Sitting of 29 July 1959

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  MILFORD HAVEN (TIDAL BARRAGE) BILL [Lords]
  Mr. Donnelly: I beg to move,
  That the Milford Haven (Tidal Barrage) Bill [Lords] be re-committed to the former Committee and that it be an Instruction to

  CLOSURE OF DEBATE (STANDING ORDER No. 29)

  Return ordered,

  "respecting application of Standing Order No. 29 (Closure of Debate) during Session 1958–59 (1) in the House and in Committee of the whole House, under the following heads:—

  1

  2

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  4

  5

  6

  Date when Closure moved, and by whom

  Question before House or Committee when moved

  Whether in House or Committee

  Whether assent given to Motion or withheld by Speaker or Chairman

  Assent withheld because, in the opinion of the Chair, a decision would shortly be arrived at without that Motion

  Result of Motion and, if a Division, Numbers for and against

  PRIVATE BILLS AND PRIVATE BUSINESS
  Return ordered,
  "of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders introduced into the House of Commons and brought from the House of Lords, and of Acts passed in Session 1958–59:
  Of all Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which in Session 1958–59 were reported on by Committees on Opposed Bills or by Committees nominated partly by the House and partly by the Committee of Selection, together with the names of the selected Members who served
  the Committee on the re-committed Bill that they have power to reconsider their decision on the Preamble of the Bill as reported by them to the House.
  Hon. Members: Object.
  Mr. Speaker: What day?
  Mr. Donnelly: Tomorrow.

  ADJOURNMENT MOTIONS UNDER STANDING ORDER No. 9
  Return ordered,
  "of Motions for Adjournment under Standing Order No. 9 (Adjournment on definite matter of urgent public importance), showing the date of such Motion, the name of the Member proposing the definite matter of urgent public importance and the result of any Division taken thereon, during Session 1958–59."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]
  on each Committee; the first and also the last day of the sitting of each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee-sat; the number of days on which each selected Member served; the number of days occupied by each Bill in Committee; the Bills of which the Preambles were reported to have been proved; the Bills of which the Preambles were reported to have been not proved; and, in the case of Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, whether the Provisional Orders ought or ought not to be confirmed:
  Of all Private Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders which, in Session 1958–59. were referred by the Committee of Selection to Committees on Unopposed Bills, together with the names of the Members who served

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  on each Committee; the number of days on which each Committee sat; and the number of days on which each Member attended:
  And, of the number of Private Bills, Hybrid Bills, and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders withdrawn or not proceeded with by the parties, those Bills being specified which were referred to Committees and dropped during the sittings of the Committee."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

PUBLIC BILLS
Return ordered,
"of the number of Public Bills, distinguishing Government from other Bills, introduced into this House, or brought from the House of Lords, during Session 1958–59 showing:

(1) the number which received the Royal Assent;

(2) the number which did not receive the Royal Assent, indicating those which were introduced into but not passed by this House, those passed by this House but not by the House of Lords, those passed by the House of Lords but not by this House, those passed by both Houses but Amendments not agreed to; and distinguishing the stages at which such Bills were dropped, postponed or rejected in either House of Parliament, or the stages which such Bills had reached by the time of the Prorogation."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

PUBLIC PETITIONS
Return ordered,
"of the number of Public Petitions presented and printed in Session 1958–59 with the total number of signatures in that Session."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

SELECT COMMITTEES
Return ordered,
"of the Select Committees appointed in Session 1958–59, with the Sub-Committees appointed by them; the name of the Member who moved for each; the subjects of inquiry; the names of the Members appointed to serve on each, and of the Chairman of each; the number of days each met, and the number of days each Member attended; the total expenses of the attendances of witnesses at each Select Committee and Sub-Committee; and the total number of Members who served on Select Committees; together with so much of the same information as is relevant to the Chairmen's Panel and the Court of Referees."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

SITTINGS OF THE HOUSE AND BUSINESS OF SUPPLY
Return ordered,
"of (1) the days on which the House sat in Session 1958–59, stating for each day of the month and day of the week, the hour of the
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meeting, and the hour of the adjournment; and the total number of hours occupied in the Sittings of the House, and the average time; and showing the number of hours on which the House sat each day, and the number of hours after the time appointed for the interruption of business; and the number of entries in each day's Votes and Proceedings; and (2) the days on which Business of Supply was considered."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

STANDING COMMITTEES
Return ordered,
"for Session 1958–59, of (1) the total number and the names of all Members (including and distinguishing Chairmen) who have been appointed to serve on one or more of the Standing Committees showing, with regard to each of such Members, the number of sittings to which he was summoned and at which he was present; (2) the number of Bills considered by all and by each of the Standing Committees, the number of Bills considered in relation to their principle and the number of Estimates and Matters considered, by the Scottish Standing Committee, the number of sittings of each Committee and the titles of all Bills, Estimates and Matters considered by a Standing Committee, distinguishing where a Bill was a Government Bill or was brought from the House of Lords, and showing, in the case of each Bill, the particular Committee by whom it was considered, the number of sittings at which it was considered, the number of Members present at each of those sittings and, in the case of Estimates and Matters, the number of days on which they were considered and the number of Members present on each of those days."—[The Chairman of Ways and Means.]

EXPERIMENTS ON LIVING ANIMALS
Address for Return,
"of Experiments performed under the Act 39 and 40 Vict. c. 77, during 1958."—[Mr. Renton.]

ALIENS AND BRITISH PROTECTED PERSONS (NATURALISATION)
Address for Return,
"showing (1) Particulars of all Aliens and British Protected Persons to whom Certificates of Naturalisation have been issued and whose Oaths of Allegiance have, during the year ended the 31st day of December, 1958, been registered or recorded at the Home Office; and (2) Particulars of cases in which persons previously naturalised have been deprived of their citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies during the same period."—[Miss Hornsby-Smith.]

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  ROYAL AIR FORCE

    Thor Missile
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Secretary of State for Air how many successful and unsuccessful firings, respectively, of the United States Thor missile have been made by the Royal Air Force in the United States of America.
    The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): There have been two firings by the R.A.F. On the first occasion, the missile performed faultlessly; on the second, a technical fault developed during the early stages of flight and the missile was therefore destroyed.
    Mr. de Freitas: Can the Secretary of State give any estimate as to how long he expects it to be before the Thor can be regarded as an operational missile rather than as a training missile, as I understand it is regarded today?
    Mr. Ward: No, Sir. I am afraid I cannot give any estimate of that, but, of course, we shall as soon as possible make some statement.

    Daily Mail Air Race
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is aware of the admiration felt in this country and abroad for the initiative, drive and organisation shown by members of the Royal Air Force in the recent London to Paris race; if he will list the units which have taken part in this exercise; and whether he will make a statement.
    Mr. Stonehouseasked the Secretary of State for Air if he will make a statement on the participation of the Royal Air Force in the Daily Mail air race.
    Mr. Ward: The Royal Air Force team, under the control of Fighter Command, included three officers from R.A.F. Station Duxford and one officer cadet from the R.A.F. College, Cranwell. They obtained first and third places in the race. Their average time on completed runs between London and Paris was less than 44 minutes. The Hunter and helicopter pilots, motor cyclists and servicing, radar and airfield teams were drawn from
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    a number of units from Commands at home and R.A.F. Germany.
    I am grateful for this opportunity to refer to the success which was achieved and which reflects, I think, considerable credit on all the officers and airmen who took part.
    Mr. de Freitas: Does the Secretary of State recognise that, since the age of the amateur in these things appears to have passed completely, there are many people who have a very great deal of admiration for the way a professional Service like this was able to take part in this race, giving such pleasure to many millions and also a sense of stimulation to itself?
    Mr. Stonehouse: Is the Secretary of State aware that those of us who have served in the Royal Air Force are very proud of the fact that the Royal Air Force has pulled this off, but when in future the Royal Air Force participates in such events, can the facilities be made more widely available?
    Mr. Ward: We made our facilities available to anybody who wanted to use them.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Will my right hon. Friend undertake to give the Royal Navy a few lessons on how to run these affairs?

    Guard Dogs (Travel)
    Mr. Stonehouseasked the Secretary of State for Air why he arranges for Royal Air Force Alsatian guard-dogs to travel on passenger trains, which is greatly to the annoyance of the travelling public and railway staff; and whether he will now discontinue this practice.
    Mr. Ward: I am afraid that we cannot provide motor transport every time dogs have to be sent to another station, nor could we very well send them as freight. The handlers accompanying the dogs observe the railway regulations and we do all we can to avoid annoyance to other passengers.
    Mr. Stonehouse: Is the Secretary of State aware that not enough is done to avoid inconvenience to the travelling public and that only last Friday I had complaints made to me by members of the railway staff at Waterloo who object very much to having Royal Air Force guard dogs in railway guards vans when

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    they have to deal with large numbers of the travelling public going on holiday? Will the right hon. Gentleman have another look at the matter?
    Mr. Ward: We have certainly received no complaints from the railway staff ourselves. I am very sorry if the hon. Member was inconvenienced in this way, but as far as I can ascertain, this is only the second complaint that we have ever received about dogs travelling by passenger train. The first complaint came from an elderly lady who thought that the muzzle on one of the dogs was too tight.
    Mr. de Freitas: Surely these dogs are accompanied by an attendant when they travel? They are not sent alone, are they?
    Mr. Ward: They have handlers.

  CIVIL AVIATION

    Errol Aerodrome
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will reconsider his decision to dispose of Errol aerodrome; and if he will now retain it in public ownership pending further efforts, in the light of the representations of the local authorities concerned and of the rapidly changing pattern of air transport, to establish air services from the aerodrome linking the Dundee, Angus and Perth area with London.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. John Hay): The representations of the Town Councils of Dundee and Perth, and of the Scottish Advisory Council for Civil Aviation, which I have carefully considered, do not provide any further information on the prospect of air services being operated from Errol Aerodrome. My right hon. Friend regrets, therefore, that he cannot see his way to retaining the aerodrome in State ownership and the town councils themselves have said that they are not interested in taking it over.
    Mr. Thomson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that that will be generally considered in the Dundee area as a most disappointing reply in view of the fact that this airfield, far from being a charge on public funds, at present
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    actually shows a small annual profit? Is he further aware that an air service to the Dundee area is urgently needed as an attraction to industry to an area of high unemployment? Will he not reconsider his decision in view of the fact that, I understand, changes are being considered in the kinds of aircraft being used for domestic services which genuinely leave it open whether it may not be practicable to have services at Errol airport in future?
    Mr. Hay: We have, of course, gone very carefully into all this. We are advised by British European Airways and independent operators that they cannot in the foreseeable future see any prospect for services to this particular district. It is true that at the moment at that airfield expenses and revenues roughly break even, but the State has some £27,500 in capital locked up in this place for which, apparently, there is likely to be no use in the immediate future. We feel, as we are under pressure from Parliament to reduce losses from airfields, that we must do something to recover that money.
    Mr. Woodburn: Can the hon. Gentleman tell us how he will remove the capital invested in an airport like that? I am quite sure that the House is surprised to hear, with developing air traffic in Scotland, that there is not likely to be a use for that airport.
    Mr. Hay: Yes. We shall, of course, dispose of the land and the buildings and any of the equipment that we have there, and we hope to recover some of the money which has been invested, which, as I have just said, amounts to £27,500 at present-day values. Unfortunately, there are no people who want to use or run services into Errol. That is a fact, and I am afraid that there is nothing my right hon. Friend can do to compel them to provide such services.

    Belfast Airport
    Mr. Knox Cunninghamasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will now make a statement with regard to the future of Belfast Airport; and when work to improve the airport facilities will start.
    The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Harold Watkinson): My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State

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    has agreed in principle to the joint use of Aldergrove R.A.F. Station as the civil airport for Belfast. This is a most satisfactory outcome to our discussions, and I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for agreeing to the principle of joint use. Aldergrove is operationally considerably superior to Nutts Corner and joint use offers the prospect of considerable savings to the taxpayer.
    The form of joint use proposed envisages the R.A.F. retaining responsibility for Air Traffic Control of civil as well as military aircraft, and the development by my Ministry of a civilian terminal area. Detailed planning studies are being pushed forward as rapidly as possible to the stage where a programme of work can be drawn up.
    Mr. Knox Cunningham: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that Answer, may I ask whether he can give some estimate of the cost of this change? Can he say when the work is likely to start?
    Mr. Watkinson: We would wish the work to start as soon as it possibly can. I could not give an estimate of costs, but I think my hon. and learned Friend would like to know that we do propose to provide full, proper civil facilities at Aldergrove.

    Transport Flight Safety Committee
    Sir A. V. Harveyasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what arrangements exist to ensure, in the interests of air safety, that the experience of all types of civil aircraft operators is fully utilised.
    Mr. Watkinson: To ensure the closest co-operation between all operators, I have arranged for a Transport Flight Safety Committee. Its members will be the Air Corporations, the British Independent Air Transport Association, the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Air Ministry, Transport Command and my Department. The Chairmanship will rotate between the airline members and my Department will provide the Secretary. Its task will be to consider problems of flight safety organisation, to agree uniform systems for the collection, analysis and exchange of information and to advise on safety publicity within the industry.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Is my right hon. Friend aware that what he has said will give considerable satisfaction? Will he ensure that this Committee, unlike some others, meets frequently and gets through a busy agenda?
    Mr. Watkinson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The Committee has a useful job to do. I hope that it will get to work, and I agree with my hon. Friend that it should meet quite frequently at the beginning.
    Mr. Beswick: We agree that this is a useful job to do in pooling ideas on safety, but what further steps is the right hon. Gentleman taking to see that whatever suggestions or recommendations are made are enforced? The good companies will accept the recommendations. What steps is he taking to enforce them on the bad companies?
    Mr. Watkinson: The hon. Member will have a chance to pursue his campaign against the bad companies later at Question Time. If he will read my Answer carefully, he will see that the Committee itself has to agree to a proper system for collecting information and getting its recommendations known and adopted.

    Independent Air Travel Ltd.
    Mr. Beswickasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what licences have been granted by the Air Transport Advisory Council on behalf of his Department for the operation of inclusive tours by Independent Air Travel Ltd., or its successor company, Blue Air Ltd.
    Mr. Watkinson: If the Question relates to approvals currently in force, the answer is "None, Sir".
    Mr. Beswick: If that is the case, how does it come about that this company is operating regularly each week from this country to the Continent and is not laying before the Minister any of the operating schedules? What action is he taking in this matter?
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not know whether the hon. Member is dealing with charter work, licensed work or inclusive tours, or what. As he knows as well as I do, there are certain charter operations which any operator can carry out that do not require prior approval

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    from my Ministry. As to the general issue, that is raised in later Questions of his own.
    Mr. Beswick: The right hon. Gentleman cannot get away from it. This company, under another name, was granted certain licences to operate certain scheduled tours. As he said last week, the licences were taken away. The company is still carrying on with its programme. What action is the right hon. Gentleman taking?
    Mr. Watkinson: As I have said, the hon. Member had better await the Answer to another Question of his. I am not sure that the hon. Member is wise to pursue this vendetta against independent airlines.
    Mr. Beswick: On a point of order. Is the Minister in order in suggesting that proper Questions, properly put to him, about matters which are of public concern can be characterised as a vendetta?
    Mr. Speaker: The expression "vendetta" really means a feud, does it not? It is something like that, and I think that within the realms of ordinary Parliamentary discussion I have heard very much worse things said.
    Mr. Beswickasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what representations have been made to his Department about the operation of weekly air services by Independent Air Travel Ltd., or Blue Air Ltd., on behalf of its associated company, Sky Tours Ltd.; and what replies have been given to those representations.
    Mr. Watkinson: The right hon. Gentleman originally raised with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary the question of Independent Air Travel. I understand that the functions of this company have now been taken over by Blue Air Travel Ltd. Representations that operations by Blue Air were in contravention of Section 24 of the Air Corporations Act, 1949 were made to my Department on 6th June and 1st July. Replies to both representations were that the matter was already under consideration. Inquiries are still proceeding.
    Mr. Beswick: Is the Minister aware that this is the first time I have put a Question to him about this matter and
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    that one Question does not mean either a vendetta or, with respect, Mr. Speaker, a feud? May I ask if the right hon. Gentleman is aware what sort of figure he will cut, having said that he has taken away the licences from these companies, and they having consistently operated since May of this year, if they are involved in another accident? What conclusions are the public to draw?
    Mr. Watkinson: I am very glad the hon. Member is making plain that he is pursuing this on a narrow front of particular companies, and I entirely accept that. I will try to explain as clearly as I can, although, as I think the hon. Member will accept, this is a somewhat complicated issue.
    I have said very clearly in my Answer that we are already proceeding with an investigation into allegations that Blue Air, which I understand is the successor to the company which the hon. Member mentioned in his previous Question, is in contravention of Section 24 of the Air Corporations Act, 1949. I certainly assure the hon. Member that these investigations will be pressed forward and, if a prosecution lies, my Ministry will take all the actions necessary to see that it is brought. But I want to make quite plain that, as I am sure the House understands, these companies can operate under certain charter arrangements with which my Ministry, at present anyway, has no power to interfere.
    Mr. Bence: If a man has his licence endorsed for life and then, by deed poll, he changes his name, can he get another licence?
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not think that is relevant, but I think that the hon. Member would like to know—perhaps he did not hear it in the recent debate in the House—that I have said that on the representations of independent air operators themselves I am proposing to introduce a system of licensing which will enable a licence to be taken away from a company if it is felt desirable so to do.
    Mr. Strauss: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that this company having come to public attention, when one asks Questions about it after allegations are made, which may or may not be true, that it is contravening an Act of Parliament, an hon. Member is not carrying on a vendetta but asking something

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    in. the public interest? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, according to information in our possession, this company is taking about 600 people a week to Europe and has been doing so since May? Will he quickly come to a decision and find out whether in fact this company is legally in contravention of an Act of Parliament and, if so, take quick action to stop its being so?
    Mr. Watkinson: I shall be only too pleased to do it and, if the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends have information which will help in that, I hope that they will let me have it. I would remind them that in previous debates when they have made representations on this matter they have been asked for information and they have been unable to provide it. If this time they can do so we shall receive it with the greatest interest.
    Mr. Beswickasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what operational schedules have been filed by Independent Air Travel Ltd., or its successor company, Blue Air Ltd., or Falcon Airways Ltd., for flights undertaken since May of this year.
    Mr. Watkinson: Air transport operators are not required to submit prior details of charter flights. None of these companies is currently approved for the operation of scheduled associate services.
    Mr. Beswick: The Minister is again deliberately evading my question. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I have not stated in my Question anything about prior submission? Is he further aware that the recommendations of his own Department are that the operational schedules should be filed after the flight? This company, as he well knows, is operating but is not filing any schedules. What action has he taken?
    Mr. Watkinson: The Question asked what operational schedules have been filed by Independent Air Travel Ltd. and some other companies. The answer I have given states that they are not required to submit prior details of charter flights. If the hon. Gentleman claims that they are not supplying these, that is certainly not within my information, but as he has made the request to me that I should look into it, I will do so at once.
    Mr. Speaker—
    Mr. Beswick: On a point of order. If I provide any other information about this, may I have your protection, Sir, in not having that information described either as a vendetta or a feud?
    Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order. I would protect the hon. Member in every proper case if he needed my protection, but he himself used pretty hard language about the Minister.

    Aircrew (Alcohol)
    Mr. Benceasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what steps he proposes to take to prevent the taking of alcohol by crews of British aircraft while on duty.
    Mr. Hay: There is no evidence to suggest that the existing legislation which deals with the taking of alcohol by aircraft crews has been disregarded or that more stringent legislation is needed.
    Mr. Bence: I thank the hon. Gentleman for that reply, and I appreciate what he says. Does he not think, in view of the tremendous record of safety in British aircraft, which is apparently due to the strict enforcement of these Regulations, that it would contribute to greater road safety if more stringent regulations were applied to prevent the carrying of alcoholic liquor in cocktail sets in cars.
    Mr. Hay: That is a little wide of the Question on the Order Paper.
    Mr. Remnant: Would my hon. Friend not agree that the purport of the Question casts a quite unfair aspersion on the sobriety of those British aircrews against whom there is no evidence whatever that they take alcohol during their tour of duty, and that we should offer our congratulations to these crews?
    Mr. Hay: I was advised some time ago that it was always unwise for a Minister to speculate on the motives behind a Question which an hon. Member puts down, and I would not care to speculate on this occasion.
    Mr. Beswick: Will the Joint Parliamentary Secretary say what the regulation is with regard to the consumption of alcohol?
    Mr. Hay: Yes. The position is that it is an offence under the Air Navigation Order, 1954, for a member of the operating crew of an aircraft, or any other person having a duty to perform in the aircraft, to fly on duty when his capacity to do so is impaired by reason of having taken any intoxicating liquor. The operators of public transport aircraft in their Operations Manuals usually provide that it is an offence against company regulations for the crew to drink on duty or within a stated period before flying.

  SHIPPING

    Inflatable Life Rafts
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is yet in a position to state the outcome of the discussions initiated by him in the spring of 1957 for the purpose of making obligatory the carriage by all fishing and cargo vessels of inflatable life rafts; and if he will now make a comprehensive statement on the subject.
    Mr. Hay: The Merchant Shipping (Life-Saving Appliances) Rules, 1958, require the carriage of inflatable life rafts in all fishing vessels over 50 ft. in length and in all cargo ships on coasting and home trade voyages. The number and capacity vary with the size and class of ship.
    The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea requires lifeboats to be provided for all on board on each side of a cargo ship. The desirability of replacing a proportion of those boats by inflatable life rafts in cargo ships on long international voyages will be discussed at the Conference to be held in London in May, 1960, to revise that Convention. Meanwhile owners of such ships have been recommended to carry life rafts in addition to the boats, and a majority of them do so.
    Inflatable life rafts were not considered suitable for carriage in tankers on long international voyages or in whale factory ships because of the risk of fire.
    Mr. Hughes: While thanking the hon. Gentleman for that long and comprehensive reply, may I ask him whether he is in a position to say in how many
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    cases the recommendations he has mentioned have not been carried out and how many lives have been lost since I last put this Question to him as a result of these inflatable life rafts not being carried?
    Mr. Hay: No. With regard to the ships on long voyages, to which the second part of my Answer related, I am advised that some 75 per cent. of the ships involved do comply with our recommendations. Therefore, the answer to the first part of the hon. and learned Gentleman's supplementary question is 25 per cent. at the moment do not. I have no figures whatever of the losses of life, but the fact is that it is not a question of simply saying, "You must have inflatable life rafts to save life", because there are already lifeboats provided. What we want to see is some more flexible system, which we shall be going into at the conference next year.

    Oil Pollution
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is aware that the various international conventions designed to stop oil pollution of the seas round British coasts have not achieved that object and that much loss and damage to human beings, to clothing and to bird life is still caused by that pollution; which of these international conventions are now in force; and what steps he is taking to make them more effective for the purpose intended.
    Mr. Hay: I regret that there have been further instances this summer of pollution of the beaches by oil. Generally, however, I am sure the position has shown improvement over the last few years.
    The 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, which came into force just a year ago, lays down zones, including a wide zone around the British Isles, in which the discharge of persistent oil into the sea is prohibited.
    The Convention has been ratified by 12 countries. The best immediate hope of making further progress in the campaign against oil pollution lies in securing general acceptance of the Convention and we shall continue to do all we can to achieve this.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the fact remains that our beaches all round the country are in a shocking condition and that, beyond putting up notices warning that beaches are polluted, very little is done to prevent pollution, which is causing great damage, as the Question indicates, to clothing and to wild fowl?
    Mr. Hay: I am sorry, but the hon. and learned Gentleman is guilty of exaggeration and distortion of the facts The plain situation is that we have made considerable progress in this matter in the last few years. There are a number of incidents reported from time to time, but the owners of the ships and those who are concerned with this problem are doing a very great deal indeed at great expense to themselves to see that this nuisance is eliminated. The solution lies in international agreement, and that is what we are pledged to continue to try to achieve.
    Mr. Straussasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will make a statement on the recent International Conference held in Copenhagen to prevent Pollution of the Sea by Oil.
    Mr. Watkinson: I welcome the holding of this Conference, which was arranged on the initiative of the Co-ordinating Advisory Committee on Oil Pollution of the Sea of which the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) is the Chairman. The Conference was also held under his Chairmanship.
    I am informed that the presence of representatives and observers from many organisations, both here and abroad, who are concerned with different aspects of oil pollution, and of a number of Governments, provided the opportunity for a most useful exchange of views. I particularly welcome the announcement made at the Conference by a representative of the United States that a recommendation that the United States should ratify the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil has been submitted by the United States National Committee on Oil Pollution.
    Mr. Strauss: I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. Is he aware that one of the Committee's recommendations is that it is now essential that a new intergovernmental
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    meeting should be summoned to deal with total avoidance of the pollution of the sea by oil. As this is essential, will the Government take steps to bring about this meeting?
    Mr. Watkinson: I should like to say, first, that the work of the right hon. Gentleman's hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) has been very notable. His Committee has done a first-class job in cutting down oil pollution. We are examining the question whether we ought to take the initiative in calling for an inter-governmental meeting, but it is important that the United States has now said that it will at least join the countries who have ratified the agreement.
    Mr. Callaghan: May I ask the Minister, most unusually, if he is aware that the work done by his official at this conference was most notable and that it enabled the British Government to continue to give the lead that they have given for so long in this field?
    Mr. Watkinson: If I might dare to say so, the end of term must be very near for the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) and I to pay one another compliments.

  TRANSPORT

    H.M. Coastguards (Claims)
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will state the number and nature of claims to compensation for personal injuries, loss of clothing and other loss sustained by members of Her Majesty's Coastguards during each of the last 10 years, and the manner in which each of those claims was met by Her Majesty's Government.
    Mr. Hay: Since 1954 there have been no cases of personal injury which fell to be dealt with under the Superannuation Acts or the Injury Warrant, 1952. In 1957 a claim at common law was made by a coastguard who was injured n the course of duty. As negligence by the Department was not proved, liability was not admitted and no compensation was paid. I regret that information about claims to compensation for personal injuries prior to 1954 could not

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    be obtained without an undue expenditure of time and labour. As information about claims for loss of clothing and other loss is rather lengthy I am writing to the hon. and learned Member.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that all protectors of life round our coasts are not included in this scheme and that all those protectors are engaged in an equally dangerous and courageous occupation, including those employed by the Royal National Lifeboat Institution? Will he do something to provide protection for the men of that Institution?
    Mr. Hay: As I explained last week when the hon. and learned Gentleman put a similar Question to me, the lifeboat service is a voluntary service and we are not responsible for making payments to it out of public funds. If the hon. and learned Member has any proposal he would like to put to us, we will certainly consider it.
    Mr. G. R. Howard: Is my hon. Friend aware that the Lifeboat Institution has a very full system of compensation for lifeboatmen who are injured on duty and that that compensation is carefully considered by the Institution, recommendations are made, and pensions are paid to the widows and dependants of lifeboatmen who suffer while in the course of their duty?
    Mr. Hay: Yes, I was aware of that.

    Rural Bus Services (Committee)
    Mr. Speirasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will now announce the names of the chairman and members of the committee he is setting up to study and report on rural transport; and when he expects the committee to start its deliberations.
    Mr. Watkinson: I am glad to say that Professor D. T. Jack, Professor of Economics at the University of Durham has agreed to be chairman of the Committee on rural bus services. I will publish the names of the other members as soon as I have heard from all of them that they are prepared to accept my invitation. I hope the Committee will start work as soon as possible after it is appointed.
    Mr. Speir: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that information and welcoming the appointment of Professor Jack as chairman of the Committee, may I ask whether he is fully aware of the urgency of the problem? Does he appreciate that many people in rural areas think that a committee should have studied this subject a long time ago? Will my right hon. Friend, therefore, give every facility and encouragement to the Committee to start its work and make a report at an early date?
    Mr. Watkinson: I am glad that my hon. Friend has expressed his thanks. I would add mine to Professor Jack for taking on this very important job. I have said that the Committee will start work as soon as we have settled the rest of the membership, which I expect will happen quickly. I agree that the Committee has an important job to do. It will receive all help and encouragement from my Department.
    Mr. Watkins: Will there be a representative from Wales on the Committee?
    Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir, certainly.
    Sir J. Duncan: How many people from Scotland are on the Committee?
    Mr. Watkinson: I believe that Scotland has two representatives.

    Drivers (Alcohol)
    Mr. Benceasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will give a general direction to the British Transport Commission to prohibit the taking of alcohol by the drivers and firemen of locomotives of British Railways, and drivers of British Road Services, while on duty.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Richard Nugent): The British Railways Rule Book already provides that employees must not consume intoxicating liquor while on duty. Drivers of British Road Services vehicles are subject in the same way as other drivers to the law concerning driving vehicles while under the influence of drink. I do not think a general direction appropriate in a matter of this kind.
    Mr. Bence: If it is good enough to say that pilots shall not have cocktail cabinet sets in their cockpits, and that locomotive drivers shall not have a

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    bottle of beer in their cabs, why is it that motorists in this country can drive around with cocktail sets in their cars and have a drink while driving?
    Mr. Nugent: This Question does not refer to cocktail sets in motor cars, but I think the hon. Gentleman must keep a sense of proportion in this matter. I think it would be unreasonable to go further than the law does at present.

    Driving Tests, Stockton-on-Tees
    Mr. Chetwyndasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation how many additional examiners for driving tests have been appointed to the Middlesbrough Centre; and whether he will now establish a centre at Stockton-on-Tees to serve North Tees-side and relieve the congestion and delay at Middlesbrough.
    Mr. Nugent: Two new examiners have accepted appointments at Middlesbrough and will start their training shortly. I think the needs of the district can best be served by stationing more examiners at the existing centre, and a further increase in examiners at Middlesbrough is planned.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Can the Minister say why there is this difficulty in getting an adequate number of examiners at this centre? Is it due to the rates of pay being too low, or are the conditions of employment too stringent?
    Mr. Nugent: There is no difficulty now that we have completed the first stage of the competition. As I say, two new examiners have been appointed and will be taking up their posts very shortly.

  ROADS

    Select Committee on Estimates (Report)
    Mr. Ernest Daviesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what action he proposes to take on the recommendations of the Select Committee on Estimates on roads; and what consequential changes in the roads programme will be made.
    Mr. Watkinson: The Report will be carefully studied and a detailed reply will be submitted to the Committee as soon as possible.
    Mr. Davies: If the Report is now being studied and a detailed reply is to be submitted to the Committee, why did the Minister rush in and reject the Report before it had been given consideration? Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that the remarks he made in his two speeches at Hendon and at Stamford rejected the Committee's findings and were insulting to the members of that Committee?
    Mr. Watkinson: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, because I would like to say this. There are two quite separate issues here. As to the relations between my Ministry and the Select Committee, we shall proceed strictly in accordance with the normal, conventional procedure, and the Committee has been so advised. Of course, the publication of the Report gave rise to widespread comment on the road programme as a whole. Whether that comment was in line with what the Committee intended I do not know, but it was certainly my job as Minister, in the light of the widespread comment arising from publication of the Report, to make the position of my Ministry quite clear, and I make no apology for that.
    Mr. Peyton: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that if he had not made some statement on that occasion, bearing in mind the nature of the occasion and who was present, and as the subject concerned roads, the impression would have been highly misleading and he would have been taken as having no effective answer to the allegations, which indeed he has?
    Mr. Watkinson: As my hon. Friend says, there are two issues here. As to the Select Committee, I have taken all the steps I can to ensure that the Select Committee is fully aware that I yield to no one in my respect for the House of Commons and its institutions but, as my hon. Friend has also said, the whole progress of the road programme could have been impeded if there had been a feeling that the widespread criticism of it in the Press as being improperly planned and executed might lead to broad changes in the scope of the programme. Tne speech I made was in front of contractors and local authorities actually engaged on the road programme. As I said before, I make no apology. It was my duty as Minister to make the position of my Ministry quite plain.
    Mr. H. Morrison: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that criticisms of Ministers by the Estimates Committee or the Public Accounts Committee have occurred before and Ministers have to put up with it? It is part of what they are paid for. Could not the Minister have let the thing take its ordinary course and be a bit patient? Further, is he aware that before this Ministers have had to wait before replying to the Committee? May I put it to the right hon. Gentleman that, since we have these Committees in the House of Commons, it is important that they should be treated with respect?
    I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that instead of coming here and saying that he has nothing whatever to apologise for, would it not be better if he had a little Parliamentary docility and humility and said to the House of Commons that he is sorry he did what he did in the heat of the moment? [HON. MEMBERS: "He has."] He has not. No, Sir, with great respect, the Minister has said that if he has upset the Committee he is sorry about that, which is a different thing altogether. I ask him to say that he regrets that in the heat of the moment he got rather wild about it. If he did that, the House, which is the most forgiving institution on earth, would let him off.
    Mr. Watkinson: There is not so much difference between the right hon. Gentleman and myself as he thinks. Last week, I took the earliest opportunity I had to say in the House of Commons that I was very sorry indeed if I had been in any way discourteous to the Committee. I have also taken further steps to make sure that the Committee is quite aware of my position.
    What I am dealing with in this answer is not the relations between either myself, as Minister, or my Department and a Select Committee of this House, but a broad issue of general and fundamental policy of my Ministry which arose from the publication of the Report. I have said that it is certainly the duty of any Minister in that circumstance to make his position quite plain. May I add that I did exactly the same with regard to the Report of the Select Committee on the Air Corporations, when no comment was aroused in this House at all.
    Dame Florence Horsbrugh: Does my right hon. Friend realise that there is a great difficulty here and that some of us who have been Ministers and have suffered under this procedure know it? It is that a report can come out with statements that might affect work going on at that time and those who are carrying it on, such as local authorities, wish to know about it. There is bound to be a considerable gap before the Department's reply can be published, so does not my right hon. Friend think it would be a better plan in the future if a new system could be evolved under which the Report would not be published before the Department received it, giving sufficient time for a reply from the Department to come out nearer the time when the Report comes out?
    Mr. J. Griffiths: On a point of order, Sir. In circumstances of this kind, where a Committee set up by the House reports to the House and the Minister feels that the matter is so urgent that he cannot wait for the normal procedure of a departmental reply, would there not be a case in which the Minister could come to you, the Speaker of the House, and ask your permission and that of the House to make a statement? Would not that be a proper way to handle a matter of this kind?
    Mr. Speaker: I do not wish to express an opinion one way or another on this controversy, but certainly if a Minister feels he wants to make a statement on a matter which concerns the public interest and the interest of his Department, in a proper case I would allow it.
    Mr. Griffiths: Are we to take it. Sir, that you have received no such request?
    Mr. Speaker: I have received no such request from anyone.
    Sir G. Nicholson: On that point of order, Sir. Will you make it plain, if you agree, that once a Select Committee has reported the matter is public property and is a proper matter for public discussion? After all, it does not follow that the Department will send a reply; it may not wish to do so. Surely if the Report is public property, anybody—a Minister or a member of the general public—is entitled to comment on it?
    Mr. Speaker: There is a good deal of weight in that.
    Mr. Ernest Daviesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation for what reasons he departed from the normal procedure of replying to the First Report of the Select Committee on Estimates relating to trunk roads by making a statement to the House or by sending a memorandum containing his observations to the committee.
    Mr. Watkinson: As in the case of the recent Report of the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, widespread public comment was aroused by the publication of the Report. This comment whether in line with the Committee's report or not raised major policy issues.
    It was therefore my duty to make the position of my Ministry quite plain on these issues at the earliest possible opportunity, not as a reply to the Committee but to ensure that the momentum of the road programme is not impeded. I have already expressed my regret, and I certainly express it again in the clearest possible terms, if the Committee thought me guilty of the slightest intentional discourtesy.
    Mr. Davies: Is it not clear from that reply and from the earliest exchanges which have taken place that the Minister still does not regret the fact that he made this speech outside the House and that these so-called apologies which he has made are really those of a petulant child whose vanity has been offended? [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Is it not a fact that he stated that this Report was misleading and inaccurate and that the Committee had given only cursory attention to consideration of the road programme? In those circumstances, is it not a matter for the House and not for speeches outside?
    Mr. Watkinson: I do not take that very seriously, because the hon. Gentleman—I certainly do not accept the very misleading letter of his in The Times this morning—has been responsible for bringing into my Ministry the nicest and biggest lot of letters we have ever had while I have been Minister, on the whole saying, "Get on with the road programme, and good luck to you". So I have no complaint at all.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the hon. Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) will soon, after the General Election, have
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    to make all his speeches outside the House?

    Accidents (Members)
    Mr. P. Noel-Bakerasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation how many right hon. and hon. Members of the House of Commons have died, and how many have been seriously injured, as the result of road accidents since 1945.
    Mr. Nugent: According to my information, I regret to say that nine right hon. and hon. Members of the House of Commons have been killed in road accidents since 1945. I have no detailed information about the number of right hon. and hon. Members seriously injured in the same period.
    Mr. Noel-Baker: Is the Joint Parliamentary Secretary aware that four of the deaths have occurred in the present Session and that there have been a great number of really serious injuries, both to Ministers and to other hon. Members on both sides of the House? Do not these facts show that road accidents are becoming a horrifying social evil, constantly increasing in gravity, and ought we not now to consider some new and imaginative measures to reduce the number of accidents?
    Mr. Nugent: I do not disagree with the right hon. Gentleman that road accidents are a horrifying feature in our national life. We are continually studying new methods to try to reduce the numbers and control them, but it would be a complete mistake to think that there is any dramatic method which could suddenly cure the problem. It is a matter of gradually changing people's mental attitudes to the way they behave in motor cars, and it will be a long process.
    Mr. Strauss: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that one hon. Member who was killed might not have been killed if the testing scheme which the Government have so much delayed putting into operation had been in existence?
    Mr. Nugent: That is not quite the same point. We are most anxious to get on with the vehicle testing scheme as soon as we can. If what the right hon. Gentleman says is correct, of course I regret it.

    Preston By-pass
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what report he has to make on the safety record of the Preston by-pass as compared with the old parallel road A.6.
    Mr. Nugent: Up to the end of June roughly a millon vehicles used the Preston Motorway and there were six accidents involving personal injury.
    During this period on the corresponding length of A.6 there were a further 51 accidents, compared with a total of 60 accidents there during the same period of the previous year for a similar density of traffic.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Do not the remarkable figures showing that there were only five accidents on the motorway in the last six months while there were fifty on the ordinary road give all of us encouragement to proceed with the programme for motorways and bring about greater safety?
    Mr. Nngent: Yes, Sir; the rate of accidents on the motorway was a good deal better than elsewhere.

    Sutton By-pass
    Mr. Sharplesasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he is yet in a position to announce his decision with regard to the imposition of a speed limit on the Sutton by-pass.
    Mr. Nugent: We have already asked the Surrey County Council, as highway authority, to consider making certain improvements on this road. What is decided may affect the arguments for and against a speed limit; I will keep my hon. Friend in touch with developments.
    Mr. Sharples: While thanking my hon. Friend for that reply, may I ask whether he is aware that more than sixty people were either killed or injured on this stretch of road in the first six months of this year, and will he bear in mind the importance of reaching an early decision?
    Mr. Nugent: Yes, Sir; I will. I know that the accident record there is a bad one.

    Queensferry Bridge
    Mrs. Whiteasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what is the
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    reason for the continued delay in making the Order under Section 1 (2) of the Trunk Roads Act, 1946, which is required before progress can be made with the Queensferry Bridge.
    Mr. Nugent: The Order relating to the Queensferry By-pass and new bridge will be made within the next few weeks, but we are reconsidering the proposals for a diversion at Aston Hill as the result of objections to the original draft Order.
    Mrs. White: Can the Minister explain why we cannot have the Order for the bridge now? Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the county council was informed in April that a separate order would be made for the bridge, that the bridge is most urgently necessary, that we have extreme traffic congestion there right through the summer months and that we have been waiting years for the bridge?
    Mr. Nugent: I know that the hon. Lady is anxious that the work should start, but there were a number of objections, and we had to consider this matter in relation to the Aston Hill section and to decide whether or not there should be a public inquiry.
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that it is almost impossible effectively to arrange for the development of industries in North Wales unless something is done very quickly about the Queensferry Bridge, which is a real bottleneck—I only wish the hon. Gentleman could see it—not only on Bank Holidays but even on normal days?
    Mr. Nugent: I know that it is a very bad one, but I am afraid that, like many other important proposals, it has to take its turn. We are getting on with the preparatory work as fast as we can, and we will bring it into the programme at the earliest possible date.

    London-Yorkshire Motorway
    Dr. Broughtonasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what progress he has to report towards deciding the route of the London-Yorkshire motor road.
    Mr. Wadeasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what road development he has planned for facilitating the movement of traffic through

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    the West Riding of Yorkshire southwards and from South Yorkshire to the Great North Road, pending the completion of the London-Yorkshire motorway; and how soon such development will be completed.
    Mr. Watkinson: As regards the line of the motorway through Leicestershire I cannot yet add to the reply that my hon. Friend gave to the hon. Member for Leicester, North-West (Mr. Janner) on 13th May when he explained that further consideration was being given to possible routes.
    Because of the inevitable delay before the motorway can be extended into Yorkshire, we are putting in hand some supplementary road works to give the industrial West Riding better links to the modernised Great North Road.
    As soon as the preparatory work can be completed, constructional work will be put in hand on the Seacroft by-pass at the eastern end of the Leeds Ring Road, and on the widening of A.63 between the Ring Road and the Great North Road. Some improvement on the A.57 route east of Sheffield will also be made. The work will be done as quickly as possible.
    Dr. Broughton: Is the Minister aware that this long delay in starting the work of constructing this road is very disappointing to the people in that vitally important industrial area, the West Riding of Yorkshire? To add insult to injury, is he aware that we have learned that there is to be a postponement of the electrification of the main railway line? Why is Yorkshire neglected in this way?
    Mr. Watkinson: I only deal with the road. The difficulty of getting a road through Leicestershire is just as frustrating to me as it is to the hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Wade: Is the Minister aware of the serious traffic congestion in the West Riding of Yorkshire? Can he say how soon he will proceed with the motorway from Leeds to Sheffield which may be linked up with the London-Yorkshire motorway? Can he give an assurance that the Leeds-Sheffield motorway will not be delayed merely because of difficulties over the London-Yorkshire motorway?
    Mr. Watkinson: The work of finding the line in Yorkshire and all the necessary preliminary work is going on. What I said today is that in the hope of helping Yorkshire over this very difficult interim period we are trying to link across into the new North Road which will give very rapid transit to the south.

    Lane Discipline
    Mr. Russellasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is aware that many motorists are not carrying out the rules of lane discipline laid down in the new Highway Code, but drive continuously in the right-hand lane of three-lane single-carriageways; and if he will make it mandatory for motorists to read the Code.
    Mr. Nugent: Yes, Sir. I am aware that many drivers do not properly observe the rules of lane discipline. I am hoping for an improvement after the new Highway Code has become available, but I doubt if making the reading of the Code mandatory would automatically ensure observance of its rules.
    Mr. Russell: Does not my hon. Friend agree that, although it would not automatically ensure observance, it would encourage people to observe the rule and make them aware of what is in the Highway Code? I am sure that some motorists are not aware of what is in it at the moment.
    Mr. Nugent: I agree about the difficulty of getting people to read the Code, but I do not think that the mandatory approach is the right one.
    Mr. Ronald Bell: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that, unfortunately, the Highway Code does not tell drivers in ordinary three-line carriageways not to go into the right-hand lane; it confines that injunction to special motor roads? Will my hon. Friend do something to dispel that false assumption?
    Mr. Nugent: It tells drivers to keep to the left.

  RAILWAYS

    Withdrawal of Services (Alternative Transport)
    Sir S. Summersasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (1) when referring to the Transport

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    Users' Consultative Committee cases where the closing of stations would deprive the travelling public of any form of public transport, whether he will in every instance request them to consider the feasibility of providing alternative omnibus transport;
    (2) whether he will give a general direction to the British Transport Commission to ensure that omnibuses are provided in all cases where the closing of railway stations by the Commission would deprive the travelling public of any form of public transport.
    Mr. Watkinson: The British Transport Commission itself always refers proposals to withdraw services or close stations to the Transport Users' Consultative Committee and the committees invariably take into account the existence of alternative services or the need for them.
    Although the Commission is under no obligation to provide alternative services, Sir Brian Robertson has already assured me that it is willing to co-operate fully with the consultative committees in exploring how the needs of the public affected by the withdrawal of railway services can best be met. I do not therefore think a general direction from me would be appropriate.
    Sir S. Summers: I was not able to hear the earlier part of my right hon. Friend's Answer. Can he say whether it contained any reference to the sphere of interest which the consultative committee has in this matter? There appears to be some doubt. If there is doubt, will he take steps to ensure that when these cases are referred to the consultative committee it is regarded as perfectly proper for the committee to discuss with the British Transport Commission the provision of buses instead of rail services?
    Mr. Watkinson: I beg my hon. Friend's pardon for being inaudible, but the first part of my Answer said that it is clearly part of the duty of a consultative committee to look into the question of what alternative services are available, to discuss that both with the British Transport Commission and with bus companies and any other interests involved, and to do its very best to see that these services are not withdrawn until it is satisfied that there is a reasonable alternative.
    Mr. Snow: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there will be a large measure of support for the proposition put forward by the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Sir S. Summers)? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I am at present in correspondence with him on precisely the same matter in so far as there is a bad time-lag between the original publication of an intention to close a station and any form of publicity as to what the Traffic Commissioners, for example, are doing in the matter of providing alternative motor transport, and that this causes extreme anxiety for people who have to commute to their work, and may indeed affect their livelihood and their ability to get to work on time?
    Mr. Watkinson: The matter is, I imagine, relevant to our later discussions. I should like to say that I am just as worried about it as many other hon. Members. The problem of pruning the railway service, which is inevitable, and yet providing some alternative, particularly in rural areas, is a very worrying one indeed, but I hope that Professor Jack and his Rural Transport Committee may help us with advice in this matter.

    Newbury-Lambourn Line (Closure)
    Sir A. Hurdasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether he will refer for consideration to the appropriate Transport Users Consultative Committee, under Section 6 (7) of the Transport Act, 1947, the proposal for closing the Newbury-Lambourn branch railway for passenger traffic, with special reference to the possibility of providing an alternative service by omnibus from Newbury station.
    Mr. Nugent: This proposal has already been submitted to the Transport Users Consultative Committee for the South Eastern Area by the Western Region of British Railways. The Committee will, I am sure, take into account any suggestions about alternative services without a reference from us.
    Sir A. Hurd: Is my hon. Friend satisfied that the procedure of the Transport Users Consultative Committee under the Transport Act, 1947, is working satisfactorily when it is a matter of safeguarding local interests? Some of us

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    have doubts about it. Has my hon. Friend noticed the letter in The Times this morning stating that out of 118 cases, 116 were rubber-stamped by the Transport Users Consultative Committee, and does it not seem doubtful whether it is an effective body to safeguard local interests?
    Mr. Nugent: No, Sir; I would not accept for a minute that the Transport Users Consultative Committee is simply rubber-stamping proposals by the Commission. It has a most difficult job to do, and I think that it does it very conscientiously and fairly in the public interest.

    Leicester-London Services
    Mr. Jannerasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what will be the effect of the rationalisation proposals contained in the re-appraisal of the plan for railway modernisation and re-equipment, Command Paper No. 813, on the passenger rail services between Leicester and London on the former Great Central line and otherwise.
    Mr. Nugent: The Re-appraisal Report describes the Commission's proposals for the Great Central line from Marylebone to Nottingham and for diesel traction on the main lines from St. Pancras. The Commission informs me that modernisation will greatly improve main line services between London and Leicester.
    Mr. Janner: Is the Minister aware that it is proposed, or suggested, that there should be a reduction in the service between London and Leicester in the new traffic proposals? Is he aware that, although his colleague has refused to give adequate roads for transport, the Minister is now adding insult to injury by stopping some train services to Leicester?
    Mr. Nugent: This proposal is nothing to do with us. It is a proposal by the British Transport Commission. It has not yet been before the Transport Users' Consultative Committee, and I am not, therefore, able to discuss the merits of it. The hon. Gentleman must wait until the proposal goes through the normal procedure.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS (UNITED KINGDOM - UNITED STATES AGREEMENT)
Mr. G. Brown Mr. G. Brown (by Private Notice) asked the Minister of Defence whether he will give the terms of the Agreement made between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, which binds this country to a specific rocket or nuclear weapon policy, and for what period such an Agreement applies
The Minister of Defence (Mr. Duncan Sandys): There are no such agreements apart from the Agreement of February, 1958, under which Her Majesty's Government undertook to deploy and man Thor rockets supplied by the United States. This arrangement is subject to revision by agreement at any time, and can be terminated by either party at the end of five years. In accordance with the normal procedure, the text of this Agreement (Command Paper 366) was laid before Parliament.
Mr. Brown: I thank the Minister for that reply, which confirms the position as we understood it, namely, that we would be free, in the light of changes, if there were any technical, political or international—to seek a revision of the Agreement. Can the Minister say why it should be reported in The Times and in other newspapers this morning that a Ministry of Defence spokesman, early this morning, said that these commitments—in connection with Thor rockets—are absolutely binding upon the next Government, whether it be Labour or Tory? Can he explain why it was necessary to issue such a statement? In view of the fact that the wording of the newspaper reports is so different from that of the Agreement and the announcement he has just made, what was the point of the whole operation?
Mr. Sandys: When people are asked questions by the Press they do not always answer in the most felicitous manner. I do not think that there was anything inaccurate in what was said. I think that the official concerned gave the policy in the terms of the Agreement, and that was that. I do not think that he intended to convey any other meaning. If the right hon. Gentleman is alarmed at the possibility of a Labour Government becoming responsible for these undertakings, I would remind him that they last only for

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five years, so I do not think there is much danger of that.
Mr. Brown: That is the whole point. The Minister always seems to have that up his sleeve, and that is what makes us feel that we have to check every statement by his Department against his own private announcements. I am prepared to believe that he was his better self in his earlier answer, and I will accept that.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Proceedings on the Motion in the name of Mr. Langford-Holt relating to Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Limited exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION (ANNUAL REPORT)
3.35 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Richard Nugent): I beg to move,
That this House takes note of the Report and Accounts of the British Transport Commission for 1958 and of the Report reappraising the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways (Command Paper No. 813).
This year's debate on the British Transport Commission's Annual Report for 1958 has a special interest for us because it is combined with a consideration of the Commission's reappraisal of the modernisation plan which it orginally sketched out four years ago. The reappraisal was set in hand last autumn, following a forecast by the Commission that the 1958 results were likely to finish up about £30 million worse than was originally predicted. It is right to put it on record that at that time the chairman of the Commission, Sir Brian Robertson, consulted my right hon. Friend on the matter. My right hon. Friend asked him to make a reappraisal of the modernisation plan in the light of the changed conditions, and the exchange of letters between my right hon. Friend and the Chairman appeared in Cmd. Paper No. 585 last November.
The 1958 Report shows that the deficit for the year was £89 million, and confirms that the forecast given last autumn was justified. I do not think that the House will want me to take up time in rehearsing in detail the causes of that decline. We have debated them before, and I think that we are all familiar with them. They are summed up in the words in the Report, at the end of paragraph 5, which says:
"So far as it is possible to analyse the deficit of the year it might be said that some £55 million of it could have been expected as part of the process of deficit financing leaving the balance due mainly to the decline in the traffics of the heavy industries and to the effects of the London bus strike."
But although 1958 was a year of setback in finance it was also a year of great progress in mechanical and engineering development as the Report records. Indeed, our own eyes now confirm it wherever we go throughout the country on our rail services. I should

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like to say a word of praise to the Commission and to the railwaymen, from top to bottom, for the tremendous job that they are carrying out in modernising services and, at the same time, keeping them operating. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am happy to hear how well that statement is received by the House.
During 1958 we substantially increased the Commission's capital investment ceiling from £150 million to £175 million, to help the Commission accelerate the modernisation plan, especially in motive power, and to bring in more diesel locomotives. It is part of our general policy to get more modernisation more quickly. In the rail passenger traffic picture for 1958 there is a marginal reduction in gross receipts of about £1 million, from just under £139 million to about £138 million. In fact, however, the trend of passenger traffics since 1955 has been steadily upwards. The year 1957 showed an exceptional rise, when there was the exceptional circumstance of the fuel shortage, but even allowing for that, the trend has been upwards, and it shows clearly that modernisation is beginning to have its effect in passenger transport.
We can see the attractions in diesel main line locomotives which, apart from looking very attractive, are able to provide better time-keeping. We can also see diesel multiple units wherever we go, and are now beginning to see some of the new electrification schemes and even, in some places, new stations and better passenger accommodation—generally a foretaste of what is to come in a fully modernised rail service. It is good, there is no question about that, and the travelling public like it. Obviously, it is being appreciated wherever it has been done.
The passenger traffics have kept up for the first twenty-eight weeks of 1959 at almost exactly the same figure as in the corresponding period of 1958, and that despite exceptionally good weather and the ever-increasing wave of the universal motor car offering alternative means of transport. So, where they have managed to modernise, the railways are evidently succeeding in offering services attractive enough to hold their passengers, and possibly to increase their number.
I had the privilege of inaugurating the North Kent electrification scheme a short time ago. It is a wonderful scheme for the benefit of the commuting public and
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Sir Brian Robertson told me that on the lengths and at the stations where electrification has been carried out already there has been a 20 per cent. to 30 per cent. increase in traffics. This is most encouraging and many similar schemes are coming along.
The freight picture is not so good. It shows the decline we expected and in the event it was about £30 million down on the year. But behind that financial result there has been an immense amount of work going on in the complex and difficult process of modernising freight services. The House will know that last year about 35 per cent. of all freight-train mileage was done by express brake-fitted trains. That is a tremendous increase on anything done before and will result in faster, more attractive and more competitive services. The Commission has closed 270 goods depots and yards and this concentration into fewer modernised depots is an essential part of the modernising of our freight services. The modernisation of marshalling yards continues, but, inevitably, it is a long and a slow job.
The current freight rates during the year show that the railways were fully competitive—and some complaints which we have received from the road haulage interests seem to confirm this. I think-that we may say that the railways held their share of the lower total freights that were going in 1958.
The Report also refers to the big programme of track improvements, the modernisation of signalling with a colour-light system, the introduction of automatic train control and many other improvements. It reveals the major fact, by which we set great store, that the Commission has managed to achieve the level of economies which my right hon. Friend and I asked of it. We asked for a saving of £20 million in the year. In the event, the net saving for the year was £9 million. If we take into account increased costs due to wage awards and other increases, amounting to £13 million, it shows that there was a theoretical gross saving of £22 million, on which the Commission is to be congratulated. I shall not have time to comment in detail on the many other interesting points in the Report before leaving it to say a few words upon the reappraisal.
Mr. David Jones: Will the hon. Gentleman give the House some information about savings? He said that in 1958 the saving which had been promised had been accomplished, but on 11th December the Minister suggested that, in addition, the Commission had been asked to save another £30 million in 1959. Can the hon. Gentleman say something about that?
Mr. Nugent: It is too early to give any details about that, but I do not doubt that when this year's working is completed the Commission will again show a substantial saving. Naturally, I cannot at this stage say what it will amount to, but I have no doubt that it will be substantial.
Before leaving the Report I wish to make reference to the London Transport Executive and, first, to record our thanks to Sir John Elliot, who has left the Executive after long and distinguished service, and to extend my best wishes to his successor, Mr. Valentine.
I should like to mention the Victoria Line tube, which is referred to in paragraphs 127 and 128 of the Report. On a number of occasions I have been asked when we should receive the Report from the London Travel Committee and I am glad to say that it was given to my right hon. Friend yesterday by the chairman of the Committee, Mr. Alex Samuels. The Report broadly recommends the building of the Victoria Line as a useful addition to London's transport facilities in any circumstances, and we shall take an early opportunity of studying the Report with Sir Brian Robertson and considering its implications.
Mr. G. R. Strauss: Will it be published?
Mr. Nugent: Yes. it will be published as soon as it can be printed. It is a surprisingly long document.
I wish now to turn to the reappraisal and to begin by thanking the chairman of the Commission and his colleagues for undertaking this magnum opus for us. It is a considerable work, as right hon. and hon. Members will appreciate when they read it. My right hon. Friend and I welcome the opportunity afforded by this debate to hear the views of hon. Members and we shall take them into account in our future studies of the reappraisal.
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The Report is the product of an immense amount of work not only by the Commission but in the regions. It provides a valuable basis for assessing the future prospects of the railways. It is in three parts: a report on progress of the modernisation plan up to the end of 1958, a description of the plans of the Commission for the next five years and a forecast of the financial outlook. It confirms that the modernisation plan of 1955 was broadly right in outline, but it recommends that over the next four years there should be a rapid acceleration in re-equipment, especially in motive power from steam to electricity and diesel, in the wagon fleet and coaching stock, and a speeding up in the general process of rationalisation and streamlining of the railways to meet modern conditions.
Under this plan, the greater part of what was originally intended to take place by 1970 will be done by 1963, so that a very rapid acceleration is visualised. Paragraph 56 tells us that there will actually be less equipment in use in 1963 under the plan than would still have been in use in 1970 under the original plan. If this can be achieved, the Commission predicts that by 1963 there will be a working surplus of between £50 million and £100 million against central charges of about £85 million.
Mr. C. R. Hobson: Is the hon. Gentleman proposing to return to the question of electrification? He mentioned it en passant, but is he proposing to tell the House a little more about it in view of the tremendous changes in voltages and the various decisions arrived at by the Commission? Will he give the reasons?
Mr. Nugent: I am not clear what the hon. Gentleman is asking. Is he asking whether electrification is proceeding on the present plan?
Mr. Hobson: The hon. Gentleman has made a general statement about electrification. There is quite a bit about electrification in the reappraisal, including the advocation of some rather costly changes. Surely he proposes to say something about that.
Mr. Nugent: I see nothing to dissent from in the general plan which the Commission outlines for electrification and

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dieselisation. It all seems to me to go in the right direction to give us a very efficient, modernised service. If the hon. Member has a different view I shall be interested to hear it, if he catches your eye, Mr. Speaker, in the course of the debate.
I was about to observe that the prospect of solvency in 1963, now predicted by the Commission, is roughly a year or so behind its original prediction that it would achieve solvency by 1961–62. After making this comprehensive reappraisal, considering all the work that lies behind this document, the Commission has, I think, made a very courageous prediction. Sir Brian Robertson and his colleagues are to be congratulated upon putting forward a forecast which they firmly believe they can carry out.
Mr. Ernest Popplewell: The Commission's Report suggests that a £50 million to £100 million surplus might be achieved by 1963, but surely that is on the assumption that production continues to rise by 2 per cent. or 3 per cent. every year. I believe that the difficulty of the Commission is that the production position is more or less stabilised and is not rising at that level. Perhaps the Minister might mention this point, as it is a cardinal one in the Commission's prediction.
Mr. Nugent: I am assuming that hon. Members have read the Report. I am not going through the Report detail by detail. It will be a comfort to the hon. Gentleman to know that industrial production is rising and that the prospect of that surplus being achieved is reasonably hopeful.
A number of important issues raised by reappraisal cannot be answered by the Government without a great deal of study. This study we are proceeding to do now with the Commission, so that we can reach conclusions on the many important questions that there are.
On the major issue of modernisation, I can be quite clear. The Government see nothing in this Report to deter them from maintaining their general policy of supporting the Commission in completing the modernisation of the railways. Perhaps the outlook is less promising than it was, but we are still convinced that this country needs a rail service and needs it modernised as
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quickly as possible. We believe that the prospect now given is firm enough to build on.
Here, perhaps I might say to hon. Gentlemen on the Liberal benches—[HON. MEMBERS: "One."]—that this answers the aspect raised in the Amendment which they have on the Order Paper. Inevitably, there are anxieties and risks in committing such large sums of money as this for the modernisation of the railways. There are all kinds of uncertainties in the picture, but we take the view that a railway service, and a modernised one, is essential to the life of the country.
On the prospect which the Commission has put before us we should press on and get that modernisation done. That, therefore, is the background of our financial appreciation. Conscious of the anxieties and risks, we still feel that the prospect justifies us in going ahead. Although the deficit, is now running at a higher level than was originally predicted, I would remind hon. Members that we always expected that the deficit would increase before it began to fall.
Now I turn to some of the major aspects of reappraisal and would say a word on passenger traffic. The reappraisal forecasts a 15 per cent. increase by 1963. That is, of course, a big increase, but it still seems possible. Modernisation of the the passenger service is undoubtedly attracting considerably increased traffics wherever it has been introduced, whether by electrification or dieselisation. I have referred to the North Kent electrification scheme, because I have been associated with it personally, but there are many other schemes with which we are all familiar and where there have been quite dramatic increases. So it seems that a modernised service has a potential which may well cause that forecast of the Commission's to mature.
As commuter traffics improve, whether by electrification or dieselation, they will increase the radius of commuter travel. That, again, will cause some people to use the service from an even bigger radius. With the increasing prosperity of the community and, therefore, the greater use of transport, it seems a fair prospect that this considerable increase will be reached at the end of four years.
Mr. D. Jones: I am sorry to interrupt the Parliamentary Secretary again, but I do not quite follow his argument. He says that where lines have been modernised and electrified the amount of traffic has considerably increased. Then why close so many branch lines? Why not electrify them?
Mr. Nugent: The hon. Gentleman will realise why these closures are being made. Wherever there is any prospect of increasing traffic to the point of profitability, the Commission is modernising. It has to take a view whether there is a potential there. On many of these branch lines there is no prospect whatsoever of attracting traffic ever to make a profit, and it then has no alternative but to close down the line.
I would say a word on the Commission's view of fares. Not only does it expect an increase in the volume of passenger traffic, but it expects increased returns because of increased fares. The Transport Tribunal has now approved new ceilings, and the Commission is considering what actual revision it should make. The Commission clearly recognises, in the reappraisal, that it is dealing in a sensitive market here, because of the competition of the motor car, and it evidently intends a cautious approach.
We have asked the Commission to do all that is possible to design a fare structure to give an incentive to spread the peak of daily commuter traffic. Anything it can do in that direction will be good not only for the economics of the railways, but enormously for the comfort of the travelling public. The Commission has undertaken to do its best in that matter.
I will now turn to freight traffic.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: Before the Parliamentary Secretary leaves passenger questions, may I ask whether he is aware of the very small increase in the rates of passenger traffic fares over many years? I remember going, as a small boy, from Liverpool to London, when my return fare was 33s. That was before the First World War. Today, the fare is 65s. I defy anybody to point to any oommodity that has gone up in price by only that proportion since 1914.
Mr. Nugent: The Commission has developed its argument in detail in the
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paragraphs with which I dealt, and I think that it makes out a strong argument for its point of view.
I turn to freight traffics. The Commission expects in its reappraisal that freights will recover to the 1957 level by 1963 and that the increases on minerals and merchandise will balance the expected fall in coal traffic. That, again, is a stiff target that it has undertaken.
Hon. Members will have seen that before making this forecast the Commission, in addition to its own very thorough and careful studies throughout the regions, has consulted the Coal Board and other nationalised boards and also the Iron and Steel Federation, the F.B.I., the N.U.M. and the A.B.C.C., as set out in paragraphs 66 and 67 and subsequently. It is evident that the Commission, in making these forecasts—both of freight and passenger traffics—has made a most exhaustive and careful study of the prospects and taken into account all possible information and expert opinion
In reading those paragraphs I felt the Commission had argued cogently to support its case. My right hon. Friend and and I accept this as a fair basis on which to work. The tunnel of darkness through which we must go is a little longer than we thought and perhaps the light is not so bright at the end, but it is still there to be seen. I think that we must accept it as what The Times calls it, a challenging Report.
The Commission has also asked for an increased rate of capital spending for the next four years. This year the capital expenditure ceiling is £212 million. It is by far the highest it has ever been. For the railways, it is £178 million, which is a very big increase of £30 million over last year, but the Commission ask for next year an extra £9 million, rising to an extra £32 million for railways alone in the coming years. I can only say, at this stage that we will give very careful attention to the programme which has been put before us. The public reception of the reappraisal was, on the whole, favourable, both in the newspapers and in public comment. Some anxiety, perhaps, about the financial prospects and some about the closure of uneconomic services has been expressed, but there is evidently general approval

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by the public for our policy of modernising the railways.
I come to the Amendment put down by the Opposition, which,
"… while welcoming the progress being made in the modernisation and re-equipment of the railways, regrets the actions of Her Majesty's Government which have damaged the financial solvency of the British Transport Commission and led to the curtailment in the services it should render in the national interest."
It really is astonishing to me to see this hostile attack on the Government for damaging the financial solvency of the Commission. In fact, it is only in this House, by right hon. and hon. Members opposite, that my right hon. Friend and I are attacked and accused of pursuing policies which injure the railways. There is no echo of these charges outside. The country as a whole is very pleased that we are providing the basis for this modernisation. The anxiety, so far as it exists, is rather the reverse of that—that we may be giving them too much. With no backing to it from public opinion, the charge is really a synthetic one, manufactured to give a basis for crabbing the outstanding success of the policies of my right hon. Friend.
Over the current four years the capital expenditure that has been provided for the Commission has been £568 million. If we add to that the £227 million to date for deficit financing, that gives an average rate of spending on the Commission of nearly £200 million a year over these four years. We can compare that with the rate of spending during the Labour Administration in the four years from 1948 to 1951, in which they were responsible, of £53 million per annum.
Mr. D. Jones: There were not deficits then.
Mr. Nugent: It does not surprise me that I get objections from hon. Members opposite, because, naturally, this is not welcome to them, but I am certain that if the Labour Government had been able to raise the rate of capital expenditure and financial provision for the railways even to half the present rate of spending that there would have been paeans of praise by hon. Members opposite for what they were doing for the railways—paeans of praise for themselves. Now that we are doing it, we get this crabbing from them and a thoroughly dog-in-the-manger attitude.
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I recognise that a horse coming out of their stable with "Transport House" over the door has a natural jealousy for his tradition as champion of the "Railway Stakes". But he cuts an undignified figure when he retires to the stable and sits in the manger. He certainly will not hold the championship in any stakes; in fact, he has probably lost it to us already.
The right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. G. R. Strauss), in his speech last December on the Second Reading of the Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill, evidently seeking to minimise the importance of the massive financing of the modernisation scheme, said that any Government would have to go on providing the money for modernising the railways today. That is true only if the Government have the capital resources available. Hon. and right hon. Members opposite did not finance the modernisation of the railways in their day. I should imagine that it was because they did not have the financial resources available. It is useless to say that this is simply a matter of years. They governed according to their political beliefs and the result was that the nation's earning power was restricted. The nation's earning power has expanded in the last four years under good Tory Government. [An HON. MEMBER: "There was the war."] I am not aware of any war between 1948 and 1951.
The fact is that today the modernisa tion scheme is able to go forward because this Conservative Government has been following sound financial policies which have caused national earning power to grow so that capital formation could also grow. Therefore, there is more for the railways. The Opposition must not be allowed to obscure the magnitude of the achievement by the Government. The Opposition have decided to divide the House tonight—
Mr. C. R. Hobson: How does the hon. Gentleman know?
Mr. Nugent: The Opposition put a hostile Amendment on the Order Paper in the names of their leaders, but perhaps the hon. Member who interrupted knows better. If arguments will convince the hon. Member, he will be very easily convinced, for the arguments are

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all on our side and there is only party doctrine on the other.
The hon. Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) has given us some indication in the past of his ideas on future policy for the railways. I hope that we are going to hear a very full explanation today. If hon. and right hon. Members opposite put down a hostile Amendment let them describe how they would carry on the programme for the future. What the hon. Member has told us before is that his party would renationalise road haulage and control C licences. [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] I am glad to hear some support for that, but we have heard about this pipe dream of integration before and have never seen it. I hope that the hon. Member will go into more detail and tell us how it is to be brought about
The more the hon. Member talks about it the better we shall be pleased, because it will find no favour in the country. Already, the nation has voted twice to show that it will not have it. Obviously, it is determined to do so for a third time, so I hope that hon. Members opposite will give us a very full dissertation on the subject. [Interruption.] I am not surprised that hon. Members opposite do not like this, because it is near the bone.
I acknowledge that nationalisation of road haulage would give the railways a short-term advantage because, of course, that would clip the wings of road haulage and give a share of its present traffics to the railways. But even that advantage would be brief, because the record shows quite clearly that a Government committed to policies of nationalisation will quickly be in financial disaster again. Then there will not be the capital resources to modernise the railways at all. [Laughter.] I make that point with all the force I can. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite are very unwise to laugh at it. If they try their hand again at government they will quickly find their difficulties of maintaining the earning power of the nation. The prospect of modernising the railways on the lines which right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite have indicated are obviously very thin.
I want to make one remark about controlling C licences. In the interim Report we have had the benefit of the
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survey on C licences, a most valuable and interesting document, and it refutes the allegation that this class of vehicle is operated inefficiently. That completely knocks the bottom out of the case of the hon. Member for Enfield, East, and there is no wonder that he keeps denigrating it. He has tried to reduce its authority by saying that it is a biased document. It is nothing of the kind. It was composed by statisticians, completely independently. In fact, one of them was the joint author of the 1952 Report. This is the time-honoured tactic of the courts: "Weak brief, abuse your opponent's attorney".
Mr. Popplewell: Is this a Departmental Report? If so, will it be published?
Mr. G. R. Strauss: It has been published.
Mr. Popplewell: This is new. I have not seen it. Will the Minister tell us where we can get it?
Mr. Nugent: It has been published and I think that it can be obtained from the Stationery Office T shall be pleased to let the hon. Member have a copy. He will find it most enlightening and very helpful in resolving his policy.
Coming back to the reappraisal, I want particularly to deal with a point raised by the hon. Member for The Hartlepools (Mr. D. Jones) earlier—the major problem of the rationalisation of the railway system. The Report is quite emphatic that there must be a more rapid closing of uneconomic services. I refer hon. Members to paragraphs 18 to 30 of the Report. This is not an initiative which comes from the Government. This is the carefully judged opinion of the expert railwaymen. Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House know very well that the railway system as it exists today was laid out in circumstances completely different from the present, when the railways were virtually a monopoly and when the only form of competition was the "penetrating lines' duplicating existing services, which worsen our problem today and make an even bigger railway network with which we have to deal.
The reappraisal is quite definite that what should be contemplated in the coming four years is a much more radical rationalisation than we have seen in the last four years. The view is taken that

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many of these services can never be economic. I think that we ought to trust the judgment of the railwaymen in this matter. It has not been uncommon to hear from right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite charges against us that we interfere with the Commission. Here is an issue on which hon. Members should take their own advice. This is the Commission's initiative, and we should proceed on this plan of eliminating uneconomic services. The Commission forecast that about 10 per cent. of the total route mileage should be closed down over the coming four years.
Where these are passenger services, inevitably when they are closed it inconveniences the few remaining travellers who are using them. I know this situation probably better than most, because I have to answer many Adjournment debates initiated by hon. Members on both sides of the House who are anxious about some proposed closure or closures in their constituencies. I also receive delegations on the subject, and I sympathise most sincerely with those remaining travellers who still use the service which the Commission proposes to close.
Mr. Tom Brown: May I put a question about the closure of lines in rural districts? Will the Department be prepared to take note of local authorities who make representations to it that it is inadvisable, in the interests of the inhabitants of that rural district, to close a certain railway?
Mr. Nugent: There is provision in the 1947 Act for transport users' consultative committees to consider proposals for closing any section and to hear the objections of local authorities and others who are interested in it. That procedure is followed in every case. I have looked into many of these cases in detail. The difficulty in most of them is that the services are hopelessly unecomonic.
The hon. Member for The Hartle-pools, who knows the railway service better than I do, knows perfectly well that in many cases there is no prospect in the world of ever making the service profitable. The potential is just not there. Naturally, because the services are there, somebody uses them, and it is, therefore, an inconvenience when they are closed. Wherever there is any
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prospect of the Commission developing a service by modernising it, the Commission certainly does so.
The transport users' consultative committees are bodies which hear objections. They have a most onerous task to perform. They were set up under the 1947 Act, and they represent local authorities, industry, the farming industry trade union interests and others and are directly representative of user interests. They have the very difficult task of hearing objections and, in the majority of cases, of hearing an overwhelming case for closing a particular section of railway. They would very much like to be able to help the people who will be affected, but they simply cannot find a case for advising the Commission to keep the section open. I want to say a word of thanks to the members of these committees for carrying out a very difficult task.
Sir James Duncan: There is one other body of people on these transport users' consultative committees, and that is the British Transport Commission itself. Would not my hon. Friend look into the matter and consider whether the committees would not be regarded as more independent if the British Transport Commission's officials and members were not members of them?
Mr. Nugent: There are only two members of the Transport Commission on a body of 20. I do not think that it can be said that they are dominating it. It is helpful to have them as members so that they can supply the facts on many of the problems which come before the committees. I think that the composition of the Committees is about right.
The closure of goods depôts is a very important part of rationalisation and is going ahead fast, to concentrate freight handling in the modernised goods depôts, and here the problems are very-much less. There is the problem of manpower, but no problems for the travelling public.
This part of modernisation, this rationalisation, cannot be done completely painlessly. It is impossible to do it without inconvenience to some people in some places. It is, nevertheless, an essential part of what the railways must

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do if we are to have a modernised system which will meet today's needs at economic rates and be consistent with the Commission's statutory obligation, laid down in the 1947 Act, that it should break even, taking one year with another, and should achieve solvency. My right hon. Friend and I therefore broadly support the Commission in its difficult operation. We shall look with the Commission at the great acceleration which it proposes and see what are the implications of such a wide range of closures.
In this context, the Commission refers, in paragraph 62, to its obligations of public interest in maintaining services, which run alongside its obligations to operate as a commercial undertaking. We shall look at this factor and at the Commission's proposals for completely uneconomic services, together.
The reappraisal also asks that the financial structure should be looked at afresh. The Commission has made the point that, although it is far from a monopoly operator today, it does not have the normal capital structure of competitive business. It has no equity-capital to give flexibility by covering the fluctuations of good times and bad times. Ii finds the single burden of fixed-interest charges a handicap. My right hon. Friend and I do not know what Sir Brian Robertson has in mind on this, but we shall be prepared to give very careful consideration to any ideas that he puts forward. Before considering shifting from the present structure of central charges with a straight obligation to repay interest and capital, we must be sure that it will strengthen financial discipline and accountability, rather than the reverse.
Despite Opposition strictures on the test of profitability, it is still the most reliable test to show whether a concern is making full economic use of the resources of manpower and capital at its disposal, in terms not only of its own management, but of serving the nation as a whole.
I certainly do not contend that the present structure is ideal. It may be that we can think of something better, and I shall be interested to hear what the Liberal view is today in supporting their Amendment. I read with interest the comment in one of the national dailies—
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I think that it was the Financial Times—that while deficits are running at such a high level accountability is unsatisfactory. It was suggested that a clearer picture would emerge with regional accountability. There are technical and accounting difficulties in this suggestion, but it may be possible to overcome them.
We will certainly include that as a feature of the study we are now undertaking. It is in line with our general policy to increase regional responsibility and autonomy. This is already showing excellent results. If this can be done and if it will help, we will consider it favourably.
I will now refer briefly to the manpower aspect in the reappraisal. I would not for one moment underestimate the huge problems presented in the manpower field. The Commission makes it clear that the human problem involved in the modernisation scheme, and especially in the acceleration, is a vast one. Last year the total manpower on the railways was reduced by 23,000, from about 573,000 to about 550,000. This kind of reduction in the total establishment on the railways will continue. Indeed, it may even be accelerated.
The Commission is to be congratulated on the general spirit of co-operation, that it has managed with the help of the trade unions, to secure, in dealing with this very difficult problem of reducing the number of jobs, having to switch men from one job to another, and, indeed, in the last resort, of redundancies. As the House knows, the Commission has concluded a redundancy agreement with the trade unions concerned, and that is brought into operation wherever necessary. It consults the trade unions wherever there is a change or a reduction to be made.
I know that many hon. Members are very concerned about the Commission's policy on workshops. I shall not go into that in detail now. I am sure that hon. Members interested will make speeches on that. My right hon. Friend and I have had representations from hon. Members on both sides of the House about both the railway workshops and the private workshops. We have been told by hon. Members on both sides that both of these are being treated more favourably than the other. [HON. MEMBERS: "They are."] They cannot both be

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This is entirely a matter of management for the Commission, but my right hon. Friend and I have discussed this with the Chairman of the British Transport Commission. He issued a public statement on the subject last May which, broadly, maintained the policy on workshops which the Commission was previously following. I say with all confidence that I am sure that the Commission is holding a fair balance between the interests of railway workshops and the interests of private workshops.
The huge reductions in equipment which are going on—for instance, the predicted reduction in wagon equipment from over 1 million wagons to about 750,000 wagons by the end of 1963—are bound completely to alter the picture, especially when the wooden wagon is eliminated and the all-steel wagon comes in, which will mean that wagon repairing will practically disappear. I agree that some very hard cases result from that. With the rapid disappearance of the steam locomotive, which was constructed almost entirely in the railway workshops, and with the alternatives of the diesel and electric motor units, where the power units are supplied from outside, the picture of what the workshops have to do is changing.
The Commission has done all that it can to mitigate the difficulties these changes bring about, and it will continue to do so. I want my congratulations to the Commission to extend to the trade union leaders who have played such a responsible and helpful part in this difficult problem.
Mr. Popplewell: Is the House to understand from what the Parliamentary Secretary says that the workshop policy is left entirely in the hands of the Commission? If the Commission desires to produce diesel and electric motor power component parts, is it entitled to do so? Is it entirely in the Commission's hands. Do I understand, also, that the question of wagon repair and building jobs is left entirely to the Commission? For instance, instead of the Commission hiving off to private industry the building of London Transport coaches and wagons, can it build these wagons itself if it so determines?
Mr. Nugent: I think that I had better send the hon. Member a copy of the Commission's statement on this. The
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broad answer is that the Commission is free to work out its own policy on these matters. It must live within its capital expenditure and it must also be guided by economic considerations. That is precisely what it does in deciding whether to use private industry or its own resources for any of these particular supplies.
I have already spoken for longer than I intended, and I wish to bring my remarks to a close. The reappraisal gives us a half-term report of the progress of the modernisation plan and a forecast of a large measure of its completion in the next four years. We can sound a note of satisfaction at the stage of modernisation already reached. It is ahead of schedule. But this satisfaction must be tinged with caution in the face of the evident stiffening of the struggle to hold and, even more so, increase traffics. Nevertheless, the forecast justifies the Government in continuing to give the Commission full support in the great task of modernisation. Our policy is to go on to achieve the great benefits which this will bring to the life of our people. I confidently ask the House to approve the Motion.
4.30 p.m.
Mr. Ernest Davies: I beg to move, at the end of the Question to add:
"and while welcoming the progress being made in the modernisation and re-equipment of the railways, regrets the actions of Her Majesty's Government which have damaged the financial solvency of the British Transport Commission and led to the curtailment in the services it should render in the national interest".
In the first third of his speech the Joint Parliamentary Secretary dealt with the results of 1958 and paid tribute to the British Transport Commission. We certainly share those thoughts—we have no quarrel whatsoever with him there—but when he came to the middle part of his speech he certainly jumped the track and made some rather naive comments on our Amendment.
I want to make it quite clear that in putting this Amendment on the Order Paper we do not in any way reflect on the Commission itself, but that we are attacking the Government, not for proceeding with modernisation, as the hon. Gentleman suggested, but for the policies they have pursued which, in our

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view, have caused, or at least contributed to, the Commission's very serious financial position.
Nobody would have thought from the hon. Gentleman's speech that the Minister of Transport has come under some very considerable criticism during recent months; that he has been the subject of three critical Reports—two of which are relevant to the affairs of the Commission—and that these Reports also provide us with support for our Amendment.
Before coming to the reasons why we think that our Amendment deserves the support of the House, I want to deal, as did the Parliamentary Secretary, with the Reports. In many ways, the reappraisal Report supersedes the Report and Accounts for 1958. As it were, it brings those up-to-date, and looks to the future. Despite the bad financial results, it is important, as the hon. Gentleman appreciated, not to overlook the Commission's very considerable achievements during 1958, in difficult circumstances. It is very difficult to proceed with normal operations—and to improve operations—at a time when a vast plan of capital investment and reconstruction of the system is being carried out. However, we must also keep in perspective the results over the whole period of nationalisation since 1948, and compare them, perhaps, with results in the pre-war period, when there was a considerable deterioration in the railway system.
I would remind the House that during the first eight years of nationalisation, right up to 1956, the Commission succeeded in earning a working surplus, before payment of interest, and that in the three years 1951–53 it had an overall surplus after meeting all central charges, including interest. It is significant that it was after 1953 that the Commission started to run into difficulties. That is significant, because it was in that year that the Government's transport policy of breaking up the Commission in favour of private enterprise, and supplanting planned transport with a competitive system, began to have its disastrous effects.
Despite the handicaps under which the Commission suffered during 1958, it has had some considerable achievements. One that must not be overlooked is that
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in the face of the tremendous increase in private transport, private motoring and the like, more passengers are now being carried by British Railways than were carried before the war. In 1958, the number of passengers carried was a record since nationalisation—except for the Suez year, when the carryings were artificially inflated.
In addition, freight carryings are still very considerable, in spite of the recession—for which the Government are, of course, responsible—which led to a fall in the heavy traffics. Anybody studying the Report will be confirmed in the belief that the railways are, and will remain, a tremendous carrier of goods and passengers, and cannot be dispensed with. I do not think that any hon. Member would quarrel with that statement.
As was stated by the Parliamentary Secretary, and by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Crewe (Mr. Scholefield Allen) in an intervention, fares and charges are, in real terms, below those obtaining before the war; that is to say, comparing the pre-war purchasing power of the £ with that of today the fares and charges are less in real terms—
Mr. Scholefield Allen: When I said "pre-war", I did not mean before this last war, but pre-1913.
Mr. Davies: I appreciate that, but in its Report the Commission publishes diagrams comparing present results with those of before the last war, and that, I think, is the significant period.
That result is certainly not true of any consumer goods produced by private enterprise. This is a nationalised industry which, in real terms, has succeeded in keeping the cost of its services below the pre-war cost. That, of course, is due to the increased efficiency—[Interruption.] If the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinching-brooke) will read the Report and study the diagrams he will see that what I have said is correct—
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Gentleman is making it appear as though this was a triumph for nationalisation and the Commission. The plain fact is that, for social and policy reasons, successive Governments have required the Commission to keep its fares and freight charges down.
Mr. Davies: I intended to deal with that point later. One of our charges against the Government is that their action in this respect is responsible for the Commission's present financial position—
Mr. John Peyton rose—
Mr. Davies: I am sorry, but I want to develop my argument. If, later, the hon. Member wishes to challenge me on certain aspects that I consider worthy of challenge I shall gladly give way, but I have much to say. The Parliamentary Secretary took some time—I make no complaint of that—and other hon. Members want to speak.
We should not minimise the achievements of the Commission since 1948 despite the very considerable change there has been in the transport pattern including, mainly, the great growth in private transport. These achievements are largely due to the work of the Commission's staff in its various undertakings, and I would share in the tribute paid to the staff by the hon. Gentleman. Here it is worth while drawing attention to paragraph 12 of the Report which states:
"The Commission take this opportunity to pay tribute to the men and women who work in all the ramifications of this great undertaking, whose careers are bound up with public transport in one form or another and who are, in spite of some derogation, among the best servants which the public possess. … The staff of no private undertakings work under the same glare of public criticism as those employed on the railways and road transport and in the catering and other branches of the Commission."
I am sure that the whole House will agree with that and will wish to pay tribute to the work which is being done.
Railways the world over are being affected by the same set of circumstances, and are experiencing this deficit operation, whether they be nationalised or operated by private enterprise. The same thing is true of the United States as it is of Britain, Germany and France, and, consequently, the order of the day is, "Modernise or die".
If one turns to the less happy picture of finance, one must continue, I regret to say, to take a gloomy view. First, I would draw attention to the fact that since nationalisation the Commission has paid out on its capital and loans no less than £475 million in interest. It has paid
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that out in interest at the same time as it has financed a considerable part of its capital investment out of its depreciation and maintenance allocations.
Under private enterprise, a large part of that interest would have been earned for the equity capital, and if the earnings had not been adequate, the dividend, of course, would have been passed and the money would not have been paid out. In other words, the holders of equity capital would have received nothing. The Commission, because of the nature of its capital, has to pay this interest—this fixed interest—on all its capital in the fat years and in the lean years.
I would further point out that private companies would have claimed that profits were earned up to 1956, because the profits of private enterprise companies are normally declared before debenture interest is charged. They are declared as profits, and then the debenture interest charges are deducted. Therefore, the Commission could claim that it was operating at a profit up to 1956.
Looking ahead, the reappraisal Report confirms the worst predictions which we have made from these benches throughout these debates. Ministers then accused us of being defeatist or pessimistic, but the figures which have appeared on future prospects and interest charges confirm, unfortunately, everything which has been said from this side of the House. In fact, the figure of £90 million for interest charges by 1963 is a figure which I quoted in the debate on the Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill in December last year and in January of this year.
I claimed then, and I repeat now, that the Government plan for financing the deficit is a crazy plan and is a crippling form of finance. In fact, it is "Alice in Wonderland" economics. Let us consider it, though it is very difficult to do so. In the first year, the Commission borrows to meet the deficit, and in the following year it borrows to meet the interest on the deficit and to meet the deficit for that year. In the next year, it borrows to meet the interest on the deficit and the interest on the interest borrowed to meet the interest borrowed to meet the interest borrowed to meet the deficit. This is "The House that Harold Built."

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As the Parliamentary Secretary pointed out, the reappraisal estimates that, on the present basis, the working surplus can be from £50 million to £100 million by 1963. That is a wide margin, and it is also a wide guess, but it shows how many imponderables there are. The Commission estimates that interest charges will be £90 million in 1963, rising to £110 million in 1965. Therefore, on the most optimistic of its estimates there is bound to be a deficit. The Commission cannot escape continuing to operate on a deficit, and this gives us very serious concern when we consider the question of capital reconstruction, to which I will come later.
I would point out that both the Commission and the Minister have so far been wrong in their estimates. These estimates have proved to be a long way out, and the results have been far worse than estimated, but the reason for this is not the action taken by the Commission, but the policies which the Ministry has pursued. Therefore, the Ministry has far less excuse for being wrong than the Commission.
In 1956–57, the House was asked to vote £250 million for deficit financing. It was considered to be enough to last the Commission until 1963, but in 1957, some months after the House had agreed to that, when the position was already deteriorating, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft), in the debate on the economic situation, dealing with the position of the Commission, said:
"So that it should know exactly how it stands, the Commission has accordingly been informed that for 1958"—
that is, the year we are now dealing with—
"the amount will not be in excess of the ascertained deficit for 1957, as certified by the auditors in due course; and that for 1959 finances will be reduced in accordance with the forecast on which the White Paper is based."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th Oct., 1957; Vol. 575, c. 57.]
That was the decree of the then Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Now, we are dealing with 1958, and the deficit is £89 million, which is £34·4 million greater than was estimated, and the Government are meeting it. In other words, what the Chancellor of the
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Exchequer then said the Government had to ignore. I suppose that £89 million is not in excess of the ascertained deficit of £54·6 million, which was the estimate for 1957.
Here, again, this is typical of the Government. They lay down policies one day which they cannot abide by and then have to desert them the next. How can the Commission operate with any foreknowledge of the position when the Government are changing their attitude in this way? It was inevitable, as we pointed out at the time, that the Minister would have to ask the House to raise the amount permitted for deficit financing. That should have warned them at the time of the effects of the policies which they were going to pursue, and of the disastrous effect which their policy of economic stagnation was bound to have on the Commission.
It is reasonable to question whether even the present depressing estimate of the reappraisal Report will be fulfilled, I suggest that it certainly will not if the present Government continue to be responsible for the mismanagement of the Commission's business, and if they continue a policy of interfering with its affairs. On the Government's past record, the Commission certainly will not be able to fulfil the estimates.
Let us take a look at the record of the Government where the Commission are concerned. In the first place, the inflationary policy pursued by the Government initially led to rising costs and wage demands, with requests for increased charges following, because they were necessary to meet them. The Commission was prevented or delayed in raising the charges to meet those costs. This was followed by deflationary policies which resulted in great losses of traffic, particularly the heavy freight traffic. It was followed by another standstill on charges and the restriction or curtailment of the new capital programme on which the Commission was embarking.
One can look a little more closely at some of the interference of which the Minister was guilty. The recent Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries, in effect, censured the Minister of Transoort for excessive interference in the affairs of the civil airways Corporations beyond his statutory powers. In

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the case of the Transport Commission he has been guilty of that to an even greater degree, and with far more harmful effects than in the case of the civil airways Corporations. In previous debates in this House I have given a long catalogue of his sins in this respect, but unfortunately, he has not stopped sinning and he is certainly not repentant.
I do not wish to repeat this long catalogue, but I should like to refer to one or two items with which the House is well acquainted. The Minister's predecessors began with the interference in the fares of London Transport in March, 1952, at the time of the London County Council elections. The interference was for political reasons. We know that. Despite the Transport Tribunal's authorisation for those fares to go up, the Government at that time prevented them going up and brought about a standstill over a period. Then, not to be outdone by his predecessors, in February, 1956, when the Commission had applied to the present Minister of Transport for an increase of 10 per cent. in freight charges, he refused to allow them to be increased by more than 5 per cent.—only half the required increase—although the 1947 Act required him to consult and consider the advice of the Transport Tribunal.
Contrary to this statutory requirement, the right hon. Gentleman announced in this House that he would permit the Commission to increase its fares and freight charges by only 5 per cent., although it had been proved by the Commission that on commercial grounds, so that it could meet its statutory obligation to pay its way, it was essential that these fares and freight charges should go up by 10 per cent.
Later, the Minister followed the statutory requirement of referring the matter to the Transport Tribunal after he had limited the increase to 5 per cent. Then the Tribunal reported that it was contrary to the Commission's financial interest not to permit the charges to go up by 10 per cent. The Tribunal said that it was "urgently necessary "—those were its words—for the charges to be raised to the full extent. In other words, the Minister ignored the advice of the Tribunal which he was statutorily required to take, and he made regulations limiting the amount to which the charges could be raised.
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What more could the Minister do to damage the Commission's financial state? He did more. He used the good old Army technique of putting the Commission up against a wall and persuading it to volunteer not to raise its charges for six months. He has very persuasive powers when it comes to dealing with the Commission and he reports to the House that it has acted voluntarily in doing such things.
Of course, the net result of these interferences in the commercial right of the Commission to charge rates essential to enable it to pay its way—rates which were below the economic cost of operating the undertakings—has been that charges have never been able to catch up with costs because, although they were justified, they were too little and too late, thanks to the Minister. That is one reason why we are moving our Amendment to the Motion. But we can go further than this. There is the same disastrous sequence of events concerning the false economies—so-called economies—which the Minister has again persuaded the Commission to carry out. When the Commission agrees to make economies of £10 million he "ups the ante" to £20 million. That is the way that he has behaved.
The Minister is a great one at making speeches. We have heard a lot about his speeches recently. I recall one that he made on 13th March, 1958, after the Industrial Court's award to the London busmen. At Sevenoaks, he said:
"As to the award itself, that is for the London Transport to consider and not the Government."
That was fair enough. But then he went on to say, according to a newspaper report:
"With the full agreement of his colleagues he"—
that is, the Minister—
"had made it plain to London Transport some time ago that he could not support or defend further general increases in London Transport fares … 'This award, if it is agreed by the parties, would not therefore increase the inflationary pressure as has too often happened in the past …' I had already told the British Transport Commission, in a letter dated 22nd October, that in accordance with the Government's financial policy no increase could be made in the advances due to the British Transport Commission under the Railway Finances Act, 1957."
In other words, the Government are not prepared to find the money to cover any

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further increase in the Commission's deficit caused by an increase in costs.
It was typical that the letter to which he referred and which he sent in October had never been mentioned in this House, but was mentioned in a speech outside in March following. But that speech certainly did not help towards a settlement of the bus dispute which followed. When that was settled he again rushed to the country, this time to Camberley, to make another speech, in which, again, after the strike had been settled, he then repeated that
"The London Transport Executive know quite clearly the financial circumstances to which they have to conform."
Then he said:
"These have not been eased in any way by the Government and therefore the London Transport Executive are fully aware that any settlement has to be held by savings, cuts, or economies within the strict limits laid down last autumn."
I refer to these matters because here again is evidence that the Minister was forcing action upon the Commission: in this case, economies to meet rising costs, cuts in the services which made it impossible for the Commission to meet its statutory obligation. In other words, if there is a wage award and the costs go up substantially, although the Commission is required under the Act, as it is, to pay its way, he says that the only way to meet the increased costs is by economies, not by higher charges. There is no alternative. The Minister refuses to allow an increase in charges on the one hand, and he forces economies, on the other hand, which have led to a threat to the maintenance of the public services.
On top of these specific actions—and there are many more with which I have not time to weary the House—is the destructive transport policy followed by the Government since 1951, directed against the Commission and in favour of private enterprise, and particularly their political friends the road hauliers. The denationalisation of road haulage which they attempted and failed to effect completely because of the success of the publicly operated B.R.S., was only one of their destructive steps. Amendments to the 1947 Act took away from the Commission the responsibility of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly integrated system of
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public inland transport, and substituted a duty confined to providing railway services and certain other services which might appear to be expedient. In fact, they destroyed the objective of the 1947 Act which was to provide an adequate, efficient public service throughout the country.
Sir Wavell Wakefield: At much too high a cost.
Mr. Davies: The hon. Gentleman says, "At much too high a cost", but at that time the Commission was paying its way. When the Tory Government came in, a surplus was being earned and profits were being made.
Mr. Peyton: The hon. Gentleman is attacking private enterprise very strongly. Can he say whether or not he thinks it is a good thing for the economy in general that road haulage rates have gone down by 25 per cent. since denationalisation?
Mr. Davies: In the first place, the hon. Gentleman is wrong in assuming that they have gone down to the extent which he stated. In the second place, we all know that they have gone down because of the manner in which many private enterprise road haulage firms are operating. Their drivers are being worked beyond the statutory permitted number of hours, records are being falsified and the law is not being adequately enforced by the Minister.
The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Harold Watkinson): Really, these wild charges are getting worse. I will certainly give notice that I will answer that point when I wind up the debate. My Department certainly enforces and implements the regulations, and the right hon. Gentleman knows that very well.
Mr. Davies: I know perfectly well that when cases are brought to the Minister's attention he courteously refers them to the enforcement officers, but, as I have frequently stated, there are not enough enforcement officers. If the Minister wanted to enforce the law he could increase, and should increase, very substantially the number of enforcement officers.
Concerning the cuts in services which the reappraisal Report suggests—and this is one of the most serious aspects of the Report, I think—there is a necessity for

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one word of warning. I think that the whole House agrees that there must be some cuts due to the change in travelling habits and to the changes in the needs of the transport users. The railways have, of course, followed a policy of shedding uneconomic services over a very long period, particularly where alternative facilities exist. But it is necessary, I think, to draw a line and to limit the extent to which these cuts should continue. One wonders how long this strip-tease act, as it were, can continue without the system catching its death of cold.
The railways operate on very high fixed costs, the costs arising from the initial cost of the system, the maintenance charges and an inherent inability to reduce operating costs proportionately to the reduction in traffics. For the railways to pay their way there must be a spreading of these costs over a great volume of traffic. The attracting of more traffics and not the elimination of essential services is the answer to the difficulties of the railways.
To cut out facilities that would otherwise attract traffics is no answer. There is a danger in this negative policy. I would say that this is, also, bad for the staff. Staff morale cannot help but be affected. It cannot be expected to maintain its enthusiasm when it sees the system on which it depends for its livelihood gradually shrinking under its eyes. If this process continues indefinitely we shall be left with no railways at all, because it will be impossible to have a viable railway system.
It may be that the Minister will reply that the Commission favours this contraction. It may be that it does, though to what extent I am not in a position to know. But I do know that the policy of contraction has gone further, and is planned in the Report to go much further, than the top executives in the railway administration and even the Minister's favourite children, the area boards, favour. They are opposed, I understand, to the extent of this curtailment.
Of course, the corollary of this retraction is the position of the railway workshops, to which reference has been made during the debate so far. I do not wish to deal with that matter because my hon. Friends are in a better position to do so both from constituency and union points of view. However, I would point
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out one thing, which is that the main trouble concerning the railway workshops today is that during the passage of the 1947 Act an Amendment was moved by the Tory Party, which, to my regret, was accepted by the then Minister of Transport, preventing the Commission from selling any of its products outside its own undertakings. Had that Amendment not been inserted in the Act at Tory instigation the Commission would be able to compete in the open market today and keep many of its workshop employees at work.
Mr. J. T. Price: Will my hon. Friend allow me to make a short comment on that matter? Does the Minister recall that the railway workshops, during the difficult war years, when we needed all the production we could get, were extensively used for producing tanks and military equipment of all kinds and that even under today's planning for military defence they no longer enjoy those facilities, which very often they would have the resources to meet, to take up the slack in excess capacity?
Mr. Davies: I agree with my hon. Friend, and I regret that the Commission is not permitted to pursue that policy.
The Government have presented this reappraisal Report to the House without really stating their attitude towards it except to accept the modernisation plan as it stands. The Parliamentary Secretary did not help us a great deal to understand what the Government's plan or policy is in regard to the Report. I want to know from the Minister whether we can be assured that the assumptions on which the plan is based will be realised. There are three in particular.
First, will it leave to the Commission freedom from interference and allow it to operate commercially as far as fares and charges are concerned? Will it cease playing ducks and drakes with its finances in this regard for party political purposes? Secondly, can the Commission rely on the Government to give it an assurance that it can proceed with its capital investment programme to the extent outlined in the Report without chopping and changing it as in the past? Here, again, there is nothing worse for the morale of its keen and enthusiastic staff than for it to set out on a task only

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to find that it is suddenly stopped. Continuity is essential if the plan is to succeed, because it is a long-term plan and is phased accordingly.
Thirdly, what are the Government going to do about capital reconstruction? The Parliamentary Secretary referred to this matter and said that it needed consideration. He gave some principles on which it should be considered, and I do not entirely dissent from some of those. But in the view of the Opposition some such reconstruction is necessary, indeed inevitable, and should have been effected long ago. It has become urgent because the Government have delayed acting to assist the Commission for so long and have interfered to such an extent and engaged in such unrealistic financing that on its present capital structure the Commission can never pay its way.
Neither the Minister nor the Commission can possibly persuade themselves into believing that the Commission can ever earn sufficient to meet the heavy charge of £110 million of interest in 1965. But for nationalisation the railway shareholders who opposed it would have lost their money years ago. Modernisation would have been impossible as the railways were rapidly approaching bankruptcy. They would have been unable to raise the capital to modernise as is being done today by the Government.
I would remind the House that in 1935 an Act was passed which permitted the Government to advance capital to the railways to enable them to modernise. In the Memorandum which accompanied the Bill it was stated:
"… the Companies will be enabled to put in hand as soon as practicable an extensive programme of reconstruction and improvement estimated to cost about £30 million. The proposed works … could not at present have been carried out without the financial facilities arranged."
This shows that the railways, before the war, were not in a position to carry out the modernisation which was essential to their success.
The sooner there is a capital reconstruction, the better for all those who use and work upon the railways. No undertaking facing insolvency, as, unhappily, the Commission does today, according to the reappraisal Report, can be a happy one and provide the best service to those
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who use it. It will be necessary to find out the maximum economic contribution which the present investment in the railways can make and then to reduce the capital accordingly. Its capital must be adjusted to the level at which presumed future earnings will at least bear all outgoings, including interest charges. That is because a viable transport system is vital to the economy.
I have spoken rather longer than I intended and I apologise, but I have touched only on a certain number of points which we can level against the Government on their transport policy. While the Opposition welcome the operational achievements of the Transport Commission, which more than justify the nationalisation of transport, and while they support in principle the modernisation plan as reappraised, both Reports convincingly confirm the view long held by us on this side that but for the policies and actions of the Government, and of the present Minister in particular, the Commission's finances would not have deteriorated to a point where the maintenance of a transport system in the national interest is in grave danger.
Because of the Government's record in transport matters, governed by doctrinaire considerations, we have no confidence that the assumptions on which the plan is based will be realised or that the rise in industrial production and the increase in the standard of living, on which they depend, for instance, will be forthcoming under a Tory Government. For these reasons, and because the Government have always lacked a constructive transport policy, only by a change to a policy of a planned publicly-owned transport system operated in the national interest—that means a change of Government—can there be a final solution of the difficulties of the Commission, and that must await the General Election.
5.12 p.m.
Mr. G. Lindgren: I beg to second the Amendment.
In doing so, may I declare my interest in that I am associated with the railway industry and I speak on behalf of its clerical, professional and technical workers? After the rather straight talking of my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) to the

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Minister, may I tell the Minister that the workers in the industry consider him to be the worst Minister of Transport that this country has seen? They have no confidence in him. As one of the industry's leaders said publicly quite recently, the less they see of him the better it is for him.
However, there is one thing for which we cannot blame the Minister. Ever since the invention of the internal combustion engine, there has been growing difficulty for the railway transport system. Some of us are old enough to remember the old "square deal for the railways" campaign during the inter-war years. Even the present Prime Minister was a director of the Great Western Railway, and, of course, he supported the "square deal for the railways" campaign, but nothing was done, except to pass the Railways (Agreement) Act, 1935, to which my hon. Friend referred, and to discuss the possibility of further Government-financed loans for capital development.
The first effective step taken to deal with the problem which arose before the war was the passing of the Transport Act, 1947. The House of Commons works on a political basis. Hon. Members on both sides of the House have political ideals, but hon. and right hon. Members opposite cannot get away from the fact that the only way to make the transport industry viable is by integration on the basis of the 1947 Act. The problems with which we have to deal today arise directly from the fact that the Minister's predecessors undermined the basis of the 1947 Act and brought about the present difficulties of the Commission. We must remind hon. and right hon. Members opposite that the previous Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation referred to those who accepted the heavy responsibility of service on nationalised boards on behalf of the country as Quislings. When Ministers of State refer to such people as Quislings, is it surprising that we wonder whether their hearts are in the effort to make any nationalised industry pay?
The most serious problem that we have to face is that there is a very grave danger of the public transport system collapsing—road transport, road and rail freight, and passenger services as well. Modernisation and rationalisation are a step forward, but let me make it plain that, from my point of view, modernisation
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and rationalisation on their own will never deal with the present difficulties of the public transport system.
I am sorry that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary went into political tirades, because generally we have more affection for him than for the Minister, but he referred to C licences and wondered what we are to do with them. Any Government that tackles the problem of the maintenance of a railway system will have to deal with C licences. The C licence is maintained at the expense of the Treasury, the national Exchequer. The services of C-licence operators are largely run at a cost over and above that for which the railway service could provide the transport. They are largely run for prestige purposes by manufacturers or distributors. If manufacturers want to maintain their own transport system for prestige purposes, then I, for one, see no reason why they should not pay heavily for it, because we cannot maintain a transport system which is only partially used and expect the workers in the industry or the taxpayers to meet the cost.
Mr. Norman Cole: Do I understand the hon. Gentleman to say that in the final analysis he would prevent a manufacturer having permission to carry his own goods in his own vans?
Mr. Lindgren: I will make it clear. There are only two choices, as I see it. There should either be restriction according to the type of traffic carried—I am talking about long-distance traffic, not the milkman, the baker or the butcher making local deliveries—or, if it is maintained for prestige purposes, the operators should pay a considerably higher licence fee for the prestige of running their own transport.
Mr. Leslie Thomas: Surely, C-licence holders run their vehicles for economic reasons, not entirely for prestige reasons.
Mr. Lindgren: The hon. Gentleman may not know, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer, very largely, pays for the C-licence holder running his own transport system. I do not say all, but very many of them are running their service at a cost well above that at which the same transport service could be provided by the established transport organisations,

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whether British Road Services or the railways.
I look at this matter from the point of view of national economics. Here we have a railway system half used or less than half used, while the roads of the country are strained to the limit. The obvious thing to do is to ensure that our public transport system is fully used and our roads are not overstrained. The Joint Parliamentary Secretary referred often to profit and loss. There is more than one way of looking at profit and loss. If it is true, as I suggest, that there is a danger of our public transport system being undermined, what will be the effect of such a result on our country's economy, if there is no rail commuter service and no railway system? What would be the effect on industry if there were no railway system to take the surplus traffics which the C-licence holder does not want to carry or which the road hauliers do not want to carry and leave to the railways?
The railways are there to be used. If they are not allowed fully to meet their costs, those costs will have to be met in one way or another. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East referred to Government interference and to interference by the Minister in freight charges. In addition to interference by Ministers of Transport of various Governments, there has been public resistance to rail fare increases and bus fare increases. I must admit that I have sometimes been surprised when a trade union branch which itself has put in an application for a wage increase and secured it has opposed any likely increases in transport charges which were to result from an increase in wages or salaries paid to railway men.
The country and the Government must make up their minds—the Government do not seem to have made up their mind yet—whether they are prepared to accept a public transport system and to meet the cosl of the social value of it to which the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) referred earlier as the reason for interference by previous Tory Governments with the Commission's ability to increase its fares.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: All Governments.
Mr. Lindgren: I do not remember it being done before 1952. The first interference with a decision of the Tribunal was in 1952 by the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill). If the noble Lord can give me any other reference, I shall, of course, give way to him and apologise.
One must realise that there is a social value to be derived from the operation of both goods and passenger services, or, as has been suggested today by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, the transport system must pay its way. If it is to pay its way, it must be free. But the British Transport Commission is not free. It cannot relate its charges to the costs it has to meet. It still operates under the restriction of being a common carrier and it cannot refuse traffic. More often than not, it has to carry traffics which road hauliers refuse to carry
If we are to have a free-for-all and competition, the competition must be on a fair basis. We must let the railways compete with the road hauliers on a basis of freedom. It is suggested that the railways can do that, but, in fact, they cannot. The railways are still common carriers. They are still restricted in the various rates which they can charge. They must still go through the procedure of application to the Tribunal, and they still have to run the risk of a Tory Minister of Transport refusing to allow them to make the charges for which they are given authority.
If my calculations are right—again, I am quite prepared to be corrected if I am wrong—taking into account the present modernisation programme and the rest of the capital structure of the B.T.C., the total figure of capital is about £3,000 million. That is a fantastic capital burden for the railways to have to bear when one considers that much of the capital is well over 100 years old. This £3,000 million has to be serviced by a much smaller, though, we hope, more efficient system of operation.
I join with my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East in saying, quite frankly, that the British Transport Commission just cannot service that £3,000 million. After all, the operation of a railway system is a high-cost business. It has to operate for 168 hours a week. The cost must be carried, but the system can use its capital fully only during periods of

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peak operation. As my hon. Friend said, we are in this fantastic situation that, not only do the railway workers work to provide for the interest charges on the capital invested in the industry, but they have even to work to carry interest charges on the moneys borrowed to finance the deficit of the industry.
On behalf of the salaried workers of the British Transport Commission, I say that we welcome the modernisation plan. We shall do everything we can to assist in modernisation and rationalisation. We shall co-operate to the full. We do not object to a smaller railway system. Contrary, perhaps, to the view of some of my hon. Friends, we agree that many of the lines which were put down in the early days of the railway boom were put down in a period of competition and were never really justified. They have not been able to justify themselves for many years. We do not object to a smaller, more efficient railway industry in this country.
We ask that the Government, who are now financing this modernisation pro gramme and who have welcomed it today, should make it possible for the Transport Commission to meet the costs of the capital invested in the industry. No worker likes to be associated with an in dustry which is losing money or which is always being criticised for working under a deficiency. Therefore, there is, because of the mere fact of morale with in the industry, a duty on the Government to ensure that—

ROYAL ASSENT
5.30 p.m.
Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:
The House went:—and, having returned;
Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Finance Act, 1959.

2. Appropriation Act, 1959.

3. Education Act, 1959.

4. National Galleries of Scotland Act, 1959.

5. New Towns Act, 1959.

6. Export Guarantees Act, 1959.

7. Landlord and Tenant (Furniture and Fittings) Act, 1959.

8. Fatal Accidents Act, 1959.

9. Obscene Publications Act, 1959.

10. Factories Act, 1959.

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11. Statute Law Revision Act, 1959.

12. Wages Councils Act, 1959.

13. Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act, 1959.

14. Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1959.

15. Mental Health Act, 1959.

16. Legitimacy Act, 1959.

17. Edinburgh College of Art Order Confirmation Act, 1959.

18. Leith Harbour and Docks Order Confirmation Act, 1959.

19. British Transport Commission Order Confirmation Act, 1959.

20. Pier and Harbour Order (Gloucester) Confirmation Act, 1959.

21. Pier and Harbour Order (Med-way Lower Navigation) Confirmation Act, 1959.

22. Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Act, 1959.

23. Falmouth Docks Act, 1959.

24. Bootle Corporation Act, 1959.

25. Tees Valley and Cleveland Water Act, 1959.

26. Mid-Wessex Water Act, 1959.

27. British Transport Commission Act, 1959.

28. Portsmouth Corporation Act, 1959.

29. Humber Bridge Act, 1959.

30. Shell-Mex and B.P. (London Airport Pipeline) Act, 1959.

31. Halifax Corporation Act, 1959.

32. City of London (Various Powers) Act, 1959.

33. South Wales Transport Act, 1959.

34. Lee Valley Water Act, 1959.

35. London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1959.

BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION (ANNUAL REPORT)
Question again proposed,
That this House takes note of the Report and Accounts of the British Transport Commission for 1958 and of the Report reappraising the plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways (Command Paper No. 813).—[Mr. Nugent.]
Amendment proposed, at the end of the Question, to add:
"and while welcoming the progress being made in the modernisation and re-equipment of the railways, regrets the actions of Her Majesty's Government which have damaged the financial solvency of the British Transport Commission and led to the curtailment in the services it should render in the national interest".—[Mr. Ernest Davies]
5.47 p.m.
Mr. Lindgren: When the procedural interruption occurred, I was addressing to the Minister a plea that there should be a real reconstruction of the capital finances of the British Transport Commission to bring about a relationship with the capital costs of the equipment which the Commission operates.
I was making the point, too, that no group of workers likes to be associated with an industry which is always operating with a deficit. If it has to operate with a deficit and it is a social service, then we accept it. But if there is a deficit when the Government of the day say that the undertaking must be run in such a fashion as to meet its costs, then those who invest their lives and their skill—all the capital they have—in the industry ask that the industry should be given a chance to pay its way by having a financial structure which has some relationship to the industry itself.
My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East called attention to the Commission's appreciation of the workers inside the industry and the manner in which they carry out their various tasks. There is one phase of the modernisation programme and the accounts which has not been taken into consideration—the possibilities of the future. In May, 1958, when we had the last wage negotiations, in which the Minister interfered in the same way as he interferes in other operations of the Commission, part of the settlement was that there should be an independent inquiry into the wage and salary structure of the industry.
It has been argued by those of us on the trade union side that the railwaymen in all grades, the salaried as well as the wages grades, have been grossly underpaid in relation to the responsibility and the duties which they carry. In order that that can be ascertained factually this independent inquiry has been set up. We do not know what the result of that inquiry will be, but we do know the wage and salary structure within our own industry and we think we know the wage and salary structure in other industries, and those of us associated with transport can see no other result of the inquiry than that there will be a showing of the under-payment of wages and salaries on the railways and the natural entering into negotiations between the Commission and
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the unions for a realignment of the structure of wages and salaries.
I want to make the plea to the Minister that on this occasion he should leave the Commission free to enter those negotiations with the unions, and leave the Commission and the unions to negotiate freely on the evidence before them. If we are to have an industry which has got to pay its way, then in the settlement of wages and salaries the Commission should be free equally to make arrangements to meet the costs satisfactorily.
5.52 p.m.
Mr. John Peyton: The hon. Gentleman the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Lindgren), who has just seconded the Amendment, was, I thought, a great deal more frank with the House than was the hon. Gentleman the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies), who moved it.
I find it almost incredible that within weeks or months, or whatever it may be, of the General Election, the spokesman for the party opposite, the Front Bench spokesman of the party which was responsible originally for nationalisation, and which has just now launched what amounts to a Motion of censure on the Government, found it impossible, in the course of a long speech, to devote even a few minutes to indicating what his party's proposals are for the difficult problems which undoubtedly, we all admit, face the British Transport Commission. It was an almost incredible speech. It repeated the themes which we have heard so often before, and without pausing even for a minute to make a single constructive suggestion.
Mr. Ernest Davies: We made constructive suggestions in 1947.
Mr. Peyton: I am so deeply obliged to the hon. Gentleman, whose only reply to me now is that they made their constructive suggestions in 1947. What a perfectly splendid admission: the last time they made a suggestion was twelve years ago, and they have not another one to make yet.
Mr. Davies: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman need get so excited over this. The policy which we laid down in the 1947 Act, as I pointed out in my speech, was working satisfactorily when the Tory Government came in in 1951.

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The policy of a planned, integrated, coordinated transport system which includes the renationalisation of road haulage is the policy to which we shall return when we get back to power.
Mr. Peyton: Let us with great effort haul ourselves back to 1959 and its problems. This is 1959 now. The hon. Gentleman seems unaware of that.
There were some points in the hon. Gentleman's speech with which I agreed. He mentioned particularly the difficulties facing the Transport Commission and the men throughout the railway industry in carrying on operations at the same time as a major reconstruction was going on. That is a very genuine point. I often think that the public do not realise the very considerable difficulties which face the Commission in this respect. Some of us from both sides of the House have had an opportunity of looking at some of the operations being carried on by the Commission at present. We have all admired the magnificent work which has been done to keep the operations going at the same time as a very major scheme of redevelopment has been carried out.
There is another point which the hon. Gentleman made to which I must refer. He reiterated the old parrot cry that the Government were responsible for the recession which has done so much damage to the industry. Very interestingly, very shortly afterwards he said that railways all over the world had been affected by the same circumstances. Either the hon. Gentleman still lives in such a tight little world of his own that he has no conception of what is going on outside, or, alternatively, he just omitted to advert to the fact of which he is perfectly well aware that every country in the Western world has been suffering from a considerable recession, in most cases with far more disadvantageous effects than has been the case in this country.
The hon. Gentleman went on to complain of the growth of private transport and said it had damaged the Commission. He did not really make it clear what he was going to do about this. Does he really thing that it is a bad thing, this growth of private transport?
Mr. Ernest Davies: I never said so.
Mr. Peyton: Am I right in supposing, then, that the hon. Member does not
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think the growth of private transport is a bad thing? Because that is a very welcome piece of conversion, if that is his view.
Mr. Davies: I do not understand why the hon. Gentleman always puts words into my mouth and misinterprets what I said. Nobody can deny that one of the main problems which confronts transport today is the growth of private transport. I have said frequently that the increase in private motoring will continue. Nobody is against the growth of private transport, but there are cases where some control is necessary, and some control is already exercised.
Mr. Peyton: It is the great difficulty that none of us knows what these controls to which the hon. Gentleman frequently refers in his speeches are; we do not know exactly what he means by them.
I must sympathise with the hon. Member about the inquiry into the transport of goods by road. He had, obviously, expected a very different result to be forthcoming. He has not been wise enough to keep quiet and bottle up his disappointment, but has let it out publicly, and he has made it very clear on a number of occasions that he is horrified, in particular, by the conclusion that C-licence vehicles are not inefficiently operated. That is a result very disappointing to him. Therefore, he claims that it must be entirely attributed to bias. He is blaming the referee.
The Opposition Amendment is really rather extraordinary, for the simple fact of the situation is that the Government are blamed for damaging the financial solvency of the railways at a time when we are investing, or providing taxpayers' money, to the extent of £1,500 million to help a very extensive modernisation programme. Really, one has to be subtle to follow the kind of argument which says that while we are providing £1,500 million of public money for a modernisation programme, with the aims of which none of us quarrels, we are damaging the undertaking's financial solvency.
I may have been unduly optimistic, but I had confidently expected to hear a little more about what is meant by "disintegration". Hon. Members opposite are fond of saying from time to time that they will produce an integrated

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system of transport. But what will happen? They nationalised 20 per cent. of the road haulage industry, omitting C-licence vehicles. Are they suggesting now that had that 20 per cent. remained in public ownership it would have made a vital difference to the finances of the British Transport Commission? If that is so, it is laughable.
Mr. Charles Howell: Why did the party opposite sell it if it was not profitable? I am rather interested in this disintegration. Will the hon. Member tell us what part of the industry the Transport Commission was forced to sell which was not making a profit?
Mr. Peyton: I was not talking about disintegration, but trying to understand the policy of the party opposite and why hon. and right hon. Members opposite have today tabled a censure Amendment in the name of the Leader of the Opposition. This is one more bad bet made by the hon. and right hon. Members opposite. They have thought that here was something which might win. They thought that this was a good runner but, on the basis of speeches made from the Front Bench opposite, we can say now that it is not a winner. It would finish last in any political race.
There is no doubt that road haulage rates have fallen substantially since denationalisation. Is this something which the hon. Member for Enfield, East welcomes or not? If the party opposite comes into power, which I think is highly unlikely, will the hon. Member try to reverse the process and get back to a stage where prices can be expected to rise over the whole of the national economy? We are entitled to ask whether that is what the hon. Member wants. I am justified in making these points because we are left in the dark about the intentions of the party opposite. I may be wrong, but I understand that a high-powered committee of the National Executive of the Labour Party has been studying this matter for over two years, but has failed signally yet to produce any coherent policy for transport.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: What is the policy of the party opposite?
Mr. Peyton: Has the party opposite made up its mind whether subsidised transport is desirable or not? Has it made up its mind on any clear proposals to deal with C licences?
A number of other hon. Members will wish to speak in the debate and I have probably said as much as I ought to say about Opposition proposals. So far as we have been given any clue to what they are, the party opposite has offered no solution. For the most part we, the country in general, the transport user, the worker in transport, and the management in transport, are left entirely in the dark about these proposals.
A great many hon. Members opposite would do well to find out what proposals are being put forward by their own Front Bench. They should ask their Front Bench how it could possibly come about that a party which is meant to be a responsible Opposition launches a censure Amendment of this kind just before a General Election and, in the process, does not consider it necessary to put forward a single constructive proposal. That is a fact which must be almost without parallel in political history.
As to the work of the Transport Commission, reference is made in paragraph 180 of the Annual Report to the desirability of gaining or retaining worthwhile traffics. I do not wish to make much of the point, but I think that it would be dangerous if the Commission allowed itself to be led into uneconomic practices in order to hold traffic which, at some future time, might be useful and profitable to it. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Enfield, East appears to have left the Chamber.
Mr. C. R. Hobson: Make a speech and get on with it.
Mr. Peyton: I agree with the hon. Member for Enfield, East about the Commission's capital reconstruction. We are rapidly reaching a stage where unreality has gone much too far. I hope that the Commission's expectations will be fulfilled. I believe that as soon as the Commission reaches a balance in its affairs it will be no longer wise or proper to postpone a really radical overhaul of its financial structure. There is no good reason for retaining this quite absurd and unrealistic present structure.

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There is also a point to be made about the rate at which modernisation is proceeding. It is a fact not subject to controversy that over the years the railways have lost much of their proportionate share of goods traffic. But is the modernisation programme proceeding fast enough? Is the necessary degree of contraction being carried out quickly enough to match the fall-off in the volume of traffic?
The last major point on the Commission which I should like to make is its public relations. The Commission serves itself ill in the way it carries on this important department. The public are interested in the railways. It would be as well if the Commission lost no opportunity to inform the public of the efforts that are being made, of the difficulties that have to be faced, and the undoubted progress being made in this very comprehensive scheme of modernisation. All of us who travel by rail have to wait at stations and on those stations there is a great deal of free advertising space which the Commission has at its disposal to inform the public of its difficulties, its achievements, its progress and its hopes.
It would be no bad thing if the Commission were seriously to overhaul its public relations department with a view to giving adequate information to the public, who are not only its customers but its bankers. I hope that my right hon. Friend will commend this view to the Commission and that it will take note of it. I am sure that the Commission could save itself much pain and tears if it were to remind itself that the public are anxious to hear about its progress. In last year's Report there is a brief reference to the fact that it is not generally realised that the Commission runs double the number of restaurant cars that are run by all the railways of Europe put together. Why should it be generally realised? The public are not to be expected to read through these annual Reports, and I think that the Commission would be well advised to ensure that much more information is given in digestible form to the public.
May I offer my congratulations to the Commission and to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport? We have made our choice and have laid down the lines upon which to proceed. We have
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accepted the fact that modernisation must go ahead. It would be dangerous for politicians to suggest half way through the programme that it should be changed. I reinforce the plea made by the chairman of the Commission in the reappraisal document that there should be some certainty of continuity. It is a most important point and I hope that my right hon. Friend will go as far as he can to give the assurance there asked for, because it would be an important contribution.
I conclude by saying that at a time when, on the whole, it is more popular to complain about railways, to hatch all kinds of stories which reflect against them, I think we should note in this House the undoubted progress which has been made, the undoubted co-operation which has been forthcoming in no easy circumstances between all who are engaged in this great undertaking. It speaks volumes for the good will, for the intelligence and the courage not only of the Commission, but of every man who works in the industry, and, indeed, for the trade unions also, who have their own problems, as one readily admits.
I do not minimise in any way the serious problems facing the Commission. T am certain that it needs, as well as our criticism from time to time, our encouragement and our good will, and I hope very much that it will receive both.
6.12 p.m.
Mr. C. R. Hobson: Among the mixture of hyperbole and mock indignation that has been characteristic of the speech of the hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) there were one or two things with which I could agree. One was the tribute that the hon. Gentleman paid to the Commission on the way it has overcome many of its difficulties. Previously, the hon. Gentleman criticised its publicity. I, on the other hand, give it full marks, and if the hon. Gentleman would visit any Underground station he would see there posters showing, for example, the Barking Cross-over and modern freight services. If the hon. Gentleman travels by railway he will see these posters and publicity, which are first-class, and I only wish other parts of the service were equally good.
The hon. Gentleman said that my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield,

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East (Mr. Ernest Davies) had made no positive suggestions. If he had listened to my hon. Friend and had not been so emotionally pent up while waiting to make his own speech—we know how frustrating this is—he would have realised that my hon. Friend made precisely the same suggestions as he himself made, namely, that there should be financial reorganisation of the British Transport Commission. So I regret the tone of the hon. Gentleman's remarks.
I begin by saying that the subject of railways is not sufficiently discussed in the House of Commons. We discuss it once a year when there are three days allocated to the nationalised industries or when there is a Private Bill. Yet this is a service which affects every one of us and it is rarely discussed in this House. I want to put in a plea for further accountability of the nationalised industries. I am a great believer in the nationalisation of our basic industries which, I think, have done a remarkably good job—including the Transport Commission—but there is one great weakness and that is the weakness in the construction of the Acts of Parliament that there is not sufficient accountability.
If I may say so with modesty and humility, I never found it difficult to deal with questions concerning the Post Office when I was Assistant Postmaster-General for five years. Many a thing that was going wrong was quickly put right. There are other ways of accountability. There is the Estimates Committee, there is the Public Accounts Committee. All those of us who believe fervently in nationalisation would welcome legislation for public accountability of the nationalised services, whichever Government was in power. Indeed, these are the only organisations which operate contrary to a constitutional doctrine, namely, they get supply without the redress of grievance, so I believe that the House must seriously consider this point.
I believe that the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation is far too big. The Minister deals with civil aviation, roads, railways, shipping, canals and also with London Transport. No one man can do all this and supervise it, no matter who he is. I am not criticising in a carping way, but the Department is
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far too big and it will have to be broken down. The same applies to the British Transport Commission to a lesser degree.
Mr. William Shepherd: It certainly does.
Mr. Hobson: I have the highest personal regard for Sir Brian Robertson, but one man cannot run the Commission. I recall the days when Sir Josiah Stamp was chairman of the L.M.S. Railway and I was negotiating with him on power station matters in Stonebridge. We got what we wanted. Sir Josiah was always genial and friendly and I remember him saying, "Hobson, L.M.S. is too big for any one man". I say that the Transport Commission is too big for one man, because it deals with railways, docks, shipping, canals—all the multifarious properties owned by the Commission. One man cannot possibly control all these in the way they should be controlled, so that is another thing which must be looked at.
Mr. Arthur Holt: Can the hon. Member tell me how long he has held this view?
Mr. Hobson: For a long time, and if the hon. Member had done me the honour of listening when I was speaking of the nationalised industries he would have heard me advocating this. I am not like some members of the Liberal Party—I do not speak with two voices.
Mr. C. Howell: My hon. Friend does not speak very often, either.
Mr. Hobson: It is regrettable that this debate comes at the end of our Session. Many hon. Members would have liked some Parliamentary continuity in respect of the problems of British Railways, because there is a lot to be said. As a result, my remarks must be general. I apologise for this, but I assure hon. Members that just as I have been tied up with my little argument with the Minister about the Parliamentary timetable, so the House is concerned about railways, because of the Recess and now, indeed, because of a possible General Election.
First, I want to say some good things about the Transport Commission and the railways. I think that their catering is excellent in the dining cars and cheaper than anywhere else in the world. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Yeovil gave me my cue, because he gave the

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number of restaurant cars run in Britain as compared with the rest of Britain. Let us give credit where it is due. If anyone wants a good bottle of Médoc, he should buy it in one of the dining cars of British Railways, for he will get it at a very reasonable price.
I pay tribute to British Railways for the cleanliness of their named trains. There has been a tremendous improvement since our last transport debate. I should like to see it extended to what I call the cross-country services. If this were done, there would be little room for criticism.
We must also give the railways 100 per cent. credit for the magnificent way in which they have developed their diesel local services. They are efficient and regular and, by and large, are timed to meet the public needs. They are a revenue earner. The Leeds-Bradford diesel service is excellent, with three trains an hour, heavily loaded. As a lover of the railways, that is what I want to see extended.
Having said that, however, I have some criticisms to make. I share the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Lindgren) and some of my other colleagues who are associated with the railway world about the necessity for closing certain branch lines. Hon. Members will laugh when I say that I am making a plea to save one of my local lines which is earmarked for closure, but I shall give good and, I hope, cogent reasons why the Keighley-Oxenhope line should remain open.
I believe that the Minister of Transport is a Yorkshireman.
Mr. Lindgren: I knew that there was something wrong with him.
Mr. Hobson: The Minister closed one of my local lines between Keighley and Halifax. We argued the case, but we lost. The Keighley-Oxenhope line is an entirely different proposition. I am told on the best authority that this branch line loses £1,500 a year. I believe that savings in station staff have been agreed with the railway unions which would halve that figure. Although there are not many trains on this line, it carries a heavy load of workers down from the Bronte country to Keighley to work. It is a push and pull service. It carries
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quite a bit of heavy freight and coal up to Haworth and Oakworth. The service is a vital necessity in winter, because there are times of the year when snow prevents the bus services from operating.
It will be argued that there are guarded level crossings on the line, but there are not many trains. I suggest that there is no need for the guarded level crossings, because the use of "Caution" and "T" signs would obviate this. In this way, the losses on the Keighley—Oxenhope line could be translated into a profit. This is a branch line—and there are others elsewhere throughout the country—on which the losses are not great and where economies in the direction I have indicated would enable it to remain open.
I refuse to accept the doctrine that every line must pay for itself. If this were applied, the Great Central would be closed tomorrow. Money which was sunk into it when it was built between Manchester, Sheffield and Lincoln has been lost. To apply the principle that every line must pay for itself would mean the closing of many lines, including main lines. We should have the same outlook towards railway services as to bus services. The No. 11 route is a money spinner. The No. 226, around Willesden, is not, but it is equally necessary.
Many of our branch lines are essential and necessary. I am not prepared to give the Transport Commission or the Ministry of Transport carte blanche automatically to close down these branch lines. It is true, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough said, that some lines should never have been built, but merely because the Ministry has pushed up its savings from £10 million to £20 million and £30 million there is a tendency to say that all branch lines which are not profitable should automatically be closed. That is wrong. I hope that the Minister will consider the situation from the viewpoint of public service.
I come now to the modernisation programme. I do not know where we are getting to. I do not know quite what we are after. I wonder sometimes whether the Transport Commission knows what it is after. Let me give some examples. In the modernisation of the main lines, some are to be electrified and some dieselised. Why have both? We are dieselising the North Eastern line out of King's Cross

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and, at the same time, it is being electrified. Why not keep the steam locomotives? They did excellent service. Why are we doing it twice over? I am told that the Western Region will not be electrified, but will be dieselised.
Mr. Walter Monslow: Will my hon. Friend tell us what is the difference in cost between electrification and dieselisation?
Mr. Hobson: I am not prepared to do that. In my opinion, electrification is far more economical in the long run, as has been proved beyond peradventure by the Southern Region.
Mr. Nugent: The consideration is mainly one of density of operation. If the density of operation is heavy enough, electrification is best. If it is not, diesel is the next best.
Mr. Hobson: That has not been the experience in France, which has probably the most efficient railway service in the world. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I think so. In my view, there is no need for both systems. We should have gone straight away to electrification and kept the steam locomotives.
I am worried about the initial cost and the maintenance cost of diesel engines. It is no good making comparisons, as people sometimes do when calculating maintenance figures, with steam locomotives and including the boiler cleaning. That is not a real test. In the case of the diesel, the incidence of mechanical breakdowns is much higher, as they are bound to be by the very nature of the machine. Except for a steam turbine, it is impossible to have a simpler mechanical machine than a steam locomotive. If the Joint Parliamentary Secretary inquires, he will find that, for dieseis, the maintenance cost is very heavy. That is what I am informed by members of my union who work on the job.
I would like to see electrification given the go-ahead. Diesels could be kept for the branch lines or cross-country lines, but not main lines. The Commission supports this view by the fact that it is electrifying the Manchester—London line and the King's Cross main lines, as well as those from Liverpool Street. The Commission cannot have it both
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ways, because it also has diesels working on these lines. There is something wrong here and it should be looked at.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary mentioned the proposed new underground line from Victoria. The Minister also has certain power stations under his direction. What is to be the future of Lots Road, Neasden and Greenwich? There has not been an extra kilowatt put in since early in the war. Against the national grid standard of 50 a 33⅓ cycle is used. The railways are already taking a lot of their current from the grid. Are they to be kept on? What is to be the source of power for this new underground line? These are problems which the Ministry must examine.
One annoyance from which all travellers on British Railways suffer is bad timekeeping. This wants looking at, particularly on trains out of King's Cross. What is wrong with trains on the Eastern and North Eastern Region? When was the Aberdonian last on time? Ten days ago the Queen of Scots Pullman was 75 minutes late. On Tuesday, the 8.23 out of Doncaster was five minutes ahead of time and had a splendid run down to "Ally Pally". What happened after that? There were about seven stops between Alexandra Palace and King's Cross. This bad timekeeping annoys the public more than anything else.
What method is adopted for dealing with this problem? Whatever one might say about the old company managers, in days gone by if a train was late the general manager bore down on the operating manager and asked why it was late and action was taken right down the line. The same thing must be done on British Railways. It is said that Sir Brian Robertson cannot do that because he is too occupied with other things. What is he paid for? People who are paid for accepting responsibility must accept it. That is a good doctrine. The Government ought to put pressure on British Railways to ensure good timekeeping.
I know about the difficulties in the renewal of stock and that sort of thing, but let us be fair about this. After all, the war has been over for fifteen years, and British Railways have had plenty of time to renew their stock. In France, bridges had to be rebuilt after the war. In

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Western Germany the density of traffic is very high, but the trains run to time. It is the duty of the Government and the Transport: Commission to look into this problem. People who believe in nationalisation, as I do, want an efficiently run service. The only way in which we can improve the service is to criticise it, and I have no hesitation in criticising the Commission for bad timekeeping.
What is to be the policy of the Transport Commission? We have heard favourable reports of a special 100 m.p.h. service between Manchester and London. I hope that that service develops, but it is asking a lot, because that is a very high speed. Even in France, where there is not the high density of traffic that we have in this country, no service operates at that speed.
Train services, particularly between Leeds and King's Cross, should be speeded up. The journey used to be done in 2¾ hours, but it now takes 3½ hours and on Sundays the journey cannot be done in under 5 hours, except by Pullman. That is the sort of thing that ought to be looked at. I know the difficulties about reconstruction, but the speed factor is very important to those of us who want the railways to continue to expand.
Mr. Charles Pannell: I do not know whether my hon. Friend will believe it—I have not known it happen for a long time—but last Sunday morning the Pullman from King's Cross to Leeds arrived at its destination a minute before time.
Mr. Hobson: That is excellent. It may be the result of some people criticising the service. The faot still remains that on the North Eastern section timekeeping is bad.
Mr. D. Jones: I do not agree.
Mr. Hobson: I do not like the notice at King's Cross about delays to trains. The notice has been there for some weeks, saying that delays to suburban services are caused by dieselisation. That takes a bit of believing. One cannot believe that these teething troubles are confined to that one area.
I want to see a little prestige-building by British Railways. We must do something about St. Pancras and King's Cross. Improvements to railway stations in
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other countries are made by Government grants and not by money provided by the railways. I do not like the appearance of Harwich, which is the first station I see on my return from abroad. Foreigners do not make the mistake of having stations which offend the eye. It is essential that our stations at which visitors from abroad arrive should be models. Other countries do it and so can we. Some attention ought to be paid to the appearance of the trains that go to the Continent. The stock is available to do it.
I have never lost my boyhood love of the railways and I never shall. I want to see the railway service improve. One of the ways in which we can help is by having more debates about the railways so that we can point out some of the things that affect the public. If we do that, in a few years' time we shall once again have a service which is the envy of the world.
6.25 p.m.
Mr. Leslie Thomas: I am sure that we all enjoyed the forthright and interesting speech of the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. C. R. Hobson). In view of his opening statement, it was a very courageous speech.
The hon. Gentleman started by saying that he thought my right hon. Friend's Department was much too big for one man to manage. Be that as it may, he went on to say that he thought that the British Transport Commission was too big an organisation to be effectively managed by one man. I entirely agree and I think that every hon. Member on this side of the House will agree with the hon. Gentleman, because he was really getting at the basis of the Opposition's policy.
The hon. Gentleman felt that the enormous growth that comes with integration gets out of manageable proportions. That was the essence of his speech and I hope that other hon. Members opposite will have the courage to be as honest as he has been, particularly in the light of the speech of the hon. Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies), who, I am sorry to say, is not present at the moment. We all deprecate his personal attack on my right hon. Friend, but perhaps it covered a somewhat weak case.

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I want to follow the line that the hon. Member for Keighley has taken up, because he has raised a point that I was going to touch upon. I am sure that all hon. Members must have given considerable thought to the problem of how big an industrial service like this can be—and I use the phrase "industrial service" because it is an industry and provides a service—before it gets out of manageable proportions. The Transport Commission, because of the vastness of its empire, has become too big for economy and efficiency. It is really an octopus.
The Commission is not only a railway operating undertaking, but a waterways and road transport undertaking. Further, it is an investment company. It holds shares in passenger transport concerns which it does not control. It holds shares in hotels and properties and, therefore, must have investment experts. These are all vast businesses in themselves. Would it not be in the interests of economy to divide up this industry? I am not suggesting that transport should be further denationalised.
I know that this impinges upon Socialist policy, but I should like to see British Road Services operating as a separate concern and competing with private enterprise road haulage. Analysing the accounts, one finds that a considerable amount of traffic is passed to British Road Services by the railways. It would be interesting to know whether that is done because it is part of the same concern, and what the difference in cost would have been if this traffic had been passed to private hauliers.
Mr. Monslow: Will the hon. Member say how, without integration, we can have either an efficient or a solvent transport industry in Britain?
Mr. Thomas: The hon. Member is saying that unless we have a complete monopoly we cannot have an efficient transport service. That is the real meaning of integration. As my right hon. Friend said in the debate in January, when we were discussing the Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill, it is not merely the operators, the staff or the Commission who are being considered; there is such a person as the British consumer and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) pointed out, as a
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result of competition road freight charges have been reduced by nearly 25 per cent.
As for the great modernisation plan, I want to refer to the point about capitalisation, which was raised by the hon. Member for Enfield, East and the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Lindgren). There is £1,500 million to be spent over the whole period of the plan. As the hon. Member for Wellingborough said, taking up a point that I made in January, we are here dealing with a tremendous capital of about £3,000 million. I agree that there must be some adjustment in the capital structure of this great concern. My hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil said that we ought to wait until we have crossed the line from the red to the black, and I agree with him.
No suggestion came from hon. Members opposite as to the form of the new structure, if there is to be one. I would ask them to bear in mind that the present structure, rigid as it is, is their responsibility.
Mr. Monslow: No.
Mr. Thomas: Yes. They nationalised the railways in their present form, with guaranteed stocks.
I want to make a suggestion which may not be palatable to some of my hon. Friends. The new capital investment which is now taking place must be funded at some time. I suggest that it should be held as an equity by the Government. I agree with those hon. Members who have said that the railway service, with the structure of the Commission as it is at present, can at no time sustain a capital as great as £3,000 million without a Government guarantee.
We are finding about £1,500 million over a period of years. What is the Commission contributing towards this capital investment? At present, everything is coming from the Treasury. The Commission has many investments which are neither ancillary to nor required for the Commission's transport operations, whether they be road, rail, waterways or whatever. The Commission has in its accounts land and surplus property not required for its operational use. Account No. VI-12, on page 118 of the Accounts, shows that this land and property is producing a net revenue

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of over £4 million. That is more than a 14 per cent. return.
I suggest that my right hon. Friend, or the Treasury, or the Commission, should consider the revaluation of this property, whether it is Chiltern Court or land alongside the railway. In the light of the capital demands of the industry I think that the Commission should make some contribution. Why should not that property be revalued? At present, it is given the old book value. It should be revalued in the light of modern prices. The property market has been booming over the years. The Commission could take advantage of this fact and make its own contribution, no matter how small, towards the cost of the modernisation plan.
For many years some regions have been running their own refreshment services. A few years ago they bought out the Pullman Car Company. The extraordinary thing is that if a person goes to Brighton or Bournemouth he has to pay a surcharge for the pleasure of having his meal on the train, but if he is travelling on the Western Region he can walk into the dining-car free. That is a stupid and ridiculous thing. I have to pay a surcharge when I come up to town on Sunday night.
Mr. D. Jones: If the hon. Member travels on the South Wales Pullman, which leaves Paddington at 8.50 in the morning on Sundays, he will have to pay precisely the same charge
Mr. Thomas: The hon. Member is labouring under a misapprehension. A traveller does not pay a surcharge if he goes into a restaurant car which is run directly by the Commission, but he does pay if he goes into a Pullman Car Company car. I know. I have to pay when I travel up to town on Sunday night.
Mr. Monslow: The hon. Member always has paid.
Mr. Thomas: Yes, but hon. Members opposite are talking about integration and standardisation. Where is it?
Some of my hon. Friends might not think that I should make this point, but I think that it is a ridiculous situation, not only in regard to the surcharge paid by the passengers but also because men
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doing the same sort of job receive different rates of pay according to the kind of dining car in which they work, and the region in which they work. The whole situation is anomalous and absurd, and I do not regret having drawn attention to it. There should be a proper levelling up of standards and labour conditions. I know it may be said that private interests are concerned in this case, but in view of the fact that the trains are run by the Commission those private interests should be bought out.
In moving the Amendment the hon. Member for Enfield, East blamed the Government for the heavy deficits which the Commission faces today. That was the chief point of his speech. But he cannot really say that with sincerity, in the light of the recent world recession and after the debates on the economic situation which took place in this House just before Whitsun, because it was then revealed that during the recession this country was better placed than any other in the world. The hon. Gentleman cannot deny that the vast reduction in the revenue of the Commission over the past twelve months is not due to the competition from private industry to which he objects, but, in the main, is due to the setback in basic industries such as steel—which is now recovering—and coal. The setback in the coal industry is not due, as the hon. Gentleman knows, to Government policy, but to the fact, if I may use the words of my right hon. Friend in a previous debate, that the gain of oil over coal has been purely on a price factor.
Like other Amendments that we have debated in the past few days, I believe that this Amendment will be defeated, and with a bigger majority even than was secured against the Amendment which we debated last night. That will reflect the justification of the policy of my right hon. Friend and the energetic manner in which the Government have dealt with the problems of transport in this country.
6.52 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Holt: The hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. L. Thomas) referred to the capital reorganisation of the Commission and twice the Joint Parliamentary Secretary referred to the Amendment to the

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Government Motion in the names of my hon. Friends and myself. I had not intended to present the case fully in support of the Amendment as I do not think omnibus speeches in the middle of a transport debate serve a very useful purpose, particularly if they are made by back benchers. I wish to discuss the Transport Tribunal and the transport users' consultative committees.
On the question of control and public accountability I have always maintained, even as far back as the debates on the 1953 Act, that any move in the direction of regional accountability and responsibility would result in the more efficient running of the railways. The Government have made a move in that direction by setting up area boards, but they have not gone very far. It would add to the efficiency of our railways, and ultimately to the understanding by Parliament of the relative efficiency of the different regions, if regional accountability could be achieved.
When such accountability has been secured, and though they would still be nationalised, I see no reason why the regional bodies should not be further separated from the Commission. They might even raise their own money in the same way as we advocate should be done by local gas boards which are already separately accountable. That would be getting back to the system on which the railways were run before they were nationalised without actually denationalising them.
From the point of view of Ministerial responsibility this presents a difficult problem. No solution is yet apparent to the problem of how the nationalised industries should be made responsible to this House. A Select Committee which has been sitting almost continuously has still not arrived at a solution, nor do I know of any solution which has been advanced from anywhere else. I suggest that during the interim period, while the reorganisation programme is being carried out, there is a great deal to be said for the Minister really exercising the powers which he already possesses—it need not be necessary for the right hon. Gentleman to take more powers—to see that the policy of the Government, whatever it may be, is implemented.
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Too often are we presented with plans for the saving of this or that. The Commission sends letters to the Minister to the effect that it proposes to do this or that with the result that millions of pounds will be saved. But that saving does not materialise. I think that the Minister rather likes the idea of being regarded as a tough character, and here is something which he could be tough about. He need not interfere in the detailed running of the railways or of the Transport Commission, but if the policy is to cut out unremunerative services, the right hon. Gentleman should see to it that they are cut out.
I remember in 1952, in one of the first debates on transport in which I took part, the current Report of the Commission stated that the suggestion that great economies could be achieved from cutting out unremunerative services and closing branch lines was an exaggeration. Little by little, more unremunerative services have been cut out. But when we look at the Commission's reappraisal of its modernisation plan we find that in paragraph 24 it states that between 1954 and 1958 the total route mileage of British Railways declined by only 300 miles, but that in the next four years it is expected that about 1,800 miles will be cut. Even at this late stage, and quite apart from whether anyone agrees with the policy of cutting out unremunerative lines, that is the avowed policy of the Government and the Commission. It is the implication of the 1953 Act because that Act does not make sense if the Commission is expected to go on operating unremunerative services. So that at this late stage the important fact is admitted that little has been done about cutting unremunerative services although in the next four years it is proposed that a great deal shall be done. We have heard so often from the Commission about what it will do in the future, but it never delivers the goods. All it delivers are bigger deficits.
I should like to see the Minister of Transport "deliver the goods" to Parliament. I should like to hear the right hon. Gentleman say, "This is the policy and I shall see that it is carried out. If it is not, I shall resign." Only if the Minister has a clear policy which he is determined to see carried out shall we ever reduce

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this deficit even to manageable proportions.
On capital reorganisation, the hon. Member for Canterbury suggested that the new money that has been provided for the reorganisation scheme should be taken up by the Government as equity capital, implying that at some time the railways would make a profit and that the Government would then get dividend on the money. The hon. Gentleman immediately followed up with a sentence which implied that he did not think the railways would make a profit because the burden of the old interest charges and the new were far too great; the railways could never stand it. It was slightly disingenuous of him, therefore, to talk about providing new capital as equity because sometimes the Government might get a dividend.
We ought to deal with this matter as it would be dealt with if the railways belonged to a private enterprise company. Everybody knows what happens. If a company gets into serious difficulties and is almost bankrupt, somebody may say, "If we put a lot of new money into this business there is actually some good trade to be done." The people who formerly had their money in the company have lost it and the equity shares are worth nothing. There is then a great reorganisation scheme, in which the equity shares may get a little. The £1 shareholders may be told that their shares are worth 6d. All the new benefits created go to the people who are putting in the new money.
Surely this is the way to deal with the railway interest problem when the reorganisation scheme is carried out. I would not care to back this scheme at the moment, but if I felt there were drive behind the efforts to make modernisation get on apace and to attract new business, as well as to cut out unremunerative services, I would say, "This is a proposition". The House could then consider the complete obliteration of the interest charges on the old capital as far as the B.T.C. is concerned, which has ceased to have any market value because the business could not pay a dividend.
There is no doubt that the 1953 Act swung the Commission over from the Labour Party's policy of an integrated transport system and an absolute
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monopoly to the idea of a freely competitive system. The only weakness was that it was not free. Various anomalies were left by the 1953 Act, and they have bedevilled the activities of the Commission ever since and have affected the mind of the Commission. The Commission on many occasions still thinks of itself as providing a nationwide railway service and only cuts out unremunerative services with great reluctance. It is taking a great deal to change that attitude of mind of the Commission to a competitive one, in which the railways are ven- much up against fierce competition from other forms of transport.
If the policy of the Government is still that of pursuing this line, the Government must carry it out to its logical conclusion. I would call attention to the Transport Tribunal. Although the 1953 Act gave the British Transport Commission greater freedom with charges it still required, as before, that its charges schemes went to the Transport Tribunal. We have recently had the extraordinary case of the British Transport Commission Charges Scheme, 1958, being presented to the Tribunal in September last year and still not approved by the Tribunal. There was an interim decision, which meant precisely nothing, on 8th May this year. So far as I have been able to ascertain, nothing more has happened, except that there has been one more sitting of the Transport Tribunal.
The interim decision was released to the world on 11th May, and all the daily papers took up a very critical attitude on the following day. The Times and the Manchester Guardian had very critical leading articles on the whole set-up of the Transport Tribunal and its relationship to the British Transport Commission. The Manchester Guardian started off its leading article by saying:
"The Transport Tribunal's reluctance to allow the railways to run their passenger services as a business has made a serious financial situation much worse."
We know that constant delay has taken place not only on this occasion but in previous cases, as the result of which the Transport Commission has been unable to get a rapid readjustment in charges.
If we were running an integrated monopoly there might be something to be said for continuing with a committee

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like the Transport Tribunal, but in a competitive system in which much more transport is already carried on the roads, both in freight and passengers, it is not logical any longer to say to the British Transport Commission, "You must act like a business firm; your deficit is absolutely monstrous", and then hamper it so—
Mr. Monslow rose—
Mr. Holt: I cannot give way. The hon. Member can make the point in a speech later, should he catch Mr. Speaker's eye.
The time has come for the House to look at this position and for the Transport Tribunal to be wound up so as to allow the railways to make charges as they think fit. Some hon. Members fear they would use their freedom to make fantastic charges, but if private firms are concerned to keep the goodwill of their customers that is not the kind of thing they would do in the usual run of affairs. The British Transport Commission will wish to keep the goodwill of its customers, whether for carrying their freight or their persons. There is no reason for us to be concerned about what might happen in equity between one firm and another, or between people, if the British Transport Commission were allowed to fix its own charges. This would require amending legislation by the Government—
Mr. Nugent: I have been making myself more expert in the matter of the Transport Tribunal before I interrupted the hon. Gentleman. I would now remind him that the Transport Tribunal in fact approved the new charges scheme on 8th July. The hon. Member hardly did it credit when he said that it had not reached a decision.
Mr. Holt: I am grateful for that, but I tried to check this. I checked it in the Library and the document is not there. I did not recollect that I had seen it in the papers, but I am very glad to hear it. Presumably it means that the increase in rate per mile which the Commission wishes to charge for passenger services can now be put into force and the Commission can have greater scope to charge a higher rate on unremunerative services.
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I do not think the Transport Commission has asked for anything like enough in this connection. Take a case where it is suggested that a branch line should be closed. There is a station, not in my constituency, but at Entwistle in the constituency of the hon. and learned Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke), who, I know, is very much concerned about it. There is a branch line to it which provides the only transport for that village. The nearest bus service is about two miles away. It might well be that people in that village would be willing to pay not just 50 per cent. more, but twice or three times the normal passenger charge if they could still use that station, but the Transport Commission has not the authority to make such high maximum charges in special cases of that kind. If a service is completely unremunerative the Commission is forced to close the service down. I cannot see that it has any other option, but, if it had powers to make much greater charges, or special charges, in these cases, it might well be that such stations could be kept open and not be unremunerative but serve the needs of special localities.
If the Transport Tribunal were to go, I think there is also a case for saying that the transport users' consultative committees should go. They are rather different from the Transport Tribunal in the sense that they have been most cooperative with the Commission. In the last annual Report for the year ending in 1958 that comes out clearly, and it also comes out in the two Reports we have before us today. The time for consideration of closing branch lines, and so on, has been greatly reduced.
The real trouble about the consultative committees is that attention is distracted from the proper activities of the staff, particularly on British Railways. If people have complaints to make they seem to make them to anyone but the consultative committees. They write to Members of Parliament. I have a long letter from the headmaster of Bolton Grammar School, who had a lot of trouble earlier this year over a party he was taking abroad and failed to get back to Bolton on time. He wrote not to the consultative committee but to the public relations officer of British Railways. It is the job of the public relations officer, the Stationmaster, the

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regional manager and so on to have most intimate contact with their customers, the users of the railways. It is to them that complaints should go.
One sometimes cannot help feeling when the holiday season comes and the railways are suddenly faced with great crowds of people that they look upon it as an awful nuisance instead of as a great opportunity to achieve increased revenue for the railways. They consider that it raises a lot of problems and is very tiresome. This attitude stems from having things like users' consultative committees. The idea is that any problems should be referred to the committee. If we want the railways to operate like a business enterprise their contact with their customers should be exactly the same as that of a private business enterprise with its customers.
If we were to do these two things and really give the railways the freedom we are always talking about—give them the opportunity to operate as a commercial enterprise—I have not the slightest doubt that they would greatly reduce their deficit. I do not think that by any means they would get it down to nothing without a capital reorganisation. How that ought to be dealt with I have indicated, but I think it important that the reorganisation and firm direction of the policy of the British Transport Commission must come first, before the capital reorganisation.
7.15 p.m.
Sir Kenneth Pickthorn: I have, for me, a rather dreadful confession to make. I think that for the first time I am conscious that I am not trying to contribute anything to the main argument, nor to say anything of any importance, even seeming to me very important, with reference to earlier speeches.
I want to raise a point, in itself comparatively small, but one which I think ought to be raised; and about this point I make no kind of assertion, much less a criticism. By the accident of chronology, I have known about it only in the last few days. I do not therefore know enough to make assertions, but this is the last occasion to ask questions on the matter, especially as I think it will be a wholly accomplished fact—I was going to say before we meet again, if
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it is "we"—before some set of people meet again here at any rate.
This is the point I want to put. Several hon. Members have referred to the closing of passenger facilities, the closing of railway stations or whole branches. I am not concerned to argue that that has not been in each case for all I know to the contrary rightly done, and I am quite clear that in some cases, of course, it must be rightly done. What I am inviting the House to do is to turn its attention to the comparison between closure in the case of passenger facilities, stations and lines, and closure in the case of freight-carrying facilities and, most especially, the closure, or partial closure, of marshalling yards, locomotive yards and, in this particular case to which I refer, the partial closing of a tunnel.
The proposal is that a tunnel which badly needs repair should be repaired as a single-track tunnel instead of a double-track tunnel. I am not suggesting that there is any mistake being made there. I am not sure enough about that. Nor am I suggesting that any avoidable hardship is being inflicted. What I want first to know, and ask my right hon. Friend if he will be good enough to consult Sir Brian Robertson and others at that kind of level about, is whose duty is it in the case of the closing or partial closing of a tunnel, or marshalling yard where the marshalling yard is necessary and not being replaced by another—in either case—to be reassured that there is no strategic reason involved against the closure or partial closure?
With every respect to my right hon. Friend, it does not seem to me that the Minister of Transport is the person best qualified to deal with that. Indeed, if the Minister of Transport were Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, I should think that he would make a mistake in the exercise of that office in deciding the question which I am putting to the House. This is a question which has not been put in earlier debates or in earlier Reports and which ought now to be put.
There is a question connected with it to which, again, I do not know the answer. The men who came to see me about the Colwick-Netherfield marshalling yard and the Mapperley Tunnel were certainly qualified trade unionists. They were the qualified spokesmen of

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their unions and very experienced men. They were persuaded, it seems to me incredibly—I may have misunderstood them, but I do not think I did—that where a marshalling yard is closed down or, as in this case, partially closed down, it is impossible to move the labour as it is graded across a regional boundary. I hope that I am being clear.
The line is drawn in the middle of my constituency between the Midland Region and the Eastern Region of the railways. I find to my great surprise that that is the view held by these very experienced and responsible trade unionists, who live in a railway community—for Colwick-Netherfield is as much a railway community, almost, as is Crewe or Swindon. They were persuaded that one of the difficulties would be that 200 or so people might be redundant. I said to them that that might be true but that they had to understand that it did not mean that there were 200 people fewer in employment; perhaps there would be 200 more employed, for example, at Retford. The answer which I was given to that was that that might be so but that it would be difficult to move men, except at the lowest grades, from one region into another.
To me that was a new thought and a new difficulty which I had not heard of before. I should not have thought that it could be true, but I ask my right hon. Friend to make sure whether there is some agreement, explicit or implicit, between management and unions or otherwise which, in the case of the closing of tunnels or marshalling yards, makes it difficult to move men at the grades to which they are accustomed across a regional boundary. As far as I know, the point has not been specifically raised in the House before, and it ought to be carefully considered.
7.23 p.m.
Mr. Thomas Steele: I feel that the hon. Member for Carlton (Sir K. Pickthorn) probably misunderstood the people who made representations to him, because I imagine from my experience that no such difficulty would arise if there were redundancy. It may be that the men themselves felt that the difficulties arose from having to move their homes.
Sir K. Pickthorn: No. They understood this point as well.
Mr. Steele: I am still not clear that there should be any difficulty, because one of the things which happened when we nationalised the railways was that, on promotion, men could be moved from one country to another. It might not be generally known, but I am a station-master on leave of absence, and each fortnight I receive from the British Transport Commission a document indicating the vacancies which occur, for which sometimes I make application.
Mr. D. Jones: I would point out that in his maiden speech the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. G. Wilson) said that he left the service of the Western Region because there was inter-regional promotion.
Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: I did not say that. I said that inter-regional promotion was a bad thing at the higher grades.
Mr. Steele: I ought to continue my speech, because I have already suffered from so many interruptions from other hon. Members. The situation was reached in which I felt that perhaps I might not be called to speak at all.
I agree that the hon. Member for Carlton made an interesting point in the first matter which he raised. That is something which ought to be considered, but it raises a problem to which I will come later in my speech. It is a problem which faces the Transport Commission in the keeping open of lines which might be necessary for strategic reasons or the keeping open of branch lines to serve the public need. It is the problem of how to finance these matters. I believe that if a line has to remain open for strategic reasons, the Government ought to say so and to make a contribution to the Commission to enable it to be done.
My hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mr. C. R. Hobson), who is not in the Chamber, and the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. L. Thomas) apparently thought that the Transport Commission was far too big. I had hoped to interrupt the hon. Member for Canterbury to request him to ask my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley whether he thought that the Post Office was too big. We all know the interest which my hon. Friend takes in the Post

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Oflice. I am sure that if the House said to him that the Post Office as an organisation was far too big and that something ought to be done about it, he would be the first to object.
I will deal with some of the other matters which arose as I proceed, but I begin by saying that I was delighted that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary paid such a high tribute both to the Commission and to those who work for British Railways. It was good to hear him say that it is essential to the national life that the railways be maintained, and that we need a modern railway service. I agree with those words. He indicated that he was painting a favourable picture about passenger services, where he had an optimistic outlook, and that he was not so happy about freight services. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies), who made a powerful contribution to the debate and whose first-class analysis of the situation answered the points made by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary.
I do not envy the job of the Minister of Transport in a Conservative Government. I can understand why he sometimes becomes irritable, argumentative and angry, because he has an impossible task to perform. I often wonder whether people understand that transport is not a productive industry. We have a certain volume of goods to be transported in the country, and they will be transported by road, rail or sea.
But the amount and volume of traffic are dependent purely on the national economy. If we achieve efficiency and modernisation of one section of transport, that does not necessarily mean that we will increase the volume of traffic. It only means that we might transfer the carrying of those goods or passengers from one method of transport to another. The Estimates Committee criticised the Minister recently on his road programme. My main criticism of the Minister is that in this matter neither he nor the Government appear to have any national policy for transport as a whole.
What will be the result of this Government's transport policy? First, in ten years' time we will have roads which will enable traffic to move on them, but those roads were necessary perhaps ten years ago. We are engaging in heavy
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capital expenditure on the railways, but the railways will have a decreasing volume of traffic. Therefore, we shall have overcrowded roads and under-used railways. It seems to me that the Minister is not a Minister of Traffic, but is, in fact, a Minister of Bedlam.
I live beside the main Glasgow-Carlisle road. The volume of goods traffic using that road has to be seen to be believed. They are not only long-distance road hauliers, but C-licence holders as well. What is the average man's attitude to what he sees on the roads? Without thinking a great deal about it he says, "This traffic should not be on the roads at all." Anyone who believes that a motorists goes on the roads today to derive any pleasure from motoring is living in a fool's paradise, because the roads today are terribly overcrowded, while the railways are not being used to capacity.
It may be that the Minister will say that C licences are being used economically, but the number of C licences has risen from 300,000 in 1946 to over 1 million in 1958 without any great work being done on our roads to enable them to travel.
There has been a great deal of criticism of the Transport Commission and of the closing of branch lines and country stations. The reappraisal indicates that this is to be speeded up. I agree with what the Joint Parliamentary Secretary said. I was a Stationmaster at a country station. I had the job of trying to find traffic for the railways when they were privately owned. I know the problems with which we were faced. We must recognise the changing habits of the people and what those changing habits mean.
In an agricultural community today farmers' feeding stuffs come by road. Farmers' livestock travel by road. The old conception of a farmer taking his livestock along the road to the station is no longer possible, and, in any case, the farmer does not have the staff to do it. Further, when the farmer and his family go anywhere they travel by car. This is done not because of heavy charges made by the Transport Commission, but because it is convenient. Agriculture today is the most heavily subsidised industry in the country. The standard of life of a farming community

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today is maintained because of the agricultural subsidies. I do not disagree with it, but it is a fact that must be faced.
If a local shopkeeper has no customers coming to his shop, the shop very soon closes and that is the end of it. Customers and traffic are not coming to country stations. The first questions I asked those who come to me complaining are, "When did you last travel on the railway? When did you last use it? When did you last send any traffic by rail?" The answers I receive are surprising. Therefore, we must face the fact and admit it.
The problem caused by the increased number of C-licence holders is a real one. I agree with my hon. Friends that many C-licence holders transport their goods in that way for prestige purposes, not because it is economic, but because of the advertising value associated with it. Another disturbing feature is that it is not only private enterprise which is using C licences. It disturbs me to see other nationalised industries, such as the National Coal Board, gas boards and others, building for themselves great transport fleets which require staffing. Private industry is doing the same.
All this is resulting in heavy overcrowding on the roads. This trend, which is continuing and looks as if it will continue, must be seriously considered. It is not a question of what controls we will use. It is not a question of what one party says or another party says. The simple facts are that our roads are overcrowded and our railways are not fully used.
Industrialists must do a lot of hard thinking about this. If they are to increase the numbers of their C-licence vehicles and if they are to go out and use the roads as they are doing, they must pay more for this privilege. The heavy vehicles are the ones which do damage to the roads and slow up traffic. If C-licence holders continue to do this, they must pay more for the privilege, not only for using the roads in this way, but for the increasing number of accidents which are taking place and which are beginning to be looked on as normal to our road use.
We in Scotland are particularly vulnerable. We have large areas which have to be served by public transport. It is only
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natural that we believe that it can be done only with some kind of co-ordination of transport. Unless something is done, many of those areas will be left without any transport at all, because the populous areas are no longer as profitable as they used to be. Both the railways and the bus companies, whether private or public, are finding, again, that with the changing habits of the people—television and other things—the traffic offered is getting less and less, and that unless they increase their charges or cut out some of their uneconomic running they will be "in the red." The private car, too, is one of the big factors.
We have to face up to these things, and so have those people who ask for branch lines and country stations to be kept open. We have to ask ourselves: is the Transport Commission to be a public service, or has it, as the Act says, to pay its way taking one year with another? If it is to be a public service, then we, in Parliament, must take this decision and, in taking it, must realise that it means that we have to provide the money to enable it to be done.
I must add, as a railway employee, that I and my fellow workers disagree violently with the placing of this responsibility on the Commission, and the workers in the industry then being victimised to the extent that their wages and salaries have to be affected because the Commission is compelled to keep open uneconomic routes.
During the passage of the 1953 Act those of us on this side representing Scottish constituencies put down an Amendment asking the Government to keep Scotland out of that Measure altogether. We were defeated, but it should be borne in mind that our suggestion was supported by prominent businessmen in Scotland, and by the Scotsman, the national newspaper of Scotland. We pointed out the special problems arising in Scotland, and we were promised a Committee to examine questions of common interest to transport undertakings, etc.
Ultimately, on 7th September, 1956, this Committee was set up. As I say, its function was to examine transport in Scotland and to arrange for its coordination not only with the nationalised interests but with interests outside. The

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committee had as its chairman Mr. C. D. Shaw. May I ask the Minister how often this Committee has met? It is unnecessary for him to make a note of that question, because I can tell him the answer. The Committee has met only once. Nothing has happened. Having met, the Committee realised that it was set an impossible task and that there was nothing it could do. It was a Committee without power. I said at the time and I think that there is now evidence to prove it, that this was, in fact, only a piece of Tory window-dressing. It is an example of the generally irresponsible attitude adopted by the Government to transport.
It is generally agreed that the reorganisation of capital is necessary, but I want now to say a word about the staff who will be concerned in the reappraisal, modernisation and rationalisation of British Railways. I think that the Commission has appreciated, as did the Parliamentary Secretary, what all this means to the men concerned. It is a difficult problem, and, as I know, the unions have approached it with rather different views. Everyone appreciates that there are difficulties, but the difficulties in Scotland are rather greater than those south of the Border.
We have had debates in this House on industry and employment in Scotland. Our problems are greater. When work is available, employment in Scotland reaches a lower figure than that in England. When unemployment is with us, it is higher than it is south of the Border. It is not only a question of the Commission looking upon the problem sympathetically, and saying that though there may be redundancies there may not be any loss of jobs. There will be loss of opportunity for young people to become apprentices, and at this time, with the greatly increased numbers of school leavers, this is, indeed, a serious problem.
Rightly or wrongly, the men concerned are seriously perturbed about the present situation. Some of their fears may be unfounded, they may misunderstand the situation, but I should like to draw the Minister's attention to what is said about the Commission's workshops in page 44 of the reappraisal plan. It states:
"The Commission's policy for the future will be to continue to use their own workshops
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for the manufacture of equipment and components for which they are laid out as well as for the repair of all equipment."
Unfortunately, there is an understandable proviso here:
"This is subject to the proviso that their costs are competitive."
From among the men in Cowlairs and in St. Rollox—two shops that will be particularly affected—my hon. Friends have had a deputation. The men do not seem to be aware of the terms of the promise in this policy statement. I understand the terms, and appreciate them, but I hope that the Minister will have a word with the Commission about this, and ask it to make clear to the men in those two shops just what it means—and make it clear not only to the union representatives but to the men themselves just exactly what it means I am sure that the men will be co-operative, but it is important that those who are to be affected like this should understand the problem. If the Commission's attitude is that all the repair work on carriages, wagons and locomotives is to be done in the raiway workshops, I hope and trust that it will make a clear statement to that effect to the workmen concerned.
I conclude by saying that so far as the men themselves are concerned, I appreciate their problems and difficulties. The Transport Commission has said to them that no one will become redundant in the sense that he will have to leave the railway service, but that he may have to go to some other job which he has not been doing in the past. I say that they should treat that offer with respect, and should treat it seriously, because I and my hon. Friends on this side of the House know only too well that the industrial situation in Scotland at present is such that any offer of employment, whether it be along the lines of work to which they have been accustomed in the past or not, is not to be sneered at.
The situation arising particularly in the shipping and other industries means that the job itself is likely to be tremendously important in the next few years. I say this not in any party spirit, because I think it is too important, but even if we do have a Labour Government, or, with the best intentions in the world, a Conservative Government, the situation in Scotland is such that the

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remedy for the bad location of industry and the bringing of the improvements we all want will not be easy for any Government which has the job to do.
7.51 p.m.
Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: As there are a large number of hon. Members who still wish to speak, I shall endeavour to be as brief as I possibly can. As is not unusual in debates on transport, we have ranged over a large number of subjects, many of them concerning small points. As has happened before in such debates, there is the danger that we might lose sight of the wood for the trees, an exception being the speech of the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele), who kept the facts in front of him all the time.
I should like to recapitulate very shortly what seem to me to be the fundamental points in regard to the transport situation at the present time. To begin with, I do not agree with the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West that transport is in any sense a cake of a fixed size, or that transport is dependent on the economic condition of the country at any given moment. That is, of course, a limiting factor, but only within a very wide range, because people travel or send their goods from one point to another for one or other of two reasons. It is either because of the cheapness or the convenience of the service offered, and if the service offered is so cheap or is convenient enough, the mere existence of the service creates its own demand and multiplies the amount of traffic which it is necessary to serve.
The main feature of the transport situation in this country at present is that British Railways are not paying their way, and the reason why they are not doing so is not merely that they were not modernised before the war, during the war or in the years immediately after the war, though modernisation is a contributing factor. That is not the main reason for the decline of British Railways. As the hon. Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) pointed out in his speech, the decline of railways is common throughout the world, despite the changing pattern of transport in many different countries. It is always very dangerous to compare conditions in one country with those in another, but there is a common
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factor in that railways in most countries—practically everywhere—are declining. In this country at least the decline is certainly not mainly due to the competition of public road hauliers or bus companies.
That is strikingly confirmed in two paragraphs in the reappraisal Report of the British Transport Commission. In paragraph 78, referring to goods traffic and competition from road haulage, it is stated:
"The main competition is not so much from public road hauliers, important as that is, as from the increased tendency of traders to carry their own goods."
and in paragraph 82 referring to passenger traffic, after stating that competition had increased, the Report says:
"Passenger traffics … have been well maintained … notwithstanding greatly increased competition from three main directions; first from the sustained growth in the numbers of private cars, motor cycles and scooters"
and so on. As the railways are not paying their way, assuming that we, as the guardians of the public purse and of the nationalised industry, will have to find the money out of the pockets of the taxpayer, and assuming that we are not prepared for that condition to continue, there are only three policies which could possibly be followed.
Two of them involve modernisation, but mean something else as well, while the third does not. It is a very simple, but not a very practical one. It is the one that is proposed by the Railway Conversion League. It says quite simply that, as the roads now carry 56 per cent. of the goods carried and the railways only 44 per cent., and the percentage is increasing in favour of the roads, we should accelerate and encourage what is already a natural and inevitable tendency and pull up the railway lines and use railway land for building roads. That is a beautifully simple solution, but I do do not think that any practical person would agree with it.
To begin with, there would be very formidable engineering difficulties in the conversion of railways to roads, particularly in regard to the clearances of over-bridges and in the maintenance of the weight-carrying capacity of the railway embankments, most of which would have to be rebuilt. Apart altogether from that, the transfer on to the roads of the 1,100 million railway passengers who

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make journeys every year would make absolute chaos of my right hon. Friend's road programme and would make the rapid improvement of roads almost impossible.
Writing off that solution, there are two others. There is, first of all, the policy of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, which may be described as the integration of road and rail transport, of which the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, West spoke. That involves some sort of super-planner, who will make full use of all existing facilities, but the use of the existing facilities would not be enough, because the integration of all the existing facilities would still produce a concern that does not pay.
If we look at the consolidated working results shown in the accounts of the British Transport Commission, we see that the gross receipts of British Road Services are about £50 million net, and, after deducting working expenses, about £2 million net. Even if those receipts were very much increased, even if they were doubled or trebled, the receipts from British Road Services would still not be anywhere near enough to make any impact on the losses on the railway services.
Moreover, if we refer again to the paragraphs of the reappraisal plan which I have quoted, it will be seen that the Commission itself says that its main competitors are not the public road services, the hauliers, or the bus companies. In other words, the mere integration of public services would not be enough. There would still be very great difficulties. Unless hon. Members opposite are prepared to go much further than saying that they will increase the charge for the C licences, which was the policy suggested by the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Lindgren), and are prepared to set up what would virtually be a police State—[HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."]—and select a few people to carry their own goods in their own lorries or themselves in their own cars, integration will not work, and it is no use trying to pretend that it would. That is the second possible policy.
The third policy is that which has been advocated by my right hon. Friend, and that is to help transport to find its own level. Like water, it does so if not
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obstructed. If we cut down the excessive amount of rail services to a more reasonable size and build more roads so that the public can, if they so wish, use public vehicles or their own vehicles on these roads, we can encourage fair competition between the various forms of transport. To run such a policy means the use of a good deal of public money in order to modernise the railways so that they can play their part, but there is no reason why that policy should not succeed. We have an example in a neighbouring country, Holland, where that has happened. Mr. Den Hollander has made a good job of modernising the Dutch railways and by concentrating on the most convenient services and paying traffics he has produced a railway which is paying its way. The British Transport Commission has had the advantage of his advice and I have no doubt that the Commission has taken many of his ideas. Certainly one can see very great progress being made in the British modernisation plan.
There are still many services, both goods and passenger, which the public would, no doubt, find more convenient if the services were rationalised properly. But this involves fair competition with the hauliers, of course, and I think there is some case for the question of fuel taxation as between the road and the railway services to be reconsidered, because it is rather odd that one of these comparable services is paying tax and the other is not. The most reasonable arrangement would be to equalise the tax, but that, no doubt, is a matter for another debate.
In addition, one would have to make sure that the competitive rates which now can be charged by the railways as against the road hauliers are genuine rates and not merely rates which take advantage of subsidies from the taxpayer. Given those two points, I can see no reason why there should not be free and fair competition between road and rail, and why both sides of the industry should not make a reasonable profit.
This does not at all affect the main proposition that in the national interest it is a good thing to continue the modernisation of the railways. In view of the striking results which have already been achieved, we may hope that in the not too distant future the predictions of the Commission will be justified and that

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the account will be squared, as has been done in Holland. I certainly see no reason to grudge public funds for the further improvement of the railways.
I am very glad to welcome the Accounts of the British Transport Commission and the reappraisal of its modernisation scheme.
8.4 p.m.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: It is always a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. G. Wilson) because he speaks with great experience on railway matters, having spent his life in the somewhat rarified higher level of the railways. I will comment on some of his observations as I proceed.
I want to deal with the reappraisal plan and not with the accounts. I welcome, as no doubt we all do, the speeding up of electrification and modernisation of the railways, but this whole problem raises four rather important general issues. The first is railway finance. The second is the nature of the railway undertaking and whether it is to be regarded as a normal commercial business undertaking or a service provided in the public interest. The third, which affects my constituency considerably since I represent the railway town of Crewe, is the position of the railway workers. The fourth matter is the question of road haulage.
I believe, with another hon. Member who has spoken, that it is high time we took a realistic view of the finances of the railways. Their position is quite different from ordinary private enterprise companies, and that fact is referred to in paragraph 117 of the reappraisal Report. The Commission says:
"… Central Charges are both fixed and inflexible, consisting as they do mainly of interest on borrowings. In good years and in bad years this interest must be paid in full; there is no equity capital. Fluctuations are inescapable in a business with a high proportion of fixed costs, especially when adjustments of charges take as long as they do. The Commission"—
and this is to be noted—
"as a newly constituted undertaking, started without any reserves available to take the shock of fluctuations in their financial fortunes and they have not since been allowed to build up any such reserves."
That view is supported by the Manchester Guardian in a recent article on 24th July which said:
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"… the Commission is … right to claim that its existing financial burdens should be reconsidered. It is now inconceivable"—
and I agree with this—
"that the past deficits will ever be repaid; and the existence of this huge liability can only undermine morale. The sensible answer is to wipe the slate clean."
That would give the Transport Commission a chance.
I now turn to the second matter which naturally worries the Commission in connection with the whole of its transactions, and that is the question which it raised as to whether this is to be a service or a normal commercial undertaking. In paragraph 62 of the reappraisal Report the Commission says:
"A matter of first importance is the rôle which the Commission's various transport services by rail and by road will be expected to play as part of the transport industry of the country. On the one hand the services are asked to compete, and they must accordingly be permitted, both by Government and by general and business public opinion, to act like a normal commercial undertaking . . "
But they are not. As has been pointed out earlier today, time after time Her Majesty's present Government have interfered and have prevented the Commission from taking the steps which any ordinary businessman conducting his own business would have been allowed to take.
I remember the famous occasion of the London County Council elections when the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) refused to allow fares to be raised when the Commission had made out a complete case for raising the fares. He was playing party politics with the Commission. [Interruption.] If hon. Members were not here, I cannot go through all the cases, but my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) mentioned a number of them in his speech.
The Report goes on to say:
"On the other hand, the Commission's services are often expected to be guided primarily by the public interest. Many of these services represent facilities which are essential to the life of a modern society, and without them the extremes of peak demand and of demand which is thinly spread could not be provided for. These two approaches, the commercial and the often unprofitable public service, frequently conflict, and though the economic benefits to the community of the latter are often substantial, these benefits"—
I ask hon. Members to note these words—
"are not reflected in the revenue account of the Commission".

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As a result, the railway workers, when they apply for wage increases, have their claims levelled against the money in the till, but the money is not in the till, not because they have not done a good job but because, in the public interest and as a public service, they have provided facilities that do not pay, cannot pay and never will pay. That is a point that must be considered.
The Times, in an article last December on this very subject, said:
"If the Government want to see the deficits under control, they must allow the B.T.C. to be in control—to carry full responsibility and, within the framework of existing legislation, to choose its policies freely."
Either we must allow the British Transport Commission to operate as a great public service, which I should like to see and which I am sure my hon. Friends would like to see, or we must let it be a business commercial undertaking, in which case the Government should take their hands off it and allow it to make profit and to conduct its enterprise as private enterprise.
When I was a young boy I was taken from Birkenhead to London and back again on a visit. The fare then, in 1913, was 33s. return. Today, the fare is 65s. No private enterprise concern could come anywhere near that. In 1913 a box of Swan Vesta matches was ½d. Today, a box is 4d., eight times as much. The Government must allow the British Transport Commission to operate as private enterprise operates or it must be run as a public service. With this tugging of Sir Brian Robertson, one arm being pulled one way for public service and the other arm being pulled the other way for profits, I wonder the man has not split in the middle. His cri de coeur comes in the reappraisal Report. The Government should not leave him on a plank. It is time that they threw him a lifebuoy. The Government should decide whether the Commission is to make profits on a business basis or is to operate as a public service. If the latter, the Government should give the Commission the necessary financial help it needs to carry out its work as a service.
I now turn to something that is most important to me, and that is the position of railway workers. In this reappraisal Report, there is one word that I do not like very much. It is "rationalisation". I am old enough to remember rationalisation
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between the two wars. I was about to say that it was a brutal thing. Companies were amalgamated and rationalised and black-coated workers and manual workers lost their jobs, but the profits of the combined companies went up. That went on throughout the country. Rationalisation, as it was called, produced a great deal of unemployment from which we suffered.
Rationalisation has other unfortunate features. The fears of the workers in the railway industry are now widespread, particularly in the railway workshops. I do not know whether it is fully realised what sacrifices railway workers have already made. We learn from the Report that in December, 1957, there were 573,000 workers in the industry. A year later there were 550,000. As a result of the policy of rationalisation, 23,000 railway workers have lost their employment. There was a banner headline in the Sunday Times the other day stating that the unions were worried. That does not surprise me. Every railway trade union leader is worried. He spends his days and nights trying to find a solution to the redundancy being created.
Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary can tell us where it will all end. I have not the figures, but the article in the Sunday Times states that 14,000 men in railway workshops in the last three years have been declared redundant and a further 11,000 scheduled to leave railway workshops. When one reads the Report, figures of that nature are not surprising. The Report states that 1,000 stations are being closed, 1,800 miles of track are not to be used and there will be a reduction in stock. The number of railway wagons alone is to be reduced from 1¼ million to 750,000. Many of the 1¼ million are wooden trucks, but, as I understand it, the 750,000 are to be modern steel wagons. There will not be one-tenth of the repair work on that fleet that there was on the £1¼ million.
I think I am right in saying that the steam engine covered 94,000 miles a year. The diesel engines will cover 204,000 miles a year. It needs very little imagination to realise that that means redundancy on the railways. It means loss of jobs for the men. The number of marshalling yards is to be reduced from

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158 to 47. It is true that they will be better and probably bigger marshalling yards, but they will not all be situated in the areas where they are now. Redundancy and unemployment will result from disbanded marshalling yards.
As I have said, a number of repair shops are to close down entirely. We have been given the list, and it is considerable. We in Crewe are fortunate. We are not to close down. Crewe has probably one of the greatest railway works in the world, certainly in this country. It is a very great national asset. At the moment, we are doing comparatively well, compared with the situation in some of my hon. Friend's constituencies. But the men walk round with a fear in their hearts. They know what is happening. From day to day they read about the closure of shops. It is not only the men who are redundant who are afraid. They have had it, but the men, now working, unless the Government can give them confidence, fear that they will be next on the list.
I have quoted the Sunday Times too often. It is not a newspaper which I rely on entirely, but this week it used these words:
"Service and maintenance can eventually be cut by as much as four-fifths."
If the repair work in railway workshops can be cut down by four-fifths, great hardship, redundancy and grave threats to employment will result.
We who represent railway workers and railway towns demand of the Government that the maximum use be made of railway workshops owned by the State. There are two reason for this. First, the railway workshops are State property. Secondly, the workers are there; they have been giving loyal service to this great railway industry. The property has been paid for by the State and it should not be closed down while work is passed out to private enterprise. We are wasting a very valuable national asset. What the Government are doing is tantamount to the sabotaging of a nationalised industry. These are not my words. The men employed in the railway workshops throughout the country are saying that as they see work being passed out to private enterprise. The present policy throws out of employment tens of thousands of railway workers who have served the industry and the nation well.
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The railway workers claim that they can make as good diesel engines as private enterprise can make. I am given to understand by a very high authority that the diesel-hydraulic locomotives built in railway workshops are giving much more reliable service than the very same models built by private enterprise. No doubt the Joint Parliamentary Secretary has some information about this. If I am wrong, I will withdraw the statement, but I make it on information given to me from a very high authority. I understand that the railway workshops have beaten private enterprise on reliability.
Mr. Nugent: I am not able to confirm or deny what the hon. and learned Gentleman says. I shall inquire and confirm or refute it as soon as I have the information.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: I think the answer will be that I am right. I do not wish to give the source of my authority, but, if the hon. Gentleman inquires, he will receive the same answer.
Mr. Ellis Smith: And there is the cost of production too.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: As my hon. Friend says, the railway workshops are superior in their costs of production.
Mr. Nugent: Is the hon. Gentleman referring to Swindon?
Mr. Scholefield Allen: Yes, it is Swindon, but I will not give the exact details of the comparison. I gather that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary knows more about this than he is willing to admit. The railway workers at the Swindon works are making more reliable diesel-hydraulic locomotives than the private enterprise company to which the Government are putting out the work.
Railway losses and unemployment, in my submission, have in no small measure flowed from the policies of Her Majesty's Government. We have accused the Government from these benches time and time again during the last twelve months of perpetuating a policy of stagnation. This is something for which we have authority and support in the White Paper now before us. On page 30, paragraph 15 says:
"There has been a relative standstill in the general level of industrial production since

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1955, but a rise in the total transport facilities available in this country."
This is not a political pamphlet, but that sentence expresses what some of my right hon. and hon. Friends have been endeavouring to convince the Government of for some time. We have been trying to tell the country that since 1955, contrary to the annual rise in production which the Labour Party produced when in office, this Government have allowed production to stagnate. That is exactly what is said in this non-political White Paper, signed at the end by Sir Brian Robertson.
Twelve months ago last October, after those four years of stagnation, there was the credit squeeze. The credit squeeze was responsible for more of the redundancy in Crewe. This is referred to on page 6 of the White Paper. One finds great support in this document for what we have been trying to say, although we have been accused of talking party politics when we have said it. In paragraph 14, the Commission, speaking of the state of its accounts, says:
"The Commission attributed the worsening of their financial position to the sudden decline in their traffic receipts, particularly the bulk traffics, which was occasioned by the fall in the level of activity in the industries vital to the railways."
Who caused the fall? The Government cannot have it both ways. They engineered the fall themselves, deliberately, by a 7 per cent. Bank Rate. They wanted it, and so they imposed the credit squeeze. Not only did they impose the credit squeeze, but they withdrew money from the British Transport Commission which it otherwise would have spent. In fact, they set back the modernisation plan twelve months ago.
The other accusation I make has been made before. The Government have disintegrated the plans of the previous Government and of the Commission itself by handing back large portions of the road transport industry to private enterprise—a policy of jobs for the boys and rewards for contributions to Tory funds. My hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele) referred to this, and the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. G. Wilson) spoke about private enterprise road haulage attracting the traffic. I tell the Joint Parliamentary Secretary that it is said by almost every man in Crewe that the position today
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means "muck for the railways". The railways can carry the muck, and the private enterprise hauliers can carry the traffic which is clean and well-packed and which yields high profits.
Mr. G. Wilson: I think the hon. Gentleman misunderstood my argument. I did not speak of road haulage particularly. I said that any transport service which is either very cheap or very convenient will create its own traffic. That happens very frequently in the railway passenger service where, for instance, if the service is cheap for people to go to the seaside, large numbers of passengers who would not otherwise travel will use it.
Mr. Scholefield Allen: I stand by this, and I know that every railway worker takes this as the issue before us. Every one of the workers at Crewe has told me the same. It is muck for the railways, the coal, the dirty and unpleasant or heavy cargoes which no one else wants, while the profitable ones go by road to be carried by private enterprise. In a short time the party now occupying these benches will be able to repeal that part of the legislation and hand back to the British Transport Commission those other services. We shall have a coordinated road and rail service.
We are glad to see that the Commission has a word for the staff. But the staff are watching very carefully what is happening about redundancy in the railway workshops, on the stations and in the marshalling yards. They have noted the compensation available for cotton capitalists. We are not far from Lancashire in Crewe. In my party it happens to be part of the same committee; we call it the Lancashire and Cheshire Committee, and I have to listen to these arguments. People there do not listen much to me because Crewe has too many problems itself. They know in Crewe that the cotton industry, parts of which are to be closed down, has been given £30 million. They will want to know, if they are thrown out of work, why there should be this compensation for cotton capitalists and not for railway workers and why there should be compensation for directors for loss of office, free of tax. They are asking these questions, and soon we shall

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be demanding compensation and consideration on a like basis for all displaced and redundant railway workers.
8.31 p.m.
Mr. Ronald Russell: I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Crewe (Mr. Scholefield Allen) will forgive me if I do not follow him on the problems of redundancy—a very human problem of which he has great knowledge and of which I have had no experience at all. The only plea on the human side that I should like to put forward is that the Government should ask the Transport Commission to do something for the railway superannuitants, mostly of pre-war years, who are not getting anything like the pension which people in other walks of life are getting and some of whom are having a very hard time indeed. I know that that problem has been discussed, and I would ask that it be considered once again, because this comparatively small body of people have been very badly treated in the light of modern conditions.
I pass to the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Keighley (Mr. C. R. Hobson), who touched on a number of topics, and with much of which he said I agree. He praised, for example, the railway restaurant car service. As I sometimes criticise the British Railways—as I shall do in a moment—I should like to join with him in that praise. It is an excellent service and far cheaper than that in many foreign countries. He also praised the fact that trains are cleaner than they used to be, and, again, I agree with him. I should like, however, to join with him in the strictures that he made about punctuality.
It is all-important, whether our railways are run as a nationalised industry or by private enterprise, that they should maintain a very high standard of punctuality. That goes for the airways Corporations as well. They are not, as the hon. Gentleman the Member for Keighley said—and I have some experience of the East Coast, because I have a home in the North of England—maintaining the standard of punctuality that they ought to. One night, I came back from Newcastle on the Talisman. It was 40 minutes late owing to the train
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in front running a hot axle box. I do not know why trains run hot axle boxes unless there is some fault in the greasing or maintenance but I would suggest that that is something that ought not to happen as a regular feature of British Railways.
On another occasion, I was on the Flying Scotsman, which broke down for two or three different reasons, the last of which was engine failure. The passengers had the annoyance of being parked in the middle line at York for a quarter of an hour while a relief train from behind came into the adjoining platform and went out again without any opportunity being given, to anyone who might have wanted to, to change into the train which had started last and was intended to get to its destination first. I think that punctuality is a very important point to which more attention ought to be paid than seems to be done at the moment.
Notice taken that 40 Members were not present;
House counted, and 40 Members being present—
Mr. Russell: As I was saying when the interruption occurred, the question of punctuality is important.
The hon. Member for Keighley, who raised the point, referred to the railways of France. Having had experience, as a member of the delegation to the Council of Europe, of travelling on French railways in the last year or two, I cannot remember an instance when any one of the express trains on which I have travelled has been a moment late. If French railways, which started more or less from scratch after the war, can manage to do this, I do not see why British Railways should not do the same.
The hon. Member for Keighley discussed, also, whether modernisation would be by electrification or the use of diesels. I have some sympathy with him. I do not know whether there is any confusion in the intentions of the Transport Commission. We seem to be adopting both policies, one on the East Coast main line and another on the L.M.S. from Euston. I only hope that we do not repeat the experience which appears to have been followed on certain foreign railways, of first electrifying and then running diesel expresses underneath

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the overhead wires. That seems to me to be a stupid policy.
An example is one of the Transeuropsan Expresses, which runs from Amsterdam to Zurich. It is operated by a diesel locomotive, yet most of the system over which it runs is already electrified. It seems to be a complete waste to put up overhead wires and then to run a diesel express beneath them. I trust that this will not happen in anything that the Transport Commission is doing.
Reference has been made to speeds. I wonder why our trains today are not as fast as the fastest before the war. I am comparing, for example, the speed of the Talisman on the East Coast line and the Coronation and Silver Jubilee before the war, which were faster. Corresponding trains on some of the French railways have higher speeds. Perhaps the reason is that the track is not yet up to the requisite standard throughout, or there is too much congestion. I wonder whether we can be told some time why we are not back to pre-war standards in that respect and why we are not up to the standard of the French railways.
I should like to pass to a point concerning an attempt which is being made to obtain an increase in traffic and to profit from the congestion on the roads. I refer to the car sleeper service which was introduced last summer on one or two routes. I wonder whether it will be extended. It would attract a good deal of traffic and would certainly take something off the roads. From the London end, however, the only service of this nature is from King's Cross to Perth. I believe that there is also one from Glasgow to Bournemouth, or to Dover for people who want to go to the Continent.
It would be worth trying out similar services on other routes. For instance, why only from London to Perth? Why not to the North of England—from London to Newcastle, for example—or from Paddington to Cornwall, to take the holiday traffic and to enable people to avoid the congested roads to the West of England? This is something which might be considered and I hope that it will be tried.
Paragraph 129 of the Report of the Transport Commission deals with the
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provision of car parks in the London area, but no doubt the problem affects other cities. The Report gives an account of what is being done to provide car parks, not only at London Transport stations, but at stations on British Railways. The plan was proposed by my right hon. Friend to try to prevent people bringing their cars into the centre of London by allowing them to park their cars in convenient places and come on by London Transport.
Surely more use could be made of the vast amount of space occupied by railway yards and railway property of different kinds. Buildings might be erected over these places and used for car parks, possibly in conjunction with offices. I gather that it is not economic to build a car park over a railway and use it simply as a car park, but surely it is economic to do what has been done at the West London Air Terminal, where the building will be of some use both as an office and a car park.
Where technical conditions allow, is it possible to erect a building over a railway and combine the need for increased office accommodation with the need for space for car parking? I am thinking, for example, of West Hampstead, where there are several different railway lines and also sidings and other railway property. This area could provide an excellent place for people to park their cars and come on by train from Finchley Road or West Hampstead stations. A great deal of ground around Kentish Town is occupied by the railways. Would it not be possible to build over this area and provide car parks, and possibly an office block, and meet an important demand in that way?
Will the introduction of the new diesel unit service provide a better service on one or two of the lines for which it is scheduled than the existing service? I have some experience of the St. Pancras line, because I live at Radlett, in Hertfordshire. The people there are very worried, because they have been threatened that when the diesel service is brought into operation there will be shorter trains. This means fewer passengers in each train and the existing trains are already crowded. I have not been able to get a satisfactory answer from the Transport Commission whether the new service will cope with the same

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number of passengers. It may be that the Commission will be able to run a larger number of trains than can be done with the existing steam service. I hope that that is the case.
That brings me to ask whether the same improvement will be made to the track on that route as is being made on the King's Cross line. The Report states that the tunnel at Hadley Wood is being duplicated, so that there will be a four-track line a good distance out of King's Cross where there is now this bottleneck. There is a similar bottleneck between Kentish Town and Finchley Road on the line from St. Pancras where everything has to pass over one pair of rails through a tunnel. There is a parallel tunnel used for goods traffic only, because I gather that damage to the tunnel prevents it being used for passenger traffic. Is there not a chance of the tunnel being repaired and brought into use as a passenger line so that the bottleneck between Finchley Road and Kentish Town is removed and two additional lines made available for passenger traffic? If this is done it will greatly improve the services from St. Pancras, particularly local services.
There are many other points that I should like to make, but I know that other hon. Members want to speak. I would merely say that I hope that the modernisation programme, as reappraised in the White Paper, will be a great success. I am sure that we all wish the Commission and the railways all possible good will in the task which lies before them.
8.45 p.m.
Mr. Ernest Popplewell: In the debate upon the Transport (Borrowing Powers) Bill last January I said:
"the best thing that the Minister can do is to introduce a Measure which will entirely reorganise the Commission's financial arrangements."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st January. 1959; Vol. 598, c. 350.]
It is very interesting to see that at long last some hon. Members opposite have been converted to this idea. The proposal is long overdue, because the task facing the Commission is impossible. Every realist knows that that is so. In the light of the present situation, for the Minister or the Commission to talk of breaking even with the modernisation
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programme in a short time is just wishful thinking, and a refusal to face realities. The nation must face the fact that a railway system is essential for its well-being. The National Coal Board and such organisations as the Federation of British Industries, various chambers of commerce and representative private industries pay service to this idea. That being so, we must face the fact that in order to have an efficient service the Government must give the Commission the wherewithal to allow it elbow-room. It can then provide a system of which the nation can be proud.
Let us look at the very serious financial position of the Commission. The Government must accept their responsibility for bringing it about. When we nationalised transport we laid down certain conditions and commenced to build an integrated transport system. Within a very short period the Act came into operation. That was in 1948. By 1951 we were showing an overall surplus after paying interest and central charges, and that trend continued. In 1952 there was a surplus of £8 million, and in 1953 a surplus of £4½ million. Then the dead hand of the Government came into operation. What have we found since? There has been a breaking up of the integrated transport system; the Government have refused to allow the Commission to increase its charges as agreed by the Transport Charges Tribunal, and from 1953 onwards there has been a deficit which has increased year by year.
Today, instead of a surplus the Commission is faced with an overall deficit of £300 million on revenue account. That is one reason why, in 1958, the Commission had to find no less than £78,391,000 in interest charges alone. How is it possible for an undertaking to make headway with such a tremendous burden?
It is interesting to note from the last page of its Report that it has been necessary for the Commission to borrow £50 million with annual instalments of principal of £2 million and interest charges at 6 per cent. per annum on the amount of the advance outstanding during the preceding year. What a fantastic position—£50 million borrowed for 25 years at 6 per cent. This follows a whole series of previous borrowings

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under the provisions of the Transport (Borrowing Powers) legislation when the interest charges varied from 5 per cent. to 5¾ per cent. That is the burden shouldered by the Commission, and it is one which the Minister should take over in the course of reorganising the financial position of the Commission.
in its reappraisal the Commission suggests that it might be able to break even, and perhaps even to make a surplus of £50 million to £100 million, when the modernisation scheme begins to operate in 1963. But the Commission and the Minister know that this is just a fantasy. The Commission, naturally, has safeguarded itself by saying that this depends upon an increase of 2 per cent. to 3 per cent. in traffics. A large amount of the freight carried by railways is provided by the iron and steel and the coal industries, and everyone knows that production is stagnant in those industries.
The necessary increase in coal production, or iron and steel production, between now and 1963 to give a surplus for the Commission of between £50 million and £100 million is very unlikely to materialise. We are all aware of the tremendous stocks of coal at the pithead and in the hands of distributors. We know that there has been a reduction in iron and steel production and the Minister and the Commission must be aware that there is little prospect of a 2 per cent. to 3 per cent. increase in that type of traffic.
Coal represents 61 per cent. of freight earnings or 36 per cent. of the freight and coaching stock earnings. Iron and steel production is running at from 70 per cent. to 75 per cent., so that it is wishful thinking to say that there will be a sufficient increase during the next three years to enable the Commission to make a surplus such as has been referred to. Iron and steel accounts for two-thirds of the traffics or 24 per cent. of the freight tonnage or 15 per cent. of freight traffic receipts.
From these figures alone one realises that it will be impossible for the Commission to break even. At the present time it faces on overall deficit of £300 million. That deficit has grown during the period of office of the present Government. When the last Labour Government left office the overall deficit was
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about £27 million. Now it is £300 million. Due to the high interest charges imposed since nationalisation the Commission has found itself saddled with a debt which by the end of 1958 amounted in cumulative interest charges to no less than £567 million. Today it has an actual deficit of £300 million.
Is not this "Alice in Wonderland" finance, to say the least of it? It is the present Minister who is the dead hand, responsible for placing the Commission in this absurd position. What hope can the railwaymen have in the committee of inquiry that has been working for the whole of this year and will probably go into next year before it issues its report, in face of this startling financial position and of the interest and other charges with which the Commission is faced?
We welcome modernisation and think it is right, but the attitude of the Minister has brought about bewilderment. It has resulted in redundancy for about 27,000 people in the last two years, while the present workshop policy will mean redundancy for 11,000, at the minimum, and probably for a number far greater than that. This is in spite of increased efficiency. Had I time, I could point to large increases in efficiency brought about in railway operations by the Commission, but the men engaged in the industry only get three different types of redundancy agreement. Instead of getting compensation on the scale paid to captains of industry, railwaymen who are in the evening of their careers merely have the benefit of three miserable redundancy agreements. Even so, the Commission is more generous than the private enterprise railways were in pre-war days; but the agreements are pretty miserable.
I am intrigued about the Ministry's workshop policy. I questioned the Minister whether the Commission would have a free hand in deciding whether to equip the railway shops for making coaches and wagons. Can they do so? It has been an interesting point of debate. It has been held that where railway shops are laid out suitably they will continue to be used for the manufacture of components. I would ask the Joint Parliamentary Secretary whether that means that the railway locomotive shops will be able to produce the motive power component parts for diesel and electric locomotives. I gather that he agrees that they can.
Mr. Nugent: I do not want to take up more time than is necessary. The hon. Gentleman had better look at my answer in HANSARD tomorrow.
Mr. Popplewell: I stand corrected. If the Commission has that power, I hope it will use it. Why should railway-men who have been engaged all their lives in building steam locomotives be turfed out? We know there is a reduction in the wagon fleet in the transfer from wood to steel, but in spite of this, cannot the railway wagon shops build London coach stock and wagons? These have always been handed out to private enterprise, but here is an opportunity to let the shop workers do the work that they are used to. If there is surplus shop floor space in railway workshops why cannot the Railway Executive utilise it for producing its own civil engineering outdoor machinery, motor, signal and telegraph equipment? That is a reasonable proposition which I hope will be followed.
The Commission has done a very good job with the resources available. The Government have placed steel bands round it by their financial arrangements, high interest charges and refusal to allow it to expand. After the General Election I hope that we shall sit on the benches opposite and be able to give the Commission that freedom of movement necessary to allow it to build up the efficient system it so desires and which is so essential for our national well-being.
9.2 p.m.
Mr. Leslie Spriggs: I wish to express my gratitude to my right hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Mr. G. R. Strauss) for leaving me a few minutes before he speaks in the debate. I shall try to deal with one or two of the points I had in mind, but I have not time to develop the main case I had hoped to put.
As a trade unionist, I think that we should take notice of what the Commission says in paragraph 12, on page 5, volume 1, of the Report issued last December. That paragraph says:
"In a year of changes and financial stringency, bringing many potential causes of strain between management and staff, it could be said that on the whole there has never been a better spirit of co-operation and mutual desire to face up to the realities of the situation."
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Later in the paragraph the Report says:
"The staff of no private undertaking work under the same glare of public criticism as those employed on the railways and road transport and in the catering and other branches of the Commission. Their steadiness and their continued efforts to maintain the generally high standards of public transport service which this country enjoys are in the Commission's view meritorious. If public transport is to provide still higher standards of convenience and efficiency for its users the morale and keenness of the staff must be correspondingly high. Good internal relations must march with the modernisation of the equipment they use. That was one of the Commission's principal aims in 1958."
Because I have no further time to deal with this part of the Report, I merely say this about the financial structure of the Commission to which hon. Members who have spoken from either side of the House have referred, and I hope that hon. Members will listen carefully. I am one of the last railwaymen to leave the industry and to enter this House. We look at the figures of wage and salary rates received by men carrying responsibility and we know the difficulties when an application is made for an increase. We are all aware of the reply of the Transport Commission. In effect, it is, "There is nothing in the kitty." I shall give a few figures in relation to a number of men who are carrying responsibility and doing arduous and difficult work.
I start at the top, because I have no prejudice against those who hold higher posts than I ever held in the industry. Stationmasters, yardmasters, goods agents, and so on, receive £12 15s. a week. Inspectors, foremen and supervisors receive £11 12s. a week. This is one of the reasons why men in the lower grades of the industry will not take promotion. They have good reason to refuse. Because of the financial structure, men with the ability to take up responsible positions are refusing to accept them.
Let us consider the wages of the men who are doing the dirty work—the men who are on the engines and in the signal boxes. A driver's wage is £11 2s. a week; a motor man, who drives the electric trains, receives £11 2s. a week; a fireman, who handles tons of coal to keep up the steam pressure, receives £9 7s. a week; a guard in charge of a train, perhaps with hundreds of lives in his hands, receives £8 19s. a week; a shunter receives £8 13s. a week.

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I must conclude, but I am very much obliged for the few moments which my right hon. Friend has permitted me to take. I regret that I have not time to tell the House and the country what the railwaymen are suffering under the present financial structure.
9.6 p.m.
Mr. G. R. Strauss: I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for St. Helens (Mr. Spriggs), had to curtail his remarks, as he was making a most interesting speech. I am sorry that he did not have time to develop it. But I have to intervene to put various points and questions to the Minister.
This may well be the last major debate in the present Parliament, and although it has not aroused the interest or the passions which we had in last night's debate, we all agree that the subject we are discussing is of very great importance and that the future and the welfare of industry and our country depends largely on the policies adopted by the Government of the day towards our transport system.
There has been general agreement in the debate on at any rate two matters. One is that no branch line which runs through anybody's constituency should be closed down, however uneconomic it may be; and the second is an appreciation of the extraordinary progress made by the British Transport Commission in executing its modernisation plan. Nobody who reads the Report can have any doubt that the Commission possesses immense vigour and determination and that this is also possessed by its administrative and technical staff. The Commission's achievements so far have been most striking and deserving of the highest praise. There is also a general desire on the part of all hon. Members that the Commission should be allowed to continue without any question or doubt to carry out its plans as quickly as possible.
The speech made by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary earlier was almost his first entry into the political arena, for previously his speeches on transport have been on more technical matters. While listening to it I could not help asking myself what his attitude and that of his right hon. Friend would be to the railways today, and what they would do
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about them, if they were not already in public possession. They would have to be modernised and re-equipped on a vast scale. Had they not been publicly owned, what would the right hon. Gentleman have done about them? Would he have nationalised them? I do not think he would have had any alternative. The only possible alternative would have been to provide Government money to privately-owned companies on so huge a scale that I do not believe even a Conservative Government would have dared to do. So I think that not only the nation but also the present Minister and the Joint Parliamentary Secretary should be grateful to the Labour Government in 1947 for introducing their Bill nationalising the railways.
In this connection we remember what happened when the railways were under private ownership in the 1930s. Many of them were unable to modernise themselves and adopt proper equipment, because they could not raise the money. We remember also that at the same time the Government refused to take any appropriate measures to overcome that difficulty. Today the nationalised industry and the State are to some extern carrying the burden inherited from the time when the railways were privately owned and we had a Conservative Government who refused to take the necessary steps to put things right.
The railways are now owned by the State and there is a direct responsibility on the Government for their general welfare. The Minister will no doubt repeat in very vigorous terms the case made by the Parliamentary Secretary, who said that the Government accept that responsibility and deserve high praise all round for backing the modernisation and re-equipment scheme of the British Transport Commission. The hon. Gentleman went further, but I think that he must have had his tongue in his cheek when he argued that when the Labour Party was in power between 1945 and 1951, it did nothing to re-equip the railways and therefore we should now praise the Government for what they have done.
Yet we are seriously criticised for not having spent vast sums of money during that period for doing this job. The hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well

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that it was impossible to do so at the time. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman was not in the House at the time, but he should have been told that time and time again during that period when the Labour Party was in power Conservative Members on the Front Bench as well as on the back benches attacked the Labour Government for indulging in too much capital expenditure. They said that we were doing far too much in that direction and that we would bankrupt the country. That was their constant criticism of the Labour Government. It is obvious that at that time any drastic action in this direction was impossible. Our industry had to be wholly re-equipped for peaceful purposes. The 1939–45 war had just ended and we were in a period of rearmament for the Korean War, which was supported on all sides of the House.
If the Parliamentary Secretary boasts today and tries to take great credit for backing the modernisation scheme, one must ask him whether he has any choice. Can he do anything else? If someone has a house which is beginning to crumble through lack of repair over many years, there is no great merit in spending money to make it habitable and put it in order, especially if there is no alternative house to live in. There is no alternative to our railway system. It is a vital national service on which the welfare of the State depends. The taking of steps to render it capable of fulfilling the national needs was inescapable and does not merit the gushing admiration that the Minister and his Parliamentary Secretary appear to expect. The fact is that they had no option.
Before coming to the terms of our Amendment, I should like to say one or two words about the present position of the railways and their current losses. This has already been said before, but it is worth while repeating it, because people must realise it. It is suggested, although not by the Minister, that the losses being made by the railways today are directly or indirectly connected with the fact that they are publicly owned. That argument is obvious and absolute nonsense, as practically all the railways in the world today, whether publicly or privately owned, are
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losing money, and for exactly the same reasons. That is particularly true of the railways on the eastern side of the United States. All railways are facing the same difficulties of road competition.
There is another point in connection with these losses that everyone should bear in mind. They should look on the other side of the balance sheet. The amount of the losses involved is well known. Those losses may not continue—we hope they will not; we hope, of course, that they will be turned into a profit—but the benefits of having an efficient railway system are incalculable, and nobody can measure them. The prosperity of a large part of British industry depends on an efficient railway system.
If the heavy costs of modernising the railways were not now being incurred one thing is absolutely certain, and that is that the losses would not only continue but would get very much worse in future years. That should be borne in mind when the losses are considered, and when people talk of the burden that they place on the State. The railways certainly cannot be closed. Their existence is vital and, at the end of the day, the State will always have to ensure that they continue to operate.
That raises a very important question that is exercising the minds of many people today, including the Commission, as will be seen from its Report. The question is the extent to which the railways should be regarded as a business enterprise whose viability is of primary importance, and the extent to which they should be regarded as a national service. The Government's actions make it quite clear that they give priority to the first consideration. They regard the railways from, if I may so put it, a capitalist rather than a Socialist angle. We differ fundamentally.
Of course we want the railways to be efficiently run, and to cut out all wasteful and unnecessary expenditure—as, indeed, we require the hospital service to do—but we say that the prime function of our nationalised transport system is to serve the public and that the amount of profit it makes is no proper test, as the Parliamentary Secretary suggested it was, of the efficiency of the industry.

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Our criticism of the Government is that during the years that they have been in power they have blown hot and cold on the Commission. For example, they say that the Commission should be run on purely commercial lines, and then prevent it getting the revenue to which it is entitled. They back the modernisation plan, and then take steps to retard its operation. This inconsistency has been damaging to the Commission, and the effect has been to prevent it developing its services as they could have been, and should have been, developed.
My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) has gone over, in some detail, the various actions of the Government—actions on the lines that I have just indicated—and though I do not wish to refer to then again in detail I must mention them. There was, of course, the Government's attempt in their early days to sell to private enterprise the profitable road haulage section. That attempt was made to appease the Road Haulage Association and the Government's many political friends and supporters.
The attempt did not succeed completely, largely because there was revolt from the industry, the chambers of commerce and a large number of hon. Members on the benches opposite. However, it succeeded partially, and to the extent that it succeeded it did serious financial damage to the Commission which, year by year, has been deprived of millions of pounds revenue that it otherwise would have enjoyed. That was one act that made us say in our Amendment that we regret
"… the actions of Her Majesty's Government which have damaged the financial solvency of the British Transport Commission …"
That was one of them, and I should have thought it undeniable.
In this connection, what we are very concerned about are reports from fairly informed sources and semi-official sources that the Conservative Party and the Minister, if he gets the chance, want to go further. I am referring to reports not only in the independent Press, but in the Conservative Press, and particularly in the Sunday Times, in front page stories, that it is the desire of the Conservative Party, and will be the policy of a Conservative Minister of Transport, to sell off further profitable sections of the Commission
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to private enterprise. Of course, the Minister says that that is not the policy of the Government. It is not, today; of course, it is not. Naturally, it would not be just before an election, but, since they have done it before, we wonder whether, if they got the opportunity, they would follow the same course again and sell off these sections to private enterprise, which private enterprise would love to have, because they are highly profitable. Such a policy would be in complete accordance with the outlook of the Conservative Party.
We refer in our Amendment to other instances, which we regret and which we invite the House to regret, by which the solvency of the Commission has been damaged by the actions of the Government—if not by the present Minister, by one of his predecessors. There was the occasion when, because an L.C.C. election was pending, the Government took deliberate action to postpone the raising of fares in London, using the British Transport Commission as an instrument to further the political fortunes of the Conservative Party. Is that denied? Can it be seriously denied? We regret that, and that is one of the things covered by our Amendment.
We also regret that later on, when the Commission—and this matter was referred to by my hon. Friend—wanted to raise freights by 10 per cent., a rise which the Transport Tribunal said was urgently necessary, the Government said, "No, we must postpone it for six months", and the Transport Commission lost many millions of pounds by that postponement. Is that fact denied? The Government may try to justify it on the grounds that the national economy required it at the moment, but we dispute that very much. It is the fact that there again the solvency of the Commission was adversely affected by the deliberate action of the Government.
Then, of course, more recently, just as soon as the modernisation plan was properly launched and all the plans were made and under way, the Government said, "We must carry out an economy policy, and we must cut down the expenditure to be incurred by the Commission, all organised, arranged and provided for in the coming year, so as to make some economies in that direction". There could not have been a more false

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economy. It retarded and upset the plans for making the Commission a viable organisation, and, of course, it had repercussions in other directions.
Those who have read the recently published Annual Report of the Iron and Steel Board will see that the reduction in capital expenditure for the railways in 1958 had a serious effect on the fortunes of the iron and steel industry and was responsible for substantial unemployment there. The actual figures show that in the second half of 1958, the railways bought only 369,000 tons of steel material, including rolling stock, against an average of over 500,000 tons in the previous half year and in the two half years prior to that. We have strong criticisms against the Government for their actions in that direction.
Most important of all is the attitude of the Government, which has been made clear by recent actions of the Minister, saying that the over-riding requirement of the Transport Commission at present is "economy, economy, economy—at all costs." When the Transport Commission proposes as an economy the cutting down of services by £20 million a year, they say, "That is not enough. You have got to cut down by £30 million". There is no doubt that it is as a result of pressure from the Ministry of Transport that the Commission proposes that in the next four years, instead of cutting down the railway services by 300 miles, as was done in the last four years, it is to cut them down by 1,800 miles—all in the sacred name of economy.
What about service to the public? Is that not to count? In our view, from all the actions and statements by the Government, that is today comparatively unimportant. The only thing that matters is the balance sheet of the Commission. We regard that as wholly wrong.
If the Minister says that the Commission has no option in the matter because by law it is bound to make both ends meet, taking one year with another, our reply is that it also has another obligation which is to provide an adequate and properly integrated service of public inland transport. Which is the more important? If it now appears after twelve years that there are burdens on the Commission which are insupportable
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and which could not be anticipated in 1947, it is the duty of the Minister of Transport to come forward and to say of which burden it shall be relieved and how it is to be done. We do not know what are the Minister's ideas about changes in the capital structure. He should have some ideas. A proposal was put forward by the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. L. Thomas)—
Mr. L. Thomas: Purely personal.
Mr. Strauss: Purely personal, but a proposal which I welcome very much. I do not say that it is acceptable but it is the sort of thing which will have to be done. I refer to his suggestion that the capital spent by the State on the modernisation plan should be taken up in equity shares—in other words, that the interest should not be an annual burden on the railways if the railways in any year are unable to make both ends meet. That is the sort of thing which we expect the Minister of Transport to suggest to us. But nothing of the sort. All he suggests is cutting down and retrenchment in the railway services. We strongly object to that attitude, as we regard the railways of the very highest importance as a service.
Mr. L. Thomas: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that the British transport service must be a viable economic unit or that it should become a social service?
Mr. Strauss: I say that primarily it should be a social service. Every effort should be made to make it viable, but the prime thing is to make it a social service. If the two things are incompatible, the need to make a good service of our railways is the more important. Of course, I do not object—no one does—when a small branch line is closed down, if it is losing heavily, if very few people are involved and a good alternative form of transport can be provided. But where such forms of transport cannot be assured and very large numbers of people will suffer hardship as a result of closing these lines, they ought not to be closed. But that is what will happen in the next three years on a large scale if the policy of the Commission, under the pressure of the Minister, is carried out and 1,800 miles of railway line are closed.

617
To sum up, we are critical of the Government in their behaviour towards the railways. We deny that they are entitled to claim great merit to themselves for backing the modernisation plan. They have no option but to do so. And we are full of criticism of the actions of the Minister of Transport and his predecessors. We hope that this evening he will not, as he so often does, regard any criticism of his Ministry as an impertinence. We hope, on the other hand, that he will give us a reasoned reply.
Our indictment is that in the past the Government have adopted policies which have often damaged the transport system, undermined its solvency and restricted the services that it should and could give industry and the public. We say that these policies have been often irresponsible and frequently irreconcilable one with the other. Now the Government have overtly adopted the dangerous policy that the balance sheet of the railways, and not the service that they render to the nation, is the only thing that matters. For these reasons, we have moved our Amendment and we claim that our action is fully justified.
9.31 p.m.
The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Harold Watkinson): Despite a rather more spirited winding-up speech by the right hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Strauss), with which I will deal in due course, I think that the major portion of the debate falls more naturally under the words which my right hon. Friends and I put on the Order Paper, which ask the House to take note of the Report, because the majority of the speeches today and the general debate certainly have not taken the complexion of what I suppose is meant to be a Motion of censure on the Government. I therefore wondered whether this was not a last-minute attempt to make the end of term a little more interesting. I wondered also whether the debate was not originally intended to be the sort of debate that we have every year on the British Transport Commission's accounts, when hon. Members, rightly, try to study the problems of this great industry, which, after all, is still the country's largest employer of labour.
618
First, I should like, in the calm atmosphere that the words "take note" imply, to deal with some of the major and important issues raised in the debate. I will deal with the right hon. Gentleman's speech and the Opposition's Amendment towards the end of my remarks, but, first, there are some important things that must be said for the sake of the railways and all those men who work on them.
I would not wish to address the House without doing what I usually do, always with a sense of great sincerity. I should like, at least for one moment, to join with the hon. Member for Enfield, East (Mr. Ernest Davies) in saying that the House should be grateful to Sir Brian Robertson and his colleagues. They do a very fine job under very great difficulty. When I say "his colleagues" I hope the House will accept that by that I mean every man and woman working for the British Transport Commission. They are all trying to do the same job.
Mr. Lindgren: They do not think that of the right hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Watkinson: That is the hon. Member's personal opinion. He made exactly the same speech last year. I do not take any notice of his speech because it is certainly not justified by the very pleasant personal relations which I am honoured to say I enjoy with the railway trade union leaders when I meet them.
Mr. Lindgren: The worst Minister of Transport!
Mr. Watkinson: What I have said happens to be true.
I now come to the general proposals made in the reappraisal plan of the British Transport Commission. Here again, the Opposition's attitude is singularly confused. Both the right hon. Member for Vauxhall and the hon. Member for Enfield, East have said rightly that, except perhaps on the west coast of America and in Holland, there is not a major railway system in the world that is not making very heavy losses. Certainly as chairman of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, I have had that brought very forcefully to my attention. But then they went on to say that in some mysterious way all would be well with British Railways if it were not

619
for the policy of the Government. They cannot have it both ways.
If world conditions are bringing on almost every major railway system very heavy losses, then all that we in this country can hope is that we can weather the storm and gradually get the position right. It is not fair to the railways of this country to assume that they are in some specially favourable position here. In fact, they are not. It is only fair to those who work on the railways to say that they are facing a situation which is common to almost every railway system in the world.
I must make another point because, again, the Opposition's attitude is certainly not clear to me. What the Opposition have said, and what the hon. Member for Enfield, East has said, and which I quite accept, is that their view has always been that the British Transport Commission is gradually running up a very heavy debt and interest burden. Of course it is. What does the hon. Gentleman propose? Is the modernisation plan, with all this material and effort, to be put in for nothing? Are the Government to give the railways the modernisation plan? Are the Government to encourage the Commission to repudiate all its liabilities? That is not what the hon. Gentleman's 1947 Act said. The Act says that the railways are required to pay, taking one year with another.
If that is no longer the policy of the Opposition, they should say so. It would be a very important change of policy. I do not know whether that is what the right hon. Member for Vauxhall means when he says that if the Opposition have to choose, they choose the railways as a social service. If that means that in future the railways are to be allowed to repudiate their general liabilities, to take large sums of money from the taxpayer without any effort to repay, I must make it quite plain that that is not the policy of the present Government. While we accept the difficulties—I shall come to the problem of capital liabilities in a moment—we certainly do not take the view that these are things to be shrugged off and ignored. The sums of money are large and it is public money into the bargain.
620
The Opposition go on to say that the Government have seriously underestimated railway deficits. Nothing was said about this from the Opposition benches, but it is only fair to Sir Brian Robertson and his colleagues to say that the plan on which the House lent the Commission a great sum of money would still be running very much as it should have been had it not been for the complete failure of the nationalised coal industry to sell its products. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I do not comment on that except to say that 44 per cent. of total freight receipts come from coal traffics. Anybody who has studied railway finances will know that the main cause of the railways' increased deficit has arisen from the disastrous—that is the right word—drop in their coal carrying.
Mr. William Hamilton: It was the Government's policy of stagnation.
Mr. Watkinson: To that extent the future position of the Commission changed, and Sir Brian Robertson very quickly came to me and the House last autumn when he realised that he would not be able to keep his bargain.
I make this point because I think it right that the House should realise that what the Government have done—I propose to say this in more formal terms in a moment or two—has been to take the judgment of Sir Brian Robertson, as chairman of the Commission, and his colleagues about the course of the railway industry and to support them in what they thought was right. We did that when they came forward with their plan saying that they hoped to break even in 1961–62. When things did not go as planned—I have given the House the reason—Sir Brian Robertson came forward quickly and gave the House the facts through my Ministry. At that time I asked him to produce this complete reappraisal and reassessment of his position.
Much has been said about this today. The right hon. Gentleman said, and the hon. Member for Enfield, East said much the same in somewhat less precise terms, that it was pressure from the Government, through me, which caused Sir Brian Robertson and his colleagues to bring forward this document in the form in which it was laid before the House.
Mr. Ernest Davies: I think that the right hon. Gentleman is misinterpreting what my right hon. Friend and I said. We said not that it was the terms of the White Paper which were influenced by the Minister but the action which has been taken in regard to economies forced upon the Commission.
Mr. Watkinson: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman because perhaps I did not make myself plain. I thought that is what the right hon. Gentleman just said, that the rationalisation plan and the cuts are a result of Government pressure. I had the opportunity of consulting Sir Brian Robertson on this, as I had the opportunity of consulting him about the statement of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Enfield, East that top executives of the railway management and members of the area boards did not agree with the plans in this document.
I must make the chairman's position quite plain by telling the House that, when I consulted him, he asked me to say that this plan is put forward as the best judgment that the Commission can make, it is put forward entirely on the Commission's own initiative, it is entirely supported by the Commission, by the area boards, by the senior executives, and it represents their best judgment of their future on which they ask for Government support. That is a very good example and a complete answer to the allegations which have run all through this debate that a Minister of Transport in a Conservative Government exercises improper pressure on the Transport Commission.
Mr. Strauss: I never talked about improper pressure. In fact does not this plan reflect the policy believed in and expressed on many occasions by the Minister during the last year or two?
Mr. Watkinson: The right hon. Gentleman cannot get out of it like that. That is not what he said at all. He said that it was a policy almost forced on the Commission. In fairness to the Commission, I want the House to understand, because it is very important in the light of future examinations which will be made of this document, that this document represents the Commission's own plan, and I thought that it was very unjustifiable to imply, as the hon.
622
Gentleman the Member for Enfield, East did, that this is not an agreed plan which the whole Commission supports.
I want to go on with the re-examination of the Commission's future. I think that this is a very important task. After all, as I have said, this industry is the country's largest employer of labour and, as the right hon. Gentleman said, it is certainly essential to our commercial efficiency. I propose to complete my survey of its future before I turn to more political matters.
The hon. Gentleman the Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele) made what I thought was a very acute speech as a railwayman himself, and he raised some matters which, I think, will need re-examination, for example, the fringe areas where there is a delicate and difficult balance between a service which possibly may never pay, but which is a service which should be kept on perhaps because there is no alternative means of transport.
I say that this document will be most carefully examined now by my Ministry in conjunction with the Treasury and other Departments which are interested. We shall try to examine the issues raised in it and look at the difficulties which arise in the fringe areas. We shall look at the question of capital structure, although, again, I must make it quite plain to the House that I have had no plan, no recommendation and, indeed, no discussion with Sir Brian Robertson on the capital structure of the Railways.
I was impressed by what my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr. Peyton) has said, and I thought that he was quite right that perhaps we ought to wait a litle longer before we come to decisions on this very broad issue. All I can say at the moment is that if the Commission comes forward with any particular proposals they will be carefully and sympathetically examined.
The next question with which I want to deal is that of modernisation. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Vauxhall said that we should not claim any particular credit for modernisation and that modernisation was not really the key to the future of the railways.
Mr. Strauss: I did not say that.
Mr. Watkinson: I thought that the right hon. Gentleman did say that we

623
should not claim too much credit. The point I wish to make is this, because it is important to the future of the railways. I do not know how many hon. Members have had time to study the pictorial section of the first part of the Annual Report and Accounts. There they will see in pictorial form some of the end-products of the very large sums of money with which the Government are backing the Commission. In these things—new diesel locomotives, new track laying and overhead electrification—lies the future for every railway man and the hope of a railway system that will in the end pay its way.
I accept that the Socialist Government may have been in financial difficulties that did not allow them to do as much as they wished for the railways, but I must say in fairness to the railways that had more modernisation been done in those early years after the war, their position today would have been immeasurably improved. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Vauxhall dealt with the situation before the war and made the case that the railways were then run down and in sad need of help. I must remind the House of the railways' record during the war, which, as every one of us knows, was completely outstanding. At least, the railways did that on the equipment which they had before the war.
In the year 1959, £178 million worth of Government money is going into railway modernisation. Sir Brian Robertson himself has said that it is as much as he can usefully spend. Thus the second broad allegation that the Government are not supporting the railways to the maximum of the Government's capacity, and, indeed, to the maximum of what the Commission itself can use, is, again, not proved. The future of the railways, which depends upon modernisation, would certainly be prejudiced by a Socialist Government which, because of recurring crises, would not be able to find the capital investment.
I have dealt with the major issues which have been raised in the debate concerning the reappraisal. Now, I must turn to the Opposition Amendment. It uses the word "regrets", which makes it tantamount to a Motion of censure. Therefore, I have listened very carefully throughout the debate to the reasons
624
on which the Amendment was based and I have listened even more anxiously for some kind of policy on which the Opposition would base the future of the railways. I have heard neither.
What I have heard is a repeated charge of interference, in fares and in a great many other things. If I interfered on fares, I was in very good company. I was in company with the Socialist-controlled London County Council and literally dozens of other local authorities throughout the country, and with trade unions, all of whom, as one hon. Member opposite said, have consistently always opposed fare increases and have opposed them as vigorously as ever they could.
Therefore, I make no apology to this House for saying to the Commission from time to time that it should keep its fares and charges as low as it reasonably can. Indeed, the Commission itself said in September, 1956, that on the railways in particular, the general merchandise traffic continued to decline and could not, therefore, be recouped forthwith in higher transport charges. If the charge is that the Government have made their attitude plain on fares from time to time, I do not regard that as being anything other than the natural duty of a Government which wants to keep price stability and to halt inflation.
I now come to the last general point, again not mentioned by hon. Members opposite. It is the freedom which the 1953 Act gave British Railways on their charges. That Act freed them from their old obligations, and gave them a chance to charge what they thought they needed to charge to get the business. Although that Act in Socialist eyes may have had other more unpalatable results, it freed the railways and gave them a chance to live in a more competitive world.
We are debating two different ways of running a great industry. We have made our way plain. It is to modernise the railways and to decentralise them, because we believe in the area boards. We believe in the method of line management. We believe that the nearer we bring the management to the customer the better it will be. Our policy and practice is, therefore, quite plain. We do not intend to throw the industry back into the melting pot with some great attempt to denationalise the whole thing. We intend to decentralise the railways,

625
make them more efficient, and thus make them serve the public better than they have done.
Throughout the debate I have waited to hear the Opposition's policy. The hon. Member for Enfield, East said that the Opposition's policy was to provide a planned, publicly-owned transport system, operated in the public interest. I do not know what we can construe from that, but I prefer the assessment of my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil who said that the Opposition's policy, meant they had not learnt a single thing since 1947.
That is true because the hon. Member for Enfield, East, when challenged, said that the Opposition rested on the basis of the 1947 Act. I therefore take it that the policy of the Opposition is to go back to the complete nationalisation of road haulage, presumably with the C-licence holder thrown in. I hope that the Opposition will make that alternative rather more plain to the country than they have here tonight because that policy is not one that the country finds particularly attractive.
I promised the hon. Member for Enfield, East that I would reply to his unjustified allegation about my Ministry and its enforcement policies. I am willing to be charged with a desire to defend my Ministry when it needs defending. The hon. Gentleman said that my Ministry's enforcement policies were deliberately slack and that we did not follow them up. The figures show that by the end of the year we shall have increased our enforcement staff by 50 per cent. We are prosecuting 11,000 people a year, and we have just extracted a line of £20,000 in one case. The hon. Gentleman's attack is an example of the sort of broad, general, quite unjustified allegation by which the Opposition are trying to disguise their lack of any practical policy.
During the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Vauxhall I waited anxiously for a clear statement of the Opposition's policy, but the right hon. Gentleman took us back to the 'thirties. He talked about inconsistency, our policy of selling off road haulage and all the rest, but not a word about an alternative policy. That is what I am interested in. If our way of
626
running the railways is wrong it is for the Opposition to demonstrate that their way is better. As far I can gather, the Opposition's policy rests on the re-enactment of the 1947 Act.
If that is what hon. Members opposite think, I hope that they will be fair enough to make it plain to the country that that is their policy, because it is beginning to dawn on the Opposition that nationalisation as a theory of management is quite unsuitable in the second half of the twentieth century. It has nothing to do with the politics of the issue; it is merely that it is unworkable in practice. Yet the Opposition say again and again that they intend to go back to the full rigours of their nationalisation policy. I cannot see how that can do anything for the railways in their present circumstances.
Mr. Hamilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman going to denationalise them?
Mr. Watkinson: I am delighted to answer hon. Members on that point. They are not prepared to accept that we are not unduly doctrinaire in this matter. We have merely developed, in the railways and the other nationalised industries, a decentralised and better managed unit which, if it is allowed to go forward on the path we have set out for it, in the end will turn these nationalised industries into something which might do the country a little good instead of being a millstone round its neck.
I now sum up. The reassessment is the honest opinion of the Commission, and the Government accept it as such and will give it the most careful study. Allegations that it is a document provided by a divided Commission are quite unfair and utterly unjustified. As to the future of the railways, our way to run them is quite plain, and it is entirely opposed to a return to the 1947 Act, which appears to be the Opposition's policy.
As for the way in which we would go on with the railways in the future, I would say that we would hope to go further with the policy of decentralisation and greater regional autonomy, giving a greater chance to railway regions to run their own affairs in their own way, subject only to broad policy control from the top. The right hon. Gentleman said that we were going to sell it off in bits. I do not know anything about that. But I

627
know that I intend to press forward with greater decentralisation and greater efficiency.
Therefore, I do not accept the Opposition Amendment. On the whole, the debate has followed its normal course. It would have been of much greater value to the Commission and to all those who work on the railways if we had gone through the normal practice of examining
this great industry, which at least I hope we all want to see succeed. I ask the House to reject the Opposition Amendment. It has not been supported by their arguments and I am certain that it is unjustified by the facts.
Question put, That those words be there added:—
The House divided: Ayes 230, Noes 304.

Division No. 177.]

AYES

[9.58 p.m.

Abse, Leo

Gibson, C. W.

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfld, E.)

Alnsley, J. W.

Gooch, E. G.

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Allaun Frank (Salford, E.)

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Grey, C. F.

Mason, Roy

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Mayhew, C. P.

Awbery, S. S.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Mellish, R. J.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Mitchlson G. R.

Baird, J.

Hale, Leslie

Monslow, W.

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Moody, A. S.

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Hamilton, W. W.

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Benson, Sir George

Hannan, W.

Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

Beswick, Frank

Hayman, F. H.

Mort, D. L.

Blackburn, F.

Healey, Denis

Moss, R.

Blenklnsop, A.

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Moyle, A.

Blyton, W. R.

Herbison, Miss M.

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Boardman, H.

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

Hilton, A. V.

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)

Hobson, C. R. (Keighley)

Oram, A. E.

Bowles, F. G.

Holman, P.

Orbach, M.

Boyd, T. C.

Holmes, Horace

Oswald, T.

Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

Houghton, Douglas

Owen, W. J.

Brockway, A. F.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Padley, W. E.

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Paget, R. T.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hoy, J. H.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Pannell Charles (Leeds, W.)

Burke, W. A.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Pargiter, G. A.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Parker, J.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Hunter, A. E.

Parkin, B. T.

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Paton, John

Callaghan, L. J.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Peart, T. F.

Carmichael, J.

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Pentland, N.

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Irving, Sydney (Dartford)

Popplewell, E.

Champion, A. J.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Chetwynd, G. R.

Janner, B.

Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

Cllffe, Michael

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Probert, A. R.

Coidrick, W.

Jeger, George (Goole)

Proctor, W. T.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs, S.)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Randall, H. E.

Cronln, J. D.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Rankin, John

Crossman, R. H. S.

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Redhead, E. C.

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Reid, William

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Reynolds, G. W.

Davies, Ernest (Enfield, E.)

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Rhodes, H.

Davies S. O. (Merthyr)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Deer, G.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Kenyon, C.

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Delargy, H. J.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Diamond, John

King, Dr. H. M.

Ross, William

Dodds, N. N.

Lawson, G. M.

Royle, C.

Donnelly, D. L.

Ledger, R. J.

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Short, E. W.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Skeffington, A. M.

Edelman, M.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Lindgren, G. S.

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Lipton, Marcus

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Snow, J. W.

Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)

McAlister, Mrs. Mary

Sorensen, R. W.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

McCann, J.

Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank

Fernyhough, E.

MacColl, J. E.

Sparks, J. A.

Fitch, A. E. (Wigan)

MacDermot, Niall

Spriggs, Leslie

Fletcher, Eric

Mclnnes, J.

Steele, T.

Foot, D. M.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Forman, J. C.

McLeavy, Frank

Stonehouse, John

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Stones, W. (Consett)

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mahon, Simon

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Car'then)

Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Watkins, T. E.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Sylvester, G. O.

Weitzman, D.

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Symonds, J. B.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Winterbottom, Richard

Thomas, lorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A,

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Wigg, George

Woof, R. E.

Thornton, E.

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Tomney, F.

Willey, Frederick

Zilliacus, K.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Williams, David (Neath)

Usborne, H. C.

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

Viant, S. P.

Williams, Rt. Hon. T. (Don Valley)

Mr. Pearson and Mr. Wilkins.

Warbey, W. N.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

NOES

Agnew, Sir Peter

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Howard, John (Test)

Aitken, W. T.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Doughty, C. J. A.

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Alport, C. J. M.

Drayson, G. B.

Hurd, Sir Anthony

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

du Cann, E. D. L.

Hutchison, Michael Clark (E'b'gh, S.)

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Duncan, Sir James

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Arbuthnot, John

Duthie, Sir William

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Armstrong, C. W.

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Hyde, Montgomery

Ashton, Sir Hubert

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Hylton-Foster, Rt. Hon. Sir Harry

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Elliott, R. W. (Ne'castle uponTyne, N.)

Iremonger, T. L.

Atkins, H. E.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Errington, Sir Eric

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Baldwin, Sir Archer

Erroll, F. J.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Barber, Anthony

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

Barlow, Sir John

Fell, A.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Barter, John

Finlay, Graeme

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Batsford, Brian

Fisher, Nigel

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Fletcher-Cooke, C.

Joseph, Sir Keith

Beamish, Col. Tufton

Foster, John

Kaberry, D.

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Bell, Ronald (Bucks S.)

Freeth, Denzil

Kerr, Sir Hamilton

Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)

Gammans, Lady

Kershaw, J, A.

Bennett, Dr. Reginald

Garner-Evans, E. H.

Kimball, M.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

George, J. C. (Pollok)

Kirk, P. M.

Bidgood, J. C.

Gibson-Watt, D.

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Biggs-Davison, J, A.

Glover, D.

Leavey, J. A.

Bingham, R. M.

Glyn, Col. Richard H.

Leburn W. G.

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Godber, J. B.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Bishop, F. P.

Goodhart, Philip

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Black, Sir Cyril

Gough, C. F. H.

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Body, R. F.

Gower, H. R.

Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

Bonham Carter, Mark

Graham, Sir Fergus

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Grant, Rt. Hon. W. (Woodside)

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon, J. A.

Green, A.

Llewellyn, D. T.

Boyle, Sir Edward

Gresham Cooke, R.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Braine, B. R.

Grimond, J.

Longden, Gilbert

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Loveys, Walter H.

Brewis, John

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Low, Rt. Hon. Sir Toby

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Gurden, Harold

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Brooman-White, R. C.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Bryan, P.

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Harris, Reader (Heston)

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Waiden)

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Campbell, Sir David

Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Carr, Robert

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Macleod, Rt. Hn. lain (Enfield, W.)

Cary, Sir Robert

Harvie-Watt, Sir George

McMaster, Stanley

Channon, H. P. G.

Hay, John

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)

Chichester-Clark, R.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Cole, Norman

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Maddan, Martin

Cooke, Robert

Henderson-Stewart, Sir James

Maitland, Cdr, J. F. w.(Horncastle)

Cooper, A. E.

Hesketh, R. F.

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Corfield, F. v.

Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Courtney, Cdr. Anthony

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Hirst, Geoffrey

Marshall, Douglas

Crosthwalte-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Hobson, John (Warwlck & Leam'gt'n)

Mathew, R.

Crowder Sir John (Finchley)

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Crowder, Petre (Rulslip—Northwood)

Holt, A. F.

Mawby, R. L.

Cunningham, Knox

Hope, Lord John

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Currie, G. B. H.

Hornby, R. P.

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Dance, J. C. G.

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Davidson, Viscountess

Horobin, Sir Ian

Moore, Sir Thomas

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Horebrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Deedes, W. F.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles

de Ferranti, Basil

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Nabarro G. D. N.

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631

Nairn, D. L. S.

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Thompson, R. (Croydon, S.)

Neave, Airey

Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

Thomeycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Nicholls, Harmar

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin

Nicholson, Sir Godfrey (Farnham)

Roper, Sir Harold

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Ropner, Col, Sir Leonard

Turner, H. F. L.

Noble, Michael (Argyll)

Russell, R. S.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Nugent, Richard

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Oakshott, Sir Hendrie

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Vane, W. M. F.

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Sharples, R. C.

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.

Shepherd, William

Vickers, Miss Joan

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Vosper, Rt. Hon. D. F.

Orr-Ewing, C. Ian (Hendon, N.)

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Wade, D. W.

Page, R. G.

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Panned, N. A. (Kirkdale)

Soames, Rt. Hon. Christopher

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Partridge, E.

Speir, R. M.

Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek

Peel, W. J.

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Wall, Patrick

Peyton, J. W. W.

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Ward, Rt. Hon. G. (Worcester)

Plckthorn, Sir Kenneth

Stevens, Geoffrey

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Pike, Miss Mervyn

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Webbe, Sir H.

Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Webster, David

Pitman, I. J.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

Whitelaw, W. S. I.

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Storey, S.

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Pott, H. P.

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Powell, J. Enoch

Studholme, Sir Henry

Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)

Price, Henry (Lewlsham, W.)

Summers, Sir Spencer

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Prior-Palmer, Brig. Sir Otho

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick

Profumo J. D.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Wood, Hon. R.

Ramsden, J. E.

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Woollam, John Victor

Rawlinson, Peter

Teeling, W.

Yates, William (The Wrekin)

Redmayne, M.

Temple, John M.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

Renton, D. L. M.

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Mr. Heath and Mr. Legb.

Rlppon, A. G. F.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Main Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House takes note of the Report and Accounts of the British Transport Commission for 1958 and of the Report reappraising the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways (Command Paper No. 813).

DINGLE v. ASSOCIATED NEWSPAPERS LIMITED
10.10 p.m.
Mr. J. Langford-Holt: I beg to move,
That leave be given to the proper Officers of this House to attend the trial of the action entered in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice and entitled Philip Barrington Dingle and Associated Newspapers Limited, Arthur George Wareham and Michael Kelly, and to produce and prove the Report of the Committee to whom the Manchester Corporation Bill was referred in the last Session of Parliament and the Journal of this House, so far as it is relevant to the said Report, and also the volumes of the Official Report of Debates appertaining to speeches and remarks concerning the Manchester Corporation Bill, and to give evidence verifying the same.
Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: I beg to second the Motion.
Mr. W. R. Williams: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wonder whether you would be good enough to give me your guidance on this matter. There are some of
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us who feel that there should be an Amendment to this Motion and I am wondering whether, at this stage, you would be prepared to accept a manuscript Amendment to the effect that other papers not defined in the Motion should also be made available to the judiciary when the action takes place. Would you be good enough to accept the manuscript Amendment to make that possible?
Mr. Speaker: I do not see how I could accept a manuscript Amendment at this very late stage of the proceedings. The hon. Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) gave notice of this matter yesterday, and if any Amendments were desired to the Motion they could have been put down.
Mr. L. M. Lever: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Surely no one would wish to object to this notice of Motion. The desire to be effected by inclusion of certain words is simply to assist the court and not circumscribe the material that the court can call for during the proceedings of the action. As the Motion now stands, the material that the court can call for is limited and not all-inclusive. For example, it does not include minutes of the proceedings of Committees and all notices in writing given by the Clerk under Standing Order No. 199A.

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Surely it is the desire of this House to ensure that all the relevant material, irrespective of whether it is in the Journal of the House or not, should be available to the court. As the Motion now stands, minutes of proceedings of Committees and of notices in writing given by the Clerk under Standing Order No. 199A would not be available to the court of justice called upon to try this case.
The situation may very well arise, if this Motion is passed in its present form, that reference may be made to you, Mr. Speaker, during the long Recess, to ask you to use your discretion to ensure that what material should be available should not be partial in regard to any part of the proceedings of this House, but all comprehensive. Therefore, it is only in a desire to assist the court that we should like to move a manuscript Amendment to include minutes of proceedings of Committees and all notices given under Standing Order 199A. If it is a fact—which undoubtedly it is—that those minutes of proceedings and notices would not be available to the court if this Motion were passed in its present form, what harm would be done if these words were added so that the court could have a full range of opportunity, when the trial takes place, of saying, "We want this, we want that, or we want something else"?
The court would not have that power under the Motion. It would not have power to call for minutes of proceedings of Committees or to ask for the notices given in writing under Standing Order 199A. Our desire to Include these words as an Amendment is simply to assist the course of justice and in no way to circumscribe it. Surely justice should be whole and complete and not limited to any part of the proceedings. I make no reference to the merits of the case, or the question of a trial. This is a question of principle, whether the court should have power to call for everything and not for just part of the proceedings.
Mr. Speaker: This has arisen so late that I feel that I might be doing wrong if I allowed an Amendment at this stage. The Motion is quite definite and is in the terms moved by the hon. Member for Shrewsbury yesterday. I do not think that at this stage I should allow a manuscript Amendment, which would be on
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facts which I have had no opportunity of judging. Even if such an Amendment were proposed, I should not propose to select it at this late stage.
Mr. Ellis Smith: Further to that point of order. Subject to your confirmation, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that it would facilitate business and help us all if we first discussed the points of order and later discussed the merits of the issue. Do you accept that that is the best course?
Mr. Speaker: I do not think that there are now any points of order.
Mr. Ellis Smith: My point of order, Mr. Speaker, if you would be good enough to follow it, is that the Motion in the name of the Prime Minister, relating to the suspension of the rule, appeared only this morning and, therefore, no hon. Member knew until this morning that the Motion of the hon. Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) would be taken tonight. If that is in accordance with Parliamentary practice, and if it is right to take the Motion now, surely it is also right for you, Mr. Speaker, to give reasonable consideration to a reasonable manuscript Amendment.
Secondly, I should like to ask you, Mr. Speaker, when this Motion appeared on the Order Paper and when the House knew that it would be taken.
Mr. Speaker: The Motion appeared on the Order Paper this morning. It is now past 10 o'clock.
Mr. L. M. Lever: Further to that point of order, Sir. The issue is whether we should limit the consideration of the court to a certain part of the proceedings of the House, or whether we should make all the proceedings, upstairs and downstairs, including all the notices, available to the court.
10.19 p.m.
The Solicitor-General (Sir Harry Hylton-Foster): If the House would hear me upon this point of order, may I say that I know it is the wish of the House merely to facilitate the administration of justice. There is no other purpose. My hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury (Mr. Langford-Holt) moved his Motion yesterday at the time for unopposed business. There were then noises such as happen in the House, and

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the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) eventually said that he objected to the Motion on the ground that it might occupy time for Scottish Questions. That was not exactly on the merits of the Motion. In that sense the House had warning that my hon. Friend intended to propose the Motion.
It is no outrage on the business of the House to say that this is a conventional Motion when there is an action at law. There is nothing odd about it that the House should be able to assist. I am sure that the House will realise that what it would be right for the House to order must depend upon the issues in the action.
Rather imagining that hon. Members might want me to be able to tell them on this issue what the action was all about, I have, by consent of both parties to the action, had a look at the proceedings, which normally are, I think, confidential documents until the trial starts. But by agreement of both parties to the action I was allowed to look at them in the hope that I could help at this stage; then I will keep very quiet, because I desire to excite only the judgment of the House.
It is an action for defamation based on an article in the Daily Mail. The article, according to the defendants, said various things which, as to part, were a fair and accurate report of proceedings in the House and, as to another part, were an extract from a Report presented to this House by order of the House. The defendants cannot prove in court either the Report or the proceedings, unless the House gives leave. That is all. Therefore, from the defendants' point of view the whole process of justice is distorted unless we give leave.
Privilege, such as it may be in this context—I do not want to deliver to the House a lecture on the law, which would be boring—would depend essentially, to begin with, on whether it was a fair and accurate report of the proceedings of the House, or, on the other hand, whether the report is something published without malice by the defendants and bona fide. It could be either way round. Obviously, no one could follow that and no jury or judge could judge that unless they had the text of the thing before them.
Mr. L. M. Lever: All the text.
The Solicitor-General: If the hon. Member will forgive me, I am trying to advise the House in as negative, flat and boring manner as I can. Obviously, they cannot judge the issue. I submit to the House that they ought to.
With regard to the kind of point of order which the hon. Member was moving, it all depends on what the issue is on the pleadings. In this context of defamation it is only what the defendants urge is the defence of what they said in their newspaper which is relevant in the interests of anyone at all, as far as one can reasonably see. To suggest introducing other proceedings of the House or other documents, which nobody has thought fit to ask for—I have no doubt that both parties are very competently and skilfully advised—does not seem to me to be developing a point of order, having had an indication from the Chair, which will help the administration of justice, which I know that the House wants to further.
Mr. Speaker: Let us understand where we are. I have proposed to the House the Question on the Motion standing in the name of the hon. Member for Shrewsbury.
Mr. W. Griffiths: On a point of order. Mr. Speaker, I wish to put, through you, a question to the Solicitor-General. I understand that the advice we have been given is to see to it that the House would not wish to place any obstacle in the way of a fair hearing of this action. Of course, we all agree with that. If it be the case that a party to the action wishes to obtain a fuller report of the proceedings or part of the proceedings, is it possible, after the House adjourns tomorrow, for that party to obtain a further part of the proceedings?
Without being a lawyer, I think that the question can be put very simply. I understood the learned Solicitor-General to say that if one party to the legal proceedings has asked to have access to the proceedings of a Select Committee of the House it cannot really be blamed if the other party to those proceedings has not so far made representations to the House. I want to know whether, if the other party to the legal proceedings wishes later to have revealed to it, for

637
instance, the minutes of the proceedings of the Select Committee, there is any reason why that should not be granted.
I take it that that is why my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Ardwick (Mr. L. M. Lever) and my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Openshaw (Mr. W. R. Williams) sought to persuade you, Mr. Speaker, to permit a manuscript Amendment. But, if we are not doing an injustice to either party to the legal proceedings, I am quite satisfied.
Mr. Speaker: I will tell the House how the matter appears to me. This Motion is necessary because of a Resolution passed by this House—in, I think, 1818—which said that an Officer of the House should not be allowed to give evidence about proceedings in this House without the leave of the House. Therefore, the Officers of the House necessary to produce and prove these documents cannot appear in court unless this Motion is passed.
The hon. Member for Shrewsbury moved his Motion yesterday without notice, as he is entitled to do. Objection was taken to it. It is now put down for today, and appeared on the Order Paper this morning. Had it been desired to amend it or alter it in any way, and had I been given notice of the matter, I would have had time to consider it and to act upon it, but I am not going to enlarge the documents that are to be produced at this trial without having an opportunity of satisfying myself that the cause of justice demands it.
In answer to the hon. Member for Manchester, Exchange (Mr. W. Griffiths), who asked whether, if we passed this
638
Motion tonight and it is found later that further documents are needed, I would say that it is usual for the Speaker, during a Recess or an Adjournment of the House—if application is made to him that certain documents are necessary to serve the cause of justice, and he is given an opportunity of examining the matter fully—for him to give leave.
That is the practice that has been followed hitherto, but I could not safely enlarge this Motion tonight, not having had a moment to consider it and not knowing what is intended. I think, therefore, that I should put the Motion standing in the name of the hon. Member for Shrewsbury, seconded, I think, by the hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Hirst).
Mr. L. M. Lever: Before the Question is put, Mr. Speaker—as I shall not have an opportunity to do so once it is carried—I should like now to say how grateful the House is for the expressions of opinion that you have just given, that we welcome them, and that we are perfectly satisfied.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That leave be given to the proper Officers of this House to attend the trial of the action entered in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice and entitled Philip Barrington Dingle and Associated Newspapers Limited, Arthur George Wareham and Michael Kelly, and to produce and prove the Report of the Committee to whom the Manchester Corporation Bill was referred in the last Session of Parliament and the Journal of this House, so far as it is relevant to the said Report, and also the volumes of the Official Report of Debates appertaining to speeches and remarks concerning the Manchester Corporation Bill, and to give evidence verifying the same.

TRANSPORT, CUMBERLAND
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Brooman-White.]
10.30 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Peart: I wish to speak on a matter affecting not only my constituency but the County of Cumberland. I know that it has coincided with a major debate on transport, but I have been fortunate enough to obtain the Adjournment and I wish to draw attention to the needs of Cumberland and to my own constituency of Workington. Most of my constituency lies in what is known as the West Cumberland Development Area, but I also have in my constituency a very famous part of England—a large part of the Lake District.
I wish to draw attention to the needs of Cumberland, with particular reference to West Cumberland, for improved road services, and above all to prevent the British Transport Commission closing down railways. I do not want to labour the point too much, because my hon. Friend the Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Symonds), a neighbouring constituency to mine, wishes to support my point of view.
First, on roads, I stress that roads are vital to our area because we are a Development Area and we are anxious that new industry should still be attracted for we still have an unemployment problem. If our industry is to develop we must have good roads so that we have an easy access for goods produced in the area and specifically an easy access towards the southern industrial parts, passing down from my constituency through Whitehaven. We have a very serious problem. In the southern part of Cumberland, leading from my area, the road situation is really serious. We need major road improvement schemes. More than that, much of the heavy road traffic from West Cumberland has to go across country through the Lakeland area, along narrow roads which are used in the summer by tourist traffic.
I have raised this matter on many occasions, not only with the Parliamentary
640
Secretary but with the Minister himself and also with Ministers in previous Governments. The Parliamentary Secretary is aware that I have met him, with my hon. Friends the Members for the various Cumberland divisions, including the hon. Member for Barrow-in-Furness (Mr. Monslow) and the hon. Member for More-cambe and Lonsdale (Mr. de Ferranti). We have pressed this matter on the Minister and we have asked that he shall make a decision. My hon. Friend the Member for Barrow-in-Furness, who represented our deputation in the sense that he did most of the hard organisational work, wrote to the Minister on 14th July about the north-west coast roads. He wrote as follows:
"You will recall that Members for the Fur-ness, Cumberland, Morecambe and Lonsdale Divisions met you on Wednesday, 8th April, to make representations as to the possibility of improvements in certain roads. You indicated that you would give consideration to the suggestions submitted and intimate your decision later on. I should be obliged if you could now let me have your observations."
All I am asking the Minister is whether we can have a decision now. Are the Government really going to act? Are we going to have a major road improvement scheme in West Cumberland? I merely want frankness from the Government either way. Let us have an answer. If the answer is not favourable, I can assure him, despite the nearness of the General Election, that we in the north-west of England will continue to press this matter, irrespective of the type of political administration which is controlling transport. We feel it is a vital issue in the development of our area. We believe that roads are vital to this area which, after all, is geographically isolated.
We are not a large area, but we are an important area with new industrial developments like Calder Hall and the Atomic Energy Authority establishment at Windscale, which is a major industrial organisation. Therefore, it is vital for this area that we have a major road improvement scheme and, above all, that the Government, after discussing this matter with the deputations which have met him, should make a decision and that we should have an understanding of what our position is. I should like the Parliamentary Secretary to give an answer about the road position, which is important.

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I will now pass on very quickly to the railway position. It has been suggested in our area that the railway line between Workington and Penrith, which runs west to east right across the County of Cumberland, passing through my own constituency of Workington and including towns like Cockermouth, Keswick and Penrith, is to be closed. We have had as yet no definite information on the matter. I hope that the Minister will use his influence to see that this is not done.
For various reasons, it is madness to suggest that this railway should be closed. The suggestion has aroused a storm of protest in the area and has created a body of public opinion which is of a non-political nature. I have here a copy of a resolution passed by the local authorities in the area. I will quickly read the gist of it. It states:
"Resolved that this conference of representatives from all the local authorities interested (that is to say, the Cumberland County Council, the Workington Borough Council, the Urban District Councils of Cockermouth, Keswick, Maryport and Penrith, the Rural District Councils of Cockermouth and Penrith and the Cumberland Parish Councils Association) deplores any attempt to close the Penrith-Workington Railway (which is the main connecting link between East and West Cumberland) and will take all steps within its power to oppose such closure which it is considered will inflict untold hardship on the inhabitants, industries and trading of the whole area within the jurisdiction of the said local authorities and aggravate the unemployment position."
It then goes on to argue:
"The whole question of closure of railways is one of utmost national importance and of serious consequence in the Lake District particularly so when the Government itself has thought it desirable to create the first National Park in the North in this area for the benefit of the public at large and is seeking to attract foreign visitors to come and enjoy its lovely surroundings and should therefore ensure adequate means of different methods of transport rather than to curtail them."
The resolution goes on to argue further:
"Any closure would impose a greater burden on the already overcrowded roads and further as many branch lines in Cumberland have been dismantled the county has contributed to the needs of the British Transport Commission …"
They are the terms of a resolution which was passed by all the local authorities not only in my constituency but right throughout the county.
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I have here many resolutions which have been sent to me from trade union organisations and from the men working in the industry. I have also a letter from the Workington branch of the N.U.R. deploring such action. I have, too, correspondence from the Lake District Resorts Federation, of which I am an honorary vice-president. That Federation, also, has expressed its concern in the matter. I have resolutions from Chambers of Trade in the area. More than that, I have had literally dozens of letters from my constituents in the area protesting against any such closure.
I have argued earlier about roads. We have an acute road problem, and, therefore, it would be madness for the British Transport Commission to close this main line in the area.
Cockermouth is a very well known town in my constituency, on the fringe of the Lake District and near to Workington. Cockermouth has a goods depot which receives coal for the area, animal feeding stuffs, and agricultural machinery for sale in the area. It receives bulk supplies of petrol, by railway tanks. It has a new cattle dock and pens with electricity laid on. We have an auction market there. To agriculture in the district, the railway is very important. Although he is now in the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, I know that the Joint Parliamentary Secretary's first love is agriculture, and he was a very successful junior Minister concerned with agriculture in the past. He will appreciate that, from the point of view of agriculture in this area, which he knows well, it is vital that we should have essential rail communications.
Keswick is a wonderful tourist centre. It lies in my constituency also, and I am very proud of Keswick and its beauty in that northern Lakeland area. Keswick, so I understand from people concerned with these matters, receives in one year 125,000 passengers at its station. From Keswick station itself, I understand, there are in one year about 27,400 bookings. In one week, for example, when the famous Keswick Convention is held, there are between 7,000 and 8,000 visitors to Keswick. In the summer and later on in the year thousands of visitors come to Keswick from all over the world.

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They come to see this lovely centre of Lakeland.
How stupid it would be if the British Transport Commission decided to close that railway station and the line which links the main London lines at Penrith 18 miles away. The tourist coming from London to Lakeland and going to Keswick would have to leave the main train, take a bus, and then proceed with all his luggage to Keswick itself. The whole idea is absurd.
The area is a great tourist centre which must develop, as we seek to develop it, and its development must not be impeded by any stupid action on the part of those who would like to restrict its railway communications.
I have put my case very briefly tonight so that my hon. Friend the Member for Whitehaven will have the opportunity to support what I say and give an indication of what he feels about the situation in his own constituency. In conclusion, I merely add that we regard any proposed closure of this line as a serious blow not only to our country life, to our local agricultural industry and to our important tourist industry, but also to the needs of our Development Area. I beg the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to use his influence with the British Transport Commission. I hope that the people in the Commission who are responsible will read the report of this debate in HANSARD, even at this stage, and will recognise that we in Cumberland will fight this proposal and do all we can to oppose it. More than that, I hope that the Minister will give me a definite reply about our roads.
10.43 p.m.
Mr. J. B. Symonds: I support what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Peart). As another Member from Cumberland, I wish, first of all, to express my dissatisfaction and the dissatisfaction of very many people in the Whitehaven area at the closing of the Eskmeals station. I have already sent my protest to the Minister. There are 30 workmen who use the Eskmeals station at present, and the closure will mean great inconvenience to them. They will have to get off the railway somewhere in the area and take an inadequate bus service. As a result, the men must now either rise earlier or be late for work. That would
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mean a loss of production, which nobody desires.
It has been said that the goods traffic will be sent by road. I would like the Minister to travel along that road. The driver of a motor car cannot exceed 30 m.p.h. because there are too many twists and turns in it.
Let me deal with the line from Whitehaven to Millom and then on to Barrow, and particularly between Millom, in my constituency, and Whitehaven. Having travelled in the carriages now in operation, my feeling is that they were some of the first ever used on the line. They are not a credit to British Railways. They should be done away with and replaced by new rolling stock. The best way to deal with the problem, and to assist particularly in the St. Bees area for the Ennerdale Rural District Council, which is trying to develop the whole of the coastline as a resort, is not to close any stations, but to modernise that section and bring it up to date.
Colleagues of mine have been 25 minutes late in travelling from Millom to Whitehaven, and vice versa. It is not uncommon for me to receive, as did my predecessor, complaints from constituents concerning the lateness of the train. Modernisation would benefit not only the workers, but others who desire to use the line. It would mean that instead of the line losing money, the area would be opened up and money would be made. If the Minister seriously considers this matter and makes a personal visit to see for himself, I think he will agree that something must be done for this part of the country.
10.48 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Richard Nugent): I have been a long time on the Front Bench today, starting with Questions, going on to a debate about transport and the Transport Commission generally and finishing up by answering the debate raised by the hon. Member for Workington (Mr. Peart). I sympathise with the anxiety which, I know, he feels about road and rail links with the towns in the North-West and especially with Workington.
First, let me say a word about the road links. I have clearly in mind the

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deputation that the hon. Member accompanied to see me about this matter last April. Although there seems to have been a long delay, time has not been wasted, because the surveyors of the three county councils—Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire—have been proceeding with the preparatory work for the survey which, I felt, should be undertaken.
I have not written to the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends, and, indeed, my own hon. Friends, because I was not clear in my own mind what would be the right way to complete the survey which should be made of the road links with this area.
As the hon. Gentleman knows, it is a problem to decide which would be the best route to back. It is obvious that we cannot back them all. The problem is to link Workington and Whitehaven with the A.6. There is the possibility of improving the coast road, but the bad gradients and alignment would make it a very expensive job, although it has certain attractions. There is also the possibility of improving the A.594 road via Keswick and linking up with towns on the coast, and of the A.595 having a branch off it and running round on the north to link up with the A.6. It is a difficult problem to decide which is the best route.
The only way to proceed is to have a complete survey made of the area. I was not clear whether our divisional road engineer would be able to manage it along with all the other commitments that he has, but in the event we have decided that he should co-ordinate the work of the three county surveyors. He has been asked if he will go ahead and get this survey made of the possibility of improving one of those three routes.
Mr. Peart: The hon. Gentleman says that it is to be one of those three routes. Has he made a decision which one it is to be, or will he have a survey made of the whole picture, followed by a political decision by the Minister?
Mr. Nugent: The survey will throw up the technical pros and cons and what the cost will be. The cost on the coast road would obviously be very heavy. There are amenity objections to the Keswick route. The northern route is more
646
attractive except for the problem of line. We want a professional survey and we shall then decide which route should be developed in the future. At that point we shall have to consider when we can bring this development into the road programme. On that I can say nothing tonight.
The delegation to which the hon. Gentleman referred was very helpful in bringing to our attention the need for preparatory work and getting on with it as fast as we can. When we have taken our decision I shall let the hon. Gentleman know.
The problem of the rail link is that the British Transport Commission is considering the closure of the Penrith-Workington railway. A Press statement was issued in May saying that this closure, and others, were being considered. I realise that this is a blow. I take note of the grave anxiety expressed by the hon. Gentleman on behalf of the local authorities, and the effect that it would have on the farming community. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kindly reference to me. The farming world is my world and I am very sensitive to the interests of the farming community.
I realise how important the tourist industry is, and I hope to see it developed. This railway is not only convenient, but very beautiful. I feel as unhappy as the hon. Gentleman does that it should be necessary for the Commission to consider making this proposal. The proposal will go through the statutory procedure. It is not for me to express any view on the merits of the proposal. The area transport users' consultative committee, set up under the 1947 Act, will consider the merits of this proposal. The committee will hear objections from local authorities and others who are concerned with the proposal, and will then advise the Minister, through the central committee. If the central committee approves—and it does not always do so—it can modify or reject the decision of the area committee—it then advises the Minister and a copy of its recommendation is sent to the Commission. The statutory procedure is there to protect the local interests as far as possible.
But I do not know the facts of this matter. I believe that the Commission has been running a diesel train over this

647
line in the hope of increasing its profitability, and obviously in the hope that it might make unnecessary the proposals that it is now considering making. These proposals do not come from us. They are nothing to do with us. The Commission, which consists of railwaymen, does not propose closures where there is any prospect of keeping the railway going, and I can only suppose that after having tried the diesel train there, and done its best to make the line profitable, it simply cannot see any prospect of doing so. But I do not wish to enlarge on the matter, because I do not know the merits of the case.
All I would do is briefly to paraphrase what the House has been saying this evening during the general debate on the affairs of the Commission, namely, that an essential part of the modernisation of our railways is the streamlining of the uneconomic and unremunerative services. That is accepted everywhere generally, although each Member objects strongly—as I have no doubt I would—to any proposal to close a line in his constituency. Looking at the national picture, however, we cannot deny that ours is a railway system laid out in the days of long ago, before the motor-car had arrived, and that large parts of it are no longer going to be remunerative.
Unless the railways are allowed to shed the parts which they cannot make remunerative and concentrate on the parts which they can, by modernising them to the best standard, they will have no prospect of meeting their obligations, firmly laid upon them by the 1947 Act, of achieving solvency. That is the broad tenor of the debate we had earlier today and both sides of the House must accept it.
But having sketched in that background, I do not wish in any way to reduce the weight of the case which the hon. Member has put. I am certain that the Commission will read HANSARD closely—as it always does on these occasions—and I have no doubt that the transport users' consultative committee will also read it when it considers the
648
case, and will take into account the cogent representations made by the hon. Member.
Mr. Edward Short: Would the Minister bear in mind that this is only a bit of the line concerned? The railway is to be closed from Keswick, through Penrith and right across to Durham. This is not a railway running through some remote valley, but a major route right across the country, from the industrial area of Durham to the industrial area of Cumberland. It is far more serious than the closing of a little bit of line.
Mr. Nugent: I realise that, and I was prepared for the hon. Member to intervene. It is a major closure and, therefore, it will have very full consideration by the transport users' consultative committees concerned before the Commission can go ahead with it. I realise the gravity of the proposition.
As for the point put by the hon. Member for Whitehaven (Mr. Symonds) about the closing of the Eskmeals station, I would point out that he wrote to my right hon. Friend, and that I replied to him on 22nd July explaining that the local transport users' consultative committee had considered this matter and had referred it to the central committee, who endorsed its decision on it on the 14th of this month. This was that the proposal must be approved and that the closure of the station would, therefore, have to proceed.
I explained that the circumstances would have to be most exceptional be fore my right hon. Friend could go against the advice of the central committee, and I am afraid that in the circumstances, much as I would like to meet the hon. Member's point, my right hon. Friend does not feel that he could give a direction to the Commission—
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at Eleven o'clock.

TRANSPORT
  Taff Mead Embankment, Cardiff
  Taff Mead Embankment, Cardiff
  Woolwich Free Ferry
  Woolwich Free Ferry
  Rural Omnibus Services, South Wales
  Rural Omnibus Services, South Wales
  Traffic Problems, London Area (Committees)
  Traffic Problems, London Area (Committees)
  Driving Tests
  Driving Tests
  Traffic Congestion, West Country
  Traffic Congestion, West Country
CIVIL AVIATION
  Air Accident Investigations (Committee)
  Air Accident Investigations (Committee)
  Boeing 707 Aircraft
  Boeing 707 Aircraft
  Air Traffic Control Board
  Air Traffic Control Board
  Independent Air Travel (Scheduled Associate Services)
  Independent Air Travel (Scheduled Associate Services)
  Air Corporations (Select Committee's Report)
  Air Corporations (Select Committee's Report)
ROADS
  New Roads (Earth Moving)
  New Roads (Earth Moving)
  Reading-Newbury Road
  Reading-Newbury Road
  London-Birmingham Motorway
  London-Birmingham Motorway
  Leicester Inner Ring Road
  Leicester Inner Ring Road
  Eastern Avenue (Extension)
  Eastern Avenue (Extension)
  A.30 and A.303 Trunk Road
  A.30 and A.303 Trunk Road
  Road Schemes
  Road Schemes
  Worcester Northern Link Road
  Worcester Northern Link Road
RAILWAYS
  Stations, Leicester Area (Closure)
  Stations, Leicester Area (Closure)
  MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND CIVIL AVIATION (SPEECH)
  MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND CIVIL AVIATION (SPEECH)
  BRITISH TERRITORIES, AFRICA
  BRITISH TERRITORIES, AFRICA
  SUMMIT CONFERENCE
  SUMMIT CONFERENCE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  White Paper
  White Paper
  Operations, Arabian Peninsula
  Operations, Arabian Peninsula
  Light Fixed-Wing Aircraft
  Light Fixed-Wing Aircraft
  NUCLEAR TESTS
  NUCLEAR TESTS
  IRAN (MR. L. GARDNER)
  IRAN (MR. L. GARDNER)
  EGYPT (BRITISH SUBJECTS' CLAIMS)
  EGYPT (BRITISH SUBJECTS' CLAIMS)
ROYAL NAVY
  Personnel, Northern Ireland (Incidents)
  Personnel, Northern Ireland (Incidents)
  Nuclear Propulsion
  Nuclear Propulsion
  Admiralty Houses, Crombie
  Admiralty Houses, Crombie
BRITISH ARMY
  Personnel, Northern Ireland (Incidents)
  Personnel, Northern Ireland (Incidents)
  Army Cadet Force (Centenary)
  Army Cadet Force (Centenary)
WIRELESS AND TELEVISION
  Skegness
  Skegness
POST OFFICE
  Industrial Premises (Strike Pickets)
  Industrial Premises (Strike Pickets)
  Central Telegraph Office Site (Redevelopment)
  Central Telegraph Office Site (Redevelopment)
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Dean Ryle Street, Westminster
  Dean Ryle Street, Westminster
  Diesel-Engined Vehicles (Exhaust Fumes)
  Diesel-Engined Vehicles (Exhaust Fumes)
SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
  Space Research
  Space Research
TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Distribution of Industry (Northumberland and Durham)
  Distribution of Industry (Northumberland and Durham)
  Paper-Making Industry
  Paper-Making Industry
  Target
  Target
MINISTRY OF SUPPLY
  Britannic Aircraft
  Britannic Aircraft
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
  Milk (Strontium 90 Content)
  Milk (Strontium 90 Content)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Bacon and Ham
  Bacon and Ham
  Calf Subsidy
  Calf Subsidy
  Small Farmer Scheme (Wales)
  Small Farmer Scheme (Wales)
ROYAL AIR FORGE
  Transport Aircraft (Seats)
  Transport Aircraft (Seats)
  Personnel, Northern Ireland (Incidents)
  Personnel, Northern Ireland (Incidents)
KENYA
  Hola Camp
  Hola Camp
  African Prisoners and Detainees
  African Prisoners and Detainees
TANGANYIKA
  Education Levy
  Education Levy
  Education
  Education
  School Textbooks
  School Textbooks
SINGAPORE
  Distressed Persons (Relief and Repatriation)
  Distressed Persons (Relief and Repatriation)
  COLONIAL TERRITORIES
  COLONIAL TERRITORIES
EDUCATION
  Building Programmes, Welwyn and Hatfield
  Building Programmes, Welwyn and Hatfield
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Civil Service Technical Classes (Pay Research Unit)
  Civil Service Technical Classes (Pay Research Unit)
  Hull (New Factories)
  Hull (New Factories)
  Wales (Development Fund Grants and Loans)
  Wales (Development Fund Grants and Loans)
  Portuguese Wine
  Portuguese Wine
HOSPITALS
  Eccles and Patricroft Hospital (Casualty Department)
  Eccles and Patricroft Hospital (Casualty Department)
  Hull (Surgical Waiting Lists)
  Hull (Surgical Waiting Lists)
  Sutton Annexe Hospital, Hull
  Sutton Annexe Hospital, Hull
  Hedon Road Maternity Hospital, Hull
  Hedon Road Maternity Hospital, Hull
  Townend Maternity Home, Hull
  Townend Maternity Home, Hull
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 (Section 39)
  Town and Country Planning Act, 1959 (Section 39)
  Local Authority Members (Subsistence Allowances)
  Local Authority Members (Subsistence Allowances)
EMPLOYMENT
  Defence Work
  Defence Work
  Western Isles
  Western Isles
  Wembley
  Wembley
  Factories Act, 1959
  Factories Act, 1959
SCOTLAND
  Retired Teachers
  Retired Teachers
MINISTRY OF WORKS
  The Mall (Litter Baskets)
  The Mall (Litter Baskets)

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Viscount Simonds

PERSONAL STATEMENT BY LORD TAYLOR
2.34 p.m.
LORD TAYLOR: My Lords, with the permission of the House, I should like to make a brief statement about the Question answered by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord President of the Council yesterday. This followed a correspondence with the Lord President which I thought was closing the incident. My speech in the House on July 13 was made in good faith and in the belief that I was correctly representing what I had been told. If, as I understand, the person concerned says that I got a wrong impression of what he intended to convey, I will not challenge his statement.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, I think the House would wish to accept that from the noble Lord. I do not think anyone who has known the noble Lord as long as I have, or indeed anyone in this House, would ever suppose that he acted otherwise than in excellent faith, and I am very glad, for my part, to say that I have never thought anything else.

SECONDARY EDUCATION IN THE SCILLY ISLES
LORD WISE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government for information as to what proposals they can now make in order that the educational facilities in the Isles of Scilly may be improved and the needs of the children met within adequate financial limits.]
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, at present, there are five all-age schools in the Isles of Scilly, providing for all the children except those selected for grammar schools. The problem is how to provide secondary education for the other seniors. The local education authority wish to build a secondary modern school on St. Mary's because they believe it would be bad for the children and for the Islands to send them to secondary schools on the mainland. The Minister of Education agrees and has included the project in the 1960–61 building programme. The authority have, however, strongly represented that their general financial position prevents them from carrying out this project. Officers of the Ministries of Education and Housing and Local Government spent two days in the Islands last month examining the facts and discussing the issues with the Council. The Departments concerned are now studying the facts and a decision will be made as soon as possible.
LORD WISE: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Viscount for his very full reply to the Question. I am certain that it will give pleasure to the people of these Islands to know that sooner or later they will have their secondary school.

PRESTWICK AIRPORT
LORD POLWARTH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government when they intend to start the construction of the following works so as to bring Prestwick Airport to the standards required of the United Kingdom's second international airport, and when they estimate that each of them will be completed—

1. Extension of the main runway.

2. The new control tower and fire station.

3. The new terminal building and apron.

4. An airport hotel.]

THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, the contract for the runway extension will be placed as soon as the Ministry can secure the co-operation of the Ayrshire

745
County Council, and the work should be completed in nine months. Invitations to tender for the control tower and fire station will be ready for issue in August. On this basis work would start in October; the fire station should be completed by June, 1960, and the control tower by March, 1961. It is hoped that work on the terminal building and apron will start next year and be completed in the latter part of 1962. As regards an hotel, the architect is provisionally including hotel accommodation in his plans for the terminal area, so that before making a decision the Minister can see the cost and relate it to the return to be expected.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, do the plans which the noble Earl has given involve any alteration to the main road?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: Yes.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, may it be assumed from the reply that a tunnel is not to be constructed simultaneously with the extension of the runway; and as the runway is to be raised by 7 feet at its western end, can the Government state whether consideration has been given to using the spoil from a tunnel to help with that embankment, and, if so, how would the overall cost of the two jobs be affected?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, the answer to the first part of that question is, Yes: the noble Lord's assumption is correct. The answer to the second part of the question is, Yes. So far as the third part of the question is concerned, the cost is of the order of £40,000 as compared with £1 million.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, does the alteration of the main road mean taking the main road through a tunnel or diverting it?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, I have not been asked that question on the Order Paper. I should be grateful if the noble Earl would put it down.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, can the noble Earl say whether the new terminal building will be more worthy of Scotland's principal airport than the present shabby structure?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: I assume so.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, the noble Earl said, "As soon as the co-operation of the Ayrshire County Council can be obtained". He is not suggesting, is he, that the Ayrshire County Council are holding back in any way and not giving every co-operation they can?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: We are awaiting their reply.
LORD GREENHILL: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that in to-day's Glasgow Herald there is, in inverted commas, a quotation from a letter to the effect that the Ayrshire County Council are reluctant to take part in consultation on the basis of the Minister's plans, which exclude the possibility of further investigation of the practicability of constructing a tunnel as recommended by the Commissioners? In the light of this statement by the Ayrshire County Council, and remembering that the essence of the whole matter is speed—because they want to get on with this scheme by next May—would it not be possible for consultations to take place immediately between the Minister and the Ayrshire County Council with a view to arriving at some arrangement whereby this important project is not delayed.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, the whole essence of this problem, as the noble Lord said, is that there should be no delay. It is for that reason that my right honourable friend has for the moment said that there shall be no tunnel; because construction of a tunnel would delay the runway.
LORD GREENHILL: But it is a temporary decision?
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: I am not aware whether it is temporary or not. That is my right honourable friend's decision at the moment.
LORD POLWARTH: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl for his reply; and without indulging in recriminations for past delays I would ask him for an assurance that the Government will treat the whole of this problem, and particularly the runway extension, with a great deal of urgency—more so than in the past.
THE EARL OF GOSFORD: My Lords, I am glad the noble Earl has asked me that question. My right honourable friend's one idea is to get this runway

747
built so that it will be ready in time for jet aircraft to land on it and without any delay.

SPACE RESEARCH: CO-OPERATION WITH AMERICA
VISCOUNT GOSCHEN: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make about the recent visit of Professor Massey's team on Space Research to the United States of America.]
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Yes, my Lords. In accordance with the Prime Minister's announcement on May 12, 1959, Professor Massey and a small team of experts visited the United States recently to discuss co-operation with the United States in the field of scientific research in space using earth satellites. I am glad to report to your Lordships that Professor Massey's team had most valuable and fruitful discussions with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
As a result, it is proposed that British scientists will prepare instruments, for satellites to be placed in orbit by the use of the "Scout" vehicle, which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are developing for use in connection with civil scientific research. Thus, British science will be able to play its own part in the advancement of scientific knowledge of our planet and its environment. Several vehicles might be involved over a period of three to four years. Her Majesty's Government have considered and approved these proposals, subject to the conclusion of formal arrangements.
Information concerning these programmes and their results will be made available to the international scientific community. Both the British and the American groups regard this project as a valuable development in scientific cooperation, and in endorsing this view on behalf of Her Majesty's Government I should like to congratulate both sides on the successful outcome of their discussions. Meantime, the arrangements for design studies of British launchers, which were announced in the Prime Minister's statement, remain unaffected.

COLONIAL CIVIL SERVANTS' PENSIONS
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why the Secretary of State for the Colonies has not sufficient information about pensions increases to Colonial Civil Servants retired from the services of the Governments of Bermuda and Malta to be able to compare these with those payable under the Pensions (Increase) Act of 1959.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS (THE EARL OF PERTH): My Lords, few of the pensioners are resident in this country. No representations have been received about their pension increase, and until very recently there has been no occasion to obtain the information. This, however, is now being sought.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his reply.

BRITISH SUBJECTS' EGYPTIAN CLAIMS
2.42 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, I beg to ask the Private Notice Question, the text of which is already in the hands of the Government. As it has not been circulated perhaps the House will allow me to read it. It is: To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in arrangements to pay the claims of British subjects whose property in Egypt has been "Egyptianised" or sequestrated?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, since the Order in Council of April 6, 1959, which provided for the Foreign Compensation Commission to receive and assess the claims in question some 590 claims have been presented and the Commission is in a position to make preliminary assessments in some cases. Her Majesty's Government are anxious to begin to make payments as soon as possible and an Order in Council on this subject has been laid before Parliament this day. It provides for interim payments in respect of assessed claims to be made according to a sliding scale.

749
These payments can be made, as soon as their claims have been established before the Foreign Compensation Commission, to all claimants who have not received loans from Her Majesty's Government.
Where, however, claimants have already received loans from Her Majesty's Government, there remains the question of the extent to which these loans should be deducted or taken into account in making the interim payments. Such loans, like any others, are of course prima facie repayable, but Her Majesty's Government are aware that there may be cases where strict insistence on this general right of recovery would create serious hardship and inequity between various classes of claimant. They will therefore be prepared, in cases where the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is so advised by an Advisory Board to be set up for the purpose, to remit the whole or a part of the obligation to repay the loan; and the Order in Council has been so drafted as to give Her Majesty's Government the necessary latitude. Sir George Rendel, whose experience in regard to such matters will be known to your Lordships, has consented to act as Chairman of the Advisory Board. It is also proposed to invite members of the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board to join this body so that we may benefit from their experience.
The sliding scale is as follows:

Where the amount of the loss assessed by the Commission under the Determination Order

The sum calculated shall be

(1) does not exceed £5,000

70 per cent. of the amount assessed

(2) exceeds £5,000 but does not exceed £10,000

£3,500, and 50 per cent. of the balance of the amount assessed over £5,000

(3) exceeds £10,000 but does not exceed £25,000

£6,000, and 25 per cent. of the balance of the amount assessed over £10,000

(4) exceeds £25,000…

£9,750, and 5 per cent. of the balance of the amount assessed over £25,000.

LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, while I am grateful for the reply of the noble and learned Viscount, which will be read with appreciation by all concerned with
750
these outstanding claims, may I ask Her Majesty's Government to remember that many of these British nationals are still suffering grievous loss; and will Her Majesty's Government continue their efforts in all and every direction possible to help these sufferers?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, yes.

COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION
2.46 p.m.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, we have a long day ahead of us, but the subject of Commonwealth education and the results of the Commonwealth Education Conference just concluded in Oxford, are so important that I think your Lordships would allow me to make a short statement.
Copies of the Report of the Commonwealth Education Conference will be published as a White Paper as soon as possible, but in the meantime a few advance copies are available in the Library. I am happy to be able to inform your Lordships that the Conference has been an outstanding success. In the ten working days available to the delegates at Oxford, plans have been made not only to bring into operation in 1960–61 the Commonwealth Scholarship Scheme approved in principle at Montreal last year, but also to provide for both short and long term assistance to those Commonwealth countries whose shortage of teachers at all levels and of specialist university staff, of technically educated men and women is holding up the development of education and the progress of the economy.
The target of 1,000 scholarships will be not only attained but exceeded. The scholarships will, for the most part, be given to graduates to enable them to do research or to work for higher degrees in universities and comparable institutions in other Commonwealth countries than their own. The scholarships will be tenable for an average period of two years and be comparable in standing with the best offered by any other country or in any other way. They will be supplemented by a small number of Visiting Fellowships to enable distinguished

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Commonwealth professors and scholars to visit other Commonwealth countries and to work at institutions of their own choice. A few scholarships will also be tenable at undergraduate level where the courses required by the candidates are not available in their own countries. In the short run the quickest way to meet the need for teachers is to send out teachers already trained to occupy key posts overseas. This the older Commonwealth countries propose to do.
University lecturers and professors will be encouraged to take up overseas posts, and we in the United Kingdom will make a special effort to help with teachers in those scientific and engineering subjects in which Commonwealth countries have reported that their needs are greatest. These subjects are, of course, those where the shortage of teachers is felt acutely in the United Kingdom. If our objective is to be achieved a number of measures will be necessary, including the topping up of salaries calculated on the local scale; the provision of passages for the teacher and his family; preservation of his pension rights and promotion prospects; and assistance in resettlement on return. But these administrative measures will not be enough: we shall have to rely also on the enthusiasm of those teachers who go overseas, and on the forbearance of those who will have to undertake a heavier burden at home. The United Kingdom proposals make provision for some 400 additional United Kingdom teachers to serve in Commonwealth made by Canada and other countries.
The long-term solution must be to build up the educational resources of the smaller Commonwealth countries by providing the staffs for new teacher-training institutions which they may decide to establish, either in their own territory or jointly to serve the needs of a particular region. We shall provide in the United Kingdom 500 more places for teacher-trainees from these countries as from the academic year 1960–61 and £250,000 a year for grants to the students occupying them. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and other countries will also make considerable countries. Offers of help were also contributions.
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The expansion of technical education must take time, but as a result of the Conference new efforts will be made to speed the process. The Conference has emphasised the need for trained teachers in technical subjects, and the continuing need for industrial training; the great shortage of suitable books and equipment was also emphasised. In the United Kingdom it is planned that over the next ten years some 4,000 additional places will be available to Commonwealth students in technical colleges. Representatives of the Federation of British Industries and the Industrial Research Association told the Conference of their intention to continue the facilities now offered to overseas students and to expand them in certain directions.
The total cost of the Scholarship Scheme will be about £5 million over the first five-year period, and of this the 500 scholarships which the United Kingdom is providing will take about half. The other projects discussed will cost at least a further £5 million during the same period, of which the United Kingdom contribution will be approximately £3½ million. While the new plan is an all-Commonwealth one, it will be seen that in money, as in men, the United Kingdom share is a very considerable one.
The Conference recognised, however, that they were only making a start, although an extremely encouraging start, on the most urgent and specific needs. They have therefore recommended that another Commonwealth Education Conference should meet in 1961 to review progress and to make further plans. Thus we hope to have laid the foundations for a close and lasting co-operation among all the countries of the Commonwealth in this vital field of education, to which the Montreal Conference looked forward.
It is with the greatest regret, I know, that your Lordships will have heard of the unfortunate accident to Lord Halifax, who presided so ably at the opening Plenary Session of the Conference. We all wish him a speedy recovery.
I should like, too, to pay a special and warm tribute to the Chairman of the Conference, Sir Philip Morris, the Vice-Chancellor of Bristol University, on

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whose wise and stimulating leadership the undoubted success of the Conference so much depended.
To give your Lordships, in conclusion, some indication of the atmosphere engendered by the Conference, I cannot do better than to quote from the Report of one of the Committees, in which the members, drawn from the whole Commonwealth, stated:
"…we are grateful for the opportunity of meeting in an atmosphere of family affection and trust and we look forward to a future in which the educational ties of the Commonwealth will be even stronger, easier and more diverse than at present."
I had the pleasure yesterday of attending the final session of the Conference and I found that spirit there to the full. I believe we have started in a new field—a field which really is vital to the success and development of the free nations of the Commonwealth—something which will develop into a new tie of great significance to the whole of our family.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, we are all obliged to the noble Earl for that statement and it is very gratifying to know that the Conference has been such a success. We shall look forward to reading the Report in more detail and it may be that when we return in the Autumn we shall require a day to discuss it. Meanwhile, we are all grateful for this effort at Commonwealth co-operation and we shall all join in hoping that the noble Earl, Lord Halifax, will soon become quite fit again.
LORD REA: My Lords, I should like to support the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in his remarks. This statement will give great gratification in every quarter, and I think we should like to put it on record how much indebted we are to Her Majesty's Government for their far-sighted, broad-minded and generous support and assistance in this matter, which we wish every prosperity.
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Lord, Lord Rea; and I am sure that the delegates will be much gratified by the general support which comes from your Lordships' House.
2.54 p.m.

OVERSEAS RESEARCH COUNCIL
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, with the permission of the House I should like to make a statement about the establishment of the Overseas Research Council. Her Majesty's Government have now given effect to the announcement made at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference in Montreal last year that an Overseas Research Council is to be established. I am glad to say that Dr. R. S. Aitken, Vice-Chancellor of Birmingham University, has accepted the chairmanship. I am circulating the names of the members, together with the terms of reference, in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
As previously explained, the United Kingdom Research Councils—Department of Scientific and Industrial Ressearch, Medical Research Council and Agricultural Research Council—are willing to provide advice and assistance on research matters falling within their respective fields to any Commonwealth country desiring such assistance wherever this can be done within the funds available. The Overseas Research Council will provide for the co-ordination of this assistance, and for the formulation of general United Kingdom policy in this field. The Council will provide a central point to which Commonwealth Governments and research institutions can refer for advice and information, and will advise generally on United Kingdom co-operation in scientific research overseas.
There are no geographical restrictions in the Council's terms of reference. Matters concerning scientific development in Colonial territories, in Commonwealth countries, and in countries outside the Commonwealth, can equally be referred to it. Moreover, in promoting such development, the Council can look to possible collaboration between this country and other Commonwealth countries, countries outside the Commonwealth, such as the United States of America, and international agencies, such as those of the United Nations and the charitable foundations.
[Following are the details referred to:]
Membership of Overseas Research Council

Dr. R. S. Aitken (Chairman).

Sir Jock Campbell.

Sir Charles Dodds, M.V.O., F.R.S.

Sir Harold Himsworth. K.C.B., F.R.S.

Sir Joseph Hutchinson, C.M.G., F.R.S.

Dr. R. Lewthwaite, C.M.G.. O.B.E.

Professor J. McMichael, F.R.S.

Sir Harry Melville, K.C.B., F.R.S.

Mr. G. D. W. Nye, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Sir Arnold Plant.

Sir William Slater, K.B.E., F.R.S.

Dr. H. G. Thornton, F.R.S.

Sir Solly Zuckerman, C.B., F.R.S.

Terms of Reference
"To advise the Privy Council Committee on Overseas Research:—

(1) on the formulation of United Kingdom policy in respect (a) of scientific research undertaken in or for overseas territories both within and outside the Commonwealth, (b) of methods of making the results of research available in these territories, and (c) of assistance to the scientific services of those territories;

(2) on the co-ordination of the activities of United Kingdom Government organisations in the development of science in the civil sphere in overseas territories; and

(3) on co-operation within the Commonwealth, with other countries and with international agencies in promoting such development."

An Order in Council was made yesterday, establishing the Committee of the Privy Council, referred to in the terms of reference. The Committee consists of the Lord President of the Council, and the Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Colonies and Foreign Affairs.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Viscount for that statement. It is most encouraging, and I should like to congratulate the noble Viscount on having created a very fine organisation. I have seen the names of the members and I think he is to be congratulated on having got together so distinguished a group of people. I would ask him just one question: Does he visualise that this will take up a great deal of the time of the members? If so, which of them, if any, will be full-time? And will they be paid? Also, will their headquarters be in London? I presume they will. And does he contemplate that they will have to do a good deal of travelling in the Commonwealth countries and the Colonies and abroad?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, it is a little difficult to answer all those questions. I should like to thank the noble Lord for his welcome to this project. The first question was: will it involve a good deal of time? I should think that for some time to come it probably will, at any rate while the project is in its younger days, because there is a good deal to discuss. I would hope that as the matter developed it would take less time than it will to begin with. I believe that payments may be made to certain of the officers, but I should not like to answer that question in detail without notice. I have some reason to think there may be some payments made. There will be a certain amount of travelling, both directly, in connection with the business of the Council, but more especially because these people have been very largely selected for their knowledge of certain overseas territories and their connection with science in them; and they will in the ordinary course of events be people who would very largely—some of them—be travelling to the United States and overseas to the Commonwealth, and I think a good deal of their work would be in connection with this Council.
LORD REA: My Lords, if these eminent gentlemen are not rewarded, or even if they are, I think the House would like it to be known how much it appreciates their gesture in offering their services in this way.

COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
LEGITIMACY BILL
Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments agreed to.

NYASALAND: THE DEVLIN REPORT
3.0 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH THE EARL OF PERTH rose to move to resolve, That this House takes note of the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry and the Despatch from the Governor of Nyasaland there-on, and extends its thanks to the Chairman and members of the Commission for their work; endorses their conclusion that a policy of violence was adopted by the Nyasaland African Congress Leadership and that the declaration of the state of emergency was fully justified, deeply regrets the loss of life that occurred, but acknowledges that prompt and effective action by the Governor prevented the development of a more serious situation; expresses its gratitude to the administration and to the Security Forces for their loyal service in circumstances of great difficulty; and looks forward to the restoration of normal conditions in Nyasaland and to the continued constitutional and economic progress of its people on the basis of respect for law and order. The noble Earl said: My Lords, on March 24 in this House we had a debate on unrest in Nyasaland. During that debate we announced that the Devlin Commission was being set up by the Governor and with the approval of Her Majesty's Government. The Commission's terms of reference were:
"To inquire into the recent disturbances in Nyasaland and the events leading up to them, and to report thereon."
The composition of the Commission was most carefully considered. Our aim was to get members whose standing and wide experience would ensure that we should reach, and would show to one and all that Her Majesty's Government were determined to reach the heart of the matter.
My Lords, four months have gone by. The Report has been published, together with the Despatch by the Governor, and these we are to debate to-day. Before doing so, I would make this comment: that our action, and that of the Governor, was not the action of someone with something to hide. It was not the action of "a police state", but the action of a truly democratic Government anxious to have a firm basis on which to go forward for the future welfare of Nyasaland and of the Federation.
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The Commission's Report runs to nearly 150 pages; strikingly written, and with a wealth of fact and opinion: fact—and I quote:
"…in order that those whose responsibility is to approve or disapprove may be provided with a firm basis of fact for their deliberations."
As my Motion shows, we have accordingly drawn attention to what are, I believe, the salient findings; and I confidently ask your Lordships' endorsement of them.
First (and on this I am sure there will be no disagreement), I wish to extend our thanks to the Chairman, Mr. Justice Devlin, who is, as it happens, an old Cambridge friend of mine, and to the other members for their work. I know a little of what a tremendous work it has been; unremitting, and under pressure of a timetable which allowed no leisure and the barest of time for quiet reflection. In a document of 146 pages, there is, of course, material for everyone to choose; and this is here even more the case, for this Report has been written in degrees as a summing up, setting out the pros and cons of every issue. I do not pretend that, in the time since it was published, we have been able to decide what action or judgment should be called for on every issue. Further, if I did try to cover every point, I should unduly weary your Lordships. Rather must I call in aid on certain aspects the important Despatch by the Governor—who, let it be well remembered, bears the direct responsibility for law and order in Nyasaland, and for the lives of its citizens.
It is essential to cast our minds back to four months ago, when the Commission were appointed. At that time, what were the questions which were being asked? They were: Was the Governor's action in declaring a state of emergency really necessary? Was the action deliberately engineered by Sir Roy Welensky to gain control of the Colony? Was the African National Congress, of which Dr. Banda was the leader, really seeking its aims through violence and killings? What does the Report find on these questions? After reviewing all the facts, it says about the declaration of emergency:
"…in the situation that existed on March 3 the Government had either to act or to abdicate".

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I could quote many other passages in the Report leading to the same conclusion, but this one seems to me to stand alone, and is sufficient.
And what of the rôole of Sir Roy Welensky? Again I quote:
"Sir Roy's intervention was not directly on the question of whether or not an emergency should be declared".
Then, later, in the same paragraph:
"…we have no reason to think that the decision to postpone the visit"—
that, my Lords, was my visit—
"and declare a state of emergency was not his own."—
that is, the Governor's own decision. I have, with the time in view, given only two extracts from paragraph 160 of the Report. There is much more in the same vein.
So much for the declaration of the emergency—and I say this with no particular satisfaction, for no one likes an emergency, least of all a Governor. But his action was clearly and completely justified. Why was it justified?—and here I come to the third question. Because of the deliberate and calculated policy of the Nyasaland African Congress leadership. Paragraph 168 says:
"We have found that violent action was to be adopted as a policy, that breaches of the law were to be committed and that attempts by the Government to enforce it were to be resisted with violence. We have found further that there was talk of beating and killing Europeans, but not of cold-blooded assassination or massacre."
I do not intend, my Lords, to go into the question of whether there was a murder plot, or into what exactly happened on January 25 at that famous meeting in the bush. It was scarcely raised in your Lordships' House, and it has been covered fully in the Governor's Despatch. The Commission disbelieves in the plot: others, on the evidence, might well reach a different conclusion. But, as the Report says:
"The murder plot has distracted attention from the Government's case against Congress."
What is sure is that violent action was to be adopted as a policy.
And what of the rôle of Dr. Banda? The Commission, in paragraph 166, say:
"We think that Dr. Banda would never have approved a policy of murder and that he would have intervened decisively if he had thought that it was so much as being discussed."
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But later in the same paragraph the Commission say:
"…but he did not, as he once frankly said, exclude violence and he never condemned it categorically".
And what was the sequel? The sequel, we find, was—and I quote again:
"We think that the ordinary official"—
that is, the ordinary Congress official—
"did think, and could reasonably have thought,"—
and I repeat those words, "could reasonably have thought"—
"that Dr. Banda would not disapprove"—
that is, of violence. My Lords, the issue of the complicity of Dr. Banda may be difficult for some, but of this there can surely be no doubt: that, as Leader of Congress, as their messiah, as the chooser of the extremist lieutenants and as not condemning violence categorically, he must bear a very grave responsibility for the events. In these circumstances, and knowing how the ordinary African views him—"as a national leader setting up his authority against that of the Boma"; that is, of the Government—clearly the Governor must consider carefully before taking any action in regard to his release; and he cannot be treated differently from the other detainees, whose release could not be justified while they represent a threat to the country.
On detainees in general, I would make the following points. Detainees are released as soon as the Governor feels their detention is no longer necessary for the maintenance of public order. The Governor has to review each case every six months. Over half of these cases, of those who are in detention, will be coming up for review in September. I know that the Governor intends to scrutinise each case personally, and he very much hopes that it will be possible for a number of those less implicated than others to be released.
Her Majesty's Government have complete confidence in the Governor and in his handling of the emergency. There was loss of life, and I know that we one and all deeply regret it. But if the Governor had waited, had not acted when he did, then—and I quote:
"If it"—
that is, violence—
"started in some places and was not checked, it would certainly have spread and might have

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gone very far; that was the real danger in the situation".
The Report covers in great detail all the incidents which led to loss of life, but not those—and they were the great majority—where firearms were not used. I think it is important to remember this, lest the idea becomes prevalent that recourse to firearms was the usual thing. The catalogue is a tragic one, but one thing struck me again and again—the forbearance of those who had to try to deal with the disturbance. The courage of the district commissioners, of the police, and of the soldiers, stands out for all to see; their constant attempts to disperse the crowds without hurt that run through the whole list of incidents.
The Commission saw everyone who was responsible for the shootings, and they say:
"…we have not found anyone who was 'trigger-happy'…we are satisfied that each man did what he did because he honestly felt that he could not discharge his duty in any other way."
None of your Lordships will be surprised at this finding; but, none the less, I am sure you will join with me in expressing, in the words of the Resolution, our gratitude to the Administration and to the security forces for their loyal service in circumstances of great difficulty.
Some of your Lordships will say: what about afterwards? What about the subsequent period, which is covered in Part VI of the Report? What about the use of unnecessary force in arrests, and force in the villages? What about tough, punitive action in areas where lawlessness and acts of violence were being perpetrated or planned? I can only deal with this very briefly; but, for those who wish, the Governor's Despatch deals with it at length in paragraphs 48 to 51. But this I would say—and particularly because the Commission in measure go against what I reported to your Lordships in our last debate: that nowhere did I see or here anything which savoured of vindictiveness or brutality among those acting to restore authority. Instructions, as we read, were that action must be firm but without brutality.
What is the limit of firmness? When does it become aggressive and bullying behaviour? That can be long debated, particularly when one is removed from the scene of action. As the Governor said, if some bullying occurred, "It must
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be a matter for regret"—a regret which of course we all fully share. He went on to say that it was based on evidence not known to him. I do not believe that anyone not taking part in the operation in the confused and fearsome conditions of riot and disturbance can easily arrive at a right judgment. The action of those during the subsequent operations was, I believe—and the Commission recognised that this might be the case—something which prevented far more serious dis-orders.
That, my Lords, brings me to a phrase at the very beginning of the Report:
"Nyasaland is—no doubt only temporarily—a police state".
When I first read it, I feared it would be misquoted and misused; and that, unfortunately, has been the case. To many, and certainly to me, the phrase "police state" has an evil connotation. It recalls horrors too well known in many parts of the world. But of Nyasaland this connotation is just not true. The Commission itself says:
"…and since with the forces at its disposal the maintenance of order could not be achieved within the ordinary framework of the law, it had to resort to emergency powers"—
to, that is, this so-called police state, since it could not be done within the ordinary framework of the law.
But what sort of a police state is Nyasaland? Leading political figures such as Mr. T. D. T. Banda and Mr. W. Chirwa have not hesitated, and do not hesitate, vigorously to express the opposition of themselves and their followers to federation, and their desire for an African-dominated Government in Nyasaland. These formed the main planks of Congress's own political platform. But there is this essential difference between them: these political figures have openly and consistently condemned any policy of violence, and have said that they would gain their ends by constitutional means. It has been neither unsafe nor unwise for these leaders—or, indeed, others—so to speak and so to act. My Lords, would a police state have appointed a Commission such as the Devlin Commission itself, to roam at complete liberty where it wished through the land, talking to detainees or others without any knowledge of the Governor? Would a police state call a Committee of Inquiry to investigate conditions as soon as there was a whispers

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of something wrong in one of the detention camps? I do not think I need pursue the point any further.
The Commission recognised that this state is "no doubt only temporary", and that brings me to the last part of my Resolution: that we look
"…forward to the restoration of normal conditions in Nyasaland and to the continued constitutional and economic progress of its people on the basis of respect for law and order."
Our aim is just that: to press forward again in Nyasaland as soon as we can, consistently with the safety of its people.
While I have dealt at some length with the past and with the Report, it is this future which really matters; and to this end the first objective, as has so often been said—as I stressed after my return from Nyasaland; as the Archbishop of York said so movingly in the same debate; and as my noble Leader and others said in the debate on the proposed Commission on Federation the day before yesterday—is to remove the fears of the Africans. What is their basic fear? It is that in 1960, or soon after, the Federation would take them over against their will, and that the protection of Her Majesty's Government would be withdrawn. Again and again we have assured the African peoples that this is not so; and we stand by our pledges that this will not happen. Last week and in another place my right honourable friend the Prime Minister was very explicit on this point. He said that the two Northern Legislatures, in their present state, could not be more than one element in any machinery used for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of the inhabitants; and, later on, he said that he wanted to make it absolutely clear that the purpose of our policy is, as soon as possible and as rapidly as possible, to move towards self-government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland—and this was publicly accepted by Sir Roy Welensky.
I would appeal to all members of all Parties—and particularly to the noble Lords opposite who have considerable influence with some of the Africans—to do what they can to make known our position on the pledges. For us all to remove fears where there is common ground is, I am sure, the common aim
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of all of us. But I know that such action (which, in connection with the pledges, is, in a sense, negative) is not alone effective; and it is with this thought in mind, and with the thought of the need for positive and reassuring action, that a Commission was proposed before the 1960 Review. Whether or not it is exactly the right form, let us again, members of all Parties, try to get over to the people of Nyasaland what is the purpose behind it—for on this, again, there is common ground. The purpose is to take first steps to reach a right answer to the many problems of federation for the Conference in 1960, so that the peoples of the three territories may live in harmony and happiness.
What other positive action can we take? Well, my Lords, there is clearly constitutional progress for Nyasaland. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State announced new steps in another place last week. He said that there were to be for the first time—and this, I think, is very important—Africans on the Executive Council, and, further, that there were to be more Africans on the Legislative Council; so that there would be a majority of Africans on the un-official side. Unhappily, at this time elections to choose these people will not be possible, but the Government will call for these elections probably on a new franchise basis just as soon as it is prudent to do so. Here, too, my Lords, we are on common ground. Some may say that it is not enough and that a spectacular step forward is called for: but I would ask them to help to put over to the Africans that these are moves in the right direction, and that while they and the Africans may continue, and rightly continue, to press for more, in the meantime the African should take full advantage of the opportunity offered to gain ministerial experience and much-needed experience in the art of government, against a future when Nyasaland is a fully self-governing unit of the Federation. My Lords, these constitutional steps are but interim ones.
And lastly, there is economic progress. We—and this is true also of the Federation—are most anxious to do all we can to develop the country, to improve its schools, its roads, its agriculture, and generally to raise the standard of its people. Professor Jack, at the invitation

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of the Federal Government and with the approval of the Governor, went to Nyasaland a little time ago to investigate means to encourage agricultural and industrial development in the lower Shire Valley. I have recently been talking with him, and he hopes in a short time to bring out his Report. In the Shire Valley water, power and land reclamation may all be developed, and a lot of preliminary work is in hand. We intend to follow it up as energetically and as quickly as we can.
My Lords, the Government Motion is necessarily long, since it covers the vital issues arising from the Devlin Report. There remains much of the Report which can, and no doubt will, often be used to-day to justify criticism of the Government's action. But when a little time has gone by, and when the steps I have just outlined begin to bear fruit, I believe that the Report which the Governor and the Government fearlessly called for when the Devlin Commission was appointed will be found to be the start of new and good times for the great venture of Federation and for the happiness of its people. It is in this firm belief that I move my Resolution.
Moved to resolve, That this House takes note of the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry and the Despatch from the Governor of Nyasaland thereon, and extends its thanks to the Chairman and members of the Commission for their work; endorses their conclusion that a policy of violence was adopted by the Nyasaland African Congress Leadership and that the declaration of the state of emergency was fully justified, deeply regrets the loss of life that occurred, but acknowledges that prompt and effective action by the Governor prevented the development of a more serious situation; expresses its gratitude to the administration and to the Security Forces for their loyal service in circumstances of great difficulty; and looks forward to the restoration of normal conditions in Nyasaland and to the continued constitutional and economic progress of its people on the basis of respect for law and order.—(The Earl of Perth.)
3 22 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH rose to move, as an Amendment to the Resolution, to leave out all words after "House" and to insert
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instead "accepts the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry (Cmnd. 814)." The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this debate we have entered on to-day is, I am sure, in the minds of all of us as one of the most important we have had to deal with for a long time. There have been precedents; from time to time in our history when matters which were cognate to the principles involved to-day have also had to be dealt with. I am bound to say that I am exceedingly disappointed in the reception of the Devlin Commission Report by the Government; and not least by the fact that the noble Earl, Lord Perth, agrees with that reception, in spite of the words he quoted—which are worth re-quoting—from his own announcement at the end of his speech on March 24.
After announcing that the Government were satisfied that conditions have improved to such an extent that, with the approval of the Government, he was setting up a Commission of Inquiry, and having given the terms of reference, he said this [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 215, col. 217]:
"Mr. Justice Devlin has agreed to serve-as chairman; and there will be three other members—Sir John Ure Primrose, a former Lord Provost of Perth"—
I think he was Lord Provost for about nine years and has great magisterial experience and a long exercise of judgment—
"Sir Percy Wyn-Harris, formerly Governor of the Gambia"—
and, incidentally, with twenty years' previous experience in East Africa; with great knowledge of the African mind and character, even in the most turbulent and ignorant areas of the population—
"and Mr. E. T. Williams, Warden of Rhodes House, Oxford "—
with a vast field of experience behind him in contact with Commonwealth, Colonial and similar matters. The noble Earl went on to say:
"I am sure that I voice the opinion of all your Lordships in expressing our gratitude to them for having been ready to undertake this important inquiry at such short notice. I do not doubt that, with such eminent men of such wide experience, we shall get to the heart of things…"
Having in mind the speeches to which I listened yesterday, and those that I have read since in the Hansard of another place, I cannot help thinking of a very

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old saying, which is perhaps not absolutely apposite, but which seems to express my own feelings on the matter:
"I can understand why you dissembled your love, but why did you kick me down-stairs?"
The Commission were introduced on a note of complete confidence: the Government's own selection, everyone appointed absolutely received by the Opposition with confidence because of their experience. Having toured the country for weeks, having taken evidence in varied kinds of territory and among varied populations, they made this judicial Report—for that is the term given to the inquiry by the noble Earl the Leader of the House, "a judicial Inquiry"—and the Government choose to accept only certain bits of it, because they happen to fall in with their particular views and desires. One of my colleagues said to me privately yesterday: "It almost reminds you of the old nursery story of Little Jack Horner", which, as we all know, runs:
"Little Jack Horner, sat in a corner,
Eating his Christmas pie.
He put in his thumb, and pulled out a plum,
And said, 'What a good boy am I!'."
Nothing else is produced by the Government out of the Report except those things which happen to prove to them what good little boys they are. That is an extraordinary way in which to receive a judicial Report from such a judicial Commission and in such important circumstances. I must say that I think it is a great pity.
Moreover, they are doing this in face of the fact of all this qualification in the Commission of four, who have produced a unanimous Report. I wonder whether there is complete unanimity on every one of these points in the minds of all the members of the collective Government in office here now: whether there are not qualms of conscience; whether there are not hesitations; whether it is considered, as has been said in one or two places, that perhaps they ought to trim their action so as not to be too inconvenient in the period of electoral time that is left in the short life that must be for the rest of this Parliament and Government. At any rate, I think that we shall need to consider that very carefully indeed.
There is one other thing I should like to say at the outset, and it is this. However much we may be upset by some of the views of the Government, and however strongly we speak, one thing of which I am sure is that in your Lord-ships' House one can say with confidence that every section of the House wants to see real peace restored in Nyasaland, and in Central Africa as a whole, at the earliest possible moment. That is to me vastly important. I am more concerned about seeing the restoration of confidence that we spoke about on this side of the House months ago as being the most urgent need of the moment—to restore confidence in the minds of the Africans, and to get on the road to such reform as will maintain and expand that confidence—than I am with anything else.
We shall have speeches, and we shall take note as we go on of the fearful cost of this state of emergency. But we have got to keep our eyes in that direction. If hard things are said here and there by people en route, do not let us take our eye off the ball. In our long Island story of building up our Commonwealth, with all its traditions of truth and freedom—freedom in religion, freedom in politics and freedom in the State at large—we have often had very sad stories of interruptions in that policy.
I am glad to see that the Bishops are represented this afternoon, for this particular matter will be by no means divorced from the influence of the Christian Church. Following inquiries into the influence of the Presbyterian Mission in Nyasaland the Commission have obviously completely cleared the Mission of some of the unkind things that have been said in the meantime. Its activities have been completely justified by the Commission. I did not hear any mention of that fact in the Government speeches yesterday. I think it is rather important that we should realise it, because in the Island story about which I was speaking we have often had this sort of thing before. Before Wilberforce was able to marshal sufficient public opinion behind him to bring about the abolition of slavery in British Colonies in the West Indies, there was one William Knibb, who belonged to the denomination to which I am proud to belong, the Baptists. He went as a Baptist missionary to Jamaica. When he had been out there a year or two he

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came back to his native city of Bristol, and he tramped England asking for the immediate action of the Government to remove this blot upon our escutcheon, the slavery there. What was his reward? Whenever he held a meeting which got excited he went to jail.
The man who is the principal leader of Congress in Nyasaland is one who has the early influence of the missionary upon him. He has taken great advantage of the education he received through both mission and South African schools. He took a degree, as we are told in the Report, in both history and politics in a United States university. He turned his attention to medicine and completed his medical qualifications in Edinburgh, and from his Christian experience and aspirations became an elder of the Church of Scotland. Where is he at the moment? For nearly five months he has been separated from his family: arrested and held without trial. If all the things that were attributed to him indirectly by the noble Earl this afternoon are true, why is he not brought to trial? Is the record of this man so shameful and horrible that he is dangerous? In face of all his academic, civic and educational experience, and his Christian service, has he not the right to a trial before he is locked up like that? I want to know what the answer is from the Government on that particular issue.
We are bound to put these questions forcibly and seriously to the Government, because, believe me, there is a considerable growth of feeling—not a reduction of feeling—in Nyasaland on this matter. I am not going to quote it, but I ask your Lordships to do me the honour of reading an extract that you can easily find in Mr. Callaghan's speech yesterday in Hansard, quoting the executive of a big industrial company in Nyasaland, begging the Government to realise what the situation is, and begging the Government to do something which is entirely contrary to the line of action they are proposing to-day. Moreover, when the noble Earl talks about the fears of the Africans, we know what the fears of the Africans are. I detailed them the other night when we were discussing the Commission which is to be sent out. I am glad that The Times correctly reported the noble Earl when he replied to all these items so that they
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got publicity through him—better publicity than The Times usually gives to me, so it was a very good way of getting it.
The whole point of the fears which have grown so rapidly since 1953 is that, in spite of what the noble Earl said, there has never been sufficient endeavour made to put the real facts of the objective of Her Majesty's Government over to the people at large. On the contrary, if I read in between the lines, as it were, of this Commission's Report, I seem to learn that all the tendency has been in the other direction; that is, to use both school and general circulation, and every other means, to bring home to the people the advantages of Federation only. During the whole of this time (about six years now since the beginning of Federation) there has not been, until the announcement made within the last few days, and repeated by the noble Earl this afternoon, any really substantial progress made in providing further advance politically to the native population in regard to their representation. It seems to me that the Government have something to answer there.
It is not sufficient answer, as the noble Earl seemed to indicate to me the other night, to suggest that the Labour Party did not make much advance in that particular direction from 1945 to 1950. Considering the state of unsettlement in the Commonwealth at large, which was bound to go on for some years after the war, I do not think that was to be wondered at. But in fact the whole situation was being examined before the actual Conference of Officials on possible Federation or the subsequent discussions with Ministers. Therefore, I rule that out. But when we come to the last six years, since 1953, there has been ample time and ample motive, in view of the ascertained view of the succession of Governors of what the true opinion of the Africans was in Nyasaland, for them to make some substantial progress in the offers they would make of constitutional reform. It has not happened.
As I had to point out the other night, and I must repeat it, nothing could have been more damaging about this time than the way in which the delegation led by Dr. Banda and two of his so-called very Left and revolutionary assistants (and we now charge Dr. Banda with responsibility for having

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chosen them) were received by Mr. Lennox-Boyd at the Colonial Office. They raised with him the question of reforms to give them greater African representation. He said he could not tell them anything then, but that in a few weeks' time, in August, of last year, the Governor would be returning to Nyasaland from his leave in this country, and that he would then be able to get from him his recommendations as to what should be done.
The first announcement we have of anything at all effective being done since that time is after the state of emergency is proclaimed. That is an extraordinary way to do what the noble Earl wants to be done: to cancel out, to restrain, to reduce, to abolish—whatever word you like—the fears of the Africans with regard to Federation. In our view, it is quite unreasonable that we should appear to the Africans to be wavering in any sense or degree on the pledges which were so properly given by the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, when he was piloting the 1953 measure through your Lordships' House. I do not need to quote them. We had them over and over last March in your Lordships' House. They were vitally concerned with what finally became the Preamble, which commits us to certain responsibilities. I feel that the only person who has really stood up to the declaration of responsibility is the noble Earl the Leader of the House. I have looked at what he said on two occasions and I feel certain that he recognises what those obligations are, and I hope very much that he is going to see them through.
But what on earth can we think of the measures now being taken to assist him in that direction? Here we have hundreds of people under detention, many of them since the early morning of March 3 last, although some were arrested during the week or two following, and the noble Earl, Lord Perth, says this afternoon that they are not even going to consider letting any of them out. True, from another place they let Mr. Brock out, but they are not going to consider any of the others until some time in September. Is that removing African fears in Nyasaland? Do the Government think that the families of the men who are so detained are not talking to all the Africans? Have they made any provision
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for the sustenance of their families? Are they being taken care of while these men, without trial, are still in durance vile?
I think that we ought to have answers to those questions. Is this the way the Government are taking away the fears of the Africans? When they talk about a certain organisation, about some effort to bring back confidence to the Africans, do they think it possible to remove the alternative of violence and force from the minds of people whose organisation has been absolutely trampled on and broken and from whom they have taken away the constitutional method of expressing their objection? I looked at the OFFICIAL REPORT of the proceedings in another place yesterday and found that a great deal had been said on various matters, but I felt that sufficient attention had not been given to one aspect of the Report of the Commission, which supports me in my view on this matter. I refrain from referring to the numerous quotations and comments on them that are in the OFFICIAL REPORT of another place, but perhaps your Lordships will forgive me for reading from the Commission's Report at some length.
What do I want to show? I want to show that without any doubt the Nyasaland Government considered Congress to be a dangerous political movement rather than a terrorist organisation, and used its powers, legal and illegal, in order to crush its political critics. I am convinced that this point is of the highest possible importance. That is my statement. Now I read from the Report at paragraph 177:
"We think that before there was any suggestion of a murder plot it had been contemplated that all branch officials of Congress should be arrested in the event of an emergency. The decision to suppress Congress, we think, owed more to the belief that its continued activities were making Government impossible than to the feeling that it was, or might be, a terrorist organisation. On the whole therefore we think that belief in the murder plot did not materially affect the conception of Government policy. When the time came to prepare the justification for Government policy the murder plot began to play a larger part; no doubt it was natural to make it the frontispiece of the story."
Those are judicial words from the judicial report of a well-qualified judicial Commission.
Let us look at paragraph 258. It says:
"It was decided that there should next be a vigorous policy of harassing and breaking up Congress organisers, supporters, and hoodlums at a lower level, an aggressive policy being needed to break up the existing pattern of intimidation, threats and truculence and to demonstrate the Government's determination to break the Congress organisation".
That is the mouthpiece of native opinion opposed to the Government, founded in 1944. It has been in existence for fifteen years and is led by an educated man, who says that he still trusts British justice.
Let us now look at paragraph 259:
"We have included this section upon it first, because it shows so clearly the need for privacy in our inquiry; and secondly, because it may be evidence of a belief, perhaps only half-conscious, in the murder plot. Methods which may be justifiable when dealing with even the outer members of a terrorist organisation might, when employed at large upon a political party, be regarded as the persecution of permissible beliefs."
These are very strong words from a judicial report of a judicial Commission. Let us look at a following part of that paragraph:
"The main object of these searches was to discover evidence of membership of Congress. Until 3rd March Congress was of course a lawful body and membership of it no offence."
I repeat:
"Until 3rd March Congress was of course a lawful body."
The paragraph goes on:
"Without the aid of some special provision in the law the prosecution would, we presume, in order to secure a conviction have to prove the commission of an act after 3rd March showing some activity consistent only with continued membership. But in most cases the prosecution appears to have relied upon a provision in the law (Penal Code section 73 (3)) which says that when any document relating to an unlawful society is found in the possession or under the control of any person, it should be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such a person is a member of the unlawful society. In some cases a search of premises has shown a membership card or a receipt for a subscription dated after 3rd March; then the position is clear. But in most cases what has been found is a membership card or other similar document dated before 3rd March. A liberal construction of section 73 (3) would be that a document did not 'relate to an unlawful society' unless at the time of its issue the society was unlawful. This view has not so far been taken by the courts in Nyasaland. Indeed, the discovery of old documents has been held in a number of cases to be virtually conclusive proof, for it is said, that the failure to destroy the docu-
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ment after 3rd March shows that the holder intended to continue his membership."
Amazing evidence from this judicial Report from the Judicial Committee!
Let us have a look at paragraph 275. it says:
"Cordoning and search operations had another object besides the search for wanted men and evidence against them. Indeed, we are inclined to think that the search for wanted men was hardly more than incidental to the main purpose of the operation, which was to impose a form of collective punishment upon troublesome villages. In the Central Province where separate operation orders were prepared, the object of the operation is always stated as being the restoration of law and order or something in similarly general terms; the apprehension of wanted men is not referred to. You will remember also that when this type of operation was originally planned, it was made clear that what was intended was tough, punitive treatment for troublesome areas and swift and offensive retribution. We have received numerous com-plaints about the behaviour of the security forces in the course of these operations. But we are satisfied that there was a great deal of aggressive and bullying behaviour, frequently accompanied with blows from fists and rifle butts inflicting minor injuries which sometimes necessitated medical treatment. Men were herded into the middle of the village, shouted at, told to stand up, sit down, hold their hands over their heads and so on, and if they were not completely submissive they were beaten. They were also struck for 'not being co-operative'. Not being co-operative embraced such things as not at once giving information about where people who were wanted by the security forces might be found or giving it in a manner which the questioner found unconvincing."
THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, the noble Viscount has quoted a very long passage. I noticed that he started his speech by saying that he wanted to make a case against the Government. I would ask the noble Viscount to be fair. In the last passage he has not quoted these words, also in paragraph 275:
"We heard allegations of rape and other outrages and we are satisfied that there is nothing in any of them. Only once or twice did we obtain even the name of anyone who was said to have been raped and we never heard any first hand evidence about it."
I should just like the noble Viscount to quote the whole passage otherwise it might be thought that he is biased.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: All right. It is not we who are in the dark, because the Government do not accept the Report of the little plums out here and there to show Commission. They only want to take what very good boys they are. I am very

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glad to go back to the original document itself, paragraph 275. Certainly. It just takes a little longer. I will read on from the point where I skipped over that sentence:
"We heard allegations of rape and other outrages and we are satisfied that there is nothing in any of them. Only once or twice did we obtain even the name of anyone who was said to have been raped and we never heard any first hand evidence about it. But we are satisfied that there was a great deal of aggressive and bullying behaviour, frequently accompanied with blows from fists and rifle butts inflicting minor injuries which sometimes necessitated medical treatment. Men were herded into the middle of the village, shouted at, told to stand up, sit down, hold their hands over their heads and so on, and if they were not completely submissive, they were beaten. They were also struck for ' not being co-operative'. Not being co-operative embraced such things as not at once giving information about where people who were wanted by the security forces might be found or giving it in a manner which the questioner found unconvincing. It was not co-operative to protest if other people were being struck. We also heard many complaints about the manner in which the searching of houses was done including allegations that property was seized or stolen. Apart from implements, which we deal with in a separate paragraph, we are not satisfied that there was seizure or stealing of property on any large scale; but we think it very probable that a great deal of the searching was rough and did unnecessary damage."
That little sentence in the middle did not make much difference to the general tenor.
A NOBLE LORD: And the next paragraph?
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: Certainly I will read the next paragraph if necessary. I know who will win on that. Paragraph 276 says:
"These tactics were employed only in areas where gangs had been perpetrating arson and sabotage.…"
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: We shall come to evidence about that. I take paragraph 278:
"The complaints we received said that houses were burnt simply because they belonged to persons who were thought to be Congress sympathisers. We believe this to be the case. We do not doubt that looting on a very considerable scale was going on, but we do not believe that the burning of houses was or was intended to be a punishment for looting only. Memoranda in justification of the burnings were at the time addressed by the District Commissioner to the Southern
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Provincial Commissioner and by the latter to the Nyasaland Operations Committee. More than two-thirds of each memorandum is taken up with a description of the degree of disaffection in the area in which the burnings were authorised, the strength of Congress there and the presence of alleged agitators; none of this has anything to do with looting. Looting is of course a crime; no prosecution for looting was brought against anyone in the district."
You just burn the house! Let us look at another paragraph. This is the last one I shall quote, and I am sure you will be glad. Paragraph 280:
"In the Mlanje district, in the area where houses were burnt, the D.C. imposed a fine of £8,734 to cover damage assessed at £8,510; the assessment was of course his own and it was not our business to check it. He considered that the main damage was caused by at most 200 men but that the remainder of the people in the district had 'tacitly assented' to what the 200 were doing. The adult male population of the district amounted to 5,823 so that the suspected perpetrators represented about 3 per cent. of the population. 'My own view is', the D.C. wrote, 'that the levy on all the people, whether guilty or not, will have the effect of making Nyasaland African Congress really un-popular'."
I left that quotation until last, because that, I think, very largely proves the case I have been submitting against the Government. Through their action it is going to be very dangerous indeed for the future efforts we want to see made to regain African confidence. They have destroyed and trampled on the one constitutional means the Africans had to get any support or sympathy from the so-called local Government, not a representative Government but an official Government. They destroyed the one means by which they could constitutionally agitate for the reforms and changes that they not only desired but obviously deserved from every human point of view. I put that at some length, because that is one of the main points we want to get over.
I want to say to the House—I said there would be some hard things said—that I am most anxious to see, and I am sure all the Members of your Lordships' House are, too, some progress made towards establishing not only confidence in the African scene but a permanent peace in this great responsibility of ours there. What sort of approach to permanent peace amongst them is being made at the present time? May I quote for a moment from the last part of the

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speech of the Secretary of State for the Colonies last night. I read it this morning in Hansard. I thought it was fundamental. After tying as far as he could the guilt, as he would regard it, of Dr. Banda in all the violent and other charges which have been made against Congress, the Secretary of State finished as follows [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 610 (No. 156), col. 444]:
"Under those circumstances, there can be no possible suggestion of treating Dr. Banda differently from other detainees,"—
Then there was an interjection from honourable Members, the Report says, "Police State"—
"and I am pleased to say that the Governor, who is responsible in these matters, will have my full support in ensuring that, while we are all anxious to bring the emergency to an end as soon as we can, there cannot be releases of detainees who are dangerous to the State until that danger has been withdrawn."
When is it going to be withdrawn? Is that view come to by the Government, and particularly by the Secretary of State, about Dr. Banda, for example, something which can be cancelled? When does he cease to be a danger? You have convicted him against the real views expressed about this person in leadership by the judicial report of the judicial Commission. You have rejected that. I hope you will not think it very unworthy, but I am tempted to say—and I think I will—that last Friday a very popular pictorial paper, referring to this Report, had two large words in a banner headline, "No whitewash". It was the Daily Sketch, not exactly a Socialist newspaper.
The only conclusion to which I can come at the present is that the Government have deliberately, on studying this very carefully drawn Report—as was said in another place yesterday, a Report drawn up mainly on a narrative basis and not making recommendations, so that no facts could possibly be unfairly stressed or overlooked one way or the other—accepted entirely the reply of the Governor to these things. They have found him, as I hope will be shown later on in the debate in detail by my noble friend Lord Silkin, very often to have been at variance with the Commission in what was contained in the original White Paper. The Governor answers in detail in his Report, and the Government clearly have accepted his Report as against what these four men, highly
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qualified, and with a greatly experienced jurist in the chair, have found in the matter. And on that they hope to get the whitewash and the cover by putting their case over through their multitudinous methods of publicity, which are not afforded to us in our limited journalistic control, and to be able to interest the people for long enough to persuade them they were right.
The noble Earl the Leader of the House last month in his speech spoke about certain aims that he had and the desire to come to whatever best arrangement could be made. I was particularly struck by the manner in which he differentiated in his speech between the granting of independence to the Federal territory now and whether that was to be of a particular type—and he was going to watch it very carefully—or whether it was to be within the Commonwealth as accepted generally in the Act of 19.53. I am very glad that he made a statement. I do not know at the moment how we can assist him to make progress in that direction whilst the present Government policy exists, That is the difficulty. We could have been all pretty well on a bipartisan basis on this matter if we had got together, as we offered months ago, in order to secure the best interests of the African population.
My noble friend Lord Ogmore, speaking on March 24, took a very moderate line; and we all wanted to help. I do not think your Lordships will find anything which is wrong or criticising in an injurious way in our speeches in this House on March 24 or March 3. We wanted to help. But the rejection of the Commission appointed with such confidence by the Government, as I have quoted from the noble Earl, the rejection of the Report, in its main parts, seems to me to have created a situation in which collaboration cannot usefully be offered unless we have some more details from the noble Earl as to what he would propose immediately in the way of reform. Or maybe that can come only from the head of the Colonial Office; and he, apparently, having been duly whitewashed, is to remain in office. I do hope and pray that our nation as a whole will see how necessary it is to bring this state of emergency to an end as soon as possible. It is for the Government to move now; it is for them to bring the state of emergency to an end. It is for them to decide

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whether it is their duty to give justice to the detainees. I hope they may be able to satisfy their consciences in the end, whatever may happen, that they have been right. I beg to move the Amendment in my name on the Order Paper.
Amendment moved—
Leave out from ("House") to the end of the Resolution and insert ("accepts the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry (Cmnd. 814)").—(Viscount Alexander of Hillborough.)
4.7 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, in private conversation and in the national Press, and of course in another place, and again to-day, with two extremely interesting speeches from either side of the House, this matter has been discussed in very great detail and over a very wide range, and I feel it would be the wish of the House that I, at least, for one, should not speak for more than a very few minutes.
I should like to divide my observations into the three categories adopted by the noble Earl, Lord Perth; that is, the past, the present and the future. As to the past, I feel that Her Majesty's Government cannot be absolved from responsibility for to-day's sad state of affairs, because I think of their insufficiently sympathetic handling of the very genuine trepidation felt by Nyasaland in facing the implications of federation and all that it meant. That point could be expanded largely, but I leave it at that and pass to the present.
I still fail to understand how a party to a dispute—because virtually that is the position—can voluntarily go to arbitration and then refuse to accept the award, even when the court concerned is presided over by one of Her Majesty's most eminent Judges. I do not expect this or any other Government to be perfect, and I do not for a moment doubt the personal integrity or great ability of our Colonial Secretary. But I do deplore the endorsement by the Government of every finding of this Devlin Commission which is favourable to their policies while rejecting every critical finding; because it seems to me that by doing that they are throwing away a really magnificent opportunity of making this objective Report, as I consider it, the starting point for a new and imaginative approach to the difficult problems of Africa, and in particular, of course, to those of Nyasa-
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land. If this Government is, if I may so put it, so self-sufficient as to believe that any stricture upon it in any degree from any quarter on any point of its policy must automatically be a distortion of fact, then I say that that is a symptom of megalomania for which the only cure is a quick dose of General Election.
Now I turn to the future. I would ask the Government to realise, please, that most normal, sensible people deplore the violence of those seemingly of the Left, in these under-developed territories, even though that violence stems from fear of losing freedom, and of having a misfitting administration possibly imposed upon them, just as much as normal, sensible people deplore the oppressive measures of reaction which, unfortunately, are evident in other parts of the African Continent. Those of us who believe in more justice for the Africans do not believe in less justice for the whites, or that that is any sort of corollary: although, of course, more privilege for the African, which we also seek, may involve a certain readjustment of responsibility.
I do ask those—I think in this matter I am probably addressing noble Lords on the other side of the House in particular—of the traditional and conservative view, to which they are, of course, perfectly entitled, to cease from classifying all those who may not agree with them as irresponsible, unpatriotic and un-British. Britain has an enviable and quite unparalleled record in the past, if not quite virginally unblemished (the noble Earl referred to slavery), and a quite unique record in at least trying to raise backward peoples to a fuller and happier life. If the Government of the day, of no matter what Party it may be, appears at times to falter in that high task, then criticism is not only justified, but is a national duty. For that reason, I propose to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, into the Lobby in support of his Amendment.
4.12 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, on an occasion like this, when the feelings on both sides of the House are deeply stirred, there is I think, always a tendency to widen, and ever more widen, the scope of debate; and especially is that so in this House, where the permissible limit of discussion is, I

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think, almost non-existent. I thought that that tendency was visible in the powerful speech of the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition when, a few moments ago, he moved his Amendment. But, if he will forgive me, I do not intend to follow him into those spheres of general policy regarding Central Africa with which he so largely dealt. We have had a good many debates in recent times dealing with the wider issues of Central Africa, and I hope we shall have a good many more. But to-day, both the Government Motion and, even more, the noble Viscount's own Amendment, are strictly confined to the Report of the Devlin Commission, and to that I would, in what I have to say to your Lordships, propose to stick. The noble Viscount, in the speech in which he moved his Amendment, I thought advanced a rather novel doctrine. If I understood him aright, he implied that the Government, having appointed a Commission, had bound themselves in anticipation to accept its findings in toto. That was the impression I gained, but I do not think many of us could accept any such doctrine as that.
The purpose of Government in appointing Commissions of this kind, as I understand it, is to clarify the issues, and for that purpose they may be extremely useful; but they do not pledge themselves beforehand to accept the findings—at least, I can never remember a case where that has happened. To do any such thing would be to surrender the functions of Government to some outside body; and no one, I am sure, in any part of the House, would approve of that. Indeed, it has been our unfortunate experience in this country of recent years that Royal Commissions and other officially appointed bodies which have been brought into being to clarify a situation and to lead to a more general agreement on subjects in dispute, only too often lead to an increase in just that controversy which they were intended to heal; and I rather feared, as I listened to the noble Viscount, that in some ways that was likely to be the fate of the Devlin Commission Report, which the House is discussing this afternoon.
But, at any rate, it has, I think, achieved one important result. The Commission were not, of course, concerned with questions of wider policy—they constantly stressed that in the course of their
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Report. Their terms of reference were extremely limited. Those terms of reference, to quote their own words, were
"To inquire into recent disturbances in Nyasaland and the events leading up to them."
In effect, that was a mandate—I think the noble Earl, Lord Perth, has already emphasised this—to report whether, in their view, the Governor of Nyasaland was justified in declaring a state of emergency, with all the results that flowed from that decision at the time when he did it. On that vital point, the Commission came to the conclusion that he was justified. That fact, I may mention, was never referred to at any single point of the noble Viscount's long speech—it never emerged; but it is a fact that the Commission said that the Government was justified.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, we accept the whole Report. That is the answer.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: But the noble Viscount never mentioned that fact in any part of his speech. That was the main conclusion of the Report, and it is I think a most important conclusion; for, after all, the main problem before any Government in times as troublous and as threatening as those with which the Government of Nyasaland was faced, is when—at what particular point of time—it is right to take emergency powers, which would not be justified in normal times, to prevent a total collapse of law and order. On this occasion the Commission think that the Governor of Nyasaland made the right decision. They think he was justified. They think he had either "to act or to abdicate." Where they differ from him, and where on some points they differ very strongly, is first, as to the validity of the reasons which he gave to Her Majesty's Government in support of his decision, and secondly, as I understand it, as to the nature of the measures which he felt it necessary to take, once the emergency had been declared.
I should like, if I may detain the House for a short time, to say something about both these criticisms. First of all, the Commission make it perfectly clear that in their view—at least, that is how I read their Report—the Governor misstated his case to the Secretary of State, and that the Secretary of State in turn misstated the case to Parliament

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on two points in particular: first, the Governor misjudged the character of Dr. Hastings Banda; and secondly, he reported that there was a murder plot, when in fact, in the opinion of the Commission, there was no murder plot, in the strict sense of the word. That, I think, is a fair statement of the main grounds of criticism, at any rate during the pre-emergency period. But before we condemn the Governor of Nyasaland, I feel that we, who are so much more happily placed than he was, ought to face fairly the position with which he was confronted in the early part of this year.
For some months the situation had been steadily deteriorating. There was steadily mounting tension in the country which he governed. The immediate cause was, of course, the return of Dr. Banda to the country in July, 1958. At first—and the Commission make this very clear—the Governor was in no way hostile to Dr. Banda. He did not start with any preconceived bias against him. On the contrary, he hoped he might play a great part in assisting towards a compromise over the constitutional proposals. But very soon it became clear (and the Commission are quite frank about this) that Dr. Banda was beginning to flirt with the more violent elements in the African National Congress. He appointed one well known extremist, Mr. Chipembere (if I have his name right) as Treasurer and Mr. Chiume as Publicity Secretary—and that, as your Lordships will realise, is a post of very great importance in a movement such as that.
His speeches, too, began to resemble more and more the tones of the demagogue—those are the words of the Commission. They became more and more violent. To give one instance, his audiences were urged to hate the Government. "They are the ones," he said, "I am fighting." And what he said in public, he was writing also in private. In a letter to one of his supporters, of November 1, 1958, he used these words:
"You have heard of the so-called riots. Well, things are hot here. I have set the whole of Zomba on fire. Very soon I hope to have the whole of Nyasaland on fire."
This particular letter plays such an important part in the Report that I feel it is right that your Lordships should examine it with some care, because I think it has a considerable bearing on
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the mentality with which the Commission approached the problem. What, if any of your Lordships had been Governor of Nyasaland at the time, at a moment of mounting tension, would you have regarded as the most important words in the passage which I have just quoted? I have no doubt at all what would be the most important for most of us. It would be the words:
"I have set the whole of Zomba on fire… I hope to have the whole of Nyasaland on fire."
That would have been the reaction of most of us; but not so the Commissioners. What they regarded as far more important—what in their view, it might almost be said, was alone important—was Dr. Banda's use of the adjective "so-called" in connection with the riots at Zomba. They enter into a very elaborate argument on this. They say that Dr. Banda could not possibly have had violence in mind, or he would not have used the word "so-called" in connection with the riots; he would just have called them "riots" pure and simple. All he can have meant—and again I use their words—is:
"I have kindled great enthusiasm in Zomba"—
apparently in the nicest possible way—
"and I hope to kindle great enthusiasm over the whole of Rhodesia."
That is the view of the Commission, and of course they are entirely entitled to their view. All I can say is that I should be very much surprised if that were the meaning the words conveyed to the African to whom the letter was addressed.
And my Lords, it certainly is not the meaning which the words conveyed to the authorities in Nyasaland—the Governor and his Government—with all their long experience of the country. To them the words meant:
"I have conducted a successful agitation in Zomba and I hope to conduct a successful agitation throughout Rhodesia."
And with their long experience of Central Africa—experience which I may say was not shared by the majority of the Commissioners—successful agitation meant sooner or later violence and bloodshed.
With this and similar information before them, the Government, I think naturally, became steadily more apprehensive as to the trend of events in the country, for which, after all, they were

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responsible. That was the position at the end of 1958. And then, in the early part of this year, as your Lordships all know, a new element was added to this witch's brew which was already simmering in Nyasaland. The Government began to get reports through secret sources of a secret meeting which had been held in the bush on January 25 and where much more extreme plans were discussed. There was to be a regular campaign of violence, including, at some stage, the murder both of Europeans and of loyal Africans, the drawing up of black lists of intended victims, and so on.
The Commissioners suggest that not too much importance should be attached to the reports of informers; and it is indeed true, as we all know, that informers are not always the most reputable of men. But would the Commissioners say—would anyone say—that Governments in Africa, at the present troublous times in our history, should have no Secret Service, or that they should pay no attention to what that Service says? If I remember aright, one of the main charges against the Government of Kenya after the Mau Mau troubles broke out was that the Government's secret service had been allowed to decay during the war and that therefore the Governor knew nothing of what was brewing. Moreover, it is, I think, a significant fact, which Sir Robert Armitage divulges in his Note which has been circulated, that these reports came from seven different sources, situated in different parts of Nyasaland and with no knowledge of each other. These reports were believed by his Chief of Police, who had a most intimate knowledge of local conditions. They were believed, as is clear, I think, from what he has said later, by the Bishop of Nyasaland, who also had very wide contacts.
Could the Government possibly ignore those reports? In these circumstances, I, at any rate, feel that the point which is made so much of in the Commissioner's Report as to what is a murder plot and what is not a murder plot seems rather legalistic. After all, it was admitted by most of the detainees—I am not sure they did not say all the detainees—who were interrogated, that violence and murder were discussed without disapproval. Moreover, the Governor knew very well that as far back as 1955, three
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years before, Mr. Chipembere, who is now one of the chief leaders of the National Congress in Nyasaland, had written, with reference to a plan of extraction of Nyasaland from the Federation, these words:
"My belief is that any such plan must include something quite akin to Mau Mau."
No mention, it is true, was made of black lists by those examined by the Commission; but the Commission themselves seem to have accepted the fact that that was the "Party line" and therefore could not be regarded as conclusive. What was important—what was vitally important—was that at this meeting of January 25, a policy of violence was approved. Whether Doctor Banda was aware of that we shall probably never know for certain. The Commissioners think not. They think he is a charming and moderate man, who would be shocked by any such idea. On the other hand, my Lords, I remember a time when some people believed much the same about Jomo Kenyatta, and I must say I find it extremely difficult to believe that a man whom the Commissioners themselves say was the undisputed leader of his Party was kept completely unaware of this vital change of policy. At any rate, never over the whole of that period did he repudiate violence. He could have done it at any moment. There was no time when he could not have got up and made a speech and repudiated violence, but he never did so. Surely, it is quite as likely he knew about the decisions of the meeting, but preferred, as other leaders of the same kind have done, to remain in the back-ground.
The Commissioners seem to have formed the impression—I am quoting from paragraph 174 of the Report—that the Government themselves were unconvinced of the existence of a murder plot. That is the underlying suggestion in that paragraph of the Report: it was regarded by them only as a convenient excuse for the declaring of an emergency. I feel that that at any rate is a matter which ought to be cleared up to-day, and I hope that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will say something about it in his closing speech, because, after all, it is a direct attack both on the good faith of the Governor of Nyasaland and, through him, on the good faith of Her Majesty's Government in London.

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I must say that, on the face of it, I should have regarded any such suggestion as very improbable. Even when I was in Rhodesia at the end of January of this year—that is, just before these events happened—there was a feeling of tense anxiety about the situation in Nyasaland, which was very noticeable. I met one old friend in the streets of Salisbury who spoke with the gravest anxiety about the safety of his wife and children who were in Nyasaland. There was no doubt about his sincerity. He was really in a state of torture. And one had other indications of the same kind. I was pretty sure that there was a general expectation of some early outbreak of violence, with inevitable murder and bloodshed. To split hairs as to whether this constituted a murder plot, or a conspiracy, or as to what was the correct definition, seems to me only to show the wide differences which exist between the legal niceties of the law courts and the harsher realities of administration.
Such was the situation which faced the Government of Nyasaland at the beginning of March, 1959. They had been driven to the conclusion—and I recommend this thought to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough—that the African National Congress, which hitherto had been accepted as a political Party, must henceforth be regarded as a subversive organisation, committed to the overthrow of law and order by methods of violence. They were convinced, as the Commission itself was convinced, that
"The African did not think of Dr. Banda as a party leader whose policies happened to be opposed to those of the Government; he thought of him as a national leader setting up his authority against that of the Boma."
The Governor reluctantly concluded that the only course before him, if law and order were to be preserved and widespread violence was to be avoided, was to declare a state of emergency, suppress this subversive organisation and arrest its leaders.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I cannot understand how the noble Marquess, with far greater academic qualifications behind him than I have and a much greater knowledge of history, cannot see my point that if you proscribe an organisation like this, which is asking only for Parliamentary reform and political advancement,
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you will have the same trouble that you have had always in history in the past. There is no other way out than to meet them, or, sooner or later, instead of having to deal with the situation as it is now, you may have to shake hands with real murder.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Viscount is against the Commission there. They say that the Government of Nyasaland had no alternative but to govern or abdicate. The noble Viscount is now recommending that they should have abdicated. That is, of course, a possible point of view, but it is not one which most of us hold, I think. Anyway, that was the view which the Government of Nyasaland took and that is why they declared an emergency on March 3. And I believe, as the Commission believe—though I understand that the noble Viscount does not believe—that they had no alternative. They had either to act or abdicate.
I am sorry to keep your Lordships so long; but I will not keep you much longer. But I would now come for a few minutes to the second phase and the methods by which the Nyasaland Government carried out what they believed to be the necessary steps. Over these—and in particular over the arrest of the Congress leaders—I cannot pretend that I do not feel a little more uneasy than I did over the decision itself. No doubt, in the circumstances of great tension such as existed at that time, it was necessary for the Government to act swiftly, secretly and with great resolution, if they were not to invite just that explosion which they were so anxious to avoid. But, according to the Report, very strong-arm methods indeed seem in certain cases to have been employed—much more than seem to have been used in Southern Rhodesia, when a similar operation took place.
In Southern Rhodesia there was no injury to any of those who were detained. In Nayasaland, in the course of what I think was called "Operation Sunrise", there were a number of Congress leaders injured with baton and other wounds. In some cases, according to the Report, those leaders were clearly resisting arrest. In others, this is not so clear. The probable reason for what occurred, I imagine, is that the number

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of police available was not nearly adequate for the job they had to do. That is always liable to make men act more roughly than would otherwise be the case. They simply cannot afford to let the situation get out of hand. We should all I feel be very conscious that we, sitting comfortably here 6,000 miles away, are hardly in a position to censure men who were acting in conditions of such danger and such strain.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Has the noble Marquess really read the Report?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have read it from beginning to end.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Does the noble Marquess remember the numerous instances of brutality it reveals?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I understand the noble Viscount is going to address the House later. But I must confess that it is with regard to this particular part of the Report that I feel the least happy, and I say this frankly.
So far as later measures are concerned—what is called, in the Report, phase 3—it is clearly very difficult for any of us to speak with authority, without more knowledge of local conditions than we have at our disposal. I was a little surprised, if I may say so, to hear the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition speak on this topic with such Olympian confidence about what were and what were not the proper steps to be taken in an area and in circumstances of which probably he, like most of us, has so little personal experience. But I should have thought, reading the Report—and I assure the noble Viscount, Lord Stans-gate, that I have read the Report—that, on the face of it the minimum force was used which those responsible thought absolutely necessary. Of course, strong measures were taken, and these we must all of us deeply regret: but, as has already been emphasised, they were adopted only in areas where gangs had already perpetrated arson and sabotage. The noble Viscount does not agree, but it is in the Report. I recommend him to read paragraph 276.
Are we to say pontifically, here at Westminster, that such steps were not justifiable—were not indeed necessary—if law and order were to be preserved
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and if anarchy were not to take its place? There was one very moving account, I thought, of an incident at a place called Nkata Bay, where a district commissioner risked his life again and again to avoid having to shoot. It is interesting to note that the verdict of the Commission on this incident is that if he had acted with greater firmness in the earlier stages, the death roll might have been less. That perhaps is the answer to those who criticise other officers for being too precipitate.
In what I have said to-day, I have tried to comment on the Report of the Devlin Commission in, I hope, a not too controversial spirit. There are things in the Report which, I frankly confess, I regret and which I think probably other noble Lords regret, too. I wish that the Report had not begun by describing Nyasaland as a "police state" and had not then, by implication, put the whole blame for this on the Nyasaland Government and apparently none on the African National Congress, whose activities were largely responsible for a situation that, on the Commissioners' own admission, made the declaration of emergency necessary. Once, as we all know, a situation of that kind has arisen, things have to be done which none of us would countenance in normal times.
We had, after all, experience of that in our own country during the period of the war, when large numbers of our fellow citizens were imprisoned for up to six years under Order 18B without trial of any kind, because they were thought too dangerous for the State to leave them at liberty. Having had that experience ourselves, and having acted at that time as we did, it hardly befits us to throw stones at those who, faced with an emergency probably in its way just as dangerous to the State as we had here, have taken similar action. In this particular instance, I could not help thinking as I read it that, however pure their intentions were, the Commission showed themselves more judicial than impartial.
Or, let me take one other example. The Commission, on page 10 of their Report, describe the common view of the African as being that
"…in the Protectorates he is treated as a human being, and in Southern Rhodesia he is not."

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I think it is a great pity that, having gone so far, they did not decide to carry their inquiry further to find out whether this view was well founded or not, instead of merely saying, as they do, that
"…it would be quite outside the scope of our inquiry to examine its validity."
If that was so, why include at all a statement which was so damaging to the reputation and credit of Southern Rhodesia and which, indeed, I believe to be quite untrue? The Commissioners may fairly retort that these difficulties to which I have drawn attention—and there may be others of the same kind—have been due not to any bias on their part, but to the limitations of the terms of reference which governed their inquiry. But if so, why mention the matter at all?
Having said that, I do not want to fall into the same error and range too wide myself. I have done my best throughout this speech to confine myself to the Report, and I would end by saying, as I said at the beginning, that on the main question, whether or not the Governor of Nyasaland was justified in declaring an emergency in the situation with which he was faced, the answer of the Commission is clearly "Yes". That is one obscurity, at any rate, which has been cleared up by this Report. And there is one other. The Report has declared unequivocally—and I was glad to see it—that the Government of Nyasaland was not influenced in any way in coming to its decision by pressure from the Federal Government. That has been said in the past, but I hope it will never be said again. These, at any rate, are solid gains from the Commission, for which I think we should all be grateful.
With that I think the Government and the House should rest content. I very much hope, therefore, that the House will approve this Motion which has been moved by the noble Earl, Lord Perth, to-day, and so enable the Government—and the Opposition, too—to turn from the past to the future and to bend their efforts to devising a Constitution for Nyasaland which will both allow progressive advance for the African and safeguard the lives and properties of the Nyasaland people, whether they be white or black, who live in that beautiful but sadly distracted country. But,
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my Lords—and this is the last thing I want to say—the essential condition for this is, of course, a return to normal conditions. That is not a question merely of politics, but also of security. And here, not only the Government but, as I see it, the Opposition, too, have a responsibility. It is by their sense of responsibility, in the difficult months that lie ahead, that the Party of noble Lords opposite, just as much as the Government, will be judged by those who come after us when the history of these times comes to be written.
4.45 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, I certainly shall not try to speak pontifically, but I find my-self in the queer situation of having a good deal of sympathy with all four of the speeches so far delivered. At the same time, what I have to say, though different, is not, I think, irrelevant. When Central African Federation was debated in this House in 1953 the late Bishop of Chichester, Dr. Bell, and I both spoke from the same premises, but we came to different conclusions. Our common premises were two. The first was that the primary concern of every European in Central Africa must always be the temporal and spiritual welfare of the African peoples, adopted by us as our neighbour—a duty more difficult to fulfil, but all the more insistent because we had the monopoly of power, wealth and experience. The second premise was that in Nyasaland, with its 2½ million Africans and fewer than 10,000 Europeans, the whole idea of federation was intensely disliked by almost all the Africans, for understandable reasons. The late Dr. Bell concluded that the introduction of federation should be delayed; I concluded, in support of the Government, that the balance of argument was in favour of going ahead, in the hope and belief that federation would justify itself to the African.
That, my Lords, was six years ago, and now a day of reckoning has come upon us. A balance sheet of a sort is recorded in the Devlin Report, not, as the Report itself says, judicially, nor clearly to serve any political interest—and I think it is a great pity that it should now have become involved in political controversy—but, I should say, as an expert (possibly wrong) analysis of the unchanging psychology of

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conflict. The pattern of conflict between authority and popular desire is only too familiar in all ages. What has happened in Nyasaland—and this is why I hesitate to discuss the details in the Report—is nothing new in such conditions: it always happens like that. The fact remains—to my mind, the governing fact, however regrettable—that the people of Nyasaland are as resolutely and unitedly opposed to federation in 1959 as they were in 1953, and less ready now than they were then to be converted. The cleavage was there in 1953.
By July, 1959, the Devlin Report says:
"The difference between the Government and the Congress had got almost beyond discussion. It was not simply that the two sides were far apart. Each had an attitude of mind which the other was beginning to find exasperating."
I have said that this is a Report on psychology: there is the unresolved dilemma. The Governor, as I should not hesitate to say, was in duty bound, as the Report shows, to declare a state of emergency; yet to have to do so was to record a failure to win the confidence of the people. Alas! that was the record. Dr. Banda, by becoming a demagogue, and a dangerous demagogue——
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: Oh, no.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY:—by bringing about this state of emergency, had won a kind of perverse but powerful victory, as demagogues always do, and he now stands for all the six-year-old fears and frustrations of the Africans of Nyasaland and is the embodiment of all their hopes.
My Lords, what I have said is a record of fact. What had gone wrong between 1953 and 1959? Authority in Nyasaland—I saw some of it for myself—had done almost everything possible to care for Nyasaland as a true Welfare State. I will not give the details; they are well known to your Lordships. There was hardly a thing lacking, except the one thing necessary—there was still present this worm of discontent; perverse, no doubt, but there. Nothing had diminished the fear of federation. Nothing had assured them—it is their fault, no doubt—that their freedom was assured or that real powers of self-government to safeguard it were on the way. I could develop that point, but let me go on.
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Of course, the root of all these fears is not in Nyasaland at all, but is now, as it was in 1953, in the Federation, in Southern Rhodesia and in the Federal Government. The battle of wills in Nyasaland becomes part of a general political encounter in the Federation. If I may be allowed to say it, the worst thing we have contributed from this country to Central Africa is to have allowed their dilemma to be seen by us over here in terms of political struggle: on the one side, those who in general pride themselves on being the supporters of reason and authority, wise judgment and economic welfare, and all the other good things, and, on the other, those who in general pride themselves on being the supporters of rights, of justice, of freedom and of Divine discontent. Both those sides have been admirably represented in the two opening speeches made here this afternoon. But because we have allowed it in this country to become a sort of political conflict, almost every discussion here may do harm, and few can do any lasting good. They help to put asunder just what God is trying to join together. The advocates of each side provoke the other. Conscience clashes with conscience. Each has an attitude of mind which the other finds increasingly exasperating. We have seen the exasperation showing itself even this afternoon. And where we ought, from this country, to be able to speak with one voice of wisdom to Central Africa, we find ourselves in the lamentable situation of speaking with two voices.
If I may say so, and if the Government will forgive me, I think the Government's Motion itself is open to some criticism on the ground that it says just too much and ends by not saying quite enough, and so itself becomes political and a source of fresh division. But be that as it may, as I said, Nyasaland looks with fear to the Federation and to Southern Rhodesia. In Salisbury, much has happened in these six years—and I have seen this for myself—which might, in a happier climate, have served to remove, or at least to relieve, the fears in Nyasaland. The leaders in Southern Rhodesia are, to my own knowledge, many of them, eager to work a real and a fruitful partnership and to give proofs of it in action. From this country the

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Colonial Secretary and others have reaffirmed the solemn pledge that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would retain their separate Governments, responsible to this country for so long as their respective peoples so desired. But I am often told that my wise words from the pulpit do not get through to the audience, and so the mistrust in Nyasaland remains, and the sense of frustration has been growing.
And we must admit that there was reason for it to grow, for they could perceive in Salisbury, as I perceived, not only the forces of reason and of brotherhood and of slow advance, but also powerful forces of another kind which were an obstacle to any advance at all. There were, what appeared to sensitive minds, the discourtesies and cruelties of social ostracism. I suffered myself in a minor degree in that way when, by a public official, I was rebuked because I dared to shake hands with two Africans. This is one of the things which has to be set out clearly: with the Government trying to do all that they could, Nyasaland was aware that there were features which moved them to fear and indignation. Another is that a certain lack of political sensitiveness caused the Federal Government itself, in whose good intentions I fully believe, from time to time to undo all the good it was trying to do.
Two instances occur specially to my mind. The African Affairs Board declared two of the Federal Government's Bills discriminatory, and they were therefore referred to the British Parliament, and Parliament approved both Bills. On the merits of the Bills, so far as I am competent to judge, Parliament was probably right, in that they advanced what I firmly believe in—the cause of a common Voting Roll. But there is no doubt that the effect on the people of Nyasaland was bad. They had been told to regard the African Affairs Board as a safeguard and protection against injustice, and all they could perceive was that it proved no safeguard and no protection at all, but had served only to bring the British Government in to support the Federal Government. Your Lordships will observe that I am not arguing about anything but the kind of things which produced fears in the people of Nyasaland.
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But far worse was the Federal intention, openly declared, to seek Dominion status as an immediate goal to be achieved when the Constitution was revised in 1960. The people of Nyasaland regarded that as putting a final end to all hope and all confidence. Nothing could now induce them to accept federation with that threat hanging over them. There is the terrible dilemma which so often occurs in clashes all through history: reason and good will set against what people want and think they have a right to.
The Devlin Report presents us, as I have said, with the psychology of the situation—that is why I have spoken at this length. But it needs far more than debates in Parliament to retrieve it. The Devlin Report was made to Parliament, and I wish it had marked the end of a chapter. That was what it was designed to do. The only question I am interested in now is to consider how the next chapter is to be written. That is a question—I say it deliberately—not of politics, certainly not of economic interests, but of psychology or, to speak truth, of religion. Again I would wish that the Government Motion had not invited the charge of being political, and I wish that the Opposition Amendment had been less open to being described, as The Times put it, as "a trap for the Government." To my mind, the first clause of the Government Motion down to the first semicolon says just enough. It stops short of saying too much. But the Motion itself is not of any importance. All that matters is what can we do to win back the trust of the people of Nyasaland and at this late hour reconcile them to Federation. For that, I believe is the real task.
A leader in The Times yesterday (or was it the day before?) set out a list of the fine things done recently to reconcile African feeling; and they are very substantial. All these things, offered of our own free will in 1953, would have made Federation secure. Are they now too late? Please God not. Certainly not, if now and in the immediate future the Government of Nyasaland can make some new offers or proposals which, whatever their political value, will recapture the imagination of the people of Nyasaland and set them free from the fixed idea with which they are obsessed

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so that they become once more the friendly, imaginative and charming people they really are.
I had set down one or two suggestions of imaginative proposals, but I will not mention them, as perhaps they would not strike other people as being imaginative at all. I come to my final word. Dr. Banda is reported in the Devlin Report to have said that he could not get a following by putting forward a carefully phased plan. Well, my Lords, nor can the Government of Nyasaland. Nor can we here. A carefully phased plan, well-intentioned, will not capture the imagination and affection of the people of Nyasaland. The task, I would say, is too hard for politics, or indeed for paternal government alone. It is a problem of psychology, to be solved by patience, by taking friendly risks, and by generous action in advance of necessity.
5.4 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, the speeches to which we have listened so far have fallen into two categories: those which dealt with events leading up to the trouble, and those which dealt with the recent disturbances. My noble friend the Leader of the Opposition has in the main dealt with the events leading up to the present difficulties, and so has the most reverend Primate. The noble Marquess dealt mostly with the actual disturbances, and I propose to speak on the disturbances that have arisen and on the Report of the Commission dealing with them.
First, I should like to say a word about the Commission. I wonder why the noble Earl who moved the Motion thought it necessary to change its terms from the terms in which it originally stood?
"To draw attention to the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry and to the Despatch by the Governor of Nyasaland relating thereto."
That would have left us with a perfectly open Motion, which we could have discussed without feeling; and we would have put forward different views about the Report without necessarily taking one side or another. Instead of that, a day or two after that Motion was put down it was withdrawn and a new Motion was put in its place. This thanks the Commission for all the things they have reported on which are favourable to the Government,
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but omits all reference to matters which are not favourable; by implication, therefore, not thanking them for those. By specifically drawing attention to a number of matters which the Government regard as favourable to them they have created the impression that they were expecting a Report which would whitewash them in every possible respect. But that has not happened. I am bound to say that the impression I received, both from the Motion and from the speech of the noble Earl, was that the Government are bad losers.
The noble Marquess referred to the Commission as splitting hairs, and as more judicial than impartial. These are rather extraordinary terms to use of a Commission whom you are thanking for their efforts. He said, and in another place the Attorney-General said, that the Government had not bound themselves to accept in toto the findings of this Commission. Of course they had not. They had not bound themselves to accept anything; and they are not being asked to. But the Commission were asked to find facts. They have done so; and they have not gone beyond that. After all, the Commission were appointed by the Government themselves; the personnel are the best they could find for this purpose, the best equipped; and they have found facts. It ill behoves the Government to dispute the facts which this Commission have found.
The Judge who presided over the Commission has great experience and training. He was on the spot. He saw the witnesses. He and the Commission thad the best opportunity—far better than the noble Marquess or anybody else in this House—of assessing the facts, and he has come to certain conclusions. It was said in another place by the Attorney-General that it is not uncommon for an appeal to be made against the decision of the Judge to another Court and to find that the decision is upset. But I see two most distinguished lawyers in front of me, the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack and the noble Viscount, Lord Monckton of Brenchley, and I am sure they will agree that there is no appeal on facts. If this Report were a decision of a court on facts there would be no possibility of appeal against them. I do not want to be legalistic——
VISCOUNT MONCKTON OF BRENCHLEY: Forgive me, but I hope you will not think that I am in support of that view. A judge could be upset on facts if there were not evidence to support his opinion, or if the Court of Appeal thought it was a perverse decision.
LORD SILKIN: Of course I was speaking very broadly. I do not think anybody would have the impertinence to say that the findings of fact of this Judge and the Commission were based on no evidence at all. I do not think anyone would dream of suggesting such a thing. Not even the noble Marquess himself suggested that, and I hope the noble and learned Viscount is not going to suggest it. Therefore my contention, I think, is right; that we have to accept the findings of this tribunal that we ourselves set up. And speaking for myself I do accept them; on the terms of our Motion we accept them.
We have been challenged on the question as to whether we accept the fact that the declaration of the state of emergency was necessary. I would draw the attention of the House to a statement I my-self made in a speech on March 24 when the Commission was set up. I said this: [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 215, col. 223]:
"I accept the fact that the Governor acted with sincerity, and that on such facts as he had available to him he was right to declare a state of emergency. He carries a great responsibility, and whether, in the result, those facts are justified or not, I think that a responsible Governor was bound to take note of them and, as a precautionary measure, declare a state of emergency."
The tribunal has accepted the fact that he was right to declare a state of emergency, and certainly in that respect it does not differ from the view which we took at the time, both in this House and in another place. The issue between noble Lords opposite and ourselves is not on the question of whether or not it was right to declare a state of emergency. The issue resolves itself really into two parts: first, what was responsible for that state of affairs; what brought about this condition which we agree was a condition of disturbance in the country which justified the state of emergency? Secondly, was the action of the Government of Nyasaland beyond criticism in the way it dealt with the disturbances? I want to say a few words—and they will be very few—on the second point:
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whether the action of the Government of Nyasaland went beyond the necessities of the case in dealing with the disturbances. I do not propose to quote at length from the Report; my noble friend and Leader has already done that.
The Report of the Commission criticises the action under a number of heads, and the noble Marquess himself accepted the fact that in certain instances the Government had gone beyond what was necessary. There was the question of collective fines and the confiscation of implements. The Report of the Commission point out that perfectly innocent implements, implements which are normally used for agricultural purposes could be used for offensive purposes; and in order that there should be no doubt about it the police confiscated every possible weapon, whether it was used for innocent agricultural purposes or otherwise, and without paying any compensation at all. The Commission found as a fact that force was used in villages beyond what was necessary; that unnecessary force was used in arresting people. They found as a fact that whole villages had been burned; that houses and contents had been burned without any justification. They found as a fact that the simple fact that a person had at one time been a member of Congress, the mere possession of a card, without any further action on his part, justified detention—and not only that, but imprisonment for a period of from six months to two years. If, further, such a person had been collecting subscriptions or taking part in the management of Congress, even in a minor degree, he was liable to imprisonment of up to five years.
Every possible assumption was made against every person who was detained. Instead of the assumption that a person is innocent until the reverse is proved, the opposite took place, and people were rounded up and detained or imprisoned on pure suspicion. Whenever people got together the assumption was that it was an unlawful assembly, and it was dealt with as such. But assemblies are not always unlawful or for the purpose of making trouble. There have been complaints both by the noble Earl and the noble Marquess that the conditions were described by the Commission as, at any rate temporarily, something equivalent to a police state. Is it

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any wonder, with all these things taking place?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, the noble Lord has quoted various things as facts. I was out of the Chamber for a moment. Particularly he said that whole villages had been burnt. I wonder whether he could find those facts anywhere in the Report. I think it is important that we should be accurate.
LORD SILKIN: I was not going to weary the House by making quotations from the Report; I thought that everybody had read the Report and that these facts were there.
THE EARL OF PERTH: Perhaps it would help if I said that paragraph 277 deals with "Burning of houses".
LORD SILKIN: Paragraph 277:
"We heard many complaints that in Mlanje district the security forces had burnt houses or huts. It is admitted that 38 houses were burnt by the order of the D.C. given on 9th March, 1959, and it is not suggested that the order was legal. Eleven of the houses were said to be shacks near road blocks and were assumed to have harboured persons responsible for erecting the blocks. The remaining 27 were said to be houses in which looted property had been found. The D.C. did not satisfy himself personally that looted property had been found in any of the houses burnt; nor did he, as he might have done (leaving aside the question of legality) give any verbal warning of his intention to burn, or burn one or two houses first by way of warning to see what effect that had. He says that he issued a general order to security forces that, if they found loot in any house, they were to burn it and that they had no discretion in the matter. You will have observed that in some of the Northern Province burnings by Africans the householder was first allowed to remove his goods; this mitigation was not adopted in Mlanje and the house went up with all the property, except the supposedly looted property, inside it".
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think that brings out very clearly that there was no finding by the Commission that whole villages were burnt. Thirty-eight houses were burnt, of which 11 were shacks near road blocks, and the other 27 we have heard about. I think it is important that when we make these statements about what is to be found in the Report, they should be exact.
LORD SILKIN: Well, I leave the House to judge whether the statement I made was correct or not.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILL-BOROUGH: There were 38 houses burned, and do not forget it!
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, I wonder if I might intervene. This is a matter of argument, and perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to tell him that there is a Royal Commission at 5.30, and if he could find a convenient pause in his speech in the next three minutes it would help us to make arrangements. I hope that the noble Lord will not take it amiss, but I thought it convenient to indicate that. It is a matter for him to decide when he will pause.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, that is an entirely non-controversial statement. I was at the point of establishing that the Commission were justified in saying that this was, at any rate for the time being, a police state. If the noble and learned Viscount so desires, I will pause at this stage in order to work up the case for establishing that this was a police state.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION
5.30 p.m.
The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

Finance,

Appropriation,

Education,

National Galleries of Scotland,

New Towns,

Export Guarantees,

Landlord and Tenant (Furniture and Fittings),

Fatal Accidents,

Obscene Publications,

Factories,

Statute Law Revision,

Wages Councils,

Town and Country Planning (Scotland),

Colonial Development and Welfare,

Mental Health,

Legitimacy,

Edinburgh College of Art Order Confirmation,

Leith Harbour and Docks Order Confirmation,

British Transport Commission Order Confirmation,

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Pier and Harbour Order (Gloucester) Confirmation,

Pier and Harbour Order (Medway Lower Navigation) Confirmation,

Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust,

Falmouth Docks,

Bootle Corporation,

Tees Valley and Cleveland Water,

Mid-Wessex Water,

British Transport Commission,

Portsmouth Corporation,

Humber Bridge,

Shell-Mex and B.P. (London Airport Pipeline),

Halifax Corporation,

City of London (Various Powers),

South Wales Transport,

Lee Valley Water,

London County Council (General Powers).

House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

NYASALAND: THE DEVLIN REPORT
Debate resumed.
5.49 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I was on the point of dealing with the criticism of the Commission that they had referred to Nyasaland as being, at any rate temporarily, a police state. Now there are various types of police states: they are not all alike. It may well be that Nyasaland has not the attributes of all the police states in the world. But the conditions there at the moment, temporarily, have a great many of those attributes, and I should like to mention a few of them. They rely to a large extent on informers. It is the practice to arrest without warrant. People are not brought for trial. People are beaten up. It is difficult to express an opinion hostile or unfavourable to the Government. There is the assumption of guilt. There is the prohibition against being a member of a political Party. I am sure that most Members of your Lordships' House will agree that these things go a long way to establishing the characteristics of a police state.
In another place it was said that if the Government had had anything to hide, they would not have set up this Commission [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 610 (No. 156), col. 434]:
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"Would a Government responsible for a police state have appointed a Commission of this kind, composed of people who could wander freely throughout the country, speak freely to whomsoever they liked, speak to men who are detained, or to their counsel, speak to men whose identity I do not know—and will never know?"
The answer is, of course, that they would, if they were subjected to a great deal of pressure, as the Government were, to set up a Commission of this kind. They did not set it up voluntarily. Your Lordships will remember that the state of emergency was declared on March 3 and it was not until some weeks later that this Commission was set up, and it was set up only as the result of considerable pressure both in your Lordships' House and in another place. Moreover, it was not set up by the Government of Nyasaland but by this Government. I do not want to take away from the Government such credit as they are entitled to for having set up this Commission, but the fact remains that this Commission has found that Nyasaland has many of the attributes of a police State and I find it difficult to see how that fact can be challenged.
I want to refer for one moment to the White Paper published by this Government. It strikes me as being most impertinent and improper for the Governor of the State concerned, by means of a White Paper, to enter into a debate—which is what he is doing—with the Commission on their findings. If there is to be a debate at all—and I dispute the right of the Governor even to enter into a debate of this kind on a Motion—it should be initiated by the Government themselves. I think that the publication of this White Paper simultaneously with the publication of the Commissioners' Report is highly improper and, so far as I know, absolutely un-precedented. I fear that we are rendering a great disservice to the cause which we all profess to have at heart, the pacification of Nyasaland, when this sort of challenge is made of a Commission which was set up with such high hopes and under such great auspices. This is not only a challenge to this Commission, but a challenge to the authority of any Commission that we may heretofore set up for the purpose of ascertaining facts. If the Government and the Governor concerned can challenge the authenticity of a Commission of this kind, I

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doubt whether in future there is any value at all in setting up any Commission to ascertain facts.
I have said that there are two aspects to this inquiry—the ascertainment of the facts of the disturbances themselves and of the facts of the events leading up to them. So far as I think necessary, I have dealt with the facts of the disturbances, and my noble friend and the most reverend Primate have dealt with the events leading up to them. I want to say one word, in conclusion, about the future. What is to be the outcome? There is no doubt that not simply the declaration of the state of emergency but the way in which it has been dealt with has created great bitterness and resentment in Nyasaland. Neither I, for one, nor, so far as I know, any one of my noble friends challenged the correctness of the declaration of the state of emergency. We did not challenge it at the time, and we think that the Commission were right in the conclusion to which they have come. But we do challenge the way it has been carried out, and great bitterness has been engendered as the result.
Our first objective must be somehow to restore conditions in Nyasaland which will not only bring peace but also create the climate in which it will be possible to discuss the future. I would submit that the Government might well consider, in spite of what the noble Earl has said, the release of Dr. Banda and a great many, if not all, of those who have been detained. It may be that, if it can be shown that Dr. Banda has committed an offence, he should be put on trial; but if not, I submit that the time has come when he might well be released. After all, a time will come when he will be released, and I wonder how different conditions will be then from what they are to-day. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, said that this was not the time to release those detained. I would ask: What is he waiting for? When does he expect the time will be opportune for the release of those who have been detained? I am sure that it must be a condition preceding any pacification of the country that those who are in the best position to speak for the majority of people in the country, those who are their recognised spokesmen, should be at liberty to talk. You can get no discussions at
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all if all the authorised, authentic spokesmen are in jail.
Secondly, I would agree very much with the most reverend Primate about the increasing fear of federation, but the most reverend Primate, who I regret is not in his place, said that in 1953 he favoured federation, whereas the late Bishop of Chichester opposed it. He gave us to understand that he had had to think again about it, but he did not say whether or not he favoured federation to-day. I gather that he does not. But I would ask: What is the Government's approach going to be on this question? Are they taking the line, as I inferred the noble Earl does, that, whatever the conditions may be, federation must continue, whether the people of Nyasaland want it or not? I should like to ask whether they really intend to continue Federation against the wishes of the whole population of Nyasaland?
It may well be—and I would not dispute it—in the economic interests of the people of Nyasaland to have federation. It may even be in their economic interests to be entirely submerged by the Federation itself. It is sometimes in the economic interests of a people or an individual to give up freedom; yet people are very reluctant to do so, even with the economic advantages that they may gain. Economic advantage is not the only factor. Unless we can ensure to the people of Nyasaland the opportunity of freedom of the right to govern themselves in their own country; of the right, not necessarily of complete control without recognising the rights of the Asians and the Europeans, but at any rate the right of governing themselves by majority, and give them freedom within the Federation, we shall never get them to accept federation voluntarily.
I would ask the Government: Are they intending to enforce Federation, regardless of the wishes of Nyasaland? Are they assuming that this question of federation is a closed book? I was under the impression that the intention was that the whole question of the continuation of federation, and the conditions under which it would be continued, if it were continued, was to be a matter for discussion in 1960 or within the following two years. But the noble Earl, Lord Perth, gave me the impression that that was not the case; that it was now

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settled for all time, and there was to be no question of reconsideration of this issue. I should be grateful if the Government spokesman would make that clear.
We have got to think out afresh this question of the free races living in these areas. We have not yet discovered the techniques of Africans, who constitute by far the greatest majority, Asians and Europeans living happily and contentedly together on equal terms, each respecting the qualities of the other, each having the opportunity of the fullest development according to his own rights. We shall never achieve that if we regard ourselves as permanently superior to the African people. The example the most reverend Primate gave of his being rebuked because he had the impudence to shake hands with an African shocked me, as I am sure it shocked a great many Members of your Lordships' House. If that is typical of the attitude we are at present adopting, is it any wonder that we are not gaining the confidence of the people of Nyasaland, and that this great measure for freedom to govern themselves, and being released from the possibility of domination by the Federation of Rhodesia, does not work? Until such time as we can regard these people as being on an equality with the people of Europe and of our particular race, we shall never get peace in Nyasaland.
That, I believe, my Lords, is the lesson to be learned from this Report. And although the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, thinks we ought to confine ourselves to the terms of the Report, the task before this House to-day is to see how we can bring this disastrous state of affairs to an end and create new conditions where all the races can live peacefully together. While, as my noble Leader has said, we may have said hard and bitter things to one another—and I hope that I have not been too bitter—I think it is as well to be perfectly frank about these matters and to say what we think. But at the end of the day let us try to be constructive, and to finish this debate on a really constructive note. I hope it may be possible that that will be the outcome of this debate.
LORD MILVERTON: Before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him to clear up one point? I understood
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from what he said that he considered it highly improper for the Governor to be allowed to reply, and for his replies to be printed, although his own conduct had been indirectly impugned in the Report and he felt that he was in a position, if the public had to see the Report, to give the public the reply which he would make in reference to the description of his administration having used improper methods and so forth. Apparently, according to the noble Lord, that is highly improper; but for the Government to muzzle in any way an organisation like the African National Congress, which they consider to be preaching a seditious policy, is an act of a police state. Is it not introducing the principle of a police state if the Governor is to be muzzled in this manner——
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
LORD SILKIN: The noble Lord has asked me a question, although he will have the fullest opportunity later on of making his speech. I regard it as improper because I regard the Governor as a civil servant who is answerable to his Department. I see no more reason why the Governor should be allowed to issue a White Paper than that any member of the police force, or anybody whose conduct has been impugned, should be authorised to issue a White Paper for publication with a Report. You might equally argue that every member of the police force whose conduct has been attacked, or every member of the military or anybody else, could issue a White Paper and have it published with a Report.
6.8 p.m.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, I do not propose on this occasion to follow the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, into a debate upon federation, although I should always be prepared to discuss federation at the appropriate time, and, I hope, in a non-controversial spirit. I think we have quite enough to debate tonight on this Report. However, I should like to answer what I thought (and it is relevant to the Report) the very odd doctrine which the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, set forth. First of all, apparently, there is no right in the Government or anybody to criticise, challenge or answer the findings (or sayings, I had better say, because, if I may say so without offence,

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there is quite a lot of rather woolly stuff in this Report which I cannot treat as findings of fact; I suppose I should treat them according, to the most reverend Primate, as psychological aphorisms) of the Commission.
The noble Viscount, Lord Monckton of Brenchley, answered effectively the suggestion that a judge could never be challenged on a matter of fact. It really is the most unconstitutional doctrine I have ever heard that, when a Commission have reported, neither the Government nor anybody else is to say anything in answer to it except presumably to stand to attention and say. "Sir", like a soldier who is charged in the orderly room in the Brigade of Guards. Equally odd I thought, was the noble Lord's complaint about the publication of this White Paper which was the Governor's despatch.
"Cet animal est trés méchant; quand on l'attaque, il se défend."
But, my Lords, the Governor did not volunteer this defence. Right at the beginning of his despatch to the Secretary of State he says that he has been told to come and discuss the Report with him What he did was done on the instructions of the Secretary of State; and if anybody is to be attacked because there is this White Paper, which I think is a very convenient thing to have, then it is the Secretary of State and not the Governor.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am glad. But the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, was saying how shocking the Governor was. All my public life I have said a lot of rude thinks to civil servants, and even Governors, in private, but I have always taken full responsibility in public for everything they do.
So if there is anybody to be blamed about this it is the Secretary of State or the two Secretaries of State. But as a matter of fact I do not think they are in the least to blame. I think it is most convenient that we should have this document. If we had not got it, what would the Opposition have been saying now?—"What is the answer to all this? What did the Governor do?" I am bound to say that it was not only convenient but, indeed, necessary for a proper judgment to be reached by Parliament that we should have this short,
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straightforward despatch which the Governor has presented to the Secretary of State, and which the Secretary of State has published to Parliament.
This debate has ranged very wide. I am not surprised, because the Report does, too, but I want to come to one or two much narrower issues which are, I think, the core of the Report. As I take it, the object, or at any rate the most useful purpose, of a debate of this kind, is twofold—first of all, to decide the cardinal point: was the Government justified in the action it took; and, secondly, what are the lessons we can learn for the future? It is very important that we should all remember, in reading the Report of the Commission, that they had the advantage of considering all the evidence and all the facts at their leisure, over a long period of time, after the Governor had to take his decision, after all the events and when much that was obscure in the beginning of March, when the decision had to be taken, had become at any rate a good deal clearer. It is important to remember that the Governor, and the Government at home, had to take rapid decisions in the light of the knowledge then available to them, in the beginning of March—a very different situation from that with which the Commission dealt in their thorough but long-term inquiry. Even so, on what after all is the main issue—the declaration of the emergency—both Governments, the Government here and the Government of Nyasaland, are entirely vindicated. It has become a cliché; but, unlike most, it is a very good cliché: as the Commission put it, "Act or abdicate".
Let the House also observe this. I am not going to say anything outside what is a finding of fact by the Commission, or, if I do, I will say so. I do not want to take up too much time by quoting chapter and verse, but the House may take it from me that everything I say is found in the Report—at least, I think so. By the beginning of 1959, the extremists among the Africans had made up their minds that they would get Congress to adopt a policy of violence. Indeed, it goes back much earlier than that, because as far back as 1955 Mr. Chipembere, who was a principal lieutenant of Dr. Banda, was quite clear that violence was what you had got to have. He said that you will not be able

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to extract Nyasaland from Federation without catastrophic pressure, and any plan must include something akin to Mau-Mau. We all form our opinions, of course, and the Commission had the advantage of seeing Dr. Banda. It is always said that it is important to see a witness in the box, but after all, the Governor had seen Dr. Banda: he had tried to deal with him, and had failed entirely, although in those times he was not treating him in the least in a hostile way. But the Commission themselves say that Dr. Banda had come to regard some degree of violence as inevitable. On another occasion Dr. Banda said, in an address to his African audience, that moderate leaders are of no use.
We are asked by the most reverend Primate; what had gone wrong? I agree that something had gone wrong, but I think it is only fair to the Secretary of State and to the Government in Nyasaland to remember that, way back in 1955, and since there had been on the part of the Congress leaders—and a relatively few people can get great power in a primitive State—a determination to subvert the Government by violence. How successful they were in the policy of getting Congress to adopt violence is clear from the notes of the meeting of January 25, which the Commission themselves say give as good an impression as can be got of what went on at that critical meeting when the leaders were addressing some 200 or 300 of their principal followers.
Let us also observe this. The violence in the Northern Province, Karonga, Fort Hall, Mzimba, and other places, took place before the declaration of the emergency, and before the arrest of the Congress leaders. I think that is very important, because it has been assumed—and a good deal has been heard both in this House and outside—that all this violence arose because of the declaration of the emergency and the arrest of the Congress leaders. That is not true at all. The worst of the violence which took place was before the emergency was declared at all. What happened, particularly at Karonga (noble Lords will find it in paragraphs 106 to 108 of the Report) shows what happens if action is not taken promptly.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: I rather think—I am not quarrelling with the general lines the noble Earl is taking—but I think that as a matter of fact, in the period before the declaration of the emergency there was a tightening hold by the Nyasaland Government on administration. They were taking a stronger line about the administration of the law concerning the seeking of permission to hold public meetings. So there were two things: the Congress Party pressing from their side, and the Government from their side.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: It was a very shocking situation. The Government in Nyasaland were enforcing the law. Well that is very shocking! I wonder what would have been said if they had not been enforcing the law and had let things slide, and there had been all this violence and rooting up of airfields. The noble Viscount cannot have it both ways, although he is a great artist at it. I remember the criticisms from that side about Kenya. The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore was saying in 1952 why was not the emergency declared earlier? He said that we had risked life and limb and people had been killed because we had not declared an emergency in time. Now we are told how shocking it was that law and order was being enforced; and enforced at a time when Congress had determined by their resolution to embark on a course of violence.
It really seems a little odd to me, who have always tried to be an impartial administrator—at any rate, I have got about as good a record in Colonial administration and African administration, whether at the Colonial Office or the Commonwealth Office or as a Minister in West Africa, as colleagues of the noble Lord or of the noble Lord himself. There are lots of things I can be ashamed of in my life but Colonial administration is not one of them. But let us hear the Commission. They say this:
"If violence had started in some place and was not checked it would certainly have spread and might have gone very far, and that was the real danger of the situation."
The Commission need not have been so conditional, because that violence in the Northern Province was before the emergency was declared, and showed the wisdom of their findings.

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Now let me come for a moment to this question of the murder plot—I suppose I ought to call it the "so-called" murder plot—which has figured so prominently, and I must say so very disproportionately, to my mind, in all the discussions both in Parliament and out of doors. The Commission come, perhaps rightly, to the conclusion that there was not a formal detailed plot or plan. Well I agree, as I so often have with my noble friend, about rather legalistic distinctions being drawn in this. Even the Commission themselves talk about a plan, so it is rather dangerous when you get into these terms. But I should never have expected a plan in that sense—a plan of the sort that a divisional commander would make, issuing detailed orders to operational troops in the field. What I should expect would be a determination and decision to riot and have violence, to cut throats: exactly what you would expect if you knew anything about Africa; exactly what you would expect excited and emotionally aroused Africans to do.
In fairness, I should like to put two questions to the House. Was there in fact an intention to kill or a prospect of killing? Because I cannot draw these fine distinctions between killing and murder, between cold-blooded assassination and hot-blooded assassination. We have been defining different kinds of murder in an Act of Parliament here and we had enough difficulty about that in the Capital Punishment Bill; but we did not get into these subtle refinements which I find here.
Just as important is to get a fair judgment of whether the Governor at the time was justified in thinking there was such a plan. The Commission think there was a great deal of talk about beating and killing without any dividing line being drawn. Let us consider the meeting of January 25—what I may call, I must not say the minutes of the meeting, but the note of the meeting—which, as I have reminded the House, the Commission say is as good an impression as you can get of what took place. "If Doctor Banda is arrested, start war after two days." I have never known war without killing. I do not know whether it is murder in civil war or in an insurrection which has started, but it does not really matter much to the
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fellow who is killed, whether black or white, what name you give it.
"Start war in two days. Destroy everything belonging to Europeans. Hit Europeans, or cut throats. If a Congress member is caught you must fight without fear."
Well, if I had been that Governor I would, without hesitation, have come to the conclusion that there was a general plan or incitement to violence and, I will not say to murder, but to killing. At the time he took that decision and made his report, as I think my noble friend Lord Salisbury said, he had other opinions, which may or may not have been accurate, but which he was bound to take into account. Now I venture to speak with some—I will not say authority, but with some experience on this kind of matter. For two years, in the Government of which many of us were members, I was responsible for co-ordinating all security and intelligence, counter-espionage, secret service and the like. It is not an easy job, even with the far-ranging services we had—and I say without hesitation that they were not matched in any other country, enemy or allied. But even with all that, it is not always easy to form your mind as to what are the facts and what is the right conclusion. You must not take too many risks. I think the House has been reminded of it. We were all concerned in Regulation 18B, and at the moment when we thought that this country was going to be faced with invasion, without any hesitation, we proceeded to round up thousands of people whom we had not rounded up before and we put them in the Isle of Man. It took quite a long time to sieve them out and ultimately let some of them—quite a number of them—go. Does anyone say that we were wrong in that?
LORD PAKENHAM: Yes, I certainly do. A lot of silly things were done by rounding up distinguished scholars and putting them in the Isle of Man when they were great friends of this country.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: The noble Lord may say that to his Leader, who was a party to it all and used to sit in on it. The noble Lord is a very delightful controversialist and, fortunately, at that time had no responsibility in Government. I dare say, if he had, he would have had a lot more sense and would not have taken stupid risks. He may say we were wrong and he may be the one

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person without sin whom he was referring to the other day—I thought rather crudely in the presence of Bishops—who can be the first to cast a stone at us. But, for the rest, it does not become any of us who were concerned with affairs and responsible for affairs at that time to say that in an emergency—and make no mistake of the graveness of the emergency and the risks which there were in Nyasaland at that time—they should not have acted as they did.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I want to have this quite clear. We accept the whole Report of the Commission and therefore we accept the Commission's Report as regards the declaration of the state of emergency. That is quite clear. What we are wondering about in regard to the fine distinction which the noble Earl referred to just now, is as to what would be the view of somebody like Sir Percy Wyn-Harris, a man of great experience, Commander-in-Chief of Gambia, and with twenty years' experience in Kenya; yet he signs the unanimous Report of the Commission. I think that should be taken into account.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: The noble Viscount has now said that for about the fourteenth time in this debate. I do not challenge it. But even the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, who is going to follow me, will perhaps allow even unfortunate people on this side of the House to make their own speeches.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I was applauding.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: It is so difficult to distinguish whether the noble Viscount is engendering indignation or affectionate sympathy. I take it in the spirit that it is offered. I really do not think I am differing very much from the Commission in this. What I am saying is that the Governor was bound to decide as he did on the information he had on March 3, and nobody has challenged that he did not come in his mind to an honest decision. Because whatever has been said, by the Commission or anybody else, about the Governor, or indeed the whole Civil Service who were there, whatever can be said, they were deeply sincere people concerned only to come to the right decision and do what they considered their duty.
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May I say this in passing—I was diverted on this point. It is said "You ought to release all these people". First of all, it is said, "You should bring them to trial". We never brought people to trial in this country under 18B. The crisis here went on a great deal longer that I hope this one in Nyasaland will. We could not bring them to trial. All of us who have been in this business know it. We had an advisory body which was useful, but everything was done in secret and had to be done in secret, because if you did not do it in secret the whole source of your information had gone. With my noble friend Lord Salisbury—and we have both held these offices; I think both of us have been Colonial Secretary and both Commonwealth Secretary—I say without hesitation that you cannot carry on in these territories, and you would be guilty of the gravest dereliction of duty if you attempted to carry on in the Colonial Service, without the best secret and intelligence services that you could have. How quickly these people can be released and who can be released is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the Government. They can be challenged, if you like to challenge them; they will have to justify it. But I dare wager that if the noble Lords opposite should by any mischance come into office in the next few months, we should find that they were carrying on in exactly the same way; they would get into the most frightful trouble if they did not.
At that crucial moment—the moment we have to consider is the few days in which the Governor had to make up his mind—after there had been this great violence at Fort Hall, he had from seven different sources of information reports that murder was being planned: four of them said of Europeans—they were all independent—three of them said of Africans. His Commissioner of Police told him that he must regard these reports and accept them seriously. Can anybody say that the Governor was wrong in believing the report that there was such a murder plot? Frankly, how far he was right as to the nature and character of the murder plans seems to me a relatively minor matter. The outstanding issue is, was he right in what he did? Do not forget that he had the example of Kenya fresh in his mind. He had the criticism of Her Majesty's

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Opposition that action was taken far too late. He had in his mind the criticism—and this criticism was not unfounded—that in Kenya the secret service, which I knew in the war was extremely adequate, had been allowed to run down and the Government in Kenya was taken by surprise. He had in his ears, I am sure, that knell which keeps on being sounded when these things happen and action is deferred, "Too little and too late". I think that he is fully vindicated. He could do no other.
I come to one other matter. In carrying out their difficult task I have no doubt that the police did use excessive force. It is true the Commission say, and say wisely I think, that it is much more difficult to control ignorant African police than it is to control the London policeman who, as they colloquially put it, can "use his own loaf." I am sure that the Government will profit by the Commission's Report. I am sure that they will introduce any reforms that are necessary in the regulations and in disciplinary control. But this I must make plain: in doing that, do not forget that you must act to maintain law and order and that you must act with sufficient force. Nothing, as Karonga and those other places show, is worse than to try to act with insufficient force. Perhaps one thing is worse, and that is not to act at all. But you must have sufficient force to do the job, and that force, of course, must be rightly used and properly disciplined. But, broad and large, I feel that both Governments, the local Government and the Government here, are vindicated, and they could not have acted otherwise then they have done.
I would add this: I would regret it profoundly if this is made an occasion of political strife. I would only say, frankly, as an old electioneer, that the Opposition will not get much out of it. I do not think it is at all a good political card to play. Any Government would have to act—it may be an alternative Government; I am not betting on it—but whatever Government it is and whoever is the Government and whoever is the Opposition, the worst service that we could do to Colonial government anywhere, and to Nyasaland in particular, would be to leave any doubt that law and order, the greatest boon that British rule has brought
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to backward countries in a dark continent, will not be preserved. The problems of Nyasaland and of the Federation will have to be solved. Maybe we cannot avoid having honest differences of opinion about them, but surely it is the duty of all of us to seek the greatest measure of agreement in the discharge of a trust which is a trust of every one of us.
6.40 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, this is an extremely interesting debate and one has learned a great deal from it. I had always appreciated the merits of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, but, until he had explained them himself. I had never had such a firm grip in my mind on the great public service he had rendered. The noble Earl gave us an extra-ordinarily good description of the benefits of a police state. He said that we must have a police state; we must have a police state everywhere. He said that he knew about these things and he had done it. Then he took us to Regulation 18B and, we understood, a universal Regulation 18B would solve the whole African problem.
THE EARL OF SWINTON: The noble Lord is making his own speech, not mine.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I like to listen, and I shall allow—
THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am so accustomed to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, failing to hear and then giving an entirely imaginary description of the speech he is dealing with that I shall not interrupt him again, but I am sure that the House will not take anything the noble Viscount says about my views as being at all akin to them.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: If I had heard that, I should, I am sure, have been very much amused.
The point about this Report is that usually, when we are dealing with Government action and M.I.5, we are told, "If you knew what I know, you would agree"; but this Commission did know what was done. The Commission had access to all the documents. It saw the informers. It even knew how much money was given according to the "juicy" nature of their information. The Commission knew all about it. Knowing all about it, the Commission came to one conclusion; and it emerges from the

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debate that the conclusion reached by this Commission of great eminence, in which, up to a certain point, everybody has expressed entire confidence, is not to be accepted, and action is taken in an opposite sense by the Government.
The effect of this on the world at large will be very bad. I quite agree with what I think the noble Earl, Lord Perth, said, that when the world saw charges being made, that we were acting in a brutal way, and when they heard that we had appointed such an eminent Commission to go into the matter and were putting everything at its disposal, our reputation in the world went up. But when people find that the Government are picking out the little bits which support them and rejecting the bits which do not support them, the loss to our prestige will be correspondingly great.
Almost everything has been touched upon, but there were one or two points which I wished to make. I am very grateful to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, because in his speech he asked me to postpone what I had to say until he came back. It is very courteous of him to come back.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I did not ask the noble Viscount to postpone it until I came back. I asked him to postpone it until he made his speech.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is right. The noble Marquess said that I should be making a speech later. He said it with a little dramatic gesture of contempt which did not add anything to the force of the argument. I was very anxious to sweeten the memories of the noble Marquess. He said, and everybody has said, that "This is all very sad; we are very sorry that the police went a little too far. These things happen, you know, in our great free land, and you must not make too much of it." I should like to read from the Report and remind the noble Marquess of what happened. I was so surprised at what he has said that I asked him whether he had read the Report. He replied that he had read it. Everybody has read the Report; indeed, almost the whole thing has been read aloud in this House. There will not be the least harm in my reading from it also.
I wish to refer to what happened to a gentleman named Mr. Chikafa, whose
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arrest took place in the Mlanje district. On page 94 of the Report, it is said:
"He is a man of about 40 and not strongly built. He is an elder of the Church of Scotland and we have heard nothing to suggest that he is a man of violent habits."
I shall now miss something out, but I hope that no one will pick me up about that, because I shall not miss anything which is hurtful to my case. I am trying merely to abbreviate my speech.
"The inspector did not tell him who he was or what he had come to do but hit him with his baton, aiming for the shoulder…
He"—
that is to say, the inspector—
"was a large and powerful man and he next caught hold of Chikafa and threw him towards the door, six or eight feet away, with sufficient force so that he crashed into one of the special constables who says that he was just coming through the door at the time. The constable says that he thought that Chikafa was trying to escape so he hit him on the head with his rifle butt. In his first report of the incident the inspector said that Chikafa was 'strongly resisting arrest'. Chikafa was then carried to the landrover and on his arrival at the police station two hours later he still appeared to be unconscious and was carried into it."
We are very sad about that. I am sure that it causes the noble Marquess a great deal of pain to think that, in carrying out a policy for which, until two years ago, he himself also shared the blame, these unfortunate things should happen.
Most of these people were arrested in the middle of the night. This was a thing which people in Nyasaland remembered. Most of us were young men when the slave trade was still being actively carried on in Nyasaland. The general instructions in the Mzimba district permitted arrested persons to be handcuffed, tied at the elbows and at the ankles, and gagged. It must be remembered that these arrested persons had not committed any crime. They were being arrested on suspicion. There may have been a Congress card found in their huts, but the Congress card was not an illegal possession up to 11.59. At 12.1 it was a crime to have a current Congress card. However, I do not want anyone to think that these are criminals about whom I am speaking. They were people being arrested according to the benevolent scheme which saved the British Empire, under the guidance of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton.
On page 98 of the Report we read that a party of four people was taken,

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"still tied up, from the Eutini junction to Mzuzu. One of the four was a Presbyterian minister…"
I am sorry that the Bishops have all gone, because I should have liked them to hear some of this. I had hoped that one or other of them would have said a word. If we could make Dr. Macleod an honorary Bishop for a week, it would do a great deal of good. The Report goes on to say:
"One of the four was a Presbyterian minister and the other a village headman. Two of the landrovers were open; the prisoners' condition could therefore be seen. The minister, who was also an active and outspoken member of Congress, was the Reverend Henry Makwakwa who had been arrested at his manse. He had been a chaplain in the K.A.R. for two years and he was described by the camp commandant at Kanjedza, who knew him, as 'a very good front line padre'."
These things do not do us any good. They cause sadness to the noble Marquess, but they do not do the reputation of our country any good, if that is the sort of way in which our instructions are interpreted. Does the noble Marquess suggest that it is just a matter for ourselves; that this Report will not be read all over the world, by the coloured people of the world, in every part of the British Empire—in the West Indies, in India, and everywhere where the non-European nations are coming together? This is the sort of thing that will do our reputation harm. It is not an accident. This is the type of thing which naturally follows the Hitler Government model of what is described in the Report as a "police state".
Those four people I have been speaking about were (says the Report):
"handcuffed, trussed and gagged and loaded into a truck at 5.45 p.m. to go to Mzuzu. The escort consisted of one special constable who was driving.… The journey was a difficult one, as the lorry became stuck in the mud, and lasted until 3.10 a.m."
That was nearly twelve hours.
"The escort said the prisoners became 'restive';"—
a bit of subversion, I fear (I wonder what Lord Swinton would say). They got a bit restive after twelve hours drive in the lorry—
"…they said that because they were tied up they could not sit up properly and were thrown on their faces at the bumps."
That is the sort of thing that is going to ruin our reputation in Africa and make any progress impossible—and there is masses of it. I do not want to
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dwell on the question of the burning of the village. My noble friend was taken up on that when he said that a village had been burned. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, said that it was only thirty-eight houses and that you cannot call that a village. We must leave it at that. But they did burn them, and they burned the possessions of the Africans in them; and they had no legal warrant to do the same. That is as I understand the Report.
Why are the Africans in this state of exasperation? No one seems sufficiently to have pondered on that question. Everyone has talked of maintaining law and order, but no one has asked: why is it that these amiable people—because they were amiable people—are in this state of fury? The answer is quite simple. Over the last five years they have been striving to establish their right to be a free people. In 1939 Lord Bledisloe's Commission reported; they would not have it. In 1949 they would not have it. In 1951 there was a Conference in which I think my own Party were engaged and interested, and the principle of federation was accepted; and in 1953 there was more talk. Dr. Banda right through said that he would not accept it. In 1953–54 there were disturbances. They took to violence. All these causes will be forced to take to violence unless reasonable and constitutional action is permitted. They took to violence and they were defeated. Then they gave it up in 1954. Then there was the election of five people to the Legislative Council. There had been nominees. Every one of the nominees was defeated, and everybody who was elected was a Congressman pledged to resist federation. Then, steadily from here came the word, "You have got to have it; you must have it'". In 1956 the then Colonial Secretary said, "Federation has come to stay". In 1957 people believed, "Dominion status is almost within our reach". In 1958 they were put off and off when they asked for it.
The problem that you have really to consider is: are you going to ram federation down the throats of these people? There are 2¾ million Africans and about 8,000 Europeans in the country. Nobody will deny that the hatred of federation in the minds of the Africans is almost universal. In the Commission's Report

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they say that they never met a chief—mind you, the chief was not allowed to take part in politics!—who was in favour of federation. The problem that really faces us is: what is going to be done? It is no good having a lot of cloudy talk about "We must reconcile this, and bring together that". These people do not want federation. Dr. Banda, who is a great leader—I am surprised at what the most reverend Primate said about him, because he is a type of Gandhi; I have seen him and have met him—says that they will not agree to it unless they have a majority in their own Nyasaland Parliament that does agree to it. Is that an unreasonable thing to ask? How can you possibly expect to have any result otherwise? It is no good just talking about it. Two things emerge to-day: first, you do not hear the authentic voice of the Nyasalanders; and secondly, you keep under lock and key the one man whom they regard as a messiah—I am speaking in a general political way; he is a Gandhi. Until those things are altered nothing will come of it.
One further point occurs to me. There is no time to do it to-day, but I think one ought to consider the outlook of these people who are governing. The Hola Camp affair has, of course, been a terrible shock. But the outlook of the governing people, who are very pleasantly described in the Commission's Report, is interesting. They say that it is "paternal, dictatorial but benevolent." Here are all these young gentlemen who are doing things about which our parents used to say to us, "My boy, it hurts me more than it hurts you." Are you really hoping to proceed on that basis? There is a terrible danger—it has not been mentioned, but it has come to light—that the African will make fun of them. It is a most dangerous thing when people begin to make fun of the Government. It was done in Ireland. I remember very well, because we were criticising every day in the House of Commons in those days, a regulation by which boys were brought before magistrates for "whistling derisorily at the police." You can imagine what power there is there. But what common sense and statesmanship is there in that? Here, you find Dr. Banda saying about somebody (this is mentioned with tremendous reproof in the
824
evidence of one of the civil servants) "After all, who is the district commissioner?—a boy of twenty-five from Oxford!" I never had the privilege of sharing the inspissated gloom of Oxford. I suppose that most people would regard that as rather a good joke. But it is one of the things you must not say.
Do you notice this about South Africa? I will say just a word about the general picture, and not proceed at length. Do you notice how they laugh when one woman is arrested by the South African police, and fifty women turn up, all with babies tied in shawls over their shoulders, and walk laughing into the police station and demand to be convicted? It is most dangerous when people have so little respect for you and also so much confidence in themselves that they can afford to laugh at your administration. I see the noble Lord, Lord Robins, in his place. He has made several interesting speeches. I wonder whether I could ask him this question: why is it that you want the 2¾ million Nyasalanders? What is the real reason? This is a deficit area. They cost you £3 million a year in subsidies. What is your reason for insisting on that and speaking prematurely (that is over for the moment) about Dominion status? Is it for their labour value? I do not know; I cannot find out. But what Nyasalanders say is that in Southern Rhodesia their condition is so depressed that they fear that if they come into the Federation they will get the same sort of thing. There is a good deal to be said for that point of view.
I think many people have been surprised at the length that federation has gone. Practically before there is a Federation the police come from Salisbury. Salisbury sent in the Royal Rhodesian Regiment, all European, a famous regiment feared by the natives wherever they go. The King's African Rifles are Africans. Then it is the Federal Prime Minister who provides the prisons in which these people are lodged. It is the Federal Prime Minister who forbids Members of the Houses of Parliament, who find the money for this Colony, to go there. He says, "You cannot go without my permission." I notice that the Southern Rhodesian Parliament passed a special Act of Parliament to permit the Commission to sit in Salisbury. Therefore, seeing all

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this growth of power permeating the Rhodesias, these Africans do not want federation. Until you solve that problem, I am perfectly certain you will get nowhere.
The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, was speaking about the old times. Well, I remember his entry into Parliament very well indeed, and he will remember that just before he entered Parliament we had had a struggle with Ireland—the big struggle with Ireland—and all the things that are said here to-day were said then about Collins and Griffiths: "You cannot negotiate with men like that. Look at their conduct." The violence in Ireland was immense compared to these road blocks and other trifling acts. But they will grow into something worse if you leave the matter alone. If we, as a country and a Commonwealth, with a great deal of experience, cannot adjust our experience and knowledge to this current problem, then I think it is a very sad day for our future.
7.1 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, the noble Viscount who has just resumed his seat has been this evening, as he always is, utterly irresistible, and, as he always is, utterly unconvincing.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I thought the noble Lord was going to say that.
LORD COLERAINE: But he is at any rate very easy to listen to, if I may say so, and it is a great pleasure to listen to him. At any rate, we know where he stands on this unhappy business. We know, for example, what his definition of a "police state" is. The noble Viscount's definition of a police state is Great Britain between 1940 and 1945. That is not my definition, and I do not think it is the definition that these eminent gentlemen who have reported intended when they described Nyasaland as a police state, "no doubt…temporarily."
The noble Viscount asks: Why is it that these amiable people have been driven to such a frenzy? He gives an answer which may be the right answer. I do not think it is. He gives the answer: because of federation. But it is possible—and this Report does not dissuade me of my conviction—that they have been driven to frenzy by acute, skilful, highly politically educated dema-
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gogues playing upon a politically immature people. But there is one point upon which I agree with the noble Viscount, even if for different reasons. I think this Report is a great disaster and I do not see how anyone who values the good name of this country, or anyone who cares for the people of Nyasaland, can possibly accept it. The most reverend Primate said that he hoped this Report would mean a new start. I hope there may be a new start, but I cannot see what the Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry is going to contribute towards it.
It is often the fate of Reports of this kind that they are put away in a pigeonhole and their fate is oblivion. This may go into a pigeonhole, but I fear that it will continue to poison relations between the two races, black and white, between these two branches of the human race, long after the occasion of it has been forgotten. The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, cannot understand why the Government do not accept the whole Report. Well, I cannot speak for the Government, but I know why I could not possibly vote for the Amendment even if the Government asked me to do so.
It seems to me that the grounds for the rejection of this Report are three-fold. First, it is irresponsible; secondly, it is almost unbelievably naïve and innocent; and, finally, it is remarkably disingenuous. I do not know how it has happened. I do not know how it is that men of the eminence and the capacity of these men have produced a Report of this kind. But what I am sure is that this Report is characterised by that peculiar kind of silliness which you can only find in very clever men and by that peculiar lack of scruple which, in my experience, often distinguishes the very high-minded.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord this, as I seem to be acting temporarily for my noble Leader: surely he does not mean exactly what he says. Surely he is not accusing these four eminent gentlemen selected by his Government—our Government; the country's Government—of being unscrupulous.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, if the noble. Lord will have patience he will find out exactly what I am accusing

827
them of. I realise that it is the duty of a fact-finding Commission to disclose facts without fear or favour, and certainly the Commission has fulfilled its duty. It has disclosed the facts. Some of them are very disagreeable—I do not deny it any more than my noble friend Lord Salisbury denied it. Some of them are very disagreeable. They are unpleasant to read about; they are unpleasant to think about. It is the duty of a Commission of this kind to disclose the facts, but it is not its duty to draw inferences from the facts, inferences which are not only unjustifiable but which are, in fact, loaded with political dynamite.
It is easy enough to say, "Well, this is a judicial Commission"—which, anyway, it was not—"and it has nothing to do with politics." My Lords, if four supposedly responsible persons are injected into the heart of the most complex, the most dangerous, and potentially the most tragic political problem of our day, surely they have to pay some regard to it. After all, this issue they have been discussing is something rather more important than the case of Mr. Liberace v. The Daily Mirror. It is something that concerns the life, the future, the happiness of millions of people, and concerns the honour, the authority, the power, the reputation of this country.
Much has been made in this debate of the term "police state", and I do not want to labour it further. But I should like to say this. When I first read the Report I asked myself, when I saw this phrase: What on earth do they mean? As I read on, I discovered what they meant. In paragraph 60 they refer back to this statement, and it is quite clear from that paragraph that what they mean by the "police state" is, in fact, the state of emergency, the declaration of which they themselves had approved and held to be justified; and I am sure that if any noble Lord reads through that paragraph, he will find that all they mean by their reference to the "police state" is that there is a state of emergency and that it has some very distasteful factors. If that is what they meant, was it not the height of irresponsibility to launch, on the first page and in the headline, into this damaging, and I think infinitely evil, expression about the police state?
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Again, my Lords, in their Introduction the Commissioners show to me almost inexplicable signs of innocence. They explain why their hearings had to be held in private. They give a number of reasons. One of them was that the African, through fear of the Government, would not speak the truth if the hearings were in public. I do not know how it strikes your Lordships, but it is almost incredible to me that it never seems to have occurred to the Commission that the African might be afraid to speak the truth at all for fear of the Congress. They explain the witnesses they have seen, and they number them out; but it never seems to have occurred to them that when they saw 1,500 witnesses in groups ranging from half a dozen to 100, it was scarcely conceivable, in the circumstances, that they could get the truth. Of course they could not get the truth—because any man giving evidence in those groups would feel he was being watched and spied upon and reported by the other five or the other ninety-nine. The Report speaks a great deal about intimidation. It admits the fact of intimidation, but it never seems to face the consequences of intimidation. That seems to me to be an example of the innocence of which I spoke.
The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, asked me just now, as he was perfectly entitled to do, whether I accused the members of the Commission of being unscrupulous men. What I said was that their Report was disingenuous, as it seemed to me, and that the only explanation I could give of that was that they had that lack of scruple which sometimes distinguishes those who are far more high-minded than most of us are.
LORD PAKENHAM: Is that particularly ambiguous way of speaking meant to imply that they are honest men or dishonest men?
LORD COLERAINE: If the noble Lord would like it perfectly straight from me, it is meant to imply what I believe—that is, that they are, in their Report, intellectually dishonest. I will, if the noble Lord will allow me, explain to him what I mean. In fact, earlier in the debate my noble friend Lord Salisbury did give one instance of this kind of intellectual dishonesty when he quoted the paragraph which stated how much the Nyasas feared federation and what an evil

829
thing they thought federation to be, and then pointed out that all the Report did was to say, "Of course, we are not allowed to comment on this." As my noble friend pertinently observed, in that case, why mention it?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Could the noble Lord elaborate that? It is a very interesting point. Does he mean the Commission should not have reported the fact that they found unanimity against federation?
LORD COLERAINE: What I mean, if the noble Viscount will allow me, in stating my case about the attitude of the Commission to these matters, is this: the Commission makes it clear time and time again that they are not offering judgments; they are stating facts. Technically, I think that is true. But time and time again in the Report we find cases where, in effect, they make a judgment and then qualify it by saying, "Of course, we cannot comment on this." I will give the noble Viscount another example of that. It is in paragraph 286. That is almost at the end of the Report, when the Commission are dealing with these very painful happenings to which the noble Viscount, and I think every speaker, has referred in his speech. This is what I should like to point out to the noble Viscount:
"The Government has not at any time, either before us or, so far as we are aware, to anyone else, expressed any regret for or disapproval of what has been done under these heads. We record this as a fact and not as indicating that any expression of regret or disapproval is necessarily appropriate."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: There is a point here. You see, you must read the Motion that is before the House. It is praising the security forces, and never saying a word of reproof for these happenings.
LORD COLERAINE: I think the noble Viscount—I almost called him my noble friend, and I hope he will forgive me for the possible lapse—has missed the point that I am trying to make. Here I am not criticising the Report for censuring the Nyasaland Government. The basis of my charge against the members of the Commission is that, having said that they are not going to offer judgments, they offer a moral judgment of a very damaging kind, while maintaining
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the fiction that they are not offering a judgment at all. And in my view that is intellectually dishonest.
LORD PAKENHAM: I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord again, but, in the absence of my noble Leader, may I say how profoundly shocked all of us on this side of the House are at this talk of intellectual dishonesty on the part of the members of the Commission.
LORD COLERAINE: I can only regret that that side of the House is not quite so profoundly shocked by some of the things which are said in this Report.
My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships further, but I should just like to make this comment. I have formed a view of this Report. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, feels that I am not entitled to form it. He is shocked by the view that I have formed. That is his problem. But, as almost every speaker has said, we have got to go beyond the Report. I hope that the evil that I am afraid this Report has done will be forgotten, and I also hope, as so many speakers in the debate have already said, that, by understanding, by appreciating the difficulties of the Central African, and by giving him the assurances which the Government have already given him, it will be possible to persuade him that Federation is in his interest. I hope that we shall be able to realise the idea of a racial partnership, and that we shall not be faced with the horrible and tragic alternative courses: on the one side an immature—and probably, because it is immature, tyrannical—black Empire, and, on the other side, apartheid. I hope that, whatever difference we may have about the Report, it may be possible for us all to work to that end of a racial partnership.
7.20 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, unlike so many debates in your Lordships' House, I am not finding this debate an entirely pleasant experience. As I listened yesterday to the debate in another place, and, indeed, as I have listened here to-day, it seemed to me that we are all the time reminded of the many penalties of this cherished Party system of ours. It would sem that there is something amiss in a situation which links the difficulties which a Government

831
experiences abroad with the political welfare of a Party at home and, therefore, perhaps makes those difficulties even desirable for a certain Party. I refuse to believe that there are two breeds of Englishman, the one an enlightened, progressive Liberal, in sympathy always exclusively with African national aspirations, and the other obstinate and out of date, opposing those aspirations. We are, I believe, all together in facing this problem, and yet, with the diabolical play of Party politics, it is sometimes extremely difficult to recognise it.
One could talk, as many noble Lords have done, by picking out quotations from the Devlin Report. It was, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who accused Members on this side of picking out only those extracts which suited them. So far as I have seen in this debate hitherto, Members on the other side have done exactly the same thing, picking out just those portions of the Report which suited them. It was in anticipation that many of your Lordships would have studied the Report in great detail and would refer to it that I thought it would be more appropriate if I attempted a slightly different approach and gave some ideas of mine related to the Indian analogy, in which I received a lead from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, when he took part in the debate on Monday last.
Before I do that, I should like to comment on one point on which the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition laid great emphasis: that is, the question of detention without trial. Nobody likes detention without trial, but there is a valid reason for it. The reason is that if those particular people were not under detention, they would be the focus for operations calculated to bring the operation of law and order to cease; and, as such, they have to be put under detention. It is quite unfair to paint an analogy of men lingering in prison, suffering, waiting for their trial. My experience is that men in that position are in comfort. They are allowed to see their relations and to write books and they are given paper and pencil. That is my experience, certainly in the case of India.
If noble Lords opposite would search the annals of what was happening in
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1948 and 1949, and even 1950, they would discover that when they were in power, there were many cases in Ghana in which detention without trial was accepted. The Government of India is to-day often held up, quite rightly, as an enlightened and progressive Government, yet it has sanctioned the detention of Sheikh Abdulla for five years without trial. I would merely emphasise that there are many precedents for this kind of approach.
The Devlin Report raised one very important issue. We are all agreed, I think, that the Devlin Commission came to two main conclusions: first, that there was no centralised plan for massacre, and secondly, that there was an emergency and that, therefore, the Governor was justified in taking measures to meet that emergency. I ask your Lordships, on both sides of the House to consider quite calmly which of those two aspects is the more important: the fact that the Governor was wrong in his assessment that there was no central plan, or the fact that the Governor was right in his assessment that there was an emergency.
The absurdity of even questioning the matter is immediately revealed to us in a comment by the Governor on paragraph 168 of the Report, which states:
"We have found further that there was talk of beating and killing Europeans, but not of cold-blooded assassination or massacre".
The Governor's comment on that, in a particularly typical British understatement, is that if it was a matter of distinguishing between beating and killing and cold-blooded assassination or massacre, he and his Government were quite unable to appreciate the distinction. Might I put the situation slightly more bluntly and say that if I were a corpse beneath the ground, I should not worry very much about the particular term that was used to define the process by which I got there.
I have seen emergency situations, not in Africa, but in different parts of the world. I have been at the receiving end. The fact that no death occurs is no criterion whatever as to whether there is need to declare an emergency. I heard yesterday, as if it were a kind of slick debating point, that no white man was killed. Are we to wait hopefully for a death before we decide that the time

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has come to declare an emergency? Just one moment's reflection will indicate what utter nonsense such an approach is. I suggest that a fair picture of what was happening was that there were a number of incidents, there were riots and there were crowds creating disturbances, and that if there was no centralised plan, at least there was a general effect which came to exactly the same thing, and that the Governor was right. The Commission have said so. In effect, as I see it, the Commission have said that the Governor was right, but for the wrong reason. I submit that all that matters is the fact that the Governor was right.
I come back to the Indian analogy. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, has left his place, because he invoked the Indian analogy, which is appropriate in these situations. I should have liked to do what he himself referred to as "sweeten the memories". The noble Viscount reminded us of his experiences in connection with the Simon Commission and the Round Table Conference. He could have gone a bit further and also reminded us that during his tenure of office, in April, 1930, the civil disobedience movement under the personal direction of Mr. Gandhi was launched. There was refusal to pay taxes, refusal to pay rent, picketing of shops selling British cloth, obstruction of the police, and so on. What exactly did happen? The movement, which under Mr. Gandhi's direction had started as completely non-violent, very quickly got out of hand; and in Bengal in particular, and to a lesser extent in the Punjab, the ugly term "terrorism" was used. British and Indian officials were attacked; bombs and revolvers were used; the armoury in Chittagong was raided; a bomb was dropped in Parliament and I think a bomb was dropped on the Viceroy's train.
On November 7, 1929, in another place the then Secretary of State, the noble-Viscount, in commenting on the general situation, very rightly said:
"What was alarming was that responsible opinion did not somehow come forward to reprobate crime, and that is a very unhealthy sign."
I think some of us might hope that the noble Viscount, whose deep sympathies with the African aspirations we all appreciate, could tender the same advice to Dr. Banda.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: When the noble Lord has finished I should like to say a word on this, but only when the noble Lord is willing.
LORD BIRDWOOD: The next point which emerges from the Devlin Report is that it does emphasise Dr. Banda's timorous and not very admirable hesitancy in condemning terrorism and intimidation. Still following up the Indian analogy following the same story, I would remind your Lordships that the Working Committee of the Congress was declared an unlawful association—and Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru were arrested—after the noble Viscount's time—
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: In my time.
LORD BIRDWOOD: In the noble Viscount's time. There were casualties compared with which the casualties in Nyasaland can be counted on one hand. In the autumn of 1931 those casualties had amounted to thousands and there were by that time about 60,000 people in gaol for creating disturbances. Incidentally, I am not aware that the Government of the day was asked to abdicate or that the Secretary of State was asked to resign or anything of that nature. I certainly think it would have been quite wrong if they had.
There are two points I want to emphasise. First, in a crisis of this kind it is very invidious to single out a party or an individual as having failed or as not having measured up to heavy responsibilities. The difference, as I see it, is in emphasis, and in emphasis only. Secondly, at no time in India was there any overall central plan to murder. Indeed, Mahatma Gandhi was bidding his disciples to control their passions. That is the sort of claim made on behalf of Dr. Banda, and yet in both cases action had to be taken which was in fact just the same as would have been required had there been a real centralised murder plot.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: When you have finished with India, I would just say a word.
LORD BIRDWOOD: I have not finished with India. I return to the political implications. The noble Viscount regretted that it had been impossible in his time to bring representative Indians into the picture at the Round Table

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Conference. Of course, Mr. Gandhi was at the second session, as a result of what was known as the Irwin-Gandhi Pact. I would say immediately, without qualification, that if we could anticipate human relationship emerging such as was built up by Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Halifax in 1929, if we could anticipate that kind of relationship in 1959 between the Governor of Nyasaland and Dr. Banda, then the future of Nyasaland might be one of real hope. It is not for me to criticise or compare two Englishmen in public life, but with regard to Dr. Banda, it does seem to be clear from the Devlin Report that he in no way measures up to the standard set by Mahatma Gandhi. If it were otherwise, I think we could by now have expected some kind of formal pledge or declaration to have emerged as between Dr. Banda and the Governor.
The noble Viscount put the case very forcefully that in 1929 and 1930 our great difficulty was our inability to capture the Indian mind. I think that was the way he very expressively put it. For me it raises a very important point, the character and calibre of the men we are dealing with—I am transferring the picture now to Africa: the character of the Africans who, on the one hand, have a blind obsession in their refusal of co-operation—I refer to Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chisiza—and, on the other hand, those Africans who, if given a chance, might have the wisdom and courage to work in co-operation towards that true partnership in which we all believe. And these are the men who have been described as "stooges".
In the case of India, it is interesting to note that those men to whom the noble Viscount very rightly paid his great tribute, were the Indian "stooges" at the time, Seitei Bahawar, Mr. Sapru, Mr. Sastii, Mr. Jayakar, Dr. Moorije, and men of the calibre of Dr. Ambedkar, who was largely responsible for the present Indian Constitution. On the Muslim side, there were men such as Sir Mond Shapi and Mr. Jinnah himself, the founder of Pakistan. Setting aside the representation of Pakistan, I doubt very much whether the India of to-day, in the full flush of entering so successfully into the international scene, would care to hear her great servants of those days described as "stooges".
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Have they been described as "stooges"?
LORD BIRDWOOD: No; but their equivalents in Africa have been described as "stooges", and I think we might find that perhaps at that time—
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Never.
LORD BIRDWOOD:—there were people who referred to them as "stooges". It is perfectly true that those men were not representative of mass political opinion in India at the time. Does one for that reason overlook them? In the case of Africa, more particularly Nyasaland, does one just ignore the potential African Sapras and Sastiis of the day?
Within the same context I come to the modern Indian stooges, the members of the former Indian Civil Service. Again, they were never typical of mass opinion, but they have been indispensable to Indian welfare and progress—men such as Bengal Rao, Bajpai, Mahari Singh, V. P. Menon, not to mention about 200 or so Indian district commissioners, men who have been described as the firm foundation of the administration. Again I turn to Africa, and I question which type of these men are we to support? If I may put the matter more accurately, in attempting to meet the political demands of one type, are we to neglect the solid value of the other, in their interests? Because there are these two types. They may aim at the same goal but they are following completely different roads. One I would describe as nationalists, the other as patriots. The one seeks his goal through the monopoly of political power; the other is prepared to take off his coat and do a job of work for his country. That second type has not yet received sufficient encouragement, nor has he yet come forward, perhaps through the lack of any encouragement; and one notes that of the seventeen district commissioners in Nyasaland not one is yet an African. Nor are they likely to be, so long as they are described as "stooges" by those who ought to be encouraging them.
If Africans are not going to come forward for training in administration, how can Nyasaland hope to control her own affairs in dignity and in the service of her own people? Dr. Banda's answer to this question is apparent from the

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Devlin Report. It seems to be the vague hope that the Europeans will stay on. British officials will reply to that, as I interpret it, that men such as Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chisiza, once in power, will use their power solely to embarrass them and humiliate them. That may be so, or it may not be so; but the fact is that those men believe that, and so they will not stay.
Finally, if I may come again to the Indian analogy, I would say one word about the question of federation. It seems to me that to a Nyasalander there is in federation a political connotation which we ourselves would never see. If Nyasaland is to be relieved of the fear of outside European domination from Salisbury, I would suggest that the Europeans in Zomba, Blantyre and elsewhere are also entitled to be free from the fear of African political pressures from outside Nyasaland.
I do not want to close entirely on a note of a negative character. My more constructive ideas concerning federation and the reactions—very natural ones, as I see them—of Nyasaland African Congressmen, which are aroused by this proposal, are centred round the passage on page 21 of the Devlin Report. Perhaps I may read it, because it seems to me to be very significant. It says:
"Briefly, the conclusion which was arrived at was that the economies of the three territories had been so inter-dependent that closer association between them in the field of economic planning was essential. This closer association would inevitably lead, it was felt, not only to greater prosperity but to the provision of better facilities for education, health services and social services generally. The immediate result of Federation to Nyasaland in the economic field has been markedly beneficial. We need not go into financial detail but, putting it shortly, Nyasaland enjoys what is in effect a cash subsidy from the two Rhodesias of £3 millions per annum, which is over a third of its annual expenditure. Without the resources of Federation, the Nyasaland Government would not be able to provide the services in health and education which it believes to be essential to the advancement of the African."
The Commission assure us that that situation is recognised by the African Congress. The African Congress answer to all that is that nothing matters but political freedom. I would ask noble Lords opposite: do they really agree that all those advantages to be obtained from federation are just to be written off? Would they not perhaps qualify
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their attitude and support this idea: that in refusing federation Dr. Banda surely should explain how Nyasaland is to forgo this £3 million subsidy? In fact some of us would like, what the most reverend Primate would refuse, not so much a demand for a few more seats in the Legislature and Executive, as an economic and administrative blue print to provide for their country if outside the Federation, a carefully phased plan, which the most reverend Primate apparently regarded as not making sense. Such a plan may not capture the imagination of the African; it may not win applause. But, as I see it, it is a duty and I cannot see that it is wrong to encourage men to do their duty. I would only say that if the day could arrive when, on the basis of Nyasaland being outside the Federation, such a plan was put forward for discussion, then on that day an independent Nyasaland would certainly be much nearer.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Hemingford, will forgive my intervening for a moment, because I did not want to interrupt a very interesting speech by an expert. I had the privilege of knowing the noble Lord's father, and we realise his great services to India. No doubt the noble Lord as a young man knew them at first hand. What he fails to see is that we had 60,000 people in gaol and we regarded that as a great defeat. Every time somebody had to be locked up, that was one down for us, because we were trying to get a Government of the Indian people. We got it in the end. The noble Lord misunderstands the situation. He thinks that the Indian interlude of a Labour Government of 1929 was merely a continuation of the Conservative view before and perhaps afterwards. That is quite wrong. It was an attempt to put the engine in reverse, and in the end it succeeded. There is this difference between us. If we turn to Ghana and Kashmir we see tensions, but there is a great difference between an act of dictatorship imposed by a native Government of their own people and an attempt to impose the same dictatorial methods by an outside country. That is my point.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I would only suggest that the country described as outside was, in fact, a British-Indian Administration, in which,

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I think, by 1929, and progressively afterwards, most of the members of the Viceroy's Council were Indians.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That is true, but we were aiming at getting an Indian Government; and we got it.
7.47 p.m.
LORD HEMINGFORD: My Lords, those of us who propose to go into one Lobby or another have to make up our minds whether we are able to accept the whole of the Devlin Report or only a part of it. In making up our minds on that question, I would suggest that one factor which should weigh heavily is what will be the effect of our action upon the opinions of Africans in Nyasaland and elsewhere, because this is one of the harsh, perhaps the harshest, of the realities that an administrator has to face.
We have heard a great deal about law and order. I would suggest, from the experience of a teacher in Africa, that there are a good many educated young men and women in Nyasaland who have had lessons about law and order, the same kind of lessons that I had to give in other parts of Africa. I had to keep order in the class or in the school. I taught that the first duty of a Government was to govern. And for those reasons I have never said a single word against the action of the Governor of Nyasaland in declaring a state of emergency and I gladly accept the part of the Report which says that he was right to do so. But I taught not only about order; I taught also about law. I taught about the Habeas Corpus Act and why we had striven for that, and why the struggle had been worth while. And I should be very disappointed in my pupils in Ghana and Uganda if they did not immediately see through the 18B argument which has been put here to-day. Of course, there is all the difference in the world between accepting methods—call them police methods, or what you like—by the wish of your own elected representatives, and, on the other hand, having restrictions forced upon you by a Government composed of different people, people who are set on a policy that you hate.
Such people as I have been trying to describe in Nyasaland will be wondering how long the emergency is going to last. What means of judging have they? From whom can they find out the answer to
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their question? They do not know. It is not a matter which is in any way within their own decision or the decision of any of their people. There will does not count. I submit, as I have submitted at intervals over the last seven years, that the tragedy of Nyasaland since 1952 has been the neglect of African opinion by the British Government. It is this which has made the people angry and determined; it is this which has caused outbreaks of violence. I, as a Conservative, am continually surprised that other Conservatives do not have something at least of the feeling that the late Mr. Bonar Law had about the people of Ulster. There were no lengths to which they might go which he did not feel that he would support. He spoke of a demonstration of theirs as being an expression of the soul of a people willing to lay down their lives for what they believed was their liberty and freedom. Why does no Conservative think of applying similar words to the attitude of the Nyasaland people in 1952 or since then?
We are told that one reason why we should not accept the Report in full is that there is no kind of obligation upon a Government to accept the Report of a Commission which they have set up. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, made this point. He reminded us that there are Reports of Royal Commissions which lie (I am not using his words) collecting dust for years before some of their recommendations are put into force. But I would suggest that there is a distinction between a Royal Commission which is set up to prepare the ground for legislative proposals and a Commission that is set up to find out facts. If you appoint a Commission to consider what reforms should be made in the law of divorce, how suitable it is that their Report should be argued over, considered and sifted over a period of years. But that is quite different from sending four specially selected and highly able people, under the chairmanship of a Judge, to find out facts.
What will the young educated Africans think of a Government which will not accept the Report of a Commission they have set up to find out facts? I think I can tell your Lordships. They will say: "One of the important lessons that we learned at school—from our English schoolmasters, maybe—was that you accept the decision of the

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referee, even if you think he is wrong." It may be that these able Commissioners have made mistakes—of course they may have done; they are human—but, in my view, the Government would have been more dignified, they would have been more effective in Africa, and it would have helped to create that kind of spirit about which the most reverend Primate spoke so eloquently, if they had accepted the Report in full and if, in accordance with traditions which Conservatives ought to venerate, the Secretary of State had resigned his office. I am speaking in order that such Africans and others may know that there is one Conservative in Parliament who accepts this Report in full; and in saying that I am aware—and I hope that the Government are, too—that there are a good many Conservatives outside this House who think as I do.
7.55 p.m.
LORD TWINING: My Lords, your Lordships may think that there is no part of this Report which has not been dealt with in the speeches in your Lordships' House or in another place, but I have found one paragraph which is of interest. I will not read it, but it is paragraph 83, which is a brief reference to the Accra Conference. The All-African Peoples' Conference, to give it its full name, was attended not only by representatives from all over Africa, but also by strong delegations from the United Arab Republic and from Russia. Although the Africans are said to have been in favour of non-violence, it is known that the Conference was divided on this issue, and pressure to use violence came from non-African delegations. The principal resolution passed at the Conference was in favour of fighting colonialism by positive action, and was, in the words of the Commission's Report, a compromise between those who advocated violence and those who advocate non-violence.
The whole declaration of the Conference is too long to read, but the last sentence is worth quoting. It says:
"The All-African Peoples' Conference pledges support to those who, in order to meet the violent means by which they are subjected or exploited, are obliged to retaliate."
That is not the part quoted in the Report of the Commission but is the end of the declaration passed at the Conference. Dr. Banda attended the Accra Confer-
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ence, and his conduct on his return was obviously influenced by what had happened there. There have been various other manifestations in other parts of Africa of the positive action demanded at the Conference which have also led to violence, and the responsibility for this must be laid at the Conference's feet.
Those of us who have worked in Africa and have, according to our own lights, tried to help the advancement of the Africans, have an understanding of these people and their problems. They have many endearing qualities and are a good-humoured, friendly and courteous people who have shown great good sense in how to make the best of life in their own environment. They are a proud and dignified people, who normally have a healthy respect for authority and who are sensitive about matters which affect their personal lives and well-being; and should these be threatened, they will react very strongly. Anyone who knows Africa must be aware that, once roused, the Africans are capable of doing things which they would be the first to regret subsequently.
I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I relate a personal experience, which I do only because it is something comparable to the situation which faced the Governor of Nyasaland. In December, 1953, we had intelligence reports which showed that the Mau-Mau in Kenya were infiltrating into the Kikuyu settlement in the Northern Province of Tanganyika, and that they were trying to organise them. Reports which reached me on December 21 of that year indicated that on Christmas Eve there was a plot to murder 500 Europeans and a large number of loyal Africans and Asians, and to burn down offices, garages and other buildings belonging to non-Africans. I consulted my Attorney-General, my Chief Secretary, my Commissioner of Police and the other advisers, and we came to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence on which we could take any single person to court and hope to get a conviction. But we all felt that there was a great deal of truth in this intelligence, and we had to act. We went through the same painful, distasteful experience of declaring a state of emergency in this one particular Province, and of arresting before Christmas Eve as many of these people as we could.

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There are some differences between that action and what happened in Nyasaland, because there was a violent reaction among the Kikuyu whom we had not arrested, as though we had stirred up a hornets' nest. They murdered the informers and the families who had given this information.
The Kikuyu in Tanganyika were aliens, and therefore I had the advantage of having the African people of Tanganyika behind me; and they acted on my side. In Nyasaland the Governor was faced with a much more difficult position, where he might have had the whole of the population roused against the Government. Had the Governor of Nyasaland not acted as he did, I am quite sure we should not be having this debate to-night, and perhaps he would not be alive to tell the tale. It may be that the noble Earl would have paid his visit and might not have returned from Nyasaland. I am myself convinced that there were Congress leaders bent on violence, and violence inevitably would have led to killings, or what some people prefer to call murder. Whether or not there was a detailed plan which would be called a murder plan is a different matter. If there is insufficient evidence to prove it, there is also insufficient evidence to disprove it. Secret conspirators do not leave evidence about, and it is clear that those on the spot, who were in the best position to judge, were convinced that there was a situation of very real danger. Nyasaland was fortunate to have a Governor who acted as he did, and it seems that sound opinion there recognises this fact.
But we now find ourselves in a dilemma. Action has been taken. Law and order has, we hope, been restored. But we are still faced with finding a solution to the main problem, and the fact that repressive measures have had to be taken may not make the task easier. We may discount the assertion that Nyasaland is a police state. If it is, it must be the envy of all the other police states in the world to-day, for the police there are very thin on the ground and have one of the lowest ratios of police to population to be found anywhere—fewer than 1,800 police to 2,800,000 people, living in 48,000 square miles, or four-fifths the size of England and Wales. The people are probably
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naturally feeling bewildered and subdued, but it is not an African characteristic to be unduly resentful, as they are realists, and there is a great hope that confidence can be restored.
But we must not pursue a policy of drift. We must show ourselves to be masters of the situation and take the initiative. It is our turn to take positive action. The vital question of federation must be left to the Commission whose appointment has recently been announced, and to the Constitutional Conference which is to follow. But the internal Constitution of Nyasaland requires very special consideration. The Times, in a leading article on July 28, mentions that Sir Roy Welensky has advocated that the next task should be to push on the individual territories of the Federation to assume a greater responsibility for their own affairs, and this policy, The Times says, has been endorsed by the Prime Minister. The Times goes on to say that the realisation that Nyasaland must advance as an African State has been generally accepted.
On July 23, the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State indicated in another place that it was intended to have an African majority on the unofficial benches of the Legislative Council, and to appoint two Africans to the Executive Council, while the life of the Legislature would be extended beyond May, 1960—perhaps for a year. This period must not be regarded just as an opportunity to pause and do nothing. The whole position must once again be thoroughly examined, and it may be that it will be found that the evolution of the traditional form of Colonial Government is not the best way to proceed in the circumstances, and that a new approach may be needed, perhaps even making it necessary to go back to square 1 and to start again. But apart from constitutional progress, we must look at the other factors which stand in the way of a rapid advance to self-government.
In my experience, it is very necessary to keep political, economic and social development in step. If they do not keep in step or in balance, the position gets out of hand. I should like to suggest that machinery be set up to examine the problems which must be

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solved. There are many, but there are two of major importance—the first, to make the economy of the territory sufficiently stable and viable for it to stand on sound foundations when self-government is achieved, so that it will not be faced with the position of having to seek financial assistance from outside; and the second to produce a sufficiency of local personnel, with the education and training to man the posts in all the activities of the life of the territory. It goes without saying that the African people must be fully represented and associated with any such inquiry which should lead to the drawing up of a programme—not a timetable—which would ensure that the road to self-government was well signposted. I believe this to be a way of teaching the Africans of the difficulties that lie ahead when they have to take up the responsibility of governing their own country.
An eminent student of African affairs, who recently visited East and Central Africa and met many African leaders, told me that one of the questions he always asked was: "Do you really believe that you are in a position to run your own country, and that you have the men available with the knowledge and understanding of the problems?" He said he always received the same answer: "We are not interested in that. We want self-government. If we make a mess of it, it will be our own mess." That is an emotional approach, and does not suggest responsibility or leadership, much less statesmanship. I believe that if African leaders could be closely associated in solving the problems they would earn the respect of their people and would gain in reputation beyond their borders.
May I conclude by saying that I believe we are in good faith pursuing a policy of leading our Colonial territories to self-government on a democratic Parliamentary basis. But if we are to succeed in Africa, the political leaders must play the rules of the game, and not for ever conspire to take short cuts by positive action, be it by civil disobedience or by violence. Such a policy shows political bankruptcy. We support democracy and not demagogy. As I have said, it is for us to take positive action and to show our national genius for solving problems which, at times, seem to be intractable.
LORD LATHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Twining, said that the Africans must be taught to play the rules of the game. Who settles the rules?
LORD TWINING: I think they are well-established rules.
LORD LATHAM: Established by whom?
LORD TWINING: By us, my Lords.
8.10 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, at this late hour of the night, with so many speakers to come, I hope I shall be suitably brief. Indeed, I think we have probably heard almost enough about the Devlin Report itself, and certainly we have had an adequate number of quotations from it. But my chief excuse for intervening at all is the fact that in my own personal career in the past I know what it is like to be faced with an emergency like this. Both as a younger officer and during the period when the supreme authority was mine, I had to make decisions of this nature, and the comments I am now proposing to make are based upon the fact that I have a very good personal understanding of what the atmosphere is like when these decisions have to be made in a time of emergency. The pattern is a very familiar one. Take Dr. Banda himself: this leader who has been brought in and has spent most of his life abroad in this country is so much out of touch with the common life of his people that he does not talk the vernacular. So his speeches have to be interpreted, with all the terrible dangers of that interpretation bearing very little resemblance, as indeed is often the case, to what he has actually said. In addition, after arrival he had been built up by his chief assistants as a sort of messiah, and he accepted that position. The Devlin Report itself tells us that he is a man of considerable vanity, in that he thinks that it is almost inconceivable now that any decision or wish that he could express will not ultimately have to be granted.
I find it extremely difficult to believe that he did not know about this programme of violence. The pattern is a very familiar one, and in Africa especially so: of a leader who has perfected the art of "willing to wound and yet afraid to strike"; a leader who will

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tacitly encourage his more violent followers and when the actual trouble starts is not there. That is a pattern which we who know Africa know quite well, and I suggest that there is every indication that Dr. Banda himself may belong to that category. If I had to suggest a motto for Dr. Banda, if you will excuse my putting it in Latin, I would say
"Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor".
I am sure that that motto might get a good deal of sympathy from the Commission itself. In Africa, especially, loose talk very quickly degenerates into violent action. I know of no country in my experience where that statement is more true than in Africa. The emotional margin is very small between talk and action and it is passed with surprising speed. It is a matter of very nice judgment indeed, on an occasion when trouble is brewing and there is an excited crowd, as to when to take action and what is the nature of the action you take. These are the difficult decisions which have to be reached by the man in charge on the spot.
I do not propose, although I am tempted to, to deal with Lord Stansgate's excursions. After all, he does live rather in the realm of emotional fiction, and there is no time to-night to deal with some of the vague statements that he made, other than that I should like to repudiate his indirect attack on the Colonial Service and his saying that it seemed to be peopled by young officers who are largely to be laughed at. I am sure the noble Viscount, in his travels, has found the Colonial Service extremely tolerant; but it would meet with no support from those who know them to say that they are something to be laughed at, either by the people of the country concerned or by visitors.
May I pass on to what the noble Lord, Lord Hemingford, said? I appreciate what he said about law and order, but when he spoke about the Commission and defended it he said they were appointed to find facts. That is exactly what they were appointed for, and the whole objection to much of the Report is that they have strayed from the facts into the realms of extremely dangerous and explosive opinion. The opinions
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may be right or wrong, but in my view they could scarcely be more wrong: and I do not speak merely academically, I speak with considerable experience of the sort of thing about which they were writing. May I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Hemingford, that they were not appointed as referees, nor were they asked for a decision: they were asked only for facts.
I felt it was rather a pity that the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition, who moved the Amendment to this Motion, issued a moving appeal to try to regain the confidence of the African, and then proceeded to make a speech almost every word of which was calculated to destroy any confidence any African might have in the British Government. It seems to me a most deplorable thing to do. I know it was done with great sincerity, but I can assure him that the effect which his words will have in Africa will be the precise reverse of what he said it was our duty on both sides of this House to do—to restore the confidence of the African in this country, which means in the Government of this country. I would also, in passing, deplore this idea of a personal attack on the Colonial Secretary. Noble Lords opposite must know, as well as we all do, that the present Colonial Secretary is known, liked, respected and trusted as few other men have ever been throughout every country of the Colonial world. We are extremely fortunate, and so are all the people of the various Colonies, to have had his guiding hand during these difficult years. No doubt it does exemplify the words:
"They that dig foundations dig fateful realms to rise upon; little credit shall they reap from their generation"—
certainly not from noble Lords on the other side of this House.
I suggest—and I cannot say it often enough—that irresponsible words in this House mean a tremendous amount abroad in the Colonies. Hansard is read and published in sections far more in many of our Colonies than it ever is in this country. What is recorded in Hansard is better known in the Colonies than in this country. Many of those words spoken in this connection are just encouraging disorder and undermining the morale of the Colonial Service, the

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co-operative African who wishes to work with the British Government, the local government, the police and security forces. The evil effect is immense. And for what? Why is this done? The Colonial Secretary is not likely to be butchered to make a Socialist holiday, even in an Election year, and I suggest that the subject is far too important for that kind of thing. Many other speakers have deplored this and it is a pity that these affairs have any political tinge at all.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, before the noble Lord goes on, would he say what he considers to be irresponsible talk? Would he consider any criticism of the Government in power to be irresponsible and therefore undermining African confidence? Is that his thesis?
LORD MILVERTON: I think it would depend to a great extent on the nature of the criticism and the words in which it was expressed.
One of the principal reasons for the difficult situation confronting the Governor of Nyasaland on March 3 was the inadequacy of the forces at his disposal. It is easy to suggest that earlier drastic action to deal with the activities of Congress might have saved us this trouble. I am rather surprised that nobody has mentioned that fact. It was slightly mentioned by me and by the noble Marquess in an earlier debate this year, though it is not a suggestion I wish to make to-night: it is merely one line of approach to what actually was the situation he had to deal with.
The precept that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance applies not only to the individual citizens but also to the Government of any country, and when intimidation becomes as rife as it has been in Nyasaland. and in many other parts of Africa, during the past five or six years, then it is a question whether that growing tendency to encourage disorder and the practice of intimidation had not better be challenged at an early date, rather than wait until the inevitable result is an emergency which requires the use of unpredictable force in order to deal with it. I am not suggesting that that is what ought to have been done. I am not criticising the action of the Governor at all, because I am convinced that he was handicapped by the lack of necessary
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forces and resources, and that he probably had no alternative but to try to solve these difficulties by peaceful means; and the measure of his failure to do that was the measure of the hostility of Dr. Banda and his organisation because in the end it broke into this state of disorder.
In administrative life it is always dangerous to wait until the trouble is right for surgical treatment unless you are confident that you have adequate forces to prevent the situation from getting out of control. The inherent difficulties in such a situation are only too well known to me and prevent my making any facile criticism of that nature. I do not criticise the Governor in any way. I think he did the best possible thing that could be done in the circumstances which surrounded him. I should like to say that I heartily support him in all that he did, and that I have the deepest sympathy with the very vigorous reply which he wrote to the Commission's Report. Therefore I supoprt the Motion which is before the House, and I oppose the Amendment thereto.
8.25 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, at this time of night a speech is more likely to be judged by its length than by its content, but there are two things I would say, very briefly, about previous speeches which have been made, although unfortunately both noble Lords have now left the House. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, had some very wise and valuable things to say about intelligence, but it must not be thought that intelligence is always either copious or reliable. My experience in Cyprus was that I had barely any intelligence of any sort whatsoever and that the few scraps which I did get were not of a nature which I ever felt I could act upon.
The second thing which I must in conscience refer to is the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine. It is not for me to say that it was a shocking speech. I can only say it shocked me, and shocked me profoundly. To use such words as those about the members of the Devlin Commission, that they were innocent, that they were naïve, that they were disingenuous and showed lack of scruple and were intellectually dishonest—those are not words that ought ever to have been used about Mr. Justice Devlin or his colleagues. And on top of this was

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thrown a stupid and ungenerous sneer about Mr. Justice Devlin because he had tried the Liberace case. It was, I think, an unworthy speech.
Much has been said about the action of the Prime Minister in accepting what he found favourable to his Party in the Devlin Report and rejecting what was unfavourable. The only point about that I want to stress is that I think he has been astute at the price of losing all claim to impartiality, and by so doing has increased African distrust. As things are, I feel that African confidence in the Government and Mr. Lennox-Boyd has been badly shaken, and at a time when, as the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, emphasised in a recent speech, all depends in Africa upon the creation and restoration of confidence. I say that bearing in mind what the noble Lord, Lord Milverton, has said. I would always respect his opinion, but that is how I see the matter.
The Devlin Report whatever else may be said about it, even by the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, was a sincere and honest document from which a new start in Nyasaland could have been made. The opportunity of making that new start is being lost. The chance of a fresh start has, in my opinion, been sacrificed to the retention of the Colonial Secretary. Paris may have been on one occasion worth a Mass, but I do not think that what we have lost in Nyasaland is worth the retention of any Minister. Mr. Justice Devlin commands a respect such as the Government, I feel, have lost by their prejudiced treatment of his Report; and as a message read in the debate in the other place yesterday shows, that loss of confidence is not confined to the Africans in Nyasaland. A cable was read from a highly responsible businessman in Nyasaland saying that he profoundly disapproves of the Government treatment of the Report, and I have very little doubt that there are other Europeans there who share his views.
I notice, of course, that the Government have forgotten all about the murder plot. I want to say nothing more about that than this: I am not interested in how many times the word "murder" or "massacre" was used by the Colonial Secretary and his junior Minister in the debate when the so-called plot was
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reported, but they spoke in terms which enabled the Press—not only what is called the excitable Press, or sometimes "the yellow Press", but papers of very great standing indeed—to come out with lurid banner headlines such as "Massacre Planned", "Massacre Day March 4th, 1959". It is not a question of how many times the words were used in the other place; the point is that the words were used in such a way as to enable the Press to start this matter off on the footing of these headlines, and consequently it has always been discussed in an atmosphere of exaggeration. I am not surprised that the Government are embarrassed, and have been embarrassed, by the Devlin Report. I think it is a most embarrassing document, and one which is, as I have said, likely to destroy African confidence in the white man's government, and so likely to stimulate that very disobedience which, we are told, the state of emergency was proclaimed to nip in the bud. Then again, it is a Report which endorses practically 100 per cent. the opposition amongst Nyasaland Africans to federation at a particular time when the Government are preparing to push on, if they are spared, with federation.
What the Report says about federation and the opposition to federation must be extremely uncomfortable for the Government. Indeed, it says many things that must be highly distasteful to the Government. As regards the statement that Nyasaland is temporarily a police state, I myself attach perhaps more importance to some words which follow the words "a police state"—namely:
"increasingly intolerant of any opposition on Western and democratic lines."
Nyasaland is a British Protectorate—and this is the state the Commission tell us has become a police state.
The Report says that the Governor felt himself confronted by an emergency in face of which the Government had "either to act or to abdicate". I will not quarrel with those words, but such an emergency does not "blow up" overnight—it develops only over a considerable time, stage by stage; and I feel, especially in view of what the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, said about intelligence, that the Governor ought to have been aware at a much earlier date than he seems to have been of what was

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"blowing up", so that he could have taken or advised remedial measures in good time. I feel that perhaps he either did not have the authentic information which he should have had, or too readily accepted information which he ought not to have believed. I think it must have been one of the two things. At any rate we know that he based his actions upon reports of the massacre or murder plot which we now know to be discredited; he based his action upon information now known to have been not creditable.
If the Government are disconcerted, as I feel they must be by the Devlin Report, they must reflect that it is a genie which they themselves let out of the bottle. They were asked to appoint a political Commission. The proposal was rejected in favour of a high-powered, independent tribunal under a High Court Judge. The Government may now be feeling a little rueful about their decision. A political Commission would have been composed of Conservative and Labour members; I feel that its Report would hardly have been unanimous, but at any rate the language employed would have been of a softer nature than the language used by the Devlin Commission, which seems tingled with a little asperity, if I may put it mildly. I cannot think, for instance, that a political Commission composed of both Parties would have found itself using such a phrase as a "police state". I feel that, somehow, that would have been softened away. But of course such a Commission would not have carried the judicial authority of the Devlin Commission. The public, reading the Devlin Report, or summaries of it, will say, "Here is what men with no political axes to grind found in Nyasaland. We can believe what they say." That, I think, will be the public comment.
I do not know whether Mr. Lennox-Boyd advocated the judicial Commission—I do not suppose I shall ever know; but if he did, I can only remind him of words from Shakespeare's Hamlet which are as follows:
"For 'tis sport to have the engineer hoist with his own petard."
"Hoist" the Colonial Secretary certainly has been; and he must not begrudge the Opposition their sport. The Colonial Secretary got a majority in another
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place, but he has not a majority in Nyasaland, which is where he wants it. The Conservatives have cheered him to the echo in another place, but if we are to have a General Election he will certainly not have made the task of the Conservative Party any easier. I would not call him or the Government "squalid" which I felt was a most inappropriate word to use in the debate yesterday. But I do say that his personality disinclines him to listen to any advice other than that which he gives himself. I once read that his ambition has been to stay at the Colonial Office longer than Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. Of course that is a most honourable ambition. But the question is not how long a Colonial Secretary stays at the Colonial Office, but what he does during his period of office. Mr. Lennox-Boyd has not been entirely successful.
Finally I ask: When will Nyasaland cease to be a police state? When will the return to normality begin? On exactly what grounds is the continuance of the emergency justified at this time? When will the progressive release of detainees begin? As for the detention of Dr. Banda, if my words were to reach him I would only remind him that not once nor twice in our rough Colonial story has the detention camp proved to be the path to glory. What can happen in Africa may possibly be somewhat disconcerting to the Colonial Secretary, but it is also undoubtedly deeply painful and mortifying to those who are jealous of our good name abroad. I feel sick at heart when I think, for instance, of Hola—but we are not discussing that at the moment—and, of African detainees being dismissed with the term "sub-human," a phrase which ought never to have been used. I hope that, when he thinks of Africa, the Prime Minister may remember how events gradually, but resolutely, threw us out of India, and the appalling loss of life in India by which a too long delayed decision and too hasty arrangements at the end marred our withdrawal. The only policy which will now avail us in Africa is one fully in line with modern ideas, about racial relations and about the rights and dignity of the human being, whatever his race or colour.
In this connection, let me say that I do not at all care for some of the advice that has come out of Southern

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Rhodesia; and in particular I remember the last speech made by the noble Viscount, Lord Malvern, in this House, which I thought a most unfortunate speech—and I know it very considerably disconcerted many of my noble friends. We are supposed to stand for ideas and principles in Africa which represent the opposition to the barbaric and uncivilised racial policy of apartheid. We cannot afford to be associated with some things that have happened lately or with basing actions on trumped-up stories about murder plots. If the General Election is to come, I can only say, in conclusion, that, if for no other reason, I pray that the Labour Party may be successful in order that we may get a modern, enlightened Colonial policy working in the Colonial Office.
8.41 p.m.
LORD FORESTER: My Lords, I intervene in this debate only because last February and March during the emergency I was in Southern Rhodesia on a farm with a large quantity of Nyasa labour; therefore I should like to give just a few points from what we might call "the other end of the stick". In the first place we all thought that the action taken by the Territorial Governments was the most perfect example of locking the stable before the horse had walked out. This is rather unusual in British history. If only it had happened in Kenya, what a lot of horrors would never have taken place, and how many lives, both black and white, would have been saved! There is certainly no fear of massacre among the white population, but there was great uneasiness, even before March, among the Nyasas. They merely said that they were frightened to go back to Nyasaland. They would be forced to join the Congress, and not only would that cost them a shilling if they did, but probably they would get a beating if they did not. On the other hand, if they did not go, some witch would cast an evil eye on their wife and that would be even worse; so they were in a dilemma.
I submit that the result of this, the banning of the Congress and the declaration of the state of emergency, was to the advantage just as much of the black man as it was of the white; in fact, more so. After the emergency the Southern Rhodesian Government
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organised a broadcast in Chananga for the benefit of the Africans. I recollect being in a shed with all the available Nyasa boys, and we listened. When it was announced that Dr. Banda had been arrested, all the Nyasa boys just shook with laughter. I really could not see the joke myself; but, anyhow, it was better than bursting into tears, which probably many people in this country would have expected. But, of course, the African has a rather peculiar sense of humour. The thing that really amuses him is when one of his friends either gets hurt or makes a fool of himself.
I should like to impress on your Lordships the complete inaccuracy of the viewpoint that the white settler out there is out to exploit the African. As your Lordships know, our race is the most soft-hearted one in the world towards both man and beast. We have only to look at our regulations on cruelty, et cetera, which are so different from those on the Continent, to appreciate that. Those Englishmen, Scotsmen and Irish-men who have gone out there are our kith and kin. In fact, one might almost say they are selected kith and kin, because no criminals or lunatics or mental defectives are allowed in the Federation; they, unfortunately, have to remain in Britain. To go back to the question of these white men, what they have done for the good of that country and its inhabitants is, to my mind, past comprehension. Consider erosion alone: a great deal of the country would have been washed away by now if it had not been carefully conserved. There are now schools for practically every farm; they have been paid for by the farmers. There are clinics and district nurses to every group of inhabitants. Even superstition is being gradually dealt with, though it is very important, should any of the native wives have twins, that the district nurse arrive immediately; otherwise they are smothered, according to their regulations. Certainly I hope that should I have another life I am not born a twin in Nyasaland after all the whites have left.
I have travelled in the French, Belgian and Portuguese Colonies, where perhaps the African is more efficiently and even more equally treated, but certainly not so kindly; there is in witness of that the white scars on the black behinds, result-

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ing from the most trivial offences, such as not building a road straight. The African has great love and affection for his native commissioner, and rightly so. He asks his advice on all occasions. It was a calamitous mistake—and we should not be having this debate here today—that those native administrators were not allowed to expound the benefits of federation. When the natives who asked a question could not get a straight answer (as all your Lordships know, the native commissioners were not allowed to say one way or the other) they at once "smelt a rat", and that was the commencement of their opposition to federation.
To my mind, Nyasaland must always be a black man's State, run by black men as soon as they are sufficiently capable. But surely that is perfectly possible within the Federation. According to my encyclopædia, "Federation" means a group of states, locally autonomous but bound together under one authority for matters of common interest such as defence, economy, et cetera. Surely this idea of federation could be put across by our native commissioners, were they allowed to do so, especially if there is a gradually-phased introduction of more and more Africans into their Legislature as time goes on.
I heard two noble Lords opposite who were very incensed at the burning down of some thirty-eight huts, and even more as all the native possessions were therein. I do not know whether those noble Lords have ever put ther head in a native hut. I have; in fact I have slept in one. One lies on the floor with just a gourd to rest one's head on and one another way up to have a little water. In any case, those huts are always burned down once a year for hygienic reasons. I love Central Africa and most of the inhabitants, both white and black. It seems to me monstrous that, after all the close co-operation between these races during the past sixty years, some left-wing elements and newspapers in this country should approach the African like a wolf in sheep's clothing and try to exploit him—and it is a real exploitation—and unsettle him for what are purely political reasons.
8.51 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, I was not quite clear as to the purpose of the
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speech of the noble Lord who has just resumed his seat. So far as I could make out, he was harping on a well-known theme: that the African is a poor, ignorant fellow, quite incapable of looking after his own interests or of governing himself without a great deal of assistance from the parental white man—which is, of course, the kind of doctrine which has been preached, not only in Africa but in India and everywhere else, as a reason why native people should not be allowed to govern themselves.
For example, he referred to the fact that the soil of Africa would all have been washed away if it had not been for the precautions taken by the white people to prevent that happening. Well, the soil of America was being washed away in very large quantities by the white settlers in that continent until very recently. So that it is not only Africans who destroy their soil by not taking the proper precautions against erosion. Indeed, of course, the whites in Africa have done a very great deal to bring the African people to that state in which they are capable of self-government—just as, no doubt, the Roman conquerors did in this country 2,000 years ago. It is surely no discredit to the Africans that they can and do learn from the example of Western democracy. What seems to be objectionable to noble Lords opposite is that Africans should want to practise in their own country, on their own initiative, the philosophy and teaching of Western democracy. That, I think, is a sufficient answer to the arguments of the noble Lord.
My Lords, I should like to emphasise what has been said by more than one speaker in this debate—that is, the really quite ridiculous terms of the Motion which we are asked by the Government to accept in this debate to-day. It treats the Report of the Devlin Commission like the famous curate's egg, and welcomes those little bits which the Government find to their taste. I thought the speech of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, was a particularly good example of this kind of fishing in the Devlin Report for little bits which could be used to support his own case, while at the same time rejecting all those aspects of it which were not to his liking. Indeed, great as is the respect and admiration which I have for the noble

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Marquess, I have never heard him, in my view, in such poor form as he was this afternoon.
The whole tone of his speech seemed to me to be most unfortunate. He treated the Devlin Commission as if it were a set of Left-wing revolutionaries which had, so to speak, set out to foster a spirit of revolution in Central Africa. He kept on talking about its "admissions", as if it had been forced from time to time to admit that the Government's case was a good one. That seems to me to be quite absurd. He talked about its judicial atmosphere as opposed to an atmosphere of practical administration, as if a Judge who was accustomed only to sitting in the High Court of Justice and dealing with things more or less in vacuo, had been transferred into a situation where practical politics were involved and had proved himself quite incapable of dealing with that situation.
I would remind noble Lords that this Commission was, in fact, chosen by the Government; and that, while its Chairman is one of the most distinguished members of the Bench at the present time, it was by no means a one-man Commission. The other members, too, are all people of considerable experience in one way or another, and certainly are not violent revolutionaries. One of them is a man with great practical experience in local government; another a man who has risen to a very high position in the Colonial Service itself; and the third one who has had great experience in many ways. It was a group of men on whom one could rely for a balanced and sensible view. Indeed, I should have said that this was a conservative Report; the Report of a number of people with a conservative outlook. It is essentially a conservative document—what I would call a very fair-minded conservative document: not a document taking even a moderately Left-wing attitude towards the essential requirements of the African peoples to be brought into a position to govern themselves, and to be in that position pretty quickly.
I thought it was deplorable that the noble Marquess should have launched such an attack on the Congress Party in Nyasaland—which, after all, is the only vehicle of political expression which
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the politically advanced minority in Nyasaland, the existence of which is clearly brought out in the Report of the Commission, has. And it really does represent the people. After all, the five representatives who were elected to the Legislative Council were all members of the Congress Party. Therefore I should have thought it was clear to everybody that the Congress Party was doing a useful job of work in bringing the people of Nyasaland into a position of sufficient political maturity for them to govern themselves. The Congress Party in Nyasaland has been playing a rôle which is surely typical of rôles which are being played by similar Parties in all countries where there is a struggle for freedom going on.
One's mind goes back to the struggles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in our own country, when Pym and Hampden were the leaders of the Parliamentary Party, and were attacked in much the same sort of way by the Royalist Executive as Dr. Banda has been attacked by the Government in Nyasaland over the past weeks. One could bring in many analogies, but I will not bring in more than one other. One's mind goes back to the Indian National Party, which has almost exactly the same name and which furnishes a very close parallel, because that Party was proscribed by similar Conservative Governments in this country, and its leaders, Gandhi and Nehru, imprisoned for many years, just as this Congress Party in Nyasaland has been proscribed and its leaders are imprisoned now. The Congress Party in India has now for ten years been providing the Government of India, and, as we all know, Mr. Nehru, after many years in prison, has been the outstandingly great Prime Minister of that great country. It may well be that before very long we shall be welcoming Dr. Banda at Westminster as the Prime Minister of Nyasaland, and fêting him and providing special facilities in order that Members of both Houses of Parliament may have the pleasure and honour of meeting him.
So I was rather disappointed that the noble Marquess kept referring to Dr. Banda as an agitator, as a demagogue. It is a very easy word to use, and it has been used of many men of outstanding political ability, men who have given

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great service to the cause of Parliamentary Government and democracy in this country. I can remember, when I was a small boy, Mr. Lloyd George, in particular, being denounced from many a platform as being an agitator and a demagogue. Yet he was a great Prime Minister, one who, perhaps more than any one man, brought this country out of one of the greatest wars in which it has ever been involved. Exactly the same was being said about Mr. Gandhi over a very large part of his career; and yet, more than to anybody else, the credit of establishing self-government in India, and liberating India—because I think "liberating" is the right word to use—is due to that great man. I think the noble Marquess was himself a member of the Government which put Mr. Gandhi in gaol, and also put Mr. Nehru in gaol.
While I enjoyed and agreed with a great deal of the speech made by the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, I would join issue with him on one point which he made, when he said that in his view the problem which confronted the Government, and which was discussed in the Devlin Report, was not a political problem at all but essentially a psychological problem. Surely, my Lords, that is a very short-sighted view of this matter. If there is anything in the world which is political it is the present situation in Nyasaland. After all, the whole of this business has been brought about by the fact that in 1960 there is to be a review of the constitutional position in the Federation. What was the reason why the Nyasaland National Congress Party was so concerned about the situation, except that it was apprehensive of that review in 1960? Is there anybody in this Chamber who will not agree that if there had been no agitation in Nyasaland over these last years the 1960 review would in due course have taken place, that Dominion status would have been conferred and that the Africans would then have had their last chance of getting any real self-government? What has been going on ever since 1953 has been a situation full of politics, and the problem which the Devlin Commission was asked to investigate and report upon was essentially a political problem.
In the wider sense of the term this is, us the most reverend Primate said, a problem which goes back many centuries in the history of liberty and in the his-
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tory of the self-government of people all over the world. In this matter, of course, he rightly emphasised that the people in Nyasaland have their eyes on what happens round about them; and particularly, as he said, what happens in Salisbury, where, as my noble Leader pointed out only the other day, African members of the Federal Government itself are not allowed to stay in the city of Salisbury overnight because of the racial segregation which exists in that place. The most reverend Primate might have said it is impossible for the educated and thoughtful people in Nyasaland not to look farther South than Salisbury, not to have their eye indeed on Pretoria itself. Because this is the festering sore which has given rise to the real problems which confront us throughout the continent of Africa. Till that sore is healed the situation will inevitably remain difficult in the Rhodesias and throughout Africa as a whole.
It is difficult to see any immediate solution. My contention is that it can be healed only by the Boer population of the Union of South Africa learning to treat their black fellow citizens as real human beings with rights in the political government of the country. If they cannot eventually find some way of doing this, in the long run the white population in South Africa will be driven into the sea. That is a sweeping statement, but it seems to me that it is as inevitably so as that the tide will flow up the estuary of the Thames tomorrow. It may be a long way away but I think it is certain and that is the difficulty we have to try to surmount in the Rhodesias and in those other parts of Africa where self-government has not yet been conferred. It is because people will always sell their lives for liberty.
It is no good denouncing violence. Violence is a most unpleasant thing, but it is endemic in all those parts of the world where self-government and freedom does not exist. We ourselves are people who have set an example to the world. It is we ourselves who have taught this—to the Americans, in the first instance, because Bunker Hill was a very good example of exactly the same sort of situation. We are ourselves the people who, by our own belief in freedom and our own readiness to fight for freedom, have taught other people in the world, if they needed any teaching, how

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valuable freedom is and how necessary it is in the long run to be ready to fight for it.
We cannot buy off this demand for self-government and for freedom by the material inducements which are held out to the people of Nyasaland through federation. I have no doubt at all that federation is a very good thing from the point of view of the prosperity of this area of Africa, and if the people of those parts wanted it for themselves surely it would be right that they should have it. But they do not want it. If there is anything clear in the Devlin Report it is that the mass of the people in Nyasaland are resolutely opposed to federation—not only what one may describe as the Left-wing politicians but even the chieftains, the old rulers who are now in effect in the payment of the British Government. It is perfectly clear that they are just as much opposed to federation as the Banda politicians.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord will allow me to interrupt him a moment? Would he advise the Africans, the Congress leaders in Nyasaland, to forgo the educational and the social advantages which flow from the economic advantages of federation? Would he advise them to go ahead without them?
LORD CHORLEY: I think it is up to this country to provide them with education and the requirements for bringing themselves abreast. I do not think that we in this country can really insist on the people of Nyasaland getting their education and the other requirements of a modern country by means of forcing them into a Federation. They themselves have said, in the words of the Devlin Report, that they would rather be poor than slaves, and if we had to choose I am sure we should choose the same way. But I do not believe that there is any such dilemma. I believe it is perfectly possible for the people of Nyasaland to have an educational system and to have a farming industry brought up to a high level in the same way that has been done in other parts of the British Commonwealth, without insistence upon this federal solution.
LORD BLACKFORD: My Lords, that being so, would the noble Lord be against transferring to the British tax-
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payer the £3 million a year now contributed to Nyasaland by the Rhodesian taxpayer?
LORD CHORLEY: No, my Lords, I would not. I think that even this country, through the Commonwealth Development Corporation and in various ways, are now paying back to the Colonial parts of the Empire some of the riches which have been taken from them over hundreds of years.
LORD BLACKFORD: Will the noble Lord say what riches we have taken from Nyasaland, which is not a viable country?
LORD CHORLEY: The noble Lord cannot deny that this country has exploited the resources of many Colonial parts of the world. No doubt we have made returns, and returns of value, but it is ridiculous to suggest that the high standard of living in this country is not partially due to the fact that we have taken a great deal of Colonial produce from the Colonies.
LORD BLACKFORD: My Lords, we are now talking about Nyasaland, if the noble Lord would confine himself to that subject. We have taken nothing from Nyasaland, which is not a viable country.
LORD CHORLEY: The British Commonwealth is a co-operative institution. We have taken a great deal of money out of Northern Rhodesia, which is next door to Nyasaland, over the last twenty years, and surely it would not be too much to ask the British people to give some of that money back to the poor people of Nyasaland in order to build that country up into a rich farming community. If the noble Lord had been able to see the sandy soil of Northern Denmark 150 years ago, when it could not have produced any kind of crops, he would not have made the same sort of remark which he is now making about Nyasaland. I claim that if it is possible for Denmark to build up agriculture in such an area it is possible that Nyasaland could be built up in the same way.
LORD LLOYD: My Lords, the noble Lord says that we have exploited all our Colonial territories for a long time, and that we ought now to be giving back what has been taken. He might advise the leaders of his own Party to suggest to the

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British electors at the next Election that their standard of living should be reduced in order to do so. That is what the noble Lord is saying. It is an observation which is quite untrue and he should follow it out or not say it.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, the noble Lord should realise that this country has acquired a great deal of its wealth from exploiting the Colonial territories. I have no hesitation in addressing the electors on these problems. My mind can go back to 1906 when the Conservative Party were thrown out as a result of Chinese cheap labour being brought into the South African mines as slaves. The British people rejected that with no uncertain voice at the polls, and it may well be that before the noble Lord is finished he will see them respond with an equally firm voice at the next General Election.
I do not want to pursue this topic in too much detail. It could be argued about for a long time. My submission is that we cannot buy off the people of Nyasaland by material inducements, by the thirty pieces of silver—the £3 million, if you prefer that—which have been offered to them to enter this system of federation. It is a mere mess of pottage. It is a situation which, as the most reverend Primate said, has been recurring throughout the ages. What we have to try to do, as the most reverend Primate said, is to discover some sort of method by which the harm which has been done by this enforcement of federation in 1953 can be undone, so that the confidence of the people of Nyasaland can be restored. It is no easy thing to do, to unscramble the omelette. It seems to me essential that no further progress should be made towards the establishment of some kind of Dominion in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland until a great deal more progress has been made in creating self-government in each of the three constituent States, and perhaps particularly in Nyasaland, which is the most essentially African of the three.
I was glad to hear from the persuasive speech of the noble Earl the Leader of the House the other day that, to some extent, the Government are impressed by what has been happening over the last weeks and are much less enthusiastic about going ahead with the Commonwealth side of this business than they
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appeared to be very recently. I could have wished that something a little more concrete had come out of that speech in the way of building up a feeling of greater confidence in Nyasaland. The noble Earl kept on repeating how necessary that was, but it seemed to me that his speech was rather barren from the point of view of showing how it was to be done. It seems to me that the only solution is to go ahead much more rapidly with the Africanisation of the Government in Nyasaland. I hope that the Devlin Report will persuade your Lordships that that is the right road to go along, and that as a result of all these uncertain difficulties substantial progress will be made in conferring self-government upon the great mass of people in Nyasaland during the next months and years.
9.18 p.m.
THE EARL OF MANSFIELD: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, has returned, because I feel that I must preface my remarks by saying how strongly I deprecate the personal attack he made on the characters of the members of the Commission. I feel that the great reputation that Mr. Justice Devlin has in the legal profession should have protected him, as well as his colleagues, from the charge of intellectual dishonesty. There is only one member of the Commission whom I know personally, Sir John Ure Primrose; and I know him very well indeed. He is a most remarkable man who enjoys the confidence and respect of all Scotland. He has not merely been the Lord Provost of Perth. He was sent out to Queensland to investigate their groundnuts scheme. During the war he did intellgence work, and for decades he has been a working farmer, getting up literally at four o'clock in the morning to milk his own cows. Anyone less like a starry-eyed, woolly-minded intellectual it would be very hard to find.
I feel some regret that Her Majesty's Government should have been so sensitive to those portions of the Report with which they are not in agreement, because the Government have an excellent case, so good that they need not have been disturbed by these portions which they found unpalatable. In my view—and I have listened to the whole of all but two of the speeches made this after-

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noon; and, indeed, to parts of those two—a tremendous amount of time has been wasted this afternoon in discussing whether there was or was not a wholesale murder plot. As the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, specifically speaking for his Party, agreed, there was an emergency which required the taking of action suitable for an emergency. Surely it could have been left at that, and we need not have had so much talk as there has been by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and many others about whether there was or was not a formal plot to murder all those who were not in accordance with the views of Congress, at least among the white settlers.
The only other point upon which there was any real difference of opinion seemed to me to be this question of the police state—an unfortunate expression, undoubtedly. But I do not myself see why for a short time there should not have been a police state. We were faced there with an emergency which had to be dealt with drastically, and which involved, most unfortunately, the loss of the lives of over fifty of Her Majesty's African subjects; and in most cases, although possibly not in all, firing seems to have been justified as the sole way of preserving law and order and saving many other lives. At the same time, I could not share the complacency of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, and the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, in their enthusiasm for their comparison with Defence Regulation 18B, because, however necessary that was during the war. I have always regarded it as a most disagreeable necessity. I do not like at any time to see British subjects imprisoned, possibly for years, without having been brought to trial, whether they be white or black, be they here or in Africa.
The position in which we find ourselves to-day is one in which I think less attention should be paid to what has happened in the past in Nyasaland and more to what may and can happen in the future. It has to be realised that, politically speaking, black Africa is on the march and could not be stopped even with atom bombs. It is my firm belief that within a period of time, varying very much so far as the different countries are concerned, but in few, if any, instances going further than
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the end of this century, we shall see all countries of Africa governed by their populations as a whole and not just by the white majority—and in that I include the Union of South Africa. We cannot halt this nationalistic trend, even if we want to do so. But we can, if we are wise, direct it into such channels as will be of the greatest advantage to white and black alike.
So far as Nyasaland is concerned, the cause of its opposition to federation has strangely enough been mentioned by only one of your Lordships to-night—namely, the noble Lord, Lord Forester, who said, perfectly correctly, that the real cause of the trouble was that the district commissioners and other officers were forbidden to expound the virtues of federation; they were allowed only to put it before the Africans. And that state of affairs, I would remind the Opposition, occurred in their time. Had federation been, to use the vernacular, "plugged" at that time, we should not have been in the position in which we are to-day. The African is a simple soul and usually uneducated. He has been used to taking from his white commissioners and other officers all sorts of instructions, which he sometimes thought were quite remarkably silly, but which he usually found later to be of the greatest possible advantage to him: things like inoculating himself and his animals, land conservation, et cetera—although it is on record that in Nyasaland we have not yet fully persuaded them of the advantages of various forms of soil conservation which are very necessary there. The result has been that, in the words of one man of great experience in Africa (he told me this personally), at the present time it would take machine guns to put Nyasaland forcibly into a Federation if that Federation attained Dominion status.
It would be completely wrong for me in the short time at my disposal to-night to try to explain, as I see it, why the natives of Nyasaland do not like the idea of federation. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, pointed out that the cause was given by the Commission, and he seemed to think that that was entirely a wrong thing to do. I do not think it was. I think that in the fullness of time, in some future debate, we shall have to investigate closely the position of white and black in Rhodesia; because it is there that arises without doubt, rightly

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or wrongly, this disinclination, to put it mildly, on the part of the Nyasaland African to federation. In the meantime, what is to be done?
The most helpful suggestion came undoubtedly from the noble Lord, Lord Twining. Here I would say that I think it is most unfortunate that the order of arranging the speeches to-day was such that the House was practically empty when everyone who had any personal knowledge of Africa was speaking. I hope that that will not occur again. The noble Lord, Lord Twining, made various suggestions, most of which seemed to me from my quite small knowledge, to be apt. But I do think we ought to make it clear to the African inhabitants of Nyasaland that we will not put them compulsorily under a Federation if that Federation is given Dominion status. If we do, I am convinced that we shall be asking for the most appalling trouble.
What we wish to bring about in Central Africa is a multi-racial community; and that we can have. The West Indies have shown that you can have black and white and other colours living together in amity. You can have a small white population still owning by far the greatest amount of the wealth and riches of a country and still not have many colour problems; and you can have what many people will not believe, but what the recent Federal elections in Jamaica—not the local elections that took place yesterday, but the Federal elections—showed to be possible; that is, white candidates, if they are the right people, returned by Negro votes against Negro candidates. That will take a lot of building up in Africa, but it has to come if we are to have peace and progress. I hope, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government will do something, if not to-day in the early future, to assuage the fears of the native population of Nyasaland, so that they will not be frightened that any further development of federation will mean their being put into the state of slavery which they anticipate, however wild and ill-founded their fears may be.
9.28 p.m.
LORD TWEEDSMUIR: My Lords, we are just coming to the end of a long debate which did not start to-day or yesterday but started about two weeks ago when it was first learned that the Devlin Report had been printed. It was
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said of the Beveridge Report that there were three schools of thought about it: there were those who were for it, those who were against it, and those who had read it. Well, I think one can take it for granted that we in this House have all read this Report—and if we have not, we have had it read to us. The newspapers, in spite of their immensely diminished space, have given the fullest coverage. I do not think anybody could claim that Britain was not interested in Nyasaland. I am going to take up very little of your Lordships' time to-night, but what I am going to say is speaking as one who was once a District Officer in Africa, not in Nyasaland, it is true, but in Uganda, which is not too incomparable—and, incidentally, as a junior colleague of the noble Lord, Lord Twining, who went on to many greater glories and eventually to become Governor of Tanganyika.
I could not follow the proposition of the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, or agree with it for one moment, that because the Devlin Report was judicial we were not able to disagree with it. I follow the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, on this: that the purpose of that Report and others like it is to clarify the issues—and he added: "Legal niceties of the law court sometimes conflict with the harsh realities of administration." We all agree on one thing; that is, the urgent need to restore peace in Africa as soon as possible. Here I must take up a small point with my noble friend Lord Mansfield, who has just sat down. He mentioned the West Indies as an example of what could be done. It is a splendid example of what can be done, as long as it is realised that you cannot take that example too far. In the West Indies every man speaks English and professes the Christian religion, and there is no question of which has a prior claim to the country, because when the white man came he brought the black man with him. Let us hope we can get that harmony in Africa we have in the West Indies, but let us remember it is not too comparable a proposition.
I think all of us, on both sides, will agree that to keep the peace and protect the lives and properties of the citizens of a country is the first duty of a Government. I believe, as the Commission does, that Sir Robert Armitage's action

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saved probably a great many lives. No one will ever entirely agree as to the precise moment that such action must be taken, but I believe that he could not have put it off another moment. Unlike all those who discuss the matter, he alone had this gigantic responsibility on his shoulders, and he was equal to it.
Let me say just one word as one who lived and served in Africa some years ago. On the whole sphere of politics in Africa you cannot generalise about Africa, except on a certain few lines, but, in the main, it is true to say that in our African territories the best African brains go either into the Civil Service or the professions or, latterly, in some territories, into business. It does not leave the best intellects in the country free for politics. In spite of the economic effects of federation which I think are not disputed, the people of Nyasaland are still very poor, taking the average man on the soil, and one of the greatest hardships of poverty is boredom. People turn in those countries to politics for excitement, light relief and amusement, as much as for anything else. That, of course, militates against the moderate politician. You are not going to walk a long way to listen to a man making a moderate speech if you can have a splendid piece of flamboyant agitation. It is a sign that Kenya is growing to a much greater stage of political maturity that that is ceasing to be true there.
When you come to set up as a politician, what is the easiest creed in the world to preach?—nationalism, the oldest and most reactionary political force we know, and none the worse for being either of those two things. But it is something with which you can inflame almost any people, because you get at a feeling which is only just under the skin of even the oldest and most civilised races, as well as the most backward. Nationalism is not necessarily bad, and it is not necessarily good. It is just as good as the intentions of the people who are flying its flag at that moment. There are some nationalisms with which we do not agree. We do not agree with Hitler, who strewed the world with human wreckage. Most Members of your Lordships' House would not agree with the nationalism of Pretoria. On the other hand, you may agree with a
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lot of other nationalisms. In my own country of Scotland we have had a great many different kinds of nationalism in the last 500 or 600 years which have contributed in many different ways to our history.
As the Commission pointed out, in Africa
"violence is an acceptable alternative to persuasion,"
and the first group that gets formed and gets momentum will naturally try to intimidate its rivals. I have seen it. Eventually, they will take that intimidation so far that only the bravest man will dare to stand in their way. Then, when we in this country read the papers we see that a political movement is sweeping the country and that nobody is standing up to disagree with it. So the citizens of this country, who have never been in Africa, say, "Here is a clear majority. If they are the majority, why are they not the Government?" That is possibly where the clear-sightedness of the ordinary Briton breaks down—the conditions of Africa are so very different. In the Commission's Report the word "arson" is mentioned. They said that arson was a facient weapon of intimidation. They went on to say—which I think was most remarkable—something to the effect that if an African lost his house it was a bad thing to be homeless and to lose everything. They missed the point altogether. Arson is the most devastating weapon among African peoples. A handful of hot embers in an oily rag thrust into the thatch of a native hut will not take fire until the perpetrator is a long way away. If you and your family are asleep, when that happens, you will never get out alive. That is a terrible weapon, and indeed there are others.
Nyasaland's political climate, like much else of Africa, is like a forest full of dry tinder. Much has been said and argued for and against Dr. Banda and his Congress Party, but nothing can change this fact: that if he did not intend by a deliberate act to set this forest on fire, he was himself going round and casually dropping lighted matches, and countenancing his lieutenants in doing the same. The prime duty of a Government is to preserve life and we could not let it go on.

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The noble Lord, Lord Chorley, in a very strange speech, which he will forgive me for saying touched reality at very few points, sees Dr. Banda and his Party as having "a useful rôle", and he added a little later that violence is endemic in Africa. During all this stress and strain, the fabric of the government and the administration of Nyasaland has remained intact, and it is a very great credit to those concerned that it has. I am very sorry for the district commissioners there and, as the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, said so entirely truly, their difficulties and the whole suspicion of federation and, indeed, of Britain go back to the point when they were ordered to act entirely out of character. People there have been used to receiving the instructions—
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, how does the noble Lord think that political maturity can possibly be obtained in conditions of that sort?
LORD TWEEDSMUIR: I will come to that in a moment, if the noble Lord will bide his soul in peace. The district commissioners were told that they must not take sides; they must just throw the subject out for debate. The African was astonished at first, and then became gravely suspicious. What did the commissioner mean by acting out of character like that? There must be a catch to it somewhere. As we all know, they believe that there is a catch to it still. I think the D.C.'s and the chiefs have the worst time, because in the main they are so much more isolated. The Colonial Service, I think one can say, is a sturdy British mixture of idealism and common sense.
I do not excuse any brutality that can be proved to have taken place. But I can see the picture of their difficulties through the eyes of the men who were trying to cope with them. Let me, at any rate, pay the fullest possible tribute to them. They have attracted a lot of criticism. Worse than that, they have attracted slander, and this is an opportunity which I will take to deal with this problem. I raise this now because two newspapers and an honourable Member in another place raised it, and it worried me deeply. I went to lengths to find out the answers.
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There was a man by the name of Thomas Kafua, who it was alleged, was the main informer who told the police officials of the murder and assassination planned by Congress; and his statements, it was alleged, were the basis of a memorandum about the Congress plans; secondly, that the statements that he gave to the police were actually prepared by the police themselves beforehand, and that he was forced to sign them. Your Lordships can imagine how concerned I was as, indeed, will be any noble Lords hearing me now. Both these allegations are totally untrue, as an investigation of the facts clearly shows. Mr. Kafua did not make any statement to the police of any kind until after his arrest and detention on March 5. As the Devlin Report shows, together with the Governor's Despatch, the Governor's assessment of the plans came from seven informers, independently before that date. Mr. Kafua was not one of the seven men and his evidence, such as it was, was not therefore taken into account by the Governor in reaching his decision. That is sufficient to nail the first allegation.
The second, that the police prepared the statement, and that he was then asked, and forced to sign it is equally untrue. The facts are that Mr. Kafua wrote a note asking for an interview with the C.I.D. officer on March 5. He wrote another note and got an interview on the 6th. As a result of these two letters, he was interviewed by the police officers and gave his story. In other words, as an informant he was unknown to the police before March 6, and anything he said was merely corroborative detail. At no stage was he forced to sign any statement whatever, and at no stage was any pressure brought upon him or any inducement offered.
I have nailed those two slanders. There is another. It was alleged last night in another place—I know that we have careful rules of politeness, but I wish to take a load off the mind of the honourable Member who made the allegation as he must have been very worried at such a state of affairs—that, in fact, the police, having produced a false confession and made him sign it, then produced a "model Court" so that he could practice giving his evidence, so that he could do it with great polish in front of the Devlin Commission. I

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am sure it will be a load off the mind of Mr. Stonehouse to realise that it is a total fabrication.
There is a second point in paragraph 36. It may seem a small point to some, but it seems big to me. You see the expression "loyal chiefs" and "loyal" in inverted commas, apparently as being something spurious or ridiculous. Why the inverted commas? Is loyalty considered to be an out-dated quality? These chiefs took the most immense risks because they were loyal to the way of life we have tried to bring to them. They believed in it and stood up for it. When Charles II came to the throne, as you may remember from the history books, he passed an Act of Indemnity and Oblivion; in other words, he pardoned everybody except the regicides. Charles II rather forgot his old friends, and years after that they called it an Act of Indemnity for his enemies and Oblivion for his friends. If we ever show oblivion towards our friends we shall not last long in Africa.
The noble Lord, Lord Chorley, asked me how under the district commissioner system anybody could learn parliamentary democracy in Nyasaland. The pipeline in Nyasaland, with its now vastly expanded educational facilities, is gradually filling up, but it will be quite a long time in Nyasaland before you get a class anywhere near to Dr. Banda in education. I mention Dr. Banda, not in approval, but merely because he is an educated man. You cannot jump into a one-man-one-vote assembly straight from the D.C. system. We all know that there are many sad misconceptions in Nyasaland which cause this dislike of federation and dislike of so much else. We must patiently try to dispel these misconceptions. But one thing that you cannot do is to legislate to fit a misconception. I put enormous hope in the constitutional Commission. It has been said that any African who sits on it will be a "stooge." He will be merely guilty of the crime of putting his country before his party. Happily we have many like that in these two Houses of Parliament. We feel that the more that goes in Nyasaland the better. I do not see Africa as being in a hopeless state. I see hope in Africa, if we show real good-
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will and keep our heads and hold out a hand of friendliness when they hold it out to us.
9.45 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, it has been my good fortune to hear every word of every speech uttered in this debate, except for a few moments of that of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, from which I had his courteous permission to be excused. Your Lordships have agreed on one thing: that an infinite number of issues have been raised. And indeed the last two speeches alone, of my noble friends Lord Mansfield and Lord Tweedsmuir, opened great vistas on the wider problems. But I am going to try, as shortly as I can, to deal with the points which, looking at this after-noon's debate as a whole, have given most trouble to your Lordships.
Before I do that I want to do two things in which, although the Opposition Amendment would omit reference to them from the Motion, I am sure I shall have the support of your Lordships. The first is to say that it is no mere figure of speech in which our Motion thanks the Chairman and the members of the Commission for their work. They had a most difficult task. They were dealing with a subject on which they must have known that feelings would be deeply aroused, and of the controversy bound to be engendered. They were dealing with it largely in a strange country and in difficult conditions. In my view, they performed their task with speed, industry, distinction and complete sincerity.
The other point, which again I think your Lordships would all want me to make, is that we have been discussing, and it was inevitable that we should be discussing, the causes of these happenings. It might appear, and it might appear to some of your Lordships when I develop my own argument, that in discussing the causes of the deaths we have forgotten the deaths themselves. I am sure that is untrue of everyone in your Lordships' House, but I think one ought to register that point. The fact of this number of deaths is a thing which is in all our minds and underlines the seriousness with which we approach the problem in front of us.
I do want to say a word as to the limits which the Commission set for themselves in the task before them. I think

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there is some misconception on the part of the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition, and indeed on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Rea, as to our approach. I would remind your Lordships again of those limits which the Commission set themselves. Perhaps your Lordships will just consider once more what they said in paragraph 4, on page 3:
"…we do not regard it as any part of our task to express views on questions of policy or, except where we think that on the facts there can only be one conclusion, to judge of the wisdom or otherwise of the measures adopted by the Government."
They go on to say:
"But the task with which you entrusted us was to report and not to make recommendations. We have aimed at setting out all the relevant facts as objectively as we can in order that those whose responsibility it is to approve or disapprove may be provided with a firm basis of fact for their deliberations."
That puts the ball right back, first in the court of the Government and then in the court of Parliament; and it is for the Government to state their view and for Parliament to say whether that is right.
The other point is this: that in the ordinary way—and this has been the practice (I have taken the trouble to find out) of Governments of every political colour—the practice is that after an occurrence and an inquiry a Report is made. There is then obtained the Governor's view on that Report; and in the ordinary way the Governor is given ample time—weeks; or it may be months—to consider the position. Then, of course, his views come back, and on that the home Government consider the position in turn. That was done on several occasions by the Labour Government when they were in office; and in this situation—we know that Parliament is adjourned in the ordinary way at the end of July—we had to cut short the period of study by the Governor and ourselves; we had to get his despatch in order that this matter might be debated and ventilated in Parliament. That is a procedure which is not only justifiable by the past, it is a procedure which is right. But on the point which has been raised to-day, it was necessary surely for us to get the Governor's Report and then consider the matter as we have done.
As I said, I want to deal with the issues which have aroused most interest. I want to base what I say on the Commission's own statements and then to
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submit to your Lordships that they justify to the full the terms of our Resolution. Whatever our views, it must be a matter of satisfaction to everyone that the Commission support the views of the Governor on three vital points. First (and your Lordships will note that in this they expect everyone to agree), that the Government of Nyasaland had to act and use emergency powers. There has been no question of that in the debate. Your Lordships will find it clearly stated in paragraph 149. Secondly, that the situation was the result of the adoption of a policy of violence by the Nyasaland African Congress. I venture to trouble your Lordships with just two short references to that. The last sentences of paragraph 100 say:
"Perhaps the effect of it all can best be summed up by saying that there was to be an all-out campaign to defy the Government, violence not excluded. When would the violence begin, how far would it go and what form exactly would it take? The only answer is that it would depend on what happened. If it started in some places and was not checked, it would certainly have spread and might have gone very far; that was the real danger in the situation."
My Lords, that is what the Commission find.
The noble Viscount who leads the Opposition put it to us that we were dealing really with a rather harsh treatment of people in a political Party. That is poles apart from that. If your Lordships look again at the first sentence (it is a very short one) of paragraph 166, you will see these words:
"When we had reached the conclusion that a policy of violence was adopted at the meeting and that Mr. Chipembere, Mr. Chisiza, and the Congress leadership generally was a party to it…"
There is violence; the leadership a party to it. That is what the Commission have found. That is the position which we have got to deal with.
The third point, which again is of vital importance, is that the Commission have found that the decision of the Governor was his own and was not carried out under pressure. Your Lordships will see that at the end of paragraph 160. I hope that what has been said today about the acceptance of the Report means that the Opposition in your Lordships' House withdraw the suggestions made so irresponsibly in other places that Sir Robert Armitage acted

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under pressure from Sir Roy Welensky, and that he abdicated his responsibilities to the Federal Government and the Federation. The Commission have made clear that that did not happen, and we go forward with that as the agreed state of facts to regard the future of this intractable problem.
I come to the point that has been discussed at considerable length to-day. That is the question: was there a murder plot or a loose plan to kill? What is perfectly clear—and I ask the noble Viscount to consider this when he is treating this as an exercise of a political Party—is that there was a decision to use violence and to kill people if they came in the way of the plan. The two views are most clearly summarised, if your Lordships will this time forgive me, in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Governor's despatch. He said in paragraph 25 that the Commission—
"found that at the emergency conference of the Congress on 25th January. 1959, 'there was talk of beating and killing Europeans, but not of cold-blooded assassination or massacre'. They also did not think that there was 'anything that can be called a plot, nor, except in a very loose sense of the word, a plan'."
That is a quotation from the Report at paragraph 168. Then the Governor puts his own view—your Lordships will consider it:
"So far as I and the Government of Nyasaland are concerned, no distinction is to be drawn between 'talk of beating and killing Europeans' and talk of 'cold-blooded assassination or massacre'. If it was the intention of the Commission to seek to differentiate in this respect between different types of murder, then I must confess myself unable to appreciate the distinction. Massacre may be a matter of numbers, but murder is murder whether you call it killing or assassination. What was important from my point of view was not whether there was just talk of killing Europeans or talk of cold-blooded, or for that matter hot-blooded, assassination or massacre, but whether there was a real threat to the lives of Europeans and Africans as a result of the adoption by Congress of a policy of violence."
Let us consider it from three points of view. Let us consider it first from the point of view of what was said. I am not collecting "plums"; I am taking this Report as it is shown as a whole. Let us take what was said first of all. If your Lordships will look at paragraph 34 of the Governor's Despatch you will see what was said by the various Congress Leaders, and in each case the reference
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is given to the Report and your Lordships can check any one you like. We have the remark
"…pointed to another African and said that 'when they spilt the Europeans' blood they would spill his.'"
Mr. Chisiza then says that if Great Britain did not give way
"the whole country is going to be in blood-shed."
He says that they will
"create disturbances from Port Herald to Karonga even if it means every person in the country dies."
After all, my Lords, Mr. Chisiza was said to be, or was described by the Commission as, a sort of bodyguard to Dr. Banda. Then Mr. Chipembere says:
"apparently there are some stooges who are prepared to face me in court. But the boys here are ready for them, the Youth Leaguers mean real business with such stooges."
He goes on:
"We mean to die for this country or win liberation."
Then the most significant statement from Mr. Chipembere—and the noble Viscount did not mention this:
"My belief is that any such plan must include something quite akin to Mau Mau, for the extraction of Nyasaland cannot be accepted by the White Settlers and their Governments except by catastrophic pressure."
The Commission said rightly that
"Mau Mau denotes to most people cold-blooded murder."
That is one test—what they said; and all these quotations are from the Commission's Report.
Now let us consider another test, which I think your Lordships will consider is a fair one: what they did. Your Lordships will find what was done summarised in paragraph 29 of the Governor's Despatch. He says, taking the first part from paragraph 99 of the Commission's Report:
"From 15th February to the end of March 1959, in the three Provinces of Nyasaland roads were blocked by trees, trenches, etc., on over 1,800 occasions; 36 bridges were destroyed or damaged; installations at three airfields were damaged, and one of these airfields was put out of action. Telephone communications were cut or otherwise destroyed on 38 occasions; 41 residences of Government officers and 30 Government buildings were damaged or destroyed."
I say, with great respect to the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition, that that is not a common concomitant of the action of a political Party; that is violence on a considerable scale.

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But let us look for a moment at the conclusion which the Governor drew—your Lordships will see that in paragraph 27. I just quote the sentence and the matter on which it was based. It was based on the report of the meeting of January 25 which the Commission accepted. This is the report that they accepted, and paragraph 3 of the translation of the notes says:
"If our Dr. were caught what would we do… Word will issue from the Central Body telling all people to start war after two days.… Digging up roads, destroying anything belonging to Europeans… Not to pay taxes… To hit Europeans or cut throat."
That is what the Commission accepted as being an accurate report of the decisions at that meeting, and the Governor says in paragraph 30 of his Despatch:
"I find it impossible myself to treat the statement in the document 'to hit Europeans or cut throat' in the event of Dr. Banda being 'caught' as anything less than a record of a decision to resort to personal violence and murder.…"
If he will allow me to say so, I liked the approach of my noble friend Lord Salisbury; that is, for each of your Lordships to put his hand on his heart and say, "What would I do in that situation and faced with that information?" I do not believe there is a noble Lord in this House who would come to any other conclusion than that that was a decision to use violence and, if necessary, to murder and to carry it out; and that the result of that was that it was necessary to take action. It is only an interesting point, in passing, that the reports of the Governor forming the basis of the Despatch which has been so much criticised, agree with the document accepted by the Commission which I have just quoted.
My noble friend Lord Salisbury asked me to deal with the question: did the Governor sincerely believe in the murder plot? The first answer to that is, of course, his own statement in paragraph 37. As the noble Marquess has asked me, I think it is fair that one should put that. The Governor says:
"The Commission seem to suggest that no one at the centre of Government appears to have regarded the threats to murder with any degree of seriousness. If such a suggestion was intended, I must flatly repudiate it. The Commissioner of Police on 18th February told me his view 'that the information about a plan for the mass murder of all Europeans and
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Asians, men, women and children, in the event of Dr. Banda being arrested, was correct and must be accepted seriously.' I could not ignore the considered opinion of the officer responsible for law and order. As [said in my dispatch of 18th March, but for the knowledge of Congress plans, and the widespread violence contemplated, I would have been justified in declaring the emergency on 20th February. As it was, I had no alternative but to defer the declaration of a state of emergency until I had sufficient forces at my disposal.…"
As my noble friend asked me, I made further inquiries, and there were three points of difficulty which I think I ought to state. The Governor first of all thought that the strong action which he had taken—that is, the wide extent of arrests of Congress members, most of whom were responsible for putting the plan into action, and the presence of security forces—would prevent the plan from moving into that stage. But, of course, there was another reason which carries weight with me, and I hope it will with my noble friend: that the more he said at that time the more it was likely to be explosive material which would exacerbate the position and make the tragedy more likely. My Lords, this is a fact (it is in the Report) that the Government referred to in a statement on March 7; so there was the reference to it. It is quite true that shortly after that, on March 9, they ceased to make reference to it; but that was for the reason that I gave, that exaggerated reports were coming through as to what was said and the Governor thought it was best there should be no further reference to it. These are the facts, and I suggest that they corroborate and reinforce the statement which the Governor himself made—I have read it—that he took this matter seriously and he put it on to the Secretary of State as something in which he had implicit belief.
I want now to pass for a moment to the position of Dr. Banda as shown in the Report. Paragraph 2 of the Governor's Despatch and paragraph 166 of the Report show that Mr. Chiume, Mr. Chipembere and Mr. Chisiza were Dr. Banda's chief lieutenants; and as I have already said, the first two are described as "extremist" in paragraph 24 of the Report, and according to paragraph 27 of the Report Mr. Chipembere described Mr. Chisiza as "extreme" in recommending him to Dr. Banda. All three owed their position to Dr. Banda.

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He gave them a free hand—that is stated in paragraph 50 of the Report. The real power was concentrated in their hands—that is in paragraph 48. It is extremely difficult to believe that in these circumstances, with these men appointed as lieutenants by himself, Dr. Banda maintained a seraphic ignorance of everything that was going on.
But let us look at what the Commission say. I do not want to jump to any conclusion. In the middle of paragraph 102 they say:
"We were therefore invited to believe that between 25th January and 3rd March neither Mr. Chipembere nor any other member of the committee mentioned to Dr. Banda the decisions taken"—
Your Lordships will remember the decision I read out, "beat or cut throat"—
"although there was nothing in them that they wished to conceal. We found this all the more surprising since between 25th January and 3rd March meetings of branch committees were taking place all over the country at which the delegates were reporting what had gone on at the emergency conference."
Then, my Lords, in paragraph 141 it is stated that Dr. Banda spoke at Dedza, and it is stated:
"On 8th February at Mlanje Dr. Banda told his audience that moderate leaders were no use."
If your Lordships will turn to paragraph 166, at the top of page 83, you will see that the Commission say this:
"Dr. Banda made his own position clear—that he would accept arrest—and he exhorted others to follow him; but he did not, as he once frankly said (paragraph 84) exclude violence and he never condemned it categorically. It was this inaction on Dr. Banda's part which made the meeting of 25th January possible. If he had been known to have condemned violence unreservedly, Mr. Chipembere's proposals could not have succeeded. If every official of Congress knew that Dr. Banda disapproved of violence in every form, those proposals would have failed."
That is what the Commission say. Again, my Lords, I am not consciously (and I have read this Report over and over again) taking words out of their context or applying to one part what does not apply to others. That is a fair account of what the Commission say. That is one side of the picture.
Let us now consider the other side, which, of course, has worried your Lordships, and that is the use of force in the
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arrests. Let us look at the facts. In paragraph 41 the Governor says that out of 263 arrests, the arrestee—if I may use that horrible word; the arrested person—was injured in seven cases. My right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General said ten last night, and it may be that apart from the seven cases which are paragraphed there are another three. There is no suggestion there are any more. That is ten cases where injury was caused in 263 arrests, which took place in the night in a very troubled place where a lot of violence had already taken place. The point was raised: why was it done without any injury in Southern Rhodesia? I do not think my noble friend Lord Robins would dissent when I say that conditions there were very different. One was dealing there with a much more urbanised population where the roads are easier, and also, of course—I think this is fail—behind those actually carrying it out there was a much greater force available and a much greater force of opinion as well. I hope I am not putting it unfairly, but I think that has to be remembered.
With regard to the question of meetings, my Lords, I am speaking last in this debate—
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: Is the noble and learned Viscount turning from that last point?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: From the arrests?—yes.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: I had hoped that when the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor reached that point he would have said just something about the manner of the arrests and the points raised by my noble friend Lord Stansgate.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am coming to that. I do not mind being interrupted at all, but of course I am coming to that. I was dealing first of all with the numbers and I think that is a fair point; and I am sure the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition would agree it is important that one should realise that, out of 263 arrests in a disturbed country, there was injury caused in, at the most, ten cases.
The other point which is also material is this—and, as I say, I am speaking last

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and no one has yet mentioned this. After all, however strongly your Lordships feel, you do not want merely to make the points that discredit your country or your countrymen. You want to have a fair picture presented, and it is that which I am trying to present. In paragraph 43 of his Despatch the Governor says:
"In very many cases—ninety-six between October 1958 and the end of March 1959, including sixty on and after 3rd March—crowds were dispersed without resort to firearms, and only eleven members of these crowds are known to have been injured. This is despite the fact that an African crowd can easily be whipped up into a violent mob."
The crowd may have amounted to 500 or 1,000. That is the general picture.
The Commission raise points, putting them interrogatively. They ask whether it could have been done on a smaller scale. The Governor replies to that in paragraph 44. Again I ask your Lordships to consider it. He sets out the violence which had taken place, and he quotes the Commission, paragraph 103 of their Report:
"It is also likely that rumour concentrated on the more dramatic parts of the discussion and that the killing of Europeans was talked about",
and:
"with all the talk that there had been on 25th January it is certainly conceivable that some Africans were thinking about murder…if the African population once got out of control, there is not in the country any force that could contain it."
And that is his answer to the arrests being nation-wide.
The Commission then asked, again putting it interrogatively and perfectly reasonably, could the public have been prepared? Of course, if the public had been prepared the effect would have been to warn the leaders and the operation would therefore have failed. Let me just give an example of the risks which were run. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Tweedsmuir, who has been in the Service, would be the last person to resent that risks of this kind should be run. But this is a rather remarkable passage, in paragraph 46 of the Governor's Despatch:
"The kind of risks which the Commission seem to expect the administration and the security forces to run are illustrated by their account of an incident at Rumpi on 3rd March. when a police inspector shot a man who came up behind the D.C. from a crowd 'brandishing
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or pointing a spear'. The Commission comment that they were not satisfied that at the time the police officer thought the District Commissioner to be in imminent danger; 'if he had, we think that he would have shouted to the D.C. rather than to the man, and the D.C. heard no warning'. For my own part"—
says the Governor—
"I see no reason to dissent from the verdict of the coroner that 'the shooting by the Inspector was…entirely justified to prevent the rioter from attacking the District Commissioner'."
The Governor's view of that is covered in paragraph 50. I think that answers the point which the noble Viscount put to me. The Governor says in paragraph 50:
"The third criticism alleges that unnecessary force was used in arrests. The Commission rightly say that unnecessary force was not expressly authorised. If it had appeared that any officer had transgressed the limitations imposed by military discipline and by the law it would certainly not have bean condoned."
That is what the Governor says. He goes on to quote the remark that the Commission make at paragraph 257. Again in fairness I ask the noble Viscount, if he is wanting a report on what Englishmen do to go out from your Lordships' House, then do let us have the other side of the picture. There has been force in ten cases. It has not been condoned.
But what is the general picture? It is not I who say this; it is not the Government; it is not the Governor; it is the Commission:
"As we have said, we saw everyone who was responsible for the shooting. In the incidents, that we have so far recorded we have not found anyone who was 'trigger-happy' The general policy for dealing with rioters may have been right or wrong; the individual may have been mistaken in his assessment of the position; but having seen all those who were responsible for the shootings in the incidents so far recorded, we are satisfied that each man did what he did because he honestly felt that he could not discharge his duty in any other way."
I shall be very content if I ever earn an epitaph as good as that from an independent commission or from anyone else. That is the position.
Now I turn for a moment to the subsequent action. I turn first to the burning of the houses at Mlanje. I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that it is not very profitable at this stage of the debate to argue about how many houses compose a village, but what I think is worth putting forward, if one

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is going to attack one's fellow-country-men, is this from the Governor's Despatch:
"The first relates to the burning of houses in the Mlanje district. The Report admits that this burning was the responsibility of a single officer. The officer took this action because he thought that without such strong measures the whole district (for whose peace he was responsible) would have broken into further violence. It was taken after two days of serious rioting and the looting of Asian stores. Instructions were subsequently given that in no circumstances should punitive action of this kind be repeated."
That is the whole picture—in one place; then it is forbidden.
With regard to conduct in the villages, in paragraph 51 the Governor repudiates that the illegalities were expressly or impliedly authorised by him. He says: that the allegation of a great deal of aggressive or bullying behaviour
"is based on evidence not known to me."
I ought to point out at once that the Commission give no specific cases. They do not mention where anything actually occurred. They just make a general statement. The Governor says, entirely rightly, that he would have to have details of the whole matter so that he could inquire into it, and he had not had the chance then.
Again, my Lords, I put to the noble Viscount who leads the Opposition the incident at Nkata Bay, when the D.C. has one sergeant and four volunteers with rifles and a crowd comes in. He has gone to the crowd. The Commission pay a tribute to his heart as well as to his head. He has gone to the crowd and tried to stop them. He and his men cannot get the gates shut. They go back, and with a mob of up to a thousand Africans coming down on them. Three times his sergeant has to ask before he gets permission to fire. Again, I should be very glad if I could imagine David Kilmuir having that restraint and that courage in such circumstances. I cannot put it any higher than that. Now, my Lords, that is the general position; and again I ask your Lordships a perfectly simple question. Put yourselves in the position of that district commissioner: what would you have done? My Lords, I do not believe that anyone here would have done anything different.
Now I come to the general point, of which something has been made—this
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phrase of the "police state". I think it is very unfortunate that the Commission should have used that phrase, because there is a great distinction in the history of our time between a genuine democratic State that has to use measures in an emergency and the authoritarian or totalitarian State that uses such methods as a matter of governmental theory. It happened that some ten years ago I was chairman of the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe, on which there were about twenty jurists from fifteen countries; and I had some part in introducing the European Convention of Human Rights. Of course, one of the rights that that Convention guarantees is that an arrest should be followed by charge and trial.
My Lords, we put in (and this was unanimously agreed by twenty lawyers from the democratic countries of Europe) that there should be an exception. What was the exception? An emergency threatening the life of the State. Or, if you like it in French, danger publique. That has been the position here. It has been found there was an emergency threatening the life of the State, and a public danger; and it is in these circumstances that we follow out the thought of democratic countries; that people cannot use their own crimes or violence in order to supplant and interfere with the democratic way of life. That is what is happening here; and, my Lords, I say it is a pity. It happens that my experience has fallen in these fields, and it it is very clear to me. I am sorry that the words "police state", which undoubtedly to the ordinary person connotes the Hitlerian suggestion, should have been used in this context. It is worth pointing out—the Governor does it—that this is not a case where there is intolerence of criticism. It is not a case where people need hide their objection to the Federation. Your Lordships will see that in paragraph 14 of the Governor's reply; and, my Lords, as my noble friend Lord Perth said, by this very Commission everything has been thrown open to inquiry.
My Lords, that is the position; and I ask your Lordships to say, as the Governor says, that of course we are not condoning wrong, or saying that nothing has been done. Of course the burning at Mlanje was wrong. Of course,

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in some cases more force than was necessary was used on the arrests. But, taking it as the answer to that violent situation, where violence and murder were decided upon, I do say that from that we ought to go on to consider the future on the basis that violence and threats to murder will not occur again.
My right honourable friend the Colonial Secretary said, and my noble friend Lord Perth has repeated it, that first of all there are what I might call the short-term advances to deal with the present difficult situation: two Africans on the Executive Council, and more Africans on the Legislative Council; so that there will be a majority of Africans. But, in addition to that, I ask your Lordships to consider two other points. In the first place, the noble Viscount was good enough to say that my noble Leader Lord Home made clear, and said with great force, what I call the preamble point in regard to the Constitution of the Federation. The preamble says:
"Whereas Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue under the special protection of Her Majesty to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire, these Governments remaining responsible to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for, in particular, the control of land and for the local and territorial political advancement of the peoples thereof",
and that the question of Dominion status, if I may use the old term, arises only when those inhabitants so desire to go forward with confidence to the attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth. My Lords, that preamble is quite clear. My noble Leader Lord Home has said that we stand by it; my right honourable friend the Colonial Secretary has said that he stands by it; Sir Roy Welensky has said that he stands by it. So that you have these two points. You have immediate political advance, and you have the preamble. Again, however much we disagree on points, I ask noble Lords opposite to consider whether they cannot really help in the Commission which we want to set up to do the preparatory work, so that we can go forward to the next stage with full information.
There has been a feeling, "Well, you must not get away from and hide from political affairs by talking of economic affairs". Years ago, when I was young, I studied philosophy, and almost the only thing which I carried away was that these antitheses—body and soul, and so
890
on—are usually either false antitheses or are over-simplifications. I do not believe that, in our life, we can draw a distinction and say, "Political things end here and economic things end there." I should have thought—and I say this with the greatest respect—that the whole history of the Labour Party is a contradiction of that. So let us again look at it from the economic side.
There is, first of all, the short and medium term programme. It is designed to spend £12 million in Nyasaland during the next period, £6½ million in the next two years; and that covers £1½ million on welfare and education, £1½ million on urban and rural development, and £750,000 on new housing. But far more exciting than that is what my noble friend Lord Perth mentioned to-day, and that is the new plan for the Shire River There it is desired to put into effect several projects—and I want to put this point because I think it comes into the general picture. The group of projects in mind for the Shire Valley scheme would help many of Nyasaland's economic troubles. The various projects which, combined together, will eventually constitute a total scheme for the Shire Valley, have recently been reviewed and considered by the Government of Nyasaland and, to the extent to which they are concerned, by the Federal Government. There is a plan for the use of the river in the development of the new town and for the use of the river for power. The financing of the scheme is the responsibility of the Federal Government, and that is being examined.
The noble Lord, Lord Chorley, said with great generosity—I hope he will not think for a moment that I am being sarcastic—why does not the British taxpayer pay for all these developments? He knows that one of the methods of getting the money for large schemes of this kind is to go to one of the agencies which have been created for helping the underdeveloped countries. To take only the World Bank as an example, it is called the World Bank, but it is the bank of the free nations of the world and is largely financed by the United States and the Commonwealth. And one of the great advantages of the Federation is that it is naturally more creditworthy and it would be easier for the Federation to get the loans which are necessary for these big schemes.

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The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, asked me one specific question, about the families of detainees. I have obtained information on that point. Their welfare is not neglected. Where detainees were arrested in urban areas they were conveyed back to the places they came from and cash allowances have been made. I made a note of that because I did not want the noble Viscount to think I had forgotten what he said.
I have given your Lordships only a light sketch of the things that can be done. They represent hopes, and the hopes are based on the content of multiracial partnership, on the fact that the races are going to contribute their own qualities to the solution of the difficulties of this part of Africa. It is because there is this sphere for multi-racial, or non-racial or whatever you like to call it, society that I hope we are going to take a constructive position to-day.
The noble Lord, Lord Winster, made what I thought was a poor attack on my right honourable friend the Colonial Secretary. But the reputations of politicians are a matter on which we are bound to differ. A politician must be like that famous donkey who got so used to being beaten at the back that when the beating stopped the donkey would stop, too. During his years of office my right honourable friend has been responsible for the emergency of Ghana into independence. He has been responsible for the emergence of Malaya into independence. I went there as leader of the British delegation and I was most struck by what was happening there. He has been responsible for the emergence of the independent Commonwealth of Nigeria, which is coming into being next year. He has been responsible for the steps taken in the West Indies. These are the things which he has done. I ask your Lordships to say that a man with these achievements is somebody who does grasp the problems, the possibilities and the hopes. Now that the matter has been investigated, now that the dust has been scattered by the political fan, I ask your Lordships to let the dust settle, and go on with our duty of trusteeship and training for the benefit of all the people in this territory.
10.46 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Wool-sack has made such a remarkable speech that, if I were not conscious of the need to conserve the time of the House, I could speak for at least an hour in reply. I do not think that I should have any difficulty in doing so. Nevertheless, I do not propose to do it. He has followed the same line in the main that the Attorney-General followed in another place yesterday—namely, to support the view of the Governor in preference to the whole of the Report of the Devlin Commission. That is for the Government to decide, but there is no reason at all why the Opposition should not criticise the Government for doing so without due reference to everything that has been said by the Commission. I observe that the noble and learned Viscount has not replied to the passages about the attack on the whole political basis of the Central African Federation. I thought that that was a great pity.
Moreover, he does not need to plead with us for recognition of the necessity for the maintenance of law and order. Many of us have had long experience in government and we do not wish to be lectured, whoever the noble Lord may be or whatever experience he may have, on how to deal with the maintenance of law and order or in any sense on our measure of patriotism to our country. We know that a great many mistakes have been made in the past and by members of the present Government. Mistakes were made by previous Governments. As I have pointed out before, there is not a single main issue in the progress of our great Commonwealth where we have not first of all adopted the kind of policy which the Government are adopting now in Central Africa, and in every case it has led to wholesale bloodshed, through the fault of one side or another, yet in the end the people whom we fought and imprisoned came to hold positions of honour in the State. What we need in dealing with these matters is to have a little more consideration.
In this case, the great effort on the Conservative side has been to denigrate the efforts of the Commission. It is all very well to say that as a Government

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you need not accept the whole of the Report of any Government Commission or Inquiry. That is perfectly true. But in this case the Government had chosen a hand-picked body which, by its judicial experience and general background could be really impartial. One thing is lacking in the attacks upon it. The critics are acting like ordinary lawyers dealing with a brief handed to them after the sitting of a legal committee, putting their own construction on the written words. But this Commission has examined witnesses on the spot up and down the country. Not one of us has done that. I should have thought that the noble and learned Viscount would have been the first to recognise the difference in the position of a Commission of such experienced people, led by a famous jurist, who made their own judgment on every one of the witnesses, including Dr. Banda. You pass judgment on the basis of this one political idea: "We support the Governor's view, and the Governor's view alone, in preference to the view of the Commission." We on this side of the House do not need to reply to many of the questions put to us to-day, because we have accepted the Report as a whole. Many of the quotations made to us have been quotations which favour the findings which the
Government have accepted; and we accept them, too. We said so in the other place yesterday, and I have already said it here this afternoon. There is no need to put to us points like that.
What we do say is that there is a great lack of courage in the Government in producing only a White Paper as the reply of the Government, instead of taking the whole Report of the Commission to Parliament and saying: "This is what we wish and propose to do, so as to remove the possibility of a recurrence of any of the things complained about by the Commission". Without doubt many people have studied this matter from our point of view; and I very much appreciate the speeches, made with considerable courage, of the noble Lord, Lord Hemingford, and the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, this evening, and the short but sharp speech of the leader of the Liberal Party. Although we can be out-numbered by the hosts of the Conservative Party in the House, by going into the Division Lobby we shall at least have made a real and emphatic protest.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 34; Not-Contents, 80.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Granville-West, L.

Pethick-Lawrence, L

Alexander of Hillsborough, V.

Greenhill, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Amulree, L.

Harmsworth, L.

Rea, L.

Archibald, L.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Shackleton, L.

Attlee, E.

Hemingford, L.

Shepherd, L.

Burden, L. [Teller.]

Henderson, L.

Silkin, L.

Carnock, L.

Latham, L.

Sinha, L.

Chorley, L.

Layton, L.

Stansgate, V.

Crook, L.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L.

Darwen, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Taylor, L.

Elibank, V.

Pakenham, L.

Uvedale of North End, L.

Faringdon, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Congleton, L.

Hampton, L.

Ailwyn, L.

Crathorne, L.

Hastings, L.

Airlie, E.

Crookshank, V.

Home, E.

Albemarle, E.

Davidson, V.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Ashburton, L.

Denham, L.

Howe, E.

Ashton of Hyde, L.

Derwent, L.

Jessel, L.

Auckland, L.

Devonport, V.

Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

Bathurst, E.

Dundee, E.

Knollys, V.

Birdwood, L.

Ebury, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Blackford, L.

Ferrier, L.

Leconfield, L.

Boston, L.

Forester, L.

Long, V.

Bridgeman, V.

Fortescue, E.

Lothian, M.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Fraser of Lonsdale, L.

Luke, L.

Camrose, V.

Gage, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Chesham, L.

Goschen, V.

Merrivale, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Gosford, E.

Mills, L.

Coleraine, L.

Grenfell, L.

Milne, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Hailsham, V. (L. President.)

Milverton, L.

Conesford, L.

Hampden, V.

Monckton of Brenchley, V.

Monk Bretton, L.

St. Oswald, L.

Teviot, L.

Netherthorpe, L.

Salisbury, M.

Teynham, L.

Onslow, E. [Teller.]

Selkirk, E.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Pender, L.

Soulbury, V.

Twining, L.

Perth, E.

Strang, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Polwarth, L.

Swinton, E.

Waleran, L.

Robins, L.

Tedder, L.

Wolverton, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Tenby, V.

On Question, Resolution agreed to.

THE HOLA CAMP DISASTER
11.0 p.m.
LORD PAKENHAM LORD PAKENHAM rose to draw attention to documents published in Command Paper 816 relating to the disaster at Hola Camp; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to call attention to the disaster at Hola. I am sorry that this Motion should have come on so late, but I do not think any Members of the House will expect me to apologise for initiating a discussion on this matter before the House departs for the summer holidays. No one in the House will need me to remind them that on March 3 of this year eleven detainees were beaten to death by African warders on the instructions of the Camp Commandant who was present for most of the time, though he absented himself for a while, leaving no European in charge. That is to say, the Commandant was absent certainly while fatal injuries were inflicted, and also many other injuries which did not prove fatal. The eleven men died a little while afterwards; that is to say, ten died soon afterwards and one later in hospital. It is, of course, fair to point out that the Commandant never expected that they would die.
Is it right beyond all shadow of doubt to say that these men were murdered? I am aware that the coroner's finding did not exclude the possibility that some part of the force—perhaps a small part—might have been used under the Regulation which permits the use of force in case of violence from detainees. But I have not found any disposition on the Government's side to shelter under that point. I should have thought that the whole House, including the Minister, who I am glad to see is going to reply, would agree that a number of appalling murders were committed under our own country's official auspices on March 3
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at the Hola Camp. The men in question were clubbed to death—that is to say, murdered—for the simple reason that they refused to work.
Murder, as we have been told several times by Ministers, both yesterday and to-day, is murder whether it takes the form of killing or assassination; and I am sure that fact has been sufficiently emphasised in the House. These men were prisoners, helpless British subjects whom we had taken into our custody and care, and whom we claimed to have been trying to redeem. To many of us there is no surer indication of the difference between civilisation and barbarism than the treatment of prisoners, as we have been the first to point out to the Germans and a good many other peoples.
I think that many Members of the House—perhaps most—including, I would hope, members of the Government, would feel that this was the most shameful single event that has occurred in our Colonial history or, indeed, besmirched our name at home or abroad within living memory. I do not know how other Members react, but when I hear of an atrocity of this kind—though I do not remember one of quite this magnitude—my first instinct is to assume either that the Commandant in question lost his head, and behaved in some way quite unrelated to his character, or that, by some appalling mischance, a man of criminal and sadistic type found himself in this crucial position of responsibility. Otherwise, on the face of it the thing appears quite inexplicable. But in fact, neither of those explanations covers the facts here. The Commandant, while admittedly encountering a situation for which he was unprepared, acted deliberately in giving his orders beforehand; and though the orders may have been somewhat distorted by the warders, the Commandant himself was present for so much of the time while the fatal injuries were being inflicted that he cannot disclaim responsibility for the way in which his own orders were carried out.
There is no passage in the Report of the Kenya official inquiry more significant than paragraph 103, in which evidence is given as to the character of Mr. Sullivan, the Commandant. Perhaps the House would allow me to remind them of that passage. Mr. Sullivan is described—and I do not doubt any of this—as having already done much for Hola "by his enthusiasm and infectious good humour." His conduct is mentioned as being "exemplary". The testimonial of Canon Webster, the Chaplain to the Kenya Prisons, is of particular interest. Canon Webster is reported as having had a very high regard for Sullivan's character. He says that Sullivan was
"co-operative, conscientious and sympathetic to the detainees under his charge."
It seems that Mr. Sullivan gave Canon Webster every help in co-ordinating the activities of the African padre and the evangelist at Mageta Island, when Sullivan was in charge of Mageta Island in 1956. Canon Webster was most certainly, we are told, of the opinion "that Sullivan was not a cruel man." So the theory that this might be some sadist who had strayed into this job by some accident must clearly be excluded. Mr. Sullivan had served in the Navy for many years with credit before coming to Kenya, Therefore, what makes the story all the more horrifying is that it cannot be explained in terms of the iniquities of a particular Englishman.
Mr. Sullivan appears to have been a good, average, decent naval type, the salt of the earth, one would suppose from that description; a man who admittedly misunderstood his instructions but who was trying to carry them out faithfully. I am afraid I see Mr. Sullivan's performance as a symptom of an outlook with terrible potentialities for evil unless that outlook is instantly and utterly repudiated, and repudiated from the highest level. How did Mr. Sullivan, this average, decent Englishman, come to authorise these murderous assaults? He did so because he thought it was his job to get these men to work at any price. He saw that as his appointed duty; that it was his job to see that if they would not work they were beaten until they did, at whatever risk to their lives.
Had he any excuse for supposing that these were his orders? The House is
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aware by now of the visit paid to Hola on February 7, nearly a month earlier, by Mr. Cowan, the senior superintendent, who unfolded to Mr. Sullivan the Cowan Plan, which was a modification of methods used elsewhere for getting prisoners to work. Since Mr. Sullivan admittedly misunderstood Mr. Cowan's instructions, both in what might be called their strategy and tactics, we shall never know what Mr. Cowan told Mr. Sullivan. But in the Cowan Plan, as afterwards put on paper, paragraph 5J was described by the coroner of being of vital consequence. May I quote from the Cowan Plan? I will come to the point that the Cowan Plan was never communicated in writing to Mr. Sullivan, but I am quoting from the coroner:
"It is assumed that the party would obey this order"—
that is, the order to proceed to the work site—
"but should they refuse they would be manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task."
This is a quotation from the Cowan Plan in writing. "Should they refuse they would be manhandled to the work site and forced to carry out the task." The later inquiry of the Kenya officials said that they accepted Mr. Cowan's assurance that he never envisaged force in the form of batons being used, even if the men refused to work. The coroner found that the words I have just quoted from paragraph 5 clearly gave carte blanche to whatever force might be necessary to secure the performance of the task. That view of the coroner is apparently rejected by the later inquiry because of other Government directions in force—at any rate, known by high officials to be in force. It is not for me to challenge an inquiry conducted on the spot by excellent officials. I am, and I must be, ready to accept what the later report about Mr. Cowan says. But it is obvious, and it is accepted by all, that the intentions of Mr. Cowan were completely misunderstood by Mr. Sullivan on an absolutely vital point. If the House asks me why—and here I am speculating but speculating confidently—the explanation seems to me to be this: that, even making allowance for the way Mr. Sullivan modified the Cowan Plan, and these modifications only made it less efficient, it seems that

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Mr. Cowan completely under-estimated the difficulties of Mr. Sullivan's task.
Here I quote the words of the coroner:
"I find that the assumption that the order to work would be obeyed was completely unjustified."
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The name of the official in question is Cowan.
LORD PAKENHAM: I am ready to be corrected on that and all other points. I asked that I should be corrected on all points were I am clearly wrong, and with regard to the pronunciation of Mr. Cowan's name, I am clearly mistaken:
"I find"—
said the coroner—
"that the assumption that the order to work would be obeyed was completely unjustified in the circumstances operating at the time the plan was formulated, in view of the large-scale previous refusals and since the Plan itself was a Plan to compel refusing detainees to work."
In other words, the point about the use of batons, which Mr. Cowan never envisaged, and which were used in this terrible way, was never settled between the two men because they never discussed the matter.
Those who have studied the documents of the debate in another place are aware of the series of errors, to call them no worse, which occurred between the visit of Mr. Cowan to Hola on February 7 and the tragedy on March 3. Mr. Cowan drew up his Plan which, whether it was sensibly human or otherwise, failed to cover one all-important contingency—an organised refusal to work. He addressed it to the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Prisons. Later, Mr. Cowan received an urgent situation report from Mr. Sullivan which, in the light of his extra knowledge, should have caused him some disquiet. But he handed it to the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Prisons and went on overseas leave. I am certain he had richly earned his leave and was entitled to depart. One certainly cannot blame him for that. In that report, Mr. Sullivan, besides revealing, it may be thought, some misunderstanding of the Cowan Plan, mentioned the general deterioration in the situation and made what was surely an urgent plea:
"It is requested"
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he said—
"that the senior superintendent of prisons with appropriate powers of summary punishment, may be present when the policy outlined is implemented."
He begged to have a senior officer there before he tackled this difficult and dangerous duty.
On February 17 the Commissioner of Prisons forwarded the Cowan Plan with Sullivan's situation report to the Minister of Defence. And the Commissioner of Prisons wrote a Minute which included this passage:
"(4) The plans Mr. Cowan worked out at (9) could be undertaken by us, but it would mean the use of a certain degree of force in which operation someone might get hurt or even killed.
(5) I think this situation should be brought to the notice of the Security Council and a direction given on what policy should be adopted with these recalcitrant or unmanageable detainees. We must either let them stew and risk the contamination of the convicts and the open camp detainees, or take such action as planned at (9) with the risk of someone getting hurt or killed."
So the Commissioner of Prisons, when he forwarded the Plan for approval to his Minister, pointed out that it might lead to someone being hurt or killed, and that the circumstances should be placed before the Security Council.
The Minister felt it unnecessary to place this Plan before the Security Council. He did not consider that any new matter of Government policy was involved and did not refer it, therefore, to the Security Council. He discussed it with the Commissioner and accepted the principles contained in it. The Minister has in my opinion been criticised, and rightly criticised, and the Minister for African Affairs to whom the Plan was also made available, must share some of the responsibilities for not bringing this matter before the Security Council.
In fairness, I must quote their defence in paragraph 38 of the Officials' Report, in which these are perhaps the key sentences:
"The Minister of the Interior was satisfied that the proposals put up by Cowan and as understood at prison headquarters did not involve the use of any illegal force."
The proposals were not carried out in precisely that form. How he thought that resistance would in fact be overcome is not disclosed, but I am bound to say that in conjunction with other critics,

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including that ex-Conservative Minister, Mr. Enoch Powell, who made such a memorable speech in another place a day or two ago, I find the defence of these two Ministers remarkable and totally unconvincing.
Two further omissions must be mentioned, for both of which the Commissioner was responsible, and then the chain of neglect or muddle, or at best lack of foresight, is complete. The Cowan Plan, which was explained orally to Sullivan and which there should have been some reason at headquarters to think he had misunderstood, was never forwarded to him in writing, and Mr. Cowan had always assumed it would be forwarded in 'writing. Poor Mr. Sullivan had to be content with this oral briefing some time before. Secondly, Mr. Sullivan was denied the assistance of the Senior Superintendent of Prisons whom he had specifically and prudently asked for, because he knew better than anyone the kind of men he was being asked to deal with.
It all boils down to this. Mr. Sullivan was expected to perform a task of extraordinary difficulty. He was badly let down by his superiors, collectively and individually, whether through shocking neglect or sheer administrative muddle we are open to choose, and the latter is the more charitable view. The actions of Sullivan on March 3 cannot be condemned too strongly, and his penalty of being required to leave the Service with a gratuity is certainly not, in my opinion, too severe. The Committee of Officials, however, rightly point to these extenuating factors, but in removing some of the blame from his shoulders they put it higher up. I would extract these sentences:
"It was unfair to Sullivan to order him to carry out this special task without giving him specific and detailed instructions in writing and without proper assistance and supervision by senior and experienced officers.
"We consider that high level control should have been exercised over the execution of this operation, more particularly as it was the first of its kind to be undertaken at Hola."
The Commissioner of Prisons has voluntarily decided to ante-date his retire merit by a short space of time; he was about to retire in any case very soon I am quite ready to believe—I have no earthly reason for not believing—that he
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is a gentleman of the highest character, as revealed in this voluntary decision. But I certainly cannot feel, and the Commissioner obviously does not feel, that it would have been right for him to escape without penalty. I am not saying now that these particular penalties are inappropriate to the two gentlemen concerned, one being required to leave the Service with a gratuity and the other to agree to ante-date his retirement by a very short time. But I am saying, if that is all, that the sum total of penalty is shockingly disproportionate to and is infinitesimal compared with the fantastic evil of the slaughter. As they stand, if that is all, it adds to the blot on our name rather than contributing in any way to erasing it.
I must draw to a close, leaving many aspects untouched on. If I do not seek at this hour to discuss the future of the detainees it is not, as the House will I hope be ready to believe, because I am uninterested in penal reform or human reclamation. The episode of the Kenya Government communiqué of March 4, which the Colonial Secretary himself described as a grave mistake and most unfortunate, I must leave to other speakers. The House will remember that after a three-man team had visited Hola the Kenya Government issued a statement on March 4, the day after the tragedy, and in that statement, after mentioning that an inquest was to be held, clearly implied that the men had died as a result of the water they had drunk. If I might quote from that Government of Kenya Statement of March 4, they say:
"The deaths occurred after they had drunk water from a water cart."
I think the implication is clear: that in their view that was the explanation of the deaths. It is impossible not to be shocked by the circumstances surrounding that communiqué. Here, again, gross muddle is the most charitable view that can be offered.
Again, I can only allude in passing to the immense gulf of thinking which divides those of our countrymen and Members of the House here, who feel that the whole of the Kenya Administration deserve high praise for the way they have tackled the problem of detainees, and those who have been crying out and will continue to cry out in protest against

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the whole system, the philosophy behind it and the results which have followed it. It may well be argued—but I am not trying to argue it to-night—that if adequate inquiries had been called for, as they were in another place by the Labour Party, and had been allowed, into the conditions in these camps, these terrible happenings could never have taken place. But I am trying to narrow the issue to-night to see whether those on both sides of this gulf of thinking can unite in a verdict on this episode at Hola.
The real difficulty—and others must feel this beside myself—is that so many public servants are involved that the question of sorting out the measure of blame and deciding how much sacrifice should be called for from each one becomes almost impossible. I am ready to believe—here again I have no credentials for arguing otherwise—that the Attorney-General of Kenya was right. It is clearly beyond my province to differ from the Attorney-General in saying that no prosecutions could be launched with any hope of success. But may I venture to suggest that if that is so, if it is really impossible to launch any prosecutions, that must increase the strain on the political consciences of those who carry the ultimate responsibility, the Governor of Kenya and the Colonial Secretary.
I am concerned with this episode and this episode alone. I used to know the Governor of Kenya well and the Colonial Secretary very well, and I have in the past been privileged to call each of them my friend. I should certainly judge them by only the highest standards. I know well that the problem in their minds would not be how to cling to office but how to reconcile one kind of loyalty with another. How each one of us solves that problem is, in the last resort, something which each one has to determine within himself. But I myself believe that nothing could have been done so much to clear our name from this great slur as the resignation, without moral blame attached, of the Governor or the Colonial Secretary. I think the Governor should have resigned and then it would not have been necessary for the Colonial Secretary to resign. If the Governor failed to resign, I think it was the duty of the Colonial Secretary to go. I suppose that
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they have been persuaded that it is a higher loyalty to remain, and I say that without any sarcasm about men for whom I have a deep personal regard. Be that as it may, these frightful murders will take a long time to live down, and I hope that in the atmosphere of this House, if not elsewhere, it will be possible for one of the two Ministers who are speaking to-night to show signs not exhibited I am afraid, as I would have hoped, to the effect that the Government are bitterly ashamed of what has occurred under their rule and deeply resolved in a contrite spirit to make sure that nothing of this kind ever happens again.
We all know in our hearts that if some-frightful thing of this kind had happened in this country the matter would not have been disposed of with these derisory penalties. These men were Africans. Their fate and our treatment of what occurred there are of vital concern not only to the whole of Africa but, even more widely, to the whole world interested in British ideas of justice with our proud boast that we govern irrespective of colour. I implore the Government to speak tonight in a way that will make it plain that we are genuine and not humbugs when we say that in the British Commonwealth the life of every human being is equally precious, whether be be black, white, yellow or brown.
11.30 p.m.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, even at this late hour I think it is both right and proper that the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, should have raised this issue which is, as he says, one of great tragedy. It is also the first opportunity that we have had to debate this question in this House. I well understand the distress and the dismay of Lord Pakenham that no one can be prosecuted for this tragedy involving the death of eleven detainees at Hola. I also understand his sense of frustration. This sense has prevailed clearly throughout what was a very sincere speech. But I cannot follow him to his conclusion—namely, that the Governor, or indeed the Secretary of State, should resign. That, I believe, is an emotional reaction—something I can understand, something I realise is sincere. But it is not, I believe, supported by reason. I know that I speak for the Governor of Kenya

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as well as for the Government, and indeed for everybody in this country, when I say that we are deeply distressed at this disaster, very greatly regret it and are determined to see that its like can never happen again. Shortly, I shall be coming to the steps we have in mind to that end.
As the noble Lord has pointed out, no one has been prosecuted. The Coroner found that that could not be undertaken. The Attorney General of Kenya also, and most reluctantly, came to the same conclusion. The issue was long debated in another place, and there the Attorney General also offered that opinion. On that point I feel that there is nothing more to be said. It is also a tragedy for another reason, that it comes at the end of a long line of successes in dealing with Mau Mau detainees. The Kenya Government over the years have succeeded in restoring to normal life 77,000 out of 78,000 of the detainees—far more than anybody believed was possible a year or two ago. This is an achievement which, whatever may have occurred on March 3—and it is a terrible thing—is something from which nothing can detract.
The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, talked at some length about the Cowan plan and about the fact that it seemed to indicate or lead to force, and so forth. But I would point out that in that plan as originally suggested, there were, as Mr. Cowan understood with Mr. Sullivan, important safeguards. It was evolved from the experience of successes in other cases than those at Hola. Mr. Cowan thought that Mr. Sullivan understood that the experiment would be tried in relation to small batches of men, fifteen or so at a time; and in those conditions, if there were a large number of Europeans supervising, the sort of thing that did occur would not have occurred. In fact, Mr. Sullivan, I think, took out all 84 men in one batch.
Again, Mr. Cowan expected that they would be told they were going out to work. It was essential that they should be told this when they were in the camp. Unhappily, Mr. Sullivan did not follow out that instruction. He took them out of the camp without telling them what they were going to do, and it was then that the trouble arose. Then, also! we had not the number of Europeans who
would have been there if——
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl, but I raised one point which does not seem to me to have been sufficiently discussed. I do not know whether the noble Earl can give us an answer. What did Mr. Cowan envisage should be done if, in fact, the men refused to work?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think the answer on that point is that they should be manhandled. I think it is put in the Report that they should be made to go through the motions of work.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: The
noble Earl used the word "manhandled". That really is the whole point of the matter.
THE EARL OF PERTH: That is my interpretation. If my interpretation is wrong, I would appeal at this moment to the noble and learned Viscount to give his interpretation in a more legal form.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, it is actually dealt with. Cowan was asked that, and it may be helpful if I refer your Lordships to paragraph 32 of the Report, which says:
"Cowan was asked about what he meant by 'manhandled', and he explained that his meaning was precisely illustrated by a photograph which he showed to us"—
that is the Committee, of course—
"cut from the Daily Telegraph of Saturday, 9th May, 1959, which showed five Metropolitan Police constables frog-marching a struggling demonstrator from outside Pentonville prison."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, what does that mean?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I see it, it means taking someone by the arm and urging them along. That is the way the police remove a demonstrator.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Where do they take them? And how long do they go on with this manhandling?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sorry; I thought that the noble Viscount was asking me what was meant by that. I understand that that is the ordinary police method. But as my noble friend said—I am sorry if I have stolen his thunder—that what Cowan had in mind was that they would be manhandled; that is, frogmarched, in the way that a policeman deals with someone, to the scene of

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the work, and then that their hands would be placed down, say, to remove a root from the trench; and that the fact of getting their hands to go round the root and take it up would demonstrate to them that the Mau Mau oath was not the terrifying, awful thing that they thought when they swore it, but that the fate they believed would befall them if they broke the Mau Mau oath was dissipated by the fact that they had succeeded in removing the root and no harm had befallen them. I should think that the folklore of every country in the world contains something of that sort, but it cannot be ignored. I am sorry if I have stolen the thunder of my noble friend, but I hope that I have got it right.
LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, if that is the interpretation that Cowan put upon it, is it not rather a misfortune that he did not explain it to the man who was going to carry out this process?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I think the answer must certainly be that it is a great pity, because obviously it was one of the causes of the tragedy occurring. I spoke a little about the Cowan plan because I think it is important to realise some of the reasons why the thing went wrong.
But, of course, all along one knew that rehabilitation involved risks; for as the Governor says in his despatch of July 6, which is published as part of Command 816, detainees include men who are ready at any time to resort to violence. I am not saying this as any sort of excuse for what happened on March 3, but rather as a pointer to the fact that the whole rehabilitation operation had always involved danger to prison officers as well as to detainees, and those dealing with it had to face this fact when planning any forward moves.
My Lords, after seeing the coroner's report, as you will know, the Governor appointed a Commission of Inquiry into charges against Mr. Sullivan, and the inquiry also covered Mr. Coutts, the Assistant Superintendent. I do not think there is any point in my going into detail on the charges. It is sufficient to say, as the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, said, that Mr. Sullivan is to be retired from
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the Service. There were extenuating circumstances, but that was the position as to the penalty. As to Mr. Coutts, the Governor and Minister accepted the findings of the Commission that the charges were not proved and no action was justified.
The findings also, as the noble Lord pointed out, revealed a serious administrative situation in the prison department. Mr. J. H. Lewis was the Commissioner of Prisons. His attention was drawn to the substance of the Committee's remarks, and he at once sought permission to retire; and this has been granted. Mr. Lewis has performed a thankless task over the last seven years, and it is a very sad thing that this should be the end of such a fine career. He acted in an honest and exemplary way throughout the inquest and throughout the disciplinary proceedings.
So far, my Lords, I do not think there has been any divergence of opinion, at least among those who have spoken. I do not think I need touch on Mr. Cusack or Mr. Johnston, the Ministers; but I should like to take up the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, about the Press communiqué.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt, but I should not like the noble Earl to feel that I accept the exoneration of the Ministers. I did not dwell on that point, but, as I tried to explain, I found their defence completely unconvincing, and I found the argument in another place of a distinguished Conservative ex-Minister most telling.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I do not want to go back to that, but I think the important thing is the Press communiqué. I agree it was regrettable, and Mr. Campbell has admitted that his notes, which were not formal but only for the purpose of an oral report, were in one or two respects incorrect. But one must not judge from that that this was a deliberate attempt to mislead or to cover up the true facts. That, I think, is an incredible interpretation to put on what happened. We must remember that when Mr. Campbell and Mr. Small were up at Hola investigating the position, in order to make a very quick report, they knew that at that very time the coroner was investigating; they knew the C.I.D. officers had been sent to see

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what was the situation; and they knew that under those conditions the doctors also were looking into it. What was the truth was bound to be arrived at. They were wrong in what they discovered, or, rather, in what they concluded; but that they ever thought of trying to cover things up is clearly something which does not warrant any belief or any support.
Now I think the most important thing I can talk about is the point which the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, very rightly made—namely, what arrangements are we making to prevent such a happening again; and, further, what are the arrangements to continue the rehabilitation of the remaining hard-core detainees? As your Lordships will know, a Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Fairn, has been considering these problems. The Committee includes Canon Bewes and another gentleman, whose name I am afraid escapes me at the moment. But they all have great experience and are people well qualified for their task.
LORD FARINGDON: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Earl would agree, in view of the fact he is quoting the Report of this Commission, that it would have been a great help to us this evening if we had had this Report, for which we asked last week.
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I quite agree and I was going to make my apology that the Report was not fully available. There are, however certain things that should help your Lordships
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, would the noble Earl agree that it is a very old Parliamentary practice that it is improper for a Minister to support his views by quotations from a Report unless he lays the Report on the table?
THE EARL OF PERTH: My Lords, I am sure that is an old Parliamentary practice. But if the noble Viscount will allow me to finish, I am going to quote from a document which is in your Lordships' hands, if you bother to read it. I refer to the Report which appears in the despatch, Command 816. I regret that the other Report is not available. As I said, it is being considered by the
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Governor, and the detailed recommendations, together with his judgment, will be known shortly. But—and this is the point—the main conclusions are already known and they are to be found in the Governor's despatch of July 6, Command 816, which is in your Lordships' hands.
They find that there is hope of eventually restoring many of the 1,000 remaining detainees to normal life, but they do not think their release without reconciliation and restoration can be justified. Detention and restriction without trial are there-for, unhappily, going to be necessary for quite a long time. But there is hope, and the Governor and the Administration are to redouble their efforts to reclaim the detainees, if necessary one by one. To this end, with the numbers falling and the problem altering, there is to be a single chain of command with a single Minister responsible. At the head of the chain of command is to be a special Commissioner, Mr. R. G. Wilson, and he will be working under the Minister, Mr. Johnston. I feel confident that this will be a strong team and that the new organisation will function well.
The following steps are also being taken to prevent a similar occurrence. A fresh directive is being prepared in clear and simple language on the rules governing the use of force. Instructions are being issued for medical officers to bear especially in mind the possibilities of deficiencies in ascorbic acid. That is important, because one of the contributory causes to the tragedy at Hola may well have been this deficiency. And, lastly, any important prison operations will be committed to writing and copies given to the officer in charge when they are approved.
My Lords, the tragedy of Hola will always remain, with its sense of frustration that none can be prosecuted. Disciplinary action for faulty administration has been taken already. Our regret at the Hola disaster is profound. But let us also remember the successes in rehabilitation in the past. As to the future, with the measures I have outlined to prevent any such occurrence again, and with the new organisation to deal with the last and most difficult of the detainees, we earnestly trust that the task of restoring these unhappy people to normal life and to their own kinsmen will succeed.
11.48 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I do not want to speak at great length, because I am not very well acquainted with the subject. But I must tell the noble Earl that to many people the whole idea of detaining people who have not been convicted is abhorrent. I do not know how many of these eleven people who were killed had been convicted—perhaps he could tell me. But to talk about retraining them, rehabilitating them, is, I believe, quite new so far as we are concerned and it is much too much like the German system. It is not to be supposed that Hitler's camps were intended to exterminate people. There were extermination camps like the Auschwitz Camp; but the camps were also intended to do what is called "rehabilitate". As regards Auschwitz, the notion was that if you beat people up enough somehow you redeem them; and that was an attempt to crush the spirit. I had one particular friend, Dr. Niemoller. Dr. Niemoller was eight years in one of these camps because he would not bow the knee to the Nazis. And they would say, "We are doing no harm to him. We are merely rehabilitating him." It would be interesting to have a paper about it.
You may say "We had 80,000 and we redeemed 79,000." But had the 80,000 people been convicted of something, or were they simply people whose names were ticked by the police? That is a point which is extremely important. Because if the policeman says, "I will put him in because I think, on the whole, he is better out of the way", is it quite easy for the man, later on, to be what is called redeemed? Will the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, who is to reply again, tell us how a man is redeemed. Suppose a man is in a rehabilitation camp and he wants to be redeemed. What does he do? Does he say, "I have given it all up"? Does he make a "decision", such as at a Billy Graham meeting? What does he do to escape? Because I well imagine, especially if he is a man with no particular convictions, that he would do anything to get out on to a farm.
When we come to the Hola case, why do these 1,000 men continue to be beaten up? The Lord Chancellor is giving us another version—not a different version, but a third version—of what can be
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done with the people. According to the first paragraph here, they must not be beaten. The Lord Chancellor describes another process of what he calls "manhandling"—pushing a man to place and making him lift a root. Supposing he does not lift a root, what do you do with him then? Then you have another system: if he refuses to work, you take him out and flog him. How does he escape? By saying, "I am saved"? That is what I cannot understand. I am perfectly certain that the French Union is looking on; that Ghana is looking on, and that the whole of Black Africa is looking on, at the way we treat these people. And we have never had—at least, I have not seen—an explanation which satisfies the ordinary conscience of an Englishman, who believes that people should not be tortured, should not be beaten, and should not be imprisoned unless they have been convicted of some offence.
11.52 p.m.
THE EARL OF LUCAN: My Lords, very little remains to be said, I think, on this one debate. I regret very much that we are not going to hear the noble Lord, Lord Twining; because, with his experience, I was hoping that we should get a really authoritative opinion on what consequences should have followed a breakdown, an incompetence in the administration, such as has been disclosed in Kenya.
The noble Earl, Lord Perth, started by complaining that my noble friend Lord Pakenham, in some of his demands, was speaking emotionally, and that his demand for the resignation of the people responsible was not dictated by reason.
My Lords, are we not dealing entirely with a matter of the emotions, not only in this country but in others? It is an emotional matter, not a rational one, that strikes the people of the world when there are wholesale murders in such circumstances. It seems to me that it is quite right to talk about it on an emotional basis. I think that is the way it has struck many, many people in this country, quite apart from those in Colonial territories, in the Commonwealth, and in other countries overseas. I think the shock, as it gradually dawned on people what had happened, has been very much deeper than Her Majesty's Government appreciate: and I think

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there is nothing which has been said that I have heard or read that cannot be classed as complacent. It was complacency that was complained of in another House; and although the noble Earl took the whole matter very seriously, I cannot help thinking that his attitude was complacent. His attitude seemed to be: "There it is. It was a great pity, and very regrettable. Somebody has suffered, but there it is; we will do better next time."
And to bring into this question the fact that 77,000 of the original detainees have been released, I really do not think is relevant. We are not considering why those men were at that particular camp. The fact remains that, while they were detained there under our powers, they were beaten to death. All noble Lords must know the story quite well, and we cannot go into it now. But I think that most people who have had any experience of, or have thought at all about, the Commonwealth realise that in the past, when cases of gross mismanagement and incompetence came to light in the Colonies, they were taken very seriously; and somebody, the senior person who was ultimately responsible, resigned, or was forced to resign. In this case, it was not merely the fact that it was a case of extraordinary incompetence and muddle running right through one branch of the administration, but the fact that that resulted in a wholesale loss of life and in conditions that really have never been equalled, I think in our Colonial history.
My Lords, next time any of your Lordships use a phrase about the free world or the Western way of life, and contrast that way of life with any others, remember, please, that things just as unpleasant can happen in places for which we, this Parliament, are responsible. We maintain that the Government have treated this matter altogether too lightly.
11.58 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Lucan, will not think that I am taking this matter too lightly. The deaths of eleven men can never be lightly passed over. It must always be regarded as a matter of the utmost gravity. I want to say quite clearly that the gravity and seriousness is not affected by what they are, who they are, or what they have done. The noble Earl
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takes my point; that it is entirely immaterial, from the point of view of inquiry into their deaths in these circumstances, what they had done when they were implicated in Mau Mau. I have said too often in my life that justice I must be done to the dead as well as the living, because the dead include all those who belong to their families and whose lives are wrapped up with them.
Now I should like to underline that by reading very shortly what my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General said with regard to prosecution, because the noble Lord said that the accumulated penalties seemed slight. Therefore, I think it is important that in this debate I should mention the difficulties in the way of prosecution. My right honourable and learned friend said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 607 (No. 126), col. 362]:
"Murder is a foul and terrible crime and the colour of a murdered person's skin does not reduce its gravity. It is a terrible thing that as a result of the events of 3rd March eleven detainees met their death. It would seem, I am certain, that some, if not all, of them did so as a result of illegal blows, but as some of the violence used by the warders was justified it was not possible and is not to establish whether any particular injury was the result of any particular blow."
My right honourable and learned friend went on to say:
"Hon. Members can read for themselves in the coroner's report that it is not possible to establish that any particular injury was the result of an illegal blow, that any particular death was due to illegal force, or that any particular person struck an illegal blow. That is the finding of this magistrate, whose conduct of this inquiry has been praised on all sides."
As my noble friend Lord Perth said, that was also the view of the Attorney-General of Kenya. The important point is that the absence of prosecution depended not on the view of the Law Officers of the Crown alone but on views based on an independent Inquiry by a magistrate who came to similar conclusions.
The next point is the position of Sullivan himself. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, has not gone into the findings in detail. The position is shown in paragraphs 101 to 105, and broadly the position is, as the noble Lord put it, that Sullivan did not apply the plan as it was suggested. If your Lordships will bear with me for a moment, I would refer to

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the finding against Sullivan which is in paragraph 101 (2).
"The first particular is that he put the 85 detainees to work in such a way that he was unable to exercise proper control over them and in a manner contrary to instructions given to him by Senior Superintendent Cowan.… We further find that this arose from Sullivan's failure to grasp what Cowan had told him and not from any deliberate breach of instructions."
There was the further finding that Sullivan "gave his warders inadequate and improper orders" and "took out a force of nearly 200 warders and detainees on the road under his sole charge" and that he left the site knowing that batons had been used. He was also charged with failing to prevent warders from improperly assaulting the detainees and with giving misleading information about the use of batons.
As my noble friend Lord Perth pointed out, the Committee are careful to say that there were certain mitigating circumstances. Broadly speaking, these are that apparently there was a failure of communication of the plan between Cowan and Sullivan. I think that it is important for your Lordships to realise what Cowan had in mind in his plan. In paragraph 31 of the Report it says:
"Applying the principles set out in paragraph 30 to the report of 11th February by Cowan, we can find that there was nothing improper in the suggestions made by Cowan for the use of 'compelling force'".
Your Lordships will appreciate that the inquiry had already distinguished between compelling force and punitive force in the preceding paragraph.
"The report was addressed to the Commissioner of Prisons. Cowan was therefore writing to an officer conversant with the differences between compelling force and overwhelming force, between legal and illegal force. The report was not, and was not intended to be, a detailed operational plan. The Commissioner discussed the report with Cowan. It was not, therefore, necessary for Cowan to qualify his report by saying in, for example, paragraph 5 (j) when speaking of manhandling and detainees being 'forced to carry out the task', that this manhandling and force should be compelling force only and would not be overwhelming force. Had the letter been addressed to a layman this paragraph would have been misleading. It was not so addressed and we can therefore find nothing improper in it."
I now pass on to the kind of force used. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, appreciates that Cowan was closely questioned on this matter. What
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he said, roughly, was that the words, "compelling force" might have been ambiguous to a layman, but his report was not intended for a layman. The use of batons was never authorised by him because the use of batons was absolutely and strictly forbidden. According to Sullivan's evidence which the noble Lord has probably looked at, he asked Cowan how they were to be forced to work. Cowan told him that the task was weeding, whereby the men had to crouch down to weed by hand. The noble Lord has gone through—if he will allow me to say so, with great restraint and perfect propriety—the number of people who were injured. I can only assure him that I have tried to carry out the same exercise.
With regard to the position of Mr. Lewis, who my noble friend Lord Perth has said has retired, the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, will see that the Committee deal with Mr. Lewis's reactions in paragraph 36. Further on they explain Lewis's reason for not sending the copy to Sullivan, and they comment most strongly upon that. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, referred to the risk of death that was observed. It was explained that that referred to warders as well as to other people, obviously on the basis (and I think this is fair) that a fight might start between the warders and the detainees. But I think the points in regard to Lewis are these: that there was no reply to Sullivan's report. Secondly, he did not read into the report that Sullivan misunderstood the Cowan plan, which seemed obvious to the Committee. Thirdly, he did not consider tools important. Fourthly, he gave Sullivan no instructions how to deal with the agricultural manager's refusal to provide a task which could be done without tools; he thought this a local matter and, as I said a moment ago, the risk he had in mind was the risk to the warders. On that, and what I mentioned in the Committee's finding in paragraph 45, the attention of Mr. Lewis was drawn to these matters and he resigned at once. As my noble friend Lord Perth said, he has done an extremely difficult job in very difficult conditions since the war.
I am very anxious not to say a word that might make it seem as if I were underestimating anything, but I am sure

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the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, from his inquiries in many fields, will realise that, these being the complaints about Lewis, and that being the job he has done, at any rate it is a reasonable view of the position that if he left the service that would be enough. I am being studiously careful in the matter. I am only saying to the noble Lord that I think he will agree that that is in the field of reasonableness.
LORD PAKENHAM: I may say at once that, speaking for myself, I would agree with what the Lord Chancellor has just said.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am very glad. I also went into the position of Mr. Cusack the Minister of Defence and Internal Security. The position was that under the Cowan plan there were the following safeguards: first, that the detainees should be told first in the compound—that is, before they were taken out at all—that they were being taken to work; secondly, that they should be told that in a party of not more than twenty; thirdly (and the noble Lord will appreciate the importance of this) that another group should not be told until the first party was safely under way and had started work; and fourthly, that at the time of the telling there should be an overwhelming warder force, including five Europeans. It was with these safeguards that Cusack took the view that the matter did not call for reference to the Security Council. He had an experienced Commissioner of Prisons with him. So far as the execution was concerned, he knew that care had been taken to send Cowan to see Sullivan, and if he had known or guessed that some of the fundamental points of the plan were to be altered in such a way that trouble might ensue, then he would have said there was to be no alteration in the plan.
The position, so far as he is concerned, is this. Can it really be said that he was not entitled to assume that, once he had given his approval to the plan, it would be carried out without any fundamental alteration? As again the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, will have noticed, he says that he would never have agreed to 85 detainees being sent out in one group. That was the main cause of this trouble. Cusack thought that as a matter of routine a copy of Cowan's letter would be sent to Sullivan; he did not think that
918
the original operation as planned by Cowan was delicate or dangerous, and he was satisfied that the proposals of Cowan did not involve the use of an evil force. Of course he never envisaged that batons would be used.
LORD PAKENHAM: If I may interrupt at that point? Surely he was taking a grave responsibility on himself at that moment in rejecting the view of the Commissioner of Prisons.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The Commissioner of Prisons originally suggested that the matter should have been sent to the Security Council. For the reasons that I have given, and because of the safeguards, Mr. Cusack thought that it need not be sent.
I do not want to seem to be making points for the sake of doing so. I gave the noble Lord nine reasons why he thought that, and again I put it in this way: that having these nine reasons, and considering that he dealt with policy and that execution was for the Commissioner, he thought he was justified in taking that view. I refer the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, to paragraphs 39 and 40 of the Report, and I think that in the circumstances the position of Mr. Johnston, the Minister for African Affairs, was really too far removed from the matter. At least, I would put it in this way: that I should find it difficult to see what charge could be framed against him. It would be possible to frame a charge against Mr. Cusack, although it is not a charge that would hold, for the reasons I have given; but I should have thought that it was difficult to say that Mr. Johnston was sufficiently proximate to the events for even a charge to be made.
The other matter is the question of the investigation of the Campbell trio. Again I should like to assure the noble Lord that I have worked out all the facts which the Campbell trio could have learned if they had been really clever on their visit to Hola; and I have in mind particularly the evidence of Mr. Thompson and the evidence as to the defence to get in touch with Dr. Rogarth, the pathologist, and some remarks that Dr. Moyes said. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, will agree that what Dr. Moyes did would have been very puzzling to anyone, because Dr. Moyes was a young man of

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25 or 26 and was engaged in dealing with twenty-two men who were hurt, rather than with examining the dead bodies. That is a priority which one could well understand. That is not an excuse; it is what actually happened.
I want to tell the noble Lord that I have gone through all that. Undoubtedly, as my right honourable friend the Secretary of State said, there was the most unfortunate failure to communicate and understand; secondly, it was unfortunate that Campbell, who is the junior of the three officials, which again complicates the matter, was the person who made a note—he did not make a formal report, but made a note—which, as he frankly put it, was also inaccurate. That note was used as the basis of the report, and the result was the communiqué which has been so bitterly regretted. But, as my right honourable friend said, when one considers that most unfortunate communiqué, one also has to remember that the police and the pathologist were both inquiring into it. They knew the matter was going to go on, and I do not think that there was any question of hiding the matter.
I want to deal with one other point, and I am sorry I am taking so long. The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked me about rehabilitation. I think I can help him in two ways on that. The first is in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Report. The Committee deal with the question of rehabilitation and describe what was done. I think this is the sentence which the noble Viscount had in mind:
"The rehabilitation of detainees depends on hard work, discipline and voluntary confession."
Voluntary confession is the getting of the fact that they have been in the Mau-Mau.
"With the continued success of rehabilitation the few remaining detainees who failed to respond to Government's efforts to turn them into good citizens and release them to freedom, became increasingly difficult and intransigent.
The Government was therefore left with those who were not acceptable to their own communities, or who had, by their refusal to co-operate with the Government in rehabilitation, made it impossible for the Government to release them."
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: How many of them?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: After the noble Viscount's question, I got as much information as I could, and as I understood it the noble Viscount asked how many were convicts.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Tried.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The number of Mau Man convicts—those who had actually been convicted—
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am talking about the Hola Camp.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am talking about the whole series of camps. It was more than 18,000, and there are now only 82 left. Rehabilitation the noble Viscount will find mentioned in Despatch 1603, in paragraph 6, and that was drafted after consultation with the Committee.
The noble Viscount will remember the maiden speech in the House of Commons of my great predecessor Lord Birkenhead, when he was F. E. Smith. He will remember that at a moment in that maiden speech Lord Birkenhead accused Mr. Lloyd George of saying that the Tory Party intended to introduce slavery on the hills of Wales. Mr. Lloyd George got up indignantly to deal with this matter, and my predecessor said,
"Anticipating such a lapse of memory on the part of the right honourable gentleman, I came here armed with a newspaper which is not generally unsympathetic to the right honourable gentleman's cause. I allude to the Manchester Guardian."
I have also come armed with the Manchester Guardian for Tuesday. I know how carefully the noble Viscount reads The Times, but he might extend it to the Manchester Guardian this time, because there is a most interesting article with photographs called:
"The brighter side at Hola. The fruits of a successful scheme."
Quite seriously, I do not think that a paper like the Manchester Guardian, which is running an attack on the Government on Hola and Devlin at the moment, would have put it in unless they had been convinced, on the old Scott principle, that news was right. They say here that out of no fewer than 78,000 such sympathisers detained for security reasons since 1954—that includes the 18,000—fewer than 1,000 remain in detention to-day, and from these only 100 or so

921
still show no signs of renouncing their past allegiance to Mau Mau, such is the success of Kenya's difficult rehabilitation process.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I do not read the Manchester Guardian very often. Can the Lord Chancellor tell us how many of these people who were murdered had been tried and convicted?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: No, I am sorry, I cannot.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: It does not matter—they are still dead.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is because they are dead that I am afraid that I have trespassed on the time of the House by explaining again most carefully why there could be no prosecution, and explaining the chain of command and the position of each person. I hope that I have shown that we have treated this as a serious matter, and again the result is, as my noble friend Lord Perth has shown, that a really effective reorganisation has been set in motion, and we hope that we have made it impossible that this should happen again. It is so easy to appear complacent in these matters that I can only throw myself on your Lordships' mercy. But it is an extraordinary thing that, after 78,000 cases have gone through without complaint from the detainees except in a very few cases, with the success that the Manchester Guardian has mentioned, the misunderstanding and the misapplication of orders by Sullivan, who is a man—I am sure the noble Viscount has read it—of high purpose and good character——
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I have nothing against him.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It was interesting that he was specially mentioned by the padre for being a man who was cheerful and co-operative and got on well with anyone. But he misunderstood or did not carry out his orders. He took out these 85 men and these awful occurrencies happened. That is the position. I do not think I can help your Lordships further, but I have done my utmost to deal with the points raised.
12.29 a.m.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am, as usual, most grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for the very careful way in which he has dealt with the points we placed before the House, and also to the noble Earl, Lord Perth, who was very courteous, as always. In a moment, I am going to ask the House to divide on this Motion, but before doing so it might be as well simply to explain what we shall be voting about. I am not accusing the noble Lords opposite in any personal sense of having brought about the deaths of these eleven men. I am saying that when those deaths occurred it was their duty to bring the culprits to justice much more effectively than they have been able to; or, failing that, it was the duty of some high-level person to resign. Because that has not occurred, I feel confident that it will go out to the world that this matter is not treated with sufficient gravity by Her Majesty's Government. That may be a misleading impression but that is how it will go out to the world. It is because I feel that the Government have failed to act in an appropriate manner in view of this unprecedented tragedy, that I am going to ask the House to support my Motion for Papers.
On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 10; Not-Contents, 59.

CONTENTS

Addison, V.

Lucan, E. [Teller.]

Shepherd, L. [Teller.]

Archibald, L.

Milner of Leeds, L.

Stansgate, V

Crook, L.

Pakenham, L.

Taylor, L.

Darwen, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Auckland, L.

Camrose, V

Ailwyn, L.

Bathurst, E.

Chesham, L.

Albemarle, E.

Blackford, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Amulree, L.

Boston, L.

Coleraine, L.

Ashburton, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Colville of Culross, V

Ashton of Hyde, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Conesford, L.

Congleton, L.

Home, E.

Perth, E.

Crathorne, L.

Howard of Glossop, L.

Rea, L.

Davidson, V.

Howe, E.

Robins, L.

Denham, L.

Jessel, L.

St. Aldwyn, E. [Teller.]

Derwent, L.

Kilmuir, V. (L. Chancellor.)

St. Oswald, L.

Devonport, V.

Lansdowne, M.

Selkirk, E.

Ferrier, L.

Long, V.

Soulbury, V.

Fortescue, E.

Luke, L.

Teviot, L.

Gage, V.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Teynham, L.

Goschen, V.

Merrivale, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Gosford, E.

Milne, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Grenfll, L.

Netherthorpe, L.

Waleran, L.

Hailsham, V. (L. President.)

Onslow, E. [Teller.]

Wolverton, L.

Hastings, L.

Pender, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Motion disagreed to accordingly.

THE EARL OF HOME: My Lords, I know that the whole House will wish me before we adjourn to thank the official reporters for the services they have given this House. We have often sat late and
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it has been a very long Session. Their services to us have been admirable and we should like to thank them for it.
House adjourned at twenty-one minutes before one o'clock on Thursday, July 30.