Sitting of 2 August 1961

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [Lords]
  As amended, considered; An Amendment made to the Bill.
  Standing Order 205 (Notice of Third Reading) suspended.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means]—[Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown and the Duchy of Cornwall signified.]
  Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  NEWPORT CORPORATION BILL
  Standing Order 208 (Notice of consideration of Lords Amendments) suspended; Lords Amendments to be considered forthwith.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
  Lords Amendments considered accordingly and agreed to.

  RIVER RAVENSBOURNE, &C., (IMPROVEMENT AND FLOOD REVENTION) BILL
  Standing Order 208 (Notice of consideration of Lords Amendments) suspended; Lords Amendments to be considered forthwith.—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
  Lords Amendments considered accordingly and agreed to.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  ROYAL AIR FORCE

    Sovereign Base Areas, Cyprus (Private Trading)
    Mr. Wallasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he will make a statement about the extent of the preferential arrangements granted to Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes as against private firms operating in the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus.
    The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Julian Amery): Within military stations and cantonments, it is the policy of the Services, in Cyprus as elsewhere, to permit private trading only to the extent that the facilities provided by N.A.A.F.I. need to be supplemented. Elsewhere in the Sovereign Base Areas private trading is permitted either where there is a military requirement for it or, if there is no military requirement, where the authorities of the Republic raise no objection under Appendix "O" to the Treaty. In addition, N.A.A.F.I. is, of course, permitted to import goods free of duty for sale to members of the forces to the extent provided in the Treaty.
    Mr. Wall: While a N.A.A.F.I. monopoly in the military establishment is obviously justified, does not the Minister agree that to extend the monopoly to the whole of the base area is grossly unfair to both British and Cypriot traders who used to deal with all these families before Cyprus became a republic? Will he confirm that N.A.A.F.I. is not opening shops in the Republic itself?
    Mr. Amery: I think that my hon. Friend did not quite catch what I said. Outside the cantonments but in the Sovereign Base Areas private trading is permitted in two sectors, either where there is a military requirement for it or where the authorities of the Republic raise no objection when there is no military requirement. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, there are certain N.A.A.F.I. establishments outside the base areas. As my hon. Friend knows, we have certain retained sites within the Republic.
    Mr. H. Hynd: As so many of the families live outside the base areas, is

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    it not for their convenience to have N.A.A.F.I. shops, for example, in Nicosia?
    Mr. Amery: Yes. I think that they do benefit where there are retained sites outside. Where they live outside it is a great help to have N.A.A.F.I.
    Mr. Wall: Does not my right hon. Friend's reply indicate that N.A.A.F.I. still has a veto, even though not a complete monopoly, in the base areas? Is it not a fact that many of these so-called private enterprise shops and kiosks which operate in the base areas are licensed by N.A.A.F.I.
    Mr. Amery: I do not think that N.A.A.F.I. has a veto. It is in the hands of the Service commanders to decide whether there should be private trading either within the cantonments or outside them; that is, where there is no military requirement, where the Services are indifferent, the decision remains with the republican authorities in accordance with Appendix O of the Treaty.

    Queen's Colour Squadron
    Mr. Boydenasked the Secretary of State for Air what was the cost during the last financial year of the Royal Air Force Queen's Colour Squadron; and how many funerals, guards of honour, drill demonstrations and other ceremonies, respectively, it took part in during that period.
    Mr. J. Amery: In the last financial year the Queen's Colour Squadron cost about £80,000 and had 112 engagements. These included 11 funerals, 27 guards of honour, 35 drill demonstrations and 39 other ceremonies.
    Mr. Boyden: In view of the cuts that the Government are making in much more desirable social expenditure, will the right hon. Gentleman consider cutting very drastically the expenditure on this unit? Can he continue to justify as his predecessors have done over the last two years, over 100 fit men attending funerals and as guards of honour when cuts are being made in much more essential social services?
    Mr. Amery: Yes, Sir. I am satisfied that the Queen's Colour Squadron performs an extremely valuable task in the functions of the Royal Air Force. The
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    hon. Gentleman should bear in mind that a good deal of ceremony inevitably attaches to military life. If there were not a Queen's Colour Squadron the burden which it carries would fall on the individual Commands which would have to use time for training at the expense of other duties.
    Mr. Mulley: While agreeing that some ceremonies are a necessary part of military life, may I ask the Secretary of State whether he is sure that the men and money involved here are being put to the best use? Will he not have another look at the whole of this problem?
    Mr. Amery: I have investigated this matter before and I investigated it again, when the hon. Gentleman tabled the Question. I am satisfied that this is the most economical way of meeting ceremonial commitments from the point of view of the useful deployment of men in the Royal Air Force.

    Aircrew
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for Air what steps he is taking to overcome the shortage of trained aircrew in the Royal Air Force.
    Mr. J. Amery: We are not at present short of trained aircrew. But we could face a serious shortage within a few years if recruiting does not improve. We have accordingly introduced more attractive terms for direct entry officers. We have extended publicity. We are improving our school liaison arrangements and providing more opportunities for headmasters and careers masters to visit Royal Air Force units. We are also trying to make our selection methods better and to cut down training wastage. There has been some improvement in recruiting in recent months, but it is still too early to say whether this will be maintained.
    Mr. Rankin: Is it not the case that enrolments in the initial training schools are declining? Are they declining because there is a widespread feeling that the trainees are getting their air experience too late? Would the right hon. Gentleman look into that aspect of the problem?
    Mr. Amery: As I have said, there has been some improvement in recent months, but I agree with the hon. Gentleman that

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    it is very important to introduce air experience into the flying training of young men as early as possible.
    Mr. Mulley: Can the Secretary of State say whether he has anxieties about reaching the target of the Royal Air Force by 1st January, 1963, in view of what he has just said?
    Mr. Amery: The Question is directed to aircrew. The numbers concerned in aircrew are small and we shall not be short of aircrew art the end of this year. The shortage is not now in aircrew but in the intake, and this could have serious repercussions later.

    Flying Scholarships
    Mr. Danceasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he has any plans for widening the basis on which flying scholarships are awarded.
    Mr. J. Amery: In addition to the 350 flying scholarships now awarded to members of the Air Cadet organisations we plan to make available 100 flying scholarships a year to boys who are attending schools at which there is no unit of the Air Training Corps or Royal Air Force Section of the Combined Cadet Force. Candidates for these scholarships will have to pass the same medical, educational and other tests as volunteers for aircrew. With permission, I will circulate further details of this scheme in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Dance: I thank my right hon. Friend for that Answer, which I think is most encouraging. Will this new scheme in any way prejudice the existing scheme under which flying scholarships are awarded to members of the Air Cadet organisation?
    Mr. Amery: No, Sir. I am glad that my hon. Friend has asked that question. The new scheme is independent of and additional to the existing one.
    Mr. Dance: Does not my right hon. Friend agree that boys in the Air Cadet organisation who are really interested will carry on?
    Mr. Amery: The object of this scheme is to catch boys in those schools where there is not a unit of the Air Training Corps or a Royal Air Force section of the Combined Cadet Force. There are
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    schools which have not either of those facilities, and we think that there might well be boys in them who would like to join the Royal Air Force.
    Following are the details:
    It has been decided that 100 flying scholarships, similar to those at present awarded to members of the A.T.C. and the R.A.F. Section of the Combined Cadet Force, should be made available under certain conditions to boys who do not belong to either of those organisations. Each scholarship will entitle the holder to free tuition in flying up to the standard of the Pilot's "A" licence at a civil flying club. Tuition will not begin until the pupil is 17.
    This new venture will not prejudice in any way the present scheme for the award of flying scholarships to members of the Air Cadet organisations. The number of scholarships available under this latter scheme is very much larger—it is at present 350—and boys who belong to Air Cadet organisations will consequently continue to have a very much better chance of obtaining an award than those who do not. Very broadly, the conditions which will require to be satisfied before an award can be made under the new scheme include the following:

    (a) A candidate should be attending a school at which there is no unit of the Air Training Corps or R.A.F. Section of the Combined Cadet Force.

    (b) He should be genuinely interested in the possibility of joining the R.A.F.

    (c) He should have passed the medical, educational and other tests which are applied to volunteers for aircrew duties.

    The new scheme is still being worked out in detail.

    Mirage IV Aircraft
    Mr. Critchleyasked the Secretary of State for Air if he will consider the purchase from Sud Aviation of a number of Mirage IV aircraft for service in the Royal Air Force.
    Mr. J. Amery: We have, of course, considered the Mirage IV project, but have 'concluded that there is no need for us to buy it.

    TSR2 Aircraft
    Mr. Croninasked the Secretary of State for Air what consultations he has had with the Minister of Aviation with a view to expediting the entry of the TSR2 aircraft into squadron service in the Royal Air Force.
    Mr. Mulleyasked the Secretary of State for Air if he will take steps to expedite delivery of the TSR2 aircraft.
    Mr. J. Amery: Questions on development are, of course, for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation, but I am in close touch with him about the progress of work on the TSR2.
    We and the firm are naturally doing all we can to bring this very advanced aircraft into service as soon as possible.
    Mr. Cronin: Bearing in mind that the V-bomber force will be obsolete in the next two or three years, will the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that the bringing into service of the TSR2 is regarded as a matter of urgency?
    Mr. Amery: As I reject the assumption on which the hon. Gentleman bases his supplementary question, I should not like anything that I say to appear to give credence to the views which he seems to hold on this matter. However, we shall do everything we can to introduce the TSR2 as soon as possible, but it is not related to the V-force, and, indeed, is not regarded as either a substitute for a V-bomber or a supplement to the V-force.
    Mr. Mulley: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that it is about four years since we first heard about this aircraft in the Air Estimates? Will he either not talk about the aircraft or deliver it to the Royal Air Force? While we recognise that he has only part responsibility in this matter, is it not the case that often the Royal Air Force's change of mind about requirements is a factor in the delay in getting aircraft into service?
    Mr. Amery: With respect, I think that the hon. Gentleman misunderstands the position. The development of a modern aircraft takes anything from seven to ten years. Unless we can give the House some information on early trends in our thinking—and, as I say, it takes from seven to ten years before we can get the final result into service—we cannot be in a position to give hon. Members the information which they ought to have on which to base their judgments. I do not think that we should be taken to task because we have been talking about this aircraft for four years.
    Mr. G. Brown: The right hon. Gentleman was not in his present job then, but does he recall that when we began to
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    argue about this aircraft it was said that it was better to go for it than to try to stretch the Blackburn Buccaneer to suit an R.A.F. rôle? It was then said that the TSR2 would be available in service in 1964. Is the right hon. Gentleman now saying that there is no chance of that?
    Mr. Amery: I am not saying anything about delivery dates on this subject. All that I have said is that we regard this aircraft as a good aircraft, that we shall press on with plans for its introduction and that we think that it is progressing satisfactorily.
    Mr. Cronin: Is it not the case that the French already have in production the Mystere IV, which has a very similar performance to that of the TSR2?
    Mr. Amery: We think that the TSR2 is the only aircraft which will exactly fit our requirement in the time scale that we are considering.

    Transport Aircraft
    Mr. Croninasked the Secretary of State for Air how many Belfast transport aircraft he expects to have in service in 1964.
    Mr. J. Amery: I am not prepared to forecast the detailed phasing of deliveries so far ahead.
    Mr. Cronin: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the considerable disquiet which is felt about the introduction of the Belfast aircraft? Is it not the case that there have been second thoughts and that a larger form of Belfast aircraft is to be introduced in 1965 and 1966?
    Mr. G. Brown: In 1967 and 1968?
    Mr. Cronin: Bearing in mind that aft present we have no strategic transport aircraft of real efficiency, is this not a serious situation, and will the Secretary of State give it careful consideration?
    Mr. Amery: The hon. Member is once again making a false assumption. It is quite untrue to say that we have no good freighter aircraft. We have some extremely good freighter aircraft, as the Kuwait operation proved the other day.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Is my right hon. Friend aware that a number of his colleagues two or three years ago gave

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    delivery dates which, it is now obvious, will not be fulfilled for various technical reasons? As there may be a gap of at least five years before Britain has this type of heavy aircraft, even with the dumping of supplies in different paints of the Commonwealth, will my right hon. Friend consider the matter to see whether we cannot borrow from the Americans at peppercorn rent suitable aircraft to see us through what must be difficult months and years ahead?
    Mr. Amery: According to my information, there is no aircraft that we could borrow in the time scale that would fill the bill far which the Belfast is required. I should also point out that the Bill for which it is required—that is to say, the freight which it is expected to carry—will also not be in general service for some time. [Interruption.] Although the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) may consider this a cause for jest and laughter, it seems to me that it is an example of good planning, upon which hon. Members opposite so often pride themselves.
    Mr. G. Brown: Does the Secretary of State claim that it is good planning to have neither the things to carry nor the things with which to carry them?
    Several Hon. Members rose—
    Mr. Speaker: I hope that we can get on.
    Mr. Brown: Abolish the Air Force as well.
    Mr. Amery: Good planning is to match the equipment and the aircraft at the appropriate time.
    Mr. Mulleyasked the Secretary of State for Air if he will state all the types of aircraft available as strategic freighters and the maximum weight and size of equipment each can carry; what are his total requirements for future strategic freighter aircraft; and what steps he is taking to meet these.
    Mr. J. Amery: The Britannia, which has a door size of about 6ft. by 7ft., will carry 15 tons for 2,000 miles. The Hastings and the Beverley—and in future the Argosy—offer some freighting capability over the same range of between 2 and 4 tons. We shall later on need to be able to move bulkier loads too expensive to stockpile and for these we
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    have ordered the Belfast. As I have said, the Belfast will be in service by the time these requirements arise.
    Mr. Mulley: Does the Secretary of State claim that an aircraft that takes freight only through a door is really a freighter? Secondly, while one appreciates the right hon. Gentleman's concern in the distant future to have aircraft to match the equipment then coming forward, would it not be a good idea to have some strategic freighter capacity to move the equipment in the event of its being called upon to be moved within the next five years?
    Mr. Amery: We moved armoured cars to Kuwait. I would have thought that that showed that we had a freighter which worked.

  MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

    Defence Expenditure
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Minister of Defence what specific proposals he is considering for the reduction of defence expenditure; and to what extent they affect the nuclear weapons programme.
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Minister of Defence the approximate reduction in defence expenditure he now proposes to make.
    The Minister of Defence (Mr. Harold Watkinson): As my right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer told the House on 25th July, I have put in hand a review of the defence programme to see what can be done to save expenditure, especially overseas expenditure. I have no statement to make about this at present.
    Mr. Swingler: Is it not increasingly obvious that, in spite of collossal expenditure over the last few years, the Government are neither keeping pace in the nuclear arms race nor maintaining efficient conventional forces? Will the Minister therefore ensure that his review is a drastic reappraisal of the whole policy in order to produce a defence policy which the country can afford and believe in?
    Mr. Watkinson: The correct answer is to say that I do not agree with any of the bases of the hon. Member's

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    supplementary question, so I find difficulty in answering.
    Mr. Allaun: Is it not a fact that other Ministers have already announced serious cuts in housing, education and health? Is arms expenditure to be sacrosanct? Does the Minister remember that only recently, in the spring, he increased our arms expenditure by £40 million to the fantastic total of £1,660 million, or one-third of all Government expenditure? Would it not solve all our other problems if we could have a substantial cut here which would make war less likely, and not more likely, because it would reduce international tension?
    Mr. Watkinson: Perhaps when some other nations are willing to make major cuts in their armaments programme we will follow suit.
    Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that, however fantastic the present figure may be, many of us feel that there is a case for increasing rather than reducing defence expenditure in order properly to preserve the peace?
    Mr. Watkinson: There is much in what my hon. Friend says.
    15. Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Minister of Defence if, in view of the Changing nature of defence problems and the reductions now proposed by Her Majesty's Government in defence expenditure, he will issue a revised edition of the Defence White Papr.
    Mr. Watkinson: No, Sir.
    Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister recollect that when the Defence White Paper was debated in this House he argued that this was the minimum amount of money necessary for defence and that now the Chancellor of the Exchequer has issued a directive saying that it is necessary to out overseas military spending? Can the Minister say who is speaking for the Government? Which is the Government's point of view? Is the Minister speaking for the Government in this matter of policy, or is the Chancellor of the Exdhequer?
    Mr. Watkinson: The hon. Gentleman should refer to paragraph 12 of the White Paper which, he will see, solves his dilemma for him.

    Kuwait
    Mr. G. Brownasked the Minister of Defence if he will make a further statement on Kuwait.
    Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir. As the House knows, withdrawals of forces from Kuwait began early in July and continued during the month. I circulated a list of the major units involved in reply to a Question last Wednesday by my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro). We are, of course, anxious to withdraw more as soon as the situation allows. I hope that it will be possible to begin more rotations soon.
    Mr. Brown: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his statement. Can he say whether we have any up-to-date news about the three men who, unhappily, got lost? Having given the information of the withdrawal of major units, can the Minister confirm the figures that were extensively publicised last weekend that the total force left in Kuwait is now down to about 2,000 or 2,300 men? Thirdly, can he toil us something about the conditions of the men remaining there? Have the Kuwaiti authorities now agreed, for example, to open the schools, which are empty, so that our men can have the shelter that they would provide?
    Mr. Watkinson: Concerning the three men, I am afraid that I have nothing to add to the full statement made by my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, which indicated that as far as we know they have been well treated and looked after. We are trying to make contact with them and to see that they are released as soon as possible. I know that the right hon. Gentleman does not want me to give a precise figure of the troops now in Kuwait. I can, however, say that they have been very largely reduced and, probably, more than halved from the original force that was there. I have had a further report on the welfare of the men. I understand from the Commander-in-Chief that all his needs are being met and that he is satisfied, from the point of view of amenities, medical care and all the rest that he has everything he needs to look after them properly.

    British Forces, Germany
    Mr. Chetwyndasked the Minister of Defence what action he is taking to bring the British forces in Germany up to establishment.
    Mr. Watkinson: Final decisions as to the reinforcement of British forces in Germany will not be taken until after the Foreign Ministers' meeting early in August. At this meeting we shall hope to concert plans with our Allies on the steps to be taken to strengthen the N.A.T.O. Alliance.
    Mr. Chetwynd: In view of all the conflicting reports about the use of Territorials and Special Reservists, can the Minister confirm that these measures are no substitute for political action, which is the only way to settle this problem? Can he say whether we shall be diminishing the strength of our Strategic Reserve by using these men?
    Mr. Watkinson: There are many supplementary questions there. Perhaps I may answer by saying this. As the hon. Gentleman will see from my Answer, the detailed plans about how the N.A.T.O. allies may be strengthened must, in our view, await the meeting of the Foreign Secretaries. Naturally, in the meantime, we are looking over the possibilities. We have asked General Cassells to examine the strength of his forces and see what reasonable reinforcements he should receive and to take all the necessary preliminary steps. What I want to make plain is that the Government are not committed to any firm and decisive action until after the Foreign Secretaries have looked at the political situation.
    Mr. Lipton: Is it not a fact nevertheless that the Rhine Army is so many thousands of men under establishment that in order to bring it up to full establishment some, at least, of the Reserve will have to be called up?
    Mr. Watkinson: No. I do not necessarily agree with the hon. Member's view. As I have said before, what steps we shall take in this way are not likely to be announced until after the Foreign Secretaries have met.

    Civil Defence
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Minister of Defence, in view of paragraphs 39 to 42 of the Defence White
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    Paper, to what extent he discussed developments in civil defence with the United States Minister of Defence during the latter's recent visit: and what changes he proposes.
    Mr. Watkinson: None, Sir.
    Mr. Hughes: Is it not rather extraordinary that no question of defending the civil population should have been discussed between Mr. McNamara and the Minister? Is he aware that today's papers carry a statement by Mr. McNamara that 50 million people might be killed if an H-bomb were to hit the U.S.A. and that 10 million people could be saved by deep shelters and a defence policy based on that? Are we to assume, then, that the United States Government think these are essentials and what Mr. Kennedy says are the minimum for survival, but that our Government are doing nothing about it?
    Mr. Watkinson: On the contrary, earlier this year in the defence debate a considerable increase in expenditure on civil defence was announced.
    Mr. S. Silverman: Does the right hon. Gentleman still stand by statements by himself and all his predecessors in that office that in the event of nuclear war the civil population of this country could not be defended at all? Is that still true?
    Mr. Watkinson: The general proposition that there is not yet satisfactory defence against the missile remains, and, therefore, if the missile is carrying a nuclear warhead, there is no means of stopping its arrival. However, of course, certain measures could be taken to minimise loss of life and casualties. Those steps are being taken, apparently, in the U.S.A., and will be taken here.
    Mr. Hughes: When? And in deep shelters?

    South Africa
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Minister of Defence whether a settlement has now been reached with the South African Government as to future defence arrangements; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Watkinson: I have nothing to add at present to the reply I made on 19th July to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway).
    Mr. Thomson: Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that he will make a full statement when these defence talks are concluded? Would he consider very carefully, apart from general defence matters, that there should be no question of sending to the Republic of South Africa small arms which might be used in the imposition of the racial policy of apartheid?
    Mr. Watkinson: As the hon Gentleman knows, defence talks are only a relatively small part of the very complicated talks on the new status of South Africa. These are still going on. I imagine that a statement will be made on them when they are concluded, which will take account of any defence interests.
    Mr. Marquand: Yes, but cannot the right hon. Gentleman answer the latter part of my hon. Friend's Supplementary question? In view of repeated statements by two Ministers of Defence in South Africa, would the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that no small arms are going to be supplied to that country for the purpose, for example, of repressing a revolt, if such should start?
    Mr. Watkinson: I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman knows, for this answer has been given a good many times in this House recently, that we do not announce in this House either for or against sales of any particular types of arms to another country.
    Mr. Marquand: Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise no difference, then, between the supply, for example, of naval vessels, and of small arms, the purpose of which we know very well in this country?
    Mr. Watkinson: That is a different question.

  TRANSPORT

    Motor Cyclists (Training Scheme)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Transport if he will now make a statement on the expansion of the Royal Automobile Club and the Auto-Cycle Union scheme to train learner motorcyclists and scooter riders through tuition arrangements at motor-cycle clubs; and
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    what will be the increased Government grants for this purpose.
    The Minister of Transport (Mr. Ernest Marples): I am in touch with the Royal Automobile Club about an expansion of this most valuable scheme, but I am not at the moment in a position to make any further statement.
    Mr. Brockway: While welcoming that statement from the Minister, may I ask whether he is aware, first, that the rate of accidents of motor cyclists during their first six months is equal to that during the next two years of their experience, and that it is tremendously important from the point of view of saving life that these experiments should be expedited? Will he resist any effort by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to reduce expenditure upon this necessary activity?
    Mr. Marples: I am quite well aware that it is necessary to save as many lives as possible, and the motor cyclist is in an extremely vulnerable position. This scheme of the R.A.C. has done a great deal of good. They submitted some pro-proposals to me, and I in my turn have submitted some proposals to them of a rather different nature. We are now considering all these.

    British Transport Commission
    Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieuasked the Minister of Transport if he will give a general direction to the British Transport Commission that it should deal with all complaints when informed that unsatisfactory replies have been received from the regions.
    Mr. Marples: No, Sir. This is a matter of administration for the British Transport Commission to decide.
    Mr. Mallalieu: Is the Minister not aware that several Members of Parliament have received very discourteous replies from Dr. Beeching when they have put complaints to him? Is he aware that I have been told by Dr. Beeching that he has no time to deal with complaints and will I not trouble him further? Would it not be a good idea if the right hon. Gentleman told Dr. Beeching that one of the points of a public service is that it should serve the public?
    Mr. Marples: I read part of a letter which Dr. Beeching sent to the hon. Member in The People on the same day that I read an article by the hon. Member. I read both most carefully. I believe that Dr. Beeching probably wants to delegate individual complaints so that he can concentrate on major policy. The larger the business the more important is the excellent principle of delegation.
    Mr. Strauss: While not being aware of the correspondence between my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, East (Mr. J. P. W. Mallalieu) and Dr. Beeching, may I ask whether it is not the fact that in the past, under Sir Brian Robertson, the relationship between Members and the Chairman of the Commission have been extremely good and every courtesy has been extended to Members of the House? Will the right hon. Gentleman look into the matter and ensure that the same tradition will continue under Dr. Beeching?
    Mr. Marples: I am sure that Dr. Beeching will be courteous, but at the same time it is usual in major tasks to delegate questions of individual complaints. I think that that is a matter for Dr. Beeching's judgment.
    Mr. Dugdale: Is it not true that the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer who have a large amount of work to do delegate functions but at the same time have time to answer Members?
    Mr. Marples: That may be the case, but Dr. Beeching has taken over a large administration employing well over half a million people and this is a matter for him.
    Hon. Members: Silly.

    Direction Indicators
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Minister of Transport with which countries discussions are taking place to reach international agreement on a suitable and practicable range of intensities for traffic direction indicator lights; by whom such discussions were initiated; when they began; and whether any steps have been taken, in consultation with the manufacturers' and users' organisations,
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    to formulate a standard acceptable to the United Kingdom Government.
    Mr. Marples: An international working party has since February, 1960, been investigating the intensities suitable for direction indicators by day and by night; it consists of technical experts from the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and most Western European countries. Agreed recommendations were reached in April last which will in due course be submitted to the appropriate Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe. I propose to await the outcome of consideration by the Commission before deciding what standard of light intensity should be adopted in the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Johnson: Is it really necessary to await this international agreement, which is taking such a very long time, about a matter which requires urgent action to deal with it at home?
    Mr. Marples: I think that any regulations about the intensity of light ought to be international in standard because of the way motor cars interchange and go through all the European countries nowadays.
    Dame Irene Ward: Can my right hon. Friend tell us how many reports he is awaiting from various committees before the House goes into Recess? It is very important to know how many reports we shall be likely to be getting before long.
    Mr. Speaker: The Question is about traffic direction indicator lights.
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Minister of Transport if she will state the number of accidents during the past two years attributable to the unnecessary brilliance of traffic direction indicator lights; and whether the problem has been the subject of investigation at the Road Research Laboratory.
    Mr. Marples: No figures are available of the number of accidents attributable to the cause mentioned by my hon. Friend. Representatives of the Road Research Laboratory have been taking an active part in international discussions aimed at producing acceptable intensity levels both by day and by night.
    Mr. Johnson: Would my right hon. Friend agree that it is common knowledge that in many cases direction indicators are far too bright and that they not only cause a lot of inconvenience but can very easily lead to accidents?
    Mr. Marples: Yes, Sir. It is for that reason that the matter is being studied. The real problem is to get an unmistakable signal in bright sunlight and at the same time avoid dazzle at night.

    Driving Licences
    Mr. Peytonasked the Minister of Transport if he will introduce a system of graduated driving licences which would have regard to the speed and power of the vehicle.
    Mr. Marples: My hon. Friend's proposal would require legislation, but I am keeping it under review.
    Mr. Peyton: Is my right hon. Friend aware that many people will hope very much that he will give this very sensible idea clue and careful consideration, particularly as it originated in a supplementary answer which he gave to me?
    Mr. Marples: I am certainly attracted by the idea. I was very disappointed when I found that there was no statutory power for me to do anything about it.

    Car Rallies
    Mr. B. Harrisonasked the Minister of Transport if he will take powers to control car rallies in the interest of public safety and amenity.
    Mr. Goughasked the Minister of Transport in view of the inconvenience caused to local residents, if he will take powers to regulate motor rallies organised to take place during weekends and the hours of darkness.
    Mr. Marples: I am satisfied that, so far as safety is concerned, the provisions of the Road Traffic Act are already sufficient. I recognise that there may be an amenity problem, and I am considering whether any additional controls are desirable or possible.
    Mr. Harrison: Will my right hon. Friend do something about it? Is he aware that there is a club in the Thames
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    estuary which has had a rally through the north of Essex in July each year for three consecutive years despite complaints from the chief constable? Is he also aware that there is a growing number of complaints about this matter?
    Mr. Marples: If my hon. Friend will send me details I will consult the police to see whether we can get rid of the disturbance.

    Vehicle Tests
    Sir B. Jannerasked the Minister of Transport whether he is aware that, in Leicestershire and elsewhere, certificates have recently been given for cars more than 10 years old, which are unsafe for use; and what steps he proposes to take in order to ensure that a more efficient test shall be applied before certificates are granted.
    Mr. Marples: Four cases of this kind in the Leicester area have been reported to my officers and have been thoroughly investigated; for the country as a whole the total is negligible in relation to the number of vehicles tested. Borderline cases are bound to occur, but the safeguards embodied in the scheme have proved themselves adequate to secure a very high degree of efficiency and uniformity.
    Sir B. Janner: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that an inspector has stated categorically that cars have been passed when their lights, brakes and steering have been efficient even though their chassis have been so rotten as to make the cars completely unsafe? Does he propose to do something definite to make it clear to garages that they must not pass cars of that description?
    Mr. Marples: In that case, which occurred in the Leicester area, we made that clear to the garage concerned.
    Mr. Strauss: Has the right hon. Gentleman read the authoritative article in The Times last week in which it was pointed out that a car was turned down by four garages, all for different reasons, and passed by a fifth, which indicates that the examination by the testing garages at the moment is wholly inadequate? What steps is he taking to deal with the matter?
    Mr. Marples: Every single complaint that comes in is investigated. The difficulty about newspaper reports is that details are so vague that they are not enough to permit the carrying out of any investigations.

  ROADS

    Hammersmith Flyover (Car Parking)
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Minister of Transport to what extent the space under the Hammersmith flyover will be used as a car park in order to relieve local parking congestion and to encourage visitors to London to leave their cars at Hammersmith and use the underground railway into central London.
    Mr. Marples: I have no power to provide permanent facilities for oft-street car parking. I understand, however, that the local authority have plans for a car park to hold about 60 cars under the Hammersmith Flyover south of St. Paul's Church. They are considering whether any other areas would be suitable for that purpose, but the number of roads passing beneath the flyover severely limits the space available.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that under this Hammer. smith Ridgeway there really is a lot of space which is suitable for car parking and that it would be an ideal place—if he could persuade the local authority—for an experiment to get motorists to leave their cars there when coming into London?
    Mr. Marples: I will draw the attention of Hammersmith Borough Council to my hon. Friend's remarks.

    Pity Me, Durham (By-Pass)
    Mr. Shortasked the Minister of Transport why the Pity Me by-pass on the A.1 road in Durham has not been constructed with a double carriageway.
    Mr. Marples: This by-pass is on the section of A.1 which will be replaced as a principal through route to the North by the Durham motorway. A three lane carriageway should be adequate for the traffic when the motorway is in use.
    Mr. Short: Is not this a rather barmy way of doing things?
    Mr. G. Brown: Well, he is a barmy Minister.
    Mr. Short: Would it not have been much better when he was building this road to have made it a double carriageway? Is it not the only part of A.1 built in recent years which is not a double carriageway and will it not be many years before the Durham motorway, apart from the Durham by-pass, is constructed?
    Mr. Marples: No, I think this motorway when constructed will be adequate. It would have been folly to have put a motorway down and to have spent money on it when it was not needed, and I am sure that the Durham by-pass and motorway will draw the main traffic now using this road.
    29. Mr. Greyasked the Minister of Transport why he was unable to accept the Durham Council's invitation to perform the opening ceremony of the Pity Me by-pass.
    Mr. Marples: While recognising the importance of this scheme, I regret that the many demands on my time prevented me from accepting the county council's invitation.
    Mr. Grey: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is aware that, while not discrediting the person who actually performed the ceremony and indeed paying a tribute to him because the visit was very well received, there is still a wide expression of opinion in Durham that either the right hon. Gentleman or his Parliamentary Secretary should have accepted this invitation? Is he also aware that this is not only because there is a general feeling about his not coming but because there is a feeling that he was rather mean in making this a three-lane carriageway instead of a dual carriageway when in the previous two years 107 miles of dual carriageway have been built right up to Durham and then the right hon. Gentleman begins to do something different?
    Mr. Marples: I did not intend any discourtesy. It was merely that there was no time to accept the invitation.

    Darlington By-Pass and Durham Motorways
    Mr. Greyasked the Minister of Transport when it is expected that the principal route for through traffic by the Darlington by-pass and Durham motorways will be completed.
    Mr. Marples: It is too soon to say. The draft scheme extending the line of the Darlington by-pass is open to objection until 5th August. There are then other statutory processes to be completed. I hope, however, that construction of three major bridges on the bypass will begin before the end of this financial year. A draft scheme for the Durham motorway will be published shortly. The project is being prepared as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Grey: Is the Minister aware that it has been stated that one of the excuses for making the A.1 by-pass into a three-lane carriageway was that the new motorway was coming into being? Can we have an assurance, therefore, that the recent cuts in expenditure announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer will have no effect on this road?
    Mr. Marples: I can give the hon. Member that assurance, and I can assure him that we hope to start work this autumn on the three bridges which are an essential preliminary to this motorway. I think that that will assure the hon. Member that we are moving very fast indeed.

    Loampit Vale, Lewisham (Car Parking)
    Mr. Chatawayasked the Minister of Transport what proposals he has for the provision of a general car park to be included in the redevelopment plan for Loampit Vale, Lewisham.
    Mr. Marples: I have made no proposals myself. The power to provide off-street car parks rests with local authorities. This redevelopment is a London County Council matter. I know of proposals to the council by the Lewisham Chamber of Commerce, but my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government answered a question from my hon. Friend about them yesterday.
    Mr. Chataway: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in a letter dated the 11th November from his Department it was stated that London County Council intended to provide this car park? Is he aware that it has now been made clear by the L.C.C. that it does not intend to provide these parking facilities which are desperately needed in Lewisham? In view of that earlier letter, what action does my right hon. Friend propose to take?
    Mr. Marples: I am not aware of an earlier letter and, as my hon. Friend has not given me notice that he would raise it, I am afraid that I cannot discuss it now.

    London-Yorkshire Motorway
    Sir B. Jannerasked the Minister of Transport whether he will now make a further statement on the progress made with regard to the construction of the Leicester portion of the London-Yorkshire motorway.
    Mr. Marples: I have nothing to add at present to the Answer I gave to the hon. Member on 21st June.
    Sir B. Janner: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his answer is shocking? Has he received a communication from the Leicester Chamber of Commerce asking him to deal with the matter at once because it is interfering with productivity, goods are not reaching the docks in time and, consequently large orders are being lost? Why does he not hurry up with the matter after seven years?
    Mr. Marples: I am following the procedure laid down by Parliament, which is that when we publish a side road order we have to wait three months for objections. I can only do what Parliament has laid down.
    Sir B. Janner: In view of the wholly unsatisfactory reply, I propose to raise this matter again at an early date.

  SHIPPING

    New Cunard Liner
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Transport if he will now announce the details of the mutual agreement between the Cunard Company and

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    Her Majesty's Government, made by him in accordance with paragraph 26 of the Memorandum of Points of Agreement, Command Paper No. 1319; and to which shipyards work on contracts and subcontracts in connection with the new Cunard liner have been allocated.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport (Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett): The tenders were returnable on 31st July and were opened yesterday. Their evaluation by Cunard and the Ministry has therefore only just begun. The final detailed agreement will not be ready until a later stage.
    Mr. Hughes: Does the Minister not realise that many shipyards are waiting in suspense for the gigantic orders which may flow from this amazing, untimely and unexpected plan of Government opulence?
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: Yes, I think we do recognise that, and we hope to be ready some time in October with the evaluation of the tenders, after which we shall get on as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Ridleyasked the Minister of Transport, in view of the fact that the majority of the shareholders of the Cunard White Star Company have declared themselves against the building of a new "Queen" liner, whether he will withdraw the offer of a public loan to that company.
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: No, Sir. I understand that the facts are not as my hon. Friend alleges.
    Mr. Ridley: Is my hon. and gallant Friend not aware that of those who replied to the questionnaire 93 per cent. voted against the project? When such a large proportion of those replying were against it, when the House is uneasy about the project, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer is calling for a great deal of cutting of expenditure, is it not time that this project was reconsidered?
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: No, Sir. I understand that Mr. Gregory, who leads the opposition of shareholders, simply declared that he had the support of 10 per cent. or more, which is sufficient for him to requisition a special meeting of the company. But that is very different from saying that the majority of shareholders are opposed to the project. At
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    the recent annual meeting the project was endorsed.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: If the Government persist in spending £18 million of public money on this plan, will the Minister at least see that the money is fairly distributed among the many shipyards which are in need of the work and which are capable and willing to do it?
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: I am not sure that I follow the point made by the hon. and learned Member. I am afraid that it is not possible to award a contract to more than one shipbuilder or, in the case of Swan Hunter, to two tendering jointly.

    Docks and Harbours (Report)
    Mr. G. Wilsonasked the Minister of Transport when he expects to receive the report of the Rochdale Committee inquiring into the adequacy of docks and harbours; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Websterasked the Minister of Transport when he expects to receive the report of the Rochdale Committee into major docks and harbours; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Marples: The Committee is fully aware of the importance and urgency of its task and is making good progress, but it will be some time before its Report can be expected.
    Mr. Wilson: Will my right hon. Friend agree that nothing would help the export trade more than an improvement in the efficiency of our docks? Would he keep a watch on this and expedite the report as quickly as possible?
    Mr. Marples: I can assure this House that Lord Rochdale is extremely anxious to complete this as soon as possible because of the very urgency of the need for it, but I am bound to point out to the House that it is a big subject which requires a great deal of study.
    Mr. Webster: Bearing in mind that 99 per cent. of the country's exports still go through the docks of this country, is my right hon. Friend aware that the decision of the Port of London Authority to increase the Tilbury Dock Scheme by £20 million is to be welcomed, and is he also

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    aware that it is necessary to improve both management and labour techniques in the docks of this country?
    Mr. Marples: I realise the importance of that. That is why the terms of reference were drawn so wide, so that Lord Rochdale could include that in his inquiry.
    Mr. Mellish: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his reply will give satisfaction to the workers and employers because it is necessary that the terms of reference should be wide, because this is a vast industry and we do not want a botched-up report but a report which will really be helpful to both sides?
    Mr. Marples: I agree. From the time of the appointment of the Committee I made it clear that it was not for witch-hunting and trying to apportion blame in any way, but for an inquiry into Management, mechanical handling, construction of docks, labour—every single thing possibly connected with docks.

    Nuclear Propulsion
    Mr. Wallasked the Minister of Transport if he will now make a statement about the development of a nuclear-propelled merchant vessel.
    Mr. Willeyasked the Minister of Transport whether he will make a further statement on the development of a nuclear-powered merchant ship.
    Mr. Marples: I regret that I am still not in a position to make a statement.
    Mr. Wall: Is my right hon. Friend aware that his replies to this question in recent months have become very pessimistic from the point of view of those Who want to see a prototype at sea? Now that my right hon. Friend has had tenders in hand for a whole year, when will he make up his mind about it? Will there be a statement during the Recess?
    Mr. Marples: I am afraid that this must be considered and is now being discussed in the light of the Chancellor's statement.
    Hon. Members: Oh.
    Mr. Wiley: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that now that Euratom
    1470
    is conducting projects in Germany, Holland, France and Italy, it would be quite disastrous if we abandoned this race? If the right hon. Gentleman is constitutionally unable to make a decision, will he ask the Prime Minister to designate another Minister who is able to make a decision?
    Mr. Marples: I am afraid that the hon. Member is not right about marine nuclear power in Europe. My information is not the same as his, but I will make a decision as quickly as possible.
    Mr. Strauss: As the right hon. Gentleman is so constantly postponing decisions on major policy, may I ask whether it would not be a good idea if he changed the name of his Department to the "Ministry of Procrastination"?
    Mr. Marples: That might have been true at some time when certain people were present in the Ministry, but not now.

    Shipbuilding (Credit Facilities)
    Mr. Albuasked the Minister of Transport what evidence he has of the credit terms being offered by shipbuilders overseas as a result of which British shipbuilders are losing orders.
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: For export orders foreign shipbuilders are frequently offering credit for seven years after delivery, and sometimes for longer periods, covering 50 per cent. to 80 per cent. of the cost of the ship. The improved facilities from the Export Credits Guarantee Department are helping British shipbuilders to offer comparable terms for export orders. But no case has so far come to our notice of a British shipowner placing an order abroad simply because of credit terms, but I hope the investigation which Messrs. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell are carrying out will throw more light on the subject.
    Mr. Albu: The hon. and gallant Gentleman said that there was no evidence that British ship owners are buying vessels abroad because of the credit terms offered by foreign shipbuilders, but is there any evidence that foreign shipbuilders are offering terms to foreign

    1471
    ship owners which are causing British shipbuilders to lose business with foreign ship owners?
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: Certainly, the credit terms are easier in many of the Continental yards with their own owners than they are here. I am not quite sure that I follow the second part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question.
    Mr. Albu: I asked whether British shipbuilders are losing orders to foreign ship owners because of the credit terms being offered by foreign shipbuilding yards.
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: That is one of the things about which we hope to obtain more definite information from the present inquiry.

    South Africa
    Mr. Rankinasked the Minister of Transport what action he intends to take following his study of the legal position of South Africa in relation to the Commonwealth Merchant Shipping Agreement; and if he will make a statement.
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: The legal position of South Africa in relation to the Commonwealth Merchant Shipping Agreement is under examination with the South African Government. It would not, however, appear to have any bearing on the present activities of British ships in South Africa.
    Mr. Rankin: That is not the point. If I follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman correctly, can South Africa use her legal position or any legal quirk to prevent the modification of this agreement?
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: If the hon. Gentleman is referring to the Canadian shipping regulations, I would reply that in our view South Africa's consent is no longer necessary to the variation of the agreement.
    Mr. Rankin: Then is it the case that we can expect a modification of this agreement to go through, and as that is of consequence to this country, what consultations has the hon. and gallant Gentleman had with the Canadian Government and what representation did he make to them?
    Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: That is another question.
    Mr. Rankin: Oh.

  RAILWAYS

    Great Central Line
    Mr. Darlingasked the Minister of Transport when, and for what purposes, he approved the cost of major works on the Great Central line between Woodford Halse and Rugby at a cost of over £250,000.
    Mr. Marples: I am informed that no works requiring my approval have been carried out on this section of the Great Central line.
    Mr. Darling: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that for years now this stretch of line has been closed on Sundays and when one writes to the various officials concerned to find out why, one receives quite different replies? Is he aware that passengers who use this line are under the impression, and they have great evidence for it, that the work is not necessary and that the line is being closed to try to prove to the public that there are no passengers on it and, therefore, it can be closed altogether? Is he aware that in this holiday period the railway officials have chosen to close the line, causing great inconvenience at this time to the travelling public, for a succession of about ten Sundays, but that the railway workers cannot tell us what is being done? Is it not time that there was an investigation into this matter?
    Mr. Marples: I am informed that the line has two tracks and that the work being carried out is for maintenance and is not a major operation. When a ballast train is occupying one track it is necessary to close the line and substitute a bus service. I am informed that Sunday closing is now less frequent.
    Mr. Darling: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is no evidence that any work is being done at all on the line? Is he aware that the line is closed so frequently that the track could have been taken up and put down again a dozen times?
    Mr. Marples: The Commission has spent about £200,000 in the last four years in maintenance work.

    PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL WORKERS
    Mr. Boydenasked the Prime Minister if his attention has been drawn to the recent resolution of the Association of Education Committees urging the implementation of the recommendations of the Underwood Committee in 1955 concerning the training of an adequate number of persons for work as educational psychologists and psychiatric social workers; and if he will ensure that immediate action is taken by the several appropriate Government departments to provide adequate training facilities and financial inducements for recruits.
    The Home Secretary (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have been asked to reply. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"]
    My right hon. Friends are anxious to increase the supply of qualified child guidance staff and have the questions of training facilities and financial assistance under constant review. A new university course for educational psychologists is expected to start this autumn. Two further university courses for psychiatric social workers have been provided during the last year.
    Salaries for these workers in the National Health Service were increased from 1st November, 1959, and a claim for a further increase is being considered by the appropriate Whitley Council.
    Mr. Boyden: Is the right hon. Gentleman not aware that this has been under consideration for at least six years, and many more years before that? Can he not, for example, undertake to release on full salary suitable people in the Government service and the local government service so that suitable people can be put into courses without money being paid?
    Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir; we will consider this and any other proposal made to my right hon. Friends.
    Mr. Lipton: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how the Prime Minister is today?

PRESS (D NOTICES)
Mr. G. Brown: With your permission, Mr. Speaker, may I make a submission to you on a matter which is of considerable interest to the House?
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Yesterday, it came to my attention that a notice had been issued to the Press and to the B.B.C. indicating a wide change in the procedure under which reference may be made to any work connected, however remotely, with defence matters. I sought yesterday, before 2.30 p.m., to submit a Question to the Prime Minister, asking whether this notice was issued with his authority, and whether, in view of the wide procedural change, he would consider it.
The Question was declined by the Table Office on the ground that the matter appeared to be secret. The submission I wish to make is that the notice itself deals only with procedural matters, making a change which, on the face of it, would seem to impose a very wide black-out in future on any news which may be raised under this matter.
On 11th May last, Questions were accepted in the House and answered by the Prime Minister on the general issue of Ministerial responsibility for D notices and their general impact. My submission is that, since this particular notice includes no secret matter—being itself a procedural matter—if we were prevented from raising it with the Government we would be thereby submitting to a complete black-out of news about issues of tremendous importance that may involve the expenditure of vast sums of money, and would have no future occasion on which to raise it, since nothing else would arise because the notice would not make any announcements. I therefore submit that to refuse a Question in these circumstances is to make tremendous inroads on the rights of this House on a matter of great importance.
Mr. Speaker: The right hon. Gentleman and the House will know, I am sure, how anxious I am—indeed, how anxious we all are—that the service we give to hon. Members in the matter of Questions is as perfect as could be. I am afraid that I have not had long enough to consider this matter. There has not been very much time since it first came to my attention.
I am bound to say that, on the face of it, there are some difficulties about the right hon. Gentleman's proposition. If necessary, I will come back to him and invite further information from him, if I may, in private circumstances. I would

1475
be grateful for a further opportunity to consider this, as I have not had much time.
Mr. Brown: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker. I drew this matter to your attention as soon as I knew of the notice. I am in some difficulty. On Friday, we rise for the Summer Recess, so that tomorrow is the last occasion on which I could ask the Prime Minister a Question this side of the Recess. Had my Question been accepted, it would have reached the Prime Minister in the ordinary way tomorrow. There are now difficulties about this. If it transpired later in the day that you felt that this Question could, because of its nature, be permitted, would you be able to arrange an opportunity for me to raise it tomorrow?
Mr. Speaker: There is some difficulty about that. I will think about it, but the time would seem to have gone by. For obvious reasons, I cannot get it in now. I do not think that I can get it in today, but I will consider what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I will try not to defeat his intentions unless my duties oblige me to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS ACCOMMODATION (COMMITTEE'S REPORT)
Mr. Speaker: I have a statement to make to the House about the further recommendations which have been made to me by the Committee advising us about accommodation. I shall endeavour to summarise them, as I am anxious not to trespass unduly on the time of the House.
The Committee proposes that the roof space over the Committee rooms upstairs could provide accommodation not only for the Fees Office and the Clerk of the House, as was previously recommended, but also 51 rooms for the use of individual Members, and two large rooms and a rest room for a total of 25 secretaries. A new lift would be provided, close to the existing lift to the Upper Committee Corridor.
I understand that the roof space scheme would be by far the most costly of the improvements which have been
1476
under consideration by the Minister of Works, who is, I understand, answering a Question today about the timing of this scheme.
The Committee has also recommended that the accommodation in Westminster Hall now occupied by the Fees Office should be used as a Members' desk room.
In order to save the time of the House, I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT details of other recommendations made by the Committee for rearranging the accommodation of the Library and for providing additional accommodation for the staff of HANSARD, the Press and B.B.C., two Clerks Assistant, book storage and lavatories. The rearrangement of the Library accommodation is acceptable to the Library Committee.
The House will wish me once again to thank the Chairman and members of the Committee for their labours in the service of the House and for the great amount of work that they have done.
Sir J. Duncan: May I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for that statement and say, in return, that the Committee—and, I am sure, the whole House, particularly the Library Committee—will be extremely grateful to you for allocating certain rooms below your house for the service of the Library.
Mr. George Craddock: While I am grateful to learn that steps are at last being taken to improve the amenities of the House, Mr. Speaker, I am satisfied that the amenities for hon. Members are in a rotten condition. What I do not understand, from a Written Answer from the Minister of Works, is that a second lift does not appear to be on the horizon. Some hon. Members, for the past four years, have had to climb to the top of this building because there has only been one lift and often that has been out of commission.
When we returned to the House after the General Election of 1959, even the lift man was taken off and, as some hon. Members do not seem to be capable of closing the gates after them, other hon. Members have to continue to walk up to the top of the building. This happens frequently. The lift was out of order only last week and it is high time—and this should be a priority—that a second

1477
lift was installed to the Upper Committee Corridor. This is a very serious matter. I know that an important debate is to follow—
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. Speaker: Order, The hon. Gentleman will forgive me. I understand and appreciate his difficulties about moving in a vertical plane. I do not desire to be frivolous. He has been to see me about it. But he will understand my difficulty. I cannot answer for the Minister of Works, and I cannot allow this matter to be debated now, because there is no Question before the House.
Following are the details of the other recommendations:
The Committee recommended that the existing rooms in the Central Block should be left virtually unaltered, but that the present corridor should be widened and used to provide additional dictating cubicles for the staff of HANSARD. In addition, they recommend that space should be allotted in the North Block for two bedrooms and a joint bathroom for the two Clerks Assistant. It is recommended that the North and South cross-wings should be used for book storage and that the existing Tea Room stairs should be extended to the Upper Committee Corridor with a mezzanine floor suitable for a desk room for three Members and additional lavatory accommodation.
The space on the ground floor of Mr. Speaker's house which he has made available for the use of the House should be allocated to the Library staff. who should also retain rooms 42 to 44 in the North Curtain Corridor. In exchange, the Library should surrender "The Times" Room, which could then be divided and provide two rooms for other uses.
Finally, the Committee make proposals for some additional accommodation for the Press and the B.B.C. They recommend that the Press should have an additional room adjacent to the present Press Gallery rooms and that the accommodation at present occupied by the B.B.C. should be extended by some 50 per cent.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (MOTION AND AMENDMENTS)
Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I apologise to the House and to the Prime Minister for delaying the important debate which we are about to have, but I want to submit to you two connected and short points of order before we begin.
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On 28th June, I moved a Motion about the European Common Market, and looking at the terms of that Motion it seems to me to cover all the points that are raised in today's Motion and the proposed Amendments to it.
My Motion was in the following terms:
"That this House, being gravely concerned at the pressure to make this country enter a European common market and the consequent threat to subject its independence, its membership of the Comonwealth and its right and power to plan its economy in its own way, to a political union with Germany, France, Italy and Benelux, as well as at the threat to the survival of the Commonwealth inherent in these proposals, urges Her Majesty's Government not to enter into any negotiations concerning such entry until expressly empowered so to do by a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and by this House."
At the end of the debate, HANSARD records:
"It being Ten o'clock. the debate stood adjourned."
you, Sir, having indicated that it would not be right for the Closure to be moved, there being points of view which had not been adequately covered in that debate.
The point which I am putting to you is whether the Motion and Amendments now on the Order Paper do not now offend against our rule against anticipation, the other Motion, covering exactly the same ground, standing adjourned.
The second point I put to you, in the event that the Motion and the Amendments on the Order Paper do not offend against the rule against anticipation and are, therefore, in order, is that the only Amendment on the Order Paper which is a direct challenge and opposition to the Government Motion is that standing in my name and the names of my hon. Friends, namely, to leave out from "House" to the end to add:
"regrets the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, as being calculated to intensify the cold war, perpetuate the division of Europe, destroy the effectivness of the Commonwealth and fatally impair the United Kingdom's power to plan its industry and agriculture, to assist underdeveloped countries and to further world security and peace".
I and the House would be grateful to you if you could indicate which Amendments you propose to call, Sir.
Mr. Speaker: The answer to the first part of the submission of the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. Silverman) is that in applying the rule against anticipation I am required to take into account the reasonable prospect of the matter being further debated. I am in some difficulty in imagining that the hon. Member's Motion has much reasonable prospect in the circumstances.
Selection is a matter for me, and I propose to select the Amendment which stands in the names of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and other right hon. and hon. Members. I am in the happy position that, so far as I can see, everything that is is desired to be said in support of the other Amendments can be said upon the issues then arising. I will not blackmail myself in any way, but I will bear in mind the fact that the hon. Member has an Amendment on the Order Paper.

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
3.42 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I beg to move,
That this House supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association; and further accepts the undertaking of Her Majesty's Government that no agreement affecting these special interests or involving British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been approved by this House after full consultation with other Commonwealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally agree.
We must all agree that the problems involved in the future of our relations with Europe are among the most difficult and the most important that the nation has ever had to face. The moment of decision, however, has not yet come. What the House is now asked to do is to support the Government's proposal to initiate negotiations on the Common Market within the terms of the Motion. When those negotiations are completed one way or the other, the House will have to pass judgment.
The underlying issues, European unity, the future of the Commonwealth, the strength of the free world, are all of capital importance, and it is because we firmly believe that the United Kingdom has a positive part to play in their development—for they are all related—that we ask the House to approve what we are doing.
After the last war, the process of reconciliation in Europe was itself a deliberate and positive act in which forbearance and even forgiveness played their part. It first took, I remember, a dramatic form when, in 1950, the German delegates were admitted to the Council of Europe. At that time, my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) conceived the notion of what he called the three interlocking groups, Britain and the Commonwealth, Europe, and the New World. He spoke of them, I remember, as three leaves of a piece of clover, or, again, as three intersecting circles. Of course, he was right in his analysis, but ever since then we have been, in one

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way or another, trying to find a practical solution to the problem of their interconnection.
N.A.T.O. brought together thirteen nations of Europe, one great Commonwealth country—Canada—and the United States in an alliance partly military, partly political. The other Commonwealth countries took no part, not because they did not sympathise with our purpose—many of them certainly did—but because they were distant from the Atlantic area. Some nations of Europe, like Sweden, remained neutral, partly through their tradition and partly through their position. In the O.E.E.C., the European group was somewhat widened to include countries such as Switzerland. Again, in the Council of Europe, we had another slight variation.
Meanwhile, there has grown up the practical application of the aspirations towards unity in continental Europe by the formation of the European Economic Community. I ask hon. Members to note the word "economic". The Treaty of Rome does not deal with defence. It does not deal with foreign policy. It deals with trade and some of the social aspects of human life which are most connected with trade and production.
Whatever views are held of what should be our relations with the E.E.C., everyone will readily acknowledge the tremendous achievement involved. Its most striking feature, of course, is the reconciliation of France and Germany. That is on the moral side. But on the political side these countries have made remarkable economic progress in recent years. Of course, that is not all due to the European Economic Community. Nevertheless, the Community has imparted an impetus to the economic growth of the Six. The Community has developed a dynamic of its own. Above all, it is an idea which has gripped men's minds.
At the time when E.E.C. was being discussed, most people felt that it would be dangerous to split Europe in this way, and a great effort was made for two years, during negotiations in which my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade played a conspicuous part, to form a free trade area upon an industrial basis, excluding agriculture,
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thus allowing almost all European countries to take part.
This negotiation, which, at one time, seemed to have encouraging prospects of success, finally broke down. After this setback, some of the countries outside the Six formed the European Free Trade Association and one of its declared objects was to work for wider trading arrangements in Western Europe, and E.F.T.A. has steadfastly pursued that objective ever since its inception.
I am myself convinced that the existence of this division in Europe, although it is superficially of a commercial character, undoubtedly detracts from the political strength and unity of Western Europe. If we are to be involved in Europe at all, then we have a duty—and so have all the other countries in Europe—to seek some means of resolving the causes of potential division.
In this country, of course, there is a long tradition of isolation. In this, as in most countries, there is a certain suspicion of foreigners. There is also the additional division between us and Continental Europe of a wholly different development of our legal, administrative and, to some extent, political systems. If we are basically united by our religious faith, even here great divisions have grown up.
Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth recording that in every period when the world has been in danger of tyrants or aggression, Britain has abandoned isolationism. It is true that when the immediate danger was removed, we have sometimes tried to return to an insular policy. In due course we have abandoned it. In any case, who could say today that our present danger had been removed, or will soon disappear? Who doubts that we have to face a long and exhausting struggle over more than one generation if the forces of Communistic expansion are to be contained?
I have sometimes heard it asked, "What would happen if one of the countries with which we might be associated in Europe fell into political difficulties, even went Communist? Would not this have a grave effect on us if we were members?" Of course, but the effects would be equally grave whether we were members of the Common Market or not. If a member of

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N.A.T.O. or W.E.U. went Communist or semi-Communist, what would be the position of the other member States? If all the countries of Western Europe became satellites of Moscow, what would be the position of this island?
We have only to pose the question to answer it. We shall not escape from the consequences of such a disaster by seeking in isolation a security which our geographical position no longer gives us. Surely, from this point of view, it will be better for us to play our rôle to the full and use the influence we have for the free development of the life and thought of Europe.
There is also a feeling, and I share it, and it is a serious danger felt by many people, that it would be very dangerous if the United Kingdom, by helping to create a truly united Europe, united in every aspect of its life, were to join in a movement tending to isolate Europe from the world and turn its back on the world and look inwards only upon itself. It may, of course, be that there are some people in Europe who believe that this small but uniquely endowed continent can lead a rich, fruitful and prosperous life almost cut off from contact with the rest of the world.
But I do not believe that such people, if they exist, are to be found among the leading men or the Governments of Europe. Certainly, this island could never join an association which believed in such medieval dreams, but if there are little Europeans, and perhaps there are, is it not the duty of this country, with its world-wide ties, to lend its weight to the majority of Europeans who see the true prospective of events? I believe that our right place is in the vanguard of the movement towards the greater unity of the free world, and that we can lead better from within than outside. At any rate, I am persuaded that we ought to try.
Before I come in detail to the various problems, and there are many—the Commonwealth, British agriculture, and E.F.T.A.—I should like to say something about the method which we will follow. It is contained in the Motion before the House, but I think that it should be somewhat elaborated.
The first and most important point is that any agreement, if reached, will have
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to receive the approval of the House of Commons. The second is equally important. There will be full consultation at every stage with the interests affected. The consultation must take somewhat different forms. Some of the E.F.T.A. countries may be negotiating themselves in their own right, but we will all work closely together.
With regard to British agriculture, we shall keep very close to the representatives who can speak for this great industry. We shall consult the Commonwealth countries at every level and at all stages. If it is desired by the Commonwealth, we will have a meeting at the appropriate stage either of Ministers or of Prime Ministers, as they may wish. This is really for them. As I said on Monday, no difficulty presents itself here. I said:
"I have made it quite clear, and so have my right hon Friends: if, at some point, it were thought desirable to have a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, at the right moment, probably when the negotiations had reached a certain stage, before any final decisions were put before Parliament and this country, then I can only say that I would be the first to welcome such a meeting."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 31st July. 1961; Vol. 645, c. 932–3.]
That is the method.
I now pass to the wider issues involved. It is, of course, argued, and with deep sincerity, that by associating more closely with Europe in this new economic grouping we should injure the strength of the Commonwealth. If I thought this, I would not, of course, recommend this Motion to the House. But let us examine the Commonwealth position. We make no binding decisions at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meetings. We follow no agreed foreign policy. We have no agreed defence policy. Some members of the Commonwealth are in the various defensive pacts of the free world, and some are unaligned. Yet, for all this diversity, the Commonwealth, although not strictly a political unit, has real life and unity. It is something precious and unique.
I ask myself the question: how can we best serve the Commonwealth? By standing aside from the movement for European unity, or by playing our full part in its development? By retaining our influence in the New World, or by allowing it to decline by the relative shrinking of our own political and economic power compared with the massive

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grouping of the modern world? Britain in isolation would be of little value to our Commonwealth partners, and I think that the Commonwealth understand it. It would, therefore, be wrong in my view to regard our Commonwealth and our European interests as conflicting. Basically, they must be complementary.
If it is vital not to destroy the influence of the Commonwealth in the political field, and I use it in its broadest sense, it is equally vital to do nothing that would damage it economically. What the Ottawa agreements did was to recognise and to strengthen a pattern of trade which had grown up naturally. It was trade between the old country and the new territories; Colonies in the strict sense of the word, opened up by British settlers as in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The new countries provided the raw materials and agricultural products; the old country provided manufactured goods. The new countries opened up the territories; the old country provided the capital with which to build the harbours, the railways, and the rest, and sold the manufactured goods necessary to develop the new life. That was the system, and Ottawa formally regularised it.
The system of free entry and preferences has been of great advantage to all the partners although over recent years its impact has been reduced. But at the same time there have been important changes in these last thirty years. First and foremost, British agriculture has been revived and now supplies our country with two-thirds of its temperate foodstuffs and with one-half of all its foodstuffs. All the Commonwealth countries have also developed a wider diversity of manufactured goods, partly for sale at home and partly for export.
As the House knows, this changing pattern of trade has presented us with certain difficulties in certain quarters and they will have to be dealt with whether we enter the Common Market or not. Nevertheless, we recognise to the full our duty and our obligations to the Commonwealth. In the words of the Motion, our aim in these negotiations is to make satisfactory arrangements to meet the special interests of the Commonwealth, particularly, of course, in the economic field.
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The same applies to our own agricultural industry, about which I will speak later. I frankly admit that if the structure of the European Economic Community had been going on for a generation or more this task would be not only difficult, but well-nigh impossible. But it has not. It is very new. The Treaty lays down a number of principles, but the working out of detailed policies, especially so far as agriculture is concerned, is only just beginning.
Before I come to consider the particular interests of the United Kingdom, I should give the House an account of the position of E.F.T.A. Our partners in the European Free Trade Association, of course, share our objective of bringing to an end the economic division of Western Europe. They have shown much understanding and sympathy during our consultations during recent weeks, and hon. Members will have noted the communiqué issued by the E.F.T.A. Council at Geneva last Monday. The Council considers that the decision of the United Kingdom to take the initiative which I announced to the House on Monday, and which was followed by a similar statement by the Danish Government, provides an opportunity to find an appropriate solution for all the E.F.T.A. countries and thus promote the solidarity and cohesion of Europe.
For our part, we have stated that arrangements which will meet satisfactorily the legitimate concerns of our fellow-members of E.F.T.A. must be among the conditions for our own entry into the E.E.C. Moreover, all members of E.F.T.A. will co-ordinate their actions and remain united throughout the negotiations. E.F.T.A. will remain in being until the objective of its members has been achieved through the creation of a wider European grouping.
I have spoken of the Commonwealth interests, which are mainly though not wholly in the field of raw materials and agricultural production. In referring to the special needs of this country in the Government's Motion we have very much in mind our own agricultural industry. We have always made it clear that any decision to join the European Economic Community depended upon satisfactory arrangements being made with the Community which would

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assure the continued well-being of British agriculture. Our objective is to have a prosperous, stable and efficient agricultural industry, organised to provide a good life for those who live and work in the countryside. This represents the fixed decision of the nation. I think that we are all agreed as to purpose. How this is to be achieved is a matter of method.
Methods have changed. In the war and for the period immediately afterwards we operated on the basis of a controlled market and the bulk purchase by the Government of the products of British farmers. We moved later into a different method, of a free market for imports, so as to obtain the advantage of cheap prices, coupled with a system of Exchequer support for the home producer. But even within this scheme there have been variations in emphasis, as in the case of milk, and deviations from the pattern of deficiency payments by the Exchequer.
Our system of agricultural support is basically different from the methods which are being employed on the Continent, and which seem likely to give the pattern of the common agricultural policy when it is decided. We shall have to see what sort of changes will have to be made over a period to bring the systems into line. It may mean that we shall ultimately have to shift from the system where much of the farmers' support comes from the Exchequer to one in which arrangements are made to secure that the market itself provides a fair return to the producer. Such a development would mean much more substantial adaptations in our methods than we have been accustomed to, at any rate in recent years—although our methods have never been static.
I believe that there is a growing realisation that with changing world conditions we are faced with the possibility of changes anyway. But such major changes could be made only gradually, and we should need to see at each stage how they could be so effected as to avoid the risk of prejudice to our main purpose. We are determined to seek such arrangements as will adequately protect the vital interests of our agriculture, but in this we shall not be in opposition to the Governments, still less of the peoples, of the Six countries: nor
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to the declared aims of the Community respecting agriculture. In our country those engaged in agriculture represent an important—I would even say vital—part, but still a numerically small part of our population. In many European countries they are a very large part of the population, and it is in their interests as well as ours to make sure that agriculture is prosperous.
But objectives and principles are not enough; we shall have to be satisfied that the actual policies adopted can successively achieve what is desired. The purpose of our negotiation will be to see how this can be achieved within the Community. Our view that we cannot carry matters further without formal negotiation applies with special force to agriculture. The common agricultural policy is not spelt out in the Treaty for all to see; it is in process of being worked out by the Six, and by engaging ourselves in discussions with them we should be able to take a hand in shaping it.
We have given a pledge to maintain the 1957 Agriculture Act for the lifetime of this Parliament, and we stand by that. As I have said, our continuing purpose is to have a prosperous, stable and efficient agricultural industry. But we must be ready to examine carefully and dispassionately all methods of achieving that purpose, and if there is the will I do not think that the working out of satisfactory arrangements to meet our requirements should prove an impossible task.
Mr. George Craddock: All that the Prime Minister has said applies to all countries throughout the world. Why should we not have this development through the United Nations? That was not set up because nations agreed on the question of peace and war, but because they disagreed. Therefore, why not have its complement in an international authority regulating international trade?
The Prime Minister: However great these dreams may be we must deal with the situation as we find it. We may get a second lift one day, or even a third; meanwhile, let us travel in the lift that is available.
I must now turn to the needs of British industry. The development of the European Economic Community, the

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opportunity of the mass market which this has created for European industrialists, and the spur that this has given them to competitiveness and efficiency, present the British economy with a great challenge. Whether or not we go into the Common Market we shall have to face the competition of very efficient industries throughout Western Europe, sustained in some cases by populations not yet wholly industrialised. This competition will be severe. The test will be in the straight competition of brains, productive capacity and energy per man. Costs—that will be the test.
The protective tariffs set up before the war have given us some shelter from this competition in the home market. Many people feel that we have perhaps had too much shelter. However that may be, in the long run an island placed as ours is, where our need to export to other people which will always be greater than their need to export to us, cannot maintain the high standards of life that we want for our people in an isolated protective system.
An even more important question is: what would be the loss or gain, not merely of entering a competitive field but of having a common market to develop? In other words, what are the possibilities on the production side? In industries requiring heavy capital investment unit costs are determined by the extent to which the equipment can be used continuously at maximum capacity. With some modern industries, of which the petro-chemical and plastic industries are good examples, the economic scale of production and the capital expenditure involved are so large that the industries can be established and developed economically only with a mass market. It is also true that advanced industrial techniques, such as automation production lines, which can bring great savings in unit costs, are economic only with really large-scale production.
The scale of a potential market also has an important bearing on industrial research. We cannot draw up a precise balance sheet of the prospects for our industries—how much they would gain and how much they would lose—but I think that the weight of opinion among British industrialists is that the balance of advantage for them lies in joining a unit which will be of a size comparable,
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let us say, to the United States or Soviet Russia.
There are some other aspects with which I wish to deal. The first is what might be called the social implications of the Treaty, such things as movements of population, equal pay and all the rest. At present, the countries of the Six are only beginning what we might call the harmonisation of their social policies. There are very different circumstances in the various countries and, naturally, each one must take into account its own circumstances. So if we joined at a formative stage, as it were, we should be able to bring our own ideas into the common pool with, I hope, mutual benefit.
Meanwhile, it is quite unreal to suppose that we could be compelled suddenly to accept a flood of cheap labour, or to alter the basis of our social security overnight. It is well understood, for instance, that movements of workers would be related by administrative control to actual offers of employment. These apprehensions about the social implications of joining the Treaty are really aspects of a wider constitutional anxiety about what has often been called "sovereignty."
I must remind the House that the E.E.C. is an economic community, not a defence alliance, or a foreign policy community, or a cultural community. It is an economic community, and the region where collective decisions are taken is related to the sphere covered by the Treaty, economic tariffs, markets and all the rest. Of course, every treaty limits a nation's freedom of action to some extent. Even before the First World War there were certain international conventions to which we bound ourselves. Before the Second World War they grew in character and affected both political and social questions, like the conventions agreed at the International Labour Organisation. Since the war this tendency has grown and our freedom of action is obviously affected by our obligations in N.A.T.O., W.E.U., O.E.E.C. and all the rest.
A number of years have passed since the movement began which culminated in the Treaty of Rome and I am bound to say that I do not see any signs of the members of the Community losing their national identity because they have

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delegated a measure of their sovereignty. This problem of sovereignty, to which we must, of course, attach the highest importance is, in the end, perhaps a matter of degree. I fully accept that there are some forces in Europe which would like a genuine federalist system. There are many of my colleagues on both sides of the House who have seen this at Strasbourg and other gatherings. They would like Europe to turn itself into a sort of United States, but I believe this to be a completely false analogy.
The United States of America was originally born out of colonists with only a few generations of history behind them. They were of broadly the same national origins and spoke the same language. Europe is too old, too diverse in tradition, language and history to find itself united by such means. Although the federalist movement exists in Europe it is not one favoured by the leading figures and certainly not by the leading Governments of Europe today. Certainly not by the French Government.
The alternative concept, the only practical concept, would be a confederation, a commonwealth if hon. Members would like to call it that—what I think General de Gaulle has called Europe des patries—which would retain the great traditions and the pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interest. This seems to me a concept more in tune with the national traditions of European countries and, in particular, of our own. It is one with which we could associate willingly and wholeheartedly. At any rate, there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome which commits the members of E.E.C. to any kind of federalist solution, nor could such a system be imposed on member countries.
Here again, unless we are in the negotiations, unless we can bring our influence to bear, we shall not be able to play our part in deciding the future structure of Europe. It may be, as I have said, that we Shall find that our essential needs cannot be met, but if they can I do not feel that there is anything on the constitutional side of which we need be in fear and which cannot be resolved to our satisfaction.
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I have mentioned the main considerations which are involved in this great problem, the long-term view of British industry and British agriculture; our responsibilities to our partners in the Commonwealth, our obligations to our fellow members of E.F.T.A.; the future of our national influence in world affairs and the strengthening of the Western Alliance.
These considerations are so important that I do not accept the view that we hesitated too long in reaching our decision. It was absolutely necessary to have the preliminary contacts both on the official and on the ministerial levels and with our friends in the Seven and with our friends in the Six. That has taken some time. It was also absolutely necessary to have thorough consultation with the Commonwealth. Equally, I think that everyone would agree that merely to postpone the decision until the autumn on some excuse or other would be mere temporising.
I have always said frankly to the House that I think that the failure of these negotiations would be a tragedy. Of course it would. If I am asked whether the prospects are now improved, I can only repeat that I am more hopeful than before. The very deterioration of the situation in Europe must tend to increase the forces of unity. There is an old fable of the rivalry between the sun and the wind, as to which could make the traveller discard his coat. As the East wind blows, nations tend to draw together under a common cloak of unity.
It has also been suggested that we should make application on a different basis, perhaps under Article 238, with the object of becoming associates of the Treaty rather than members—"country members" so to speak. We have thought about this and we have found that it would raise all the same problems for British agriculture and Commonwealth trade without giving us any position in which we could share in the decisions of the Community in all its aspects. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion, in the light of the informal discussions, which, as the House knows, we have had over a lengthy period, that the only practicable way to put the question to the test would be to apply for membership under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome.

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I feel sure that European countries realise that there are special problems affecting our position which must be dealt with by special provisions. Indeed, that was their experience when they formed the Six. For instance, special arrangements were made for France's large overseas interests. There were special protocols for Italy, for Holland and for Germany. These were all the subject of negotiation and debate. We must hope that the Six will regard the special arrangements which we require as negotiable in principle and in that case negotiations will begin.
These must, of their very nature, be protracted, detailed and technical. For as well as any matters of principle there is a question of dealing with a large number of separate commodities and reaching agreement on them. No one can be sure that these negotiations will succeed. We hope that the Six will recognise that our decision opens out wide perspectives for future co-operation which could be to our mutual benefit and to the benefit of many other countries, not least those in process of development. We have much to gain from membership of the Community and we have also much to contribute.
A great responsibility lies on the Six as well as on ourselves. Hitherto, although there has been this economic division in Europe, while the rift was there, there has also been the hope of closing it and thus the position has been tolerable. But if it should become clear that this rift will continue and perhaps deepen then I fear that the consequences will be grave. As I said in the United States earlier this year
"… it will be a canker gnawing at the very core of Western Alliance."
I am sure that this consideration is in the minds of our Continental friends.
To sum up, there are, as I have said, some to whom the whole concept of Britain working closely in this field with other European nations is instinctively disagreeable. I am bound to say that I find it hard to understand this when they have accepted close collaboration in even more critical spheres. Others feel that our whole and sole duty lies with the Commonwealth. If I thought that our entry into Europe would injure our relations with and influence in the Commonwealth, or be against the true
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interest of the Commonwealth, I would not ask the House to support this step.
I think, however, that most of us recognise that in a changing world, if we are not to be left behind and to drop out of the main stream of the world's life, we must be prepared 'to change and adapt OUT methods. All through history this has been one of the main sources of our strength.
I therefore ask the House to give Ministers the authority—not to sign a treaty—but to find out on what honourable basis such a treaty could be put forward for the decision of the House.
4.22 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
"notes the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association regrets that Her Majesty's Government will be conducting these negotiations from a position of grave weakness; and declares that Great Britain should enter the European Economic Community only if this House gives its approval and if the conditions negotiated are generally acceptable to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and accord with our obligations and pledges to other members of the European Free Trade Association".
I must begin with a personal explanation. Some time ago I accepted an engagement in Canada this week and I was to have flown there on Monday. In view of this debate, I managed to postpone this visit, but I do not think it right to cancel it altogether. If the House, as I hope, does not think me too discourteous, I Shall leave for Canada tonight. Therefore, I am afraid that I shall not be available for the rest of the debate.
There are those who see the problem of whether or not we should enter the Common Market as a clear-cut and simple one. They have no doubts. Some are passionately in favour of our entry and others are equally passionately against, unconditionally in both instances. The pictures they present of what will happen if we follow the one course or the other are so different as to appear to be related to something totally different.

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Those who are for are convinced that economically to enter the Common Market will provide our salvation, that we shall be miraculously caught up in the dynamic economy of Europe, that there will be perhaps some transitional difficulties, but that these will not be on a great scale and that when they are over we shall by this means be on the high road to permanent prosperity.
As for our political relationships, they take the view that either we shall retain our political independence in full and our markets with the Commonwealth or—if they happen to be European federalists—they would say that while federal Europe is inevitable we must be part of it and even lead it. Equally, of course, they paint in the gloomiest terms the prospects for us if we do not enter the Common Market, that we are faced then with continued economic decline, that we shall become politically less and less influential in the world. They imply that the Commonwealth, if we really think about it, has no real future and that our very impotence vis-à-vis Europe will contribute to the decline and decay of the Commonwealth.
At the other extreme there are those who hold with equal passion the opposite view. They reserve their gloom for the picture when we enter the Common Market. The economic growth, they say, is a mirage and, anyhow, if there is dynamism in that economy we shall not be able to compete with it. Our foreign policy, they say, will be dictated by others, our ancient Parliament deprived of its authority and our Commonwealth destroyed by a foolish and fatal decision. For them, equally, the picture, if we stay out, is totally different. It is bright with promise, Commonwealth markets can and will expand while Europe languishes and squabbles. We shall go ahead economically and politically while our influence, spanning five Continents, will continue to be strong and beneficent.
Those are the two extreme points of view and both of them, I know, are held by some hon. Members in the House, but I think that the large majority of us in both parties find it hard to accept either of these two pictures. We have not the certainty of the extremists. We feel that whether we accept the one picture or the other depends upon profoundly difficult judgments—almost a matter of guess-
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work—and that on that account they are inevitably greatly influenced not by cool calculation, but by emotional attitudes. We also suspect that both extremes are wrong, that the issue is not as clear-cut and that a more careful analysis will show that it is much more a matter of balance.
For example, the economic case for going in is said to be very powerful because of the great expansion that has taken place in the Common Market countries in recent years. There is no doubt that there has been such an expansion, but for my part I do not hold the view that this is overwhelmingly due to the Common Market. I think that there are, to any objective observer, other influences at work. For instance, in the case of France—let us face it—the devaluation of the franc was a powerful aid to the expansion of its exports and industry. In the case of Germany, it has been said many times in this House that the emigration from the East has helped West Germany to move faster.
Certainly not every country in the Common Market has been so prosperous and so dynamic. Belgium is mostly at the bottom of these league tables, even below us in production. I do not think that it would be right to assume that merely by the existence of a Common Market—which, when all is said and done, in the early years of the decade was not there at all—this expansion is to be explained. Incidentally, I think that we must also point out—those of us who are a little sceptical of this—that the idea of immense increases in free imports as the great stimulant to our industry does not seem to be borne out by the experience that we have had of freer imports in recent years.
On the other side, I do not think that the political consequences which some fear from our entry into the Common Market are as dangerous or profound as they are sometimes made out to be. I agree with the Prime Minister in that I do not think we are necessarily bound for federalism in Europe. Equally, I think that one can exaggerate all too easily the picture of the Commonwealth prospect as apart from Europe in economic terms. Above all, those of us who take this intermediate position, and who cannot accept either extreme, say that before we make up our minds we must know the conditions.

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At least, then we shall have eliminated some of the elements of doubt. At least, then it will be easier to make what will still be, I think, an extremely difficult judgment—for this reason: although there are parts of the Government Motion which we cannot accept, and to which I will refer later, and for that reason we are moving an Amendment to it, yet we shall not oppose the substantive Motion in the Lobby if our Amendment is defeated.
The decision to open formal negotiations has been hailed as historic and decisive. At first glance, it is hard to see why. It is not as if there had not been negotiations before. I am not thinking only of the long period of negotiations of the Free Trade Area, or even of those between E.F.T.A. and the E.E.C. I am thinking of the informal, official negotiations which have taken place for at least six months now between France, Germany and ourselves.
Of course, if it were assumed that the negotiations must succeed, then the Government's decision to enter upon them would be historic, but I think that the Prime Minister will agree—indeed, he has said so—that we cannot assume any such thing. Perhaps, therefore, we had better look upon the present decision as no more than this: as a decision to bring the matter finally to the test.
In any event, it is a noticeable change on the part of the Government, even if the process of change began a little earlier. The Prime Minister, for instance, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, in November, 1956, in a debate on this subject, said:
"I do not believe that this House would ever agree to our entering arrangements which, as a matter of principle, would prevent our treating the great range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as favourably as those from the European countries. So this objection, even if there were no other, would be quite fatal to any proposal that the United Kingdom should seek to take part in a European common market by joining a Customs union."
He went on to say:
"We must remain free to continue to grant to this great volume of imports the preferential arrangements we have built up over the last twenty-five years."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th November, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 37–42.]
I do not know whether the Prime Minister still stands by that statement, which was made four-and-a-half years ago. If he does, of course, it is very
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severely limiting the possibility of the negotiations. Even the Minister of Aviation, when he was President of the Board of Trade, speaking in that same debate, said:
"We cannot enter into a Customs union because that would mean that we should have to put up tariffs, where no tariffs exist today, against a whole range of Commonwealth goods."—[OFFICTM REPORT, 26th November, 1956; Vol. 561, c. 155.]
I wonder whether he still stands by that. It is rumoured that he is to conduct the negotiations, or to be in charge of them. It is rather important that he should clear this up, as I hope he will, or that somebody else will on his behalf during this debate.
The President of the Board of Trade said somewhat later, on 28th March, 1958:
"As the House is aware, we have given a clear undertaking"
—I repeat, a clear undertaking—
"to the Commonwealth countries to maintain their position in our markets for foodstuffs, drink and tobacco."—[OFFICIAM REPORT, 28th March, 1958; Vol. 585, c. 793.]
Does that undertaking stand? It is important that this should be cleared up.
A little later, on 12th February, 1959, he said:
… I cannot conceive that any Government of this country"
—any Government of this country—
"would put forward a proposition which would involve the abandonment of Commonwealth free entry. It would be wrong for us and for the whole free world to adopt a policy of new duties on foodstuffs and raw materials, many of which come from underdeveloped countries, at present entering a major market duty-free."
I hope that he will bear that in mind when the negotiations about New Zealand butter and lamb are taking place.
The right hon. Gentleman said something else of which I must remind the Prime Minister. He said:
"Finally, we must recognise that the aim of the main proponents of the Community is political integration. We can see that in Article 138 of the Treaty, which looks towards a common assembly, directly elected. The whole idea of the Six, the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom is a movement towards political integration. That is a fine aspiration, but we must recognise that for us to sign the Treaty of Rome would be to accept as the ultimate goal"
—to accept as the ultimate goal—
"political federation in Europe, including ourselves."

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He added, I think quite correctly:
"That, as I have said, does not seem to me to be a proposition which, at the moment, commands majority support in this country."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1381–82]
I do not think it does today, either.
The question whether or not the Government were right to change their mind, if they have changed it, is one thing. But the question of how the negotiations have been conducted over these years is another and one about which I think there can be no doubt, for we, at any rate, think that the conduct of these negotiations from 1956 onwards has been profoundly unsatisfactory. Allowing for all the difficulties—and I am well aware of them—I am bound to say that Ministers on the Government side of the House have again and again committed gross errors of judgment as to what the Continental countries were likely to accept.
When it was plain to a great many people that the French, for instance, had no intention of accepting the Free Trade Area, the President of the Board of Trade went on and on and on with those negotiations, and it was clear that the chances of an agreement between E.F.T.A. and the E.E.C. had disappeared long before the attempt to make such arrangements was abandoned. I must say that I feel some anxiety, in view of the way in which these negotiations have been conducted in the past, that the very same people should conduct the new lot of negotiations now.
There is also, I think, much force in the criticism that if we were to negotiate our entry, as we now intend to do, this should have been done much earlier. Certainly, the economic position today could hardly be weaker than it is. This is one of the points which we make in our Amendment. I heard it said in Europe—I heard it said only last week-end—that we are looked upon as a liability to the E.E.C. if we join and that, therefore, we have no option. [HON.MEMBERS: "0h."] I am stating what I was told in Europe this week-end, by people of very considerable authority. We are, as it were, asking for a shot in the arm. We are dependent on support from European bankers. I repeat that that is what is being said today.
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The second reason why earlier negotiations, if we are to have them at all, would have been wiser, is that various decisions have already been taken, and taken in a way which might not have been the case had we begun the negotiations before.
I come to the implications of the Treaty. Until this afternoon the Government have said little about the problems for Britain except that of agriculture. Today, the Prime Minister said a little more about the advantages for British industry. I want to ask only one question, in order that it may be made perfectly clear. Since we have repeatedly said that the great problems were the Commonwealth, E.F.T.A. and agriculture, can we have it firmly laid down that we are still quite uncommitted on all the other aspects of the Common Market which might, or will, affect British industry?
I will give the right hon. Gentleman one or two examples of the sort of thing which I have in mind. The first is the question of capital movement. I do not know how far hon. Members are aware of what the Treaty of Rome says and what has happened on this subject. Under the Treaty eventually capital movements are to be completely free as between the different countries of the E.E.C. Governments can take protective action in emergency, but what they do can be overruled by the Commission or the Council according to the circumstances.
This is a very serious infringement of our own rights to protect our foreign exchange markets, and it happens that it is directly contradictory to the Chancellor's latest proposals in this field, for one of the things which he intends to do—indeed, has done already—is to introduce a much stricter control over the movement of capital from this country to countries outside the sterling area. It seems fairly clear that unless special arrangements are negotiated, the freedom which the Chancellor enjoys today to protect our currency would disappear as soon as the Common Market was in full operation. I should like to make this proposal: I think that we are entitled, as the centre of the sterling area, to ask for a special protocol governing the circumstances in which we may introduce control over capital movement, whatever may be the

1501
position in the rest of the Common Market.
There is the question of the Investment Bank. This in itself is an excellent plan by which the poorer, less-developed parts of the community can be helped from a central fund. I suppose that we should have to contribute to it, but I think that it would be fair to say that we have some very serious and heavy obligations to help under-developed countries in other parts of the world, and this, too, is something which should be covered in the negotiations.
There is also the question of the Social Fund which is set up to deal with transitional hardship. I do not want to go into details, but there is one particular part of our agriculture which I should have thought was almost certain to be damaged by our entry into the Common Market, and that is the horticultural industry. I should like to ask whether the Social Fund, if we decide to go in, could be used to assist in dealing with any difficulties which may arise there.
There is the question of a common currency, which is mentioned in various quarters as something to which we must look forward. In my opinion, it is idle to speak about a common currency until there is a common government, and the idea of not being in control of our own currency, and having it subject to a supranational or international gathering, would be quite wrong, and I hope that that, equally, will be made abundantly plain.
I turn to the political aspect of the problem, and I quote again what the President of the Board of Trade said about the effects of the Treaty:
… we must recognise that for us to sign the Treaty of Rome would be to accept as the ultimate goal political federation in Europe, including ourselves".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th February, 1959; Vol. 599, c. 1382.]
That is not what the Prime Minister said this afternoon. We are entitled to clarity in this matter. In his statement on Monday he spoke of the aim of the Treaty of Rome being to promote unity and stability in Europe, and today he made it quite plain that what he would expect to see was confederation rather than federation.
My view on this is quite clear. I think that there is no question whatever of Britain entering into a federal Europe
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now. British opinion simply is not ripe for this, and in any event it is surely completely incompatible with all the pledges and promises which have been made about the Commonwealth. I am not saying that we have to commit ourselves for all time, for twenty, fifty or a hundred years hence. There is no reason to do that. But we must be clear that what the President of the Board of Trade said in 1959 is not true and that there is no commitment at all, even to eventual federation. That must be left open. I hope that that will be cleared up beyond any possible doubt in the course of the debate. [An HON. MEMBER: "By our own independent decision."] Yes, by our own independent decision.
I draw the attention of the House, in this connection, to the proposal of the E.E.C. Assembly made in May, 1960, carried in that Assembly, for the setting up of a directly elected Parliament. This is a proposal coming from one of the three organs of the E.E.C., and which has also received powerful backing from the Commission. Where exactly do we stand on that? Is this something that is to take place whatever happens'? What is the attitude of the Ministerial Council towards it? Because, if we have a directly elected Parliament, we have taken a very long step towards a federal Europe, and, I repeat, I do not believe, whatever the future may hold, that at present British opinion is in any way ripe for such a step.
There is another point of great importance. In his statement, the Prime Minister referred to negotiations about changes in the Treaty. Did he really mean changes in the Treaty? What is, I think, allowed under the Treaty is adaptations. This is not regarded in Europe as at all the same thing, but I think that it is of great importance to know—I do not pass final judgment on it at all—whether, for instance, the basic structure of the Community is something that could still be reviewed, or whether it is bound to be the case, if we go in, that the Commission which has this peculiar independent status, being responsible ultimately to the Assembly, but pretty well free in every other way, and very powerful indeed, should continue.
It is very foreign, as I think all hon. Members will agree, to our ideas of the

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position of civil servants. The Commission is responsible to the Assembly only in the sense that on a two-thirds vote of the Assembly it can be dismissed, but it does not regard itself in any way as under the Council of Ministers. It is an independent body parallel with them. [Interruption.] I think that the Prime Minister is wrong about this, but by all means let us have it cleared up. That is all that I am asking at the moment.
Then there is the question, if the present arrangements continue, of the allocation of votes in the Council and in the Assembly. In a short time now many more decisions will be made in the Council of Ministers by a qualified majority, in effect, something like a two-thirds majority. This is a very important point. If it appears from the allocation of votes that France and Belgium for instance, voting together, are in a position to veto any decision that might be made otherwise by the Council, but we and Denmark are not, then, I think, that would be very unsatisfactory indeed. On the other hand, if the right of veto remains with us, plus one other country—for example, Denmark or Norway; I mention them because they are close friends and they will be coming in from outside with us, if they go in—it removes some of the doubts which many people have.
I do not take the view that one should draw an absolute line between a qualified majority system and the right of veto. Anybody who has had anything to do with international negotiations knows full well that, even where there is a veto, countries work very hard to persuade the country that wishes to stand out and in most cases the country is persuaded. I hope that, even where there is a majority system, the Council of Ministers would hesitate for a very long time before voting Great Britain down, if we enter. Nevertheless, the voting allocation is important and I should like to be assured on that point.
I turn, thirdly, to agriculture. I will say very little about this, because the Prime Minister has covered it. I do not think that it is the major difficulty. I agree with him in this respect. I am not frightened of Continental competition for British farmers, who are quite efficient 1504
enough to stand up to it. The people who have to be protected in this case are not the farmers at all, but the consumers. It seems to be far more likely that we shall replace a system of subsidies and deficiency payments with a system of tariffs. That will mean a rise in the cost of living. We should like an assurance from the Government that, if this is so, if this is the only way, they will balance out the saving they make on the Exchequer by reducing indirect taxes, which fall heavily on poor people, and not by making further tax concessions to the wealthy.
I turn to the question of E.F.T.A. The Government have already given a very strong pledge to E.F.T.A., which I read out the other day and which I will not repeat now. It goes much, much farther than anything we have said to the Commonwealth. We must be quite clear on that. It is a pledge that we do not break up the E.F.T.A., which we would have to do if we entered the Common Market and, therefore, will not enter the Common Market
"till satisfactory arrangements have been worked wit in negotiations to meet the various legitimate interests."
and so on. This goes a very long way indeed, and I do not in any way regret it. I think that it was right, but I am sorry that the actual words of this pledge were not incorporated in the Government Motion. We should like an assurance from the Government that they stand absolutely by this.
That is why we have specially emphasised it in our Amendment. We must remember that there are several reasons for keeping relations between ourselves and the E.F.T.A. countries very strong and cordial. It would be a very great tragedy if, at this moment, we were, by our activities, to drive the neutral countries towards the East. It would equally be very unfortunate if we were to offend our closest friends, Norway and Denmark, which are likely to come with us into the Common Market. We must not forget that if negotiations fail we shall still require E.F.T.A., at least as providing something of a large market.
Finally—and, in my view, most important of all—there is the Commonwealth. I do not propose to go into details here. The great difficulty in the economic

1505
situation remains. The very idea of switching preferences which have been in favour of the Commonwealth into preferences which are against them is very difficult to stomach. We all know how tremendously important this is in the case of Australian and New Zealand dairy produce and Canadian and Australian wheat.
Let us not forget sugar from the West Indies, either. This is not a purely economic issue. There are moral obligations in this. It would be quite outrageous if, by going into the Common Market, we did things which seriously damaged, for instance, the extremely poverty-stricken West Indies because they lost their preferences in the sugar market.
I welcome this categorical phrase in the Prime Minister's statement:
"if a closer relationship between the United Kingdom and the countries of the European Economic Community were to disrupt the longstanding and historic ties between the United Kingdom and the other nations of the Commonwealth the loss would be greater than the gain."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st July. 1961; Vol. 645, c. 928.]
This is certainly badly needed, because in my opinion a good deal of damage to our relations with the Commonwealth has already been done. No doubt the Ministers who went on these visits did their best. All the same, what came out of them was not exactly encouraging.
The important point I want to emphasise is this. It is all very well to talk about consultation. It is easy to do that. The question is whether the Government will carry the Commonwealth with them. I repeat the question that I asked before. Why should we not give them the same or a similar pledge to that which we gave our E.F.T.A. partners? I know that it will be said that the position will be different and that the E.F.T.A. countries will be engaged in direct negotiations, but, whatever the Government may think, if we do not carry the Commonwealth with us it will have been disrupted. That is why we believe that by far the best way of bringing this matter to the test is the summoning of a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference. It would then be possible for the Prime Minister to put the whole thing before them under not unfavourable conditions, as I think he will agree, where it can be looked at as a whale.
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I do not say that we could give, or should give, a right of absolute veto on any detail to any member of the Commonwealth. That would be unreasonable. That is why we have said that the conditions should be "generally acceptable" to such a conference. If they are, a great deal of the opposition here and elsewhere to our entry into the Common Market would disappear. Even then, not all of it would disappear. There are some people who would, in any case, be against it. But many of us would be greatly relieved in our minds. On the other hand, if such approval was not forthcoming I doubt whether the Prime Minister himself would be able to carry this country into the Common Market. That is why I think it is the best way of testing the whole thing.
Very much depends on the negotiations which are likely to take place and the spirit in which they are conducted. Very nearly all of us want a closer unity in Western Europe. We recognise the dangers of the present division. We know that it could easily become sharper and more permanent. We accept all that, and want to avoid it, but we want to avoid something else—any action on our part which would precipitate the decay and the downfall of the Commonwealth. Somehow or other both these dangers have to be avoided.
I am encouraged by the declaration of the Six at the W.E.U. meeting, which has been published this morning, that they attribute the greatest importance to the links with the Commonwealth and that it would be contrary to the interests of the free world to weaken them. I hope that they will draw the practical conclusions from this statement, both in the economic and political fields.
I hope that Her Majesty's Government, despite our economic weaknesses, will not approach these talks in any way in a suppliant mood, nor, on the other hand, with any idea of dominating Europe. That is not the best way to enlist the support and help of other European Governments. I hope that they will not try to solve this problem by clever formulae which are interpreted in one way by the E.F.T.A., in another way by the Six, and in another way by the Commonwealth. I hope, above all, that they will remember that the greater unity of Europe cannot be

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given a firm foundation on suspicions and fears in Great Britain, on anger and dismay among our other European friends, or on bitterness and disillusionment in our great multi-racial Commonwealth, of whose development we are all so proud.
4.59 p.m.
Sir Derek Walker-Smith: I am grateful for an opportunity to take part in this momentous debate, for it is certainly a momentous one. It is not just a debate about the Common Market, important as that is. It is not just a debate about economics, important as they are. It is acknowledged that it raises great political issues: issues which concern our constitutional practices, our national institutions and our future as a sovereign State.
Because of these issues it is necessary, when we are discussing the economic aspect, to see the matter as a whole and in its long-term implications. We cannot in this matter be content with the modest asseveration of the hymnographer. We must ask to view the distant scene; for one step in this case might be far too much. It might, indeed, be fatal if we do not know the direction and destination in which it is leading us.
I believe that we have made progress in the last few months, progress which is illustrated by the terms of the Government's Motion. It may be that, relatively recently, the Motion would have been phrased in rather different terms. It even includes the word "sovereignty". A little time ago I began to think that perhaps this was a dirty word or, at any rate, a forgotten thing.
These political issues have two distinct, but related, aspects. First, the longterm implications of sovereignty and, secondly, the context of the defence of the free world against Communism. Most of my speech will be directed to the first, but I recognise of course the importance of the second. We understand that the Soviet would rather that we stayed out of the European Cornmunity; and there may be hon. Members for Whom that is a reason, or an additional reason, why we should stay out. If so, I am emphatically not one
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of them. Rather the reverse, for I put Soviet advice in the category of Grecian gifts. If it were Shown that it was indispensably necessary to the defence of the free world, then that would be a different thing. But that is not the case that has been put, or has ever been put; and it would seem, at the least, an unlikely proposition that in order to counter the menace of a monolithic society one should create one for oneself. Surely that would be pushing, to extreme, the principle of by Beelzebub, cast out Beelzebub.
If the proposition that it is indispensably necessary to the defence of the free world were true now, why was it not true earlier—last year, the year before or even the year before that—When this matter was being dealt with? Further, I would submit that this is contrary to the teaching of history, which is that democracy draws its strength in no small measure from the native vigour and individual genius of countries freely co-operating on the basis of national sovereignty.
In everything I say it is inherent and implicit that we have a supreme duty in our contribution to the defence of the Western world against Communism, but that that duty is better discharged by the courses I shall venture to counsel.
Against that background I come to the question of sovereignty; and here again we must look at it from two points of view. First, the derogation of sovereignty which arises expressly from the Treaty of Rome; and, secondly—and inescapably—the consequences of those contemplated further arrangements on the part of the European Community, acceptance of which would be implied by our adherence to the Community now. I shall adduce later my evidence for this second proposition; but, first, I shall devote a word to the first matter—the direct consequences of the Treaty itself. Time and a naturally kind disposition will prevent me from burdening the House with detailed references to the Treaty. Hon. Members will have in mind the content of Article 3, which lists the functions of the Community, and paragraph H of that Article, which requires the member States to aproximate their municipal law—which is international law phraseology for national law—to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common

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Market. Thus there is some immediate surrender of sovereignty expressed in that.
The question is not whether the matters in respect of which sovereignty is surrendered are good or bad. The question arises: in so far as they are good, could they not be achieved by the ordinary methods of international agreements entered into on a basis of sovereignty? We know that in some cases the answer is "yes". It is "yes" in regard to the elimination of quantitative restrictions and the lowering of tariffs. Of course, when one comes to the question of a common external tariff against third parties, that is a different matter. That is a supra-national consideration; but that is one of the things we do not want because it impinges upon our obligations to the Commonwealth.
Then there are the other matters to which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition referred, such as the control of capital and services. Is it right and safe for us to surrender this control? We are not merely a European power but the centre and chief banker of the sterling area.
Then there is the question of the control of workers. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister paraphrased the Treaty; but let hon. Members remind themselves of the provisions of Articles 48 and 49 in respect of the control of workers. They are precise and mandatory and they get rid of national discrimination in respect of employment. This may be a liberal philosophy, and it may be very good in times of full employment; but what if depression comes? What is to happen at the ebb tide to those who came in at the flood?
Against this derogation of sovereignty some will say that there is a substantial economic advantage; but we have seen no real economic balance sheet. We can assume that there would be some economic advantage, in particular to those large, dynamic, and progressive concerns in respect of which our main hopes of expansion lie. But we can equally feel that there would be some economic detriment, particularly to the smaller industries and to the horticultural industry. I do not propose to deal with these special matters today, because I want to concentrate on the broad central theme. We are told that, economically,
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competition and the need to be competitive is the keynote.
Of course, no one would suggest that by not joining the European Community we can insulate ourselves from the necessity of being competitive in Europe. That would be to pursue the policy of the ostrich, which is notoriously as ineffective as it is inelegant. Competition for us in this small and crowded island is not a matter of choice. It is something imposed on us by nature, by geography, and by inescapable circumstance. It is as natural to us, and should be as bracing, as the air we breath. I find something humiliating in the proposition that the only way to bring economic realism to a great industrial people is to join the Common Market.
The true test is not to measure the potential, under a European Community, with the actual now. The test is to measure the potential under the Community with the potential under other arrangements. Particularly is this true of our Commonwealth arrangements. One cannot set 1961 European arrangements against 1931 Commonwealth arrangements eroded by circumstances and G.A.T.T.
We have a duty to review and revise these arrangements so as to get the maximum economic co-operation possible in the conditions of the times, and to negotiate, if possible, any necessary revisions of the G.A.T.T. That is the effort that we have to make. It will mean tough negotiation. Of course it will, and not only in the G.A.T.T. but tough negotiation with some of our Commonwealth partners. I have been a Board of Trade Minister, and I do not take just a sentimental view about these economic matters. The effort must be made and made with vigour, faith and force.
My right hon. Friend knew that we were interested in the terms of reference and the activities of the three Ministers who went on the Commonwealth Odyssey, but we have not heard what they did. Did they go, among other things, as prospectors of new seams of economic Commonwealth co-operation? Or did they go only as bagmen of the Common Market?
I turn, then, to the question of the long-term implications in regard to sovereignty; and I say with confidence

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to the House that we are not justified in looking at this purely in the narrow context of the direct results of adherence to the Treaty of Rome. We have to look at it from the point of view of the wider implications of the long-term effect in relation to our sovereignty and our constitutional machinery. I say that, because I believe that is what the evidence is. Time forbids any exhaustive adducing of evidence, but perhaps I may be permitted to cite four very brief extracts from the introduction to the Third General Report on the Activities of the Community, the latest we have, placed in the Vote Office by the courtesy of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in response to my request. Page 16:
"The Community is not simply a trading agreement or an economic agreement, but one element in a wider political construction…"
Page 17:
"… a proposal made by the Commission … is an autonomous political act by which the Commission speaking with complete independence, expresses what it considers to be the general interest of the Community."
Page 24:
"… the Commission wishes to emphasise the political importance it attaches to this acceleration. The internal strengthening which it proposes … is intended to reinforce, by leaving behind national divergencies, that movement towards union which the Six States began when they signed the Treaty of Rome."
Finally, on page 25, it is stated that the Commission hopes that the Six will
"assemble their forces in order to make a reality of economic Europe while laying the firm foundations of political Europe."
And for good measure, if hon. Members will look at the next two pages they will see that the word "political" figures no fewer than five times. Is not that evidence that for the Community economic union is a prelude to political union?
Let me make this clear. I make no sort of reproach to the Community for having this intention in mind. I would associate myself with no derogatory observations that might be made at this or any other time about the Community or the six nations that compose it. On the contrary, I have a high regard for the ability and integrity of the gentlemen who administer the affairs of the Community. I respect, as I believe every objective person must, the leadership which has lead some of these countries
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from the slough of despond to the firm plateau of their present position. Above all, I salute—and all should seek to share—the sense of Christian purpose which animates their aims and aspirations.
If this be so, why should we not hasten to join this goodly fellowship? I will give the House the answer. It is, of course, this: that what may be good for them is not necessarily good for us. The reason for that lies in our history and institutions and in that special and separate position which time and the toil of our forefathers have built up for us. To refer to our special and separate position is not to take a narrow or parochial view. It is from that special and separate position that Britain has served the interests of Europe and of the world over the centuries and has contributed mightily to their well being. It is on the basis of that special and separate position that our greatness has rested.
Are we now to be told that the time for that position has passed? Shall we be told that the time of our greatness has passed or is passing too? I believe that a glance at history helps to get this matter into perspective. Sovereignty came late to most of the nations of the Six. They were part of the Holy Roman Empire, that physical embodiment of the mediaeval law of nature which preceded the formalisation of the modern doctrine of sovereignty. Our national sovereignty did not follow that doctrine; it preceded it. We were practising national sovereignty and evolving our Parliamentary institutions and our common law when others were looking to Europe. The sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law are for us the twin pillars of our Constitution and our way of life. For the Six, Parliament has its roots less deep; and perhaps the institution is held in less high regard generally than with us. We evolved our own common law. They preferred the general acceptance of Roman law.
The Six share their constitutional outlook and practices with each other, but not with us. Their evolution has been Continental and collective. Ours has been insular and imperial. Therefore, for them political union would be a reunion and a rediscovery, while for us it would be a departure and a divergence.

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I do not say that the pattern of the past can never be varied. I know, of course, that we are living in a fast-moving modern world in which science is daily shrinking distances and approximating frontiers; but I do not believe that these physical factors can render obsolete the constitutional heritage which the native genius of our forefathers has bequeathed to us. Still less do I believe that it would be right to sacrifice it as a sort of postscript to an economic arrangement. These are not matters which can be decided simply by the test of tariffs or in the terminology of trade.
There are considerations here which go beyond the considerations of the counting house. They involve the past and the future of a great people. These considerations arise inescapably and they arise now, and my right hon. Friends must ask themselves and answer questions such as these. If we adhere to the Economic Community now and the Six proceed, as they are entitled to proceed, to the next stage of political union, what then is our position? If we do not want to go along with them on the political side, could we stay in on the economic side, or could we get out at that stage even if we wanted to? Or is the real position this, that if the decision is taken now we forfeit the power of political decision? And what is the intention of the Government in this regard? Do they want to take a step forward into political union or not? So far we have not had an answer to that question. If we tried to come out of the Community in those circumstances, would not the Six be justified in saying to us, "But you knew all along of our enthusiasm for the next political step. If you did not share it, why did you join us in the first place?" Then the last state of our relations with Europe would be worse than the first.
With respect, I conclude with a word of counsel and exhortation to my right hon. Friends. First, a few words on what they should avoid. Avoid any temptation to blink or to mask the long-term implications of this decision. They would catch up on them in the end. Avoid any temptation to rush into a decision in a matter which has taken a longish time on the road. Avoid at all costs any sophisticated exercise in seeking to ease us into political union in the
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wake of economic union. Avoid taking the responsibility of putting us in the position of having to say at any stage, reluctantly but resolutely, "We can have neither part nor lot in the thing you seek to do." In this matter there is a high responsibility; and it rests not on the Government alone but jointly and severally on every Member of this House.
Now what to do. Tell the Six that we wish them well and that we want the maximum co-operation with them which is compatible with our own independent sovereignty and duty to the Commonwealth. Remind them of the difference between our position and theirs, and tell them that we do not wish to renounce our heritage but to use it for the common good. Seek an association with them under Article 238 of the Treaty which can bring the maximum honour and advantage to all. Try for a closer association with the Commonwealth, both economic and political, stressing the importance to those who need it of truly democratic institutions in our Commonwealth system. Remind our people that we are the guardians and the propagators of great principles and the centre and prime inspiration of the Commonwealth. Ask them for an effort to make these things a living and dynamic force in the world today.
If my right hon. Friends take that course, they will do well; and I believe that they will give a great stimulus to our people, and will bring to them the sure hope and strong conviction that, God willing and we deserving, the best is yet to be.
5.23 p.m.
Mr. A. Woodburn: We have listened to a very interesting speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). It reminded me of the custom in the church under which, before a person is admitted to certain places, a devil's advocate is heard who states all the arguments against the admission of that person. We have had a most efficient speech from the right hon. and learned Gentleman which presented all the arguments against our entry into a united Europe.
It appears to me that we must approach this matter in one of two ways. As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, there are those

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who favour every argument for not going in and for keeping our independence and there are those who favour every argument for going in. I must confess that I think in terms of trying to get greater and greater unity, not only in Europe but eventually in the world, and, if possible, world government. We on this side of the House have committed ourselves to this as the ideal which will establish peace throughout the world. We must have some world regulation of affairs by law and order if we are to preserve peace and not have nations settling their disputes themselves. The argument of the right hon. and learned Gentleman is that every man must be independent and must make decisions for himself unless he can come to agreement with others. But, if we are to co-operate with others, there must be some surrender of sovereignty.
I am satisfied that, however much we should like to be in a stronger position in our approach to European unity, we in this House are playing a part in one of the most dramatic moments of our history. I do not believe that the Government have gone thus far without having some idea of where they will finish up. I am satisfied that the Government are not going ahead in order to fail. They have made sure to some extent that they will succeed, and the declaration of the W.E.U. reported this morning seems to confirm my impression.
We are discussing the end of Britain as a key unit in the world. We are crossing the threshold and taking part in one of the greatest economic combinations of the world. If we enter the Common Market, Europe will be the greatest economic organisation in the world, bigger than either America or Russia. It could not be expected that such a change could even be proposed without raising strong emotions, and even violent opposition. The Prime Minister is not faced with the desperate life and death situation which existed when the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) offered, with general consent, common citizenship with our country to the French. But evolution means that change has to come. Change has always been a condition of survival.
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Clearly, the Government must have been moved by some irresistible pressure before they reached the conclusion which they have announced. No Government, except a Socialist one, on grounds of theory alone, comes up against all the prejudices of people to propose change for the sake of progress. The Prime Minister has not wholly given the reasons behind the Government's decision in this matter. I am satisfied that something much greater than we have heard so far has moved the Government to take this decision. Conservatives do not want change on principle. They like things to remain as they are, a view which the right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East clearly expounded. They are not pioneering, as the Labour Party is pioneering, to change the world to the kind of world that we think it should be.
What has compelled the Government to take this decision? We gather that it must be either the pressure of the possibility of war, which certainly compels change, and the need for European defence, or that some desperate economic situation is pressing them to go ahead. I am sure that, in addition, there must be the fear and knowledge that if we refuse to go forward as part of Europe our prosperity and well-being is, relatively speaking, doomed to decline. In short, we can continue to count in the world only as part of Europe. That would seem to me the dominant factor in the Government's decision. Standing alone, the bus of progress would pass us by. In this case, necessity is the mother of change and I am sure that the Government must have thought that there was no other course than this one if our country is to survive.
After the First World War, it was commonly assumed that the first and greatest step towards peace was to have a United States of Europe. I remember that early text books contained maps with a United States of Europe outlined, but, as people recovered from the war, this ideal gradually faded away and after the Second World War it was not revived. The unity of Europe was regarded as one of the hopes of people. Now we look forward eventually to world government based on the acceptance of law. Such a development is clearly important if we are not to remain insular "Little Englanders",

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refusing to mix with foreigners. In fact, we have long built up a high standard of life by trading with people of every race and colour in every part of the world.
The terms of that association with other peoples must either be agreed or dictated, and the time for the domination of other peoples has gone by. This means that we must give and take and have some surrender of sovereignty, for all co-operation involves compromise. In any case, the idea that at present, by standing alone, we are masters of our own fate cannot be sustained in the face of reality, and I think that the speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman in this regard was self-delusion. It cannot be sustained in the face of the facts.
It was Britain that inspired the move towards the Common Market. The right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) and the present Prime Minister and some of his colleagues, who were outside the Government at that time, went to Europe, and, however much embarrassment they caused to us who were in the Government here, there is not the slightest doubt that they inspired the people of Europe to want unity and to become Europeans, instead of Germans, Frenchmen, Belgians, Dutchmen and others. The Government of which I was a member were compelled to take a more practical line, and it was very embarrassing to us for these activities to be taking place on what seemed to be a very romantic and idealistic line of progress.
The right hon. Member for Woodford rapidly became one of the great heroes of Germany, and not very long after the war had finished, his visit to Aachen was proof of this, when they invited him to receive honours which was a most remarkable transformation. There was no question of the inspiration. Unfortunately, they inspired a great many people into thinking that Europe could be united overnight, and could become federalist under one united Government on a democratic basis, based on the sovereignty of the whole of Europe.
It is this idea of federalism which has been imported into the Treaty of Rome, which has alarmed a good many people here today and has alarmed a good many people in countries inside the Common Market. In any case, if we
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are to go forward, we have to go forward on practical lines. Ernest Bevin suggested the scheme that became Marshall Aid, which, together with Britain's help, put Europe back on its feet. We thought it better to build on the foundations of already existing institutions and through existing Governments. The United States expressed its willingness to help, if Europe united in efforts to help itself.
The United Kingdom and France invited all the European nations to a conference on a programme for European recovery, and sixteen nations formed the Organisation far European Economic Co-operation. It is rather interesting now to read the declaration of O.E.E.C. as to the purpose to which this nation and all the others had committed themselves:
"To join together to make the fullest collective use of their individual capacities and potentialities. To increase their production, develop and modernise their industrial and agricultural equipment, expand their commerce, reduce progressively barriers to trade among themselves, promote full employment and restore or maintain the stability of their economies and general confidence in their national currencies."
Common economic problems were to be studied jointly, and each Government was to submit to other countries budgets, investments and a balance of payments.
Quite clearly, that was to a large degree a surrender of sovereignty, although it was not put in legal form, nor did it become a permanent institution that could not be withdrawn. It was a wonderful lead, and out of it came a long series of united activities which led up to the Common Market, and therefore, to some extent, Britain was responsible for the steps that are now taking place in Europe.
Why, therefore, did we step aside? I think the first important step was our refusal to join the Iron and Steel Community. As a Member of the Government Which took that decision, I have to accept some responsibility, but, unfortunately, the terms of the invitation appeared to make it quite impossible for us to accept. We may have been wrong. Looking back on it, we might have done better to have paid no attenion to the terms of that invitation and to have relied on ourselves at the meeting to make the conditions different.
Mr. A. R. Wise: There is one effect which that would, unfortunately, have had. If we had joined the Iron and Steel Community, we should be paying £ or £4 10s. per ton more for our steel.
Mr. Woodburn: The hon. Gentleman thinks that we were right not to join, but it may be that that would not have been the case if we had joined. That is pure speculation on my part and his. In any case, it was at that decisive moment that we withdrew from this progress towards the unity of Europe which we had done so much to inspire and foster.
It is obvious that the Government are not to be deterred this time by the terms of the invitation or the terms of the Treaty of Rome. I understand that the invitation to discuss the Coal and Steel Community was couched in these terms deliberately through the influence of M. Monet in order to keep us out. There are some people on the Continent even today who do not want us to go into the Common Market. We are told that General de Gaulle has been voicing deterrent conditions of this kind, and, quite clearly, the Government have decided to ignore them and to face the negotiations which they will enter. Some of General de Gaulle's advisers do not want us in and have been saying so, publicly and privately. They are creating the impression that they represent the whole of France, but, actually, there are a good many people in France who do want us in.
France itself, and even General de Gaulle, is rather anxious, for certain purposes, that we should be in, though they may object to us on some grounds, and General de Gaulle is very anxious on the points which my right hon. Friend and the Prime Minister raised—the question of help for under-developed nations outside. France is having considerable difficulty in persuading fellow-members of the Common Market to have any responsibility in a United Europe in helping the under-developed nations which were formerly colonies of France, and France would welcome our outlook on that. There is no doubt that we shall be able to join them in fostering the development of under-developed countries abroad.
There are other people in France who would welcome us in. A good many influential people in the Six, however,
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are apprehensive about our coming in. It is not that they would not like Britain to join, but many say that they were let down by Britain in the past. They felt that the Prime Minister and the right hon. Member for Woodford were passionately advocating united help when not in the Government but that immediately they came into office they forgot all about this enthusiasm and the people of the Continent felt that they had been letdown. It revived all the suspicions about "perfidious Albion", and today there is a good deal of suspicion among people who otherwise would like us in that the only reason why we are willing to come in is to prevent the progress towards a better unity even among the Six. They think that if we go in, we shall sabotage the existing unity and hold the thing up. I think they are a little romantic about the rate of progress that can be expected, but the true feeling is that if Britain goes in we shall slow down the pace of development.
I heard M. Spaak at a conference some weeks ago—and he is one of the people with whom the Government will have to negotiate—actually making this declaration:
"We went ahead on our own. We decided that it was better to go somewhere without Britain than to go nowhere with Britain."
That is the attitude of M. Spaak, and he takes the view that if we go in, far from helping the Common Market we shall actually sabotage it and prevent progress.
Mr. William Yates: But did he not also say that Europe had suffered so tragically since the war that she could not sustain a European Common Market without Britain with her?
Mr. Woodburn: I heard him three weeks ago making this statement, which was not very friendly to the idea of Britain joining, and I am very glad to hear that he has expressed a different view when speaking elsewhere.
This is the most likely kind of opposition which the Government will meet—the fact that if Britain joins, she will slow down the pace of development. A good many people on the Continent want. this Parliament of Europe elected by direct suffrage, and I understand that we are fully protected in the Treaty of Rome by the fact that progress of that kind could only be obtained by

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unanimous decision and not by a majority.
It is difficult to prevent people rationalising in a controversy of this kind and to look for arguments which will support their preconceived judgment. We are told that if we enter the Common Market we shall give up our sovereignty to Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle. But any development towards political unity or political federation would involve a sacrifice of the sovereignty of other countries as well as of our own. We are told that this is the thin end of the wedge which will split us off from the Commonwealth. But history shows that thin ends of the wedge are never driven home. That is an old story.
As to sovereignty, does anybody believe that we are a wholly sovereign State today? The definition of a State by Jerks has been given as an association of people under one military command. In earlier days that meant a king. If not in law, certainly in fact we are no longer under our own military command. We are under N.A.T.O. for defence, and no one can conceive of any country standing alone in the matter of defence.
Mr. Wise: If we are under N.A.T.O. command, will the right hon. Gentleman explain what N.A.T.O. has to do with our operation in Kuwait?
Mr. H. Hynd: What has that to do with defence?
Mr. Woodburn: It is impossible for this country or any other country in the West to defend itself alone, and for defence we have sacrificed our command to N.A.T.O. I thought that was the policy of the present Government, and of all hon. Members opposite. Last week I heard the French Minister of Defence state that anything less than Europe as a defence unit was not conceivable—
Viscount HinchingbrookeDefence against what?
Mr. Woodburn: Our exchanges are now conducted in co-operation. Britain is linked up with Euratom and a great number of European organisations, all of which in practice limit our sovereignty. We live in a Europe of interdependence, not independence.
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What would be the sensible development of European co-operation? There is no reason to think that complete federation is either practicable or desirable. Our own history illustrates this. Our organs of government each do what they are best fitted for. Parliament delegates the functions of government locally to town and county councils. It is found convenient to allow Scotland, Ireland and Wales in various ways to discuss matters not concerning the United Kingdom as a whole. Parliament could easily become choked if it attempted to deal with every local problem. But it is essential that the British Parliament should deal with matters which affect the whole country. Europe now has questions to answer which cannot be dealt with in any one country, and surely, eventually, there must be some European Government and Parliament to handle these problems.
Defence is the clearest case for a civilian authority to control the military unity, and this will be necessary sooner or later. The military force is impotent without an economic basis for its operation, and this calls for European government decision sooner or later. There are other lesser issues which need European law and not national law, whether it is in the form of the combined Heads of Government such as N.A.T.O. or other forms of government. One example is the regulation of fishing grounds and limits. It is one of the bugbears for even this Parliament that nobody can control fishing fleets of European countries fishing in our waters, and surely common sense would dictate that there should be some European body to establish law in this respect. Agriculture cannot be left to chance, and sooner or later we shall need European and even world planning.
This raises the question of the Commonwealth. It would not be possible to divorce us from the Commonwealth. We are told that there are 20 million Scots and large numbers of Welsh and English abroad, and that they have ties with this country which no amount of arguing will break. But they are all hard business men. The fact that they are Scots, English and Welsh does not mean that they will pay more for goods coming from this country than they would if they went to the Common Market. With the Common Market, economic development is such that even

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a 20 per cent. tariff could not protect us against the advantages of mass production and automation which is made possible by a 200 million population market on the Continent. Therefore, we cannot dictate to the Commonwealth that they should buy their goods here.
I used to be in commerce in the days when Australia bought all her goods in this country, and I remember when, because the steel masters arranged a monopoly price for steel, Australia went to Switzerland and other countries on the Continent for her railway material and thus did away with a great British monopoly.
It is nonsense to say that the Commonwealth buy all their goods here. They do not intend to do so. But that does not mean that there is any break in relationships and friendship, so far as economics make it possible, between ourselves and the Commonwealth. The European countries recognise that the accession of Britain with the Commonwealth is a greater asset than Britain without the Commonwealth. Naturally each country wants to safeguard its own citizens, but I am sure that the Common Market countries will make every provision so that Britain can come in with the Commonwealth. They have already shown great flexibility in their own discussions and mutual adjustments.
What will not be acceptable to any of them is that while we refuse to make any concessions, we want all the benefits that come from membership of the Common Market. They are not going to agree to Britain having its cake and eating it and taking all the benefits while making no concessions in return.
It is vital to political progress that political administration should keep pace with technical development. Mass production, automation, electronics and atomic energy have provided us with powers to produce wealth which cannot be contained within present national frontiers. We are already bursting at our economic seams in many cases.
Air travel has made modern barriers ridiculous. I can recall how housewives in the old days used to have to stop at the gates of Paris, open their bags and have them examined by octroi or customs officials, to see whether they were taking any contraband in or out of Paris. The
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present customs arrangements at our own frontiers and the frontiers of Europe are just as ridiculous an anachronism. The customs officials can hardly cope with the traffic which goes through. The examination in many cases has to be very much a spot check here and there. The sooner we can make arrangements for Europe to get out of that nonsense the better. As Ernie Bevin said, What we want to do is to be able to make arrangements, at least in Europe, where we can buy a ticket at the desk and go where the hell we like." That was his philosophy as to how we should develop liberty and freedom in Europe.
Surely moves to free ourselves from useless handicaps must be good common sense, and I hope that. the Government, in addition to all these deep economic considerations, will get down to dealing with some of these common sense problems that irritate people who want to mix with their fellows on the Continent. The Government are faced with a great responsibility, but they are equally faced with a great opportunity. Whatever may be the reasons which have impelled the Government to make the move towards uniting with Europe and however much the background may lay them open to criticism and controversy, no one with a sense of history can fail to feel the drama of our crossing this threshold into a new and uncharted future.
When Scotland and England united their Parliaments, the Commissioners were abused and reviled for selling out their national independence for a seat at the table of the English colonial trade. The right hon. and learned Member for Hertfordshire, East reminded me of some of the speeches made before the union of England and Scotland. Today, after 250 years, there are still those who denounce the Union as treachery and who want to turn back the clock. Even in this House there are some who do not give what might be called a hearty welcome to the Scots in their presence here. But the fact is that, with the Union, Scottish and English prosperity moved forward by leaps and bounds, and the United Kingdom has never looked back since. I question whether any voluntary union in history has ever been more fruitful and productive than the union of our two peoples. While we may tolerate, without loving, each other, I

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believe that even this Parliament would lose something if the Scots went back to their own country.
It is difficult to foresee the future, but I am satisfied that 250 years from now there will be people denouncing this Parliament and Government if we do unite with Europe. Nevertheless, the Government must go forward in the knowledge that they have in their hands responsibility for the prosperity of our country. We shall watch with interest the progress of their move, in the hope that reason and good will may take us one step forward towards the unity of all mankind.
5.52 p.m.
Sir Lionel Heald: I know that many Members in all parts of the House wish to speak on this matter, and I think it is necessary that as many as possible should speak in view of its tremendous importance. I hope to be brief, therefore, but I feel that it is one's duty to try, if possible, to identify and clear up any misunderstandings and confusion which might arise in the debate if we do not keep our eye on the ball and bear in mind the real question before the House today.
When he made his statement the other day, the Prime Minister said something which I shall repeat because I believe that to do so will be of assistance to us all now. My right hon. Friend said:
"We have reached the stage where we cannot make further progress without entering into formal negotiations. I believe that the great majority in the House and in the country will feel that they cannot fairly judge whether it is possible for the United Kingdom to join the European Economic Community until there is a clearer picture before them of the conditions on which we could join and the extent to which these could meet our special needs."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 31st July, 1961; Vol. 645, c. 930.]
The speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) contained much food for thought but they contained also a good example of what the Prime Minister had in mind. I refer to the matters they discussed upon Which we cannot arrive at any conclusion until we know what it is possible to obtain in the way of terms by means of negotiation.
No one can logically vote against the Government Motion today unless he is prepared to maintain that, as a matter
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of principle, in no circumstances should we join the Common Market, whatever terms we might obtain. That issue should be faced by everyone who speaks or votes in this debate. I can understand such an attitude, although I cannot accept it. It is a perfectly honest and straightforward attitude, based in very many oases on a great ideal—what used to be called Empire Free Trade—the champion of which has always been Lord Beaverbrook. No one who knows Lord Beaverbrook could fail for a moment to appreciate and admire his abiding faith in that conception, although I must say that some of us find it rather difficult to admire the methods adopted by his newspapers in supporting it, particularly when they make very selective and partial quotations from the Treaty of Rome and when in their leading articles they offer intimidating and terrifying threats about what will happen to Members of Parliament if they do not do what they think they ought to do.
We must face the simple truth. Unfortunately, a Commonwealth common market is not possible. This cannot be said to be the fault of the British Government, or, at any rate, the fault of any British Government alone. Many of us have had long and interesting talks with friends from Canada or Australia and have learned from them that, much as they would like to see something of that kind, there are insurmountable obstacles in those countries against its attainment. Let us make no mistake about it: we cannot hope that it will ever be possible.
There is another way of looking at the matter which is really part of the same point of view. As Lord Beaver-brook has perfectly frankly and honestly always accepted—one has seen it said time after time in his newspapers—to vote against this Motion involves the view that for practical purposes we should take a decision in favour of the permanent isolation of Britain from Europe. This, again, is a view held by some people. I believe it to be wrong. But, unless one is able to take that view, how can it be justified not even to attempt to join the European Common Market? If we were to say now what some people have suggested we should say—" Let us wait five years and see what the position is"—within five years all the major decisions of policy will

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have been made and we shall have had no say in them at all. Let there be no mistake about that. Moreover, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East pointed out—though I must say that I do not agree with some of the views he expressed—there is the political future also to be considered. The concept of splendid isolation was very attractive fifty-five years ago when the phrase was first coined.
Mr. Wise: Fifty-five years ago we were negotiating the Entente Cordiale.
Sir L. Heald: I am much obliged to my hon. Friend for telling me that, but I was talking about the phrase and, at the risk of repetition, I will say that I believe that, if we were to decide now that we should adopt a policy of isolation in relation to Europe, there would, in 15 or 20 years, be nothing very splendid about it in trade or in any other sphere. Let us remember, also, that after the 1914–18 war, this was, unfortunately, the approach of the United States to Europe, and it was, perhaps, one of the biggest negative causes of or contributions to the Second World War.
Again, I feel that there is some misunderstanding about the actual machinery. The application to join is a necessity, arising out of the form of the Treaty itself. Informal discussions can, of course, always take place at any stage but, according to Article 237 of the Treaty, a formal application is essential as a preliminary to negotiations for the necessary agreement which has to be entered into when any new member joins.
On this, I support the Prime Minister's view that the realistic situation must not be obscured by technical arguments of whether a word means "amendments", "adaptations" or what. No special provisions are required in any treaty in order to allow the participants to vary it, or add to or subtract from it. After all, it is one of the most elementary principles of the law of contract of any country that those who make an agreement may vary it or add to it by mutual agreement.
In any event, important changes must be made under Article 237. As has been already mentioned today the voting machinery must be changed—and what
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an important matter that is, as my right hon. and learned Friend has already pointed out. The qualified majority which subsists under Article 148 (2) at certain stages has to be rearranged. Who is to have four votes? Are there to be four votes? Are we to make fresh calculations?
Or if we think it formally impossible or undesirable to proceed under Article 237 there is another way of proceeding. There is the familiar method known as a protocol. As the Prime Minister has pointed out, there are already several important protocols in this Treaty. I wonder how many hon. Members appreciate that France has a most important protocol in this Treaty? France—some of whose representatives insist that in no circumstances can any members or aspirants to membership ever secure any protection for themselves.
France has secured some very excellent protection. I have a book here by M. Jean Deniau, a very distinguished French authority who, I think, at the moment holds a most important position in connection with the Common Market itself. The book is called "The Common Market", and in page 87 the author states:
"… in the special protocol concerning France, Member States record their opinion that at the end of the first stage after the establishment of the Common Market a situation will have been reached in which the basic level for overtime payment and the average overtime rates of pay will correspond to those which existed in France according to the average figures for 1956. If at the end of that period these conditions have not been realised, the institutions of the Community must provide a suitable escape clause for French industries suffering as a result of this inequality."
If, in those circumstances, one says that it is not possible for the interests of any country to be protected, one should add "except France", but, of course, that applies to everybody.
Luxembourg already has a protocol dealing with what are called "certain specific problems" special to her. So, also, has Italy, and there are various other escape clauses and protocols. Therefore, with great respect to those who have discussed this matter, the question of how exactly these changes are to be made is, in a sense, rather a technicality.
There is no time now to discuss sovereignty, but I would suggest that, to a great extent, that also is overdone.

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After all, when we enter into a treaty we are not derogating from our sovereignty. As has been said by great authorities, in entering into a treaty we are exercising our sovereignty. It is one of the essences of sovereignty that we should be in a position to take such action.
In this connection, I refer again to this eminent Frenchman who, in page 61, says:
"… the Treaty of Rome does not attempt to establish a political community, and the machinery of co-ordination is restricted to the minimum requirements which can be foreseen at present or, to use the definition which appears on numerous occasions, 'so far as necessary to the proper working of the Common Market'. To go any further would involve a serious encroachment on the essential preserves of the political independence of the member States"—
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: How, then, would my right hon. and learned Friend interpret the words of Professor Hallstein, who said that he was not in the Common Market for economics but was in it for politics?
Sir L. Heald: In any argument in any assembly there are members who make magnificent statements which do not always agree with the rest.
One further point might usefully be mentioned. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has very clearly undertaken that the results of the reconnaissance, if I may put it in that way, will be communicated both to the Commonwealth and to this House, with ample opportunity for discussion and expression of view. I suggest that beyond that it would not be right to tie his hands. In such circumstances, a Prime Minister should surely be a plenipotentiary, and not a delegate.
It is not impossible that even if the actual entry under Article 237 were shown not to be possible, the negotiations and discussions which took place, if they were fruitful, might lead to some quite new arrangement, some quite new possibility. Let us look at it from that point of view. I hope, therefore, that I may ask that we should give the Prime Minister unanimous support in this most vital enterprise, so that he can go into the negotiations with a feeling that the whole country is behind him. Let us wish him all good fortune.
6.7 p.m.
Mr. William Blyton: I hope that the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) will forgive me if I do not follow him, except to say that in the light of the speeches that have been made by those who are controlling the set-up in the Common Market I disagree on the political implications.
The Prime Minister has made what I regard to be the gravest decision that could be made in peace time. The technique appears to be an old one. It is said, "There is a position of difficulty; let us take no precipitate steps. The situation is obscure and we must not take up firm positions from which it will be impossible to retreat." I expect that we shall next be told that, whatever may be the merits of the Common Market, there is little we can do about it and that we had better make the best of it. I am afraid that, as a consequence, we shall find ourselves tied up with the Common Market and that Parliament will be manœuvred into a position in which it may have no option but to consent to our joining it.
I remember quite vividly the occasion when I had the privilege of putting the Labour Government's case at Strasbourg on the Schuman Plan. The present Prime Minister, the present Minister for Commonwealth Relations and the present Minister of Education were all leaning towards the federalists and against the Labour Government's case. When I heard my right hon. Friend the Member for Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire (Mr. Woodburn), who was a member of the Cabinet at that time, speaking a short time ago I began to wonder whether when I went to put the case on the Schuman Plan I had got the wrong instructions from Lord Attlee.
The fact remains that the Prime Minister and his two colleagues whom I have mentioned most certainly leant towards federalism at that time. They opposed us, and what we were arguing was that in the political implications of the Schuman Plan there was the object of federalism. We could not accept that, but suggested that when they had made up their coal and steel plan we would enter into articles of association with them on specific matters in order to protect all our economies.

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When my party was defeated at the 1951 Election, the Government sent the Lord Chancellor to Strasbourg to say that the Tory Party would follow the policy laid down by us in 1950. I remember Mr. Spaak leaving the Chair, going over to the floor of the Chamber and severely criticising the Tory delegation, who had "kidded" the Assembly that they were supporting federalism when we were in power.
This controversy has gone on for twelve years. I remember, when I was a delegate in the years when federalism reached its crescendo, the American pressure that was put upon us to go into the Schuman Plan. I am pleased to say that Lord Attlee resisted the American pressure at that time. I wish that the present Government had resisted the American pressure from which they are suffering and which has brought the Common Market issue before us today.
The cardinal principle always enshrined in the Coal and Steel Community, in Euratom, and now in the Common Market, is the political and economic integration of Europe under a federal Parliament. No argument could get away from the fact that that is the basic principle on which all these set-ups are made.
We said in 1950 that we could not become full members of those set-ups because of our Commonwealth relations and that we could not accept any position on the Continent in which a Parliament there would be responsible for our internal economy and in which the elected Government of the country could not interfere with that Parliament's decisions. We said that we would enter into articles of union with the other countries. The objective of all these Common Market set-ups is that we must accept the political concept of federalism as a condition of entry. President de Gaulle, Herr von Brentano, the West German Foreign Minister, Professor Hallstein and Mr. Spaak have all told us in the last few weeks that if we are to receive the alleged economic benefits, we must accept the political implications.
We are told in this House by the advocates of the Common Market of our future doom if we do not become full members, but I am not in the least disturbed by that advocacy. A few years
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ago many people were shouting that we were becoming the 49th American State. Now we are to become the seventh State in Europe. Does anyone on the Government Benches believe that the Treaty of Rome, with the cardinal principles of federalism embodied in it, will be amended to allow us to enter and still to have the same trade relations with the Commonwealth as we have now? Knowing the Continent as I do, I do not believe that the Government will get this concession. Even today, nearly every one of the Commonwealth countries is very much upset at the attitude that the Government are taking.
I then ask whether the Government intend to throw overboard the Commonwealth to be absorbed in a federal Parliament of Europe and our economy to be determined by an authority whose decisions our elected Government must accept. I ask the Government why it is that the federalists of Europe could enter into articles of association with us for coal and steel and Euratom but are not prepared to give us articles of union freely negotiated in trade. Is it because they think that they are strong enough now to force us to accept a principle of federalism by threats of discrimination towards us, regardless of our relations with the Commonwealth?
If we join the Common Market, what will happen to E.F.T.A.? It was the Conservative Party which set up this economic organisation. I hope that we do not leave our partners in E.F.T.A. in the lurch if we happen to get into the Common Market on this basis. I ask my Labour Party friends in a kindly way, if we are to become full members of the Common Market, how shall we reach the commanding heights of our economy which is in our party constitution? The control of our economy will be in the hands of people on the Continent. Do the Labour Party think that if they get power and accept the Treaty of Rome they will be able to renationalise the steel industry? I am very doubtful about that, because the steel owners are now in favour of the Common Market and they regard it as another safeguard against the renationalisation of steel.
Then there is the machinery for a Council of Ministers and a Commission of the High Authority in which no decision on any matter can be carried unless it is unanimous in many instances.

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There is also the Council of the Parliament. The High Authority cannot be dismissed without a two-thirds majority. It has its own courts and interprets its own laws. Thus, no matter what is harmful to our economy, the Government would have a little say, since the power would reside with the Commission of the High Authority.
I regard the alleged advantages of full membership as not worth the sacrifice. Joining the Common Market as full members would also mean that we would have to join Euratom as full members, and to join the Coal and Steel Community also, because we could not join one unless we joined the other. One of the arguments that is used for this purpose is that this great combination of nations would be a third force in the world between Russia, on the one hand, and America, on the other hand. Be that as it may, I believe that if there is to be a third force it ought to be Britain, the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. in a freely and fully negotiated partnership with Europe; but if the other countries are not prepared to have us in this rôle, I suggest that we should develop it on our own.
Let us consider some of the arguments that are involved. The advocates of the Common Market say that there might not be much in their political concept. The Treaty of Rome is full of rules and of procedures and has set up its own democratic empire.
In this country of ours we have been for centuries a political democracy. I say to the House quite sincerely that if we were to go to the people of this country and tell them that their elected representatives were to be no longer sovereign, and that vital decisions affecting the economic factors of their common, everyday life were to be left to be decided by a Parliament in Europe, we should be treading on very dangerous ground, and I do not for one moment think that if this were submitted to the people the people would accept it.
Here we see a combination of nations in collaboration, economic and political, and there is nothing in the world which can be compared with the conditions of the Treaty of Rome. I believe that the Treaty could be exploited against us in every way.
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Another argument of the advocates of going into the Common Market is that if we go in we shall have a voice and shall have some influence upon the Common Market. I ask, how much? How many members shall we have in the Assembly, in the main council? Can the Government tell us? I think the people have a right to know before they are committed to this. If vital decisions have to be made, I believe that those decisions ought to be made in here and not outside. There may be in the lifetime of Governments occasions when they have to take immediate, important and vital decisions without reference to the electors, but often they have to delay things because they have no mandate. This Government had no mandate in the 1959 General Election for this serious kind of departure, and the issues are so vital that at least the people should have the chance to say whether they are prepared to hand over power elsewhere or keep it in this country.
When we talk about power within the Common Market Assembly, I have been greatly struck by the conditions. If a country makes an application for changes, even though they are detrimental to that country, there must be unanimity in many instances before the changes are passed. There are both abroad and at home advocates of the Common Market who say that we cannot have this unanimity and yet they still say that we must go in. If we cannot get unanimity in the Council of the Common Market there is nothing for us. I believe that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will not disagree with me on this, and I am not a lawyer. Moreover, suppose there is a dispute within the Common Market on any action taken by one of its members, one of which does damage which in the ordinary course of events under the common law of any country would be a matter for the courts of the country involved. It is not so under the Rome Treaty. The Common Market has its own courts and its own judges and it is its own courts which will decide issues which may be harmful to our own internal economy.
What about food prices? I do not want to read too long a list of the tariffs against those outside the Six, but for beef, fresh, chilled or frozen, the tariff is 20 per cent.; for beef salted, it is

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24 per cent.; for mutton it is 24 per cent.; for wheat, 20 per cent.; for bacon 25 per cent.; butter 24 per cent.; cheese 23 per cent.; tea 23 per cent.—all external tariffs against our Commonwealth, if we cannot get some arrangement that these tariffs will apply to the Commonwealth. What is to happen to the economy of our Commonwealth?
I was reading the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was Foreign Secretary last year. I ask the Government, do they believe what he said in that debate? I shall read what he said. He was opposing Britain going at that time into the Common Market and he said:
"The third matter is our commercial relations with third countries. Under the Treaty of Rome, apart from the question of the co-ordination of common policies within the Community, by 1970 members would have to abandon their direct commercial relations with third countries In our case that would mean, amongst others, the countries of the Commonwealth, and the political consequences of Rich a development would be far-reaching."
Continually last year, 12 months ago, the present Chancellor was saying this sort of thing:
"We have to remember that we do 84 per cent … of our trade with countries outside the European Community, but, by their rules, by 1970 we would have to abandon our direct commercial relations with third countries."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 25th July, 1960; Vol. 627, C. 1103.]
Do the Government still stand by that statement made by their own Foreign Secretary, now the Chancellor? Is that what is to happen in England in 1970? The Commonwealth would be shattered to smithereens.
I would ask what is to happen to agriculture. All parties in Britain agree that the assistance we give to agriculture helps our balance of payments and keeps down prices to the consumer, and we think that is the best way for this industry. What is to be substituted for this? It may be said that in the Common Market there are arrangements for certain agricultural countries to be able to continue to give production grants in their own countries, but, of course, all our grants in England are not entirely production grants. We are paying a subsidy of about £250 million a year. About £160 million of that is production grants. What is to happen to the other £90 million? Is the farmer to have to find it? Is it to be found at the expense
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of men's wages, or do we put up the prices in the shops and get the £90 million that way? We have to face this situation in agriculture and exactly what the country are going to do.
I want to talk now about the trade union side of this issue. There has been a lot of talk about British manufacturers. When all is said and done, British manufacturers have to have trade unionists working for them to keep them going. We saw just a fortnight ago, from one of the Ministry of Transport's own statements, that British shipowners are having their ships built on the Continent, and our own shipbuilding is in a bad way. I want to know, will this process increase in the Common Market, as wages are less over there than they are in our country? If we join the Common Market and are still to get shipbuilding back here, will our shipbuilding workers have to suffer a reduction so that our yards will be able to compete?
I heard an hon. Gentleman in the last debate say that going into the Common Market would give British industry a jolt. I am afraid that the biggest jolt will go to the trade unionists. If we join the Common Market, Western Germany, France, Belgium, Italy will export freely into Britain. With their generally lower wages and working conditions they will be able to carry out a vicious price war against British manufactures with the certain result of unemployment and a depressed standard of living for the British trade unionists. But having entered this market, no matter what party was in power, the British Government, having lost control of the economy, would be unable to offset this unemployment because it would no longer be able to control imports and investments or plan a new distribution of industry.
I would say to my trade union friends outside the House, "You had better be careful about this because you will wake up some day and find yourselves in extreme difficulties." There is the problem of the mobility of labour. This mobility may be a very desirable thing if it can be arranged with the agreement of the workers and at the same time a happy state of affairs can be arranged for them.

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Let hon. Members consider the situation in my industry—coal mining—for instance. We all know what happened in that industry when Italian labour was introduced. We have heard in the House agitation about West Indians coming into the country. I think that the trade unions ought to know how the system of mobility within the Common Market is to work and how it will affect the trade unions. There is a great agitation now to keep Commonwealth people out of this country, but are we to accept the French, Italians, Belgians, Dutch and Germans and keep our Commonwealth friends out?
At the same time are we to send our people to work in these Continental countries? Are we to tell the people of Britain, as we must do, that if we join the Common Market and there is no work for them here they must go to work on the Continent? What about wages? Continental wages are lower than ours. German wages are lower than British wages. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Are wages to be harmonised up or down? This is a question which trade unionists must face.
I am prepared to agree to articles of association freely negotiated, but I am not prepared to throw the Commonwealth over so that we may be full members of the European Common Market. I am not anti-European but I will not be forced into federalism, because I believe that it would break up the Commonwealth, give us a small voice in Europe, and give us no power in this country over our own economy. I would say to the Government Front Bench in the words of Shakespeare:
"The friends thou hast, and their adoption tried,
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel."
6.32 p.m.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The last thing that I would want to do would be to hurt, embarrass or offend the hon. Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton) in any way because I have very great admiration for him derived from fifteen or twenty years of acute political controversy, but the fact of the matter is that I agree with every word he said. I regard it as a very great honour and privilege to take part in this historic debate.
Mr. Charles Royle: Does the statement which the noble Lord has just made include the comment which my hon. Friend the Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton) made about the renationalisation of the steel industry?
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: I will come to that before I finish.
If I may be allowed, as briefly as possible, I should like to address the House on this occasion on three principal aspects of this matter—the economic results that will flow from membership of the Common Market, the effect upon the Commonwealth and the change that will ensue in Britain's position in the world balance of power. I could not in any circumstances vote for the Government in the Division tomorrow night, because a careful reading of the figures of our overseas balance of payments recently and over the last few years has led me to the conclusion that the Government's existing policy of free trade, to say nothing of the cost to the taxpayer of cushioning the results of it with subsidies, now lies in ruins before our eyes and any further expansion of free trade by joining the Common Market would carry the process to disastrous lengths.
I voted for the American loan in 1945 because the country was exhausted, badly fed and needed recuperation. It needed reinvestment, it needed activity, indeed it needed even another tin of Spam on the shelf, and it did not seem to me that that could be achieved without accepting the American loan. One felt that in voting against it one was straining at the camel, apart altogether from swallowing the gnat of the consequences of the loan in the restrictions which it put on Imperial preferential arrangements and discrimination in trade.
Then followed G.A.T.T. and the increasing disposition of both Governments, Socialist and Conservative, to go in for this policy of free trade. The effect was masked by the devaluation which took place in 1949. But we are now drawing away from the benefits that immediately ensued to the Conservative Government in 1951–52 from the tariff effect that a devaluation has. If one looks at the figures, one can see the situation we are now getting into. For the years from 1952 to 1959, with

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the single exception of 1955, we had very large export surpluses on our visible and invisible trade ranging from £350 million to £180 million. The plunge into our present almost desperate situation began in 1959 when we had an exportable surplus of only £145 million. In 1960 we went for the first time, except for that single year I have mentioned, disastrously to the figure of minus £300 million.
I cannot see how it is possible to join the Common Market, with the consequential reductions of tariffs that will be made in those circumstances, without a further devaluation which will immediately ensue to rectify the anomalous position of Britain's overseas trade. I am not altogether unhappy that, economically speaking—though politically I think there are great advantages in it—the E.F.T.A. group is now making its own way home and making its own arrangements with the Common Market. For E.F.T.A. was and is very expensive.
Out of a total overseas deficit with the non-sterling area of £400 million this year, E.F.T.A. accounts for £50 million. The Common Market, without any further tariff reductions, accounts for £150 million. What that figure will rise to when we start the process of tariff reductions I do not know, but it seems to me that a very dangerous situation is bound to arise if the Government persist in this policy of free trade. Free trade accompanied by a determined policy of full or over-full employment must result in devaluation.
It seems to me that the equation is all too clear, and that is why I say that the Government's policy now lies in ruins and that something must be done to correct it. Indeed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer took the very action necessary to help to correct it the other day when he clamped on a 10 per cent. increase in tariffs to help save the £. That is the sort of control that we shall lose if we are part of the Common Market.
Then we are told that competition is vital for British industry and that, somehow, we shall get competition by going into the Common Market. In the case of the export trade, it seems to me that we shall merely add to the length of industrial order books and the length of industrial 1540
delays. What is going to put the exporter on his toes unless it is done by legislation in this House, or by cajoling him, or by some of the exhortatory devices which the Government apply from time to time? How is the placing in front of the exporter of a new market in Europe going to put him on his toes? I should like to know the answer to that.
Then there is the import side. Are we really prepared to see small tirms—I suppose the big firms can look after themselves—which produce in the home market put out of business by the arrival in this country of an enormous new flood of goods from across the Channel? How many of the small producers in this country can tee themselves up and go straight off into the export trade?
My hon. Friends have been calling for special inducements in the last Budget to help the export trade. I cannot go now into the fiscal immorality of that, as I conceive it, but it is symptomatic of the all too liberal policy of free imports that we are forced to prise people in this country out of their natural setting in supplying the home market and push them into the export trade in order to try to recover the ground that is lost by the importations.
There is a wider aspect of this. The hon. Member for Houghton-le-Spring touched on it as only he could. I accept, with reservations about the extravagances of it, the Welfare State in industry. I do not like the subsidy to the Cunard Company. I do not like the cotton scheme. I do not like the idea of taxpayers' money being used to site industries in certain places. However, by and large, we have arrived at a situation in this country where work is done according to certain rules legislated for by this House and agreed to after zealous trade union bargaining with employers over many generations.
What part of this Welfare State in industry is to be jettisoned in order that industry can be put upon its toes by joining the Common Market? Which of the tea breaks is to be given up—the morning or the afternoon? Which industries are to work longer hours than they do now? Which are to go back to one week's holiday with pay, or none? Is it this sort of idea of putting British industry on its toes on which some of my hon. Friends who are very

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commercially minded in these matters are so tremendously keen?
Mr. William Shepherd: is not my noble Friend aware that some of the countries with which we shall be in direct competition have shorter hours than ours, longer holidays—[HON. MEMBERS: "And more money."]—and much better social welfare?
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: My hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) is now talking in the most delectable terms of increasing the Welfare State in industry by joining the Common Market. Most of his hon. Friends have, I think, taken an altogether different view. They are ashamed of certain aspects of British commercial and industrial life, and so am I, of some of the impossible and ridiculous restrictions on both sides of industry. But these are things which are much better dealt with in this House under our own volition than, as it were, by a side wind by joining the Common Market.
Finally on this economic point, there is the control of our fiscal policy. I touched on this just now. We have had what is supposed to be called a stop-and-go system—stop when one gets to an inflationary situation and go when one gets to an impossible unemployment position; and these things are conveniently timed electorally.
When Brussels takes over, the time scale may not be quite the same. Apart from how it will affect the fortunes of Her Majesty's Government, it is perhaps more seriously true that our unemployment might rise to almost disastrous proportions and that our inflation might be in a galloping state before the bureaucracy in Brussels took the action necessary to rectify the situation.
I want now to refer to the Commonwealth aspect. There seem to be two empty arguments which have been used and which ought to be disposed of, and I will try to do that as briefly as possible. It is said that trade is declining in the Commonwealth. Who wonders? The Government have not done much—no Government has done much—since the war by redesigning the Ottawa Agreements, or even attempting to do so with Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences, in order to get Commonwealth trade improving and reviving. As I have said, it is declining.
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What of that? Suppose it was increasing. Would the advocates of going into Europe then say that because it was increasing it could be let alone and that we should make our arrangements with Europe, divert our trade there? It seems to me that the argument cuts both ways, and that that particular one is hardly worth considering.
There is another point, that the Commonwealth is now no longer supplying the raw materials to this country, that the old pattern of exporting high-cost merchandise to the Commonwealth, investing our exportable surplus, and importing low-cost materials, is over, that the Commonwealth is getting industrialised, and that we can no longer go along on the same arrangements with it as before. If that is the case, what is the argument for joining the Common Market. The Common Market is industrialised. Again, that argument cuts both ways.
Fortunately, Britain's export surplus with the sterling area, including Canada, has been running consistently high at £250 million, and over the years since the war we have reinvested a great part of it—an average of £140 million per year since 1945. That compares very favourably with the investment that we put back into the Commonwealth in the years after the First World War—an average of £67 million between 1925 and 1929 and £28 million between 1932 and 1936. That means that we are now reinvesting in the Commonwealth with this exportable surplus of the sterling area rather more, relatively speaking, at prewar prices than we did in the period immediately after the 1914–18 war and three times the rate at which we were investing it in the period before the last war.
That surely points the way. If we are having this success already to the tune of about £140 million, why should we not take it up almost to the level of the £250 million that were receive from the Commonwealth? Why, for example, is there no payments union with the Commonwealth such as there is with Western Europe? We have since the war devised every sort and kind of scheme for economic co-operation in Europe, but we have practically nothing comparable in the Commonwealth.
The Government do not seem to be as sensitive to the developing needs of

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the Commonwealth as they are to the organisation of Western Europe, and I cannot but conclude that this derives directly from the United States policy which has constantly concentrated our minds on the menacing position, as it seems to them, of these ill-organised States of Western Europe facing across to the Soviet Union.
Britain has all too easily slid into a position where it has been careful to devise all these schemes for Europe and neglect them for the Commonwealth. There is a sort of "shotgun marriage" going on with Europe, ordered by President Kennedy and carried out by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. It is time that this country realised that, and began to see how it is neglecting, with the new techniques of economic co-operation, the purposes of the Commonwealth.
I should like to see established not only a Commonwealth payments union but also a Commonwealth bank. It should be possible to get over, as I have said in previous debates, the terrible disability of a crisis in our balance of payments when we export substantial capital to the Commonwealth. If we could devise a system whereby no greater harm befell this country by exporting its capital and merchandise wholesale to the Commonwealth for investment than by exporting from Glasgow to London, then at least we should have put ourselves into a powerful position in the world.
Now I turn to the political problem itself. Many of my hon. Friends seem to regard the trade war as if it were part and parcel of the cold war and fought with the same weapons. The trade war is an entirely different concept. It is not a war of internal lines of communication and great agglomerations of industrial power. It is a war which is fought in the deep field behind the enemy lines. It is a war in which we should use every device that we have for straddling the Iron Curtain. Fortunately, we have such a device in the Commonwealth itself.
I do not object to President Nkrumah going to Moscow. Some of my hon. Friends, however, regard it as an almost traitorous thing for him to do. We have to realise that my right hon. Friend the
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Prime Minister himself has been to Moscow. Recently, we have also had the remarkable success of the British Trade Fair there.
These acts of success in the trade war are, fortunately, much more applicable to this country than to some others which have vast bureaucracies and slow moving industrial machines. One has only to read The Ugly American to see how gross was the failure of the United States to fight the trade war successfully in South-East Asia. The Russians are not making a very great success of the trade war, or even of the cold war, in parts of the world, such as Africa, where we have created a vacuum by leaving precipitately, or threatening to do so.
These vast industrial machines are not good at the process. We do better with Out "small ship" philosophy—the one that defeated Napoleon and defeated the King of Spain. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear"] Our small, quick moving, resilient, resourceful trading philosophy is one which is much more likely to secure a key political contract, provided that it is backed up by a good organisation, than anything that may come from these enormous powers. For that reason, if for that alone, I should not be for joining the Common Market and getting involved in that vast complex of countries.
Finally, I believe that there are a number of my hon. Friends who would like to do the Samson act. It is a horried thing to say, but I feel bound to say it. I feel that it is my duty to say it. There axe hon. Members on this side of the House who would rather see this country ruled by European bureaucracy than ruled by British Socialism. The fear of nationalisation, of loss of business enterprise and of over-taxation is such in the minds of some of my hon. Friends that they think there is a nice easy escape route out of it into Europe.
I do not believe that the Socialist Party is an alien philosophy that is trying to work an evil on our society. I therefore hope that as many of my hon. Friends as agree with me—and more particularly with the most brilliant speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker Smith)—and as

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many hon. Members opposite, who have cause to fear—as was expressed so well in the speech by the hon. Member for Houghton-le-Spring—ought on this issue to join together and tell the Liberal-Conservative Government, if not tomorrow night then very soon indeed, that the paramount success which "Mr. Butskell" has had for a very long time is not necessarily eternal, and that it is possible to have a group of hon. Members on both sides of the House which will be effective in exorcising the spirit of intent of some Ministers and in producing again a policy of which this country will be justly proud.
6.57 p.m.
Miss Jennie Lee: The House has listened to a most remarkable speech by the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). Whether we agree with all or part of what he said or not, at least we are indebted to him for the candour with which he spoke, and I shall endeavour to pay him the compliment of continuing this debate and argument with equal candour.
No issue which has come before this House in my lifetime has been of greater importance. This is not an occasion when strict party rules, Whips, or anyone else, ought to decide the issue. It is too big for that. I hope to reply to some of the comments made by the noble Lord and others on the economic front. As a nation we have to earn our living. But first of all I want to deal with what for all of us is the paramount issue in the world—even greater than our standard of living.
When we are at war, as in the Second World War, we feel that it is for a worth-while cause, and we take great punishment and face many hardships. At the present moment, when the world is in a state of cold war, surely the biggest question of all for us is: how can our nation so conduct itself in the affairs of the world that we make our maximum contribution to reducing the nightmare danger of a third world war? That takes precedence over any other issue.
I am appalled when I hear hon. Members on both sides of the House suggesting that the combined wisdom of Dr. Adenauer and President Kennedy
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is greater than anything which we can produce to deal with the danger of a third world war. It is not my philosophy to be anti-German, anti-American, or anti-Russian, as I have said before. I think that that is illiteracy. But the German mind is highly regimented. The German people are clever, but there is a distinction between cleverness and wisdom. In the same way, particularly under a young President, the Americans are apt to regard the various countries and needs of Europe as if they could draw parallels between them and the various States of America. That is not possible, and I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made that point.
What I fear most is the polarisation of world forces into one vast area of power and influence which is Communist-dominated and another vast area under Conservative-Catholic-domination. We have had enough religious wars in the past, and we must now try to ensure that there is not another, because we shall not survive it. When I read the speeches from the leaders of the European Community, Professor Hallstein, Dr. Adenauer and others, I find that again and again they reiterate that their basic concern is not economic but political, and they say that it is political mainly in order to provide a build-up of forces which will contain Communism.
I want to contain Communism. I do not find it easy to live at peace with the relatively mild Whips in the Labour Party. I should find it impossible to live under any stricter discipline. But how many of the European nations have anything to teach us about how to contain Communism? There is a powerful Communist Party in Italy. There is a powerful Communist Party in France. If there were not a divided Germany, there would be a powerful Communist Party in Germany. But in recent elections not a single constituency in Britain could have been won by a candidate advocating the Communist cause.
Why is that? It is because in our internal affairs we manage things in such a way that we keep alive the hope that the authority of the House of Commons will be sustained, so that the noble Lord has an innings one time and can scold my party for spending too much on

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the social services while at another time I can have my innings and scold his party for spending too little on them. The noble Lard might think it unwise to extend full public ownership and I might think it absolutely essential, but in our own internal affairs we have managed pretty well to offer alternative ways of living and governing to that offered by the Communists.
If there were no other reason for trying to sustain the Commonwealth, I would wish to do so because I see it as an area of relative coolness between the hot total capitalist attitude which comes from business pressures on both sides of the Atlantic and the equally dedicated Communist pressures which come from the other side of the Iron Curtain. Do we really say that by going into the Common Market we can make a greater contribution to what we all want—a live and let live atmosphere in the world?
Then there is the question of E.F.T.A. What is to happen to Finland? What is to happen to Austria? Is it not something that we were building up Commonwealth ties and all the hope of a multiracial Commonwealth? We have heard a great deal about Christian leadership, but is not the hope of the Commonwealth the hope of a racial brotherhood in which we neither seek to patronise nor to be patronised? Is not that something well worth upholding and does not that give us strength in Asia, Africa, India and other wide areas, an influence which may not be produced by other methods?
The Commonwealth's trade has to develop. I know that Australia and New Zealand and Canada have got to live, but if we spent on trying to build up Commonwealth associations to our mutual advantage one-tenth of the energy which we spend on trying to get into the European Common Market, we would find it very worth while.
I am much obliged to the noble Lord for bringing into the open something which some hon. Members on both sides of the House are too nice to talk about. He said quite clearly that one reason why some of his colleagues were anxious to join the European Community was that they thought that in that way they would build a bulwark not just against
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Communism but against democratic Socialism. I ask my hon. Friends to consider what would happen if we became members of the European Community and had a Labour Government, How can it be said that the fortunes of that Labour Government would be uninfluenced by such a membership?
We are all grown up and we all know perfectly well that every country interferes in the internal affairs of every other country to the maximum of its power and ability. No matter how much I admire my American friends and wish for good Anglo-American relations, I hotly resent the way in which time and time again, at critical moments in our history, America has interfered in a way going far beyond the bounds of propriety.
The noble Lord spoke of the pressures from America, from President Kennedy, on us to join the Common Market. I remember the pressures which came from America in 1945. The noble Lord said that he did not vote against the American loan at that time, when there was a Labour Government. It was not an easy decision for me, but I did vote against the American loan.
I thought it shocking that immediately at the end of the war when our whole economy had been re-geared in order to produce certain things which were our contribution to the war and when we needed a period to reorganise our affairs, Lend-Lease came to an immediate end. It was doubly shocking that we were offered a loan by America on terms which the Americans themselves knew it was impossible for us to fulfil.
I did not like the shady conversations in the background—"Never mind, old boy; we know that you cannot do it, but this is just a good public relations job for the American people." Great nations should not behave like that, and I wish that the Labour Government of those days had not agreed to the loan so readily. What I am now saying I said at the time.
I wish in the same way that America had not interfered so much in 1951. Once again we had American pressure asking us to make a contribution which was beyond our economic and manpower resources. That is not the way to make Britain strong or build up our defences, or make friends in the world.

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Now, under a Conservative Government, pressure is being put on us by the Americans to join the Common Market. With all modesty, this country ought to tell those who are pressing this advice on us that we know better; that we are not, as one of my hon. Friends said the other day, uniting Europe by going into the Common Market but we are doing something which is terrifying. We are dividing Europe more drastically than ever before.
Some generals are supposed to prepare for the next war by furbishing the lessons learned in the last one. Some economists take the same line. They say that the only thing we have to fear is Germany once again going on the rampage. I am afraid of a more real danger. I am afraid of a combination of certain forces in Germany, France and Italy becoming so afraid of Russian economic competition that they will drift to the edge of war. I believe that we can influence European behaviour better by staying outside the Common Market than by going into it. We have only to look at the figures to see that on all the important issues we would be outvoted. The paramount issue for me is how best we can make a contribution to easing world tension, and how far we can create an atmosphere of live and let live.
The next point is that we have to earn our living, and I believe that here we come to an impossible position. The Prime Minister has had a good time for a number of years. I would be the last person to attack him sharply today, because I know very well the aches, pains and difficulties of his position. I am certain that he is trying to do what he considers best, but in the last ten years he has considered it best not so to reorganise the industries of Great Britain, not so to stimulate our export trade, and not so to reorganise our internal incomes that we would be fit to meet world competition. Instead, he has been having a party. Now he is having a hang-over. The right hon. Gentleman has been having the kind of party which has alienated elements in this country without whom it is impossible to rebuild our economy, whether we are inside the Common Market or outside it.
We cannot have a situation in which 16s. of every is divided among about
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10 per cent. of the population and the remaining 90 per cent. have to scramble for their share of the remaining 4s. Any economist could make minor adjustments up or down, but that is the broad picture. The distribution of wealth in Great Britain is more unequal even than in super-capitalist America.
Mr. Douglas Jay Mr. Douglas Jay (Battersea North) indicated assent.
Miss Lee: I am glad to see my right hon. Friend nodding. I am glad to be in agreement with him for once.
We cannot leave those factors out of our considerations. I believe that our people have a strong sense of fair play. They will do their best work if they think that they are being treated reasonably. Not long ago we debated industrial relations. Illustrations were given from both sides of the House to show that when managements behaved sensibly they had no trouble with their shop stewards and their production benefited according!), but when they were arrogant, old-fashioned or over-greedy, there was trouble.
I can see no way out of the present situation for the Government. They do not know what to do next. They are using the European community as a kind of funk-hole. Suppose that we were in the European Community, and suppose we found that it did not have all the wonderful advantages which are supposed to flow from it, and suppose we found that there was industrial unrest in this country and that some of the issues could not be dealt with by our employers, our trade unions, and this House, how would the British people react to that kind of situation?
I said earlier that there was not a single Communist Member of the House of Commons. If all kinds of businesses and individuals were being pushed around without being told why they were being pushed around, and they felt that the shot in the arm was all going into one arm and they were getting the swelling and the pain without any of the advantages, the result of a General Election held in those circumstances would be such as we have not had in the past.
Some of us profoundly believe that this island cannot play its part in the

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world, and cannot sustain at the highest possible level the standard of living of our people, unless we have a planned economy. The noble Lord went part of the way with me. He and I could get out our banners and go on a demonstration against the old-fashioned nineteenth century Liberals around the House who believe in free trade. I do not believe in free trade, any more than the noble Lord does, but I believe in planned trade. If we are to plan our trading, how do we set about it?
We are told that we will get the most wonderful new markets if we go into the European Community. When I go round London and the southern counties, I meet one industrialist after another who simply does not know how he will fulfil his present orders. He cannot get raw materials, or the quality of labour which he requires to do the job. How will going into the Common Market solve those problems? Will it mean that instead of having unemployment in parts of Scotland and the North, and over-employment in other parts of the country with the result that schools and hospitals there are over-crowded and there is an ever-growing demand for houses, we will be able to put our internal affairs in order?
I was recently in Northern Italy. As everyone knows, Northern Italy is bulging with prosperity, but before anyone says "Three cheers" let him remember that the prosperity is in Northern Italy and not in Southern Italy. In Southern Italy the unemployment position is shocking and the standard of living is desperately low. But, more than that, civilised people in the north of Italy are shocked at the distribution of wealth there. I will not labour that point further, but we are constantly having battles about whether the standard of living in Europe is higher than it is here.
I do not think that we will become another Southern Italy or a junior member of the Krupps empire if we go into the Common Market. We could easily go in without it improving the way in which we use our manpower, our coal, our steel, how we plan our resources, and so on.
Our first job is to put our own house in order. There is no escaping our Socialist claim that we must have a planned economy. We must know what
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we want to do with our manpower. We do not need more orders; we need different orders. We are using much of our manpower in coal, steel and land unintelligently, wastefully and stupidly. If we can give an example to the world of a civilised community with a spirit of live and let live among its people—even between people of different political points of view—and if we can go to our trade union leaders and those in the rank and file and say, "Look, lads, here is the jab that has to be done," we may be able to get back to the status that we won during the war and kept in the years immediately afterwards.
There was nothing wrong with the British worker in those years. Very much less time was lost in strikes, and there was a much higher output year by year, because the workers knew what was happening to them, and it made sense to them. We were building up a Health Service and the various social services. We need not be afraid of appealing to the common sense of the British people, but the British people have far too much pride, as well as sense, to think that they can solve their difficult internal problems by looking for a funk-hole in Europe.
7.21 p.m.
Mr. Peter Smithers: The House appears to have taken with fortitude the announcement of the coalition between the hon. Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) and my noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), but I cannot congratulate either upon the first product of that coalition. My noble Friend said that many members of his own party supported the idea of association with the Common Market as a means of defeating Socialism in Britain, and the hon. Lady made it clear that one of her principal objections to association with the Common Market was that it would make it inconvenient for a Socialist Government here.
I do not think that a majority of Members on either side of the House is governed by considerations of that sort in relation to this great matter. We would do well to take the advice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), who pointed out that the question before the House today is not the merits or demerits of the Treaty of Rome but whether or

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not we should negotiate to establish certain positions. That is the question to which we should return.
This is a happy occasion for me, because my first memory of European affairs on any scale is of the Brussels Conference of the European Movement, in 1948 or 1949. I travelled to Brussels with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Sandys), and I remember that when we arrived at Melsbroek Airport my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was wearing a bowler hat. As we left the airport he remarked to me, "One should always wear a bowler hat on the Continent." Shortly afterwards, about forty of us were standing outside the airport waiting for taxis. One taxi drove up and went straight up to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who got into it and drove away. Ever since then I have believed that he has a great understanding of European psychology.
I want to refer to the speech made by the hon. Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton), in connection with the events of those days. The hon. Member recalled a time when, as he alleged, the Conservative Party at Strasbourg and elsewhere stood for federal principles in Europe. That is a quite erroneous statement, and it would be most unfortunate and dangerous for us all if such an idea gained currency. Neither did my right hon. Friend at that time, at Brussels, nor has the Conservative Party at any time at Strasbourg, since, come out in favour of a federalist solution in Europe; on the contrary, we have repeatedly made it clear beyond question that that was not the opinion of our party.
I now want to turn to the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire East (Sir D. Walker-Smith). He talked a great deal about ostriches, and he characterised the ostrich as an inelegant creature. If his speech is anything to go by, and if elegance be the criterion, my right hon. and learned Friend is certainly no ostrich. His was a most artistic presentation of his case. But when he said that he wished Io view the distant scene he made the mistake, which is so often made by those who have very positive views about this very complicated matter, of viewing only one of the many scenes which have to be viewed.
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He looked only in one direction—that of the Treaty of Rome—and in doing so, like others who have followed him, he maximised the various bogies to be found under the various beds. Some of them are quite real, but a great many are purely theoretical. The direction in which he did not look is that in which we shall drift if we do nothing. That is the question which has to be asked. Can we, in practice, do nothing? At the end of my right hon. and learned Friend's speech he stated five things which we should avoid, but when it came to the question of any practical move forward into a dynamic age, he said that he was for close association with the Commonwealth. I am sure that none of us differs with him in that. For him, that more or less dismissed the matter. I am sure that to do nothing is not an answer to our problem.
I want to consider the question of sovereignty. I thought that from a distinguished lawyer I might have heard a definition of sovereignty but I did not hear one from my right hon. and learned Friend. I am not a good enough lawyer to give one myself, but I think I know what the House and the people mean by the word. They mean effective control over the destinies of the nation by us in Parliament. But today the destinies of the nation are decided by all kinds of things very germane to ibis debate. They include our ability to become a space Power, to undertake military operations even on a modest scale, to conduct our economy in conditions not entirely dependent upon the benevolence of others, and to afford heavy commitments to under-developed countries and other parts of the world.
It is apparent that the giant Powers which are growing up in the world today are able to do all these things, because they can afford them. The United States and the Soviet Union can do all these things, and, shortly, China—and before long, no doubt, the Common Market—will be able to do them. But we in Britain are in a very difficult situation. If we were the French, we could at least say that we could feed ourselves, and double or treble our agricultural production if necessary. That would give us a certain nonchalance in economic affairs. But we cannot do that. If we were Switzerland, we could say,

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"We have no world-wide commitments. We do not have to keep up armies and garrison garrisons, and so forth," and therefore we could consider ourselves to have a powerful sovereignty. If we were little Albania, we could say, "We are supported by the Soviet Union, or China, and that is what our sovereignty is worth." But the plain fact is that our sovereignty today is a precarious one, and in practice it depends upon our relations with the outside world.
Whatever we may resolve to do in the House of Commons our resolution will be impotent if we do not have the means. That is what these negotiations are really about. I am quite sure that if there is one thing that we ought to be dogmatic about in this debate it is that it is not open to Britain to do nothing. We simply have not the resources in an age of power politics to be a great Power entirely and solely by ourselves. We cannot stay as we are unless we wish to decline into poverty and impotence. Therefore, those who oppose these exploratory negotiations must make some other proposal. I have not yet heard another proposal and I want to hear one before the end of this debate. They must face the fact that inertia is not the answer to the problem of Britain at present.
I believe that we are drawing towards the end of a long historical process. My right hon. and learned Friend spoke of the need for us to glance at history and to get everything into perspective. J humbly suggest that the perspective is this. The whole history of political mankind is the history of the coalition of small political units into larger ones. First, the kingdoms of England, then the formation of a modern Britain, or of a modern France a modern Germany or a modern Italy. Now there is the appearance of super-States. It is this historical process with which we are confronted, and we have to make up our minds whether we wish to take part in it or not. I believe that if we stand aside we condemn ourselves to oblivion in the history of the world of the future.
I know that it is suggested by some hon. Members that here the Commonwealth is the answer. When I first became a Member of this House I was, and I remain, a devoted adherent of the
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Empire and Commonwealth. I believe it is that thing which distinguishes us from all other nations and which we must preserve at all cost to ourselves. But again, we are not living in a static age. To listen to the speeches made by some of my hon. Friends one might think that the world around us did not change. But the world is changing fast and the Commonwealth with it. The noble Lord produced a lot of figures about investment in the Commonwealth after the First World War and it is very gratifying to know that now we invest more. But the scale is increasing far beyond that. We have to ask ourselves whether we in this country, a nation of 50 million, can provide the finance, the capital goods, the technical "know-how" and all the other things demanded by a Commonwealth of 600 million. The noble Lord spoke about a Commonwealth bank, a very good idea. But what I want to know about the bank is what is in it. and I do not believe that this country alone has the resources to fill such a bank.
The problem of the Commonwealth is that in an age when its demands are very great its members turn increasingly—anyone with his eyes open can see this fact for himself—to the United States, some of them to the Soviet Union—and in future they may well be turning to a Common Market of which we are not a member—for the supplies which they cannot obtain from us. Not only that. It is not only a question of quantity. The organisation of these new giant States will mean that they will be supplying what the Commonwealth wants on better and more competitive terms. This House must ask itself: if we value the Commonwealth, can we really hope to hold it together all by our little selves, as some hon. Members seem to think that we can? It would indeed be a pleasant world were that so, but I do not believe this vision.
I ask myself; is it better to see the lines of Commonwealth trade and finance, and with them politics, drift away into other hands—hands with which we are not associated? Or is it better to see whether we can find that basis of association with Europe which will enable us to associate Europe in partnership with the Commonwealth in its economic and political structure? My belief is that the antithesis put before the House and the country of a

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choice between Europe or the Commonwealth—eyes to the right and noes to the left—is an entirely false antithesis. I believe that if we can solve the problem in Europe we can solve the problem in the Commonwealth and benefit both as never before. If we fail in Europe, then indeed I have grave misgivings, which I should be wrong not to state today, about the future of the Commonwealth.
I wish now to refer briefly to the problem of the Seven, which was referred to by the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock. It must be remembered that the Seven came into being in particular circumstances. This association came into being very largely because its members were afraid of being picked off one by one by the Common Market. It did not come into being because of itself it was a very coherent economic whole, and anyone who studies the structure of the Seven will see straight away that in the long term a number of its members are in considerable embarrassment. I think that we should be foolish to assume that if our negotiations about the Common Market fail we can be certain that the Seven will remain as a permanent element in the situation. I merely say that in reply to the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock, because I think that it would be a mistake to build 100 much on an organisation which presents great difficulties to some of our friends.
I wish to say—I should be wrong not to do so—how I think that we ought to approach these negotiations if they are to succeed. There is one cardinal point which cannot be ignored. We must learn the lesson of past negotiations, of the negotiations for the Grand Design and the negotiations for the Free Trade Area. Both were errors of psychology, however desirable in themselves, because both were interpreted by those with whom we negotiated as being designed to destroy what they were creating. If these negotiations are to succeed—I think that the House is generally agreed that it would be a serious situation if they failed, whatever view we may take of their purpose—the first and cardinal point is to establish our good faith with those with whom we negotiate, and to convince them of what I think we are convinced ourselves, that we do not wish to overthrow what they have built but,
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on the contrary, we wish to strengthen and fortify it.
I do not take a very optimistic view of these negotiations. The problem has become so very wide.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: Hear, hear.
Mr. Smithers: I am glad if I am cheering up the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman).
If we have to reconcile the Six and the Seven, and consider the interests of the Commonwealth, and think about the problem of the English and French territories and ex-territories in Africa, and then find that there are one or two good friends not comprehended anywhere else whose interests have to be taken into account so that they are not damaged by what we do, we are getting perilously wide; well away from the close concept of Europe and into something which gets very near to being the whole assembly of the G.A.T.T. This presents a psychological difficulty to the negotiations, because the picture then begins to look exactly like what the Common Market people fear may be our intention—an attempt to absorb the Common Market into this larger whole.
I have merely posed the problem. Perhaps I may be permitted to say this to my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal. Since he has been charged with the responsibilities which he holds, the European question—which I have followed through the years with disappointment about what we might have done in years gone by—has taken on a new sense of purpose and is being handled with a fresh understanding. I wish for my right hon. Friend purposefulness and understanding in all that he may do in this matter.
Finally, what if the negotiations fail? I think we should be wise to face this. It is often said by those on the Continent that the Channel no longer exists, strategic considerations have washed it out, and so forth. That may be so. Then they go on to say—or presume without saying it—that Britain is therefore a part of Europe. I do not believe that any such consequence follows. The Atlantic does not exist either, when one talks in terms of military strategy today.
I think that it should be made clear to those with wham we negotiate that

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it would not be tolerable for us to find at the end of lengthy and detailed negotiations which had broken down that we were still expected to carry many of the burdens of Europe with all the disadvantages which would come with them, without being permitted to participate in the benefits. Therefore, some very radical rethinking about alliances and alignments would be required. If we were to be driven back on G.A.T.T. in these circumstances, it must be clear that—not as a matter of spite or of choice, but of necessity—we would be compelled to fight in the G.A.T.T. and everywhere else against hostile commercial and financial groupings of which we were not a member.
This is precisely the situation which, in the interests of the free world, I wish to avoid. Therefore, I suggest that there are powerful reasons why the members of the Common Market on the Continent of Europe may on reflection think it wise to try to help us to bring these negotiations to the successful conclusion which I, for one, wish to see them reach.
7.41 p.m.
Mr. H. Hynd: This is a most unusual debate with lines cutting across both parties. I find myself, somewhat to my surprise, in agreement with at least a large part of what the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Smithers) has just said.
He reminded us that he has been interested in this subject since the conference at Brussels. I can go back a little further, to the original conference at The Hague, and since then I have been keen that this country should play its part in arrangements for bringing the countries of Western Europe closer together. I think I can say that subsequent events and experiences have confirmed and strengthened that view.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Clackmannan and East Stirlingshire (Mr. Woodburn) reminded us of those early times from The Hague conference onwards and of how Western Europe felt very badly let down when the great protagonist, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), changed his mind on coming into office and did not carry out in office what he advocated in Opposition. It is for reasons like that, while in principle I am
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with the Government in their desire to enter into negotiations, that I am a little suspicious about the people who will negotiate in our name. Of course, I would much rather that a Labour Government were doing the job.
There have been many attempts to unite Europe, dating from the time of the Holy Roman Empire. Everyone has realised the necessity for something to be done. If I read a short quotation I hope it will not be discounted because of the source from which it comes. It is as follows:
"In that vital region history, custom, language and prejudice have combined to hamper integration. Progress has been and is hobbled by a web of Customs barriers interlaced with bilateral agreements, multilateral cartels, local shortages and economic monstrosities. How tragic! Free men, facing the spectre of political bondage, are crippled by artificial bonds that they themselves have forged and they alone can loosen."
That is what ex-President Eisenhower said when he took command of S.H.A.P.E. ten years ago. That is roughly the picture in Western Europe where something obviously had to be done and still has to be done to overcome many of those obstacles.
We ourselves recognised the necessity for something to be done in this direction by joining E.F.T.A. I suggest that we should not be satisfied with being a team in the second division of the European league. We should aim to be in the first division of the European league and to do all we can to get full membership of the Common Market. Of course, we must approach it with caution, but not too much caution because time is no longer on our side. We have just seen the fourth Annual Report of the European Economic Community, which shows quite clearly that the Common Market is not only a reality, but has proved to be a spectacular success.
I believe that it could be an even bigger success if Britain were a member of it. Already it has been able to speed up its timetable of lowering tariffs between the members of the Community. By the end of this year the tariffs between the members of the Common Market will be down by 50 per cent. and there will be no more trade quotas between them. They are starting to work out the common tariff which will be the wall round the Common Market.

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That is quite remarkable progress in the short period of four years and it puts E.F.T.A. on the spot. What is E.F.T.A. to do in face of that?
There is one thing it could do and which we must try to avoid. That is to start a trade war between E.F.T.A. and the Common Market. If we start to create two permanent blocs of that kind in Western Europe, it will have consequences which we dare not contemplate. We need not look quite so far as that; I do not think it necessary to do so. Something has to be done in the short term. British traders already find it necessary to get into the Common Market by various means in order to meet this unfair competition—unfair because of the fact that by the reduction of tariffs within the Common Market it is mad:, more difficult for our people to compete.
Very many points of view are held about what the effect on British interests will be if we go in. The only authoritative one which I have been able to find was in a report by Economist Research which estimated that these industries would definitely gain by our going in: motor vehicles, chemicals, wool, electrical engineering, general engineering, rubber manufacturers, steel, hosiery and clothing. Another list is given of further industries which would probably gain. Of course, there would be many other consequences. One I mention in passing is construction of the Channel tunnel. That would help our people even further. In fact it may become a necessity if we are in the Common Market, and certainly we would be more likely to get it.
We hear as a result of what has happened in the last few weeks that other countries are considering the question. We read in the Press this morning that the Irish Republic has announced its intention to join. We also read that some of our partners in E.F.T.A. have indicated that if we go in they will come in with us. I believe that they are all intending to seek negotiations to find what the prospects are.
What about the principal objections which have been raised? Some have been answered and I do not intend to repeat the answers which have been given. I think enough has already been said to disprove the assertion that this
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is a choice between the Commonwealth and the Common Market. I do not believe that is the case. I do not think that the Commonwealth need necessarily be badly affected, if affected at all, by our going into the Common Market. It depends on what arrangements the Government are able to make. Certain countries are regarded as associated territories. That happened to the overseas territories of certain present members of the Six. They have free access to the Common Market and certain other arrangements which are specified in Article 131 of the Treaty and Annex IV.
The self-governing Dominions, of course, present a rather bigger problem, but, at the worst, they could make treaty arrangements with the Common Market. It is all a matter of negotiation. I think it rather significant that, in recent days, some of the principal Commonwealth countries have indicated that they have no objection to our Government entering into negotiations.
There is also the fact that the Commonwealth countries nowadays do not necessarily try to trade or succeed in trading with this country to the exclusion of all others just because they happen to belong to the Commonwealth. The figures show that exports from the Commonwealth to Western Europe have increased and that exports from the Commonwealth to this country have decreased. My right hon. Friend the Member for East Stirlingshire reminded us of this when he said, quite rightly, that the people of the Commonwealth were fairly hard-headed business men and that the prices they are able to obtain will very largely govern where their trade goes.
It seems that the political objection is what causes hon. Members most concern. As is said in the E.E.C. Annual Report, economic unification is only one stage towards political unification. No one has attempted to disguise this. Some enthusiasts want a United States of Europe. This may or may not be a consummation devoutly to be wished for, but, of course, it could not possibly be achieved for very many years. What is wrong, particularly from the Socialist point of view, in trying to work towards some joint political arrangement with other countries in Europe? The present

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frontiers are entirely out of date and far too restrictive having regard to modern communications and so forth.
The Common Market has actually begun to set up certain political institutions. They are as yet elementary in character, although, in due time, they may become more influential. At present, there is a body which is nothing more than an advisory council consisting of members of the various Parliaments, nominated in some mysterious way which I have never been able to ascertain, and the great point is that that body will not be able to become a sovereign Parliament unless all the parties to the Treaty agree that this should be done. That is one reason why we ought to be there, to have our say in whatever future plans are contemplated.
On 17th May, the Lord Privy Seal spoke of
"the danger which faces us of a decline in political influence in the world at large and in our Commonwealth."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th May, 1961; Vol. 640, c. 1389.]
Undoubtedly, our political influence will decline if these European political institutions become more influential. This will happen if we are not there. I suggest that we ought to have our proper place in the new European political institutions.
As for giving up sovereignty, the natural reaction of anyone, of course, is that we do not want to give up any sovereignty. But, as the Prime Minister reminded us today, we have already given up quite a lot of sovereignty to the United Nations, to E.F.T.A., to G.A.T.T., to W.E.U., to N.A.T.O., to O.E.E.C. and so forth. The question of sovereignty should not stick in our gullet too much, particularly since any hon. Member of this House would, I think, feel fairly safe in promising to give up as much sovereignty as General de Gaulle would be prepared to give up.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Is there not a difference between the European Economic Community and the other international organisations which the hon. Gentleman has mentioned in that there is no provision in the Treaty of Rome for leaving the Community whereas one can leave the other organisations?
Mr. Hynd: No one has yet contemplated the possibility of leaving the Common Market, but I do not think that it would be impossible if such a situation should arise. There is talk about not being able to unscramble omelettes. We know about that. I can hardly imagine that the situation would arise, but, if it did, the resources of diplomacy are never inexhaustible.
General de Gaulle made his point of view about sovereignty quite clear when, at a Press conference on 6th September last year, he said:
"What are the realities of Europe? What are the pillars on which we can build? In fact, they are the States—States which are certainly very different from one another, each having its own spirit, history and language, its own misfortunes, glories and ambitions, but States which are the only entities with the right of command and the power of being obeyed … In short, there is an opportunity to organise co-operation among men. That is what France proposes … This implies regular discussions in an Assembly formed by delegates from the national Parliaments."
In other words, General de Gaulle does not envisage a federal assembly of Europe. He envisages some sort of confederation. I have no doubt that that is the kind of thing which will eventually emerge in the Common Market.
I have been rather surprised by some of the remarks coming from the benches behind me purporting to show that entry into the Common Market would be contrary to Socialist ideals. I believe that quite the reverse is true. Socialists have always believed that any good and just society founded on co-operative principles must be international in its application and that only thus could we build a peaceful and democratic world. In the Common Market countries, the trade unions, the free trade unions affiliated to the I.C.F.T.U., have played a full part. Two of the nine members of the European Coal and Steel High Authority are former trade union leaders, and the trade unions are represented on the Consultative Committee.
The support of the trade unions has been fully justified by results. Wages and conditions have improved in those countries. The principle of the forty-hour week has been accepted. The principle of holidays with pay, three weeks per year, has been accepted and is being applied. The principle of equal pay for women has been accepted and

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will be applied in all those countries by the end of next year. The trade unions in the Common Market countries want us to join. The Socialist parties in those countries want us to join.
My hon. Friend the Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton) spoke of lower wages in certain countries. I am sorry that he is not in his place. I shall have great pleasure in presenting to him a booklet which, I think, will give him some information to the contrary. He expressed certain fears about nationalisation. Again, I hope to show him that the main industries in the Common Market countries are not all privately owned. Quite a number are nationalised industries. In any case, I do not think that the question whether industries are nationally owned or privately owned really affects the argument one way or another.
Although I say these things and make quite clear that I am in favour of the principle of trying to make proper arrangements for our country to enter the Common Market, I hope the House will not feel that I under-estimate the difficulties. They are enormous, and I know that the Government will have a difficult task. I wish that they were entering upon that task more wholeheartedly and with more nearly united effort. We may be divided on this side of the House, but in the majority that the Government will have in the Lobby tomorrow night there will be many hon. Members who, in the words of one hon. Gentleman, will be dragged straining and kicking into the Lobby. If the Government were more wholehearted about it they might have better prospects. I wish them all success in the negotiations, and I hope the result will be that this country will be able to play its full part in a reinvigorated Europe.
8.0 p.m.
Mr. Ronald Russell: For over four years I have had the honour of being a member of the delegation to the Council of Europe and to the Western European Union, and during the last 18 months we have had several debates on this issue, not only in those two Assemblies, but in joint sessions of the Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliamentary Association, namely, the Parliament of the Six. In most of those gatherings, some of us
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have tried to explain the problems of the Commonwealth and the obligations to which we are pledged to honour.
I, for one, have tried to make it clear that I welcome the establishment of the Common Market, whether we have anything to do with it or not, and that I am thoroughly in favour of closer economic association between the Commonwealth and Europe. But I am certainly against our joining any political federation or political union in any circumstances whatever. I know that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said that there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome about political unity. That is perfectly true.
Having attended meetings at Strasbourg for over four years, I have certainly learned that most of the members of the delegations from the countries of the Six have political federation in mind in the end. We have had the statement about that from the king-pin of all, Professor Hallstein, the Secretary-General of the European Economic Commission. Therefore, for those reasons, I would prefer the action that the Government are now taking to be done under Article 238 rather than Article 237. Although that would give us no say in the politics of Europe, it would have the advantage that Europe would have no say in the internal affairs of the United Kingdom.
I know that there is this difficulty. I do not think that it has ever been established, because there has been no cause for it to be established, whether entry into negotiations under Article 238 could be initiated by an outside country, or whether it would have to come by invitation from the Six. The wording of the two Articles is different. It has never been put to the test. We could at least try to put it to the test by applying in that way. Perhaps the Minister who is to reply to the debate would say whether in fact it would have been possible for us to apply under Article 238.
So far, I do not think that anyone has mentioned the various communiqués issued at the end of the talks which my right hon. Friends have had between them with all the self-governing Commonwealth countries and also with the State of Singapore. These are very revealing documents, A few of the communiqués are very uninformative indeed, and possibly their lack of information is

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in proportion to the lack of urgency with which certain Commonwealth countries regard the Government's present action. These are Ghana, Nigeria, Malaya, Ceylon, Sierra Leone and Singapore in particular. Some of the others are very revealing, particularly the communiqués issued at the end of the talks with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the West Indies and also by one of our latest Commonwealth recruits, Cyprus.
The Australians have made it clear that they are worried about the division in the Commonwealth which may be caused by our applying to join the Six and its weakening effect on Commonwealth relations. In the communiqué with Canada there is this sentence:
"the Canadian Government … expressed grave concern about the implications or possible negotiations between Britain and the European Economic Community, and about the political and economic effects which British membership in the European Economic Community would have on Canada and the Commonwealth as a whole."
These are very grave words indeed, and they fill me with alarm that that sentiment should be expressed by one of our Commonwealth Governments. Of all the Commonwealth Governments I think the Canadian Government are best entitled to say that, because they have made some attempt, and about the only attempt that has been made, to improve trade with Britain and with the Commonwealth.
One of the first actions of Mr. Diefenbaker when he became Prime Minister in 1957 was to suggest a switch of trade. That was countered in this country by the suggestion, which I can only call very clumsy, of free trade between this country and Canada. It was impracticable because of the Canadian industries, to begin with, and because of Canada's huge dependence on trade with the United States. Canada would have given a very great kick to the United States if she had abandoned the duties imposed on our goods and allowed them in free.
The communiqué with New Zealand shows that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had to make it clear that in any such negotiations the British Government would seek to secure special arrangements to protect the vital
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interests of New Zealand that Britain would not feel able to join the European Economic Community unless such arrangements were secured.
That is a most satisfactory assurance given by my right hon. Friend and, perhaps, the most comforting thing that has come out of these negotiations, conversations and statements up to the present. The New Zealand Ministers inserted in the communiqué a phrase saying that New Zealand welcomed this assurance and made quite clear the vital importance of the maintenance of "unrestricted duty-free entry" of products into this country. I emphasise "unrestricted duty-free entry" because we must look to the future as well as to the present.
India is anxious about the weakening of Commonwealth links—and coming from India that is a very welcome statement in one sense—and of ensuring the economies of developing Commonwealth countries. Pakistan, which is trying to diversify her economy so as not to be so dependent on jute and cotton, is also worried about the prospect of her semi-manufactured goods and wants to find markets for them.
I am worried about two other aspects of this problem. I am worried in case at the end of the negotiations we find ourselves in a situation from which we shall find it difficult to escape and that we shall be faced in this House with a proposition which my hon. Friend the Member for the Isle of Ely (Sir H. Legge-Bourke) mentioned in a Question on Monday, that in order not to weaken European unity, or some phrase like that, we must join the Common Market. I hope that some assurance will be given that in no circumstances will that position be reached and that we shall be faced with that dilemma.
I am also worried about the possible financial pressure from the United States. I know that from one point of view if we were to join the E.E.C. it would mean that the United States might face even more discrimination in Europe against her exports than she does now if we were to accept common internal tariffs. I think that the United States would promptly want to recompense itself for that by taking over the trade of the various members of the Commonwealth who would then be floating about leaderless

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in the rest of the world. I trust that the Government will resist without any hesitation any kind of pressure—moral, political, financial or otherwise—applied by the United States for us to join the Common Market if the Government do not think that it is in our interests to do so.
I agree with the statement that, if negotiations fail, we cannot just leave things as they are. I have never believed that we could. We should then be faced with the possibility of losing markets for our goods inside the Common Market, particularly when the Six have reached complete free trade, and the possibility of increasing competition from their goods in other parts of Europe. We should then do what I think we should have done first, namely, look to the Commonwealth, as the Canadian High Commissioner, Mr. Drew, reminded us only a few days ago, and do what we can to expand Commonwealth trade. I can claim to have advocated that ever since I have been a Member of Parliament. So far my words seem to have fallen on very deaf ears. I hope that, if these negotiations fail, the Government will give a strong lead in this direction and that Commonwealth countries will respond. Mr. Diefenbaker gave such a lead in 1957, but he did not meet with the response he should have met with.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Would it not be better for the Government to start doing this now?
Mr. Russell: I was coming to that. I was going on to say that over this issue we are putting the cart before the horse. The Amendment says that we are entering this from economic weakness. We could enter it from much greater economic strength if we had put our Commonwealth house in order first and negotiated as a Commonwealth. We should have been much more welcome in Europe if we had done that and were stronger.
We are told that our proportion of trade with the Commonwealth has declined. That is true. The Prime Minister said this afternoon that the impact of Commonwealth preference is less than it used to be. This is also true. It is so simply because we have done nothing to strengthen it. Because we have been hamstrung, we have left Commonwealth preference either at
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exactly the same level as it was when it was instituted under its present system in 1932 or we have had to see it whittled away and reduced.
Mr. Stratton Mills: Has my hon. Friend any indication that the Commonwealth countries are willing to increase their trade with us? Have not the Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Conferences over the years, culminating in the Montreal Conference in 1958, all indicated perfectly clearly that their ideas are in exactly the opposite direction?
Mr. Russell: I do not accept that. I mentioned just now that when Mr. Diefenbaker became Prime Minister of Canada he suggested a switch of trade. He was willing to face something which was politically a little dangerous in Canada in order to try to switch some of Canada's trade from the United States to this country. Unfortunately, he did not meet with the right response. If we gave the right lead, bearing in mind that most Commonwealth countries have to find markets in this country, we should meet with a great response. In the early years of this century the Commonwealth countries gave the lead to us in trying to restore Commonwealth preference. They eventually met with response. This time it should be the other way round. We should give the lead. If we did, we should meet with response from many of them, though not necessarily from all.
Before we can do that we must revise G.A.T.T. I support what my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith) said. We must revise G.A.T.T. and be able to revise our Commonwealth preference system upwards as well as downwards. At the moment we cannot do it upwards. We can only do it downwards.
We could associate ourselves with Western Europe by having a three-decker tariff. We have had a three-decker tariff since we brought the E.F.T.A. into being. We now allow goods from the E.F.T.A. countries into this country at 70 per cent. of the rate of duty which corresponding goods from other countries carry. This is a new device for us. Except for sugar, we have never had a three-decker tariff, at least within living memory. This system is quite simple to operate. The only point about

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it is that under G.A.T.T. it is legal if it is temporary and will eventually lead to free trade but is completely illegal if it is made permanent. This is absolute and utter nonsense. We should have it revised so that we can apply the system not only to the E.F.T.A. but to Western Europe as a whole. In that way we could associate ourselves with Western Europe without any danger whatever of being involved in any political union or federation, and this would be to the benefit of both the Commonwealth and Western Europe.
8.16 p.m.
Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: Tonight we are considering not just one matter of temporary political importance. We are considering the whole future course which this country is to take. We are considering a departure from the course which this country has followed in the past. We are facing in the long run the giving up of the independence and identity of this country in order to merge it with Europe. There may be a case for that, but it is clearly a case which should be proved to the hilt before this country can adopt such a course.
We are not merely concerned with short-term measures and remedies. We are not merely concerned with making up for the present deficiencies of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his lack of courage in producing any long-term solution to our economic situation. We are concerned with a vital permanent decision affecting the whole future of our country. We cannot take this decision as a leap in the dark. We cannot take it on a hunch. This decision can be taken only if it is proved that this country and everything that it stands for will be undoubtedly benefited by taking the course which the Prime Minister has in mind.
I want now to consider the arguments which have been put forward. There is the economic aspect, and there is also the political aspect. The Prime Minister, very wisely from a political tactical point of view, concentrated all the attention upon the economic aspect. Only yesterday he made some concession to there being political considerations. Today be withdrew from that, and again emphasised the economic aspects and played
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down the political side. If it is the Prime Minister's case that on economic grounds we should go into Europe, we should be told exactly what the economic arguments are. What I have found about the economic arguments is that it is very easy to blazon economic arguments in general statements, but when it comes to proving the case which is made and examining what the argument is in detail they are not substantiated.
It is said that we shall be lowering tariffs inside Europe and raising them against other people outside Europe. I can understand the argument that if tariffs are lowered between us and European countries we shall have an advantage because we can export into Europe without having a tariff wall against us. That cuts both ways. European countries will have the advantage of exporting into this country without having a tariff wall in this country against them. That is the dilemma in which the supporters of the Economic Community find themselves. To get out of that dilemma—because they cannot show in detail, by taking industry by industry or commodity by commodity, that the balance is in favour of this country—they get out of it by saying that we shall benefit from competition. And that is where the competition argument comes in.
It is said that competition is what this country needs because our industry is inefficient: and that we need to go into the E.E.C. because we shall have the advantage of lowering our tariff barriers against our European competitors so that, by reason of that competition, our industries will have to make themselves more competitive and will, therefore, benefit from that. Really!
Let us consider the matter. If the advantage is from competition then obviously, of course, we can incur competition without going into the Common Market. We ourselves have control—because we are not yet in the Community—of our own tariff barriers and we can ourselves reduce them if we wish. But, of course, competition may be disastrous to save industries in this country and certain industries may be obliterated. I can understand that competition may be beneficial to some industries in some circumstances.
So we must consider the ways in which the interests of British industries might

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be affected. We must see which industries would benefit from competition and which would need protection, which would need lower protection and which would need higher protection and what degree of reduction of tariff barriers might be advisable in this or that case. That can be decided industry by industry or commodity by commodity, but what the Government are proposing by this procedure is a blanket reduction of tariffs.
There is just the same objection to a blanket reduction of tariffs as there is to the effects of a blanket rise of the Bank Rate. It is an undiscriminating weapon. Should we reduce tariffs by this blanket process against our European competitors—The Government's case is that our European competitors are more competent than we are. They are, therefore, in a stronger position to take advantage of a reduction of tariff barriers between us, instead of our being in the stronger position and having the advantage over them.
Surely if we are going onto Europe with a tariff wall around us, cutting us off from our friends outside and leaving us to the mercy of what, in the Government's argument, are stronger European industries inside, we should make certain that we are the winners by making ourselves stronger than are our competitors. But if we make ourselves stronger than they are before we go in, what is the case for going in. When we examine this in detail, we find that the case which has been made out for our going in on the tariff aspect completely disappears.
The rather wiser economists, who do not commit themselves to details, then resort to the cryptic word "dynamism". They say, "If we go into the Common Market—assuming, of course, we survive the competition—we would have the advantage of the dynamism of European industries." But what evidence is there for that? What is this dynamism about which we are told? Is it due to the Common Market?
Just after the war we saw the United States dominating the whole world's economy. No one would have said from 1946 to 1949 that the dollar would ever be a soft currency. No one would ever have thought that the dollar would so soon be threatened, but that is what has happened. The dynamism we had
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in Europe started before the Common Market came in. There is dynamism in Japan, without the Common Market, and in Belgium we do not have the dynamism there is in other countries.
In France we have seen the revaluation of the franc, which has immediately led to increased prosperity. In Germany we saw the position transformed overnight by the revaluation of the mark and the whole of Europe has had the advantage of Marshall Aid and in Germany—and this was the Chancellor's case the other day—the German balance of payments advantage is precisely equivalent to the British and American expenditure of foreign currency within Germany. In other words, if one transfers the British and American payments inside Germany to this country we should have the advantage which Germany now has as a result of that expenditure.
Thus there is no evidence at all to show that this dynamism is due to the Common Market. However, supposing it were? I can understand the argument that if one has a big trading area—a big Common Market—that Common Market as a whole might be more efficient because of the division of labour, industry and function within that big area and that it might be possible—depending on the size of the area and other economic considerations—for that to be advantageous to the area as a whole.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Europe as a whole would be more efficient economically with the Common Market than without it. It does not follow from that assumption that this country, this particular part of Europe, would be more efficient. It does not follow, because the area as a whole has an advantage from it, that every part of that area has that advantage.
This Government must prove that Britain would have that advantage. The curious thing, however, is that we are the only country contemplating going into the Common Market, as it is called, or into the European Community, for economic reasons. The whole foundation of the creation of the Economic Community in Europe is political and not economic.
The Prime Minister says that we do not find a political objection in the Treaty of Rome. We are accustomed to

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double talk from the Prime Minister. I should like to know what he said to his possible partners within the Treaty of Rome. Has he told them the same as he tolls us; that there is nothing in the political future, the political cohesion, the political union of Europe? Is he double talking with them as he double talked with Sir Roy Welensky, and with us, over the Monckton Commission?
Of course, the object of all this exercise of the European Economic Community is a political one. Of course, the objective is, in the words, I think, of the Treaty of Rome itself, "ever closer union" of the countries of Europe. If we put down a stipulation that we would sign the Treaty of Rome without subscribing to its political objectives, and that if it were to result in ever closer union politically we ourselves would have the right to contract out—if, in fact, it were then physically possible to do so—does anyone think for a moment that the countries of the Six would accept it? Of course they would not.
This political union has been formed by countries defeated in the last war, countries disappointed in their own state, countries finding themselves inadequate far their own protection and for their purpose, and, therefore, having to form a new union in order to provide themselves with a sense of security and confidence that they lack. That is exactly what happened.
We ourselves have not had that experience; we ourselves have not had that need. We are not now, perhaps, the great political Power that we once were, but I believe us to be a tremendously important political Power. And our political power is not just the power of this country standing on its own; it is the political power of this country, and the influence that this country has by reason of being the founder and a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The Commonwealth has become with too many people in the Establishment a dirty word overnight—the night of the Kennedy-Macmillan meeting. The Commonwealth, however, is an association, a voluntary association of free peoples, all brought up in the same traditions, all speaking the same language, all having the same democratic
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conceptions, all having the same methods of handling their affairs, and all having the same ideals.
The objection is made that the Commonwealth is not an organised association, in the sense that it has no binding constitution in which we can bind each other. Of course it has not. It is a free association of people, and we come to our conclusions by process of reasoning and discussion. It is none the worse for that. This is the first time that I have heard it advanced—and particularly from Conservatives—that there is an advantage in a rigid written constitution to which we have to adhere. Throughout the years, the emphasis, particularly from Conservatives, has been on the advantages of an unwritten constitution, a flexible constitution, a voluntary association of peoples, all proceeding by discussion and arriving at agreed conclusions. That, surely, embodies the very spirit of our democracy.
This association, the Commonwealth, has a unity, and I should like to see the response in Europe to a test of unity. I should like to see whether that response would, under the stress of war, be comparable with the Commonwealth response. We have seen with the Commonwealth countries a unity that brought them into a war on this country's side when they themselves were not obviously directly involved. Would we have that unity in Europe?
We had that Commonwealth unity displayed here, and rather dramatically displayed hare, on the occasion of the reopening of this Chamber, when we had the Speakers from all the Commonwealth countries coming here as part of our own democratic system which is implanted in those countries. There is unity in this, and not the less unity because it is not in a written treaty—a Treaty of Rome.
Further, we have the immense advantage of having in this Commonwealth coloured peoples. That, to my mind is one of the most important and vital aspects of it. We have had the trust conception of Empire. I have attacked aspects of it—there are aspects of its development that are thoroughly disreputable—but right from its earliest days—the days of Wellesley, of Cornwallis and of Warren Hastings—there has been as a continuous thread

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amongst the best of our people the conception of the Empire as being a trust to develop into a Commonwealth of all our peoples, including the coloured peoples. That has developed, and we are now, in this age, in our generation, seeing that development coming to realisation and all the members of the Commonwealth becoming self-governing communities. This is exactly the time when these people most need understanding, encouragement, assistance and friendly help. This is the very time when this Government, with its imperialist conception instead of a Commonwealth conception, chooses to abandon these people. This is a loss, not only to us, but to the whole world.
I agree most strongly with the observations of my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) that we are facing here in this state of the world a tremendous conflict between the Communist Powers and ourselves. How is this conflict to be averted? Communism is not just a military power. Incomparably more important, and what makes it so dangerous, is its hold upon the minds of men. Traditional Europe, as represented by the European Economic Community countries, gives no spiritual reply to that spiritual challenge.
In Europe we are pitting against the Communist countries an absolutist conception as against the Communist absolutist conception, and we are in Europe trying to establish and set up a military reply to what is essentially a political and spiritual challenge. What we have prevailing in the pressure being brought to bear upon this country to go into Europe is what I think all parties in this House have condemned, and that is the Pentagon conception of the reply to the Communist challenge. It is ominous that the watershed in the Government's decision in this matter—the decisive moment—is the Kennedy-Macmillan meeting.
Of course, America would have advantages from our going into Europe. She would have the advantage of having us in as part of the military organisation of Europe, to the same extent as Germany and France are in. [Interruption.] Oh, yes, the case made is that it is necessary for us for military reasons to go into Europe to strengthen Europe, politically and militarily, in answer to
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the Communist challenge. America would have the advantage of our weakening all our ties with the Commonwealth. Do not let us run away from that. New Zealand has already spoken about the possibility of getting alternative markets in America, as contrasted with this country. With us in Europe, and with stronger ties with Europe than with the Commonwealth, Canada would be abandoned to the United States of America.
We all remember the position about A.N.Z.U.S. and what happened there. The various countries of the British Commonwealth would fall into the American lap, but with one vast difference—that it would fall in separate pieces, it would have none of the spiritual democratic cohesion which it now has. It would lose the advantage of being the tremendous political, democratic and spiritual force which it is at the present time. It would merely have the separate units of the British Commonwealth, and not the Commonwealth as a whole.
It is inconceivable that we can go into Europe without weakening our ties with the Commonwealth. Would the Prime Minister be prepared to say that we will form no closer association with Europe than with the Commonwealth, or does he contemplate that we should have a far stronger association with Europe than with the Commonwealth, that we should become primarily a European Power and not a Commonwealth Power at all, that our association with the Commonwealth would disintegrate into separate bargains here and there?
We have had the shameful spectacle of the Prime Minister sending round his commercial travellers to the Commonwealth to sell the Common Market idea. He has told us that this was done for the purpose of consultation, but one thing which has emerged perfectly clearly from all the reports is that there has been no consultation at all. There has been a tremendous effort to bring pressure to bear upon the members of the Commonwealth to agree to our going into the European Economic Community. If he were in a position to say that they agreed, would he not have said so today?
The whole political idea embodied in this proposal is one which is alien to the

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mind of this country, is ruinous to our Commonwealth development and, in my view, so far from contributing to the peace of the world, goes most strongly against it.
8.42 p.m.
Mr. John Harvey: I am not old in the service of this House, and yet in the few years in which I have been here I can remember that it is not so long ago when, if hon. Members on this side of the House had said some of the eloquent things that have been said this afternoon about the Commonwealth by some hon. Members opposite, it would have been regarded as old-fashioned Toryism. I welcome this new esteem which the Commonwealth has suddenly found among some hon. Members opposite, even though I cannot help wondering what are the reasons for it.
We have heard a most forceful presentation by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister of his case. We have heard a very middle-of-the-road speech from the Leader of the Opposition. If in future months or years anybody should quote his speech of today as selectively as he quoted some speeches that my right hon. Friends have made on earlier occasions, he will always be able to say "Yes, but in that same speech I also said so-and-so." He will be right, whatever happens in the future trend of negotiations, because he has seen to it that he has made the sort of speech which must come down the right way however the future goes.
Indeed, the right hon. Gentleman has restrained his party in the Division Lobby from showing precisely which way it might like to go. He has in effect apparently taken the advice of Lord Attlee in the matter and said, "There is no need to help the Government with this." Perhaps there is not. Perhaps the Government can carry their own responsibilities. But to avoid in this way accepting their own responsibilities on the benches opposite does them no great credit. No doubt, it is politically wise of them to leave until some future date a definite decision on an issue which certainly exercises all our minds. It may be politically wise, but it is no real substitute for effective leadership and responsibility.
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Apart from the two speeches that I have already mentioned, we have had a most eloquent speech from my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker-Smith), a speech which certainly must have given us all to think, and a very able and well presented speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Smithers). I think that all these speeches might repay reading again in HANSARD tomorrow.
One might at this stage ask: which of them spoke for Britain? We might have a variety of views on that in the House tonight. If one looks at the various public opinion polls, it would appear that those who favour our going into the Common Market might speak for anything up to 70 per cent. of Britain. If one looks at the Gallup poll in particular, one will find, averaging it out over the last three years, that about 40 per cent. apparently think we should go in, about 20 per cent. seem to think we should stay out and about 40 per cent. do not know. If only somebody could mobilise the "Don't-knows", they would make a pretty formidable force.
On the other hand, the one point that we must bear in mind—my right hon. Friend certainly has to bear it in mind—is that with such a large element of "Don't know" over such a very vital subject, it is of the utmost importance that in the weeks ahead the Government should accept the responsibility for ensuring that the people do know a very great deal more about all the pros and cons involved than they do today.
So I hope that if any White Paper is in due course published as a result of the negotiations that I assume we are now going to enter into, it will not only deal with these negotiations but will seek to amplify and clarify all the various issues which have been discussed in the House this afternoon and are being discussed in the country and which add up to a great deal of uncertainty and confusion about priorities, results, duties, rights, benefits and responsibilities.
This is a responsibility which the Government really must accept. It is not good enough to leave it to the newspapers, even though the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Herald have produced very good, valuable and most helpful documents. The Daily Herald must have sent

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to some hon. Members opposite a document which sent to, I think, all hon. Members on the Government side of the House, and if hon. Members opposite had taken the Daily Herald seriously, some of the Aunt Sallies which they have set up this afternoon and then knocked down could not possibly have been set up.
I do not want to labour this theme. I do not want to set up Aunt Sallies of my own. I want to make only one major point. In my earlier post-war years I had the honour of serving as Chairman of the Young Conservatives in the Woodford division when my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) was Leader of the Opposition and then again Prime Minister. I always remember the great speech that he made in Zurich in 1946 when he said:
"We must turn our eyes away from the horrors of the past towards the future. If Europe is to be saved from infinite misery and, indeed, from final doom, there must be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the follies and crimes of the past."
I would not know, from their murmuring, whether or not that view is shared by Members opposite, but I hold it strongly and I feel that in an act of faith this country has its part to play and its quota of leadership to contribute.
In my few years of political life and experience I have always held the view that my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford has time and time again sought to enunciate—that there need be no conflict between our interests in Europe and our interests in the Commonwealth. I worry a great deal lest today some people are trying artificially to manufacture such a conflict because, for one reason or another, they would prefer that the strength that is Britain's be not added to the generating strength of Europe. I feel that it is time that we in this House faced fairly and squarely the fact that the identity of interests that exists between the countries of free Europe and the Commonwealth is a very considerable one indeed.
The hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) referred to the fact that one of the great advantages of the Commonwealth was that there were coloured people in it. But so are there coloured
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people in the Common Market as a result of the arrangements which the French have made for their own colonial States and the successor States to former colonial States.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Are they full members or second-class members?
Mr. Harvey: They are not second-class members. They are associate members. I firmly believe that we should today seek, if we can, to find a way to reconciling the interests of the Commonwealth and of Europe, and that, as I understand it, is what my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has proposed to the House. I believe that the House has made it abundantly clear that there are certain terms that we would not be, prepared to accept, but that does not mean that we should not make the effort to see whether a solution is possible on terms that would be reasonably acceptable to the British people, to the people of the Commonwealth and to our E.F.T.A. partners.
Those who seek to destroy the possibility of reaching such an agreement in advance of negotiations are themselves showing a sense of irresponsibility which could serve their country ill in the years that lie ahead. That virtually is all that I want to say tonight. The Government are right in seeking to see whether the gap can now be bridged.
If the gap cannot be bridged, let us by all means take stock of the situation which will then face us and show some vigour and firmness of purpose in seeking a possible alternative. But at the moment it is right and proper to see whether we can bring about the identity that I believe exists and could flourish between our interests as a European Power and our interests in the Commonwealth and across the Atlantic.
8.54 p.m.
Mr. Roy Jenkins: At one stage when the hon. Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. J. Harvey) was speaking, I thought that he might be winding up the debate, so widespread and gracious were the compliments he paid to his hon. Friends who have spoken. At another stage, I feared that he alone of the back benchers who have spoken in this great and important debate was not going to tell us unequivocally where he stood on this issue. However,

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I am glad that towards the end of his speech he cleared up that last doubt and came out on what I broadly regard as the right side—the pro-Europe side—of this controversy.
From both sides of the House some extraordinary arguments have been deployed against our moving towards Europe. Some of them have been deployed with great force and passion, and the speech of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) was an example, as was that of the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). Out of what has been said have emerged two main arguments with which I would like to deal.
The first is the Commonwealth argument. Without question, and partly because of the Government's extraordinarily inept handling of the question of our relations with the Commonwealth, this has become the main and most widely held objection in the last few months to our going into Europe. I do not expect that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations will agree with me, at least not publicly, but with due respect to the hard job he had to do, I can think of no more inept way of taking action about this than the mission of the three Ministers to the Commonwealth, asking members of the Commonwealth for any objections which they could think up without placing firm proposals before them.
That apart, my belief is that the Commonwealth objection as it has been deployed in the House and in arguments outside has been largely based on a false premise. It is based on the premise that the Commonwealth could afford us, through an alternative source, the same advantages which we could get by going into Europe. I do not believe that it possibly could.
What is the economic advantage of our going into Europe? We think—and I put it no higher than that at present—that the advantage which we would get is that we would become part of a large, unified and rapidly growing market. On the basis of that, we would see not a vast diversion of our own exports to Europe—it is irrelevant to say that only 14 per cent. of our exports go into Europe and therefore that market is unimportant
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—but, as a result of becoming part of a large, rapidly growing unified domestic market, we ought to achieve greater adaptability, greater specialisation and a greater "edge"—all the things which British industry is now so notably lacking. It would enable us to improve our competitive position not merely or even most importantly in Europe itself, but in the third market and in the Commonwealth itself, where we are steadily losing ground to our competitors.
That is the crux of the trade argument for going in. It does not mean that by going in we would automatically solve our present economic difficulties. I cannot believe that even the Government think that. There is still a great deal to be done, but going in would tend to make us do many of the things which the Opposition have been advocating, rather than going on from crisis to crisis, which is the danger for this country in future.
At any rate, the argument for going in is that we would improve our general competitive position. If we could do that, we could break through the core of our present troubles, which is our inability to expand at home for a sustained period without running into balance of payments difficulties.
If we could do that, we would be in a position to serve the real economic long-term needs of the Commonwealth, which are that we should be a steady source of long-term capital and a steadily expanding market which does not have to contract its market to the Commonwealth and which is a market not merely for traditional temporary foodstuffs from the white Dominions, but for tropical products and for simpler manufactured goods from both the white and coloured Dominions. That is the essential rôle which we must play towards the Commonwealth.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth offers us no basis alternative to Europe for making that essential break through and it does not do so for the perfectly simple reason that there is no possible prospect of the Commonwealth becoming a large, unified rapidly growing market. There is not such a prospect, because the Commonwealth has not shown much growth in the last few years.

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Secondly, and much more important, the last thing that Commonwealth countries are prepared to do is to give United Kingdom manufacturers a free rein in their markets. Whether it is the old white Commonwealth, Canada or Australia, or whether it is the new Commonwealth, whether it is Ghana or Malaya, none of these countries would be prepared to remove their tariffs and give us free entry. This is possibly right from their point of view because of their present state of development. They, too, are interested in building up their industries. This being so, any idea of a Commonwealth Customs Union is out of the question, for the simple, but completely adequate, reason that nobody in the Commonwealth would support it.
To look at this issue in terms of a free choice between an economic union with the Commonwealth and an economic union with Europe is to look at it in false terms. I believe, too, that if we stay out of Europe we will go on being economically weak. If by 1970 we are still a sluggish, crisis-ridden nation unable to provide substantial resources of development capital to the Commonwealth, whatever sentimental arguments the Commonwealth may produce during the months of negotiations, they will turn their backs on us far more than if they find that by being in Europe we are economically prosperous and dynamic and able to offer them the economic leadership which to some extent they need. The kind of action which the Government think is fair, like refusing Mr. Nyerere £8 million, will do the Commonwealth far more damage than going into the Common Market.
The second point, perhaps applying myself principally, but not exclusively, to hon. Members on this side of the House, is what one might call the special dilemma which the Left in this country is creating for itself over going into Europe. It is the question of how one can reconcile one's ability to promote social progress, and enable Socialism to have an effectve left-wing Government in this country, with the traditional internationalism of the Left. I apply it mainly to hon. Members on this side of the House, though the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South surprisingly came out as a defender of our ability to produce, autarchic Socialism in this country against the machinations of, I
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forget who it was, but I expect it was something to do with President Kennedy.
Let us begin with that. To raise this issue is to raise a dilemma between the internationalist tradition and the desire to preserve at all costs one's ability to do what one wants in this country. It is generally presented in terms of Europe with a good deal of anti-Adenauer and anti-de Gaulle undertones at the same time, but to some extent the same difficulty would arise were one to go into almost any group one is likely to go into. Certainly Atlantic Union would not make it very much easier. Certainly going into a close tie-up with those new heroes of the extreme Right and Left in this country, Mr. Diefenbaker, Mr. Menzies, and Mr. Holyoake, would not solve this problem. I think that even so far as E.F.T.A. is concerned, leaving aside the special embarrassment of Dr. Salazar, the attitude of the Scandinavian Prime Ministers might be rather cool for my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) on certain issues.
Mr. S. Silverman: I take the point. Does not my hon. Friend realise the difference between an association with people who do not wish to interfere with our own planning of our own economic resources, and entering into a Common Market which would necessarily entail limitations upon our freedom of action in our domestic field, which association with the Commonwealth or with Scandinavia does not?
Mr. Jenkins: All I was endeavouring to point out is that to take this point to its logical conclusion means that one is not against going into Europe at present but one would be against even surrendering one's sovereignty to almost any conceivable grouping that one could think of. It must be obvious that if we say that we must at all costs preserve our right to do what we want with our own, whether it is done for imperialist reasons or in the name of Socialism, or simply for xenophobic reasons, this requirement of an absolute right to do what one wants with one's own is bound to produce an inward-looking and a contracting-out attitude which is at variance with the international outlook of the Labour movement.
I want to examine this point in more specifically European and more practical

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terms. Is it suggested that by entering the Common Market Britain would become more of a Tory nation? Is it suggested that she would be less capable of advances towards social progress than she would be if she stayed out? Whatever view we may take about certain policies of Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle, anyone who looked at the situation in Europe at the present time and said that from a left-wing point of view this country was far in advance of the Europe of the Six must have gone to sleep in 1949 and not woken up since. He would be living in a world of twelve years ago.
Let us consider what has been done in Europe. We have the most rapid rise in national incomes shown by France, Germany and Italy; the fullest of full employment shown by France and Germany; a model system of economic planning in France; highly successful nationalised industries in France; a very developed system of retirement benefits, which makes anything that we have in this country look a disgrace, in Germany, and excellent family allowances in France. In many respects the Europe of the Six has far more to offer the people, and has shown a greater achievement in the last ten years, than anything we have been able to get in this country.
When I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Houghton-le-Spring (Mr. Blyton) talk as though the wage standards in Europe were now on a sort of coolie level, I began to wonder where I was.
Mr. Blyton: I hope that my hon. Friend is not trying to be funny. If we add our wage rates to our welfare benefits we find that the standards of Britain are higher than those on the Continent.
Mr. Jenkins: Certainly. My hon. Friend made a powerful and impressive speech, but I am surely entitled to reply to some of the points in it with which I do not agree. Taking that factor into consideration, Britain still has just the highest wage rate, but for how much longer will that be so? The rate at which the Europe of the Six is catching up is enormous. German wage rates rose by 11 per cent. in 1960. From the point of view of under-cutting labour
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costs the cost of employing labour, which includes, in France and Germany, social security surcharges, is also relevant, and not merely the actual wage rate.
Mr. A. C. Manuel: Does not my hon. Friend agree that if we have real wages which are higher than those which generally apply in the Common Market countries it is because of the real bargaining power of our trade unions? Does not he think that there is some danger that they will lose that bargaining power if we join the Common Market, because the trade union concept is not accepted by it?
Mr. Jenkins: I do not want to enter into an argument with my hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Manuel), but I am willing to make a firm prediction that, unless something very surprising happens in this country, in five years' time wage rates in Germany will be substantially higher than those in this country.
Miss Lee: There will be a crisis here under the Tories. That is my prediction.
Mr. Jenkins: I listened to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) and I am sure that she will be prepared to listen to mine.
My point here is that in the first place it is greatly possible to exaggerate the lack of progressive content in the Six. It is enormously possible to exaggerate the extent to which going into the Six would inhibit a Labour Government from doing what is wanted. Such an action would have no effect on any nationalisation. The coal and steel industries in Europe, as the House is aware, have already been in a community for nine years. Nor would it affect the mixed pattern of public and private ownership. I know of nothing at all in the articles of the Coal and Steel Community or E.E.C. which would prevent from being carried out any measure of nationalisation thought desirable.
The other argument, or the further development of the argument advanced by some people, is that it does not matter about these detailed questions of planned social services, of wages or whatever it may be. The great danger to us is getting ourselves mixed up with the political image of the Six. What would do us harm, it is argued, from the point of view of our leadership in Asia and Africa, is

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the France of Algeria and Bizerta, the Belgium of the Congo, and the Germany of intransigent irredentism.
I think that there are two things to be said about this argument which is a powerful one and a most difficult argument to meet. I think that we are inclined to adopt a Pharisaical attitude. We are too inclined to believe that we are not as other men; that we are more self-righteous and that everyone will accept us at our own valuation, and that if we rub our hands unctuously enough, people will not notice the dirt of Suez and Cyprus.
The second and, I think, the very real danger to this country is the belief that nations all over the world are waiting to be led by us. This new imperialism is only slightly less dangerous than the old imperialistic belief that everybody else in the world was waiting to be dominated by us. I believe that most of the new nations do not want to be led or to be dominated. They want to get on with the conduct of their own affairs and to obtain as much help from us as possible. They will not be impressed by a Britain, unable to solve its own economic problems, standing on the sideline waiting to be asked by someone to lead them somewhere. That is the danger which will confront us if we stay out.
I think that the Government have little about which to be proud in the way in which they have handled matters in the last four years. I think that the President of the Board of Trade has little to be proud of regarding the statements he has made. I do not even know how the Prime Minister feels about it, because only a few weeks ago the right hon. Gentleman was rebuking the leader of the Liberal Party in violent terms for having had the temerity to suggest exactly what the Prime Minister is now proposing. However, I think there is no doubt that it would be impossible for the Government to put up an effective defence to the argument that if, as I believe is right, we propose to go into Europe, it would have been far better had we done so two or three years ago when we had at least the semblance of some economic strength.
There is a grave danger that in conducting these negotiations the Prime Minister may say too many different things to too many different people. But,
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even allowing for my great lack of confidence in the ability of the Government to conduct the negotiations with success, I still believe, and believe firmly, that it is right for this country to go into Europe.
The Commonwealth objection to staying out is a false one. There are more things involved in going in than diversion of trade, or even our particular rate of growth. I believe that this country at present—encouraged to a large extent by the Government—is suffering from a general ineffectiveness of performance and a national mood Which is half that of misplaced complacency and half that of growing lack of self-confidence. There is a real danger that we shall go into a kind of drab decline rather detached from the main currents of life in the world, blaming other countries for our misfortunes and occasionally deluding ourselves, but no one else, with illusions of grandeur. I believe that the best prophylactic against that rather dismal happening is that we should go into Europe.
9.16 p.m.
Mr. John Farr: It is with a great deal of surprise and a certain amount of pleasure that I find myself tonight in a similar position to that of the hon. Lady the Member for Cannock (Miss Lee) and the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas). I am less surprised to find myself in a similar position to that of the hon. and learned Member, because not only is his constituency in the same county as mine, but the arithmetic he used is more in keeping with the arithmetic I have employed in arriving at the same position.
It is surprising to me that the word "agriculture" has hardly been mentioned at all in this debate today. One of the chief objections I have to this country joining the Common Market under the present terms of the Treaty of Rome is that British agriculture will be threatened and the prosperity—indeed the existence—of our farming community will be in jeopardy.
The Common Market, under the terms of the Treaty of Rome, provides that agricultural support as laid down in our Agriculture Acts of 1947 and 1957 will no longer be tolerated. Certain economists calculated the other day that the

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removal of the British subsidy which brings down the price of food in our shops would have the effect of increasing the price per head by only about Is. 0½d. per week. I have not heard another comparison or another figure given, but I took certain pains last week to look up some of the fatstock marketing prices and guarantees which the Government are paying. I found that roughly for every 3s. that a British farmer received for fat cattle in the sales this month the Government provided Is. and 2s. was paid by the consumer. It does not need a mathematician to work out that if that is transferred in the same ratio a 15s. leg of beef, when the agricultural subsidy is removed, will cost 22s. 6d. in the shops.
Another very important consideration is what is to happen to horticulture. Our British horticultural industry is struggling today. It is protected by a strong tariff wall which is absolutely necessary. If we look at the terms of the Treaty of Rome we find that internal tariffs for agricultural and horticultural products will be abolished. The proposals of the Common Market agriculture commission are very vague about what would be done with horticulture. It says that the rules of competition for horticulture will be governed by quality and productive capabilities. How can British tomato growers compete with tomato growers in Italy and France, where they have the natural climate to help them and they can produce tomatoes as a field crop and not as an expensive heated crop under glass as has to be done in this country?
Last Friday, I had the pleasure of addressing my local branch of the National Farmers' Union, and I found that the vast majority of farmers attending that meeting were disturbed at the prospect of this country joining the Common Market. They were dismayed at the possibility of losing the support embodied in the 1947 and 1957 Agriculture Acts. The message they gave me to deliver here today was that the vast majority at that meeting was against our involvement or entanglement in the Common Market.
Mr. J. M. L. Prior: Would it not be equally true to say that at other times when my hon. Friend
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speaks to farmers' meetings he finds that they are no more satisfied with the present system of support than they are at the prospect to which he has referred?
Mr. Farr: I am interested to hear that my hon. Friend knows as much, if not more, about what goes on at National Farmers' Union meetings in my constituency. I shall have to pay more attention to them in future.
The Motion before the House refers particularly to our applying for entry into the Common Market under Article 237. I regret that we are not to apply under Article 238. I am very worried about the effect which our membership of the Common Market would have on Commonwealth trade. The Commonwealth trade which we still enjoy, though, perhaps, with weakened Imperial Preferences, is about the only tangible link we now have to hold the Commonwealth together. There are some nebulous, vague links, connections and sinews which help to hold our vast family together, but the one factor of substance on which we can still put a finger is Commonwealth trade.
I am appalled to hear hon. Members on both sides say, or imply by not saying, that it does not really matter if we erect tariff barriers against New Zealand, Australia and other of our Empire countries and it does not really matter if we abolish tariffs between this country and the Common Market countries of Europe. What does it matter, they ask, if instead of New Zealand exporting butter and lamb to this country we have a lot of dumped Dutch produce here, or if we import large quantities of French grain instead of Canadian grain? If we join the Common Market, we shall have to erect a common tariff wall outside the Common Market over which all our Commonwealth imports will have to climb but through which Common Market imports, especially of agricultural produce, will come without hindrance.
It is said that it will be a wonderful boon to British industry if we join the Common Market. Our manufacturers—there are many industrialists here tonight, particularly on the benches behind me—say that there will be a wonderful

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opportunity for our companies to compete in a home market not of 52 million people but of 220 million. How wonderful will be the opportunities, they say, for us to sell our manufactured goods. Many of them do not give a thought for the smaller firms. Moreover, if I may say so with respect, there are many who may have the smile wiped off their faces after a few years within the Community.
I took the trouble to inquire the other day at what price certain popular foreign motor cars are sold in their country of origin and at what price they are sold in this country, the difference, of course, being accounted for by shipping. Purchase Tax in this country and a very large tariff. I shall not go into details now except to mention two cars made on the Continent and exported all over the world.
I take first the Simca "Etoile", a French motor car. Its price in the country of origin today, excluding T.V.A. and local taxes, is £332. In this country, its price is £779, and even at that price one sees a lot of them about. The price of the Volkswagen in Germany today, including turnover tax, is £425, but a buyer in this country has to pay £739 for one. If the tariff is removed there will be such a demand for and such a flood of foreign cars coming into this country that many of our large car manufacturers, who apparently regard the Common Market as a ripe plum for picking, will be very sorry that we ever entered into negotiations with the Common Market.
There was a debate in the House at about 3 or 4 this morning on immigration. My hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne) and my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Kirkdale (Mr. N. Pannell) had an exchange of conversation. They were mainly concerned with the immigration of Jamaicans and other coloured citizens from the Commonwealth. What they did not turn their minds to, and have not turned their minds to, and what, I submit, we should be turning our minds to now, is the fact that if we join the Common Market under its present terms by 1970 any citizen of the Common Market countries will be able to come to this country provided that he has a job to come to. He will have to apply to no one and will come here automatically as of right.
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As the Common Market stands today, a citizen of France wishing to take a job in West Germany has to wait for three weeks while that job is advertised. At the end of that period, if a national of West Germany has not taken the job, the Frenchman has a right to take it. By 1970, there will be no such waiting period. I submit that we should be far more concerned about the possible curtailment of our right to allow citizens of our Commonwealth into this country. If we join the Common Market, we shall not have the right of free immigration into this country of Commonwealth citizens. We shall have to apply to Brussels. It will not be possible to say a word if people flock in from other Common Market countries to take advantage of the very high employment rates that we have enjoyed over the last fifteen years, and which, if we do not join the Common Market, I submit that we shall continue to enjoy.
One hon. Member earlier tonight referred to the fact that despite the number of criticisms made by hon. Members on both sides of the House of the Government's Motion, there was no concrete alternative before the House for us to consider. He made the point, a very valid one, that it is no use going into bargaining or consultation unless one has an alternative. It is no use going up to someone and asking him to lend one 6d. without somehow giving the impression that one is not really stony broke and done for if he turns one down. The same principle applies to our negotiations with the Common Market.
I beg of my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench not just to give the impression that they have an alternative for us to fall back on, but to have a really practical alternative, embodying the Commonwealth, and embodying the countries of E.F.T.A. in the Commonwealth to make a larger British and part-European and Commonwealth community which can act together as an economic bloc. We should then have a bloc which would dwarf the Common Market and many other nations of the world.
I should like to see our relations with the Common Market countries remain on the most friendly basis and, perhaps, negotiations concluded between the bloc that I am suggesting and the Common Market, whereby perhaps a most favoured

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bloc in terms of the old most-favourednation clause would be evolved. The most friendly links could exist. If we could hammer out such an association of like-minded people—people whom, with respect to our European friends, we understand who are our own kith and kin, who have stood beside us in our victories and sorrows. in peace and war—we should make a great contribution towards the negotiations which are shortly to be commenced.
I have heard, as other hon. Members have, of the Expanding Commonwealth Group. Is not this something for the Group to get hold of? Is it not a bone for its members to chew over? Is not this one way of expanding the Commonwealth to make it work? This could be an association of the E.F.T.A. countries with our own under-developed countries in the Commonwealth. They could be economically associated, trading together. This is material for members of the Expanding Commonwealth Group to consider.
I do not approve of our application under Article 237. I should approve of an application under Article 238. I leave the House with the thought that we should seek to make progress towards having a living alternative if our negotiations with the European Economic Community are turned down. We should seek to build up something on which we could pin our hopes and fall back on, should the concessions which the Prime Minister will try to get from the E.E.C. not be granted.
9.31 p.m.
The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Reginald Maudling): I want to deal with some of the important points which have been made in this remarkable and unique debate.
Mr. George Brown: The right hon. Gentleman should also deal with his own past.
Mr. Maudling: I need not answer that interjection, because it is as irrelevant to the argument as most of the right hon. Gentleman's interjections.
Before dealing with the points which have been made, I want to recall the terms of the Motion which the Government have put before the House. We ask the House to support
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"the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association."
We ask for support in finding out whether this can be done. The only way in which it can be done is by making such an application.
The House should record a clear view on this point, because it is of very great and possibly historic importance. The Opposition Amendment and the speech by the Leader of the Opposition were a little disappointing. The Opposition seek to substitute for the words "supports the decision" the words "notes the decision". That is a little inadequate in relation to what is required of the House of Commons and of both major parties. The country is entitled to know whether the Government have the support of the House of Commons in making this decision. Anyone who objects to this decision is clearly declaring his unwillingness to contemplate joining with our European neighbours in any circumstances whatever. [HON. MEMBERS: "Article 238.] I will come to the point of whether it should be under Article 237 or Article 238 later. My right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will also deal with this point tomorrow. The main answer is the clear one that association under Article 238, as compared with membership under Article 237, would lead to all the disadvantages, on the one hand, while not on the other hand giving us the great positive advantages which would flow from membership.
It is important that we should have the support of the House in finding out what can be done. This can only be found as a result of negotiations. The ultimate decision is not to be taken today. The decision is whether we inquire what the circumstances will be, in order that we can make a final decision, upon which the House will be consulted.
Mr. William Baxter: About what has the hon. Gentleman been negotiating during the last four years?
Mr. Maudling: In 1957 and 1958 I was trying to negotiate the Free Trade Area. In 1959 I was engaged in negotiating the E.F.T.A. Since then I have

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not been engaged in negotiating with Europe.
The main points which have been made during today's debate have been concerned, first of all, with the political significance and, subsequently, with the economic significance of any agreement we may reach with Europe. It is clear that in modern conditions one cannot wholly disentangle economic and political considerations. The coherence of any Group, politically and economically, is intermingled.
If one looks at the remarkable development in co-operation in Western Europe since the war—there is O.E.E.C. and the European Payments Union, to which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition made a very fine contribution—that has been the basis of much of the political coherence of Western Europe. Similarly, the Commonweath. Surely the Commonwealth is both a political and an economic association, and I doubt if it would be wise or realistic to try to suppose that one could take one aspect of the Commonwealth and ignore the other.
In modern conditions these two aspects—economic and political—inevitably are tied together and where one has an economic division one is bound to have a political division in the long run, and that is one of the strongest arguments at the present time for trying to achieve a greater economic strength in Western Europe.
If it is true that economic and political considerations are intertwined, it is also true that the treaty of Rome, which we are discussing, is, as my right hon. Friend said, an economic Treaty. If one looks at its terms one sees that it is concerned with establishing a common market and that it is also concerned with the other provisions that are necessary in order to ensure that a common market functions efficiently.
There is a provision, it is true, for an Assembly sometime, elected by direct suffrage, but that can only be brought into effect by unanimous agreement all round. We are, therefore, dealing with a Treaty which is essentially an economic one. It has, it is true, very great political overtones, but here, I think that there has been quite a change which should be observed in the European scene in recent years. The motives
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which led the people who sponsored the idea of Western European collaboration were, in many cases, a step towards political federation. That is true, and it was, and should be, recognised.
But we have seen in the last year or two the development of the European patrie of General de Gaulle and it is clear, I should have thought, that the Governments of the Six are not supporters of the conception of a political federation. Therefore it is fair to say that neither by the terms of the Treaty itself nor by the expressed views of the Governments concerned in the Community would our membership commit ourselves in any way to ultimate political federation. As the view has often been expressed—and this is important—it would be wrong for us to accept obligations, either expressed or implied, which went further than the country is prepared to accept in present conditions.
Another important point which has been touched upon by several hon. Members is the question of sovereignty, to which my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, East (Sir D. Walker Smith) paid particular attention. Clearly, this is a very important problem indeed. It is absolutely true that the Treaty of Rome contains surrender of freedom of action different in kind, and possibly different in degree, from that seen in other treaties. It would be fair to define sovereignty as freedom of decision and action.
Certainly, in the Treaty of Rome, if we were to become partners in it, our freedom of action would be considerably circumscribed. The Commission has powers that, I think, are probably unprecedented in any international body, and there is the point that the Treaty of Rome is envisaged as being permanent, and without particular duration. I agree that these are important points to be taken into account, but we must look at the realities of the derogation of sovereignty that is involved, try to assess precisely what is involved and set that against the other commitments that we and any nation of the modern world have inescapably to undertake.
I do no believe that it is open for any nation in the world community, any more than it is open for an individual in the national community, to claim complete freedom of decision and action.

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Whether it be a treaty that we sign, like G.A.T.T. or N.A.T.O., or whether it be the mere obligations of international law, it inevitably means some restriction on our freedom of action and decision. I should have thought that this was particularly true in the military field, which is of such tremendous importance. By our adherence to any alliance we are bound to be placing some restriction on our freedom of action.
The question we must look at on this occasion is how much we should be circumscribed in our freedom of action if we were to join the Community, and how much this particular disadvantage should be judged to be when balanced against the great advantages of joining a European system.
We should certainly lose control over our tariffs and our commercial policy in relation to a considerable part of our trade, but, of course, if we were successful in getting satisfactory arrangements for the Commonwealth this loss of fredom of action would be concerned only with about a quarter of our world trade at most, because three-quarters of that trade rests within the Commonwealth and within Europe.
Also, if we lost our freedom of action—
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Does that mean that Australia and New Zealand and Canada, if they come in, are to be given power over their own fiscal future whereas we have to surrender ours?
Mr. Maudling: I do not think that was the point I was on. I want to come to the Commonwealth a little later.
I said that if we have proper arrangements to meet our points about the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth and Europe together represent about three-quarters of our total trade. Therefore, although it is a disadvantage to lose our freedom of action over a common tariff and a common commercial policy, we must look at the matter in perspective and see how much, in practice, we should be losing compared with, as I have said, the advantage of participating in a really large single market.
The limitations that are involved on our freedom of action should we join the Community are all expressly designed to ensure the efficient working of the Community.
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If we look at the various provisions of the Treaty about State intervention, subsidies, establishment, restrictive practices, dumping, and so on, we see that all these are aimed at ensuring that a single market works effectively, and we must ourselves squarely face the fact that if we do go into a single Common Market, it is in our interests that that Common Market should work effectively and that there should be rules of competition and institutions to ensure that it should work to the best advantage.
A number of right hon. and hon. Members have referred to E.F.T.A. We have, of course, a great and a solemn responsibility to our colleagues in E.F.T.A. Lt was formed, I think, for two purposes; partly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Smithers) said, because the members of E.F.T.A. felt that a further fragmentation of Europe would take place unless there was some cohesion amongst the industrialised countries outside the Common Market.
We also formed it, I think, because we felt that we had many things in common, and that an association of the seven countries with a population of 90 million people with, on the average, very high living standards, formed in itself a valuable and important single market.
We had those two purposes in mind, and in our communiqué at the London meeting we said quite clearly that in any negotiations the members of E.F.T.A. would co-ordinate their actions and remain united throughout the negotiations and that E.F.T.A. should be maintained at least until satisfactory arrangements had been worked out in negotiation to meet the various legitimate interests of all members of E.F.T.A., and thus enable them all to participate on the same date in an integrated European market. In reply to the question which the right hon. Gentleman asked me, that is the Government's view, and it remains the Government's view.
Mr. G. Brown: What about the Commonwealth's view?
Mr. Maudling: I will come to that.
The problem about negotiations involving the E.F.T.A. countries is that,

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while we all have difficulties in the context of the Treaty of Rome as it stands, these difficulties tend to vary. We have our special problems of the Commonwealth, while some of our E.F.T.A. partners have their special problems, such as neutrality and the constitutional position of Austria and Switzerland.
Therefore, the solutions that may be found in the long run to bring us all together into a single European system may be, in individual cases, differing solutions. I think this is logical, because different problems lead to different solutions. Therefore, it may be a question of a series of negotiations involving different countries.
The point is that we are partners and intend to act as partners. This is not a question of giving one person a veto over another. This is not how partners talk. I want to emphasise that the spirit of understanding and co-operation among the Seven countries of E.F.T.A. is very remarkable indeed. We have worked together for a long time. We understand one another and we trust one another. We realise that we have a responsibility to one another, as partners, to ensure that everyone's legitimate interests are properly settled before a final settlement is accepted by any one. That undertaking, which we gave certainly remains true.
The right hon. Gentleman also asked me about the Commonwealth, and I am glad he did, because I want to refer to it, and it was a point referred to by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition earlier. We have given the same undertaking to our Commonwealth partners and to the other E.F.T.A. countries, namely, that we will not join the Community unless special arrangements have been worked out in negotiations to protect their essential interests. I do not think that any country, either in the Commonwealth or in E.F.T.A., wants to make our decision for us. They recognise that they have no right to do that, nor would they claim to do that, because they do not want to take upon their shoulders the solemn responsibility that will rest upon this House when the time comes to make a decision. They do not want to take our decision for us, but they want to have, and have, the assurance that before we take our decision, we will be satisfied that special arrangements have
1602
been worked out in negotiations to protect their essential interests.
Of course, there will be a difference in procedure between the E.F.T.A. countries, who will themselves engage in negotiations with the Community, and the Commonwealth countries, whose interests it will be our responsibility to bear in mind, and whom we will consult closely and continuously throughout the negotiations. But the principle of the obligation remains the same in each case.
Mr. Harold Wilson: The right hon. Gentleman is making a very important point. Is he saying, quite categorically, in respect of each Commonwealth country, that there is the same commitment and the same pledge to meet their interests as there is in the case of each E.F.T.A. country?
Mr. Maudling: The undertaking in each case is collective, and not individual, obviously. I will read again the words I used, because they were carefully thought out. We have given the same undertaking to our Commonwealth partners and to the other E.F.T.A. countries, namely, that we will not join the E.E.C. unless special arrangements have been worked out in negotiations to protect their essential interests. That is where we stand, and it is perfectly the same in both cases. That is a rather deliberate statement of the position in answer to the point raised by the right hon. Gentleman.
Mr. G. Brown: I understand what the right hon. Gentleman has now said, but do I also understand that in the case of E.F.T.A. the undertaking has been given to each country that we will not join unless arrangements have been made to protect the interests of each individual E.F.T.A. country? If that is so, it is not collective. Are we giving it to each individual Commonwealth country, or are we saying that it is not for each individual E.F.T.A. country?
Mr. Maudling: In this matter, we are treating our Commonwealth partners and our E.F.T.A. partners in precisely the same way. I do not think I can say more, I have explained twice already what the position is, and if the right hon. Gentleman will look at HANSARD, he will see what it is.
The next point I want to came to is the very important one of the Commonwealth trading system and how it is

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affected by the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The important point that we all have to consider is, first of all, as my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester said, how we can best serve the Commonwealth inside or outside the European Community. That surely is the basic problem. When we look at the question of investment which is of such importance, what is of the greatest significance to the Commonwealth is in what circumstances the United Kingdom will be able to provide the maximum flow of investment capital to the Commonwealth countries. Clearly the conflict between our present Commonwealth system and the Treaty of Rome arises in the field of the common tariff and of the common agricultural policy, and in the provisions for a common commercial policy.
I should like to say one or two things about our Commonwealth trade to outline the problem that has to be faced. We think of Commonwealth trade at the moment very much in terms of the sales that the Commonwealth makes in our market here. That clearly is of very great importance indeed. Temperate foodstuffs are obviously the largest individual item, but manufactures are also of importance to India, Pakistan, Canada and of growing importance to Australia. Raw materials and tropical foodstuffs are all of importance. The Commonwealth is bound to be concerned both with the question of the Common external tariff which, unless provision is made for the Commonwealth, will apply automatically to Commonwealth products, and also with the nature of a common agricultural policy, because on the nature of that policy will depend the extent to which members of the Community import foodstuffs from other countries outside.
That is a very good example of the general principle of the desirability, if we are to enter the Community, of entering at the formative stage before policies have too much crystallised. That is the first aspect of Commonwealth trade—the sales that they make in our markets which are in some cases of overwhelming importance to the Commonwealth countries concerned.
Then there is the second aspect; that is our sales in Commonwealth markets,
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which must not be overlooked. Although the volume of our trade with the Commonwealth has fallen, it is still 40 per cent. of our trade, and my own belief is that the period of steep decline that we have seen has had historical reasons and may well not continue. I hope to see an improvement. We are still accorded preference over about half our exports to the Commonwealth of an average of 10 per cent. or 12 per cent. It is very important indeed for our engineering, chemical and other industries, and is clearly a matter which we must bear in mind in our discussions just as much as we bear in mind Commonwealth sales in England.
Then there is the rather more intangible question of the habit, system and tradition of Commonwealth countries in economic matters. I believe this to be a very precious thing—something which we must preserve and regard not merely for its economic and commercial value but for the strength and sustenance which it puts into the whole Commonwealth. Therefore, when looking at the problem, which is a very tough problem, of reconciling the Commonwealth system with a European settlement we must have regard to these three aspects of our Commonwealth trade and try to find solutions to them.
On one matter I would not agree with some of my hon. Friends. I do not think we should regard the Commonwealth as an alternative to a satisfactory solution with Europe. Of course, we should aim at expanding our trade with the Cornmonwealth—I quite agree—but I do not think the idea of a Commonwealth free trade system is really a practicable proposition at all, as several people have said it is, simply because the Commonwealth countries with their developing industries could not in present circumstances contemplate opening their markets freely to products from industrialised Britain.
The other reason for not looking at the Commonwealth as an alternative to Europe is that it is fundamentally wrong to do so. We must not get into the frame of mind of choosing between the Commonwealth and Europe. It would be tragic if this country were forced to make that choice. For some years now I have seen the various interests, difficulties and problems which sway across

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this rather difficult stage, but one thing that I have been convinced about is that there is absolutely no fundamental reason at all why we should not reconcile our membership of the Commonwealth system with our proper place as a European nation, which we are. One of the advantages of the Treaty of Stockholm and the E.F.T.A. is that we achieved in that Treaty precisely that result. I do not say for a moment that the system would be appropriate or applicable to a wider European system involving the Six, but it can be done. It has been done once with goad will, and I am convinced that it can be done again.
Also, we must look at the problem of our trading relations with Europe as an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunities are immense. We shall have much competition, I quite agree. There will be rules for fair competition, and that is very important. I do not agree with the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. UngoedThomas) who shed so many tears for the companies and businesses in this country which will go under in the face of fierce competition. I think that the great effect of going into a wider European market will be that the efficient firms will prosper and the inefficient will go down. That, surely, is precisely what we must see in this country if our economy is really to expand and our growth is to be more rapid.
There will be vigorous competition, and, certainly in the first instance, it may well be that the strain on our balance of payments will be increased by our having to face a considerable volume of imports, but in the long run we can in modern conditions hope to expand the technical basis of our industry and harness all the possibilities of modern industrial methods only if we can operate in a very large market.
I think that the opportunities and the challenge of a single European market for British industry are very great, and
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the difficulties if we stay out are also great. It is true that Europe is taking only about 14 per cent. or so of our overseas trade at the moment, but it is a very rapidly growing market. I agree with those hon. Members who have said that the growth was taking place before the Treaty of Rome was signed, but I think the Treaty of Rome has stimulated it. If we stay out, we shall lose great opportunities far trade there.
Also, outside Europe we shall be facing a new competitor throughout the world, and in the Commonwealth as well, with an industrial base on the same scale as the United States but with wages not three times ours but about the same as ours; and the competition to be met from a body such as that would be formidable indeed. So I think we must recognise that the advantages of going into Europe are great and the difficulties of staying out are equally great, but what we must not say is that, whatever we do, we must go in at any price. This alternative is equally untrue. There is the whole of the rest of the world for us to make a living in if we want to do so and have to do so. If we are efficient and really competitive, we shall prosper outside, but we shall prosper even better inside. [Interruption.]
I am sure that it should be posed, to such as want to listen, that the advantages, political and economic, of going into a European system can be enormous, but we do not have to go in regardless of the cost. Therefore, we have to find out what the conditions are upon which we can join, which is precisely what the Government are asking support for this evening.
Mr. G. Brown: Might I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman is for the Motion or the Amendment?
Debate adjourned.—[Mr. Hughes-Young.]
Debate to be resumed Tomorrow.

INDUSTRIAL THERAPY (MENTALLY SICK)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Hughes-Young.]
9.59 p.m.
Mr. W. A. Wilkins: I shall not talk tonight about the Common Market but about the need for a common community effort on behalf of an unfortunate section of our community. The House has always shown itself sympathetic in matters which concern the welfare of the mentally sick, and I am sure that it is always ready to aid and encourage every worth-while effort designed to assist them to regain their health and to help to reinstate or rehabilitate them in industry and society and normal industrial life.
It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Chichester-Clark.]
Mr. Wilkins: In these days of modern medical knowledge and techniques, this is by no means impossible in quite a substantial number of cases which, in days past, would have been written off as being incurable, and the story that I want to tell tonight to the House, and, I hope, to the country as well, is really a message of hope for these people.
It is also a story of a dedicated man, a consultant psychiatrist, who, with the sympathetic and practical support of industrialists, trade unions, trade unionists, the churches and social workers, and also of civic authorities, including doctors, ventured forth in faith upon a scheme for the industrial rehabilitation of mentally sick people. Very rich rewards for their courage and vision and enterprise are already being reaped, with tremendous financial advantages to the nation, which is one of the points I want emphatically to register.
Far transcending any consideration of this kind is the restoration of dignity and independence for the patients who have been restored to community life and to their immediate relatives and friends. The organisation I am referring to is known as Industrial Therapy Organisation
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(Bristol) Ltd., and its work provides a fascinating story of achievement. Here, interpose to say that I know that in at least two parts of the country similar but not parallel experiments are being undertaken, mainly. I understand, by local authorities.
This organisation has developed from an industrial therapy scheme which was pioneered in Glenside Hospital, Bristol. Some years ago the patients were encouraged under this scheme to assemble such things as ballpoint pens and small electrical components. Today, there is a thriving industrial unit in Glenside Hospital. In it nearly 400 longterm psychiatric patients are gainfully employed and are being helped to regain their confidence and self-assurance. But this has now become only stage 1 of a three-stage process of rehabilitation. Industrial Therapy Organisation (Bristol) Ltd. is stage two in this process.
This organisation a couple of years ago leased some old disused school premises which were literally derelict and equipped them as a factory through the great generosity with gifts of money by local people, but more especially with machinery which has been loaned to the organisation by a number of eminent local firms. These firms have gone even further, however. Some of them have seconded supervisory staffs to this work both at the hospital and the factory which enables them to ensure that the work which is produced for them by the patients is completed to their satisfaction.
A little more than six months ago a car-washing project was launched. It has proved a huge success. In the first four months, to 6th March this year, it had taken £1,314. The cars were washed at the rate of 6s. per vehicle and contract terms were also offered for the work. Contracts have now been secured to wash the whole of the G.P.O. fleet in the City of Bristol, and the fleets of some of the large industrialists in the city.
At the moment, the service is overstaffed, but as the organisation is nonprofit-making and as its major concern is the therapeutic value attached to it, the present staff will continue until and unless the organisation is forced to do otherwise. I believe that it will not be

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compelled to impose any restriction, because it is now proposed to instal a second car-washing branch.
I should now like briefly to quote from a paper which was reprinted from the British Medical Journal of 3rd June, this year. The paper is entitled, "Evolution in the Mental Hospital" and was written by Dr. A. B. Cooper, senior registrar, and Dr. D. F. Early, consultant psychiatrist of the Glenside Hospital, the man who I believe to be the inspiration behind this scheme. The paper says:
"There can be no doubt … of the improvement in morale of both patients and staff following directly on the establishment of the industrial units. For the first time a large proportion of the hospital population are fully and usefully occupied, and perhaps more important patients have been given the prospect of earning their living in the outside world. Not only are those patients formerly regarded as potentially capable of work now actually becoming self-supporting, but many others, once thought hopelessly deteriorated and unemployable, are now proving that they can make a useful contribution. Over the past three years patients' earnings have increased rapidly and continuously … and if the present trend continues the hospital population will soon contain a sizeable proportion of wage-earners who will need only suitable accommodation to become independent and self-supporting."
I said that this was a fascinating achievement, and I will quote only a few figures. In 1957, none of this work was being undertaken and the total of hospital and basic workers' allowances in that year was £6,820. In 1960, the earnings in the unit in the hospital were £10,043. Earnings of the people employed by I.T.O. over a period of only ten months were £7,943. It is estimated that patients already placed in open employment have earned £3,750. The comparison is that between £6,820 in 1957 and the earnings £28,818 by these people in 1960. I have recited only the barest details concerning this great work of rehabilitation.
I now want to say a word about the third stage and the important people in this fascinating experiment; the important people being, of course, the patients. No compulsion whatsoever is exerted on these patients to undertake any of this work, whether it is in the hospital or in the factory. They come to work if they wish, or they stay away and remain in the hospital if they so desire. If they come to work and at some period of the
1610
day they feel that they need a rest, they have one, because they are paid only for work they choose to do, and they are paid for that work at proper piecework rates for the job.
I do not know whether the Parliamentary Secretary has visited this factory. If she has not, I hope that when she is Bristol way she will take the opportunity to have a look at it. It is apparent to anyone who visits the factory that these people are really happy to be employed in this way, and that I think accounts for the tremendous success story which it is.
At the moment of my speaking in this House, 42 of those patients—it is a big figure—are back in normal civilian employment offered by sympathetic Bristol employers. I want to emphasise that they are able to do the work which has been offered. This is not philanthropy in any sense of the word. There is no philanthropy whatever about this aspect of the experiment.
Between them, those 42 patients have spent nearly 400 years in hospital. These are fantastic figures. Let us consider what that means in cost alone to this nation, to say nothing of what it means to the patient and his family in human terms. Surmising that the average cost of maintenance in hospital is about £8 per week—I believe that it is actually £7 19s. 8d.—that represents a sum of £166,400. We are therefore safe in saying that it is a figure of something over £150,000, but of course it is the human aspect which concerns me and the public spirited people who run this organisation.
May I give three examples of the kind of patient who has now been rehabilitated and reinstituted into normal industry and normal life? I have supplied the Parliamentary Secretary with two lists—male and female patients—which I think she will agree show pretty astonishing results. Mr. X is now 60 years of age. It is 35 years since he last worked. He was in hospital for 33 years. He is now a garage hand enjoying private life. He has held this job for eight months and is doing extremely well. Miss Y is 57 years of age, and she has never previously been employed. She has been in hospital for 37 years. She is now fully employed in a canteen. Mr. Z

1611
worked for ten years, and was then in hospital for nine. He is now working at the docks. He had worked previously at the docks, and his workmates approached the Transport and General Workers' Union and asked it if they could have him back working with them. He is now with them again, doing a useful job for the community. Those are only three of the 42 great achievements.
I bring this to the notice of the House tonight for three reasons. Incidentally, I wish to apologise for my voice; I have been getting this trouble for a week. First, I hope that what I have said here tonight will fire the imagination of colleagues on both sides of the House, so that they will endeavour to encourage or promote similar schemes of industrial therapy within their constituencies. Secondly, I hope that my words will reach the ears of industrialists, social workers, trade unionists, the Church and civic authorities, and inspire them to do likewise. Thirdly, my faith in the British people is such that I believe that a human problem such as this has only to be stated to ensure a warm and sympathetic response in their hearts. There is grand work to be done, and a very great reward for its doing.
Nothing that I have said tonight implies a criticism of the interested Government Departments; indeed, entirely the reverse is the case. I am able to tell the House that the local officials of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance and the Ministry of Labour have given their assistance to the limits permitted by the regulations under which they administer such matters. The newly appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour recently visited this factory and opened what we call a sheltered workshop—a workshop for those people who may not be able to be completely rehabilitated in the way in which the patients to whom I have been referring have been. I am sure that the Minister was astonished at the progress and opportunities which he saw there.
I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary has received the further information that I sent her today, relating to one or two remaining snags- One of them would require a very lengthy recital, which the time limit imposed by
1612
the Adjournment debate prevents me from stating. I am sure that she will examine it with great care. I ask her to do two things. First, I hope that she will agree that when we return after the Recess she or her Minister will provide an opportunity for a talk about the matters to which I have referred in my communication and which I cannot mention tonight, with a view to seeing whether something can be done.
Secondly, I invite her, through her Department, to take all the steps that are open to her to publicise the possibilities of schemes of this character, through the Federation of British Industries or the various chambers of commerce and the trade unions, so that we may hope that this kind of scheme will be sponsored in all the great cities—the Leeds, Bradfords, Birminghams and Newcastles—with a view to bringing about a national rather than a local effort in matters of this kind and offering opportunities to those less fortunate people in our community for whom the House still recognises some responsibility.
10.20 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Miss Edith Pitt): I welcome the opportunity afforded me by the hon. Member for Bristol, South (Mr. Wilkins) by choosing this subject for an Adjournment debate to pay my tribute to the energy and enterprise which has been shown in this project at Bristol. It is a particularly good example of what I would call joint voluntary community effort. I think also that it is a good example of something about which we feel keenly in my Department, the acceptance by the community of the mentally ill as part of the community; the acceptance of a responsibility towards them.
The results of the first year's operation of the Industrial Therapy Organisation includes, according to the report I read, the successful placing in employment of thirty long-stay patients. The hon. Gentleman said that the figure was forty-two.
Mr. Wilkins: The figure in the report was up to March. My figures are up-to-date.
Miss Pitt: I am happy that the figure has increased and I think it extremely encouraging. It suggests that the scheme

1613
is making an important contribution to the problem of bridging the gap between hospital and life in the community.
The hon. Gentleman referred to some difficulties which have arisen and I know that to be the case. It is true that initially arrangements for patients to contribute to their maintenance in hospital and the rules governing National Insurance contributions and benefits and National Assistance gave rise to difficulties. In some cases patients were worse off working far I.T.O. I think it inevitable that schemes such as the National Insurance Scheme and the National Assistance Scheme should be administered according to regulations. The Departments concerned have made every effort within the limits of the regulations to meet the special circumstances of I.T.O. The Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance was able to accept I.T.O. patients as undergoing training which meant that they were exempt from the liability for National Insurance contributions. In so far as the Board arranged to meet the essential needs of patients' dependants when National Insurance benefit ceased, the local officer of the Board visits the training factory regularly and takes any new applications for assistance and discusses any difficulties. In addition my right hon. Friend uses his discretion to vary the maintenance charge payable by patients under Section 28 of the National Health Service (Amendment) Act, 1949.
Some problems however remain. I appreciate that I.T.O. would like patients to be progressively better off continuously until they are independent. As he said, the hon. Member handed to me a letter from the managing director of I.T.O. making suggestions as to how this might be achieved and I am asking my right hon. Friend the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance to examine these. I think it fair to say that the main difficulties have been resolved and the Departments concerned have shown clearly their anxiety to co-operate fully with I.T.O.
I would add, in no spirit of criticism, that I feel that some of the earlier difficulties might have been avoided had the organisers of I.T.O. approached the Departments concerned fairly well in advance of arranging the scheme. I put that on record now in the hope that when similar schemes may be launched the organisers will profit from that experience.
1614
I am glad of the opportunity to make clear that there are other areas where progress has been made in rehabilitation of long-stay patients and where there has been fruitful co-operation between the hospital, industry and the trade unions.
I need hardly say what value my Department attaches to this work of occupational therapy in the treatment of mental patients and that it has long been recognised. Mental hospitals have traditionally provided for patients a variety of occupations in farms and gardens, wards, kitchens and laundries and in hospital workshops. Some of these occupations, however, tended to encourage the institutionalisation of patients and emphasis was on the occupation rather than on the rehabilitation of patients who had to be accepted as chronic. In recent years the prospects for rehabilitation have been transformed by advances in treatment and changes in the régime and approach of mental hospitals.
As part of these changes, hospitals have in recent years provided a greatly increased range of occupations through which patients can progress to the point whore many even of the long-stay patients are able to return to the community. Industrial work carried out under contract with outside firms has been of great importance. This makes it possible far patients to carry out the kind of work they might expect to do outside hospital in conditions which resemble as far as possible those of outside employment. Patients can thus be trained to meat the stresses of competitive employment and to secure the work habits necessary to enable them to hold a jab.
There remain many long-stay patients who developed their illness before modern treatments were available and who cannot now be rehabilitated to the paint of discharge. There are many long-stay patients Who are elderly—around one-third are over 65—and there is no question of their being able to return to normal employment but for these patients also industrial work has a part to play in providing stimulating occupation and helping to redeem them from the vegetative existence which would, at one time, have been their lot.
My Ministry has done all it can to encourage this industrial rehabilitation

1615
work. The Standing Mental Health Advisory Committee reported in 1957 and we followed that up with a general memorandum on rehabilitation commending to the hospital authorities the advice of that Committee and of the Piercy Committee. Since then the Ministry, in its Annual Report, has drawn attention to the value of industrial work and has given examples of particular schemes whose experience was likely to be of value to other hospitals proposing to enter this field. We have shown what has been done so that others can profit by it and since 1958 there has been a great expansion of industrial units in hospitals for the mentally ill.
The hon. Member may like to know that we recently sent out a questionnaire from the Ministry and fifty-seven hospital management committees reported that they had one or more industrial units at mental hospitals within their groups. The reports received indicated that hundreds of different processes are now being carried out by the mental patients the main types of work being assembly, packaging and salvage work for a variety of industries. At Netherne Hospital, for example, eleven different kinds of work are undertaken which include electric blanket wire threading, varnishing children's toys, machining of coat hangers, contract typing, subassembly and soldering of radio and television parts, the latter entailing fourteen different jobs.
At Banstead Hospital, which has a long standing industrial unit establishment in association with the social psychiatry unit of the Medical Research Council, work includes packing clutch plates, folding and packing serviettes and filling and sewing up various types of dolls. There are many other examples. Hon. Members may see from the notes I have how long I could have
1616
gone on had time permitted. There have been other forms of rehabilitation and extension of the occupational work and diversity of occupational work within hospitals.
Important though industrial and occupational therapy is, it is not the only factor which is contributing to the improved prospects of rehabilitation for the long-stay mentally sick. In recent years a number of developments have interacted and combined so that it is impossible to say what has made the greatest contribution to the discharge rate. These developments include the advances in physical treatment and drug therapy, the removal of unnecessary restriction on patients, the increased range of recreation as well as occupation, improved physical surroundings, new methods of group therapy and rehabilitation and the development within the hospital of a community life in which patients are given great responsibility.
Following on from industrial therapy, and in a few cases as an alternative to it, hospitals arrange for suitable patients to go out to work with local firms while living in hospital and remaining under general psychiatric supervision. Services provided by the Ministry of Labour, in particular the work of resettlement officers, have made an important contribution to placing patients in employment. It is only by a planned programme of rehabilitation involving a combination of these developments that it has been possible gradually to bring chronic sick patients to a point where they can take their place in outside employment.
The Question having been proposed at Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.

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  ARAB LEAGUE INFORMATION CENTRE (MR. RIZK)
  EAST GERMANY
  EAST GERMANY
EMPLOYMENT
  Northern Region
  Northern Region
  Factories Act, 1937
  Factories Act, 1937
  Factory Workers (Dermatitis)
  Factory Workers (Dermatitis)
  Trade Union Elections
  Trade Union Elections
  Older Workers, London and Middlesex
  Older Workers, London and Middlesex
  Disabled Persons, London and Middlesex
  Disabled Persons, London and Middlesex
  Tilbury Dock (Industrial Disputes)
  Tilbury Dock (Industrial Disputes)
ROYAL NAVY
  Admiralty Departments (Transfer to Bath)
  Admiralty Departments (Transfer to Bath)
  Security Department (Director)
  Security Department (Director)
BRITISH ARMY
  Personal Case
  Personal Case
MINISTRY OF AVIATION
  Air Transport Licensing Board
  Air Transport Licensing Board
  Vickers Vigilant Anti-Tank Weapon
  Vickers Vigilant Anti-Tank Weapon
  Departmental Staff
  Departmental Staff
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  North-East
  North-East
  Local Employment Act, 1960
  Local Employment Act, 1960
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Wages and Salaries
  Wages and Salaries
HOSPITALS
  Nurses
  Nurses
HOUSING
  Rents
  Rents
EDUCATION
  Pwllheli Grammar School (Remodelling Scheme)
  Pwllheli Grammar School (Remodelling Scheme)
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Goya Picture (Duke of Wellington)
  Goya Picture (Duke of Wellington)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Bookmakers' Permits and Betting Office Licences
  Bookmakers' Permits and Betting Office Licences
PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  Sickness Benefit
  Sickness Benefit
SCOTLAND
  Chief Constables (Appointment)
  Chief Constables (Appointment)
  Classified Roads (Grants)
  Classified Roads (Grants)
  Road Programme
  Road Programme
UGANDA
  Slaughter of Animals (Bunyoro District)
  Slaughter of Animals (Bunyoro District)
TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION
  Voluntary Service Overseas
  Voluntary Service Overseas
MINISTRY OF WORKS
  House of Commons (Accommodation)
  House of Commons (Accommodation)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock. The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich

TRANSPORT TO LONDON AIRPORT
2.35 p.m.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will state the average time taken to-day, travelling by the various means of transport available from the centre of London to the actual time of boarding an aircraft at London Airport; and how long it takes the majority of passenger aircraft to travel from London Airport to the airports of Edinburgh, Belfast, Paris, Bonn, Antwerp and Rome.]
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, it takes about 50 minutes to travel from Piccadilly Circus to Heathrow by motor car and about 60 minutes by Tube and bus. The Airlines require passengers to check in at the Airport long enough before the scheduled time of departure to enable their baggage to be loaded and the various formalities completed. The time allowed for this varies between one airline and another and between one service and another. Typical times, however, are 45 minutes, in the case of a long-haul international flight, 30 minutes in the case of a short-haul international flight, and 20 minutes in the case of a domestic flight. Passengers travelling by airline coach, who have already checked in at the Town Terminal, generally reach the Airport 30 minutes before the scheduled time of departure.
The flight time varies according to the type of aircraft. Typical flight times from Heathrow are 1 hour, 30 minutes, to Edinburgh; 1 hour, 30 minutes, to Belfast; 1 hour to Paris; 2 hours 10 minutes to Bonn; 1 hour, 5 minutes, to
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Antwerp; and 2 hours, 20 minutes, to Rome.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lards, while thanking my noble friend for that information, it does strike one as being rather absurd that it takes longer to get from Piccadilly Circus to the Airport than it does to get to one of these places. Is it not upside down? Could not this matter be rearranged?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, the length of time it takes to get from Piccadilly Circus to the Airport is not longer than the time it takes from the Airport to Rome, because there are the various formalities at the Airport. But I shall be giving a fuller Answer to this point when I reply to my noble friend's second Question.

FORMALITIES AT LONDON AIRPORT
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government if they do not consider the time has arrived when a further detailed review should be made of the length of time it now takes a passenger from the centre of London to go through the many activities required to reach the actual aeroplane at the airport, and to see if it is not possible to enable this time to be materially reduced.]
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the importance of enabling passengers to travel easily and quickly between Central London and Heathrow. Substantial road improvements have already been made and further projects are in hand. When these are completed the journey from the West London Air Terminal at Cromwell Road should take no more than 18 to 25 minutes, and from the Victoria Terminal no more than 30 to 35 minutes.
At the Airport there are Customs and Immigration formalities. Of these the Immigration control takes, on average, a matter of seconds per passenger, and only a minority of flights is selected for Customs examination. In addition, of course, the airlines have to complete

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essential documentation, such as the load sheet which determines the trim of the aircraft, and this cannot be done until after the last passenger has checked in. Both Her Majesty's Government and the airlines are continually seeking ways of speeding, up the processes for which they are responsible.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, while again thanking my noble friend for that Answer, is it not time that we did away with a lot of unnecessary waste that we have to-day in these various places? Why cannot the entire system be reconsidered, to see if we cannot improve on the entire arrangement: taking the passengers right on to the tarmac and putting them directly into the plane, and doing away with the intermediate waste of time?
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, I think your Lordships will agree that the various Customs formalities and Immigration control formalities, which do not take a great deal of time, are necessary. The load sheets which have to be completed after the last passenger has arrived are very necessary, because it is important that the aircraft should be loaded correctly.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, while again thanking my noble friend for that comment, is it not a fact that trains do better than aircraft in this particular respect? You can go on to a train almost right away, and get off the train, and through the Customs, in half the time you can do it from an aeroplane. Really, the matter does justify a thorough review of the entire situation.
LORD DENHAM: My Lords, those two things, with respect to my noble friend, are not comparable, because it is important that the aircraft should be loaded correctly, whereas it does not particularly matter whether my noble friend's suitcase is on one side of the train or the other in the luggage compartment. I can only repeat the last part of my original Answer: that both Her Majesty's Government and the airlines are continually seeking ways of speeding up the processes for which they are responsible.
LORD BOSSOM: My Lords, I thank my noble friend very much, but I assure him that my suitcase, when I have one, never weighs as much as he indicates by his comment.

BROADCASTING AND BLIND PERSONS
2.41 p.m.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government if they will call the attention of the Pilkington Committee on Broadcasting to the fact that there are in the United Kingdom 100,000 blind persons, and a larger number of persons who do not see very well, for whom television is inappropriate, and that it is desirable, when considering the balance between aural and visual broadcasts, to ensure that all aspects of entertainment and national affairs, including "sound pictures", shall continue to be available.]
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I take it that anyone would recognise the importance of the view expressed by my noble friend. I am equally sure that the Pilkington Committee will already have it in mind, and will give every consideration to its expression in your Lordships' House to-day. I do not think it is appropriate for Her Majesty's Government to prompt the Committee on such matters. I would suggest to the noble Lord that, as the Committee have generally invited views on broadcasting, he might like to consider putting his comments directly to the Committee.
LORD FRASER OF LONSDALE: My Lords, in view of the temptation to spend money, skill and time on television, to the exclusion of sound, is it not just that this House and Ministers should take a view about the requirements of those old and blind people, and others who cherish the sound programmes? And, so far as blind people are concerned, is my noble friend aware that to them the radio is their newspaper, their magazine, their theatre, their film and their friend? Will not the Government, in addition to my representations, lend their view, and that of this House?
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, arising out of that question, may I ask the noble Lord whether it is not a fact that the Pilkington Committee are an advisory

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committee, and that responsibility rests on Her Majesty's Government? Therefore, could the Minister undertake that the needs of these blind people for sound radio will be borne in mind by Her Majesty's Government?
LORD ST. OSWALD: Yes, my Lords. I think both supplementary questions were answered in my original reply. In reply to the question of the noble Lord opposite, I think it is for the Government to take matters of this kind into account when considering the Report, once presented. Both noble Lords can rest assured that the point they make will be borne in mind.

NAVAL SECURITY
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, may I ask the Question of which I have given Private Notice: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any further statement to make about the action being taken as a result of the Report of the Romer Committee?
THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (LORD CARRINGTON): My Lords, as I announced to the House in the course of the Navy Estimates debate, I have decided to set up a single Department of Security in the Admiralty. After considering a number of different candidates I have decided to appoint Colonel J. L. A. Macafee, Royal Marines, as the first Director of this new Department. Colonel Macafee has the necessary background and experience far this post. He has served as a Provost Marshal, as a Staff Officer, Intelligence, and, for the last seven months, as a Deputy Director of the Naval Intelligence Department directly concerned with security. He has also commanded two different Royal Marine Commandos.
Further, as a result of disciplinary proceedings following the Romer Report, I have now decided to terminate the appointment of the security officer who was criticised by the Committee. Disciplinary proceedings in the other two cases are still in progress.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the First Lord of the Admiralty for his Answer. I am quite sure that he has probably made a good choice in this experienced Colonel of the Royal
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Marines, but may I ask him whether he had under review, at the time of making the appointment, any civilian persons who were suitable for the post?
LORD CARRINGTON: Yes, my Lords. I did consider whether or not I should appoint anybody from outside, and I had a number of names which were suggested to me. But on balance I thought it would be better to have somebody from within the Admiralty itself, because it seemed to me that the best way of engendering a sense of security is from within rather than by imposing it from outside. Also, any newcomer would inevitably need time to get to know the Department, which is a large one, its out-stations and the Fleet, as well as the Admiralty's security procedures and rules. I was also anxious to maintain the momentum of the measures I instituted before the Romer Committee was appointed. At the same time, I have obtained somebody from outside who is knowledgeable about security to help Colonel Macafee.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord. May I ask him whether I am right in assuming that the two remaining further inquiries on a disciplinary basis are the executive officer of the post and the civil servant?
LORD CARRINGTON: No, my Lords—the civil servant and the Captain of the establishment at the time.
LORD OGMORE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is making arrangements to have proper contact with other security services in the Government, because as I understand it that was one of the breakdowns in the old arrangement.
LORD CARRINGTON: My Lords. I am doing that, though I would not entirely agree with the noble Lord that that was the trouble before. But certainly I am arranging that.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I should like to inform your Lordships that dinners will be available this evening, and I should be grateful if your Lordships would warn in as early as possible.

BRITAIN AND THE COMMON MARKET
2.48 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF HOME)THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF HOME) rose to move to resolve, That this House supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association; and further accepts the undertaking of Her Majesty's Government that no agreement affecting these special interests or involving British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been approved by this House after full consultation with other Commonwealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally agree. The tickle Earl said: My Lords, my noble friend the Leader of the House, who will speak in this debate to-morrow, has asked me to open it to-day, and to speak to the Motion on the Paper.
The first thing I should like to say about this Resolution which I move is that the House is not asked to-day to decide whether or not the United Kingdom should enter the Common Market. If that question has to be answered, it will be answered at some future date. To-day's Motion is concerned solely with the possibility of negotiating, with the European Economic Community, with the object of deciding whether terms of entry can be arranged which would justify Britain's membership. Your Lordships will have seen that our partners in the E.F.T.A. association have come firmly to the conclusion that the United Kingdom should negotiate, although they have reserved the final decision as to Whether an entry into the Common Market can be made until the negotiations are concluded.
But there is another piece of evidence which I myself should like to see—and I have no doubt your Lordships would like to see—before a final decision is taken on whether or not this country can enter the Common Market; that is, the exact effect that United Kingdom membership would have upon the economic fortunes of the Common-
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wealth. Several Cabinet Ministers have lately been round the Commonwealth, and have discussed with the Commonwealth Governments the possibilities of the United Kingdom's entry into the Common Market. I am sure that that was right. I am sure that it was a good thing to carry Commonwealth consultation to the point of Ministers going and consulting the Prime Ministers and other Ministers in their own Cabinets and in their own Councils. That is the way Commonwealth consultations should work.
As I think has been recognised, and as was said by my noble friend the Lord President, in answer to an inquiry from the noble Leader of the Opposition the other day, all the Commonwealth Governments recognised that the question of whether or not we should enter into negotiations with the European Economic Community was one which Britain must judge in her own interests and one which Britain had a right to decide. United Kingdom Ministers, in return, were able to give the Commonwealth Governments the assurance that not only would there be the closest consultation during the negotiations which are to take place but, before a decision was taken to enter into the Common Market, a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers—or, indeed, any other kind of meeting which the Commonwealth might think to be desirable, and which was agreed between them—would be perfectly agreeable to the United Kingdom. I cannot say what type of Commonwealth meeting will best fit the circumstances, but that will obviously be for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to decide at a rather later time.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, may I ask a question on that, as I am not quite clear? I have been looking at Command Paper No. 1447, which gave particulars of the communiqués issued at the time, and particularly after the visits, and I cannot see any assurance mentioned there as regards holding a Prime Ministers' Conference.
THE EARL OF HOME: I think that for the time it will be left open, because it will obviously be for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to decide, rather nearer the time, what form of consultation they wish. There are, of course, other forms

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than a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and it will be for them to decide. The Prime Minister has already said in another place, I think, that what they decide will be agreeable to us.
Although the discussions with the Commonwealth Governments were confidential, nevertheless it is clear to everybody that the Governments showed the liveliest interest, and in some cases, anxieties, about the economic consequences of Britain's entry into the Common Market. Some were concerned with temperate foodstuffs; others were concerned with tropical products, some others with textiles, some others with manufactured goods; and, of course, the effect of the possible United Kingdom entry into the Common Market leads to some very complicated calculations. It is partly a matter of calculating tonnages of butter, meat, wheat and other products. But it is not only that; it is a matter of trying to assess, for instance, that if there were to be a temporary loss it might be more than compensated for by a longer-term gain. It is a matter of forecasting the demand for Commonwealth raw materials and food, first of all under conditions which would prevail if things remain as they are, and secondly under conditions of expansion which might result if there were successful negotiations with the European Economic Community covering those Commonwealth products. Then again, apart from the economic anxieties, the Commonwealth Governments wanted a rather clearer picture of the political implications of the United Kingdom membership of the Common Market; and to that aspect I will turn in more detail in a moment.
Having considered the reports of the Cabinet Ministers who visited Commonwealth Governments—and we considered them with care and understanding, and with a jealous regard of our special responsibilities towards the Commonwealth countries—we decided that the answers to the questions which the Commonwealth Governments had asked could be found only through negotiation. Therefore, the Government decided to use the machinery specially provided in the Treaty of Rome for the purpose of enabling another country to establish relations with the European Economic Community. I think we have selected the proper way to negotiate membership,
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and the House will see from the terms of the Motion on the Paper that before a final commitment is made Parliament will have the opportunity to decide. That, too, I think is right.
My Lords, in this country, and no doubt in the House, there are many persons who have legitimate apprehensions. The noble Lord, Lord Strang, for instance, asked in debate the other day whether the derogations from sovereignty involved in the Treaty of Rome were different in kind from those involved in any other contract into which we have entered before. There are others who are concerned about the effects of our entry into the Common Market upon British agriculture. No doubt the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hills-borough will have something to say about that.
There are others who perhaps have less tangible objections but feel by instinct that, whereas in the past we have done very well with the world as our market, very well under the Ottawa arrangements which gave us preference in Commonwealth markets, and very well in retaining the absolute right to legislate for ourselves across the economic board, entry into the Common Market may prejudice that: that it may be an adventure of which we cannot see the end and, therefore, dangerous. All of us who have our roots in our island history share those anxieties and instincts in some degree, but with the reservation of which I spoke before—on the nature of the terms that we can obtain for the Commonwealth—I want to give to your Lordships some of the reasons which lead me to incline towards membership of the European Economic Community, and certainly towards the process of negotiation, which I personally, think it is absolutely right.
I base my reason for inclining towards membership of the European Economic Community on certain assumptions. The first is that Britain wishes to retain her political influence on the world stage; the second that Britain means to retain her position as a leading partner in the Commonwealth and the largest generator of capital for development in that association; and the third that we wish to enjoy in this country rising living standards. My Lords, I believe—and I have said so many times in this House—that the basis of the political influence

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of the United Kingdom in the world depends fundamentally on our economic strength; we cannot fulfil our rôle in our world-wide alliances, we cannot be a reliable partner, and certainly not a leading partner, in the Commonwealth, unless we are rich; and that means richer than we are now. The experts have calculated that if we are to fulfil our commitments the world over, and to fulfil this rôle which I have described as a leading partner in the Commonwealth then we must earn roughly £500 million overseas more than we are doing now.
I want to ask now how we are to earn that and where, and to face facts even if they are rather inconvenient at times. We are now in the middle of an economic crisis. I see it is mentioned in the Amendment which the noble Viscount is to move. I am not going to comment on the Amendment very much, because my noble friend the Leader of the House will do that tomorrow after he has heard the noble Viscount move it. But at one point it says
"… regrets that Her Majesty's Government will be conducting these negotiations from a position of grave economic weakness;"
Well, my Lords, there is an economic crisis now, but I must remind the noble Viscount that this is one of a series of regular economic crises which have been recurrent since the last war, and each of them, whatever Government has been in power, has revealed the same essential weakness in our economy, and that is in the balance of payments. We are not earning sufficient foreign currency to sustain our commitments overseas. I think the reasons are these: that we are losing and have been losing for a considerable time our share in the increasing world trade; and within the Commonwealth, even where we have enjoyed a system of preferences, the proportion of our trade has been falling.
For the first symptom we have tried various remedies. We have tried exhortation by austerity; that was the remedy of Sir Stafford Cripps. We have tried exhortation by kindness and inducement; that was the remedy of my noble friend Lord Amory. As the noble Viscount the Leader of the House indicated in his speech in the economic debate only a few days ago, it may be that we could very quickly solve our imme-
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diate economic plight if we agreed that wage increases should be matched in every case by increased productivity and improved management. I think he was right and I hope that very wise advice will be taken; it has been given not only by him but by many other people. I myself, looking at the facts over the years, have felt bound to conclude that we shall hold our own in world markets only if to a degree we expose ourselves to the astringent of competition. There are other ways of doing that than entering the Common Market and none of them painless; but the Common Market at least has this advantage: that while it will expose our industries to competition, at the same time it will open up to them wide and new opportunities for investment and enterprise and expansions over that range of products which we are well equipped to supply. In part, then, I have tried to answer how we might earn some of this extra wealth, this extra £500 million which we have to find.
Now, where? I am not going to say more about that except this: that I do not believe that the United Kingdom can allow itself to be excluded from any important expanding market in the world. We cannot afford it; nor can our friends afford that we should do so. It is important, too, I think, that we should examine the question so often raised in this House by my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye, and others, as to whether we could earn a very high proportion of this additional £500 million which we have to find within the Commonwealth. In theory we could do so, if the Commonwealth were to turn itself into a free trade area. But here again we have to face same facts, and one of the facts is this: that the United Kingdom's exports to the Commonwealth have fallen from 47 per cent. to 42 per cent. in ten years. In spite of the Montreal Conference, where we passed all sorts of resolutions to maximise Commonwealth trade, that tendency to fall has nevertheless continued and been intensified.
I was one of the strongest protagonists of the Ottawa Agreements. I believe the whole Commonwealth owes an immense debt to my noble friend Lord Swinton and his colleagues at the time who devised this system, because they provided an economic base on which the political

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cohesion of the modern Commonwealth was very largely sustained. But that was 30
years ago. An entirely different and perhaps unforeseen set of circumstances have intervened and a different situation exists to-day. Almost all the Commonwealth countries—and this I think is true from the oldest to the youngest—now want to become industrial nations in their own right. We have passed from the days when the Commonwealth countries sent us all their raw materials and we exported to them all our manufactures. They now want to exchange their own manufactured goods and build up their own industries and to protect them while they are doing so.
Other noble Lords like myself have been to these Commonwealth countries—for instance, to Australia—full of young, vigorous, manufacturing industries. Australia wants to trade with other countries, including Japan. In Canada at the time of the Montreal Conference we offered the Canadians to make a free trade area with them, but they could not accept it because they wanted again to build up their own industries. I have no complaint about this. I think now, looking back, that although this tendency may not have been fully foreseen at the time of the Ottawa Conference the process was really inevitable. But we must face what has happened as a result of it, namely, that while the United Kingdom has retained full free entry for Commonwealth goods, our system of preferences has been very gradually but certainly eroded. It is no matter of complaint; I think it is an inevitable tendency in the evolving modern Commonwealth in the twentieth century world.
Then, again, there are, of course, great possibilities in the developing markets in the great new Commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa—very large potential markets; but most of them have immense internal problems of their own concerning the growth of their populations, and, looking at the medium and short term ahead, it is very difficult to see how they can greatly increase their earnings of foreign exchange. Indeed it is necessary to-day to lend them the money before they can buy. I have no doubt we shall continue to do an enormous volume of Commonwealth trade. We can do more, but we can only do more—and this, I think,
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is a point we must realise—if our national income here continues to rise and expand, and that will happen only if we manage to arrest and avert this decline of our share in the increased trade in the world.
From the point of view of the Commonwealth countries who are exporters of temperate foodstuffs, I think there is one other aspect which must be given consideration. All Parties in this country are broadly agreed that the agricultural production in our own country here at home cannot be allowed to fall below its present level. Indeed, as the efficiency of our farmers increases the home producer will have a greater share of our market. But, with the best will in the world, there is a limit to what our people can eat in home-grown and imported foods. There is one other observation I should like to make, particularly relating it to entry into the Common Market, and that is this: the Common Market countries have not as yet formulated their agricultural proposals, and if we are to enter it will be good sense to do so soon, when we have a chance of shaping and forming their agricultural policy.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I thought that they had been formulated but had not been actually approved because of Dr. Adenauer's opposition. Is that not so?
THE EARL OF HOME: No; they have not yet been formulated. They are in process of formulating them. All I am saying is that if we were to decide to enter there are strong arguments for doing so now, when we have still a chance of influencing their shape and direction.
When I add up these considerations—namely, the need for Britain to increase her earnings so that she can maintain her purchases of Commonwealth food, and the need for Britain to increase her standard of living; when I look at the paramount need of the Commonwealth for capital for development, and realise that we are one of the great sources which must continue to provide that capital; and when again I look at the physical limitation on the amount of imported foodstuffs which this country may be able to take over the next few years, that leads me to repeat what I said the

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other day in America when I was talking on this subject: that in my opinion it is quite likely that Britain can serve the Commonwealth better inside the European Community than she can outside it.
My Lords, I should like now to turn to the political implications of membership, remembering that I am placed almost exactly halfway between the pundit of Common Market doctrine, Lord Gladwyn, and the master of International Law and jurisprudence who sits on the Woolsack, and who will help me out if I go too far wrong. I should like to advance one general observation about sovereignty which perhaps I can do without too much dissent. It is that each surrender of sovereignty should be judged by whether or not there is a compensating gain. In fact, we are surrendering sovereignty in some degree all the time. The most obvious example is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; another example is the G.A.T.T. There are many examples that I could give. But when we are considering this question of sovereignty it is really a matter of balance of advantage.
We should not make sovereignty into a shibboleth. It is harmful to surrender it if the results damage the nation, but it is not harmful if, on balance, the results are beneficial to it. It occurs to me that the bachelor surrenders some of his sovereignty on marriage; but, by and large marriage benefits the human race. I ought not to push this analogy too far, because the noble Viscount will be saying that one ought not to marry two wives at once, and at least I am flirting with two. At any rate, I believe that it would meet with general acceptance if I said that when considering the surrender of sovereignty it is a matter of balance of advantage.
Let me admit at once that the Treaty of Rome would involve considerable derogation of sovereignty. Let me say also that the field in which there could be surrender of sovereignty is clearly defined and restricted to economic matters. When the Common Market is established it will, it is true, be the Commission and the Council who, for instance, will raise or lower the common tariff; it will be the Commission and the Council who will decide on trade agreements with third parties. I can-
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not, at this stage, when the Common Market is in a formative stage, look forward to the future and say whether any individual operation will be to the advantage or disadvantage of this country. But at this moment, I think I must say to Lord Strang that he is right in saying that, within this restricted field, derogations of sovereignty will be different in kind from any contract into which we have entered before. It is well that people should realise that, although I cannot forecast whether these derogations would be substantial or whether in any particular case the derogation of sovereignty would act against us or for us.
When I spoke to the House a week or so ago on this question of sovereignty, and the possible impact of derogations of sovereignty, I was talking largely of national political institutions; and I said I did not think that, in practice, countries would allow a derogation of sovereignty which impinged in a serious degree on their treasured national institutions. That is still my opinion. It was not based merely on the fact that no member country of the Common Market has yet shed any sovereignty at all, nor even on the hunch that they would not do so. It was based upon this solid fact: that the Treaty as it is written does not bring in the question of political sovereignty at all, and any extension beyond the terms of the present Treaty as it is written down needs the unanimous consent of the Council.
I would refer noble Lords to Articles 235 and 236. But in order to leave no doubts in your Lordships' minds I will read Article 235:
"If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions."
Article 236 underlines these points, saying that changes and additions outside the existing Treaty can be passed only if there is a unanimous vote in the Council. But my feeling was also based on the wider principle of International Law—that you cannot be bound to do more than you agreed by your signature to do. So, my Lords, I think it is clear that

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I must agree with Lord Strang that in the economic field, in this restricted field covered by the Treaty, derogations of sovereignty would be different in kind. Extensions of the Treaty would have to be agreed by unanimous vote. And, of course, if we were inside we should have the opportunity to control that.
I certainly would not advocate entry into the Common Market if we were going to exchange our traditional outward-looking policies, our historic outward-looking policies for that of a bloc mentality. That is not our objective—quite the contrary. If the needs of our E.F.T.A. friends can be accommodated, then the European Economic Community would embrace much of free Europe. If the needs of the Commonwealth can be met, that will open a very wide window looking out from Europe on to the world. I do not know whether your Lordships saw the result of yesterday's W.E.U. meeting when, in welcoming the United Kingdom's decision to open negotiations, I think practically all the delegates said how much they welcomed the opportunity of bringing the Commonwealth closer to Europe.
Nor do I think that our imagination should boggle, nor our vision stop, at the reconciliation of Europe and the Commonwealth. There is the Atlantic Community still beckoning to us to an even greater inter-dependence later on if we have the wisdom to take that course. Then again, I want to see Britain keep abreast of the trends of the future. Britain and America, on whose cooperation much of the peace of the world depends, have held for many generations a special position of trust and confidence in each other. But it would be an error to take that relationship for granted. Each of us, here and there, has to work to maintain it. And Europe is now on its feet again, thriving, confident and powerful. The centre of power and the weight of investment could well shift from this island of Britain to the Continent of Europe; and over 200 million people, my Lords, acting in concert, can exercise a greater political power and offer greater opportunities for investment than 50 million people. I suggest that as we look at this picture there is a strong interest for the United Kingdom to be inside this new power complex rather than excluded or on the
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periphery. When the United States and Europe are more nearly equal in their achievements, and more nearly shouldering equal burdens, then it will be more practical to join forces and men will be able to achieve a great new impetus to freedom.
My Lords, there is another trend which I have in mind, about which I may be wrong, because I am not an industrialist or economist, but I think it is becoming apparent. The great need of the world is for capital for investment. How is it to be generated most quickly? My Lords, it seems to me that there is a greater trend now towards trade among nations at equal stages of industrial development, and that has many advantages for us. It leads me to the conclusion that, if I am not wrong, if certain trends in trade are at present operating against us—and I think I have shown they are—we should exploit with double vigour those that are working in our favour; and I think the Common Market in Europe offers us and our industries these great opportunities.
My Lords, I understand the qualms and the anxieties. Perhaps the one that haunts us most is that somehow, in some way, Britain as part of Europe means that the Commonwealth partnership might lose its inspiration and that a great association of peoples which we have led and inspired would lose some material and moral values, which would be the loss of the whole world. I see that, my Lords. I feel that possibility; but I do not believe that it would happen. I believe that we certainly have in this country the political maturity, and I do not think it is arrogant to say the political genius, which not only would allow us to draw strength from the Commonwealth association and from Europe to ourselves but would contribute to each, to Europe and to the Commonwealth, from the reservoir of our experience after centuries of successful practice in international living.
Therefore again I come to the conclusion that there is a lot to be said for Britain's trying to come into Europe, to help Europe politically to gain cohesion and, at the same time, to continue our leadership of the Commonwealth. My Lords, although I cannot say whether Britain will enter the Common Market; nor can I say, until I have the evidence

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of what effect there will be on the Commonwealth from our negotiations, whether indeed we should enter the Common Market; yet time and again there come back into my mind the prizes which might result from doing so: the unity of free peoples which must be found, and must be found in Europe, if the challenge of Communism is to be met; and then, again, the picture of the three organised social and political systems of free men—the Commonwealth, Europe and the United States of America. Interdependence between those three would be a great prize for humanity. Those three together could set an example in vigorous living and unity of purpose which could inspire all men. They could, my Lords, set an example which other men and countries will aspire to follow, because our free way of life and our achievements, both material and moral, would be seen to be so closely akin to the hopes of all mankind.
Moved, to resolve, That this House supports the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association; and further accepts the undertaking of Her Majesty's Government that no agreement affecting these special interests or involving British sovereignty will be entered into until it has been approved by this House after full consultation with other Commonwealth countries, by whatever procedure they may generally agree.—(The Earl of Home.)
3.26 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH rose to move as an Amendment to the above Resolution, to leave out all the words after "House", and insert:
"notes the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association; regrets that Her Majesty's Government will be conducting these negotiations from a position of grave economic weakness; and declares that Britain should enter the European Economic Community only if
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this House gives its approval and if the conditions negotiated are generally acceptable to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and accord with our obligations and pledges to other members of the European Free Trade Association."
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I rise to move the Amendment to the Motion just moved, which stands in my name on the Order Paper. May I say at once that I am quite sure the whole of the House has enjoyed the manner in which the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary has presented his case in support of the main Resolution? He has a knowledge of the Commonwealth and he has a growing knowledge of international affairs which enables him to speak with authority and with an insight which perhaps is not at the disposal of all of us. If at times I may seem to disagree, if not so much specially with him as with the policy of his Government leading up to the present situation, then it is in no sense in lack of appreciation of the manner in which he has presented the case.
The Amendment that we have put down is borne in upon us, not, as you will observe, because the Party which I am honoured to represent feels that it is right to oppose in substance a request that the Government should be allowed to negotiate on the question of entering the Common Market. In any case, that is a position which on the basis of negotiation would in the long run have to be negotiated by a Government and no doubt pursued, if they wish to pursue it, with the authority of Parliament to its natural end. But we are not happy at all as to the manner in which this particular issue at this particular time has had to be raised, seeing that we have had on many previous occasions in Parliament discussions about this matter and in respect of which very specific pledges have been given, either that there was no intention to enter the Common Market in those existing circumstances, or else that in the event of that entry being made, then it could only possibly be made with conditions having been secured which would not be to the detriment of the other members of the Commonwealth.
I think it is rather necessary that we should refresh our memory upon one or two of the major occasions to which I am referring. I am thinking particularly of the debate which was opened in another place by the present Prime

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Minister when he was the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on November 26, 1956. It was a speech which was very broad in the area of debate which it covered in dealing with the general question of European trade. But it was also a speech which dealt very specifically in certain passages with the question as to how entry into the Common Market, which was only just then beginning to think of functioning, would affect the Commonwealth. I think that the House will therefore bear with me while I turn to the actual passages in the Prime Minister's speech on that occasion, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, and see what I have in mind.
He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 561, col. 37]:
"Nevertheless, whatever we may feel about this problem, I believe that we all agree that it is quite impracticable for the United Kingdom to join such a Customs union."
The Customs union is what the Common Market was at that preliminary stage. Further down in the same column he said:
"If the United Kingdom were to join such a Customs union the United Kingdom tariff would be swept aside and would be replaced by this single common tariff. That would mean that goods coming into the United Kingdom from the Commonwealth, including the Colonies, would have to pay duty at the same rate as goods coming from any other third country not a member of the Customs union, while goods from the Customs union would enter free."
I turn to the next passage that I want to quote from the same speech:
"We could not expect the countries of the Commonwealth to continue to give preferential treatment to our exports to them if we had to charge them full duty on their exports to us. Apart from that, our interests and responsibilities are much wider. I do not believe that this House would ever agree to our entering arrangements which, as a matter of principle, would prevent our treating the great range of imports from the Commonwealth at least as favourably as those from the European countries".
I stress that quotation, because if the Government are going into negotiation with the Common Market on the basis that commodities will come free from them into this country, I take particular note of that passage from the Prime Minister's speech in 1956. There are many people—I think the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, included—who have urged that we should be forced to join the Market under any conditions and that
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we had better go in and join on the basis of the Rome Treaty. Then, I just quote one last passage from the Prime Minister on that occasion [col. 38]:
"So this objection, even if there were no other, would be quite fatal to any proposal that the United Kingdom should seek to take part in a European common market by joining a Customs union. I think that we are all agreed there".
And he wound up that paragraph of his speech by saying:
"So that is out".
That is less than five years ago, and it makes us wonder exactly what all the events can have been which have led to such a change of mind on the part of the Government since then as shown by the manner in which they have been dealing with the Commonwealth issue in the present stage. The House will remember that from time to time in the last few months my noble friends and myself have drawn attention to the fact that we thought there ought to be more consultation with the Commonwealth. We have drawn attention to the fact that it was our view that, before the Government had gone as far as they had at that time already gone, there ought to have been, probably, a meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth at which the matter could have been considered. But that, of course, does not appear to be the situation.
Now it seems to me, speaking personally, that the kind of declaration which was then made by our present Prime Minister, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, would have lulled the members of the Commonwealth into a certain amount of peaceful security; into the feeling that nothing really very serious was going to happen to them about this: and it is difficult to see what active steps the Government have taken from time to time to disabuse them of any kind of complacency on that score. However, when I come to the matter which was (providentially, I think) raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, last week, it indicates the kind of attitude which is abroad. I have secured the quotation from The Times to which Lord Elibank referred and which is with regard to the view of Mr. Menzies. It is from Perth, Western Australia, July 27—and this is, I think, a pretty pointed comment on some of the hopeful

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remarks made by the noble Earl who has just spoken:
"Negotiations with Britain as 'a separate, independent, uninhibited power' would be impossible if she joins the Common Market, Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, said here last night. A decision on Common Market membership would be 'the most remarkable and crucial event in Commonwealth and Britain's history—outside of war—this century', he added. The free entry into Britain of German iron and steel manufactures, he said, presented the Problem of whether Germany—with a brand new industry—could compete on better than even terms with British industry. 'This is a tremendous decision on the economic side', he said. 'If they are right in going in it may have tremendous advantages. If they are wrong it may turn out to be fatal".
I think that shows the kind of intensity of study and feeling and anxiety on the part of the leaders of the Commonwealth abroad. I think I can say—I am perhaps being over-sentimental, but the noble Viscount the Leader of the House, probably quite rightly, in his own view, appealed to us on a patriotic basis in the economic debate—that surely we do not forget all the services that these people in the Commonwealth have rendered to us in the past great crises; not merely financial crises, but imminent, dangerous crises in the past, when they have given us their men, their money, their loyalty and their strength. Never have they let us down. In fact, the connections between, say, such a comparatively small and yet such a fundamentally vigorous population as New Zealand, with all their loyalty to us, are such as to lead them to say, when they come to negotiate with our Ministers, "Will you please remember that we have organised very nearly the whole of our market on the basis of our supplies to the United Kingdom?" And that is the fact.
If you take the point which was made (I am speaking from memory) by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer when he was Foreign Secretary, just before he took over the Chancellorship—I think it was about July 25, 1960—when dealing with the same problem as we are talking about to-day, in another debate upon trade in Europe, he pointed out that 84 per cent. of the trade of this country at that time last year was being done with markets outside the Six of the Common Market, and that the basis of our development in the Commonwealth had probably had a great deal to do with
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that balance, that proportioning, of the trade of this country with the rest of the world.
Though, as the Foreign Secretary has quite rightly said, we are certainly taking no decision to-day as to whether we finally enter the Common Market, nevertheless, when we go in we want, if possible, to lay down, as is laid down in the final Resolution of the House, if your Lordships will accept it, the fact that we note you are going to negotiate but that certain conditions will be laid down under which we shall be receiving the report of the Government when they come back to tell us the result of their negotiations.
I do not want to seem to be unduly suspicious, but I must say that when I came to look in the Report of the proceedings in the other place at the statement of the Prime Minister, which the noble Viscount gave us separately in this House on Monday last, my mind went back again to one which struck me as I was listening here. In that statement the Prime Minister said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 645, col. 929]:
"No British Government could join the European Economic Community without prior negotiation with a view to meeting the needs of the Commonwealth countries, of our European Free Trade Association partners, and of British agriculture consistently with the broad principles and purpose which have inspired the concept of European unity and which are embodied in the Rome Treaty."
In so far as anything like the nature of a promise or pledge was made in the rest of the discussions which arose from that statement in another place, there was none in the statement itself. It seemed to me as if the Prime Minister in this statement was making the best of both worlds: trying to placate, on the one hand, views in the Commonwealth; and, at the same time, giving no adequate pledge which was anything like in line with the kind of pledge which was given by the Prime Minister in his speech in the other place in 1956.
My Lords, I, too, have been making a study of the communiqués—I do not suppose all your Lordships have yet had time to read them; they have not been out many days—issued in Command Paper 1449. Let me say, first of all, that I felt in my heart earlier this year that the very hurried nature of the decision suddenly to send out Ministers to explain the case to our Dominions

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was very much behindhand, and actually did not fructify at all as an action until there had been very severe complaint from the Dominions themselves. Yet now we read, in the revelations made to us in the last two or three weeks, that in fact the Government have had unofficial consultations going on with the members of the Common Market for about nine months. How is it, then, that we had to be left to these individual rushes of Ministers, whose missions were to be accomplished within two or three weeks, and then the Government try by all means possible to get this Motion through the House before the vacation? Why all the rush like that? How is that, when only a few months ago, after a meeting of Dominion Premiers in London, the matter had not been discussed at all? That seems to be rather extraordinary.
It is in the light of that that I must ask your Lordships to forgive me if I am somewhat suspicious about the guarantees which have been given so far. That is one of the main reasons why I want these references in the Amendment which I am moving and which I think will appeal to different people of quite different Parties, as well as to those of my own. I have looked at these communiqués which have been issued. With regard to the one concerning Canada, Mr. Diefenbaker had, of course, tried two or three times to get a meeting of Ministers. He has not got it yet. There is one paragraph which is particularly interesting, and it is as follows:
"The Canadian Ministers indicated that their Government's assessment of the situation was different from that put forward by Mr. Sandys. They expressed the grave concern of the Canadian Government about the implications of possible negotiations between Britain and the European Economic Community, and about the political and economic effects which British membership in the European Economic Community would have on Canada and on the Commonwealth as a whole.
"Mr. Sandys said that before the British Government reached any decision, they would carefully consider the views of the Canadian Government together with those of other Commonwealth Governments".
Now I turn to the statement issued from Canberra, Australia. I do not need to quote at length from this one, because I have already quoted Mr. Menzies himself from the London Times:
"Australian Ministers pointed out that they thought the ultimate political implications of the Treaty of Rome are extremely significant
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and will tend to possess a developing character in the achievement of some kind of European unity … However, they emphasised that, although avoidance of a divided Western Europe was a desirable objective, it should not be accomplished at the cost of division within the Commonwealth or elsewhere in the free world. Australian Ministers expressed their concern at the weakening effect they believed this development would have on the Commonwealth relationship".
And there is an additional paragraph which says:
"… but Australian Ministers explained the serious adverse consequences for Australian producers and for the Australian balance of payments which would confront Australia if the United Kingdom were to enter the Common Market on a basis which failed to safeguard Australian interests for the future".
It goes on:
"They further stressed that as in any such negotiations various Australian export industries would be materially involved, Australia should be in a position to negotiate direct on Australia's behalf when details and arrangements affecting items of Australian trade were being discussed".
I know that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary was very pressed for time, but he did not say anything on that point. Is it the intention of the Government during the negotiations, whenever asked by a Prime Minister or a Government of a Dominion, to be associated with a discussion upon his own particular country? Is he to be represented?
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I do not know the exact arrangements which will be made, of course, but I did say that we had told the Commonwealth countries that at all stages of the negotiations the Commonwealth would be kept in full consultation. Perhaps I might add here, about the time of which the noble Viscount was talking before—my noble friend the Lord President will be able to check up on this—that for the last three years, ever since the Free Trade Area proposals were negotiated, I remember discussing these matters continuously with the Commonwealth High Commissioners here. We used to meet for the purpose, and, indeed, every member of every meeting of the Finance Ministers, which now takes place twice a year, discussed this matter, which has always been on the Agenda and has always been discussed in great detail. So there has been a lot of consultation.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I am much

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obliged, and I shall wait to see exactly how they are treated in these negotiations. But obviously they are very important countries. Canada has her fast-growing population; Australia will be above ten million population now, I suppose, and has a growing manufacturing industry, as well as primary. Surely they should have something to say about it. However, I turn to the communiqué on New Zealand. I have already mentioned the point about the market. What interests me very much is that in this communiqué is the first pledge I saw given by a member of the Government, and it is very specific. Mr. Duncan Sandys
"made it clear that in the course of any such negotiations the British Government would seek to secure special arrangements to protect the vital interests of New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries and that Britain would not feel able to join the E.E.C. unless such arrangements were secured."
There is nothing of that kind in either of the other two communiqués which I have mentioned. I do not know what that means as between the different communiqués. If you take the communiqué in respect to India, the Indian representatives pointed out
"that the principal exports of India as well as of many other developing countries were subjected to high tariffs, internal taxes and quantitative restrictions of a discriminatory character in some of the countries of the E.E.C., while these products were being admitted duty-free and without restrictions to the United Kingdom."
On that they base their case. So far as I can see, no pledge was given in this case by Mr. Thorneycroft, nor was any real pledge given in the case of Pakistan.
The communiqué about Ceylon is almost non-communicative of anything and the communiqués on Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria and Cyprus are without value at all. Our information on these matters has all the way through been strictly limited. If we look at the communiqué with regard to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we see that there is obviously strong feeling there. It says that the Federation's economy is largely dependent on the British market and stresses the grave consequences if Britain were to join the European Common Market without taking steps to protect the Federation's vital interests. Mr. Hare made it clear that the results of any negotiation would be
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thoroughly discussed with the Governments before any final decision was taken—but gave no pledge. The communiqué on Singapore says very little.
On the West Indies, where we were represented by a Member of this House, the noble Earl. Lord Perth, we have much more information. The noble Earl
"explained that Britain would not expect to be able to join the Common Market of the European Economic Community without some changes in the present arrangements for Commonwealth goods in the United Kingdom".
This is one of the most honest parts of the communiqués that I have come across and I pay full respect to the noble Earl in this connection. The communiqué continues:
"In this connection he made it clear that in the course of any negotiations the British Government would seek to secure special arrangements to protect these vital interests, and that Britain would not feel able to join the European Economic Community unless such arrangements were secured."
So the Member of this House representing us abroad gave a pledge on behalf of the Government. But all the way through, we have been left in this situation of having no information until the Government finally decided to announce, on July 31, that they were going to make application to go into the Common Market.
To-day, for the first time, we are able to get at the Printed Paper Office official information, but there is enough of it to give any Member of the House who is conscientious about studying the conditions steady reading for three whole days. How can noble Lords be expected to be up to date for this debate under these conditions? We pleaded for a White Paper, for more information. I am grateful to the noble Viscount the Leader of the House. I feel in my bones that somehow it must be through his interposition that these documents have arrived and I assure him that they will receive most careful study. But they cannot be effective in this debate. Therefore, we feel that we have a right to be suspicious about the Government's intentions as to how far they are going ahead with this matter with what I would call completely adequate safeguards for the Commonwealth. That is why we have put down this Amendment.

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Before I sit down, I must refer briefly to two other things. The first is the position of our agriculture. The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary said that no doubt I should say a word or two about it. I have not much time to deal with this, though certainly I could occupy the length of a full speech on the question. Although we have often praised our farmers, I do not think that we have ever paid a full tribute to what they have done. I do not believe that half the people in this country realise that we are now producing more than 60 per cent. of our total food requirements, excluding, of course, drink and tobacco, and that in the balance of trade this is a very vital factor. And it is not realised that of many of the foods grown in temperate climates we grow much more than our total user. I give the noble Earl the point that if we enter into the agricultural market of the Six, these countries may provide a useful outlet when our own agriculture produces a surplus. But will that be allowed?
The noble Earl said just now that no agricultural scheme has yet been formulated for the Common Market. I have an idea that there is something said about this, but I cannot put my hand on it for the moment. I will look it up and let the noble Earl know. My impression is that nearly twelve months ago a general scheme for agriculture was laid out in a communiqué issued by the Common Market for consideration and that there have been discussions and attempts to get discussions with Dr. Adenauer, in spite of the improbability of getting a final decision before the coming election in West Germany. The rates of duty proposed for the agricultural industry in the draft which I have seen are interesting.
The figures of 25, 24 and 20 per cent. are given and if they are the kind of barriers which products from the Commonwealth have to get over, if they are going to be able to maintain themselves on their present standards of living, they are very considerable.
There seems to be a general impression that, if we do go into the European Community, then the present system of support to agriculture goes altogether. I would quote the comment of one of the officials of the Common Market, in which he shows that they could not pos-
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sibly have our agricultural system. Dr. Mansholt, the Vice-President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, said:
"Agriculture will have to be included in any agreement by Great Britain and the Economic Community.
"A common agricultural policy, he said, was one of the essential elements of the Community and this had to be respected."
And I noted the words with great care,
"It was clear, at the same time, that in any agreement providing for the association of Great Britain a different procedure would have to be followed for the agricultural sector from that applied to industrial goods. There was a great difference at present between the agricultural policy of the Six and that of Britain, and the British system would be very ill-fitted for use on the Continent—not because of any inherent weakness in it—but because something like 20 per cent. of the Community's active population was engaged in agriculture as compared with about 5 per cent, in Britain. 'If we were to subsidise our agriculture in the British way', said Dr. Mansholt, 'we should place an intolerable burden on the national budget'."
I have had a letter this morning from a gentleman whose name I do not think I can give but I should be very glad to show the letter to the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture. He has been commenting on the present position, and how backward some parts of the community of primary producers are, but on the other hand what surpluses are arising. The two surpluses which seem to strike them most at present are butter and, strange to say, beef. In those two commodities you will hit very hard if you are going to be in the position of having a high tariff against them, on the one hand, with New Zealand and/or Denmark, and on the other, Australia on beef. That is the position with regard to agriculture.
I must say I am not at all happy about the statements made so far by Her Majesty's Government with regard to agriculture. Somewhere among my papers I have a statement by the leader of the National Farmers' Union in which he says they could not possibly advise their members to go into the Common Market, according to their present information; and there it is. I hope we may be able to get something before the debate ends, perhaps from the noble and learned Viscount, the Leader of the House, to say what the Government's real intention is and how far they will go with regard to the proper maintenance

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of the standard of life. I had intended to say a great deal more but I have to remember that many other Members of your Lordships' House want to be able to speak in these two days; therefore I will leave out much of what I was to say.
Of course we want a better standard of life; of course we want at least to maintain the standard of life that we have. But, having heard the view and depression in replies to some of the questions put to the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister and the at times gloomy forecasts by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, I wonder how it was ever imagined that there could be put into Election propaganda that the standard of life here and now could be doubled in twenty-five years. Was there at that time confidence in what was being done? What were the arrangements for production and what the direct or improvised plans for industrialists for the maintenance of the economy? Now there is a rush of this kind to deal with this matter, which ultimately is a political issue of the most fundamental importance.
I would just quote one point from the aftermath of the statement of the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister in the other place the other day—a question by a very old friend of mine, at one time Deputy Chairman of the other place, Mr. Bowles. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 645 (No. 159), col. 936]:
"May I ask the Prime Minister to give an undertaking that he will not agree to anything that might prevent a future British Socialist Government from establishing Socialism here?"
The Prime Minister said:
"I think that that is the best question I have had so far"—
and made no further comment, reminding me of the old writer commenting on Pilate who wrote:
"'What is truth?' said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
That raises a question of fundamental importance when dealing with a political issue and especially in dealing with leaders of industrial trade unions, because it means that unless you protect us in the matter when you come to negotiate with the political side of the European Economic Community there
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is the question of whether you are to have, under the Treaty of Rome, such arrangements that it would be impossible for a Labour Government here, in face of opposition from the E.E.C., to nationalise the steel industry.
I am hearing, it said in business circles, "Oh, we are in favour of the Common Market", in spite of the fact that they may have to go very lowly when German, Belgian and Luxembourg steel begins to come into the market more easily. Those people say, "We are in favour of the Common Market because you will never be able to nationalise steel here again".
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Viscount will think this is a discourtesy, but it is not intended in that sense; but so far as I know there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome which either prevents or encourages public ownership. That is to say, this is a matter which we can discuss among ourselves.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I have studied the Treaty of Rome and I cannot find anything on which I can lay my finger firmly, but now that I have the courtesy of these additional documents from the noble and learned Viscount I will certainly look at it. But that is what is being said in this country to-day, and Her Majesty's Government may be completely misleading leaders of the trade unions and the like if that is not so politically. At least there is sufficient in the Treaty of Rome to show that decisions can be taken if they are unanimous at present and by a majority vote in the future—certainly after 1970, so far as I know. That would very often interfere with items in our economy which would then affect the economy as a whole; and we have never yet been quite in the position of having to take that kind of line with our people, their life and their standards. My Lords, I apologise to the House for having been a little lengthy and only wish I had been able to say a great deal more. I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name.
Amendment moved—
Leave out all the words after ("House"), and insert ("notes the decision of Her Majesty's Government to make formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome

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in order to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association; regrets that Her Majesty's Government will be conducting these negotiations from a position of grave economic weakness; and declares that Britain should enter the European Economic Community only if this House gives its approval and if the conditions negotiated are generally acceptable to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and accord with our obligations and pledges to other members of the European Free Trade Association.").—(Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough.)
4.8 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, like the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition, I should like to pay tribute to the manner in which the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary, has moved the Motion before this House. Others, I am sure with more knowledge of agriculture, will deal in detail with the fears expressed by the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition upon which Her Majesty's Government, as I understand, are at present reserving judgment.
Speaking personally and also giving the expressed view of the Liberal Party I can say I should consider it most unfortunate and undesirable that Britain should be separated from the important developments which are taking place on the mainland of Europe. After centuries of conflict these developments may usher in a happier future for some 200 million people who are neighbours. The peoples of Europe, it is true, have attained a high level of individual intelligence, unsurpassed in any age, but, none the less, they have for centuries failed collectively to restrain their internecine conflicts. So, in the decision which Her Majesty's Government have taken, they have our support and our good wishes in the difficult discussions upon which they are embarking. We shall therefore support the Motion moved by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary.
The great turning points of history are but moments when there have been a special conjunction of circumstances or of personalities, or of both, favourable to change and development. In short, they have been what perhaps I may call miracles of timing. No one, I think, would have dared to prophesy the favourable conjunction of circumstances and personalities in six countries
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which produced the Treaty of Rome. We hope that a similar and even more startling miracle of timing may bring into being a wider European community.
Whatever may have been the shortcomings of successive British Governments since the end of the war, we have not deserved the strictures which have been levelled against us since the signing of the Treaty of Rome by the Six. In speech after speech from representatives of the Six, in the Council of Europe and elsewhere, we have been accused of seeking the commercial advantages of the Common Market without being willing to shoulder the obligations or to make political commitments. In truth, my Lords, has not the reverse been the case? Immediately after the war, in the Treaty of Dunkirk we gave guarantees to calm the fears of our French friends. Was not that an act of political co-operation and commitment in Europe? We took the lead in formulating the Treaty of Brussels. When E.D.C. was before the European Parliaments, we made commitments which added greatly to the strain on our people, both politically and financially. Although the purpose for which these commitments were made was not achieved, and although because of the holding back of France we did not get the compensating advantages contemplated, we have not withdrawn from the obligations we then assumed. I assert that we need make no excuses. We have not lagged behind in political co-operation. We have worked for common political policies as the basis of European unity. In our obligations for common defence and, in particular, under N.A.T.O., no country has come so near the target set for it as Britain; other European countries have not done so well as Britain.
Personally, as I said some two or three years ago at a meeting of the O.E.E.C. in Paris, I have never been so worried over the commercial aspects of a lack of unity in Europe as over the consequences of a political and cultural division in Europe. Business firms usually find a way—and many British firms have already established themselves within the area of the Common Market—of getting over unnatural divisions which are maintained, even when out of date, for lack of political initiative.

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This is perhaps the important question to which we as Liberals ought to address ourselves. Can we, as Liberals, offer any suggestions to Her Majesty's Government which might help them in their task? With respect, I think we can make two, the first on the political side. The Treaty of Rome makes clear the intention of the signatories to build European unity. I should have thought that this implied a merger of sovereignty, even if it is not so expressly stated. But the signatories wisely did not fill in the details. We know that the urge behind was, and is likely to be even more strongly toward a federal form of government. I have never been able to understand why British Governments consider federal constitutions excellent for almost everyone else in the world. They sponsored a federal constitution for Germany after the war, and have sponsored federal constitutions for many developing areas in the world, but they are always worried if any form of federalism is suggested to them. Could Her Majesty's Government visualise the possibility of certain limited powers being exercised by a federal authority in Europe? Could they contemplate that, as confidence is built up between the members of a European Community, there could be a transfer of limited and clearly defined powers to a federal authority, powers over certain aspects of European policy, such as, for instance, the defence of Europe? That is the suggestion which, with respect, I should like to make on the political side.
On the Market side, the commercial side, would not the objections from the Commonwealth, from E.F.T.A., from the developing countries and from G.A.T.T. with which we are confronted be largely resolved if a united Europe emerges with a low common tariff instead of a high common tariff; and if there is also a declaration of intent by Europeans progressively to reduce their common external tariff? This is the solution upon which I should personally concentrate in any negotiations, rather than upon securing a mass of detailed exceptions to the general tariff level. I have found the force of this plea well understood by representatives of the Six when it is put to them, but they have always been able to reply that Britain should set a good example in this matter, for Britain is a
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high tariff country—a fact which, as a Liberal, I deplore.
There is, I believe, a growing public opinion in the world in favour of the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods and people, not only in limited areas such as Europe, but throughout the world. I hope Her Majesty's Government will give fresh impetus to this movement for wider freedom in the negotiations upon which they are embarking, and I wish them well.
4.20 p.m.
LORD POOLE: My Lords, I have hesitated for some time to intervene in your Lordships' debates, and I do so today only with the greatest diffidence; and I hope that I shall receive the indulgence which your Lordships show so generously to those who speak in your House for the first time. The relationship between this country and the European Economic Community is of such far-reaching importance, not only to this country and to the Commonwealth, but to the whole world, that I thought I might intervene. It is, of course, a controversial matter, and I only hope that I do not trespass too far on your Lordships' indulgence in that direction this afternoon.
It is difficult to discuss, as was mentioned in your Lordships' House on Monday, because of the absence of a White Paper and because most of us, and, certainly myself, like the noble Viscount opposite, have not had time to read all the documents. Moreover—and this, surely, is the fundamental point—only those who are actually negotiating can know all the factors involved. But all of us who have commercial and industrial responsibilities in this country, however slight, have of necessity given the whole of this question most careful thought, not only over the last few weeks and months, but over the last six years. I think it wise, on occasions like this, to make one's own position clear at the start, and I will say at once that I welcome the statement that Her Majesty's Government are making formal application to join the European Economic Community, and I welcome also the reports which we have had this morning of the reception given to the Lord Privy Seal in Paris yesterday.
I am aware, of course—indeed, the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary,

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emphasised this when he opened the debate—that this application in itself commits us to nothing, and provides only an opportunity for detailed negotiations. But surely the mere fact of an application must mean, if it means anything at all, that the Government urgently wish to join the Common Market and propose to do so unless, in the course of negotiations, conditions are raised which make it impossible for them to do so. In fact the Prime Minister in another place has said that
"the risks and dangers of failure are very great."
Therefore, it seems reasonable to-day that we should assume that the Government, if they can achieve the means, will enter the Common Market; and I think it is right that we should consider, with what evidence is available, the implications of joining the Common Market.
I am not sure that it is entirely realistic to try to separate completely the political and economic consequences. There are, of course, grave political and economic consequences. But they are so much interlocked, and so dependent on each other, that I think they must be taken as a whole and not used as a sort of trade-off, one against the other: that because our joining would have economic advantages, we should be prepared to pay the price of a political disadvantage. The whole must be taken together. But at least when we consider this problem it will make us do one thing: it will make us face up to the fact that Great Britain to-day is a totally different country, living in a totally different world, than some people seem to imagine—not in any way a worse country, in a worse world, but, in my opinion, a better country in a better world, which is quite different. I believe that reluctance to accept this fact has been the cause of many of our difficulties, not just since 1945 but since 1918; and the decision we have to take now with regard to Europe will make us at least face up to that fact.
It is extremely important—and never more so than at this time, when we anticipate a crisis in Berlin—that the free countries in Europe should be as strong and as united as possible. This is vital, not only to us but to the Commonwealth countries as well; and it is also vital that British influence in Europe should be strong. It seems to me that we cannot
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best achieve this by excluding ourselves from the councils of Europe; because decisions are affected by representations made while the discussions are going on, and it is extremely difficult to get things changed afterwards. It seems to me that we should be a much more important political Power in Europe if we were there when these decisions were being discussed. I cannot conceive why anybody should think that, because we join in the councils of Europe, we must inevitably be dominated by them. It seems to me quite unrealistic to think that. But of one thing we can be quite sure: whether or not we take part in the discussions on these vital affairs that are going to affect the next 20 or 30 years in Europe and the world, we are going to be vitally affected by them, and it seems much more important to me that we should have our say before the decisions are made, and not after.
Our political influence in Europe and, indeed, in the world cannot be great if our economic position is weak, and that is why I say the two go closely together. We can neither sustain our position as head of the Commonwealth nor be an influence in Europe unless we have a dynamic and expanding economy. For example, I am doubtful whether the sterling area, which is probably the most important material factor that holds the Commonwealth together, would survive another devaluation of the pound. Moreover, the Commonwealth countries look to us for material help as well as leadership.
The noble Viscount opposite, who moved the Amendment, referred to the very great assistance, the loyalty and support we have always had from the Commonwealth countries; and we shall never forget that. But let us also face up to the fact that from time to time they place considerable burdens on us. In the case of India, we have assisted them, I hope successfully, with their exchange difficulties. In Australia, we have understood and have not been unsympathetic when they have found it necessary to impose severe quotas on the imports of British goods to protect their own industry and their exchange position. In Canada, we have watched the problems confronting that country in the last year or so, and we have sympathy with them, even when Mr. Fleming rejects

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the idea of our joining the Common Market at the same time as the Canadian Government are considering a tariff on British cars.
It is essential that we should consider both sides of all these questions. It is our duty, as the centre of the Commonwealth, to sustain the Commonwealth countries in their difficulties. But we can do so only if we are economically strong enough; and it is no good pretending that they do not add considerably to our burdens. We have, in addition, other serious commitments. It is essential that we assist the progress of under-developed countries, not only in the Commonwealth, but throughout the world. Again, whatever actions we may or may not take in this country, the course of events in the world in the next 40 years of this century is going to be immensely affected by the relations between the so-called rich countries and the under-developed areas. But the more prosperous countries can assist only to the extent of their resources.
There is another important aspect of this matter. It is not only a question of giving aid. Important though that is—and the United States have seen the difficulties and disadvantages that occur solely through that course—we have also to trade with these countries and to build up their trading activities; and this requires a low-cost as well as an expanding economy. Therefore, my Lords, I cannot accept that a prosperous and expanding Europe, with full participation of this country, can be anything but essential, not just favourable, for the Commonwealth countries.
It is certain that if this country joins the Common Market some great changes in our industrial life will be the consequence. The impact of all these changes cannot as yet be discovered, but I do not believe, as some people appear to, that British industry will collapse at the first cold blast of competition. In fact I hold exactly the opposite view. I believe that the fact that this country is one of the most protected countries in the world has greatly militated against growth and efficiency, and I have no doubt that, when the initial difficulties are overcome. British industry, the vast majority of British industry, will be able to deal effectively with competition from Europe or elsewhere.
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Also I have no doubt that the stimulus which this competition will give will have a very beneficial effect in certain quarters. Your Lordships will no doubt recall that Dr. Johnson wrote in a letter to Boswell:
"Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully."
I believe that there are sections of British industry who may well have their minds directed towards increased efficiency at this time.
Another factor which is often overlooked is that most of the problems that are consequential on this country's joining the Common Market would arise anyway. It is quite a wrong conception that in the world we have the choice of going one way or the other. The world is going one way and it is just a question of which manner we go along. The problem is whether we think it better for us to solve this problem alone, or unilaterally, or in conjunction with both the Commonwealth and the Common Market. I think there can be no doubt that going ahead alone can be only a most difficult and unrewarding task. It is inevitable in the present circumstances that the Government should wish to examine every aspect. Each item that effects Commonwealth countries—butter, wheat, mutton, whatever it may be—must be the subject of separate and detailed negotiations. The problems of our colleagues in the E.F.T.A. countries are, of course, a great responsibility. But surely we must face the fact that there can never be a cut-and-dried solution to all our problems, and in fact many difficulties can best be overcome after joining the Community.
The noble Viscount who moved the Amendment referred specifically to agriculture. Agriculture is, of course, one of the great matters, one of the vital matters, that must be resolved. I do not wish to take issue with the noble Viscount but I insist that the problems of agriculture have not yet been resolved among the Six, and I am led to believe that the German farmer is showing that he has very little to learn from his opposite number in the National Farmers' Union here; and German agriculture is still a highly protected industry. I should have thought it would be better and more satisfactory that we should influence these decisions

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before they are taken, rather than try to change them afterwards, and use them as a sort of bargain over the entrance fee to a club.
My Lords, I am very doubtful whether the Government have unlimited time to settle these negotiations. One thing is quite certain: the political difficulties at home will be greater as the opposition becomes louder, and in certain quarters more irresponsible. Delay will make these problems more difficult and not easier to settle, and I believe that a decision on this matter will have to be taken within the next twelve months. I apologise for making so many controversial and dogmatic statements. I said that it was impossible not to be controversial, and it is difficult to make points in a short time without being dogmatic. But I am very grateful to your Lordships.
4.35 p.m.
LORD BRAND: My Lords, I think you would all wish me to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Poole, on his speech. I have seldom listened to a speech with more "meat" in it, I thought we should hear a very good speech from him, because I had the advantage of his presence on the board of my firm for a good many years. I have now resigned, and I think he has too, though of that I am not sure. But he is, in my opinion, full of knowledge and wisdom, and I am very glad that we have him in this House.
I wish to add only a few rather perfunctory remarks more or less to what he has said. I venture to address your Lordships because I have known the British Commonwealth very well for many years. I am the only surviving member of a group that helped to federate South Africa and founded the Round Table Magazine in this country, which has lasted now for over fifty years and has constantly advocated the interests of the Commonwealth. Therefore your Lordships may take it that I have that side of affairs very well in mind; but the whole tendency of the times has been against the federation of the Commonwealth. I remember in the early days my friend Mr. Lionel Curtis suggesting that possibly the problem of a Commonwealth Government could be overcome by having a communal Cabinet sailing round the Commonwealth in a "Ship of State" and taking
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their decisions—even before radio and the telegram existed—as they reached each port. But that idea never came to fruition. Now the whole tendency of the British Commonwealth is in the opposite direction, and we have to recognise what it really is to-day.
India is still in the Commonwealth but probably would not be of very great assistance to us in a European war. Probably she could not be. India, as a member of the Commonwealth, looks to us for money. She wants money; she must get huge sums of money from somewhere. She would like to get them from the Commonwealth, but unfortunately we have no money to give them. We have a large adverse balance of payments, and anything we can give her we must borrow from somewhere else. Then there are the African States. What part they are going to play in the Commonwealth nobody knows. They all want money. What is Mr. Nkrumah going to do in the Commonwealth? Mr. Nyerere, of Tanganyika, is very unhappy because he could not get from the British Government quite what he hoped to get. But we have not the money to give them. At present—until the Welfare State manages to secure not to have an adverse balance of payments—we can give them money only by borrowing money elsewhere.
All these countries look for very large monetary help, and they will inevitably turn to the countries which are able to give it—whether it is the United States, Europe or Russia. We have in our time given thousands of millions of pounds to the Commonwealth, but at present we are unable to do so. Let us hope we can do so as soon as we have learned to create a favourable balance of payments. No doubt we have many friends in India and in Africa, but mere friendship will not be enough to keep them close to us unless we can help them. South Africa meanwhile has left the Commonwealth, and what is really left of the Commonwealth is Canada, Australia and New Zealand. All these countries would like to remain allied to us, would like us to help them, and in turn they would like to help us. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, said how grand was the help those countries gave us in two wars and we can never forget that. Canada, of course, is better off for money than

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Australia or New Zealand because she is tied in with the United States. The great trouble is that she has to borrow too much; she gets too much American money and would like some from us.
Those three countries belong to the Western European world but they face the Asiatic world. Australia has nearly 15 million people; New Zealand about 2½ million. China, nearby, has 600 million and Indonesia 80 million, not forgetting behind them 200 million Russians. Those countries must look to others as well as ourselves for help if help is needed. They will naturally look to us for protection, but that alone will not be enough. They are bound also to look to the United States, and we must remember that the United States strongly wishes the European world to unite more closely so that a United States of America and a United States of Europe, including the United Kingdom, may be powerful enough to protect themselves and their friends against the Communist Powers, whose strength is likely to grow rapidly. We must not suppose we shall maintain our old relationship with the United States if our 50 million are separated from the whole of Europe and do not compare in strength with the 170 million of the Continent. It is because we must work together to be strong that I am in favour of joining the Common Market. Of course we must protect Australia, Canada and New Zealand so far as trade is concerned. Of course also we must protect the British farmer. I have been a farmer for 40 years and I certainly want protection if a great change comes about. The noble Lord, Lord Netherthorpe, will no doubt know how to give it to me.
We cannot say now how far politically as well as commercially we shall be led by the Common Market if we join it. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Poole, that politics and commerce cannot be really divided. There are ardent advocates in the Common Market, some of whom I know, who wish to increase the political unity in Europe and to take steps which will diminish the sovereignty of each State and increase the sovereignty of the central State. That may happen, but I think it will take a long time. We could, I think, go a long way not only by free trade but
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by financial measures in supporting one another in Europe.
I believe that financially it would be possible to found a European central bank which might help the European countries, including ourselves, a great deal; but of course each country must pay its way and cannot live on the central bank. We are not paying our way at this moment. I believe the future will show us that to join the Common Market is necessary. For one thing, though this may seem an odd argument to use, it would prevent the Germans, if ever they wanted to, from joining Russia. Possibly if left to themselves the Germans might at some critical moment in history join the Russians, and that would be disastrous. Commercially and industrially I consider we have a very great deal to gain. It is no doubt a tremendous step. Nevertheless we ought to remember that the Scots and the Welsh thought it a tremendous step when they joined England, and it may turn out not to be so much worse than that.
4.48 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I believe you will think it natural that my friends of the Common Market campaign and I should welcome whole-heartedly the decision of Her Majesty's Government to apply for membership of the European Economic Community, because, after all, this action is in entire accord with what was suggested in our Declaration on Europe published on May 25 last. As some of your Lordships may also be aware, I myself have had a Motion down on the Order Paper here for many weeks which reads as follows:
"To call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the desirability of their consulting with the Commonwealth and with the European Free Trade Association as to the terms on which this country could join the European Economic Community … as a prelude to negotiating the necessary derogations from the Treaty of Rome; and to move for Papers."
This Motion I now have the greatest pleasure in withdrawing!
It will no doubt further be within your Lordships' recollection that in my last two interventions in your Lordships' House I enlarged on the political and economic reasons which, as it seemed to me, made it absolutely imperative for this country to negotiate its entry into

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the E.E.C. on the basis of an acceptance by us of the principle of a common external tariff and of the institutions and political implications of the Treaty of Rome. As I see it, the Government have now explicitly accepted the principle of a common external tariff, though they rightly insist that, unless this can be somehow reconciled with the basic long-term interests of our Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. colleagues, and of course British agriculture, they will not be able to sign the Treaty.
What remained implicit, I think, until this afternoon was their broad acceptance of the institutions and political implications of the Treaty: implicit because, after all, if you apply to join a club you normally duo not suggest that the rules and the committee and the club should be radically changed. You join it because you see advantage in joining it. Until we heard the Foreign Secretary this afternoon it was not certain, I think, Whether Her Majesty's Government would, broadly speaking, accept the Treaty of Rome as it stands, and merely attempt to negotiate the essential economic protocols, or whether they would seek to revise the Treaty of Rome itself.
From what the noble Earl said in his admirable speech, one thing stood out to my mind. All his remarks were, in my opinion, admirable, but I thought that one thing stood out—namely, that there was no doubt that if we entered the European Economic Community (it is true in a restricted economic sphere) there would be certain derogations from the strict letter of what is called our sovereignty, and that this was a fact which the Government were prepared to accept, in view, of course, of the great prospective benefits which would be obtained from coming into the Community.
With your Lordships' permission, I should like to devote almost the whole of my speech to-day to the so-called political implications of the Treaty, because they are really quite important. I am encouraged to do so all the more because I observed on reading my Hansard yesterday that there was an interesting exchange of views of this subject between the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and the noble Earl, the Foreign Secretary, during a discussion on the Prime Minister's statement of July 31. As a matter of fact, I did not know that the
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noble Earl, Lord Swinton, was going to refer to me by name—otherwise, naturally, I should have done my best to be in my place.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I did not know, until I heard it, that there was going to be a statement.
LORD GLADWYN: I am sorry. I do not wish to say anything that I should not say, only that I should have liked to be present. All the more should I have liked to be present since, with the greatest possible respect, the account of my views which was given by the noble Earl was, I am afraid, rather a travesty of what I have written and said. I know that the noble Earl was attempting to summarise an attitude which it is admittedly difficult to summarise. But I must say that I was astounded to have attributed to me the view that—and I now quote [OFFICIAL, REPORT, Vol. 234 (No. 118), col. 32):
"the Treaty of Rome obliges us, whether the parties to the Treaty want it or not, to enforce upon anybody who enters the Treaty the most complete abdication of sovereignty."
This was contrasted, I think you will see on reading the Record, with the comforting view of my noble friend the Foreign Secretary, which, we were led to infer, was that any Treaty was to some extent a derogation of sovereignty; that the Treaty of Rome was, after all, just another Treaty; and that therefore there was no reason for us to be frightened or to regard our eventual signature of the Treaty as anything out of the ordinary. Subsequently, the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary said that he did not think that there was necessarily a difference of opinion between himself and myself; and, after his magnificent speech this afternoon may I assure him straight away that I do not think there is.
But obviously there is great confusion about the political obligations which we should assume if we sign the Treaty of Rome. I hope your Lordships will agree that at any rate I have consistently tried to clear it up to the best of my power. In my speech in this House on June 21 last, for instance, I analysed these political issues, and I suggested that we might not find them quite so frightening as some people thought. I have also expressed the same views at much greater length in articles in the Press,

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some of which, I regret to say, have been twisted and quoted out of context. All these efforts of mine have had as their text one single basic theme—namely, that, although on becoming a full member of the Community we should—and here I quote from my speech in this House on June 21 [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 232 (No. 96), col. 646]:
"have accepted a binding and, so to speak, an organic commitment wider than, and different in kind from, our commitments under our existing Treaties, far-reaching as some of those undoubtedly are",
this would be a commitment precisely limited in scope, which could not be developed into anything like a Federation except with this Parliament's own consent.
My Lords, I should of course welcome some authoritative support for what I would call this doctrine by the Lord Chancellor, and I hope that the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary (who would clearly subscribe to it himself), will have no further reason to be apprehensive of the view of the highest legal authority, as he seemed to be to some slight degree in his speech. But I do not think, subject to what the Lord Chancellor may say, that the broad judgment which I have just made can be seriously disputed by any instructed person who reads the Treaty of Rome attentively.
Let us take the various institutions. Here, may I say at once that I think we must accept them as they are if the forthcoming negotiations are going to succeed at all. No amount of arguing that the French word "adaptations" which occurs in Article 237 and is translated as "amendments" in the English version, justifies our demanding major changes, will do any good. What the word probably means is, I think, something like "necessary consequential changes", and certainly these will have to be made.
LORD KILLEARN: Why should it not mean adaptations?
LORD GLADWYN: No, my Lords, I really think it should be rendered as "necessary consequential changes". Some of these, for instance those concerning the various voting formulæ and, more especially, the voting formula in Article 148 which governs the voting
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procedure in the Council of Ministers, will be of the greatest importance. But the attempt to secure major changes in the Treaty itself would not only give rise to an interminable debate: it would also be pointless. After the appalling difficulties which they had on agreeing to them, it stands to reason that the Six cannot modify the existing institutions, and that if we join we shall have to accept them substantially as they are—I assume, after what has been said this afternoon, that we are going to.
So let us for a moment examine these institutions in detail from the point of view of what some people call "derogations from sovereignty", but which I should like to call restrictions on our entire freedom of action in the economic field. First of all, we have the Commission. This consists of a number of civil servants sitting in Brussels and seconded from their national Governments for a period of time. Their task is to prepare plans for bringing into effect the various chapters of the Treaty of Rome which look forward to the formation of the Community. The Commission, of course, cannot overrule any individual member. It is subordinate to its political chiefs sitting in the Council of Ministers. Of course it has to be admitted that it may represent the potential International Civil Service of the future. After all, the Treaty does set up an Economic Community. But—and I think this is an essential point—we could only get to the stage at which a potential International Civil Service would be at the orders of some International Authority of a comprehensive nature, when and if this country of her own volition—I repeat "of her own volition"—has agreed to such an international government being set up.
For instance, the Parliament laid down by the Treaty can be established only when all members have agreed that it should be established. In the meantime, it is a purely advisory body. Therefore there will not be any Federation, or indeed, for that matter, any Confederation, under the Treaty until at any rate we have come to the end of the traditional period, which may be as late as 1972, and even after that, not without our formal consent.
A third institution is the International Court. Here we should, even during the

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transitional period, I believe, be obliged to refer to the court disputes relating to the interpretation of the Treaty or to allegations that a member was not carrying out his obligations under it. I do not think this ought to worry us. After all (and the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor will correct me if I am wrong) I think we have already agreed to limit our sovereignty in this respect by subscribing to what is called the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Supreme Court at The Hague.
But, my Lords, there remains the Council of Ministers. And here it simply cannot be denied that if we became members of the E.E.C. we should have to agree that the Common External Tariff, once established, could be changed only by a majority vote in that body: and the same would apply, of course, to any measures designed to restrict the flow of trade. Nor could we prevent the Common External Tariff from being set up within the timetable fixed by the Treaty. We should have a veto on acceleration; we could insist, if necessary (although it is to be hoped that we should not), on the optional delays; but that would be all.
It is quite true that we might be able to achieve a majority in favour of changes—and, of course, much would depend on the voting formula to which I have referred. But, again, we might not; and if we did not, then, whatever the pressures inside this country on the Government might be in 1972, or whenever the Common External Tariff finally comes into operation, we should have to accept in the last resort some majority verdict which might, after all, have considerable consequences to the economy of this nation. But we must always remember, even so, that the Treaty provides far special facilities for those members who may in balance-of-payments difficulties, or who are suffering from some other forms of economic distress.
Even during the transitional period there are certain additional matters which could, if necessary, be decided by a majority vote, but I do not think these need bother us unduly. The essential thing is for us to accept the principle of majority voting in the Council—in a certain restricted sphere, it is true, but nevertheless the principle of majority vot-
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ing. With great respect, this is a principle which, with one perhaps rather minor exception, we have, I believe, never accepted before—though I speak subject to correction. N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., C.E.N.T.O., O.E.E.C. and the Council of Europe are all run on the principle of unanimity. I am not quite certain about G.A.T.T., to which the Foreign Secretary referred, but I believe I am right in saying that it is not absolutely obligatory on us to accept the decisions of G.A.T.T. from the legal point of view. Even in the United Nations, the resolutions of whose Assembly have no juridical validity, as a permanent member of the Security Council we can rely, if necessary, on the Veto.
The only real exception, I think, to the unanimity rule which we have so far accepted is in W.E.U. Here we undertook, as doubtless noble Lords are all aware, not to diminish the strength of our forces in Germany without the consent of a majority in the W.E.U. Council of Ministers. However, this obligation, though binding, is subject to important qualifications, notably as regards our own finances and as regards the defence of our overseas possessions. Our economic obligations under the Treaty of Rome would clearly be of a far greater order of importance even than these.
I now turn to the various chapters of the Treaty. The Customs Union, of course, comes first—that is the basis of the whole thing—and after that we have chapters on agriculture, the free movement of persons, services and capital, transport, rules governing competition, fiscal provisions, approximations of laws, balance of payments, commercial policy, social policy, an investment bank and the association of overseas countries and territories. All these together constitute over one-third of the huge volume containing the Treaty. The final half of this enormous work consists, for the most part, of special Protocols relating chiefly to the individual interests of members. But the various chapters on the things I have read out come to one-third. With the exception of the last two on the list which I have read out, I think these chapters may really be described as objectives. They lay down very sensible rules about how the Community might be gradually established in these various spheres. But, my Lords,

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how far they will actually be achieved is anybody's guess. It depends primarily, it seems to me, on what degree of confidence there is. Besides, there are, as we all know, two broad schools of thought among the Six themselves (and there would be among the Seven if we came in); namely, those who wish to proceed quickly towards an actual Federation and others, including, I think, at least one powerful Government, who are not now prepared to move towards any form of Federation at all.
Always on the subject of these "objectives", what I should like to say is this. So long as nation States are nation States, there will always be practical limits beyond which no great power can be dragooned against its will. In particular, it really is not to be imagined, at any rate during the transitional period (which, as I have said, may well go on until 1972), that any major member of the E.E.C. is going to have severe local unemployment forced on it against its will as the result of some majority vote. Nor would it, in practice, be forced against its will to agree to any large influx of foreign labour.
All these problems would, of course, be threshed out first in the Commission and then in the Council in Ministers. All that is essential, unless the whole idea of a Community is to fade out, is that all the nations concerned should loyally accept the disciplines imposed by the Common External Tariff. Because, my Lords, unless we do voluntarily accept these disciplines, what are these negotiations going to be about? How is the Common Market, now an established fact the other side of the Channel, going to be enlarged so as to include ourselves and others? What inducement would the Six have to let us into their "club" at all, to say nothing of granting us those important economic derogations which we hope to secure and without which, naturally, we say we shall be unable to sign the Treaty? They would have none.
And so I repeat that if we go into the negotiations, as I trust we shall, it must be with our eyes open on these essential points. By all means let us agree—and here again, I think, I am at one
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with my noble friend the Foreign Secretary—that many of the practical limitations on our complete freedom of action might be worked out by common agreement over the years. But do not let us delude ourselves about the nature of the essential disciplines which we should voluntarily agree to abide by.
My Lords, I cannot, however, see that if we enter into this kind of Community our own great and ancient institutions, of which we are so proud, could be anything but strengthened. To assert, for instance, that the Monarchy would be imperilled touches, to my mind, the very depths of imbecility. The opposition to our going into Europe always asserts that entry into the Common Market—and this was a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Poole, in his excellent speech—would in some way involve dictation to us on the part of foreigners. The fact is that if we did come in it would be we who would be dictating to the foreigners, just as much as they would be dictating to us.
There is no doubt, to my mind, that if we did eventually sign the Treaty of Rome, on satisfactory terms, we should be, as a nation, in a far stronger position than we are now. By and large, the authority and influence of this Parliament would be increased rather than diminished. Nor have I any doubt that, always if we achieve satisfaction as regards the trade of the Commonwealth, that unique body, with a Europe united economically behind it, could play a rôle the importance of which can hardly be imagined in the present state of affairs. But in order to achieve all this we must, I repeat, be prepared to accept certain rules, without which European unity cannot in fact be achieved. This may well require a great change in our ingrained habits of thought, and to accomplish it there must be an inspired effort of leadership which I have no doubt at all the Government will provide. If I may venture to say so, the Foreign Secretary gave proof of it to-day.
Lastly, may I say that I have not raised all these awkward questions about the interpretation of a complicated Treaty with any idea of being difficult, still less of prejudicing the success of a venture which, as your Lordships know, I have always had so much at heart. We must, I think, recognise that if I did not raise

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them somebody else undoubtedly would, if not here then on the other side of the Channel. What effect would it have over there if we gave the impression that we were not one with them in a sincere desire to establish an even wider European Economic Community? I know, of course, that anything one says on the subject may, and no doubt will, be twisted to show that, by signing, we should transform ourselves into a province of the Empire of some new Charlemagne. But I believe that such apprehensions are ludicrous. I believe that the kind of European Confederation to which we, together with that great leader, General de Gaulle, may legitimately aspire (and which, incidentally, is much more likely to come about if we do join than if we do not) is something which would in no way involve our country in any diminutio capitis, as the Romans said, but rather would raise it to new heights regards its influence and standing in the world.
My Lords, I believe that the formation of a united Europe, or at any rate a united Western Europe, is the one sure way to arrive at that ultimate construction of our dreams of an Atlantic Community—some association of Europe and America which, in conjunction with the Commonwealth, would form a real pole of attraction for the entire free world. I believe, further, that it is the only sure way to counter the advance of what the Prime Minister so rightly referred to on Monday last as "the enormous monolithic strength of the Soviet power." I consequently hope and believe that July 31, 1961, will go down as one of the most momentous dates in our country's long history, and I hope that the great majority of your Lordships will be found to support the Government in the bold and imaginative decision which they have taken.
5.10 p.m.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I know the House has listened with especial attention to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, Who is so great an expert on the subject under discussion. I suppose I should declare, if not an interest, at any rate a kind of allegiance to him, as I am one of the signatories to his European Manifesto, but that agreeable but localised allegiance does not, of course, interfere with my more profound and organic allegiance to
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my colleagues here, and particularly to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. Indeed, I might offer my services to the Government when they try to reconcile allegiance to the Commonwealth and to Europe. Those much more experienced in these matters suggest that the obstacles are much less than commonly supposed.
I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Poole, on his speech. I feel that, under the strain of speaking, he has left the Chamber; but at any rate it is my pleasant duty to congratulate him on an outstanding maiden speech. He comes to us, of course, with a record of service in war and of achievement in the Conservative Central Office. I am not quite sure what he did there, but it was understood that he was collaborating with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham—who is perhaps reviving him, I do not know, after his oration. The exact distribution of function was never made clear, but, if I remember rightly, one was to do the thinking and the other was to do the talking. Again, it is not absolutely clear which it was did which, but anyone who could keep up with the noble Viscount the Leader of the House in either department obviously would be a great acquisition here, and Lord Poole has certainly proved that this afternoon.
I myself wish to speak as candidly as compatible with the ordinary rules of conformity. At the end, perhaps noble Lords will say, in the way expressed by the Irish: "Mind you, he said nothing". But I will try to speak as candidly as possible and say at once that I wholeheartedly welcome the approach that the Government is making to the six countries of Western Europe, with a view to negotiating with them and joining their number. I must say, to be candid, that I could have wished that, in our own Amendment, we had made that welcome a shade more explicit; but I have perhaps said enough to make my own views plain, and I am only going to say that those issues must be worked out with one's own conscience, and with the Party Whips and other high functionaries. I have indicated where my conviction lies.
We are told in all the papers, and we have been told more than once in this

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House, that this is an epoch-making decision—one of the greatest. Some people have gone so far as to say it is the greatest, but I think that is an exaggeration, perhaps, because the decision so far taken, at any rate, does not carry us very far. But we are confronted by a total decision which is certainly one of the greatest we have ever taken in peace-time. I was very much interested by what the noble Lord, Lord Strang, said the other day. I am quoting from memory, but he said, in effect, that the obligations that we are now being asked to assume are different in kind (I am glad to see I have the noble Lord's assent) from those assumed hitherto. But those who have read, as I did with much pleasure, the noble Lord's classical History of British Foreign Policy will find that we have often taken decisions which were different in kind, or seemed so at the time.
Those of your Lordships who refer to page 249 of Lord Strang's book will find a quotation from the famous memorandum of the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, who of course was the grandfather of the noble Marquess. The question then was whether we should depart from our traditional isolation. It was long before the complicated question of sovereignty, and derogating from it in the modern sense, arose. Lord Strang quotes Lord Salisbury to this effect in 1901. He wrote:
"Except during Napoleon I's reign we have never been in danger, and, therefore, it is impossible for us to judge whether the 'isolation' under which we are supposed to suffer, does or does not contain in it any element of peril. It would hardly be wise to incur novel and most onerous obligations, in order to guard against a danger in whose existence we have no historical reason for believing."
That was, of course, 60 years ago, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Strang, and other experts, would agree that during this century we have seen a steady departure from our traditional isolation. I need not run through the various stages and moves, but if we are being confronted to-day with a decision which is different in kind, it is surely the logical outcome of a process of evolution which has been worked out by the various Governments which have been ruling in this country for the last 60 years.
LORD STRANG: My Lords, could I remind the noble Lord that there were people who thought at the time, and there are people who think now, that we made a mistake in 1904; that Lord Salisbury was right and that Lord Lansdowne was wrong. Lord Rosebery thought at the time that the Anglo-French Entente would lead straight to war, and people now say that it did. Therefore, it may well be that there are people now who think that this step is a mistake, and it may well be in future they will think the same.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I should think it very odd if nobody opposed so far-reaching a measure, and very odd after the event if nobody thought it was a mistake. But surely the noble Lord, Lord Strang, and other noble Lords as a whole, would not say that the Anglo-French Entente led straight to the war of 1914. Perhaps I should not pursue it too far.
LORD STRANG: My Lords, I was not expressing that opinion at all; I was merely saying people had thought so.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, there is always room for eccentrics, and I hope there always will be room for them in this country.
There are, as was made plain in the very able speech (which goes without saying) of the noble Earl, Lord Home, two decisions, in effect, to take. There is the one decision, with which we are confronted to-day, the decision whether to negotiate; and then there is the second decision whether actually to go in. To-day, as we are all quite clear, there is just the first decision; the second decision will, of course, come later.
When we are confronting this first decision, I would, simply in a sentence or two, indicate my own attitude, which is not a unique one. If I may return to the phrase I used just now, it is not an eccentric one, but is held very widely in the Labour Party and in other Parties. Whether it is a majority opinion it is not for me to say. I would describe myself as a 100 per cent. supporter of the idea of Britain joining the Common Market. But even I, and the others who think like me, would not suggest that the Government, in advance of the negotiations, should express their readiness to join the Common Market at any price,

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even if no concessions whatever were made. I am very glad to think the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, is going to speak to-morrow, and I hope he will speak in this same sense. He is someone whom I would perhaps regard as a "super-eminent authority" on negotiation, and I am sure he, and all others concerned with negotiation, whether in business or diplomacy, would say that one cannot take up the position that one would go in at any price, any more than a person buying a house would say that, whatever price the vendor put on it, he would buy it. Obviously, there are limits to the enthusiasm even of the strongest supporters of the Common Market.
As I said earlier, I wish that our Amendment could have made that attitude somewhat plainer, but I can well understand the difficulties of the Party leaders, and I am not criticising them. I would emphasise, however, that I certainly am not suggesting that we should have refrained from a critical Amendment at all. I agree, for example, with the Guardian, which in a leading article yesterday treated the statement of the Prime Minister as a tepid one, though I do not think that they used that word. For tactical reasons, it might have been clever to be tepid. But I echo any criticism of that sort.
More fundamentally, and coming closer to our own Amendment, I would say that the Government's record with regard to Europe in their ten years of office is
wretched. That has been brought out in various striking ways by my noble Leader,
with some remarkable quotations. I do not think that anyone can claim that there is any advantage to be gained from negotiations now which could not have been obtained, with fewer risks and greater safeguards, three or four years ago. No one would say that any benefit has come to this country with the delay. I do not think that anyone would have the audacity to put that view forward. And nobody would blame the Labour Party, saying that in some mysterious way we had delayed proceedings. The Government must fairly and squarely take the blame for that.
We must consider our obligations to E.F.T.A., which have grown up in that period, along with our more deep-rooted obligations to the Commonwealth and
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to our agriculture. The whole establishment of E.F.T.A. has proved to be a cul de sac. The whole idea has proved to be a "washout". The Government are doing the right thing now, but in the sense that the prodigal did the right thing in returning home, announcing that he had sinned before Heaven. His bargaining position on his return is generally recognised as having been extremely weak. He was lucky enough to get away with it, but he had a compassionate father. With all the virtues we attribute to Dr. Adenauer and others, I do not think that we can assume that depth of Christian charity. But there it is. The Government come out very badly in any dispassionate discussion of their record in this matter.
I would certainly join my colleagues and follow my noble Leader in refusing to congratulate the Government—indeed, in censuring them to the best of my ability—in regard to their handling of our economic affairs, do not want to run over the ground of our recent debate, even though, as my own small act of national sacrifice. I refrained from speaking. But I would take one sentence, which comes from an admirable pamphlet called, Britain and the Common Market, which has been issued by the great Conservative paper, the Daily Telegraph. May I say, in parenthesis, as many of us from time to time criticise the Press very sharply, that the Press have done a wonderful job in regard to this whole subject. If we are not educated about it, it is not the fault of the Press of this country. I quote from the Daily Telegraph, which, as I need not remind your Lordships, is a strong Conservative paper:
"One new factor is said to enter the Government's mind. The poor state of
our national economy. Flabby and uncompetitive. We are rapidly pricing ourselves out of this world"—
I do not know what we are pricing ourselves into—
"The drastic action is overdue. It may take the form of joining Europe."
If that is our position after ten years of Conservative rule, I am glad to join in any kind of censure of those who have been administering our affairs.
I should like to deal with only one other point before I sit down; and if, in doing so, I seem to differ from the

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noble Earl, Lord Attlee, it is in the spirit of a pupil who cannot resist the conclusion that his master has checked his thinking at a certain point—I hope, of course, only for the time being. We hear a great deal of talk about the interference with our sovereignty, about the reduction of our sovereignty, if this goes through. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, explained that with extraordinary clarity this afternoon. I cannot imagine any Socialist—and I learned such Socialism as I possess from the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, if I learned it from anyone—whose ideal does not involve a major interference with our own national sovereignty, a major reduction in our national sovereignty, and along with that, of course, a major interference with, and a major reduction in, the national sovereignty of every other country in the world. That is what I have always understood to be the position of international Socialism; and Socialism which was not international would be a very limited conception.
Certainly world government as an aspiration involves a much greater reduction of sovereignty than anything we are discussing today, and when I talk of a reduction of sovereignty, I bear in mind what was brought out, for example, by the noble Earl, Lord Home; that when we reduce our own power of independent action we assume a share in a wider international sovereignty. He gave as an example, the bachelor as compared with the married man.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, I think that the noble Lord will realise that there is a difference between surrendering sovereignty to a world body and surrendering sovereignty to a group of Powers.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I appreciate that; but may I say, with great humility, that we must make a start somewhere.
EARL ATTLEE: Not a wrong start.
THE EARL OF LONGFORD: My Lords, I cannot resist breaking off to tell a story. Yesterday I bought a newspaper to find out what had happened in the Test Match. At that time, we were 100 for 1, with Dexter still going strong. I asked the newspaper man what was
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happening. He said, "Oh, he has slammed them all over the place." I thought he meant Dexter, but the heading was, "Attlee Slams Common Market". The noble Earl had driven the Test Match off the front page altogether. However, that is by the way. I have no doubt that the noble Earl, who is a masterly debater, will dispose of me very readily when he speaks to-morrow.
World government is accepted to-day as the official aim of the Labour Party, and no one has done so much, or half so much, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to bring that about. Some of us have been pressing, in this House and elsewhere, for a positive lead from the British Commonwealth in the direction of world government. Once again, I endorse everything that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said on that subject, which he said with especial force in our last Foreign Affairs debate. But the truth is that Soviet Russia is sabotaging progress towards even so limited an institution as a small International Police Force. I cannot accept, with respect to the Government, that the opposition is anything like so complete as they make out, and I believe that far more progress towards world government could be made through that medium than they are ready to admit. Here, in Western Europe, it is possible to make progress towards a general international system in a field where the Communists cannot block us and in partnership with other Christian nations.
I do not want to alarm anybody. If anybody was to be alarmed, it would be by what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, who spoke with candour about the dangers and difficulties of the Common Market. But as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has explained—and I believe he made that point to-day as well as in our last discussion—the Common Market cannot be turned into a Federation without the consent of everybody including ourselves. So I am not afraid that if we go into the Common Market we shall find ourselves in world government before we know where we are. But, looking beyond that, I cannot understand how anybody can seriously believe in world government as an objective to be realised in our lifetime and at the same time fail to show

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genuine enthusiasm for any British lead towards a united Europe.
It goes without saying that we must scrupulously honour our obligations to the Commonwealth family, but there is no difficulty in principle there. We read in the Press to-day, and the noble Earl, Lord Home, has explained authoritatively, that the six representatives of Western European Union confirmed to the Lord Privy Seal yesterday that they attributed the greatest importance to the British links with the Commonwealth; and that must have been a most encouraging response to the visit of the Lord Privy Seal. The leaders of Western Europe made plain that in their view it would be contrary to the interests of the Free World to weaken those links.
Obviously there is going to be a great deal of hard bargaining, but in the light of that European reaction to the statement of the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister it is surely inconceivable that an honourable settlement should not be available if only we maintain throughout the negotiations a genuine vision and a generosity and largeness of mind. It is not for me, in these few observations, to argue against old-fashioned isolationists of Conservative temper—and I hope I am not insulting anybody by implying that such people still exist—but I will, if I may, reserve my last few sentences for my own political friends. It seems to me that any Socialist to-day, and particularly any democratic Socialist (and certainly no other kind of Socialist is wanted in the Labour Party) must face the fact that social democracy at the moment in the world is a minority cause; and, whatever may lie ahead, it is likely to remain a minority cause in the leading countries for some little while yet. I hope it will not remain a minority cause in this country for very much longer and we may well hope that it will be a majority cause here fairly soon. But, taking the world picture, we must admit that it will be a minority cause in the world for a little while ahead.
This country has, at the present time, in spite of having had ten years of Conservative Government, the most effective Socialist democratic Party in the world. Either we in the Labour Party cast our influence in favour of a national policy
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which would more and more pool our sovereignty, or we are so reactionary, we fear the foreigner so much, that we draw in our skirts and preach to ourselves in Hyde Park without any noticeable influence on world affairs. I believe Britain to-day is presented with an opportunity which, properly handled, will bring us more influence than we have ever possessed in the past, an influence for still wider and nobler causes than we have ever served. But if we fail to take this chance, which is unlikely to recur for many years, we shall be condemned, and rightly condemned, for timidity and indecision, by generations not yet born.
The primary burden lies on the Government of the day. I shall be happy to join in censuring them for many things, but an Opposition like ours, which hopes to succeed them at no distant date, cannot escape its share of the heavy but glorious responsibility of being confronted with a wonderful chance of taking a great step forward to a saner and more Christian world.
5.35 p.m.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to have heard the words of the noble Earl, Lord Longford, who so warmly supports the policy of Her Majesty's Government, even if in some respects he has reservations; but I rise this afternoon to support the Government most strongly in deciding to apply for membership of the European Economic Community. Ever since the creation of the Council for Europe in 1949 I have hoped, for geographic and economic reasons, that we should ultimately try to become members of such an organisation, but I have never minimised the problems so far as the Commonwealth and our own agriculturalists are concerned. But there is one point I should like particularly to make in answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and I hope he might give his attention to what I have to say. I believe at one point in his speech the noble Viscount quoted my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, saying that the Prime Minister had turned down this idea altogether four years ago. It occurred to me, immediately after that, to inquire when the Treaties of Rome came into force, and I find they were not in force at that time, and the circumstances have changed a good deal since.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, the whole scheme of the Common Market was in existence and that whole scheme was part of the debate on European trade from which I was quoting.
THE EARL OF BESSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am very glad to accept that from the noble Viscount; but the drafts of the Treaties were concluded only in March, 1957, and the Treaties did not come into force until 1958. So far as our own farming community are concerned, we have no agricultural treaty and, as I believe the Government have already stated, it would seem to be right that we should make this move before any such Treaty is concluded; so the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary must be right about this.
So far as the Commonwealth is concerned, I cannot believe that even if there are likely to be major problems to resolve at the outset it will not be in the long-term interest of members of the Commonwealth that there should be this strong and prosperous economic community in Europe. I believe the point was well made in the communiqué following Mr. Sandy's visit to Canberra; and the noble Earl, Lord Home, made a strong point about our earning abroad. He amplified it in such a way that I feel it can only have been wholly convincing to your Lordships.
So far as the political implications of the Treaty are concerned, there has been a great deal of talk and I should not like to add any word to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. I agree with every word he said, as I agreed with everything said by the noble Lord, Lord Poole, in that admirable maiden speech. I think these political implications should not be exaggerated. As the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary said in his speech, there is the safeguard in Article 235.
After all, there have been many examples since the war of relinquishing degrees or shreds of national sovereignty in many organisations. If we are to achieve this ideal to which the noble Earl, Lord Longford, has referred and to which we know the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has given his full support—that is to say, this ideal of one world and perhaps even some form of world gov-
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ernment—surely we should welcome any stage which seems to bring us forward in that way; and we should welcome not only the enlargement of economic areas but also a further merging of political sovereignties. Some people, especially protagonists of Commonwealth, have said that we make a mistake by going into Europe. Some people sometimes disparage Continental customs and ways of life. This seems to me to be a ridiculous attitude to be taken by a country which has developed as a result of an amalgam of races—Romans, Saxons, Normans, Danes, French Huguenots and even Russian, Norwegian and Austrian refugees, to say nothing of Italian and Spanish labour coming into the country at this moment. Are we really to say that this Island of Britain is not part of Europe?
Again, what of the Commonwealth which is united in its allegiance to our gracious Sovereign? Are not the populations of three of its oldest members mainly drawn from European stock? Have they not been developed largely by Europeans, as indeed have all those great countries in North and South America? Is not Her Majesty the Queen herself of European ancestry, as are other members of the Royal Family? If your Lordships will permit me to say so, Her Majesty, in addition to being Head of the Commonwealth, is a European too—as we all are in this House. This may be unpopular with a certain noble Lord, who is not only a distinguished Canadian and an Empire crusader but also the proprietor of a well-known daily newspaper, but these are facts which I hope he will not fail to publish.
Several Members in both Houses have suggested that the Government should issue a White Paper on the implications of their decision, but I see the several reasons why this may be difficult at this stage. There have been some admirable supplements in the national Press, as we all know; but it seems to me that this is a matter which should have the careful attention also of the United Kingdom Council of the European Movement and its associate organisations, such as the campaign over which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, presides. They might well do more to inform the people of

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this country of the problems at stake. The U.K.C. and these other groups have done an excellent job in that respect already, but now it is most important that their work should continue and that their efforts should be redoubled.
I wish the Prime Minister and his colleagues every good fortune in the arduous negotiations to come. Some people have said that my right honourable friend is tired and needs a rest. Who would wonder if he were tired when one thinks of the great burdens that fall on the shoulders of a Prime Minister to-day? But whether he is tired or not, it would seem to me that he has dealt with these problems in a statesmanlike manner. No one can say that he has pushed us into the Common Market against our will. Every kind of consultation with others interested has taken place, and will continue to take place in future, before the final decisions are taken.
On the other hand, the noble Earl, Lord Longford, and others have expressed the criticism that the Government have delayed too long. Personally, I think that they have played their hand with great tactical skil. Whenever there is a change interests are always affected, and, on the whole, most people and countries do not like changes, especially if they are reasonably well off as they are. If you ask someone's advice on a matter of this kind, it is right that they should put forward objections, and it is right that the Commonwealth should have done so. But I personally believe that, given reasonable safeguards, the negotiations will succeed. Indeed, we cannot allow them to fail, for it must be remembered that it is not just Britain that will be going into the Common Market, but I believe E.F.T.A., too; and who knows, certain members of the Commonwealth, and even the United States, may also ultimately come to be associated.
The future of the whole Western world, and even the Free World, is at stake. I believe that British industry, finance and commerce should come out of its shell, out of its relative isolation, face the competition, and go into this wider economic group. I consider that our Prime Minster has shown imagination, courage, enterprise and prudence of a kind which few
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other great Prime Ministers in our history have possessed. I think that in this vital matter we are now doing about the right thing in about the right way.
5.44 p.m.
VISCOUNT KNOLLYS: My Lords, I venture to intervene in the debate to-day because, although this question of entry into the Common Market has been for a long time, and still is, a political one, it was originally, and perhaps still is, an economic one, too. For that reason, I speak to-day purely as an industrialist, in order to refer to some of the effects which I think are likely on some wide sections of British industry if we enter the Common Market. In speaking in this way, one must assume that essential and reasonable safeguards can be obtained regarding, in particular, those in the Commonwealth, whose well-being is important to us from a trade point of view, as well as vitally important to them. One hopes that in dealing with these safeguards they will not be to the detriment of a truly realistic negotiating position on the main issue. To carry a stage further a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, a candidate for membership of an exclusive club does not increase his chances of membership if before he becomes a member he objects to the amount of the subscription to the club, to the food in the dining room, and perhaps, as in this case, to the rules regarding the introduction of guests.
It may be convenient if I relate any comments that I have to make to-day on the more earthy part of this subject (most have been on the political aspect) of the probable effect on industry in the four main divisions of the industries which are comprised in the group with which I am connected, because I happen to know them best. They are engineering, heavy and medium, shipbuilding, aircraft and steel. In engineering the prospects are inevitably bound to be mixed. Some sections of industry will undoubtedly be adversely affected, but new opportunities will be opened up for others; and there should be greater opportunities on that all-important question of collaboration with European partners in business.
Shipbuilding is already doing much to modernise itself—more than it is given credit for in some of the statements I have seen recently. I am sometimes somewhat

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envious of those of our competitors who have been able, through war, to have the most complete form of modernisation, which is to rebuild their shipyards from the ground up; and envious, too, of the incentives and advantages which they enjoy, but which regrettably are not, so far, available to us in this country. Of course, there is much which still can be done and must be done in modernising, both in equipment and in thinking. There always is. But we cannot do this alone. It is necessary to get the proper understanding and co-operation of labour, and understanding of the Government that increased costs through new taxes, higher transportation charges and various arrangements regarding new assessments of rating, and many points of that kind, certainly do not help that competitiveness which we have to achieve. But if all the shipyards in a Common Market area are going to be able to compete on really equal terms in every way, then I believe that British shipbuilding can benefit.
As to aircraft, where tariffs are not a major factor, we should be better off for several reasons. Airlines of the Six, most of which are in Air Union, are I think likely to be more ready to consider British built aircraft, particularly if there can be some co-operative production work between firms in this country and those on the Continent. The existing programme towards attaining this particular and very sensible objective should certainly be helped and stimulated by entry into the Common Market. If this should happen, then an essential factor
of prosperous aircraft manufacture would be achieved by a bigger home market in
a new form, where airlines, strong technically, could help to develop new types. We have always found that without this our efforts to sell to the rest of the world are seriously handicapped. The steel industry, which is dependent on the prosperity of its customers, has already welcomed the prospect of entry into the Common Market, more perhaps because it should inject a new dynamic force into the British economy as a whole rather than from any immediate advantages.
If the picture I have tried to summarise of what my own group sees its prospects
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to be should apply to British industry as a whole, then the answer must be that, on balance, it is surely in the overall interests of our industry that we join the Common Market. There is, though, one point which I think it is always important to remember, and that is that the other industrially developed countries are generally the best markets for our own manufactures. But to take advantage of these opportunities which I hope are going to be given to us, there are certain prerequisites which industry here must be prepared to get down to without delay.
The theme which every industrialist, particularly every exporter, must in any case be putting to himself and to every department of his business at this time, is this: how can we make ourselves more competitive? That was the point which I think was stressed very much by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary in his speech at the beginning of the debate. It is a slogan which ought to be in every single office. The prospect of membership of the Common Market will surely be a spur to ensure that this question is swiftly answered, for it will, at the same time, provide a new and enlarged market, and also make it essential to be really competitive or else fail to survive, either in home or in overseas markets, for marketwise they will in the end be largely the same.
There are three essential partners who have to do their bit in adjusting industry under these important new conditions: first of all, management, who must more than ever think in terms of competitiveness, plan ahead more than I think has been done in the past, and provide the necessary organisation and equipment. Secondly, there is labour, who must think in terms of new conditions for our industry; that is, to be competitive or fail to survive, and I am sure that labour in this country will co-operate in this field of productive effort. Then there is the Government, the third partner, who alone can provide the incentives and rewards necessary to stimulate and to support the efforts of management and labour. If there are no longer to be any of the special existing incentives anywhere in the Common Market, then I feel that the Government can at least refrain from financial measures which add to costs and defeat the main objec-

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tive, that of exports, which I am afraid is sometimes not the case now.
Also in that respect with regard to this partnership, I would very fully endorse the suggestion in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's recent statement that these three partners should bring themselves together to get that amount of long-term thinking which will enable general long-term objectives to be set out, to show how far they are feasible, and how far they fit in with the general economic position of the country, for this kind of forward planning (I hardly dare use the word) is essential for the greater stability of our economy. I feel, my Lords, that this may well be the historic moment for modern British industry. I believe we shall take advantage of it, because we must. We led the world once in industrial development. I should like to think that entry into the European Common Market may give us the chance to do so again.
5.54 p.m.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: My Lords, the subject we are discussing to-day is one of the biggest issues that have faced the British Parliament for many a long year, except declarations of war. It is a profoundly important matter, very, very serious, and it is worthy of serious debate, as it is receiving, from your Lordships' House. I think we can all congratulate ourselves as an Assembly on the earnestness and the seriousness with which this matter has been discussed, although inevitably there are differences of opinion which cut across industrialists and even cut across both the great political Parties.
It is a difficult issue. It is no good one's assuming that this is an easy matter upon which to make up one's mind out of hand. I thought about it for weeks and even months, and I confess that as the weeks passed I did one or two switches from one side to the other and back again, and I am not ashamed of that. Indeed, anybody who takes this decision as one to reach lightly is, I think, being exceedingly unwise. It is for that reason that, with my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, I am sorry that the Government did not bring these papers out until to-day. I think they ought to have done it before, because there have been
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several requests to give us the facts about the Treaty. Moreover, there are other faults as well on the part of the Government. It cannot be helped, but it is a pity that this application for membership of the European unity organisations has come at a time when our country, unfortunately, is in serious financial and economic difficulties.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL AND MINISTER FOR SCIENCE (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, if I may just say one thing, which I hope the noble Lord will not mind, it is not, of course, the case that we have only to-day brought out any of these papers; they have been published for years. What we have done—and I was grateful for what the noble Viscount said—is to make them available to Members of this House in the Printed Paper Office, which is more convenient, of course. But they have, in fact, been published for years by the Community itself.
LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Viscount. Of course, I congratulate the Government on putting them into the Printed Paper Office. My only regret is that they did not help our education by doing it weeks ago, because, evidently they have existed for quite a long time, and I think that was a pity. However, I was saying that it is unfortunate that we should have this matter to be decided at a time when our country, unfortunately, is in financial and economic difficulties, the reasons for which and the Government's responsibility for which I shall not discuss because we debated that last week. It is just bad luck that it should be so. However, my Lords, that would not be a reason for postponing negotiations and decision in this matter. Already we are rather late in reaching this stage. My point is that it would have been better if the Government had come to a conclusion earlier on, though I appreciate that they had their difficulties within their Party, as we have some within ours. But we need a great deal of education.
My noble friend Lord Longford has referred to the Daily Telegraph. I would refer to the Daily Herald, which had a series of articles explaining, pro and con, if I remember rightly, the Common

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Market, and they have since published them as a pamphlet. They support the Common Market, it is perfectly true, but this was good journalism, useful to the country. One of the things I could not stand, and which made me say things that I ought not to have said, was the B.B.C.'s silly so-called discussion last week on the Common Market, which was just about as bad as I.T.V.'s Free Speech at its worst. It was a slanging match—and Free Speech on I.T.V. is a pretty awful thing—with everybody interrupting everybody else, and at the end of it I would defy any citizen who watched television and those chaps fooling about to be able to say that he knew more about the Common Market than he did at the beginning. The B.B.C., for which I have a great respect, and which I will champion against commercial television any day, dropped in standing, in estimation and in status by that horrible performance which it put on. I hope these words will reach their Lordships at Broadcasting House.
Of course, the Government on these matters have rather wobbled. I remember going to the first meeting of the Council of Europe when Mr. Winston Churchill, as he then was—and he was in great form—got up, without anybody knowing what he was going to do, and advocated a European Army, a real international show. We of the Labour Party did not jump and pick it up at that moment. We were in government and so we let it go. But he did advocate it. Then in 1951 Mr. Churchill became head of a Conservative Government and dropped the very thing that he had advocated with much passion at Strassbourg just a few years previously.
I think the Prime Minister has had his evolutions. He has had an important political career and, on the whole, at any rate until recently, it has been on the side of enlightened ideas. But he has gone up and down, as my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition showed. I am not making too much of this, because I suppose everybody in the course of his life may have changed his views about something. It would have been far better than waiting for my noble friend to come out and criticise the Prime Minister for it if the Prime Minister had said that this was so and made
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a clean breast of it. That is the best way of getting away with it, in my judgment.
I thought that my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough made a sincere, able and understandable speech at the beginning of the debate. I think he is to be congratulated upon it, because I know that he has deep and sincere convictions on this matter. If I do not fully agree with him it will not be by way of criticizing him. We are too good friends for that, and I know he will be understanding, tolerant, and will not hold it against me if I happen to take a different view from the one which he genuinely holds. There are mixed views about this in all parts of industry. An essential point that we must remember is that we are not settling the issue to-day. We are not finally deciding whether or not we shall join the Common Market. What we are deciding, if the Government get their majority, is to make application to join in order that important negotiations may follow; and then, arising out of those negotiations, if the Government think the result is satisfactory, they will come to Parliament and ask Parliament to take the decisive step. I think the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, who also, if I may say so, made his usual able speech, would agree with that interpretation of the situation in which we are at this moment. So final judgment is deferred by the Government and by the Opposition.
I think the situation has arrived when we cannot delay, even though we are in economic difficulties. As I say, I think it would have been better if we had come to this point at an earlier stage. But we must remember that if we hold out too long, if we do not move at this stage, if we want months or even years of delay it may be that we shall not be able to join the Common Market at all. As it is, there have been one or two people, particularly has there been one person, who did not seem very enthusiastic about the British joining. But I hope that has altered. There are matters to be taken care of. The Commonwealth is profoundly important, and none of us wishes to upset or to endanger our good relations with the Commonwealth countries.
Of all the Commonwealth countries, perhaps the one I personally feel most

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concerned about, though I am concerned about all of them, is New Zealand. They are, perhaps to a greater extent than the others, dependent upon British trade with them and the British economy. Moreover, they are, as is Northern Ireland, aggressively loyal to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and I like that. I am loyal myself, and I want everybody else to be, too. But that is a great thing on the part of New Zealand. There is never any doubt about where New Zealand will go if the Mother Country is in trouble. So we must do our best to take care of the Commonwealth and its interests, and the E.F.T.A. powers with whom we have been associated—that should be kept in mind.
It is important that we should know the position which has been taken by the Prime Minister as to where we stand in this matter. He said in the House of Commons on Monday, July 31, at column 929 [Vol. 645, No. 159] of Hansard:
"No British Government could join the European Economic Community without prior negotiation with a view to meeting the needs of the Commonwealth countries, of our European Free Trade Association partners, and of British agriculture consistently with the broad principles and purpose which have inspired the concept of European unity and which are embodied in the Rome Treaty."
I refer to these statements of the Prime Minister because I am going to ask at the end for an assurance by Ministers that they mean what they say; that there is no intent to be evasive in the matter—which I am not alleging; though I think we are right in wishing to be assured emphatically that the Prime Minister said what he meant.
My right honourable friend, the Leader of the Opposition in another place, said at column 931:
"The Prime Minister has, however, made it perfectly plain that what is now proposed is not any decision to join the Common Market, but the start of negotiations to establish the conditions on which we might join."
A little later on, at column 932, the Prime Minister said:
"At every point the Commonwealth will be consulted. I have made it quite clear, and so have my right honourable friends: if, at some point, it were thought desirable to have a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, at the right moment, probably when the negotiations had reached a certain stage, before any final decision were put before Parliament and this country, then I can only say that I would be the first to welcome such a meeting."
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I have read those extracts in order that they may be underlined by Ministers who take part in the debate, and that we may be doubly assured about the matter.
Agriculture is important, and that will be a factor in the negotiations. We are not asking that the Commonwealth countries should each have a veto over anything the British wish to do in this matter. That would not be tolerable, and it must be remembered that in economic matters the Commonwealth countries themselves take their own course—naturally, and not improperly—when they think that their own national economic interests warrant that being done. The Dominions have done it from time to time in the way of duties and import quotas. I am not saying that they should not, but I think it fair to say that although we must do everything we can to take care of the Commonwealth, nevertheless the British have some right, in this troublesome world, to take care of themselves as well. We have our rights; and, after all, in essentials, despite the Channel, we are part of Europe, and I do not think we can get out of that. Our electorate has rights. Possible future Labour or Socialist Governments will have their rights, and I hope very much that the Leader of the House was right when he said that they need not worry that the Treaty will prejudice the possible policy of a future Labour or Socialist Government, which is, of course, for the British electorate to settle, and not other people.
The Council will be there. Political powers are importantly involved, and perhaps the political side is in some ways a little more worrying than the economic. But it depends upon what kind of political set-up comes about. I am inclined to think that the idea of a Confederation is better than something like the United States Congress running the United States of Europe—not quite to the extent that the Congress does, but to a considerable extent. I would sooner have Governments co-operating. As I tried to explain to the Continentals at one of the meetings of the Council of Europe, the difference, in our view, is that the French and Italians, for example, are liable to accept a doctrine, the whole thing. But when it comes to

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the point we find that there are reservations.
There was a Frenchman who, in a great and eloquent speech, said that he was proud that the new Constitution of France had left in the original wording of the Constitution that France was willing to give up its sovereignties for the good of the world. I said, "That is fine, but I will guarantee that when you come to give up some of your sovereignties, or you are faced with the question, you will find reasons why there should be exceptions to the doctrine which is laid down in the Constitution, and you will get away with it." I said, "That is your way of thinking; it is not for me to be abusive about it; but I will tell you the British way. The British learn as they go; they are a bit ad hoc in their thinking. They are not rejecting all ideas of international co-operation in Western Europe, but they want to try things out; do one thing at a time; then add to the thing when they begin to see the light about it. Therefore they move by practice and experience, whereas you move by theory and then go back on the theory if you want to." That is the difference between the British process of thinking and the process of some thinking on the Continent of Europe. I am not saying who is right, but I think I know.
However, despite all this talk about the political situation we really must not play the fool, using words about people's names and then saying "I am not going to mix up with that man." Other countries elect in some way the Government they want. I was not happy about General de Gaulle getting the dictatorial powers he got, and I said so on television, when the view of some other prominent people in the Labour Party was that it was not too good but that it was the only thing they could do. Moreover, I think he is a hit of an awkward chap—I thought that during the war. He is not a typical Frenchman; in fact he is quite unlike the average Frenchman: he is cold and distant, and over-dignified. Nevertheless he must have ability to have "got away with" the things he has. I am not going to say, however, that, because I do not praise General de Gaulle, therefore we must not join the Common Market. That really would be idiotic.
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It would be equivalent to the French saying they do not like the Prime Minister—and we might agree with them. It seems to me that they have no right to tell us who is going to be our Prime Minister, and we have no right to tell them either.
Then some other people use the word "Adenauer" with bated breath as if he is a shocking chap, a sworn enemy of our country. They are absolutely wrong. I know Dr. Adenauer very well. I have had the pleasure of talking to him several times and shall be glad to do so again. He is a good friend of this country and a good European. He is a friend of peace; and in Germany he, with the Socialist leaders, has made a much better job of Parliamentary democracy than the Germans made after the First World War. So why should people use the word "Adenauer" and say that they will not have anything to do with him? They might as well say, on one ground or another, that they will not have anything to do with the President of the United States, which would be plainly absurd and ridiculous.
It seems to me that some people are very anxious to be "buddies" with Mr. Khrushchev, of the Soviet Union, and Mr. Mao, of China, which is a curious thing. I have no objection to doing business with Mr. Khrushchev or Mr. Mao. I am willing to do business with anybody for the sake of peace and for the good of the world and for our country. But my feeling is that these men are much more trouble than Adenauer or de Gaulle; and, moreover, they do not believe in democracy, and say so. It is a curious lack of logic that is tolerant to the Communist totalitarians and intolerant about the men who, in the case of Adenauer is a good parliamentarian and a friend of Europe, and de Gaulle, who, while not perfect, might be worse.
My Lords, it is no good Socialists, of whom I am proud to be one, saying, "Workers of all countries unite", and then adding, "but not with the French under de Gaulle; not with the Germans under Adenauer; not with the United States under their capitalist Government." We live in a mixed world. We are living in mixed political Parties on this subject now, but we have to live in a mixed world, and that is all the more reason why we should fight for the causes in which we believe, and why we

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should be sufficiently tolerant to enable the peoples of the world to live in peace and friendship with each other.
Now I come to the economic aspect about this proposal—and I do not say that it is particularly simple. The people who negotiate this business on either side will have plenty of worries, and there will be sonic different brain processes lake place with the British as compared with some of the Continentals; it will not be easy. But I remember the first time I went to the United States of America—I have been there seven times, and I hope to go again. What impressed me was the vastness of that country. There were 48 States then; there are now 50. In a sense, they are supreme States. The only powers the Federal Government have are the powers conferred upon them by the Constitution, or granted by Congress; otherwise the States are supreme.
The thing that particularly impressed me was the absence of customs and tariff barriers between those 48 States. Supposing they had had them—and they could well have had these tariff and customs barriers. It would have hamstrung the internal trade of the United States of America, which has become extensive and, on the whole, apart from their sort of prosperous inflation, successful, due largely, I say, to the absence of barriers between the trade of the various States. If it is right for the United States, it seems to me that it is in principle right for Western Europe, which potentially in this matter has a population of 300 million; much bigger than that of the United States and much bigger than that of the Soviet Union. It does seem to me that, as an economic proposition, by and large, though it will hurt us here and there, it is right that we should go into this scheme.
Not so long ago we used to talk about the desirability of a United States of Europe. When M. Briand brought that argument out—I think the British Socialists had brought it out before—it was received with considerable enthusiasm; and, if I am not mistaken, many Labour leaders at the time thought it was a good idea. If we believe in a United States of Europe, what is the matter with some unity between the Western European countries? I should have thought that in principle it was
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right, and I think there ought to be as a whole—and one can talk only about "as a whole"—economic advantages in the Common Market idea in Western Europe.
It is true that we shall have to face competition within these numerous countries with a tariff wall around the lot—not each of them, but the lot. But I am not sure that a little competition will do us lasting harm. Perhaps a little competition may do British industry good. I think some parts of it have been avoiding competition too much. I am prepared to tolerate private enterprise, within its proper sphere—at any rate, whether I am prepared to or not, we must, as things are—but what I do not wish to tolerate is private unenterprise; and at present we have some of that. If this new state of affairs livens up competition it may be a good thing.
My Lords, the idea is opposed by the Communists and the Communist countries. If it were practicable and if there were sincerity all round, they would be welcomed into this new concern; but, of course, in their case it is not practicable, and they would genuinely avoid it, so that they would almost certainly be unwilling. But they ought to be the last to grumble. They have a "Common Market" in Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, and they have a centralised political direction over their European colonies in Eastern Europe. The truth is that the Communists want to make the West weak, not only militarily but economically, because if they make the West economically weak they will automatically make it militarily weak as well. I think there is a great deal of hypocrisy going on in the Communist Party and among their sympathisers elsewhere.
If we go in we have a potential 300 million free trade market. We have not been able to get a free trade Commonwealth, for reasons that we all understand; the British Commonwealth has not full free trade, though there is some preference between various countries of the Commonwealth. If this comes off, I should like the idea some day to be extended to N.A.T.O. and the N.A.T.O. countries as well. That would make an even bigger and much more successful economic proposition than Western Europe. I think that going in will liven up our industry, give us some of the

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advantages the United States has; and, of course, it will help peace in Western Europe. One of the curses of Europe has been the traditional enmity between France and Germany, as was, earlier, the enmity between France and ourselves. France and Germany are now co-operating, are good friends; and I think that is right. If we stay out we lose those advantages. Western Europe will expand economically and we, relatively, may economically contract. Many of our factories will transfer to within the tariff wall of Western Europe; in fact some of them are going to Western Europe now—the process has started.
My ultimate idea in international government is a World Government as an instrument of a mixed lot of countries, but free countries, democratic countries, and free peoples. In the end, within proper limits that is right. It is not practicable to-day, because we cannot yet solve this Communist problem, but since I believe in world government as an ultimate ideal, within this sphere, I can hardly object in principle to this step on the way, if agreement can be reached. I think it is consistent with that ideal, and therefore I think it is right.
Our island has had a great place in the world; it still has a great place. We have often done much in the way of helping the world towards sanity, and in world leadership I believe that the British have a part to play in the European community. Therefore, subject to the results of these negotiations, I think it is right to take the proposed step.
6.23 p.m.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friends Lord Longford and Lord Morrison of Lambeth for assuring me that their support for our entry into the Common Market springs from their Socialist beliefs. I am reassured because in 1948 when I attended, in company with the noble Lord, Lord Netherthorpe, the conference at The Hague on a United Europe it was frowned on in official Socialist circles. So it is good to know that I am now, as it were, restored to the fold.
It is obvious, of course, since I was a signatory of the manifesto which was originated by 'the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and am now a member of the Common Market Committee, of which
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he is Chairman, that I warmly welcome the Government's decision. I have throughout my political life believed in this kind of union, both economically and politically. I can indeed share the regrets of my noble friends which are sot out in the Amendment that the Government action has been so long delayed, and that, as our Amendment indicates, we now go into these negotiations from a position of economic weakness. But that is the only criticism I can make. I do most warmly welcome the Government's action. Indeed, if there is a Division to-morrow night, and I find myself in a small but select company, it will be for the sole reason that I greatly appreciate the value of that company and like the company in which I shall find myself; because I feel that there is absolutely no argument at all on general grounds against the action the Government now propose to take. Indeed, in my view, the consequences for Britain and for Europe of our staying outside the Common Market are too disastrous to contemplate.
The noble Viscount, Lord Knollys, dealt with a number of points with regard to industry, and I should like to deal with some of the objections and fears that have been raised in connection with the agricultural industry. It is my experience that people do not understand or appreciate the most abstruse points which are discussed with regard to the Treaty of Rome. What they are concerned with, and I think quite rightly concerned with, is the question, "How is it going to affect me?" The issue has to be broken down into those points, how, so far as we can gather, is it going to affect the individual. After all, that is the most important point.
For the last 35 years I have owned and farmed a small farm, and I have been through the very bad times of the inter-war years. Throughout my political life I have fought for the interests of a prosperous agriculture, and I should be the very last to advocate any kind of policy which I believed would be likely to affect adversely the interests of the farming community. I am not only convinced that entry into the Common Market is the one way to ensure the continued prosperity of British agriculture, but I am certain that that prosperity will be destroyed if we stay out and adhere to our present open market system.

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Last year nearly two-thirds of the food we consumed in this country—I am speaking of food which can be grown in temperate climates—was raised on British farms. That included the lion's share of many staple foods, about 90 per cent. or more of liquid milk, eggs in shell, barley, oats and potatoes, and two-thirds of our meat. This year I think the proportions will be appreciably less, for the simple reason that, except for meat, all those foods are in surplus and we are the world's only major free food market. So to an ever increasing extent we are becoming the world's dumping ground. This year, as we know, there has been dumping of eggs, milk products, and barley. The French have sold barley here at £10 a ton less than the price they are paying to their own farmers. Russia, too, has entered our market on a substantial scale. Market prices have gone down, and the taxpayers' subsidy bill has gone up.
As European food production increased, of course, the dumping would also increase, and the situation would become worse. We should, therefore, be faced with the alternative of ending the free market and the price support system or destroying British agriculture. I submit that if we join the Common Market dumping will cease, dumping not only by countries of the Six but also by other countries. Then, of course, the argument runs that we should be at the mercy of the low-cost producers of the Six countries of the Common Market. I doubt it. Germany, a high-cost producer, apparently has no fears; and as yet no evidence has been produced at all, so far as I am aware, that France produces at lower cost than we do. I do not believe they do, because it is against all the probabilities.
British agriculture is unquestionably more efficient. We have an overall average of something like 70 acres per farm compared with perhaps less than 25 acres per farm on the Continent. We are far better capitalised and technically more advanced. For instance, we have one tractor to every two-and-a-half workers, whereas on the Continent the proportion is one tractor to nearly nine workers. That is one of the reasons why, in the last ten years, we have increased output per farm worker by 40 per cent. That is a quite incredible achievement and I think, with proper encouragement,
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this trend will continue. I am convinced that our efficient, mechanised, modern farming industry has nothing to fear from the Continental peasant farmer.
But then the objection runs: you will have to abolish the support price system of farm subsidies. Your Lordships will be aware that during the last three years, on every possible occasion, I have tried to prove how stupidly and disastrously expensive this system has been to farmers, taxpayers and consumers alike. I think its abolition would be the greatest economic blessing the Government could confer on the long-suffering farming community and the housewife. Consider how farmers, taxpayers and consumers alike have suffered under the price support system. In the last ten years, although farmers have
increased their efficiency by 25 per cent. and therefore their production by 25 per cent., they are now, in real terms, 12½ per cent. worse off than they were ten years ago. No other industry in the whole country has fared anything like so badly as that; and it has cost and is costing the taxpayer £250 million a year to provide even this miserable Irishman's rise.
If we decided now by decree that the farmers should enjoy to-day the same living standards that they had ten years ago, when they were producing 25 per cent. less food, the taxpayers' bill would be £500 million per year. You have only to mention such a staggering sum to realise the tragic failure of the price support system. It has been possible for the Government and the Treasury to continue it so long only by depressing farmers' living standards. I express the view, as a member of the National Farmers' Union, that it is to the eternal discredit of the N.F.U. that, last year, they should have brought themselves to say that such a system was the best for British agriculture. That is why I say that its abolition would be a blessing, and one of the blessings which can arise from our entry into the Common Market.
Last week I asked the Government whether steps could be taken to control imports of Russian barley. The noble Earl, Lord Waldegrave, said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 233 (No. 117), col. 1090] that this
"would require a major change in the Government's free market policy and the system of agricultural support by deficiency payments."

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I believe that major change cannot come too soon. I submit that we do not have to wait for entry into the Common Market in order to make that change; we should do it now and adopt the Continental system of import levies and tariffs. We should then be gaining experience of the kind of system under which we shall have to work, if and when we enter the Common Market. What would be the effect of such a change? The taxpayer, of course, would be relieved of this annual burden of £250 million, because farm production grants, which I hope will continue, would be paid for out of the tariffs and levies. The farmer would sell at prices roughly equivalent to the level of the present guarantees and would not be any worse off—perhaps in some commodities he would be a little better off.
Then the argument still runs that there will be higher prices in the shops. I question that. Present retail prices are quite high enough to allow processers and distributors ample profit, even if they paid full guaranteed prices. One of the unexplained mysteries of the present system—I hope that whoever is going to reply for the Government will try to explain this mystery and deal with it—is, that as farm prices fall, prices in the shops rise. For example, although barley prices are a post-war low, practically back to pre-war, the price of beer is an all-time high. Although wheat prices continually fall, bread prices continually rise. For example, wheat is two-thirds of its 1951 price, but the price of bread is more than double.
The Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Soames, said last month that the price of Canadian hard wheat was the same to-day (that is, last month) as it was in 1960, but that English soft wheat was £18 a ton compared with £24 10s. last year; and he added that home milled flour was 16s. a ton dearer. That means—and it is beyond any kind of denial—that the middlemen have pocketed that extra £6 10s. a ton profit. There is no other possible answer to it. If the price of the product has gone up and the price of the raw material has gone down, then the people in between have enjoyed the extra profit. It really means that the subsidies have been used to depress farm
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prices and that the housewife does not benefit. It is more than time that the Government acted. If distributors and processers were satisfied with reasonable profits there would be no need for shop prices to go up, if and when we go into the Common Market.
I believe those are the only points which I have heard raised from the agricultural point of view in regard to our entry into the Common Market, and I think they have been answered. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Netherthorpe, is here, because I shall be most interested to hear him to-morrow deal with those points, and perhaps demolish them; or at least make some kind of an answer as to why it is that the prices of these commodities are so much lower than they were ten years ago but the prices in the shops are so much higher, sometimes double. I submit that this is something that entry into the Common Market can avoid.
There remains the genuine fear which farmers have expressed, that the countries of the Six may wish to fix farm prices at a level which British farmers would find unremunerative. I think that is most unlikely. Twenty-five per cent. of all workers in France and over 40 per cent. of all workers in Italy work on the land. Agriculture is of supreme importance to them. There is not the slightest chance that their people would agree to a level of prices which British farmers would find unremunerative. The French Prime Minister made clear in a broadcast on July 29, the difficulties that would be encountered, and said that
"As regards farm products the Treaty of Rome remained more of a hope than a reality."
I warmly welcome what was said by the noble Earl, Lord Home, that now is the time for us to enter into these negotiations, particularly in respect of agriculture. However unfortunate it may be that we did not start some years ago, I think the time for this particular point is now, and that for the same reason we should at the earliest practical moment endeavour to deal with the problems of the Commonwealth. But I would say that, even there, the difficulties are not on anything like so wide a front as some people would have us believe. After all, tropical foodstuffs and almost all Commonwealth raw materials enter the

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Common Market freely now, and presumably they will continue to do so. These raw materials bulk large in total Commonwealth exports. Wool, for example, represents nearly one-half of Australia's total exports and more than one-third of New Zealand's.
Of course, there are very difficult products, such as grain and dairy products, where it is no use blinking the fact that we shall have very considerable difficulties. But I would say this, my Lords: at the end of the day, when the negotiations are completed and when we have got all the concessions that we can, if, as may well be the case, we have as regards those difficult products not got everything which we should have liked on behalf of the Commonwealth, I would submit that that would not be a reason for not coming to agreement on our entry into the Common Market. I think that we should then search round to see whether we can find other ways of helping the Commonwealth producers.
I suppose that, of the major maritime nations of the world, we alone do not in some way or other subsidise our shipping. I should like to know, and perhaps the noble Viscount will be able to tell us later on, whether it would be completely "out", under the terms of the Treaty of Rome, if, for example, we subsidised British merchant shipping and if the subsidy were used to give a freight advantage to Commonwealth countries who were shipping these difficult products—grain and other things—to this country. It might well be that by these and other means we could restore any loss that might arise to the Commonwealth countries from the negotiations which are taking place.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, if I may interrupt, the noble Lord will find that it is incompatible, under Article 92 of the Treaty.
LORD STONHAM: I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount. Then we have the corollary: the other countries of the Six will obviously have to discontinue the illegal practices that they are now carrying on. But it was at least worth a question, and it illustrates the kind of thing that I have in mind: that we should, from the very beginning, make it clear that we are determined that the Commonwealth shall not suffer.
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I feel that if we make that clear we shall find a way, perhaps several ways, to reach the objective.
Finally, I should like to say a word on the question of sovereignty, and the possible loss of sovereignty, which seems to worry a great many people. In 1946 there was formed in this House the British Parliamentary Movement for World Government, of which I was the first Treasurer; so at least I became accustomed to the idea of the advantages of the surrender of sovereignty a long time ago. I find it difficult to understand how some form of union or regional federation or association involving a loss of sovereignty can be in any way incompatible with the wider and ultimate objective of world government. I would just say this: the classic definition of war, which is very frequently overlooked, is:
"A collection of sovereign States in contact."
In other wards, war is continuous while sovereign States are in contact. When countries surrender sovereignty over matters of common interest they achieve peace.
My noble friend Lord Morrison of Lambeth has mentioned the impression which was made on his mind with regard to the 48, now 50, States of the United States of America. The 50 widely differing countries of the United States of America came together in a democratic way: the many countries of the United States of Russia were fused by totalitarian methods. The important point, my Lords, however, is that within both those unions war is extremely unlikely; and I feel that it would be the same within, whatever you like to call it, something comparable to a United States of Europe. I am equally sure that we shall never be certain of peace until we are wise enough to surrender or fuse certain basic sovereignties. I think it is true that, in the nuclear age, national sovereignty is an illusion, whether it is bolstered up by an expensive but totally inadequate Army or a hopeless determination to "go it alone" in a trade war. I would say that those who still believe in such things should ask themselves whether the British people can best fulfil their pride of race as equal partners in a prosperous, peaceful Europe or as sovereigns over a radio-active desert.
6.46 p.m.
LORD AUCKLAND: My Lords, as another Session of Parliament draws to a close it is perhaps opportune that in both Houses to-day we should be discussing what is perhaps one of the greatest decisions of the century: whether or not we should enter into the Common Market. It is in terms of future years that we must think as well as of the present. I am quite certain that none of us would want the name "Commonwealth" to become, in future years, a forgotten word—already it is a ward which is denigrated in some quarters—and I have confidence that the Government will ensure that the Commonwealth will be given the maximum protection and consultation in all negotiations which may take place. But it is to be hoped that, in 50 years' time, our children, at their school desks, will not think of the Commonwealth in the same terms as they may think of, say, the Jacobite uprisings—as another history lesson; and I think it is incumbent on Parliament to-day to make sure that they will not.
My Lords, to quote the phrase of one of the greatest statesmen of all time, "In this matter, time is not on our side". We have to decide quickly, but we have to decide carefully. On balance, I believe that our entry into the Common Market will do nothing but good to this country. As a nation we have a proud record of leadership. We have given the Commonwealth a great deal of leadership during the past two centuries or so, and now we can give Europe leadership. There are many countries in Europe, and particularly in the Six, which do not possess Governments and economies as stable as one would like them to be, but I believe that, even at this late stage, we can give them that leadership.
There is already one very big commercial institution, namely, Lloyd's, in which I myself work, which in a sense operates its own Common Market. We have a great deal of long-term treaty business with countries like Italy and Belgium; and by and large it works quite well. Naturally, of course, we should like to capture our own markets as well. Here I should like to pay my own tribute to the outstandingly good maiden speech of my noble friend Lord Poole, who himself has distinguished connections in Lloyds, and is dis-
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tinguished in many theatres of business. He made an incisive speech which was entirely convincing.
My Lords, there is one matter which is causing worry, and that is the business of horticulture. I believe that Scotland, in particular, is worried on one question. One of the relatively new industries of Scotland—at least I think it is fairly new—is the growing of raspberries; and a train now runs every day from Coupar, Angus, to London, with fresh raspberries. Indeed, in my own experience there is nothing to beat English fruit, be it apples, strawberries, raspberries, or tomatoes. If I may turn to the excellent and lucid publication by the Daily Telegraph, Britain and the Common Market, which is the first publication that has enabled me to understand the Common Market, I see that it says in one section:
"There would be no tariff or quota protection against Continental imports".
I feel that the horticulture industry might well be worried about that, because already our markets and our shops are over-flooded, to my mind, with Italian tomatoes and apples; and it would be a great pity if apples from Australia and New Zealand were handicapped by this.
I turn now to cars. There was a protest in one newspaper, which has always been hostile to the Common Market, that the Volkswagen would be a good deal cheaper. Personally, I do not subscribe to that protest. The Volkswagen is a very good car, and some of our own cars are not, perhaps, of as good a quality as they might be. I feel that entry into the Common Market could provide a great incentive to our motor manufacturers to produce more sturdy cars. Many of our cars have tinny bodies, and their performance certainly does not measure up to that of many Continental cars, although there has been an improvement over the past five years or so.
The noble Earl, Lord Longford, mentioned that, by and large, the Press had been very fair-minded towards the Common Market; and I think that is true. But I am very concerned about the attitude of the Daily Express, if I may be allowed to quote one newspaper. They are, of course, entitled to their views, but they have not stressed the fact that the Government are only negotiating to enter the Common Market. While not wishing to be unfair to the Daily Express,

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I feel sure that the ordinary person reading this chain of newspapers might well
get the impression that we had already decided unconditionally to enter the Common Market. I rather hope that the tone of these newspapers will change.
The other specific point that I want to raise is in regard to Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, which deals with the influx of workers. I hope that the Government will state quite categorically that this country will not become flooded out with foreign workers who have no proper jobs to go to, and that workers who do come in will not be able to change their jobs ad infinitum. I think that that is especially important in agriculture. Many of the small farms in Bedfordshire and East Anglia are already suffering from a labour shortage. It is true that bona fide workers from the Continent would help them, but it is to be hoped that it will not be to the exclusion of the British worker.
My Lords, over the past weeks people as a Whole, and especially young people, have been taking more and more interest in this subject. The other evening I addressed an audience of young Conservatives. I touched on the subject of the Common Market, in a completely non-Party manner—because it is a non-Party matter so far as the country is concerned—and I was bombarded with questions. This is a healthy sign, because it is the young people of this country who will feel most of all the implications of the Common Market. I would end by stressing that, whatever negotiations the Government enter into, I think they are adopting the correct attitude that the Commonwealth, and especially Australia and New Zealand, will be very firmly considered.
6.58 p.m.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, I must apologise to your Lordships for not having a speech as well prepared as your Lordships are entitled to, but on arrival at the House to-day I expected to find that I was speaking tomorrow, and to my astonishment, I found I was down to speak this afternoon. But I venture to speak to your Lordships, none the less, because having a certain first-hand knowledge of the Continent, for I have lived there for a certain amount of time as well as worked there, I feed that I could make a
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few remarks about our attitude towards the Continent and the Continental mind. If we in this world are ever to return to the conditions before the Tower of Babel, when all were alleged to have spoken the same language, it seems to me that this step of which the Government have given notice—and I, amongst many of your Lordships this afternoon, welcome it—must be taken if we are eventually going to have real peace on this earth and move out of the present state of the cold war. As the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary said in his admirable and very pleasant speech this afternoon, we are only asking permission to enter, and not in fact taking the final step.
If Europe is to survive, Europe must come together and weld itself into a much more tightly-knit group of countries than it is at present, which must include Britain. Of course, there are difficulties and problems, about which we have heard this afternoon—the Commonwealth, agriculture and E.F.T.A.—but given the spirit, there is no doubt that these problems will eventually be solved. But—and this is the basis of my remarks—we shall not solve them unless our negotiators are men who understand the Continental mind. After all, we have been cooped up in this island for a 1,000 years or more and it is difficult for us to realise what the Continental is thinking. The main impression that we must give the people of the Continent is that we are approaching them with a vew to helping and not disrupting, to strengthening and not to weakening. Europe will not welcome us unless we discard the attitude of looking down our noses at the Continent. Unfortunately, that attitude still exists. We had an example of it when the Six offered us a chance of associating with them. If I remember rightly, we did not exactly snub them; we did not even bother to reply. That is the sort of attitude which has now disappeared, and I hope that it will not return.
I was in Germany and Holland last week and I heard on all sides that these two countries—and I am sure this applies to Belgium also—will welcome us with open arms. Of course, there will be reservations about France, but I am sure that many of us understand the difficulties in which she finds herself. We

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must bear with France; and, after all, she is only one of the Six. As the Foreign Secretary said, with patience we will achieve the end. I shall not touch on any other of the problems in detail. Your Lordships have heard them already this afternoon. The Foreign Secretary, who was Secretary of Commonwealth Relations, is happy about the Commonwealth attitude, and who am I to be otherwise? I must say that I welcome this. The noble Lord, Lord Knollys, told us that industry as a whole would seem to welcome this step, and from my own small knowledge of industry I know that it is true. I am sure that the genuine competition which joining the Common Market will engender will come to eradicate the restrictive practices on both sides of industry, and that is something which will be good for the ethics of this country.
In his admirable maiden speech the noble Lord, Lord Poole, said that we must face up to the fact that we are living in a new world, but while we are negotiating, we must remain steadfast to our friends in the Commonwealth and E.F.T.A. With patience, with understanding and with the realisation that the countries on the Continent do welcome us, provided they realise that we come to help and not to hinder, this great step will prove of benefit not only to ourselves, not only to Europe and to the Commonwealth, but also to the world at large.
7.5 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, I have had great searchings of heart over this problem. I have read an immense amount of literature on the subject and, like the noble Lord, I have gone from one side to the other. But my economic doubts are now resolved, and therefore I support the Government approach. The march towards political power will be full of difficulties for all the partners, but let us meet these difficulties and devise their solution as they arise, and not try to conjure them up to meet them in advance; because it is very likely that the problems will be different when we actually come to deal with them.
My economic doubts were on agriculture, free trade in manufactures and the
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Commonwealth. Agriculture I do not see as a food factor. I regard it as a way of life, as a stream of replenishment of lost vitality in an urban people; and no industrial nation can afford to neglect its agriculture. It appears to me that the Common Market is likely to have precisely this same approach to this problem, and I believe that British agriculture would be safer in the philosophy of the Common Market than it may be in the philosophy which at times tends to prevail in this country.
I turn to manufactures. To me, free trade is a problem to be approached in a purely pragmatical manner. I do not share the almost religious fervour with which Cobdenite ideas have captured a large part of the Conservative Party. Free trade between comparative equals, if over a sufficiently large area, is obviously a good thing, as has been proved by the United States in their immense area of free trade behind a very high tariff barrier. But in my opinion there can be no free trade between those who are grossly unequal, no free trade with costless Communist blocs and no free trade with the civilisations of the Orient based on rice-bowl wages. And I believe that here the Common Market will have much the same philosophy. I do not think that there is going to be any nonsense about Communist or Oriental goods destroying large and efficient industries paying Western wages in a Common Market. Some people are doubtful whether we can compete within the bloc with those whose standards are roughly our own. Well, if we cannot do that, we shall certainly perish if we stay out. So we had much better go in, and, if necessary, learn to compete.
My third doubt is about the Commonwealth. We must not let down those great Dominions who share our creed, but I do not believe that there is any need for them to be let down. The Anglo-European bloc is still going to eat. In fact, with increasing population and, we hope, a rising standard of living, it is going to eat more and more. Any increase in food production in Europe is likely to be, on the whole, high-cost production, and the low-cost producers of Australia and New Zealand should be able to surmount any reasonable tariff. In fact, I think they may be in a better position than they are at the moment,

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when they are faced with great uncertainty, owing, as the noble Lord, Lord Stonham, has pointed out, to the peculiar nature of our farm support.
But supposing they do not like to take the risk, cannot we do something even better for them? What every farmer in the world wants is a guaranteed market at a known price—of course for an unlimited quantity, but one cannot admit that. But can we not consider whether guaranteed markets and guaranteed minimum prices for a limited quantity can be provided, in view of our position as a huge consumer? And can we not share the possible cost of this with their own Governments? If we do so, are we not entitled to ask for some reciprocal benefit?
The benefits of the Ottawa preferences have been largely whittled away by the change in the value of money, and it seems to me that the Dominions, on the whole, get rather better value out of their remnant than we do. I believe that here is an opportunity of starting something new which would form a still more valuable link than we have at the moment. By and large, the food they grow is wanted here in Europe, or in this country, or in the under-developed countries for which we and Europe have some responsibility and which we are pledged to help. Surely there are in this the makings of a scheme which would do a great deal to resolve their doubts, and we should be a big enough Community to consider approaching the Americans to see whether in certain commodities the same considerations could not apply.
Quite apart from the economics of food and raw material production, a close link with the great Dominions is of immense interest, I should have thought, to the countries of Europe, because they have no outlet under their own control for migration for their own surplus population to temperate climates; and I should have thought that emigration to the Dominions would be of great interest to them. The rest of the Commonwealth, of course, is in somewhat of a state of flux and we do not know of what the Commonwealth will consist in ten years' time. India and Pakistan are very heavy millstones round our neck economically; and what about these newer territories in Africa?
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Whatever we do, they will ultimately have the choice of affiliation, friendship or whatever we may call it, economic and sentimental, with one of three great blocs: the Communist world, the American world or the Anglo-European world. Those who are subverted from within will choose the Communist world, as they will do whether or not we join the Common Market. By and large, I do not think that most of them have much liking for the American way of life, and I do not think they will choose the American world if they can get satisfaction of their needs from the Anglo-European world. I believe that they will, on the whole, prefer the world of London, Paris, Bonn and Rome, which centuries of Christian civilisation have proved to be the culture centres of the world. So that, taken overall, the Anglo-European world will have the need for the production of markets in the whole Commonwealth, and I do not think it is impossible to provide adequate safeguards. Of course, our going in will add immensely to the possibility of their obtaining the capital and resources they all need.
My Lords, I do not believe that an approach is going to mean ruin for our agriculture. I do not believe that it is going to mean ruin for our industry, and I do not believe that it is going to mean ruin for the Commonwealth. But if all these think they are going to be ruined, and if the Government have to provide safeguards in advance against every conceivable mischance, then our approach will obviously be unsuccessful; and if we miss this chance, I do not know what suitable alternative course we have.
7.16 p.m.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords whose powers of sedentary endurance and sustained interest in the subject of debate have carried them through to the final speech. I have listened to the debate, of which I have missed only one or two speeches, with peculiar interest because noble Lords who have spoken have for the most part devoted themselves to the merits and demerits of the Common Market and it is apparent from what they have said that most noble Lords, both on the Benches opposite and on this side of the House, are in favour of the

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Common Market—of course, on suitable terms. This alone is a fact which I am sure will be of importance for Her Majesty's Government to consider and of importance also to the public here and on the Continent; and it will be a fact of even greater significance if the same thing happens in the course of the debate to-morrow.
I propose, however, to do something far more dull and far less stimulating than has been done by some noble Lords who have preceded me—namely, to talk about the Motion before the House and the Amendment which noble Lords on this side of the House have put to the Motion and have invited your Lordships to accept. I believe it may be of some interest, at any rate, to your Lordships, and it may be useful in view of the fact that we may have a Division to-morrow night, to know some of the arguments which we should like your Lordships to consider in favour of the Amendment which we have tabled.
We take the view that the Government have seriously mishandled this great issue of the Common Market which, as several noble Lords have said, is the most important issue which the Government and the country have had to decide since the war. First, several noble Lords on this side and on the Benches opposite have already said—and I believe it needs to be said again—that Her Majesty's Government should have provided the public with much more information so that the ordinary citizens, and of course the young people for whom the noble Lord, Lord Auckland, was speaking in particular, may be in a position to form a judgment about this issue when they are asked to decide whether or not this country should go into the Common Market.
I do, of course, appreciate the Government's difficulty, which has very rightly been pointed out, about publishing their own views about the Common Market before these negotiations have even begun, or even making comments which could be mistaken for views. But surely that could easily be avoided. It should surely be possible to publish a White Paper limited to the essential facts—
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: What are they?
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL:—and not opinions. There would be no need for the Government to express opinions about the facts in such a Paper. May I give one or two examples of what I mean? Could the Government see any objection to publishing a summary of the main provisions of the Treaty of Rome? The Treaty of Rome is not likely to be read by a very large number of the public or even by your Lordships from beginning to end. But surely it should be possible for any clever draftsman to compile a summary of its main provisions and to include these in a White Paper. Of course, the Government could point out, without in the least departing from the facts, that this, like other Treaties, is one which can be amended by agreement.
Furthermore, they could as an interpretation of the Treaty, which has already been given by the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, the greatest protagonist of European unity, agree about what we refer to in this House as derogation of sovereignty. The ordinary man is asking whether Britain will lose its independence if it goes into the European Economic Community. Surely it should be possible, if the Government take the view that has already been expressed about the derogation of sovereignty, to say that the only field in which our hands would be tied would be the economic field—and that is a matter upon which it appears the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and the noble and learned Viscount the Leader of the House both agree. I am quite certain that this is not something of which the ordinary man in the street is aware, and that it is something of which he should be aware. That is one suggestion.
I should like to make one other suggestion about the possible contents of such a White Paper. Would it not be possible, again without departing from facts and agreed interpretation of the facts, to give some sort of historical data about the Six and what has happened since this Association of European countries was formed? Would it not be possible to describe their trade relationships and the economic development that has taken place in these countries since the Association was formed? That, in itself,

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would help the public to form a judgment about whether it would be worth while for this country to go into the Economic Community. I am quite certain that 99 per cent. of the population are not aware of the commitments we should undertake if we adhered to the Treaty of Rome, and that they do not understand the economic implications of associating with these countries in Western Europe. I feel that the Government ought to do much more than they have done up to now to provide essential facts and objective data on which the ordinary man can form a sound judgment. That is one complaint that I have against the Government.
My next complaint is this. We on this side of the House think that the timing of these negotiations is thoroughly bad. We take the view—and, indeed, this as a general principle is one which I think noble Lords opposite would not disagree with—that you should negotiate from strength and not from weakness. We have always been told that when you are negotiating for political advantages or disarmament, or whatever it may be, you want to negotiate from military and economic strength. Similarly, when you are negotiating, as we shall be, for economic advantages, you want to negotiate from economic strength, and to show that there is every advantage for the people with whom you are negotiating in having a British market to which they can send their goods. If the Government had started these negotiations several years ago, when we were in a state of prosperity and had more to offer, then their task would have been much easier than it is at the present time. They have made the whole thing far more difficult by allowing this period of time to elapse before starting to negotiate with the countries of Western Europe.
The third complaint that we have against the policy of the Government relates to the Commonwealth. Your Lordships will notice that in our Amendment we have said that general acceptability to the Commonwealth should be a necessary condition of entry into Europe; and furthermore, that we think a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference is the best way of testing Commonwealth acceptability. I do not want any misunderstanding to arise as to what we mean by "general acceptability to the Commonwealth". We do not
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mean that any single Commonwealth country should have a veto on what we want to do, or that we must wait to negotiate until we have convinced opinion throughout the Commonwealth that we are right. No other Commonwealth Government will accept this from us or act in this way, and, therefore, it would be perfectly reasonable for us to proceed without getting as wide a measure of agreement as that. What we mean is that the integrity of the Commonwealth is more important than our entry into Europe, and that we must obtain during our negotiations with the Six conditions of entry that will enable our Commonwealth partners at least to acquiesce—we cannot expect them all to agree with any feeling of enthusiasm—in what we propose to do. Surely, both the political and economic terms of entry, whatever they may be, must be consistent with the major national interests of our Commonwealth partners.
One of these major national interests is certainly international trade. We shall not find it at all easy to form new trading connections with Western Europe without damaging our existing connections with the Commonwealth. An obvious example is that the Commonwealth countries which supply us with foodstuffs, such as New Zealand, will suffer greatly if we can no longer give them preferential treatment in the United Kingdom. If we find—and logically it looks extremely likely—that our present system of Commonwealth preference is incompatible with a common external tariff for a Common Market area, then surely what we must do is to endeavour to compensate our Commonwealth partners for the loss of their preferential advantages. It is not for us here in this House to work out how such compensation can be arranged; that is a matter for the Government and for those to whom instructions will be given by the Government when they take part in the negotiations with Western Europe. This, at any rate, should be one of the main objectives of Government policy when these negotiations begin.
I should like to point out only one way in which I think it is obvious that certain Commonwealth countries could be compensated if we were to enter the Common Market. There are the advantages of associate membership provided

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for by the Treaty of Rome. Your Lordships will remember that the French territories of French Africa have already received these advantages as associate members, and there is nothing in the Treaty of Rome which would prevent countries of British origin in Africa from being associated with the Community in that way. The two outstanding advantages which the French countries have enjoyed, and still enjoy, are free access for their products to the European market, and investment of capital by the Community in their relatively undeveloped industries and agriculture. Countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, are, of course, in very much the same position as the French territories, and I very much hope that the Government will do all they can to see that, if the United Kingdom joins the Common Market, then the benefits which now go to the French countries will also accrue to the British countries in Africa. I believe that part of the Treaty dealing with associate membership is being negotiated next year, so that this would seem to be a very good opportunity of dealing with our Commonwealth partners in relation to the Community.
My Lords, we go on to say in our Amendment that the conditions we negotiate with the Six should be "generally acceptable to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference". Why do we place so much more emphasis than the Government appear to do on a Prime Ministers' Conference? It is perfectly true that the Government do not rule out a Prime Ministers' Conference, but we take the view that the Prime Ministers' Conference should be proposed, at any rate, on the initiative of the British Government. The reason for this view is that we have found from experience that a Prime Ministers' Conference is the best way of ironing out differences between Commonwealth countries on major issues. The differences between us and our partners were shown up extremely vividly during the recent Commonwealth tour of Cabinet Ministers. T do not know whether the Government were surprised, but I certainly was surprised, and I have come across many other people who were very surprised, by the amount and the extent of opposition that was shown to the Common Market policy.
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When I say that we recommended this course from experience, I should like to point out a very close parallel in the case of India. In 1948, India wanted to stay in the Commonwealth after becoming a Republic. At that time my noble friend, Lord Attlee, who was Prime Minister as Mr. Macmillan is to-day, decided to send emissaries to find out the views of the other Commonwealth countries on this proposed step. I myself was one of the Ministers sent on this Commonwealth mission, and I can speak from my own recollection when I say that there was serious opposition in some quarters to the idea that any country could stay in the Commonwealth after it had broken with the Crown. That opposition was perfectly understandable, and I am sure that your Lordships will appreciate it.
What my noble friend Lord Attlee decided to do, in order to carry the Commonwealth with us—which is, I am sure, what the Government want to do at the present time—was to invite the Conference in London to discuss the specific issue of India's remaining in the Commonwealth as a Republic. Now at that Conference there was unanimous agreement that India should stay, and in this way the greatest threat to the unity of the Commonwealth since the war was averted. Surely this is the most useful precedent for what we are commending to the Government and to your Lordships this afternoon. We are simply suggesting that Her Majesty's Government should take the initiative in proposing that this procedure should be used to carry the Commonwealth, to get the endorsement of the Commonwealth, to any conditions that may be negotiated in relation to entry to the Common Market.
My Lords, the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary said (and I do not think anyone would agree with him), that we in this country need the economic strength which the Common Market might give us, both for generating capital for development in the underdeveloped countries and to give us the purchasing power we need to buy Commonwealth products. He went on to say that we must earn £500 million more than we are earning at the moment in exports in order to do both of these things; and no doubt he is right.
THE EARL OF HOME: And defence.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: And to cover defence expenditure.
THE EARL OF HOME: Overseas.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: Defence expenditure overseas. In other words, to avoid balance-of-payments crises here
and to help our friends in the Commonwealth. I am grateful to the noble Earl for making it perfectly plain that I have not misunderstood him.
My Lords, that is an aim with which we should all agree. But what are the Government doing to increase production so as to earn this additional income from our exports? The policy of the Government, unfortunately, is not to expand production but to contract production all round—that is to say, production for the export markets, as well as for the home market. We shall not be able to export our products to Western Europe; we shall not succeed in doing what the noble Earl and all of us want to do, unless we produce more at competitive prices at home. So a Common Market policy must, if it is to succeed, be supplemented by an expansionist policy at home. That is exactly what the Government have failed to give us.
The noble Earl, Lord Home, in his speech referred to the Atlantic community and to the interdependence of Europe, the Commonwealth and the United States of America. My only complaint about that was that he referred to it so briefly, only in one short passage, because I felt that it was really the most important thing that he said in his speech. Surely Western Europe can be only a first step. We must look to the much wider unity of the North American countries and Western Europe. I am so thoroughly convinced of this that, when I was asked the other day to become Chairman of another organisation—it is so difficult to take on more work, as your Lordships know—the European Atlantic Group, I agreed to do so. The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, is President, and I could hardly fail to follow his example. But I feel that this is something of urgent and immediate importance, and we must not lose sight of that if we decide to go into the European Community, because the tariff wall which we shall build up against the outside world, if we do this, is bound to
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affect adversely our economic and trading relations with the United States. The only way we can get over that is to negotiate with the United States, either through G.A.T.T. or bilaterally, for a mutual reduction of tariffs, with economic unity as the goal at which we are aiming, in Europe and between all the countries of Europe and North America.
LORD GLADWYN: With respect, I believe the United States seek the further unification of Europe, including ourselves, and would not object to a certain amount of discrimination provided it was not too much.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: The noble Lord is perfectly right about the policy of the United States, but what I wonder—the noble Lord may well be right—is whether the main reason why the United States support us in this policy is not political rather than economic. My own feeling is that what the United States need is the economic, political and military strength of Western Europe, and that they are prepared to put up with whatever economic disadvantages may follow simply in order that Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, may be strong. That is my interpretation of American policy. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, would agree. After all, the North Atlantic Treaty, to which we have adhered, contains provisions about economic, social and political co-operation and unity, which have not hitherto been implemented. It is not just a military Treaty, and it seems to me that these provisions have been sadly neglected hitherto. It is most important that in times to come we should try to carry them out and, above all, that we should see that closer relations with Western Europe do not mean a greater distance from America or greater strain on our relations with the United States.
I hope very much—and I appeal to the Government—that the noble Viscount, when he speaks, or the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, will make it plain not only that this approach of Europe is not intended to interfere with or detract from our present relationship with the United States, but is a step towards a much greater unity in which the whole of the Western world will be united in one community.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I beg to move that the debate be now adjourned.
Moved, that the debate be now adjourned.—(Viscount Hailsham.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION) BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a and to be printed.
NEWPORT CORPORATION BILL RIVER RAVENSBOUR NE &c. (IMPROVEMENT AND FLOOD PREVENTION) BILL
Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.

BRISTOL CORPORATION BILL [H.L.] DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: the said Amendments considered and agreed to.
House adjourned at nineteen minutes before eight o'clock.