, when I was there, of a battalion dug in in the midst of this mass of humanity, with their guns pointed day and night into it. This situation was brought about through ignorance of African conditions and through misjudgment, not by intent. The Africans collected there because they were offered protection over the radio against a threat which probably did not exist at all.

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Because of these conditions it seemed to me that a clash was inevitable. Dr. O'Brien was courteous enough to give me an interview and I did my best to convey to him that this was what I believed; he made no reply.
The second impression I brought away, stemmed from a story which I was told on what I took to be good authority. It was supposed to have leaked from the United Nations force themselves that the orders from Dr. O'Brien on which the military operation had begun originally were these. The United Nations Force had to capture certain key points in the town and had to arrest a number of Katangese Ministers, including Mr. Tshombe, and take them to Leopoldville. This, if it were true, would have been a complete condemnation of the reason given for that attack, which was said to be to capture mercenaries only. I discounted this story because I thought that the matter was far too important for a story like that to be accepted except on direct evidence. But since then, last Sunday, in his article in the Observer there was the clearest confirmation of these orders from no other person than Dr. O'Brien himself. The best thing I can do is to read briefly from his statement.
Dr. O'Brien says that Mr. Khiari, whom he describes as "nominal head of the civil operations in Katanga, to whom Mr. Linner had entrusted or relinquished great authority in the political field" came down to Elisabethville shortly before the fighting started and gave instructions to Dr. O'Brien at his house in Elisabethville. They were:
"to take over the post office, the radio studio and the transmitter; to raid the Surété and Ministry of Information offices; to arrest any European officials found there, and seize their files; and to arrest Godefroid Munongo, the Minister of the Interior; Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, Vice-President and Minister of Finance, and Evariste Kimba, so-called Foreign Minister. Tshombe also was to be arrested if absolutely necessary. Mr. Fabry, who was then Legal Adviser to the O.N.U.C. at Leopoldville … produced from his brief case Mandats d'amener—roughly equivalent to warrants for arrest—for Tshombe, Munongo and the others. These warrants bore the seal of the Central Government."
He adds that when he went to Leopoldville several weeks later he found that neither General MacKeown nor Mr. Linner knew of these instructions.
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When he got to New York, subsequently, neither Dr. Bunche nor General Rikhye, the Military Adviser to the United Nations, knew of them either. Finally, Dr. Bunche told him that he believed Mr. Hammarskjoeld never knew of them at all. Mr. Khiari, again according to Dr. O'Brien, claimed that he had been in direct personal touch with Mr. Hammarskjoeld by secret unnumbered telegrams. If this is true, it means that Mr. Hammarskjoeld passed secret orders for the beginning of an operation of this importance to a junior officer, bypassing the senior military official and senior civilian in charge of operations in Katanga.
I do not believe that anybody who has read of, heard of, or knew Mr. Hammarskjoeld will ever believe that that was true. Whether we agree with the United Nations operation in the Congo or no, it seems to me that everybody in this House would accept that the decision—and the important decision was for the first attack and not the second, if my thesis is accepted, because the second followed automatically and inevitably—was of vital importance to the future of the United Nations.
The implication of what Dr. O'Brien has written and of what I am saying is very clear. It is that this decision was taken and this attack started without the knowledge of the Secretary-General or of the senior officers of U.N.O.C. Where did these orders come from? Whom does Mr. Khiari represent in Katanga? What power or group of powers—if this is true—took it upon themselves to send him to Elisabethville to give instructions? I do not know the answer nor can I vouch for the truth of this story. All I am doing is repeating what I heard in Elisabethville and what Dr. O'Brien has written in the Observer.
It has been said, and I have heard it fairly frequently in Africa and in this country—it is a serious and in many ways alarming suggestion—that the United Nations Force in Katanga is nothing more than the instrument of Afro-Asia. If this is true, surely there is real cause for dismay, and I think never more so, than now after the example of what I can only call hypocrisy which we have seen from certain Afro-Asian nations at U.N.O. over the past few days.

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The Government made plain during the debate last week that their reason for refusing to send the bombs was their general disquiet at the conduct of their operation in the Congo. If this story is true, then they could not have any greater reinforcement of their misgivings, and in a most alarming manner.
In conclusion, I believe this in general about the Katanga operation, whatever the apologists may say; that if a ceasefire is achieved it will have been brought about principally perhaps by two factors; firstly, by the initiative taken by Her Majesty's Government, on which I should like to congratulate them; and secondly, because of mounting feeling in the United States, against this operation. Those are the two things which will bring about a cease-fire and some sanity into this situation, if anything can.
Two matters remain. First, there is a need now to find an equitable solution. As my right hon. Friend said, there is no news about the meeting between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. If we can in any way help to ensure that from that agreement, if agreement there be, the stable administration of the Katanga can be preserved, we shall have done a service for the future of Africa. Of this I have no doubt. There is nothing whatever to replace it. Finally, although I recognise that at this moment it would perhaps be invidious, because the object is to get agreement and to get some peace and sanity into the Congo, but if we are to have faith in the United Nations in any operations of this kind again either in the Congo or elsewhere, from now on, we must have a full inquiry to find out how it was that the United Nations embarked on this disastrous course on 13th September last.
10.24 p.m.
Mr. Christopher Mayhew: The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) called for an inquiry into the events in the Congo. I do not see any objection at all to the United Nations instituting a full inquiry when these problems are settled. I believe that inquiry will show how much of the statements that we have heard from the other side on this Katanga question have come from sheer, calculated propaganda put out by the Katanga people.
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One of the most contentious statements made by the hon. Member was when he followed his right hon. Friend in suggesting that the situation in Katanga has now improved as a result of the initiative of the British Government. This was a point about which the Lord Privy Seal said a good deal, and it is important to get the record straight on it. The Lord Privy Seal plainly implied three things: first, that the initiative of the British Government was actually welcomed; secondly, that it was acted upon; and, thirdly, that it has led to the current improvement in the Katanga situation.
Which of these three statements holds water when the facts are studied? In the first place, was the British initiative welcomed by the United Nations? What are the facts? The appeal by the British Government was carefully considered by the United Nations Committee on the Congo, and it was unanimously rejected by all 19 members, including seven members of the Commonwealth. Therefore, the first point by the Lord Privy Seal is plainly wrong.
Secondly, the right hon. Gentleman suggested that the British initiative was implemented. It was not. On the contrary, the United Nations went on to free its communications and to restore freedom of movement to its troops. Once that was done, admittedly, the position improved. But what evidence is there that Mr. Tshombe would have gone to see Mr. Adoula if the British Government's cease-fire demand had been carried out before the United Nations won freedom of movement for its troops?
It seems to me that the bad habit of rewriting history has been travelling westwards in the last few days, and it is necessary for us to make quite plain that Her Majesty's Government's iniative for a cease-fire was utterly rejected by the United Nations and was not acted upon, and that, if it had been acted upon, we should not have had the current improvement in Katanga.
Apart from this point, in his speech the Lord Privy Seal was, on the whole, uncontentious. He did not say anything new. I think that he would probably agree with that. I should like to add a

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word of congratulation to the Government. My right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) congratulated the Government on their vote on China. I feel that their diplomacy in connection with Laos has been patient and constructive. In fact, I think that it can be recorded that our diplomacy in South-East Asia under successive Governments has been a good deal more successful than in many other parts of the world. We hope that the Governmetn will rise to the occasion over the West Irian crisis.
There was one omission from the Lord Privy's speech which, I hope, will be remedied by the Minister of State. There was no reference to disarmament. I confess that, after the Soviet tests and the long history of disillusionment and frustration on this subject, it needs an effort of will to address oneself to this question again and pick up the bits and see what can be done about making progress. But we have to remind ourselves that even the smallest practical achievement in this field would have a political value out of all proportion to its intrinsic importance, and also that the economic benefits to be gained from any all-round measure of disarmament would be of a scale to dwarf almost any other means of improving the economic prospects of the world.
We are at the moment, thanks to the agreement on procedure between the Soviet Government and the United States Government, actually closer to agreement on disarmament, on paper, than ever before. The recent agreement about the composition of the new Disarmament Commission is very welcome. It embodies a principle for which my right hon. and hon. Friends and I have been asking for a long period—the principle that the neutral, uncommitted countries should be brought in to bear some responsibilities. Bearing in mind the agreement on methods between the great Powers, the agreement on procedure and the agreement on the composition of the Disarmament Commission, I think that it can be said that, on paper at least, the prospects for agreement are probably better than they have ever been.
I imagine, however, that we all feel that it would not be enough even to get agreement on paper in the existing state of tension between the Eastern and
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Western countries. There would still be the need for that psychological urge to take the first plunge into practical disarmament. I want to make an appeal to the Government, that perhaps while they are negotiating on this disarmament question they should bear in mind the possibility of lowering the tension in a more fundamental manner. I will come back to that later.
I support what my right hon. Friend said about the Government's attitude in these negotiations. In the past, for example, over the nuclear tests conference, I think that it is fair to say that the British delegation played a patient and constructive part in the negotiations. Certainly, the disastrous end to the conference was no fault of the British Government. But now I sense on the Government side a lack of will power, an inertia, about disarmament. The Government seem too ready merely to follow the United States lead in recent months on disarmament.
I support the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend. Let the Government make a fresh start by taking out of their ranks, and out of the ranks of the Civil Service and the Foreign Office, a group of men entirely specialised in disarmament; a group of men who have a personal vested interest in the success of disarmament. Let them name a single Minister and make him responsible, and let him have his own small Department capable of doing research, planning, and briefing for conferences simply on the subject of disarmament; a group which will exert pressure for disarmament not only outwards on other countries, but inwards on other Government Departments. I believe that this would be a way of recovering momentum on disarmament by the British Government. Let them increase the whole status of the subject and give it increased priority.
Something must be done, also, to relax the appalling tension between the East and West. Perhaps the most important cause of this is the arrogant claim of the Communist countries, that their way of life is the only civilised way of life; that it ought to be followed by all countries; and that in the course of history we shall all adopt their way of life. The arrogant claim in the Peking People's Daily last week:
"Capitalism will be wiped from the face of the earth."

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and Mr. Khrushchev's declaration that all our grandchildren will be Cornmunists—these statements do not help to create the conditions in which disarmament can become possible.
I ask the Government whether there is not perhaps a case for a shift of emphasis here in our information services, in the speeches of Ministers, in our diplomacy generally: that we should lay less stress perhaps on the undoubted shortcomings of the Communist way of life and undoubted virtue of the British way of life and more stress on the folly of ideological rivalry itself in the nuclear age, and stress the simple truths which come naturally to British people, that there are many different social systems in the world, that the variety of them is increasing, that the Soviet and American ways of life have serious shortcomings and are wildly inappropriate for the vast majority of the countries of the world, and that this proselytising, this ideological rivalry increases tension, diminishes the chance of disarmament, and is altogether a barrier to peace.
We in the West should surely formulate and press for our concept of co-existence—a concept of "co-existence plus"—plus ideological co-existence, plus genuine freedom of contact between East and West, plus practical cooperation between the East and the West.
In the meantime, I have to note that all that the Government seem capable of doing in this field is to cut our overseas information services by £600,000 next year. As though our influence in world affairs had not sunk enough, they must now cut the instruments by which that influence is so often exerted. It seems absolute folly to cut down these services, precisely at a time of crisis, and precisely when we are doing badly—when these things are needed more than ever before—and also to cut them down in such a manner that schemes just started this year will have to be cancelled next year. Anyone who has anything to do with overseas information, and with British Council work, knows that it is far worse to start something one year and cut it out the next than never to start it at all.
A great opportunity exists for our overseas information services at present, particularly in the teaching of English.
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There is an enormous demand for that, and for the training of English teachers. These services should be in process of expansion rather than being cut down, as the Government seem determined to cut them down. I hope that when the House meets again it will be possible to debate the whole subject. It is years since the overseas information services were discussed in the House. This is a moment when they could and should be more useful to this country than ever before. I hope that the Leader of the House will see his way to providing a full debate on this question when the House resumes.
Hon. Members on both sides of the House have pointed to the dangers, and the very black outlook, in many parts of the world. It is easy to look out at the dark side—at the growth of Communist power, the strength of world Communism, the Soviet tests, Khrushchev's threats and his brandishing of the 100-megaton bomb in our faces, and his boasts about the mission of world Communism—but I hope that we shall bear in mind the fact that we can also look at the recent development of Communism in another light, and compare Mr. Khrushchev with Stalin, noting the real increase in the approachability and realism—and, in my view, the increased sense of responsibility—of the Soviet Government, as compared with the situation in Stalin's day. We can also note the growing uncertainty and division within the Communist camp, which may have a profound effect on the whole world outlook before many years have passed.
Therefore, I feel that it is wrong to look only at the extremely dark and worrying side of the international scene. We have the problems of disarmament and Berlin and other problems, which seem insoluble. But I like to recall some of the seemingly insoluble problems' which faced us at the Foreign Office during the time of the Labour Government. There was the "insoluble" problem of the Austrian Treaty. It seemed totally impossible to get a treaty for many years, at that time. There was the "insoluble" problem of the Dardanelles, of Trieste, and of Greece, and the problem of getting the Russians to lift the Berlin blockade without war.

1515
Above all, there was the "insoluble" problem of the Iron Curtain, and the impossibility of communicating with any Soviet citizens, even with a Soviet diplomat. It is worth recalling these things, because many of these problems seem to arise spectacularly, so that everybody notices them, and to be solved so slowly and imperceptibly that one hardly realises that they have been solved at all.
We look to the Government to tackle the problem of disarmament and Berlin with renewed vigour. Hon. Members on both sides, including the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) felt that the Government were not approaching the problem of Berlin with proper urgency. The Lord Privy Seal could give us no information about the North Atlantic Council meeting. It is extremely vague and unsatisfactory that after all these discussions we should not only have no common Western position on Berlin, but not even a common Western position on probing—how the probe is to be carried out; whether it should be in Russia, by our ambassadors or Foreign Ministers. After all these months of coming and going we seem to be no nearer a solution of the problem of negotiating on Berlin.
It is absurd to become optimistic because Khrushchev has postponed his ultimatum. He will come back to this problem again and again, and it will be more and more perilous each time. Therefore, the Government should show more energy and confidence on the subjects of disarmament and Berlin. We hope profoundly that the Bermuda talks will be successful, and that the problems that now seem so appalling will in due course be solved.
10.40 p.m.
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. J. B. Godber): It is a pleasure to welcome back to the Dispatch Box the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew). We have been most interested in what he had to say on this occasion, and we hope that we shall hear the hon. Gentleman on many other occasions.
Anyone listening to our debates today must have been given cause to wonder at the way in which, having wasted a great deal of time earlier, we have now
1516
had a very constructive and useful debate in the latter part of the evening. It is unfortunate that other hon. Members were prevented from taking part in what so far has proved a very useful debate. There are several points on which I wish to touch, and though time is limited, I shall seek to deal with some of the points which have been raised.
Perhaps I may refer first to the matter on which the hon. Member for Woolwich, East closed, the question of Berlin, which has dominated a number of speeches and particularly that of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson). I realise the forebearance which the House has shown on this subject over a considerable period of time now. I am also quite sure that the House will realise from the course that the developments have taken that it is still very difficult for me, or for any Government spokesman, to say anything further with regard to this problem at the present time.
I have listened to the various suggestions and proposals put forward and they will certainly receive careful attention from the Government. I was struck by the number of references to the wall, and I was glad to hear the remarks of some hon. Members, particularly those of the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. J. Hynd). Generally, over the question of Berlin our position remains the same. We believe that further discussions could fruitfully take place—indeed must take place—through diplomatic channels. We hope to continue to play a very full part in these discussions. It is our view that the discussions which have taken place so far have established a position from which further steps can be taken, perhaps in the forms of discussions, perhaps probings, leading to the negotiations which it is obvious that hon. Members on both sides of the House desire to achieve.
The right hon. Member for Huyton spoke of a lack of urgency in this matter. I can assure him that there is no lack of urgency on the part of the Government. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman realises the problem we are up against. It is on this basis and because of a desire to make progress that we have been discussing the matter again recently with our major allies and the present discussions at Bermuda will

1517
embrace this. It is well known that in this matter our position and that of the Americans are very close indeed.
It has been suggested that the negotiations are being held up because of the obstinacy of France. It is true that at present our French friends are less hopeful of the chances of an acceptable basis for negotiations in the near future than the rest of us, and the recent statements both of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Menshikov, which was mentioned today, have done little to persuade them to change their view. But they made clear to us in Paris that they are not opposed to negotiations in principle. And last week the N.A.T.O. Ministerial Council unanimously agreed that the next step should be the resumption of diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union to see whether an acceptable basis for negotiation could be found; so there is no obstacle in the way of going ahead in this sense with our immediate task.
Our three main essentials have been repeated in this House on many occasions, but I want to stipulate them once more because Mr. Khrushchev's own demands by comparison are so much vaster and I think that it is well to show the contrast with the things which we are seeking from the Western aspect to maintain and to guarantee.
The essentials we insist on and which neither the Americans, nor the French, nor the West Germans nor ourselves can allow to be whittled away are simply these: freedom of the people of West Berlin; the continued presence of our troops to be able to ensure that freedom; and freedom of access to West Berlin both for allied troops and civilians. These are the basic considerations on which all these discussions take place. I agree with right hon. and hon. Members who have added to that the question of the wall and the need to see that something is done about that, but those are the basic considerations, and it is well to remind the House of them.
It is the Russians who are trying to change our status in West Berlin. They do so on the basis of saying that, by signing a treaty with their own régime in East Berlin, they can remove Allied rights in West Berlin. But those rights do not rest on any such basis. They derive from our occupation rights,
1518
established in 1945 and buttressed by the free wish of the free people of West Berlin. I would also like to quote from the interview which President Kennedy gave to Mr. Adzhuvi which has already been quoted by the right hon. Gentleman. Referring to the signing of a treaty, the President said:
"If the Soviet Union attempts in that treaty to turn over jurisdiction over West Berlin to the East German authorities, against the wishes of the people of West Berlin—if the lines of communication and access, from West Berlin to the outside world and the West, are completely under the control of East German authorities to cut any time they so wish—then this treaty does not bring peace, it only increases the danger.
Now I am hopeful that, in the conversations and negotiations which we hope to have with the Soviet Union, assurances will be given which will permit us to continue to exercise the rights which we now have in West Berlin, as a result of the existing four-Power agreement, and will permit free access in and out of the city. We do not want to stay in West Berlin if the people there do not want us to stay … it seems to me that the rights that are ours by agreement should be maintained."
That sums up the position very clearly.
The right hon. Gentleman also referred, in dealing with this interview, to what the President said about N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact engaging in a commitment to live in peace with each other. I can say that we are wholeheartedly in agreement with the President that such a commitment should be helpful.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked if we supported what the President said about not giving nuclear weapons to other countries. I can give an emphatic answer to that. We do support Mr. Kennedy in that. That is why we voted on 4th December in the United Nations for the resolution which opposed the relinquishment of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. This was the Irish resolution, for which we voted. I can give the House an absolute assurance in that regard.
Mr. H. Wilson: I am grateful for the clarity of the hon. Gentleman's answers to my questions. Does this extend not merely to handing over nuclear arms to West Germany but also to the proposals for a nuclear deterrent held jointly by N.A.T.O.?
Mr. Godber: I was dealing specifically with the handing over of nuclear weapons to any individual State. In regard to N.A.T.O., the position is, of

1519
course, that at the present time final control of the warheads is held by the United States, as the right hon. Gentleman realises.
I now turn to the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations. I was very glad to have the kind congratulations of Members opposite on our vote concerning the admission of the Peking Government. It is very pleasant to find a welcome on that vote. I was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. Longden) how this will affect our position with regard to Formosa. My best answer is to quote the words I used in the plenary debate last Friday in explanation of our vote:
"I wish. However, to make it clear that in the view of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom sovereignty over the island of Formosa is undetermined. It therefore follows in its view that the question as to who should represent Formosa in the United Nations is also undetermined. The vote which I cast in favour of the draft resolution and of the amendment does not prejudice the position of Her Majesty's Government on this point."
I think that that clears up the question of where we stand in that regard. I am sorry if it does not clear it for hon. Members opposite, but it makes it quite clear that we have distinguished the position from that of Red China.
I now turn to nuclear tests and disarmament, to which the hon. Member for Woolwich, East particularly referred. As regards nuclear tests, there is little that I can usefully say. Discussions are still going on slowly, but the prospects are very discouraging indeed. It would be quite wrong for me to pretend that there are any great hopes there. The truth is that the Russians' so-called treaty abandons every sort of international verification or control. They do not even propose or contemplate an international body to compare or to check the results of a detection system. It is to be self-inspection, absolute and complete.
This means, in fact, that the Russians are suggesting that the whole basis of our previous discussions, the agreed basis, the experts' report and the whole score of agreed treaty articles should be repudiated in this way. They are suggesting that three years' work should be aban
1520
doned, and they do this without giving any satisfactory reason. The Western Powers still say that our draft treaty is the proper basis on which to go forward for a treaty. We believe the international verification system must be preserved if we are to have any confidence at all in such a treaty.
As to disarmament itself, the picture is a little more encouraging, as has been suggested. We have, of course, got the agreed principles between the Soviet Union and the United States plan which was put forward by Mr. Kennedy in his speech to the plenary session of the United Nations in September, the plan about which we have been closely consulted in its preparation.
We now—in the last few days—have agreement on a negotiating body of 18 States, the original 10 plus India, Burma, U.A.R., Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil, Mexico and Sweden. On a geographical basis, this gives a fair coverage of the world and gives us a rather larger negotiating body. I hope that it will not be unwieldy. It takes account of the increasing interest of a wider number of States in this problem. What we have still to agree is the place of conference and the date of starting. Various dates have been suggested. It is certainly the desire of Her Majesty's Government to get started at the earliest possible moment, but, at the same time, we recognise that it is no good going into talks without the most careful preparation.
I have every intention of pressing ahead in this way very strongly indeed. I welcome the encouragment—if I may put it that way—of right hon. and hon. Members opposite by suggesting that we should make a very special drive in this matter. I do not accept, of course, the suggestion of the right hon. Member for Huyton that this is a question of the matter being looked at by one man and a boy at the Foreign Office. I am sure that that is not so. At the United Nations in the last month or two I personally have been very active in initiating discussions with some of our Western colleagues on this important matter. We are very anxious to make rapid progress here.
Mr. Mayhew: I do not think anyone disputed that Ministers have been busy

1521
about disarmament from time to time, but the point is this: is there a department, and how strong is it, specialising about disarmament, and should there not be a Minister specialising in disarmament?
Mr. Godber: There is a department specially designed to do that. If it were necessary for a Minister to give the whole of his time to it, certainly that should be done, but it depends on making progress, and my noble Friend is seeing that it is adequately staffed. There is a major difficulty which we must not miss in regard to this, which was the qualification brought out in the McCloy and Zorin correspondence which followed the agreed principles on the question of what in fact was meant by control and verification of disarmament.
The Soviet is considering disarmament in the very narrowest field as things which one throws away and as not having anything to do with control and verifications of "remainders", as the forces and weapons left have come to be called. This seems something wholly unrealistic, because both the United States plan and the Russian plan proposed definite force limits, the Russian of 1,700,000 and the American of 1,200,000. They are definite but cannot be determined under present conditions of international tension without some international check, and this is what at present the Russians say they are not prepared to face.
This is one of the basic points of difference we have to resolve before we can travel along the road. However, if the Russians want to make progress they will find us more than ready to meet them half way. We want to get started and, having got started, to continue on the road. That is one thing in the United States new plan; it is contributing to a continuing process. Although it is in three stages, every stage overlaps and there will be very little break at all.
As I have little time left, I want to deal with one or two other points made in the debate. We have had reference to the question of Goa. We had a rather extraordinary speech by the hon. Member for Bosworth (Mr. Wyatt) in which
1522
he seemed to be going back to the pure concept of power politics and nothing else. It was an interesting speech, and I listened to it, but I am afraid that I have to tell the hon. Member that I cannot go very far with him. I think most hon. Members deeply deplore the action taken by India in this regard, and I am very sorry that a man of Mr. Nehru's standing should have taken action of this sort which undoubtedly must have blemished his very fine reputation in the world in regard to the question of negotiation and settling matters by peaceful means. This is something which must cause us all regret.
I believe that it has had a bad effect in regard to the United Nations also. I do not think it would be right to ignore this, and I certainly am not going to be led astray by the somewhat cynical sneers of the hon. Member in regard to the Suez position of a few years ago. I think that is just a red herring he is trying to draw across the path. The position is serious and, in particular, the action of the three countries in the Security Council who, along with the Soviet Union voted in support of the Indian armed intervention of Goa is something which causes all people with a serious interest in the United Nations regret. Whatever may be thought about Portuguese colonial policy this was an armed attack and runs counter to the principles of the Charter. I believe that this sort of action can only have a very serious and harmful effect on the future of the United Nations as a whole.
I should like to have had time to develop the position in regard to the United Nations because I think that one of the interesting and valuable things which have come out of the debate is the genuine concern shown by a number of hon. Members following on the strains and difficulties which have arisen both in the Congo and Goa and elsewhere. I believe that the United Nations is passing through a difficult and critical time. Having been there and seen it at close quarters, I realise some of those strains. We have a position in the Security Council where the effectiveness of that body which should have been controlling all general peace-keeping operations was undermined by the quite improper use of the veto by the Soviet Union. Added to

1523
that we have the question of the General Assembly which has not been able to develop its authority properly. It has doubled its numbers in the last ten years, but all those new members have not as yet attained the experience really necessary for a balanced judgment on world affairs.
It being Eleven o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
  SIERRA LEONE (GIFT OF A MACE)
  Sir J. Vaughan-Morgan, Mr. J. Griffiths, Mr. Gibson-Watt, and Mr. Wade to have leave of absence to present, on behalf of the House, a Mace to the House of Representatives of Sierra Leone.—[Mr. Iain Macleod.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  NATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACT, 1948 (AMENDMENT) [MONEY]
  Resolution reported,
  That, for the purpose of any Act of the present Session to amend section thirty-one of the National Assistance Act, 1948, and to empower local authorities to provide meals and recreation for old people, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any increase in the sums payable by way of Rate-deficiency Grant or Exchequer Equalisation Grant under the enactments relating to local government in England and Wales or in Scotland which is attributable to the new Act.
  Resolution agreed to.

  HOUSE OF COMMONS CATERING
  Mr. Gibson-Watt discharged from the Select Committee; Mr. McLaren added.—[Mr. Finlay.]

  TRAINING CENTRE, SLOUGH (CAR REPAIRS)
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Finlay.]
  11.1 p.m.
  Mr. W. R. van Straubenzee: I am, Sir, very much indebted to you for permission to raise the small and detailed matter with which I seek to detain the House for a few minutes. I have on a previous occasion had reason to comment upon the way in which the House can move quickly from consideration of great world events, such as we have recently been discussing, to the affairs of one person only. It is with the affairs of one person only that I am for a few minutes detaining the House.
  I wish to draw attention to the case of my constituent, Mr. Weston, who lives at Earley, which is near Reading, in my constituency, and in particular his experiences in taking to the Government training centre at Slough in Buckinghamshire his car for a overhaul. It was news to me at the time I started inquiries into this difficult case that Government training centres undertook overhauls of this nature. This I have now learned, and, indeed, it is part of my object tonight to sound a warning to others who may be similarly disposed.
  My constituent took his 13-year-old car, which was, and mercifully is—just is—a Hillman Minx, into the Government training centre on 10th January, 1961. He received an estimate for the work. The estimate given for the work was £20 1s. 6d. Being a Government-sponsored body, he was not only asked to pay in advance but, in addition, was asked to pay £30 in all to cover contingencies. This is a very pleasant way of doing business which some of us who are in private business of one sort or another would be very pleased to emulate. It was, in fact, the 24th May of this year, 17 weeks later, that he finally recovered the car. For 17 long weeks the car was incarcerated, as I shall show in a few moments, in the Government training centre at Slough undergoing this overhaul.
  1526
  I want to say to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, for whose courtesy in attending at this late hour I am deeply obliged, that I make no point at all of the length of time that was taken. It behoves hon. Members, before taking up the time of the House like this, to examine the matter closely by correspondence, and my hon. Friend has been courteous enough in extensive correspondence with me to explain carefully that this delay was caused by the absence of the class instructor over a long period owing to illness. I should like my hon. Friend to note that both my constituent and I quite understand that reason and I am not, tonight, on behalf of my constituent complaining at the element of delay. I would be obliged if that was quite clear to my hon. Friend.
  What I am concerned about and seek to raise tonight is the condition of the vehicle when it was returned to my constituent from this Government training centre, for which my hon. Friend's Ministry is responsible. Perhaps I might quote briefly from a description of the vehicle, or rather from the experience of my constituent when he first went to withdraw the vehicle on 7th April, 1961. This is how he describes what happened, and this is after the vehicle had undergone an extensive overhaul at the centre:
  "The car would only start with extreme difficulty. I caused considerable traffic mix-up on the A.4 since the engine stalled every time I changed gear and I had difficulty in restarting. The noise it made was unbelievable. I drove straight back and it had to be pushed by trainees into the Government Training Centre."
  That, I put to my hon. Friend with some emphasis, was what happened in April. It had been sent to the point of collection after the overhaul for which my constituent had paid in advance and had paid for contingencies and yet had to be pushed back by trainees into the training centre.
  The Government training centre then set to work a second time and eventually had the vehicle available for collection on the date which I have already mentioned, 17 weeks after it was first put in, namely on the 4th May. I have a careful and detailed account of the vehicle as it was actually disgorged. I do not propose to worry the House with a lengthy

  1527
  description of it. Suffice it to say that the engine over-heated considerably and it had no pull. The comment was that even the slightest incline required the gears to be changed down. A workshop test of the ignition timing showed the timing marks to be two inches apart. Consumption of petrol was as low as 20 miles to the gallon. The connecting rods of the gears began to fall apart. The radiator emptied itself overnight in the garage because the hose barely overlapped the engine housing and the clip held nothing but the hose. The gearbox cover was not secure. The starting handle was bent and required to be pressed to straighten it. The coil was hanging loose on the engine, and my client was extremely lucky not to lose it on the road.
  I am not mechanically-minded, but I can understand a dip-stick, which measures the oil. My constituent found that not only was it not his dip-stick but it was altogether too short for the vehicle into which it had been inserted. The sparking plugs were the wrong sparking plugs. The bolt and two nuts securing the dynamo fell out on the journey back from the training centre, and the fan belt pulley was so badly bent that the fan was already showing signs of wear.
  I believe there is nothing more graphic than being able to see these things, and I consulted the rules of order to see if I might bring into the House the vehicle itself, but I find that that would offend against the rules. But I think that I am in order in bringing with me the last-named piece of mechanism so long as it is not a weapon. I have with me the fan belt pulley which, even to an amateur's eyes, has obviously been severely wrenched and damaged in such a way as to indicate that it was probably pulled from its sockets with some heavy implement such as a crowbar.
  So far this has been a recital with a certain humour attached to it. But for my constituent this is a very serious matter, and I must say to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary that had this work been undertaken by some non-Governmental body there would have lain with my constituent a proper claim under the legal processes for very
  1528
  severe damages arising from the way in which the work was undertaken. But because it was undertaken by a Governmental body there is no kind of recourse left to him except through his Member of Parliament.
  It may be, although I must not stray into this, that this is precisely the sort of situation with which an Ombudsman is designed to cope, but this is a matter that I must not explore for it involves legislation. I believe that my constituent would have been entitled to feel that that the Ministry of Labour would have said, "Not only have we, for reasons which we have explained and for which we have apologised, taken an unconscionably long time with your car, but we have turned out a thoroughly bad job."
  Of course, it is understood by the general public that the charges of a Government training centre are lower than in a commercial organisation, and it is also understood that there is an element of risk in the sense that one cannot be given a firm estimate. That is understood. But where, as here, so palpably and obviously a thoroughly bad job is done upon a vehicle, it would not seem to me inappropriate that my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary should be generous in his approach. I appreciate that it is merely in his official capacity that so far he has not felt able to be more generous than he has.
  I repeat, my constituent paid the sum which was originally demanded of him. He did it because those were the terms upon which it was required that his car would be put in. There is no question, if I am accurately informed, of some allowance having been made to him, for the figure that he paid was the figure that was originally quoted, and no consideration in monetary terms has so far been given to my constituent for the experience which he underwent.
  I repeat, I raise this matter for two reasons. The first is the domestic concern of my constituent. The only way in which this matter can be raised is on the Floor of the House, for there are no legal processes open to him. The second reason is to warn other persons who may be similarly inclined that they would be very ill-advised to have their

  1529
  cars overhauled at a Government training centre, certainly at the one in Slough.
  I must say in all friendliness to my hon. Friend that this is a view to which I shall adhere and which I shall take suitable opportunities to repeat unless in the general spirit of good will and of Christmas in which we meet he feels, having listened to the catalogue that I have briefly given him, that he is over-persuaded by the case that I have put to him and that it is appropriate that a full remission of the charges made should be repaid to the man whom I now seek to represent.
  11.15 p.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour (Mr. Alan Green): I agree entirely on one important point with my hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. van Straubenzee), that although he has called this a small, detailed matter, it is none the less important. On his comments about the value of Government training centres, I propose to say something at the end.
  My hon. Friend has quite rightly said that I have more than once expressed through him my regrets that Mr. Weston, his constituent, should have been inconvenienced, and I am quite happy to repeat those regrets now.
  My hon. Friend has also said, correctly, that the point about delay is not really a valid one in all the circumstances, because Mr. Weston knew quite well, and accepted, that delay was inevitable if he chose this method of getting his car repaired, and, of course, it was his choice to take his car to this place to be repaired. I am sure that he had informed himself of this beforehand. So Mr. Weston took what was known to him to be a risk. My hon. Friend has also already admitted that there is a known element of risk.
  Perhaps it would be a good thing, as my hon. Friend has gone in detail—sometimes quite amusing detail—into the facts as he understands them, if I recapitulate the facts as I understand them.
  First, the Government training centres exist to provide training for unemployed and disabled persons. Their purpose is to fit these people to obtain useful work within their capacity. One of the trades
  1530
  in which we provide training for this purpose is motor vehicle repair. To get experience in repair work, the trainees obviously need motor vehicles, and we therefore have arrangements for taking in vehicles in need of repair for use as training exercises.
  I must emphasise that our primary duty is to the trainees, and the repair job is ancillary to this. This, I think, is known to all people who take cars in to these training centres. We therefore make it clear to all those who send their cars for repair that the work will be done as part of a training exercise and that it will not be done at a commercial pace. I do not need to elaborate on that in view of what has been said already. Also, we do not accept responsibility for loss or damage to the car while it is at the centre. We think it right that we should make a charge to cover the cost of material used and some element of labour, because private individuals are, in fact, gaining some benefit from the work that we do.
  We try to obtain the sort of cars for repair which the trainees are likely to meet when they take employment with garages. We prefer to have more modern cars, because they are more suitable as training material. From time to time, however, we agree to take on older cars which may not be worth repairing on a commercial basis. That is what we did in the present case.
  Mr. Weston brought his 13-year-old car to the Slough Government training centre on 10th January with a list of repairs including an engine overhaul which he wanted done. Incidentally, I share my hon. Friend's lack of knowledge of mechanical matters, but I think that he will agree that it is never possible with a car of this age to say what will be necessary until some examination, including a stripping down of some parts, is made.
  I understand that Mr. Weston was given a provisional estimate of £16. At that time he also asked for a respray for the whole car, but when he was told that the estimate for this re-spray would be £30 he refused because he did not think it was worth while. I have an idea that he was wise.
  Further examination of the car showed that more extensive repairs were necessary, and an amended estimate was

  1531
  given to him of £30. The addition was not to cover contingencies; I understand that it was an amended estimate for £30. It is our practice to require payment in advance for work that we do, and Mr. Weston therefore gave the centre a cheque for this amount.
  I should make it clear that it was open to him to say, as he did in respect of the re-spray, that he did not want this work to be done at this price, but he accepted the estimate and the conditions under which the repair work was done, and the centre accepted the job.
  Here we come to the first complaint, with which we have already dealt, and that is the length of time which the repair took. Despite the perfectly correct account which my hon. Friend has given of why this delay occurred—it was due primarily to the unforeseeable illness of the instructor in charge of the motor vehicle repair class—I want at this moment to make a further, I will call it an apology, through my hon. Friend to Mr. Weston. On thinking about it, I have come to the conclusion that where the centre really did go wrong, and I take responsibility for this, was in not telling Mr. Weston, when this extra unavoidable delay occurred, that it was going to be much longer than he thought, and offering him the chance of taking the car away if he wished.
  As I hope to demonstrate later, in view of the condition and age of the car, I am doubtful whether it would have been in Mr. Weston's interests to have had the car overhauled at commercial rates in a commercial repair shop. Mr. Weston knew that he could have his car overhauled at the Government training centre at something less than commercial rates, and be asked the centre to do it, knowing and accepting the disadvantages inherent in this method of repair.
  Here I come to the second complaint, that the car did not go very well when it was handed over to Mr. Weston on 7th April after repair. If I have made an understatement, perhaps my hon. Friend has compensated for that with his statement. I will not call it an overstatement. It is necessary to appreciate that an engine overhaul, including a cylinder rebore, the fitting of new pis
  1532
  tons and the regrinding of the crankshaft on a car of this age involves an inevitable risk. The repair and renewal of old components in one part of the mechanism can put a strain on the remainder which is still in its old and worn condition.
  I must admit also, however—and I do this as I have already done in correspondence with my hon. Friend—that some minor jobs had been badly done or neglected. The car was therefore taken back—
  Mr. van Straubenzee: It was pushed back.
  Mr. Green: It was pushed back, I understand, by the unpaid labour of trainees. The car was taken back and checked over again under the direct control of a very experienced chief instructor who has had 21 years in the motor trade. When the car was picked up on 4th May I am advised that it was in as good a condition as its age permitted.
  My hon. Friend may well say that this was not good enough. I must make it clear that there are limits to repair work, as such, on cars of this age. Perhaps I can illustrate what I mean. Examination of the steering box showed that all parts were evenly worn, although not to the point of being obviously unsafe. Incidentally, this is quite a tribute to the original makers of the car. To replace one or two worn parts and hope that the new ones would function properly in conjunction with the remaining worn ones would not appeal to my hon. Friend or to his constituent as being an honest or a safe thing to do. The safe alternatives were a total replacement or a total retention; not a half-and-half operation. The same reasoning applies to almost any major part of an old and much-used car. It is very difficult to know where to stop, unless there is just one specific defect.
  A further complaint which has been made is that Mr. Weston was not sufficiently compensated financially for the inconvenience that he was put to. Mr. Weston had accepted that the repair would take some time, but it was nevertheless felt that he should be given some recompense for the extra delay. Now I think there is some misunderstanding here. He was in fact given back

  1533
  £7 14s. 11d. out of the sum of £30 which he had originally paid to cover the repair estimate. He therefore paid, in all, £23 for a job which I shall show would have cost many times more if done commercially.
  The work which was done included a rebore of the engine. The centre is not equipped to do this work, and it was put out to a contractor whose charge, including the provision of new pistons, was £14 1s. 3d. In addition, new parts were provided at a cost to the Ministry of £4 9s. 7d. The Ministry therefore paid on Mr. Weston's behalf the sum of £18 10s. 5d. for new material and work done on the car. If it is agreed that it would be proper for Mr. Weston to pay for this in full, it follows that he was charged only £3 14s. for all the labour involved at the Government training centre.
  Another way of looking at these figures—and, I think, a fair one—is to estimate how much this would have cost at a commercial garage. We think that it would have taken approximately 52 hours of a qualified mechanic's time, and this alone would have cost about £40. Mr. Weston had that labour for a net cost of £3 14s. The full commercial cost, including materials, would come to about £60, and Mr. Weston paid, in
  1534
  total, under £23. Doubt may be raised whether it would be or was worth repairing a car of this age at a cost of £60. It seems unlikely that the value of the car would be sufficiently above this to make it worth while. But Mr. Weston asked the centre to do what they could for this rather aged car and, in the circumstances, I do not feel that he has been harshly dealt with.
  I want to make one final point. I am sure that nobody wishes to present this as being a general experience at these training centres. There are 16 motor vehicle repair classes at 13 centres, and they are doing a very good job in training ex-Regulars and disabled persons for this trade. They repair about 1,300 vehicles a year, and the number of complaints is very small. It is certainly no greater than those which arise with a normal commercial garage. I suggest that it would be a great pity if this thoroughly well meant if over-optimistic effort to repair an elderly vehicle were used, in its turn, as a vehicle for damning some first-class work which is done by disabled people and ex-Regulars at Government training centres.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Adjourned accordingly at half-past Eleven o'clock.

ROYAL NAVY
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Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Worcester

BEEF PRICES AND AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
2.35 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the lack of official knowledge, and the desire expressed by the Federation of Master Butchers, they will institute an inquiry into the relationship, during 1961, between the fat stock prices and the retail prices of beef; and, whether they will implement the guarantees to farmers by abandoning support subsidies and substituting minimum prices, supported, when necessary, by Government buying and control of imports.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL WALDEGRAVE): My Lords, the Answer to both parts of the first Question on the Order Paper is, No.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that there is a sum of £70 million involved in these subsidies? The butchers and dealers deny that they have had any part of this sum, which is equal to two whole groundnut schemes. Is it not, therefore, the duty of Her Majesty's Government to inquire into this sum which has vanished into thin air and to let us know exactly what has happened to it?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, of course the Government are aware of the Supplementary Estimate that my right honourable friend has had to put before Parliament, but some of the other statements made by the noble Lord, that the butchers and farmers (I think he said) have had no part of this, are not substantiated by the facts.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, will the noble Earl say which statements in the Question are inaccurate? Is he aware that in the days of Sir Stafford Cripps the £400 million worth of subsidies nearly all went to the reduction of retail prices? Now we have a level of some £350 million, and it is difficult to see the extent to which farmers and consumers benefit. Is it not, therefore, not merely important, but absolutely vital, that the Government should make these inquiries to satisfy themselves, and, indeed, to satisfy us, that this money is not being squandered and that other methods would not be better? Will the noble Earl answer that part of the Question?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I did not mean to imply, and I hope I did not say, that any part of the Question was inaccurate. But there are two questions: would the Government institute an inquiry; and would they abandon the deficiency payments system or the support subsidies and substitute minimum prices, supported, where necessary, by Government buying and control of imports? The only simple and accurate answer to those two questions is, No, my Lords: the Government are not prepared to do either.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I seem to remember statements by the Minister on two occasions that the system of support which is at present in operation is not going to be continued, and that farmers will have to look to markets for the support that they require. Is that the position? Is that why the Government are not giving us quite straight answers to the Question?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: Surely, my Lords, my answer was straight enough. What the Minister said was that if negotiations were successful—I know the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition would not think they were successful—and we were to join the Common Market, then this system of support would have to be changed.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, on the contrary, that is not exactly what I put to the noble Earl. I understood from the Minister's statement on another occasion

727
that he is not prepared to go on with subsidies, but will leave it to the market to supply the support to farmers, whether there is entry into the Common Market or not.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I have not an exact reference to what the noble Viscount is referring to. I know that my Minister has said that this system is under strain—I think those were the words used. With that I think we should all agree. But I have not heard him go further than that.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, if the Minister will not make a retrospective inquiry into these retail prices, could he not at least make a prospective inquiry for next year? Surely there will be no difficulty about this. The Government have the machinery in their social survey for collecting retail price data. Will the noble Earl look into the question of making the inquiry in future, if he cannot look backwards?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, that is another question. I will certainly bring to my right honourable friend's notice that that is what is desired by the noble Lord. I should like to make it clear that it is not a question of our not having the data on which to base estimates—though unfortunately sometimes they may be wrong—but it is our policy that we do not disclose individual items that make up the retail price index.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, this is a particular item, and really there is no technical difficulty whatsoever about collecting this information: it is available to every housewife. All that is necessary is to pick a sample butcher and go to interview him and collect the prices. I cannot see that there is any technical difficulty about it, and it would be most desirable and quite cheap to do it. I hope the Minister will consider this sympathetically, because it really is a piece of common sense.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, the Question on the Order Paper relates to 1961, and I have answered that. Whether or not it would be desirable to have some sort of roving inquiry in the future about the future trends of prices and of marketing in general is really another matter. But I will bring what
728
the noble Lord has said to the attention of my right honourable friend.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, may I suggest to my noble friend (I do not want to prolong this particular Question unduly) that in view of the rather unsatisfactory nature of the answers we should put down a Motion on agriculture very early after the Recess?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble Leader for that suggestion, and I agree that this subject cannot be dealt with merely by Question and Answer. But could I ask the noble Earl these questions? First, will he arrange to publish the retail prices of beef, which have already been collected by the Ministry of Labour, as he stated last week (so the information is known); and if not, why not? Secondly, will he say whether the Government are satisfied with the present position of the level of subsidies, and if not, what alternative methods they have in mind?
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT' HAILSHAM): My Lords, now that the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition has given notice that he intends to move a Motion, I think it would not be right to continue by way of Question and Answer.

EDUCATION IN PRISONS
2.43 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the estimated total expenditure on education in prisons, borstals, and detention centres, for the financial year 1962–1963 and how this compares with the current financial year.]
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (EARL BATHURST): My Lords, the Vote for Education and Recreation in Prisons, England and Wales, for 1961–62 is £341,540, and in Scotland £12,145. The Estimates for 1962–63 are not yet settled, but, subject to the Government's consideration of Estimates generally, the

729
present intention is that the total shall be about the same.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am very pleased to receive that Answer, because there was a report in the Sunday Times that there would be a cut of about one-sixth in the expenditure on education. May I ask the noble Earl, being gratefully aware of his interest in this subject, whether he can make representations to the Prison Commissioners that greater weight should be placed in prison training on the semi-skilled occupations, in which the men are more likely readily to find employment when they come out of prison, than in the traditional craft occupations?
EARL BATHURST: My Lords, we should not be confused over the type of education. So far as I know, there will be no cuts in the ordinary day-time training. Any cut will be purely on educational subjects in the evening, in respect of work taken by outside schoolteachers or such worthy people who come in to do prison training. That is the sort of cut that is bound to take place.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: My Lords, I find some difficulty in following the noble Earl, because he said in the first place that the expenditure was about the same, and he now refers to certain cuts. Would he explain that?
EARL BATHURST: I thought the whole point of the noble Lord's Question was the raising of schoolteachers' salaries and the salaries of the sort of people who do this training. As I say, the estimates are about the same, so obviously some of the classes are bound to be cut.
BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER: Would the noble Earl not agree that if a little more were spent on education in prison there might be fewer persons who returned to prison?
EARL BATHURST: My Lords, it rather depends upon the sort of education. I am certain we are all agreed that there should be the best education facilities that are possible in prisons but, like all Departments of Her Majesty's Government, Estimates must be held to. But I assure the noble Lord that the Estimates will be the same, and that
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there is no intention to take any money away from them.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that this cut would amount to about £50,000? It will be an effective cut, in real terms, which is a trifle compared to the £70 million the Government have just squandered on farms. May I also ask the noble Earl whether he will approach his right honourable friend the Home Secretary to see whether this matter can be reconsidered, because a real cut in prison education training for occupations afterwards is a deplorably false economy? If this cut is made, it is bound to lead to far greater expenditure, willy-nilly, on prisons.
EARL BATHURST: My Lords, I think that what will happen is that there will probably be rather fewer classes, but there will be facilities for just the same number of prisoners to attend the classes. Some of the classes are already under strength. It would seem ridiculous to keep those classes going, when they might be amalgamated. Obviously, some of the classes may have to be discontinued, but I hope that it will be possible to keep as many going as the Estimates will permit.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.N. CONGO OPERATIONS
2.46 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government, with regard to special contributions for the United Nations' military operations in the Congo, why, since it is not undignified for France to abstain from financial contribution while a member of the United Nations, it would necessarily be undignified for the United Kingdom to notify its withdrawal of financial support for military operations in Katanga.]
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I think that in framing his Question my noble friend has inadvertently misconstrued the terms of a private letter I sent him in reply to a telegram he sent me. What I said would be undignified and ineffective would be an

731
attempt on our part to support our arguments on the merits of the United Nations' operations in the Congo by linking them with a threat to withdraw our contribution. The question of our continued financial support to the United Nations' operations in the Congo was dealt with in the debate on Monday by my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and my noble friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. I have nothing to add to what they said then.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, may I thank the noble Viscount for his reply? It was gracious of him to make reference to a letter which he was good enough to send me, but I would set his mind at rest and tell him that my Question was framed on a quotation from the speech of the Prime Minister, which was categorical. He said that such action would be both undignified and ineffective. Since my Question was framed before the speech of the Foreign Secretary, as ever brilliant, in this House on Monday I would quote from that and ask the noble Viscount if he would interpret it. The noble Earl said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 236 (No. 23), col. 524] that if we cut off our financial supplies—that is for the conduct of an aggressive war in Katanga—
"… we lose all influence on events."
May I ask my noble friend if it is to be assumed that France has no continuing influence on events? And am I wrong in understanding that Russia has no continuing influence on events?
Secondly, may I ask my noble friend, arising from his reply whether he thinks it would be worth while to give some indication of the basis of the supplementary contribution for this particular operation, since the speech says that the Foreign Secretary—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
LORD BARNBY: With the indulgence of the House I quote the speech of the Foreign Secretary. As to the payments legally assessed under the rules of the Charter, would my noble friend think it worth while that there should be given some indication of how the payments were assessed under the Charter, since certainly they could not have been for the Katanga operations?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I will try to answer all that. In the first place, I think my right honourable friend the Prime Minister used the same words as I did in my letter to my noble friend, in exactly the same connection. I think we both felt that it would be ineffective to couple an argument with a threat, because no one would take a threat seriously in those circumstances, and undignified because it would betray a failure of confidence in our own arguments. As regards the rest of the question, I would point out to my noble friend that a resolution has been adopted by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly referring to the International Court of Justice the question of the obligation to pay costs of this nature. We were among the co-sponsors of this resolution and we voted for it. In those circumstances I do not think my noble friend would expect me to supply my own interpretation of the legal consequences of a resolution of that kind.

THE 18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will take the initiative in convening the eighteen-nation Disarmament Committee at an earlier date than at present proposed, namely April next year.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF DUNDEE): My Lords, I should make it clear that, when on Monday I mentioned April next as a tentative date, I was speaking only of the preliminary views of Her Majesty's and the United States Governments. Both the time and the place of the negotiations will have to be fixed by agreement between all the participants. Our Representative at the United Nations has already stated in New York that we would be willing to meet earlier if there was agreement on this. At the same time, however, he pointed out the need for full preparation if the conference is to get off to a satisfactory start.

KATANGA TALKS
2.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, may I put a Question of which I have given Private Notice—namely,
"To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on the talks between the Congo Government and Mr. Tshombe."
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, as your Lordships will be aware, on December 12 Her Majesty's Government sent a message to the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations calling for a cease-fire in order to create the conditions in which in a united Congo a peaceful and just basis for co-operation might be negotiated. I am happy to say that as a result of very close co-operation between the Governments most directly concerned and Her Majesty's Government, and by proceeding in concert with the Secretariat of the United Nations it has been possible to achieve both our objectives of a de facto cease-fire and talks between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe.
From the moment that Mr. Tshombe left Elisabethville on December 18, at which time he called upon his own troops to stop fighting, the United Nations forces have also called a halt to military operations. This will continue so long as the talks are in progress. There have been some incidents since that time resulting, I understand, from sniping at United Nations forces. Talks at Kitona between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe began yesterday and I am awaiting reports from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Leopoldville on their progress. The important thing is that a real attempt is being made to solve the Congo problem by peaceful negotiation and not by fighting.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Earl for his Answer, and we are all happy, of course, that certain events have led to the talks which are now going on and that a cease-fire is practically existing. But I must say I am surprised at the terms of the first part of the Answer of the noble Earl. It looks as if Her Majesty's Government are claiming a large share of
734
the responsibility for the present happy position, and I find that very difficult to follow. Perhaps he would not mind explaining a little how the terms of the Answer were arrived at, starting with December 12. Because, if my recollection is right, when the Government made representations for a cease-fire this was rejected by the United Nations and also by the State Department in America at the time on the grounds that the United Nations must first obtain their objectives and that these objectives were actually achieved. Surely, the fact of Mr. Tshombe's own representations to Mr. Kennedy for him to help to arrange a meeting so that there could be talks between himself and Mr. Adoula is the main reason why the talks are taking place. I think it would have been a little happier for the country at large if the facts had been rather differently stated.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the noble Viscount questioned the accuracy or appropriateness of the opening part of this statement, which perhaps therefore I might read again.
"I am happy to say that as a result of very close co-operation between the Governments most directly concerned and Her Majesty's Government, and by proceeding in concert with the Secretariat of the United Nations it has been possible to achieve both our objectives of a de facto cease-fire and talks between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe."
The proposal for a cease-fire was put forward by Her Majesty's Government last week, and we are very glad that those who at first rejected it have now decided that it is a good thing.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I really must protest at this extraordinary, deliberate face-saving of Her Majesty's Government, because, in fact, the United Nations and the State Department of the United States said that no such ceasefire could be operated until the United Nations' objectives had been reached; and by December 18 they had been so largely reached that Mr. Tshombe left Elisabethville. Do let us have the facts straight.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the noble Viscount I think is putting his own interpretation on events.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: Public interpretation.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I do not know what the minimum objectives referred to were supposed to be, and whether those who referred to them consider they have yet been attained or not. When the noble Viscount asked me about this last week I said that we hoped very much that the attainment of these minimum objectives would not involve heavy street fighting and heavy civilian casualties in Elisabethville, which, as I pointed out, might make it impossible for a peaceful solution ever to be achieved; and I would still repeat that. I hope that fighting will not be resumed because there are many people who think that the minimum objectives have not been achieved. We think that the fighting should be stopped and that peaceful negotiations should proceed.
My Lords, in view of the great difficulty of these negotiations I would rather not say anything now which might prejudice their course. We are all hoping and praying—we have had so many meetings in the past which have not led to a peaceful result. We hope most earnestly that this meeting may do so.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, we all echo the hopes that the noble Earl has expressed and we are not saying anything or desiring to do anything which would have any prejudicial effect upon the discussions. What my noble Leader raised was the accuracy of the historical set-out which began this statement; and, as he pointed out, it is quite correct that their suggestion was rejected by the United States and rejected by the Secretary-General. and the rejection was confirmed by the 19-Power Advisory Committee. That ended the matter so far as the British call for a cease fire was concerned. What happened then in the light of the achievement, or the near achievement, of the United Nations minimum objectives, of which the noble Earl says he does not understand? I understand that they were opening the lines of communications and protecting United Nations' personnel in Elisabethville. That they have done, and at that point Mr. Tshombe indicated that President Kennedy could invoke his good offices to mediate between the warring parties. That took place and, as a result of that, the negotiations, or the discussions—I only think of them
736
as discussions, not negotiations—are at the moment taking place. We think that it is not quite right to present the facts in the way in which the noble Earl has done.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I cannot altogether accept the gloss which the noble Lord is putting on this matter. If I may refer to another supplementary question which he asked me last week, about the possible rejection of our proposal for a cease-fire, I said that I did not think it likely that it would be directly turned down, though I thought it might be asserted that the time was not yet quite ripe for it; but in our view, the sooner it was done the better. It was only five days, and that is not a very long time for all the machinery involved to work.
Our view has always been that, whatever your minimum objectives may be, it is not a good thing to achieve those objectives by heavy fighting against a hostile population; and we have never made any secret of our belief that the United Nations has been acting upon a mistaken appreciation of the local conditions and strength of feeling in Katanga. What we are trying to do is to save both Katanga and the United Nations from getting involved in a long, bitter, repressive colonial war which would be equally bad for the Congo and for the United Nations itself. We have repeated that over and over again, and that is why we are glad that the proposal—which, I repeat, we were the first to make—for a cease-fire has now been agreed. I do not want to raise any false hopes that this happy event is certain to lead to a satisfactory solution, because we have had so many disappointments before. But we all are hoping that it will.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, I must say that I think a gloss has been put on the facts, and the gloss has been put by the Government, not by me. I stand by the statement of the specific facts which I made, and I think that the noble Lord is not being quite so frank on the matter as he normally is. I am sure that the whole House is anxious to see a successful outcome of the negotiations, and we all accept the desire to avoid a continued conflict on the lines just mentioned by the noble Earl himself. Nevertheless, I think the fact

737
remains that the United Nations has played a very leading part in bringing the position to what it is at this stage.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, if the noble Lord thinks that a ceasefire would have taken place just the same, even if the British Government had never pressed for it, he is, of course, entitled to that opinion. All I can say is that we have constantly been pressing for it; and not only by one representation: we have been working for it the whole time. We are not concerned with distributing any credit for it; we are concerned with the future peace of the Congo, for which we have always been working, but which, I might remind your Lordships, has not yet been attained. But at least a step has been achieved towards it.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, does it not appear that the Labour Party, for their own good reasons, are fishing in troubled waters and that they are now rather cross because the waters are not so troubled as they were?
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I think that remark is not very clever at all. I think I am well enough known in Parliament, after 40 years, not to endeavour to fish in troubled waters on such matters as this. What we are anxious about is that we should keep the proper reputation of this country in that great United Nations Organisation. You do not improve it by attempts at face-saving.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, are Her Majesty's Government aware that there are many people in the United States who are convinced that the improved and better informed outlook of the State Department results directly from the action of Her Majesty's Government?
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that the United Nations commander on the spot is reported in to-day's newspapers as saying that Ethiopian troops have achieved all objectives in Elisabethville? In that event, of course, that is the natural end of hostilities and is owed entirely to the United Nations. And let us hope that the present end of hostilities will be a continuous one.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, our belief is that the attainment of certain objectives would not necessarily lead to the end of hostilities in Katanga.
A NOBLE LORD: Why not?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Why not! I do not know whether the noble Lord agrees with our appreciation of the situation—I know that some people do not. But our estimate is that popular feeling in Katanga is becoming more and more bitter against interference, and that the longer fighting goes on the more impossible it will be ever to achieve a peaceful solution, let alone to restore orderly government; and that, as I have said, has been our objective all along.
With regard to Lord Stonham's more specific question about what is happening in Elisabethville, our Consul in Elisabethville left with Mr. Tshombe yesterday, and accompanied him to Ndola. He is not taking part in the discussions at Kitona, and I expect that by now he is probably back in Elisabethville. But the result of his temporary absence has been that we have not been receiving full reports about the situation there, and I would rather not make any comment on other reports which we have all seen in the newspapers.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, if that is the case, how is the noble Earl aware that popular opinion in the Katanga is so inflamed that they may break the cease-fire and attack the United Nations?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, that is only one very small possibility; there are many future dangers which are far more extensive than that.

GOA
3.8 p.m.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask Her Majesty's Government the Question of which I have given Private Notice—namely,
"To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can make any further statement regarding the situation in Goa."
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I should like to begin by explaining that there is no British Consul in Goa; consequently Her Majesty's Government

739
have very little first-hand information regarding the situation there. We have, however, received a message from one of the British subjects in Goa saying that all British subjects are safe and well. We have also received assurances from the Indian Government that British lives and property will he protected. So far as we can make out, there is now no danger to British subjects and H.M.S. "Rhyl", which had been standing by in the vicinity of Goa, has now been withdrawn.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, while we are all relieved to hear about the safety of British lives and property in Goa, has there not since then been a decision by the Security Council rejecting a proposal sponsored by Her Majesty's Government, calling for a cease-fire and for the withdrawal of the Indian forces behind their own frontiers? Does this mean that the United Nations can or will do nothing more in the face of this outrageous act of aggression? And, if that is so, will my noble friend say what further action Her Majesty's Government intend to take, short of military operations, to fulfil their obligations under the Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 1899. Will they, for example, consult with the United States Government to see what practical steps can be taken to secure the restoration of the status quo in these three territories?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, there were two Resolutions proposed in the Security Council, one providing that nothing should be done and that Portugal should be asked to withdraw her troops and facilitate the end of colonialism in India. That resolution was defeated by 7 votes to 4, being supported by Soviet Russia, the United Arab Republic, Ceylon and Liberia. The other resolution provided that:
"The Security Council,
"Recalling that in Article 2 of the Charter all members are obligated to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
"Deploring the use of force by India in Goa, Damao and Diu.
"Recalling that Article 1 (2) of the Charter specifies as one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based upon respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
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"(1) Calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

"(2) Calls upon the Government of India to withdraw its forces immediately to positions prevailing before December 17, 1961.

"(3) Urges the parties to work out a permanent solution of their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter.

"(4) Requests the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be appropriate."

For that Resolution the same seven Members voted, and the same four Members—Liberia, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic and Soviet Russia, voted against. As Soviet Russia is one of those who have the right of veto, both Resolutions failed and the Security Council was therefore not in a position to take any action.
LORD COLYTON: But my noble friend has not answered my question as to what Her Majesty's Government propose to do now—first of all, whether there is anything more that can be done at the United Nations; and, secondly, what Her Majesty's Government propose to do to carry out their own obligations under the 1899 Declaration.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, with regard to the future we are naturally remaining in touch with the other Governments concerned. With regard to the 1889 Treaty, I think my noble friend already stated the Government's position on that two or three days ago, or at any rate this was stated by the Commonwealth Relations Secretary in another place: that we had warned the Portuguese Government as early as 1954 that we could not engage in hostilities against India. We repeated this warning at the beginning of December, 1961, and the Portuguese did not in fact ask us to take such action. They have asked for full diplomatic support, particularly in attempting to dissuade the Indian Government from the use of force. We certainly did our best to help in that way. Before the invasion we made the strongest representations to the Indian Government that we should deeply deplore the use of force, and I can only repeat that Her Majesty's Government deeply regret that their efforts proved to be unavailing.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, is it not quite clear that the United Nations

741
neither intends nor has the power to stop aggression anywhere?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, in his reply to my noble friend Lord Colyton the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, quoted certain passages from the Statement of the Commonwealth Secretary in another place yesterday. May I draw his attention to two other statements that he made. One is [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 651 (No. 35), col. 948]:
"We have long understood the natural desire of the Indian people to incorporate these territories in the Republic of India and their feelings of impatience that the Portuguese Government have not felt disposed to follow the example of Britain and France."
The second statement was this:
"The attitude of Her Majesty's Government on this matter has been clearly explained to the Indian Government from time to time."
What I want to ask the noble Earl and the Government is this: Is that the settled policy of Her Majesty's Government? Has it for some time been the settled policy of Her Majesty's Government? When was it expressed to the Indian Government, to whom it must have given considerable encouragement? In any case, if it was divulged to the Indian Government, why was it not divulged to Parliament, in view of the bearing which any such statement must have on the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty? That is the first question. The other one is: Was it necessary, at this of all times, for us to have made public these views which appear to justify the action of the Indian Government?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Yes, my Lords. The fact that we stated these views many years ago and (as the Commonwealth Secretary put it, I think) understood the feelings of the Indian Government about Goa, and that we have never concealed them from anybody, does not in the least diminish our opposition to the settlement of this question by violence and not by peaceful negotiation.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the point I was trying to make to the noble Earl was that, as stated, that attitude clearly was not in harmony with the views of the Portuguese Government, or with our natural moral obligation to them under the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Were these statements ever
742
made to the Indian Government that we sympathised with their desire to take over Goa; and, if so, why was that fact not divulged to Parliament?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I think it would be better, if my noble friend wants precise information about that, to put down a Question. In any case, I will send him written information about it. I do not think that we have ever concealed our ideas on the subject of Goa. But that does not in the least mean that we have ever sought to suggest, or to condone for a moment, that a question of this kind ought to be settled by force; it ought not.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, is the Minister aware that, speaking as the only surviving member of the Mission to India in 1946 which led to the independence of India, I share the great sorrow which has already been expressed in your Lordships' House at the military action taken by Mr. Nehru's Government in order to achieve these particular objectives? We are exceedingly sorry. We understand the resentment of Portugal in this particular instance, but I do not think our action can depend upon an ancient Treaty with Portugal. I think we must remember that we have commitments to the United Nations, and that there is a standard of conduct laid down for Mr. Nehru as well as others in the United Nations Charter, of what ought to be the practice under the Charter, which we are sorry that Mr. Nehru has not followed. I think we should make that perfectly clear to him.
LORD COLYTON: My Lords, the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition should know better than anybody else that these guarantees were reaffirmed in 1943, when we sought to obtain the use of the islands of the Azores to protect our merchantmen from sinking by submarine. These guarantees were specifically reaffirmed at that date, so it is not possible to talk about an "ancient Treaty". But the second thing I should like to ask my noble friend—
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: May I know—
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I think we are in danger of embarking

743
upon a debate at this stage. This ought to be a time for questioning my noble friend.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl whether there is not one thing he can do—namely, to make it known to the Indian Government that many old friends of India in this House, and outside, are horrified at the action of the Indian Government over Goa? May I also ask whether there was any consultation between the Indian Government and the other Governments of the Commonwealth as to the intentions of India in this matter?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, we are all well aware, and I am sure the Indian Government are well aware, of the sensations of shock—they were described in your Lordships' House as of "incredulous horror"—at this action. With regard to the noble Lord's second question, there was certainly no consultation between the Indian Government and any member of the Commonwealth about this action, which took us completely by surprise.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I must put one point arising from what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Colyton. The first point is that the Treaty or understanding of 1943 took place nearly four years after the war had started, and at the end of prolonged endeavours to get our Ally Portugal to allow us the use of the Azores. I have inner and very distinct recollection of all the facts connected with that. Let me just point out, also, that that understanding was more than two years before the agreement of this country to the General Charter of the United Nations.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, have Her Majesty's Government observed that the spokesman of the Indian Government at the United Nations has expressed his complete indifference both to the Charter and to any action that may be taken by the Security Council?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I have observed many things at the United Nations, and your Lordships will no doubt have read the comments of Mr. Adlai Stevenson upon the rejection of the resolution by the Security Council.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, I was actually referring to the statement made by the Indian representative—I think on the previous day—on the proposal to bring the matter before the Security Council.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend just one question on this matter? Does my noble friend not feel that the withdrawal of H.M.S. "Rhyl" from those waters may be viewed by some—and perhaps even by many—as a recognition of a final fait accompli? Also, would it not be possible for this frigate to return to those waters, so that it will not be felt by other countries that we consider the aggression on the part of India as a fait accompli?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the only reason for sending "H.M.S. "Rhyl" to Goa was to secure protection for British lives and property. The reason why she has been withdrawn is because it is considered that they are not now in danger.

ACTS OF PARLIAMENT NUMBER ING AND CITATION BILL [H.L.]
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to provide for the numbering and citation of future Acts of Parliament by reference to the calendar year in which they are passed. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

WOOL TEXTILE INDUSTRY (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LEVY) (AMENDMENT) ORDER, 1962
3.23 p.m.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, your Lordships will have heard the Clerk call the Wool Textile Industry (Scientific Research Levy) (Amendment) Order, 1962, and it is the Order for that year that I propose to move. I beg your Lordships' indulgence for the misprint on the Order Paper, where it is described as the Order of 1961.
My Lords, the only effect of this Order will be to increase by one-third

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the rates of the levy for scientific research payable by the wool textile industry. The Order is to be made under Section 9 of the Industrial Organisation and Development Act, 1947. It has been prepared at the request of the Wool Textile Delegation, which represents some 85 per cent. of the employers in the industry, and has the support of the trade unions representing those employed in the industry.
The levy, first introduced in 1950, is raised partly from suppliers of wool—that is to say the merchants, not the farmers—and partly from processors of wool. The amount collected under the levy is now no longer sufficient to maintain the present scope and standard of the services provided for the industry. When the Scientific Research Levy was instituted in 1950, it was expected to produce between £100,000 and £120,000 a year. The average annual yield since the last increase in the rates has been £184,000. It is expected that the amended rates now proposed would produce a total of some £245,000 a year. The increased yield would be achieved by a straightforward increase of one-third in each of the levy rates; the proposed Order does not alter the incidence of the levy on the different classes of levy payers. The cost of the work financed from the levy by the Wool Textile Research Council has risen substantially as new inquiries have been undertaken for the improvement of the already high efficiency and high standards of the industry. In particular, the industry's research association, which receives most of the levy and which is also supported by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, has recently opened a new wing at its research station at Torridon. Research is, of course, particularly important to the industry at the present time when there is such rapid technical developments in the textile field and increasingly competitive conditions in international trade.
The 1947 Act requires the Board of Trade, before making such an Order as this, to consult any organisation representing substantial numbers of persons carrying on business in, or employed in, the industry. This they have done. There have been a few objections to this Order but they represent only a
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very small proportion of the total amount collected. The objections have been carefully examined, but do not appear serious enough to offset the large measure of support—I would almost say demand—from the rest of the industry. The industry in general clearly values the work done and paid for by the levy, and wishes it to be continued at the level necessary to meet the industry's needs. This is demonstrated by the fact that the increased rates proposed in the draft Order have been specifically requested by the principal employers' organisation in the industry, and are warmly supported by the trade unions. I hope your Lordships will see fit to approve this Order, and I beg to move.
Moved, That the Wool Textile Industry (Scientific Research Levy) (Amendment) Order, 1962, be approved.—(Earl Waldegrave.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, on a point of order, may I ask the noble and learned Viscount whether there was time for one to have got up before the Question was put? I had deference to the Lord Chancellor's being on his feet. I had notified my noble friend earlier that I was intending to speak in support of his Motion.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am very sorry. I try to make a pause after I state what the Question is. The noble Lord did not rise, and I went on to put the Question. I am extremely sorry if we have been prevented from hearing the noble Lord, but I am bound to say that I had put the Question and he did not get up to speak.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, am I to take it from that ruling that I do not have the indulgence of the House to suuort this Order?

HOPS (IMPORT REGULATION) ORDER, 1961
3.28 p.m.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, the purpose of this Order is to safeguard the Hops Marketing Scheme which is designed to secure the orderly marketing of hops. The Order has been made by the President of the Board of Trade under Section 43 of the Agricultural

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Marketing Act, 1958, which consolidated earlier legislation. That Act provides for schemes to ensure stable markets for agricultural produce in the United Kingdom.
Before making an Order under this section, the Board of Trade have to be satisfied that there exists a scheme for the reorganisation of the industry concerned, and that it would be jeopardised if imports were not regulated: that the interests of consumers (including manufacturers) are not prejudiced by the Order; and that the Government's international obligations are not broken. On all of these points the Board of Trade is satisfied.
Before 1932 the hops industry was vulnerable to violent changes in world prices. In that year, a marketing scheme was established under the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1931, and this has served well in controlling the marketing, and stabilising the prices, of the home crop. This could not work unless the home market were insulated from the effect of fluctuations in world prices by some control over imports. This was accomplished by an agreement, included in the Report of a Committee set up in 1934 by the then Minister of Agriculture, between the Hops Marketing Board on the one hand and the Brewers' Society on the other. The parties undertook, amongst other things, to restrict imports of hops except in years when the home crop was short, and to allow limited imports of hops for lager and other special beers, the hops for which could not be grown here.
The Hops Marketing Scheme, together with the voluntary agreements, have given the industry stability and settled prices, and have benefited hop growers and brewers alike. By regulating home production and prices, they have ensured that growers do not produce more hops than the brewers can use, and that the growers get a fair price. The brewers, for their part, have agreed not to let down the English grower by buying hops abroad wherever they can be picked up cheaply, and it is this part of the Agreement which will be replaced by the Order. The consumer, I should mention, gains, of course, by having his beer of the flavour to which he is accustomed, and pays no more for it because, after
748
all, the hops element in the price of beer is only about a farthing a pint.
Last year, however, the Hops Marketing Board and the Brewers' Society were advised that the voluntary import restrictions embodied in their agreement would have to come before the Restrictive Practices Court. They were also advised that the Court was unlikely to be able to approve the restrictions. Unrestricted imports would have meant the disruption of the Hops Marketing Scheme, and that would have been a disaster for the hops industry. Fortunately, powers to restrict imports are available in these circumstances. That they were not used in the first instance in place of the voluntary agreement, to which I have referred, was a matter of historical accident, for the Restrictive Trade Practices Act had not then been thought of.
These powers, therefore, have now been used to make the present Order. These secure the effective working of agricultrial marketing schemes. The fundamental problems of the industry have not altered since 1934, and the case for regulation is as strong as ever. The Scheme is an integral part of our agricultural economy, and the regulation of imports is fundamental to its operation. No new control is being introduced, but similar controls to those which have operated since 1934 are being given a legal basis. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Hops (Import Regulation) Order, 1961, be approved.—(Earl Waldegrave.)
3.32 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I was carefully observing the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack, because I wanted to "hop" up at the right time. On this occasion, I assure him that he did not look towards the Opposition Benches before he "popped the question". My Lords, I would congratulate the noble Earl on a very nice sense of timing, in that he has introduced this measure on the last sitting day prior to the festive season. I am grateful to him for his explanation of the Order, which I think was necessary in view of the fact that the Special Orders Committee indicated that it was a matter which required the special consideration of the House. I think it would be fair to say that the Order gives

749
statutory force to a voluntary arrangement which has now worked with very great success for 30 years. For those 30 years it has provided—and this is the only branch of horticulture for which it has provided any kind of stability—an assured market and steady prices; no subsidy at all has been paid and it has depended on the control of imports. I would point out to the noble Earl that they are all precisely the factors which I suggested in a Question which he answered earlier this afternoon and which he resolutely rejected as being unsuitable for a different branch of agriculture. I would remind him that it has worked with very great success and I hope therefore that when he considers this question he may take a more favourable view.
There are one or two questions which I should like to put to the noble Earl, about which I hope he will be able to reassure us. He made it clear that this Order is necessary because although the agreement has been registered under the Restrictive Practices Act for some four or five years it was likely to be adjudged a restrictive trade practice and therefore illegal. I have no complaint about bringing in an Order to make something legal which is otherwise illegal, but I would submit to him that there must be many such industries or parts of industries where there is an extremely beneficial though highly illegal practice going on—beneficial to the whole of the industry, to the whole of agriculture or to the whole of the country. I wonder whether in such cases the Government would not consider the possibility of an amendment to the Act to avoid the general uncertainty which must exist in the minds of people engaged in the industry, and if it were possible to do that it would perhaps avoid a whole series of Orders of this type. I would submit that this is a matter for particularly urgent consideration because of our impending (as I view it) entry into the Common Market.
The second question I should like to ask the noble Earl is with regard to the quota. The hop growers operate under a quota system and these quotas are very valuable. That is evidenced by the fact that if a farm which enjoys a hop quota comes up for sale it attracts a very much higher price than it would if there were
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no quota, although it might be in a hop growing area. Now the noble Earl said that this Order would make no essential difference to the existing arrangements, and would merely give them statutory force, particularly with regard to licensing. But what arrangements exist for new entrants? How and under what conditions will horticulturists who are not now growing hops, but who would like to, be allowed to start? I would submit that if we are going to legalise an illegal practice—and I am all in favour of doing that—we ought to have an assurance that it will not be unduly and unfairly restrictive and thereby perhaps force prices too high.
We are at present, and have been for many years, importing hops, and therefore that fact might be a valid reason for enlarging the home industry. Because hops can now be kept for at least a year and if a surplus arises from a good crop it could be kept to cover a deficiency arising in a bad year. That would avoid the need for imports and it might also help to expand the export trade in British hops to the Commonwealth, and to Ireland, as against the continental variety. I ask the noble Earl therefore whether that also is under consideration.
My last question concerns price. He mentioned that the hop content, as it were, in a pint of beer costs only about a farthing. He did not mention, of course, that the tax content in a pint of beer is 8d. Of course that is the most important part. But, nevertheless, the price of hops is a matter of some importance and since we are creating a completely protected market we should be given an assurance—and I hope the noble Earl will be able to give it— that machinery exists, or will be put into operation, to keep prices at a fair level, always providing that there is a reasonable return to the growers and the workers in the industry. Those are my questions, my Lords, and subject to the points I have raised I think we should warmly welcome this arrangement as one which is of benefit to producers and consumers without recourse to the taxpayer. I only hope that before long the Government will see the wisdom of making similar arrangements for other branches of agriculture and horticulture. If the noble Earl, in what he is going to say, could hold out some hope of sense at last, this would indeed be a merry Christmas for the taxpayer.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I should like to follow up one point made by my noble friend Lord Stonham. Is it not the case that, under the Hop Marketing Scheme, the growing of hops was confined to those areas of land which had been growing hops at a certain date before the Scheme was brought into operation, and that it is virtually impossible for any other land to be used for the purpose? That being so, the natural result of the Scheme, as my noble friend has said, is to give a monopoly value to those particular tracts of land, and the real ultimate beneficiaries of it are the people who happen to own them.
3.40 p.m.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I am glad that there has been a general welcome for this Order. I think I can reply briefly to the points which have been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, and the noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch. The noble Lord, Lord Stonham, suggested that this might be a convenient way of dealing with the subject on which he had been speaking earlier in the afternoon—meat. But I really think that there is very little comparison between the volume and the value of hops used in the flavouring of beer, and such an enormous business as that of meat. I believe that the total value of business in meat is over £800 million a year.
We must realise that this Order which we are considering, and I hope now passing, does not do anything new. It does not make any alteration in the arrangements which have been made in the past. It is simply that the arrangements which have been going on all these years since the 1930's in connection with the hop industry are now, as it were, put under another seal. Instead of an agreement between the Brewers' Society and the Hops Marketing Board, the arrangements are now authorised under this section of the 1958 Act. It is not intended that there should be any changes in the Scheme itself. In fact, there cannot be any change in the Scheme itself in an Order under this section. It is perfectly true that a quota to grow hops is valuable. I think that there is nothing wrong in that. There are quotas for the growing of potatoes, as for the growing of hops.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, if the noble Earl will allow me, I would point out that there is provision in the Potato Scheme for new entrants. Will he tell me this: does he not agree that it is a point of substance that we are giving statutory authority to an agreement which was previously of a voluntary nature, and, therefore, would this not be the right opportunity to make provision both for new entrants and for a certain control of prices? They are the two points on which I think we should be satisfied.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I am advised that this would not be the proper opportunity to alter the Scheme by making any different provisions as to entry, or by making any other arrangements as to price or price control; but with Notice of the Question I would naturally look into it. I cannot believe that any Scheme under the Marketing Act, or under any other arrangement, is so inflexible and fixed for all time that, if it is desirable or desired, it cannot be altered in the future. I am advised that it is certainly not the intention in this Order to alter the Scheme in any way, but simply to bring, the arrangements under Section 43 of the Marketing Act, 1958, instead of under the voluntary agreement as before. That is the answer which I must give at the moment to the noble Lords who raised that point.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, my noble friend has brought to light a rather disturbing state of affairs. If in fact we are giving now statutory authority for the doctrine that there can be no new entrants in the production of hops, whereas earlier it was a voluntary Scheme, then I think, while it may be that we can do nothing about it this afternoon, it is something of which we shall have to take note. I warn the noble Earl that it is something which we shall have to raise in this House on a future occasion. I do not think we can tolerate a state of affairs where there can be no new entrants to the production of hops in this country. We are creating a virtual, or a real, monopoly for those who are producing them to-day, and are giving them all the advantages which flow from that. Perhaps the noble Earl may be in a position to deal with this matter on an early occasion when we come back.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, the details of the Scheme with regard to new entries and quotas are not fully in my head, and I should not like to answer as to them at this moment. But I think that it would be unwise for it to go out from this House that we were doing anything new which was alarming or dangerous. Whatever has been done has been done consistently since the early 1930's, and, so far as I am aware, there has been no complaint from any section of the community that by the agreement that has been operated in the past, stability and prosperity in this small section of this trade has been undesirable. I should not like it to go out from this House that here, because we were changing the umbrella under which this arrangement has gone on for all these years, we have suddenly uncovered something which is very bad, which ought to be looked at, and that we should stop it, because on examination I do not think that will be found to be the case. But I appreciate the point which the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has made. We will, of course, look at this, and perhaps I may communicate with the noble Lord afterwards and discuss with him the question of new entries into hop growing.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, does that mean that the noble Earl will also send me a copy of any communication that he addresses to my noble friend, as I raised the point?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I should be delighted to do so.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

WHITE FISH SUBSIDY (UNITED KINGDOM) (AMENDMENT) SCHEME, 1961
3.47 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I beg to move that this Scheme be now approved. It was only very recently that we were discussing a Scheme to provide a measure of relief for the middle-water fleet in their present difficulties. That Scheme, which is now in force, allows grant-aided middle-water vessels to make five voyages to distant waters, instead of only three, without incurring any penalty. The need for this arose because those middle-water vessels which had been fishing at the
754
Faroes had been having a very difficult time, and we wanted to give them the opportunity to help themselves by trying more distant waters.
Welcome though it is to the industry, that measure can provide only a limited amount of help, because the fact is that these vessels, which have been fishing mainly in the waters around the Faroes, have found for more than a year now that the catches there have been disastrously small. When the subsidies for the year beginning August 1, 1961, were discussed with the industry in the early summer, they asked for rates of subsidy considerably higher than those then being paid for vessels of the middle-water fleet, and supported their claim by evidence of the declining catches of the Faroes. At that time the Government had not sufficient evidence to justify paying such high rates of subsidy on this account. The subsidy rates introduced on August 1, therefore, took account of the performance of all middle-water vessels in 1960, and an increase in subsidy was granted which was based on their average performance and needs; and that increase amounted, on average, to £3 to £3 10s. 0d. a day.
When this subsidy Scheme was discussed in another place the Minister did say, however, referring to these Faroes vessels, that if the industry was right, and if a critical situation should arise over the next few months, he would have another look at the situation. The industry has now produced evidence of this critical situation. It has submitted accounts for vessels fishing at the Faroes in 1960 and 1961, and these show that in the first nine months of 1961 vessels spending the greater part of their time fishing at the Faroes lost, on average, £6,400. Vessels spending less time at the Faroes, and vessels not fishing at these grounds at all, were also making losses, but much less than this amount. I should like to remind your Lordships that these losses are not estimates, but the actual losses that have been incurred during nine months of this year. Unless there is a sudden and substantial improvement in catches in the Faroes, or these vessels are more fortunate in finding alternative grounds than they have been so far, the losses are likely to continue. There is an obvious need for urgent action to help the owners over

755
their present difficulties. For this reason, my right honourable friend has kept his promise to look at the situation again and is now introducing an amendment Scheme in the middle of a subsidy year.
The Scheme now before your Lordships provides for a subsidy of £13 a day to be paid to all motor vessels which in 1960 or 1961 spent 30 per cent. or more of their days at sea fishing at the Faroes—an increase, according to the length of the vessel, of from £3 10s. to £8 a day. The oil-burners built before 1950 will also receive the same increase.
As I have said, the losses have already been incurred, and had the information now available to the Minister been known earlier this year, these higher rates would have been awarded at the beginning of the subsidy year. Therefore, my right honourable friend has thought it right to apply the higher subsidy rates to voyages made by these vessels since the beginning of the subsidy year—namely, August 1—as well as to future voyages. He has also thought it right to pay the subsidy for all voyages by these vessels, and not only for voyages to the Faroes. If subsidies were to be paid only on voyages to the Faroes, those who have been fishing elsewhere would be penalised and the owners might be encouraged to continue fishing at the Faroes when all the evidence is for the need for less fishing there.
There is one other point to which I should draw your Lordships' attention. As the remuneration of crews is settled by reference to the gross proceeds, subsidy Schemes since 1956 have laid down a maximum amount of subsidy that can be counted in the gross proceeds for this purpose. In the past, the main reason for awarding increases in subsidy has been increases in costs. Therefore, since 1956 subsidy increases have been excluded from the crew settlement. On this occasion, as the additional subsidy is to be paid in order to compensate for a decline in proceeds, and this decline has already affected and will continue to affect, crews, as well as owners, it has been agreed that the whole of the subsidy increase should be added to the gross proceeds for the purpose of calculating the crews' share. I hope, there
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fore, that your Lordships will give approval to this scheme. I beg to move.
Moved, That the White Fish Subsidy (United Kingdom) (Amendment) Scheme, 1961, be approved.—(Lord Hastings.)
3.55 p.m.
LORD WISE: My Lords, there are just one or two small points that I wish to raise from this side of the House in regard to this Scheme. I think that generally we can approve the Scheme as being very necessary at the present time, in order to safeguard the interests of the fishing fleet concerned. From what the noble Lord has said, it is obvious that fishing around the Faroes has become more difficult and the profits of the owners have not only decreased considerably, but have now become a series of heavy losses. It is necessary that we should see not only that boats put out to sea at a reasonable remuneration to the owners but also that the crews are paid reasonable living wages according to results.
This Scheme enlarges upon a previous Scheme, and the higher subsidy involves additional expenditure by the taxpayer. I should like to ask the Minister one or two questions in regard to this. He gave no gross figures of the subsidy. What is the increase above the original subsidy? And can the noble Lord inform us of how many boat owners or boats will benefit by this Scheme? The losses have undoubtedly been very high, and perhaps he may be able to tell us what proportion of the losses incurred will be reimbursed by the subsidy which is now to be paid.
The noble Lord told us about the new procedure in regard to gross proceeds and the remuneration of crews. Can he tell us the amount that will be paid over to the crews: what proportion the owners will receive and, what proportion the crews will receive? We look upon this Scheme as being in the nature of a palliative for the time being, and it may be necessary for the Scheme to be continued in future years, possibly amended in some way, in order that the interests of the fishermen may be safeguarded.
3.58 p.m.
LORD HASTINGS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wise, for his general recommendation and

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approval of this Scheme. His questions are very much to the point, and I am only too pleased to answer them. Indeed, I apologise for not introducing in my opening speech the figures for which he asked. He asked what the extra subsidy will amount to under this amendment Scheme. Perhaps I should have pointed out that in connection with the Scheme an Order was introduced in another place to allow the Minister to receive from the Treasury the extra grant necessary. It has not come to your Lordships' House, because it is a Finance Order. There is to be a permissive increase up to £250,000 over and above the £25 million already authorised and advanced under the subsidy Schemes.
The noble Lord's next point was the number of boats which will benefit. It will be somewhere between 90 and 100 middle-water vessels, out of a total of just over 300; that is, about one-third. The proportion of losses incurred now to be reimbursed, I am afraid, is a more difficult question. As I said, the average loss in the nine months of this year was £6,400. I think it is correct to say that this extra subsidy will cover between £3,000 and £4,000 of that sum. The extra subsidy will not guarantee the owners altogether against loss but will be an assistance to them to help them over a difficult period.
The amount of subsidy to be paid to crews is regulated by the Scheme already in force. It may interest your Lordships to know how the Scheme is worked. On every voyage certain sums are deducted from the gross proceeds of the haul of fish they take. These sums, which do not include the ordinary overheads, but the actual costs of the voyage—fuel and food and (this is important) the basic wages of the crew. Those sums are taken off the gross proceeds, and then a bonus is paid out on the balance, in accordance with the agreement already in force, of so many pence per pound. That practice will continue, except that gross proceeds will have up to £13 a day added on top as a result of the subsidy, and the same proportions of the balance will be paid as are being paid now. I hope that this explains everything the noble Lord wished to know, and that the Scheme may be now approved.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

FAMILY ALLOWANCES AND NATIONAL INSURANCE BILL
4.0 p.m
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. The Bill does not effect major changes in the schemes of national insurance, industrial injuries or family allowances; nor is it one of those several Bills which, over the years, have provided for general increases in the rates of benefit and allowances payable under those schemes. It is a more modest measure, which aims, for the most part, at securing such small improvements and adjustments as have been shown to be desirable as a result of practical experience and study of the day-to-day working of the schemes. Since Bills of this kind invariably bundle together a number of unconnected items, they tend to be somewhat complicated and difficult to understand. It may thus be desired to refer briefly to one or two of the main features only of the Bill.
I should like to mention first the improvement and extension of the allowances payable to "old cases"; that is to say, those who are disabled either totally or partially as a result of employment before the Industrial Injuries Act came into force in 1948. The allowance of 17s. 6d. which was introduced under the 1956 Workmen's Compensation and Benefit (Supplementation) Act for totally disabled persons in receipt of workmen's compensation or allowances under the Special Schemes is to be increased by 15s., that is, to 32s. 6d. a week. A partially disabled man on workmen's compensation is to receive an increase of 10s. a week. Finally, the allowances paid for partial disablement under the Special Schemes are to be increased by 7s. 6d. a week. It is estimated that about 20,000 disabled persons will benefit from these proposals, and that the cost in the first full year will be over £500,000.
Clause 2 modifies the basic condition for benefit under the Industrial Injuries scheme, that the accident in question must "arise out of and in the course of" insurable employment, so that accidents which happen "in the course of" insurable employment are to be held also to "arise out of" it if they result from

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"common risk", provided that the injured person did not contribute to the happening of the accident by any action not incidental to the employment.
Clause 5 re-casts the present provisions on retirement pension increments for wives and widows, as recommended in the Report of the National Insurance Advisory Committee, to whom this question was referred. The result will be to give the wife who is under 60 during her husband's deferred retirement half his increments on widowhood instead of none as at present. The clause will also allow these half-rate widow's increments derived from the husband's insurance to be paid in addition to a retirement pension on a woman's own insurance, whereas at present increments derived from the husband can only be paid with a pension on his insurance.
Clause 8 re-defines "apprentice" for family allowances purposes in the light of the change of circumstances which has occurred since the original definition was enacted in 1945. In order to return to the original concept, that allowances would be payable in respect of a young person who, because he was learning a skilled trade, was earning little and was hence still dependent upon his parents the test which has been taken is that which is applied for deciding the question of whether a person is a dependent under the insurance schemes—namely, whether earnings exceed 40s. a week.
Those, briefly, are the main features of the Bill. It will not, of course, be possible to implement all these provisions immediately. In many cases regulations have to be made, and claims have to be received and determined. It is, however, desired to bring it into operation as soon as possible, and it is hoped that the present rate of progress which the Bill has enjoyed will continue. Every effort is being made to secure that those who stand to benefit will do so as soon as possible.
The main purpose of the Bill is to make provision for "old cases" and also to make amendments and adjustments to the working of the schemes. If not a measure embodying major changes of policy, it is yet one which will benefit many people in many ways. It will, moreover, smooth out several difficulties in our complex schemes of insurance and
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thus have a beneficial effect on their administration. For all these reasons, I hope that your Lordships will give the Bill the Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Denham.)
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for explaining this Bill in such detail and in so lucid a manner. There is only one aspect of the Bill on which I should like to comment. It is customary of course in the Ministry of National Insurance to examine the grievances, hardships and, indeed, injustices which are brought to their notice. Some of these are brought to their notice through the Law Courts and some are quite obvious—they may be anomalies. But, however they are brought, they are collected together and examined, and finally a Bill is produced. The noble Lord used the expression: "You will find that this Bill is a number of items bundled together." I agree that it is a number of items, but actually it is, as I think he will agree, a number of grave hardships in one Bill. On examining Bills of this kind it sometimes occurs to one that perhaps the wrong methods have been adopted in the Ministry.
Let us examine the items bundled together which the noble Lord listed. He talked about the "old cases". I think I am right in saying that some of the cases which come under the first part of the Bill, dealing with industrial injuries and industrial diseases, will be those partial cases of pneumoconiosis. I am sure the noble Lord will agree with me that pneumoconiosis is a terrible occupational disease. These men, who I think benefited for the first time in 1950, are to be admired, because they have served the nation so well in the pits; and furthermore, their expectation of life is very limited. This has been known for many years. Representations have been made by trade unions to amend the Bill, and finally a Bill has come to the House. But it has waited until there are other grievances and hardships to be embodied in a Bill of this size.
The noble Lord has mentioned some of these, although not in detail. There is the question of the guardianship of children by grandparents, where one parent is in prison and the other one is

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dead. Then there is the matter of the widows under 60 who will benefit from this Bill. What I want to say, and what I hope the Minister will note for future action, is this. The men suffering from partial pneumoconiosis must be comparatively few, because while this has been considered over the last few years they have been dying. Would it not be possible in future to break up a Bill of this kind and deal with it in an ad hoc fashion? After all, "hardship" is a relative term. There are greater and lesser degrees of hardship, and not for one moment would I say whether the child of the parent in prison or the widow under 60 suffering grave hardship is the worse off. But in looking at this, I think noble Lords would agree that the old miner suffering from pneumoconiosis should not be compelled to wait until his case can be embodied in one Bill.
What I would ask is that, in future, cases of this kind which can be dealt with should be dealt with, without any further delay. I am quite well aware that an omnibus measure of this kind is much easier for the Department. There is a lot of work in it. It has to be drafted, there have to be frequent conferences, and even when the Minister comes to the House of course he has the Second Reading. All the other stages of the Bill are so much easier to conduct if all these grievances and hardships are embodied in one Bill. But I would ask that there should be a slightly different approach. When it is quite obvious that a great many people, inarticulate, many bedridden, and with no pressure group, are suffering as many people are suffering, they should be picked out and dealt with solely on the merits of their case. Then, later on, a Bill of this kind should be introduced in which the other hardships are dealt with. That is all I have to say. It is simply a question of the timing and handling of the measure.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Baroness for the welcome she has given to this Bill. I agree with what the noble Baroness has said about horrors of the disease of pneumoconiosis. It is a really frightful thing. I will pass on to my right honourable friend the remarks of the noble Baroness about the timing of the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.
Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of December 14), Bill read 3a and passed.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT
4.13 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYrose to call attention to the situation of the various categories of British claimants under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February, 1959, in the light of the Order in Council laid before Parliament on Monday, December 4, 1961; and to move for Papers. The noble Marquess said: My Lords, in rising to move the Motion standing in my name, I should like to say how sorry I am to have had to raise this important subject in the last flicker of Parliamentary life before Christmas. It is not really my fault. We were, we understood, promised a Ministerial statement on this subject as far back as last July, but we were asked to allow it to be postponed until after the Summer Recess. Reluctantly we agreed to postpone a debate to suit the Government's convenience. However, when Parliament reassembled, after another long delay it was not until November 27 that the Order in Council was issued on the subject to which my Motion relates. We asked, immediately after November 27, for a date for a debate, but at that time there was no opportunity, and eventually the earliest day we could get was the day before yesterday. Even then, as your Lordships know, that day was filched from us for a Foreign Affairs debate. I do not complain of that. It was a very important debate indeed. I am only explaining why it is we have been unable to deal with the question until to-day. I can only say how very sorry I am for this delay, both because of the steadily deteriorating position of the claimants themselves, and also because I believe the subject is too important to be dealt with at the last moment in this manner.
As your Lordships know, five years have now passed since the Anglo-French landings in Suez. They have already become almost part of history. It is not my purpose this afternoon to argue the rights and wrongs of the policy

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adopted by the Conservative Government of that day, of which I was a member. That would be merely, I think, to cloud the more limited issues with which your Lordships are concerned this afternoon. But there are, I believe, two things we ought to remember. First of all, one of the main purposes of policy in Egypt in 1956, as the then Prime Minister, now Lord Avon, made clear at the time, was to protect British property there. Secondly, whether those landings were right or wrong, one result, at any rate, is certain: that there have been numbers of British firms and British nationals who have suffered very seriously as a result. In particular, I refer to the nationals, the individuals, who were driven from their country, the country where they had made their homes, and their property was either Egyptianised. which means, in other words, nationalised, or sequestrated, and they have been largely ruined.
For some time, as your Lordships know, their outlook was not so bad. They had the most specific guarantees from British Ministers as to their future. The present Chancellor of the Exchequer, when he was Foreign Secretary, gave particularly binding assurances to this effect. He said in another place on May 16, 1957 [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 570, col. 584]:
"The blocked accounts"—
that is, the Egyptian sterling accounts in London—
"are our security for the claims of British subjects against the Egyptian Government. We have no intention of whittling away that position."
I am sure, knowing my right honourable friend, that he meant exactly what he said. But the pressure of events—and possibly also the pressure of the Treasury—seem to have forced his hand, and when ultimately two years ago it seemed necessary to Her Majesty's Government to seek better relations with the Egyptian Government, an Agreement, as we all know, was negotiated on which the claimants, I understand, were never consulted at all, and which gave away the main bargaining counter on which our rather unhappy fellow countrymen had relied, in the shape of these Egyptian sterling balances which amounted to £41 million and which were held in this country.
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Since then the claimants, our British fellow countrymen, have had to be content with the hope that some day, in due course, some portion of the £27½ million, which was all that Her Majesty's Government were able to obtain from the Egyptian Government as a reimbursement on the losses which had been incurred by British nationals owing to the Egyptianisation and sequestration of their properties, to which I have already referred, should come their way. I am not suggesting that Her Majesty's Government have been entirely unmindful of the plight of their fellow citizens. We all know that they set up machinery to enable the claims to be assessed, and they agreed, in addition, to make available ex gratia loans to tide the claimants over the period which must elapse before they could receive the moneys owing to them if their claims were established under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. But they were, in any case, bound to lose heavily, for the —27½ million represented only a fraction of the losses that had been incurred by firms and individuals, which amounted to upwards, so I am told, of £100 million.
Moreover, while it was no doubt the intention of the Government to act quite fairly as between the owners of Egyptianised and of sequestrated properties, in fact this did not turn out to be so. The owners of Egyptianised properties, which included actually most of the large firms, have to go through only a comparatively simple procedure. If they merely establish the value of their property at the date it was nationalised, and that that property is gone for good and all, an interim award is paid over immediately; and it is paid over (and this is very important) in London. Owners of sequestrated properties, on the other hand, have had a much rawer deal. They cannot, like the owners of the Egyptianised property, simply regard their former properties in Egypt as gone beyond recall and make a claim on that basis.
The conception under the Agreement, as I understand it, it that they will get their properties back in due course, and when this happens they will be entitled only to put in a claim for the difference between the value at the date of sequestration and the date of the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. This is often—indeed, usually—extremely

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hard to find out, because the first process of the desequestration in itself is extremely long and tortuous. All kinds of difficulties are put in their way by Egyptian officials, and counter-claims are often made in respect of such things as taxation said to be owing by the claimants—claims which may take months, and even years, to sort out.
Even when the desequestration has been completed, there are still many hurdles to be surmounted before the claimants can actually derive any benefit from their property. If it is cash, or stocks and shares, it is paid by the Egyptians into a specially blocked account in one of the banks in Egypt; and there it stays. If it is, say, house property, it is the case that very often after the forced departure of the owner the property has been let to someone else. In order to get possession of it the owner must appear personally and say that he needs the house for his own long-term occupation; and as re-entry permits are usually limited to one year it is not surprising that normally it is impossible to clear out the occupant so as to be able to dispose of the house at its full value. Further, if the property happens to be a business, that business may have been mismanaged during the years of sequestration and may be worth very little when it is returned to the owner. Details of this mismanagement are, however, very hard for him to obtain, and yet such details of the present value of the business are required, I understand, by the Foreign Claims Committee before any claim can be formulated.
My Lords, above all—and this, I think, is the most important thing we have to consider this afternoon—there is the continuing difficulty for claimants in transferring funds from Egypt to England. Even if they have got their property, of whatever kind it may be, desequestrated and converted to some liquid form so that it can be transferred, nowadays, in practice, it is often impossible to get in out of Egypt. Under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1959, the Egyptians undertook to transfer up to £E5,000, and to give favourable consideration to the transfer of further amounts. But in practice this undertaking has proved to be a dead letter; and the most a claimant can hope to bring to Britain, whatever the value of
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his estate, is just about £800—that is, the value in sterling of £E1,000. All the rest has to stay in Egypt, and unless the claimant wishes to return there—and, my Lords, after all that has occurred very few wish to do that—it is absolutely useless to him and is likely to remain so for the rest of his life.
This last point of the transfer of funds has become the most urgent problem of all for the claimants at the present time. The situation in Egypt, as your Lordships know, is extremely and, I think, increasingly unstable. There are already cases where property which had been desequestrated has been resequestrated and, taken all in all, the property of claimants in Egypt is definitely not safe there. It is not merely that they cannot get at it; it is worse than that. They may find at any moment, unless they have been able to transfer it to England, that they have seen the last of it altogether. That aspect, which, as I have said, more than any other at the present time causes anxiety to the claimant, is not touched at all by the new Order in Council of November 27.
I fully recognise the effort that has been made by Her Majesty's Government in that Order in Council to increase the grants that can be made out of the £27½ million. In respect of claims that have been established, especially for larger properties, the others had benefited more in the early stages. Though I am quite certain that all those people who have benefited by the new provisions will be duly grateful to the Government for what they have done, this new Order in Council will benefit chiefly the owners of Egyptianised property; and that will make even worse, by comparison, the position of the owners of de-sequestrated property. The more the owners of Egyptianised property get, the less out of the £27½ million will remain for the others. Nor, if I may say so, does the Order do anything to assist what I have described as the most pressing problem of all; how funds which are owed to the claimants in England can be transferred to the United Kingdom.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, could the noble Marquess give us some approximate idea of the amount of the £27½ million which the Egyptianised property will absorb?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I think the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, can give more accurate figures than I can, but I believe that if they had the full payment it would absorb the whole of the £27½ million, and a great deal more.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: The figure is £60 million.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, if it will help the noble Marquess I will give the answer. I had a Parliamentary Question about this which dates back, I think, to May 5 last, when the total claims put in on Egyptianised property came to £65,852,000. That figure, of course, represents the claims before they were adjudicated. No doubt the noble Lord will be able to put us further right on that later.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I am very grateful for that accurate information.
My purpose in tabling the Motion is to ask Her Majesty's Government to look again at these particular aspects. I realise that we have sympathetic Ministers in key posts, both in the Treasury and at the Foreign Office. Cannot they do something to help over this admittedly urgent problem? I say "urgent", not only because of the uncertainty of the situation which to-day exists in Egypt, but because many of those claimants are getting very old. They are retired people; many of them have lost the savings of a lifetime and cannot start afresh. If they are not helped soon it will be too late. I beg the Ministers, therefore, not to weary in well-doing. For, my Lords, welcome though the proposals of the Order in Council are, so far as they go, I must emphasise yet once more that they will not touch at all some of the most basic difficulties of many of the claimants, and especially of those owners whose property has be desequestrated. And, in particular, the Order will do nothing to help them over the problem of how to transfer their money from Egypt to Britain, which, as I have said, is at the present time the worst problem of all.
I very much hope that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, who I understand is to reply, will be able to give assurances at the end of this debate that the Government really mean to tackle this particular aspect. For instance, I hope he
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will feel able to say on behalf of the Government that if they cannot get the Egyptian Government to release more sterling for this purpose they will look into the possibility of themselves advancing the money, to be repaid when the money now locked up in Egypt can be transferred to this country. Some arrangement of that kind—I do not want to tie it down too tightly—would be, I think, more helpful than anything, but without that, much of what the Government has said becomes meaningless and may even seem insincere. The money in, say, Alexandria or Cairo, is no use to someone, say, in London, and the Government must know that as well as anyone else. I hope, therefore, that we may receive solid assurances on this point at any rate from the Government to-day.
I am afraid that we may have to decide, in spite of the smallness of the attendance, to divide the House, not, I would emphasise, as an attack on the Government but as an act of justice to the claimants who have, many of them, suffered so much and are still suffering so much for events for which they, at any rate, have been in no way to blame. It is in that spirit that I, and I am sure other noble Lords in this House, will await the reply which the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, is to make. I beg to move for Papers.
Moved, That there be laid before the House Papers relating to the situation of the various categories of British claimants under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 1959, in the light of the Order in Council laid before Parliament on Monday, the 4th December 1961.—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
4.31 p.m.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, there is no doubt that the House owes a debt of gratitude to the noble Marquess and his friends for raising this matter. The fact that it has been so delayed is a matter for regret. Nevertheless, there are some noble Lords down to speak this afternoon who know the subject so well and who have identified themselves so unmistakably over so long with the interests of these British subjects in Egypt that I have no doubt Her Majesty's Government will be reminded of all the difficulties and of their obligations.

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As the noble Marquess said, this is not a time to go back over the Suez incident. It aroused great passions at the time. It has been left in no doubt, I think, where my Party stands on the question. But so far as we in 1961 are concerned, what we have to face is the fact that several thousands of British subjects were, through no fault of their own, owing to the action of the British Government of the day, suddenly, almost overnight, deprived of the greater part of their livelihood and their life savings; that is the thing we must never forget and that is the justification for not letting the Government rest on what they have already done.
I think everyone was glad that relations with the United Arab Republic were restored to normal by the Agreement of February, 1959, but, at the same time, as a settlement it left much to be desired. It is easy to see that Her Majesty's Government were not in a strong bargaining position at that time, and perhaps nothing more could have been obtained, but the fact remains, and it is a fact of simple arithmetic, that the compensation obtained from the Egyptian Government is £27½ million sterling and the value of the assets lost by British subjects far exceeds that. The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, has reminded us that the claims for Egyptianised property amount to £65 million. The sequestrated property, I believe, has been estimated at £130 million in value.
The noble Marquess said, and I think it is generally agreed, that the Government's proposals in the latest Order in Council so far as the owners of Egyptianised property go are not unreasonable. It is particularly satisfactory that on the smaller estates the Government are giving up to 90 per cent.—that is, up to £5,000. Obviously the small man with the very small property is more in need. The sliding scale goes up to cater for properties of much greater amounts, half a million pounds or over, but it is the owners of sequestrated properties, as the noble Marquess said, who represent the chief problem, and they are the people on whose behalf we ask the Government to think again.
The position is exceedingly complicated. I should be the last to claim full knowledge and understanding of the various categories of the owners of the claims, but other noble Lords who are
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going to speak, I have no doubt, are perfectly well aware of the problems. Looking at some of the documents, I am struck by certain points on which I would like to know the Government's answer. A proportion of the sequestrated properties, something like two-thirds, have been desequestrated up to date; that was the figure given by the Minister in another place on November 15. We are told that of that figure something like 10 per cent. have been resequestrated in more recent measures of the United Arab Republic Government. Can the Government tell us exactly what is the situation and, under this Egyptian legislation, what are the prospects? Is the resequestration going to continue and going to cover more of the desequestrated properties? What are the prospects? What representations have the Government made to the U.A.R. Government?
The Minister assured an honourable member in another place that the U.A.R. Government are being left in no doubt about the great importance which we attach to remedying the various problems involved. That is all right; they have left the Egyptian Government in no doubt about the great importance that we attach to it. But what then? Do they know what the intentions of the Egyptian Government are, and do they know what the prospects are for the owners of desequestrated property which is again at risk?
Secondly, in March this year Her Majesty's Government said that they acquiesced in representations from the Egyptian Government that their foreign exchange position was so weak that they could not continue to allow owners of property to transfer £E5,000 to the United Kingdom, and Her Majesty's Government agreed to the reduction of that figure to £E1,000, at which possibly it stands now.
What is the Government's view on the prospects of the foreign exchange situation of the Egyptian Government improving to such an extent that our claimants can get more money transferred back to this country? As the noble Marquess said, £E1,000 when it has been processed and turned into sterling, comes down, I think, to £840. Lastly, the Minister in another place said of the sequestrated owners, that 205 had actually got their £E1,000 trans-

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ferred to this country and he said there was about another 800 applications in, as he called it, the pipeline. That makes a thousand. But it has been mentioned in another place that there were 3,000 persons with claims for sequestrated property. What is happening to the other 2,000 who have not yet submitted their claims? It seems to me that only one-third of those entitled to compensation for sequestrated property have in fact submitted their claims.
There is one other category. The noble Marquess's Motion mentions the various categories of British claimants under the Agreement of February, 1959. I see in the Agreement that there is another category that has not been mentioned—I think possibly the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, may refer to it, as he has spoken on the subject before: it is, persons entitled to Egyptian Government pensions, together with arrears and so on. The situation of the claimants for sequestrated and Egyptianised property deserves all our sympathy, but we must not forget the small group of pensioners of the Egyptian Government. We hope Her Majesty's Government will include that category in the Answer they are going to give to this Motion. We want to hear the Government's reply as soon as possible. We want to hear the statements of other noble Lords. All I would do is to assure Her Majesty's Government that we on this side wholeheartedly support the noble Marquess in his Motion.
4.43 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I rise warmly to support the Motion of the noble Marquess and everything that he said. He put the case before your Lordships with great force. The House has always been well disposed on this case. It is one of those questions where there can be no doubt whatever about the justice of the claims, and I am sure that we have never had a better exponent of the case than the noble Marquess to-night. He put before your Lordships certain of the issues immediately confronting us, and I repeat, I rise to support his Motion with all the force at my command.
I do not want to hold up the debate because it is late. Somebody has said
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tonight that the Government have shown good timing in the time they have allowed—I think it was said in relation to the Motion concerning the hop industry. The time is running rather finely for us; it is now quarter to five. I shall be as brief as I can, trying to limit myself in regard to the Motion to the question of the shortfall.
Before I move to that there are two quite small subsidiary points of which I have given the noble Earl prior notice, and with which he will perhaps be able to deal in his reply. The first one is that which interested this House a good deal the other day—namely, the levy of income tax on the interest on this £27½ million held by the Foreign Claims Commission. There is no doubt that on that occasion the House was solidly against this levy, and I know that the Minister without Portfolio, Lord Mills, undertook to put that matter before the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It would be interesting if to-day the noble Earl could include in what he says some information as to how representations made by this House in connection with income tax levied on the interest of that fund have been received.
The second point of which I have already given preliminary notice—in a sense it is a subsidiary point too—concerns these ex-gratia loans. We have heard little about them lately. Your Lordships may remember that there was an ingenious scheme devised whereby, on the grounds of hardship, advances were made of various sums—they were called ex-gratia loans, I think, and the recipients of these loans had to sign receipts. The receipt was very strongly worded. I have not a copy here—I might well have had one. They agreed that, if and when they received a payment from the Egyptian Government, the loan might be called in. I should like to hear from the noble Earl, if he can give it to us in his reply or perhaps later, a statement of how much has been repaid and how much has been called back. May I put it in this way: what was the total of the ex-gratia loans; and how much has been called back on receipt of doles, or whatever you like to call them, from the Egyptian Government? That is the second point I should like to make.
I propose now to turn to my main point, the question of shortfall. It seems to me that that is becoming the

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fundamental issue of this whole question. In the interval we are having questions of hardship and so on, which ought to be dealt with, but it may be not a bad thing to remind the House of the degree to which the Government are in fact committed on this question of shortfall. I have in my hand seven closely typed pages of assurances in one form or another given by the Government in the two Houses. I do not propose to inflict all of them on your Lordships, but I think I should refresh your Lordships' memories about one or two. The seizure of the property and the expulsion of these people took place in November, 1956. On April 11, 1957, the Prime Minister used these words in another place:
"It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government to secure from the Egyptian Government restoration of these assets in full, or alternatively, complete compensation."
Those words were more than echoed in this House by my noble friend Lord Home on May 2. On May 15, 1957, the Prime Minister said in another place:
"We fully realise our responsibilities and the urgency of the matter for all those concerned."
I do not want to overdo this business of quotation, but there was an assurance given by the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, on May 16, 1957, in these words:
"The blocked accounts are our security for the claims of British subjects against the Egyptian Government. We have no intention of whittling away that positon. The House can be sure of that".
That was a fairly categorical assurance. What happened? At the time that assurance was given I understand that there were standing to the credit of the Egyptian Government in this country, blocked sterling accounts to the amount of £100 million.
Your Lordships may perhaps remember that after the war we agreed to pay Egypt for all the facilities, camps and so on which, under the Treaty of Alliance we had received from Egypt. I had left Egypt at that time, but I thought that we were acting pretty generously, because after all we were paying Egypt for the privilege of saving her national existence. The sum total of that amount was approximately £400 million; it was fairly generous action on our part.
We now come back to the unfortunate affairs of 1956, when the then Secretary
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of State for Foreign Affairs gave an assurance that the £400 million had dropped to about £100 million, and as your Lordships can see it was a very categorical assurance. I must say, my Lords, that I cannot guarantee the accuracy of these figures, and they are approximate. Then time passed, and for reasons explained and, I think, understood by all of us—though we did not approve of all that was done—the Government felt that it had to come to an agreement with Egypt which they did in February, 1959. Under that agreement—which I think I can say without doubt was disliked in every quarter of this House, though we felt we more or less had to accept it—we accepted £27½ million in "full and complete discharge" of every obligation that Egypt had towards us under this unfortunate affair.
Incidentally, the claimants were never consulted. When we raised that point we were told that it is common form that claimants are not consulted in cases like that, and it is just done. I have in front of me a letter addressed by the claimants to the Treasury representative, pointing out that they hoped, and ardently hoped, that those funds which were still held as security would not be whittled away. That was during the negotiations in Rome—I regret that I do not have my chronology quite right—but, despite that, the agreement of 1959 was signed.
My Lords, if you can carry your minds back to that date you will realise that I am not exaggerating when I say that we allowed that to go through unchallenged. We all heaved a sigh of relief that there was no Division, and there was no Division because of certain assurances which had been given by the Prime Minister about this question of short-fall. This is the assurance that the Prime Minister gave on March 16,1959 [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 602, col. 150]:
"While we will not here and now pledge ourselves to make any fixed addition to the total of £27½ million, as has been suggested in the debate, I can say now that the Government will watch how this works out and will play their part in reaching a settlement which will be reasonable and fair, and we do not exclude a further contribution from public funds."

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I am only stating the fact that it was on the basis of that assurance that certain Members of this House did not oppose the agreement and let it go through. If anybody cares to read the record of the debate, it is very clearly set forth.
That brings me down to the present state of affairs. There were all those assurances in 1959, and there are all these difficulties to which the noble Marquess has called attention. But where is this generous spirit of helping out, and so forth? It is not the fault of the Foreign Claims Commission that the distribution is working out so inequitably, so unfairly. The Commission simply follow instructions and there is a legal Order-in-Council. The trouble lies in the faulty drafting of the 1959 agreement. Obviously, we all make mistakes, but nobody foresaw at that time how inequitably this was going to work out as between these two classes.
I come now to the point made by the noble Marquess about the nationalised and the sequestrated property. A great many of the claimants in respect of property now de-sequestrated have not even gone as far as presenting their claims to the Foreign Claims Commission, because the Foreign Claims Commission will not take their claims until they have gone through the rigmarole of getting certificates from the Egyptian Government, and so on. But they never will get them, and this will go on for ever. Are we for ever to stand by, because we cannot state the final amount of the shortfall? Are we just to stand by and let these people suffer? I put it to your Lordships that it is grossly unfair. I know that until the total loss of nationalised and sequestrated property has been worked out authoritatively—which has been put to me as £100 million—you cannot fix the totality of the shortfall. But you can at least somehow meet the cases of hardship, though I do not quite know how. I strongly support the Motion of the noble Marquess, and I think that something should be done in the interim. After all, the Government have experts who can work out some means of helping these wretched people. Only last night, by pure accident, I was talking to an unfortunate woman who has been a widow for the
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last few months. She does not have a cent, not a penny of compensation, yet she had landed property alone worth £33,000. She is now trying to eke out a living by running a shop. And is that right? Obviously, it is not right.
I do not want to say any more because other speakers will follow, but I am extremely grateful to your Lordships for the way in which you have dealt with this matter from the very beginning. Your sympathies are not in doubt, and I think I can probably say the same about the Government, but there is a lot of talk and no action. I should like to see more positive action to meet the difficulties of these people. I feel very strongly about this matter and I think it is a question of national honour. These poor, blameless victims were thrown out without a penny being paid to them and with just the clothes they stood up in. It really is terrible, but the delay still goes on over five years after it happened. It happened in November, 1956, very nearly six years ago—and what more can one say?
4.58 p.m.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, we have had many debates on this subject, and every time we have a debate I always hope, with everybody, that it will be the last one. For the sake of the claimants, every time we have a debate I hope that it will be unnecessary to have another one because Her Majesty's Government will have done something to put things right. But here we are again with another debate, and I will only re-echo my feelings at other debates, which is that I hope that this will be the last one because Her Majesty's Government will, between now and six months hence, take some steps to rectify what I believe to be a great injustice.
My noble friend the Marquess of Salisbury explained to your Lordships the delay over this debate, and it is perhaps unfortunate that it should have been put off to such a late hour on the last day before the Recess. On the other hand, in another sense it comes at a seasonable time because it is just before Christmas. It occurs to me that possibly something like a Christmas spirit may have got into the breast of the noble Earl who is going to reply. It is true, as we look at Goa and Katanga, that peace on earth is not there in the

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abundance in which we should like to see it, but perhaps that will be made up for this afternoon by a certain amount of good will from the noble Lords on the Front Bench. At any rate we must hope so, and therefore I once again address my pleas to the Government.
I do not wish to detain your Lordships for very long, because I think the case for the claimants was put admirably by my noble friends, and there is not a great deal to add to it. I can only fill in one or two small gaps, perhaps, and ask for a few bits of information. As the noble Marquess said, the 1959 Agreement, from the point of view of the claimants, was really a disastrously bad Agreement. It was bad for the two reasons which have been put forward this afternoon. It was bad because it extracted from Egypt a sum totally inadequate to satisfy all the claims, and it was bad because, whether through inadvertence or for any other reason, it dealt very unfairly as between the two categories of claimants. I should like to touch briefly on those two points.
First of all, as to the inadequacy of the amount extracted from the Egyptian Government, I have not up-to-date information, but earlier in the year I put down some Written Parliamentary Questions to discover what was the total of the claims at that time. I was informed that the Egyptianised claim, which at that time was the largest, amounted, as I mentioned before, to approximately £66 million. Of course, it is perfectly fair to say that £30 million of that is in respect of claims by individuals, companies and associations who held shares in the Egyptian companies concerned. I think it right to say that the Egyptianised claims have been greatly inflated by the fact that there are two or three very large company claims in the total, and the noble Earl will no doubt make that point later on.
It has been suggested in some quarters that, because these claims are so very large, they ought to be treated differently from the others. I should like the noble Earl to tell us what he thinks about that. My own feeling is that it would not really be right or equitable. One of the biggest claims is that of the British and American Tobacco Company. I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, is not in her place, but I hasten to
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declare no interest. I am not a shareholder or an employee of the British and American Tobacco Company. The British and American Tobacco Company certainly has a very large claim, but I went into this matter and I found that a very large majority of their stock is held by people who have £300 worth of stock or less. So there again you are dealing with small shareholders in this country, and I think that they are entitled to be protected in the same way as any other small man.
My Lords, as I say, at that time the Egyptianised claims amounted to £66 million. I should expect that the majority of those claims have probably been filed, because it is much easier for them to file their claims than it is for the sequestrated people. But I should like to ask the noble Earl—and I tried to give him notice of this question—whether he can tell us the up-to-date figure of the claims actually presented by people with Egyptianised property. As to the claims for sequestrated property, the Answer to the Question was given on June 15 last. At that time a much smaller amount had been claimed by the people with sequestrated property, for the reasons given by the noble Marquess and others—that is to say, they had the greatest possible difficulty in getting their property desequestrated and all the formalities sorted out. At that time, the claims amounted to only £3 million. Again I would ask the noble Earl whether he would bring us up-to-date on that figure and tell us the present amount claimed for sequestration, so that I may get an idea of the total amount of the bill.
On the inadequacy of the fund for these people, I should like to say to Her Majesty's Government that in the past it was perfectly reasonable that they should say that they could not give any indication of their future policy on this matter because they had no idea of the total bill. I think that was perfectly fair. But, with the figures I have given to your Lordships this afternoon, which were given by the Government themselves, there can be no shadow of doubt that the fund is totally and utterly inadequate for the claims made upon it. Therefore I think we are entitled to know from Her Majesty's Government, and I think the claimants are entitled to know, what is their future policy on

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this matter. They have said throughout that they wish to see a fair and equitable settlement. So far as I can see, even on the figures given six months ago, this fund will pay about 7s. in the pound, and I should like to ask the noble Earl whether, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, 7s. in the pound constitutes a fair and equitable settlement. Secondly, if he does not think so, will he tell your Lordships what sort of figure in the pound Her Majesty's Government would consider a fair and equitable settlement?
Finally, though I do not want to press the noble Earl too hard, I think it would be helpful if he could this afternoon give us some indication as to what steps are going to be taken to produce a fair and equitable settlement on those lines. It would be a great help to noble Lords if we could have that, and I think it is now reasonable to ask that of Her Majesty's Government, because it is quite clear that the claims enormously exceed the funds.
I should now like to touch on the disadvantages suffered by those with sequestrated property. Those with Egyptianised property have already been mentioned by the noble Marquess, and I should not wish to traverse that ground again, but there are one or two points of additional difficulty about which I think your Lordships ought to know and which I think are quite unfair. For example, probably most of your Lordships are unaware of the cost involved to these unfortunate people in getting their property desequestrated. They cannot go there themselves—they would have to spend the whole of their lives in Egypt if they did—so they employ an agent. Over eighteen months ago I was told that an agent's fee at that time, if the desequestration did not take too long, was 5 per cent. of the total value involved. About six months ago I was told it had risen to 10 per cent. Therefore, straight away 10 per cent. goes in getting their property desequestrated, and for that they are not allowed to claim a penny from the fund. On top of that, as your Lordships have been told, the Egyptians, in breach of the Agreement, refused to desequestrate properties until various tax claims had been satisfied—some of them claims
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which were quite unjustified and, very frequently, almost impossible to counter because the papers had been taken by the Egyptians and had been destroyed or lost. All that increases the bill and puts up the cost to these unfortunate people.
Then, again, there is the case of the compensation. These delays all mean that the property remains in the hands of the Egyptian Government much longer than was ever envisaged under the Agreement. During that time it probably suffers additional damage. Yet, my Lords, the claimants of sequestrated property are not allowed to claim for any damage that occurred after February 28, 1959, if my memory serves me aright. That, again, is extremely unjust. Therefore, if you look at the total position as between these two classes, I would say that everything that the noble Marquess and my noble friend Lord Killearn have said is more than justified; and I think the position is very unfair indeed.
Now I should like to come to one last point. It has been pointed out, both by the noble Marquess and by my noble friend. Lord Killearn, that, of course, nobody wished his property to be sequestrated. I have met no claimant yet who would not infinitely have preferred, for obvious reasons, to have had it Egyptianised. It was, of course, entirely fortuitous whether it was Egyptianised or sequestrated. It was your luck; although, if you tended to be a large company, it was more likely to be Egyptianised because there was more loot for the Egyptians in it. If you were a small man, your property probably was not worth Egyptianisina, so it was sequestrated. It therefore happens that it is the small people who are the people who have been hit hardest, and they are the people who are least able to bear it.
As has been pointed out, it is quite useless to these wretched people to have property in Egypt which they cannot repatriate or do anything about. Furthermore, the Egyptians have made, I would say, very little effort, really, to honour their part of the Agreement. They took the sterling balances, which were the last sanction we had available to put pressure upon them to do anything. Here, may I say, looking back,

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that I think it was rather imprudent of Her Majesty's Government not to have kept something back in order to see that at any rate the terms of the Agreement were honoured. As it is, we have no means of exerting any pressure at all on the Egyptian Government.
The sum of £5,000 is, I believe, a small amount to be allowed to repatriate. I should like to re-echo here what the noble Marquess said, and I make a slightly different suggestion from the one he made. The Egyptians have spent all their sterling balances—I suspect on Czechoslovakian arms, which they have been importing recently—and have nothing left. Therefore, I think it is a genuine fact that They have no sterling exchange. But in looking at their balance of payments position, it seems to me that they are not likely to have any sterling exchange in the future. They have had a deficit on current account for the last two years, both with the United Kingdom and with the sterling area, so it is clear that these people will not be paid out in sterling unless something is done.
Therefore, I would ask the noble Earl whether some scheme on these lines would not be possible. Her Majesty's Government have various expenses in Egypt, and £5,000 per head is not a large sum. Would it not be possible for somebody who has his property eventually desequestrated, and can sell it in Egypt, and therefore has Egyptian currency, to be given £4,000 sterling, and give Her Majesty's Government the equivalent in Egypt of £4,000 sterling, which could be used by them for British Government expenditure in Egypt? It would enable these people, at any rate, to get their £5,000 promised in the agreement; otherwise, so far as I can see, they will never get it. I do not put that scheme up as anything hard and fast, but merely as a possible means of doing this, because Her Majesty's Government so far as I know, are the only people likely to want Egyptian currency in Egypt at the present time.
I will say nothing more, except to reecho the pleas which have been put to the Government about these people. It is six years now since this happened to them. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Suez operation, and whatever the
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rights and wrongs of the agreement—Her Majesty's Government have said it is the best agreement they could get and that may well be true; I do not know—it seems to me that, throughout, these people have been the victims of British national policy at no fault of their own. For that reason alone, they have suffered on behalf of this country, and I think it is up to this country to do something for them in return.
5.12 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, this is no new subject, but your Lordships on both sides of the House have been very generous in giving support to the various debates which have taken place. if some of your Lordships are at all weary of repetition, and if Her Majesty's Government are at all weary of debate, that weariness is nothing to the weariness of the claimants. I would, if I may, in a very few moments, summarise one or two points and underline one or two. It seems to me that all the debates, Questions, Government replies and assurances do not alter three facts. The first is that the agreement has not worked out as hoped; secondly, the position remains unsatisfactory; and, thirdly, great sections of claimants remain entirely unsatisfied.
The position of the fund to-day is this. Of the fund of £27½ million, in two and three quarter years approximately one-third has been paid out, almost entirely against Egyptianised claims which will finally amount to some £65 million. There is remaining the great bulk of some £35 million at least of claims for damage to sequestrated property. The contrast in these two classes of claims has been stressed by my noble friend Lord Salisbury, but I have worked out a figure. In the case of Mr. A, who had a claim admitted for £50,000 of nationalised property, under the distribution of the three Orders-in-Council Mr. A will get approximately £30,000 over here. Mr. B, who does not wish to go back to Egypt, has a claim for £50,000 for damage to his sequestrated property, and the most he would get over here at the present time is some £830 sterling. There is only a general indication from Her Majesty's Government of the possibility of future help when the fund is exhausted, as it seems it inevitably will be with the claims of the Egyptianised and sequestrated claimants. Therefore,

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I think I am justified in saying that great sections of claimants remain unsatisfied, and that the position is unsatisfactory.
I believe that the basic reason for this—and I think it is time it was said—is that Egypt has shown an increasing lack of good will to implement, in spirit and in fact, the agreement. For example, paragraph 4, Annex B, said that all sequestrated property was to be released within three months of application, but nothing of the sort has occurred. There are difficulties put in the way; there are arguments over registration; and there is the refusal to release until tax claims have been paid (which is entirely contrary to the Agreement); and, again, claims cannot be dealt with until certain documents are produced, and these documents are either lost or unobtainable. But I would remind your Lordships of these phrases in the Agreement: "Give immediate approval"; "Ensure within three months"; "Provide copies of all records"; "Give favourable consideration". They have become meaningless words because of Egypt's evasion, in spirit and in fact, of what she had undertaken to do under the 1959 agreement. It is hard to foresee any date of finality of claims for damage through sequestration and of claimants either in having their claims agreed in Egypt, or, unless the Government go further than they have felt able to up to the present in regard to Shortfall, in getting cash here.
In successive debates here and elsewhere we have been told: "Go easy; hold hard in your criticism of Egypt for the sake of the claimants' cases being administered in Egypt", and also on the wider grounds of the restoration of Anglo-Egyptian trade and political relations. We were told of hopes that trade would flow and friendship would flower. In fact, trade with Egypt is such that she cannot meet the exchange obligations under the agreement, and Colonel Nasser's economic conditions are becoming desperate. In fact, so far as friendship is concerned, Colonel Nasser's radio and press continues to pour out constant abuse of the United Kingdom and our policies. My Lords, if my remarks are thought in any way unhelpful, I do not care, because there comes a time when, as someone once
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said, "enough is enough", and constant turning of the other cheek to insults and obstruction becomes a painful and useless process.
I think the time has come to ask Her Majesty's Government two questions, and I hope the Minister will be able kindly to give a reply to these two questions. Do the Government see any finality in the processes of sequestration claims in Egypt; and, with only guarded statements as regards possible shortfall, do they foresee the sequestration claimants getting back a large proportion of their losses? Or, do the Government take the view that these claimants must be prepared to face great losses not envisaged at the time of the agreement, and which Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to make good? If the latter is the case, I believe it is kinder and better to say so now, rather than continue shadow boxing as to Egypt's real intentions and Her Majesty's Government's ability to make good. In conclusion, I would summarise the position in three sentences. Here we have an agreement that has not worked. A debt of claims remains unpaid. And, a debt of honour has not been met.
5.20 p.m.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, I wish at once to associate myself with everything that has been said by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, with such lucidity and conviction. As one who has raised this matter in your Lordships' House before, I might have wished to repeat much of what I have already said, when my feelings were high, but I think that there is no point in prolonging the debate by repetition.
It would seem that we are dealing with matters that are particularly in the hands of Her Majesty's Government. There are questions for reference to the Egyptian Government but, in the main, the force of our representations is that the arrangement has been concluded with the Egyptian Government and therefore it remains for Her Majesty's Government to implement it. My noble friend Lord Killearn has referred in a factual manner to the past assurances given by Her Majesty's Government. I feel that, apart from compassion—and, goodness knows!, we all receive enough letters giving the most poignant instances of the misfortunes that have beset the

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people who have had their property sequestrated—we have a right to look to the Government to give evidence that they are not shirking their responsibility. I refrain from saying "commitment", because no succeeding Minister can be committed necessarily by his predecessors. My noble friend Lord Killearn quoted the Prime Minister's words:
"We do not exclude a further contribution from public funds."
And in another place as recently as December 5, Mr. Heath, the Lord Privy Seal, stated that [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 650 (No. 26), col. 1143]: Her Majesty's Government adhere to the statements, but cannot foresee what the total amount will be. Presumably, that is the amount of additional compensation contribution the Government may make.
The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, put forward in a temperate manner the strong views felt on the other side of the House. The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, has given us, in appealing language, the position of the claimants under sequestration. I am going to refer to a case under Egyptianisation. It is of a company which is based in the City, in which I have a great interest and which I had the honour to represent in Parliament. It is a large concern with 14,000 shareholders and is very much in the position of the company about which the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, was speaking. The holdings of the shareholders are very small, and therefore it is quite inequitable to suggest that, because this is a large claim from one company, it should be treated differently from the smaller claims, because the effect on the thousands of small shareholders may be just as great.
In the past, this company has shown great courage and spirit of adventure in investing a large amount of money in Egypt, to the advantage of the shareholders and of the Exchequer in this country, and it has experienced a very large loss. The amount of their claim is over £3 million. Under the distributions to date, they have received only 25 per cent. of their claim. Surely it sounds very unfair that 75 per cent. should not be returned to the company. In the first distribution, the amount they received was £97,000; in the second dis-
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tribution, £256,000, and in the third, which we have recently had, they received the modest sum of only £50,500.
I give this as an illustration of a purely business case. In the cases of sequestration, there is compassion and hardship and sad tales of the effects of the present policy. My purpose is to raise the instance of a large claim which receives such a small amount of compensation. It appears that only about 48 per cent. of the approved Egyptianised claims have been completed. It would look as though in the end not more than 45 per cent, will be available without recourse to public funds. Surely, on those grounds, the earnest pleas that my noble friend Lord Killearn made should carry great weight. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has also said that there is strong feeling in the country about this matter. It is in that spirit of Christmas anticipation to which my noble friend Lord Lloyd referred that we earnestly hope the noble Earl may be in a position to-day to remove the need for these continued references in Parliament to the dragging of their feet by the Government, and that he will be able to announce something not only on grounds of compassion, but on sheer business grounds; that there should be the honouring of an apparent intention by the Government. If there is not, I feel that I should look forward to following the noble Marquess into the Division Lobby, should he decide to divide the House. However, I hope that will not be necessary and that the noble Earl will be able to give us the reassurance for which we have been so long waiting.
5.31 p.m.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, I should like to begin by saying that I entirely appreciate and sympathise with the difficulties the noble Marquess has had in bringing this subject before your Lordships until now. I know it has been put off on many occasions. I remember that a little before the Summer Recess, when I had a different office from the one I am in now, I was to have had the duty of replying to the Motion which my noble friend had put on the Paper, because none of my colleagues was able to be here on the day for which it had been put down, and although I most diligently prepared myself to undergo a

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severe inquisition from the noble Marquess, I was considerably relieved when I heard that he had decided that I ought not to be allowed to "hold the baby" and he would prefer to wait until some more experienced nurse should arrive.
May I express my gratitude both to the noble Marquess and to all noble Lords who have spoken to-day, not only for the moderation with which they have expressed themselves but also for their brevity. I do not think, if I may say so, the strength of their case has in any way suffered from it. I realise that the reason for it is that we all want to get our business finished before the Royal Commission. I am grateful for their consideration, and I will certainly do my best to give them all the information that I can give at the present time.
I know that your Lordships are deeply affected by the real hardship which has been and is being suffered by so many British subjects, both men and women, who either temporarily or permanently have lost property and possessions in Egypt. I recognise that it is the hard situation of many of these persons which underlies what has been said by your Lordships this afternoon. The Motion of the noble Marquess calls attention to the various categories of claimants, but in reply to it I think I should prefer to distinguish not between the various categories of claimants, but between different categories of hardship, because one claimant may suffer in two or three quite different respects, some of which are covered by the 1959 Agreement, while others are not.
There are, as I see it, several different categories of hardship. There are, first, those whose property was Egyptianised permanently in 1957. Next, there are those whose property was sequestrated and restored having suffered damage. Both these categories of hardship are covered not only by the Agreement of 1959 but specifically by the £27½ million which was then transferred to us for the purpose of compensation by the Egyptian Government. Thirdly, there are the people (who, of course, may in some cases be the same) who have received back their property; who may or may not have a claim for damage, but who, whether they have a claim for damage or not, have great difficulty in
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getting any value out of their property—either in getting any of the income from it or, if they find it necessary to sell it, getting any of the capital. These are also covered by the 1959 Agreement to the extent of £E5,000. They are not covered by the £27½ million which was transferred to us for the purpose of compensation, but under the Agreement the Egyptian Government undertakes to pay them up to £E5,000 in respect of the value of their property, quite apart from whether they can get any other value out of it or not.
The next class of grievance is that of those people whose property has been sequestrated and restored, but who, even if they do get the £E5,000 which is provided for under the 1959 Agreement, may have a lot more property in excess of £E5,000 from which they are unable to get any benefit, because they are not living in Egypt and because of exchange difficulties. They are not covered by any agreement at all. All the benefit to which they are entitled under the 1959 Agreement is, first, compensation for damage inflicted while the property was sequestrated (that may come out of the £27½ million); and secondly, the £E5,000 which the Egyptian Government undertook to make available. Apart from that, they may have no claim for damage, and the £E5,000 may be a very small fraction of the value of their property. Over and above that, they do not come under the 1959 Agreement, and, naturally, they may suffer hardship through owning property in Egypt out of which they cannot get any benefit owing to ordinary exchange difficulties.
Finally, there is the question of resequestration; that is to say, in the last few months in some cases the Egyptian Government has again sequestrated property which may or may not have been sequestrated before. That presents us with an entirely new set of difficulties. With your Lordships' permission, I should like to say a word about all these different categories of hardship.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, before the noble Earl does that, could he clarify one point He said that the Egyptian Government would make available £E5,000.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Under the Agreement.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: That is the claimant's own money, not a grant from the Government. They are going to give exchange control permission to export that money.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I said that it did not come under the £27½ million, which is their own money which they gave for the purpose of compensation. That is a question of releasing currency.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: Releasing the individual's money.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Yes, of course. It does not come under the £27½ million given for the purpose of compensation. It was an undertaking that they would release up to £5,000—that they would release £5,000 of the property of the owner whose property had been sequestrated and restored.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, before the noble Earl goes on, for the purposes of clarification may I make one point? When he said that things are covered by the Agreement, I take it he means that they fall within the ambit of the Agreement. He does not mean that the fund has enough money to cover the losses, because there is not enough money to cover them.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I did not mean to imply that £27½ million was enough to satisfy all the claims—certainly not.
Now let me say a word about the first category—that is, the former owners of Egyptianised property whose payments have been revised under the recent Order in Council. The scope of this Order (in regard to which my noble friend Lord Killearn asked me a question a week or two ago, and to which I think a fairly full answer was given) is a limited one. It does not widen or narrow the categories of claims on which compensation can be paid, and it does not relate to people who have suffered losses which are later than, or not covered by, the financial Agreement of 1959. The purpose of the new Order was to allow the money still available in the Foreign Compensation Fund to be distributed as soon as possible, particularly to those who are most in need of it—namely, the many individual
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claimants for smaller sums, many of whom have been suffering very severe hardship. Its purpose was thus to provide additional relief for the more needy claimants, whose cause has often been pleaded so eloquently by my noble friend Lord Killearn and others.
I am sure your Lordships will not wish to go again over the various percentages which have already been fully gone into. As I explained to your Lordships, the result will be that all the smaller claimants will now receive about 90 per cent. of their assessed claims. I pointed out to your Lordships that we appreciate that a large claimant (whose case has been mentioned, very rightly. this afternoon by both my noble friend Lord Lloyd and my noble friend Lord Barnby) may be a limited liability company with many small shareholders.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I do not like to interrupt the noble Earl, but he was talking about the small claimants being satisfied as to 90 per cent. Can he tell us how much they have had to hand back in payment of loans?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: As my noble friend asked a question on that, I have got an answer, and perhaps I might give it now.
LORD KILLEARN: It seemed to fit in there.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My noble friend particularly asked how much had been given in ex gratia loans, and how much had been called back and paid. The amount so far repaid is negligible—practically nothing. The amount issued, I am informed—I have only just got this—is £700,000.
LORD KILLEARN: Do I understand that the amount repaid is negligible?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: Paid back, yes.
LORD KILLEARN: Is that really so?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: That is my information, but I will certainly confirm it.
LORD KILLEARN: With all respect, I wonder if it is correct.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: If it is not, I will certainly inform my noble friend.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, could the noble Earl at this point in the sequence of his speech say what is the percentage of the distribution to date on the sequestrated claims?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I do not think it will be necessary for me to give that in the form of percentages. In a moment I was going to give the actual figures, particularly in reply to some detailed questions which were asked by my noble friend Lord Lloyd.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the noble Earl is trying to explain a very complicated question which some of us here are trying to follow. I think it would be in the interests of the House if he were allowed to make his statement. The noble Earl does not need me to champion him, but I am trying to understand, and all these questions seem to me to confuse the issue.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I will do my best to speak, either without or with interruptions, as your Lordships please. I hope we shall be able to conclude before the Royal Commission. Until then I am very much at your Lordships service in this matter, because I know it is a complicated question, and I think your Lordships are entitled to all the information you want and I am in a position to give.
In respect of the larger claimants under this new Order in Council, I want to say that they will receive about 25 per cent. of their total claims, if they are over £500,000. Although the percentage above £500,000 is not increased, they get the increased percentages up to £500,000 which applies to everybody; and that, in the case of a firm which has more than £500,000, would amount to £50,500. This new Order of course does not represent a final distribution. It provides only for what we think can safely be paid out now, keeping a reasonable amount for the claims which have not yet been formulated.
I should like, before I go any further, to try to give the information which my noble friend Lord Lloyd asked for, first, about the amount of Egyptianised claims, and then the amount of the claims for damage on sequestrated property, on which I can give some more up to date figures than I gave last time
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in respect of claims presented to the Commission up to November 30. The claims for compensation for Egyptianised property amount to £59,489,406. We must divide that into two classes, the claims which have been assessed, and those which have been made but not assessed. The figure of £38,980,138 represents the total assessments made and approved by that date—that is, November 30—including both large and small. Then the balance of £20,509,268 represents the claimants' figures of amounts of claims for which no assessments had been made by November 30.
Now the claims for sequestration losses, as your Lordships will appreciate, of course, take very much longer. It takes people much longer to find out how much damage they think they are entitled to claim for than it takes them to find out the value of property which was confiscated in 1957. The information about these claims for damage is often difficult to get. But the total claims for sequestration losses presented by November 30 amounted to £4,043,234, of which a good deal less than half, namely, £1,613,869 represents assessments made, and the balance of £2,429,365 represents the amount of claims still to be considered and assessed. When we add these figures together we find that the total known commitment on November 30 was £63,532,640, which is not very much less than the conjecture of £65 million which was made in another place on November 16 by my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Thomas.
There are just two further facts regarding the work of the F.C.C. that I should like to put before your Lordships. The first is that since the new Order in Council came into force on December 5, up to December 18, the Commission have sent out a further 503 cheques for a total of £474,378. Next, we are trying to speed up the work of the Commission in dealing with all these claims, which have taken so long to formulate; and in order to hasten matters further two Commissioners have been appointed so that from the beginning of this month six Commissioners have been at work instead of four.
As my noble friend Lord Killearn suspected, the information which I had got was not complete, but I now have it

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complete, if I may go back to that question of ex gratia loans. The total amount issued was £7½ million, and the amount repaid directly by recipients is negligible. That repaid by deduction from Foreign Compensation Commission payments is £700,000 out of £7½ million. I am sorry that the first paper I got, which had to be done in a hurry, was not complete and not at all clear in that respect. I am very glad now to be able to give my noble friend the figures which I know he wanted to get.
LORD KILLEARN: I thank the noble Earl very much.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: I have spoken about the owners of Egyptianised property and the people who have claimed for damage for sequestrated property which has been restored to them. After that, we come to the next category of British owners of de-sequestrated property, that is to say, those who are entitled under Article V (1) (a) of the Financial Agreement to receive a transfer of up to £E5,000 of their released property into sterling. The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, said in his speech that this had been reduced to £E1,000. It is not quite correct to say "had been reduced." Owing (as I think most of your Lordships who have studied the matter recognise) to genuine currency difficulties, it has not been possible to make the payments provided for so far under the Agreement, and last March, as a temporary measure, and for the time being only, we got the Egyptians to agree that they should grant permission for immediate transfer of up to the first £E1,000 of each application which was found to be in order. That is the basis for the figure of £840. which represents £E1,000, which is all that these people have so far been able to get. In the great majority of applications which have been notified to us as being in order—the number is about 240—this permission has been granted.
Her Majesty's Government are constantly pressing the Egyptians to give full effect to the provision of the agreement by which the full amount of £E5,000 should be authorised, but so far without success. My noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye asked me to say whether we really thought that they would be able to pay. I know his motive was to try to let people know the worst
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now, as I think he put it. It is a very difficult thing to prophesy whether the future course of international trade will or will not allow another country to have a larger foreign exchange balance than it has now. And would it do any good if one took a pessimistic line and said that, according to the way things seem to be going now, there does not seem to be much chance of it? I do not think it would be desirable for me to take that line. It is not at all impossible that the trade of any country should improve its balance with the result that that country might hold a greater quantity of any particular kind of foreign currency; and I do not think we should take such a necessarily despairing view of the future of world trade that we think a country which is now in exchange difficulties should not be able in future to extricate itself from these difficulties.
As for the question of Egyptian will to do so, I shall say something about that at the end of my remarks when I deal with the question of re-sequestration; but my noble friend will understand that we want to give every chance of goodwill operating or reviving and you do not always achieve that object by losing your temper early in the negotiations because you are irritated by delays, some of which seem to be deliberate and many of which seem to be unnecessary. I am sure your Lordships will understand that if I want to do the best I can for the claimants I ought to be as careful as I can in what I say on that subject in reply to my noble friend's question.
Her Majesty's Government are constantly pressing the Egyptians to give full effect to the provisions of the agreement by which the full amount of £E5,000 should be authorised, but, as your Lordships know, so far only with the meagre success of getting the first £E1,000 released. We are of course actively considering whether any means can be devised, without relieving the United Arab Republic of their obligations in this matter, to help those people who have not been able to obtain their full rights under this particular revision of the agreement, because their difficulties are very keenly appreciated.
I am not sure whether the noble Marquess was referring to people who had claimed £5,000 or to the people who

795
had a great deal more than £5,000, but it does not really matter; he said, if they cannot get sterling, will the Government advance money against the future possibility? We are considering many possible lines of action in that direction. I will certainly put the noble Marquess's views before my right honourable friend and the Treasury. My noble friend, Lord Lloyd, had a suggestion that we might transfer sterling to people here and get it back from them with our expenses in Egypt. I will certainly look into that and I am grateful to him for making the suggestion.
It is, of course, more urgent in the case of the people who have not got their £5,000 sterling which was promised under the 1959 Agreement, but it applies also, as your Lordships recognise, to people who had more than £5,000 and who, even if they got their full amount of sterling payable under the 1959 Agreement, would still have a lot more property left which might be of very little use to them. There is no provision under the Financial Agreement by which those people can transfer more than £5,000 of their property from Egypt to here, and they may therefore be worse off even than the people who can claim against the Compensation Fund. That is a difficulty which does not apply by any means only to Egypt. There are very many countries in the world who, for various reasons, have nationalised or seized or taken property, sometimes with compensation and sometimes without compensation, sometimes with compensation which is extremely inadequate; and some of your Lordships may well think that this would have happened in Egypt even if the events of 1956 had not occurred and even if the Financial Agreement had not been concluded.
The question of what can be done to help people with more than £5,000 of Egyptian property does not arise out of the Financial Agreement, but we have had their case very much in mind, and during the past year or so we have been actively exploring a number of suggestions for trying to help them by some kind of arrangement by which their blocked assets in Egypt could be utilised against the provision of sterling in this country. I am bound to tell your Lordships the difficulties have been
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rather greater than we thought they would be at first, and so far I am not in a position to say that any practical solution has been found, but we are very anxious indeed to find one.
The whole position on this question, which has been giving us all so much anxiety for the last four years, has been sharpened in the last few months by the decision of the Egyptian Government to resequestrate a considerable amount of property owned by foreigners in Egypt. It began in the third week of October. So far a total of about 850 people are involved, of whom 47 are British subjects. So your Lordships will see it is not a measure directed against British subjects in any particular sense; it is a general policy of taking over the property of foreigners. It has affected 850 people, of whom 47 are British; and of those 47, 11 are living in Egypt, the remainder are not. It is impossible to assess with any degree of accuracy the value of all these assets belonging to British subjects affected by these new measures; any estimate must largely be guesswork, since it can be based only on unverified figures which were given a long time ago in our case. As I said, most of the 47–36 out of 47 of the British subjects—are living outside Egypt. They have been unable to regain personal possession of their property in Egypt since 1956, either because it has not been returned to them at all under the 1959 Anglo-Egyptian Financial Agreement or because they have not been allowed to bring assets out of the United Arab Republic, except for very small quantities in a few cases; and therefore these latest measures mean that a number of British subjects have had their property sequestrated a second time.
With regard to those who are living in Egypt, I understand that the Egyptian Government are making arrangements for the payment of monthly allowances to them, but only after an examination of each individual's assets and liabilities, which takes time. The Egyptian bureaucracy is even slower than those with which we are more familiar. One British subject is known to have applied for such an allowance, and Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo have spoken to the United Arab Republic authorities about her case. But so far the Embassy have

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not reported receiving any request from the British subjects concerned for financial assistance as a. result of the measures in question.
On October 29, a fortnight after these measures were announced, our Ambassador in Cairo asked the Egyptian authorities to explain the grounds on which these measures had been taken against British subjects. On November 13 he raised the matter again with the Egyptian Foreign Minister and left an aide armoire setting out more fully the information which we required and which we think we ought to be given. Since then we have received an unofficial translation of the Proclamation under which these measures have been published. It is dear, as I said, that they are not directed against British property as such, but their effect seems to be equivalent to the sequestration measures which were imposed in 1956, and there are several important questions which will require clarification. Accordingly, my noble friend, the Foreign Secretary, raised this matter on December 7 with the United Arab Republic Ambassador in London. He pointed out that Her Majesty's Government still awaited from the Egyptian authorities an official statement for the reasons for the sequestration of British property affected; that Her Majesty's Government needed to know whether the Egyptian authorities had really taken a temporary measure and would hand the property back or whether they proposed to confiscate some of the property, and if so what rate of compensation they would pay. The answers to those questions are still outstanding. They have not yet been received, and until they are forthcoming the situation is bound to appear unsatisfactory.
As I said earlier to my noble friend, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, I do not want to prejudge it, but Her Majesty's Government have left the Egyptian Government in no doubt of the seriousness with which we view these matters. Unless the position is clarified soon, there is clearly a risk that the welcome improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations over the past year or two may not be sustained. We should naturally regret such a development, but the remedy, in our view, now lies firmly with the United Arab Republic Government. Meanwhile, I should like to associate myself
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with the expressions of sympathy from your Lordships for this new class of hardship which has arisen so lately. Although it is difficult, in the absence of further information, to decide what further steps might usefully be taken to protect their interests, we are actively considering all possible courses.
My noble friend Lord Salisbury indicated in the course of his remarks that he might possibly wish to divide on this question, or he might possibly wish to withdraw his Motion. I do not know whether it would do more good to withdraw the Motion or to accept it, but if the noble Marquess would prefer it to be accepted I see no objection to advising your Lordships to do so. With regard to the Motion for Papers, your Lordships are fully entitled to all the information you want on the subject, and I see no objection to calling attention to the various categories of claimants. I am not trying in any way to incite the noble Marquess to press his Motion, but I should like to make it plain that I do not see any objection if the noble Marquess thinks it would do more good to the people we are all trying to help, that the House should accept the Motion rather than that he should withdraw it.
LORD BARNBY: My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, is he able to say how soon another substantial distribution is to be made, even if it involves, as has been suggested, a contribution from public funds?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, we have just made a new distribution under the new Order. With regard to the question of public funds, I could not go beyond the statement of the Prime Minister, which was quoted in full by my noble friend Lord Killearn and which he made on March 16, 1959. I will not quote it again because my noble friend has quoted it all correctly.
I would conclude by thanking the noble Marquess for giving us an opportunity to debate this question, and I would again say that I will leave it to him whether he thinks it will do more good to withdraw the Motion or to ask your Lordships to accept it.
6.12 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I need not say how grateful I am to the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, for

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the sympathetic and persuasive tone of his reply. I will not go into all the points he has raised, first of all because there is nothing so tiresome at the end of a debate as a mover who makes his speech again, and, secondly, because I understand we have coming a Royal Commission and the Government wish to finish this debate before that. I would only say that he has done his best for the Government in the circumstances, but he has in fact given no absolute assurances on some of the most important points which were raised, and in particular he has given no absolute undertaking that the Government will make it possible for claimants who have assets in blocked accounts in banks in Egypt to transfer them to this country.
I know that my Motion was widely drafted, and in order to crystallise the position I should like to put one simple question. I am not sure whether my noble friend has answered it yet, but anyway I should like him to do so. My question is: will Her Majesty's Government give an undertaking that they will make arrangements by some means or other that will enable claimants with assets in blocked accounts in banks in Egypt to transfer those assets forthwith to this country? If the answer to that question is "Yes", I will withdraw my Motion. If the answer is "No", I must press it to a Division. In saying that, I should like to make it clear that the vote on this question need not, and should not, be regarded as hostile to the Government. It is not intended to be that, because in my view this is a purely non-Party matter. It should be regarded as an expression of the sympathy of the House towards these unhappy people, and support for their claim to justice. I just ask my noble friend, is the answer to that question which I have asked him, "Yes" or "No"?
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, the answer is that we could not give an undertaking to do so, but we are trying our best to find out means of doing so. The noble Marquess has put me in a slight difficulty in suggesting that perhaps the whole of his Motion should be dependent on this one point. The only reply I can give is that we are doing our best to find some method of
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doing this. I do not see how we can give any promise that it will be done.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I am afraid that I think these claimants will expect an expression of the opinion of this House, and therefore I am afraid I must divide the House.
On Question, Motion for Papers agreed to.

THE ELECTION IN MALTA
6.15 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWELrose to ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they will take to ensure the participation of all the political Parties in the forthcoming Election in Malta and to guarantee that it is conducted with scrupulous fairness towards all qualified to vote. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I am inflicting a Question upon the Government and a short speech on your Lordships before the Recess for this reason: that in the middle of February there will be a General Election in Malta and this is the last opportunity I shall have before the Recess of asking the Government for certain further statements about their policy with regard to Malta and the Election.
We all hope that this Election w ill be successful and that Parliamentary Government in Malta will be restored on a firm and representative basis. We are all glad that Malta is getting out of direct rule and returning to a Parliamentary system of Government. But this Parliamentary system will not be successful unless it is representative and the people who are elected really speak for the people of Malta; otherwise there is a grave danger that we shall go back again to direct rule, which has so often happened before in the history of Malta. To get a representative Government in Malta it is essential that all the main political Parties should take part in the Election; and for this to happen I think that certain further actions are required by Her Majesty's Government. That is why I am addressing this Question to the noble Earl opposite.
First, I think we may need a fresh statement of policy from Her Majesty's Government about Malta. This state

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ment of policy should include two important things: first of all, it should acknowledge in principle the right of Malta to self-determination and independence. This does not seem to be going very far. I know that the statements that have been made so far stress that this new Constitution is not the last stage in the constitutional development of Malta; but I think we want a definite statement that Malta has the same right to self-determination and to independence as any other Colony and cannot be treated as an exception to the general rule. I am not going to labour that point because I have laboured it before. I do not wish to inflict a long speech on your Lordships, but I think it is quite impossible to expect that the Maltese will accept a position in which they are treated quite differently from their neighbours in Cyprus and from any of our Colonies on the other side of the Mediterranean in the continent of Africa.
The second thing that I think we want the Government to say is that they would be willing, after the Elections have taken place, to discuss with an elected Government in Malta the questions of a final. Constitution for Malta and of fixing a date for the independence of Malta. After all, in February a Conference is being held in Lancaster House for this particular purpose in connection with Kenya, and it is impossible for Malta to watch all these things going on in connection with other Colonies without feeling that they are not being given the same right to self-government and self-determination.
Finally, it seems to me that it is most important that a statement of policy on those lines should be published as soon as possible and well in advance of the Election. That is why I am asking the Question now. If this is done then there will be a very good chance that all the main Parties will take part in the Election; if this is not done, then there is a chance that that will not happen. The other thing which I hope the Government will do is to give every guarantee they can give that the Election will be free and fair, and that all persons qualified to vote will be in a position to do so without any interference or any pressure from outside.
What I mean in that regard is this.
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Unfortunately, at the moment, in Malta, there is very considerable tension between individuals and between organisations. We all know, we all regret, the conflict between the Malta Labour Party and the Church of Malta; I mention this only because it is an example of the extreme tension in Malta which may easily explode into violence. As your Lordships know, the Church of Malta has decided to ban the literature of the Labour Party—its publications, its printing and the selling of such literature. It has also placed an Interdiction on the members of the Executive Committee; and, of course, the Church also feels that members of the Labour Party have been disrespectful and have not played their proper part as Catholics in Malta.
I do not, of course, venture to express any opinion about the merits of this conflict, and I should hope that that would be the view generally held in your Lordships' House, because the last thing we want to do is to inflame opinion. What we all desire is that there will be a friendly settlement of this religious conflict. I merely point to it as a most striking example of the tension in Malta. Your Lordships will remember that only a short while ago shots were fired at some visitors from overseas and from the Commonwealth, as they were passing in a car through a street in Valletta, and there have been other examples of violence and of interference with freedom of assembly in Malta. I hope the Government will do everything in their power to make certain that the Election campaign is conducted with absolute fairness, and that all Parties will have an equal chance of holding their meetings without being interfered with, without the meetings being broken up, and with the proper protection to which they should be entitled from the police. The other point is that when the Election takes place on February 18, polling should be absolutely secret and no pressure should be brought to bear on any voter to vote in any way except in the way he or she wishes. Obviously, that is equally indispensable.
I hope, therefore, that the noble Earl can give these guarantees that the Government will do whatever they can to ensure that the Election is conducted in the way in which Elections are conducted in this country, in order to ensure

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that every voter has a chance of forming a reasoned judgment and expressing that judgment secretly when he casts his vote. Also, I hope that the Government may be able to make a firm statement of policy which would encourage all the main Parties to take part in an Election which they would then feel is leading to another stage in the progress of Malta towards self-government and independence.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do now adjourn during pleasure, until the Royal Commission at 6.30 p.m.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
6.30 p.m.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:
Export Guarantees,
Expiring Laws Continuance,
Coal Industry,
Family Allowances and National Insurance,
Glasgow Corporation (Parking Meters) Order Confirmation,
Edinburgh Corporation Order Confirmation,
Rothesay Burgh Order Confirmation,
Argyll County Council (Scalasaig Pier, etc.) Order Confirmation.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

THE ELECTION IN MALTA
6.45 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for giving us the opportunity, before we rise for the Christmas Recess, to ask a few questions about the situation in Malta. I agree with him entirely that, in time to come, it will be a question of Malta's having either self-determination or independence, or going from one stage to the other. But that is not, of course, the issue at the moment. I myself strongly hope that all Parties in Malta, or the main Parties in Malta, at all events, will contest the Elections. I think it would be a great pity if they did not contest the Elections. But if any of the Parties who do contest them get a strong measure of support, then it will show what the opinion in Malta is; whereas if any of the main Parties do not contest the Election, the result will be unbalanced, to say the least, and that would be a great pity. As I understand it, the Progressive Constitutional Party and the Nationalist Party have already agreed to contest the Elections, and the Labour Party has not yet committed itself one way or the other. That is the situation.
There is one question I should like to ask on this matter, purely on the subject of the Elections, and that is this. In another place yesterday, a Question was put to Mr. Maudling as to whether 50 candidates were asked for from each Party. Mr. Maulding did not actually answer this Question, and I think that here is some possible misunderstanding. I gather that it is not essential for every Party to put up 50 candidates. As I understand it, there are to be 50 seats. I think there must be some misconception about that, because it seems to me unnecessary that every Party should be required to put up 50 candidates, whether they could do so or not. I think there is confusion between the requirement that there are to be 50 seats, and the necessity for candidates; but perhaps the noble Earl, when he replies, will clear up that point.
Then as to the feeling in the Catholic Church, we in this country, of course, are not used to clerical politics of any

805
kind, and have not been so for many years. But that is not so in the Mediterranean countries, and I think it is very much more common in Latin countries for the church to take an active interest in politics than it is here. Therefore, it is not at all unreasonable that the Catholic Church should take a very strong interest in politics in Malta. Although a good deal has been said in this House and elsewhere as to what the Catholic Church has said about the Labour Party, we have not heard very much about what the Labour Party has said about the Catholic Church. They have 'been by no means backward in giving very strong expressions of opinion.
The situation is this. The Archbishop, whom I had the honour of meeting, as have many of your Lordships, feels, I have no doubt, that his opponents, or some of them, are connected with, and perhaps sympathetic to, the Communist system, and very naturally—I do not blame him at all—he wishes to keep that out of the Island of Malta, for which he thinks he has, and indeed has, a good deal of responsibility. But Communists in many parts of the world do not go into fights with kid gloves, by any means, and 'I do not think that people who flirt with them should necessarily expect to have kid glove methods used toward them. I must say that I entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel; it is not for us in this House to take sides in any way at all. But I say that the hard punching has not by any means been all on one side. There have been some pretty shrewd blows coming from the other side as well.
There are just two points I should like to make. First of all, there is the question of local government. I do not think that it is realised in this country what the Blood Commission were very surprised to find: that there is no local government whatsoever in Malta. There are embryonic beginnings on the island of Gozo, but nothing in Malta, so that when the Constitution is suspended, as unfortunately happens now and again in Malta, all political life, national and local, is suspended. I agree that on a little island like Malta it would be ridiculous to have as well as the national Government a whole series of local government bodies. The
806
island cannot carry it. There would be "far more harness than horse", to use an old expression. But there is a case for Valletta having a Council and Mayor. I think that would encourage local interest and patriotism. Then, if at any time the Constitution is suspended, as it is at the moment, at least the Valletta Town Council would carry on and there would be some local interest in Malta for people to rally around.
The other point I want to mention is the Election. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, made the important point that it is a responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that the Elections are properly and fairly conducted, because Parliament and the Government here are at the moment responsible for all affairs in Malta. I have no doubt that the Elections will be fairly conducted and there is no reason to suppose that they will not be—the noble Earl would be in the best position to know this—but if there is doubt perhaps it would be possible to send some experienced people from this country to give them a hand. There are precedents for this. In the past we have sent people from the Central Office and from Transport House to Greece. Perhaps the noble Earl might care to think about calling upon various sources in this country which could give the necessary aid in this respect.
6.52 p.m.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, at this late hour, I venture to rise for only a couple of minutes because I have a special knowledge of the Island of Malta and I am in fairly constant contact with people there. I rise mainly to support the point which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. I am sure that it is the desire of all of us on both sides of the House to see all Parties in Malta participating in the Elections. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, is perfectly right when he suggests that some kind of electoral commission, a body of people of standing from this country or an international body, to oversee the Elections would have an enormous influence on the decision of the Malta Labour Party about whether or not they shall take part in them. As the noble Lord said, there are plenty of precedents for this. Therefore, I strongly

807
urge the Government to appoint some such Commission to supervise the Elections and give what I hope and believe would be an unnecessary guarantee, but none the less one which I know people in Malta feel they will require and with which they would be far more likely to take part in the Elections. I beg the Government to consider this proposal very seriously.
6.54 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think it has been both useful and appropriate that almost the last subject before the Recess should be the Election in Malta, which is coming shortly. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and other noble Lords have expressed the hope that all Parties will take part in the Elections. I certainly hope that, too. I think that we have done all we can or should do to ensure this. With great difficulty, we have carved out a Constitution, with the help of the Blood Commission, and we have promulgated it. Now the stage is set. I think that we have really "done our stuff"; it is up to the Parties in Malta to do theirs.
I am glad that the Progressive Constitutional Party and the Nationalist Party are going to take part in the Election. If other Parties do not, of course, that is regrettable. I think that one would be inclined to ask why. I am sure that the reason is not that the stage is not available for them to do all they can to run their own country, and to get back to what we all want to see, a normal form of Government.
The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked me to give a further pledge about the future. He has pressed me many times before, and I am sure he is not surprised when I say that I am not able to go beyond what I have said before—namely, that we do not regard the present Constitution as the final stage in Malta's development, and that when we have a new Government and that new Government want to talk about other stages, it is always open to them to do just that thing. But I cannot, and will not, go further to-day, because I do not think that there is any advantage in doing so, much as I know the noble Earl would like me to do so.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Earl does not
808
want to raise false hopes in Malta when he referred just now to a future Government in Malta talking about the next stage in constitutional development. Clearly, that would not be possible unless Her Majesty's Government were also willing to talk. I understand that that is not the case. I am sure that the noble Earl would wish everyone to be absolutely clear about this, both here and in Malta.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, what is quite clear is that people can raise this subject. Whether Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider it can only be decided in the light of events. I know on15' too well, as do your Lordships, that one should never use the word "never" in this context.
The next part of the noble Earl's Question is whether we will do all we can to ensure—"guarantee" is the word used in the Question—that the Elections are conducted in a perfectly fair way in regard to all qualified to vote. I understand the importance of this very well, and we have been at the greatest pains to ensure that just this will happen. Not only have we studied the question here, but we have also had the Chief Electoral Officer and Registrar of Malta over here to discuss with him his plans for the Election. We have advised the Governor upon all our anxieties in this matter, and when the Governor was here last my right honourable friend the Secretary of State and I cross-examined him (if I may put it in that way) very closely on all the angles and everything that would have to be done to ensure that the Elections were fairly handled. I assure your Lordships that we are fully satisfied about this.
If it would be of any value, I should be glad to write to the noble Lords who have spoken this afternoon and give them in more detail just what is being done to make sure that this will happen. There is in Malta a detailed and complicated system of representation and election, something which the people there have always been accustomed to, but we have taken particular care in this case to avoid the possibility of unfairness or duplication or anything like that. As I say, I should be only too happy to give further details in

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writing to the noble Lords. but there is no point in going into it at great length at this moment.
The noble Lords, Lord Faringdon and Lord Ogmore, said that, despite all this, we should send a representative group of people to oversee the Election. I do not really think that this is called for. It is rather a curious situation. Here, on the one hand, is a demand that Malta should be given self-government and should be allowed to run its own affairs, and, on the other, it is said that we cannot trust them to do it.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I did not say that. I said, if the noble Earl was not satisfied would he call in aid from here? I agree that if he is satisfied that they have the aid there then there is no need to call in aid from here.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for saying that. I am satisfied, and I am willing to write and give further detail on this.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, what I said, or hope I said, was that, in my view, this anxiety on the part of the Maltese might not be justified, but if one wanted them to take part in the Elections one must set at rest unreasonable fears.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I understand that. But I feel that to set at rest even unreasonable fears in an unreasonable way—and I believe this is an unreasonable way—is not the right course to follow.
There were two other points made by the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, one of which—whether we require 50 candidates from each Party—I am glad to have the opportunity of clearing up. Of course, the answer to that is, No. What has happened is that there are to be 50 seats, and it is up to the Parties to nominate as many candidates as they want to, or can do, in the constituencies where they think they will have a good chance, or, for one reason or another, they may want to nominate candidates. If it happens that an independent candidate or a Party of only two comes forward, that is fine; and if it is 50, that is fine, too. It is up to the Parties to put forward the candidates they want.
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On the second point raised by the noble Lord, on local government, I have great sympathy with the suggestion he makes, and I am not at all sure that it is not something which we have already commended; because, although one does not want too much harness, as the noble Lord put it, none the less, I think there is value in a certain degree of local government more widely spread than is projected at the present time, or as he suggested it in relation to Valletta. There has been a start made in regard to Gozo, and it will be for the people of Malta themselves to decide whether they want to go further. I would only say that we should certainly welcome any such move. So, there we are, my Lords: the date of the Election is fixed and the stage is set. We have done our part, and I hope the Parties will do theirs and all go to the Election, and that we shall see what we all want to see—namely, Malta with her own Government, running her own affairs.

PROPOSED MERGER OF I.C.I. AND COURTAULDS
7.3 p.m.
LORD SHEPHERDrose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, having considered the proposed merger of Imperial Chemical Industries and Courtaulds, they will in the general interest refer the proposition to the Monopolies Commission. The noble Lord said: My Lords, although the hour is late and the attendance is thin I feel that I should proceed to put the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. At the beginning of this week an announcement was made by the Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries to the effect that, after friendly discussions, there was the intention to create a merger between Imperial Chemical Industries and Courtaulds. The Financial Times of yesterday described the matter in this way:
"The take-over bid that I.C.I. has made for Courtaulds is a major event in the history of British business".
I believe the issue is such that Parliament should give some consideration to it. This is not an ordinary take-over. It raises considerable matters of policy, and I believe that in the interests of the shareholders of Courtaulds it is well that

811
we have a statement from the Government of their position. We could hardly wait until we returned after the Recess, because then the merger may have been completed.
I personally am not against take-over bids, as such. I believe that by certain mergers much good has been done, and certain firms have been made more virile by the finance that has become available to them following a merger. But I believe that when very large organisations which play a vital part in our industry become involved in takeover bids or mergers careful consideration should be given to the position not only by the Directors of the company but also by the Government. The Conservative Government have always made their position quite clear. When Mr. Peter Thorneycroft was introducing the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill in the other place on March 6, 1956, he described it as
"reinforcing the system of free and flexible competitive enterprise which we on this side of the House foster and sustain."
I must put the question whether a monopoly of such a magnitude as will be created through the merging of Imperial Chemical Industries with Courtaulds will provide the competitive enterprise that the Government wish to sustain.
I think we should consider the position of these two companies. I would, first of all, make it quite clear that my remarks are in no way intended to be critical of these companies. Both are very successful and virile, and they have done a tremendous amount for British industry, particularly in the field of research. It is perhaps for that reason that they hold so much influence and power. This is not the first occasion that we in this House have expressed disquiet about take-overs and mergers. Not so long ago we had the question concerning newspapers; then there was the Guest Keen & Nettlefold merger with Delta Metals, and there have been others. We have seen over the years. and particularly of more recent months, a great concentration in industry. I would remind the House of the merger between Tube Investments and Raleighs, when over 80 per cent. of the production of bicycles came under one control. I have to ask noble Lords whether they are happy with that situation.
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To come back to I.C.I. and Courtaulds, I.C.I. have net assets of £695 million; they have 95 subsidiary companies, 54 of which operate abroad. Courtaulds have net assets of £207 million: they have 78 subsidiaries, 42 of which operate in the United Kingdom and the remainder abroad. These companies are not, as many people believe, companies that are producing simply one line of production. They are very large groups. In many ways their productions and interests are twined and intertwined. They have grown up by force of circumstances. The Imperial Chemical Industries were started as a chemical firm, and by force of nature and force of circumstances they were driven into textiles and other lines, such as paint, plastics and paper. Courtaulds, who were initially a textile firm, again by force of circumstances, have moved into chemicals.
If this merger goes through, in the man-made fibres industry, which is basically a chemical industry, the new group will account for over 90 per cent. of production in this country. If it goes through, in the paint industry, the subsidiaries of both these groups are, I believe, the biggest producers of paint in this country, and they will be responsible for from 25 per cent. to 30 per cent. of production. In the case of plastics and paper, their position is equally important. But what is interesting to note is that throughout industry, and particularly in the items that I have just mentioned, both Courtaulds and Imperial Chemical Industries are themselves responsible for the production of the raw materials. If the proposal goes through, the group assets will be in the region of £900 million.
But I do not believe that is the real issue. I think the real issue lies in their interests, in their production, and the question of distribution. It is said by the Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries that the purpose of this merger is that it will make them strong to face international competition, particularly when we enter the European Common Market. I think there is some truth in that. But it is interesting to note that in the man-made fibres, the nylons and the Terylenes, there is very little physical transfer of goods to any part of the world. Most of the production is done under licence. Imperial Chemical Industries have a licence for

813
Terylene, and they also grant sub-licences to other parts of the world. In fact, in 1958 I believe only 10 per cent. of the entire production of man-made fibres was exported. Therefore, it would appear at the present moment that the main distribution for man-made fibres will be in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, I think the Government must consider whether this merger is going through for future development in overseas markets, or whether it is being created to bind tighter the already existing agreements and arrangements that there are, not only in this country but overseas, and perhaps, as far as this country is concerned, in regard to the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. It is interesting to ask—and this is again a question which the Government must face—if this merger goes through, where will it end? In recent months and last year both these companies have been absorbing virile organisations. Courtaulds amalgamated with one of its main competitors, British Celanese. The whole progress has been to concentrate power into these two organisations. To what degree there was competition between them it is difficult to assess. But it is again interesting to note that they had a 50/50 partnership in British Nylon Spinners.
It is true, on one side, that Courtaulds were on nylon viscose production (again, I am talking of man-made fibres) whereas I.C.I. were on Terylene. It may well be said that they competed with each other. But if this merger goes through there will be no competition. The policy of the Board 'obviously will be to relate both productions for the market needs. I would submit that, if this merger goes through, in the manmade fibre industry the monopoly will be complete. I should remind the House also that, apart from these restrictive arrangements, this industry is also well protected by tariffs. As an illustration, rayon and nylon yarns coming into this country from the Continent 'have a 20 per cent. ad valorem duty, plus 9d. per lb. weight. From the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. there is a slightly lower tariff. But it is quite a high tariff on such a bulk item. Therefore, we have the position that, if this merger goes through, in the man-made fibre industry
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you will have a complete monopoly protected by high tariffs.
I will not go over the other items where these two companies have arrangements, and where the arrangements will become complete through the merger. But I feel that the question I must put to the Government is this. Are they themselves satisfied that the benefits they wish to see in industry—virile competition, from which efficiency and low prices will arise—will flow from this merger?
On an Unstarred Question I have no right of reply, and therefore to some extent I must anticipate the reply of the Minister. I understand that the Monopolies Commission are not in a position to study or rule upon a hypothetical question and that this present case is hypothetical in that the merger has not been completed. I think that is true. Equally, a Monopolies Commission in practice takes a good deal of time in making its Report. In this particular case and in others which no doubt will arise—because the whole trend of 1960 and 1961 is one of increasing mergers—it seems to me that the Government will need new machinery, because if this type of proposition arises, an urgent, prompt decision must be made, not only for the benefit of the company, but also for the benefit of the shareholders. I believe present trends definitely show and justify that a fresh look by the Government should be made in the machinery that is available.
I feel that I have been guilty of going rather wide of the Question, but this is the immediate issue. Two large companies of national importance may merge with or without the consent of the directors. The arbiter may be a question of price or profit to the shareholders. A complete monopoly on a certain side of the industry will be created. May I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, of some words that he uttered on November 7, words which I thought had a good deal of wisdom in them. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 235 (No. 4), col. 339]:
"Excellent as our system of negotiating may be, I must testify personally that in the five years in which I have been in the Government I have seen case after case where agreements have been made between employers and employees, or awards have been made by

815
arbitrators after hearing arguments between employers and employees, in which the public interest could not possibly have not been made a determining factor in any of them, and where nobody was present to argue the case for the public interest where what determined the matter was not what the public economy would stand, but only what the parties were willing and able to pay ".
That is probably, in context, a little wide of the subject but I think it is clear what was meant.
I submit that in cases like this, if it applies to wages it certainly applies to the question of capital and industry. I think that where an issue arises in which the public and the nation may be in a position of loss through the creation of such a monopoly, there should be some quick, flexible machinery, and if it applies to wages I certainly feel it should apply to industry and capital.
7.22 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord, to whom I am much indebted for the way in which he has asked this Question, has raised a number of very wide issues and, as he said, he put a number of questions to the Government. While I welcome, as will emerge I hope in my reasonably short remarks, the raising of these issues, the only question he has asked the Government is whether, having considered the proposed merger of the two companies, they will in the general interest refer the proposition to the Monopolies Commission. Really, therefore, there are two kinds of question which I have to answer, one the Question on the Order Paper and secondly, the kind of general reflection with which the noble Lord introduced it.
Now I am glad that this question has been raised in Parliament, because the issues are obviously important and deserve public discussion. I am also glad that it has been raised in this House of Parliament, because I think there is a genuine danger that these issues, which are really very complicated and important, might become the subject of rather stereotyped Party attitudes. Those of us who support competition—among whom I would certainly number myself —are rather apt to think of competition in 19th century terms, between relatively small units of production or distribution, and not to realise that in the modern world advanced technologies
816
may involve a somewhat different conception, which I shall try to examine very shortly. On the other hand, I think those noble Lords who favour what I think they themselves describe as Democratic Socialism—and I make no attempt to-night to define either term—are rather apt to think again in the terms of the evils of the capitalism of the 19th century, and of a national corporation or national machinery, as the noble Lord has referred to it, as the right remedy for these evils. I think in truth and fact we are up against something different and more fundamental than either Party is prepared to acknowledge at the present time.
However, before I consider these wider philosophical questions of general policy perhaps I may call them that—I must deal with the question on the Order Paper and some of the practical constitutional points raised by it. Since the war, two main Statutes have been passed to deal with monopolies and restrictive practices; one by the Labour Government and one by the Conservative Government; and they are, respectively, the Monopolies Act, 1948, and the Restrictive Practices Act, 1956. Together they form, and are intended to form, part of the Code. One is a complementary Statute to the other. Neither Government have so far thought it proper to ask for, or to receive from Parliament, statutory power to interfere with the purchase and sale of shares in the public market, although, of course, both Governments retain restrictions on the export of capital abroad, which gives them some power to control mergers if control or money were to pass outside the country. This is a subject I am not going to deal with to-day.
Clearly, therefore, there could be no question under any existing Act of Parliament of referring the desirability of the purchase of shares—what is popularly called a take-over bid, which covers a multitude of activities, whether sins or not—to the Monopolies Commission or to any other existing body. The noble Lord really admitted such when at the end of his introductory remarks he said that what was needed was some kind of "quick, flexible machinery ". There is nothing which could be referred to the Monopolies Commission in

817
accordance with the suggestion in the Question. Whether, should the merger go through, there will be anything which it is worth referring to the Monopolies Commission is, of course, another matter which I must leave open until the merger has gone through and until my right honourable friend the President of the Board of Trade, at whose discretion it lies under the Act of 1948, has had time to consider the implications of the subject. Probably the House will come to the conclusion on both sides that, even if there is something to refer to the Monopolies Commission, it is not really the important question which the noble Lord has raised.
If I may go back to the Statute for a moment in order to illustrate that point, the situation its as follows. The Monopolies Commission was created by the Labour Government following, I think, the recommendations of my noble friend Lord Woolton, when he was Reconstruction Minister during the war, in order to deal with a state of facts which could exist as a result of a merger, but something on a very much smaller scale and of quite a different order from that which the noble Lord was really dealing with in his introductory remarks. Reference can be made to the Monopolies Commission, if monopoly conditions prevail—that is to say, if control of, say, one-third of the supply (I think that is the proportion mentioned in the Act) is in the hands either of a single concern or of a series of inter-connected concerns.
Now the position in this field—I am going to ignore paint, where I do not think it will happen, either before or after the merger arid other activities which I do not think really matter for the purpose of my present answer—is that monopoly conditions already existed in the field of man-made fibres, independent of the proposed merger. The result of the inter-connected shareholdings of the two firms concerned, and in the third firm referred to, in relation to nylon spinning, is that monopoly conditions already existed because of the interconnected shareholdings of the two firms. Therefore, it would be possible for my right honourable friend, quite independently of this merger, to refer questions in the
818
field of man-made fibres to the Monopolies Commission. The effect of the merger, if it takes place, will in this field, I am advised, be only marginal, so far as the creation of monopoly conditions is concerned, precisely because they already exist. The effect will be that, instead of its being true, as it is, that monopoly conditions exist in a series of man-made fibres such as terylene, nylon 66, and so on, it will be true that in man-made fibres as a whole monopoly conditions will exist, because the manufacturers of the different fibres will by that time have merged or amalgamated.
The effect of that, strangely enough, will, I think, be only marginal. It will reduce the amount of competition only to this extent. At any rate in theory, there are a number of fibres which the consumer—by which I mean the user of the end-product—could select as suitable for his particular purpose, a choice between terylene and nylon, and to that extent the monopoly conditions will be accentuated by the merger. But this is relatively rare, since in actual practice the particular fibres concerned are different kinds of fibre, used not for competitive purposes but for different purposes; that is to say, they occupy different areas of the field. The result is that the monopoly conditions which already exist, which cover the entire field, fibre by fibre, will not be very materially increased as a result of the merger.
This, of course, does not mean at all that my right honourable friend may not think at some stage that there is something to refer to the Monopolies Corn-mission. Where monopoly conditions prevail and he considers it would be worth while, he must obviously have that question in mind. But I should not myself think that it really determines any of the particular issues raised by the noble Lord, because the truth is that the Monopolies Commission is not the kind of animal which was created for the purpose of discussing these very wide issues which the noble Lord has raised. It is obvious that where monopoly conditions exist in, say, the manufacture of electric light bulbs or car tyres, the Monopolies Commission would have a say. But we are dealing here with a merger of companies with £1,000 million of capital, and it was not

819
the purpose of the Monopolies Commission to deal with this kind of thing.
I would agree with the noble Lord that the question one has to consider is whether a fresh kind of machinery is required or not—not whether it should be referred to the Monopolies Commission. But I do not think it would be appropriate to embark on this extremely difficult and thorny subject. I would say, in passing, that I welcome the acknowledgment by the noble Lord that mergers are not intrinsically bad and that bigness is not necessarily a synonymous term for badness in this connection. I think we all ought to see that and agree with it. I think also it is remarkable that, although a great number of mergers on one scale or another have taken place in recent years, there is remarkably little evidence—I should say no evidence, but it may be that I should be challenged on that—that any particular merger which has taken place has in fact operated to the public disadvantage.
That being so, I think we must ask ourselves some questions. One of the criteria of the public interest laid down by the Act of 1948—and I choose that simply because it was the Labour Government's Act—was the efficient production and supply of the articles in question. Of course, in the 19th century when raw materials were largely naturally obtained by industrial agriculture and processed by relatively small firms, we thought in terms of competition between these relatively small firms or. as I say, State monopoly. This was the classical argument between Socialism and private enterprise, which I am afraid still goes on, although I had hoped that after the war it might take on a rather more constructive phase. But over great new ranges of really advanced technologies, of which one can think of a whole number, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the old size of production unit is no longer appropriate to the process involved. Capital involved in the manufacture of computers or manmade fibres or the generation of nuclear energy is something quite out of proportion in scale to that of the production unit or distribution unit of 19th century industry; and in the latter part of the 20th century, whatever system of production or distribution you choose, we are dealing with giants, and giants of
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this scale—they may not always be so big as to have £1,000 million of capital, but sometimes millions of capital and sometimes hundreds of millions.
It is quite clear, whatever we do about monopoly, whatever we do about Socialism and whatever we do about private enterprise and competition that these technical factors are going to dominate the scene in one way or another. In passing, I accept wholeheartedly the statement by the Chairman of I.C.I. which was made on the wireless the other day, that his motive in promoting this merger was that of creating a scale of unit of a technological kind rather than trying to tighten up arrangements, as the noble Lord put it. I think it is a true view of the problem, although of course we shall see how it works out in practice.
But the point about this, of course, is that it does set a lot of problems for all of us. In the first place, some people think that it gets rid altogether of the reality of the discussion between monopoly and competition. It sometimes does. Nuclear energy is, so to speak, an operating monopoly; these great power stations of 500 megawatts we are putting up now cannot compete with anything except conventional fuel power stations, which are controlled, rightly or wrongly, under the Labour Party's Act, by the Central Electricity Generating Board. The same is going to be true of a great number of kinds of production where really advanced technology is employed. But I think a second look leads one to the conclusion that something quite different is really happening. In this field of man-made fibres, for instance, to take a relevant one, there will be, I think, quite bitter competition, but it will be competition between the giants. The giants are not small firms operating within the United Kingdom, but the United Kingdom giant, if it comes into being, the American giant, and I think it is the French giant —certainly the European giant. If we enter the Common Market, which the House has already expressed the desire to do, that competition will be quite severe. I agree that this raises the whole question of tariffs, although I do not propose to try to answer it this evening.

821
Quite obviously you have there got competition, but on an entirely new scale. One must not therefore assume too readily, as I think many people in all Parties tend to assume, that when a merger on this gigantic scale is contemplated you thereby automatically get rid of competition. Very vast competition goes on between oil companies, between different types of industry providing the same service—road and rail is a good example; there is oil and coal; there is conventional fossilised fuel and nuclear energy; there are these different units of production in the chemical industry and in man-made fibres industries, this vast and intricate process of macromolecules being used for manufacturing raw materials which previously could only be derived from agriculture. This obviously sets us all difficult problems.
The only point I want to make this evening is a double one. The first is that no political Party which values its reputation for being contemporary can fail to face these problems in some form or another, and no political Party that wishes to arrive at solutions can adopt stereotyped attitudes derived from its forbears. This does not necessarily stultify the healthy controversy between the two Parties, but it means that it ought to be conducted on an extremely constructive level. The other thing is that I personally do not believe that when we are dealing with things of this kind Parliament can yet afford to shelve its direct responsibility. This would mean, in my own view, that we should he quite wrong, and in the view of the Government, that it is probably premature to talk in terms, such as the noble Lord opposite did, about the flexibility of the machinery, because until you have verified your principles about what is to be to your interest or advantage—you do not know which of them will take the form of debates ranging over months, and I should have thought, probably years—it is not much good delegating your responsibility to a body which is not directly responsible to the nation.
Moreover, I would make this last reflection: that more and more, I think, we are coming to see with these really advanced technologies and units of production that not all of them, and perhaps not most of them, can be fixed into a national mould. Certainly in this kind
822
of field you get into international economics before you know where you are, and therefore the national corporation or the national machinery is not necessarily the right way of approaching it. This was recognised, I think, in a dim way in the Monopolies Act, when the fact had to be faced that the. orders of the competent authority would not have very important extra-territorial effects. But I think the issue is much deeper than that, and that is when we move to a scale in units of production in the advanced industries when the nation is not the appropriate organ through which to exercise control.
It is obvious, I hope, both that I have tried to deal rationally with the actual Question on the Order Paper and that I have shown that the noble Lord was quite right in raising in this House the wider issues in the discussion which I do not pretend that I have adequately covered, in my rather sketchy reply.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I do not propose to break the rules. I thank the noble Viscount for his reply and, if I may, I wish him a happy Christmas.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: The same to you.

MANCHESTER CORPORATION BILL
Presented, and read 1a.
  ARMING SECURITY GUARDS
  ARMING SECURITY GUARDS
  BANK GUARD'S FIREARM CERTIFICATE
  BANK GUARD'S FIREARM CERTIFICATE
  CRIMINAL'S POSSESSION OF ARMS
  CRIMINAL'S POSSESSION OF ARMS
  IMITATION FIREARMS
  IMITATION FIREARMS
  RESEARCH IN RADIO ASTRONOMY
  RESEARCH IN RADIO ASTRONOMY
  D.S.I.R. GRANTS OF RESEARCH PROJECTS
  D.S.I.R. GRANTS OF RESEARCH PROJECTS
  ORDNANCE SURVEY HALF-INCH MAPS
  ORDNANCE SURVEY HALF-INCH MAPS
  POLIOMYELITIS IN HULL
  POLIOMYELITIS IN HULL