Sitting of 19 March 1959

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  SOUTH DERBYSHIRE WATER BILL (By Order)
    SOUTH DERBYSHIRE WATER BOARD BILL (By Order)
    Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Motor Vehicles
    Mr. Nabarroasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has made a recent comparison of the low domestic taxation of the products of the German motor vehicle industry with the high taxation of the products of the British motor vehicle industry, together with the consequential effects on their production costs and competitive power in the export markets of the world; and whether he will publish the results of such an inquiry before the Easter Parliamentary Recess.
    The Minister of State, Board of Trade (Mr. John Vaughan-Morgan): Yes, Sir, but my hon. Friend will appreciate that specific taxes on motor vehicles and fuel are not the only factor affecting competitiveness in overseas markets. The relevant facts about taxation are all available, but I will write to my hon. Friend and give them to him. It would not in my view be practicable or wise to publish a report assessing the weight to be attached to individual factors.
    Mr. Nabarro: Has my hon. Friend observed in today's Times that Sir Henry Spurrier, Chairman and Managing Director of Leyland Motors, and Sir William Lyons, Chairman of Jaguar Cars
    600
    —both companies with magnificent export records—have published their reports on behalf of their respective companies saying how highly detrimental to export trade and competitiveness with the Germans is the high rate of Purchase Tax on our home market, which is running at 60 per cent. on cars and 30 per cent. on commercial vehicle chassis? In those circumstances, will he take very early action?
    Mr. Speaker: I think the hon. Member could put his point more shortly.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I have seen both those reports, and I am sure that we all place great weight on those gentlemen's views, but it is not for me to anticipate any action or statement by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I would further point out that last year, for the first time for some years, we ousted Western Germany as the leading foreign supplier of cars in the United States of America.

    Advertisements
    Miss Burtonasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the Independent Television Authority has decided that misleading advertisements for toothpaste shall be banned or amended; and if, in view of the new evidence submitted to him by the hon. Member for Coventry, South, he will reconsider his decision not to amend the Merchandise Marks Acts so that toothpaste manufacturers and others have to substantiate statements made on their behalf in advertisements in order that the public interest may be safeguarded.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. John Rodgers): I am aware of the action taken by the Independent Television Authority. The article in the British Dental Journal to which the hon. Lady has drawn the attention of my right hon. Friend deals with scrutiny of the manufacturers' claims by the British Dental Association. There is a distinction between this and making unsubstantiated claims criminal offences under Merchandise Marks legislation.
    Miss Burton: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that they are exactly the same as far as the shopper is concerned? Is he aware that the Independent Television Authority demanded of one advertiser

    601
    that he should either substantiate his claims or withdraw the advertisement and that he withdrew the advertisement? Does the hon. Gentleman tell the House that such injurious advertisements should be permitted in the Press but not on television?
    Mr. Rodgers: Of course, I am delighted at the action taken by the Independent Television Authority, but I think this is a matter of the influence of informed public opinion and that toothpaste manufacturers will pay more scrupulous attention to this now then they did in the past.

    Stoke-on-Trent
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the industrial prospects within the city of Stoke-on-Trent and North Staffordshire, respectively; what consideration he has given to the letter and resolution of the North Staffordshire Trades Council, forwarded to him by the hon. Member for Stoke, South; and what action will be taken.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: There are no major industrial developments in the area to report, but since January unemployment in North Staffordshire has fallen by over 2.000, including nearly 1,400 in Stoke. I am hoping that this trend will continue. Meanwhile, we will continue to bring the facilities available in the area to the attention of industrialists.
    Mrs. Slater: Even though unemployment in North Staffordshire may have fallen during the last few weeks—which is purely seasonal—does not the hon. Gentleman think that to an area such as North Staffordshire, which is dominated by pottery and mining, more ought to be done by his Department to try to send us other industries? What steps does he propose to take to encourage manufacturers to go there?
    Mr. Rodgers: I am glad to be able to tell the hon. Lady that it is understood that the National Coal Board does not foresee any reduction in employment in the North Staffordshire coal mining industry. Since the summer of 1957, the Board of Trade has suggested to more than a dozen firms that North Staffordshire would be a suitable place for their development. Some have visited the area. One firm recently decided to set
    602
    up there and an I.D.C. was issued this month.
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent his officials used their influence with the management of the Michelin Tyre Company not to carry out their extension in the city of Stoke-on-Trent; what representations the Lord Mayor of Stoke-on-Trent made to him for the retention of the proposed extension in the city; and, in view of the need for employment and diversification, on what grounds the decision was made.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: I understand that the suggestion to locate this factory in a Development Area came from the company itself. They discussed the matter with our officials, and it was eventually agreed that the Board of Trade would build them a factory at Burnley. We have not received any representations from the Lord Mayor of Stoke-on-Trent.
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Am I correct in understanding that no representations were made to Board of Trade officials by the Lord Mayor? Can the Parliamentary Secretary explain to me why there are twice as many unemployed in Stoke-on-Trent as there are in Burnley? Will he give an assurance that nothing like this will occur in the future?
    Mr. Rodgers: No communication was received from the Lord Mayor. A communication dated 23rd August, 1957, was received from the Town Clerk. Stoke-on-Trent has not been deprived of all the Michelin Company's expansion. An I.D.C. was given for an extension of 216,000 square feet after the decision to move part of the factory to Burnley was taken. This is estimated to employ a further 300 people.

    Pottery Industry
    Mr. Ellis Smithasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make a statement on the prospects of the pottery industry; what steps are being taken to bring about a large-scale increase in exports; what recent increases in output capacity have been made; and what further assistance is to be given to the industry by Government Departments and other organisations for which he is responsible.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: In view of its fine record and the world wide reputation of

    603
    its products, I see no reason to doubt that the prospects of the industry are good. Exports last year were equal in value to 44 per cent. of the total sales of domestic pottery, and I know that manufacturers are doing everything possible to increase this trade. Manufacturing capacity has been increased substantially in recent years. The Board of Trade is always ready to give the industry any help it can.

    Imported Timber (Report)
    Mr. Oramasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will now state his intentions with respect to the Monopolies Commission's Report on imported timber.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: My right hon. Friend is not yet in a position to make a statement, but hopes to do so shortly.
    Mr. Oram: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that that excuse has been given before and that four or five different excuses have been given over a period of about six months? Is he confident that he has enough excuses to go on delaying and delaying until the General Election removes the right hon. Gentleman from responsibility in these matters?
    Mr. Rodgers: The making of an order to implement the findings of the Monopolies Commission involves the consideration of a number of points. My right hon. Friend will announce his decision as soon as these points have been fully considered.

    Merchandise Marks
    Miss Burtonasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware of the increased number of seals and marks of approval being attached to goods in the shops; what proportion are approved by his Department; and what check is kept on those not approved to safeguard the interest of consumers.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: Some seals or marks of approval are registered as certification trade marks and the regulations governing these must be approved by the Board of Trade. Other marks may be subject to the Merchandise Marks Acts.
    Miss Burton: Will the Parliamentary Secretary never make any advance on these matters? Is he aware that during the past twelve months we have had an absolute deluge of these marks on goods?
    604
    Is he further aware that some of them are worth exactly nothing? What guarantee has the customer and what chance has she of finding out the true value?
    Mr. Rodgers: I agree that these seals of quality which are not certification trade marks are commonly issued without any indication of the tests which have been applied in granting them. The Board of Trade endorses the view that it would be in the interests of shoppers that the tests should be made known.
    Miss Burton: Then why does the Board of Trade not do something about it?

    Foreign Textiles
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will now state the details of the agreement reached with the Eire Government restricting the import into Great Britain of foreign textiles made up into garments in Eire, stating the total maximum value allowed annually and also the ceilings for corduroys, shirts and other categories.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: The Government of the Irish Republic have undertaken to limit to an annual amount of £600,000 exports to this country of garments made from woven cotton materials imported from Japan and Soviet Bloc countries. Within this total, garments made from corduroy and similar cloths will not exceed £50,000 and shirts will not exceed £93,000. These arrangements came into force on 1st March.
    Mr. Allaun: While textile workers and employers will warmly welcome those ceilings, is the Minister of State aware that they cannot understand why these evasions of import restrictions which have caused widespread unemployment were not stopped sooner or were allowed to take place at all?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: This is a voluntary undertaking on the part of the Irish Republic. Most of the interests in the United Kingdom thoroughly appreciate the agreement.

    Leipzig Fair
    Mr. Lewisasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give the reasons why he did not officially attend

    605
    the Leipzig Fair; and why he omitted to make arrangements for an official observer to be in attendance on behalf of his Department.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: It would not be appropriate for Ministers to attend officially this or any other fair organised by the East German authorities, who are not recognised by Her Majesty's Government. As regards official observers, we did not ask this year for visas as our request in 1958 for visas was refused by the Soviet authorities.
    Mr. Lewis: Is the Minister of State aware that, whilst appreciating that one may not recognise the East German Government, the same applies to West Germany? One hundred million pounds worth of trade is being done at present between East and West Germany to the detriment of British traders? Does the Minister of State not think that we should take the opportunity of showing at the fair the British way of life, which shows the contrast between East and West? Is he aware that the British pavilion, which was a great tribute to the British business men, who did a good job, was inferior to the one we ought to have had? Will he not give some assistance in order to show the British way of life at the fair?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I have already answered one question about a contribution to the fair in the shape of a United Kingdom Government pavilion. It was a rather lengthy supplementary question. There are now opportunities for trade with Eastern Germany, and we welcome the agreement which the F.B.I. has recently concluded.
    Mr. Bence: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that vast quantities of products from Eastern Germany, with much literature printed in the United States attached to them, are circulating in the United States, and that literature can be bought in London? The literature is being published in the United States because the products are being sold in the United States, but we will not take them.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: Most people agree that, under the circumstances, the F.B.I. reached a very satisfactory agreement with the East Germans.
    Mr. M. Lindsayasked the President of the Board of Trade what contribution was made by Her Majesty's Government towards the cost of the British trade exhibition at the recent Leipzig Fair.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: None, Sir.
    Mr. Lindsay: Is my hon. Friend aware that the British pavilion at Leipzig, which was purely an individual effort of a few British firms, was such a poor show that it would have been very much better if no British exhibitors had been there at all? Will he consider the very important focus which the Leipzig Fair has on the East-West trade and also the political aspects involved in Great Britain putting on such a poor show on the edge of the Iron Curtain, particularly as we are able to give £14,000 to support the British effort at Lisbon? Will he look at this matter again?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: My hon. Friend knows that as we do not recognise the East German authorities official participation is not practicable, but I shall be very glad indeed to discuss with him the quality of the representation of the British firms that were there. It has no relevance, I may say, to the £14,000 we are spending at Lisbon.

    Advance Factories, Scotland
    Mr. Benceasked the President of the Board of Trade what advance faotories are to be built in the burghs of Clydebank, Milngavie and Kirkintilloch.
    Mr. Steeleasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will include the Strathleven Industrial Estate, Dumbarton, in the list of places in which advance factories will be built.
    Mrs. Mannasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will ensure that the area of Coatbridge, North Lanarkshire, carrying 10·2 per cent. unemployment, is given one of the three factories contemplated for Scotland.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: As I told the House yesterday during the debate on unemployment, the place chosen for the experimental advance factory in Scotland is Coatbridge.
    Mr. Bence: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that unemployment is growing in

    607
    Clydebank? It is increasing in Milngavie and it is increasing in Kirkintilloch. Mines are being closed in this part of the country, which puts men out of work in Milngavie and Kirkintilloch. Is the hon. Gentleman telling me that no advance factories are to be built in this area where serious unemployment will arise in the next three years unless something is done? Is he aware that the shipbuilding industry is in a very difficult state and may be causing unemployment in a few years?
    Mr. Rodgers: There are at present six empty Board of Trade factories in Scotland. As I said last night, the Board of Trade is prepared to build one advance factory and, depending on what we learn from the experiment, it will then reconsider the matter. Kirkintilloch should be able to benefit from the overspill agreement with Glasgow.
    Mrs. Mann: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware—and if not, he soon will be of the very great pleasure that that information will give to the people in my constituency, not least because it demonstrates that the Government know their very special problem? Has the Board of Trade contemplated the size and nature of the work that will be engaged in?
    Mr. Rodgers: I am very grateful for the gracious remarks of the hon. Lady. At present we have not decided the exact size of the factory. It will be built to a standard pattern. While it is being built we shall try to negotiate for someone to move into the premises.
    Mr. Nabarro: All vote Tory next time.

    Anglesey
    Mr. C. Hughesasked the President of the Board of Trade if, in view of the high and growing incidence of unemployment, he will now schedule Anglesey under the Distribution of Industries Act, 1945.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: Anglesey qualifies for D.A.T.A.C. assistance, and the Development Fund is available to assist the building of factories there. I do not believe that scheduling the island under the Distribution of Industry Act, 1945, would assist, and in any event there are obvious objections to scheduling areas with small
    608
    or sparse populations. As I announced last night, the experimental advance factory for Wales will be located in Anglesey. This will be financed from the Development Fund.
    Mr. Hughes: I, also, was extremely glad to learn that an advance factory is to be built in Anglesey, but does the Parliamentary Secretary not agree that the high unemployment there—it now stands at about 12·6 per cent.—warrants further action in scheduling the area under the 1945 Act? To see that we get the full benefits of that Act would be the logical step to take.
    Mr. Rodgers: The main benefit that scheduling would confer would be site clearance, and we have no evidence of firms being prevented from going to Anglesey for lack of sites.
    Mr. J. Griffiths: If the hon. Gentleman says that the Government are averse to scheduling some of these sparse areas in Anglesey and some other places where the population is now much less than it was because of the steady drain from it, would it not be more in the national interest to keep the population in these areas rather than to let them go to overcrowded places?
    Mr. Rodgers: There is much in what the right hon. Gentleman says, but, as I said last night, the White Paper prepared by right hon. Gentlemen opposite in 1948 itself argued the case against scheduling such areas.
    Mr. Jay: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that, although in the opinion of many people it was right in the first years after the war to concentrate on the great industrial areas, nevertheless today, fourteen years later, there is really a case for the scheduling of these areas, and will he consider the matter closely?
    Mr. Rodgers: We always keep an open mind on this subject.

    Second-hand Household Equipment (Advertisements)
    Mr. F. Noel-Bakerasked the President of the Board of Trade if he has completed his inquiries into switch sales; and what action he now proposes to take to protect the public from businesses which use this technique.
    Mr. Stonehouseasked the President of the Board of Trade when the report being prepared by his Department on the misleading advertising of second-hand household equipment, including reconditioned vacuum cleaners and washing machines, will be available.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: The Board of Trade inquiry has now been completed. It has not produced any evidence on which criminal charges could be based. I am glad, however, to hear that the Newspaper Proprietors Association and the Periodical Proprietors Association have recommended their members to obtain undertakings from advertisers of mail order goods that the goods are available.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that that inquiry is totally inadequate and has been shown to be so? Ls he aware that the firms about which complaints were made in this House many months ago are still carrying on these activities and that new firms are starting to indulge in them? Will he please prepare a much better reply when the matter is raised again tomorrow by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) and myself, when we shall give him a very bad time, or try to, if we do not get a satisfactory answer?
    Mr. Rodgers: I am glad of the warning, but there is nothing fraudulent in attempting to sell a product that is more expensive than that advertised. In matters of this kind, the Board of Trade can take action under the Merchandise Marks Acts only against false and misleading descriptions.
    Mr. Stonehouse: Whilst we welcome the action taken by the Newspaper Proprietors Association, is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that this practice of misleading advertising of second-hand goods when the firm intends to sell new goods at much higher prices is continuing on a very wide scale? His Department should take some action to control the practice.
    Mr. Rodgers: Our information is that firms will now see that the goods advertised are available.

    Advertising Expenditure
    Mr. Warbeyasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will give an estimate of the total expenditure on advertising in the United Kingdom in
    610
    1958, and of the total amount spent in the same year on sales promotion of all forms by British firms in overseas markets.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: No official estimates are made. The latest estimate have seen for advertising in the United Kingdom is £334 million for 1957 made by the Advertising Association.
    Mr. Warbey: Is the Minister aware that the United Kingdom figure is now approaching £400 million and that there are estimates that our advertising in overseas markets is only about £13 million? In view of that enormous disparity, will he consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to consider ways of discouraging extravagant and frivolous advertising in this country and encouraging it where it can be used to the best advantage?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: No, Sir, I certainly will not. I would point out that advertising expenditure now represents about the same proportion of the national income as before the war.

    Anglo-American Trade
    Mr. Warbeyasked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the continued use of discriminatory and protectionist trade practices in the United States of America, he will defer any further relaxation of controls on United States imports into this country until explicit guarantees of reciprocity have been given by the United States authorities.
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: The United States is our largest export market, and while it protects its domestic market it does not discriminate against us in favour of other countries. Our policy remains, as stated at Montreal last September, to relax restrictions which discriminate against dollar goods as and when circumstances permit.
    Mr. Warbey: Is the Minister aware that it is not enough for his right hon. Friend to make bold and bluff speeches about the growth in protectionism in some sections of American industry but that some action is required? Will he at least give an assurance that there will be no further liberalisation of American imports until we have some definite undertaking that there will be a change in this growing American practice of protectionism?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: We will certainly continue to make representations to the United States Government whenever action is taken by them, or anyone else, that harms unfairly the traders of this country. I think that my right hon. Friend's speech to the American Chamber of Commerce, on 11th March, which had the backing of the whole House, was well received by everyone. In that speech he very carefully said that whilst we should like to go further in the way of relaxations we had to be sure that we could earn enough dollars to pay for any imports which would follow.
    Mr. Jay: Will not the Government desist from the policy they have followed in the last six months of making unilateral concessions on dollar goods in one month only to find some new restrictions placed on our goods by the United States sometime later? Is not this eminently a case for negotiating a bargain between the two countries?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I think we have to see it against the background that our exports to the United States continue to increase.
    Mr. H. Wilson: But will the Minister note that this is not only a question of manufactured goods and engineering equipment? Last week, very serious evidence came out of discrimination against British shipping on routes in which the Americans think they have a special interest; and that they are, in fact, trying to revive the principle of the old Navigation Acts which we once operated and caused so much trouble with the American States in the eighteenth century?
    Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I have already said that we shall continue to protest whenever it is appropriate.
    Mr. Gower: Is it not fair to say that even at the height of the American recession we maintained a very high level of exports to the United States?

    Tourist Industry (Dollar Trade)
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the President of the Board of Trade what special steps he is taking to encourage the dollar tourist trade in Great Britain.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: As the Estimates which my hon. and learned Friend the Financial Secretary to the Treasury will
    612
    shortly be presenting to the House will show, it is proposed to increase the maximum level of the annual grant-in-aid to the British Travel and Holidays Association by a quarter-of-a-million pounds next year, from £800,000 to £1,050,000 a year. The major part of this increase will be spent on publicity in North America, to which the Association already devotes much attention.
    Mr. K. Robinson: Has the Parliamentary Secretary seen a story in the Sunday newspapers headed:
    "Dollar Tourists Get Tea With M.P.s"
    which tells of a British travel agency advertising tea on the Terrace with Members of Parliament as an inducement for the £410 tour of Europe? Will he do whatever he can to discourage this commercial exploitation of the privilege that hon. Members have to entertain their friends and constituents?
    Mr. Rodgers: I did not see the article, but I have heard about it. I deplore equally with the hon. Member the selling of the facilities of this House for these purposes.

    Food and Drugs Acts
    Mrs. Mannasked the President of the Board of Trade which women's organisations received his proposals for extending the Food and Drugs Acts circulated 14 months ago, and how many welcomed these proposals and submitted suggestions or amendments as requested.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: As the Answer is a long one, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mrs. Mann: Is it not a fact that the answers were not very complimentary to the Parliamentary Secretary? Do I understand that it is proposed that weight tickets for 232 items of foodstuffs are to be completely scrapped and there is no demand for them? Was not the reason given in an Answer to me last week that it would increase the cost? Does not that reply clearly reveal that a great deal of exploitation is going on at the moment which cannot be detected and makes fun of the cost-of-living index figures?
    Mr. Rodgers: As I said to the hon. Lady, we were very grateful indeed for this advice and for the suggestions we

    613
    received at the Board of Trade, but some of these involve very great difficulties, and some, if adopted, would have added to the cost of the goods. However, all the proposals will be looked at in the light of the social survey that we are conducting into this very problem.
    Following is the Answer:
    The following Women's organisations were consulted about the proposed Regulations under the Sale of Food (Weights and Measures) Act. 1926, and the Food and Drugs Acts:

    (a) National Federation of Women's Institutes;

    (b) National Institute of House Workers;

    (c) National Union of Townwomen's Guilds;

    (d) Scottish Women's Voluntary Services;

    (e) Women's Voluntary Services;

    (f) National Joint Committee of Working Women's Organisations;

    (g) Women's Group on Public Welfare.

    The first four agreed to the Board of Trade's proposals; the last three suggested additional provisions.
    The additional provisions were:
    (by the Women's Voluntary Services)
    (a) fruit in punnets should be sold by net weight even if it meant increased prices;
    (by the Committee of Working Women's Organisations and Group on Public Welfare)
    (b) biscuits should be sold only in certain specified weights;
    (c) packeted sweets and chocolates weighing 2 to 3 ounces should be marked with their weight as well as those over 3 ounces;
    (d) there should not be an exemption from the sale by weight and the marking requirement for poultry and parts of poultry weighing less than 2 lb.
    (by the Committee of Working Women's Organisations)
    (e) boxes containing collections of packets of sweets and chocolates should be marked;
    (f) cake mixtures of various kinds and custard and blancmange powders should only be sold in specified weights;
    (g) apples and pears should be sold only by weight (i.e., not by number or by the box);
    (h) prepacked large cakes and pieces of cake should be marked with their weight;
    (i) all bread, including fancy bread and sliced bread, should be sold by net weight only;
    (j) shortbread or oatcakes should not be exempted from the marking requirements.

    Cinemas (Closures)
    Mr. Jannerasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that three cinemas have recently been closed down in Leicester, namely, the Floral Hall, seating 750, the Star, seating 660, and the Tudor, seating 932, and that, during the last six months, cinemas have also closed in Market Harborough, Auster and Mountsorrel, Leicestershire; what is the position in other parts of the country; and what steps he proposes to prevent a further decline of the industry.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: My right hon. Friend is aware that many cinemas in all parts of the country have closed; the provisional total of cinema closures in Great Britain in 1958 is 260. The principal causes are the change in public habits, and decline in the popularity of cinema going. The Government cannot control public taste.
    Mr. Janner: That Answer will not do. Is the Parliamentary Secretary aware that in addition to the particulars I have already given him, a large cinema in Leicester—the Regal—is being offered for sale at about half its original purchase price; that the film production industry is being affected very seriously because cinemas are being closed down, and that this Entertainments Duty is a real discrimination against this industry? Is he further aware that it is mainly because of the duty, and not particularly because of the changing tastes of the people, that they are in this serious position? Will he do something about it?
    Mr. Rodgers: The Government cannot force people to go to the cinema if they prefer to spend their money in some other way. We are taking lots of steps to support the British film production side of the industry. Any question relating to Entertainments Duty is a matter for my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and not for me.

    Stockton-on-Tees
    Mr. Chetwyndasked the President of the Board of Trade what applications have been received in the past year for the tenancies of the empty Government-financed factories on the North Tees Trading Estate, Stockton-on-Tees; and how many factories are now empty.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: Two applications were received during the past year. One

    615
    of these was withdrawn and the other resulted in a new lease. There is at prsent empty one factory and a small partitioned area in another factory which is suitable only for storage.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Will the hon. Gentleman now consider allowing the other factory, which I understand withdrew its application, to have the extension which it so greatly needs?
    Mr. Rodgers: I will certainly look into that point.
    Mr. Chetwyndasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will give financial assistance to enable a firm in Stockton-on-Tees, which has had to close, to be kept on a care and maintenance basis until a revival of trade enables it to go into production again.
    Mr. J. Rodgers: No, Sir. My right hon. Friend has no power to do this.
    Mr. Chetwynd: In view of the fact that we are likely to lose this firm permanently unless it can be kept on a care and maintenance basis, would the hon. Gentleman ask his right hon. Friend to seek powers to enable him to do this?
    Mr. Rodgers: I have every sympathy with the hon. Gentleman in his problem, but I am afraid that we have no powers to do so, and we cannot seek special powers for this one case.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Purchase Tax
    Mr. Nabarroasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that wadded, or otherwise filled, tea cosies are tax free, whereas wadded, or otherwise filled, cushions are subject to Purchase Tax at 5 per cent., and wadded, or otherwise filled, nightdress cases, for boudoir use and not for travel purposes, are subpect to Purchase Tax at 30 per cent.; and why such articles, all made from the same wadded material, should be subject to different Purchase Tax treatment.
    The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. F. J. Erroll): Because the relevant consideration in the tax Schedule is the character of the finished article, not that of the materials used.
    Mr. Nabarro: Can my hon. Friend tell the House where elsewhere in the Tax Schedules wadding or similar material is considered to be a determining factor in the application of tax? Is a fat man taxed more heavily than a thin man? Why should basically the same article, a tea cosy or a boudoir case, merely because the different descriptions cause the Treasury to apply very widely differing rates of tax?
    Mr. Erroll: Personally I am very glad that we are not as individuals taxed according to weight or wadding. In this case of Purchase Tax, the articles are subject to tax and not the materials from which they are made.
    Mr. Nabarro: My hon. Friend will have to change it all soon.
    Mr. Nabarroasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that a household tray is subject to Purchase Tax at 15 per cent. when not fitted with legs, whereas the same article, fitted with legs, attracts Purchase Tax at only 5 per cent.; and, as this distinction between basically similar articles warps and twists design in a way contrary to the national interest, whether he will cause all trays to be treated in equivalent fashion so far as Purchase Tax is concerned.
    Mr. Erroll: The articles chargeable at 5 per cent. are basically similar to occasional tables such as coffee tables, the assumption in the second part of the Question is accordingly wrong, and the answer to the third part is, "No, Sir."
    Mr. Nabarro: Evidently my hon. Friend has forgotten his Answer the day before yesterday. Does he recall that he then used the words:
    "The Customs look at legs only where their presence, or absence affects the character of an article."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th March, 1959; Vol. 602, c. 79.]
    Could it be more ridiculous that legs are thus taken into account—warping the design and patterns of manufactured goods—in determining the application of all these different rates of tax in the Schedules?
    Mr. Erroll: No. I think that in this case legs do effectively alter the character of the article. A tray without legs is a tray; give it legs and it becomes a coffee table.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Since for seasonal reasons we must now be approaching the end of this long series of questions from the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro)—
    Mr. Nabarro: One hundred and eighty-eight up to today—twelve more to come next week to complete, making 200.
    Mr. Wilson: —would it not be possible for the Treasury to reward the hon. Gentleman's pertinacity and perseverance by at any rate offering to remove the Purchase Tax from badges on the front of motor cars?
    Mr. Gowerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the approximate annual cost of removing all Purchase Tax from soap.
    Mr. Erroll: Approximately £6 million.
    Mr. Gowerasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the approximate annual cost of removing all Purchase Tax from stationery.
    Mr. Erroll: For paper stationery, excluding greeting cards, picture postcards and pictorial calendars, about £28 million.

    Private Industry (Capital Investment)
    Mr. Croninasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, having regard to the substantial fall in capital investment by private manufacturing industry which is expected to occur in 1959, he will take early steps to reverse this trend.
    Mr. Erroll: The Government has no direct control over capital investment by private industry. My right hon. Friend has taken a number of steps in recent months to stimulate investment. If he judges further measures to be necessary, be will take them.
    Mr. Cronin: Bearing in mind the extreme gravity of the capital investment situation, will the hon. Gentleman try to induce his right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to resist the siren voice of the floating vote and give this matter proper priority in the Budget?
    Mr. Erroll: As my right hon. Friend will be opening his Budget in less than three weeks' time, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will not expect me to comment on what he has just said.

    Distribution of Industry
    Mr. C. Hughesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer under what circumstances applications for loans for factory building can be made to the Development Commissioners from areas scheduled under the Distribution of Industries (Industrial Finance) Act, 1958.
    Mr. Erroll: As I said in reply to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, South (Mr. M. Clark Hutchison) on 12th February, 1959, applications for loans from the Development Fund for factory building can be made in respect of projects in North-West Wales (including Anglesey), the crofting counties of Scotland, and the Buckie-Peterhead district. These are the same areas as those where factories were built with the help of the Development Fund prior to the passage of the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act. A document describing the procedure for applications is in preparation, and will be distributed shortly to local authorities in the areas concerned.
    Mr. C. Hughesasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many applications for grants and loans under the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act, 1958, have been received from Anglesey; and how many have been accepted and rejected, respectively.
    Mr. Erroll: Five firm and eligible applications under the Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act, 1958, have been received from Anglesey. Of these, one has been approved, three rejected and one is still under consideration.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that many industries of substance which might come to the county to set up business are being deterred from making applications because of the rigid application of the 1958 Act on Section 4 of the 1945 Act, and would he not consider making a more generous interpretation of the Section?
    Mr. Erroll: It is not for my right hon. Friend to interpret the Section but for the independent Advisory Committee which operates under the terms of the Act, which I believe the Committee interprets fairly and consistently as between one applicant and another.
    Mr. Jay: Although that is perfectly true, is it not also possible for the

    619
    Treasury to ask the Committee to reconsider some of these applications, and will the Economic Secretary look at one or two of those turned down in the case of Anglesey, which have been very hard cases?
    Mr. Erroll: I study a number of applications, both those accepted and those rejected, myself, and I do not think that it would be right or proper to interfere in any way with the independent judgment of the Committee in which my right hon. Friend has the highest confidence.

    Dockyard Employees (Pensions)
    Miss Vickersasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent established and non-established dockyard employees will be contracted out of the Government's proposed graded pension scheme; and what will be the position in regard to pension rights already acquired.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. J. E. S. Simon): Detailed study and consultation with staff representatives will be needed before it can be decided how Admiralty dockyard employees, and all other civil servants, will be affected by the proposals in the National Insurance Bill.
    Miss Vickers: Can my hon. and learned Friend give an assurance that the present establishment of over 8,000 employees in the dockyard will not have their pension in any way affected?
    Mr. Simon: I do not think I ought to make any statement on this subject pending consultations and discussions between the staff side and the official side.

    Industrial Production
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer by what percentage the latest figure for the index of industrial production differs from the figure for May, 1955.
    Mr. Erroll: The unadjusted index of industrial production for December, 1958, is about the same as the index for May, 1955, but after adjustment for seasonal factors the index for December, 1958, is about 2 per cent. higher than in May, 1955.
    Mr. Wilson: Is it not a very pathetic performance that, even after the hon. Gentleman has finished cooking all his figures, all he can show is an increase—
    Mr. Nabarro: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the right hon. Gentleman to accuse my hon. Friend, in such opprobrious terms, of cooking figures? Does that not suggest to you, Sir, that an imputation is being made that figures are being falsified? Would that not be entirely unparliamentary?
    Mr. Speaker: It certainly would be to suggest that. But I have heard the term "cooking" used in a variety of respects. An answer was given about the adjustment of the figures. I think the right hon. Gentleman ought to make it clear that he is not accusing anyone of falsifying the figures.
    Mr. Wilson: Yes, Sir. Even after a convenient alteration in the basis of the index in September, 1958, in a way which favours the presentation of the Government's case, will the hon. Gentleman not agree that it is a rather poor performance that, four years after an election at which we were promised every form of economic expansion, doubling the standard of living and all the rest of it, the industrial production of this country, almost alone among advanced industrial countries, shows virtually no increase over the figure four years ago?
    Mr. Erroll: I do not accept the imputation made by the right hon. Gentleman regarding the so-called cooking of the figures, nor do I accept the imputation about the adjustment made last year, which is perfectly in accordance with what it is proper to do. As regards production in this country, I should not have thought that the production of over I million motor cars in 1958, nor exports of aircraft amounting to almost £100 million, were indicative of the stagnant economy to which the right hon. Gentleman so frequently refers.
    Mr. Wilson: But is not the hon. Gentleman aware also of the significant fall in steel production compared with a year or two ago, if he wants to select individual industries? Without selecting industries, how does he justify to this House or to the country a record of stewardship which means that industrial production in this country almost alone in the world has hardly increased over four years ago?
    Mr. Erroll: There has, of course, been an increase in service industries and

    621
    activities and in production which is usefully required. To increase production at a time of a pause in world economic expansion would lead only to a balance of payments crisis and inflation at home.

    Labour Costs and Wages
    Mr. Croninasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer by what percentage labour costs per unit of output increased in 1958; and by what percentage wages increased in 1958 as compared with the previous year.
    Mr. Erroll: It is estimated that labour costs per unit of output were 6 per cent. higher in the first nine months of 1958 than they were in the same period of 1957. I regret that figures for the whole of 1958 are not yet available. The index of weekly wage rates rose by 3½ per cent. between the beginning and end of 1958; the corresponding increase during 1957 was 5½ per cent.
    Mr. Cronin: Are not these figures of the greatest significance? If labour costs per unit of production have actually increased, is it not clear that the Government's monetary policy, although it has produced increased unemployment, has had no beneficial effect whatever on inflation but has actually increased it?
    Mr. Erroll: No. The hon. Gentleman has chosen, perhaps unintentionally, a highly selective period for making the comparison. It would be possible to take other periods which would show very different comparative figures. The fact is that the higher labour costs in the earlier part of 1958 were a reflection of the very large wage increases of 1957.
    Mr. H. Wilson—
    Hon. Members: Oh.
    Mr. Wilson: I can understand hon. Members opposite not wanting these points to be underlined. Do not these figures, and indeed the figures for previous years, confirm the argument put forward by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in the Budget debate last year, that the real cause of the increase in labour costs per unit of production is the fact that production has not increased and that that is the greatest bar to the increase in productivity which we need?
    Mr. Erroll: No. As I said, the period chosen was highly selective. If a later period were taken, very different deductions could be drawn.

    Entertainments Duty (Cinemas)
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the loss of revenue from Entertainments Duty in 1957 from cinemas which closed in 1956 or 1957, and in 1958 from those which closed in 1957 or 1958, assuming that the amount which would have otherwise been the same remained the same as in their last full year of operation.
    Mr. Erroll: I regret that it is not possible to make the estimates for which my hon. Friend asks.
    Mr. Johnson: Would it not be very desirable to make that estimate in order to discover from it whether it is necessary or desirable to reduce Entertainments Duty on cinemas? Is it not probable that a great deal of revenue is being lost.
    Mr. Erroll: It really is quite impossible to make the estimate because no centralised record of Entertainments Duty paid by individual cinemas is kept; and it is not, of course, possible to estimate the revenue collected from those other cinemas which have not closed and which have succeeded in attracting patrons from those which have closed.
    Sir W. Anstruther-Grayasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether his attention has been drawn to the fact that in 1958 no less than twenty cinemas throughout Scotland were forced to close and that in 1959, to date, a further ten have closed; and whether he will bear these facts in mind when reviewing the Entertainments Duty.
    Mr. Erroll: My right hon. Friend is aware of the situation to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers and he will bear it in mind in his review of the Entertainments Duty.
    Sir W. Anstruther-Gray: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that of all the deserving cases brought to his attention none will be more deserving in equity than the case of the cinemas?

    Post-war Credits
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the procedure for repaying post-war credits to corporations.
    Mr. Simon: I assume that my hon. Friend has in mind post-war credits belonging to someone who has died which have been assigned to a corporation. The corporation can claim repayment of such credits when the original holder would have reached the qualifying age for payment, at present 65 for a man and 60 for a woman. The claims are made in the same way as claims by individuals on forms which may be obtained from Inspectors of Taxes or in any post office.
    Mr. Johnson: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that he is not quite right in the assumption he has made about what I was supposing? My Question was based upon the post-war credit amounting to £2,895 shown as outstanding to a building society. Is it possible that some are outstanding to corporations themselves, and is there any intention of ever repaying them? Those concerned do not know how to obtain repayment.
    Mr. Simon: Post-war credits which are held by building societies are not repayable under the present law. As to the implication of my hon. Friend's question, that the law should be changed, I will draw that to the attention of my right hon. Friend.
    Mr. McKayasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider the advisability of reducing the age at which post-war credits can be paid, and of making the payment apply to all widows of men entitled to post-war credits regardless of the age of the widow.
    Mr. Simon: My right hon. Friend has noted the hon. Member's suggestions.
    Mr. McKay: Is the Financial Secretary aware that when the Government first started repaying these post-war credits they paid them off at the rate of £65 million a year, but that during the last three years they have paid off only at the rate of £57 million a year? Does the hon. and learned Gentleman not consider it time that something was done to try to get the money repaid? Not half of it has been repaid yet.
    Mr. Simon: I certainly undertake to draw the hon. Member's suggestions to the attention of my right hon. Friend.

    Bonus Shares
    Mr. Osborneasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that employees who take up bonus shares must pay Income Tax on the difference between the issue and market price; and, in order to encourage this form of property-owning democracy, if he will take steps to free such bonus issues to employees from tax penalties.
    Mr. Simon: My Hon. Friend will not expect me to anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Mr. Osborne: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that the Midland Bank at the present time is offering 600,000 £1 ordinary shares to its workers at £1 a share, and they have to pay tax on the difference between £1 a share and 65s. which is the market price, whereas ordinary shareholders like myself who are paying £2 a share get the difference between £2 and 65s. free of tax? Is it not stupid to tax the workers on a bonus given to them in this way when we ourselves say that we intend to build a property-owning democracy?
    Mr. Simon: I think it would be highly dangerous at this sensitive period for me to comment on my hon. Friend's statement, except to say that I will draw it to the attention of my right hon. Friend.

    French Franc (Devaluation)
    Mr. R. Edwardsasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will give an estimate of the loss in currency in this country arising from the revaluation of the French franc.
    Mr. Erroll: Although a precise estimate is not possible, it seems likely that any loss of currency to this country arising from the devaluation of the French franc was very small.
    Mr. Edwards: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reassuring reply, but has his attention been drawn to reports in the French Press about leakages prior to the devaluation of the franc which led to heavy speculation in both Paris and London? Has he any information about British citizens selling francs before devaluation?
    Mr. Erroll: I have not seen the reports to which the hon. Gentleman refers, but I will look at them. I have no evidence that British citizens were doing anything which it was not legally proper for them to do.

    Customs Regulations (Troops)
    Mr. Ronald Bellasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will instruct Customs officials to allow some latitude in the application to troops returning to the United Kingdom from Cyprus of the concessional rule requiring twelve months to elapse between the purchase of an article and its entry into this country, in view of the unexpectedly sudden ending of the Cyprus emergency.
    Mr. Leatherasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what instructions he has given to Customs officials to exercise discretion when applying the rule regarding payment of duty on articles purchased less than twelve months previously to troops returning from serving their country in Cyprus.
    Mr. Erroll: In applying Customs regulations all possible consideration is given to troops returning from overseas, but in fairness all round discriminatory reliefs could not be justified.
    In the case of the troops from Cyprus who returned on the "Empire Fowey" on Monday, the majority of their goods held pending payment of duty consisted not of goods bought in Cyprus, but of cigarettes in excess of the concessionary quantity purchased on the ship shortly before arriving in the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Bell: While being only partly reassured by my hon. Friend's reply, may I ask him, not so much about this one ship as generally, why in a matter which is already based on discretion special latitude could not be extended to troops who are returning at the end of an arduous and dangerous campaign which has come to an end sooner than expected and the end of which has been marked by a general amnesty to the Cypriot population? Does my hon. Friend really believe that the civilian population would resent a slight temporary concession to the returning troops?
    Mr. Erroll: It is not the practice to reveal the period of ownership and use abroad which qualifies an article for relief
    626
    from duty. The period varies according to the nature of the goods. As I said in my main Answer, however, in applying the regulations all possible consideration is given to troops returning from overseas.
    Mr. Leather: Does my hon. Friend not agree that there are occasions when Nelson's blind eye is thoroughly justifiable? Is it not obvious that in this case some official organised a blitz on these troops? Will my hon. Friend find out who that official is and give him the rocket he deserves?
    Mr. Erroll: I have myself examined this matter carefully, and I assure my hon. Friend and all hon. Members that there was no special blitz as my hon. Friend describes. No special instructions were given and, indeed, there was no special Customs search for dutiable goods, A large number of Customs officers were present at the time to facilitate the movement of the troops from the ship to the trains that were waiting for them.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Can the hon. Gentleman say how many cigarettes are being confiscated in this way and what amount of duty is owing on them?
    Mr. Erroll: I cannot give a precise figure, but there were substantial quantities, in excess of the concessionary amount, which were freely declared by the troops themselves.
    Mr. Bell: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that, apart altogether from the question of cigarettes, when the main body of troops comes home from Cyprus there will be a lot of cameras, gramophones and articles of that character which will have been held by the men for just under a year and that it would be a very grave hardship if they were taken from the troops because on arrival in the United Kingdom they did not have enough money to pay the duty?
    Mr. Erroll: I am aware of that point, and I assure my hon. Friend that it will be studied sympathetically.

    Graving Dock, Greenock
    Dr. Dickson Mabonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what financial assistance he proposes to give to James Lamont and Company and the

    627
    Greenock Harbour Trust as a result of the recommendations of the Development Areas Treasury Advisory Committee regarding their application for aid to build an intermediate-sized graving dock in Greenock.
    Mr. Erroll: No recommendation has been received from D.A.T.A.C. in respect of financial assistance for the construction of the small graving dock at Greenock.
    Dr. Mabon: Is the Economic Secretary not aware that the terms suggested by D.A.T.A.C. to the firms have already been rejected by them and that they have asked for further consideration? Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise that there is a growing impression among many hon. Members who represent areas of heavy unemployment that D.A.T.A.C. seems to be more concerned with doing good business than relieving unemployment? Furthermore, will the Economic Secretary and his right hon. Friend, if they are genuine in their concern about this matter, realise that in many cases the recommendations of D.A.T.A.C. are frustrating the objective set by the Government?
    Mr. Erroll: No, Sir. D.A.T.A.C. is anxious to relieve unemployment and to do good business at the same time. There is no point in doing bad business which would not relieve permanently the unemployment in the D.A.T.A.C. areas. Normally, all applications are regarded as confidential but in view of the inaccurate reports of this matter which have appeared in the Press, I would like to explain to the House that full details necessary for consideration of the original application were not received until 9th December, 1958. The Committee informed the promoters on 14th January that it was unable to make a recommendation in favour of that application, since when D.A.T.A.C. has discussed with the promoters the basis for revised proposals. D.A.T.A.C. is waiting to receive further suggestions from the promoters.

    BOEING 707 AIRCRAFT (RADIOACTIVITY)
    Mr. Beswickasked the Prime Minister if his attention has been drawn to the fact that the Boeing 707 aircraft which suffered an auto-pilot failure on
    628
    3rd February was found on inspection to be mildly radioactive throughout its outer skin; how far details of this condition have been made available to his advisers under the agreement with the United States of America for exchange of nuclear information; what research has been or is being conducted in this country into the radiation to which high altitude aircraft are subjected; to what extent the natural radiation in the upper atmosphere is being increased by nuclear weapon tests; and if he will make a statement.
    The Paymaster-General (Mr. Reginald Maudling): I have been asked to reply.
    I have had no official report from the Americans, but I understand that Press reports were substantially correct. A very low level of radioactivity was found on certain parts of the aircraft exterior. No cabin contamination was found and there is no reason to think that the activity had any effect on the behaviour of any of the aircraft instruments.
    Measurements have been taken at high altitude by aircraft flying in this country and made available to the United Nations Scientific Committee on Radiation Hazards. The increase in radiation in the upper atmosphere is linked with the deposition at ground level. Reports of measurements in the United Kingdom are published regularly and placed in the Library of the House.
    Mr. Beswick: Whilst I agree that this accident was not caused by radioactivity, the inspection which followed disclosed a phenomenon which is most significant. Can the Paymaster-General assure us that there is adequate research into this matter? Will he also bear in mind the factor, which the Prime Minister appears unable to grasp, that the spread of radioactive fall-out in the upper atmosphere is not necessarily even but is concentrated in the air streams and that we appear to be laying up for ourselves a problem in the upper atmosphere, which we hope to be using in greater degree in future years, about which we know insufficient? Will the right hon. Gentleman therefore ensure that there is adequate research into these problems?
    Mr. Maudling: This is a very interesting phenomenon, but it can be exaggerated, as is shown by the fact that the level of radioactivity concerned was very low.
    Mr. Bowles: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Dr. Mont Follick, on his deathbed, told a late hon. Member of this House that he was dying through a disease which he got through sailing too close to Christmas Island and that he was suffering from radioactive anaemia and had the same treatment as the Japanese sailors? Is it not about time that these tests really were stopped?
    Mr. Maudling: It is important in these matters to rely only upon scientifically-assessed evidence.

    STRONTIUM 90
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Prime Minister the increase in radioactivity in Great Britain during 1958, compared with 1954 and 1956, as a result of hydrogen bomb tests.
    Mr. Maudling: I have been asked to reply.
    The results of monthly measurements of Strontium 90 in rain falling in the United Kingdom have been published for the months up to August, 1958, and a copy of the report has been placed in the Library of the House. Final results for the whole year are not yet complete.
    Mr. Allaun: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that according to a member of the Atomic Energy Authority, there was a 200 per cent. increase last year? Secondly, in view of that increase and the eight months' stalemate at Geneva, would not the commonsense first step be to stop immediately all the large and dirty tests, which can be detected already, without setting up new controls or inspection points, over which disagreement has arisen?
    Mr. Maudling: Common sense will advise us to wait until we get the full information.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business for next week?
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 23RD MARCH and TUESDAY, 24TH MARCH—Report and Third Reading of the Town and Country Planning Bill.
WEDNESDAY, 25TH MARCH—Committee and remaining stages of the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill.
THURSDAY, 26TH MARCH—It is proposed to meet at 11 a.m., take Questions until 12 noon and adjourn at 5 o'clock. There will be then an adjournment for the Easter Recess until Tuesday, 7th April.
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask when the Government expect to be able to announce their decision on the proposal to send a Parliamentary commission to Nyasaland?
Mr. Butler: I cannot give an exact date, but I have already noted the request of Her Majesty's Opposition.
Mr. Grant-Ferris: Does my right hon. Friend think that he will be able to give half-a-day, perhaps after the Recess, to a discussion of the White Paper on Government proposals following the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Inland Waterways, especially as there has not been a debate on the Bowes Report? Is my right hon. Friend aware that it would give great satisfaction to hon. Members and to the public outside if this could be done?
Mr. Butler: We shall have to see, first, how we get on, but I will note what my hon. Friend has said.
Mr. Mitchison: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Town and Country Planning Bill took up 25 Sittings in Committee and that there are on the Notice Paper 155 Amendments, of which 110 come from the Government and their supporters? In those circumstances, is it not somewhat optimistic to suppose, and somewhat unfair to suggest, that the Third Reading will be reached on Tuesday?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. The Report stage is often merciful. There will be an opportunity of suspension or suspensions of the Standing Order, and I have every hope that we shall be able to conclude all stages of the Bill.
Mr. Mitchison: Does not that mean that to have a proper discussion on Report we shall have to sit until quite unreasonable hours?
Mr. Butler: We had better wait and see. As the Amendments put down by the Government will be almost all of a beneficial and acceptable character, they will ease the passage of the Bill.
Mr. Osborne: Since the Budget will be opened on the first day that we return after the Recess, and we cannot judge the Budget fairly unless we have the Economic Survey beforehand, can my right hon. Friend assure us that we shall have the Survey in plenty of time to do our Easter homework?
Mr. Butler: There is a little difficulty this year which we propose to get over in this way. The Economic Survey cannot be published until 2nd April. We propose to arrange to mail it to all right hon. and hon. Members so that they will be able to have a certain amount of time in which to digest it.
Mr. Woodburn: Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm whether the General Election is or is not to take place immediately after the Budget?
Mr. Butler: I can answer a good many questions on business, but I certainly cannot answer that one.
Reverting to the question of the Economic Survey, it will reach hon. Members, we hope, by first post on 2nd April, to give them time to read it.
Mr. C. Pannell: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether it is his intention to take the Committee stage of the Street Offences Bill next Wednesday until a late hour and even through the night? Does he think that that piece of legislation is likely to win the Government even the Borough of Stepney?
Mr. Butler: The hon. Member should refer to his hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. W. Edwards), who is one of those who have most ardently supported the Measure. I do not imagine that the
632
situation will be quite so fearful as the hon. Member suggests. If some of the hon. Members on that Committee would be a little more reasonable, it might be possible to get the Bill through in good time.
Mr. Rankin: Will the right hon. Gentleman find the time soon to debate the Report from the Select Committee on Procedure?
Mr. Butler: It is a very important Report and we are very indebted to the right hon. and hon. Members who were members of that Committee. It is simply a question of finding time but, of course, it would be a very good thing to have a debate.
Mr. Ede: Could the right hon. Gentleman let us know when we shall be able to see a print of the evidence put before that Committee?
Mr. Butler: We should not have a debate until there has been time to digest the evidence. It is a rather large volume. I understand that it will be out shortly. I will tell the right hon. Gentleman when I know the date.

AGRICULTURE (GUARANTEES)
The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. John Hare): Mr. Speaker, with your permission, and that of the House, I would like to make a statement about the guarantees to agriculture for the coming year.
The Government have now determined these in the light of the annual review of the economic condition and prospects of the industry. The details are set out in a White Paper which will be available in the Vote Office when I sit down.
The weather in 1958 was, of course, appalling. I am sure that all those in the industry have had the sympathy of the House in their difficulties and disappointments. Great efforts have been made by farmers and farm workers to get in the harvest and to keep up milk yields as far as possible under the bad conditions that prevailed.
Net output in 1958–59 is forecast at 61 per cent. above pre-war. This is just below the revised figure of 62 per cent. above pre-war for 1957–58 which was a record. But had it not been for the

633
effects of the weather net output would probably have reached a new record level.
Similarly, actual net income is down from last year's record. It is forecast for 1958–59 at £327 million. This is a fall of £27½ million from the revised figure of £354½ million for 1957–58. But when adjusted to normal weather conditions, in accordance with the usual procedure for judging the trend of net income, it is forecast at £360 million, an increase over the revised figure of £355 million for 1957–58 and that of £339 million for 1956–57. Thus, despite the cut of £19 million in the total value of the guarantees last year, net income shows a satisfactory and rising trend, apart from the unfortunate effects of the weather.
Costs have gone up by about £11 million in a full year on review commodities—practically the same as last year. Efficiency continues to improve, though the effects this year have in part been masked by the weather. Imports of feedingstuffs are forecast to increase from 5·4 million tons in 1957–58 to 6·1 million tons in 1958–59.
We have also taken account of the needs of the national economy, of our international trading position, especially in relation to the Commonwealth, and of the considerations affecting particular commodities. The cost to the Exchequer of support for agriculture has fallen from £284 million in the financial year 1957–58 to £248 million in 1958–59. But it is still high. The situation on individual commodities, which must have a strong influence on the changes to be made in the guarantees from year to year, is rather better than it was a year ago. Less change in the guaranteed prices is, therefore, required this year on that account. This is, of course, partly due to the changes in the guarantees we made a year ago.
Our general conclusion, as a result of considering all these factors, is that we should not reduce the total value of the guarantees this year, but, equally, that there is no need for any substantial increase.
The determinations that we have made provide for a net increase of £3 million in the total value of the guarantees, after taking credit for the £6 million net cost of the Small Farmer Schemes. The guaranteed prices for milk, cattle, pigs,
634
sheep, barley, oats, potatoes and sugar beet will be unchanged. The guaranteed prices for eggs, wheat, rye, and wool are to be reduced—hen eggs by 1d. a dozen, wheat and rye each by 6d. a cwt. and wool by 2d. a lb.
There will, however, be an increase of 15s. a head in the subsidy on steer calves and of £2 a head in the hill cow subsidy, so as to encourage further the rearing of beef store cattle. There will also be an increase of 7 million gallons in the milk standard quantity for England and Wales. The new potato guarantee system will apply to the 1959 crop and the support price is being adjusted to this change. Some alterations are also being made in the fatstock guarantee arrangements without affecting the value of the guarantees.
The determinations now made are, we think, fair to the industry and the nation.
Mr. T. Williams: As we are much more generous than the right hon. Gentleman and hon. Gentlemen opposite were in 1947, I shall not blame the Minister for the bad weather in 1958, but am I correct in assuming from the figures that he has given that the balance sheet winds up with this conclusion: that prices have increased by £3 million per annum, that £6 million are to be contributed to the Small Farmer Schemes and £11 million to increased costs, which leaves the industry to bear, under recoupment or by increased efficiency, £14 million?
Secondly, if the £360 million forecast as net income for this year matures, am I right in assuming that, translated into 1951 values, the £360 million will be £270 million?
Mr. Hare: The right hon. Gentleman has his figures a little wrong. The net award is an increase of £3 million. The Small Farmer Schemes of £6 million are part of the guarantees, but the total increase is £3 million. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, increasing efficiency is calculated at the rate of £25 million a year. If we add £3 million to that, we get £28 million. If we subtract £8 million for additional costs, which we reckon the industry will still have to face in this coming year, it looks—weather and everything else being equal—as though the industry will receive an additional recoupment this year of about £20 million.
Mr. Williams: Does the Minister think that the £25 to £30 million increase in efficiency is a possibility, if we have the same sort of weather as we had in 1958?
Mr. Hare: There is no doubt that efficiency in the industry is increasing continually, and it certainly affected the income last year. If it had not been for the increase in efficiency, the net income would have fallen much further.
Sir A. Hurd: May I take it that the Government have found it unnecessary to make any major changes in the prices guaranteed this year because the levels they fixed a year ago worked so well—after allowing for the appalling weather—for crops and dairy cows that it has not been necessary to make any major changes? Am I right in thinking that a saving of £36 million has been effected to the Exchequer over the past year, and that the level of prices now determined has been approved by the leaders of the National Farmers' Unions?
Mr. Hare: The National Farmers' Unions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have stated that they agree with the conclusions reached.
On the general point raised by my hon. Friend, it is true that because of the measures we took last year no drastic changes are necessary because, as hon. Members will see from the White Paper, the position as regards milk and pigs is much healthier. Exchequer subsidies have gone down by £36 million, and for those reasons it is possible for us to take the view that we have taken.
I do not wish to be discourteous to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Don Valley (Mr. T. Williams), who put a second question to me. He asked what was the income worth in real terms to the industry today. In real terms, the income to the industry has been above that of the year 1947–48, when a large sum of money was injected into the industry.
Mr. Willey: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that we have to set off taxpayers' savings against increased consumer prices? With regard to last year, realising the difficulty about making a calculation in the light of the weather conditions, can the right hon. Gentleman say what effect the disincentive on milk had on production? Can he further say,
636
in considering this year's and last year's review, what effect the disincentives on milk, eggs and pigs have had on the relative position of the small farmer within the general figures of the total guarantees?
Mr. Hare: Of course, the weather has played a big part, as the hon. Gentleman will see when he reads the White Paper.
As regards milk, there has been a 4 per cent. decline in the milk cow herd. There is no doubt that our policies are working out and that we are getting the switch from milk to beef. The important thing is to ensure that switches do not go too far.
Mr. Peart: The Minister has given a figure of 61 per cent. above pre-war production. Would it be possible for him to give the average yearly increase of agricultural production from 1951 to 1959 as compared with the yearly increase in agricultural production in the years 1945–46 to 1950–51?
Mr. Hare: I shall be delighted to do so. It will be a long recitation of figures, but I will see that the hon. Gentleman has that information.
Major Legge-Bourke: When my right hon. Friend states, as I am glad he did, that the potato guarantee will be unchanged, will he make it clear that this will mean that the actual guarantee will be paid on the new calculation and adjusted basis of £12 14s. a ton throughout the year, as agreed with the Potato Marketing Board?
Mr. Hare: Yes, Sir. My hon. and gallant Friend is right. As I said in my statement, we are moving on to the new method of dealing with potatoes which has been agreed with the National Farmers' Unions. Full details are in the White Paper.
Mr. T. Fraser: The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland will recall that when we were discussing the withdrawal of marginal agricultural production grants in Scotland under the Agriculture (Small Farmers) Bill, we were promised that the new difficulties created for farmers on marginal land in Scotland would be discussed thoroughly at the Price Review. Have those discussions been completed? Are we to assume that the increases in the hill cattle subsidies and the calf subsidy are compensation

637
which those farmers are to enjoy for the withdrawal of any M.A.P. grants, and if so, would he not agree that there are many hundreds of farmers who will lose those grants who will not get the benefit of the increases mentioned by the Minister?
The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Lord John Hope): The rise in the hill cattle subsidy is awarded on the merits of the case and is in no way compensation for any marginal agricultural production money that is to be lost. On marginal agricultural production, the hon. Gentleman has probably seen the Answer given by the Secretary of State for Scotland to a Question put down yesterday about future talks with the National Farmers' Union. If not, he will see it in HANSARD.
Mr. C. Pannell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would you ask the Front Benchers to raise their voices a little and take us into this whispered conversation?
Mr. Speaker: I heard clearly enough, but the backs of right hon. Members are turned to the hon. Gentleman and perhaps they forget that occasionally.
Sir J. Duncan: Would my right hon. Friend agree—[HON. MEMBERS: "Speak up."]—that the increase in subsidies on steer calves and hill cows will be welcomed in Scotland, although we would like to have another look at the reduction in the price of wool? Would my right hon. Friend also agree that the statement he has just made will nullify the accusation made by the Opposition in past years that the Government would take the full 2½ per cent., or £30 million a year, every time they had a chance?
Mr. Hare: I am glad that my hon. Friend has made that point. The long-term assurances provide a floor, and we have repeatedly told the Opposition that although a floor was provided it was not necessarily the case that we should automatically use to the full the right of reduction to which we are entitled under the Act. The Act has been in operation long enough now for farmers to have confidence.
Mr. T. Williams: Is it not nevertheless true—[Interruption.] Shut up, you—that the 1957 Act gives the Government the right, between the date of the Act and 1962, to reduce the net income by £30 million, as they did last year, although they are not obliged to do so every year?
Mr. Hare: We have considerable affection for the right hon. Gentleman, but he gets away with murder in some of his interjections. My only criticism of him is that although we always give him reasonable marks for his work in the 1947 Act, he has not been quite so generous to my predecessor in relation to the 1957 Act.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members should look at the White Paper.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Proceedings on the County Courts Bill [Lords] and the Overseas Resources Development Bill [Lords] exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY
  CONSOLIDATED FUND BILL
  Considered in Committee; reported, without Amendment read the Third time and passed.

CYPRUS
3.52 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): I beg to move,
That this House welcomes the Cyprus Agreement as serving the best interests of all the people of Cyprus, achieving a permanent settlement acceptable to the two Cypriot communities and to the Greek and Turkish Governments, safeguarding essential British defence requirements, strengthening co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies in a vital area thus satisfying Her Majesty's Government's aims of policy; records its tribute to the statesmanship shown at the Zurich and London Conferences without which the rapid completion of agreement would not have been possible; recognises the major role of the security forces and the public services in Cyprus during the last four years; and expresses its deep sympathy with the injured and the families of those who lost their lives during the emergency.
For a number of years the House has had many debates on Cyprus, especially in 1956, when the emergency was at its height. The last big debate was on 26th June last, following Her Majesty's Government's statement of policy a week before. There has, therefore, not been a major debate on Cyprus in the House for the last eight months. I recognise that this has been in large part due to the desire of the Opposition not to make a settlement more difficult. We are also entitled to conclude that another reason has been a growing amount of support, in the House and outside it, in N.A.T.O. countries and, indeed, in the world, for the aims of policy which we outlined last year, on 19th June.
Today, rightly, there is a debate in the House of Commons. Five parties were engaged in the London Conference—the United Kingdom Government, the Governments of Greece and Turkey, and representatives of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Two of the three Parliaments concerned have already expressed their views: the Greek Parliament, on 28th February, approved the London Agreement, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly did the same on 4th March. I hope that the House will do
640
the same today, and will do so without a Division.
In the debate in Athens the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Karamanlis, stressed the spirit of understanding and cooperation shown by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Turkey, as well as by the heads of the two communities in Cyprus. The Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Averoff, explained that it was essential for any settlement that the two communities should be animated by a spirit of co-operation, and he suggested that both Enosis and partition were thus impossible. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Zorlu, described the London Agreement as a perfect example of how the most bitter quarrels could be settled by peaceful means, thanks to mutual concessions by the parties concerned. He said that both partition and Enosis were ruled out by the same provision of the Agreement, and that there could, therefore, be no possibility of claiming that one was still possible while the other was not.
Now it is the turn of the House of Commons In commending this Agreement to the House, I would remind hon. Members of the aims of Her Majesty's Government's policy as described on 19th June last. We then said that the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Cyprus has had four main purposes: first, to serve the best interests of all the people in the island; secondly, to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments; thirdly, to safeguard the British bases and installations in the island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations; and, fourthly, to strengthen peace, security and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies in a vital area. I claim that the Agreement reached in London makes possible the achievement of all these purposes.
This miraculous change has been brought about by a number of circumstances. First, there has been the courage, patience and discipline of the security forces in Cyprus, and of the civil administration. They have always shared the view that a political solution was essential. This was throughout the view of Lord Harding, as it has been of Sir Hugh Foot—two far-sighted and generous

641
leaders. But it was the work of the security forces and of the civil administration, in defeating efforts to force the issue by violence, that made the way open for a solution based upon compromise and common sense. Praise could not be too great for the superlative contribution that they and their wives and families have made to this settlement.
Then there has been the growing realisation that in the absence of an agreed solution between the two Governments and the two communities, which also preserved British strategic interests, Her Majesty's Government intended to proceed with the Macmillan Plan—the partnership plan. It was recognised in Greece and Turkey, and elsewhere, that this was not just another plan—as there had been many plans for Cyprus over the years—but, in the absence of a guaranteed alternative, a policy which Her Majesty's Government proposed to follow and from which they would not withdraw.
These are two of the major factors which have brought about the change. I do not think that it is necessary for me to analyse today, in greater detail, other circumstances which have helped to bring about this happy development. Of one thing I am sure; everyone at the London Conference was animated by a desire to restore the Anglo-Greek-Turkish alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, wherein, as the Prime Minister has said, lies the key to many vital areas of the world. Pray God, this alliance has been restored.
The Greek contingent that we had at Izmir, and which was withdrawn in June at the height of the inter-communal disturbances, returned to Izmir in two groups on 25th and 28th February, a few days after the London Conference. All the leaders in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have made it clear, in public and in private, that it is their desire and their intention that the alliance in all its old intimacy shall be restored and maintained.
My right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal will have something to say, when he winds up the debate about the diplomatic negotiations. The House will remember, also, the very helpful rôle of the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O., Mr. Spaak.
642
No one who was present, as I was, at the talks during the London Conference, at either its final session or any of the private talks, could be in any doubt of the massive contribution made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to achieve a settlement. When he was Foreign Secretary, he and I strove for an agreement and, as the House knows, convened the first London Conference. It was not at that stage possible to reach agreement. At that stage, the other parties were not prepared to do so.
When my right hon. Friend became Prime Minister, it was his appeal, on 31st July last year, for an end to violence which was followed by similar appeals by the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece, and followed a few days later by the end of communal violence. It was also my right hon. Friend who played a major part in the Macmillan Plan and who, by personal visits to Ankara and Athens, adapted the plan to try to meet the rival claims. His untiring efforts have played a large part in bringing about the Paris and Zurich talks which, throughout, he and all his colleagues welcomed and encouraged and which led to the London Conference itself.
I do not believe that any party feeling in the House will be allowed to obscure the fact that among world statesmen who meet and deal with him my right hon. Friend is regarded as a foremost leader of the free world. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] If I make expressions of sentiment of that kind, I assure hon. Members opposite that it is no more than would be said by all those from other nations who co-operated in that and other conferences.
I do not doubt that some hon. Members will say that, as a solution has now been found, so a solution on the same lines could have been found before. I do not believe that that will be the judgment of history, or that anyone who has followed the story as closely as some of us have done can believe that to be true. If hon. Members examine the agreements reached and in the knowledge of the fears, passions and suspicions of the last few years, I am confident of what their conclusion will be. It would have been inconceivable for an acceptable Agreement along these lines to have been reached before.

643
I ask hon. Members, first, to examine the great issues of Enosis and partition. In the basic structure it is recognised
"that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent States) shall be excluded."
In the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, on the one part, and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, on the other, the Republic of Cyprus undertakes not to participate in whole or in part in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent, it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the island.
In Article 2, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey recognise and guarantee the independence, the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and likewise undertake
"to prohibit as far as lies within their power all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State or the partition of the Island."
Having for nearly five years lived very close to this problem, I can say without fear of contradiction that such a settlement would have been impossible until the Paris, Zurich and London talks.
On the other provisions of the Agreement, I do not propose to try to evaluate the relative advantages which Greece and Turkey each obtain, or to attempt to compare from the standpoint of either country this final Agreement with other proposals which have been made by the United Kingdom or others during the last five years. The House will have read all the details of the Agreement in Cmnd. 679.
Hon. Members will there see the recognition of the rights and interests of each of the main communities in the island, the recognition of the Greek majority in the island and, equally firmly, the recognition of the Turkish interest in Cyprus, not only, as has so often been suggested by hon. Members opposite, because of the Turkish community in the island, but also because of the proximity of Cyprus to the mainland of Turkey and the inevitable strategic consequences which flow therefrom.
The House will also have carfully considered the British declarations. We in
644
the United Kingdom Government wed-corned and in every way encouraged the talks between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in Paris and Zurich. It was our readiness to make a major contribution that played a vital part in the talks themselves. Mr. Zorlu, in the Turkish Assembly, said:
"I stress with appreciation and thanks that from the moment we began talks with Greece on the Cyprus question the British Government encouraged and supported the discussions. Showing great understanding and self-sacrifice they informed us that in the event of our reaching agreement with Greece they were ready to renounce their rights of sovereignty over the island. You will appreciate that this played an important rôle in our reaching a positive result in the talks."
At no point during the Paris or Zurich talks, I understand, was there any disagreement that Her Majesty's Government would require the safeguarding, as we said last June, of the British bases and installations in the island which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations. Nor was there any question of failing to agree on those rights to those bases which, in our view, could best be ensured by retaining British sovereignty over them. This was never questioned in the Paris or Zurich talks between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. Nor was it ever questioned in any of the talks which I and my colleagues had—
Mr. James Callaghan: It has never been questioned.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I am stating historically what happened for the record as well as for other things, and I suggest that hon. Members might listen.
Nor was it ever questioned, in the talks which I and my colleagues had with the Greek and Turkish Ministers in London, or in any of our talks at the sessions of the Conference or privately with representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in the island.
Mr. Kenneth Robinson: To complete the record, will the right hon. Gentleman answer one simple question? At what point during the last five years did Her Majesty's Government decide that they could abandon sovereignty over the island of Cyprus?
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: If the hon. Gentleman will contain himself for one minute, I shall come to that point.

645
Some hon. Members have raised the question whether, over the last few years, we have needed Cyprus as a base, or merely a base in Cyprus. The answer is quite clear. Until the recent talks, the Greek Government and the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot community were pledged to Enosis or self-determination of the island as a whole which would have led to Enosis.
The Turkish Government and the Turkish community in the island were pledged with equal intensity to partition, either as the ultimate or as the immediate answer. Either of these solutions would have led to civil war in the island—and to war not only in the island—and civil war on a scale far transcending last year's communal riots.
At any moment in the last few years any attempt by the British Government to leave the affairs of Cyprus to be settled by the Greek or Turkish Governments and by the two communities, and to retain sovereignty solely over British bases, could have resulted only in an attempt by one nation or the other to impose Enosis or partition.
In such circumstances, with civil war in the island, the bases would have been in great danger. Communications between the two bases would have been threatened. Our port facilities at Famagusta—guaranteed in the Agreement—and our airfield facilities in Nicosia—also guaranteed—would both probably have been unusable. Indeed, most of the vital requirements to make the bases effective, as set out in the annex to the British Government's Declaration could not have been fulfilled.
Because, without any agreement between Greeks and Turks, such a situation was sure to arise, we could not contemplate any relinquishment of sovereignty. We needed all Cyprus as a base. But with the settlement, and the determination of all the leaders to make it work, the security and value of British bases can be ensured and sovereign bases in Cyprus can fulfil our strategic requirements. Under this Agreement we have now retained sovereignty over those parts of the island necessary to meet our interests and to fulfil our obligations.
The House also knows that we made certain other conditions. One was that provision should be made for the protec-
646
tion of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus. I am very anxious today to see that provisions to protect the rights of the smaller minorities are ensured. I met a number of them when I was in Cyprus two weeks ago. Among them I saw certain British residents in the island. Discussions have been taking place between the Governor and their representatives and I shall be very ready to consider any suggestion put to me when those local discussions have been completed.
Another requirement that we made is for the protection of the interests of the members of the public service in Cyprus. I also saw a number of them lately in the island and I met their representatives in London three days ago on matters which included the preparation of a scheme of compensation. Her Majesty's Government recognise their obligation to those Cypriot people, whether members of Her Majesty's Government's Overseas Civil Service or not, who, in the Government service, have served loyally and courageously under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty. Discussions have already started with Cypriot leaders to work out plans regarding Government service designed to give to the Cyprus members of the Government service a full opportunity to continue their work and also a sense of security regarding their posts and their pensions.
I now wish to say a few words about detainees and about prisoners. On 22nd February, orders were given for the release of all detainees and the closing of the detention camps. A few days later the terms of the amnesty were announced and, as the House may know, prisoners were dealt with in two categories. The lesser offenders were dealt with first, and by five days after the announcement of the amnesty 227, that is, nearly all of these, had been released.
All the more serious cases, particularly those guilty of offences involving violence against the person, were reviewed, and a list prepared of those who would be released on two conditions. The first condition was that they left Cyprus for Greece immediately upon their release, and the second was that they did not return to Cyprus without the permission of the Government of Cyprus before the date on which their sentences would have expired.

647
By 8th March, 244 releases had been made, leaving 72 people in the second category for decision, including 32 held in prisons in the United Kingdom. Of this number the Governor decided that 49 should be released in Cyprus and the remaining 23, of whom 14 were in England, would be released on condition that they went to Greece. On 9th March, nine prisoners were sent to Greece and four days later 31 prisoners held in the United Kingdom were returned to Cyprus. The following day 14 were sent to Greece.
At the same time as the amnesty announcement was made, the Governor announced that special arrangements would be made for the safe conduct of Colonel Grivas and anyone he might wish to take with him to Greece, and, as the Houses knows, Colonel Grivas has now left the island. Few serious people would say that after a settlement had been reached, we were wrong to follow it up speedily with this amnesty. I am also glad to say that as a result of the return to peaceful conditions it has now been possible to lift the ban imposed in November last on the employment of Greek Cypriot workers in N.A.A.F.I. buildings and on Royal Air Force stations.
Much work arising from the London Agreement still remains to be done. All of us who were closely concerned with these talks realised throughout that it was very desirable to act quickly or some of the momentum, the impetus, might have been lost and the strains of the past few years might have reappeared. "This", said one of the leading participants, "is a soufflé which must be eaten before it subsides."
Much more detailed work has to be done, but spectacular progress has already been made in the island. The Governor tells me that Greek and Turkish Cypriots are increasingly inclined to give their minds to practical, political and economic problems with a desire to forget the animosities of the past. This is indeed very welcome, for Cyprus will have many economic and other problems to face. Most of her exports come to the United Kingdom and are mainly foodstuffs with the advantages of Imperial Preference. Cyprus has a large adverse balance of visible trade financed mainly by a surplus
648
on Government invisible transactions, mainly by expenditure by a large number of British Service men on the island.
Cyprus is faced with a considerable fall in the value of her imports unless the departure of the troops is followed by a huge growth in the tourist trade and an influx of investment funds. Many very important problems concerning trade, banking, currency and tariffs will have to be considered urgently. The machinery for joint consultation is making rapid progress.
Those who have followed this matter closely will know that there are to be three committees to speed the work. There are to be a Joint Commission in Cyprus, to complete a draft constitution for the Republic incorporating the basic structure and, secondly, a Joint Committee in London to prepare the final treaties giving effect to the conclusions of the London Conference. All the parties concerned are now in process of selecting their representatives to sit on these committees and the first formal meetings will, I hope, be held soon.
The third committee—a Transitional Committee in Cyprus to draw up plans for adapting and reorganising the Government machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority—has already met. It is the Governor's hope that additional appointments to this body will be made by 30th March so that a provisional Council of Ministers can be established from that date. First decisions have been taken for the appointment of permanent secretaries and other officers to serve this new Council.
In all this the zeal and drive of Sir Hugh Foot is finding full scope. As was said of Lord Milner after the South African War, he has "turned with the speed and energy of a racer who has been held up at the starting post" to the creative task of administration and planning of peaceful development. Finally, now that we have come to the last chapter of the history of British administration of the island, it is fitting to pay tribute to the achievements of the long line of administrators who have represented Her Majesty's Government in Cyprus.
Those who saw the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley, in 1878, would not believe their eyes if they could see the island today. It is true that development in the earlier

649
period of our rule was restricted by financial stringency. In more recent years there has been a major transformation. The bare mountain sides have been clothed with forests, industries have been established, numerous water supply and irrigation schemes have revived the countryside, and the towns have grown beyond recognition. There have been revolutionary improvements in the standards of public health, including the elimination of malaria, and the population which, at the first census after British rule started in 1881 was 186,000, had risen by the census of 1956 to 523,000. Thus, it had multiplied three times in about seventy-five years.
The crumbling antiquities which we inherited, and which are one of the glories of the island of Cyprus, have been put under a proper system of preservation. It would be invidious to mention people individually where so many have contributed. They were proud and happy to serve in this beautiful island, and their work will long be remembered and continue to be fruitful in the years to come.
To reach this Agreement, we have all made sacrifices, but we in the United Kingdom remember with special gratitude and reverence those who, in those bitter years, made the supreme sacrifice of their lives, and whose memory is proudly cherished in so many homes. For some, it was a soldier's death in the performance of duty, in an island familiar to their ancestors so many centuries ago in an heroic chapter of our history. The reward of their sacrifice is a settlement founded on agreement and good will, and not on concessions to violence, and on the secure establishment of bases vital to the defence of the free world.
To others, death came treacherously in the course of ordinary civilian life. Their sacrifice, too, was not in vain, for it was the revulsion from the horror of such indiscriminate and barbarous bloodshed, and its evident condemnation by world opinion, that at last brought even the supporters of violence to seek a settlement by the civilised process of negotiation and agreement. The memory of these sacrifices lays upon us all the duty to ensure that, on the agreed foundation, we build a structure of peace and happiness for the people of Cyprus not unworthy of the price that has been paid.
4.24 p.m.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: I beg to move, to leave out from "Agreement" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
"and hopes that it may lead to an arrangement by which Cyprus remains associated with the Commonwealth; pays tribute to the rôle of the security forces and the public services during the emergency and expresses its deep sympathy with the injured and the families of those who lost their lives; but regrets that the policies followed by Her Majesty's Government since 1954 have been a major factor in preventing an earlier settlement".
Listening to a speech by the Colonial Secretary always reminds me of some unpleasant experiences of my youth at the hands of my parents, when, in trying to get rid of some rash of adolescence, I was made to swallow sulphur. It could only be done by giving me large quantities of treacle at the same time. The speeches of the right hon. Gentleman are always of that curious kind of unpleasant mixture. We have to listen to long passages in which he gives prizes all round. We have not had any prizes on this side of the House. I will try to establish our entitlement to them.
One would have thought by what the right hon. Gentleman has said that no responsibility at all rests upon Her Majesty's Government for the situation that arose in Cyprus. I am not going to deal with the culpability of Cypriots, either Turkish or Greek, or with Turkey or with Greece. We are responsible for the conduct of our own Government in this matter, and the right hon. Gentleman has forgotten when the real trouble started and how it started.
It started from a speech from the Government side of the House, and I am not resurrecting this piece of history, which the right hon. Gentleman carefully left out—in fact, he left out whole slabs—merely to be polemical and to establish the case for our Amendment, but because it will have a bearing, I am quite certain, upon the policies of this Parliament in relation to dependencies overseas. What was the statement? It was a statement made by the then Mr. Hopkinson, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, in July, 1954, that
"… there can be no question of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 507.]
That sentence did more damage and has lost more lives than, probably, most

651
sentences ever uttered. What did it say? It said that Cyprus could not expect to advance towards self-government, like other British possessions, and that, no matter what the people of the island thought and wanted, they could never achieve independence.
Let us understand what was meant by that, because it has a very close bearing upon the condemnations of violence which have fallen so readily from the lips of right hon. and hon. Members on the Government benches. With the permission of the House, I want to read a letter which appeared in The Times yesterday; and I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not here myself advocating the use of violence in this affair. I am merely trying to establish the circumstances in which it occurs. This is a letter written by Mr. H. C. Fox, and this is what it says:
"May I quote from a letter written to my great-grandfather by John Bright in 1866?—'I have never said a word in favour of force. All I have said has been against it—I am at liberty to warn those in authority that justice long delayed, or long continued injustice, always provokes the employment of force to obtain redress, It is in the ordering of nature and therefore of the Supreme that this is so, and all preaching to the contrary is of no avail. If men build houses on the slopes of a Vesuvius, I may tell them of their folly and insecurity, but I am not in any way provoking, or responsible for, the eruption which sweeps them all away. I may say, too, that force to prevent freedom and to deny rights is not more moral than force to gain freedom and secure rights.'"
I regard that letter as entirely unanswerable. We may say that a people denied their liberty are foolish, imprudent or ineffective in using force. What we cannot say is that they are wrong. We cannot say that they are immoral. If they have reached the stage in their development, both spiritual and material, where they wish to attain national independence, to deny it is, at the same time, to restore to them the right, if they wish, to use violence to secure their liberty.
There is no answer to that. It is very fortunate indeed that we can now discuss these great matters in a calmer atmosphere, because our security forces are no longer in danger in Cyprus; but a lesson must be learned elsewhere and everywhere where we have dependencies and people who feel a sense of injustice.
May I add this: when those words were written the institutions of democracy
652
had not yet fully established themselves. The moralists and political theorists of the nineteenth century had not had experience of their full working. We have. The universal franchise enshrined in proper institutions had not been established in very many places. Therefore, in the nineteenth century, the moralists would have objected even further. They would have said that individuals inside States that enjoyed independence were entitled to use violence if they felt the burden of unendurable wrong.
We have reached a different stage. We say that there are limitations placed upon the use of violence in the State in which we live and that is because individuals themselves enjoy liberty inside the State as well as the State enjoying independence. Once the wishes of people have been ascertained, it does not lie with the minority to use violence to impose its will upon the majority. That is what we say here: but that was not said by the moralists and political theoreticians of the nineteenth century. They were not in a position to establish the limitations on violence. Even here, in this House, there are conventions by our rules of procedure, and by our whole conduct, by which we recognise over and over again that majorities must not use their power in such a way as to oppress minorities beyond the limits of tolerance.
So the case of Cyprus is a classic example of a people who revolted against a statement by a British Minister that no Englishman would ever have lived under. No one on either side of the House, no one in Scotland or in Wales, would ever have accepted such a position. If someone had got up in a foreign Parliament and had said that in no circumstances could the people of Great Britain ever look forward to independence there would be advocates of violence in all parts of the House.
That being so, why have we, on this side of the House, had to endure humbugging sermons from the Government side over the last four years? Over and over again we have had flabby sentiments thrown at us when, as a matter of fact, the people who put the lives of our soldiers in jeopardy are sitting on the Government benches.
Mr. John Eden Mr. John Eden (Bournemouth, West) rose—
Mr. Bevan: No.
Hon. Members there not only put those lives in jeopardy, but persisted in keeping them in jeopardy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Let me read the story.
Mr. Eden: Where is the hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle)?
Mr. Bevan: The hon. Gentleman asks a very foolish question about the one hon. Member in the House who has an honourable record in this matter, as he will see.
The first substantial point I want to establish is that these disorders broke out into open violence, or rather the disagreements in Cyprus broke out into violence, and developed into organised violence, because a British Minister had told the people of Cyprus what no British Minister ought to tell any dependency overseas. The trouble with Government supporters is that in their hearts they are not democrats at all.
Major H. Legge-Bourke Major H. Legge-Bourke (Isle of Ely) rose—
Mr. Bevan: I cannot give way. Hon. Members have accepted democracy only as a political expedient. In their hearts they are authoritarian, and no one is more authoritarian than the present Colonial Secretary.
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Bevan: I know that hon. Gentlemen opposite do not like this, but they will get more of it.
Then there was a development. The Government insisted at the United Nations in September, 1954, that the Cyprus question was a domestic issue. The then Tory Government invited the Greek and Turkish Governments to a tripartite conference, which broke down over the irreconcilable claims of Greece and Turkey to the island. It was perfectly clear that if they called in Turks and Greeks at that stage they would have disagreement. And, of course, they had it. Then the Government having realised the supreme folly of Mr. Hopkinson's statement, but not knowing quite how to get away from it, modified their attitude by saying this:
"no prospect of any change in the sovereignty of Cyprus in the foreseeable future."
That really was a ridiculous statement to make. In the first place, there could
654
never be independence. Then, when that had caused trouble, the Government said that in the foreseeable future there could not be a change of sovereignty in Cyprus.
Three months later, in December, 1955, the Government retreated again. They modified their policy by recognising self-determination in principle, some time and in certain conditions. Just imagine what happens when those sentences are read by people who are already bitterly resenting the statement originally made. Then there was a conference between the Colonial Secretary and Archbishop Makarios. It is a curious thing that the right hon. Gentleman has managed to make a whole speech today without mentioning the name of the Archbishop. The right hon. Gentleman failed to reach agreement with the Archbishop. I do not want to prolong my speech, but I want to give some of the reasons why that conference failed.
Why did it fail? We had howls from Government supporters when Archbishop Makarios wanted an amnesty for all the prisoners. It has now been granted. Even Grivas has been released and has gone in honour to Athens. He is a general now. The Tory newspapers were headlined day after day about this "thug", this "terrorist", and speeches from the Government side of the House were almost incoherent because of the indignation of the Government supporters, when all that was being asked was that, to facilitate a settlement in Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios wanted what has always been asked in circumstances of that kind, an amnesty.
Today, the Colonial Secretary is anxious to credit himself—
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: I was at the talks with Archbishop Makarios and the right hon. Gentleman was not. That was not the reason why the talks broke down. I explained at great length why that was so. At that time, the right hon. Gentleman was not following Cypriot affairs with quite the same attention that he claims to be following them now.
Mr. Bevan: I did not say that that was the cause of the breakdown. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] There were other causes. One of the chief causes of the breakdown at that time was that the right hon. Gentleman introduced for the first time the threat of partition of the island.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The right hon. Gentleman is wrong again. That was not so. That was in October, after the Radcliffe proposals, when we said that partition must be among the eventual options. It was in my statement after I went to Ankara and Athens in an attempt to commend the Radcliffe plan.
Mr. Bevan: In other words, the right hon. Gentleman brought it in.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: Certainly, and had it not been brought in we should never have had the settlement which we have reached.
Mr. Bevan: I am exceedingly anxious to say nothing today, in this hot controversy, which would cause trouble outside. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I said "cause trouble outside". I do not give a tinker's cuss what trouble I get from hon. Member's opposite. The right hon. Gentleman was engaging at that time in a shabby trick. He was himself fomenting the idea of partition in Cyprus so as to drive, by fear, the Cypriots into accepting his position.
Indeed, partition was raised on the Floor of the House. It was raised in an obviously inspired speech by the late Walter Elliot from the Tory benches. Before that no one had ever mentioned partition. It was a most dishonourable situation, and the right hon. Gentleman connived at it.
Sir Thomas Moore: If the right hon. Gentleman believes that he will believe anything.
Mr. Bevan: Then, of course, the Archbishop was kidnapped. We were not using violence. We were not using force. We merely sent a number of soldiers to kidnap him. He had no rights at all in the matter. No one on the other side of the House has ever suggested that that is an immoral act. No one on that side of the House said, "What a monstrous thing it is to send soldiers to an airport, to snatch a man and take him away and to make him incommunicado for a number of months." Hon. Members opposite were able to do it not because of any moral ascendancy they had, but simply because they had more soldiers than he had.
Lieut.-Commander S. L. C. Maydon: Why was it so monstrous?
Mr. Bevan: For the same reason that if the Egyptians could have dropped bombs on London the Government would never have bombed Port Said.
In 1956, from this Box, I made a very earnest and special appeal to E.O.K.A. to give up violence. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about Makarios?"] I am not responsible for the Archbishop. Right hon. Gentlemen opposite have now made themselves responsible for him.
Mr. William Hamilton: At £25 a day.
Mr. Bevan: I do not think that we paid the bill, did we?
Archbishop Makarios was kidnapped. We made our appeal for non-violence, and we made it because we honestly believed at that time that if violence stopped in the island right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite would start talking sense. E.O.K.A. announced a truce. How did General Harding react towards that? He did not say that a truce had been declared in Cyprus because E.O.K.A. was anxious to have negotiations. That is not what he told a meeting of this House. That is not what he told us. He told us that the reason why the truce had been declared by Grivas and E.O.K.A. was that the rebels were being driven into a desperate situation and wanted an opportunity of re-forming. That was what hon. Members opposite had been saying all the time. But after that there followed the bloodiest period of all.
The fact is that hon. Members opposite had dedicated themselves to a soldier's solution in Cyprus, and one of the reasons was that until that time they could not clear their minds as to what they wanted. I am giving the House the facts of the case.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: Highly selective.
Major Legge-Bourke Major Legge-Bourke rose—
Mr. Bevan: The hon. and gallant Member must contain himself for a moment.
Major Legge-Bourke: On a point of order. I do not know to what extent the right hon. Gentleman is in order. May I ask for your Ruling, Mr. Deputy-Speaker about the extent to which an hon.

657
Member is entitled to go in defaming a professional soldier without anyone having the right to reply?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): If anyone goes too far out of order I will stop him.
Mr. Bevan: When the governor of an island, a general, takes it upon himself to come to the House of Commons and to address Members of Parliament on an issue of this sort he must expect his point of view to be known and to be criticised. Personally, I hold the view that it is improper, but once it is done, it is a matter of open controversy.
Until quite recently General Harding has adhered to his position, although the Government have departed from it. One of the reasons the Government could not clear their mind was that they did not quite know what they wanted on Cyprus. If I may be allowed to do so, I should like to quote from a speech which I made on 14th March, 1956. This is what I said:
"Furthermore, it has been very hard to discover whether the Government are anxious to have Cyprus as a base, or a base on Cyprus. In some respects that goes to the very heart of the matter, because if it is a fact that the Government wish to have Cyprus as a base the negotiations with the Archbishop have been dishonest from the beginning. … If we had been insisting all along on having Cyprus as a base, the negotiations with the Archbishop would never have started."
The negotiations with the Archbishop were started upon the assumption that we were sincerely wishing to negotiate self-government for Cyprus, with certain limitations for a period of time.
I continued:
"So we want to know from the Prime Minister at the very outset what it is the Government have in mind. Are they, in fact, saving that they wish to have Cyprus as a base, or do they want to have a base on Cyprus."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1956 Vol. 550, c. 391.]
This is a perfectly fair formulation of the case, because, as we understood it all along, we could have negotiated a base on Cyprus. We have understood in the House, and it has been stated over and over again, that both the Greek Government and Archbishop Makarios had declared that there would be no difficulty, if there were self-government in Cyprus, in giving us base facilities on the island. That has always been our position, but
658
General Harding told us that a base on Cyprus was useless and that the island was too small.
This is the very heart of the matter. All this disagreement went on over and over again because of that fact. Until quite recently the Government have been adhering to their old position. They released the Archbishop from exile in March, 1957, although they refused to consider his return or to have bilateral negotiations. This was after fifteen months of failure either to end terrorism and inter-communal violence or to reopen negotiations with the Cypriots. The Government produced their partnership plan based on the separation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots and the integration of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots into the island's affairs.
We one this side of the House told the Government that we thought the plan would not work. We said to the Government that in our judgment the plan would have no prospect of being considered if it were presented by the British Government alone, because the British Government had covered themselves with such obloquy in the eyes of the Cypriots and Greeks that in representations by them alone there would no longer be any faith. We said that what we could not understand was how this problem remained so obdurate because we had so many advantages on our side. As Greece and Turkey were members of N.A.T.O., N.A.T.O. should be called to obtain the best possible auspices to get acceptance of what we considered to be a defective plan.
Then the Prime Minister went on one of his journeys and dropped one piece of luggage after another. When he came back home he told the House, with considerable unction, that he had accepted two of the amendments suggested by the Opposition in the previous debate, but retained the third proposition which we said would not be accepted. All the time what was involved was independence for the island, but the representatives of the Government went on. They refused ID accept the proposal made by Archbishop Makarios in which he offered self-government for a limited period in the island. That was in September last year.
In rejecting the offer, the Colonial Secretary said at Blackpool, on 9th October, that the Government would not

659
be dissuaded from its short-term, seven-year, proposal by
"the pretence that a long-term one is possible when at the moment we know it is not."
That was on 9th October last year. He said that the Government would continue to carry out the partnership plan, which, of course, they have now dropped. He said:
"We knew pressure would grow to urge us to abandon it. We have no intention of doing that."
There is a strong fellow. Like a rock outside—cardboard painted to resemble iron.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to make his famous reference to Cyprus as a Turkish offshore island.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd Mr. Lennox-Boyd rose—
Mr. Bevan: I have given way three times.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: The right hon. Member is so constantly misquoting me that he can hardly quarrel if I have to put the record right. I said:
"To the Turks it is an offshore island."
He has left out those very important words. Perhaps his party headquarters failed to give him the full quotation.
Mr. Callaghan: That is just about the level of the Secretary of State.
Mr. Bevan: If I have misquoted I have not done so intentionally. If it is a misquote I withdraw and apologise, but I do not say that I have yet misquoted the right hon. Gentleman. We will check that.
My hon. Friends will remember that in speech after speech the right hon. Gentleman has always insisted on the strategic importance to Turkey of Cyprus. He did so again today. I have never accepted that view on strategic grounds at all. In modern war these small islands off the mainland would be entirely militarily unviable, so it is nonsense to bring that rubbish before us over and over again.
The story goes up to 5th November last year. The then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the right hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble), warned in the United Nations that it would be "disastrous" to endorse immediate independence for Cyprus. He said:
"We must not be mesmerised by a word".
Mr. Callaghan: No wonder he resigned.
Mr. Bevan: Of the possibility of partition, the right hon. and gallant Member said that although his Government did not favour it, it had to be recognised that partition was one of the possible solutions envisaged. That was last November, and then it became obvious to the Greeks and Turks and to N.A.T.O. that the whole alliance was put in jeopardy, in the main through the behaviour of the British Government. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Yes, because, remember, up to that point independence was regarded by the British Government as impossible. Then there were meetings in Paris and Zurich. Unfortunately, they succeeded in reaching an agreement largely due to the fact that they had the enormous advantage of the absence both of the right hon. Gentleman and the Foreign Secretary by which time they reached agreement.
The Archbishop Makarios was brought to London. The shouting died, the atmosphere became more tranquil, stories about thugs and thuggery were dropped. At the end of the story we had reached what we had warned and prophesied at the beginning of the story. The history of this sort of struggle has now assumed a classic form. It never departs from it. First, we put people in gaol and attack them in the bitterest language, as we did with the Indian and the Irish leaders. We said that we could not "shake hands with murder", and then we did shake hands. [An HON. MEMBER: "Then they shot each other."] I do not wish to make a retort to that, because the fact is that, very largely through Tory behaviour, we have brought about a state of affairs of which hon. Members opposite ought to be ashamed.
We did the same with Nkrumah. Hon. Members opposite put him in gaol. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Well, we shoved him in gaol. [Laughter.] If hon. Members opposite will restrain their hilarity for a moment, I said that this is a part of the classic story of these struggles. If we, by our behaviour—[Interruption.] Hon. Members will not put me on my seat in this way. If we, by our behaviour in this House, allow conditions overseas to degenerate to the point where those who are trying to win independence for their country take violent action, then this is always the grim alternative we have to face. Either at that moment we have to

661
surrender to the physical violence which exists, or we have to win a period of peace in which constitutional advance can be made.
We ought always to try to avoid that situation. That is exactly what we are saying. It is no argument to say that my argument is undermined because, in circumstances which ought never to have arisen, we did the same thing. On the contrary, we are reproached by right hon. and hon. Members over and over again because in the period 1945–50 we did not succeed, in five years, in destroying the wicked work of two centuries of misrule by the party opposite.
I say this, in conclusion, if right hon. and hon. Members opposite will have the courtesy to listen to me. We now have an Agreement between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus which we hope will work. It will be a difficult Agreement to work. It is a constitution festooned with all sorts of obstacles. For example, I am told by some of my Greek and Turkish friends that sonic of the proposals for divided municipalities will be very difficult to work and that the suggested frontiers might become occasions for all sorts of troubles and quarrels.
There is a provision in the Agreement that, where the communities desire to have common institutions, they will not be prevented in fact, they will be encouraged. We ought to say in the House today that it will be desirable, in the working of this constitution, for both Turks and Greeks, if possible, to have common institutions, communally operated by themselves, because only to the extent that the communal divisions now existing in Cyprus can be destroyed will we be able to guarantee permanent peace.
We hope that the bitter feelings which now exist between the communities will not grow into permanent separate communal institutions that can never come together. We hope, also, that the proposal in our Amendment, that
"it may lead to an arrangement by which Cyprus remains associated with the Commonwealth"
will be accepted, because we believe that if it is accepted it might be possible, if trouble arises, for the good offices of the members of the Commonwealth to be made available to try to prevent open disorder again breaking out.
662
Right hon. and hon. Members on this side of the House therefore welcome the fact that the Agreement has been reached, but we deeply deplore the fact that the unwisdom of the Government made it impossible for the Agreement to he reached long ago.
5.3 p.m.
Mr. H. P. G. Channon: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, in rising to address the House for the first time I ask for your indulgence and that of all hon. Members. I ask for the indulgence always accorded to a Member making his maiden speech, but I also ask as both the youngest and the newest Member of the House, both of which distinctions, if distinctions they be, I have recently snatched from my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. Wolrige-Gordon), whose tenure of those posts was very brief.
When one arrives in the House one is given much advice, frequently conflicting, as to when is the best time to make one's maiden speech. I have consulted the maiden speeches of my three predecessors who sat for the Borough of Southend-on-Sea. They had only one thing in common. They ranged from the merits of the Prayer Book to the demerits of nationalisation, but all three were highly controversial. My aim today will be to try to make the first non-controversial maiden speech by a Member of my family for a very long time.
I chose this debate to make my maiden speech because, as far as I can ascertain, I am the only hon. Member in the House who has had the opportunity of serving in the Army in Cyprus during the recent emergency, even though it was for only a few short months. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) will forgive me if I do not follow him in that part of his remarks which related to the apportionment of blame and the reasons for the long delay in bringing about a settlement of the Cyprus situation.
I welcome that part of the Opposition Motion which stresses the good work done by our Forces in Cyprus and welcomes the Agreement. I was in the island at the time when Archbishop Makarios was deported. Since that time there have been several truces—a short one in 1956, a longer one in 1957 and two last year.

663
Now there has been a truce since Christmas.
In between those temporary lulls the rôle of the Army in Cyprus has not been a pleasant one. It cannot have been pleasant to have walked around the streets of Nicosia or Famagusta with the ever-present danger that one might be shot in the back. In my opinion—and I think that this is non-controversial—the part played by the Army in Cyprus and the great restraint shown by those in the Forces at all times have played a great part in achieving the present settlement. If the British Army had behaved differently and retaliated to the provocation which it received on so many occasions, a situation might well have developed in which relations between this country and Greece would have been permanently embittered. I am glad that both my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale stressed how the Army played its part in the settlement.
I am especially interested in that portion of the Agreement which relates to the British enclaves to be created in Cyprus. I cannot speak with any firsthand knowledge of the Episkopi enclave, so I will confine my remarks to the enclave round Dhekelia. This enclave stretches from Dhekelia almost to the outskirts of Famagusta and covers a large section of territory. Hon. and right hon. Members will have noticed that the main Famagusta-Nicosia road will pass through the enclave. As all trade and traffic in Cyprus goes by road and the railway between Famagusta and Nicosia no longer exists, it will be realised that a very large proportion of the trade of the island will pass daily from the only port of importance, Famagusta, to the capital, Nicosia, and to nearly all the island—always going through part of the British enclave. To avoid that would require a very long detour.
What arrangements will be made in the enclaves for this continual flow of trade should Cyprus decide not to stay within the British Commonwealth—though we hope that she will—or should she decide not to stay part of the sterling area?
Another point in which I am especially interested concerning the British enclaves
664
is what will happen to those villages in the enclaves that were particularly sympathetic to the idea of Enosis and were especially strong supporters of the E.O.K.A. movement. They now find themselves in areas to be specifically reserved for British sovereignty. What attempts will be made to make those villages happy under British sovereignty? I am thinking especially of the village of Athna, on the main Famagusta-Larnaca road, which will probably be included in the enclave, and the village of Avgorou, one mile south of the main Nicosia-Famagusta road, which will almost certainly be included in the enclave.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has told me that he cannot yet give any accurate estimate of the number of people who live in these enclaves, but there are, perhaps, more than 15,000 Cypriots who do so. I hope that every attempt will be made to have the closest possible liaison between the local authorities and the British administration in the enclaves. I trust that every attempt will also be made to provide adequate educational facilities for the British, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot people in these areas.
The last hon. Member to make a maiden speech in a Cyprus debate, as far as I can discover, was my noble Friend the Member for Hertford (Lard Balniel), who spoke at great length on the importance of providing higher and technical education in Cyprus. I am sure that it is vital that those projects, even should they fall behind in the rest of the island—and we all hope that they will not—must yet be carried forward in the enclaves, so that we can prove our ability to provide and maintain the sort of local governmental institutions that the island has been so sorely lacking for many centuries. We have a great opportunity in the enclaves to provide these opportunities for people of all races.
I was lucky enough last summer to spend a month along the south coast of Turkey and I think that we are very fortunate to have obtained this present Agreement, because at that time the tension, the anti-Greek feeling among people of all classes, was very strong indeed. There seemed to be little, if any, communication between the Greek Dodecanese Islands and the mainland of Turkey, so very near to them.

665
Even the little island of Castel Orizo, which now belongs to Greece, two miles from the shores of Turkey, has not had any communication whatsoever with the Turkish mainland for a very long time. The result is that this once important island has dwindled—its population grows smaller and smaller cacti year—because the Greeks on the island and the Turks on the mainland have no desire to meet, nor any wish to mingle in any way. I hope that one of the results of the Agreement will be to slacken the tension that exists today on the south and west coasts of Turkey.
It is often said in this House that Cyprus presents a very peculiar problem. It is not a purely colonial problem—otherwise it might have been settled some time ago—nor is it a purely international problem. It is the mingling of both the colonial and the international aspects that has proved so difficult in the past few years, but I think that the lesson this Agreement must teach us is that no international problem can be said to be entirely insoluble. A year ago, perhaps, it would not have been believed that we could reach this Agreement today. There will be many difficulties in the years to come and many chances for this settlement to fail, but, at least, we have managed to get the good will of the three nations most actively concerned to try to solve the problem.
When I was at school—and I have been forcefully reminded by some hon. Members opposite that it was not all that long ago—I was taught that the island of Cyprus was traditionally the island of love—the island where Venus first appeared, somewhat scantily clad—off the coast of Paphos. This spirit of love has been sorely lacking in Cyprus for the last few years. That is the tragedy of the past. I know that all hon. Members hope that the future of Cyprus will be very different. Perhaps, if all goes well in the island, this will be the last full-scale debate on its future in this House, and I am proud to have had the opportunity of taking part in it.
5.15 p.m.
Mr. Desmond Donnelly: The hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon) is the son of a former hon. Member who was regarded with affection and respect in every part of
666
this House. As he has reminded us, he is the youngest Member of the House, and this is something on which he will be able to look back with great pride in the distinguished political career which, after listening to him, we will all agree lies ahead of him.
He is probably the only hon. Member who has served in the Armed Forces of the Crown in the emergency that has now come to an end. In those circumstances alone his contribution to the debate would have been remarkable, but I think that I am speaking for hon. Members in all parts when I say two things. First, I should like to congratulate him most warmly on one of the outstanding maiden speeches of this Parliament. Secondly, it is fitting and appropriate—and I am very privileged to have the opportunity to say this—that we in this House should pay tribute, through the hon. Member, to the courage, gallantry and restraint of Her Majesty's Forces through many difficult years.
With those words, I want now to turn to what I might call the "nuts and bolts" of the independence that we are now discussing, as that is much more the practical problem of the future. I do not dissent for one moment from what my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) had to say about the past, and as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) once said, the value of recrimination about the past is to ensure effective action in the future. It is that which underlies our condemnation of the Government in this Motion of censure.
The nuts and bolts of independence fall under two main headings. There is the political problem and there is the economic one, and perhaps I might first say a word about the political problem that faces us in erecting this edifice of independence.
First, the whole Agreement is entirely dependent on the very delicate relationship between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island. We should be blinding ourselves to some of the very grave difficulties if we did not specifically recognise that. There is, for instance, the relationship between the Turkish Vice-President—and his possible veto, which we do not want to discuss here because it is a matter for the Cypriots—

667
and the Greek President. It is very important that that relationship should be good.
The Turks have to realise that in the Agreement the Greeks have gone a very long way. The 70–30 ratio in the House of Representatives is not in accordance with the proportional representation of the population, and the Greeks have gone far to meet the Turkish requirement for safeguards. Therefore, a good deal will depend on the restraint exercised by the Turkish community.
The second aspect of this very delicate balance concerns the British. We have to understand that, in Greek eyes, we have been playing a pro-Turkish rôle for a long time, and that it is not long since we apparently favoured the Turks. If there is any impression of such favouritism in the transfer negotiations now going on, the Agreement might well collapse.
The other political aspect of the settlement is that, as the Colonial Secretary said earlier, it depends very largely on how the will to make the Agreement work is shown in working out the transfer. If the mood of hope and determination dissipates, the Agreement will disintegrate. Therefore, as the right hon. Gentleman said, speed is absolutely vital and essential. I therefore hope that the Home Secretary will be able to give us some idea of the kind of timetable to which the Government are working. I know that it is not an easy thing to say at this stage, but we want to know the sort of tempo that the Government have in mind.
Another point comes out in the Conference document initialled and signed at Lancaster House. I must say that it is the most intriguing set of initials. We have Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Averoff as outside left and inside left, Mr. Zorlu and Mr. Kutchuk as inside right and outside right, with the Foreign Secretary as a kind of centre forward. I did not know that anybody thought he could shoot. After this monumental bit of initialling, not only we but Mr. Khrushchev now know how the right hon. and learned Gentleman justifies his existence.
There are some very significant words in Article 3, in page 10. It reads:
668
"In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions."
Then it says:
"In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty."
I should like the Home Secretary to tell us what that means. In those words there could be great danger. In endorsing this Agreement we are endorsing something that could contain the seeds of great crises in the future and we want to know what it means.
Another aspect of the political settlement is not on the local but on the international level—the Greek-Turkish relationships that have deteriorated during the recurrent Cyprus crises. We have to recognise the geographical and political positions of the two countries—the one as the hinge of N.A.T.O. and the other as the hinge of the Bagdad Pact. I recognise that the Bagdad Pact is in process of becoming, first, an economic organisation, and secondly, a set of bilateral arrangements between the United States of America and different countries. But at one time, however, there was the Balkan Pact. That Pact, which was signed in 1954, has been largely allowed to become dormant, yet, in 1957, Roumania made a Russian-inspired attempt to get it widened and infiltrated.
I know that Marshal Tito has quite recently said that he is not interested in the reactivation of this Pact, but it concerns a vital part of the world. It could well be an area of Communist expansion in Southern Europe. I suggest to the Government that if the Russians thought it worth while exploring the possibilities of diffusing the Balkan Pact, it might be worth the Government's while to examine the possibilities of its resuscitation. If Marshal Tito is cold about it, quite a lot could be done to stimulate his interest. It is our job to do this. Furthermore, this Greek-Turkish rapprochement affords an opportunity that the British Government should take to cement that friendship, and to make it a more positive alliance for the defence of Southern Europe.

669
That brings me to another aspect of the political implications of the Agreement, and that is the future membership of Cyprus within the British Commonwealth. I think that we have to be clear that it is not for us to press for her membership of the Commonwealth, from here, in this House. This is a matter entirely for the Cypriot people. Having agreed to the independence which we have granted her, we have to respect that sovereignty, and Cyprus must decide without any pressure or any apparent pressure. If she should so decide, then it becomes a matter for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers to consider whether she should be admitted to the Commonwealth, but the decision must entirely rest with her in the first instance. Then, of course, the membership has to be considered by the guaranteeing Powers, Greece and Turkey as well.
Cyprus as a member of the Commonwealth has certain implications for the Cypriot people themselves. First, there is the question of British nationality and the position of Greek Cypriots in London, represented by my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South (Mrs. L. Jeger) in this House.
Mrs. Lena Jeger: And the Turkish Cypriots.
Mr. Donnelly: The Turkish Cypriots also, that is fair enough, but they are mainly Greek Cypriots. What will happen about these people?
Secondly, there are the economic implications for Cyprus if she should decide to contract out of the Commonwealth. Cyprus today has inherited a bankrupt economy and has serious economic problems ahead. As was pointed out in The Times today, in an interesting article, there is a very strong Communist Party in Cyprus, too. If the economic position is allowed to deteriorate it will have political implications for the whole of that corner of the Mediterranean. Much of this Agreement will then be redundant.
The economy of Cyprus in the past has been dependent largely on five things. First, there has been the copper and that is coming to an end; secondly, there have been the military installations and these are being run down; thirdly, the overseas remittances will become less and less if
670
emigration is stopped as a result of Cyprus contracting out of the Commonwealth; fourthly, there is tourism, and there, I think, much could be done; and fifthly, there are the agricultural products of Cyprus. The agricultural economy has been largely distorted as a result of the emergency, and the heavy installations which have gone in. The redeployment of the economy must now be considered so that agriculture can be built up once more. It is not all that easy.
This island is not a land flowing with milk and honey. It has very grave agricultural limitations. With these problems that Cyprus now faces, the economic position is unquestionably very bleak. She has her independence but scarcely a crust of bread. This is something which we, who are not only concerned with the political aspects of the settlement but also with the fate of the Cypriot people—because our interest in them does not end with the signature of the Agreement—have to address our minds to and decide what we can do to help. We have to decide how we can do it and how most tactfully we can do it, because tact plays a great part in the subtle process of freedom.
Obviously, the first great need for Cyprus is a development commission, but this is a matter for them to decide. All that we can do is to offer to make available some of our best economic consultants. We can only make the offer and leave it to the new Government of Cyprus to accept or reject it. They could do with a few good businessmen on the development commission. It is really a case of asking Mr. Niarchos to help Mr. Makarios.
We have to try to provide some of the facilities, as we are leaving, which will enable such a development commission to function, and the main facility, of course, is capital. Here, while we have to be careful about the balance between the three Powers, we have to recognise, too, the economic difficulties of Greece and Turkey and their limited capacity to help. The most important capital investment for Cyprus at the moment is in agriculture. The independence of Cyprus may be secured in various ways in the first stage, but it will really depend in the future on water, fertilisers, and tractors and how much mechanisation and

671
capital investment goes into the farmland to increase not just the productivity of the individual but the productivity per acre.
The second economic point about which something ought to be done—I want to know what the Home Secretary has to say about this—is that of a deep-water port for Cyprus. There has been much talk about a deep-water port. I appreciate that it is a very expensive undertaking, but, on the other hand, if a mole were run out into the sea at a particularly sheltered position, the effect of a deep-water port could be created without a great deal of the expense. I am told, for instance, that at Limassol, which is one of the most exposed areas of the island, the days on which such a mole could not be used would number only 18 or 20 in the year. I should like to know what action the Government are taking about this very important problem. A deep-water port would give Cyprus the opportunity of becoming an entrepreneur in that corner of the Mediterranean which she has been denied until now because of the lack of facilities.
There is one more aspect of the Agreement which has implications not for the Cypriots but for us. In the post-war era, we have been concerned in developing a new concept of Empire geared to the changing conditions of the second half of the twentieth century. During the last few years, we have seen some of the most dramatic changes which have taken place since the collapse of the Roman Empire sixteen centuries ago. But there has been a very big difference—I do not say that either side has been blameless—but, on the whole, a very remarkable change and transformation came over the old concept of colonialism with the freedoms which we have granted to India and the South-East Asian countries. A new pattern was thus set in the development of the Empire as it used to be called.
Sometimes, that trend has been set in reverse. Sometimes, when the conditions have not been so good, the results have been extremely damaging. We must ask ourselves whether here, in Cyprus, we have learnt lessons which will be applied in an even more critical and explosive situation 3,000 miles to the South.
5.32 p.m.
Sir Roland Robinson: I find myself in very full agreement with the opening remarks of the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly). I can truthfully say that the maiden speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon) gave a great deal of pleasure to us on all sides of the House. I add my personal tribute to him. Since I knew his father so well for very many years, it is with a sense of real pride that I acknowledge that my hon. Friend did so well. He will not, perhaps, mind if I say that I have been in the House somewhat longer than he has been in this world. Hence, he will realise that I have heard very many maiden speeches, but I do not think that I remember one which gave me so much pleasure.
The speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan), on the other hand, did not give very much pleasure at all to many of us on this side of the House, although we were interested in his reminiscences when he told us that in his early days he had been brought up on sulphur and treacle. Sulphur and treacle must be habit-forming. They are still here. The sulphur is reserved for us in the synthetic anger with which he attacks our integrity and the integrity of the Colonial Secretary. The treacle is reserved for his hon. Friends who are never wrong in anything they ever do. It was a pity that today the treacle became a little bitter when his own friends had to remind him that the cases of Nkrumah and Seretse were their actions and not ours.
Mr. Callaghan: Is that the only point the hon. Gentleman has?
Sir R. Robinson: I have many more, as the hon. Gentleman will hear if he stays to listen. It is a great pity that the right hon. Gentleman does not take care to discover—it would be a discovery for him—the record of the past before he blames us for so many things done by people on his own side.
The most unworthy part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was the attack he made on my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Many of us resented his words about "humbugging sermons" and "flabby

673
sentences". It is my opinion and, I believe, the opinion of people all over the Commonwealth that the record of my right hon. Friend is one of really constructive achievement in the constitutional development of the new Commonwealth we have today. History will remember his work long after even the name of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale has been forgotten.
In the excitement and synthetic anger of his attack upon us, the right hon. Gentleman practically forgot all about the great achievements of this new Agreement. He was concerned with raking up the past and blaming us for some delay which he imagined had been caused by us. I think it would have been far better if he had done what we are doing and turned to the future, thinking of what will happen in Cyprus under the achievements of this Agreement.
It is an outstanding accomplishment, after long years of trouble and strife, that we have been able to reach a settlement which can be accepted with honour by all the parties concerned. It is a great achievement, and I pay my tribute to the Prime Minister, to the Foreign Secretary, to the Colonial Secretary and to the other members of the Government for it. I pay my tribute also for what was done in the final conferences by the Greeks, the Turks and the Cypriots, and I pay my tribute also to Sir Hugh Foot, the Governor of Cyprus. All of them played a part in bringing about a measure of peace.
At this time, it is really too bad that the Opposition should seek to move an Amendment in which the whole emphasis, according to the right hon. Gentleman's speech, is simply to blame us because a settlement was not made before.
Mr. Callaghan: Hear, hear.
Sir R. Robinson: The hon. Gentleman says "Hear, hear." I am convinced that we could have attained a settlement long ago if many hon. Members opposite had not, time and time again, made it abundantly clear to the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that if there were a change of Government Enosis was just around the corner. When people representing practically one half of this House of Commons create that kind of atmosphere, it is exceedingly difficult to negotiate with any chance of success.
Mr. Callaghan: The hon. Gentleman ought not to believe a word of that.
Sir R. Robinson: I turn now to the policy of the Government on Cyprus. It was well stated in June by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, when he said that we had four main purposes in our policy. They were, of course, repeated in Cmd. 455 of June last year. The first purpose—properly the first purpose—was
"to serve the best interests of all the people of the Island."
Those were the Prime Minister's words and the words of the White Paper. In this settlement, we have, I think, done that. Hate and fear have been replaced by peace and friendship. Point No. 1 has been met. The people on the island of all races can walk about freely and without fear, carrying on with their work and life in decent and proper conditions.
Point No. 2 in the same White Paper was
"To achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the Island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments."
At all times, that has been one of the objectives of our policy. We have made it clear in debate after debate in the House and in statements by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary that, if only we could have real agreement between Greek and Turk in Cyprus, we were happy to try to meet them on every possible point.
The aim has been, of course, to reach a permanent solution. This is most important. It is something in which our troops can feel that they have played their part. Some of the greatest tragedies in our history have occurred when we have gone out before a job was completed, leaving the place in chaos instead of order. We have but to think of the example of Palestine. If we had been able to stay just a little longer, making it clear at all times that we were going when our job was completed, a great many lives would have been saved. By getting this kind of permanent solution in Cyprus, we have possibly saved thousands of lives and our troops can say that their stay there has been well worth while.
The next aim in our policy was to safeguard the British bases and installations on the island which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out

675
her obligations. In the negotiations, the most important British point has been met in the sense that we have sovereignty of our bases. I regard this as vital. Some people would say that it is sufficient to lease our bases, but a lease is not sufficient because Governments come and go. We know from the past that, even though there has been agreement for British bases, when we have put vast sums of money into the installations new Governments have come and, because we had no sovereignty, we have lost our bases. On this occasion, therefore, I consider that the right thing has been done. What is more important from the viewpoint of our bases is that we have managed to do it with good will. Instead of having enemies along our lines of communication, we have friends.
The last of our four points of policy was to strengthen peace, security and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies in this vital area. We have done that and, by the settlement, we have been able to strengthen peace, security and co-operation. As was made clear by my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary in his speech, we are now in a much better position in N.A.T.O. with Greek and Turk working together side by side.
Over the past few years in Cyprus, strong passions and prejudices have arisen on both sides. Now is the time to let them cool off as rapidly as we can. In spite of everything that has happened, I am firmly convinced it was wise that the amnesty should come into effect at once. Of course, there have been crimes and crimes have been committed in the name of freedom. Let us, however, try to forgive these people and see whether we cannot get everyone in Cyprus now to work together for one common aim. We have been generous to those who opposed us, and we have been wise in so doing. At the same time, having been generous to our opponents, let us in every way be generous to our friends. At the head of this category, I put our own troops. No tribute that can be paid to them can be good enough to express our appreciation of all that has been done by the troops in Cyprus during the past few years.
What was so much resented by our troops and by many of us in this House was when certain hon. Members made
676
great insinuations that the troops were doing other than their fair and proper duty. That was remembered, and it will be remembered for quite a long time.
Now that the troops are coming back, having knowledge of what they have done, let us be generous to them in every way. If any political crimes have arisen through over-exuberance while they have been in Cyprus, let them be forgiven along with the Greeks and Turks. At the same time, however, when they come home let us be more warmhearted in our generosity, too. What does it matter if our troops in Cyprus come back with 400 instead of 200 cigarettes [An HON. MEMBER: "Or a watch, too."] On an occasion like this, they should have a great welcome and we should not be too fussy about such matters as cigarettes.
When we pay our tribute to the fine work of the troops, let us pay a tribute to the work which has been done by their wives. That is something which is often forgotten. This is a military operation in which the troops have been allowed to have their wives and families with them under conditions of great difficulty. Towards the middle of last year, when conditions seemed to be very difficult, they were given the opportunity of coming home, but they all said that they would prefer to stay there by their men and to face whatever troubles and difficulties there were.
There were 200 or 300 of them in this country who had been debarred from going and who asked me and others to help to get them out there. There was great joy on their part when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was able to arrange that they should join their men in time for Christmas. They went out freely and voluntarily, knowing all the difficulties and troubles that they would face. The whole of those women have what, to use a good British word, we call guts, and we can honestly say that we are proud of the part they have played.
I have spoken of the troops. I welcomed particularly in the speech of my right hon. Friend his remarks about looking after the administrators and civil servants who have stuck with us throughout our troubles in Cyprus. [HON. MEMBERS: "And the police."] Yes, and the police. They have all done a fine job and been very loyal. Whatever happens now, we must see that they have a square deal and that they are not let down

677
because they remained loyal to us while we were there. I am extremely pleased that discussions have already begun, and I would like my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary to know that certainly on this side of the House, and, I think, on the benches opposite, we will back him in securing that a fair deal is given to these people.
The hon. Member for Pembroke spoke of the possibility of Cyprus joining the Commonwealth. He was much more reasonable and proper in his approach to the problem than was his right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale, who more or less wound up by giving his orders about how it should be done. Association with the Commonwealth is a voluntary effort, and the first thing that must come about is that Cyprus and the Cypriots should say that they wish to join. If they wish to join freely, I am certain that on all sides of the House we should be happy to have them. Membership of the Commonwealth carries both rights and obligations, and I am sure that all of us would welcome the people of Cyprus as partners. The choice, however, is with them, and at this stage we should not force them.
I feel that in Cyprus we have been able to reach an honourable solution. It is not a victory for Greek or for Turk, or for or anyone else, but a victory for common sense. There remain many difficulties ahead, both political and economic, but I believe that with good will they can be overcome and that the new constitution can be made to work. Cyprus will carry the good wishes of all of us.
5.48 p.m.
Mr. Clement Davies: I cannot refrain from paying my tribute to the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon) and expressing my admiration for his remarkable maiden speech. It was thoughtful, constructive, informative, and what is more, delivered with great charm, which captured the House. All of us, on both sides, listened to him with rapt attention. In common with many other hon. Members, I had the privilege of friendship with his father. Naturally, we would be inclined to favour the hon. Member because of our recollection of his parent, but he has established his reputation among us, not in memory of his father, but by his own ability and the way
678
in which he has addressed the House on this difficult occasion.
There is not one of us, in any part of the House, who does not rejoice that the strife in Cyprus has ended and that peace once more has come to that island, which was so movingly described by the hon. Member for Southend, West in his closing words. Our one hope now is that the people of Cyprus will live together, forgetting bitterness and animosity and having one aim and one aim only: that is, the welfare of the island as a whole and its gradual development—as it must be done gradually—and happiness for all time.
The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for the Colonies very rightly referred to the fact that we had not had a debate on Cyprus since last June or July. He might have paid a tribute to the fact that those of us who did not agree with the plan which had been put forward by Her Majesty's Government showed, throughout the whole of that period, very considerable restraint under great difficulties. We had many criticisms to make of the plan, but we decided that if it were possible that that plan might bring peace to the island and bring about a settlement, not one word of ours should be uttered which might endanger that possibility. It would have been right if that tribute had been paid to those of us who felt strongly about this matter but, throughout that period, did not utter one word of captious criticism.
An Agreement has now been made between Greece, Turkey, ourselves, the Hellenic Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It is not for me to criticise that Agreement in any way. I would not desire to do so for one moment, because the aim not only of the people of the island but of all of us should be that the Agreement should be a success and that these people should now live in amity.
But that does not prevent our criticising Her Majesty's Government for the way in which all this matter has been handled. Throughout, I have felt that the people most concerned were the islanders of Cyprus. They were the people of paramount importance. Even our position was secondary to theirs, for we were there as trustees and, that being so, it was their desires and wishes which

679
should have had paramount consideration from everybody. It was because of the failure to give that consideration that all along we were criticising the policy and the attitude of Her Majesty's Government.
If the island were necessary for the protection of our interests in the Mediterranean, then, a fortiori, it was necessary that we, being alien to the people of the island, should carry with us their friendship at all times. It is impossible to establish a base of any value whatsoever among people who are hostile to us and who are prepared to make any sacrifice, even of life itself, in order that they might get rid of the alien domination which they dislike.
One felt all along, that being so, that the right solution for us to adopt, and especially for Her Majesty's Government, was to treat the wishes of the people of Cyprus as of paramount importance. We took a kind of conditional responsibility for these people in 1878. There was a possibility that we might have had to resign our position there and restore responsibility to the Turkish Government and people, but, from November, 1914, when we annexed the island, and certainly after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, we had sole and complete responsibility for the people.
That being so, and that being our position in every land where we have held dominion, the primary consideration, following the policy which we have always pursued, should have been the wishes and desires of these people. That has been the principle which we have followed in every case where we have held dominion over other lands. It is because we have followed that policy that our position today in the world is so high among all peoples as a people who not only desire liberty for ourselves but for all other people.
Reference is often made, even in the House, to the clauses in the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic Charter dealing with the rights of peoples everywhere, their rights to their own individual liberty, their right to choose their own Government, and their right to decide their own way and destiny. I take pride in the fact, as I am sure everyone else does, that these clauses in these charters merely reiterate the policy followed by
680
this country whenever its Government have acted wisely and correctly. These clauses ought to have been nothing new to us, for it is in that way that the Commonwealth has grown and flourished and the Empire has withered and is continuing to wither. It is only when we depart from that principle that trouble arises.
When we assumed complete responsibility for the people of Cyprus we were responsible not only for their good government, but also for their welfare and their education until they had achieved a position in which they and we could safely say that they were entitled to self-government. Those matters concerned them and ourselves, and nobody else. They were no concern of Greece and no concern of Turkey. They were matters for us and the people of Cyprus alone. That has been the position which we have taken up and recognise as the right position in every instance where the Commonwealth is now flourishing.
It is only when we depart from that principle that trouble arises. How much suffering and misery could have been avoided if that principle had been consistently followed not only in this, but in many other cases. How heavily have we had to pay when we have departed from that principle.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies made a reference to South Africa and Lord Milner. I thought that it was a most unfortunate reference in this connection. I do not think that Sir Hugh Foot would welcome the fact that he had been compared with Lord Milner. Although the people of South Africa have had self-government and freedom since 1906, and the right to go their own way and decide their own destiny, that will not obliterate from their minds what happened between 1899 and 1902. Nothing will obliterate the concentration camps from their minds. The bitterness of that still remains and is the cause even today of all the trouble in South Africa.
In the same way the memory has never been eradicated from those who suffered because of what happened when we departed, as we did in the first instance when this great problem of Cyprus came before the House, from the principles to which I have referred. Again, the wrong policy which was adopted in 1776 still remains a memory in America. It has

681
done harm not only to us, but to all our friends. The idea they had that we were still colonially-minded has caused a great deal of the trouble in Europe today. Even President Roosevelt was firmly convinced that Stalin was less colonially-minded than the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill).
Therefore, I deeply regret the attitude taken throughout this matter by Her Majesty's Government. I hope that the one consideration now will be the future of these people and their welfare. I agree with the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) that it is necessary to realise that we are still under an obligation to these people. As I have said, we have been trustees for them since 1878. We have brought new ideas to them. We have shown them a different mode of life from that which they had before. We cannot desert them now and we ought to treat them with the greatest generosity possible.
Having said that, I still think that the Government were wrong. I agree with the Amendment moved from the Opposition benches by the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. It is a matter of deep regret that so much suffering and so many deaths should have been caused. People have lost their loved ones, and this need never have happened if we had followed the principles which guided us so rightly in the past.
6.2 p.m.
Viscount Lambton: Nearly every hon. Member who has spoken so far today has expressed his appreciation of the distinguished maiden speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Chan-non), about which I shall say something later. But, first, may I say how pleased I am also to hear an old-timer speaking in his usual pleasant way. The right hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies) has not spoken much in this House recently, and it is pleasant to hear him again.
Whatever else one has to say, one must express great pleasure that for the first time in a number of years there is peace in Cyprus. I can honestly say that I have not felt the surprise expressed by some hon. Members of Her Majesty's Government, and by the Governor of Cyprus, that this has come about, for once last autumn the Greek Government
682
and Archbishop Makarios officially abandoned Enosis, a great stumbling block to peace had gone. For the Turkish desire for partition had always been a defensive measure, brought about purely by the fact that the Turks could not bear to see their south coast under the domination of a country in whose government they had no say.
Taking this into consideration, it seemed clear at the end of last year that we were losing an opportunity to establish peace and to safeguard our own position in the island by abandoning the partition plan and taking the rule of the island into our own hands until a settlement could be effected. Indeed, the statement of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies of Mr. Zorlu's willingness to leave the matter in our hands if the Greek attitude could be minimised would seem to support this point of view.
I still think that last autumn this would have been the correct decision to make. It would have divorced the military situation from the political one, and how valuable that would have been. That is made clear when one remembers that had it not been for the intervention of the Foreign Secretary, who telephoned from Paris to save the lives of a few Cypriots at that time, there would now be a severance of relations between Greece and this country and the present solution could not have been reached.
However, that is a matter of opinion, and the main thing we are glad about and must discuss is the settlement. I want to make a very stringent criticism of the way peace was reached, because it seems to me to impinge upon a vital principle. I cannot believe it was right that tire Turkish and Greek representatives should meet at Zurich to discuss the future of a British Colony without one of our representatives taking part in the discussion. Neither can I believe it was wise to let it be believed that we would agree to what those representatives decided there.
It is a business maxim that in any problem where three people are concerned, if only two of the three meet to discuss the solution the interests of the third will not receive just consideration. It has been said in opposition to this point of view that the justification of the

683
Zurich talks was that we were aware of what was going on. However, I find it a further need for comment that it tied our hands even more, since it made it impossible for us to object to what was accepted there. It has always seemed to me that in entering into discussions where one's interests are concerned one should be as uncommitted as possible to any point of view.
Taking all this into consideration, should we not have stated definitely at Zurich that it was our opinion that we must remain in force in the island for a period of from three to five years? I say this not in any colonial spirit, not in the spirit which the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite sometimes thinks inhibits all hon. Members on this side of the House, but because of the singular difficulties existing in Cyprus today. I am thinking of the vendettas that will be pursued and the blood feuds that will be waged and of the opportunities for disorder that will be given to the Communist Party, which is stronger now in the island than has ever been known before. All this, in my opinion, may affect adversely a nation emerging into self-government for the first time.
We have a great responsibility in Cyprus. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman said, we have been there for eighty years. It seems to me that to leave an island emerging from a state of bloodshed without an adequately trained police force is not taking our responsibility in the right way. When we go, goodness knows what the state will be in an island with a new constitution of which we have yet no experience.
However, this is going back into the past in a sense, and as this point of view was not put forward at Zurich, and as the impression reached there was that what was agreed we would accept, we have no alternative but to accept withdrawal from the island. Why, then, do we suddenly throw in the question of the sovereignty of bases? Having abandoned the position of staying for a period, we should then withdraw. What does the sovereignty of bases mean? We are told that there are three areas in Cyprus which we desire to keep.
There is not a single enclave. They are scattered and disordered. There is an
684
aerodrome here, a port there. Anyone who has been to the island can see that only by enormous expenditure will it be possible to concentrate everything into one of those three areas. I return to the singular maiden speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West, who spoke with the experience of having served in the island. He asked the Government how they were to see that the three bases were co-ordinated. Anyone who has been to the island wants to know the answer to that question, and I hope that it will be answered tonight.
It is said that we are to have the right of communication, but are we to have sovereignty of communication? If so, what does it mean and is it workable? I have spoken to several military strategists, generals, all of whom have served in the island, and they cannot see how the scheme can be worked against a hostile community without our having a very large number of troops in the island, which is precisely what we are trying to avoid.
Apart from that, is it wise, when we are beginning a new relationship with a new country, to insist on an irritating situation which it will be very difficult for us to preserve? Without doubt, in the years that lie ahead, by the very nature of the problem and by the very nature of the past, there will be strained relationships between the Archbishop, the leaders of the island and ourselves. Is it wise to leave in their hands a pretext for personal attack against this country, especially, as I have said, when that pretext is one which it will be extremely difficult for us to contradict without enormous expense? Is it worth while, for the sake of saving face which we have already lost, to insist on a position which is the reason for dissension?
Once again, as so often in the last two years, it seems to me that our policy has regrettably fallen between two stools. We had to decide whether to stay on the island for a period of years, nursing, as it were, by benevolent force a new nation coming out—and, taking all the circumstances into consideration, that is the course I would have adopted—or the alternative to it, the acceptance of that to which we were committed by keeping silent at Zurich and accepting what was agreeable to the Turks, the Greeks and Archbishop Makarios.

685
The pity seems to me to be that we have not accepted either of those two courses, each of which might work, but have taken four-fifths of the second and spoiled it by one-fifth of the first. As the result, I fear that we may once again have the worst of both worlds. We should learn the proposition which I have put forward again and again in the last year. It is simply that a policy of pure strength can work, that a policy of pure compromise can work, but that in a situation such as this a mixture of the two cannot work.
6.14 p.m.
Mrs. Lena Jeger: The noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) has made an intensely interesting analysis of the Agreement. Much of what he said will be echoed by hon. Members on this side of the House. It will be for his right hon. Friend to deal with the specific matters which he has raised and I would not make so bold as to try to put a gloss on these admittedly difficult matters.
Looking back at our debates, I felt how easy it would be to make a speech which was merely a collection of quotations from Government benches over the last five years, putting on the record, to the embarrassment of the Government, a series of catastrophic misjudgments and shifts of policy and contradictions which have distorted relations between this country and Greece, Turkey, and all the communities in Cyprus.
We have had to go from the "never-never" land of Mr. Hopkinson, now Lord Colyton, a little further forward to the "not foreseeable future". In the White Paper published in 1956, after the talks between Governor Harding and Archbishop Makarios, we went to a new situation in which the Government announced that it was not their position that the principle of self-determination could never be applicable to Cyprus. Having passed from the "never" to the "not 'never'", we could see how confusion had reigned.
I admit that my own feeling is one of relief that the bloodshed in Cyprus has stopped and it is thus easy to respond to the understandable invitations of hon. Members opposite to forgive and forget. But I think that we should have been failing in our duty if we had let the
686
Government's disastrous record on Cyprus sink without trace.
I say that for several reasons. The first is that it has cost this country as a whole, and many families, dearly. It is easy for politicians by their wrong policies to put our soldiers in jeopardy and then seek to discharge their responsibility to those soldiers and their families by praising the troops. That costs the politicians nothing, but it often costs the soldiers their lives.
It is not only in this country that families have been bereaved and suffered grievous injury. So far today, very little reference has been made to the tragedy which the last few years have brought to the people of Cyprus themselves and to the even longer and in some ways more horrible death roll of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Those of us who have spent some time in the island and who, for different periods, shared something of the life of the people, as I have, realise what it has meant to the families of the Cypriot people—hundreds of menfolk in prison, many more in the mountains, families deprived of the breadwinner, husband and wife separated, the indignity of constant searches, curfews, the distortion of the economy, the constant atmosphere of fear. Those have all been part of the life of the ordinary men and women of Cyprus over the last few years. It is on hon. Members opposite that responsibility for that must be placed.
I pay my tribute, if he will not resent it, to the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon), for his maiden speech. The whole House was deeply impressed with its quality and tone, all the more so, because he spoke as a soldier who had served in Cyprus. It is remarkable that almost everyone who has been to the island, and who has spent some time among the people, agrees that part of the heartbreak of the present situation arises from the fact that Cyprus is such a beautiful place and that the people are so likeable and so friendly. I say that because I thought that I detected undertones of near affection for Cyprus in what the hon. Member said.
I have watched soldiers at work in Cyprus when they have been trying to do their desperately unfair job, many of

687
them conscientiously and with the minimum of friction, but in many cases it has been an impossible task. It is most unfair for hon. Members opposite to suggest that there is any lack of appreciation by hon. Members on this side of the House of the efforts of our troops and the work that they have done. Time and again we have said that the fault is with those who sent the troops to Cyprus. It is time that that fact was recognised.
This conflict has gone on for many years. Had the Government made earlier the concessions which they have made now, many lives could have been saved. I feel that we are somehow back at the beginning. It is as though we had been through a nightmare of lost years. Now we are starting out to reach the point that we could have reached several years ago had it not been for the many statements, full of lack of wisdom, that we have had to put up with from hon. Members opposite.
The Colonial Secretary made much of the importance of our strategic needs, and of our bases in Cyprus. I was puzzled to know why he spent so long on this subject, because it has never been a point in issue. If we think back to the tripartite talks between Greece, Turkey and this country which took place in London in 1955, and refer to the White Paper published after those talks, we find that the Greek representative, Mr. Stephanopoulos, made the position quite clear. He said:
"Greece has never (and I emphasise never) for a single moment entertained the idea of a withdrawal from Cyprus of the British Forces."
In none of the discussions that have taken place with Archbishop Makarios has there been any argument about the right of the British to maintain forces in Cyprus. In fact, if hon. Members opposite will read the White Paper published after the breakdown of the talks between the Archbishop and General Harding they will see that a situation far more favourable to our strategic needs could have been secured then, because at that point, just before the Archbishop's deportation, the talks had reached a point at which the Archbishop was prepared to concede continued British sovereignty over the island.
The points then at issue concerned the question whether there should be an amnesty, as my right hon. Friend
688
reminded the House; the composition of the elected Chamber, and the question of who should have power over internal security. It would have been possible to reach agreement on those three points, and in the debates which took place on the White Paper it was pointed out by hon. Members on this side of the House that none of those points was insoluble and that there seemed to be no adequate reason for breaking off the talks at that stage: and certainly no reason at all for the exile of Archbishop Makarios, which followed soon after these very substantial concessions had been made by him.
I thought that it illustrated the almost pathologically hostile relationship between the right hon. Gentleman and Archbishop Makarios—hostile from the right hon. Gentleman's side—that he was able, in this important debate today, to make his opening speech on the Cyprus Agreement without making one reference to the name of Makarios.
It would have been too much to expect him to pay a tribute to the Archbishop. It must have been extraordinarily humiliating for him to have to bring the Archbishop to the Dorchester Hotel via the Seychelles and Athens. It is always easier to get rid of people than it is to bring them back into the picture when we happened to need them. The House must face the fact that, but for the cooperation of Archbishop Makarios, we would not be discussing the Agreement today. There can be no doubt on the part of hon. Members on either side of the House that it is only because the Archbishop has signed the Agreement that the people of Cyprus, from the Left to the Right, have accepted it.
The hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke) seems to disagree. Perhaps he would like to make his position clear.
Major Legge-Bourke: The hon. Lady is arguing that agreement would never have come about had it not been for the Archbishop, but she is overlooking the fact that E.O.K.A., too, would never have gone on for so long if it had not been for him.
Mrs. Jeger: That is historically difficult for me to accept, because the heyday of E.O.K.A. came after the Archbishop had been deported. We must get our history right.
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. John Profumo)The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. John Profumo) indicated dissent.
Mrs. Jeger: I never know whether the Minister is shaking his head because he does not like what he is looking at, or because he is disagreeing with what I am saying.
Mr. Profumo: It is because of the general tenor of the hon. Lady's speech that I shake my head. It is nothing personal.
Mrs. Jeger: It must be quite clear that but for the Archbishop agreement could not have been reached. In fact, while Archbishop Makarios was in exile we were repeatedly told that one beneficial result would be that now, at last, other moderate Cypriot leaders could come forward. We have heard that term "other moderate Cypriot leaders" for years and years, in this House, and we have waited for them to materialise. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman was waiting for them, and we told him that he would wait in vain. If his intelligence service had been a little better he would never have acted in that manner.
Mr. Callaghan: We are now going to hear that term in reference to Nyasaland.
Mrs. Jeger: The real turning point in this tragedy came last autumn, when the Archbishop made it clear that he was prepared to consider a situation in which there would be independence for Cyprus without any claim for Enosis. This was a very bold and difficult step for the Archbishop to take, and that fact should he acknowledged. In many ways this was the catalyst in this hitherto intractable situation, and I cannot see why hon. Members opposite are not gracious enough to concede this.
I should have thought that it would have been only fair and helpful. But no—between this new statement by the Archbishop and the conclusion of the Agreement, 50 more people had to die. The right hon. Gentleman told the House today that the lives lost in Cyprus were not lost in vain. If he can comfort himself with that reflection, I cannot—and I do not think that the relatives of those who died can derive any comfort from that statement.
So much for the past. Looking to the future we have an Agreement, which the
690
House must consider. It is a complicated Agreement. There are many obvious difficulties which must be faced, and I very much hope that we shall be able to give all possible help to the people of Cyprus in this new and difficult stage in their history. But we should recognise that this is the first time in the history of the Cypriot people that they have had the chance of independence and a representative Government of their own.
That chance was never given to them under any of the other dispensations which have ruled in the island, and we must welcome the fact that they now have that chance, because all those of us who know the island and its people have been aware for a long time of their need for more direct political responsibility and experience. At last, they have the chance of an elected Parliament which will be able to speak directly for them. I hope that soon we shall find Cyprus an independent, sovereign member of the United Nations, and for the first time playing a full part there.
I should like to mention one or two points which I find rather worrying and which I hope the Government may be able to clarify. On the first page of the White Paper there is a reference to the right of veto of the Vice-President, who is to be Turkish. If I read the White Paper correctly, it would seem that rather than being a Vice-President, the Turkish member, in practice, will be a co-President. I cannot see any difference in the powers of the President and the Vice-President. I am not arguing that there should be. I am merely asking for information about whether there is in reality any difference in status or in power between the President and the Vice-President.
While many of us welcome the fact that the worst communal features of the—I do not know whether to call it the Macmillan Plan or the Foot Plan; perhaps we had better put a hyphen between the two names and refer to it as "Foot-Macmillan"—Plan have been dropped, and there is to be this General Assembly, this Parliament to which I have already referred. I am sorry that it seems that this Parliament will be elected on a communal roll. It is one of my hopes for the future that we shall find the people

691
voting on a common roll for the best person to represent them in their Assembly.
Mr. John Biggs-Davison: Surely that is something for the Cypriot people to decide.
Mrs. Jeger: Indeed it is, for the Cypriot people to decide, and I am glad that the hon. Member admits it.
Mr. Biggs-Davison: Why does the hon. Lady wish to impose these conditions on the constitution?
Mrs. Jeger: Nothing I have said implies that I am desirous of imposing conditions. It is the Agreement which imposes these conditions. I am merely asking that some attention be given to this during the intervening talks. There are to be talks about the details of the constitution and I hope that this is one of the details which will merit a little attention.
It is also rather worrying that many matters are to be managed entirely by communal chambers. Education is listed—
Mr. Biggs-Davison: What is worrying about that?
Mrs. Jeger: I am trying to explain, if I may be allowed to.
I know that hitherto education in Cyprus has, in the main, been divided between Greeks and Turks and I have always thought that that was a pity. For anyone who cares about education it is sad to go to a Cypriot village where there is a mixed population and to find there are perhaps 10 Turkish children in the village who have to go to a separate little school. I have visited such schools, and one finds one teacher teaching the whole school.
Viscount Lambton: Is the hon. Lady opposed to Catholic schools?
Mrs. Jeger: I am not opposed to children going to whatever school their parents wish them to go. I am only saying that it is a pity if they have to go to a Catholic school and they do not want to.
Mr. Anthony Fell: Who said that they do not want to?
Mrs. Jeger: If the hon. Gentleman wishes to interrupt me, perhaps he will be courteous enough to stand up.
Mr. Fell: I apologise to the hon. Lady most humbly. But she seemed to be getting a little muddled about this. I did not want to interrupt her again, because she did not seem to be able to answer the question about schools.
Mrs. Jeger: I feel that the hon. Gentleman has abused the privilege of interruption. He said nothing which was helpful to our discussion. I consider it such a bad precedent that I do not propose to give way again.
The real point I wish to make about education—I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not want to listen—
Mr. Patrick Maitland Mr. Patrick Maitland rose—
Mrs. Jeger: Please let me finish my point about education.
There are few facilities for higher education in Cyprus, such facilities as are provided by the Forestry School, for example, and I think that it would be disastrous if the very limited facilities for higher education, particularly in technical spheres, which have been made available, should be so communalised that we find it impossible for Greeks to go to one institute or Turks to go to another. I hope that where the two communities can come together and agree to share in these limited facilities we shall encourage them to do so; it would not be proper to go any further than that.
Mr. Maitland Mr. Maitland rose—
Mrs. Jeger: I do not propose to give way any more to hon. Members opposite. They have so little to say when one does try to deal with them courteously.
I have mentioned those few points, and there are others which I think will be dealt with as confidence develops in Cyprus. The limitations which have had to be laid down, because of the suspicion which unfortunately exists, may in time wither away. I look forward to a time when the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus will not feel it necessary to have it laid down that the Civil Service must be 70 per cent. Greek and 30 per cent. Turkish; that the Army must be 60 per cent. Greek and 40 per cent. Turkish, but that these people will gradually begin to think of themselves as Cypriots living in a common homeland and contributing together to its progress and to its welfare.

693
We have referred to this Agreement as giving sovereignty to Cyprus but it is a very muted sovereignty. The noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed referred to the enclaves of which there are to be two in this tiny island about equal in size to a couple of English counties. All sorts of difficulties will have to be worked out. On page 10 of the White Paper we find references to the right of interference by Greece and Turkey, to the rights of Greece and Turkey to have troops on the island. So that in this small country there are to be troops from three other countries.
If, as we all hope, Cyprus remains in the Commonwealth, it will surely be an unprecedented situation that in a Commonwealth Territory there are to be troops from two foreign countries. I am asking for guidance about this, because I find it very puzzling. Coupled with the right given in Article 3 to Greece and Turkey to intervene, either separately or together, in certain very vaguely defined circumstances, it needs examining carefully.
We all wish well to this new country. Most of the past troubles of Cyprus have arisen out of her geographical situation. I hope that in the future most of her prosperity and happiness, also, will arise out of her geographical situation. There she is, on the frontier between Europe and the Orient, at the crossroads of many civilisations and cultures. Cyprus can become a very beautiful, interesting, prosperous and, I believe, happy country which many people would find great pleasure in visiting; a country where, I hope, the people, by their own efforts and their own hard work—because they are an industrious people—will find a new prosperity and happiness.
6.40 p.m.
Mr. J. Enoch Powell: Whatever words are spoken and whatever attitudes are taken up in a debate which, unfortunately, it appears, is to end in a Division, I do not believe that there is any hon. Member anywhere in the House who is not glad at heart that these Agreements have been reached upon which it is hoped that a settlement in Cyprus will be based, and who does not pray that that settlement will be rapidly worked out and brought to fruition.
694
It is not a settlement which anyone, until quite recently, was at all expecting in this form. If one goes back five years or ten years, we find that the very nation of an independent Cyprus, a Republic of Cyprus, which is the essence of this solution, was regarded as fantastic. It was taken as axiomatic by people on all sides—hon. Members opposite as well as hon. Members on Government benches—that Cyprus as a separate entity was not "viable". That, I think, was the word which was most favoured.
I will not trouble the House with many quotations, but it is, perhaps, worth remembering one or two things which have been said, which illustrate how automatically it was assumed that this territory could not in itself be independent. In February, 1954, Lord Ogmore, a former Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Labour Government, said, in another place:
"In my view, there are at least thirty Colonial Territories which can never in the ordinary way be entirely independent of this country … I am looking at Cyprus, as I think we can only look at it, as purely a Colonial Territory and one that is likely to remain so."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 23rd February, 1954; Vol. 185. c. 1083–4.]
The hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Parker), in a very interesting speech which he made in an Adjournment debate in 1954, said:
"The alternative before us is either to stay in the island … or to hand over Cyprus to Greece."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd July, 1954; Vol. 530, c. 1847.]
The Labour Party, in its official document on colonial policy, in 1957, said:
"… in present circumstances, it seems likely that all, or almost all, of the Territories mentioned"—
these were the smaller territories of the Empire and included Cyprus—
"will neither be capable of national sovereignty nor anxious to attain it."
That document went on to say:
"The people of a territory too small for independence can attain representation in a sovereign Parliament by integration into an existing nation state. Integration can be either with the United Kingdom, as in the case of Malta, or with some other Commonwealth country, or with a nation outside the Commonwealth, as the Cypriot advocates of Enosis desire."
So, until almost yesterday, it was common ground that Cyprus, like certain other places, was a territory which, by its very

695
nature, we could not expect to see as an independent sovereign nation. Yet today we are taking part in launching the Republic of Cyprus; indeed, we are proposing to enter into guarantees of its status as an independent sovereign republic.
I believe that there is a lesson in this unexpected change in our point of view which has a value extending even beyond the affairs of the Island of Cyprus. I think that we have been much too ready in the past to assume that this or that territory, because it is small or poor or labours under some disadvantage, is not capable of being a sovereign independent entity in the world of today. The map of the world is dotted with territories which, if today they were dependent, everyone would be ready to deny could ever be independent. One does not need, either, to point to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg or the Principality of Monaco as examples; much more substantial cases will occur to hon. Members of territories which, if they were colonial today, we should regard as not viable, as countries for which there could be no independent future.
I believe that we have made these assumptions, proved in the case of Cyprus to be erroneous, all the more readily, and all the more honourably, too, because of the difficulty of conceiving how territories of this kind can both be independent and still within the Commonwealth. I suggest that a good deal of rethinking may be necessary in this respect about the composition of the Commonwealth. We have, perhaps, too readily assumed that membership of the Commonwealth is only practicable for great sovereign nation States like India or Australia. This may be another assumption which will prove on further experience, and with further development, to have been ill founded.
Mr. Callaghan: As the hon. Member has quoted from the Labour Party pamphlet, will he go on to say that that was the whole argument of the pamphlet—that there were a number of nations which could well become Dominions, which we regarded as being of vacant status, but should remain inside the Commonwealth?
Mr. Powell: Yes, but in relation to Cyprus, and, indeed, many other countries, this was not conceived in that
696
pamphlet; indeed, as I pointed out in the passage which I quoted, it was never imagined that Cyprus could have independence except by being embodied in another sovereign State. It was only yesterday that independence for Cyprus, otherwise than through Enosis or partition, that is, union partly with Turkey and partly with Greece, was conceived by anyone.
But this is not the only assumption which I believe we are called upon to reconsider by this dramatic and welcome turn of events in Cyprus. The assumption which I have been criticising is closely linked with another assumption, also made hitherto on both sides of the House, that sovereignty was necessary to the discharge of Britain's obligations and the fulfilment of her requirements—that it was an indefeasible necessity of the situation. Here, again, neither party until yesterday, so long as that party bore responsibility, had departed from the concept of British sovereignty in Cyprus as being an essential for British requirements.
The right hon. Member for Wakefield (Mr. Creech Jones), when he was Colonial Secretary, announced in 1947:
"No change in the status of the island is contemplated by His Majesty's Government."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th March, 1947; Vol. 434, c. 1318.]
When the party opposite produced a draft constitution for Cyprus in 1948, the despatch in which it announced it began by rejecting in terms
"the principle of fully responsible Government in the internal affairs of Cyprus",
and it was a condition of that proposed constitution that
"the Legislature may not discuss the status of Cyprus within the British Commonwealth".
In 1950, the right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. J. Dugdale) was assuring the House:
"It has repeatedly been made clear that no change in the sovereignty of the island is contemplated".—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 21st June, 1950; Vol. 476, c. 1279.]
Here, incidentally, is the refutation of the charge made today from the opposite side of the House that it is that principle, accepted and enunciated by Secretaries of State of both parties, which has been the cause of our difficulties in Cyprus. If to say, in 1954, that sovereignty was

697
necessary in Cyprus, was the cause of bloodshed, was it not the cause of bloodshed to say so in 1950?
Mr. Callaghan: No, certainly not.
Mr. Powell: The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said this afternoon t hat something new was done and said in 1954 which precipitated the troubles and the bloodshed since that time. So far from it being something new, it was the repetition of a principle which was accepted until very recently without question by both the parties in this House whenever they were in a position of responsibility.
Now we are welcoming a settlement under which sovereignty for the island is given up, while sovereignty of two enclaves is 10 he retained. It is great evidence of the desire of all parties, the Turks, the Greeks and the two communities in the island, to come to a settlement, that sovereignty over those enclaves has been written into the agreement; but I share with my noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) the hope that we shall not be deluded into the idea that there is some magic in sovereignty as such.
The utility of these areas to Britain, whatever be the forms adopted and whatever we say about sovereignty, will and must depend upon the good will of the people of that island. They cannot be of use to us unless we have that good will. The mere assertion of sovereignty gives of itself no security; in fact, there may be circumstances in which it actually diminishes security. The United States has the use of bases in Great Britain; I am far from sure whether the United States would be more certain of being able to use the facilities of those bases if she insisted that they should be under United States sovereignty.
We have to divest ourselves of the notion that sovereignty in itself confers any advantages or gives any security which does not rest upon the real circumstances in the places concerned. Sovereignty in itself is a mere form. The realities within it are the will of the people and the power of the sovereign. Nor are these two different and unconnected realities: they are only the reverse and the obverse of one and the same thing.
698
I believe that this brings us right to the heart of Britain's colonial problems over the last twenty years, problems of which that of Cyprus has only been one facet and one phase. In those last twenty years the reality inside our sovereignty has gradually been hollowed out. Both the physical and the moral or sentimental reality of sovereignty have gradually fallen away—the physical reality by the loss of Britain's absolute and relative economic and military preponderance in the world, and the moral reality by the spread of what we ineffectually call "nationalism", but is really the projection of all that Europe has given over the last two centuries to peoples of different races and circumstances throughout the world. Those two forces have hollowed out the reality, and have left behind little more than the shell of sovereignty—and one thing else, responsibility. It is responsibility inherited from the past, but still responsibility, for all that—responsibility to minorities, for peace, for well-being, for those who have served the Crown.
In this contradiction—for it is a kind of contradiction—lies the essence of Britain's colonial problem, lies the tragedy of Britain's colonial position today. Logically purely as a matter of logic—there can be no responsibility without the power to discharge it; but that is logic and not reality. We cannot, in fact, with a Lex non cogit ad impossibilia, simply wave aside the responsibilities with which history has left us in those territories. Thus, while sovereignty has come to be something different, to be in some places scarcely more than a form, there is still and there remains our moral duty.
In these circumstances, there are two extremes which we must avoid. One extreme is to suppose that we must, or, indeed, that we can, guarantee in perpetuity those things for which we are responsible; that "into the future, far as human eye can see", we have to make ourselves responsible for minorities, for welfare, and so forth. There is also the equally false and equally dangerous opposite extreme of supposing that we can cut the knot by ignoring the difficulties, by ignoring minorities, by ignoring the consequences of the removal of Britain's presence—that we can wish away part of the picture simply because it makes our task so difficult. That is the real difference between the two sides of this House on colonial questions. The party opposite

699
has too often been partial in its view of a situation, been too ready to simplify, too ready to see one side and to forget the additional reality, but still the reality, of those responsibilities which remain.
Between these extremes we have to seek the mean. Our duty goes thus far and no further, but it goes thus far: that wherever humanly possible our presence should not be withdrawn until there is a reasonable possibility that the rights of minorities will be provided for, that there will be peace and justice when we have gone, and that those for whom we have been responsible have a reasonable opportunity and a rational likelihood of survival and of well-being.
To achieve this will not always be possible. It will always be difficult, especially in circumstances like those on the island of Cyprus, complicated by the communal divisions of the island and by the involvement of those communal divisions in an international situation itself of great complexity. If this Agreement is carried into effect we shall, in this case, have achieved and have done our duty, and I rejoice with my right hon. Friend that it should be under his Secretaryship of State that it has been achieved.
But my last word is not for him, as I am sure he would have not wished it. This duty of ours cannot be achieved unless, as long as may be necessary for achieving it, we can hold the ring. In Cyprus, it is true to say that this peace, this settlement, has been achieved by the means of those who held the ring so long. Those civilians, and those in the Queen's uniform, who died in Cyprus, died no less certainly for Britain's honour than if they had fallen on the field of battle in our campaigns of imperial expansion.
6.59 p.m.
Mr. Frank Tomney: The hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) has engaged the attention of the House in one of the most thoughtful speeches I have heard for a long time. At times his argument was on a very high plane indeed. He also left behind a multitude of unsolved practical problems turning upon Britain's colonial policy, whichever Government is in power, whether the Labour Party, as we hope will be the
700
case shortly, or hon. Members opposite. These are problems which cannot easily be solved by ready-made arguments or quick solutions.
Like him, I expressed some surprise when I first heard over the radio that the Greeks and Turks had arrived at a solution of their difficulties in Cyprus. In view of all that had occurred in the previous four years, I could not believe it. After all the strife, the bloodshed, the arguments, the divisions, and the religious influences, it did not seem possible that this agreement could have been reached in such a short time. It had, however, been achieved—and achieved principally at Zurich without the advice and consent of Her Majesty's Ministers.
This at once poses a particular problem for us in Great Britain because of the changing nature and complexities of the Commonwealth and the rising nationalism in territories which we formerly either protected or governed. When we gave independence to India, Pakistan and Ceylon we started a train of events which gathers momentum as it goes along. It does not absolve us from our responsibilities, but it poses special problems for us in this country as the accepted maternal guardian of these people's destinies and rights. When they achieve independence, to all intents and purposes they are on their own. We say, "This is what you wanted. Now you have it. What will you make of it?"
Cyprus is a peculiar problem in this respect. When we had to leave the Canal Base in 1954 we surrendered in the Middle East a vital base which could have been used had war, regrettably, ever broken out again. We took ourselves to Cyprus on the advice of those who ought to know—the military advisers to the Crown. I always had the gravest misgivings whether Cyprus could serve the purpose for which it was intended. I think that the Suez adventure proved conclusively that it could not. For instance, there is no deep-water harbour, there was a hostile population and the terrain is mountainous to a degree.
As a consequence of our move to Cyprus and of the statement in the House by the then Minister of State, Mr. Hopkinson, in which he implied that

701
Cyprus could never be granted independence, there arose a campaign which has been bitter and long. Nor do I believe that the sovereignty granted to Great Britain over the enclaves under the Agreement makes the use of the island a military possibility. Everything being taken into the island must be manhandled, not once but several times, and everything being taken out of the island has to be manhandled in the same way.
If a decision had to be made at this point, surely the right decision was to place the whole of the jackpot in Turkey, which is our reliable and established ally. The policy of basing troops in Cyprus and using it as a base for aircraft in my opinion will not work. I will tell the House why. Although the Agreement has been reached on a proportional basis of responsibility between the Greeks and the Turks, it is obvious that somewhere in the fastnesses of E.O.K.A. there must remain men who will demand complete independence for the island. This concession of independence appears in some respects remarkably similar to the independence of Ireland, and we know what happened there. Any base which we set up in the three areas of Cyprus will be untenable. The people who will become the new self-styled patriots will make them untenable for the soldiers who have to remain there.
We have a long colonial history. We have been responsible for many bad things and much bad government. We have also been responsible for many good things and much good government. We have done much good work in the Colonial Territories, but we are now vacating them one by one. What we leave behind is a responsibility which perhaps we cannot avoid, but it is not a responsibility which we can necessarily shoulder, because the people here must be considered, too. We are the maternal protectors of these Colonies and territories, but we can undertake that duty only up to a certain level; we cannot go all the way.
The Cyprus Agreement presents us with new problems. In Article 3 provision is made, as I read it, for a position which might arise in the event of insurgence in the island and breach of the provisions. This leads me to the question, why should we have British troops in Cyprus at all? If Turkey and Greece are members of
702
N.A.T.O., according to their strength and ability, what is wrong with stationing their troops on the island to perform the task which British troops have carried out? I can see nothing wrong with that. The presence of troops of the same nationality would be a less hostile presence to Greek Cypriots than that of British troops. Cypriot troops and Turkish troops might not have to suffer the same inconvenience as British troops may have to suffer on the island. I cannot see this arrangement of bases working in practice.
Another possibility which may arise, and which has not been mentioned in the debate, is one which we shall have to consider closely. Cyprus is a new responsibility within the Commonwealth. If Cyprus opts for Commonwealth membership, the question will have to be decided by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in common meeting. It will involve dual nationality within the Commonwealth. It could be Turco-Greek or Greek-Cypriot. Are we to understand that immigration would then be permitted into Cyprus from Greece and Turkey and that after twelve months those people would be eligible for residence in the United Kingdom? If that is so, we shall have something very forcible to say about it. This point has not been considered.
What will be the position of the people here if Cyprus decides to stay outside the Commonwealth? Are we to grant them residence within this country and on what basis? What amount of hardship will it cause? Eventually the British taxpayer will be asked to foot the bill. If Cyprus remains in the Commonwealth, she is not viable economically, either agriculturally or otherwise. Shall we be asked to provide subventions of perhaps £20 million a year to an independent nation?
The situation is somewhat akin to that of Malta. Mr. Mintoff was offered six-fifths of what he asked. He turned it down. The British taxpayer would have had to foot the bill. If Mr. Mintoff wants independence, let him have it, but he must be prepared to take the consequences and he knows that if he has it, he cannot keep his people alive. Such are the difficulties of a changing Commonwealth.
If Nyasaland decides that she cannot remain within the Federation—she is now

703
being kept alive on the Federation budget—what will be the position of this country? It will cost another £40 million a year.
These territories have been a great benefit to us in the past in establishing our predominant industrial and economic position. The world is changing, and we have to change with it. It is a position which may be outside our control. That is why I view the position with the gravest doubt.
I wish to express my regret, as all hon. Members of the House have expressed their regret, about the position in which British soldiers have been placed in Cyprus in the last four years. If it was due to policy executed on the advice of experts, whose knowledge of strategy and the necessity for maintaing certain areas should have been based on deeper thinking than it has been, let us make sure in the future that advice on policy, and any action executed on that advice, is correct when it is taken.
If in the face of rising nationalism throughout the world we have to surrender areas which we formerly protected and in every single case be confronted with bloodshed, and if British troops behave in every case as magnificently as they have done in Cyprus under great provocation, it will be better to go at first by consent and agreement than to have that position thrust upon us. This much we owe to our traditions and our history. Whoever is responsible in the future in a situation which may arise should weigh the consequences gravely.
Before I sit down, I intend to say one thing which has not been said today. I am always fearful when the Church interferes in affairs of State. Archbishop Makarios is not the first bishop or archbishop in history who has interfered in affairs of state. We had a number of them in this country in centuries gone by, and we know what it cost us. It is true that he could at any time by giving the word have ended the activities of Eoka. It is true that in the execution of Government policy men in uniform will take the normal risks assigned to them on soldierly duties. It may be that they were not met face to face by honourable opponents. When one is dealing with guerrilla warfare and ambush one expects
704
to receive the treatment that guerrillas mete out.
One thing which should not pass without notice in today's debate is the issue of Mrs. Cutliffe. She was the wife of a British soldier. She was a noncombatant in Cyprus—a wife giving comfort and solace to her husband performing onerous duties. She, a noncombatant, was shot down in the back in Nicosia. When the final Articles on Cyprus are agreed and signed, taking the view that no man's experience is complete, that no man knows everything and that there is always something to learn either from emotion or experience, a copy should be presented to Archbishop Makarios, together with two photographs, one showing Mrs. Cutliffe surrounded by her five children, and the other showing Mrs. Cutliffe dead in a street in Nicosia. This crime revolted the whole civilised world. It should not pass without notice in the House of Commons.
If we have now to accept in fairness, justice and equity, the changing position in the world—I return to my previous statement—let us do it by consent.
7.15 p.m.
Mr. Hendrie Oakshott: It is not by any means the first time that we have heard a most thoughtful speech from the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney). He carried most of us with him in his concluding remarks. He was very right in the earlier part of his speech also—even though I may not agree with all his conclusions—when he drew attention to some of the very real difficulties which will be encountered in making the new arrangements work.
I wish to comment very briefly on two of his statements. First, he appeared to be very doubtful about the stationing of British troops in Cyprus. He said that as Greece and Turkey are members of N.A.T.O. why should they not do it all? I think that I am right in saying that British troops are there also because of our strategic interests in the Middle East, Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and down into the Indian Ocean. That is a very powerful reason why there should be British troops in Cyprus.
Secondly, the hon. Gentleman spoke about the possible problems arising out of dual nationality. I think that he is

705
wrong, but I am not quite sure. I cannot check it up in the White Paper. Surely they have citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus.
Mr. Tomney: This problem has not been posed in the White Paper.
Mr. Oakshott: Am I not right in saying that? No doubt my right hon. Friend will be able to clear this up. If it is not mentioned, as one is creating a new republic one must be creating citizenship of the republic also. This is an important point which should be cleared up.
Mr. R. T. Paget: The position as I understand it is that the new Cypriot Government have power over immigration. If they are to be members of the Commonwealth, their citizens will be citizens here, and so will those whom they admit to citizenship. That is the difficulty.
Mr. Oakshott: Surely the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) will agree that that is true of any Commonwealth country.
Mr. Paget: Yes, it goes throughout.
Mr. Oakshott: I mention this because I think that it is a very important point.
Mr. Paget: It does not matter yet.
Mr. Oakshott: It is an important point which should be cleared up.
I may be forgiven if I add my congratulations to those already expressed to my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon) on his very remarkable maiden speech. In representing that constituency he is replacing somebody who was much loved on both sides of the House. Both for his own sake, and out of affection for his father, I should like to extend my personal good wishes to him.
I wholeheartedly welcome the terms of the Government Motion. I join with hon. Members on both sides of the House who have expressed their pleasure that there is a reference in the Motion and in the Amendment to the security forces and the public services in Cyprus. In their bearing and behaviour the British troops and security services have maintained the highest possible standards and lived well up to the traditions which we expect from our Services in carrying out tasks which very often must have
706
been extremely distasteful. This was referred to by the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South (Mrs. L. Jeger), and indeed it is not very nice for some of our finest troops to be engaged on police duties.
To those in the administration, as my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) has said, the House owes a especial tribute, also. There will be some, no doubt, who, during the emergency, had to leave the island for good reasons and may not wish to return. There will be others who are there now who may, again for good reasons, not wish to stay. All these public servants must be properly compensated, and I most strongly urge my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary to ensure that the terms they receive are generous, so that the House of Commons can make sure that the compensation really reflects the value that we place on their devotion.
I have two things to say about the Opposition's Amendment. I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said—the hon. Lady the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South certainly did—that my right hon. Friend made no reference today to Archbishop Makarios. My right hon. Friend did not mention Mr. Kutchuk, either. The Amendment contains no reference whatever to the Zurich and London talks, nor does it pay any tribute to those who participated in them. Archbishop Makarios participated in the London talks, and reference is made to that in the Government Motion—
Mr. Callaghan: We welcome the Agreement.
Mr. Oakshott: The last part of the Amendment alleges that Government policies have prevented an earlier settlement. That appears to imply that there has been unreasonable and undue delay. That was the burden of the speech of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale. That it took a long time is undeniable; that—in view of all the happenings in the island—it was very sad that this was so is also true; but to say that it was avoidable is flying in the face of reality.
This goes back to the time when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, then Foreign Secretary, arranged the tripartite talks to which reference is made in page 3 of Command 680. All along, it seemed to many of us that a settlement that had

707
any chance of success or permanency could be arrived at only by arrangements acceptable to all parties. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale talked of a soldier's solution. The Agreement is very far from that. Addressing the London Conference, the Prime Minister said:
"Cyprus was a problem which could only be resolved by agreement between our three countries, as well as with Cyprus itself."
That does not sound like a soldier's solution.
Many of the critics of what we have been trying to do have never paid enough attention to the views of Turkey. The hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) appeared to accuse this side of being inclined to favour the Turkish case. I do not think that that is true. Let us look at the position of Turkey. As my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West said, the Turkish mainland lies only 40 miles from Cyprus—Cyprus sits astride the southern Turkish ports. The Turks would never consent to the occupation of the island by any Power other than ourselves. With the relative numerical positions of the communities in Cyprus, the Turks were genuinely apprehensive that self-determination inevitably meant union with Greece. Turkey was not prepared to accept that.
The right hon. Gentleman said that this was really a question of independence. It is not that at all. I well remember a debate here on 14th May, 1956, when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, speaking then as a backbencher, put the Turkish position very clearly. At that time he was a leading member of our delegation to the Council of Europe. I also was a member, and so was the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). In conversations at the Council of Europe, we all had ample opportunity to appreciate the extremely acute feelings of our Turkish friends on this matter. They certainly let us know about it. My right hon. Friend gave his views then of the strength of Turkish reaction to an early announcement of self-determination, and was followed by the hon. and learned Gentleman, who agreed with him. They were both right.
All the way through, the problem has been to find a way by which the feelings so deeply nourished in Greece and Turkey, and in the Cypriot communities
708
themselves—completely opposed feelings—could ever be reconciled. I therefore do not believe that a solution could have been found more quickly and in a manner acceptable to all. The last part of the Amendment is quite invalid.
We could never have got anywhere except by agreement, and now that we have this Agreement, we have peace in the island, there is much to be done, and many problems have to be met; but we have what we need for our bases. The Greeks, Turks and Cypriots are satisfied. In all the difficulties that may lie ahead we have the great asset referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell)—good will; it is a very fine seedbed for a permanent settlement. But, perhaps, at the end of the day the best thing may turn out to be that this Agreement will, as we pray, heal a schism between old Allies and restore true and traditional friendships.
7.38 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth Robinson: The hon. Member for Bebington (Mr. Oakshott) addresses us in such an engaging way that it is, perhaps, more difficult to disagree with him than with some of his colleagues, but he did try to take my hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) to task for saying that hon. Members opposite have wanted a soldier's solution. In defence of his argument, he quoted some words used by the present Prime Minister at the 1955 London Conference. It is not the words of the Government or of hon. Members opposite about which my right hon. Friend complained. He complained about their deeds, and the deeds done in their name.
There is not the slightest doubt that throughout this struggle the Colonial Secretary has thought that he would be able to suppress the violence on the island and then impose a solution upon a cowed population. That was the soldier's solution that was aimed at during Field Marshal Harding's tenure of the Governorship, and it was to that that my right hon. Friend was referring—
Mr. T. L. Iremonger: But was not the hon. Member present when Field Marshal Harding spoke to a number of hon. Members from both sides of the House? I remember the Field

709
Marshal saying that a political solution was the only solution and that his object was merely to hold the ring.
Mr. Robinson: I remember that meeting very vividly. It was when Field Marshal Harding addressed hon. Members after he had given up the Governorship. His words after he left the island were very different from those that he used when he was still there.
The hon. Member for Bebington also said that we had constantly underestimated Turkey's apprehensions about Cyprus. This is a theme which has been repeated ad nauseam by the Government. We are told that Cyprus is only 40 miles from the mainland of Turkey, and when we reply that the Island of Cos or some of the other islands in the Dodecanese are only two or three miles away we are told that that does not count. The fact is that the strategic arguments that Turkey put forward make no sense at all in the world of the hydrogen bomb. The only other thing that I want to say about Turkey is that we should not forget that Turkey formally renounced all her rights and interests in the island of Cyprus at the Treaty of Lausanne.
We knew that the Colonial Secretary was not going to find it very easy to make his speech this afternoon. Even taking that into account, I was a little surprised at the extraordinary travesty of the story of Cyprus that he gave us today. At one point of his speech I felt more like Alice in Wonderland than I have ever felt since I have been a Member of this House. Indeed, we only came down to earth at one point when the right hon. Gentleman started extolling his right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in terms that were extravagant even for the Colonial Secretary. It then became clear that we were probably embarking on the preliminary stages of the General Election campaign.
I welcome this Agreement, as, I think, everyone else does in this House. I welcome it not so much for what it contains but for the fact that it was signed by all five parties to this long, bitter, tragic and very largely unnecessary conflict. I think there is very little point in trying to assess the relative degrees of sacrifice made by Greece or Turkey or Greek-Cypriots or Turkish-Cypriots. That would not be a very profitable exercise.
710
I do not, however, think that the same reticence is necessary or desirable concerning Her Majesty's Government. There are lessons to be learned here. One wonders if the Government will ever learn a lesson in the colonial field, but I think that the lesson could hardly be more clearly and sharply defined than it is in the case of Cyprus. We must not overlook the fact that the Government have given up the one thing that has been an obstacle to the settlement of this problem over the past four years, and that is sovereignty over the island itself.
As my right hon. Friend and my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mrs. Jeger) said, there has never been any argument about bases on this island either for Britain or N.A.T.O. There has never been any difficulty raised by the Greek Prime Minister or by Archbishop Makarios, and if it had been only a question of bases on the island this whole problem would have been solved at least four years ago. But, of course, from the very moment that we had the Hopkinson "never" and then the Prime Minister's "some time not in the foreseeable future" and all those vague phrases and double negatives, so far as we can see there has never been any evidence of Her Majesty's Government contemplating a surrender of the island.
It is just as well for hon. Members on the back benches opposite to reflect that time and again Her Majesty's Government could have had a solution of this problem on the basis of self-determination for Cyprus within seven years, ten years, or perhaps even fifteen years. Now we are faced with a situation where we get out of the island the day after tomorrow. Of course, the Colonial Secretary comes along with an explanation of this today. Like so much in this story of Cyprus, it is a new explanation. The Government are getting almost as bad as at the time of Suez; everything has to have a new explanation when the old explanation falls to pieces in their hands. Now we are told that until this moment we could not have been satisfied with bases on the island because there was such tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriots that the bases would not have been safe. What a palpably falacious argument. Really, the right hon. Gentleman has to do better than that.

711
The fact is that, for strategic reasons, which we all know now to be wholly ill-founded and which we on these benches have always said were ill-founded, Her Majesty's Government wanted the whole island. Field Marshal Harding made it perfectly clear that nothing less than the island as a base would satisfy this country's needs. We were also told that there was no question whatever of independence for Cyprus. That was said as recently as last November at the United Nations. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Chelsea (Commander Noble), who was then Minister of State, told the United Nations that we must not become mesmerised by a word. I say in favour of the right hon. and gallant Gentleman that at least he had the grace to resign his office—
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. John Profumo): It was nothing to do with that.
Mr. Robinson: I gave him the credit that it was something to do with that.
Mr. Profumo: The hon. Gentleman ought to get this in perspective. I said under my breath that it had nothing to do with that, and I wish to say it publicly. If he is trying to tell the House that my hon. and gallant Friend's resignation had some connection with the statement he made at the United Nations, it is as well for me to make it quite clear that it had nothing to do with that at all.
Mr. Robinson: It is quite proper for the hon. Gentleman to say so. I can only say that I am sorry. I hoped that it had something to do with that. I hoped that at least one Member of the Government, when they turn on their heads and completely repudiate their statements in public in the councils of the world, would feel it necessary to return his seals of office.
The Colonial Secretary this afternoon put another very interesting and quite new gloss on another aspect of the Cyprus story, and that was in connection with the Foot-Macmillan plan. I remember it very vividly, because it was not very long ago when this plan was presented to the House of Commons as Her Majesty's Government's final solution of the Cyprus problem; a solution which was to be imposed
712
and which might possibly be modified in some small details but the basis of which was not capable of modification at anybody's instance.
We know very well that the first thing that happened was that the Prime Minister went to Athens and Ankara, as my right hon. Friend said, dropping pieces of luggage everywhere he landed. One feature after another was whittled away from the Foot-Macmillan plan, and all that we have left of it in this Agreement is the two communal assemblies. Nevertheless, we are now told that we said that we would impose this plan purely in order to bring the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots together to make an agreement which they hitherto were unwilling to make. If the right hon. Gentleman is telling us that this was a subtle Machiavellian plot of the Prime Minister aided by Sir Hugh Foot in the island in putting forward that plan, he is straining our credulity a little too far.
My hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras said that it was a very remarkable thing that the Colonial Secretary could make half an hour's speech about Cyprus and not mention Archbishop Makarios once. I am not surprised that he did not mention Archbishop Makarios. I can see that the whole situation must be deeply painful to him. He had undoubtedly a very curious, strong personal antipathy to Archbishop Makarios, which was obvious in every reference he made about him during the last four years. The fact is that Archbishop Makarios signed the Agreement, and possibly his signing of it was the most difficult decision of all. The fact that he signed it at least vindicated his good faith.
As I ventured to say in a supplementary question to the Colonial Secretary, the Archbishop's good faith has constantly been impugned on the Government benches. Without the Archbishop's signature this Agreement would be worth absolutely nothing. Despite all the efforts of the Government to destroy the Archbishop's influence in the island, there is quite obviously nobody else who could have persuaded the Greek-Cypriots, that is, 80 per cent. of the population of the island, to accept this Agreement. When he was still in London, many people had doubts whether even he would be able to

713
persuade the left-wing trade union movement or, perhaps, the extreme right wing to do so. I am happy to say that since he has been back in Cyprus there has been every indication that he will carry his people with him.
This shows how utterly foolish the Government are. When they have a leader of opinion, of nationalist opinion, in a Colony, they always try to deport him or destroy his influence in the hope that some mythical moderate person who will be a stooge will come along and enter into agreements. But no such person ever does. In the end, the Government must eat humble pie, and, of course, it is not a very palatable dish.
There have been many quotations from speeches in the course of the debate. I wish to make one from what my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) said in the debate of 14th May, 1956: He said:
"The Ethnarchy Council should be invited to send representatives to London for discussions and Archbishop Makarios should be brought to London for consultation and participation in those discussions. [Laughter.]."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th May, 1956; Vol. 552, c. 1662.]
The House will note that HANSARD records that there was laughter from the Government benches. It was a ludicrous thought that the Archbishop, who had, I think, only just been brought back from the Seychelles, could be brought into negotiations. Of course, in the end, as we have always said from these benches, the Government had to negotiate with him. They had to swallow their pride and save their face as best they could.
The Colonial Secretary said that we should look to the future and turn our hacks on the past. I can well understand that he wants to do that. I have dealt with the past because I believe that there is a lesson to be learned. It is all very well saying that the Cyprus problem was not like other problems, that it has been complicated by all the communal differences between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots in the island. Basically, it is the same as other colonial problems. A people feel they are enslaved and they want their freedom. That is what the fight has been about. They have their freedom, at the end of the day, as we on these benches always said that they would.
714
I welcome the Agreement. I hope that the strife and bitterness of the last few years will be forgotten and that this beautiful island, one of the most beautiful islands of the Mediterranean, will be able to go forward as a democratic, independent republic.
7.42 p.m.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: The hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) suggested that there was little of othe Macmillan Plan in the present Agreement. When he re-reads all the documents, he will, I think, agree that he was less than fair in that analysis. The essence of the Macmillan Plan was not that there should be two separate assemblies, though that was part of it. It was that Greece and Turkey, by the appointment of commissioners, should be built into whatever solution was reached, so that there would be, as it were, a self-locking and self-enforcing solution which, at the end of the day, no one party could disturb without bringing down upon it the force of the others.
What we now face is not a sharing of sovereignty, for which I myself had hoped, but a transfer. It is a critical difference. But the heart of the matter still is that Greece and Turkey are built into the foundations of the structure of the Republic of Cyprus, with Britain alongside, and it will be very difficult for any one of the three parties to disengage itself, or be disengaged, from now on.
I shall return to some of the points which the hon. Gentleman the Member for St. Pancras, North made. Before I do so, I should like to add my word of tribute to the maiden speech which we heard this afternoon from a new and very welcome Member, my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon). His speech was not only worthy of his constituency and worthy of his father, but, by invoking the loves of Aphrodite, he evoked the love that all of us who know the island have for Cyprus.
I share some of the misgivings of my noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). This is a kind of half sovereignty. I do not think much of paper rights of re-entry. Rights of re-entry are of value exactly in proportion to the will of the re-entrant, and that, in turn, may be conditioned by many factors. No paper charter is a guarantee.

715
I was more interested in the trend of argument used by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), who went with some thoroughness into the concepts of sovereignty which are being turned aside at the present time. For that reason, I think that we should have the record straight, and it is worth while taking a last look at the context of the famous "never" of 28th July, 1954. I am glad that the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths), who took part in that critical exchange, is present. He will know that I have given him warning that I proposed to raise this matter.
The famous "never" was stated in reply to the final point of several which the right hon. Member for Llanelly made to Mr. Hopkinson, as he then was—Lord Colyton, as he is now. The right hon. Gentleman said:
"Finally … are these steps being taken with the full intention that they shall lead eventually to full Dominion status, which means that when that status is reached Cyprus will have the right to decide its own future?"
That was the question to which the answer, causing so much controversy and, I think, misunderstanding, was given. The answer was in these terms:
"The last and the most important question which the right hon. Gentleman put to me was whether in due course this would lead to selfgovernment—I think he called it Dominion status—and the right, I take it, to opt out of the Commonwealth. Certainly this"—
that is to say, of course, the new constitutional arrangements under discussion—
"is a first step on the road to self-government and it depends on how the new scheme is operated by the parties in Cyprus as to how fast we can go along on that road. At the same time, my statement has made it quite clear that there can be no question of any change of sovereignty in Cyprus"—
then, after interruption, he repeated it—
"no question of any change in sovereignty. That, therefore, would act as a limitation on the suggestion which the right hon. Gentleman put in the last part of his question." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 506–7.]
My reason for reading that passage is that the context is important. The question was about Dominion status, which is a recognisable, identifiable and definable condition known to the Commonwealth, of which there are now ten or
716
eleven precedents well established. It was that concept of freedom to opt out of the Commonwealth which Mr. Hopkinson said there could not be.
My hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West very rightly pointed out that, in the intervening period, there has been much rethinking by everybody, including Members on this side. [Laughter.] That men should rethink is not a matter for mockery. Only those who have stopped thinking fall back upon mirth.
What is now proposed for Cyprus is not Dominion status. It is not, even, full and real independence. It is a republic which is to be underpinned by certain guarantees, limited as to its freedom of action and restricted in various ways by the involvement of Britain, Turkey and Greece in its structure. It is not, therefore, a full surrender of British sovereignty and it is not, of course, Enosis.
The context in which it was constitutionally correct at the time to say that Dominion status was not thinkable for Cyprus was a context when it was normal to require three main conditions to any territory that should graduate to dominion status. The three conditions were set out by my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in a speech the same year, or, possibly, in 1955.
He said that a territory would be considered qualified for the sovereignty that comes with Dominion status if, first, it had developed democratic institutions that were well established and the electorate had attained a certain maturity of judgment. Nobody can contend that that has happened in Cyprus.
Secondly, my noble Friend said, there must be a viable economy, because unless the economy was viable the form of political independence might altogether lack content. These are absolute statements, of course, and I recognise that there is no such thing as total economic autarchy outside a totalitarian Communist State, and not always even there.
My noble Friend laid down as the third condition that there must be what he called a moral readiness for the responsibilities of sovereignty. There must be some stability of judgment about the great issues, which, in sovereignty, are

717
the final ones, of peace or war. Is a territory, are its people, is its form of government and are its institutions all such that these decisions can, and will, be taken responsibly? By none of these criteria can Cyprus be considered, even now, to merit Dominion status as it is well known and recognised in the Commonwealth. It may even be asked whether Cyprus is yet ready for a total severance of the ties that exist through her Commonwealth relationship with Great Britain; but to that question I shall return presently.
What is certain is that the Republic of Cyprus, its future, its stability and its happiness will depend on its economy and on the level at which that economy can be made viable. For one thing, if the Cypriots are at least busy making money and enjoying the fruits of their labour, working hard, enjoying hard, saving hard and enjoying, say, an expanding economy, it would be natural that the frustrations which express themselves often in political agitation would to some extent die away.
And what is equally certain is that there is no hope whatever that the aspiration for Enosis, on the one hand, or the clamour for partition, on the other hand, will evaporate merely by itself, merely by the signature of agreements in London and the creation of a new constitution. There must be some degree of prosperity and contentment in the island based upon a sound and virile economy. That is the heart of this matter as I see it—the heart of the problem of this new State underpinned by three foreign countries in a sort of glorified checkmate.
The economy of Cyprus, which is so poor and whose poverty was so admirably and thoughtfully described by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly), can only be advanced along these sort of lines. First, I should like to see the British enclaves, which are by definition to be under absolute British sovereignty, British property and part, if one likes, of the old British Empire, really well developed. I want the deep-water harbour to be provided and to be shared between ourselves and the Cypriots. That will need a lot of money. I want to see good hotels in the enclave. I want to see a very good school or schools for the offspring of British merchants and others throughout the Middle East. I want the place to hum with business as it gathers the
718
entrepôt trade of the Levant. I want to see it—and, I believe, it could be—something like a Hong Kong or a Singapore commercially; and I am now thinking purely in commercial terms.
I believe that if we pump investment into the enclaves and make them a really prosperous going concern, this in turn will stimulate Cypriots to work for stability and for the respect in the outside world that will enable them to call upon investment for their own development. I believe that a really imaginative programme of investment in the British enclaves would stimulate the whole island and stimulate the Cypriots to imitate the example. We might well see coming into being in our lifetime something that throbs and hums with commerce like a Singapore or a Hong Kong.
Such prosperity and such gathering of the entrepôt trade of the Middle East, of South-East Europe and of Northern Africa, is not likely to come about, however, unless there is freedom of movement. It is vital for Turks and Greeks and Britons to have real freedom of movement into and out of Cyprus. Here is one aspect of the citizenship problem to which a number of hon. Members, on both sides, have already alluded.
I take the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Bebington (Mr. Oakshott) that once the Republic of Cyprus is created, its citizens and subjects will be citizens of that Republic. Before it can be created, however, we will be alienating that territory from the sovreignty of Her Majesty to what at that moment becomes an alien State. It will not go through the procedure of Dominion status. The Statute of Westminster will not be applied to it. It will not go through the process that Burma underwent of becoming a Dominion and then freely leaving. Cyprus is territory that will be alienated and its citizens with it. Consequently, one must presume that its citizens who are already over here will be alienated in the same way.
What is to be done? I believe that citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus must be of a very special kind. It must be, in some ways, not unlike the citizenship of the Republic of Ireland. Its citizens must be not foreign to Greece, not foreign to Turkey and not foreign to the Commonwealth. Whether such a position can be devised on the Irish

719
model, I do not know, but it seems to me that something of that kind is necessary if people are to have absolute freedom of movement into and out of the Republic of Cyprus as of right, to trade and go about their commerce. But the business of being not foreign involves many legal complications, as those of us who have Irish constituents know very well.
Before leaving this phase of my argument, I would only make the further point that if it is possible for Greeks from Greece to go to and from Cyprus with absolute ease and freedom, and if it is possible for Cypriots to go to and from Greece with the same ease and freedom, traffic is almost certainly likely to be in one direction only—namely, into Cyprus; but at the same time the thirst for Hellennic unity which is at the heart of the aspiration of Enosis will to some extent have been satisfied.
The question has been posed in different forms as to the future relationship of the Republic of Cyprus with the Commonwealth. There are those who assume that it will never leave the Commonwealth and that when this territory is alienated it will somehow still remain a member of the Commonwealth. But it is not even a member now. It is a dependency of Great Britain.
But whatever the decision is to be, and however the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, with whom the decision finally rests, handle this matter, one thing is quite clear. We cannot equate a Cyprus of half a million people with New Zealand, with 2 million, with Ghana with 4 or 5 million, with Ceylon or Malaya with 8 million, Canada with 16 million, Australia with 10 million, or India with 390 million. I do not believe that Cyprus really qualifies to come into that category. In any event, from the structure of the Agreement, Cyprus will not be fully sovereign. So on that basis, too, it is debatable whether Cyprus can ever be given Dominion status in the Commonwealth, particularly as no Dominion status is provided for in the Agreement.
I was encouraged by the form of words used by the Government when the Cyprus Agreement was announced. Reference was made to the possibility of "some form of association" between the Republic of Cyprus and the Common-
720
wealth. That is very different from saying "membership of the Commonwealth", and I believe that we may now be on the brink of a completely new experiment, which is to contrive a new status of association with the Commonwealth which is short of Canada's or India's position but is still different from the foreign position of foreign countries. The Republic of Cyprus might continue to enjoy the benefits of Commonwealth preference. It seems plainly to be to everybody's advantage that she should remain in the sterling area. It would not seem improper to me if relations between Cyprus and this country were handled by the Commonwealth Relations Office as with the Republic of Ireland.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: On a point of order. I have been trying to follow the hon. Member's speech for some time. In the last second or two I have been trying to relate it to the Motion and the Amendment before the House. Is an argument about the complicated nature of Cypriot nationality at some future date relevant to any issue raised by the Motion or by the Amendment?
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Gordon Touche): It is very difficult to draw strict limits in this matter.
Mr. Maitland: I am obliged to you, Sir, for your protection. I am afraid that if the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) had listened to the other speeches, he would have been on his feet with such points of order at intervals of five minutes throughout.
The relationship such as I have suggested could be handled at this end by the Commonwealth Relations Office as in the case of the Republic of Ireland. There might well be regional consultations between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom Government as a matter of normal right. There might well be some arrangements whereby citizens of the Republic of Cyprus were guaranteed easier access to naturalisation as Commonwealth citizens, easier, that is to say, than for foreigners. There might well be Cypriot participation in many specialised activities of the Commonwealth such as in the Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau, which could be of great use, the Shipping Committee, in telecommunications, in the Commonwealth Press Union, and the like.

721
There are many respects in which Cyprus might join in some kind of external association with the Commonwealth which would not debar the new State from later on attaining a kind of membership distinct from the status of a Dominion, but suited to her special position.
It is for the Commonwealth to decide what is to be done. I will not say that something will "never" be conferred. We know that today's debate has largely been about the word "never". "Never" is a dangerous word. I sometimes think that the Spanish mañana is better. It serves the same purpose without being so final. What is clear is that on past Commonwealth convention the standing of Dominion status is not one that will be appropriate to the Republic of Cyprus.
On the other hand, this may well mean that we are at the beginning of a two-tier Commonwealth. Some people think that we already have that, because of the Republics and the Malayan monarchy, but that is not so much of a two-tier system as is commonly thought. When we are considering these matters, as we are bound to do in working the Agreement and watching the work of the Commissions bringing it into effect, and studying particularly the legal aspects, we should have regard to the consequences elsewhere of the precedents that we set.
Without wishing to call the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne to his feet again with more points of order—and I know that he is only waiting for his chance—I cannot help remarking that the Motion before the House does not allude to the consequences that would follow our decisions in this field. But there is the possibility of a Greater Somaliland in East Africa and there are developments in West Africa with the Guinea-Ghana union that could be accommodated by a form of external association.
My hope has always been, and it has run through number of speeches tonight, that the Cyprus crisis in the end would lead to reconciliation between ourselves and the people of Cyprus and, indeed, not only between ourselves and the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey but between those two foreign countries and the Commonwealth of nations. One thing made plain in every
722
speech tonight has been that this is a changing Commonwealth. My hope had been that we might by sharing sovereignty in Cyprus try to draw those two countries closer to us. That hope has receded. But Greece and Turkey are to be built into the structure of the new Republic which it would be difficult irrevocably and finally to remove from some kind of association with the Commonwealth and this leads me to hope for a wider and grander association in the years to come between the present but expanding Commonwealth and foreign nations.
To conclude: this is a transfer, and not a merging, of sovereignties, which I regret. It cost me some difficulty to stomach the Agreement but, having swallowed my doubts as best I can, I look to new political forms arising out of this experiment to create a new form of association between foreign countries and our own system. I believe that if such comes to pass the crisis, the struggle, and the tears in the end may well have been worth while.
8.10 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: The hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon), in a most engaging maiden speech, anticipated that this would be the last debate that we should have on Cyprus. I only wish that I could share his optimism. I do not feel that this is by any means the end of the Cyprus problem for us. I do not blame the Government because their policy has delayed an agreement. I blame the Government for a policy which has been so disastrous as to make this Agreement acceptable.
Just consider what the Agreement does. Among the lighter prospects of Dominion status within the Commonwealth is the attendance of Archbishop Makarios at the meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, accompanied by his alter ego Dr. Kutchuk with the dedicated task of saying "No" when the Archbishop says "Yes" and "Yes" when the Archbishop says "No", because that is what the Constitution provides.
I have on occasions in the past been accused of being pro-Turkish. Let me say now, God save me from ever having to be in the position of a Government subject to a Turkish veto at every stage, because the Turks have a profound

723
suspicion and a deep subbornness. They have a preference for inertia, and how the constitution of Cyprus is to work upon this basis, I shudder to think. What Cyprus lacked was capital. Our great failure was the failure to produce investment here. Does anybody imagine that any private investor will invest in this show? Does anybody seriously imagine that any of these Governments, with their divided situation, will invest in this show? I say, God keep me from having to govern subject to a Turkish veto.
There is something which may be worse than that, and that is to be put in the position in which Her Majesty's Government are putting us, of having to guarantee the working of that arrangement, with the duty to intervene if anybody has the sense to interfere with it. That is where we stand on the Agreement.
Some years ago I was in Cyprus when Field Marshal Harding arrived. I was there with the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) on an intensive fact-finding tour. The first thing I realised then was that in my travels within Cyprus the one person I never met was a Cypriot. I met Greeks who were in Cyprus and I met Turks who were in Cyprus—the most passionately Greek and the most intransigently Turkish I ever met. The one thing which they were not, and which nobody was, was Cypriot. I came to the conclusion then that unfortunately, as it seemed to us, we were condemned to rule there because the only way that community could work would be if a third party, which had done a great deal to earn the trust of both as an honest broker, carried the balance. There was no other available policy.
One thing I am certain of is that if at that time we had said to a Greek, "Would you prefer British rule or this?", he would without hesitation have said, "I would prefer British rule". If we had said to a Turk, "Would you prefer British rule or this?", he would at once have said unhesitatingly, "British rule". The grim thing is that our ineptitude in those three years, our vacillation, the cowardice of the Government in the failure and refusal to do the things which they knew were necessary for their policy, have produced a state of anarchy and misery and lack of assurance of any
724
future for anybody who served the Government. That is the grim thing, the lack of assurance of any future for a policeman, a civil servant or anybody who served the Government, because the Government had shown themselves too weak to assure that future.
That situation, that anarchy, that hopelessness, have made even this Agreement acceptable. Do not let us be proud of ourselves and say that we have worked on these people until they have agreed. We have worked to the point where they are prepared to agree to something which, at any earlier stage, would rightly have been totally unacceptable to them. That is the strength of our achievement.
Now what is to happen? I agree profoundly with the speech made by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). In these issues the Government must make up their mind one way or the other. Either they stay and rule or they go—and if they are going, for God's sake go.
What are these enclaves, that we term a base, worth to us? Militarily, I believe, less than nothing. I have said before that the value of a base, according to the great military invention of Marshal Touraine, is to provide the scope of manœuvre. If we can move our troops to their supplies, we can get greater concentrations with less troops; but once our base becomes a commitment, once our base becomes something which we have to supply instead of drawing supplies from, once our base becomes something in which we have to deploy troops rather than draw troops from, then it has ceased to be a base and has become a commitment.
Is there any doubt about what will happen in Cyprus? The Government provide this quite unworkable Constitution. They then have enclaves over which they maintain a futile sovereignty. Now, as neither the Greeks will be able to work the Turks or the Turks will be able to work the Greeks, both will find their alibi in blaming the British. Everything that goes wrong here will be our fault, because all these areas, as was pointed out in the maiden speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southend, West, cover the main communications of the island of Cyprus, involving its port,

725
involving its working. Here is the occasion for every friction and the placing of every blame on us.
That is supposed to add to our military strength. It is insane. I urge the Government to have second thoughts on this. They have ruined their position in Cyprus to the point where they cannot stay there. They have suffered the grave indignity of having to leave the agreement to people other than themselves, other sovereign States, who could agree only on condition that we kept away.
It is agreed by everybody that it is to everybody's advantage that we should get out, and yet still we are not getting out finally. We are keeping this tenuous hold which will involve us in every sort of trouble. We are keeping the liability of guaranteeing what I believe to be plainly unworkable, and we are supposed to be doing that for our military advantage.
I urge that this be reconsidered. We shall shortly be having a change of Government and that may be the occasion for reconsidering it. But when we have a change of Government, the situation in Cyprus will have gone past our heads, so let us then get out and get out entirely. That does not mean that by consent and within a sovereign Cyprus of sorts, or within Turkey, we cannot have landing rights, commercial rights and stations, but a base on these terms is not an addition to our power but an addition to our military commitments. It ties up our troops. It prevents our trade. It weakens our nation. It is a futile effort to save a face which is shamed beyond saving.
8.21 p.m.
Mr. T. L. Iremonger: I want for a moment to follow the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). He did not tell us his in-tensions for tonight, but I do not see that he can possibly support the Opposition Amendment, because the Amendment is to leave out from the word "Agreement" and, therefore, to leave in what comes before "Agreement". Therefore, if he were to support his right hon. and hon. Friends he would be welcoming the Cyprus Agreement, so I have no doubt that we shall see from the Division list tint he has allowed his feet to follow his voice.
Mr. Paget Mr. Paget rose—
Mr. Iremonger: I will give way in a moment, but I have one other comment to put to the hon. and learned Gentleman and, knowing his dialectical skill, I am sure that he will want to reply to that as well. Does the hon. and learned Member want me to give way now?
Mr. Paget: On that simple point. As the hon. Member knows, by a convention of the House, a three-line Whip vote is a vote simply on one thing, as to whether this would make a better Government than that, and I have no doubts about it.
Mr. Iremonger: That is a constitutional principle which I would accept with very serious reserve, but it is for the hon. and learned Gentleman to make his own decision. However, it is not very much to the credit of this institution that he should boast that although he opposes an Amendment he will vote for it. But we will leave it at that, for I understand his difficulty and he has been quite frank.
I also want to take him up on one other point of difference which he established between himself and his right hon. and hon. Friends. It has been a matter of general agreement on that side of the House that the one thing about which there was never any difficulty in the past was that we should have bases in Cyprus. We were asked why we did not accept what the Archbishop and others would have been glad that we should have. There was never any difficulty about that, and yet the hon. and learned Gentleman is opposed to the Agreement on the argument that the bases will prove an intolerable sore to the people of Cyprus and that we shall have to get out because they will be no use to us. I do not agree with him, but I register the fact that his right hon. and hon. Friends do not agree with him either. I do not want to labour the point or be tedious.
But I am the only Member from Essex who is now in the Chamber, and I associate myself with the deservedly kind words said about the maiden speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon). We all welcomed him to the House because he is his father's son, but we can now also welcome him because he will be a great asset to our councils

727
here and do great credit not only to his party but to the House as a whole.
This is an occasion which gives rise to serious temptations which have to be resisted. There is a temptation to us on this side of the House to accuse hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite of misjudgment and mischief. That temptation should be resisted. Having heard the speeches which have come from hon. Members opposite, it would be uncharitable to point out the temptations which have risen before hon. and right hon. Members opposite. It is only too obvious what the temptations are, and I scorn to suggest that they should resist them.
However, there is a temptation which arises outside the House and which presents itself to widows, to mothers and fathers who mourn their sons, a temptation which leads them to look with anguish and a feeling of bewilderment and betrayal at this Agreement, as they see in the newspapers all these junketings in Athens and junketings in Cyprus, when it is made to appear that the Government have shaken hands with those who have bloodstained hands.
This country would not be what it is if those misgivings did not arouse passionate understanding and sympathy, but we ought to say to people who feel like that, that much as we understand their feelings, they are mistaken and those temptations should be resisted. Anger is a bad counsellor, and it is always a mistake to allow great passions to arise over emotions which, measured by the scale of history, are rather small. It is much more constructive and positive and hopeful that we should address ourselves to the future. The temptations should be resisted by all concerned.
I do not want to emulate Oscar Wilde and say that the one thing I cannot resist is temptation, but I intend to yield to the temptation to deal with one or two points which have been made by hon. Members opposite and which are somewhat unfair. I say that the Government deserve praise for the speed with which they took the opportunity which presented itself after the meeting of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in Zurich. They deserve praise for the way in which they have kept constantly before them the supreme objective in the whole operation, which has not been adequately emphasised in the debate so far.
728
We ought to recognise that the Government's principle upon which they had been working in seizing the opportunity of Zurich was the one which animated them from the very beginning, the principle which animated the Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, in the London Conference of five unhappy years ago. It was the principle that a solution to the Cyprus problem could be found only with the agreement of the Greek and Turkish Governments. It was on that principle that the London Conference was held. Although it was not successful, it was well conceived, and this Agreement is merely a decision taken now which ought to have been taken then.
I want also to refer briefly to another point, which we ought not to allow hon. Members opposite to get away with. The party opposite cannot claim that it has known the answer, because it has not. I will not bother the House with the record, which is beautifully presented in the reports of the Labour Party Annual Conferences, but the Labour Party has never conceived of a solution to the Cyprus problem in the terms in which it has now been solved. It has always been talking about the one thing which was totally irrelevant—what it called independence, or freedom. Independence did not mean anything to the people of Cyprus. They did not want independence; they wanted union with Greece—and it was because independence meant for them union with Greece, and union with Greece meant civil war in Cyprus and also war between Greece and Turkey, that it was never realistic to propose it. The party opposite cannot claim to have advocated a policy which would have ended in anything but bloodshed.
I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell) quoted what the right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) said, because in 1950 he said exactly what the right hon. Member for Fbbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) attributed to Lord Colyton. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale is having trouble with his Delilahs and is determined to show that he is growing his hair. Leaving that aside, however, I would point out that in the most deplorable speech that he made tonight he said that it was an observation by Lord Colyton, that a change of status

729
was not contemplated, which led to the bloodshed of the last four years.
I want to point out that an identical statement was made in 1950 by the then Labour Minister of State, the right ton. Member for West Bromwich. It is not correct to say that a new principle was enunciated by my noble Friend when he spoke at the Dispatch Box in 1954.
Mr. Joseph Slater: It was Hopkinson who started the trouble.
Mr. Iremonger: I do not want to trouble the House with the record, but this is what was said by the right hon. Member for West Bromwich on behalf of the Labour Government on 21st June. 1950:
"My right hon. Friend is aware of this plebiscite. It has repeatedly been made clear that no change in the sovereignty of the island is contemplated."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st June, 1950; Vol. 476, c. 1279.]
Mr. Slater: The topic under consideration is the action of this Government, and Mr. Hopkinson, as he then was, as Minister of State at the time, said that self-determination or self-government would never be granted to the people of Cyprus.
Mr. Iremonger: If it was that which caused the bloodshed it would have caused it four years before when the same thing was said by the right hon. Member for West Bromwich. The fact is inescapable. The hon. Member for Sedge-field (Mr. Slater) is entitled to disagree, but the fact is unanswerable, and it is unfair to continue to make the point that my noble Friend, Lord Colyton, started the trouble.
Having now finished yielding to temptation, I suggest that we should address our minds to three matters. We have to ask ourselves what is the supreme objective of the whole problem of Cyprus; we must examine the agreement and see how far that objective is upheld; and we should acknowledge soberly the concessions made by all five parties to the agreement individually, and the concessions and gains made by all five collectively.
In order to define the supreme objective, we cannot do better than to quote the Prime Minister's words in the final statement at the closing of the plenary session of the Conference on Cyprus, when he said that the Agreement was one
"which preserves to the United Kingdom the defence facilities which are essential not only
730
for our narrow national purposes but for the greater alliances of which we are members."
This point has not received sufficient attention in this House today. Underlying that statement are certain fundamental assumptions. There is the assumption that our way of life—the fruit of 2,000 years of civilisation, freedom and order—is positively threatened by an order which we are determined to resist. Underlying it also is the resolve that we have a duty to take part in alliances in resisting this attempt to undermine the order of the free world. There is the proposition that we have rights and duties in the Middle East independently of our alliances, and the proposition that Cyprus is essential to our doing our duty in connection both with our alliances and with our national responsibilities.
I do not propose to argue the validity of those assumptions; there are other debates in which that question would be more relevant, but we should ask whether the base will be secure if we accept those assumptions. Why, if we were so insistent in the past upon having Cyprus as a base, and said that a mere base in Cyprus was inadequate, should we now be satisfied with what is, after all, no more than a base in Cyprus? I think, therefore, that we want to look first at the security of the base and to take note of these points which are to be written into the Treaty and Constitution of Cyprus.
British sovereignty is guaranteed by the proposed Treaty of Guarantee. For whatever they may be worth, the rights over the rest of the island are similarly guaranteed. Cyprus is debarred from union with Greece, and the United Kingdom and Turkey are guarantors of this. We have a right under the Treaty, if the Treaty be contravened, to assert our rights by force. That is a very different base in Cyprus from the base that was previously envisaged and rejected as being inadequate; a base not guaranteed by any international subscription in a Cyprus liable to become part of a politically unreliable Greece—I say that with respect—and one which was not guaranteed by any agreement and not undewritten by the new and stabilising influence of Turkey.
Of course, we have to recognise that there are risks. Any constitution can be breached. We have only to look at the Union of South Africa to see what can be done if people really try. The

731
best one may say is that a constitution which is underwritten in this peculiar way by three independent sovereign guarantors is more difficult to breach than an ordinary constitution like the one in the Union of South Africa. But we recognise that no one can guarantee that political freedom will be maintained for ever in Greece and Turkey. One cannot guarantee that they will not go behind the Iron Curtain. No one will guarantee that there will not be a recrudescence of Enosis, stimulated by Greek ambition in Cyprus, which could wreck the Treaty.
These are risks which no human instrument can obviate, but they are much better than the certainty of some or all of the disadvantages that prevail at the moment—the possibility of civil war between Greek and Turk in Cyprus; war between Greece and Turkey; and continuing terrorism which would pin down 20,000 United Kingdom troops in Cyprus. With all the reservations one must have about the impossibility of ensuring that treaties are kept and constitutions are not breached, all in all the Treaty gives us as sound a military situation as any human promise can guarantee and it would be unrealistic to hope for better.
I turn now to assess the concessions and the gains which have been made. The Prime Minister said, and I think that this was the heart of the spirit in which the Agreement was made:
"To reach it, each of us, all of us in this room, have had to make concessions, and I am sure that it was right for us to make these mutual concessions."
The Turks have had to make great concessions. They have had to reconcile themselves to Greek and Turk in Cyprus entering into a risky experiment in partnership. They have to try to be part of a partnership in which they are the minority community.
The United Kingdom has had to make concessions with regard to the base which is to a certain unavoidable extent in pawn to the good faith of other Governments. I do not think that we have had to make any concessions in the independence of Cyprus, whether in or out of the Commonwealth. That is something which, provided we discharge our responsibility properly, is implicit from the beginning in our conception of the Commonwealth.
732
But the Greeks have had to make a most painful and, if they really face it, an almost intolerable concession. Both the Cypriot Greeks and the Greek Greeks have had to abandon the idea of union between Cyprus and Greece, they have had to abandon Enosis. That is what they were fighting for. I have never believed that the Cypriot Greeks were half as keen on it as the Greek Greeks. It was largely pushed by the Greek Government which wanted to divert attention—but perhaps it would be better not to go on in this vein when I am saying that we want to resist temptation. The Greeks have had to accept the abandonment of what they were asking for. They did not want an independent Cyprus guaranteed by treaty and never able to achieve union with Greece. That is exactly what they did not want. They have, therefore, made very great concessions, and we should not begrudge them either the flag-wagging or the drum-beating in which they have been indulging.
While, individually, we have all made concessions, I think that collectively we have nothing but gains. First, we have an end to the waste, the misery, the bitterness and the terrorism, and the need to suppress it. I honestly believe that we have an end to the danger of civil war in Cyprus. We have an end to the danger of war between Greece and Turkey and the consequent disruption of the N.A.T.O. Alliance. Secondly, and a far more important gain, we have shown to the world at large that in the free world we can resolve deep, difficult and important differences by common sacrifice and mutual trust. That is of supreme importance, I believe, and I think that the Prime Minister was quite right to emphasise that in his statement when he said:
"… unless we stand together, our most cherished ideals and deepest interests will be overwhelmed in a common catastrophe."
I think that this example which we have given of this mutual trust in the free world is a valuable one, and I hope it will be marked in quarters in which "Suez" is a term of reproach and "Hungary" is not.
That is the balanced assessment that should appeal to the reason of the country, and I now want to turn for a moment from the reasons of the head to the feelings of the heart, to say two things. First, with hon. Members opposite, we wish this new Republic well, and we are

733
confident that the two peoples will muster the requisite trust and restraint to make this extremely difficult and testing partnership work. The second is about our own British troops. I think the House should make clear to them the pride which the nation feels in them. No one ever doubted their skill or their courage. We on this side of the House never doubted their decency or their honour.
We hope that they may add to those qualities the political wisdom to understand that the essential interests of their country and of the free world have been maintained, and that this was only made possible because they have been, throughout these terribly difficult years, worthy of and true to their traditions and their duty.
8.43 p.m.
Mr. E. Fernyhough: The hon. Member for Ilford, North (Mr. Iremonger), like the hon. Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland), obviously has some difficulty in speaking in the House tonight. They are men of deep conviction. They feel deeply about our Commonwealth and Empire, and I know that they find it very difficult joyfully to subscribe to any agreement which in any way lessens what they feel is our special power and our world position.
The theme running through the first portion of the hon. Gentleman's speech was one which I welcome, because I think that a great many hon. Members, even some on the Opposition side of the House, though I think practically every hon. Member opposite, have to try to learn from this the hard lesson. It is not a new lesson. It is a lesson which we have been learning right from the days when we lost the American Colonies. It is the lesson of Ireland and of India, and too many hon. Members on the Government benches can only learn it when violence has broken out and lives have been needlessly lost. I hope that as a result of this settlement hon. Members on the Government benches will be very careful in the future about the language they use against those to whom at any particular time we may be opposed.
Last week we signed an Agreement on Suez. I remember, on one occasion when Egypt was being discussed, saying to the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), "Some day, perhaps tomorrow or next
734
week or next year, we shall have to talk to Nasser." The language in which Nasser was described was hardly fit for reasonable people to hear. The same things have been said about Archbishop Makarios. He has been described as one of the most wicked, indecent persons that ever breathed God's air. The Secretary of State for the Colonies has subscribed to the proposition that the Archbishop has done things which cannot even be found in the calendar of crime. He is alleged to have been associated with murder, arson, sabotage and a whole list of things. Yet, despite all the evidence we are said to have had and in spite of the fact that we have had the Archbishop in custody, we never attempted to charge him and to bring him to trial.
That is the lesson which Government supporters have to learn very quickly. I can understand the attitude of some hon. Members on the Government back benches. Some of them are directors of companies, and when they are in the Forces most of them are officers. They are always in the position of making other people obey them. I sometimes think that what happens in their everyday life they believe can be carried out in every branch of the Colonial Empire. They are like some mothers and fathers who do not realise that their children are growing up. They want to keep the strings of authority tightly round them. The children are beginning to develop and want to exercise independence, but the parents will not slacken the reins. Therefore, in countless homes there is a bust-up, a terrible row, because those in authority have not known when to relinquish some of it and grant a little more independence. The people of Cyprus were as entitled to be free and independent as anybody else.
This is our quarrel with the other half of the world and particularly with the East, where they deny the freedom and independence to which we subscribe. What a mockery we make of our professions and our principles when we say to the East, "Yours is a tyranny and a denial of human dignity," but we try to hang on and ignore the danger of exercising the kind of authority with which any totalitarian régime is maintained.
Nobody on this side of the House has ever said a single word to the detriment of our troops. During two years of this

735
campaign I have had a lad in the Army, although in another part of the world. He might have been called on to do things to which I should have objected, but I should not have blamed him; I should have blamed the people who gave the orders. In Cyprus we were asking the troops to do the impossible. We were asking a relatively few thousand men to try to keep down half-a-million people who were determined to have their freedom. There is not one hon. and gallant Member opposite who does not believe in his right to be free and who does not believe in the right of Britain to be free. In this day and age we cannot claim that right for ourselves and attempt in any way to deny it to other people.
I remember listening to the military Governor of Cyprus when he spoke in Westminster Hall. He said, "In six months' time we shall have quashed this rebellion. The terrorists will have been rooted out and calm will have been restored to the island." Everybody knows that as the months went by the violence increased, and as the violence increased the Government foolishly resorted more and more to methods which, having regard to our past experiences, it is very difficult to justify.
When we imposed collective fines and other collective punishments, I protested in the House, because this, of all ways was the way in which we could not win a single Cypriot to our side. We were making guilty people of innocent people. We resorted to the whip and to the closing of the schools. This is very important. Let us try to understand what would be the reaction of people in this country if somebody came here and did things like that. Much as we may regret it and express our horror at what the Cypriots were doing, in fact they were doing that for which we hailed the French, the Belgians and others during the war.
In such a situation they cannot wage war on the basis of meeting one another face to face. There is too much military power on one side. There has to be a resort to the methods which they adopted, but they were not new methods in our history. Remember Ireland and India. I could give other examples. This has always been the problem and the way in which we tried to tackle it,
736
and always in the last resort we have had to concede to violence what we would not grant to reason. I hope that we shall have no more repetition of what has happened in Cyprus. I hope that in Nyasaland in a few years' time we shall not have to reach the same conclusion and leave behind the same bitterness and hostility.
I have always been amused—and I say this deliberately—when we have been discussing this problem, by the attitude of most hon. Members opposite to Turkey. The hon. Member for Lanark is not here at the moment, but the number of occasions during the debates on Cyprus on which I have heard him refer to our gallant allies the Turks is almost beyond counting. The reference has always been to our gallant allies the Turks. What about 1914–18 and 1939–45? Except for its association now with N.A.T.O., it is a very long time since Turkey was a gallant ally of Britain. It is very strange that in both world wars Greece was on our side. One would never have thought during the debates that Greece had been our ally and Turkey had been in one case neutral and in the other actively hostile. It always appeared that the friendliness had been from Turkey and the hostility had been from Greece.
At least one hon. Member has attempted to make play of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said about a soldier's solution. What my right hon. Friend said was quite clear. In circumstances of this kind, it is never possible to impose a soldier's solution, because a soldier's solution means force. It means complete subjection of a people that are demanding freedom. In present-day circumstances we could never impose a solution to a problem of this kind by force.
Major Legge-Bourke: Will the hon. Member not agree that a soldier's solution founded on justice is a good deal better than a politician's solution founded upon dishonour?
Mr. Fernyhough: I am not prepared to subscribe to the notion that the Secretary of State is dishonourable in bringing forward the Agreement. I would not use language of that kind. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman is a changed and a wiser man. I do not believe that he is a dishonourable man in that respect or he

737
would not have been recommending the Agreement to us this afternoon.
I welcome the Agreement because I hope that it will mean peace on an island which has been torn asunder by war for four or live years. I welcome the Agreement also because it can mean the restoration of normal relationships between our own people on the island and the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. I am glad to know that trade is once more beginning to flow and shops which were closed have been reopened. Generally speaking, a new spirit is abroad in the island.
The island now requires a period of tranquillity. It wants an opportunity for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live harmoniously and freely together. Our own history shows that, given time, that can be possible. There were cities in this country during this century where it was almost impossible for Englishmen and Irishmen to live together. That state of affairs has disappeared. There were certainly times much earlier in our history when it was impossible for Catholics and Protestants to live together in this country. History has taught them that they will either live together or they will die together.
What we have to learn from the Agreement is the one simple fact that today force has no relationship to the problems confronting the world. We live in the days of the H-bomb. We live in the days when all people of every creed and clime are demanding their freedom. We who right down through the centuries have demanded that for ourselves, far from denying it to other people, should always be in the vanguard helping them to obtain it.
9.0 p.m.
Mr. James Callaghan: I am sorry that we shall not have the benefit of the views of the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle and Ely (Major Legge-Bourke). We always like to listen to his views even though, usually, we do not agree with them. I trust that he will have another opportunity to tell us his thoughts on this problem.
I must say that when the Colonial Secretary had finished distributing the prizes—including a modest one to the Government—I almost felt that he should
738
have ended by asking you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, to grant the usual half-day holiday for the boys. After his speech, with all the paraphernalia that he went through, one would have thought that we were listening to a review of the activities of the school over the last year: it had done pretty well, everybody had done their jobs well, and a number of awards and honours had been gained-" and now, let us look to the next year and see if we cannot do better."
The right hon. Gentleman at least took a little more responsibility for the situation than did a number of Government back-benchers. When I listened to the speeches of the hon. Members for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) and Bebington (Mr. Oakshott), I began to feel that the Government had no responsibility at all for the events of the last five, six or seven years. So far as one could tell from listening to those speeches, the Government had been honest brokers attempting to reconcile a difference between Greece and Turkey about the future of the island of Cyprus; and, once the two parties showed signs of coming to an agreement, then of course the Government were very ready to offer assistance in making the necessary accommodation.
I do not think that that was quite the view that the Colonial Secretary took. As far as I could understand it, his defence of the Government's attitude—over the last five years, in particular—was, first, that an earlier agreement was not possible. The second leg of his defence was that if Britain had given up sovereignty earlier there would have been communal violence. Those were the two things on which he principally relied, but neither he nor those of his supporters who have spoken today have touched the kernel of the case, which is that Britain herself has a major responsibility for what has taken place over the last few years by her insistence on retaining sovereignty over the island.
Some have argued that the Labour Government took the same attitude and that, therefore, if the Labour Government did that in 1948, and repeated it in 1950, that exonerated the Government from any responsibility for themselves taking the same attitude several years later. That is a curious argument, and if it appeals to the Home Secretary as one that he

739
wishes to follow, I should like to put it in this way:
"Agitation for union with Greece became dormant for many years until, coincident"—
Mr. Iremonger Mr. Iremonger rose—
Mr. Callaghan: I am in the middle of my sentence—
"coincident with the world-wide advance of 'nationalism', the embers were fanned to flame by … Archbishop Makarios, shortly after his election to the Archbishopric early in 1950."
Mr. Iremonger: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. That is simply not true. The question that his right hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) was answering was about a plebiscite in favour of Enosis in 1950.
Mr. Callaghan: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman does not think that to be true, because I was quoting the best possible authority. I was quoting the Monthly Survey of Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, published by the Conservative Party. That has, of course, become a political "Lolita." It is now an indecent publication and anybody quoting from it is likely to be prosecuted for obscenity. Nevertheless, at the risk of having my home searched, I still have a copy of it.
I want to point to this difference between 1950 and 1954. Until Archbishop Makarios appeared on the scene, little interest in Enosis was taken in Greek political or official circles on the mainland. Indeed, the Greek Government felt that any discussion in Greece on the sovereignty of Cyprus could only harm the international position of Greece herself. That was the difference then. Greece herself did not want the situation discussed, and was entirely against raising the matter at all.
I have many more quotations if hon. Gentlemen wish to interrupt me again but I will spare them any more at the moment. I assure them that I have read this document very carefully indeed.
I think the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) has proved a most uncomfortable bedfellow for the Government this afternoon. He said, not for the first time, that Government policy in foreign affairs
740
over the last few years had fallen between two stools. It had wavered between force and compromise, four-fifths force, he said, and one-fifth compromise. The point on which I disagree with him is that he thought that the policy of force could succeed.
Viscount Lambton: The policy of strength.
Mr. Callaghan: I think that he used the two words, force and compromise, when he said that we had lost face because on some occasions we used force and on other occasions we attempted to compromise. I was waiting for him to ask the question: why is it that we have these two faces in Conservative policy? Why is it that in so many countries, throughout the Middle East in particular, we have had this twin face of Conservative policy which has led to the humiliation to which the noble Lord referred?
The answer is simply that not all Conservatives are lineal descendants of Lord North. On the other hand, there are sufficient of his descendants still in the Conservative Party to make it impossible for them to follow a consistent policy. That is the simple truth of the situation. We have only to review the history of the last few years to see that a Cabinet based, on the one hand, on Lord Salisburys and, on the other hand, of right hon. Gentlemen like the Leader of the House at the moment simply cannot follow a common policy for long that will be either one of strength or one of compromise. Any hon. Gentleman opposite can take his choice as to which camp he falls in. I am very much in favour of compromise and I think that if the Home Secretary had been handling this problem over the last few years we should have seen far fewer displays of strength and far more displays of compromise, and I doubt whether the noble Lord would have found himself in the humiliating position that he is in tonight. The Conservative Party is still in the same psychological stage that it was in a number of years ago.
I have heard every speech made today except one. When listening to the speeches and watching the reactions of hon. Gentlemen, one finds that they are a compound of shame, relief, dislike and apprehension because of what has happened. They simply cannot bring themselves to see that

741
in bowing to the inevitable facts of the situation they are carrying this country along a path which should have been embarked upon many years ago.
The whole attitude of a great many hon. Members in the Conservative Party was summed up by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), who has been a Minister, in what, I think, was a very analytical speech with parts of which I agreed, when he spoke in a sentence of the tragedy of Britain's colonial position. In that, I am sure, he is expressing the view that most hon. Members opposite take. It is that which accounts for this dualism in Conservative policy today.
I propose to weary the House by reading into HANSARD a number of quotations which, I think, it would be as well to have on the record for future discussion. It will not be a bad thing if we have them all assembled in one place. Although it is true that there has been much discussion about whether Britain should or should not have yielded up her sovereignty at an earlier stage, the Government took up a prior position to that. The prior position they took up was that they simply would not discuss this matter. Indeed, there was not a problem to discuss. I think it is not going too far to say that.
There are many people who hold the view that the trouble really started when Sir Anthony Eden met Field Marshal Papagos in Greece and told him that there was no Cyprus question. That remark rankled with the Greeks for a long time afterwards. It was that which started and gave rise to much of this trouble. We have had a long succession of these things. I shall not comment on them. I shall merely read them.
First, there was Lord Chandos, when he was Mr. Oliver Lyttelton:
"In all British Colonial Territories, we do not admit the right of any foreign Power, however friendly, to interfere with the sovereignty of the British Crown."
Can the House imagine the cheers from hon. Members opposite when that was said? He went on:
"Let me make it quite clear that that applies to Cyprus as well as to every other British territory."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c 552.]
742
Sir Anthony Eden, on 15th March, 1954:
"… as has been made clear to the Greek Government, Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to discuss the status of Cyprus."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th March, 1954; Vol. 525, c. 8.]
The Foreign Secretary, on 12th May, 1954:
"We cannot agree that any foreign Government, however friendly, can assume the right to be consulted about the future status of one of Her Majesty's present possessions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th May, 1954; Vol. 527, c. 1230.]
The hon. Member for Banbury (Mr. Dodds-Parker), when he was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—I must say this, though I am very fond of the hon. Gentleman—reached a new low level of fatuousness:
"… I trust we shall hear no more of this Cyprus agitation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 23rd July, 1954; Vol. 530, c. 1852.]
I remember how he crushed one of my hon. Friends who was bold enough to raise the matter at the time.
Then, of course, there was Mr. Hopkinson, now Lord Colyton, who rose on 28th July, 1954—there was a long succession of them just after Sir Anthony Eden had sat down after announcing the withdrawal from Egypt. Three times, Mr. Hopkinson said it—
"… the Government cannot contemplate a change of sovereignty."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 504.]
and:
"… the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise—that British sovereignty will remain."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 508.]
I do not really know whether to award Mr. Hopkinson the biscuit instead of the hon. Member for Banbury, but he concluded by saying,
"I do not see any reason to expect any difficulties in Cyprus as a result of this statement …".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 510–11.]
Really, hon. Members opposite and the Government Front Bench must bear a share of responsibility for misjudging the situation. They misjudged the situation. They misjudged the temper of the people of Cyprus. They misjudged the changes which took place when Archbishop Makarios became the Ethnarch of the island. For four years, they went on repeating these phrases while the tension mounted.

743
I think that I have read enough. The Colonial Secretary, of course, has some which could be quoted. Just one for the record, perhaps—it is not a bad one—
"The Government cannot reopen the question of sovereignty. That has been settled." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th December, 1954: Vol. 535, c. 2439.]
I have lots more quotations.
Mr. E. Partridge: Has the hon. Gentleman got the one about Nkrumah?
Mr. Callaghan: Where is the Minister of Labour tonight? Is he not here to advise the Government on their choice of weapons? It is they who put down this Motion. It is they who invited us to applaud their record in this particular matter. If there are any boomerangs flying about, the right hon. Gentleman might have been there to give the Government a little advice, before starting to give us advice, because there are plenty of other weapons which could be chosen. The Home Secretary, I suppose, with his present responsibilities, might choose the flick knife. But, in view of what the Prime Minister did to him when Sir Anthony Eden resigned, he might care to pass it on to the Prime Minister who showed himself a very handy and slippery customer with the flick knife when he had the opportunity.
Now I come to the Government's misjudgments over E.O.K.A. On 3rd June, 1956, an official announcement was made that the E.O.K.A. gangs had been broken up following operations. [Interruption.] The continual talk will not put me off quoting these things. It is a well-known trick, but it will still get into HANSARD and be read. [An HON. MEMBER: "By whom?"] A fortnight after the E.O.K.A. gangs had been broken, however, further operations were undertaken against the terrorists. Then, in August, two months later, more violence was followed by an E.O.K.A. cease-fire. E.O.K.A. announced that this was done to give Archbishop Makarios a chance to solve the Cyprus national question, but E.O.K.A., it said, would keep itself ready.
Here is the second misjudgment. That was interpreted by the Government in this House and by the Governor on the spot as a surrender by E.O.K.A. They put out surrender terms on 22nd August and
744
Sir Anthony Eden sent a message to Lord Harding saying
"Your work has made this possible."
The jubilation was very short-lived, because the very next day E.O.K.A. denounced its truce offer and violence was resumed once again.
Why have the Government been so badly informed about the position of E.O.K.A.? We have been working against E.O.K.A. for years and endeavouring to break it. We have had thousands of troops on the island to do it. We have been told more than once that it was practically at an end. Now, in the last few days, tons of arms have been handed in. They include five British mortars. Can the Minister of Defence tell us where E.O.K.A. got them from or when they were used? Hundreds of guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition have been handed in and the only revolver left on the island was that which Mr. Grivas—[An HON. MEMBER "General Grivas."]—I am sorry, General Grivas—took with him when he left.
The Government are responsible for a great deal of cynicism which exists about this situation. Do not let them mistake the temper of the British people over this. For years, we have been told that they were on the point of crushing this movement. They failed to crush it. They have now made peace with those whom they have been readily denouncing and the man in the street in Britain has an account that he will settle in a very short time.
Now, I come to the Government's relationships with the Archbishop. This is a significant point. It relates to the dualism in Conservative Party policy which we see from time to time and which has still to be resolved by the Conservatives before they can follow a consistent colonial line. We have alternated between trying to negotiate with the Archbishop and with deporting him. In February, 1956, Lord Harding was playing a great part in trying to get negotiations going. The record exists of the fine points to which the disagreement was reduced. The differences were narrowed down to very fine points indeed. The Colonial Secretary went out to clinch it. He tried to clinch the discussions that were going on.
There were three points only. The Archbishop demanded an amnesty for

745
all offences and the Government offered an amnesty for certain crimes only. I am trying to summarise fairly in a short time. On internal security, the Archbishop opposed indefinite control by the Governor and the Government proposed that foreign affairs, defence and public security should be reserved to the Governor. The third point of difference was that the Archbishop demanded an elected Greek majority. I should like to make it clear, to start with, that all these three points have now been conceded.
Mr. Bevan: More than conceded.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: As I was actually present at the talks I had with Archbishop Makarios, I should point out that those talks in his mind were in the context of eventual self-determination for the whole island, under which Enosis would have been achieved. Nor even in the detail is the hon. Member right. As I explained at the time, in regard to there being only three difficulties, as soon as one was cleared away another appeared. But the main point is that it was all within the context of self-determination for Cyprus as a whole, which meant Enosis, which would have meant civil war.
Mr. Callaghan: I fancy that my recollection is clearer than the right hon. Gentleman's, because I had looked this up before coming here and I could read what is on the record. The right hon. Gentleman is as entitled to say, as we are to disagree with him, that if he had settled those three points the Archbishop would have found other points of difference. That has always been the right hon. Gentleman's line of defence. On what grounds he bases it I do not know, because there is nothing in the correspondence in the White Paper that would lead one to that conclusion. Indeed, if he had thought that, surely he would not have gone out there to try to clinch this deal.
I said that there was dualism about Conservative thinking, and I will now suggest to hon. Members opposite why this broke down. Three days before the breakdown of this agreement, General Glubb was dismissed by the Jordanian Government and the impression made on hon. Members opposite was of such a character that they immediately became obdurate about any concessions to Archbishop Makarios. This is just in line with
746
the pattern of announcing evacuation from Egypt and saying that they would never evacuate from Cyprus. Unless they can free themselves from this dualism, we shall never get consistent Conservative policy.
Mr. Partridge: Tell us the story of Seretse Khama.
Mr. Callaghan: Then, of course, after that, they immediately decided to make up for General Glubb, and Archbishop Makarios was deported. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) said at the time, one would have thought from the reaction on the faces of Members of the Conservative Party and from the waving of the Order Papers that we had won a new battle of Trafalgar, such was the excess of their excitement when this happened. They misjudged the position of the Archbishop and his hold over the people. Throughout the whole of this scene the Government had failed to take advantage of the oportunities that were offered to them.
I come now to the Amendment and the Motion. This is an all-embracing Motion. It is cast in terms wide enough to sweep all the dirt under the rug. The question is—and that is why we on this side of the House seek to leave out part of the Motion—whether the Agreement does what the Motion says it does, that is, safeguard Britain's essential defence interests. Doubts have been expressed about that on both sides of the House today. I range myself with the doubters.
I do not know what the Minister of Defence thinks about it. Perhaps he does not believe that Cyprus is now worth very much—a view which I have held for some time. But the most powerful torpedoes were fired this afternoon, in the course of his non-controversial speech, by the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon). It was a maiden speech and one which, if I may say so, did him very great credit indeed. He put some searching questions to the Government, having come back, as he has, from Cyprus as a serving soldier.
He said, first, that in the middle of the enclave now reserved for British sovereignty live the most ardent and violent E.O.K.A. supporters. Secondly, he said that throughout the main part of one of the enclaves runs a main road on which most of the commerce and trade

747
of the island is conducted. He wanted to know from the Government how they proposed to safeguard their sovereignty over this small part of the territory. I hope he gets a reply, but it is not often that in a maiden speech an hon. Gentleman delivers quite such searching questions to his own Front Bench. I hope I am not getting him into trouble, but I do not think I shall; I think his uncle will look after him.
I say this to the Government. If there had been any question of merely needing a base on Cyprus, they could have had it years ago. Field Marshal Papagos when he was Prime Minister of Greece offered this to Sir Anthony Eden. He did more. He said "I even offer bases on the mainland of Greece". That was the attitude before we reached the time when Mr. Henry Hopkinson got to his feet and said that these people could never have self-determination. We could have had bases on the island then. Why did not the Government make up their mind years ago that what they needed were bases on the island, if indeed they could be safeguarded, and not Cyprus as a base, because for years they have been saying to us that they need Cyprus as a base?
As for the Motion, we have left out these portions because we do not believe that the loss of prestige to Britain in lives and in money can justify us in applauding what the Government have done, or even accepting what they have done over the past few years. As for the Amendment, we say in the most general terms what we have said consistently, and what I have said to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, that we hope arrangements can be made under which the island can be associated in some form with the Commonwealth. That has been our consistent policy on this matter and that is why we express it in the most general terms here.
Of course, it is for the people of Cyprus to choose. We are not the people who have tried to deny them that right in the past. The people on the benches opposite are those who have tried to deny them that right and we wish to go on asserting that the people of Cyprus have the right of choice if they wish to exercise it.
Let us come to the balance sheet. We said we would not discuss Cyprus with
748
anybody; we have done so. We said that they must remain in the Commonwealth; they are now free to leave. We said that public security, defence and foreign affairs must be handled by Britain—we said it time after time. They will be handled by the Republic of Cyprus. We refused to deal with Archbishop Makarios; we have now feted him in the Dorchester Hotel. Indeed, more than that, the Prime Minister has gone on record, unlike the Colonial Secretary, in paying tribute to him. The right hon. Gentleman said he desired humbly to pay tribute to the leadership shown by those responsible for the affairs of Cyprus. This sounds strange when the Colonial Secretary could not bring himself to announce the name "Makarios" this afternoon. The fact that the Prime Minister should now be paying tribute to the Archbishop is a rather astonishing thing.
Let us continue the balance sheet. We have surrender the sovereignty of the island. We shall withdraw from administration. We have closed the concentration camps. We have released the E.O.K.A. members and the other detainees. We have allowed Makarios to return to the island. We have declared an amnesty. We have facilitated the departure of Grivas. And we are asked to applaud the Government's action.
We cannot do it. We uphold the Agreement. We are glad that it has been reached. We trust that it will lead to better relationships between people living in the island. It has been agreed by the parties concerned, and the road is open to the re-creation of good relations. But we do not blind ourselves to the weaknesses of the Agreement, and my hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) pointed out that the unilateral right of any one of the parties to the Agreement to march in on the island could be a cause of considerable friction in the future. We do not know how long the people of the island will be willing to tolerate foreign bases, quite apart from how far they will be useful to us.
The lessons we draw are these. There has been vacillation in our policy. We have alternated between strength and compromise without ever consistently following either policy. We have repeated in Cyprus the lesson which we repeated

749
at Suez and in Malta and which we are now in danger of repeating in Nyasaland, of learning too late the consequences of trying to prevent people from meeting the basic desire of all of them, to be free. Because we believe that the cost in life and in money has been very heavy, because we believe that the Government have misjudged the serious nature of this problem over many years, we shall vote for our Amendment, and hope that we shall get some support from some hon. Members opposite.
9.32 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Before I come to grips with my speech, I pay tribute to the maiden speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Channon). I entirely endorse what was said by the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) immediately after that speech, namely, that it was both gracious and bore signs that the hon. Member would serve us well in the House in future.
He is the son of a distinguished father, who was once my Parliamentary Private Secretary. I should like to say to the hon. Member that in those days I used to have the job of winding up in a most difficult period for the Foreign Office. When his father left me for higher and better things, he gave me a volume entitled, "Winding Up", in which all my speeches were included. To give me justice, I have never looked at that book again.
If I may say so, the art of winding up is very difficult, and I hope that the hon. Member in his future participation in our debates will preserve that same sense of modesty and that slightly nervous apprehension which assails any of us if we are of any use when we address the House of Commons. At any rate, we congratulate him and wish him well.
I am sure that we all regret the absence of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. The Opposition have been good enough to indicate their understanding of the reasons for the absence of my right hon. Friends whom, I am sure, we all wish well in their task in North America. In their absence, I can but say that the solution of the Cyprus problem owes a great deal to their patience
750
and their hard work. [Laughter.] Hon. Members may laugh, but I am convinced that the pages of history will include a testimony to the work of my right hon. Friends and my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who has worked through a long and arduous period and whose speech today was a triumphant vindication of a long policy.
The Agreement which we have reached solves our major problems, as my right hon. Friend indicated. The justification for that is that our major policies have been carried out. The diverse communities in the island and the two Governments particularly concerned, namely, Greece and Turkey, have sunk their differences and have shown their determination to operate the new plan, even though compromises have had to be made by all parties on previously held convictions. It ought to be the case—and that is why I am sorry about the latter part of the Amendment—that the House of Commons should show the same spirit on this occasion.
Her Majesty's Government have certainly indicated their determination to play their part in this settlement, and despite the speeches to which I have listened throughout the debate, and despite the Opposition Amendment, I have been able to sum up what I believe to be the underlying sense of the House, namely, that there is evidence of considerable relief in the minds of hon. Members opposite that this Agreement has been signed. At any rate, this is the most important feature of our debate this evening, for this is the message that we want to send to Cyprus. I am glad that to that extent, at any rate, we can say that the House of Commons is united in wishing this Agreement well.
I am sure that the Agreement deserves an encouraging welcome and unselfish co-operation, so as to have the best possible chance in the immediate future. I have a certain amount of matter to refer to the House in answer to the speeches which we have heard, and I do not propose that the main theme of my speech should consist of an inquest into the inglorious record of the Opposition in relation to the island's affairs.
The Opposition have had a somewhat unfortunate and uncomfortable week.

751
There has been an improvement in unemployment, a settlement in Egypt, and now there is an agreement over Cyprus. On the first issue this week we had a majority of 62, and on the second occasion a majority of 72. I can assure hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite that we shall defeat their Amendment by a very large majority tonight.
I can imagine the feelings of the Opposition in regard to their third damp squib in one week. I can also imagine the feelings of the right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition as he goes home tonight. It will be a rather lonely home- coming for him. He will say to himself, "Poor old Samson has put his foot in it again. I wish to goodness we had decided on a perm and not a large haircut." The right hon. Gentleman will also regret the speech of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), usually so buoyant but tonight apparently unconvinced by the case he was putting. He will regret the participation of his leading lieutenants in this debate.
One point made by both of them, and especially stressed by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, was that there is a certain dualism in Conservative policy, and that we do not have to our credit a creditable or progressive colonial or overseas record. All I can tell him is that the great continent of India today owes its well-being and Constitution to the initiative taken by the Conservative Party. [Interruption.] I can also tell him that the constitutions of Malaya, Singapore, Nigeria and Ghana have all been due to steps taken by Her Majesty's Government and are a logical conclusion of the belief that we have in the independence of overseas territories. I would say that no Colonial Secretary of modern times has to his credit more advanced thinking or more progressive results than my right hon. Friend.
As for Ghana, I think the less we say about the speech today of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) about Dr. Nkrumah the better. The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that it was under a Labour Government that Dr. Nkrumah was detained. I would only say this: we have heard already that Mr. Khrushchev wishes to join the Conservative Party, and judging by the speeches made by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen
752
opposite tonight, I should not be at all surprised if Dr. Nkrumah has exactly the same feeling.
My business will be to answer some of the points which have been made. The first general point I wish to make has something to do with my own responsibilities, which is to refer to the public services and the police. I am glad that there is mentioned in the Opposition Amendment the security services and the police. A tribute has been paid to them by my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, and except for one or two rather jarring references which have been made in this House and outside, I think the whole sense of the House has been in favour of a tribute to our security forces, and also in favour of a tribute to those who have lost their lives or been injured and to their relatives. I am glad to acknowledge that that appears in the first part of the Opposition Amendment.
As Home Secretary, I wish to add a personal tribute to the police. They have done a first-class job. We have sent many sterling recruits from the police forces in this country, including women police, and I am only sorry that I have not had an opportunity of going out and thanking them myself. But I think we should express our thanks in this House for their courage and their example. I have also in mind many members of the public services, including such services as the prison service and the fire officers and others who have gone from this country and whose service has been of first-class quality throughout this difficult time. Our police standards are the highest in the world, and we feel sure that future police forces which have to be recruited will benefit from the tradition which we have set and which we shall leave behind. I do not wish to limit my praise for the police only to the British members. I also extend it to the Cypriot members of the police force who have done so much in these difficult times.
I turn for a moment to the speech of the hon. Member for Pembroke, who asked me to give some description of how the new State is being created. Now we have to spell out in full much of what was set out in the Zurich and London Conferences. The Governor returned immediately to Cyprus and began immediately the restoration to normal conditions. The facts show that he moved with a sense of the greatest urgency, and

753
he deserves our thanks for his sense of reality and the manner in which he is carrying out the London settlement.
There are three bodies—I will not speak about them for long, but I will give an impression of the latest news—which are the Joint Commission on the Constitution, the Transitional Committee in London, and the other Committee which is to meet in Cyprus. It has already been agreed in relation to the Constitutional Committee that official asistance to the Greek Cypriot representative and to the Turkish Cypriot representative should be given by two eminent Cypriot Q.C. Law Officers of the Cyprus Government. So we can hope for developments there.
In Cyprus, the Transitional Committee held its first meeting ten days after the Governor's return, and from now on it will meet twice a week. This body has to discuss the complex mechanism of the new Constitution and the transfer of power, and in fact already it has set up as a form of Cabinet and already decisions have been taken about Ministries to be established. It is hoped that by the end of this month additional appointments to the Transitional Committee of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots, nominated by the Governor after consultations with Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kuchuk, will be made so that the provisional Council of Ministers can be established from that date. I think it is not a bad achievement that, within little more than a month of the island being administered purely by direct rule, there should be functioning what is virtually a Cabinet, representative of the Cypriot people. I think that is a speed of action which augurs well for the future.
As regards the Joint Committee in London, the parties to the settlement will be represented on it, and it will prepare the final treaties under which the transfer of sovereignty will take place, in accordance with the conclusions of the London Conference. First of all, there are matters such as the areas to be retained under British sovereignty, the facilities that Her Majesty's Government require, and such questions as nationality, which are being decided by that Committee and which depend largely upon the conclusion as to whether Cyprus becomes a member of the Commonwealth or not.
754
In that connection, I welcome that portion of the Opposition Amendment which welcomes the idea of Cyprus becoming a member of the Commonwealth. This must be a matter not only for working out in London, which we are doing now, but for other members of the Commonwealth, and finally, a question for the Cypriot people themselves to decide. Upon this will largely depend, though not entirely, because we are prepared to give special consideration to the particular circumstances, the fate of the 60,000 Cypriots who are in London and in this country. Therefore, we shall work that out with the London Committee.
There are the many financial and economic problems, to which the hon. Member for Pembroke referred, and which affect the future of Cyprus. In this connection, I would say that if the Cypriot people wish Commonwealth preferences to be extended to the island, that will receive the most sympathetic consideration from Her Majesty's Government and, I believe, from other members of the Commonwealth.
I should like to make a passing reference to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Powell), and to say that I thought his reading of the situation, constitutionally—namely, that a small island should be able to achieve sovereignty in these days and be independent and be a member of the Commonwealth—is an extremely healthy international development, and I cannot improve upon the terms of his speech in this sense.
The London Committee will hold its first meeting on the morning of 23rd March, and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs will be the Government representative. He will have a full-time deputy in the person of Sir Knox Helm, a former Ambassador to Israel and Turkey, and formerly Governor-General of the Sudan. I am sure that the House will join me in wishing this Committee godspeed in its important work.
I have only a limited time, but I want to answer the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East by referring to the record of Her Majesty's Government over the past few years. In 1955, Sir Anthony Eden

755
invited the Greek and Turkish Governments to London to discuss the Cypriot problem. In the autumn of that year, tripartite talks took place and an advance constitution for the island was considered. This involved the association of Greece and Turkey in connection with Cyprus itself. This initiative was not accepted, but throughout the autumn and winter of that year Lord Harding had conversations with Archbishop Makarios, and I am glad to mention his name for the second time, and I hope that will give satisfaction. It was again abortive.
In 1956, Lord Radcliffe prepared constitutional proposals which were presented to Parliament, and special steps were taken to present them to Greece and Turkey, whose capitals were visited by my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary. Our representatives visited the Archbishop, but again the proposals were not accepted. At once, Her Majesty's Government took a further initiative. The United Nations, in February, 1957, passed a resolution calling for negotiations to be resumed on Cyprus, and Colonel Grivas announced his truce offer. At once, Her Majesty's Government announced their acceptance of the proffered good offices of the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. The Archbishop was released from the Seychelles, and we announced our readiness to have talks with Greece and Turkey and with Cypriot representatives, including the Archbishop. Again, this initiative was not taken up.
In the summer of 1957, we undertook a series of informal exchanges with the Greek and Turkish Governments with the object of bringing about a conference. Following this up in January and February of this year, my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary visited Ankara and Athens, and in June the Prime Minister brought forward his proposals for partnership. In August he took with him to Athens and Ankara the so-called "Macmillan Plan", an imaginative appeal for partnership. I believe that this initiative started the constructive period of negotiation which led to final peace.
We followed up this initiative and we did our utmost in N.A.T.O. During the autumn we persevered with our efforts in the United Nations Assembly. Before
756
Christmas the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers explained to the Foreign Secretary in Paris the lines of the settlement which they were discussing, and directly the Foreign Minister agreed their agreement at Zurich Her Majesty's Government at once called the London Conference. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East wants us to put things on the record, that is a good record of achievement.
Mr. Callaghan: An important question for the Government is whether at any time during that long record of initiative they ever said, before February of this year, that they were ready to relinquish control of internal security, defence and foreign affairs and were ready only to have a base on the island?
Mr. Butler: I think that point was answered by my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, who made it perfectly plain that the conditions preliminary to a cession of sovereignty over parts of the island not wanted for the bases from which we could conduct our international obligations were not precedent to any particular situation which has arisen before now. [Interruption.] Without agreement with the Turkish and Greek Governments, it would have been impossible to achieve any success.
The main theme of the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale was that the difficulties over Cyprus, and particularly over Enosis, started as a result of the statement made by the then Minister of State in 1954. Really, this is a very simple view of history. It is surely known that for years before that the situation in Cyprus had been somewhat unsettled. I remember my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) describing an experience as much as 50 years before that. When he arrived at Cyprus he found a crowd ready to meet him on the beach. He thought they were coming to welcome him, but he found that they were shouting "Enosis". That was in 1906. He said to me that he had never realised that the fame of an Under-Secretary could spread so far.
It was between 1929 and 1931, in the Labour Government of hon. Gentlemen opposite, that Government House was burned down. It is not exactly true, therefore, that the troubles began under the present Government. What the

757
Opposition have done is to wrench out of its context a single sentence from the speech of the Minister of State, ignoring altogether the lessons of history and ignoring also the explanation that Lord Colyton gave the House of Lords in 1956 of his own statement. What is forgotten by hon. and right hon. Gentlemen is that they were in power in 1950 which, according to the speech of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East, was after the establishment of Archbishop Makarios, and that in 1951 two of their Ministers had made speeches. The right hon. Member for West Bromwich (Mr. Dugdale) said, on 21st June:
"It has repeatedly been made clear that no change in the sovereignty of the Island is contemplated."
The theme was later supported, on 14th February, 1951, by the then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger). He confirmed it by saying that Enosis was a non-discussable subject.
That is the background, and it is rather valueless our wasting our time on these post-mortems. I am certain that if we are to face the future, as the party opposite is always asking us to do in its policy statement, we should look ahead and congratulate this country on having come to an agreement which, I believe, is based upon the only sound foundation—that is, an agreement between the Greeks and the Turks and between the Greek and Turkish communities in the island and an agreement that sovereignty shall be ceded on the parts of the island which we do not need for bases.
Mr. Bevan: The pamphlet to which reference was made, which is now banned, said,
"But the present tempo of excesses of Enosis really dates from the visit to Greece of Makarios in 1954."
That is his own pamphlet.
Mr. Butler: I know that pamphlet, and I also know the pamphlet quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, which emanates from Labour Party headquarters and which was published in 1957.
What I was saying before the right hon. Gentleman interfered was that we are not interested in looking solely to the past. Our object is to look to the future. There has been criticism about suffering which could have been avoided. Of course, we could have simply thrown in our hand. By this we could have surrendered all sovereignty regardless of the fact that Greece and Turkey and the Cypriot people remained torn on the question of Enosis or partition. Such unilateral action would have achieved nothing. It would almost certainly have led to civil war, followed by war between Greece and Turkey. What, then, should we have done by that? We should have abandoned all responsibility to the Cypriot people, we should have jettisoned our security requirements, and we should have betrayed the cause of peace and undermined the strength of N.A.T.O.
By sticking to our policy over these years we have managed to fulfil our responsibility to the Cypriot people and to save our security arrangements in the interests of our international obligations, and we have saved the cause of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is because this policy has had these results that I recommend the House to reject the Socialist Amendment. I ask the House to think, lastly, of the people of Cyprus and to wish them well in the future.
Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question:—
The House divided: Ayes 299, Noes 246.

Division No. 67.]

AYES

[10.0 p.m.

Agnew Sir Peter

Barter, John

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Aitken, W. T.

Batsford, Brian

Braine, B. R.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Alport, C. J. M.

Beamish, Col. Tufton

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Brooman-White, R. C.

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Bryan, P.

Arbuthnot, John

Bennett, Dr. Reginald

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Armstrong, C. W.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Burden, F. F. A.

Ashton, H.

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Bishop, F. P.

Carr, Robert

Baldwin, Sir Archer

Black, Sir Cyril

Cary, Sir Robert

Balniel, Lord

Body, R. F.

Channon H. P. G.

Barlow, Sir John

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Chichester-Clark R.

Cole, Norman

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Page, R. G.

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Cooke, Robert

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Partridge, E.

Cooper, A. E.

Hurd, Sir Anthony

Peel, W. J.

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Hutchison, Michael Clark (E'b'gh, S.)

Peyton, J. W. W.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth

Corfield, F. V.

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Hyde, Montgomery

Pilkington, Capt. R. A

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry

Pitman, I. J.

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Iremonger, T. L.

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Crowder, Petre (Ruisllp—Northwood)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Pott, H. P.

Cunningham, Knox

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Powell, J. Enoch

Currie, G. B. H.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Dance, J. C. G.

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Davidson, Viscountess

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Profumo, J. D.

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Ramsden, J. E.

de Ferrantl, Basil

Joseph, Sir Keith

Rawlinson, Peter

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Kaberry D.

Redmayne, M.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Keegan, D.

Rees-Davies, W. R.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Doughty, C. J. A.

Kerr, Sir Hamilton

Renton, D. L. M.

Drayson, G. B.

Kimball, M.

Ridsdale, J. E.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Kirk, P. M.

Robertson, Sir David

Duncan, Sir James

Lagden, G. W.

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Duthie, W. S.

Lambton, Viscount

Robson Brown, Sir William

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Lancaster, Col, C. G.

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Elliott, R. W. (Ne'castle upon Tyne, N.)

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Roper, Sir Harold

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Leather, E. H. C.

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Errington, Sir Eric

Leavey, J. A.

Russell, R. S.

Erroll, F. J.

Leburn, W. G.

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Fell, A.

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Sharples, R. C.

Finlay, Graeme

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Shepherd, William

Fisher, Nigel

Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Forrest, G.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Fort, R.

Llewellyn, D. T.

Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher

Foster, John

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (Sutton Coldffeld)

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Speir, R, M.

Freeth, Denzil

Longden, Gilbert

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

Loveys, Walter H.

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Gammans, Lady

Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Garner-Evans, E. H. £

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Stevens, Geoffrey

George, J. C. (Pollok)

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Gibson-Watt, D.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Glover, D.

McAdden, S. J.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malolm

Glyn, Col. Richard H.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Storey, S.

Godber, J. B.

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Goodhart, Philip

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Studholme, Sir Henry

Gough, C. F. H.

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Summers, Sir Spencer

Gower, H. R.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)

Tayler, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Graham, Sir Fergus

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Grant, Rt. Hon. W. (Woodside)

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Teeling, W.

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Maddan, Martin

Temple, John M.

Green, A.

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Gresham Cooke, R.

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Thompson, R. (Croydon, S.)

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Gurden, Harold

Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.

Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Marshall, Douglas

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Mathew, R,

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Turton, Rt. Hon, R. H.

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Mawby, R. L.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr, S. L. C.

Vane, W. M. F.

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

Medilcott, Sir Frank

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Vickers, Miss Joan

Hay, John

Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Moore, Sir Thomas

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

Wall, Patrick

Henderson-Stewart, Sir James

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Ward, Rt. Hon. G. R. (Worcester)

Hesketh, R. F.

Nairn, D. L. S.

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Neave, Airey

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Nicholls, Harmar

Webster, David

Hill Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Nicholson, Sir Godfrey (Farnham)

Whitelaw, W. S. I.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Nicholson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Hirst, Geoffrey

Noble, Comdr. Rt. Hon. Allan

Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

Hobson, john(Warwick & Leam'gt'n)

Noble, Michael (Argyll)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Nugent, G. R. H.

Wolrige-Gordon Patrick

Hope, Lord John

Oakshott, H. D.

Wood, Hon. R.

Hornby, R. P.

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Woollam, John Victor

Hornsby-Smith, Mist M. P.

Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Horobin, Sir Ian

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Orr-Ewing, C. Ian (Hendon, N.)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Osborne, C.

Mr. Heath and Mr. Legh.

760

761

NOES

Abse, Leo

Hastings, S.

Peart, T. F.

Ainsley, J. W.

Hayman, F. H,

Pentland, N.

Albu, A. H.

Healey, Denis

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Popplewell, E.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Prentice, R. E.

Awbery, S. S.

Hobson, C. R. (Keighley)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Bacon, Miss Alice

Holman, P.

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Baird, J.

Holmes, Horace

Probert, A. R.

Balfour, A.

Houghton, Douglas

Proctor, W. T.

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Randall, H. E.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)

Hoy, J. H.

Rankin, John

Benson, Sir George

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Redhead, E. C.

Beswick, Frank

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Reeves, J.

Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Reid, William

Blackburn, F.

Hunter, A. E.

Reynolds, G. W.

Blenkinsop, A.

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Boardman, H.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Bonham Carter, Mark

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Bowles, F. G.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Ross, William

Boyd, T. C.

Janner, B.

Royle, C.

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Brockway, A. F.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Short, E. W.

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St.Pncs, S.)

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Silverman, Sydney (Neison)

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Burton, Miss F. E.

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Skeffington, A. M.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Callaghan, L. J.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Chapman, W. D.

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Snow, J. W.

Chetwynd, G. R.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Sorensen, R. W.

Cliffe, Michael

Kenyon, C.

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Clunie, J.

Key, Rt Hon. C. W.

Sparks, J. A.

Coldrick, W.

King, Dr. H. M.

Spriggs, Leslie

Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

Lawson, G. M.

Steele, T.

Craddock, Ceorge (Bradford, S.)

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Cronin, J. D.

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Stonehouse, John

Crossman, R. H. S.

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)

Lewis, Arthur

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Lindgren, G. S.

Swingler, S. T.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Logan, D. G.

Sylvester, G. O.

Deer, G.

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

de Freitas, Geoffrey

McCann, J.

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Delargy, H. J.

MacColl, J. E.

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Diamond, John

MacDermot, Niall

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Dodds, N. N.

Mcinnes, J.

Thornton, E.

Donnelly, D. L.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Timmons, J.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwich)

McLeavy, Frank

Tomney, F.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Edelman, M.

Mahon, Simon

Usborne, H. C.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Viant, S. P.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Wade, D. W.

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Mason, Roy

Warbey, W. N.

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Mayhew, C. P.

Watkins, T. E.

Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)

Mellish, R. J.

Weitzman, D.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Messer, Sir F.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Fernyhough, E.

Mitohlson, G. R.

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Finch, H. J. (Bedwellty)

Monslow, W.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Fitch, A. E. (Wigan)

Moody, A. S.

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Fletcher, Eric

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)

Foot, D. M.

Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

Wigg, George

Foreman, J. C.

Mort, D. L.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Moss, R.

Wilkins, W. A.

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Moyle, A.

Willey, Frederick

George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Car'then)

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Williams, David (Neath)

Gibson, C. W.

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Gooch, E. G.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Oliver, G. H.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Greenwood, Anthony

Oram, A. E.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Oswald, T.

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Grey, C. F.

Owen, W. J.

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Lianelly)

Padley, W. E.

Winterbottom, Richard

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Paget, R. T.

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Grimond, J.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Woof, R. E.

Hale, Leslie

Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvll (Colne Valley)

Pargiter, G. A.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Hamilton, W. W.

Parker, J.

Zilliacus, K.

Hannan, W.

Parkin, B. T.

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Paton, John

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Mr. Bowden and Mr. Pearson.

Main Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House welcomes the Cyprus Agreement as serving the best interests of all the people of Cyprus, achieving a permanent settlement acceptable to the two Cypriot communities and to the Greek and Turkish Governments, safeguarding essential British defence requirements, strengthening cooperation between the United Kingdom and her allies in a vital area thus satisfying Her Majesty's Government's aims of policy: records its tribute to the statesmanship shown at the Zurich and London Conferences without which the rapid completion of agreement would not have been possible; recognises the major rôle of the security forces and the public services in Cyprus during the last four years; and expresses its deep sympathy with the injured and the families of those who lost their lives during the emergency.

CENTRAL LAND BOARD (DISSOLUTION)
10.10 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. R. Bevins): I beg to move,
That the Central Land Board (Dissolution and Transfer of Functions) Order, 1959, a draft of which was laid before this House on 5th March, be approved.
The purpose of this draft Order is to wind up the Central Land Board and to transfer the uncompleted functions of the Board, in England and Wales to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government, and in Scotland to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. Perhaps I may be allowed to add that these functions include recoveries under Section 52 of the 1954 Town Planning Act.
10.12 p.m.
Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: I hope that we may have a little more explanation from the hon. Gentleman than the very swift statement which he gave of what the Order does, which we already know. Can the Minister explain what functions of the Central Land Board are now outstanding, how far these functions have not been fulfilled and why the decision has been taken at this stage to transfer the functions to the Ministry?
We are concerned to know that this is the proper time at which to transfer these functions, and it can be the proper time only if the functions have been substantially fulfilled and what is left is something comparatively insignificant. May we have information from the Minister on these points?
10.13 p.m.
Mr. Bevins: I do not think there is a great deal that I need say in addition to what I have already said, although I will do so if the House so wishes. When the Central Land Board was in its heyday, it employed a staff of rather more than 1,000. The staff is now down to 35, and 28 of those officials will be taken over by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, one will go to the Scottish office, and the balance will be absorbed either by the War Damage Commission or by other Departments. None of the officials of the Central Land Board will in any way suffer any diminution of salary or rights. Of the claims made against the Board under the 1947 Act a total of about 950,000 have been assessed and only 11 are outstanding at the present time. I think that I can safely say to the House that the functions of the Board are substantially disposed of.
10.14 p.m.
Mr. G. R. Mitchison: There is one question that I should like to ask about this Order. One sees from the Explanatory Note that one of the functions is the recovery of certain payments from the acquiring authorities. The hon. Gentleman is well aware that in respect of these payments there has been a dispute of considerable magnitude and there are still quite large sums outstanding.
This is a matter upon which the Government are seeking to introduce retrospective legislation under the Town and Country Planning Bill which we shall be considering next week. Is it now proposed that these disputes and the responsibility of collecting the money from the acquiring authorities should pass directly to the Minister who is bringing in this retrospective legislation?
Mr. Bevins: I doubt very much whether it would be in order, for me, on this Order which is limited to the transfer of the functions of the Central Land Board to the Ministries, to discuss the rights and wrongs of town and country planning legislation. I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Kettering (Mr. Mitchison) would not wish me to do that. The answer to his question is in the affirmative. Outstanding recoveries will be made by my right hon. Friend who, of course, is taking over all the functions of the Board.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That the Central Land Board (Dissolution and Transfer of Functions) Order, 1959, a draft of which was laid before this House on 5th March, be approved.

COUNTY COURTS BILL [Lords]
Considered in Committee; reported, without Amendment; read the Third time and passed, without Amendment.
OVERSEAS RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT BILL [Lords]
Considered in Committee; reported, without Amendment; read the Third time and passed, without Amendment.

HAMMERSMITH HOSPITAL (TRANSPORT SERVICES)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]
10.18 p.m.
Mr. Frank Tomney: The matter I wish to raise with the Minister tonight concerns the Hammersmith Hospital in my constituency, which, in association with the West London Hospital and St. Mark's, is a post-graduate school under the same board of governers. This hospital is one of the biggest in the country, and certainly one of the most famous. During the last twenty years of its history, no fewer than 12,000 doctors have been trained at the hospital. It has 700 beds. In-patients number 12,000 yearly, 50 per cent. of whom come from Hammersmith. There are 200,000 out-patients a year.
At present, the hospital is being gravely affected by the cuts imposed by the London Transport Executive in its recent economy drive on transport services. As the post-graduate hospital depends entirely upon its out-patient service for its training and knowledge, it is not difficult to understand the situation which has arisen as a result of the curtailment of the bus services.
The nearest Underground stations are White City and East Acton on the Central Line and both of them are 15 minutes' walking distance from the hospital. The only bus service which now passes the hospital is the No. 7A route, which runs
766
between the City and Acton via the West End, operates on a ten-minute schedule up to 6.30 p.m. and provides only a meagre service outside peak hours.
During morning and evening, the hospital cannot cope with the passenger traffic to and from the hospital. Out-patients and staff leaving the hospital after 5 p.m. have frequently to wait for long periods and in inclement weather. This cannot but be harmful to those attending for out-patient treatment. After 6.30 p.m., bus No. 7 operates on a 15-minute schedule, with extreme inconvenience for hundreds of visitors and patients to the hospital. The list of visitors to see patients at the hospital totals no less than almost 5,000 every week.
A survey has been taken by the postgraduate medical school of the numbers of people visiting the hospital in two complete weeks. From midnight on 13th September, 1958, to midnight on 20th September, 1958, the total was 27,391 people and from midnight on 5th October until midnight on 11th October, 1958, no fewer than 30,776 people visited the hospital. In addition, there is a full-time staff of 2,500, of whom approximately 350 nurses live in hostels or other accommodation outside the hospital. Despite London Transport Executive's drive for efficiency, it is apparent that there are services which cannot, and should not, be curtailed. The service to this hospital is one of them.
During peak hours, it is almost impossible either to board a bus going to the hospital or for patients going home, quite apart from the staff, to board a bus at the hospital gates. Formerly, two services, Nos. 7 and 7A, operated on this route. The No. 7 service has now been abolished and this is causing great difficulty especially to the nursing staff in arriving at the hospital in time for duty.
The post-graduate school which is connected with the hospital is an organisation of international importance. Last year, 330 of the total of 466 doctors attending the school came from abroad. It thus becomes apparent that this hospital, of international renown, is suffering serious inconvenience in its everyday management, as well as inefficiency, due to the curtailment of the bus services. It is imperative for the Minister to bring what

767
pressure he can upon the London Transport Executive to review the position concerning the service which it provides to this hospital.
It is not unknown, for example, that during the recent bad weather, patients coming to the hospital were unable to get on a bus and in several cases had to be put straight to bed by the hospital staff. This cannot be good either for the patients, for the hospital or for the medical staff. In addition, patients arriving for out-patient treatment—the Minister will recall my mentioning a figure of no fewer than 200,000—are arriving not merely half an hour late for appointment, but, in some cases, up to one hour late. One therefore sees that grave dislocation is caused, seriously affecting the hospital and its work.
It is true that other facilities are available. The No. 72 bus, however, which passes along Westway, is at least seven minutes' walk from the hospital. Route No. 105, which operates along Westway from Shepherds Bush, is the only other available route which passes directly parallel with the hospital, but it necessitates crossing a footbridge over the railway line. This is impossible for people who are lame and crippled and, in consequence, they, too, arrive late for appointments. Representations have been made from time to time by the hospital board of governors to the London Transport Executive, but no relief to this problem has been forthcoming. That is why I am raising the matter tonight.
As I said in opening, the hospital is probably one of the most famous in the world. People come from all parts of London for attention. The ambulance service, both the sitting-up service and the ordinary service, is gravely extended. Because of the curtailment of the bus services, the ambulance service has had to cope with the ever-increasing number of patients who could not get transport to the hospital. In addition, distinguished visitors from abroad attending the hospital for courses and training or to view the hospital find that they have at least 15 minutes' walk from either of the two stations. No taxi services are available locally. Thus it can be seen that the problem builds up into a quite formidable one.
The board of governors recognises that this problem exists. They have tried every
768
means within their power to secure some alleviation of the difficulties. They have failed to do so, and the Board of Governors is drawn from a wide cross-section of the population, under the chairmanship of Sir Desmond Morton, a man with a great record of service in diplomatic and public life. They have been most patient over the last twelve months in their endeavours to rectify the position, but, unless something is done immediately, the management of the hospital and its working will get more and more into a state of chaos.
There is an alternative. On the Central Line, which passes the hospital, and at a point immediately facing the hospital there is enough land available to make either another station or another halt or stopping-place. This probably would be the ideal answer to the whole problem. If this could be looked at by the Minister as a possible solution it would be appreciated. The hospital is growing every day. New departments and clinics are being added. If the Minister could endeavour to have talks started about the provision of a halt it would be greatly appreciated. The halt need not be an elaborate affair.
In the meantime, in view of the importance of this matter, I suggest that something should be done. I hope that overtures will be made immediately to the London Transport Executive to have the No. 7 bus service reinstated. The position is further complicated between 5.30 and 7 p.m. in that buses moving from the congested city are full. Visitors to the hospital cannot board at the boarding points, and when the buses pass the hospital they have already come through the densely populated industrial area of Park Royal. The cycle of events which I have described demonstrates quite clearly that there is complete chaos. I am not unmindful of the difficulties of London Transport Executive but I hope that an effort will be made by the Minister, even if it is only in an advisory capacity, to reinstate at least one bus service to alleviate the position.
10.30 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. G. R. H. Nugent): I must congratulate the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Tomney) on securing the Adjournment to ventilate this complaint of the difficulties of the

769
hospital at Hammersmith. I agree with him that it is a hospital of importance and that it is doing a splendid job. Naturally, I am very concerned to hear that it should be handicapped in the access for the staff, for the patients, the out-patients, and the very large number of visitors to the hospital. I am naturally concerned to hear the hon. Member's complaint about the effect of London Transport Executive's cuts last year.
However, although expressing sympathy and concern, the hon. Member will understand that I do not in fact have any control over this situation. Nor is my right hon. Friend responsible for it. It is essentially a matter of day-to-day management for London Transport Executive and the British Transport Commission. When I knew that the complaint of the hon. Member was to be raised, I inquired from the Executive what the position was and what it had done.
I can confirm what the hon. Member said, that the No. 7 bus service was taken off last August, but my information from the Executive is that the No. 7A service was extended and increased at the time to counteract the removal of the No. 7 service. It is not as much as the combination of the two before, but the Executive fully intended to cover the needs of this very important hospital.
What puzzles me a little is that the Executive tells me that it has not had a complaint from the Board of Governors about the new service or deficiencies about which the hon. Member has told us. The Executive said that when it was about to reduce the service, the Board of Governors asked what changes were to be made and was given that information by the Executive, but since then the Executive has had no further communication or complaint from the Governors.
Mr. Tomney: The letter which I have mentioned states that representations were made by the Board of Governors in collaboration with Hemmersmith Borough Council, but they failed to obtain any augmentation of the existing No. 7A service. It was hoped that something would be achieved by those repre-
770
sentations from the local authority and the Board of Governors.
Mr. Nugent: My information is that the Executive has not received these. In any event, as a result of what the hon. Member has said, no doubt the complaint will reach the right ears and I hope that helpful action will be taken.
I am sure that the hon. Member will not mind if I remind the House that there is a machinery, even if the Executive fails to respond in a helpful way. The Transport Users' Consultative Committees were set up under the 1947 legislation and they give users a chance to complain when the Executive is unable to meet complaints. I should put it on the record that that machinery is there to safeguard travellers and give them a chance to have their complaints considered by an independent body, and it is only right that it should be used as far as possible.
Of course, I have had a word with the Executive, which is very concerned to do what it can to help in these difficulties, as the hon. Member has acknowledged. It has had falling traffics, particularly since the bus strike of last year, and is having great difficulty in making both ends meet.
As I said, however, it recognises the great importance of the hospital, and in the light of the serious complaint made by the hon. Member tonight I believe that it would be very glad to send down a senior official to talk to the Board of Governors or the Hospital Secretary, in order to hear just what the problems are and to see what can be done to meet them. The problems of which the hon. Member has told us are serious, and it is a matter of getting the details of them to see what can be done to meet them.
I hope that the hon. Member will be satisfied with that general assurance, which is as far as I can go. I will see that his remarks are conveyed to the Executive, and I am sure that it will do its best to help him to meet the needs of this very important hospital.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-four minutes to Eleven o'clock.

NATIONAL FINANCE
  Income Tax (Schedule A)
  Income Tax (Schedule A)
  Purchase Tax
  Purchase Tax
  £ Sterling (Value)
  £ Sterling (Value)
  Messrs. Colvilles Ltd. (Dividends)
  Messrs. Colvilles Ltd. (Dividends)
  Messrs. Stewarts and Lloyds Ltd. (Dividends)
  Messrs. Stewarts and Lloyds Ltd. (Dividends)
  Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act, 1958
  Distribution of Industry (Industrial Finance) Act, 1958
  International Monetary Fund (Loan Repayment)
  International Monetary Fund (Loan Repayment)
  Steel Company of Wales Ltd. (Debenture Stock)
  Steel Company of Wales Ltd. (Debenture Stock)
NYASALAND
  Commission of Inquiry
  Commission of Inquiry
  Detainees
  Detainees
  Disturbances (Fatalities)
  Disturbances (Fatalities)
  Minister of State (Discussions)
  Minister of State (Discussions)
  Conference, Blantyre Airport
  Conference, Blantyre Airport
  Political Advancement
  Political Advancement
SIERRA LEONE
  Primary Schools
  Primary Schools
SOMALILAND
  Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao (Electoral Registration)
  Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao (Electoral Registration)
RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
  Detainees and Prisoners
  Detainees and Prisoners
TANGANYIKA
  Produce Marketing Boards (Finance)
  Produce Marketing Boards (Finance)
  Education
  Education
COLONIAL TERRITORIES
  Law Students, United Kingdom
  Law Students, United Kingdom
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Metropolitan Police (Disabled Officers)
  Metropolitan Police (Disabled Officers)
  Casement Diaries
  Casement Diaries
  Shops, Seaside Resorts (Sunday Opening)
  Shops, Seaside Resorts (Sunday Opening)
  Offensive Weapons (Police Searches)
  Offensive Weapons (Police Searches)
  Police (Press Communications)
  Police (Press Communications)
  Civil Defence (Manual)
  Civil Defence (Manual)
  REGENT'S PARK TERRACES (CROWN ESTATE COMMISSIONERS' STATEMENT)
  REGENT'S PARK TERRACES (CROWN ESTATE COMMISSIONERS' STATEMENT)
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
  Republic of Eire (I.R.A. Detainees)
  Republic of Eire (I.R.A. Detainees)
  Scholarships and Fellowships
  Scholarships and Fellowships
GAN ISLAND
  Situation
  Situation
EDUCATION
  Teachers' Training Colleges
  Teachers' Training Colleges
  Infant Schools
  Infant Schools
  Lancashire County Council (School Building)
  Lancashire County Council (School Building)
  U.S.S.R. (UNITED KINGDOM FINANCIAL CLAIMS)
  U.S.S.R. (UNITED KINGDOM FINANCIAL CLAIMS)
EMPLOYMENT
  Retail Prices
  Retail Prices
  Borough Employment Exchange
  Borough Employment Exchange
BRITISH ARMY
  Fort George (Future Use)
  Fort George (Future Use)
ROYAL NAVY
  Building and Civil Engineering Work (Tenders)
  Building and Civil Engineering Work (Tenders)
  Service Voters
  Service Voters
HOSPITALS
  Southmead Hospital, Bristol
  Southmead Hospital, Bristol
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Aged Poor (Maintenance Costs)
  Aged Poor (Maintenance Costs)
SCOTLAND
  Midwives
  Midwives
  Approved Schools
  Approved Schools
  Local Education Authorities (Teachers)
  Local Education Authorities (Teachers)

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Chichester
The Earl of Aylesford—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

LICENSING (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
3.5 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I beg leave to introduce a Bill to consolidate certain enactments which relate to licensing in Scotland and to matters connected therewith, with corrections and improvements made under the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act. 1949. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.— (The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 1a and to be printed.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, I beg to inform the House that my noble friend Lord Waldegrave will be making a statement on the Farm Price Review at a convenient moment after half past three o'clock.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES
Order of the Day read for the consideration of the Second Report from the Select Committee.
The Committee reported as follows:
1.—REPORT FROM THE LIBRARY SUB-COMMITTEE
The Chairman of Committees and the Lord Great Chamberlain, in the absence of the Viscount Simonds, gave a report from the Library Sub-Committee for the year 1958.
2.—SUPPLY OF HANSARDS TO PEERS WHO HAVE SPOKEN IN DEBATE
The Committee recommend that Peers who have spoken in debate should be able to give to the Printed Paper Office a standing order
70
for the supply of up to six copies of the Hansards reporting the debates in which they have spoken.
3.—ANNOUNCEMENT OF DIVISION FIGURES
The Committee recommend that in future the results of divisions in the House should be announced over the loudspeakers.
4.—APPOINTMENT OF PRINCIPAL CLERK OF PUBLIC BILLS
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee that he had appointed Mr. Robert Westby Perceval Principal Clerk of Public Bills in the place of Mr. Henry Montagu Burrows, C.B.E., from January 20, 1959.
5.—APPOINTMENT OF PRINCIPAL CLERK, JUDICIAL OFFICE
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee that he had appointed Mr. Richard Philip Cave Principal Clerk of the Judicial Office on the retirement of Mr. Geoffrey Hugh Eastwood, C.V.O., C.B.E. The appointment dates from January 1, 1959.
6.—APPOINTMENT OF A CHIEF CLERK
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee that he had appointed Mr. Peter Stuart-Heaton Chief Clerk in the Office of the Lord Chairman of Committees in the place of Mr. Perceval from January 20, 1959.
7.—APPOINTMENT OF CLERKS IN THE PARLIAMENT OFFICE
The Clerk of the Parliaments informed the Committee of the appointments of Mr. John Christopher Sainty and Mr. John Egerton Grey as Clerks in the Parliament Office to fill the vacancies consequent upon the retirement of Sir Francis Lascelles and Mr. Eastwood. These appointments date from February 2 and 16, 1959. respectively.
8.—RECORD OFFICE
The Committee have approved alterations in the establishment of the Record Office as follows:—
The Assistant Archivist to be an Assistant Clerk of the Records,
The Senior Office Assistant to be a Clerical Officer,
The two Record Office Assistants to be Office Assistants.
The Committee have also approved the payment of an allowance for the repair of historical manuscripts and authorised an increase in the weekly payment for two cleaners in the Victoria Tower.
9.—REVISED SCALES OF PAY
The Committee sanctioned the application of the following Establishments Circulars:

(a) No. 12/59 Central Pay Settlement 1958,

(b)No. 14/59 Clerical Officers, etc., Revised scales of pay,

to analogous grades of the staff of the House of Lords.
The Committee authorised the consequential increase in the Estimate for 1959-60.
10.—SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE 1958-59
The Committee approved the Supplementary Estimate submitted to meet expected excess expenditure in the year 1958-59, due mainly to the further provision required for repayment of expenses to Peers, revised rates of pay and the retirement of a senior Officer.
11.—RETIREMENT OF A CLERICAL OFFICER
The Committee sanctioned a pension and additional allowance underthe Superannuation Acts to Mr. Jack Laurence Martin, who retired on the ground of ill-health on the 29th December, 1958.
12.—RETIREMENT OF A CUSTODIAN
The Committee sanctioned the payment of a gratuity under the Superannuation Acts to Mr. Albert Edward Amos, who retired on the 10th March, 1959, after 7 completed years' service.
13.—RETIREMENT OF A CUSTODIAN
The Committee sanctioned a pension and additional allowance under the Superannuation Acts to Mr. Stanley Frederick Hartopp. who retires on the 11th April, 1959.
14.—RETIREMENT OF AN UNESTABLISHED CUSTODIAN
The Committee sanctioned the payment of a gratuity under the Superannuation Acts to Mr. Arthur Edwin Wise, who retires on the 6th April, 1959.
15.—COLUMN PRINTER NEWS SERVICE
The Committee authorised an increased annual payment to the Exchange Telegraph Company Limited for the Column Printer News Service from the 1st January, 1959.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (LORD MERTHYR): My Lords, I beg to move that this Report be now considered.
Moved, That the Report be now considered.—(Lord Merthyr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES: My Lords. I beg to move that this Report be agreed to. In doing so, I do not think that there are any special matters in it to which I need refer, but needless so say, if any noble Lord desires further information in respect of any of the paragraphs in this Report, I will do my best to give it to him, either now or as soon as possible thereafter.
Moved, That the Report be agreed to. —(Lord Merthyr.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

VACANCIES IN SEES MEASURE, 1959
3.8 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDON rose to move to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Vacancies in Sees Measure, 1959, be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent. The right reverend Prelate said: My Lords, I beg to move the Resolution standing in my name on the Order Paper. There are a number of Acts and Measures which necessitate action by the Bishop of a See, or the consent of the Bishop to action by other people. Difficulties are liable to arise If there is no Bishop owing to a vacancy in the See. On a vacancy, the duties of the Bishop as spiritual head of his diocese become the responsibility of the guardian of the spiritualities, who is usually the Archbishop, but in certain cases is the Dean and Chapter. Modern Measures always provide for the guardian of the spiritualities to act in appropriate cases, but in older Acts and Measures the point was often not considered; and difficulties and undesirable delays may occur as a result. The purpose of this Measure is to allow the guardian of the spiritualities to exercise the Bishop's powers under certain of these older Acts and Measures where it seems appropriate that he should.
This Measure was regarded as entirely non-controversial by the Assembly, and no objection to it was raised. There was a previous version of this Measure which came before the Ecclesiastical Committee. That Committee was doubtful about one clause, and the Measure was withdrawn. This second version was prepared without the clause in question, thus resolving the doubts of the Ecclesiastical Committee.
Moved, to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Vacancies in Sees Measure. 1959, be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent.—(The Lord Bishop of London.)
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, I do not rise to oppose this Motion but—though this may strain your Lordships'credulity—the speech which the right reverend Prelate has just made is a "maiden," and I should like to say how

73
much we welcome his maiden speech and the next one which he will be making almost at once. I hope that the right reverend Prelate will come to the House on many occasions to speak on subjects on which he will have real scope for his obvious Parliamentary abilities.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure that noble Lords of all Parties will desire to he associated with what the noble Earl has said. We wish the right reverend Prelate the very best spiritual success in the great charge he has undertaken. I hope that the Measure which he has just introduced will have the proper disciplinary effect during any absence of the normal Bishop.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

GUILDFORD CATHEDRAL MEASURE, 1959
THE LORD BISHOP OF LONDONmoved to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act. 1919, this House do direct that the Guildford Cathedral Measure, 1959, be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent. The right reverend Prelate said: My Lords, I proceed to my second speech, and I beg to move the Resolution which stands in my name on the Order Paper. The Diocese of Guildford was created in the 1920's,and the Church of the Holy Trinity, in the middle of Guildford, was made the Cathedral for the Diocese, But the building was not large enough for its purpose, and the Diocese accordingly decided that a new Cathedral should be built on Stag Hill, just outside the built-up area. A start was made an the building, but the war came and then there were the postwar difficulties over building. But it is expected that by May of next year, the nave of the Cathedral will be ready for consecration and that the Diocese will then he able to have its new Cathedral.
There are other steps that have to be taken. An organisation for the Cathedral must be provided. A Measure was passed in 1938 and a constitution and statutes for the new Cathedral were also prepared. Cathedrals can be divided into two classes:Dean and Chapter Cathedrals, which have no parochial responsibilities like all the ancient
74
cathedrals, and cathedrals which are also parish churches, which have a provost, who is also the vicar of the parish, and a cathedral council. The intention in the 1930's was to adopt the second alternative and to provide the new Guildford Cathedral with a parish.
The surroundings, however, have not developed in the way that was expected. There has been much less building than was anticipated, and a by-pass, which is a major obstacle, has been constructed close to the Cathedral. Since there is no natural parish of the Cathedral, it has been decided that the better solution is to leave it without a parish. It is also believed that if it has no parochial responsibilities it will be the more effective as the spiritual centre of the Diocese. This Measure therefore provides for the transfer of the statusof a Cathedral from Holy Trinity, in the town. to the new Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, and the creation of a Dean and Chapter.
There are a number of other necessary provisions, and these are explained in the comments and explanations of the Legislative Committee which are appended to the Report of the Ecclesiastical Committee, The Measure has the approval of the Cathedral and the Diocesan authorities. It passed through the Assembly without amendment being moved, and without any opposition. I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Guildford Cathedral Measure, 1959, be presented to Her Majesty for the Royal Assent.—(The Lord Bishop of London.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

EXCLUSION OF OTTO JOHN
3.15 p.m.
LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL rose to ask Her Majesty's Government to state the reasons for their recent refusal Ito allow Otto John to enter this country for a short visit. The noble Lord said: I beg to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. I chose the procedure of an Unstirred Question to enable me to have an opportunity of explaining to your Lordships why I have put this Question down for answer, and also in the hope that the noble Lord

75
who is to reply on behalf of Her Majesty's Government will be able to deal with some of the points I wish to raise quite shortly. If his Answer does nothing else, t hope it will at least explain to your Lordships why Otto John is now considered to be an undesirable alien, when it is not so long ago that he was considered a trusted and helpful friend.
It would appear necessary, having regard to the decision of Her Majesty's Government, that I should remind the Government of Otto John's work against Hitler during the war, and long before it, and of the co-operation which he gave to authorities in this country both during the last months of the war and for some time afterwards. He wasone of a group of young men, most of them lawyers who worked in the ministerial offices of Berlin. who joined up with the more senior opponents of Hitler at the time of the Fritsch-Blomberg crisis in order to obtain von Fritsch's acquittal and his reinstatement as Commander-in-Chief. It was from this small beginning that the anti-Hitler resistance movement had its birth.
Those who held up their heads above the crowd in Hitler's Germany, when it is considered that the Third Reich had something like 80 million inhabitants, were unbelievably few. Besides Otto John there were—and I make no apology to your Lordships for mentioning their names—Fabian Von Schlabrendorff; the brothers Bonhoeffer, Dietrich and Klaus, von Donhanyi, RÜdiger Schleicher, and Otto John's own brother Hans. Their names should be remembered with pride, for they never compromised in thought or in deed with Hitler or National Socialism. Not only did they never join the Party, and therefore showed that it was possible in Hitler's Germany to abstain from joining the Party, but they opposed Hitler and all his works from the earliest possible moment. All but two of them paid the inevitable price, after the failure of the July 20 plot against Hitler's life, with their lives. Are they remembered?—I do not mean in this country, but in Germany. I am afraid not very often; and frequently when they are remembered, it is as traitors and not as heroes. In this connection, is there not food for thought in the fact that the anti-Communist rising in East Germany in October, 1953, is
76
celebrated in Western Germany as a national day, whereas July 20, 1944, is not celebrated as a national day?
Otto John, as many of your Lordships, I know, are aware, escaped to Spain, and thence via Lisbon to this country. When he arrived on that occasion he was not refused admission, but was welcomed with open arms. From then onwards until some time after the war he co-operated greatly with the British authorities both here and in occupied Germany. In 1950, during the Allied Occupation, he was appointed, doubtless upon our recommendation, to a post in the office which was to have charge of the defence of the Federal Constitution of the West German Republic—something akin, I believe, to our M.I.5. That was never a popular appointment for many Germans, particularly Germans like General Gehlen and Dr. Globke, who held and still hold important offices in the Adenauer Government; and when John went into East Germany on the tenth anniversary of the July 20 plot against Hitler, it was General Reinhardt Gehlen who said of him: "Once a traitor, always a traitor.
Two and a half years later, after his return from East Germany, he was tried and convicted by the Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe for what was described in the charge sheet as traitorous conspiracy, and was sentenced to four years imprisonment. There was, however, not a scintilla of evidence that John had intended to commit treason or that he was on that occasion a traitor. What is more, the senior member of the court which tried him, Dr. Geier, was at pains, in his summing-up. to say this about John—I will quote his words:
"The accused never had any intention of serving Communism and he was not a criminal in the eyes of the law."
Many of the German newspapers criticised the trial at the time.
It is difficult to understand how a person who is pronounced by his judges not to be a criminal in the eyes of the law could possibly be sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Supreme Court of any country which had a real appreciation or regard for justice, more particularly when the prosecution itself had asked only for a sentence of not more than two years, which seems to me

77
to indicate that they did not regard the matter with any great seriousness.
I am going to ask your Lordships to bear with me while I read a short paragraph from a book which I wrote in 1956. I hope that I am in order in doing so, hut it expresses what I want to say in language better than I could do it again. It was a book called Though the Heavens Fall. It was in a chapter dealing with the offence of treason, particularly in regard to the famous cases of Colonel Lynch, Sir Roger Casement and "Lord Haw-Haw". I happened to deal with the case of Otto John because I wrote in between the time that John went to Germany and before he returned from East Germany. With your Lordships' permission I will read a short extract:
"The crux of the offence of treason is the intention behind the overt acts, which must have been done ' traitorously ', and whether a person who has committed treason deserves the title of traitor or patriot is often a bone of contention. The question is being argued today in Germany with all vehemence. Were those who took part in the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life on 20th July 1944, and paid for it with their lives, martyred patriots or traitorous criminals? Those who take the former view have their President, Herr Huess, as their leader; but there are many others, not all of them pro-Nazi, who take the opposite view, and when Otto John, who had been one of the July conspirators, went over to the East, these were the first to point the finger of scorn and say, ' Once a traitor, always a traitor.' It may well he that anti-Hitler conspirators were guilty of Hochverrat, or High Treason, in attempting to overthrow their Government from within, but they were not traitors to the Fatherland. Hitler's Third Reich had long forfeited all right to loyalty, and to act against Hitler was to act for Germany."
I do not see how Her Majesty's Government could possibly take the view that John's visit to East Germany was treasonable, or even criminal, having regard to the wording of the judgment of the court which tried him in December, 1956. I sincerely hope that the Government do not share the view of the Germans that he was a traitor in 1944. Why, then, has he been declared an undesirable alien and refused entry to this country? He could not possibly have done any harm while he was here, and in any event steps could easily have been taken to see that he did not. I trust, in view of what I have said—and I must apologise to your Lordships again for having taken up so much of your time that Her Majesty's Government will now reverse a decision
78
which was at once unreasonable, unnecessary, unjust and, above all, ungrateful.
3.25 p.m.
Lord CHESHAM: My Lords, it was last year that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary decided that in view of Dr. John's record he was not a person to whom leave to land in this country should be given. I think it may he of assistance if I also remind your Lordships of Dr. John's recent history, which my right honourable friend took into consideration in coming to his conclusion.
He held, as we have heard, the office of President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Incidentally, he did not receive that appointment at any instigation of ours: he was appointed by the West German authorities. When holding that office on July20. 1954, he went to East Berlin accompanied by a physician. Dr. Wohlgemuth. Shortly after his disappearance he broadcast on the East German radio and appeared at a Press conference, sponsored by the Committee for German Unity, in which he explained the reasons which had led him to go over to the East: and thereafter he continued to engage actively in various fields of propaganda under the auspices of the East German Government. Seventeen months later he returned to West Germany and, as we have already heard, was shortly afterwards arrested. After a period of preliminary investigation, he was brought to trial by the Federal High Court in Karlsruhe on November 12, 1956. As we have heard, he was found guilty of treacherous conspiracy and was sentenced to four years penal servitude.
He was released on July 26, 1958, after he had been granted the customary remission of one-third of his sentence for good conduct, and also because the period that he had been detained in prison while awaiting trial had been taken into account. Shortly afterwards, a warning was conveyed to Dr. John that if he were to travel to the United Kingdom he would not be granted admission. This decision was still in operation when Dr. John decided to travel to this country on February 10.
I simply cannot entertain the noble Lord's suggestion that the verdict against Dr. John should or could be disregarded on the basis that the German Supreme Court came to the wrong conclusion, and

79
that justice was not done. It may well be that the criminal procedure of the German courts differs in a number of respects from our own, but the German Federal Republic is one of the countries of the free democratic world, and I cannot accept the suggestion that justice for Dr. John was not to be expected from those who held high office in the Judiciary there. I think, therefore, that your Lordships would certainly not expect me to enter into any discussion as to the merits or demerits of the trial of Dr. John. In conclusion, I might add that more recent legal proceedings against Dr. Wohlgemuth did not serve to cast a doubt on the justice of Dr. John's conviction.
3.28 p.m.
VISCOUNT TEMPLEWOOD: My Lords, perhaps I may say a word in support of the Government, for this reason. When I was Ambassador in Madrid Dr. John came to stay with me—or, rather, we put him up in the Embassy. He was then claiming to be in a position to negotiate a peace with the Allies. As Ambassador I could not go into a question of that kind, and what I did was to facilitate his journey to England. I then gathered that he was claiming all sorts of things to which he was not entitled. Anyhow, the fact remains that his approach to the British Government came to nothing.
I formed the view, although I did not actually talk to him myself, that he was one of the many people who were drifting into Madrid at that time claiming to be in a position to negotiate this or that settlement, and really, at the back of it all, being chiefly engaged in making themselves important. That being so I fully accepted the view of the Government in London that his mission was not really a serious one, and I was not in the least surprised when I heard afterwards that he had been coming and going between Western and Eastern Germany and that both sides had equally distrusted him. That being so, I feel that the British Government were fully justified, with knowledge probably much greater than my own in taking the action they did, particularly after the verdict of the German Courts, and in refusing to give him a visa for entry into the United Kingdom.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN FINANCIAL AGREEMENT
3.31 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM)THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM) rose to move to resolve, That this House approves the Agreement between the Government of the United Arab Republic and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland concerning Financial and Commercial Relations and British Property in Egypt (Command Paper No. 639).The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this Motion, as your Lordships know, has had to be advanced to to-day from next week at relatively short notice. I am afraid that this change in our plans may have inconvenienced some noble Lords who wished to hear the debate or to take part in it. I am sorry that this inconvenience has been caused. I think noble Lords who know the reason for the change in our plans appreciate that it was not taken hastily, and it may be some consolation to noble Lords who have themselves had to rearrange their programmes to know that I have shared in some of the inconvenience which has been occasioned. Should I. at a late stage in the debate, have to absent myself from some noble Lords' interventions in the debate, I hope they will understand that it is part of the inconvenience and penalty that I shall suffer from the change of plans.
My Lords, the Motion standing in my name is to approve the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. It does no more than that, and I myself would sincerely hope that, whether or not the proval is wholehearted or enthusiastic, it may at least be unanimous. In another place it was thought right to employ the occasion of a similar Motion to indulge once more in a rather heated debate about the Suez operation. No doubt this was very exciting, and it appears from the Press to have been the occasion of some very fine Parliamentary oratory in the grand manner, but I hope, if I may venture a suggestion, that we may not follow that precedent here.
As I have said more than once in this House, the Suez operation is a subject about which all of us have, in all good conscience, adopted attitudes from which we are unlikely to recede. In this case all the familiar argumentation would be, I think, strictly speaking. irrelevant to the

81
Motion and might interfere with its proper discussion. The Agreement to which my Motion relates raises important questions of its own to which I believe noble Lords would wish to address themselves, and such questions are better discussed, and certainly more easily answered, in an atmosphere not charged or distracted by general political, or, I should hope, personal recrimination.
My Lords, the fact is that the questions to which this debate gives rise would have fallen to be considered by any Government, whatever its political complexion. It would have fallen to be considered by an Administration presided over by the official Opposition, by the so-called "Suez Group", by the Liberal Party or by the Communists or the League of Empire Loyalists no less than by the present Government. The questions which would have been required to be asked and answered in each case would have been fundamentally the same questions. Iwould respectfully suggest that these are the very questions which really fall to be asked and answered by your Lordships' House in the present debate.
The first question which I would raise is whether, whatever one's views about the events of November, 1956, it was really tolerable that in 1959 relations with the Egyptian authorities should be left indefinitely in the state in which they had been left as a result of those events. That, I would say, is the first question which we should ask ourselves. I have never concealed my own personal opinion about this. It was my view, as the House will recall, from the very start that the sooner we came to a business arrangement the better. The events of 1956 left business and diplomatic relations between ourselves and the Egyptian authorities in a state with which we in this House have become in the interval only too familiar. Diplomatic relations were ruptured. Business and financial relationships were complicated by the consequences of the extrusion of a number of British subjects, who had done no wrong, and by the sequestration of one part, and the Egyptianisation (as it was called), of another part, of British assets. We, on our part, had held, and were holding, as security the sterling balances remaining in our hands. In the meantime, trade between Britain and Egypt was severely hampered; air communications were interrupted. And the
82
absence of diplomatic relationships could serve only to perpetuate misunderstanding.
My view, frequently expressed, has always been that, whatever opinion is held of the Suez operation or of the Egyptian authorities, or of the future of Anglo-Egyptian relations, a business settlement was desirable. It was desirable in the context of the world situation, on which I have no need to descant at the present time; in the interests of the claimants to property in Egypt, or compensation for it;in the interests of our future trade; and, for that matter—and I say this with complete sincerity—in the interests of our own and of the Egyptian people. There could be, as I thought, no advantage from our own point of view in continuing the state of affairs in which claimants to compensation for Egyptianised property were debarred from compensation, and sequestrated assets were allowed to continue in the hands of a sequestrator (where they could hardly be expected to improve) instead of being returned to their true owners who could repossess them if they wished to do so, or cause them to be realised if they did not.
Nor was it a real advantage to hold sterling balances frozen which, if they did not deteriorate, certainly did not cover the sequestrated, let alone the Egyptianised, assets, and which my right honourable friend did not consider himself free in honour to distribute consistently with our obligations as an international banker. If I may widen the field, I do not believe that the existing situation was in the interests of our traders, our merchants or our industrialists wishing to buy from Egypt or to sell to her, or of our communications by air and sea, or of the wider diplomatic consideration which, I would say, cannot be long absent from our minds in any international context. It therefore followed, in my submission, that any Government, however situated, would have been right to break the logjam if it could. The question arose, how to do it. and on what terms.
My Lords, before we were free to discuss such a business arrangementa preliminary barrier required to be overcome. This was the existence of public claims and counterclaims arising out of the Suez operation. The Egyptian authorities wished to put forward a claim

83
for reparations arising out of the military operation. We wished to put forward several claims, including that arising out of the seizure of the stores and installations at the Canal Base. In the event, both parties have agreed to waive these respective claims. I should hope that the House will consider that this was a wise decision for us to come to. If it was desirable, as I have argued, to bring to an end the existing situation, it was necessary to do so by this means, and I do not myself see that there was ever the smallest chance of getting either party to agree either to the justice or the justiciability of the other's claim. Even a mutual set-off would have involved some degree of recognition. Waiver was therefore the only solution; and waiver is the solution which has been adopted.
Attempts have been made to make much of the alleged loss of the stores at the Suez Base. I do no think I need spend much time on this, but I must make one observation—that I believe this to be the wrong approach. The value to us of the Suez Base and the stores therein was primarily a military value, not an economic value. Its loss must therefore be estimated primarily in military rather than economic terms. Of course, this is not the time or place to discuss the military value of the Base or the military consequences of its loss. I myself doubt whether it would ever have been of military value, in the context for which it was originally envisaged, ever since the relationship between the Egyptian authorities and the Soviet bloc became involved by the acceptance of Iron Curtain arms and technical assistance.
But I think that it is a mistake to look at it in this way: it is a mistake, I would say, to view either the Suez operation or the present Agreement against a background of the economic loss of the Base. If either was right—and as a member of the Government I am, of course, concerned to defend both—each is to be defended on broad national grounds which override the economic loss involved. If either was wrong, as noble Lords opposite will perhaps argue, it is vulnerable to criticisms which make considerations of the economic loss either irrelevant or relatively unimportant. My submission to the House, therefore, is that if we were right, as I have argued, to seek a business
84
settlement with the Egyptian authorities, we were also right to clear the ground by waiving our own claim to compensation in return for the waiver of the Egyptian claim. It would, I think, be inappropriate and unhelpful for me to compare the two claims, either in amount or in merits. The point is that both claims are now waived, and that no further progress could have been made unless they had been.
The removal of this difficulty left the ground clear for a discussion of the rights of the owners of property that had been Egyptianised or sequestrated and the rights of the Egyptian authorities to their sterling balances. Not unnaturally, this has occupied most attention from the public and the House. These rights, I must next tell the House, lay fairly and squarely in the field of diplomacy; so did the allied questions of the resumption of commercial relations and the rights of air passage.
I do not wish to say anything to prejudice any individual case, but I think I am right in saying that, broadly speaking, none of the claims against the Egyptian Government was justiciable either in the Egyptian courts or in the English courts. Nor am I aware of any international court of law to which they were amenable. Hence, they had to be dealt with by diplomacy; and, since in the ordinary course at International Law international persons are States and not individuals, and since the claims of individuals at International Law fall to be negotiated by the diplomacy of the States in default of other means, it was in accordance with precedent that we sought to negotiate these rights by diplomacy in the present instance. Nor, I am bound to say, did I hear a whisper of a suggestion, until after the present Agreement had been signed, that any other course was really open to us. The general issues were, of course, discussed with representative individuals and organisations, but it was not possible to consult with them at every stage.
Since the Agreement, however, the noble Lord, Lord Wilmot of Selmeston has suggested that the claimants should have negotiated with the Egyptian authorities themselves. I must say that I regard this suggestion as altogether impracticable. It is true that the Shell Company was able to negotiate

85
separately, both on account of the size of the claim and because a factor in the negotiations was, inevitably, the ability of the Shell Company to offer the advantage of world-wide connections in aid of the conduct of a local business. But I have no reason to believe that the Egyptian authorities would have entertained private negotiations on behalf of sonic 4,000-odd claimants. I cannot conceive that any business result would have emerged if they had; and since the only security on our side was the sterling balances, in the hands of the Government, not of the claimants, it would have been impossible to conduct the negotiations in such a way as not ultimately to involve the Government. Certainly no suggestion was made at the time that this would have been a preferable or even a possible course.
My Lords, I should now like to say a word about the substance of thesettlement—the desiderata to be aimed at and the extent to which these desiderata may be said to have been met. Looking back on what I have said in the past, I am quite sure that I had two main considerations in mind: first, that we should get from the Egyptian authorities concrete and substantial recognition of our legal rights; second, that in our desire to effect a political agreement we should not sacrifice the interests of the claimants to that desire. I shall try to show that although, from our point of view, the Agreement is defective in several important respects, these two considerations at least have been fulfilled. By our legal rights I meant, first, that the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company, British and French, should benefit from compensation for their holdings; second, that the Shell property should be restored; third, that the compensation for the Egyptianised property should be paid on a scale at least as generous as one can reasonably expect to obtain by negotiation from a revolutionary Government of the type with which we are dealing and fourth, that the sequestrated property should be returned.
I make no secret of the fact that I should have liked, in addition, an impartial valuation of the claims and separate damages for injury to the sequestrated property. Except for the last two, all these desiderata have been covered. I do not think that the absence of the last two, although it is to be
86
regretted, is necessarily fatal. I had always regarded it as inevitable that something would be lost in the process of negotiation. I believe that it is perhaps undesirable for a member of the Government to enlarge on this theme. But perhaps I may say this, after a long experience in negotiating claims in my professional walk of life: I have had many times to advise a plaintiff with an unassailable case and no want of courage that a compromise settlement was better than an unsatisfied judgment. Secondly, I was quite certain that it would be wrong to sacrifice the interests of the claimants to the desirability of a political settlement. But that, most certainly, we have not done. We did not sign the Agreement until we were absolutely satisfied that nothing more could be obtained for the claimants by the process of negotiation, and that the alternative to the Agreement signed was the status quo, and that alternative less favourable to those we serve than the Agreement we have been negotiating. Whatever may be said about the adequacy or otherwise of the terms, I am absolutely certain that negotiation could have yielded no more. The claimants would have been worse not better off, had we delayed our signature, and therefore we have not sacrificed them for political considerations at any stage of the negotiations.
From our point of view, the ideal course would have been to establish some form of independent arbitral tribunal, to establish, first, the title to each individual claim to property, and secondly the amount of each individual claim, or at least a fairly accurate total of the combined claims. This was our original purpose, but it proved inthe end impracticable. Perhaps we underestimated the difficulties. In candour, one must at least admit that that process would have been neither short nor inexpensive. In the event, however, the Egyptians were not prepared to accept the principle of impartial arbitration or of individual assessment of the claims, and whether they were right or wrong to adopt this attitude, clearly we had to choose between negotiating a lump sum and not negotiating anything at all.
I cannot myself doubt that on balance we were right to negotiate a lump sum, even if the result were that, as a consequence of the ordinary process of

87
bargaining, the lump sum arrived at was more than the Egyptian authorities had originally offered and less than we had originally asked. In my view this was probably the hardest choice we had to make, but I believe the decision was in the public interest, and although I myself should have preferred the other way cannot doubt that it was in the interests of the claimants. The alternative was to let the negotiations fall to the ground. I cannot say that the method adopted was wholly without precedent, either in municipal or in international law, or so unsatisfactory as to render negotiations on these lines in some way improper. I will in due course discuss the adequacy or otherwise of the sum ultimately arrived at.
I wish at this stage, however, to complete the story of the logical development of the negotiations. I was myself always optimistic that the negotiations would yield a positive result. My confidence was at its peak perhaps when I announced last July that Her Majesty's Government would consider a limited extension of the loans scheme; and that confidence still existed less hopefully—although I confess now, wrongly—at the moment when we debated the wider scheme last November.
The House will not, of course, wish me to rehearse the chequered story of negotiation with the Egyptians. It nearly achieved success more than once; and more than once it appeared to have hung fire indefinitely. In the end, it bore fruit as the result of the good offices of Mr. Eugene Black, given on an informal and personal basis, at the request of both Governments.
One criticism which has been levelled at the agreement came from Colonel Moore, who sometimes appears to speak on behalf of a number of the claimants. He appeared to think that there was something discreditable or humiliating in engaging the good offices of Mr. Eugene Black at all, seemingly on the grounds that he is an American, or at least is not British. As he wrote to the Press:
"Have we not sunk pretty low that we must invoke the help of Americans to settle our affairs with Colonel Nasser. remembering the' kindly ' policy they have adopted towards us in that part of the world in recent years? It is heartbreaking for those of us who have for many years tried to fly the flag and boost British prestige in foreign parts."
I must say I deplore both the attitude and the tone illustrated by those remarks. To begin with, they are incorrect, As a matter of record, it was both Governments, and not Her Majesty's Government alone, who requested the good offices of Mr. Black—Hand that not as an American but as President of the International Bank. We welcomed those good offices and wish to record our gratitude for his services. I should like to know whether there is any of your Lordships who would now condemn us for so doing. If there were a prescribed method of putting ourselves wrong at the bar of public opinion, I should myself have thought that it would have been the refusal of the good offices of so eminent and international personality. I shall ask the House to say that we were right to accept Mr. Black's good offices and that in the circumstances we could have done no other. Her Majesty's Government have more than once thanked Mr. Black for his services and I would repeat those thanks this afternoon.
When Mr. Black undertook to use his good offices he very soon suggested to us a course of action which, since it has been the subject of criticism in your Lordships' House. I feel I should describe in detail. He suggested that, as an important element in the settlement at which he was aiming, we should release £3,300,000 from the frozen Egyptian sterling balances in order to enable the Egyptian authorities to meet their obligations to the Suez Canal Company. That request was made during the Christmas Recess, and in agreeing to it my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer was obviously taking upon himself the responsibility of justifying his action before Parliament. Again I shall ask your Lordships to say that my right honourable friend was right in what he did.
The risk that my right honourable friend took was that if no agreement was arrived at as a result of the release it might have been said that we had diminished the value of the security we were holding in order to safeguard the rights of the claimants. Whether or not that would have been so had no agreement resulted is manifestly not an altogether easy question: but what is certain is that if any agreement did result—as it has now done—it would not have cost the claimants one penny of loss. It is clearly

89
not desirable for me to name the various figures under discussion at different times in the negotiations. It is, however, I think no breach of confidence on my part to say that at no time was there ever, or could there ever have been, any suggestion that the amount payable by the Egyptian authorities would have amounted to the whole of the sterling balances or anything like a sum within £3·3 million of this figure. Negotiations were always on the basis of the return of the sequestrated property and a lump sum in respect of the monetary compensation. It follows that, assuming that an agreement did take place, my right honourable friend was not in any way jeopardising and has not now in any way prejudiced the position of the claimants. I am of the opinion—and I shall ask the House to support me—that the effect of refusing the request of Mr. Eugene Black at this time would have been that no agreement would have been forthcoming and that in addition we Should have put ourselves wrong in the eyes of reasonable men.
I mention these details because this aspect of the matter has been made the subject of criticism in your Lordships' House. When the SuezCanal agreement was first reported in the Press nearly a year ago it became known that a clause in it—Clause 7—related to the possibility of a special release of sterling balances by Her Majesty's Government. This special release was a release of sums of money to cover the outstanding instalments in advance of the period at which instalments became due. Fears were, not unnaturally, expressed that if such special release were made, without agreement on the claimants' claims for the whole or part of the compensation money due under the Canal agreement, the security of the sterling balances would be diminished to the detriment of the claimants.
In these circumstances a Question was legitimately put by the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, to me on May 14 last year in answering which I assured him that any question of a special release would be dependent on the conclusion of negotiations for a final settlement of the outstanding claims. That this Answer was understood as relating to a special release under Clause 7 is shown by the supplementary question and answer recorded
90
in Hansard at the time. I explained this to the noble Lord in this House as recently as February 25th last. I doubt whether either the noble Lord or I considered in our most far-seeing moments that either question or answer had the remotest application to the circumstances of Mr. Black's request, which, at any rate so far as I was concerned, was completely hidden at the time in the mists of the future.
In spite of this the noble Lord thought it right to write a letter to the Press, which appeared on February 27, in which he deliberately accused me—and here I quote him—of sailing pretty near the wind." I cannot myself understand what he meant by this offensive phrase; that is, whether he meant that I had deliberately deceived the House by my earlier answer, which presumes a degree of foreknowledge of Mr. Black's request which I certainly did not possess; or whether he meant that I deliberately misinterpreted the earlier answer by my later answer. which I should have thought was disproved by the documents; or whether he thought I had in some way instigated Mr. Black's request or my right honourable friend's response, which is not true.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords. I hope that the noble Viscount will forgive me if I intervene. He mentioned my name. He mentioned this question of £3 million and my having described that in the public Press as "sailing pretty near the wind." i should like to tell him that I maintain that opinion.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I still do not know what the noble Lord meant. But what I propose to say to the noble Lord about it is this. It clearly includes a suggestion of dishonesty on my part, which I bitterly resent. I resented this attack on my personal integrity, not the less because it was based on what appears to me to he a somewhat astute use of my words in their strictly grammatical sense but out of context. I wish to declare to your Lordships' House that in all my utterances to your Lordships' House on this complicated and difficult matter there has been no thought in my mind at any moment but to lay before your Lordships the whole truth of the matter so far as it was in my power to give it and I must say to the noble Lord that it will be an evil day for public

91
life in this country if a Minister of the Crown, trying to discharge his duty honourably before Parliament in answering questions to the best of his ability in delicate matters, is to be laid open in the public Press, where he can effectively answer only by means of an action for deformation, to innuendoes against his personal integrity.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I am sorry to intervene again. I had not the slightest intention of doing so. But in the light of what the noble Viscount is saying, I propose myself to deal with this matter at some length when I come to speak.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords,I was hoping that the noble Lord would withdraw the charge upon my personal integrity.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I never made any charge against the noble Viscount's personal integrity. What I said was that what the noble Viscount said from the Front Bench, which he has just repeated, was misleading; and I maintain it.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord said that "The Lord President was sailing pretty near the wind"; and he added for good measure, "which is not what one expects from a Lord President".
LORD KILLEARN: Hear, hear!I still maintain that view.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords,I am glad to know that the noble Lord does not consider that such language affronts my personal integrity; and, of course, since he has given that assurance I will accept it. I will only tell him this: that my honour is as dear to me as his is to him, and I resent and rebut the insinuation he has made against it, which seems to me to be both unworthy and untrue.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I must say this to the noble Viscount. His honour is as dear to him as mine is to me; but there is no reflection on his honour what so ever, and I hope there is none on mine.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords,I did not mean to make any reflection on the noble Lord, but I must tell him frankly that if I accused him publicly
92
of "sailing pretty near the wind" I should consider that I was making such a reflection. I now return to the main issue of the agreement. I am sorry for that slight deviation from my main course, but it seems to me that a Minister of the Crown is entitled to defend his personal honour and these are not merely small details that ought to be passed over in silence. I return to the main issue.
The effect of the agreement is that we have received, or shall receive, fully secured, £27½ million in cash. This is in compensation for the value of the Egyptianised business property (which was claimed at £E45 million) together with land and damage to the sequestrated property. More important. my Lords— at least more important in my assessment of the matter, and I would ask the House to agree—we received the promise of the return of sequestrated property which was claimed at something more than £E130 million, including, of course, the Shell property in that figure of £E130 million. In return we have released £41 million in sterling balances, excluding the £3,300.000 released for the instalment of the Canal money, of which a proportion, of course, will return to us as shareholders. The balance in our favour on the transaction is considerable, although probably a good deal less than our just due.
This, in my opinion, affords a reasonable defence of what we have done. In my view—and I would ask the House to agree—the clue to the situation has always lain with the sequestrated property, which has always, with the Egyptianised, far exceeded the amount of sterling balances available for release, and this is now to be returned.
It is said that the £27½ million will not suffice to meet the claims which it is designed to cover at 20s. in the pound. My Lords, this may well be so. But it remains still to be seen how large the gap is or how much it is increased by damage to the sequestrated property. It is, of course, a matter of speculation how far in a court of law the values of the individual claims could in fact be substantiated. I make myself no criticism whatever of the amounts of the claims, but perhaps the House will allow me to say this. Over twenty years of my life were very largely devoted to cases which turned upon the valuation of claims for compensation. Some, I would say, have been exaggerated and inflated. These are

93
in my experience, I would say, very few; but, nevertheless, leaving all such claims aside, I must still tell your Lordships that it is a very rare thing for a plaintiff's claim, if contested, to get through from writ to judgment without substantial diminution of value. I would not myself therefore necessarily assume that the gap is of the size often assumed.
Clearly, whatever our opinion may be, the next phase in this difficult matter is to work it out, in the case of the Egyptianised property with the Foreign Compensation Commission, and in the case of the sequestrated property, in Cairo; and to recover, and where it is so desired to realise, the value of the sequestrated property; and try to see how the arrangements for crossing the Egyptian exchange control work out in favour of the owner. This will require the co-operation of the claimants, and I would say it is a co-operation to which we are fully entitled.
If, when all is done, a gap emerges, we shall have to look at its size and see then what justice demands. In his speech in another place my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 602 (No. 78), col. 41]:
"Hon. Members may ask whether the Government are prepared to supplement the sum of £27½million compensation. I said when I made my statement the other day "—
I am quoting my right honourable friend—
"that neither this Government nor rtny other Government in this country have ever accepted a commitment to make good losses suffered by British subjects in foreign countries. We could not possibly accept a general commitment of that kind, but we are anxious to see a fair outcome of the matter."
Those words should be read with the assurance of the Prime Minister, and perhaps I should read his words, too, by way of connotation, because I think they have a bearing on the matter. The Prime Minister said [col. 150]:
"While we will not here and now pledge ourselves to make any fixed addition to the total of £27½million, as has been suggested in the debate, I can say now that the Government will watch how this works out and will play their part in reaching a settlement which will be reasonable and fair, and we do not exclude a further contribution from public funds. But, as I am sure the House will agree, while we trust wait for precise calculations, for the final settlement, we must try to deal with any hardships and gaps that arise between now and a final settlement. But this point is worth remembering. Any general undertaking,
94
such as that asked for in some quarters, given by Her Majesty's Government before agreement was reached, that we would stand behind and pay in full all British claims, would certainly not have resulted in a satisfactory agreement."
My Lords, I would ask the House to accept these assurances as reasonable at the present stage.
I think I should also remind the House that, in the case of those claimants who are also refugees, their capital is to some extent—and, to the number of half of them, to 70 per cent. of their reckonable assets—secured by ex-gratia loans, which are not repayable except out of recovered assets. Even in respect of these, my right honourable friend has said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 602 (No. 78), col. 151]:
"It is also proposed to leave the question of the repayment of the ex-gratia loans, which have so far been made to former Britishresidents in Egypt, in abeyance for the time being".
I think, also, that the House will be interested to know the following figures. Of the £E45 million claimed for Egyptianised property, £E38 million represents the claim of only ten concerns. Of the £E130 million claimed as the value of the sequestrated property, a very large proportion represents the single claim of the Shell Company, whose property appears Ito be at least in good running order. A great deal is in a form which will be handed back—£E10 million for building, and £E23 million for bank balances, cash and securities. Nor can it be supposed that the £E7 million for personal properties, including insurance policies, or the £E3 million for plant and machinery, have necessarily all gone. It must also be remembered that the many claims on the fund will be met in England, in convertible sterling, when they were made, at least in many cases, in respect of goods or cash in Egypt, subject at all material times to currency restriction; and that the values of property in Egypt, quite apart from the events of 1956, must have been the subject of violent fluctuation and, in many cases, of decline.
I know that to many claimants it would seem no more than reasonable and just if Her Majesty's Government made a plain commitment to makeup the amount of their claims to 20s. in the pound in advance. I do not think my right honourable friend should be pressed as far as this. In his view—and I believe

95
it to be correct—the right course would be to wait until we see what emerges from the return by the Egyptian authorities of the sequestrated properties, and the work of the Foreign Compensation Commission. The Government are anxious for a settlement of individual claims which will be fair both to the taxpayer and to the individuals concerned, and do not exclude a further contribution from public funds.
My Lords. I must say—and I hope the House will accept it—that throughout this long and difficult business I have always held myself open as willing to answer, either in private correspondence or by discussion of a less formal kind, individual difficulties and hardships (of which there have been, and no doubt will be, many); and I will continue to do my best to offer the same services if noble Lords should desire to make use of them. Those who have experience of my right honourable friend's honesty of purpose and generosity would, I think, be well advised to accept his assurance.
My Lords, I have now reached the end of my argument. May I sum it up as follows? My first proposition is that a business arrangement on these lines is desirable in the interests of all concerned; my second proposition is that, in pursuing it, we have followed a course of negotiation which was, in itself, a legitimate course; my third is that we have pursued that course of negotiation to the utmost limit of what it was capable of yielding; and my fourth is that we have now to choose between accepting or rejecting the results. After carefully weighing the advantages of each course, and the disadvantages—to which I am not blind—I remain utterly convinced that we were right to sign.
I cannot resist the impression that if, when we debated this matter last, in November, noble Lords had known that within a matter of weeks this Agreement would be concluded, some at least—and amongthose the most shrewd of them—would have been agreeably surprised. The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd; the noble Lord, Lord Killearn; the noble Lord. Lord Derwent; the noble Lord, Lord Grenfell, and even the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, expressed at various times during that debate different degrees of conviction, some of them most absolute, that no agreement would be forthcoming.
96
All these arguments were presented in answer to my contention that the system of loans should be allowed to continue a little longer so as not to prejudice the chances of negotiation. I think that it therefore follows that they were unequivocal declarations that, in the view of noble Lords (who number among themselves the shrewdest judges of this matter, and the most experienced and knowledgeable Members of this House), no agreement, favourable or unfavourable, would be forthcoming.
Now that an Agreement has been forthcoming, all I would ask is that noble Lords should look at it dispassionately, and not condemn it out of hand. No doubt there will be plenty of things they will wish to discuss or raise with my right honourable friend or myself; but theonly issue to-day is the general issue—whether we were right to sign the Agreement or whether we were wrong. On that general issue, I myself have no doubt. I ask noble Lords to express no doubt, either. I would, therefore, make this plea: devoted as I know they all are to the public interest of their country, let them support the Government upon this general issue. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved to resolve, That this House approves the Agreement between the Government of the United Arab Republic and the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland concerning Financial and Commercial Relations and British Property in Egypt (Command Paper No. 639).—(Viscount Hailsham.)

THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF FARM PRICES
4.17 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL WALDEGRAVE): My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I should now like to make a statement similar to that which my right honourable friend has just made in another place about the guarantees to agriculture for the coming year.
The Government have now determined these in the light of the annual review of the economic condition and prospects of the industry. The details are set out in a White Paper which will be available in the Printed Paper Office when I sit down.

97
The weather in 1958 was, of course, appalling. I am sure that all those in the industry have had the sympathy of the House in their difficulties and disappointments. Great efforts have been made by farmers and farm workers to get in the harvest and to keep up milk yields as far as the bad conditions would allow.
Net output in 1958-59 is forecast at 61 per cent. above pre-war. This is just below the revised figure of 62 per cent. above pre-war for1957-58, which was a record. But had it not been for the effects of the weather, net output would probably have reached a new record level.
Similarly, actual net income is down from last year's record. It is forecast for 1958-59 at £327 million. This is a fall of £27½ million from the revised figure of £354½ million for 1957-58. But when adjusted to normal weather conditions, in accordance with the usual procedure for judging the trend of net income, it is forecast at £360 million, an increase over the revised figure of £355 million for 1957–58 and that of £339 million for 1956–57. Thus, despite the cut of £19 million in the total value of the guarantees last year, net income shows a satisfactory and rising trend, apart from the unfortunate effects of the weather. Costs have gone up by about £11 million in a full year on review commodities practically the same as a year ago. Efficiency continues to improve, though the effects this year have in part been masked by tile weather. Imports of feeding stuffs are forecast to increase from 5·4 million tons in 1957–58 to 6·1 million tons in 1958–59.
We have also taken account of the needs of the national economy, of our international trading position, especially in relation to the Commonwealth, and of the considerations affecting particular commodities. The cost to the Exchequer of support for agriculture has fallen by £36 million from £284 million in the financial year 1957–58 to £248 million in 1958–59. But it is still high. The situation on individual commodities, which must have a strong influence on the changes to be made in the guarantees from year to year, is rather better than it was a year ago. Less change in the guaranteed prices is therefore required this year on that account. This is, of course partly due to the changes in the guarantees we made a year ago.
98
Our general conclusion, as a result of considering all these factors, is that we should not reduce the total value of the guarantees this year, but equally that there is no need for any substantial increase.
The determinations we have made provide for a net increase of £3 million in the total value of the guarantees, after taking credit for the £6 million net cost of the Small Farmer Schemes. The guaranteed prices for milk, cattle, pigs, sheep, barley, oats, potatoes and sugar beet will be unchanged. The guaranteed prices for eggs, wheat, rye, and wool are to be reduced—hen eggs by 1 d. a dozen, wheat and rye each by 6d. a cwt. and wool by 2d. a lb. There will, however, be an increase of 15s. a head in the subsidy on steer calves, and of £2 a head in the hill cow subsidy, so as to encourage further the rearing of beef store cattle. There will also he an increase of 7 million gallons in the milk standard quantity for England and Wales. The new potato guarantee system will apply to the 1959 crop, and the support price is being adjusted to this change. Some alterations are also being made in the fatstock guarantee arrangements without affecting the value of the guarantees.
The determinations now made are, we think, fair to the industry and the nation.
THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE:My Lords, perhaps, before noble Lords opposite raise any points. I may put a question. The answer may possibly help them in their questions. I should like to ask my noble friend whether these terms have been agreed with the National Farmers' Union.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I am glad to be able to say that the National Farmers' Union have agreed these determinations.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS BOROUGH: My Lords, we are much obliged to the noble Earl for making in your Lordships' House the statement which has been made in another place. We defer any detailed comment until we have had an opportunity of reading the White Paper. I must say, however, that I was rather impressed by a passage more than halfway through the statement. It seems that a loss of income, owing to weather conditions, of about £23½million, an increase in farmers' costs of

99
about £11 million and the reduction of £6 million of grants to small farmers apparently show that there is no reason to increase the guarantees in general. I think that is a wonderful story. It is like Alice in Wonderland—jam yesterday, jam to-morrow, but no jam to-day.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, the noble Earl will forgive me, but with a number of figures to assimilate all at once, without a copy of the statement, it is rather difficult to follow all he said. I should be glad if he could clear up my mind on two points. First, he mentioned £360 million as being the net farm income in a year of normal weather. In fact, the net farm income was £327 million. Can the noble Earl say whether the present level has been made on the assumed basis of average weather? Secondly, the noble Earl mentioned the rising trend in farm incomes, but is it not the case that the actual figures show a substantial fall, as compared with the previous year? And do I understand him as saying that the £3 million net increase in guarantees is the figure after taking into account the £6 million for the small farmer scheme. so that, in fact, that means a £3 million reduction?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, perhaps I may answer the noble Lord's last question first. The £6 million which is the cost of the small farmer scheme is included in the guarantees balance sheet, as it was always said that it would be. The £3 million is an increase in the value of the guarantees; it is a net increase over and above last year. Compared with the cut of £19 million last year. there is this £3 million rise this year.
In regard to the noble Lord's question about the trend of income, it has always been recognised by farmers that these figures are adjusted to what we call a normal weather basis. If we take the normal weather basis, there has been a rising trend in income. But the noble Lord is perfectly right: owing to a number of factors, including the weather, the actual income has fallen by £27 million, as I said in my statement. But we must never forgot that the increase in efficiency of the agricultural industry goes on all the time, and that, for review purposes, that can be calculated at about £25 million. The effect of the determinations this year, as the noble Lord will see if
100
he studies the figures, is that a great deal of the result of this increased efficiency will be retained by the farmers; and we think this to be just.
LORD STONHAM: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for what he has said, but on the last point do I understand that £3 million more of Government money is being provided for farmers?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: Yes, my Lords, certainly. The determinations are £3 million-plus, as compared with £19 million-minus last year.

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN FINANCIAL AGREEMENT
4.26 p.m.
Debate resumed.
LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, like the noble Viscount the Lord President of the Council, I find it a little inconvenient to have this debate thrown upon us at such short notice; but we all know that the reasons were very proper ones, and we naturally accept them. We are all obliged to the noble Viscount for the clear way in which he has submitted the Financial and Commercial Agreement for the approval of your Lordships' House. As he was speaking, I thought that he would not include to-day's task amongst the more congenial occasions which he has relished so much from time to time. He was, for him, very restrained.
The noble Viscount was frank enough to say that he had expected that something would be lost in the process of negotiation, and of course that is precisely what has happened. I do not think that any of us can be very happy about the Agreement. The fact is that it involves substantial losses both for the British nation and for British nationals. Her Majesty's Government were not negotiating from strength. Their representatives must soon have realised, if they were not already aware of it, that British authority and prestige, which are important factors in negotiations, had been seriously weakened. They had to be content with a compromise Agreement. Compromise is not necessarily a bad thing. It is sometimes essential. I agree that there may be times when an unsatisfactory settlement is better than

101
no settlement at all. I believe that the present is a case in point. But it should be frankly recognised as such. We should not attempt to delude ourselves. or others, into believing that the Financial and Commercial Agreement is an achievement which Her Majesty's Government can recommend and your Lordships' House can approve with pride or satisfaction. It may be true—I have no doubt that it is—that the settlement is the best that could be made in the circumstances; but I feel that many people will have found themselves agreeing with the Daily Telegraph, which two days ago described it as
"the sorry tidying-up of a sorry story."
Like the noble Viscount the Lord President I am not going to spend any time in going over the background of events which necessitated the making of an Agreement. Our views are well known. In the series of debates on the Suez action, at the time and subsequently, the opposition in your Lordships' House stated their position quite clearly. We opposed intervention as a disastrous policy and one based on political and military miscalculations. That was our view then, and it is our view now. I will leave it at that, and proceed to deal with the Agreement which is now before the House.
That Agreement represents a bargain, and a hard bargain. I believe that there will be general agreement that the provision which is causing most concern, and not a little anxiety, is Article IV. This is the Article which provides for compensation to he paid in respect of (a) British property which has been nationalised by Egypt, and (b) injury and damage to sequestrated property which Egypt is to return to its British owners. The claim value of the nationalised property has been stated to be £45 million, and a few millions more for land—a total of around £50 million. Colonel Moore, Chairman and Director of the British Communities' Association of Egypt, has stated that the losses and damage to sequestrated property would probably be £30 million, "on a charitable view". Thus the British Government are to receive £27½ million in full and final discharge of all liability on the part of the United Arab Republic Government and nationals in respect of claims estimated at £80 million. It may be true, as the Chancellor of the
102
Exchequer has pointed out, that owners, when assessing their claims, were often apt to take a somewhat rosy view; and it may prove to be the case that the total which emerges from the Foreign Compensation Commission will be lower, and perhaps substantially lower, than £80 million. But even allowing for that, it seems clear now that the total sum of £27½ million will be utterly inadequate.
I have no doubt we all agree that the claimants should receive fair compensation; but if that is to happen it is obvious that an additional sum will be needed. That additional sum can come from only one source, and that is the State. I was glad, as I am sure all noble Lords were, to hear the noble Viscount the Lord President reaffirm the statement made by the Prime Minister in another place. The noble Viscount quoted that statement, and I think part of it will bear repetition, because it is an important statement. The Prime Minister said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 602 (No. 78), col. 150]
"While we will not here and now pledge ourselves to make any fixed addition to the total of £27½ million, as has been suggested in the debate, I can say now that the Government will watch how this works out and will play their part in reaching a settlement which will be reasonable and fair, and we do not exclude a further contribution from public funds. But …while we must wait for precise calculations, for the final settlement we must try to deal with any hardships and gaps that arise between now and a final settlement."
There is no pledge. I agree, and the absence of a definite pledge may have caused disappointment to those primarily concerned. But in my opinion, the Prime Minister accepted a firm moral obligation when he said that the Government would play their part in reaching a settlement which will be "reasonable and fair." How else can a reasonable and fair settlement be made than by additional money from the Government. if precise calculations show, as we believe they will, that the£27½ million is inadequate? I hope that the Governmentwill be generous when they know the facts, as ascertained by the Foreign Compensation Commission, and that they will be prompt in their action to help the claimants.
I also hope that, in the meantime, the second part of the Prime Minister's statement,
"we must try to deal with any hardships and gaps that arise between now and a final settlement",

103
will be speedily and properly implemented. I emphasise that point because it seems to me that the procedure to be followed in determining claims will inevitably mean delay in the settlement of claims, and hardships may be experienced. If all this is done, I believe that the British nationals concerned will find themselves better off than they would have done had they been left to do their own negotiating with the Egyptian Government direct. But no doubt this House will have an opportunity later on of judging whether these people do, in fact, receive fair compensation; and I am sure the House will wish to do so.
I think that our special concern is for the British nationals who lived in Egypt, had their homes there, made their lives there, and had jobs or small property or businesses there. Large concerns can bear losses more easily than the individual can. For many of these people, who were compelled to leave Egypt as a result of the crisis, the future may not be very promising. To be uprooted, to lose property, or homes, or jobs; to suffer hardship, and to have to start a new life again, is a bitter human experience. The sense of injustice is greater when it happens through no fault of one's own. A firm may regain lost business, but a man in this position may not be able to regain his lost future; and among the claimants there may be many in this category. It is difficult to equate compensation with this type of loss. I certainly do not believe it can be done by a flat "x shillings in the pound" settlement for all claims.
I realise, of course, that the special machinery which has been set up in London and Cairo by the Foreign office to help and advise claimants may be of real service to them in the preparation of their claims, but I hope also that the Foreign Compensation Commission will be able to take into account what might be called a claimant's intangible loss. This is a point which might be borne in mind in the drafting of the Order in Council which is to be a directive to the Commission.
Under Article V (1) (a) provision is made for the transfer into sterling of £E5.000 (that is, about £3,750 sterling) by owners of British property who do not wish to resume residence in Egypt. This is not a large sum in
104
these days if a person wants to buy a house or start a business. It seems insufficient for a claimant who does not want to go back to Egypt and seeks to start a new life here. It takes no account of basic needs in such a case. I know that a further provision is that the Government of the United Arab Republic is pledged to give "favourable consideration" to applications for additional transfers. The value of this provision will, of course, depend on the manner in which it is implemented, and I hope that it is the intention of the Foreign Office, through its machinery in Cairo, to see that such applications are expeditiously, as well as favourably, dealt with by the appropriate authorities of the United Arab Republic. What I have just said applies also to the permission to British owners to export their jewellery and other personal and household effects released from sequestration.
What is, of course, most welcome is the return to British owners of sequestrated property to the estimated value of £130 million. As I have already said, the loss and damage to this property has been estimated at £30 million. That is Colonel Moore's figure—a British estimate. Some further observations by the British Communities Association of Egypt seem to me to be very pertinent. On What basis will "injury" and "damage" to de-sequestrated property be assessed, and by whom? Many businesses will be returned in a depreciated and valueless condition. They (especially agency businesses) will have been run at a loss because there was no fresh business; staffs have been retained and the sequestrator's salary and expenses deducted. Then will "injury" and "damage" cover consequential losses to professional men—for instance, a doctor's loss of his clientele? These are important practical considerations in the field of compensation for injury and damage.
There is an additional matter, which is set out in paragraph 7 of Annex B. Before returning the property to British owners, the Sequestrator-General is entitled to levy sequestration charges up to a total not exceeding £E2¼ million. I am not clear about this levy. Is it for the Sequestrator-General's salary and expenses, or is it an additional charge? How is this sum arrived at? How, and by whom, is it to be apportioned across

105
the returned property which is owned by about 4,000 private individuals and 300 businesses?
Compensation for "injury" and "damage" is to be made out of the £27½ million which is to be administered by the British Government. But who will determine the extent and value of the damage sustained? It will, I take it, be the Foreign Compensation Commission and not an Egyptian authority. Nor, as I understand it, will a dissatisfied claimant have access to either Egyptian or British courts. I think noble Lords will realise that this is an important matter: to those most directly concerned, and I hope that the point may be cleared up in the course of the debate.
Then there is the waiver of inter-Governmental claims. As the noble Viscount has told us, Britain drops her claim in respect of United Kingdom property at the Suez Canal Base, and also costs borne for the clearance of the Suez Canal. The United Arab Republic drops its claim for damage to property during the Suez affair. Now we no longer have the Base, the installations or the stores. The Government have not been able to put a financial value on them. No doubt British interest was more in the strategic value than in the financial value —which is what I think the noble Viscount indicated—but, as has been increasingly apparent in recent years, in the changed conditions of the Arab world the strategic value has been on the decline.
Bearing that in mind, it was probably only a question of time before we should have had to give up the Base. But then the atmosphere might have been less strained than it has been as a result of the Suez intervention, and a negotiated transfer might have been possible on more satisfactory terms. As it was, we were not in a position to negotiate a sale to Egypt. The result is that we no longer have a base in Egypt, or the right to keep a base there, and the existing installations and stores now belong to Egypt. That is part of the price paid for British action at the time of the Suez crisis. But if we could not put a financial value on British installations and stores at the Base, there can be no doubt of their value to Egypt. If not a willing buyer, Egypt was certainly a willing taker, and there can be no doubt that the Egyptian Government
106
attached considerable value to what Egypt was getting, otherwise they would surely not have waived their claims for war damage. Some evidence of Egyptian satisfaction is to be found in the statement made by the Egyptian Economic Minister that in effect they have already sold for £17 million some of the military and civilan stores existing at the Base.
The Egyptian balances which have been blocked in this country are released to Egypt under the Agreement. Their value was nearly £70 million. Of this amount. as we have been told, £3½ million has been paid to the British Government as part of the total compensation sum, and the remaining £24 million is to be paid by Egypt in February of next year. Until this sum is paid, the British Government are to hold in London Government stocks to the value of £35 million deposited by the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Government gets back the rest—about £41 million. Egypt is now able to spend this money freely. Negotiations for the Agreement started in the spring of 1957, but it was not until two years later that an Agreement was concluded. Whether in fact we could have got the present Agreement earlier I am not in a position to judge. But if it had been concluded last year. that is, before convertibility, Egypt would have been obliged to spend her released balances in the sterling area.In this important respect failure to get an Agreement sooner has a recognisable disadvantage to Britain.
The only other Article to which I will refer is Article VI, which provides for the resumption of normal commercial relations. In 1955 our trade with Egypt was £28 million. It fell to some £2½milllion in 1957, and improved to about £13 million last year. Imports from Egypt fell from £7·3 million in 1956 to only £690,000 in 1957, and then improved to £2 million last year. This improvement is a hopeful sign. But we have a good way to go if we are to recover our old trade position. In the meantime, West Germany and other countries have been cutting into the Egyptian market, and we may expect keen competition from them as well as, no doubt, new frustrating Egyptian restrictions. But the latter will apply equally to all, and we should be able to surmount them as effectively as our competitors.
There is obviously scope for steady expansion, and certain new factors and

107
developments may be found to operate in our favour and to our advantage. The signing of this Financial and Commercial Agreement will, we hope, close an unhappy and costly chapter in the recent history of our relations with Egypt and the Arab world generally, and enable us to develop new friendship and understanding, to our mutual benefit. We must hope that the recovery and expansion of our trade will not prove so difficult or so slow as may have been thought likely in recent years. The Agreement, despite its defects, should surely establish better relations than have existed between the two countries for some years, and provide a new opportunity for rebuilding our influence in the Middle East on the basis of friendly co-operation. Finally, my Lords, I want to say that we on these Benches do not intend to oppose the Motion.
4.50 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, in the few words, and they will be very few, that I propose to address to your Lordships this afternoon, I do not intend, any more than previous speakers, to advert to the landings at Suez or the other wider issues which occupied so much of the debate in another place. In that respect I hope to follow the wise lead that has been given by the noble Viscount, the Lord President, and by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. I do not believe that any useful purpose now could be served by repeated inquests into this subject. I cannot feel that they are going to do very much good to anyone, to whatever Party they belong. They may be all right, if I may say so, in another place, where, after all, Members are elected, or consider themselves to have been elected, to oppose each other: hut not here. Here I feel certain that it will be the wish of the great majority of noble Lords to confine this debate to the Agreement itself, for which the Government are asking the approval of the House, and it is to that that I propose to limit what I have to say.
I am sure that there are a great many others, like myself, who had been awaiting the debate in another place on Monday and the speeches of Government spokesmen with very keen interest. It may be true, as the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said to us this afternoon, that in principle a business
108
settlement between Britain and Egypt was most desirable. But, my Lords, it is idle to deny that the actual details of the present Agreement which has been reached have come as a grievous disappointment to many, even among the most loyal supporters of the Government. The Chancellor of the Exchequer described it the other day as a "compromise", and I think the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Hailsham, used the same word today. No doubt, nearly all agreements of this kind are in the nature of compromises. It is very seldom that either side gets exactly what it wants, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. commented just now, compromise is not always a bad thing. But, my Lords, this was surely compromise very much on the side of the Egyptians.
I do not intend to go into the question of Governmental claims, the main one, of course, being over the Base and the installations of the Base. On that, differing views may be held, and in that connection I am sure the House will wish to consider very seriously what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. I am concerned this afternoon merely with private claims. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said in his opening speech that these claims were not justiciable. I am certainly not going to enter into an argument with him about that he is a lawyer; I am not a lawyer, and this, I suppose, is an extremely legal question. But the hard fact remains that the Government had claims on behalf of British firms and private individuals amounting certainly to £45 million in respect of Egyptianised properties and an unspecified sum which may amount to £130 million with regard to sequestrated properties.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Egyptian pounds.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am quite ready to accept Egyptian pounds. In settlement the Government have accepted the sum of £27½ million.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Sterling
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Sterling. But that is not quite the equivalent. To get even that sum they have to release all Egypt's sterling balances in London, which amounted, I believe, to somewhere in the neighbourhood of £60 million.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: £41 million have been released.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: £41 million. Nothing that the noble Viscount says alters those hard facts. There are some other rather odd features about the Agreement about which I think it is difficult to feel very much enthusiasm. To mention only one or two—and I have no doubt other noble Lords will mention others—the Government found it necessary, no doubt to satisfy the Egyptian Government, to declare not only on their own behalf but on behalf of all United Kingdom nationals that
"the payment of £27Í million "—
I am quoting the words—
"fully and finally discharges the Government of the United Arab Republic and nationals of the United Arab Republic from all liability to the United Kingdom Government and United Kingdom nationals."
That, I take it, precludes any United Kingdom national who feels he has been inadequately compensated for the damage done to his property from bringing an action in court. That is the only meaning one can read into that provision.
The noble Viscount may say again that most or all of these claims are not justiciable. That is surely a matter that might be left to the claimants themselves. So far as I know, neither the United Kingdom nationals individually who had claims against the Egyptian Government nor their representatives were consulted in any way before this solemn pledge was given on their behalf. I may be told that that is common form, but it seems very strange to me, and I think it must seem pretty strange to other noble Lords as well. I should have thought that as between two individuals it would have been almost actionable. Having said that, would add this: that it is perhaps rather churlish to complain about that, for, after all, by absolving the Egyptian Government entirely from any further responsibility Her Majesty's Government have placed that responsibility for looking after the claimants fairly and squarely from now on on their own shoulders, and it is Good that we should know that.
There is another provision which I think must seem to the ordinary man rather queer. It is the treatment, I think already mentioned in passing by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, of claimants
110
who had cash and bank balances in Egypt and who did not return or do not intend to return there. And, mind you my Lords, after what has happened that may apply to quite a large number of claimants. The value of property of this kind, as the House will appreciate, is not in any doubt. It is not like land or businesses; there is no question or deterioration about it. It is just so many pounds in the bank —either Egyptian pounds or sterling pounds, I do not care which; it is pounds in the bank. One would have thought that Her Majesty's Government might have insisted that the whole value of this type of property, at least, should be refunded at once. But not at all. All the Egyptian Government are required to do is to give immediate approval to the transfer of sterling up to £5,000 Egyptian, which I understand is about £3,700 sterling, and above that, whatever greater sum may be involved, whether it is £10,000, £20,000 or £30,000, whatever it may be, the Egyptian Government undertake only to
"give favourable consideration to applications for further transfer."
Her Majesty's Government have accepted that. Why was it necessary to agree to that? The Egyptian Government are going to get back—I use the noble Viscount's own figure—in sterling balances at least £41 million; I think that that was the figure he gave. Surely they could devote some part of that very large sum to paying back to these unfortunate people the money which certainly belongs to them, which is certainly in the bank and which can certainly be transferred at the present moment.
Those are only one or two of the rather strange features of what I can only call a very unhappy Agreement. Other noble Lords who are taking part in the debate will no doubt wish to mention others. It is "doing it proud", I think, to call This Agreement a compromise, and I personally should have felt most inclined, in spite of what the noble Viscount has said, to vote against it, but for one ray of hope—and what one may hope, quite frankly, will be a really bright ray of hope—which shone out amid the encircling gloom: I refer, of course, to the clear intimation in the speeches both of the Prime Minister and of the Chancellor of the Exchequer which has been repeated by' the Lord President this afternoon, that the £27½ million which is

111
being provided by the Egyptian Government in satisfaction of British private claims is not the last word; it is not all the compensation that those claimants may hope to get. The Government may not have extracted very much from the Egyptians, but they are, it seems—and I am grateful to them for saying so—prepared to do something (I hope quite a lot) to bridge the gap between the £27Í million and the far larger amount which has been claimed.
This undertaking, indeed, has been very cautiously worded, as one might expect from a statement which presumably emanates from the Treasury. The Government, it is explained, could not accept a general commitment always to make good losses suffered by British subjects in foreign countries. Well, so far as I know, nobody has ever asked for that. We have always emphasised from the beginning of this controversy that this is sui generis, in that it was our initiative at Suez, whether it was rightly or wrongly undertaken—I think rightly—that led to the present plight of these people. That, to my mind, differentiates it entirely from other precedents like thetwo world wars, one of which was started by the Kaiser and the other by Hitler. But I am glad to say that the Chancellor emphasised that the fact that the Government accepted no general commitment does not mean, unless I have got it wrongly, that in no circumstances would the Government be willing to provide further financial assistance. That is something quite new; it is further than the Chancellor or the Government have ever gone before.
And the Prime Minister went yet further than the Chancellor. He said that the Government would play a part in reaching a settlement which would be fair and generous, and which would not exclude a further contribution from public funds. He explained that the Government were setting up a Commission to examine claims, and he added that in addition they would give consideration to cases where financial hardship would be involved by meeting the expenses of necessary visits to Egypt and the paying of agents expenses. These statements may mean little or they may mean much—time alone will show. But, certainly, they represent a considerable advance on the Government's
112
previous attitude, though we must see how it works out in practice.
My Lords, now I have done. I would only repeat, in conclusion, that, looked at as a whole, the Agreement which has been concluded between Great Britain and Egypt and which we are asked to approve this afternoon must, I am afraid, at least in my view, be regarded as a poor one from the point of view of this country. It may be that the Government felt it expedient for wider reasons to come to an accommodation with President Nasser. But I do not think that that is so; indeed, I think the noble Viscount said specifically that that was not the case, and that the Agreement was not reached for purely wider political reasons.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, what I did say—I should like to get it straight—was that we were not in any way sacrificing the claimants for wider political reasons. I did not say, of course, that it was not desirable for wider political reasons to arrive at an agreement. What I said was that the conditions were not made worse by that consideration.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY:That is what I understood the noble Viscount to say. Whether the Government were right to take into account these wider reasons is, no doubt, a question which can be very properly debated on another occasion. Anyway, it is outside the scope of this afternoon's discussion. I do not think that anyone could attempt to defend this Agreement as a roaring success for this country. One of the most loyal supporters of the Government, the Daily Telegraph, a day or two ago used in connection with it the words "disagreeable" and "humiliating". Many of us would not dissent from those words and, as I have already said, I personally should have felt inclined to vote against the Agreement, in spite of all that the Lord President has said, had it not been for the assurances of further assistance to British claimants to which I have just referred. I feel that the Government must be given a fair chance to make good those assurances. I hope and think that they mean to make them good.
Now I should like—and this is the last thing I want to say—respectfully to put one thought in the Minister's mind.

113
When these events occurred in 1956 which led to the expulsion of the claimants from Egypt, many of these people were already old. They are much older now and they are more worn and weary as the result of the stresses that they have undergone. I hope that Sir George Rendel's Commission, which is going to have a rather invidious task, will not he given instructions which necessitate haggling over every single little detail. No doubt the Government cannot be expected to pay 100 per cent. in regard to claims on these sequestrated properties without finding out whether the property has been injured, and if so how much. Nobody would expect that. But I hope that as little delay as possible will take place in making these inquiries, otherwise many of these claimants may be either very ill or even dead before they get any benefit from the proposals which are now being announced. Action must he swift and it must be effective if it is to have any value. It is in that spirit that many of us will watch further developments in this hitherto unhappy story. In the meantime, if there had been a Division I should have abstained. I am delighted that there is not to be a Division, and I hope that this afternoon's discussion will foreshadow for the unhappy people who have suffered so much that full justice shall at last he done.
5.8 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: MyLords. the Government's best friend could not say that this is a happy day, either for any of us here debating this Agreement or, indeed, for those who have been affected by the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. I need detain your Lordships for but a few moments, because some of the points which we have in mind and on which we should like further information have already been dealt with by previous speakers, and no doubt subsequent speakers will deal with others.
The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham said, in effect, "We had to accept this Agreement 'on the wider ground that our vague and indefinite relations were unsatisfactory, and the sooner we put them on a regularised basis the better"; he used the words, "A business settlement was required." But that very indefitnite: ness and vagueness which he criticises as regards our relations with Egypt has now been transferred to the victims of Egypt,
114
because this Agreement is full of uncertainty for those people who are suffering as the result of the breakdown of negotiations. I think that in accepting this Agreement our task is to examine and to see where the Agreement needs strengthening, where perhaps we might get some further information upon it.
I also take up the words of the right honourable gentlemen. the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in another place that this is not the end for those who are suffering; and therefore I will deal very briefly with only one or two points. Before doing so, I must express my regret (I should be less than frank if I did not do so) that the noble and learned Viscount. Lord Hailsham, in making a perfectly valid point, which he was quite entitled to make—the justification for and the advantages of having had the assistance of Mr. Eugene Black—mentioned by name, took to task, and indeed was pretty harsh upon, Colonel Moore.
Somewhat incensed with my noble friend Lord Killeam, the noble and learned Viscount asked: "Is not a Minister of the Crown entitled to defend his honour?" Of course lie is. But Colonel Moore is not entitled to defend himself in your Lordships' House, and I thought it was rather harsh when Colonel Moore was described by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Hailsham, as one who "sometimes speaks for the claimants". He is, in fact, the Chairman of the British Communities Association of Egypt; and he has done noble and selfless work and earned the gratitude of these people who are suffering to-day—for whom, I am sorry to say, the noble and learned Viscount did not find time in his speech to utter one word of sympathy. If I may be allowed to say so, without wishing to give offence, I think it was not worthy of the noble and learned Viscount that he should seek out by name an individual who is unable to answer for himself and castigate him for having put a point of view which he was perfectly entitled to put.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I certainly did not intend any slight on Colonel Moore's honour. But I must say that, Colonel Moore having written to the public Press to make what seemed to me to be a particularly nasty attack upon the very valuable intervention of

115
Mr. Eugene Black, I was well entitled to express my opinion that that action was, in itself, deplorable; and was made worse, I thought, because Colonel Moore is Chairman of the British Communities Association. Nobody would be less willing than I to make any slight on his personal honour or to belittle the work that he has done in other spheres; but if people are to write to the public Press deploring our action and saying how low we have sunk to invoke the help of an American, when all we had done was jointly to accept the good offices of the President of the International Bank, then I feel I should have been failing in my duty to Her Majesty's Government and to your Lordships' House had I not wholly dissociated myself from that public attack.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, we will not pursue this matter any further, but I feel that for the noble and learned Viscount to single out one individual, to give an inadequate description of his work, to pay no tribute to the work that he has done, and then to say. "I am entitled to do so as he wrote to the Press" is stretching matters a little far. The noble Viscount has been long in public life. We were in another place together, and if someone were to write to the Press every time about something the noble and learned Viscount had said of them in his public speeches and on political platforms, the columns of the Press would be full, day after day, of nothing else—
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: They are!
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: —the Press would be full of the noble and learned Viscount's justification of his actions; but we will leave the matter at that. I hope that, on reflection, the noble and learned Viscount will feel that it was not quite fair to mention by name one who has done great work and put him in a position where he is unable to answer for himself.
I want to ask only two questions. As we see it, there is some £27½million to meet Egyptianised property claims and any damage and injury to sequestrated property—two unknown totals. The sequestrated property is put at some £130 million and Egyptianised property is valued at £45 million. It may well be that the partial satisfaction of either of
116
those would drain the pool dry. We do not know. The first question I should like to ask—perhaps the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack can answer it later—is: Will the remit to the Foreign Compensation Commission be such that that Commission will knowwhether one kind of claim has priority over the other—whetherdamage or injury to sequestrated property has a prior call over Egyptianised property, or vice versa, or whether, as it were, they run parallel; because in my mind there is the fear that the pool may be very dry very quickly.
Then I should like to ask a question concerning advances which have already been made to those who have suffered. In another place the right honourable gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, in effect, that he was leaving those advances alone for the moment. Supposing the Foreign Compensation Commission find themselves able to make some interim payment from monies which come to hand prior to a final settlement, would the advances still be left in abeyance and such interim payment made, or would the view of Her Majesty's Government be that those advances were, so to speak, a prior charge against any interim payment which it might be considered possible to make?
My last point concerns the Order in Council which will govern the work of the Foreign Compensation Commission. In another place the right honourable gentleman the Prime Minister said that that Order would be drawn widely. I would ask the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack whether he could be a little more precise upon that, and whether he could say that the Commission will be entitled to consider all the claims in their entirety, quite irrespective of claims in relation to the sum of money available. In the former case we shall see a complete picture of the total claims under the headings of Egyptianisation and sequestration; but if there should be a narrower definition, a narrower remit to the Commission, then we might never see the complete picture with any authority.
Like my noble friend Lord Salisbury, I conclude by saying that this is not a happy occasion for any of us; but when a Prime Minister and a Chancellor of the Exchequer speak as they did in another place with (in ordinary parlance)

117
"a nod and a wink", that is nearly as good as a promise; andI believe that it is because of that that we are able to-night to give our support to the very harsh terms of the Agreement which we are asked to approve.
5.18 p.m.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in his speech, reminded your Lordships that on the last occasion we debated this subject quite a number of noble Lords were rash enough to say that in their view no Agreement was likely or possible. That is perfectly true. I was one of them. I took that view at that time because I did not believe that the Egyptians would ever agree to any settlement which was remotely fair to British nationals; and in this I feel I was right. If we wish to decide in our own mind whether this is a good or a bad Agreement. the simplest way of doing so is to look at what the Egyptians think of it. They think they have made a "killing". I do not want to weary your Lordships by quoting the speech of the Economic Minister in Cairo after the Agreement was made, but, to summarise, he reada long list of the vast profits that the Egyptians considered they had made out of this Agreement. So obviously, they thought they had made a very good Agreement: and the assumption, there fore, is that we have made a pretty bad one.
The other reason I did not think there would he an agreement was. I must confess, that I did not believe Her Majesty's Government would agree to any settlement that was manifestly unjust to the claimants in any case; and, above all, I did not think they would do such a thing without any form of prior consultation and agreement with the claimants. In this, my Lords. I admit, quite frankly, that I was wrong. Nevertheless, I am quite sure of one thing, and that is that it is no good any of us now crying over spilt milk; nor is it, I think, much good saying. "Why was this part of the Agreement made?", or, "Why was that part of the Agreement made?", because we cannot alter its terms. All we can do this afternoon, as indeed I think most previous speakers have endeavoured to do, is to try to find out how the Agreement does, in point of fact, work, and
118
to urge Her Majesty's Government (as they have already indicated their willingness to do; it is not, perhaps, a very clear indication, but they have given some sign that they will be prepared to do it) to mitigate the evils of what is undoubtedly a shocking Agreement.
There were one or two points of detail of which I gave the noble and learned Viscount as much notice as I could. It was rather difficult owing to the shortage of time, but some of the points have been covered by other speakers.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, may I say that I should like to thank the noble Lord most sincerely for his kindness in giving notice to me, and to assure him that I shall do my best to deal with his points. I have looked as carefully as I can into his points, and I shall do my best to deal with them. I thought that if he knew I intended to try to do that it would save him a little of the trouble of developing his points more fully. Also. I give him full and free permission to interrupt me as much as he wishes if my first answer is not adequate.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Viscount should think I have interrupted him too frequently in the past, as he clearly does. But I know that the noble Viscount is always very painstaking, and I am sure he will do his best to answer the questions. But it is quite a brief list.
Following what my noble friend said, quite clearly the compensation is totally inadequate to meet either calls of compensation: it is not enough for the Egyptianised property; it is not enough for the sequestrated property. My noble friend asked, in effect, which were the debenture holders and which were the equity holders, and I am sure that the noble Viscount will tell us whether the Government have reached any conclusions about that. There is another point that I should like to ask him, on the assumption that the compensation will be inadequate: is there going to be any consideration as between the size of firms and between private individuals and businesses or will it be done on the basis of "6s. 6d. in the pound all round"? Perhaps these questions are rather difficult to answer, and perhaps the noble Viscount has not got as far as dealing with them yet; but I think it is

119
something which everybody is anxiously wanting to know.
In Article III of the Agreement (this is a small but interesting point) are laid down a number of things which the Egyptian Government are expected to do. There is a list of them. But only the first of those obligations, it appears to me (perhaps I misread it), has any date. It says that on the date of the signature of the Agreement they have to de-sequestrate the property. But it does not say when they have to authorise the release of balances held on Egyptian account in banks in this country. I am informed that up to date people still cannot get their money out of Egyptian accounts in banks in this country. I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount can give us any information on that point.
The next question that I should like briefly to put is this. Article IV deals with the satisfaction of claims in respect of injury and damage to property. The words "injury" and "damage" are not defined in any way; and I would urge that those who are entrusted with the task of assessing injury "and" damage "will be given a fairly wide mandate and will not be too narrowly restricted. I do not know who is going to deal with this matter. Presumably there will be some assessors in Cairo who will have to report back to the Claims Commission.
Another point is one that other noble Lords have raised, and it is enormously important. It is now over two years since the Suez episode. Anybody who looks at Annex B and who has any experience of Egyptian civil servants will have some idea of the task that is going to confront the unfortunate assessors and those persons who have to try to work out these claims. I think that the records will be imperfect, if not non-existent. In certain important details they may have been altered or suppressed. I think, therefore, that this business is obviously going to take a very long time. I can well imagine that it may take as much as eighteen months. In the meantime, the people concerned have to exist, and their funds must be getting pretty low. They have also to get to Egypt and back: I suppose that someone will have to pay for that. If they cannot do so, will Her Majesty's Government help them? Those are the
120
considerations which I am sure are running in the minds of these people at the present time, and I hope that those considerations will receive the attention of the Government.
My Lords, that is all I need say about the Agreement itself. Like my noble friend. I should have felt that I could not support this Agreement were it not for the assurances that have been given by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. and the noble Viscount the Lord President. Clearly—and I realise this—the Government had to consider national interests as well as the interests of the claimants. The noble Viscount has given us in his speech some idea of what those considerations were. It may well be that it was rightindeed, I think it was—that some settlement should have been made. I do not know whether the noble Viscount claims that claimants were not sacrificed for the national interest. I am quite sure that they were not deliberately sacrificed, but I would say that they are nevertheless a burnt offering. and I think it would be both wrong and dishonourable if they were to be sacrificed entirely to serve the national interests. We are glad to know that that is not, as we understand, going to happen. Therefore, with other noble Lords who have already spoken, I feel that I can support the Agreement, though naturally we shall all watch anxiously in the coming months to see what the Government do to fulfil the pledges they have given.
5.28 p.m.
LORD JESSEL: My Lords, since we did not carry out at Suez what we set out to do, I and many others (including, I am glad to say, the Lord President of the Council) have for some time thought that the sooner we came to terms with the Government of Egypt the better for all concerned. As the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, has pointed out, in 1955 our trade with Egypt amounted to £28 million, and since then it has diminished considerably. At least this Agreement will give us a chance of re-entering a market in which British goods have always been extremely popular. I have here a letter, written in Cairo, and dated March 12, from a friend of mine who represents a group of British companies. He says:
"Yes, we are all very pleased that the financial Agreement is now signed, and hope we can settle down to work once more."

121
So, my Lords, I say that the part of the Agreement dealing with the restoration of public rights is all to the good—the part that terminates restrictions on British nationals; that allows them to do business once more; to enter into contracts; to go to Egypt and to leave Egypt when they want to; and to reside there if they so wish. My information is that the Egyptians, having seen for the last year or two a good many Germans and Russians, will be more than pleased to see some British people.
Broadly speaking, if Her Majesty's Government say that the compensation part of the Agreement was the best that could be obtained, I am quite prepared to accept that view: and II entirely agree with what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in another place, that if we were going to have an agreement. the sooner we had it the better. Of course, the £27 million is well below what we claimed. But I was interested in a speech made in another place by Sir Toby Low, when he said that this was not the first occasion on which British Governments have made agreements with other Governments accepting compensation well below the total claimed. He gave as examples the case of Yugoslavia in 1948, when a settlement of £4Í million was agreed by the British Government to be paid as compensation by Yugoslavia against claims totalling £25 million: and the case of the Czechoslovak Government which, in 1945, paid us £8 million against claims of £90 million—and I need hardly remind your Lordships which Government was in power on those two occasions.
However, there are at least two points on which I should like further assurances. What is going to happen to the owners of sequestrated property who are unable to return to Egypt? As has previously been said by several noble Lords, under the Agreement all those owners are entitled to remit to this country at the moment is what amounts to £3,700. If a claimant has £50,000 in Egyptian money in Egypt, what is the use of it if he can remit only this amount of £3,700? And, so far as we know at the moment, that is all they will ever be able to remit: there is no promise of anything further. I would suggest that some machinery should be devised for paying to those who remain in England, at some
122
fixed rate of exchange, further sums against the compensation received in Egypt.
My second anxiety is in regard to the procedure affecting those who hold credit balances in banks in Egypt—anti here, my Lords. I must admit an interest in a small way. There are many similarly placed to myself who are unlikely to go to Egypt in the near future, and probably will never go at all. These people would like to have their money sent here—or what is left of it after the Sequestrator General has levied his taxes. I understand that the present position is that if the holders of these bank balances do not personally go to Egypt, they must nominate somebody to receive the money on their behalf; and this person must have a power of attorney witnessed by the Indian High Commissioner in London. My Lords, I have received this information from Cairo in a letter in answer to my inquiries, and I have no doubt that it is correct. I would ask: cannot this procedure be simplied? For the last ten years I myself have held a cheque book which has enabled me to draw on the National Bank of Egypt. Since Suez, my account has been blocked. Why cannot I now be allowed to operate it again, as I was before?
I have mentioned only two anxieties that I have. I am sure that other noble Lords share these, and have many more, also. But I say, as other noble Lords have said, that provided Her Majesty's Government, as I am sure they will, honour the assurances given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister—that they will watch to see how this settlement works out, and will see that it is reasonable and fair—I support the Resolution, although I cannot disguise the fact that I feel that a further contribution from public funds will be inevitable.
5.36 p.m.
VISCOUNT COLVILLE, OF CULROSS: My Lords, I am afraid that I am guilty of the discourtesy of not having warned the noble and learned Viscount in advance of the points that I am going to make, and perhaps he will not be able to give me anything of an answer to-day. But if he would be kind enough to write to me, I should be very grateful. I am sure that your Lordships will allow me to refer to my own subject, for which perhaps I have more justification than usual, in that

123
paragraph (f) of Article III of this Agreement refers explicitly to the group of people who were expelled from Egypt in 1951, and who ever since then have been attempting to get some redress for the loss of their positions in that country.
This Agreement provides them with an interim payment of £100,000. My Lords, that is exactly the sum that was lent or advanced to this group of people by Her Majesty's Government last year. The first question that I should like the noble and learned Viscount to answer, therefore, is: will that £100,000, when it is eventually paid by the Egyptian Government, be set off immediately against the loan which has just been advanced to these people? Because that loan was almost entirely taken up (I think that only eleven out of the 164 members of this group did not benefit by it), and they would not be in a position to pay it back.
Then, my Lords, the Agreement provides for the setting up of a new Commission. A Commission was set up in 1954, under the terms of the Treaty of that year with Egypt, to inquire into the situation regarding the claims to compensation of these officials, and I think it was common knowledge that it was about to report at the very time the Suez crisis occurred. As a result of events, of course, nothing happened. Now a new commission is to be set up, and I should like to know, first of all, to whom it will report. Obviously, perhaps, to the Egyptian Government. But when the offer is made by the Egyptian Government as a result of the report of the commission, who will accept it? Will it be Her Majesty's Government, who have all along, looked at and backed the claims of these officials, or will it be left to the officials themselves to say "Yes" or "No" to the final award? I cannot imagine that it will avail them very much, one way or the other, if they are left to do it on their own; but perhaps it will be a different matter if Her Majesty's Government are to be at the receiving end of the offer, when it is made. If that is so, and if Her Majesty's Government are to be at the receiving end, will they, before accepting, consult with the 1951 officials? I do not know whether the same technique will be applied in that case as has been applied to those who lost their property as a result of Suez, but certainly I hope that it will not.
124
Finally my Lords, will Her Majesty's Government, by whatever means they are able, hurry up this new Commission? The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and the noble Lord. Lord Lloyd, have pointed out that this is now the third year since the 1956 crisis. It is the eighth year since these officials lost their jobs in Egypt and it was not until last year that they received one penny in compensation. If anybody has cause to complain, it is they and I hope that your Lordships will sympathise with them and commend their patience in having waited so long. So I must reserve judgment on paragraph (f) of Article III. But I hope that Her Majesty's Government will keep an eye on the situation of this small group of people who have been treated so badly. Supposing that the final offer made by the Egyptian Government is very little, if anything, more than the £100,000 they have now given, will Her Majesty's Government sympathetically bear in mind the ideas that have been expressed in relation to the 1956 victims by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in another place? If the noble and learned Viscount can give me in due course some sort of answer to these questions, both this group of people and I will be most grateful to him.
5.41 p.m.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, your Lordships will agree that during the long series of debates on this question that we have had during the past two years I have done my utmost to help these ex-British residents who have lost all their possessions in Egypt—some of them coming out of the country with only what was contained in a suit case. I am not going to harp back on those circumstances. which we all know only too well, but it is not unnatural that some of these people should feel bitter about the terms of an Agreement which they regard as unfair to many of them.
On the other hand, I do not feel that anything would have been gained by putting off this settlement any longer. I feel in accord with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when he says this. I do not believe that any better terms could have been obtained now, in view of the circumstances. And if lubrication was applied by the President of the World Bank. I think that the Government were quite

125
right to make use of his services. However, I should be very unhappy about the Agreement were it not for the categorical assurances given us by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that further assistance, including financial assistance, was not ruled out in certain cases. Several noble Lords have spoken in support of further financial assistance from the British Government and I hope that sympathetic consideration will be given to this subject.
I would say that there is another way in which the British Government can help—that is, by speeding up the carrying out of the Agreement. There has been long delay and I hope that now that we have got the word "Go", everything possible will be done to make a speedy settlement. I hope that the Government will supply all those concerned in dealing with this matter with large pairs of scissors so that they can ruthlessly cut the red tape. One example of the red tape has already been given by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd. Like him, when Iread the Agreement I thought that at least Article III (g) was straightforward, where it says that the Agreement authorises the release to the beneficial owners who are United Kingdom nationals or institutions of the securities and funds held by the United Kingdom and other banks outside Egypt to the order of banks in Egypt. I thought that this problem, one to which I have paid particular attention in our debates. would be settled at once; but I was told the other day, and I have since verified it, that this is not the case. I understand that many things have to happen before this money comes into the hands of the rightful owners. First of all, an owner has to apply to the sequestrator and the sequestrator, after presumably considering it for some time. has to tell the branch of the bank of Egypt that the money can be released, and then the branch in Egypt has to tell the hank in London. I give that as an example of how what seems to be the simplest thing of all has a great many hurdles.
The noble Lord, Lord Jessel, told us an astonishing fact about the power of attorney. It sounded to me like one of those quizzes in which we find the younger generation partaking, which consist of dashingaround in a car in order to get the signature of the lock-keeper at Teddington. These are two obstacles to a
126
speedy settlement which have been unearthed this afternoon and doubtless there are many others. I appeal to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor to do all he can to help to knock down these hurdles.
As I said before, the people we are trying to help have a feeling of bitterness. I think that we are all sorry for that and hope that that feeling can be changed. I believe that the best way of changing it is to deal as sympathetically as possible with their problems and help now, both financially and administratively, to get on with the job of seeing that the claims are settled within the terms of the Agreement now reached.
5.48 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, oneof the drawbacks of speaking ninth in the list of speakers is that all the points, good or bad, have been made ahead of one, and there remains little to say that is fresh. That is inevitable. I would start off by saying right away, before I get down to the actual Agreement—and I shall be as brief as I can—that when the nobleViscount the Lord President of the Council was making his speech, hemade two points at the outset with which I could not agree more.
The first was on inter-Governmental claims, the waiver of claims for damage inflicted by our people during the incident against the Egyptian seizure of our base and, coupled with that, the question of the Suez stores. That is the best part of the Agreement. It would be perfectly futile to go on discussing it. I have always been afraid about this problem. I remember saying to the late Lord Jowitt at the time of the Suez invasion, "You, particularly, know what happens if we are sued before the International Court." This aspect has been a nightmare to me ever since, and this part of the Agreement has been a great relief. I congratulate the Government on having liquidated that particular matter. I say that with all the greater pleasure because later on I shall have some comments to make that are not quite so favourable.
Before I go further, I would associate myself wholeheartedly with what the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, said about Colonel Moore. I do not want to be offensive, but I thought the noble

127
Viscount the Lord President was hitting below the belt. He was belabouring someone who could not answer back, and someone who was perfectly entitled to say what he had to say in the Press. Altogether, it was one of those things that just "are not done." Having said that, I will not proceed further on that line. But I would pay a warm tribute to the work which has been done by Colonel Moore and his organisation from the start of this wretched business up to date. He has a very efficient organisation, and it has worked hard all the time collating claims and so on. Indeed, many of us have felt for a long time that it might have been much better if there had been closer liaison between Colonel Moore'sorganisation and the Foreign Office. But I have hopes that with the appointment of Sir George Rendel the liaison will be much better. I felt bound to say that on behalf of Colonel Moore. I did not raise the question, but those are my views; and I strongly endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, said. There was another little brush later between the noble Viscount and myself about the release of the £3·3 million, and perhaps I may come back to that later.
I turn now to the question of the Resolution. I could not possibly vote for this Resolution, but it would be a difficult thing to vote against it. Therefore, I am relieved that there is not to be a Division. In the light of what was said in another place, and has been repeated here—I refer to the assurances of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer—there is now a completely new aspect to this matter, and I do not want to divide the House. We are now face to face with something that is new and with assurances that I do not doubt will be made good. But they will need careful watching.
The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, made a number of specific points, which the Lord Chancellor will go into, so I need not cover them again. But I will comment broadly on the Agreement for a moment or two. I have a certain amount of experience of diplomatic documents—forty seven years, to be accurate—and this seems to me to be an extraordinary paper. We know why we signed it, because the Lord President has explained that at length. But it is not a paper that I should have liked to sign on behalf of any British Government. In fact. I have
128
put down in my notes: "A most remarkable paper, not in what it gets, but in what it gives."
We accept £27½ million in full and final discharge of two things: Egyptianised property, the value of which the Chancellor of the Exchequer has assessed at £45 million, and damage to de-sequestrated property, which is assessed at about £l30 million. Obviously that £27½ million will not be enough to cover either of those liabilities in full. The Government are quite right in saying that it is impossible at this stage to know how far short that sum will be. But one thing that is clear is that no more will come from Egypt; so far as Egypt is concerned, it is all washed out. That gets us back to what has been from the beginning our theme song, that any shortfall in the sums recovered from Egypt should be made good by Her Majesty's Government, in whole or in part.
The good points of the Agreement are first of all, that it expunges inter-Government claims: that is an immense achievement and a great relief. Secondly, it settles the claims of the 1951 claimants—the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, has had something to say on that matter, and perhaps I was slightly anticipating; anyhow, I thought it settled them. Thirdly, it releases bank balances held in the United Kingdom, though there again it appears that there are still technical reasons why the owners of balances in the bank here paid through the branch of the British bank in Cairo cannot touch their money; so I was wrong in that. Then it disposes of any future plea of sheltering behind Nasser. I think that is a great advance. Hitherto, those of us who have been fighting this battle have been told we were fighting Nasser. Now that pretext, reason, justification, or whatever you call it, has gone. Lastly (this point has already been touched on by the noble Marquess. Lord Salisbury) the fact that the Agreement gives full and final discharge of the Egyptian liability without the authority of those concerned—which I admit it might have been difficult to get—seems to me, inferentially, greatly to strengthen the moral claim of these unfortunate sufferers.
The Agreement bristles with bad points. The question of Cairo balances has been touched on at some length, and I need

129
not go into it again. I hope that this matter will be put right. Take the case of the poor widow I mentioned previously, with £40,000 in Cairo—I agree that we have had it all before but it is quite true. She left just before the incident and before she had had time to get her money out. So she had nothing. She has had the benefit of two "dibs" and "dabs" of £5,000 on which she has had to live. When I read this Agreement I thought that she would get this £40,000 released. Not a bit of it! She gets £E5,000,equivalent to £3,700. And what is the good to her of having £35,000, desequestrated, sitting in Cairo, where she cannot go, which she cannot transfer or use? That is plain silly; and it is not right. However. that is a point which I hope and believe the Government will take up and try to put right.
I am strengthened in that belief because, just before I came in hereto-day, I was handed a list of British subjects who, before the incident, of course, but in the more or less recent past, on leaving Cairo for good, as no longer being resident, had been able to get out their entire property without this restrictive limit of £E5,000. It has been done in the past, and one can only hope that it will be done again in the future.
There is another point that I was not going to mention, but since the noble Viscount thought it right to do so, I feel I must do so. I refer to the question of the release of this £3,300,000. We all know how it was released. The noble Viscount told us at whose instance it was released. It was released at the request of Mr. Eugene Black, before the initialling of the Agreement—and, I maintain, contrary to an undertaking in both Houses of Parliament. The Lord President will not agree, because he has denied that the security for these claims, which was the sterling balances, would be affected. The £3,300,000 was handed over right away, before the Agreement was initialled; and I maintain that that is against what we were promised. I was attacked for that. Fortunately, it is on record in the House what the Lord President said, and what I said. I feel rather like the man on the stage who said, "if I have said anything I am sorry for I am glad of it." It was rather a brisk exchange of views, and I still think that I was right, because the totality of these sterling balances amounted to £68 million
130
or £70 million. The Foreign Secretary—I have his words here, and they have been quoted time and again—gave an explicit assurance that this was the security for the payment of these claims, and the House was assured that it would not be whittled away. I can quote the phrase if necessary. That being so, it seemed to me that the release of this £3 million-odd ran counter to that assurance.
I am going to say something now which may offend the noble Viscount—it is a point that a friend of mine in the City put to me. I must remind the House that these sterling balances have been earmarked in both Houses as the security for the liquidation of these claims. There is no doubt about that. This friend said to me, "What would you say of a trustee who dipped into the portfolio and used the assets for his own benefit?" The reason I say that is that that £3,300.000 was intended to be used for the payment of claims by shareholders in the Suez Canal Company settlement. Who are these shareholders? I am told that the British Government hold 44 per cent. I think that the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, was wrong when he said the holding was one-third of the total. I believe that it is published as 44 per cent., so your Lordships can draw your own conclusions. There was a pledge that these monies would not be released in advance. On pressure from Mr. Black—I do not blame him—they were doled out before we initialled the Agreement. Anyhow that is what happened.
Another curious feature, in that same line of thought, is that under this Agreement, and despite the curious inadequacy of the funds supplied, we have released what was left of these sterling balances—£41 million sterling, not Egyptian pounds—despite the fact of the shortfall in the payment of British claims. Is that not all very peculiar? Perhaps your Lordships will understand why I say here and now that I do not approve of the Agreement. I shall not vote against it, because there is no reason to. We have received assurances which I hope will see us through the difficulties ahead—and there are many of them. But I certainly would not approve the Agreement because I think it is a bad Agreement. It "smells to high Heaven" as a bad Agreement. That is the long and short of it.

131
I have kept your Lordships quite long enough. All of us who have stood for these claims during the past two and a half years were infinitely relieved and grateful to the Prime Minister, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and to the Lord President, for repeating the assurances we have had to-day, and relying upon them I do not propose to go any further. I could not approve the Agreement, but I am relieved that the House is not going to divide upon it.
6.6 p.m.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Henderson who spoke on behalf of the Opposition following the noble Viscount said that we had no intention on this side of the House of dividing against this Motion, and I certainly do not rise in any way to deduct from that statement of my noble friend. But I believe I am speaking not merely on behalf of my colleagues on these Benches but on behalf of every speaker who has spoken to-day, I think without exception. when I say that we do not approve of the settlement. The most that can be said is that we are prepared to acquiesce in it. I do not think a single Member, not even the Lord President of the Council, approves the settlement. At the most he acquiesced in it as the best of a bad business. The settlement is far from satisfactory, and practically every speaker has said that. The only thing that is to be said for it is that it might have been worse and that it is better than no settlement at all. I do not think that in saying that I have in the least put one side of the House against the other, because to the best of my recollection—and I have listened to all the speeches except possibly one—every speaker has taken that point of view.
What is it about the settlement that is so unsatisfactory? I think there are three points. In the first place this country has had to give up a large national asset. It is quite true that after we left the Suez Canal area that asset may not have been of a great deal of use to us, but it was of some value. It had cost us a large amount of money to install, and there is no doubt that the Egyptians would have been prepared to pay a considerable sum for it. The settlement has had to acknowledge the fact that we write that oft entirely as a counterpart, of course, to the
132
writing off of the claims for the war damage, as the Egyptians have done. Therefore, the first ground on which this settlement is unsatisfactory is that our Government have had to write off a considerable asset that we had a few years ago.
The second reason why the settlement is an unsatisfactory one is that it does not compensate in full financially the persons who have been damaged by the recent events in the Egyptian area. Practically everyone has admitted, even the noble Viscount who moved the Motion on behalf of the Government, that it does not do it. How far it fails to do it I do not know, and nobody knows until the claims have been justified by the facts and tried by some tribunal which is going to discuss them. The point I wish to make is that this position has not been met adequately in this debate at all. Even if the full financial damage done to the persons concerned had been met to the last sixpence, I should still say that they had suffered immense damage that was unrequited, because a great many of them were living happily and peacefully in Egypt; their whole way of life has been broken up; all that they were doing has been destroyed and their whole life has been broken. Some of them may be able to go back and resume, to some extent, the position they had before. A great many of them will not be able to go back, and many of those who do go back will never have the same standing in Egypt that they had three or four years ago. Therefore I say that even if the full compensation in money is paid to them they will have been gravely damaged by the action that was taken. I think those points are really uncontroversial.
Now I come to the third point, which is of a more controversial character, and that is this: that there has been and there is no repair, and cannot be repair, in this Agreement of the irreparable loss of good will and prestige which this country had in Egypt before the Suez incident. I admit that it is a controversial point and I am not going to argue it or press it but I am only going to say this: I believe that more and more, as time goes on, that view will be recognized not only from the Benches on which I sit but in all parts of this House, as I know many noble Lords with whom I have had conversation recognise it in discussion with me. Therefore I say that in

133
all these respects this is an unsatisfactory Agreement. But, unsatisfactory Agreement as it is, it is much better than nothing; that I think no one can deny. We needed to make an Agreement; we have made an Agreement, and it is probably the best Agreement we could get in all the circumstances.
I want to conclude on a positive and constructive note. However much we think the Agreement unsatisfactory, Her Majesty's Government can, and your Lordships can and the people of this country can, make it a better Agreement as years go by than it is on paper at the present moment. They can make it a better Agreement in three ways. In the first place, the Government can give, as they have undertaken to do, additional compensation to the people who have been wronged, our own nationals who lived in Egypt in the days gone by; and we on these Benches share the views of many of those who have spoken on the other side and we hope that that assistance will be generous. I do not say it should be unlimited; naturally that cannot be; but it should be generous, and we have reason to hope from what the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer have said that they do contemplate a generous contribution to relieve the misfortunes of the people who have lost their jobs in Egypt.
In the second place—and this is, I consider, of the greatest importance, and it applies not only to the Government but to the Press and to the people of this country—I hope that from now on we shall cease the bickering against the Egyptian Government that has been going on all these past years. A great deal of that bickering quite clearly was due to false grounds. We said in the first place that the Egyptians were quite incapable of operating the Canal, or whatever you do with the Canal; in fact it is going quite as well a sit ever was in the old days. We said that the Egyptian Government were Communist, but recent events, I think, have convinced a great many people who otherwise thought that, that that is wholly untrue. I am not here to defend the Egyptian Government or make out that Nasser is a fine man; that is not the point at all. There are a great many countries where we may not agree with the Government but we do not go on continually denigrating them in the Press and elsewhere, and
134
it is quite time we ceased to deal with Egypt in that way.
Finally, without re-opening old controversies and without asking noble Lords who do not take our view as to the past to share it, let us hope that the Government and the noble Lords opposite and the people of the country as a whole will learn from these tragic events of the last few years never to do the same again.
6.15 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I do not think that anyone rising at this stage and having heard, as I have, the whole of this debate could have any ground of complaint on the general tone and substance of the speeches that have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Henderson, commenced the debate, after my noble and learned friend the Lord President, with a very restrained and reasonable speech which at the same time showed his sympathy and understanding with the human problems involved. He asked me about the Order in Council in respect of the Commission. As your Lordships advanced this debate to this afternoon I had to be here instead of being engaged in actually considering the Order in Council. But I shall, I hope, be doing that to-morrow, and I will certainly bear in mind what the noble Lord said. I think it would be as well if I said some thing on the question of the sequestration charges which he also asked me about, because I know my noble friend Lord Lloyd was also worried about that point. The sequestration charges are collected before the property is handed back, and the Egyptian regulations prescribe how these are to be apportioned. In practice —and this may be of some practical comfort to my noble friend Lord Lloyd—we believe that they have already collected charges to the limit of £E2¼ million, which is the limit under the agreement. That, at any rate, will relieve my noble friend as to the possibility of future difficulty.
I want to make it clear that Her Majesty's Government have accepted the position that certain charges are payable under Egyptian law, though they do not admit that it was justifiable to levy those charges on the scales imposed or that the cost of administering sequestrated property should have reached so high a figure. This is one of the matters that

135
were discussed in the negotiations. But I think my noble friend will agree, and so will the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, that it is an advantage to the claimants that the total amount is limited by the Agreement and machinery will be devised to ensure that this limit is not exceeded. It will be open, therefore, to claimants to submit information to the Commission concerning any charges levied on their property before it was returned.
Of course, I do not want to hold out any hope—and I think the noble Lord will appreciate why I do not—that such charges will be reimbursed by the Commission, since it is clear that in distributing the sums available priority will have to be given to cases where property has been expropriated altogether or returned in a damaged condition. I will come in a moment to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, but these are the claims which I am sure the noble Lord will agree are the primary ones—namely, the Egyptianised property and the damage to the sequestrated property, and I do not think it would be right to put against the £27½ million the sequestration charges.
Now I return to the points that have been raised in the debate, and I come to the speech of my noble friend Lord Salisbury, who was rather doubtful about the procedure followed in the Agreement in the discharge of the claims that the claimants themselves would make. In deference to the most restrained way in which my noble friend put forward his argument, I hope that the House will bear with me if I put a little more elaborately the difficulties that were in our way. So long as Proclamation No. 5 was in force in Egypt, the United Kingdom nationals had no access to the Egyptian courts; so that forum was ruled out to them. Individuals have no right to take cases to the International Courts of Justice themselves; as noble Lords are aware, any proceedings there have to be between States. But on the next point, the United Arab Republic has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court. and therefore it would not have been possible for Her Majesty's Government to have taken the United Arab Republic to the Court. Finally, in the United Kingdom courts, the United Arab Republic could, in my view, successfully
136
have pleaded sovereign immunity. That is the difficulty, as I see it, in both municipal and international law.
In those circumstances, the United Kingdom nationals could not negotiate, as I said, while the Proclamation was in force. They could, of course, make agreements, and a few did; but I do not think that that affects the general point. But, with that difficulty being there, we certainly had the impression—I think my noble friend the Lord President said this earlier—that the majority of the claimants would much prefer us to have taken the course of negotiating on their behalf than to have had to argue each individual case with the Egyptian Government. The noble Marquess himself conceded, as I heard him, that once you get on to the basis of Governmental negotiation, it is of course the usual form, which has been pursued in so many Agreements, that they contain a clause barring individual claims.
The next point that my noble friend Lord Salisbury made—indeed, it is one of the points of which my noble friend Lord Lloyd was good enough to give me notice—is what I might call the £E5,000 point: that is, the limit of withdrawing sums from Egypt to £E5,000 or a figure of about £3,700. I do not think anyone said in the debate—and I think it is important that it should be on record and that your Lordships should have it in mind—that that final limit of £E5,000 derives from the Egyptian Exchange Control Regulations as they existed for years before 1956. It is not a limit which was put on as a consequence of the happenings which have been the background to our debate to-day, but something which is of considerable standing in time in Egypt. Indeed, in the world in which we live, in practice few countries allow the unrestricted export of capital on the part of those who cease to be residents.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount said that I might interrupt him. I wonder whether he would allow me to make this point on that particular argument. Of course, it is true that there were exchange control restrictions before the Suez episode, but I think that if he will be good enough to look into the situation he will find that although the amount which could be freely transferred from Egypt was limited to the same figure of £E5,000, it

137
was possible in those days to get further amounts transferred by arrangement and agreement with the Bank of England, which debited such further transfers to the Egyptian No. 2 Account over here. After the release of the sterling balances, there is no No. 2 Account; so that cannot be done any more. In the old days, therefore, you could get round this difficulty; now, these people cannot get round it. I do not want to ask the noble Viscount for an answer to that point tonight—it is a point of which I did not give him notice—but I wonder whether he would bear that in mind in considering this question, because I think it is a very important point.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I wonder whether I might intervene to say that this £E5,000 amount was dependent on persons giving up their residence in Egypt—retiring from Egypt and taking their things out. I have in my pocket details of at least twenty cases where, on moving out of Egypt, people were allowed to take the whole amount, regardless of the £E5,000 limit. When the noble Viscount is looking into the point he might perhaps find that somewhere. But it was possible to get round that difficulty.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords. I should like to look into it. It would be idle for me to pretend that I carry the whole of the municipal law of Egypt in my head. I assure both my noble friends that I will look into the point. My noble friend Lord Lloyd asked me about the next stage—namely, the "favourable consideration." It is quite true, as he said in his communication to me, that that does not give us a legal sanction. It is an expression of intention which is familiar in diplomatic Agreements. I do not want to go into detailed matters of construction. but the expression of intention is that the Egyptian Government will approach the problem with the desire to approve. I think the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, would agree that it would be unhelpful to everyone, including those with whom he is most concerned, if I were to try to speculate on the hypothesis when they would be entitled to refuse; and with his permission. I will leave the matter there.
The next point raised by my noble friend Lord Salisbury was the question of
138
speed, and especially how that would react on the older people concerned, whom he had very much in mind. That point was also raised by my noble friend Lord Lloyd and by my noble friend Lord Gifford. It is clearly true, of course, that some time will be required to assess and pay compensation on the many claims which will be received; but my right honourable friend the Prime Minister dealt specifically with this point, and he indicated that Her Majesty's Government were pressing on with the introduction of an Order in Council to enable the Foreign Compensation Commission to start work. The only reason I have not been engaged in drafting that Order to-day is your Lordships' debate; and I am very glad that I have had an opportunity of hearing the many points that have been made, so that I shall be in a better position, when I begin the drafting of the Order, which it is my plan to start doing to-morrow morning. The Commission will then be able to start their examination.
My noble friend Lord Killearn has been very critical throughout this matter, but I am sure that there was one of his points to-night in which the whole House will agree with him—I certainly do. That was on how fortunate we were to obtain Sir George Rendel to look after the Foreign Office and London side. There will be that piece of machinery, which I am glad receives the full approval of the noble Lord, Lord Killearn. Then at the other end, as he knows, we took immense pains to pave the way for suitable machinery in Cairo. In a moment I shall come to what was said by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister about assistance on other points in the intermediate stage, but there we have these two parts of the machinery, and I am quite sure that they will do their utmost to see that speed is of the essence of this operation.
There is one other point that I should like to mention. The Commission have £½ million in hand, but my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has said that if any further sums beyond this were required, Her Majesty's Government would certainly consider introducing legislation to authorise any further necessary credit to the Commission, so that there will be no hold-up in the payment of the further sum. My right

139
honourable friend the Prime Minister also said in the debate—and I am referring your Lordships to him because I feel it is very important to do so on a point which has worried a number of your Lordships: whether we are really going to get on with this matter [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 602 (No. 78), col. 151]:
"Her Majesty's Government are prepared to give sympathetic consideration to cases of hardship among owners of property in Egypt who have difficulty in meeting the costs of return passages or of their agents' fees during the process of recovering their property under the Agreement."
I believe that the last point made by my noble friend Lord Lloyd in this field was the question of ex gratia loans. There are two points on which I feel I ought to ease his mind. I repeat to-day what I have said before, and what my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham has often said: that there can be no repayment except out of recovered assets. But in addition to that, I would remind my noble friend of what was said by the right honourable gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer: that we would leave the matter in abeyance at the moment, which will enable us to look at the general situation and see what equity and justice demand. I do want noble Lords who are here—and I hope my noble friend Lord Salisbury may read these words—to know that certainly it is our intention to create in these organisations such spirit as we hope will remove as much worry as possible and give as much help as possible to those who are in difficulties.
My noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye asked me three questions with regard to the claims for Egyptianised and sequestrated property. He asked about the priorities between them. Will he allow me to-night, before my meeting.to-morrow, to put it in this way. I sympathise very much with the principle of keeping them pari passu, and I do not see any reason for priority being given to either Egyptianised property or to damaged or sequestrated property. I have tried to listen to everything that has been said to-day, but I do not think anyone has expressed any view to the contrary on that matter. It seems to me to be the sensible course, and I should like to approach the matter in that way and to see whether any problems are raised.
140
The second question which the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, asked was: would the Commission consider all claims? Again, let me say at once that the noble Lord's suggestion appeals to me very much. That seems to me a suitable way of doing this, provided, of course, that it does not bar an interim payment; for it would be a terrible thing if, in trying to do strict equity by getting in the whole picture, we should debar any advance to those who might badly need one; and therefore I should prefer that there should be some provision. I hope the House will take it that I will look into that point and also the third point made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, on the position between an interim payment (if there is one) and advances.
I come now to the speech of my noble friend Lord Lloyd. Though I have dealt with some of his points I promised to deal with the specific matters he has raised. I hope that he will feel that I have dealt with his first point—the question of passages and ex gratia loans, and if there are any further details on that, if my noble friend will write to me I shall be very pleased to look into them. His next point concerned paragraphs (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Article III. The noble Lord asked me why there was no date for the Egyptians to act under these paragraphs. So far as the return of sequestrated property is concerned, the time limits are as set out in Annex B. There is, first, an announcement of the steps to be taken by an owner to recover his property. That has been made, and application forms are being made available. Then, when the form is put in,
"within three months after the date of the receipt of each application"
from the owner, the property must be released and handed over by the Sequestrator-General. That is provided in Annex B, paragraph (4) (i).
Now with regard to paragraph (d), which deals with the industrial property, the obligations of the United Arab Republic under Annex C come into force immediately. That also is a paragraph taken from another Agreement of this kind. With regard to paragraph (e) and the payment of pensions, again, this obligation comes into force immediately. Three hundred and sixty pensions out of

141
the 486 which the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board acknowledge are now being paid; 14 pensioners have had arrears as well; and 53, I am sorry to say, have died. But, in any event, no hardship arises from the non-payment, because the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board are still making up the pensions, and we shall naturally press for implementation in full of the United Arab Republic's obligation under this Article.
While I am on that point, perhaps I may go on to the compensation for the dismissed officials, about whom my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross asked me. On this point I would say that under this section the United Arab Republic have accepted a definite obligation to assess and pay compensation; and that is, in fact, an improvement of the position as it existed in 1956. My noble friend knows —I do not know whether all your Lordships have it in mind—that the dismissed officials have already had the £100,000 which was advanced to them by the Exchequer. Therefore, the sum from the United Arab Republic will go to the Exchequer extra receipts at the Home Office.
On the next point which my noble friend raised, I should like to tell him that we will do everything possible to expedite the Commission. The further points, upon which he was kind enough to allow me indulgence, I will look into; and I will write to him, as he suggests. My noble friend Lord Lloyd also asked me about the return of beneficial securities. That obligation, again, enters into force immediately, and we shall press for its early implementation. My noble friend was rather worried, too, about the question of the tax claims, and I wanted to inform him that, again, so far as my knowledge of Egyptian law goes, an appeal to the Cour D'Etat involves an appeal to the highest reviewing body in Egypt; but under Egyptian law only the Minister can finally decide the matter. That is an aspect of government which my noble friend and I had sometimes to consider in quite another connection; but at the moment the relevant point is that that is the Egyptian law, and therefore he will appreciate the difficulty of getting any further provision.
My noble friend asked me about Article IV and the meaning of "injury 142
and damage". My Lords, the term has its natural and ordinary meaning, but it will be for the claimants to put to the Foreign Compensation Commission anything that they think is injury or damage to the property. I take, for example, the obvious case where it is a piece of property that is concerned. They will be able, I am sure, to give some evidence as to its state, and of course there will be no question of not having hearsay evidence. They can get a surveyor's report; the agent out there can get a surveyor's report of the present value of the property and the damage. That can be sent to the Commission and the matter will be considered.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, will the noble and learned Viscount forgive my interrupting? The only point I had in mind was that presumably the Foreign Compensation Commission will be given terms of reference in this matter, and I was hoping those terms of reference would be reasonably wide, enabling the Commission to be reasonably generous in assessing damage under this head.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I will certainly bear that point in mind. The last thing we want is to make any of this machinery pettifogging, if I may use a defamatory word. I do not think I can add anything to what my noble friend Lord Hailsham said about the question of the negotiations. There were a number of meetings in which the viewpoint was put there, but it was not possible for consultation at every point. It was a matter we discussed quite often.
The next point which I think I have not dealt with is the doubts of my noble friend Lord Lloyd about paragraph 2 (b) of Article V—namely, the question of the rate of the pound before July 27, 1956, in the case of applications which were approved before that date. I think I can rejoice my noble friend's heart on this point, because the benefit of the International Monetary Fund parity between the Egyptian pound and the pound sterling was the object of this Article. That has been given, and that is the rate, 97½ piastres to the pound sterling, which was in fact established before the First World War; and in this case no question of depreciation arises.
My noble friend also asked me about the question of depreciation of property

143
between the time of the Agreement and that of handing back. That is a matter for which the United Arab Republic are responsible; there is nothing, as I see it, in the Agreement to bar the claimants from making them responsible for any damage between these two dates. The Agreement excuses only up to the date of the Agreement. But I think the noble Lord will agree that it would obviously not have been in the interests of the claimants to make that subsequent damage available against the lump sum.
LORD LLOYD: No.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: There were two other minor points. My noble friend was anxious about the records and what could be done to help, and we have required the Sequestrator-General to furnish copies of all records to the owners. I am afraid that it is difficult to go further as to the adequacy of such records, but it will be one of the functions of our representative in Cairo to help as much as he can on that point. I think that, on consideration, my noble friend will agree with me that there is an advantage in having the report of the Sequestrator General put in writing. We all know in our own lives the difficulties of a normal interview. We thought it would be valuable that he should put the report in writing and then we should be able to do what we can.
I apologise to the rest of your Lordships for what has been the answer to a private cross-examination of myself by my noble friend Lord Lloyd, for his part largely conducted on paper. But I think my noble friend will agree that I have at any rate tried to deal with all the points, and perhaps he will be able even to agree that I have dealt with some of the points.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, if I may interrupt the noble and learned Viscount, I am sorry indeed that I should have put him to so much trouble. I think, however, from the point of view of those concerned, that it has been very valuable that there should have been an explanation in your Lordships' House of all these matters, which are matters of concern.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I assure my noble friend that he need not think for one moment of any trouble
144
that it has been to me. I have been only too glad to have been able to help.
I intend to say very little about the general position, but I should like your Lordships to consider one aspect which I do not think has been mentioned in this debate: that is the fact that, apart from the financial considerations, to which I shall come in a moment, there were quite important changes in the position of our trading community in Egypt. As a result of this agreement—and, again, I will take it quite shortly—there is a resumption of normal commercial relations. We get the most favoured nation treatment in relation to Customs duty and other matters; the treatment of sterling is put in terms no less favourable than those for other currencies; favourable consideration will be given to the creation of British commercial agencies; and most favoured nation treatment will be given to British commercial establishments. Then there is the side of life which is made up of things like copyrights, patents, and trademarks agreements. All these come into force again, and that will be most helpful. Then, as my noble friend reminded your Lordships, we shall go hack to the status quo in regard to civil aviation.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: And diplomatic representation?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: We hope that that will come. That is another stage. That is not involved in this agreement, but quite clearly we shall have someone there—I think this is what the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, probably has in mind—who will be dealing with the particular problems of the Agreement. That will mean that, at any rate, there will be a new conduit pipe in Cairo, and, with the changes that I have set out, it will put relations on this new basis.
With regard to the Agreement itself, I merely want to remind your Lordships, in no argumentative sense, of the aspects which my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer considered the most important. The first is the restoration of by far the greater amount of the property; and, with that, the restoration of legal rights, the rights of capital transfers, and the taxation position. My Lords, on that, it is easy to be pessimistic, but I want your Lordships to consider what is the position, looking at it as objectively as one can. The

145
sequestrated property has been taken at £130 million; the Egyptianised at £45 million; and the land at varying sums. We cannot get a clear amount, but I think Mr. Gaitskell's figure—I will quote his figure—took it at £5 million. That makes, in all, £180 million. Against that, making the initial balance sheet, there is £157½ million, plus these intangibles that I have mentioned, and plus the improvement which one can reasonably anticipate in the position of our trade.
Now, what we do not know—and I hope your Lordships think that I am stating it objectively—is the value of the Egyptianised property; we do not know the value of the land; and we do not know the amount of the damage that has been clone to the sequestrated property. The figure for sequestrated property, your Lordships will remember, was £130 million—that is the amount that is claimed. That includes the Shell property. Again, I think it would not be right for a Minister to value the assets of a private firm, but everyone has concluded that it is a very considerable amount. In addition, the bank balances and securities are to a claim value of £23 million; buildings are about £10 million; personal property, including insurance policies and other financial claims —personal property in the strict sense—are £7 million; the stocks of goods are £4½ million; and plant and machinery are £3 million. That adds up to £47½ million: and, as I said, there is a very substantial figure for Shell. Of course, I do not want to put it too much the other way, but when there is pessimistic talk of the damage to sequestrated property, I should have thought that in all the matters that I have mentioned you are dealing with fairly hard figures, and that the ones where you would expect that the damage might make a difference—for example, stocks of goods and, to a lesser extent, plant and machinery—are a relatively small percentage of that hard figure which I have mentioned.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I wonder whether I may interrupt the noble and learned Viscount for one minute? Could he make it clear—it is certainly not clear to me why, in view of all these very large figures, we let loose £41 million to the Egyptian Government? It seems rather curious. It was what was left of our security. I seek information: but
146
it seems a curious thing to have done without a quid pro quo.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I thought that my noble friend Lord Hail-sham dealt with that point in the introduction. The fact that the claim figure amounts to £180 million—and that is made up of £130 million of sequestrated property, which in turn can be broken down into the figures that I have stated—shows that, as far as we were concerned, there really was no necessity for the maintenance as security. Put the other way—and this is the point I will ask my noble friend to consider—when you are getting back £130 million of claim of sequestrated property and you are getting £27½million, you have to put that against the retention of the money in the sterling balances, apart from the moral point as to whether we can, as bankers of the sterling area, deal with it, and apart from the very formidable economic point as to the effect on British financial prestige if we were to take the deposited balances in that way. But I think the noble Lord has not put enough weight on the fact that we are getting the sequestrated property back.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, perhaps I was wrong, but I had assumed that we did not admit the legality of the sequestration.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: With his knowledge of Egypt, the noble Lord must have known that if we had not made this Agreement, the risk that the owners of sequestrated property were running was great. It could have been Egyptianised, and then what would they have done? All the speeches of the noble Lord and his friends in the last debate showed that the danger was in their minds and, in the friendliest manner in the world, I crave it in our aid to-day. That is the position.
The figures are unknown; and what is the right thing to do in this circumstance? The right thing is to have some method of ascertaining the figures. I hope that we have that. Then, when that has been done, at the end of the day we come to the position which all noble Lords have recommended—namely, the undertakings that have been given by my right honourable friends, first the Chancellor of the Exchequer and then the Prime Minister, and repeated by my noble friend Lord Hailsham to-day. If I may

147
put them in my own words, because they have been read often, they amount to this: first, that Her Majesty's Government will watch how the settlement works out and will play their part in seeing that it is fair and reasonable; secondly, that Her Majesty's Government do not exclude (I think I am using the exact words of my right honourable friends) a further contribution from public funds; and thirdly, that we will try to deal with hardships and gaps arising between now and the final settlement.
That is our approach, and it is in that spirit that I have endeavoured to put the matter before your Lordships. Again, I ask your Lordships' indulgence for my speech, for of necessity I had to deal with an infinite variety of small points, but I have tried to do so and I now ask your Lordships to pass the Motion, as your Lordships have intimated we should be allowed to do.
LORD GIFFORD: My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount sits down, could he answer my point about Article III (g), concerning sterling balances in this country?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am sorry that I did not deal with it. Of course, applications for de-sequestration have to take place. As the noble Lord will appreciate, the bank in this country holds on account of the Egyptian bank with whom the security
148
has been deposited. That means that the person who wants it back has to apply for desequestration. He gets the form from the Foreign Office. I am glad that the noble Lord interrupted me, because I will certainly look into the point that the noble Lord, Lord Jessel, raised about simplification. Then the person concerned has to apply for desequestration and the security has to be desequestrated within the three months provided for in the Agreement. If there is any further point, perhaps the noble Lord will either come and see me or drop me a line, and I shall be very pleased to deal with it.
On Question, Resolution agreed to.

  REGENT'S PARK TERRACES
  REGENT'S PARK TERRACES