Sitting of 26 June 1958

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS
  BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION ORDER CONFIRMATION (No. 2) BILL
  Read the Third time and passed.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Cotton Goods (Imports)
    Mr. Haleasked the President of the Board of Trade, for the twelve months up to the most recent date for which figures are available, and for the period of twelve months immediately preceding, the imports from India and from and via Hong Kong of cotton piece goods computed by measurement.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Sir David Eccles): Imports from India and Hong Kong were 166 million square yards and 89 million square yards respectively in the year ended 30th April, 1958, compared with 149 million square yards and 59 million square yards in the corresponding period a year earlier. Imports via Hong Kong are not separately distinguished in the Trade Accounts, but re-exports of woven cotton fabrics from Hong Kong to the United Kingdom recorded in the Hong Kong Trade Accounts in the years ended April, 1957, and April, 1958, were negligible.
    Mr. Hale: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that for seven years now we have been raising this issue, for seven years various Presidents of the Board of Trade have been saying that they were considering what action to take and that for seven years the figures have been going up? Is he further aware that they are now causing grave unemployment in Lancashire, that they represent a grave
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    form of quite unfair competition, and that we are not helping the people of Hong Kong by permitting their employers to employ them for eighty hours a week at low wages? Has not the time come for joint action by the right hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary to deal with this very serious matter?
    Sir D. Eccles: The hon. Gentleman is no doubt aware that negotiations to put a voluntary ceiling on these exports are going on. I can hardly think that it will help labour conditions in Hong Kong if we refuse to buy its production.
    Mr. Jay: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what is the latest stage of these negotiations, and whether any progress has been made?
    Sir D. Eccles: We are still waiting an answer from the Government of Pakistan, or rather the industry of Pakistan.
    Mr. Hale: Is the right hon. Gentleman now enunciating the principle that the employment of slave labour should be preserved by a Tory Government merely because the slave might be worse off if we did not buy the goods? If he applies a condition of that kind, how are we ever to improve conditions in the Colonies?
    Sir D. Eccles: I think that the expression "slave labour" is a reflection on Hong Kong which is not deserved.
    Sir J. Barlowasked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the fact that the possibility of an agreement between the United Kingdom cotton industry and the cotton industries of India and Pakistan as to the level of imports from those two countries depends on a limit being placed on imports of cotton goods from Hong Kong, what steps the Government are taking to facilitate an understanding being reached between the United Kingdom and Hong Kong industries.
    Sir D. Eccles: Negotiations between the cotton industries of Lancashire, India and Pakistan have not yet been concluded. The question of further action as regards Hong Kong does not, therefore, arise at present.
    Sir J. Barlow: Does my right hon. Friend realise the great importance, for

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    Lancashire as a whole, of the early and successful conclusion of these negotiations?
    Sir D. Eccles: I can assure my hon. Friend that the Government are impressing upon the various parties the need for the utmost urgency in concluding these talks.
    Mr. S. Silverman: Is the Minister aware that the key to any question of voluntary agreement lies in Hong Kong, and that it would be quite unreasonable to expect India and Pakistan to agree to a voluntary limitation if only Hong Kong exporters were to benefit by it? When the right hon. Gentleman says that the Government are doing their best, will he say whether they have been doing their best for seven years—and explain why, in that case, there has been no result? Will he bear in mind that this industry is different from any other industry which is exposed to competition of this kind, in that it is geographically situated in one limited area, and that there is, therefore, no possibility of people who lose their employment finding local employment in other industries?
    Sir D. Eccles: I realise that this is a very serious matter for Lancashire—but it is also a very serious matter that competition comes from within the Commonwealth.
    Sir J. Barlowasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the higher levels of wages paid in the Hong Kong textile industry apply mainly to the large organised spinning mills, and are higher than those paid in some weaving sheds and by the making-up end of the industry; and whether he will accordingly include finished and made-up cotton textiles from Hong Kong as well as grey cloth in any negotiations for limiting imports into the United Kingdom.
    Sir D. Eccles: The information at my disposal does not wholly bear out my hon. Friend's statement about wage levels in the Hong Kong industry. The answer to the second part of the Question is that the current negotiations are on an inter-industry basis and their scope is a matter for the parties to them.
    The Government's position on this matter was stated in my Answer to Questions on this subject on 3rd April, 1958.
    Sir J. Barlow: Does my right hon. Friend appreciate the necessity for including made-up goods in any negotiations for the limitation of imports into this country?
    Sir D. Eccles: I fully appreciate the desirability for doing that, but these are voluntary agreements, and it therefore depends upon what the industries concerned are willing to do.
    Sir A. V. Harveyasked the President of the Board of Trade what weight of cotton yarn has been imported from Hong Kong during the last six months.
    Sir D. Eccles: In six months ending 30th April, 1958, 1,114 tons.
    Sir A. V. Harvey: Can my right hon. Friend say what negotiations have taken place with the Hong Kong people since the visit of Sir Frank Lee? Can he tell the House what he intends to do about this very serious problem, which is affecting all our constituencies in the North of England?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am not aware that any discussions have taken place about cotton yarn. The figure I gave my hon. friend represents 0·7 per cent. of the United Kingdom production.
    Mr. H. Hyndasked the President of the Board of Trade what steps he takes to prevent the importation of cotton textiles produced under unfair labour conditions.
    Sir D. Eccles: Whether or not labour conditions are unfair depends on the point of view. If the hon. Member has in mind imports from Asia, cotton textiles from China and Japan are restricted by quota and tariff, but those from Commonwealth countries in Asia are admitted freely.
    Mr. Hynd: What is the Minister's point of view about the hours of work that were revealed in the House by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnworth (Mr. Thornton) only last week? Would not he regard those conditions as so unfair as to justify special action, at any rate in regard to Hong Kong?
    Sir D. Eccles: The conditions in the Colony are, of course, a matter for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and I think he did say that a labour law is in preparation.

    Cotton Industry
    Mr. Haleasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will state to the most recent available date the number of men and women employed in the cotton spinning and doubling and in the weaving sections of the cotton industry.
    Sir D. Eccles: At the end of April, 48,600 male and 90,500 female workers were employed in spinning and doubling and 54,000 and 91,700 respectively in weaving.
    Mr. Hale: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that since the Election of 1951, in every hour of every twenty-four hour day in every seven-day week, one man in Lancashire has lost his employment in this industry over a period of seven years? Is not this a deplorable indictment of the policy that Tory freedom works, and has not the time come when this Government should show that they have some interest in this great and historic industry?
    Sir D. Eccles: Without being able to accept exactly the hon. Gentleman's figures, the fact is that those who have become unemployed in cotton have become employed in other industries.

    Film Industry
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade if, in considering the future of quota legislation, he is giving consideration to the restoration of renters' film quota.
    Sir D. Eccles: The reintroduction of a renters' film quota is one of the numerous suggestions for amendments to the Cinematograph Films Acts, 1938, and 1948, at present under consideration.
    Mr. SwinglerCan the President of the Board of Trade give any indication how far this consideration has gone? Is he aware—no doubt he is—that the trade unions are unanimously of the opinion that the reintroduction of this quota should be seriously considered, because it could give some stability to production? Can he give some indication when he will be able to give us his view on the matter?
    Sir D. Eccles: The renters' film quota was abolished by the Labour Government in 1948 for what appeared to me to be a very good reason; namely, that it led to the production of "quota quickies"
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    and other inferior films. Therefore, it is a matter for serious consideration before we decide to reintroduce it.
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will make proposals to the Commonwealth Economic Conference for promoting the production and exchange of films within the Commonwealth.
    Sir D. Eccles: I have asked the Cinematograph Films Council to consider whether any proposals in regard to trade in films might usefully be made at the Commonwealth Economic Conference, and I am awaiting its advice.
    Mr. Swingler: Is not an important part of the solution to some of the film industry's problems the finding of wider markets? Might not something be done at the Commonwealth Conference by way of making reciprocal agreements with some of the Commonwealth countries, both about the sharing of production facilities and also the promotion of the exhibition of British-made films?
    Sir D. Eccles: It is because I am hopeful that something in that direction may be done that I have asked the Council's advice.
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the lower level of cinema attendances, the development of television, the removal of taxation from all forms of entertainment other than the cinema, and the importance of fostering a film industry for economic, cultural, and prestige purposes, if he will set up a committee to examine and make recommendations upon the future of national policy on film production and exhibition.
    Sir D. Eccles: No, Sir.
    Mr. Swingler: Does not the Question mention four very powerful reasons why this might be done? Is not it a fact that in the past independent committees of inquiry have been established from time to time, and have played an important part in making recommendations to the President of the Board of Trade in regard to future legislation? As the right hon. Gentleman has to produce some quota legislation in the near future might not such a committee be valuable?
    Sir D. Eccles: Conditions in the industry are changing rather rapidly, as the hon. Member knows. We have made a number of moves to help the industry—the reduction in the duty and the increase in the levy, for example—and I think that it is better for us to watch how things go on and act from time to time than to put the matter in the hands of a committee.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Could not the film producers help themselves and reduce their own difficulties by making fewer and rather better films than they do at present?
    Sir D. Eccles: In my estimation the quality of British films is improving.

    Butter (Imports)
    Sir I. Fraserasked the President of the Board of Trade what reaction there has been to his proposals for a voluntary reduction of butter imports from Continental countries.
    Sir D. Eccles: I would refer my hon. Friend to the Answer which I gave to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Mr. Hurd) on 19th June.
    Sir I. Fraser: Would not it be just as short for the right hon. Gentleman to tell me the Answer?
    Sir D. Eccles: I regret to inform my hon. Friend that the Answer was very long—and when I gave it I apologised to the House for its length.
    Mr. Snow: In view of the disquiet that has been occasioned by price increases following this arrangement, would not it be a good thing to inform the public that we are dependent on these Comonwealth markets for our major heavy exports, and that there is an element of reciprocity which at present a large body of the public does not fully appreciate?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am very ready to look into that matter, but I thought that there had been a good deal of publicity about butter recently.

    Haggis
    Mr. Hector Hughesasked the President of the Board of Trade the weight and value in money annually of the haggis exported from Scotland during each of
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    the last 10 years indicating the countries to which it has been exported.
    Sir D. Eccles: Haggis is not separately distinguished in the trade returns.
    Mr. Hughes: Does not it deserve to be? Will the Minister state what his plans are for extending the export of this satisfying and nourishing food, in the interests of the peace of the world?
    Sir D. Eccles: I agree that this delicacy is important, but I have always understood that Scotsmen abroad did the advertising very well.

    Lomond Discount Company Limited
    Mr. Hamiltonasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he has yet completed his inquiries into the trading practices of the Lomond Discount Company Limited; and what action he now proposes to take.
    Sir D. Eccles: No action is required. The company has now told me that it has discontinued its credit facilities business.
    Mr. Hamilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman really satisfied with that undertaking? Is he aware that there is a great deal of anger and unhappiness, not only among consumers but among the competitors of these people, who practise things which are not recognised as morally justified in the business world? Will he give some further study to this matter, in order to see that these undesirable practices are stopped?
    Sir D. Eccles: We have a number of inspectors who look into these matters. I am very anxious to bring wrong practices to an end.

    Wool Cloth (Canadian Tariff)
    Mr. Jayasked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the new Canadian announcement on the matter, whether he will invite the Canadian Government to reconsider their decision to impose a higher tariff on imports of wool cloth from the United Kingdom into Canada.
    Sir D. Eccles: The Canadian Government were fully aware of our views before they decided to accept the recommendation of the Tariff Board, and now that this decision has been announced we could not usefully suggest that it should be reconsidered.
    Mr. Jay: Could not the President of the Board of Trade make further representations, since woollen goods are a very important British export, and since the present Canadian Prime Minister is always protesting his wish for more Anglo-Canadian trade?
    Sir D. Eccles: The present and the former Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself have spoken to Canadian Ministers about this problem on four or five occasions, and the Canadian Government are fully aware of our views. But in the course of the announcement of their Budget proposals they took this decision, and once that decision had been made in the Canadian Parliament there was not much more that I could do.

    Iron and Steel Pipes and Tubes (Canadian Tariff)
    Mr. Jayasked the President of the Board of Trade what representations he has made to the Canadian Government on its decision to raise the tariff on iron and steel pipes and tubes imported from the United Kingdom into Canada.
    Sir D. Eccles: We informed the Canadian Government fully of our views before they reached their decision in regard to this tariff. Some of the changes may turn out to our advantage, particularly the improvement in the margin of preference in favour of our exports of pipe for natural gas transmission.
    Mr. Jay: It not it the fact that in several cases the duties have risen? In view of the very important pipeline project which is now going forward in Canada is not this another disappointing decision?
    Sir D. Eccles: On the whole, I think that the changes are not bad from the point of view of our industry—and that is the industry's view.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Has the right hon. Gentleman made any representations since the serious fall-off in export orders, which is bringing unemployment to the iron and steel industry in this country?
    Sir D. Eccles: If, as I suspect, the hon. Member is talking about pipe from South Durham, we have.

    London Dock Strike
    Mr. N. Pannellasked the President of the Board of Trade the estimated loss of exports as a result of the recent unofficial London dock strike.
    Sir D. Eccles: No estimate can usefully be made. The strike in a large part of the London docks has resulted in a considerable delay to shipments which will be reflected in the trade figures for June. It can be expected that, as after previous stoppages, this delay will largely be made up in subsequent months. But the dislocation and inconvenience to our overseas customers must nevertheless be a matter of concern.
    Mr. Pannell: Would my right hon. Friend agree that by any computation the loss must have been very serious, and does not he consider that this great damage to the country's economy, stemming as it did from an irresponsible, unofficial strike, should have been prevented by Government action, if necessary by the use of troops? Also, may I ask him whether he consulted with his Cabinet colleagues with a view to action of that kind?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am concerned only with the loss of trade. It is quite true that the figures for June will, as far as I can tell at this period in the month, show a very considerable drop. The other part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question is not for me.

    Bananas (Import)
    Mr. Russellasked the President of the Board of Trade the quantity of bananas to be imported under quota from the dollar area; and to what extent the Governments of the West Indies were consulted before this arrangement was made.
    Sir D. Eccles: The size of the quota has not yet been fixed. The West Indian Governments will be asked for their comments before this is done.
    Mr. Russell: Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that this is not the thin end of the wedge? Will he bear in mind the need for ensuring markets in this country for Commonwealth produce of this kind which does not compete with anything that is grown over here?
    Sir D. Eccles: Subject to consultation, my intention is that the quota shall be very small in relation to the amount which we spent on bananas in 1957.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: In future will the Minister consider consulting, at any rate, the new Federal Government, particularly in view of the expansion of banana production in many of the islands—and very good bananas, too?
    Sir D. Eccles: Yes. I am not absolutely sure whether it is better to consult the individual Governments or the Federal Government.

    Whale Factory Ships (Embargo List)
    Mrs. Castleasked the President of the Board of Trade to what extent export licences are issued for the export of whale factory ships to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
    Sir D. Eccles: At present, there is an embargo on these ships.
    Mrs. Castle: Is the President of the Board of Trade aware that the German State shipyards at Kiel have, in the last few years, constructed and shipped twenty-four of these ships to the Soviet Union and that trade between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Communist China is steadily growing? Does not he think it time that British shipyards had a look in on this trade, and when will he put in a blow for British industry?
    Sir D. Eccles: The information which the hon. Lady has given to me is new and I shall at once look into it, because the West German Government have observed the embargo very well so far.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Why is this information new to the President? Whatever the West German Government may say, is not he aware that West German manufacturers are breaking this embargo day after day and that this is very well known to the Russians and to most manufacturers in this country? Further, will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind the unanimous and strongly-worded Resolution of the House on this question a week last Friday? Will he explain what strategic use these restrictions are on whale factory ships in the age of the Sputnik and inter-continental ballistic missiles?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am very ready to examine any information about specific cases of evasion, and if the right hon. Gentleman or any of his hon. Friends can provide it we shall be glad to look into it. On the last part of his supplementary question, I think that he and I would make the same argument.

    Drugs (Key Industry Duty)
    Mr. Snowasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will re-examine, under the terms of the Safeguarding of Industry Act, 1921, and subsequently amending legislation, the key industry duty payable on steroid hormones and certain anti-biotics and vitamins, in order to satisfy himself that prices charged to the National Health Service in respect of certain drugs are reasonable, and are made controllable by varying such key industry duties in the light of recent pharmaceutical discoveries and productions in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
    Sir D. Eccles: Prices of drugs under the National Health Service are a matter for my right hon. and learned Friend the Minister of Health.
    If an application by users for a change in the duty on any of these drugs were made to me, I should consider whether any action were called for.
    Mr. Snow: While thanking the right hon. Gentleman for that Answer, may I ask him whether he is aware that this Question was put down rather as a ranging shot with a view to drawing the attention of the right hon. Gentleman and his colleague the Minister of Health to the fact that the powers under this Act may be a way, possibly a small way, to control the high cost of certain drugs in the National Health Service?
    Sir D. Eccles: The hon. Gentleman probably knows that the key industry duty will lapse at the end of this year and will be embodied in the new tariff schedule, in which case changes can be made in a more simple manner.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Museums and Galleries (Grants)
    Mrs. Whiteasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if his attention has been drawn to the proposal that grants to

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    assist the arts should be made on a basis comparable with those to universities; and if he will make a statement on the policy of Her Majesty's Government in this regard.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. J. E. S. Simon): I have seen a proposal that grants to national museums and galleries should be on a quinquennial basis, but there are difficulties about this proposal and I am not sure that the bodies concerned would wish to see it accepted.
    Mrs. White: Can the hon. and learned Gentleman tell the House on what he bases that Answer and what consultations, if any, have been held since the Romanes lecture of Lord Bridges who has had great experience in the Treasury and as trustee of various institutions? Has the matter not been reconsidered since we had his powerful advocacy for the proposed change?
    Mr. Simon: The sort of difficulties I had in mind were that the bulk of the grant is for the purpose of Civil Service salaries and Ministry of Works services. The galleries and museums are largely Government Departments, and there are various constitutional difficulties about putting grants to Government Departments on a quinquennial basis. There have not been discussions about that since the Romanes lecture, but, of course, I am willing to hear what any of the museums and galleries wish to represent.
    Mrs. White: Surely the hon. and learned Gentleman would agree that Lord Bridges, through his former position as head of the Treasury, must have been very fully aware of any difficulties that there might be, yet he gave very firm support to this proposal.
    Mr. Simon: Of course, I am aware of the authority with which Lord Bridges speaks on these matters. That is not to say that his views would necessarily be universally accepted.

    Bridges Committee on the Arts
    Dame Irene Wardasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has yet received an interim report from the Bridges Committee on the Arts; and to what extent he proposes to act on its recommendations.
    Mr. Simon: This Committee was appointed by the trustees of the Gulbenkian Foundation and it will report to them, not to my right hon. Friend. The second part of the hon. Lady's Question does not, therefore, arise.
    Dame Irene Ward: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that sometimes outside bodies have a little more experience, knowledge and guts than the Government? Will my hon. and learned Friend consider the recommendations that have been made in respect of opera, having regard to the fact that that well-loved provincial opera company, the Carl Rosa Opera Company, is being murdered in breach of contract? When will he take some action on behalf of the arts?
    Mr. Simon: The first part of my hon. Friend's supplementary question is put in too general terms for me to express an opinion. With regard to the second part, naturally my right hon. Friend will be very interested to see the report of the Committee to which my hon. Friend refers if the Gulbenkian trustees decide to publish it or make it available to him. I do not think that it is proper for me to comment on the third part of the supplementary question.

    Electronic Equipment (Government Offices)
    Sir I. Fraserasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what use is made of electronic computers and similar devices to economise in the use of manpower in the public service.
    Mr. Simon: Consideration is given to the use of computers and similar equipment in the Civil Service wherever economies of money and staff would thereby be achieved. At present four Government offices have been equipped with computers and orders have been placed for equipment for a further four. Studies of the possible use of computers in five more offices have almost been completed.
    Sir I. Fraser: Are not the Government Departments a little behindhand in using these modern devices?
    Mr. Simon: No, Sir. I think that the record of Government Departments in this respect compares quite reasonably with that of private industry.

    Small Fixed Income Group
    Dame Irene Wardasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, having regard to the general advantage of curbing inflation, whether he is satisfied that it is to the national advantage that those living on small fixed incomes, and in particular those covered by the Pensions Increases Act and the Royal Warrant, should have their pensions frozen while free voluntary wage and salary negotiations enable a large section of the population to meet the increased cost of living, thus making those whose financial position remains static bear an increasing burden and worsening the position of those most unable to bear it; and what action he proposes to take in this connection.
    Mr. Simon: The best way to help all those who live on small fixed incomes is to beat inflation; and that is one of the Government's principal aims.
    Dame Irene Ward: My hon. and learned Friend having made that observation, which I am rather tired of hearing, may I ask whether the same reasoning does not apply to everybody else? Is he aware that the object of my Question is to find out why one section of the community should have to take the situation in a static sense while other members of the community are able to reimburse their salaries and wages by voluntary negotiation? Is not my hon. and learned Friend going from the sublime to the ridiculous? I hope that we shall not leave it at that for those who are living on small fixed incomes.
    Mr. Simon: I am delighted to find that my hon. Friend thinks that I have at any time been sublime. Concerning the earlier parts of her question, it is true, as she states, that those who have lived on small fixed incomes are those who have suffered worst from the inflation. It is also true that all sections of the community stand to gain by the halting of inflation.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Despite the fine words of the Financial Secretary and of the hon. Lady, will the hon. and learned Gentleman explain why as recently as last week his side of the House rejected a proposal to ease the position of people living on small fixed incomes? Will the Financial Secretary say whether the hon. Lady
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    voted against that proposal or merely paired against it?
    Dame Irene Ward: Look at the right hon. Gentleman's record.
    Mr. Simon: The record of the present Government compares very favourably with any other in the protection of those who live on small fixed incomes. It hardly lies in the mouth of the right hon. Gentleman, in view of the record of his Government, to take the line he has done.

    Occupational Pension Schemes
    Mr. Marquandasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent he is undertaking further studies in order to amplify the information already provided in the Government Actuary's Survey of Occupational Pension Schemes.
    Mr. Simon: I would refer the right hon. Member to the reply which I gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, North-East (Sir K. Joseph) on 17th June, 1958.
    Mr. Marquand: Whatever that reply may have been, will the hon. and learned Gentleman now undertake to publish as soon as possible the findings of any inquiries which are made? Is he aware that The Times on 28th May listed no less than seven important types of information which should be published? Is he further aware of the inspired statement in the Daily Telegraph yesterday that
    "The Government may decide to test Parliamentary and public opinion by the issue of a White Paper this summer but this is by no means certain … If the decision is to go ahead with a definite scheme, no White Paper will be needed"?
    Can the Financial Secretary assure us that the rights of the House of Commons in this matter will be respected and that information collected will be placed before the House so that all hon. Members may have an opportunity of studying it before any legislation is introduced?
    Mr. Simon: I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the rights of the House will certainly be respected. The other matters fall within the compass of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance.
    Mr. Marquand: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that this Question was originally put down to his right hon. Friend the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance but was transferred to the Chancellor of the Exchequer?

    Metric System
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will arrange for the Organisation and Methods Department of the Treasury to make an estimate of the savings which would be effected if the metric system were introduced for all Government work; and whether he will arrange for this to be done before a final decision is taken about the recommendations of the Hodgson Committee on weights and measures.
    Mr. Simon: No, Sir, this would involve disproportionate trouble and expense.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Would not it give a lead to the nation if the Government could give a practical demonstration of the financial saving that would accrue by the adoption of the metric system, particularly in weights and measures, based on the Hodgson Report, which is now five or more years old? Will my hon. and learned Friend bear in mind that all the mechanical computers which are now coming into use in Government offices as well as in private industry work only to their fullest advantage on the metric and decimal system?
    Mr. Simon: The British Association for the Advancement of Science last month set up a committee to examine this problem under the chairmanship of Sir Hugh Beaver. Probably it would be wise to await the result of that examination.

    Income Tax (Schedule A)
    Sir F. Medlicottasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what proposals he has under consideration for the abolition or modification of Schedule A tax; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Simon: I have no statement to make on this subject, but we may have an opportunity to discuss some aspects of it next week.
    Sir F. Medlicott: Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that the collection and payment of this tax, often in quite
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    small amounts, imposes a great burden upon taxpayers and their advisers and the Inland Revenue? Taking into account the cost of collection, is not it a fact that the net revenue could quite well be dispensed with?
    Mr. Simon: No, Sir. It is true that the collection of any tax puts a burden on the taxpayer and, to some extent, on the Revenue. Nevertheless, the receipts from this tax certainly far outweigh the cost of collection.
    Mr. Wade: Quite apart from the complexities of the task, will the Minister take into account that the owner-occupier of a house is allowed no depreciation allowance, as opposed to a maintenance allowance, and, therefore, is at a disadvantage compared with many taxpayers who gain considerably from depreciation allowances on various assets?
    Mr. Simon: This is a complex problem which was examined exhaustively by the Royal Commission. It would be wrong to isolate any single factor.

    Capital Issues Committee
    Sir J. Barlowasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent, in view of the reduction of the Bank Rate, he proposes to revise his instructions to the Capital Issues Committee, with a view to alleviating the present restrictions on credit.
    Mr. Simon: There is no necessary connection between a change of Bank Rate and the control of capital issues. The latter is covered by my right hon. Friend's statement of 17th June, when he said:
    "… we are determined to keep our policies flexible and to adjust them promptly whenever our assessment of the situation suggests the need for that."—[OFFCIAL REPORT, 17th June, 1958; Vol. 589, c. 1003.]
    Sir J. Barlow: Does not my hon. and learned Friend consider that the time has arrived when there might be some relaxation of these instructions?
    Mr. Simon: It is not for Financial Secretaries to make pronouncements of that sort.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Is the Financial Secretary aware that while we welcome the Chancellor's very halting steps towards a resumption of industrial expansion after three years of stagnation, we believe, as

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    we said in the debate on the Budget, that the time is long overdue for much more rapid steps towards expansion, but that the one proposed by the hon. Member in the Question is not one of those which should be followed?
    Mr. Simon: I am quite aware that the right hon. Member and his hon. Friends have proposed various other measures. I certainly cannot agree that there has been stagnation of our economy over the last three years. On the contrary, production has reached the highest level in the history of the country.
    Mr. Wilson: Why does the hon. and learned Gentleman say that when, on his own figures, the figure is exactly the same today as it was in the autumn of 1955?
    Mr. Simon: It is still the highest figure in the history of the country.
    Mr. Croninasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is still considering steps to prevent the evasion of the requirement to obtain the permission of the Capital Issues Committee for raising fresh capital in excess of £10,000; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. Simon: My right hon. Friend still has this matter under review.
    Mr. Cronin: As the Chancellor has been reviewing this for the last six months, is not the situation rather unsatisfactory? Is not it the case now that methods of evasion are so well developed and so well known that the Capital Issues Committee itself is rather reluctant to take unfavourable decisions except in extreme cases? Is not this bringing the law into disrepute?
    Mr. Simon: In these matters my right hon. Friend has to reconcile, on the one hand, the effectiveness of the control with, on the other hand, the risks of interfering with normal commercial transactions. It must be a matter of judgment if and when he should intervene to alter the present system.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Is not the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that when we have this very harmful credit squeeze in force it is possible for hire-purchase finance companies to raise all the money they want without any difficulty at all? Is he aware that a large number of transactions are going on at the present time both for tax avoidance purposes and to outwit the Capital Issues Committee by
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    simple exchanges of shares and the stripping of cash reserves out of companies? Has he studied the evidence presented during the Budget debate showing where money can be raised for tax free capital gains of 20 per cent., 50 per cent. or 100 per cent. overnight?
    Mr. Simon: I think that the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is founded on a gross exaggeration. As for the second part, it is of course true that a number of transactions are now taking place outside the control.
    Mr. A. J. Irvineasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how many applications were made in the last two years to the Capital Issues Committee by shipping companies; and how many of these applications were rejected.
    Mr. Simon: The records of the Capital Issues Committee do not distinguish shipping companies from other commercial and industrial applicants and I regret that the figures for which the hon. and learned Member asks could not be obtained without considerable special work which I think would not be justifiable.
    Mr. Irvine: Does the hon. and learned Member agree that without this information it is difficult to estimate the practical worth of the concession made by the Government to the shipping industry and announced last Thursday? One has doubts about whether there is any value attaching to that concession. Can the Government indicate what it was worth?
    Mr. Simon: The concession was made because the Government were convinced by the representations of the industry that it was justified. It has been welcomed by the industry, and they, after all, are the best people to know.

    Central Electricity Authority (Investment Programme)
    Mr. Bonham Carterasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the light of the relaxations in the financial restrictions he has recently introduced, whether he will restore the cuts in the investment programme of the Central Electricity Authority.
    Mr. Simon: The level of investment in the public sector as a whole in the years immediately ahead is now under consideration. I cannot, however, predict

    595
    that the level of investment already authorised in any particular part will be raised.
    Mr. Bonham Carter: Is the hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the number of farms in Devon connected with electricity in the current year is 800, whereas last year it was 1,500, and that this has caused great disappointment, hardship and inconvenience to the communities concerned?
    Mr. Simon: I would ask the hon. Member to be good enough to put that question to the Ministry of Power.
    Mr. Marquand: When the hon. and learned Gentleman is considering the level of investment in the public sector, will he do his best to ensure that restrictions are raised to help the steel industry?
    Mr. Simon: My right hon. Friend the Chancellor will, of course, consider all aspects of the economy and will take every other consideration into account when he reviews the level of public investment.

    London Clearing Banks (Advances)
    Mr. Croninasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to what extent the average level of aggregate bank advances, during the eight months since the banks received the relevant directive from his predecessor last September, has been less than that of the preceding eight months; and by what approximate proportion.
    Mr. Simon: The total of advances of the London clearing banks was 1 per cent. lower on the average for the eight months from October, 1957, than for the corresponding period a year earlier; excluding advances to the nationalised industries, it was about ½ per cent. lower.
    Mr. Cronin: is not the lower level of bank advances due to the business recession and the falling off of capital investment rather than to the Chancellor's September directive? Would not now be an appropriate time to withdraw that?
    Mr. Simon: As for the first part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I do not think there is any doubt that it was the reaction of the bankers in response to the request by my right hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. P. Thorneycroft) which had the effect of
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    restricting bank advances. As for the second part of the supplementary question, as my right hon. Friend indicated the other day, his policies are flexible, and he is watching the economic situation to see at what moment it would be appropriate to change any course on which we may be set at the moment.
    Mr. H. Wilson: Yes, but is not the hon. and learned Gentleman living in a dream world about this? Does not he realise that if the credit squeeze were taken off altogether now there would be no significant increase in borrowing—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—for essential industrial purposes—because the Government have dealt such a blow to the psychology of industry and the economic community on this question of expansion against stagnation?
    Mr. Simon: No. I do not think that that is the right way to put it. It accords very curiously with the request made by the right hon. Gentleman, a short time ago, that the Capital Issues Committee should be kept intact.
    Mr. Wilson: On the contrary, does not the hon. and learned Gentleman realise after all that has been said—we shall have a lot more to say to him shortly on this issue—that what is needed in this country is some means of distinguishing between essential and inessential borrowing as soon as expansion is resumed? The trouble now, under this Government, is that with stagnation very few people want to borrow at all.

  SOMALILAND

    Future
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what are now the proposals of Her Majesty's Government for the future of British Somaliland after Italian Somaliland attains independence in 1959 or 1960.
    The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. John Profumo): I have at the moment nothing to add to my right hon. Friend's reply to the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson) on 15th April. The Report of the Commission on Unofficial Representation in the Legislative Council was laid on the table in Legislative Council yesterday. I received copies yesterday and am placing

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    them in the Library of the House. My right hon. Friend is now awaiting the Governor's recommendations.
    Mr. Brockway: Does the hon. Gentleman appreciate the urgency of a decision? Is not it a fact that political progress has been much greater in Italian Somaliland than in British Somaliland; that the constituent assembly is to meet this year in Italian Somaliland; and that there are no elected Ministers in British Somaliland? In view of all this, will the hon. Gentleman seek to prevent the frustration which may grow in 1960?
    Mr. Profumo: I do not think that I can answer a hypothetical question about frustration which may appear in 1960. I would ask the hon. Gentleman to await the report by the Governor, which may, of course, not be confined solely to the matters covered by the Commission.

    Somalis (Government Posts)
    Mr. Rankinasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if, in view of the small number of Somalis at present occupying or qualifying for senior posts in the Secretariat, Treasury, Judicial or Public Works departments, he will take steps to investigate the methods used to enable Somalis in Italian Somaliland to occupy responsible Government positions.
    Mr. Profumo: The Governor is setting up a Commission to make recommendations for a programme whereby officers recruited from abroad can be progressively replaced by Somali officers without injustice to individuals or undue loss of efficiency. The Commission will no doubt take into account any relevant experience of other territories.
    Mr. Rankin: Does the hon. Gentleman recollect that in reply to me on 16th June his right hon. Friend stated that at present three Somalis held senior posts in the Government and nineteen were under training? Does he regard that as a very creditable achievement by his Government after seven years in power, in view of the fact that in less than two years Italian Somaliland will have full self-government? Can the hon. Gentleman assure us that the recommendations to which he has referred will result in a speedier and more comprehensive advance?
    Mr. Profumo: The hon. Gentleman ought to make these generalised remarks more in relation to the context concerned. The figures have to be judged against the context of the small size of the public service in the Protectorate.
    As to the second part of the hon. Member's supplementary question, I hope that he will await the outcome of the recommendations.

  KENYA

    Council of State
    Mr. Stonehouseasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to what extent Ministers will be able to attend and participate in the deliberations of the Kenya Council of State.
    Mr. Profumo: Under the Kenya (Constitution) Order in Council any Minister and any Assistant Minister may attend and take part in the proceedings of the Council of State, other than any proceedings which the Council may decide to hold in private; but they have not the right to vote.
    Mr. Stonehouse: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the growing suspicion in Kenya that the Council of State is but a stepping stone to a second Chamber? Will he use this opportunity to kill this suspicion and also to make clear that although Ministers can attend the Council of State they cannot make proposals to it?
    Mr. Profumo: I expect that those who are entitled to attend will attend. I cannot accept the contention in the first part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question.

    Detainees (Land Rights)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to what extent land belonging to detainees now in camps in Kenya has been included in the land consolidation programme of that territory.
    Mr. Profumo: All land, including land in which detainees have rights under native law and custom, is being consolidated in those areas to which the Native Land Tenure Rules, 1956, have been applied.
    Mrs. Castle: Is the Under-Secretary of State aware that this fact is causing very grave unrest among detainees, who feel that their land rights are being alienated

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    without their consent while they are detained? Will he give an assurance that there will be no interference with the land rights of detainees without consultation with them, however worthy the objects of land consolidation may be?
    Mr. Profumo: I cannot accept the contention in the hon. Lady's supplementary question. Perhaps I may put the matter in perspective. All detainees who may be concerned are informed well in advance of the intention to consolidate an area and are given an opportunity of naming someone to look after their interests.

    United Somali Association (Delegation)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement regarding the interview recently given by the Chief Secretary of Kenya, Mr. W. F. Coutts, to the delegation of the United Somali Association with particular reference to their difficulties in the marketing of livestock and their representation on the Legislative Council.
    Mr. Profumo: The object of the delegation was to ask that the nominated member from the Northern Province should be a Somali. The Chief Secretary pointed out that the population of the Province was less than half Somali and that the present Arab member had been appointed because of his great experience of all the problems of the province. The question of livestock marketing was incidental to the main discussion and the Chief Secretary noted the views expressed.
    Mr. Johnson: While welcoming the fact that the Somalis now have a member to look after their own interests, may I ask whether the Under-Secretary agrees that it would be a good thing if there were a Somali to look after their interests, since they are the largest and most forward group in the territory, and those who are in the greatest difficulties at this moment?
    Mr. Profumo: I have every confidence in Mr. Kullatein's ability to represent the interests of all the people of the Province.

  NORTHERN RHODESIA

    Gwembe District (Incident)
    Mr. Stonehouseasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what caused the disturbances in the Gwembe District of Northern Rhodesia when Africans attacked the District Commissioner, Mr. Allan Prior; to what extent the grievances were related to the compulsory migration of members of the Tonga tribe from the area to be flooded by the Kariba hydro-electric scheme; and what revised arrangements are being made to compensate and resettle on good land those concerned.
    Mr. Profumo: The incident arose from the unco-operative attitude of a headman and his followers towards proposals for their resettlement in preparation for the flooding of the area they now occupy later this year. The villagers demonstrated with violence against the arrest of their headman for contravention of a Native Authority Order under which he was required, but refused, to attend discussions about the proposed move. The headman and rioters have now given themselves up and the situation is quiet. Details of the move are still under discussion, but no change in the plan for compensation or the area for resettlement is contemplated.
    Mr. Stonehouse: Can the hon. Gentleman tell us how many people have had to transfer compulsorily? Can he also say whether the Tonga tribe will still have access to the northern shore of the Kariba Dam Lake, as this is protected land to them?
    Mr. Profumo: I think I should like to see those questions on the Order Paper.

  TANGANYIKA

    Julius Nyerere (Charges)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will specify the charges of alleged criminal libel aginst Julius Nyerere, President of the Tanganyika African National Union, made by the Tanganyika Government.
    Mr. Profumo: I am circulating the precise terms of the charges in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Johnson: Will the hon. Gentleman exercise special caution in these political cases against African leaders, in view of the unhappy and almost ineffective efforts in Kenya against the African elected members, which came in for special notice in The Times?
    Mr. Profumo: As the hon. Member knows, this case is still sub judice and I am not prepared to say anything at this stage.
    The following are the precise terms:
    Julius Kambarage Nyere on or about the twenty-seventh day of May, 1958, in Dar-es-Salaam District of Eastern Province, unlawfully published in Issue No. 29 of the publication "Sauti Ya Tanu" the following defamatory matter concerning:
    (1) One F. B. Weeks, District Commissioner, Musoma, with intent to defame the said F. B. Weeks that is to say—"the present D.C. (meaning the said F. B, Weeks) in Musoma was D.C. in Geita when trouble began there … he 'succeeded' in Geita and hopes to 'succeed' in Musoma. A very senior Chief there (meaning Musoma) was taken to Court for cooked-up reasons (meaning that the said F. B. Weeks had been responsible for, or had been a party to, fabrication of evidence and false accusations against a Chief); he was duly convicted but on appeal won the case. The good D.C. (meaning the said F. B. Weeks) is refusing to let the Chief go back to his people."
    (2) One G. T. L. Scott, M.C., lately District Commissioner of Mahenge and presently District Commissioner of Songea, with intent to defame the said G. T. L. Scott, M.C., that is to say—"at one time trouble was reported in Mahenge. On inquiry I learnt that the D.C. (meaning the said G. T. L. Scott, M.C.), there (meaning Mahenge) had already closed a TANU branch (meaning a branch of the Society known as the Tanganyika African National Union) before being transferred to Mahenge … this evening I am interviewing an elderly gentleman from some district (meaning Songea) in the country. He thinks our branch (meaning a branch of the Society aforesaid) there (meaning Songea) is in danger of being closed. I am not surprised. The D.C. (meaning the said G. T. L. Scott, MC.), there (meaning Songea) is the good gentleman who, had he stayed long at Mahenge, would have closed dawn our branch there and is bound to close down this other branch. He (meaning the said G. T. L. Scott, M.C.), is now instigating people to make false accusations against TANU. He has already dismissed a sub-Chief who refused to give false evidence in Court against TANU."
    (3) One F. B. Weeks, District Commissioner of Musoma and one G. T. L. Scott, M.C., lately District Commissioner of Mahenge and presently District Commissioner of Songea, with intent to defame the said persons, that is to say—"these same officials (meaning inter alios the said F. B. Weeks
    602
    and the said G. T. L. Scott, MC.), who would have people commit perjury in Court if only to help them to vilify TANU (meaning the Society known as the Tanganyika African National Union); these same people who intimidate and punish innocents, cajole and reward crookery; have the temerity to invoke law and order."

  ZANZIBAR

    African Students (Makerere and United Kingdom)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies how many Africans from Zanzibar are at present studying at Makerere University College; and how many have bursary scholarships to the United Kingdom.
    Mr. Profumo: At present one African from Zanzibar is studying at Makerere. One hundred and twenty-six Zanzibaris are studying in this country, but I cannot say how many are Africans. Of these twenty-four are holders of Government bursaries or scholarships.
    Mr. Johnson: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that out of this large figure only one student is an African? Is not this lamentable in view of the fact that there are 200,000 Africans in Zanzibar? Will the hon. Gentleman pay special attention to African education overseas?
    Mr. Profumo: It is because the Zanzibar Government recognise that the position as a whole is not satisfactory that they set up the Committee to which I referred the other day.

  COLONIAL TERRITORIES

    Citizens (Freedom of Movement)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what restrictions are placed on the freedom of movement of citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies within their area of citizenship.
    Mr. Profumo: Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, in possession of the necessary travel documents, may enter the United Kingdom without restriction. Entry into the various Colonial territories is regulated by legislation, which usually places restrictions on persons who do not belong to the territory concerned. This legislation varies from territory to territory.
    Mrs. Castle: Is not it a fact that the citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies enjoy common citizenship, and does not it follow from that automatically that they have full freedom of movement within this area of common citizenship? Will the hon. Gentleman look at this matter and see whether restrictions placed by colonial Governments on freedom of movement may be contrary to the Nationality Act and therefore illegal, just as it would be equally absurd to stop me, for instance, from going to Ebbw Vale?
    Mr. Profumo: Fortunately, these sorts of travel are not under the jurisdiction of my right hon. Friend, but I do not think that there is anything wrong with the present regulations, which my right hon. Friend believes are in the general interest of the communities concerned.

  HONG KONG

    Employment Bill
    Mr. Jayasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies what types of labour and what industries will be covered by the Employment Bill now being prepared by the Hong Kong Government; and how soon he anticipates this legislation will enter into force.
    Mr. Profumo: The Employment Bill may cover a wide field and will certainly be a complicated measure. Its contents are still to be worked out in Hong Kong, and the Labour Advisory Board will have to be consulted before final drafting instructions are given. I cannot therefore say at this stage what detailed provisions it will contain or when it will be introduced; but the Hong Kong Government are proceeding with the preparation of the Bill as a matter of priority.
    Mr. Jay: Is the Minister aware that the President of the Board of Trade has constantly said that this matter is the responsibility of the Colonial Secretary? Would he agree that an improvement in the deplorable labour conditions in Hong Kong is in the interests both of people in Hong Kong and people in Lancashire? Would the hon. Gentleman show a sense of urgency about all this?
    Mr. Profumo: As I have said before, it would be wrong to describe the general conditions as deplorable. There are
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    aspects, notably wages, which are being looked at by the Government of Hong Kong, and all those who hold dear the interests of Hong Kong would do well to await the recommendations by the Governor.
    Mr. Jay: Would the hon. Gentleman deny that working hours in many cases are disgraceful, and that at present there is very little legal limit on them at all?
    Mr. Profumo: This is one of the matters which will be considered when legislation is being prepared.

  AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (BRITISH AIRCRAFT)
  Mr. Beswickasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had whilst in Australia with regard to the future purchase of British aircraft.
  The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): Although this matter did not come to a head during my visit to Australia, we have left Australian Ministers in no doubt of the importance we attach to our aircraft manufacturers having fair opportunities in Australia.
  Mr. Beswick: Is the Prime Minister aware that in this case the Tasman Empire Airways ordered British Comet aircraft, and that they met the technical specifications and delivery dates? Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that if we are to have a situation in which there is to be increased Commonwealth trade it makes sense only if we can have an agreement under which Commonwealth countries take our aircraft and we in return take some things like their butter? If there are difficulties, would the right hon. Gentleman have them examined urgently?
  The Prime Minister: I am sure that the matter of New Zealand butter was not, in any case, in question in making the Australian decision as to what aircraft they wished to have. We are, of course, disappointed that we did not get all these orders, although we got some orders for Viscounts at the same time. But I repeat that I am sure that Australian Ministers realise the importance that we attach to this matter. As far as credit was concerned, if that had been the difficulty, it could have been met.
  Mr. Beswick: In view of the seriousness of this matter to the British aircraft industry, is it possible to have this discussed within the context of our Commonwealth trade talks?
  The Prime Minister: Yes. We are in continuing discussions on this sort of matter and I think that the next Question raises it more specifically.
  Mr. Beswickasked the Prime Minister if, in view of the imminent purchase by Australia and New Zealand State-supported companies of United States aircraft, following the technical recommendations by one company concerned of a suitable British aircraft, and in view of the recent difficulties over the United Kingdom purchase of New Zealand butter, he will suggest the immediate emergency consideration of these possibilities of Commonwealth trading by the departmental agencies now responsible for the agenda of the forthcoming Commonwealth Economic Conference.
  The Prime Minister: Questions affecting Commonwealth trade are being examined in preparation for the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference.
  Mr. Beswick: May I ask the Prime Minister again whether this matter of the order for Comet aircraft, which were originally to be supplied by this country, is to come up for discussion again within the context of the forthcoming talks?
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir. These orders were given on grounds which were no doubt thought adequate and right by those who had the responsibility, but of course the broad question of increasing trade, including the aircraft trade, will be discussed.
  Mr. Woodburn: Is the Prime Minister aware that in some of these questions of sales of aircraft in colonial and foreign countries the United States start out by giving very big concessions, which certainly amount to unfair trading, and that we are not competing in a fair market in many of these countries?
  The Prime Minister: I should like to correct the right hon. Member. This is
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  not a question of colonial countries. It is a question of Commonwealth countries. It is not a question of the United States Government or of the British Government. It is a question of commercial competition. I have made it clear that as far as credit is concerned the British Government will do all they can to help our own aircraft manufacturers.

  NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT (EXPORT)
  Mr. Stonehouseasked the Prime Minister what precautions are being taken to ensure that civilian atomic plants being exported to Japan, Italy and other countries cannot be converted to produce military plutonium.
  The Prime Minister: Both Japan and Italy have signed agreements with Her Majesty's Government undertaking that the nuclear materials and equipment supplied will be used solely for peaceful purposes. The agreements contain provisions for inspection.
  Mr. Stonehouse: Why are the agreements with Japan, which were signed on 16th June, not to be published in this country until 1st July? What sanctions are there in the agreements to provide that this military plutonium is returned to this country?
  The Prime Minister: As I said, the agreements, which are rather complicated, provide for inspection. As for the reasons for the fourteen days' delay in publication, I am afraid I do not know them. If the hon. Member will put a Question on the Order Paper I will try to clear the matter up. Perhaps the documents were being translated.
  Mr. P. Noel-Baker: Can the Prime Minister say what kind of inspection is to be established? Is it to be under the International Atomic Energy Agency which was set up last year?
  The Prime Minister: If the right hon. Gentleman will put down a Question about the detailed agreements, I can make sure that I get the Answer correct.

RUSSIAN TRAWLER, SHETLAND (REFUGEE)
Mr. Grimond(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he has any statement to make on the circumstances in which a refugee escaping from the Russian Fishing Fleet off Shetland was pursued by Russians across British soil.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): The information in my possession is as follows.
A man named Erich Teayn, stated to be an Estonian, came ashore in the Shetland Islands early this morning from the Russian fishing vessel "Ukraina," one of three Russian trawlers anchored in a bay at Walls. He made his way to a crofter's house and indicated that he did not want to go back to the Russian vessel. He was followed by a party of Russians, said to number about 30, who landed from two small boats in pursuit of him. He was taken into custody for interrogation under the Aliens Order. Three Russians subsequently called at Lerwick police station and sought access to him. This was refused.
Mr. Grimond: While expressing my pleasure that this man has been taken into safe custody, may I also ask whether, if the facts as stated are confirmed, and he is a genuine political refugee, immediate protest will be made to the Russians about this incident?
Mr. Butler: First, we have to examine the case. If this man asks for political asylum, it will certainly be considered. Secondly, the question of any protest will arise after we have concluded our investigations. At the moment I can say no more except that this man will be given every consideration.
Mr. Shinwell: Is it possible that this gentleman was anxious to join the Liberal Party?
Mr. Ede: What happens with regard to the other 30 Russians? Did they have permission to land?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. They landed illegally and they have now gone away.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business for next week?
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 30TH JUNE—Supply [18th Allotted Day]: Committee. Debate on the State of the Cotton Industry.
TUESDAY, 1ST JULY—Committee stage of the Finance Bill.
WEDNESDAY, 2ND JULY—Conclusion of the Committee stage of the Finance Bill.
THURSDAY, 3RD JULY—Second Reading of the Tribunals and Inquiries Bill [Lords].
Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.
Consideration of the Lords Amendments to the Maintenance Orders Bill.
FRIDAY, 4TH JULY—Second Reading of the Water Bill [Lords].
Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.
Report and Third Reading of the Public Records Bill [Lords].
Second Reading of the six consolidation Bills which have been received from another place.
Mr. Grey: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he has taken note of the fact that many more names, from both sides of the House, have been added to the Motion on opencast mining?
[That this House bearing in mind the likelihood that some collieries may be closed, either because of exhaustion of seams or high stocks of coal, that redundancy will result, and that this process will create a considerable recruiting problem when a policy of national expansion is resumed, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to issue a direction to the National Coal Board to reduce the output of opencast coal until the demand for coal supplies increases to the point when additional supplies of opencast coal are required.]
In view of this added support, does he not think that a day could be given for a debate on the matter?
Mr. Butler: It is a question of whether there is time. There is no time in the immediate future unless the Opposition were to choose a Supply Day for it.
Mr. Grimond: May I ask the Leader of the House whether it is his intention to make a statement about the end of the bus strike, and, in particular, whether the Government are sending directions to the London Transport Board not to raise fares?
Mr. Butler: I have learned from experience that it is wiser not to make statements of policy in answer to a business question, so I will discuss this with my right hon. Friends who are involved.
Mr. J. Hynd: As the right hon. Gentleman will have noted that America has now received orders for atomic energy stations in the European Community, is it not time that we had a debate on the British attitude towards Euratom?
Mr. Butler: We will take that into consideration, together with other important issues.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Leader of the House aware that the Prime Minister
610
has now definitely turned down the request which came from Scotland for a special Burns stamp to mark the bicentenary of Burns? As this was a non-party matter—there was a non-party deputation—will he give us an hour of Government time so that we can express our indignation at the action of the Government?
Mr. Butler: No, Sir. I think it unlikely that Government time will be given for a discussion of this matter, the decision on which followed precedent.

BILL PRESENTED
  CHEQUERS ESTATE
  Bill to amend the deed of settlement set out in the Schedule to the Chequers Estate Act, 1917; to authorise the payment of Exchequer grants in aid of the expenses of the administrative trustees under that deed, as amended; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid, presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. R. A. Butler, the Attorney-General, Mr. Molson, and Mr. Simon; read the First time; to be read a Second time upon Monday next and to be printed. [Bill 139.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  SUPPLY
  [17TH ALLOTTED DAY]
  Considered in Committee.
  [Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTI- MATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, 1958–59, AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE, 1958–59
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That a further sum, not exceeding £40, be granted to Her Majesty, towards defraying the charges for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1959, for the following services connected with Cyprus, namely:—

CTVIL ESTIMATES, 1958–59, AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ESTIMATE. 1958–59

£

Class II, Vote 7 (Colonial Office)

…

10

Class II, Vote 8 (Colonial Services)

…

10

Class II, Vote 1 (Foreign Service)

…

10

Ministry of Defence

…

10

Total

…

£40

CYPRUS
3.36 p.m.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd): The last debate that we had on Cyprus in this House was on 15th July last year, and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I have already expressed our gratitude to the House for the restraint that has been shown ever since. It is true that since that date I have had 160 Questions addressed to me on Cyprus, but there has not been a debate, and for the opportunity to discuss matters informally internationally we are very grateful. The problems of Cyprus can only be settled in one of two ways: either by co-operation or by conflict, and it is very doubtful indeed whether a settlement by conflict would last for long.
Throughout the period of tension we have been fortunate in Cyprus in having two remarkable Governors, Lord Harding and Sir Hugh Foot. Each of them has made, as Sir Hugh is still making, his own unique contribution of courage, imagination and devotion to an island where history and race, geography and
612
strategic needs confront us with formidable difficulties.
As the Committee knows, the legal sovereignty of Cyprus is vested in the British Crown by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. Under Article 20 of that Treaty Turkey
"hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on 5th November, 1914."
This is the operative Article relating to Cyprus in that Treaty, and in recognising our sole sovereignty over Cyprus the Treaty legally and implicitly permits us to do what we think best in and with the island. It gives us the right, among other rights, to decide what other countries we choose to consult about the status of the island.
I do not think that it would be profitable to go over the many efforts that have been made over the last few years to find a settlement for Cyprus—continual diplomatic approaches, visits to Cyprus, Athens and Ankara by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary and myself, the Tripartite Conference, the Radcliffe Constitution, and in many other ways. One day the whole story can be told. Then, patient efforts, opportunities taken, opportunities lost, all can be considered, and praise and blame can, we hope, then be fairly allotted.
However, I am sure that today it is to the future that we should direct our thoughts, for the opportunity is now at hand to bring to an end the disputes over Cyprus, which have disturbed Western unity, and to turn Cyprus from an island of controversy between Allies into an island where we can demonstrate to the N.A.T.O. alliance and to the world what friendly co-operation and partnership can achieve.
I owe it to the Committee to say something briefly of the efforts which have been made since the last debate to find a settlement. In the last debate, though, of course, many differences of view were expressed, a good deal of common ground was found. We were all desperately auxious to find a solution and to reach an agreement in compliance with the United Nations resolution of the previous February. We carried on attempts at international agreement and tried to find a settlement as a result of the resolution that had been passed by the United

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Nations the previous February. Earlier attempts at international agreement had shown that the positions of Greece and Turkey were too far apart to make it possible to get a settlement on the basis of a detailed agenda.
The best way of making progress seemed to us to be by private talks between Governments. We suggested a conference for that purpose, without a fixed agenda and with freedom to discuss, without prejudice, every solution that had been previously mooted. The purpose of that conference would have been to find an acceptable solution of the international problem and so to pave the way for a subsequent settlement of the internal problem by direct discussions with the representatives of the two main island communities.
The Turkish Government accepted this suggestion, but the Greek Government, while not rejecting the idea of a conference, preferred that the basic outlines of a solution should first be agreed among the Governments concerned. At that time, there was also a problem of timing. We suggested a conference in September, but it was felt that it could not usefully take place before the Turkish elections, which were timed for the end of October, or until after the forthcoming discussions at the United Nations had taken place.
During those months of diplomatic discussion, E.O.K.A. resumed activity, it is quite clear, to maintain its grip on the Greek-Cypriot community. In this, Left-wing Greek-Cypriot trade unionists were among the victims and the Turkish-Cypriot organisation, T.M.T., came to the fore at the end of August. Sir Hugh Foot arrived in Cyprus as Governor in early December. As the Committee will remember, there were riotous demonstrations during the United Nations discussions when the Greek resolution failed, in the plenary Assembly, to get the necessary two-thirds majority. That, incidentally, left the resolution of February, 1957, as the last substantive resolution by the United Nations.
The new Governor returned to London on the first day of this year to report to Ministers in the light of his experience during his first month in the island, and to make recommendations to us for future policy. At that time, it was still our intention to try, through confidential
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diplomatic exchanges, to reach agreement with the Greek and Turkish Governments on a course of action before any statement of policy was made.
My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary was due to visit Ankara at the end of January for a meeting of the Bagdad Pact Council. He decided to stay on for an exchange of views with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Turkey, and he afterwards visited Athens for a similar exchange of views with Greek Ministers. After the Foreign Secretary's return to London, there were further exchanges of views through diplomatic channels.
I do not want to give an account of those discussions, or to mention the ideas that were put forward on one side or the other, because, as I think the Committee as a whole will agree, it is essential for these confidential exchanges between friends and Allies that they should be able to take place under the mantle of secrecy. I can only say that it became unmistakably clear to us that it was not possible to secure agreement on a course of action to be pursued in Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the situation in the island itself was deteriorating very rapidly. It became urgently necessary to announce a policy and to carry it through. We therefore abandoned the search for a course of action that had been agreed in advance among the three Governments, and we set out minds to working out a British plan of action, to be put forward on British responsibility, which would be fair to all and in which all concerned would be invited to co-operate.
I said that the situation in the island at that time had been steadily deteriorating. Murders by E.O.K.A. of Greek Left-wing trade unionists began to reach their peak in May, following the Governor's next visit to London. In the weeks before, there had been stirrings among Turkish-Cypriots following the deaths of Turks in January, and the T.M.T. began to get very active. At the beginning of this month, violence took on an openly communal form and the people of Cyprus were given grim warning of the horrors of civil war.
Broadcasts from Athens and from Ankara, distribution of literature calling openly for the storing of arms and ammunition and blackguarding the members of the other race, the migration of

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hundreds of Greek and Turkish families from their old homes—all the ugly signs of civil war were there, and in the wider field, the withdrawal of Greek N.A.T.O. personnel from Izmir, showed the dangers to the N.A.T.O. Alliance.
As the Governor said, we are not engaged in an academic exercise. We are dealing with a desperately dangerous situation. There have been two lessons to be learned from this period. The first is that Cyprus is on the brink of civil war, which could not be limited to the island, and the second is that there is no possibility of the Greek and Turkish Governments arriving at an agreed solution, either by a conference or by diplomatic means, and that the only hope of avoiding disaster was for Her Majesty's Government to take a new initiative and to adhere to it with resolution. That is what we intend to do.
The Governor came again to the United Kingdom in early May. We then agreed with him on a new policy. As the Committee will remember, the Greek Government was then due to be formed by mid-May and our Parliament was going into recess at the end of the third week of May. We wanted to have consultations with the Greek and Turkish Governments and with other Allies. The statement of policy was, therefore, postponed until last week.
Meanwhile, the security forces, the troops and the police, have faced a grim situation with courage, with patience and with good humour. If, as we believe, the way is now open before us for a constructive settlement of the problems of Cyprus, it will have been made possible by the devotion of those who have striven to keep the peace.
The policy is based on two main foundations. The first is partnership and the second is communal autonomy. It has always been our view that the interests of the people of Cyprus must come first. This policy, we believe, puts their interests first, but it would be very foolish not to recognise that Greece and Turkey have been, are, and must be, interested in Cyprus. How much better it is to turn that interest into practical co-operation.
The second foundation of the policy is communal autonomy. This policy is essentially one for an undivided Cyprus,
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but it recognises the obvious fact that there are two main separate communities in Cyprus. Hon. Members on both sides who know Cyprus will realise that the principle of communal autonomy, the principle on which a community should manage its own communal affairs, is already widely practised in Cyprus. Indeed, it is one of the few principles in which the Greeks and the Turks are agreed.
The Greek-Cypriots do not want to interfere in Turkish religion, education or social affairs, and the Turkish-Cypriots do not want themselves to interfere with Greek-Cypriot religious, educational or social affairs. The plan provides that each community shall control its own communal affairs. The precise extent of communal affairs and what constitutes communal affairs is a matter which should be discussed. As the Governor has already said, communal affairs might include some aspects of local government.
Those are the two main principles. Under this policy, Cyprus will be associated not only with the United Kingdom and, therefore, with the Commonwealth, but also with Greece and Turkey. We have asked for the co-operation of the Greek and Turkish Governments with us in a joint effort to achieve peace and progress for the island. Our policy provides for the appointment of representatives of the two Governments to co-operate with the Governor, for arrangements for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots to have, if they wish, Greek and Turkish nationality as well as their British nationality. It provides for the new constitution, with representative government and communal autonomy, to be prepared in consultation with the representatives of the two communities and of the Greek and Turkish Governments. There will be a separate House of Representatives for each community, with final legislative authority in communal affairs.
There will be a Council, presided over by the Governor, which will be composed of the two Government representatives, Greek and Turk, four elected Greek Cypriot Ministers and two elected Turkish Cypriot Ministers, these last four and two being drawn from the two communal Houses of Representatives. This Council will exercise authority over internal affairs other than communal affairs and internal security.

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To protect community interests still further, there are two other provisions. The Governor will have reserved powers, acting after consultation with the representatives of the two Governments, to ensure protection of community interests and, if this is not enough, the two representatives can have any legislation which they think discriminatory reserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal. Of course, authority for external affairs, for defence and for internal security will be reserved to the Governor, acting after consultation with the two representatives. There will be no change, under the plan, in the international status of the island for seven years. Subject to an end of violence, progressive steps will be taken to relax the Emergency Regulations and, eventually, to end the state of emergency. This process will include the return of Cypriots at present excluded from the island.
Under this policy, the interests of all the peoples of Cyprus are safeguarded. To the Greek Cypriots, this seven-year plan offers participation by the Greeks in the administration of the island, the advantages of dual nationality, the maintenance of Cyprus as a unit, and the fact that the composition of the Governor's Council will reflect their numbers in the island. It holds out the prospect—in-deed, if all co-operate, the certainty—of an early end of the emergency and all that that entails. To the Turkish Cypriots, the policy gives participation by Turkey in the administration of the island, dual nationality, communal autonomy, and an impartial tribunal to consider legislation which might be thought discriminatory.
There are, of course, some very important matters on which we want the help and advice of the Governments of Greece and Turkey and of representatives of the Greek-and Turkish-Cypriots. We want to work out with them in detail a system of representative Government and communal autonomy in consultation with them. Many very important points remain to be settled, on the communal Houses of Representatives, on the definition of communal affairs, on the composition of the impartial tribunal to which legislation can be referred, and on many other matters.
As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, we have not asked for immediate acceptance of our policy in
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every particular. We recognise that some initial reactions may be critical. But we are convinced that we are on the right lines and we believe, as my right hon. Friend said, that further consideration will lead to the recognition of the genuine merits of this policy.
During these last anxious but hopeful weeks, we have been greatly fortified by the understanding shown by our Allies on the North Atlantic Council. The discussions of our policy in the N.A.T.O. Council have been a very great value to Her Majesty's Government in showing us the attitudes not only of those directly concerned, but also of our other Allies who can look at the Cyprus problem perhaps with more detachment. We have been very struck by the way in which the 12 countries not directly concerned in the problem, and the Secretary-General himself, who has been most helpful in the cause of conciliation, have all regarded our policy as a basis for constructive discussion between the three countries directly interested. It seems to Her Majesty's Government that this general expression of view was well worth waiting for, and we are very glad indeed that the Governments represented on the North Atlantic Council had time to consider our plan.
We stand ready to enter into the constructive discussions on our plan which have been recommended with the Greeks and with the Turks as soon as they are prepared to do so. This, naturally, applies to talks with representative Cypriots. We shall, of course, continue to keep in touch with our other N.A.T.O. Allies on this question and take full advantage of the opportunities for consultation and conciliation which the N.A.T.O. machinery offers. We now have a chance—perhaps it may be the last chance—to heal a wound which is weakening and impoverishing the free world. I ask the Committee, with confidence, to approve the policy of Her Majesty's Government.
3.58 p.m.
Mr. James Callaghan: The Colonial Secretary said at one point in his speech that the N.A.T.O. countries, our Allies, could perhaps look at this problem with more detachment than could Her Majesty's Government. Having listened to the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon, I am bound to say that I thought he was a model of detachment. One would have thought that the

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connection between Her Majesty's Government and this problem and the responsibility which the Government have for a great deal of the situation which has arisen in Cyprus was something upon which he could comment as an outsider.
It is not our desire this afternoon to pursue the subject of the heavy responsibility which we think lies upon Her Majesty's Government. That is something for which, in due course, they will have to account to the British people. I cannot, however, agree with the Colonial Secretary when he says that now, as in the past—that is where my disagreement comes—the interests of the people of Cyprus have been first in the minds of the Government. I do not know what else Mr. Henry Hopkinson—now Lord Colyton—will be remembered for, but he is bound to have a footnote in the history books for his classic reply of 28th July, 1954.
We must face the fact that what forced the issue to the surface, what brought it to the point where violence broke out, was the suggestion not that the interest of the people of Cyprus should be placed first, but that British sovereignty over the island could not be abrogated. Much as I wish to spare the Colonial Secretary a rehearsal of the history of the past, it must be remembered that the Government themselves have played a very active part in the negotiations which have taken place and in the course of events, and I wish to say, straight away, that, in our view, grave mistakes lie on both sides in this dispute.
Here, we have a different approach. Mr. Henry Hopkinson, as he then was, insisted, the Colonial Secretary insisted, the Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, insisted, that Cyprus was a domestic issue. Now we have a change in the Government's plan, in which they are inviting the Greek and Turkish Governments to join with them in a solution of this problem. This is the second change which has been made in the Government's approach. There is now a belated concession to common sense in the recognition by the Colonial Secretary and members of the Government that representatives of the people of the Island of Cyprus must be brought into discussions on this problem.
We have been pressing for such a step to be taken for a very long time, but it
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is only now that the Government are willing to discuss with Archbishop Makarios some of the details of the constitution which should be worked out. It is a very great pity that our advice on this, as on some other matters, was not taken at a much earlier stage. The real question, and the purpose of my saying this, is to ask: why is it that it has taken so long for the Government to change their attitude in these matters? This is the question which must interest us before we get down to a detailed examination of the plan.
Why is it, having said, first, that British sovereignty must remain unique, that they are now willing to share it and why, having said that it was a domestic issue, have they invited other countries in and have invited the help and conciliation of N.A.T.O.? Why is it that they are now ready to talk about these matters with the representatives of the people of Cyprus? The reason is that, at long last, Her Majesty's Government have got over the period of indecision and division in their counsels which prevented them from taking the initiative before.
I do not know whether the Committee has forgotten that the Marquess of Salisbury, one of the most important members of the Cabinet, at the time, resigned on the simple issue of whether Archbishop Makarios should be kept in detention or not, three months after the publication of the Radcliffe Committee's Report. How could we expect the Radcliffe Committee's Report to be implemented? How could we expect the Government to put their weight behind it, as they are now putting their weight behind this plan, at a time when the Government, and, indeed, their back benchers, were so divided on the approach to Cyprus that they could not agree? This precipitated the resignation of one senior member of the Government and led to the resignation, in part, of some members of the Conservative Party. I say this because in this matter the Government really cannot escape from their own measure of responsibility.
The plan which is now being produced is not altogether new. I must say that it does, of course, hold some advantages for the people of the island, and I am glad that it should do so. For one thing, it will permit the ending of the Emergency Regulations, under which the island has lain now for over three years. It will

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permit the return to the island of its leaders. It will enable some form of normal government to be resumed. All of these things are advantages which are bound to appeal to the ordinary people of Cyprus, lying as they are under the threat of terror and under day and night curfews in many parts of the island.
These are great advantages which must be weighed in the balance when considering a plan of this sort. I imagine that it is to some extent these advantages, if not other features of the plan, which have had some effect in adjusting the attitude of the Governments concerned and of Archbishop Makarios to the Government's proposals.
The Government's plan has been published and has been rejected by all concerned. I do not think that the Government should pay so much attention to the rejection of the plan as to the reasons that are given for the rejection of it, and as to the change of attitude which has arisen as the result of the publication of the plan. Let me illustrate what I mean.
Take, first, the Archbishop. He has rejected the idea of partnership, which the Colonial Secretary says is the foundation of the plan. But, just as important, if not more significant, is that in the course of his rejection he said in his letter to the Governor:
"We do not reject a transitory stage of self-government."
This is the first time that the Archbishop has ever, in such terms, put this matter. Hitherto, he has always insisted upon the details of self-determination being worked out before he would consider any measure of self-government. If, as the Colonial Secretary says, this plan is designed to lead to self-government—well, at last, there is at least "a chink of light" here, if I may use the words of the Minister of Labour in another connection; and the Colonial Secretary, I am sure, would not ignore what I regard as a significant change in the attitude of Archbishop Makarios.
Mr. Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, in his letter to our own Prime Minister, seems to acquiesce in setting aside, for the time being, the idea of self-determination so as to consider
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"a temporary solution on the basis of democratic self-government under British sovereignty."
These major concessions have both come, I ask the Committee to note, from the Greek side. So far, from the Turkish side all that we have had is a statement, so far as I can make out, that the idea of partnership is reconcilable with the idea of partition.
I always understood that when a partnership comes to an end the partners divide the assets and that one cannot have a continuing partnership if the assets are divided. I do not think that the Turkish Government, in their reactions to this plan, have done anything to modify the stand which they have taken up so far. The concessions have come from the Greek side in this controversy.
I would say to Her Majesty's Government that they would neglect an opportunity if they were to seize upon the formal rejections which have taken place and ignore the substantial shift which has also taken place in the attitude of the people concerned. I would hope that they would concentrate on seeing to what extent their plan, which has been introduced, as the Colonial Secretary said, as a basis for discussion, could be amended in such a way as to take advantage of the shift of opinion, which I have tried to outline.
The original Foot plan, which, we understood, was to be published in January, never saw the light of day. It disappeared after the Foreign Secretary had been to Ankara. It has never been published and, therefore, I am not able to comment on it. I think that it is fair to say that if it disappeared after the visit of the Foreign Secretary to Ankara it was because of the fierce Turkish objections to the proposals which he took to them.
In those circumstances, I am bound to say that, looking at the plan as it stands, the Government have gone to the very limits in the concessions they have made to the Turkish point of view; indeed, in some ways they have gone beyond the limits that I should have liked to see. Any modifications which are to be made in working out the details of the plan should, in our view, be on the side of meeting those who have given up a great deal of the attitude which they have adopted up to the present.

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I come now to the criticisms which lead to this conclusion. The major criticism that can be made of the plan is that it emphasises the separation of the two communities rather than their unity. Is that denied? We have two communal assemblies, each of which is to consider its own communal matters. Above them we have the Governor's Council, in which Greeks and Turks are to be represented, not in the strict proportion that the Colonial Secretary led us to believe but in a proportion of 2 to 1—not that that is a very significant point, but it is not a strict proportion. Then we have a representative of the Greek Government and another of the Turkish Government sitting on the Governor's Council.
All this is an emphasis on division, and not on unity. It is an emphasis on the Greek nature of the people and the Turkish nature of the people. Where is there, in this plan, any emphasis on the fact that these people are Cypriots? That is what I mean when I say that the Government have gone to the very extremes in the concessions that they have made to the Turkish point of view in this matter.
I will quote The Times in support of what I am saying—and perhaps the Government benches will accept its authority even if they will not accept mine. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] We never quite know where the party opposide stands in relation to The Times—but at least I think that it will be conceded that both The Times and right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite regard themselves as the top people. The Times editorial put it very succinctly. It said:
"It"—
that is, the plan; and I ask hon. Members opposite to note this; especially those who growled just now—
"involves what is virtually a system of non-territorial partition."
When we look at the organs at present in the plan we see that it is impossible for any fair-minded observer to come to a different conclusion.
In the view of hon. Members on this side of the Committee the plan can be justified only if it is a temporary expedient, for the purpose of bringing the people together, and not a permanent feature, designed to keep them separate. I
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was glad to hear the Colonial Secretary say that the plan is designed to produce unity in the island, because that is certainly our approach to the problem. I am, therefore, entitled to say that in my view these provisions emphasise the separateness rather than the unity that the Colonial Secretary wishes to achieve.
No one that I have ever discussed this matter with—except the late Walter Elliot—ever believed in partition and, as I understand, partition is still ruled out. As I understand from the broadcast of the Governor, his view is that this plan cannot and will not lead to partition. I hope that that is true, but if it is to be made true the organs contained in the plan should provide for the Greeks and Turks to be able to come together. In his reply to our Prime Minister the Greek Prime Minister put his finger on the spot when he said:
"in examining the outline of your plan from a practical point of view, it is apparent that the whole system is based on an entirely ephemeral situation, that is on tension in the relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who have lived for centuries in peace and unity in this indivisible territory."
Whatever else we disagree upon we will agree that this has been an ephemeral outburst of communal violence. To what extent it has been artificially fostered it is difficult for us to judge, and they know where their responsibilities lie.
But we ought not to base permanent institutions on what may be a temporary and passing quarrel between the two communities in the island. Therefore, we would like to make a suggestion to the Government which we think they should consider in connection with the plan. We would like to put to them that, as one of their ideas, they ought to propose an instrument of the Constitution that would enable the Greeks and Turks to meet together. As present, there is only one place where four Greeks and two Turks meet—on the Governor's Council. That is not self-government by any stretch of the imagination.
What right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on this side would like to see is the creation of another larger instrument, ideally based on a common roll—although I suppose that is impossible at the moment—which would form a legislative assembly of the island. As to the details, I would not press the Government now, but it seems to me that there

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should be a place at which the two communities can meet. It may be that, initially, their authority would be little; it may be that at first they would have little to say to each other, but at least it would be possible for them to come together as passions quietened and their interests grew.
We should like the Government to create such an organ, or propose its creation. At least, we should like the Government to consider it. We do not ask them to reply today. We are trying to put forward a suggestion which we think will be helpful in accordance with our understanding of the Government's aims. We suggest that they might create this organ which would of itself, if it came to life, stop the Greeks looking so much to the Greek representative from Athens for their protection, and stop the Turks looking to the Turkish representative from Ankara. The danger of the plan—and I am sure that the Colonial Secretary must have seen this in preparing it—is that it will encourage both communities in the island to look almost exclusively to the representatives from Ankara and Athens There is no unity that way.
What we want to do is to make it possible to create an assembly to which the Cypriots can look, to divert their eyes from Ankara and Athens. That is the proposal which we make. In due course, as self-government comes, it could be a receptacle into which the reserve powers which the Governor now has could be poured, so that it would eventually become a democratic assembly in the fullest sense of the word. It would enable the people of Cyprus to register their views not merely as Greeks and as Turks, but as Cypriots.
In rejecting the plan all the parties to the dispute have agreed to further talks. We hope that the Government will follow the matter up—as I believe the Colonial Secretary said he intended to do—through diplomatic channels with the two Governments and that the Governor will be empowered to enter into discussions or correspondence with the elected leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot people in the island, so that he can discuss with them the form of the internal constitution.
I now come to the Opposition's attitude to the plan. This, to us, is a particularly frustrating and baffling matter. We are
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told that everybody is waiting to hear what we have to say. We have responsibility, but we have no power. The power lies with the party opposite. We were not consulted about the drawing up of the plan. I do not complain about that; in our system of Government that is the Government's job. But we had no part in shaping these provisions. We therefore do not feel that it is the job of the Opposition to give a blanket endorsement to the plan. As everybody is assuming that we shall succeed the present Government, I must say that it seems to us likely that there will have to be changes in the constitution.
Everyone who has written about this plan since it was published has doubted whether its provisions can last, so we must hold ourselves free in that respect. I want to make this clear: the situation in the island is of such a character, and in the Middle East generally it is of such a nature, that we would welcome any agreement that the parties to this dispute can come to. We should want to see it run its course. We would not seek to overturn it. We say to all the parties to this dispute, "It is your duty at the present time to go into negotiations and discussions. We beg of you to do so wherever you may be and whoever you are, to see whether this situation can be brought to an end."
That will need flexibility, of course. We cannot go into discussions of this sort, on which the fiercest passions are held on both sides, and expect to retain our first position. That is the only object of putting forward the propositions which I have put forward. I cannot believe that the Government can go into discussions of this sort in present circumstances, private diplomatic discussions in the first place, without some idea that they would be prepared to make adjustments in order to concentrate upon the essential unity of the island rather than to emphasise its separateness.
This brings me to another question, which has concerned us as well as the Government very much, and that is—I speak as a member of the Opposition—our attitude to this question of self-determination. We have to uphold the doctrine throughout the whole of the Commonwealth Territories that peoples are entitled to decide their own destiny. We certainly do not depart from that

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principle. If we do depart from it, we do so at our peril and perhaps to the peril of the British people at some time in the future. Nevertheless, in saying this we must make it clear that, in our view, self-determination, when it comes, must come with the consent of the people of the island. It cannot be imposed by force. It would be wrong to try to impose self-determination by force and it would not be our intention to do so.
Here is a dilemma. I see that some of the Suez "rebels" on the Government benches below the Gangway are very quick to seize upon it. Of course, pit is a dilemma. I hope that they will be prepared to face it honestly. This can be construed as giving any trouble-maker in the island the opportunity continually, and for an indeterminate period, to hold up the idea of self-determination as long as he can continue to make trouble. That is the real dilemma and I acknowledge it straight away. That is why we now say that it should be the job of the Government, as far as they can, to promote unity inside the island so that the people of the island will themselves come together in due course and determine what their future shall be. That is what we would say is the proper approach to this problem.
In present circumstances it would certainly be impossible to apply the doctrine of self-determination in an atmosphere of civil war, and we have no right to ask British troops to hazard their lives in such an undertaking. It follows that as the consent of the minority is a necessary element, if self-determination is to be lasting, we should endeavour, as far as we can, to create these organs.
To those outside the island it seems as though the rôle of the two communities is being reversed. There has been a feeling for a very long time that the Turks have been the favoured children of the Administration. How far it is true the people can judge, but there has been this very strong feeling. Now it seems that it is the Greeks who are more ready to co-operate and the Turks who have become recalcitrant. I make the request of the Colonial Secretary that everyone in the armed forces, the security forces, and the Administration should deal out the same consideration and the same evenhanded justice to everyone in the island.
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I have no need to go back over the past and to the allegations that have been made. The Colonial Secretary and other members of the Government will know what I mean. It is vital that this should be the policy of the Administration at present, whatever it may have been in the past. The Colonial Secretary tells us that the Greek and Turkish wireless still pours out incitements to violence and revolt, but Athens radio is jammed and it is the Turkish radio which is not jammed. It is Turkish incitements to violence which are reaching the island at present. When similar irresponsible propaganda was put out from Athens, the Government of Cyprus jammed it. I hope that they will not be reluctant to act again, unless these statements which are incitement to violence from Ankara cease. The Government can do no less in the interests of the people of the island.
We recognise the legitimate fears of the Turks about the safety of their southern ports and of their minorities. As to the second, I believe that the dangers have been over-emphasised and then artificially fomented. As to the first, that is a legitimate and lasting fear of the Turks, but I do not believe that it is impossible to remove that fear. Indeed, it is quite possible to do so and the Government are right in endeavouring to ensure that the Turks have no legitimate cause for fear.
Having done that, the Government equally have the right and the duty to say to the people of Cyprus, "We want you to proceed like other territories have inside the Commonwealth, to determine your own future in due course. This is a holding operation. That is the point of view that we approach it from. Our desire is to create unity and an instrument that will enable you to come together, to live together." If the Government make that approach, I believe that the future of the island may be happier than the past has been.
4.28 p.m.
Mr. James Lindsay: The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) concluded his speech with the hope that Cyprus would be happier in the future than it has been in the past. We are all concerned with the future of the island. Some of the opening remarks of the hon. Gentleman were not quite as satisfactory as I had

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hoped they would be. He was more happy about the fact that N.A.T.O. is now concerned and has given our plan its blessing.
Of course, there will be difficulties. I do not think that anybody expected that there would not be difficulties confronting a new plan like this. I hope that it will result in something helpful and constructive. The hon. Gentleman suggested that the plan concerned division more than unity, but I assure him that we on this side of the Committee, and, I believe, every right-thinking person in the country, aims at unity on the island.
As for the question of self-determination by force, that is an impossibility. The island must decide whether it wants terrorism or democracy. The two are incompatible and cannot exist together. I am sure that every administration in our Commonwealth and Empire is handing out even justice to all, always has done so and always will do so.
I welcome the proposal. It is a great step forward and I hope that it will lead to peace on the island. We can all approve the aims of the policy as set out so clearly and concisely at the beginning of the statement. I think that is necessary. There has been a great deal of uncertainty and doubt, leading to suspicion as to what our position actually is, and this definition is very helpful. Everyone now knows exactly where we stand, what are our objectives and aims, and that is all to the good.
I hope very much—indeed, there seems a possibility—that this plan will at last break the deadlock from which we have been suffering for so long. All the arguments which have been put forward in the past have cancelled each other out. History, geography, race, religion and many other subjects have been dragged in as evidence, but they have all cancelled each other out, as do the ideas of partition and majority rule. Those two ideas are self-destructive.
Perhaps this last moment, when it appears that there is great fear between the two countries—even the possibility of civil war—spreading further dangers, may be the right moment for this new plan, which, I hope, will be successful. Any new plan has to be different, so different that the past can be forgotten and the violence which has taken place may
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be forgiven, so that positions which have been held may be evacuated and a new start be made. If this can be taken as a completely new chance, I believe that something may come of it.
I am very glad that this is our plan, that it is a British plan, and that we have not shirked our responsibility nor evaded our duty. It will be salutary that we are taking action and carrying out our duty. I think that will have a good effect on many places in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, at the same time I am glad to know that N.A.T.O. has given us its backing. That will give us confidence and assurance and the conviction that we have the support of many friends. I hope that will make the plan more acceptable to Cypriots. They cannot say that this is a plan of one of an imperialist country trying to dictate to the islanders.
I believe one of the many advantages of the plan is the fact that it is definite and certain. We all know the dangers and trouble that arise from uncertainty and doubt. We all know the saying:
"Hell is paved with good intentions".
Perhaps I might say that the road to war is often paved with vague intentions. If people know where we stand they can make plans accordingly and there is no fear of danger coming from uncertainty. They know what we plan to do and I think that will be of advantage to all the islanders. We shall not be persuaded or frightened out of the island so long as we have a duty to the people of the island and to the Western world. The islanders will now know what is to happen whether they co-operate or not. I believe that, human nature being what it is, sooner or later they will decide to co-operate. They will say, "We might as well be in this, as it will take place in any case."
In the past, that co-operation has been denied to us. All our plans have been rejected, not because of any inherent defects in them, but because of their origin. I think that they have been refused because they were our plans. If we are further denied co-operation, and they will not participate in this plan, I believe that we should pass the initiative to the Cypriots themselves and ask them to do some constructive thinking about how they can reach a proper solution. Whether or not there is co-operation, eventually there will have to be a long-term plan for the island. We ought to give an

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opportunity to the islanders, and encourage them, to try to work out a scheme which will be acceptable to both parties.
In this case, it takes three to make a constitution. If they really wish to have independence they must show the qualities of independence and, at the same time, develop a sense of responsibility. It is essential that those who want to work a constitution should be able to create a constitution. They cannot rely entirely on blaming and criticising us; they themselves ought to try to work out a scheme on which the two parties in the island can mutually agree.
After all, we are not dealing with a backward people. We are dealing with Greeks and Turks whose self-respect, I should have thought, would encourage them and allow them to work co-operatively in a democratic constitution. I hope that on that we shall get assistance from all the groups in the island. The plan which the Government have produced is a very good one and I believe that it has a good chance of succeeding and enlisting the help and support of the islanders.
I support the plan. I hope that it will receive the support of everybody in the United Kingdom and that we will all do what we can to make it a success. That will be not only for the benefit of the people of Cyprus, but also to the benefit of the Middle East and of the world at large.
4.37 p.m.
Mr. Clement Davies: I am very glad the Secretary of State for the Colonies began his speech by saying that the matter of primary importance to him was the welfare of the people of the island. I should think we all agree with that. To me the consideration which overrides all others and is the matter of paramount importance is the welfare of the people of this island. Be they Greek-speaking Cypriots or Muslims, we are responsible for their welfare, their social welfare, their economic welfare and, above all, their political welfare.
I emphasise that, for I take it that it is the desire of all of us to see that sometime or other these people shall be able to choose their own Government. They are to decide on and draw up their own form of constitution, to elect their Parliament and choose their Government which
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they can criticise and turn out if they wish. That has been the policy of this country throughout in regard to other territories.
We have been responsible for these people since 1878. That is a long time—eighty years. I take it that for the first thirty-six years, down to November, 1914, we were in the sort of position of permanent lessees. Nevertheless, we were solely responsbile for their welfare through the whole of that time. Then, since we annexed the island when Turkey saw fit to enter the war against us at that very difficult time, certainly since the Treaty of Lausanne in 1922, we alone have been responsible for these people; nobody else.
Nobody would have questioned our sovereignty and nobody could have questioned our duty to these people, to whichever country they belonged. If any suggestion had been made during the whole of that time we should have scorned it. The responsibility was ours and ours' alone. In the same way as we have guided other people, we have helped these people economically. We have advised them, we have helped them, we have guided them, just as we have done with others. Inevitably, the time will come when they say that they should guide their own destinies and should be released of parental control, however kindly that control has been. That has been the history of every one of the territories, and I take it that it will be the future history of other territories for which we are responsible today.
It is right that we should say, however, that there are moments when we can regret the delay which there has been in meeting the wishes of these people for whom we have been responsible. What agonies, what disasters and what memories of bitterness and rancour might have been avoided if we had taken the right action at the right time. There is a vast difference between an act done willingly and generously and an act which is done by force of events and by pressure of circumstances.
I believe that even in Cyprus none of these troubles which beset us today would have arisen and none of the acts of violence would have taken place had we done a few years ago what the Government themselves considered to be the right thing to do. I think I am right in

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saying that that is the true view of the Government. I would remind the Prime Minister of his speech in the House on 5th December, 1955, when he told the House what had taken place in the discussions which occurred at the Conference between the Turkish representative, the Greek representative and himself. All had agreed—although the Turks apparently had some reservations—that there should be self-government. The only difference was as to the time of self-determination. The Prime Minister put it in these words: so far as the Greeks were concerned, they said, "Now or very soon." So far as the Turks were concerned, they said "Never." The Government of the day thought there should be self-determination but that it would be "some time". My regret is that that policy was not put into effect long ago.
We must remember that the Greek-speaking Cypriots and the Muslims in the island have lived together in amity and friendliness for centuries. Today, unfortunately, there is hatred, violence and murder. Not only have we quarrels amongst themselves, but apparently there is also a quarrel between the two Governments who claim to represent them—the Greek Government on one side and the Turkish Government on the other side. They are snarling at one another and threatening one another until we are told that we are on the verge of civil war and of the possibility of war in the Middle East between two countries which are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
It is in those circumstances that the plan is brought forward. I do not know whether it will work. I do not know whether it will be accepted either by the people of the island or by either of the two Governments. I feel that in many ways I could criticise the plan. I might even disagree with it and doubt it. But the question which I must put to myself at the present moment is, "Will any doubt, any criticism or any disagreement on my part help any one? In particular, will it help the people of the island?" I feel that the Government could not have put forward this plan without the full support of the Governor of the island, who has now had over six months' experience there, and for whom all of us have not only a great admiration but also a very great respect.
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I do not know whether I have stated the true position. I have to accept, and I do accept, what is said by the Government and by the Governor. If it is true, then it is the duty of all of us to do all we possibly can to avoid bloodshed and to avoid violence and to bring these people together as best we can so that we may reach what is obviously the desire—it certainly was the desire and, I imagine, it still is the desire of the Prime Minister—of all of us, that these people should determine their own destinies and their own form of government.
I should like to support what was said by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) in his excellent speech when he urged that there should be a better method than is contained in the plan of bringing the Muslims of Cyprus and the Greek-speaking people together, if only for a short time each year, so that they may realise that they are still islanders, that they have to work together and that the destiny and future of the island is in their joint hands.
I do not know whether the plan would succeed. It is the Government's plan and they should be given every opportunity of putting it into effect and seeing what can be done. If, as we all hope, it brings a settlement of the troubles and disputes, the Government will have done well and will have earned the praise of us all.
4.48 p.m.
Mr. John Peel: Having had the good fortune to catch your eye, Sir Charles, in rising to make my maiden speech, I must crave the indulgence of hon. Members for any shortcomings and mistakes of which I may be guilty. It has been said that one of the advantages of being married is that one does not make mistakes without finding out about it. I think that this advantage might be said to apply to Members of Parliament, so I hope that hon. Members will make as generous an allowance for me as they have done for my predecessors.
I also understand that a maiden speech should be uncontentious. All I should like to say about that is that the subject which the Committee is debating today is of such grave importance to the Commonwealth, to N.A.T.O. and to the whole free world that we cannot afford to be contentious.

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I shall certainly do my best to avoid contention, but I wanted to speak on this subject principally for two reasons. The first is that it is very important and involves vital principles of our Commonwealth policy. The second is that there are many students and others from many parts of the Commonwealth who are living, studying and working in my constituency and in the East Midland area. They are most welcome. I think I can say that in the main they have been very much welcomed, and I think that their happiness and welfare is put as much to the fore in my constituency as anywhere else in the country.
I was very interested when the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) mentioned self-determination, because it seems to me that this is not only of vital importance to Cyprus but also to the smaller dependent territories of our Commonwealth. It is, of course, a human right that has been implicit, if not explicit, in our colonial policy for many decades. At the same time, we must recognise that there are other vital human rights, such as the right to peace, to safety and to freedom from fear.
It is not always easy to isolate rights, the problem is how to reconcile them in the right way. I feel that there is quite a lot of rather woolly thinking on this subject, partly, perhaps, because we are passing through a phase in an increasingly materialistic world where the accent seems to be on rights rather than on duties and responsibilities to others.
Those who maintain that self-determination is an absolute right are not being really practical or sensible. There are many difficulties. If one maintains it as an absolute right, is there any logical reason why, say, the Liverpool Irish or the Istanbul Greeks should not set up their own empire within an empire; or, possibly, why the Walloons should not disrupt Belgium, or the Sikhs India, or the Indians South Africa; or, coming nearer home, and very much more up to date, why the different races of Nigeria should not divide that great country?
The fact is that this principle has never been applied logically or indiscriminately. When the American Colonists broke from Goerge III they took the matter into their own hands, but the majority of their descendants denied the
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Southern States the right to secede. I do not think that a refusal to do as one has been done by is necessarily and universally to be condemned. I should have thought that common sense and the practical economic and strategic realities would show where the line should be drawn.
Balkanisation is not a very happy state of affairs. If Switzerland, Belgium and Canada had allowed their component peoples to secede, I do not think they would have reached their present stage of advancement. I really think that those who maintain self-determination as an absolute right are either blind to history or to present circumstances, or they are mischief makers, because, of course, it is a very useful weapon for our enemies to egg on extreme nationalism in backward and under-developed countries.
Perhaps I may, for a moment, look at this subject in the context of our smaller dependent territories, of which Cyprus is a very important one. It is essential that we should clear our minds on the subject, because our policy for the future development and progress of these territories depends upon our finding the right answer. I cannot admit the inherent right of a part of our Commonwealth to secede, unless it has obtained sovereign status which, of course, these smaller territories have not.
I can conceive of conditions arising, possibly, in which the desires of a small part of the Commonwealth to throw in its lot with a foreign sovereign Power should be granted, not only in the interests of the territory itself but of the Commonwealth as a whole. I think that those cases will be few but, if they do arise, they should be studied not only from the point of view of the territory in question and of the United Kingdom, but from that of the Commonwealth as a whole. In these circumstances, the idea that a non-sovereign territory, however small, has an inherent and absolute right to self-determination should be shown up for the complete fallacy that it is.
In the continuing story of our growing Commonwealth we have recently got, in the proposals agreed with Singapore, the concept of an internally self-governing State as, possibly, the final constitutional set-up for a small territory that is too small ever to attain sovereign status.

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That offers an idea that should be developed. It is an honourable and a dignified status. I know hon. Members are quite well aware that if dependent peoples are to live and progress in happiness they must be given and must be encouraged to have a proper pride in themselves. That is quite understood, but it is not a new concept in our history. From a close acquaintance with the work of some of our forebears, particularly of some of the great proconsuls of previous generations, I believe that they, too, worked according to that idea; and that, in fact, it was not that they were not quick enough, but that they did not, and could not, foresee the appalling cataclysmic events of this century which have disrupted and quickened the processes.
In applying this particular principle to the case of Cyprus, I am not suggesting that the concept of an internally self-governing State is necessarily the right answer for that island, but in welcoming the very fine proposals—courageous and generous—that have been put forward by the Government, I would ask only two questions of the Committee which, I think, must be considered at the present time. The first question is this. In view of the quite understandable determination of Turkey not to allow Cyprus to fall into weak, uncertain or unfriendly hands, to the extent even of fighting to prevent it, and in view of the very grave situation that would obtain if that happened, is it not the bounden duty of Great Britain to discharge her sovereign rights and duties in the island, not only for the benefit of the people of the island but for the benefit and welfare of the whole of the Western World?
Secondly, in view of the fact that at this time peace depends upon a balance of power between two opposing and antagonistic ideologies in the world, would it be right to allow 100,000 people, or even 400,000 people, to put at very grave risk the safety and freedom of millions of people in the free world?
It is not as though we were imposing an intolerable tyranny upon Cyprus. On the contrary, we have offered a very large measure of constitutional development in the hope that the Cypriots would use it to get some experience of the very difficult work of democratic government. After all, what are seven years, or even for that matter fifteen or twenty years, in the life history of a people?
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I feel that any policy for our smaller dependencies, of which Cyprus is such an important one, to be either satisfactory or to have any chance of success must have the broad agreement of both sides of this House. It is all very well for us to disagree over internal matters of domestic policy, but here we are dealing with the lives and happiness of other people, and I do not think that their fate should be the butt of party politics here.
I would remind the Committee of I think it was Lenin's statement that Great Britain would never be defeated on the Thames but on the Yangtse, the Ganges and the Nile. I think that in a modified form that is equally true today, and I think it is very necessary that we and our friends should remember this.
There are certain matters in which agreement is difficult, particularly perhaps on the economic side and in regard to a timetable, but I believe that agreement is possible if common sense, a sense of proportion and, above all, patience at this time are brought to bear upon such problems as self-determination. Such agreement would be easier if many people in this country ceased to suffer from a spurious sense of guilt over our Commonwealth, and recognised the undoubted fact that for over three and a half centuries of Imperial trusteeship, despite many mistakes—but he who makes no mistakes usually makes nothing at all—we have done and are doing the greatest civilising job outside the borders of our own country that has ever yet been attempted or achieved in the whole history of mankind.
May I pay a tribute to the outstanding courage, patience and cheerfulness of the British forces and civilians in very difficult times in Cyprus, and recall with pride that the 1st Leicesters have just completed an outstanding tour of duty in that lovely island.
5.2 p.m.
Mr. Franck Noel-Baker: The Committee has listened with great attention to the speech which the hon. Member for Leicester, South-East (Mr. Peel) has made. I have no doubt that when he gets back to his constituency he will receive many congratulations from those who will have read what he said. I have no doubt also that after the debate many hon. Members on both sides of the Committee will seek an opportunity of

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congratulating him privately on the effective, sincere and clear way in which he spoke.
We all know what a trial it is to make a maiden speech. We all know how difficult it is to approach a contentious subject, particularly as stormy a one as that which we are debating today, in a non-controversial manner. Perhaps it may be even more difficult for the hon. Member than for some of us, following as he does a vivid and hardly non-controversial Member of the House. At all events, we were very glad to hear him. We shall listen to him again with great attention in the future. I cannot guarantee that we shall always listen to him with the silence which dominated the Chamber during most of his remarks, but we shall certainly enjoy disagreeing with him as well as listening to him.
Perhaps I might start the second section of what I have to say by recalling very briefly an occasion which the Colonial Secretary will remember vividly, about twenty-eight months ago, when he and I for a few weeks were together in Nicosia, I in response to an invitation from Nicosia but, at his suggestion, doing what I could to try to help towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem.
Remembering that, I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will believe me when I say that I am desperately anxious that neither I nor any of my hon. Friends nor anybody else in the Committee should be guilty today of saying anything which might make it more difficult to get a settlement of the problem. I might recall that I was the first Member of Parliament, I believe, to appeal for a cessation of violence—an appeal which was followed by far more powerful appeals from many of my right hon. Friends and which, I think, did something to contribute to a cessation of violence from the Greek side for many months.
The Secretary of State knows very well that neither I nor my right hon. and hon. Friends who have taken a special interest in this matter want to do anything but contribute, if possible, to a settlement and ensure that this new plan may be the beginning of discussions and negotiations which may lead to general agreement. We have been constantly preoccupied by a desire to see the end of violence, from
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whatever quarter it may come, and to see a peaceful settlement acceptable to the people of Cyprus and negotiated with their chosen leaders. I think it can be said that some progress has been made in recent weeks and that there have been some hopeful new developments, in contrast to the many growing dangers that we have seen in the island and in the area around it.
In the first place, the whole Committee, and particularly we on this side, warmly welcomed the appointment of the new Governor, the dramatic change in atmosphere which his arrival produced throughout Cyprus in the first few weeks after he took up office, the relaxation of some of the emergency regulations, and the release of a number of detainees—although many of us on this side felt that it would have been more in the general interest to have gone a good deal further and faster than the authorities thought possible at that time. We welcome the way in which the new Governor broke out of what I might call the "barbed-wire curtain" which surrounds Government House and established, for the first time for many months, personal human contact between himself and the Cypriots whom he governed.
We likewise warmly welcome the formal recognition by the Governor at long last of the position of Archbishop Makarios and his colleagues as leaders of the Greek Cypriot majority on the island and the abandonment of the campaign to isolate or dislodge him from that position. I expect the Secretary of State remembers how often I warned him inside the House and outside that if he wanted to have co-operation and, indeed, any contact with the 80 per cent. majority of the Cypriot people he would, in the end, be obliged to work through leaders whom they themselves freely chose. We welcome the fact that the Governor had talks with the Archbishop some time ago and that, as it seems, the Archbishop is shortly to be allowed to go back to take his place as the leader of the Cypriot people.
Among the recent developments which we welcome are signs of what seems to be a new spirit of willingness in various quarters to discuss and consider realistic proposals for a settlement from most, if not all, of the parties concerned. Certainly, the Colonial Secretary could hardly

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have expected more from the Archbishop of Cyprus than the phrase contained at the end of his recent letter which my right hon. Friend has quoted. Nor would it have been realistic in present conditions to have expected more from the Greek Government than what Prime Minister Karamanlis said in his letter of 23rd June to the right hon. Gentleman our own Prime Minister, in which he said that the Greek Government would welcome
"a temporary solution on the basis of democratic self-government under British sovereignty and for postponing the settlement of the main issue until a more appropriate time."
In the realities of Greek politics, that was a very bold, courageous and realistic line to take.
Even in another quarter, on the Turkish side, there seem to have been signs in the very recent past of a more flexible and less intransigent attitude which, if that is the case, we warmly welcome on this side of the Committee.
I now turn to the plan itself. The Government, and, indeed, the Governor of Cyprus, have been very free with warnings to the Opposition about the awful responsibility that rests on our shoulders at the present time. I think I would be right in saying that, of course, we on this side of the Committee accept all the responsibilities of an Opposition who are themselves on the threshold of taking office. We are well aware that it will not be many months before we ourselves are dealing with and trying to solve this problem. We have this consideration very much in mind.
At the same time, the Government have clearly been told by my right hon. Friend that we do not accept responsibility either for their policies during the last few years or for this new plan which they have suddenly revealed, but about which, of course, there has been no consultation and which is still full of a great deal of obscurity and omission. At the time of the Radcliffe Constitution, we were told that to produce a workable plan for the future of Cyprus would involve a long period of preparatory work and consultation by a constitutional expert. Indeed, Lord Radcliffe took many months to produce the Constitution.
We on this side of the House know nothing of the way in which the present
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plan was prepared, but we see that it is only a rough outline of action that might be taken and is in no sense a detailed Constitution.
I propose to put a number of questions, some of them critical, but none of them intended to be hostile, which I believe it would be very much in the interests of the Government that the Prime Minister should answer before the end of the debate, because these questions are not only being asked by myself and my hon. Friends. They are questions the answers to which may very greatly influence those in other parts of the world who are waiting to decide what their attitude shall be.
I start with the background to the negotiations themselves. The Colonial Secretary said that what had happened between January and the production of the plan must remain a secret to the Governments who were concerned in confidential conversations at that time. But I think that something should be said in answer to the general belief that a plan was drawn up at the beginning of the year in agreement with the Governor of Cyprus, that that plan was discussed at Ankara, that under pressure from the Turkish Government and under pressure from riots inside Cyprus organised by the Turkish Government that plan was scrapped and that what we have in its place is the result of a policy of, not to use a stronger term, backing down in the face of Turkish pressure.
If that is not the case and it is really the fact that people closely concerned with the administration of Cyprus think that this is a better plan than the one proposed at the beginning of the year, some of the obscurities about the circumstances in which it was produced ought to be dispelled.
Secondly, I want to ask a specific question. There is a good deal of mystery surrounding what happened during the 48 howls when, last week, the Prime Minister asked us to accept a deferment of the announcement of the plan. It has been widely said that the last paragraph of the White Paper concerning a tridominium was matter added during that 48-hour period. I see that the Colonial Secretary shakes his head, and I take it that that is not the case. I am very grateful for the right hon. Gentleman's answer.

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Secondly, I think that at some stage the Government's exact position in relation to the principle of self-determination must be defined, because the Government are on record at the present time as being as much committed to the principle of self-determination as we are on this side of the Committee. If there has been a modification of that position, then the Government must frankly say so.
That leads me to the point of what exactly is the attitude of the Government to partition which, very regrettably as we think, the Colonial Secretary himself first publicly put forward in the House in, I think, December, 1956. Has the pledge that partition is among the possible solutions given by the Colonial Secretary been scrapped, and, if it has not, what is its relation to the present plan?
We know that Mr. Zorlu, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, has said quite openly that his Government's policy is to achieve partition within a year. The Colonial Secretary knows that that is so. He knows that the Turkish Government have given a kind of qualified welcome to the plan because they think it can be reconciled with partition. It is very important that when he replies the Prime Minister should make plain what the Government's attitude to partition really is and whether they accept Mr. Zorlu's interpretation of the proposals now put forward. The Government must make it plain that if they do not accept that position they are not going to be pushed by threats from any quarter into a further adjustment of their attitude over the question of partition.
Next, I want to ask for more information on what seems to me to be one of the most difficult aspects of the proposal, and that is the plan to associate Greek and Turkish High Commissioners with the administration of the island.
I listened carefully to the Colonial Secretary when he spoke. He said that these High Commissioners—he was referring specifically to the Turkish High Commissioner—would be partly responsible for the administration of the island. I want to ask the Government whether that is so, whether the purpose of having these two representatives of the foreign Governments is to assist in the administration of the island, or whether it is a mechanism for the protection of the
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various communities, and particularly, of course, of the minority in Cyprus, the Turks. If we could have a clear definition of what the purpose is and what the duties and responsibilities of these High Commissioners would be, it would be much easier for us to comment.
Mr. Lennox-Boyd: They would be full members of the Governor's Council, and, in addition, would be entitled to refer legislation which they thought discriminatory to the appellant tribunal.
Mr. Noel-Baker: That, of course, makes it very difficult for us, without a great deal of reassurance, not to be most apprehensive of the position.
Let me take, if it is not too fanciful—which I do not think it is—a hypothetical example. Supposing that the two Governments accepted this part of the plan and that the Turks appointed Dr. Kutchuk as their High Commissioner in charge of 80,000 to 90,000 Turkish citizens on the island, and supposing that the Greek Government were to appoint not Colonel Grivas, perhaps, but at least Archbishop Makarios as High Commissioner, or that persons having views as divergent as the views of Dr. Kutchuk and Colonel Grivas took these positions, would it be possible to make progress? Would not the Colonial Secretary and the Government of Cyprus face an immediate deadlock?
Is it realistic in the present atmosphere to imagine that these nominees of the two foreign Governments would be used for any other purpose than to further their declared policies for Cyprus? Mr. Zorlu has, as I have mentioned, said that the Turkish Government's policy now is to get partition within a year. Of course, if he had a nominee in the Governor's Council his instructions to that nominee would be to work for Turkish Government policy. What would there be to stop the Turkish High Commissioner in every matter which came before the Council or the Tribunal saying that it affected the rights of the Turkish minority whether it did or not? And, of course, his Greek counterpart could play a similar rôle furthering the cause of Enosis.
Mr. Nigel Nicolson: I can see the point which the hon. Gentleman is making, that there might be quarrels between the two national nominees, but

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because there is such a divergence of opinion between the two representatives in the island is surely a reason for objecting to the plan put forward by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) for a single national Parliament instead of the two community Parliaments suggested in the White Paper.
Mr. Noel-Baker: I am grateful to the hon. Member, for whose opinion I have a very high regard, as have most of my hon. Friends and, I think, hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber.
Surely, the difficulty is this. If one is to include the nominees of foreign Governments, receiving their instructions from outside, responsible not to the Cypriot people but to politicians in Athens and Ankara, are they not likely to find it very much more difficult to co-operate, and to use their positions for the purpose of furthering the policies of those foreign Governments, whereas the Cypriot Ministers in the Council—the Cypriot elected representatives—will at least be responsible to the Cypriot people. They will be dealing with the real problems of the administration of the island. The chances of their co-operating, difficult enough in the present atmosphere, and of co-operation, between the communities, are not easy. But they have a far easier chance than will the nominees of foreign Governments in Athens and Ankara.
There is another point I wish to make in this connection. The proposal, as I understand it, is that at the same time that the High Commissioners take their seats on the Governor's Council we will give the Turkish minority in Cyprus Turkish passports and citizenship and to the Greek Cypriots Greek passports and citizenship. Would that not enormously increase what is already a source of difficulty—the possibility of direction and intimidation over the Greek and Turkish communities in the island from outside? To take my illustration once again, if Dr. Kutchuk was to be the representatives of the Turkish Government with authority over Turkish citizens and Colonel Grivas was to represent the Greek Government with authority over Greek citizens, how very dangerous the situation would become. If the Colonial Secretary's intention is that these two High Commissioners shall be primarily responsible for seeing that the two communities are not victimised by
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each other, and, more particularly, the Turkish minority, is there not some equally effective but much less cumbersome way of achieving that?
I turn now to an even more serious implication of this proposal to grant foreign citizenship and passports to the inhabitants of Cyprus. If it is the idea, as I understand it is, to grant this concession immediately the plan comes into operation—if it does—does that not immediately provide juridical grounds to justify any intervention in the protection of their own countrymen, either from the Greeks or Turks, and make the possibility of administering the island as a unit and without outside interference relatively impossible? It seems to me that this question of Greek and Turkish citizenship at this stage is perhaps the most dangerous of all the proposals in the plan.
Now I should like to ask for one specific piece of information in connection with the proposals to give the two communities communal autonomy. The Colonial Secretary said that the purpose of that was that he wanted to unite and not divide the people of Cyprus. I find his reasoning difficult to follow. I ask him, as an illustration of what the Government have in mind, if they envisage that the municipal councils in towns on the island, and local government in the villages, shall be one or two. Will there be a unified system, or will there be two municipalities in all the towns and villages of Cyprus? Perhaps the Colonial Secretary is now in a position to answer.
I am asking if, in line with this proposal to separate the two communities and give them separate elected bodies representing them, he is also going to give sanction to a proposal which has already been illegally started by the Cypriot Turks, and allow separate municipal councils to come into operation? If that is so, I cannot see how he can possibly sustain his contention that he is seeking to unite and not divide the people of the island.
On this question of communal autonomy, we need to keep in mind that the field of communal affairs is a very narrow one indeed. It is confined, even at its widest, to education, religion, special land arrangements for the Turkish community and possibly some social services. These

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are minor details in the life of the island, and the things that are really important in Cyprus are practical questions like irrigation, communications, economic development and day-to-day administration. These are the matters in which it is really important that the people of Cyprus should play a part, and should have the institutions to enable them to control them.
Is the Colonial Secretary satisfied that in setting up this form of communal autonomy there will not be objections from religious leaders on both the Greek and Turkish sides. Will the Evkaf Council and the Mufti in Cyprus welcome having atheist, Communist Turks running these matters? Will the Church of Cyprus like having Left-wing leaders put in charge of purely ecclesiastical affairs? I think there are many pitfalls and difficulties here, other than the obvious ones, in this proposal to communalise some aspects of life in Cyprus.
If the intention really is that this plan shall be a prelude, not to a condominium but to a tridominium, the experience we have had of that in other areas is not very hopeful. The Colonial Secretary knows only too well what a nuisance and a constant source of irritation and trouble was set up when we began sharing the administration of the New Hebrides with the French, and he knows that the condominium in the Sudan only worked at all because the Egyptians were sleeping partners. In any foreseeable atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean that seems likely at present, tridominium is about the most unworkable solution that could be found.
I turn now to my final and most important question about this plan. Will the Prime Minister, when he replies, tell the Committee quite clearly whether these proposals are subject to modification and, if so, to what extent? Is the plan to be a basis for discussion and negotiation in which concessions and adjustments can be made, or is it simply another "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal, so many of which have led to failure in Cyprus in the recent past? If the Prime Minister shuts the door on modifications and changes and discussion and negotiation, then the plan is as good as dead.
I do not want to give the impression that I am hostile to anything that may
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lead to a settlement in Cyprus, but I am bound to say that I have the duty to look at this plan in the light of my own familiarity with the area to be affected by it and to say what I honestly think about it. As it stands, I do not think it can either be accepted or can work, but if, on the other hand, the Government are to be generous enough and flexible enough to make it a basis for discussion and negotiation, then there is very great hope indeed that something may come out of it.
I should like finally to ask the Colonial Secretary and the Government to remember what they have already told us: that this debate is being watched very carefully outside the House. What we say is, in fact, far less important than what the Prime Minister says in answer to the points made. I beg the Colonial Secretary, even at this late stage, to use all the influence he has with his right hon. Friend to see that we get answers that will give hope to the people of Cyprus, so that this may be the beginning of negotiations leading to a solution of their tragic problem.
5.29 p.m.
Major H. Legge-Bourke: The last occasion on which I took part in a debate on this subject was on the date which the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) mentioned in his opening speech, 28th July, 1954, at which time I was not a member of the official Conservative Party. I understand that others who I thought might have taken the same action as I took at that time are in the process of following me back into the fold, or attempting so to do. I mention that because, rather naturally, I have looked at what I said on that occasion. I have also looked at what was said on that occasion by Lord Colyton, or Mr. Henry Hopkinson as he then was, to whom the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East referred. Certainly, regarding anything connected with the economic development of Cyprus I cannot find anything inconsistent with what Mr. Hopkinson then said and what the hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) said he would like to see happen.
The big change which seems to have taken place since that day, and which is involved in this new plan, is the putting to the top of the list the interests of the

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people of Cyprus specifically set out in words, instead of what I always thought, certainly up until 28th July, 1954, was the top priority, namely, defence and military security. It has always been an agreed principle, it was particularly embodied in the Haley Report on Africa that the paramountcy of the interests of indigenous populations was unquestionable in the whole of our colonial policy.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Mr. Peel), whom I should like to congratulate on a splendid maiden speech, made clear that if we follow an argument to its logical conclusion, sometimes we can finish up with an absurd situation. I still feel that what dominates the Cyprus issue is that no matter how fast progress is made towards self-determination, there is a limit to the length at which it can be taken with safety. However far we go along the road to self determination in Cyprus, there comes a moment when if Cyprus chose to become, or was given the opportunity to become, completely independent, I am quite certain that the island would not be in a position to protect itself militarily. This White Paper makes no difference to that because it is a fact.
On the earlier occasion when I spoke on this subject, I did so because I had spent six months in the island during the Second World War; and I warned both myself and the House that ever to assume that one knows anything about the politics of a country when serving in it as a soldier, especially in time of war, is a very dangerous assumption. Today, I still should not like to pretend that I know all the political situation there. But of this I am absolutely convinced; if we look at the history of Cyprus since the time it was first ceded to us we must realise that we cannot possibly allow Cyprus ever to fall into enemy hands so long as we remain a maritime Power.
Cyprus was first ceded to us in exchange for an undertaking that we would assist the Ottoman Empire against Russia were it ever attacked. We have now come the full circle and we have N.A.T.O., which is partly designed to do the same thing. Whether it is now a question of using Cyprus, or whether it is a question of denying Cyprus so that it can never fall into the hands of a potential enemy of ourselves, of Turkey or any
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other member of N.A.T.O., I do not think matters nearly so much as the fact that the principal importance of Cyprus to the Eastern Mediterranean, to N.A.T.O. and to world peace, is its strategic position. We cannot get away from that.
There is one problem which has disturbed me a great deal ever since we decided to evacuate the Canal Zone and to put G.H.Q. in Cyprus. It is that so long as we were in Egypt the importance of Cyprus was comparatively small, so long as we denied its possession to any potential enemy. The moment we left Egypt—and do not forget we were not in Egypt when Cyprus was ceded to us—the importance of Cyprus became infinitely greater.
If we study the writings of those responsible for arranging the ceding of Cyprus to us, it becomes clear that what was in the mind of Disraeli, the principal architect of that transaction, was that we should have a tripod, or at least a bipod, of establishment in the Middle East. He described Cyprus as the key to Western Asia. We should have one foot in Cyprus and the other on the mainland. The Lebanon, he said, was the key to Asia as a whole and in particular to Syria. Of course, in those days Syria included Palestine.
However, I do not wish to get diverted on to that theme, beyond saying that I believe that, militarily, so long as we are relying on Cyprus alone in that part of the world, we are in an unnecessarily dangerous position. It is quite as important, now we have turned our front and are looking north, as it was in the days when the principal concern was the land communications with the Indian Empire, which was the position when Cyprus was first ceded to us.
We are now dealing with the hinterland of the Bagdad Pact front. We have a useful lodgement in Cyprus from a military point of view. But surely the lesson that Egypt, Palestine, and a great many other places in the world has taught us is that military lodgements in a hostile population are never as good as they should be from a strategic point of view. The most encouraging part of the present situation—there are many anxious features about it—is that for the first time since, I think, the Second World War village communities, be they Turkish or Greek, or mixed, are welcoming British

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troops who come to the villages to keep the peace. One may well say that it is regrettable that that situation should ever have arisen where two communities are at loggerheads with each other, and I would agree; but I do not think that hon. Members on this side of the Committee have as much responsibility in that regard as have some, not all, hon. Members opposite—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—I knew that would annoy some hon. Members opposite but I feel it intensely, and I will not withdraw what I have said.
However regrettable it is that such a situation should ever have arisen, it is encouraging that now ordinary persons, be they Turkish men or women or Greek men or women, or even the children, are welcoming British troops when they appear on the scene. I think that is conducive at least to some sort of settlement because it shows we now have both the principal populations in Cyprus ready to co-operate with British troops, and that is important. I believe it should help this plan to go forward. I must confess to my right hon. Friend that when this plan was published I wished the policy could have been carried out in another way. I do not propose to dwell on this point, but I personally would have made a condition of any considerable reform the establishment of law and order. This policy has now been published and I hope that something will come of it. I believe, however, that we must make it quite clear that what has been offered will not be withdrawn in any respect unless we are requested so to do by both the two parties concerned.
I still believe that the looser we can make the conception we have in our minds at this moment, the better. It would be a great pity to get tied down to too much constitutional detail at this stage before even bipartite talks had taken place, let alone tripartite talks. I am very much of the view that if one looks back over the situation, one of the most unfortunate features is the assumption that we could possibly get the constitutional reform which is now envisaged before law and order, and that is a question which will confront every democratic government that has any overseas possessions. It is bound to
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happen. It has happened in the past, and it will continue to happen.
Those whom I have known best before I came into the House and some of those whom I know now and who have had the unpleasant job of trying to keep that law and order have not always been encouraged by the conduct of the British House of Commons. There have been occasions, and I dare say there will be again—I pray that they may be very few—when troops have been put in and were almost getting on top of their job and were about to re-establish law and order, only to be told to hold their fire. What happens? It has happened recently. It happened about six months ago in Cyprus, and it may well be that Grivas would have been dealt with once and for all if the troops had been allowed to go through with their job.
It is easy for us back here, without adequate knowledge, to criticise people on the spot. Sometimes when hon. Members criticise those who are responsible here they may be undermining the position of those who have had to do the dirty work and who are trying to clean up the mess. Our troops are doing an extremely difficult job. They have been doing it with great skill and for many months. But they have been disconcerted when they have been stopped from completing the job that they started. If Palestine has not taught us the absurdity of that policy, even the criminality of that policy, I do not suppose anything ever will.
It is all very fine for hon. Members to praise the troops for what they are doing; but every time they say something which undermines the position of those in authority in Cyprus, then they make it more difficult for them to do the job.
I wish my right hon. Friend all possible success with this scheme. I would have had qualifications to suggest if I had been in a position to be consulted before it was published, but I wish it well, and I wish the Governor well in what he is trying to do. I only hope that we shall never for one minute let up on the undertaking which I take to be implicit by the introduction of this White Paper, and that is that, failing agreement or failing readiness to come to agreement either through bypartite or tripartite talks, we shall not hesitate to

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maintain law and order in Cyprus. I hope we shall continue to do that and make it absolutely clear that we shall do so if necessary for the full seven-year period. Any wavering in that direction will be fatal to hopes of peace in Cyprus and, I believe, will greatly endanger the whole of the N.A.T.O. structure. Few things could be more disastrous than that.
5.45 p.m.
Mrs. Lena Jeger: I do not propose to waste the precious time of the Committee by following the anachronistic meanderings of the hon. and gallant Member for the Isle of Ely (Major Legge-Bourke). I do not wish to follow the strategic argument, but I should like humbly to submit that it seems extraordinary, in these days of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war, that the House of Commons should have to listen to a strategic dissertation based on Disraeli's concept of the last century. If that is the only contribution which an experienced soldier like the hon. and gallant Member can make, I think that it is a poor outlook for the advice which he has given.
Secondly, I cannot agree with the hon. and gallant Member's assertion that we should base our policy in Cyprus on the strategic needs of this country. He has sought to justify what has been happening in Cyprus in terms of the Bagdad Pact and other military commitments. I do not know how hon. Members opposite think we can take the country of another people and use it for our own strategic purposes without consultation with those people. I think that that is the question which most fundamentally divides us, and I prefer to leave that aspect of the matter there.
I have seen our troops at work in Cyprus during some of the most difficult periods, and I must emphasise that, in my view, the Government have during the last few years placed on our soldiers in Cyprus a bitterly unfair and difficult job, and the measure of that responsibility lies with hon. Members opposite Any attempt to suggest that it lies elsewhere is dodging the responsibility.
I want to deal for a few moments with the plan. We would have had a far better plan from the Government had they been able or willing to produce it sooner. I think that this plan is to a
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large extent a measure of their failure. It has gone back on other proposals which the House has had to consider, such as the Radcliffe proposals, and, to my mind, in many ways it even goes back on Mr. Hopkinson's suggestions.
I think, therefore, that we have to ask ourselves a lot of questions in putting forward this plan to the people of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece and Turkey. But whatever our criticisms of the plan—and I must honestly say that mine are fundamental—even if it cannot form the basis of negotiation, the most important job that we have to do this afternoon in the House of Commons is to use all the influence that we have on both sides to ensure that negotiations are opened and that people start talking with each other. I do not think there is any difference between the two sides on that point.
On the other hand, it is no use our being so relieved that at last the Government have produced this long-promised plan that we fail to examine it really carefully and make any constructive suggestions that we can in all honesty and good faith for its improvement. The whole situation has been overshadowed by the deterioration in the relations between Greece and Turkey. In fact, this plan bears the imprint of that deterioration. The attempts which have been made in this plan to create machinery to meet those difficulties cannot succeed as machinery unless there is an improvement in cordiality and unless there is good will from both Greece and Turkey.
Never before can it be said that Greece and Turkey have needed each other so much as they do now. They are allies together in N.A.T.O. and fellow members of the United Nations. All the developments and circumstances of the modern world make their co-operation essential for reasons of geography and of progress, because both of them have, above all, the overriding need for security, for peace and for reconstruction of their countries. Both of them have heavy tasks to do in raising the standard of living of their own peoples, in seeking to reduce the burden of armaments that rests on both their countries and in coming together in amity.
There were signs and hopes that that was happening in the years before the war, when Kemal Ataturk and Mr.

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Venizelos seemed to be bringing about a lessening in this traditional historical enmity. I very much wish that we could get something of that feeling today between these two allies, because I am convinced that the trouble in Cyprus is not so much the intrinsic question of Cyprus itself as that Cyprus is being used as a symbol of continuing enmity and difficulty between the two countries. Anything that we or the Government can do to reduce the friction between these two Powers can bring nothing but good, not only to Greece and Turkey and to the whole of N.A.T.O. and the United Nations, but, above all, to Cyprus itself.
We must look carefully at the plan, not from our point of view so much as from the point of view of the people of Cyprus. It is their country that we are talking about. Never in the history of the international treaties which have been referred to this afternoon has there been a single occasion on which the people of Cyprus have ever been consulted. Disraeli did not consult them at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. Nobody consulted them at the time of the Treaty of Lausanne. Anthony did not consult them when he gave Cyprus as a birthday present to Cleopatra. Throughout history, nobody has ever paid the slightest attention to the views of the people whose country this is.
I want for a few moments to look at the plan from that simple starting point. Surely, the people whose country this is must have priority in consideration. I cannot see any other fair and honourable approach. It is they, above all, who suffer from the continuation of the present situation in all sorts of ways which must evoke the sympathy and understanding of all Members. Whatever some hon. Members may feel about the guilt that rests upon individuals in Cyprus, we must all agree that many innocent people have been involved in the suffering which has come to that country.
In the first place, I consider that the plan is misconceived in its attitude to the communal question. I am very sorry that it should seek to establish the two separate houses of representatives on a communal basis, which seems to me to be based on the conception of communal partition. I see no other way of looking at it. I know that the present
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situation must give many people grounds for thinking that this is the only way out, but I hope that that will not be the last thought of the Government on this question. Communal relations are probably worse now than they have ever been. I hope that this is a transient phase and that we will look forward to a situation in which this tension will ease, instead of enshrining the tension by this permanent division. To do so seems to me to accept that there must be separation between the two communities.
When we have seen Turks and Greeks working together in Cyprus in the administration, in the hospitals and the orphanages, in many forms of social service and, until quite recently, on the municipal councils, when we have seen them talking together and their children playing together, and knowing the social contacts which have existed between the two communities, we should try to seek a way of recapturing that co-operation. I do not consider that to be impossible. If it was impossible, the whole plan would not work either, because tacitly there must be co-operation.
I want to ask the Prime Minister whether it is envisaged that these houses of representatives, which, we are told, will deal with communal affairs, will be limited to those subjects which are usually taken as referring to religious practices. We do not know, for instance, how many people will comprise these rather high-sounding bodies. Is their main preoccupation to be with cemeteries, marriages and the upkeep of church or mosque buildings, as the case may be? If this is so, it seems to me that to have such limited subjects as the only agenda for, the two elected chambers is constitutionally difficult to follow.
It seems to me that we are rather over-weighting the communal subjects. Moreover, this does not make a great deal of contribution to the present situation, because it is precisely in this very sphere that there is at present no argument. In fact, most of these things are already separately managed, either by the Ethnarchy Council or by the Evkaf in the case of the Turks, so that they are not a cause of present friction. These suggestions, therefore, cannot be expected to make for any further advancement.
What is much more important is the common interests of the predominantly

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peasant population in the welfare of their country. From my reading of the White Paper, it seems that a whole range of important subjects vital to the life and progress of the country will be contained only in the small Governor's Council. Matters of finance, the Budget, allocations of capital and current expenditure, labour conditions, the health service that the Cyprus Government have been trying to build up, and the embryonic national insurance scheme that they have been trying to organise, all of which are questions of vital concern to the prosperity of the island, are to be dealt with in this small Council, on which there is to be a representative from Greece and one from Turkey, with full voting rights.
It may be, as my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) has suggested, that Greece and Turkey may choose representatives even from the Cypriot communities to do this job. On the other hand, they might send to Cyprus people who have no knowledge whatever of local conditions. To have a small council which is the legislature, the executive and, to a certain extent, the head of any judiciary that will be established, all united in one small body, seems to me to be fraught with practical difficulties. Anyone who has had experience of colonial administration must surely feel the deepest sympathy for those who will have to try to work the plan. Therefore, I hope very much that the Government will give careful consideration to the suggestion put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan).
What we must look towards in Cyprus is the establishment of some kind of directly-elected assembly which will be the beginning of a Parliament in the fullest sense of the word and one which will be directly answerable to the people and which will be elected on a common roll, so that we can have in Cyprus a situation in which a Greek can vote for a Turk or a Turk can vote for a Greek. Many of us who know the island know that there could be plenty of opportunities for that to happen. It certainly is not an impossible conception by any manner of means.
It seems to me that the presence in the island, and in this kep position, of the representatives of Greece and Turkey on the Governor's Council will make permanent the ties with Athens and Ankara
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which we have on so many occasions deplored. It will keep the Cypriot people looking out, rather than looking in towards their own country and the task of building it up. This is a very difficult matter especially for Greek Cypriots. It must be remembered that to them this symbolises bringing back the Ottoman conquerors right into the inner councils of the island. It is a great deal to ask of them. I hope that this will be one of the subjects which will be negotiated, for I cannot see the island settling down to getting on with its own affairs if we put right at the heart of the Cabinet, as it were, these two alien representatives.
Then it seems to me that by making available to the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus Greek and Turkish nationality the Government are abandoning the hope of the two communities settling down together as Cypriots. I know that there may be many reasons for feeling depression about that conception, but it is not a depression which I share. I remain convinced that given the right policy, given the right objective, the people of this island could still look forward to the future.
Dual citizenship is not only a psychological danger, but it seems to me to raise all sorts of problems in international law. It would be a very difficult question if the Turkish liberation army, of which we have read in the Turkish Press, were ever to invade British Cyprus in an attempt by the Turks to rescue people whom they could legally regard as Turkish subjects. If we deliberately create 100,000 Turkish subjects in Cyprus or 400,000 Greek subjects on this little island it seems to me that we shall be asking for trouble.
Mr. Patrick Wall: Does the hon. Lady equally condemn the activities of Greek nationals and Colonel Grivas in this British island?
Mrs. Jeger: Yes, indeed I do. I have done so, and not only from the safety of these benches, but in Cyprus itself at the height of the activities of Grivas.
The overriding consideration, as I said earlier, must be the views of the Cypriot people. I ask the Government to see that those views are given priority. They are much more important than the reactions of the Greek Government or the Turkish Government to this plan. After

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all, this plan and its predecessors were held up from time to time because there were to be elections in Turkey at one moment or elections in Greece at another. I thought at one time that they might be held up because there was to be an election in this country. I certainly do not think that the Government should base their policy too exclusively on the reactions of two Governments which, on their own showing, are liable to change from time to time.
The one permanent element in the situation is the people of this island. No talks have been held with any direct representatives of those people since Archbishop Makarios was deported in 1956. I ask the Government to make the earliest arrangements they can to come face to face with the Cypriot people, with the representatives of both communities, and to give their views priority over whatever the views may be of the Turkish Government or the Greek Government. I ask the Government to meet those representatives without prior conditions or reservations, and to let them feel that any concessions which they have been able to make, several of which have been referred to today, will be reciprocated by the British Government.
On these grounds alone can we look forward to constructive talks, and we hope that the Government will come back to the House of Commons with a plan for Cyprus agreed by the people who will have to live with it, whose country it is, a plan which will not need 37,000 British soldiers to stay in Cyprus.
6.6 p.m.
Viscount Lambton: I should like to begin by congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Mr. Peel) upon his maiden speech. I think it is sufficient to say that it shows that upon him has fallen the mantle of his predecessor, whose presence in this Committee we all miss so much.
I listened with keen interest to the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), who opened for the Opposition. There are certain criticisms which I should like to make of his comparatively restrained remarks which were delivered in his usual competent fashion. First, he argued that Cyprus cannot have unity by division. I do not understand how he conceives or proposes that there
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should be any unity in the island without some separation of the peoples. Nor did he make any proposal to show how that could be done.
Then he complained that this separation denied the opportunities of both sides to get together. I really cannot imagine which would be less calculated to ensure both sides getting together in Cyprus than a mixed assembly swayed by public opinion. Paragraph VIII (a) of the plan for Cyprus as contained in Cmnd. 455 seems to me to offer a far better opportunity for co-operation upon a higher level of Government.
Later the hon. Member said that the country must have self-determination, but he did not stress the interests of the Turkish population or the strategic importance to Turkey of Cyprus. He continually seemed, as certain other hon. Members seemed to do, to be stressing that the Greek Cypriots were the suffering party in the island. I cannot imagine how anything could be more tragic than that this Committee should seem to be divided on this issue, and that it should be suggested that the Government favour the Turks and the Opposition the Greeks. I hope that whoever sums up the debate tonight for the Opposition will stress more than the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East did that there have been faults upon both sides and that both sides have been and must be considered equally in any solution.
I myself think there are very considerable reasons for welcoming this new move towards the achievement of peace. It is so easy to criticise any scheme as unworkable, but when there is a country torn between two dissenting factions it is unlikely that any solution immediately it is offered will be accepted by both sides. Indeed, even justice itself is unlikely to calm the present irrational excitement. Certainly, neither side is ready to accept anything that it would imagine gave pleasure to the other.
What we have had is an ideological plan put forward against such a stormy background that it is unlikely that in its present state it will be accepted. Nevthertheless, there is one section of these proposals whose wisdom one is inclined to doubt. It is that which deals with the rights of both Turks and Cypriots to appeal to independent tribunals on matters relating to their separate communities.

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Where such a process as this begins or ends it is difficult to say, but what it means is that we are actually abdicating that complete authority which one might have thought it would be necessary to have upon this island. We can only fear that this concession might be used as an instrument by either the Greeks or the Turks to undermine the authority of British rule if upon some other matter they were not in agreement with our action.
Nevertheless, I would join in welcoming the scheme for there may lie a subtle strength in it—not if it is accepted but if it is not accepted, for we in this country who have been branded for a long time in Cypriot eyes as black colonialists have offered for a period of seven years, alone retaining police and defensive rights, to abdicate our absolute authority and originate an offer of equality of citizenship. Surely, if neither side accepts such reasonability—or something very close to it which we have leaned over backwards to prepare—it must show that there yet remains such differences of opinion in the island that we have no alternative but to continue to govern.
Therefore, I should like to ask the Prime Minister what will happen in the eventuality of this plan not being accepted and if a compromise settlement is not accepted either. A phrase has been coined during the last week that we are going to "soldier on". This surely implies that for a period of years we shall have to maintain, if not the present force, considerable forces on the island. Nor is it unlikely that if eventually we put forward a further plan large-scale violence might once again break out, and once again large forces might have to be recalled to the island.
I should like to know how we are to carry out this policy in the future and how we are to "soldier on" to do it, for it is no use talking about such a policy if we have not the wherewithal to carry it out. We cannot soldier on without soldiers. It seems to me that there is danger that we are going in two directions and that our authority in Cyprus may be a casualty of such diverse policies. For while we have pledged ourselves to the continuance of authoritative rule in Cyprus if this plan fails to be accepted, at home we are engaged upon
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defence cuts which make it almost impossible to see where in a few years we should find the full-scale forces which might be needed to carry out our pledge to be responsible for law and order on the island. Shall we be prepared to enforce the logical conclusion of non-acceptance of the plan? That really is the point at issue.
Nothing would be worse than that this plan should merely be regarded as a stopgap and as merely a prelude to bringing together the heads of the two Governments, whom we have been taught by experience are singularly unlikely to agree. No one must realise more than the Prime Minister the danger of tripartite talks without the minutest consideration of all the subjects concerned. Unplanned talks at the moment would surely be an encouragement to both sides to think that they can do as they have done in the past and serve their best ends by the encouragement of outrage, for we cannot afford in the Mediterranean now a repetition of the events of three years ago.
I hope that if this plan proves unacceptable we shall insist upon retaining our authority, and I hope that the Prime Minister will emphasise that tonight. A final point which I should like to make is that on the larger scale one cannot be quite certain that the economies in defence are not being so considerable that they are hampering the future policies of our Foreign Office in this and other spheres and putting into jeopardy that which we are pledged to do.
6.16 p.m.
Mr. Desmond Donnelly: The noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton) talked about the imperative need for us to have some idea of what we mean by "soldiering on." This question is very much in the minds of the Committee this afternoon when we are considering the Government's proposals and what happens if they fail. I should like to come to that in a moment or two. Before I do so, I should like to make clear where I stand with regard to this plan. I look upon it as a basis for discussion, not to be rejected out of hand—because of the consequences that would inevitably flow from that decision—but with certain reservations, and subject to a number of questions which I should like to ask the Prime Minister.

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The first is about the proposed tri-dominium. How essential is this to the working of the whole plan? Here we are introducing something which is very debatable. It is something which might be unnecessary. It raises a number of problems, inevitably the result of this type of constitutional proposal. My hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South (Mrs. L. Jeger) drew attention to some of the dangers which would flow from it.
The ratio of four Greeks to two Turks is, considering the proportions of the population of the island, substantially balanced in favour of the Turks. A ratio of five to three resulting from additional appointments, each from outside, makes the balance even worse. I wonder whether these two pro-consuls of Greece and Turkey, appearing in a way in which they would be really answerable to Powers outside the island, may not act as cheer leaders for rival factions within the island. Very dangerous results might flow from that. How esential is it to the plan that this proposal should remain?
My second question to the Prime Minister is about the communal assembly. I appreciate the Government's difficulties at the moment in establishing in the island any kind of internal self-government in which Greeks and Turks would actually sit down in the same room. We have already seen this problem where the Greek Government are withdrawing from some of the committees of N.A.T.O. At this stage, the first thing we have to do is to get them to sit down at all, let alone sit down in the same room. Is it the Government's intention that this should be the end of local government proposals or is it only a beginning? If this is a success, can it be made into an island assembly; and do the Government see it in those terms, so that eventually it becomes the means of Cypriot self-government? I want to have some indication from the Government of how they envisage this proposal.
The next question which I should like to ask the Prime Minister is about the court of appeal, the impartial tribunal as the Secretary of State for the Colonies called it today. What kind of impartial tribunal do the Government envisage? Who are these people to be? That really is the important thing. And would it not
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be better for the Governor himself to be the impartial tribunal as the representative of the British Government? Again I ask the Prime Minister, how absolutely firm are the Government on this point, because if we have external influences again we run into many of the human problems which stem from the kind of passions which are aroused in the island? If the Governor himself exercises the right of final appeal, he is at least in an impartial position between the Greeks and the Turks.
My next question is about the seven years' date line. There is often a lot to be said for a time limit, especially if it is a short one. For instance, there was a lot to be said for saying that we would be leaving India by a certain date. It concentrates a man's mind wonderfully if he knows that he is going to be hanged within a fortnight, but if one tells him that he is going to be hanged within seven years, it only exacerbates his neurosis. I question whether it would not be better to have no time limit, but, at the first point when it is practicable to do so, to have negotiations rather than any fixed time limit. Is it not giving a serious hostage to fortune to settle on an arbitrary seven years' time limit? Why not five, ten, or twelve?
My next question is about the position of Archbishop Makarios. It seems to me that his presence, in the position he holds, is an essential factor in the negotiations which take place with the Greek Cypriot people. Some of us may not approve of the Archbishop, but, nevertheless, we have to recognise the position he holds. It is the legacy of the Ottoman Empire that the Ethnarchy are in this position, and, whether we like it or not, at some stage we shall have to negotiate with him. Would it not be much better to make it as a corollary of the plan to have the Archbishop back within the next few weeks? It would remove one of the main difficulties in negotiating with the Greek Cypriot people.
With those reservations, although I may be wrong, I nevertheless feel, from reading newspapers and talking to people, that, provided the Government are flexible and courageous enough, this plan has a chance of success. Practically nothing else at this moment has a chance of success. The fact that we ourselves do not necessarily endorse the individual

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terms of the plan, that we raise questions about them, and the specific circumstances in which we are considering it here this afternoon—all that is really the direct result of the responsibility which the Government must shoulder for the vacillations and the hesitations during the last few years.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said earlier this evening that we should think only about the future. He said, in effect, never mind about the past, let us think only of the future. Every criminal in the dock at the Old Bailey would echo exactly the same sentiment. The value of recrimination about the past, as the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) said when speaking in the Chamberlain Government, is to ensure effective action in the future. I say to the British Government that if their nerve fails now, if there are any more vacillations or hesitations, they will have a very heavy accountability before the British nation and also before the world.
The ideal solution to this problem—I do not think this is a contentious point—if it had been possible, would have been to have self-government within the island, moving to self-determination, with proper guarantees for the Turkish minority and for the Turkish strategic position on the mainland. That was the Labour Party's position and it remains the Labour Party's position.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South) indicated dissent.
Mr. Donnelly: Yes, it does. My hon. Friend has not changed his position at all. The noble Lord completely misunderstood the basis of our suggestions for a wider island assembly.
We all recognise that it is obviously an impracticable proposition for the original conception to be implemented now, and I want to take up first one point made by the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed. He said it is often thought that the Labour Party is pro-Greek and that the Conservative Party is pro-Turk, that this is a disastrous situation and that this has always exacerbated the position in discussing any question of self-determination, because it is always discussed in the context of a General Election, in a year or two, and of what, may happen in this country.
I should like to say that there is no
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question of the British Labour Party being either pro-Greek or pro-Turk. We are pro the British nation and the Cypriot people, and we are completely impartial as regards the races on the island. There is no doubt whatsoever that a British Labour Government would be just as fair in dealing with the Turkish people as any other Government which this country may have.
On the other hand, the Greek people must realise clearly that the statements made by my hon. Friends and myself in supporting self-determination are based on the hope that conditions will prevail which will enable self-government ultimately to move towards self-determination in the island. But there can be no question of self-determination, as my hon. Friend said, being conducted in an atmosphere of civil war. The best vehicle for anybody who believes in self-determination is peace, and the best way of achieving the things which some of the Greek Cypriots want on the island is to avoid a return to violence.
That brings me to the question of what would happen if the plan were to collapse completely. This is very much in the minds of all of us in considering this question today. First, there is a possibility of what the noble Lord said, which is colonial rule, of soldiering on. The question arises whether we have the adequate means for that, and what would be the political situation in this country, quite apart from what would happen in Cyprus, if we were to find ourselves in a worse and bloodier Palestine, and where it would end. Voices may be raised to say that we should leave the island and let the Cypriots fight it out—just that.
This would be a disastrous situation. But if people exacerbate the situation in the island then they may be creating just that very situation. And who would be suffering most of all if that were to happen? In the first place, it would be the Greek Cypriot people, because they are close to the Turkish mainland. The possible alternatives which would be imposed upon them would be either partition, which I would regard as disastrous, or Turkish annexation, and that would lead quite possibly to war between Greece and Turkey, to the destruction of N.A.T.O. in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to grave damage to

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the Bagdad Pact. And at the end of it all, it would be the Greek Cypriot people on the island who would suffer. That warning must be clearly given.
On the other hand, a warning ought to be given to the Turks as well. We all recognise the special position of Turkey as the hinge between East and West, between N.A.T.O. and the Bagdad Pact. We all recognise the special, isolated position of Turkey vis-à-vis the Communist world. However, I beg the Turks to understand that if they push their claims so far that they lead to a political revolution in Greece and to a Communist Government in Greece, then the Turkish nation will be the one most vulnerable in that situation. The Turkish nation will have the most to lose. I do not think that there is a danger of Greece going Communist at the immediate moment, but twelve months from now there could easily be a very ugly political complexion in Greece, and the Turks should consider their own position in that situation. We should suffer, but they would be infinitely more isolated than we should be.
That brings me to my last point, the strategic implications of Cyprus. This matter has been mentioned only in passing by one or two hon. Members in the course of the debate. I do not want to widen the debate too far, or to explore a new idea at this stage, but I suggest that we may now be entering on a new era of defence strategy in which this base may be necessary for the fire-extinguisher squads—not as a base for the hydrogen bomb and nuclear deterrent—but, possibly for fire-extinguisher squads in different parts of the world. It does not matter whether they are British-owned and controlled, or controlled by treaty organisation or by the United Nations; the principle remains.
In that respect, Cyprus may be one of the most important bases. We cannot lightly cast aside its military significance and importance at this moment. That brings me to the conclusion that this problem is much more complicated than that of India. It is much more complicated even than that of Palestine. It will tax to the uttermost limits everybody who is involved in future negotiations.
This, may be, is the last chance for the Greeks; it is the last chance, may be for the Turks to avoid a worsening of relations with the Greeks; it may be the last chance
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of the island to avoid civil war. It is certainly the last chance of the British Government to produce a successful policy for Cyprus.
In the House of Commons we are sometimes members of political parties and at other times citizens of Britain. It is because I am a citizen of Britain that, whatever may be my reservations, because we are all inevitably associated with the success or failure of the Government of the day, I wish this plan every success.
6.33 p.m.
Mr. Anthony Kershaw: I listened with considerable interest and agreement to the hon. Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly), and I very much agreed with what he said about the disasters which will overtake the inhabitants of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, and to a limited extent ourselves, if this plan for Cyprus is not accepted and fails to work.
If the impression has gone abroad that members of the Labour Party are pro-Greek, that is because until now they have seen the solution of the Cyprus problem on the lines of self-determination. If the two communities could be induced to live together amicably, I have not the slightest doubt that self-determination would be the sort of solution of which we should all approve. However, it is not the case that they will live together amicably, and so we cannot blame the Turks if they think that self-determination may be a very serious matter for them.
Mr. Callaghan: How does the hon. Member know?
Mr. Kershaw: Surely that is obvious from what has happened in the last years.
Mr. Callaghan: Has not it been established that the tension between the two communities is of comparatively recent origin and that it may well be temporary?
Mr. Kershaw: I agree that it is of comparatively recent origin, but the reason that tension has grown up is that self-determination seemed to be a policy which was to be imposed on Cyprus, and so the Turkish community in Cyprus became increasingly anxious about it, which is why the Turks have been behaving recently in the manner which we have all deplored.

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However that may be, I welcome, as I am sure does everyone else, the expressions of non-partisanship, fairness and equality which have come from both sides of the Committee today. I am certain that if these words are considered in Cyprus, they will add very much to the chance that this plan will be accepted.
Outside the House of Commons, it is sometimes asked whether it is worth our soldiering on in Cyprus. It is asked why we should stay in Cyprus. In the first place, we must discharge our responsibility to the people living in Cyprus. It is perfectly obvious in the present situation that, if we were to leave, the most immense disasters would fall upon them. Secondly, as the hon. Member for Pembroke has just said, we must not underrate the military value of Cyprus. It is essential to N.A.T.O. in that part of the world, it is very necessary to the Bagdad Pact, and it is very useful as a staging post for our Far Eastern commitments. It is also very useful and even essential for the radio broadcasting, and so forth, which we have to undertake in order to present our case in the Middle East.
It is quite clear, as the past years have shown, that this is not a colonial issue. I imagine that there is hardly any hon. Member who does not wish that it were possible to settle this problem peacefully simply by getting out of Cyprus, but I am certain that that would be a way which would bring irremedial disaster to that part of the world.
The criticism has been made that this plan, while possibly a good one—and I think that it is a good one—has come too late. It has been asked why it has not come earlier. The answer is that if at an earlier stage there had been a plan giving the Turks so much authority in this island, the Greek Government would never have accepted it. It would also have been impossible to sell it to the majority of Greek people on the island.
Mr. R. T. Paget: Why does the hon. Member think that they will accept it now?
Mr. Kershaw: I do not know whether they will, but we can only hope that they will accept it now because of the obvious disaster which lies around the corner. Before there may have been time to spare
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and there may have been some latitude in which to move, but it is now quite clear that this is the last plan. It may not be a very good plan—I think that it is—but even if they say that it is not very good, it is the last plan, and if they do not accept it, they will go down in this disaster which lies around the corner.
I am bound to add that the support from this country for the Greek cause has given the Greeks reason to believe that if they held out longer and longer the time might come when, by a General Election or some reversion of opinion in this country, they might get everything they wanted. That is now clearly not to be, and because of that I believe that they will see the necessity of accepting the plan.
Finally, what are the alternatives? Certain it is that we cannot remain in our present posture in the island with all these troops tied up there and with a very large proportion of our strategic reserve undertaking police duties. We cannot impose self-determination by force. That is implicit and has been agreed by every hon. Member this afternoon. I am bound to say that the communal council, as proposed by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), is very unlikely to work in present circumstances and I believe that it would contribute not to the pacification, but to the exacerbation of present relations in Cyprus.
I welcome the separation of the communities in function to some extent. It is rather like living with relations whom one does not especially like, the sight of whom one may even hate, although one has to have them in one's house. It is far better to have the relations living side by side but in different houses, rather than have them trying to share the same kitchen.
We come then to the possibility that the plan may fail. What do we do then? I suppose that we could walk out and abandon the place, but I hope that I have already indicated that that course is not one which we could in honour pursue. Next, I suppose that it would be possible to withdraw the British troops, whom we cannot permanently spare all over the island, into some sort of enclave, a bridgehead, as it were, whence we could operate so far as that was possible. That is a proposition one can think about, but I am bound to say that I fail to see how it would work.

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The idea of British troops sitting happily behind a wall with the racket of communal fighting going on outside does not, I feel, present a picture which could possibly survive close scrutiny.
In effect, therefore, I believe that this plan is the only one which has the slightest prospect of succeeding. I believe that it is right not to define too closely what is to happen at the end of seven years. If we did define what we thought would happen, or even exactly when any future plan might be developed, then this plan would have no chance of acceptance, for the eyes of the two communities would then be fixed on the future. They would be manœuvring for advantage, to see how they could take up what they thought would be their best position in order to take advantage of the next plan which they would see coming along. I feel that the only way to make this plan work is to assume that it is to go on. For myself, I wish that the plan might go on for longer than seven years. I see no reason for putting a term to it. In that way would be given, at least, a guarantee that this plan would be sincerely worked and that both the communities would do what they could to make it work.
If the system in the island should ever be changed, I believe that it will be necessary, so far as one can see now, to preserve British sovereignty. We cannot, at the moment, envisage handing over sovereignty to any other single Power. The White Paper foresees that it might be possible to hand over to a tri-dominium. Whether that will work very well it is impossible now to say. Certainly, the disappearance of this country from sharing in the sovereignty or having sole sovereignty in Cyprus would be an absolute disaster, and I very much hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will indicate that there is no intention of allowing that to happen.
There is one point of detail on which I should like clarification. It is the same point as that which troubled my noble Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton). In paragraph VIII (e) of the White Paper there is a reference to an impartial tribunal. If the Governor is to govern, as I imagine he is, because he will not be able to operate by a majority vote in that Coun-
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cil, it will surely be necessary for him to decide what affects the communities and what does not. If there is to be some form of court to which every action he takes is to be submitted, certain difficulties will be introduced. I should like some clarification about this, if possible tonight.
I very much welcome this very imaginative plan. It will be a disaster if it does not work, and I hope very much that the people of Cyprus will do their very best to make it a success.
6.44 p.m.
Mr. R. T. Paget: The hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) showed a certain lack of understanding of the Greek ethos when he said that the Greeks would choose to accept this plan because the alternative was disaster. When the Greeks have a choice between agreement or disaster, they choose the latter.
Some two and a half years ago, that is, before the E.O.K.A. rebellion, the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser) and I went to Cyprus, and we made a report on the island. On rereading that report, the hon. Gentleman and I were amazed at our prescience. We had prophesied almost everything which has happened. We had also come to the conclusion that, heavy burden though it was, there was then no alternative to British rule. I am afraid that, for all that has happened since, that is still my opinion, and I shall try to give the reasons for it.
It is said that Cyprus was once a peaceful island. That is perfectly true. But it has never been inhabited by Cypriots. It has been inhabited by Greeks and by Turks, totally separate peoples, educated at different schools, with school masters coming from different nations, speaking different languages, having different religions, with not only no inter-marriage between the communities but with separate marriage laws for each community which did not provide for the possibility of marriage between the two communities. The two communities were totally separate and, indeed, our failure to provide a secular Cypriot education is, I think, the major criticism of our administration. They were separate people who lived happily at peace, for one reason and one reason

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only. Each had confidence that British rule would frustrate the ambitions of the other. Once that belief was challenged, the peace disappeared.
Enosis was always there as an aspiration, but it was an aspiration. It was like heaven to the Greeks. Everybody wants to go to heaven, but not today or tomorrow. As an aspiration, it satisfied the Greeks and it did not seriously worry the Turks. Therein lay the tragedy of Lord Colyton's "Never". That was an affront not only to the manhood of the Greeks. It was an affront to their Greekness. Where an aspiration had previously served, now action was demanded. They owed it to themselves, to their self-respect. That is why that single word changed the whole situation. Since that time, we have passed from blunder to blunder and the situation has gone from bad to worse.
I do not wish to discuss in detail the present proposal. My approach is quite simple. I regard the present proposal as a non-runner, and I am not particularly interested in whether a non-runner is lame in three legs or four. The real difficulty is that we are faced here with an emotional problem and a solution is provided which may save everything except face. No Greek Government which owes anything whatever to popular support can conceivably accept Turkish participation in the government of what it regards as historically a Greek island. It could not do so and live.
People do not understand the intensity of the feeling here. A proposal which involved the acceptance of Turkish participation is inconceivably more objectionable than the existing situation and acceptance of British rule. That is what one is up against. But I would say further that it is not much use negotiating about it. The Greeks certainly will not negotiate about it or produce an alternative to the Ethnarchy Council. I do not think that negotiations are at all practicable in this atmosphere.
I would illustrate that a little by saying this. If the Under-Secretary were to ask me what he could say about the Cypriots which would be most generally acceptable within the island. I think that I would say to him, "Well, Jack, I think I would say simply 'All Cypriots are murderous, treacherous thugs.' The Greeks will then say 'Splendid chap, at last he under-
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stands the barbarous Turks', and the Turks will say, 'Splendid chap, at last he understands the treacherous Greeks'. Anything else which you might say would I fear be considered controversial and partisan."
If hon. Members think that I am exaggerating let them try the converse, as I have done, and say to any of their Cypriot friends, how charming, delightful, and friendly they find all the people of Cyprus. The immediate reaction—and I have tried it several times—is an outraged denunciation of the race to which the person to whom one is talking does not happen to belong, and he tells one how wrong one was. In that atmosphere it is very difficult to negotiate.
There is a rule of physics which says that every action promotes an equal and opposite reaction. Unfortunately, that does not apply in Cyprus. It produces an opposite and larger reaction. For instance, we hear from my hon. Friend the Member for Swindon (Mr. F. Noel-Baker) a commendation of the very gallant actions of the Governor in, as he says, breaking out of the enclave of Government House and visiting the Greeks. I think that it was my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) who gave him the accolade of the statesman of the year for those actions; and, undoubtedly, they pleased the Greeks. But then we get the opposite and greater reaction of the Turkish riots. Whenever we move one way, the other side goes further off. I am a great admirer of Sir Hugh Foot, but, so far as these actions were concerned, I believe that the balance sheet was an adverse one.
I would summarise by saying that we cannot negotiate between people who are more concerned to frustrate the interests of the other than to advance their own. That is really the situation which we are up against in Cyprus.
While on this subject I should like to say something about self-government, because we are told that the Greeks are now in favour of self-government. In this context, I am reminded of the famous phrase Timeo danaos et dona ferentes—I fear the Greeks when they come bearing democracy.
The Greeks have never wanted self-government. They rejected self-government when it was offered them by the Labour Government in the days of my

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right hon. Friend the Member for Wakefield (Mr. Creech Jones). They do not want self-government for themselves. What they are concerned with is Church government. They have been governed as a community by their Archbishop for a thousand years. They are solid for the Archbishop. If we ask them to elect a Government they will say, "No, we want the Archbishop." The only interest which the Greeks have ever evinced in self-government in Cyprus is in so far as it provides them with an opportunity to govern the Turks, and the Turks are totally aware of that.
So I give a warning on this occasion. Be a little careful about self-government as a prospect because the attitude with regard to it is not altogether sincere and it does not mean the same thing in Cyprus as it means to us.
What, then, are we to do? The first thing which I urge upon the Government is this: do not go on with these proposals once they are finally refused. Do not go on saying when the Greeks refuse to form a council, when the Turks refuse to form a council and nobody will send anybody along. "This is still our policy and we are going on," because if we do that we may inhibit any Greek in the island from collaborating with us.
If we are firm about our intention to go on, and as the Turks and the Greeks have had a great fright, there may well be an atmosphere, if we can guarantee the future of our rule, in which we will get collaboration, but no Greek can collaborate with this plan because it contravenes his whole ethos. Therefore, while we have these negotiations hanging about we shall not get anyone to work with us in the island. Personally, and very firmly, I urge the Government to put a term to these negotiations, and say that if this is not agreed, then we have no alternative and for seven years Britain will rule, and she will rule as a colonial Power.
Frankly, I believe that such a declaration would give the maximum satisfaction in the island, because it would assure each that the other was not to get his way, and that is what concerns each most. Let us remember this. Cyprus has been a very peaceful, happy island. We are not the only people who know that; the Cypriots know it, too. They remember
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when it was a happy island, they remember the conditions that made it happy. They have not been enjoying this situation and if those conditions are afforded to them again there would be a very big inclination for them to say, "We have been fools enough. This time we will co-operate".
It is very significant that British troops have been welcomed in those villages racked with communal fear. I believe that we can stop the trouble now, and if we are firm and provide a sufficient future guarantee of English rule the people will dare to come out and work with us without fear of being shot as collaborators.
If we do that I do not think that it will be necessary to keep 30,000 or 40,000 troops there. I think that in a year or so it will be enough to have one battalion. That is my own view. I think that on this point there is a chance if we are firm. If that does happen, the one thing which I would urge on the Government is not to be stingy. The all-important consideration in my mind is to create in Cyprus a secular university, which provides first-class education and an opening to secure professional qualifications, and to provide schools to give a secular education to enable admission to the university. It is only in that way that we can get Cypriots. It is only when we have got Cypriots that we can give self-determination to Cypriots. Self-determination as a principle is applicable only within a homogeneity.
This will be a long pull and it will be difficult and dangerous. I think that we have to try it because the alternative is a most horrible massacre, which there certainly would be. The alternative to our rule is civil war, which the Turks would certainly win, and that is a very dreadful prospect to those who, like myself, love the Greeks, who are a most charming people. The alternative is dreadful. I think that we should try this way and the future depends more on our determination than on our forces.
7.0 p.m.
Sir Charles Mott-Radclyffe: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) has injected a good deal of realism into this debate. He is one of the few hon. Members opposite who, throughout this period of difficulty in Cyprus, has consistently understood the

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Turkish point of view. I agree with what the hon. and learned Gentleman said about education. The Cyprus problem has been debated many times here. It has been debated many times in the United Nations and somewhere there must be acres of print recording all the speeches made and the newspaper articles written on the subject. I have often wondered whether the story might have been very different had a British Government, in between the two world wars, spent £2 million, or £1 million, perhaps even less, on building a university in Cyprus, not only for the benefit of the Cypriots but to serve all the communities of the Middle East. However, it is no use harking back to what might have been.
It is absurd to allege that, because we are living in an atomic age, Cyprus no longer has any strategic value. Of course it has a strategic value. I do not see how, without having bases in Cyprus, a United Kingdom Government, of whatever colour, could discharge their obligations in respect of N.A.T.O., the Bagdad Pact or the Tripartite Declaration, or in respect of treaties or other arrangements in the Persian Gulf. But we are here discussing something even more complicated than that. What we are really discussing tonight is an island in which the embers of the age-old conflict between Greek and Turk, between the Muslim and Greek Orthodox are smouldering. Feeling over these matters can be very easily fanned into flames, and indeed that has been done recently by two quite different sorts of blowers.
First, this antagonism was fanned through the rather astonishing tendency of hon. Members in this House and people outside to underestimate the strategic interest of Cyprus to Turkey. And, secondly—I must say to right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite—that it was fanned by their attitude in the past, an attitude which has diminished today—whether they meant it or not, I do not know—that caused the Greeks to believe that they would get Enosis from a Labour Government.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: Nonsense!
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: It may be. I do not know what they meant to say, but they certainly gave that impression to the Greeks.
Mr. Bevan: As my hon. Friend has said, the mischief started when it was stated from the benches opposite that Cyprus would never achieve self-determination.
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: I am coming to that later on, and I will then deal with the comment of the right hon. Gentleman.
I have looked through the debates two years ago last May on this question, when the speeches of the two speakers from the Opposition Front Bench amounted to a period of about one-and-a-half hours. In those speeches there was only a brief and passing reference to the Turks, and that was only in relation to the Turkish minority in Cyprus. I have never quite understood why people should underestimate or write off the importance of Cyprus to the Turks from a strategic point of view. Unless one refuses to look at the map, or looks at it upside down, or unless one cannot measure distance at all, it seems to me incontestable that Cyprus should be of absolute strategic interest to Turkey.
This was put extremely well and briefly by the Turkish Foreign Minister at the Tripartite discussions in August, 1955, and with the permission of hon. Members, I will read one extract which could not put it better.
"Strategically the vital interests of Turkey and the requirements of defence and logistics made it imperative that the Island should belong either to Turkey or to a country which is closely interested in Turkey and in the fate of Turkey's Eastern neighbours. In the case of war Turkey could be supplied only through her southern ports, and whoever controlled Cyprus was in the position to control those ports."
Nothing more need be said about the importance of Cyprus to Turkey.
Mr. Bevan: Nonsense.
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: The old proverb about sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind could be applied with more truth to Cyprus than to almost any other issue of modern times. Much as I love them, I must say that the Greeks thought they could stampede us. There was the propaganda from Radio Athens which was condemned by hon. Members on both sides of the House. There was the terrorist campaign in Cyprus, and the less said about its sponsorship the better. Murder is normally regarded as a crime by the State and a sin by the Church.

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Murder by proxy comes in the same category. At any time Archbishop Makarios could have turned off the tap and denounced terrorism. He did not do so, and according to today's Press reports of a television interview by the Arai-bishop of Canterbury, the reason why Makarios did not do so was because he said he would lose influence with his own people.
The more the emotions of the Greeks ran away with them, the more the Turks first became stubborn and then actually hostile, and, as a counter to the Eoka terrorist organisation, a Turkish terrorist organisation has been built up. That is a perfect example of sowing the wind and reaping the whirlwind.
I must here say a word about the responsibility of the party opposite. The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) seemed to think that all the responsibility for the trouble in Cyprus lay on this side of the House. I do not think that the memory of everyone is quite so short as that. I do not think that the attitude of the party opposite is altogether commendable.
Mr. Bevan: We should feel sorry if the hon. Member did.
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: I am trying to put it moderately. That is something which would not appeal to the right hon. Gentleman.
When hon. Members opposite were in office, there was, of course, to be no change in the sovereignty of Cyprus. But when they became the Opposition there was a marked change in their sense of responsibility. I will repeat what I have said before. Throughout many debates in this House, in many newspaper articles and broadcast discussions, in this country and outside, hon. Members opposite have created the impression in the minds of the Greeks that if the Labour Party won a General Election, the Greeks would get Enosis. As a result, the Greeks said to themselves, "If the British Labour Party wins the next Election not later than 1960 we shall get what we want 100 per cent. So why on earth should we settle for anything less now?" The Turks, being equally nervous, demanded partition now as a minimum safeguard. That is the position in which we have been placed by what I regard as the grave irresponsibility of the party opposite.
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We should all pay tribute to the astonishing efficiency, discipline and forbearance of British troops in Cyprus during the incredibly difficult period of the last three or four years. I do not suppose that troops of any other nation could have behaved as they have done. From time to time there have been allegations about rough treatment of prisoners, of brutality and things of that kind, but for the most part those allegations were wildly exaggerated and usually completely false. This has been proved where individual cases have been carefully examined.
I find it difficult to understand why people in certain quarters are so unwilling to concede the benefit of the doubt to British troops of their own kith and kin in situations of that kind, while being willing to concede the benefit of the doubt to Archbishop Makarios and other evildoers.
I believe that the people of Cyprus, whether Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, are heartily sick of all this terrorism and counter-terrorism and want to live as they used to live, in peace and increasing prosperity. Those who condemn off-hand the imaginative plan which the Government have introduced will have to ask themselves, when they say that the plan is unworkable, whether they can put forward anything better.
I quite agree with a remark made from the Opposition benches that the plan envisages a separate communal system, that the two communities in Cyprus would not live together and that it is desirable in the long run that they should live together. The plan is designed to deal, as it were, with two patients whose temperature is very high. They cannot be expected to live together amicably until a period has elapsed, when the heat has been taken out. That is why I hope that both Greeks and Turks will decide to have conversations on the basis of the plan.
The reaction to the plan shown by Mr. Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, has been a little unhappy. He has not actually condemned the plan hook, line and sinker, but he has taken a strangely legalistic point of view, judging from the text of the letter which he sent to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and which has been sent to me and, I suppose, to other hon. Members

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by the Greek Embassy Office of Information. The letter contains one very strange passage, which reads as follows:
"Cyprus is a British Crown Colony by virtue of international treaties. Turkey has relinquished all rights and titles on the island. Greece, supporting the right of the Cypriots to self-determination, has declared that she does not aim at the annexation of Cyprus. Those entitled to determine the future of the island are, therefore, principally the people of Cyprus and the United Kingdom since, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, this right was reserved to the 'interested parties'. Turkey is certainly not an 'interested party', having relinquished her rights of whatever nature by the same treaty."
If the Greek Prime Minister wants to make a very neat international legal point there is a comeback. It is true that under the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey renounced all interest in the legal sense in the island, but so did the Greeks. The Greeks have no legal status there, either. Indeed, under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greeks made certain reservations with regard to the Dodecanese, as the right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) will know, but no reservation was made about Cyprus. It is, therefore, no good taking this narrow legal view, because neither Greeks nor Turks have any legal interest in the strict sense in Cyprus. In fact, of course, both sides have ethnic interests while the Turks have a very intimate strategic interest.
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: I would not deny that the interpretation which the hon. Gentleman has given to the Treaty of Lausanne is correct, but I would point out that all the legal rights of the Turks were relinquished to such an extent that we made a condition that if any Turk desired to retain Turkish nationality he could do so, but must go to Turkey and leave the island within two years.
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: That is precisely the point I wanted to make. It is no good the Greek Prime Minister attempting to argue a very narrow legal point against Turkey, because exactly the same point can be argued back against Greece if necessary. I want to get away from legal argument. I admit that both Greeks and Turks have an ethnic interest in Cyprus, but, in addition, Turkey has a very intimate strategic interest.
Mr. P. Noel-Baker: Do I take it that the hon. Gentleman admits that it follows from that that the Greeks are not claiming a legal right, but are only saying that, according to the practice of the Commonwealth, some day the people of Cyprus ought to have self-determination?
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: The Greeks seem to be saying that the Turks need not be consulted at all because they have no legal interest. I hope that both the Greek and Turkish Governments will accept the invitation and will enter into conversation on the basis of the plan to try to compose their differences and work together with us for the future of Cyprus. Then both communities, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greeks who live in Greece and Turks who live in Turkey, as well as all the other peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean, can join in achieving the two essential conditions of civilisation—security and prosperity.
7.17 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth Robinson: In view of the fact that the Government appear to be anxious to get bipartisan support for their Cyprus proposals, we have just listened to a very curious speech from the hon. Member for Windsor (Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe). Not only did he go over all the ground which has been gone over religiously in every Cyprus debate by Government supporters in trying to fix responsibility for the failure of Government policy upon the Opposition, but he said something else which has become familiar in these debates. He said that it was a tragedy for Cyprus that the Opposition appeared identified with the Greek Cypriot cause and the Government with the Turkish Cypriot cause and then went on to chide the Opposition for supporting the Greek cause. He then went on to repeat exactly the same arguments in support of the Turkish solution to the Cyprus problem that we have heard so often from Government benches. I cannot think that his speech was helpful in any way.
In the twelve months since our last debate a great deal has happened in Cyprus. One of the most important things was the arrival as Governor of Sir Hugh Foot. I welcomed his appointment warmly, and described it as one of the Government's few imaginative actions. I admired the way in which he managed,

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in his first few weeks in the island, to transform the situation by his courage and his friendly understanding of the people of the two communities. It was all the more tragic that that new atmosphere was allowed to evaporate by the Government's delay in introducing their plan for solving the Cyprus problem.
It is because I have this great respect for Sir Hugh Foot, and had such high hopes of him and his concern for the welfare of the people of Cyprus, that I was predisposed in favour of the plan, of which he was author or part author. Perhaps on that account I am all the more disappointed with the plan now that we have seen it. It seems to me to be a plan which puts the Turks on an almost equal footing with the Greeks in the Island of Cyprus and which totally ignores the fact that, numerically, the Greeks outnumber the Turks by four to one. The only factor in this plan which in any way recognises the numerical disparity is the relationship of five Greeks to three Turks on the Governor's Council.
It is a great disappointment to me that I cannot support this plan. I think it necessary to say why I find it objectionable. First, it seems to make permanent, to petrify, the present wide division between Greeks and Turks in that island, a division which I think all of us in this Committee hope is only a transient phenomenon. I would prefer to remember the generations during which Greeks and Turks have worked and lived side by side in the Island of Cyprus in amity. This plan, instead of aiming at repairing the damage that has been done to the bridge between the two communities, the damage done by the communal disturbances, appears to sweep away the very foundations of the bridge itself.
It envisages a total separation of responsibilities for administration and government in the two communities. In my view this plan was correctly described by The Times as a form of non-territorial partition in itself. I should say that it makes self-determination virtually impossible and partition of the island almost inevitable. Although I freely accept that that is not the intention of the Governor, and, I presume, not of the Government, I cannot see that any other long-term outcome could result from the plan.
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My second objection to it is that it does not provide any representative government for the people of Cyprus. In that respect it is a far less liberal constitution than that proposed by Lord Radcliffe. I think that the hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Kershaw) did the Committee a service in saying so frankly why he supported the plan. He made it quite clear that he liked it because it preserved British sovereignty in permanent or semi-permanent form, because it meant that the Governor would govern and that there would be no possibility of government by majority rule. I have a suspicion that those are two of the reasons why this plan is reasonably popular on the benches opposite. Though this purports to be an interim scheme of self-government, it seems to me that the instruments under the plan do not permit that in any way.
The association of Greek and Turkish High Commissioners with the Governor's Council, I imagine, would make the job of the Governor almost impossible. I deplore very much this retrograde stop of trying to associate the Governments of Greece and Turkey with the Government of Cyprus itself. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras South (Mrs. L. Jeger), I think that the essential thing to do in this delicate stage is to get the Cypriot people not to look outwards towards Athens and Ankara, but inwards towards their own affairs in the island.
One of the biggest dangers of this plan is the proposal to give Greek and Turkish citizenship to Greek and Turkish citizens in the island. This point cannot have been thought out very clearly by Her Majesty's Government. By creating Greek and Turkish citizenship in that island we shall be giving the Governments of those two countries rights under international law which they certainly do not possess at the moment—rights of intervention, even military intervention, in respect of their own citizens. That would be a constant danger and a standing threat to peace in that part of the world. The financial provisions, and provisions for responsibility for communal affairs—which were in no way defined by the Colonial Secretary in his opening speech—will lead to difficulties and confusions which will make this plan quite unworkable.

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It has been suggested in some quarters that if the Opposition fail to support this plan we shall bear responsibility for its rejection, if it is rejected, and for the violence and bloodshed which might follow such rejection. Of course, it is always convenient for a Government to seek to find a scapegoat for their own failures. Indeed, the hon. Member for Windsor repeated that point again this evening in respect of past failures. The responsibility for this situation in Cyprus rests very fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Government. It is no good their trying to escape that responsibility for the past.
I do not believe that in any way that charge could be levelled against the Opposition and the Labour Party in respect of this current plan because it has been turned down already. It has been turned down in quite unequivocal terms, not only by Mr. Karamanlis, the Greek Prime Minister, but by Archbishop Makarios, the spokesman for Greek Cypriots. I do not want to waste time by quoting the precise terms, but I do not see how anyone could suggest that the plan has not yet been turned down by the Greeks. It was also turned down by Mr. Menderes, four days before it was announced, but I gather that there may be second thoughts on the way from Turkey.
Those decisions have been taken by the Greek Government and by Archbishop Makarios during the period of a week or ten days in which not only has every hon. Member on this side of the Committee been silent on the merits of the plan, but when practically every informed political commentator has been saying that the Labour Party broadly supported the plan—a statement made without evidence, but, nevertheless, made and repeated. Despite that, this plan has been turned down by the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots. Nothing we can say today will kill this plan because it was stillborn. The most the Government can hope to do now is to embark on a bit of artificial respiration.
I agree with the Governor that co-operation between the two communities in this island is an essential preliminary to any final solution. It is essential for the welfare and prosperity and peace of mind of everybody who lives in the island and
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for economic and political development there. Certain things must be said if we are to get that co-operation. I should say to both the Greeks and to the Turkish minority that it is not in the interests of either to continue violence nor to attempt to provoke civil war.
I believe both sides of the Committee could give a pledge that no solution to this problem would allow Cyprus to become a military threat to the Turkish mainland. It could also be stated that no political solution would be envisaged which did not fully protect and guarantee the legitimate rights of the Turkish minority.
Having said that, however, it must also be said that partition is out, and out for good. I believe that no sane person has ever believed that partition was feasible in this island, and it is time that that fact was faced and stated clearly. On this we should say that our mind is finally made up and that no threats, no violence, nothing at all will shake us on it.
Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe: I have been following the hon. Member's speech very closely. Could he enlighten us a little futher? If partition is out and Enosis is out and this plan is out, what is in?
Mr. Robinson: I was very interested to hear it said that this is the last plan and that there can be no other plan. I want to know why. There are plenty of other solutions. Many have been put forward in the course of the last two-and-a-half or three years from these benches which the Government would have done well to heed. There are far better solutions which could be put forward even in the present situation. Of course this is not the last word. It cannot be the last word.
The Governor believes passionately that this plan provides an opportunity for the kind of co-operation which will be necessary in the future. Against all the evidence he has faith in the plan. It is an act of faith, and one in which presumably the Government share. But I cannot possibly share that faith. I wish I could, because, like other hon. Members, I am very apprehensive about the immediate situation in the island.
I do not say that the Government have wasted their time in putting the plan forward. I do not believe that it can be a basis for negotiation, but I believe

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that the publication of the plan has provided an opportunity for negotiation which did not exist before.
These are the questions which I want the Prime Minister to answer when he winds up the debate tonight. How far is this plan negotiable? In view of the concessions which have been made by Archbishop Makarios following the publication of the plan, and in view of the modified attitude of the Greek Government, will Her Majesty's Government now enter into direct negotiations with representatives of the Cypriot people? I have always believed that that is the only way to solve this problem. It was a fundamental mistake ever to try to treat it as an international problem. I believe that it is the fact that it has been treated internationally and not basically as a Colonial problem which has led to the difficulties which we are in today.
I hope that the Prime Minister will make it very clear that the Government are flexible and do not stand rigidly upon any of the main planks of this plan if, as I expect, it is turned down flat by both sides.
7.35 p.m.
Mr. F. M. Bennett: The hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) began his speech by criticising as unhelpful the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe). I do not know how the hon. Member gauges unhelpfulness, but in view of the attitude adopted by his Front Bench, judging from the opening remarks, he himself would not gain very many marks for helpfulness if we are looking for a constructive solution based on trying to make the plan work. My only other criticism I intend to make of what he said is that he was wholly unrealistic in his appreciation of the emotions which are at play. He was just as unrealistic about them as his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) was aware of them. There could hardly have been a bigger contrast between two speeches.
Whenever there is a great international controversy of this sort it is very difficult for one, even subconsciously, not to show a degree of partiality one way or the other. Most of us have friends in Greece or Turkey; some have more friends on one side, some have more friends on the
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other. I shall do my best to maintain a strict impartiality in what I say, in marked contrast to at least one or two speeches from the benches opposite this afternoon.
I confess, however, that I have very strong personal ties with Turkey, because almost, if not uniquely, my late father was, as an Englishman, an officer in the Turkish Army and fought for them against the Italians in Libya. When I last went to Turkey I found that his name was remembered even to that day, and I was certainly given a much better welcome than I should have deserved had those circumstances not existed. On the other hand, after the last war I had the opportunity to go as an observer to Greece during the Communist crisis, when the Greek Army was fighting against the Communists in the mountains on the borders of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and I formed strong friendships there. Hence, as for many hon. Members, this has been a particularly painful episode for me, for like hon. Members on both sides, I have so many links with both our allies.
In contrast with the criticism that the new plan is bound to fail because nobody seems to like it very much, I feel that this is almost the best thing that could be said for it. One thing is certain. Had it been enthusiastically accepted by one side, it would have been just as enthusiastically turned down by the other. As soon as I heard that the Government were to announce a British plan, I thought that the best thing that could happen was for there to be a rather cautious, tentative expression of dislike on both sides, while both parties studied it. That is what has occurred. I believe that time and study will show both contesting elements in this issue that this plan represents just about the best that they can expect out of the present situation.
I thought that the criticisms by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) of the Government were, in general, not justified, but perhaps one could be forgiven, as a humble back bencher, for saying that some of the suggestions incorporated in the plan are not exactly new and do not spring from a genius in recent weeks or months, and could perhaps have been put forward earlier. In fact, from time to time they have been put forward by those who have

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not quite the expert experience at their disposal which is available to Her Majesty's Ministers.
On the other hand, to say that we hold the sole responsibility for the way in which the situation has deteriorated is not fair. I have no wish to introduce a note of party controversy. I wish only to defend my party and our Ministers in this respect. We have today been criticised heavily. Lord Colyton has come under heavy fire once or twice this afternoon for the damage alleged to have been caused by his use of the word "never". In retrospect, one might think of it as a phrase which could have been a little more happily worded, although it is only fair to say that if one reads HANSARD carefully it becomes clear that that remark cannot fairly be interpreted by the interpretation commonly given to it.
One must say—and this was brought out in earlier debates—that the Opposition have adopted a sanctimonious attitude in saying that we began the use of the phrase about no self-determination. This suggestion is nonsense. It has been said clearly in the House, and never denied, that on no fewer than two occasions before they left office the Labour Government turned down the Greek Government flat about the future of Cyprus. They did so in no uncertain terms, both by telegram and verbally. For them now suddenly to suggest that the recalcitrance of the Greeks sprang only from the time that the present Government came into office is simply not in accord with the facts. The right hon. Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) was a member of the Government at the time that these telegrams were sent saying that the question of the future sovereignty of Cyprus was not a matter for discussion between Britain and Greece.
Mr. P. Noel-Baker: The hon. Gentleman will, of course, remember that the Communist invasion of which he has just spoken was then going on, and that made a very great difference indeed to the whole situation. We offered them a constitution, which would have led to self-government if they had accepted it—and I regret that they did not—but I really would put it that, even if we then made a mistake, that is no reason for adhering to it now.
Mr. Bennett: It may not be a reason for adhering to it now, but it may well
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be a reason for not being so unfair now as to neglect to say that that attitude was not taken up. This is the first time that I have heard a Labour spokesman admit that a mistake by them too may have been made. As for the Communists having been at war in Greece at that time, this, indeed, is a novelty, because we have been told that this sort of thing should be settled on a moral basis. Now we have a Labour spokesman saying that strategic reasons are also very important in Cyprus. We therefore cannot blame the Turks very much for what they say about that.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East made one practical suggestion of which I should like my right hon. Friend to take account—the suggestion of a third assembly. In the atmosphere of tension now obtaining in Cyprus, I do not think that the creation of a third joint assembly could do anything but harm. We shall have enough difficulty in making the present suggested bodies work without our adding to them.
There might, however, be a case for my right hon. Friend to consider in due course, whether on certain specified matters there might not be joint sessions of these two communal assemblies to see whether it is possible to discuss even the most mundane issues in a non-communal atmosphere. Without creating a new body at this stage, I suggest that such a provision for a joint body might be included experimentally in the constitution. I should like my right hon. Friend to consider that suggestion.
Why ought the two Powers concerned, other than ourselves—Turkey and Greece—accept the plan? In the first place, I should have thought that it offered Turkey the maximum protection of her interests. To some extent, it would be possible to argue that it would be better for the Turks even than partition, because, if the plan succeeds, they will have representation in the highest councils of the island as a whole, which may, for many reasons, be better for them than would total sovereignty over only a small part with a hostile section of the population occupying the other part. I should have thought that, for that reason alone, Turkey should welcome the plan.
A second reason for her welcoming the plan is that self-determination, against

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the minorities consent, is now, I think, forever out, because if the plan goes through, what is now a question of fact will then become even more difficult to override, in that it would be quite unfeasible, when dual citizenship obtains and there are separate communal councils, to imagine that in seven years' time it would be practical to have overall self-determination leading to Enosis. I should have thought that that would have been really quite unthinkable.
I presume that it was with that consideration in mind that the Prime Minister said the other day that, whatever happened, the pledge that had been given earlier by the Secretary of State that self-determination without the consent of the minority would not be granted by the United Kingdom; and I should like some reassurance on this point.
Why should Greece accept the plan? Short of Enosis, I should have thought that from her point of view it was the best possible available solution. The last thing that Greece wants is partition, which, quite frankly, if this thing is driven to its logical conclusion and away from any more sensible solution, is what will come about, whether we like it or not, or whether or not we want to bring it about. Surely except for Turkish annexation, nothing could be more distasteful to the Greeks than partition.
This plan would give them complete control over their own affairs, a majority in the council for the whole country, and would give them, if only they could forget their emotions for a moment and start thinking rationally, the best solution possible in the present conditions. For the Greeks in Athens now to imagine that, whatever we may do in the House, self-determination leading to Enosis is any longer a practical project, is like living in a world of dreams.
Here, I may say that, Whether or not one agrees with the Turks, the state of affairs in that part of the world is such that it would be quite impossible practically for Greece to obtain Enosis for Cyprus, even with the help, which God forbid, of British troops driving the minority to consent to a solution to which they would violently object, and contrary to pledges already given in the House.
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It has been asked several times today, "Why is it necessary to go for this sort of plan? Why cannot we have self-government"—leading, presumably, to ultimate self-determination—"but with safeguards for the minority interests written into the constitution?" I should have thought that history had taught us that once sovereignty passes to a country it is impossible to enforce such safeguards.
Hon. Members opposite have often pointed out—and I sympathise with them on this—how useless now are the safeguards for coloured minority rights written into the South Africa Act after the Boer War. At that time, those safeguards were firmly written in, but as time has passed we have found that, however carefully embodied they are in the original constitution, if a sovereign body is determined to get rid of such safeguards it will do so—
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: There is a difference, surely, between an entrenched Clause in a constitution which can be amended, as in the South Africa Act, and an international minority Statute that is registered with the United Nations.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: There is no difference in practice.
Mr. Bennett: As my hon. Friend says, no difference comes in the practice.
Finally, there is the British position. When we are discussing all this trouble about what the Greeks, the Turks, the Cypriot Greeks and the Cypriot Turks feel, we should surely spend a little time in studying what are Britain's interests in this matter. I am not ashamed to endorse what has been said by my hon. Friends. Apart from anything else that I have said, I welcome this plan because it seems to offer the most effective safeguards for Britain's future essential needs and rights in the island.
It is no good saying that in an atomic age all ideas on strategy and where best our troops should have bases have to be amended. For instance, hon. Members opposite spend a good deal of the time of the House trying to bring about a situation in which the manufacture and use of atomic bombs will be banned forever. If the policies that they advocate were to be adopted and we were to return to conventional weapons, the strategy that

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they now seek to dismiss as being of no account in the atomic age may enter into its own again. As we have learned, too, in Korea and elsewhere, there are local conditions in which remedies, short of nuclear war, can be used and prevent even worse effects. Thus we must have bases for our troops to carry out our responsibilities.
In a leading article in The Times the other day, I read a passage to the effect that Britain's strategic rights were to be safeguarded only for a period of up to seven years. I did not understand that from what the Prime Minister said. Nor do I understand that from the White Paper. But in view of the fact that in that responsible newspaper that statement has been made that our national strategic rights are to lapse after seven years, I should like an assurance that that is not so and that, whatever else the seven-years period applies to, it does not apply to that.
At this moment it is impossible for anyone to exaggerate the gravity of events in that part of the world, not only in Cyprus but elsewhere in the area. If ever there was an occasion when we all ought to try to make a plan work, even though we may not agree with all its particulars, this is that moment.
Up to now, whether hon. Members opposite like it or not, the impression has got abroad that if the Greeks can only hang on until the party opposite gets into power they will get a better deal than they will get under this Government. That has been denied today. It has been said that the pledges which could give such an impression have never been made. I can only assure hon. Members that that is the impression which obtains in Athens today. For example, any hon. Member on the opposite benches who was with me last spring at the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, will have had this fact proved only too decisively, and not by a British Tory, but by the Greek representative who, with tears in his eyes, thanked the Labour Party representatives for the promise of self-determination which they would have when the Labour Party was returned to office.
Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: Hear, hear.
Mr. Bennett: We now have an endorsement of that proposition. I can assure the hon. Gentleman who said "Hear, hear" that earlier in the debate many of his hon. Friends were saying that no reasons have been given at any time for the Greeks to believe that they would get a better deal under the Socialists than under the Conservative Party, and I was only seeking to dispel the idea.
Mr. Brockway: The Labour Party decision at its annual conference, which has been endorsed repeatedly by the party, is that when we come to office we shall proceed to self-government for Cyprus, and that after a period of self-government, when the passions of the two races have died down, we will endeavour to reach self-determination. That is our decision, and that decision stands.
Mr. Patrick Maitland: In order to elicit information on a point that has been made by the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway), which does not altogether clarify the situation, will the hon. Gentleman say whether self-determination for the majority means also self-determination for the minority?
Mr. Bennett: Perhaps I should get on with my speech. Perhaps the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway) was not in the Chamber at the time, but we had a very clear undertaking from the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East that, in fact, self-determination was no longer a practical project, however desirable it might be, against the consent of the minority, and that that fact had to be accepted. I do not think I am being unfair to the hon. Gentleman. That is contrary to the impression which has been formerly created abroad. If the hon. Gentleman the Member for Eton and Slough now likes to make speeches which will alter the minds of the Greeks on this question, I shall be only too happy, but that is the impression which has been created abroad, and it is most unfortunate.
I had not intended to be diverted in my last remarks, for I was hoping to finish on a completely non-controversial note, in an appeal that all of us should follow the exhortation of the Colonial Secretary, and that even though we may all "tick off" the Government for being a bit slow in the past and criticise the Opposition for being irresponsible, we should at least now try to give the plan a sporting run.
7.55 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Torquay (Mr. F. M. Bennett) for having raised this issue of the Labour Party's position, because it is important to get it clear, and I intend to try to do so.
However, before I do so, I should like to make a general observation. It seems to me that in this debate, on the benches opposite there have been general commendations for the Government's plan and that from this side of the Committee there have been detailed criticisms. I observed that the hon. Member for Torquay started by saying that he was completely impartial and would speak with the strictest impartiality. He said that he welcomed the plan because it killed any chance of self-determination leading to Enosis. Whether one considers that right or wrong, I would suspect that the person who says that is like the Irishman who, when he was asked about neutrality, said, "I cannot make up my mind who to be neutral against." At least, it is clear whom the hon. Gentleman is being impartial against when he says that the great advantage of this plan is that it kills self-determination.
Mr. F. M. Bennett: I did not say "self-determination leading to Enosis." I was particularly careful to say "self-determination without the consent of the minority." I should have thought that that was being strictly impartial both to the minority and to the majority.
Mr. Crossman: With respect to the hon. Gentleman, if he were to go to Cyprus and meet a Greek and a Turk there he would discover for whom he was being impartial.
I do not claim any impartiality in this debate. I have never shown any impartiality in that sense. I think it is one of the questions which we have to discuss, for the vital thing for which we on this side of the Committee stand is not Greeks against Turks. We stand for a very simple principle, which is that when the population of the island, by neatly four to one, passionately want one thing, we think that by and large, if they are under British rule, we should try to see that four-fifths of the inhabitants should get the kind of independence that they desire. That is what we have said.
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We have said that we believe it is essential to get self-government and that it should lead to self-determination, even if the self-determination decided on union with Greece.
I will be very frank and will try to be objective, if not impartial. We have gone further in the past. We said that the period of self-government should be limited in time. We said that because it was found in other Colonial Territories that if we wanted a decision to be made, it was necessary to get a time limit. We saw that in India and in Malaya, and, therefore, we insist on the importance of a time limit in the case of Cyprus.
In the conditions obtaining when the Tory Government took office, the idea of self-government for a certain specific limited time, leading to self-determination, by referendum or by any other method, was a perfectly reasonable and practicable proposal which, if it had been introduced at the time, would have led to a successful solution.
Again, we have to face the facts, and the change that we have made as a party—a change which has involved some of us in a terrible struggle—is to admit that so much has the situation degenerated in Cyprus in the last six years that the idea of a determined period of years of self-government followed by self-determination must temporarily be abandoned. We cannot possibly now predetermine a certain number of years and say that after that there will be a referendum. We now have to try to get self-government. We have to try to get a period of peace. I can assure hon. Members opposite that my hon. Friends did not suggest that there would never come a time when self-determination could be achieved. We say that we cannot predetermine, we cannot commit ourselves to a time limit. We must face a longer period of self-government than we had hoped for five or six years ago. That is the big change which makes us take a different attitude to the Government's present proposal.
I want to look once again at these Government proposals as objectively as I can. I want to follow the lead given me by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). He summed up extremely well the view we have come to by talking it out together on this side of the Committee. First of all, obviously we cannot turn any plan

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down flat and say it is no good, because it depends on the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and whether they like it. I say to hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite that if the plan is accepted by Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks there is not a single person on this side of the Committee who will have any doubts whatsoever, because that would be self-determination, that would be the principle that we have supported—that they should decide for themselves their fate.
What makes us doubtful of this plan is that some of us who have knowledge of the island and all of us who have knowledge of human nature wonder whether this plan will lead to a workable system of self-government. I think that it is a little poppycock to talk about this as a great and imaginative conception as though it were something thought out Completely apart from politics or power by somebody coming fresh to the matter and saying, "Let us have a completely fair solution to this problem." It was not done that way. The interesting thing is to see its history. It is interesting to see what led to this kind of desperate plan. For it is a very desperate plan. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) that this is an extremely desperate plan.
Let us look at how the Government got to such a desperate plan and where it all started. I shall not forget sitting here the day the Government announced what many of their back benchers thought was the Suez surrender, and in order to compensate their back benchers for the Suez surrender and to make them swallow the Suez surrender the Government gratuitously inserted an extra statement on Cyprus to sweeten the Suez pill. I have never seen a colonial issue treated in such a strictly party, partisan way; and, heaven knows, this country as a whole has paid a very heavy price for that clever idea of putting that Cyprus statement in just after the Suez statement.
I want to be as fair as possible, and I am not pretending that only that word "never" and only what has been done here has made the Cyprus situation deteriorate. There is one factor which we have to take into account on both sides of the Committee and that is that in these last years something has happened to make the Cyprus situation as difficult as
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it is now, and that is the really active attention of the Greek Government to Cyprus. Relatively speaking, the Enosis movement was an impotent, weak movement, not actively supported from Greece. One of the pathetic and moving aspects of the matter was that the Greek Cypriots longed to join a country which showed no interest whatever in them for generations. They longed to join Greece, but Greece did not seem very anxious to join them. I believe it was only very shady party politics in Athens which changed the position and turned a local Cypriot passion for loyalty and unity with Greece into a great international problem. The new move was launched with the whole technique of such things, including a radio station, backing up the Greek Cypriots 100 per cent.
Thus, it is true that the Greek Government then for the first time made this not a merely Anglo-Cypriot problem but an international problem, and made it almost insoluble. Then, two or three years even later than that, the Turkish Government were needled out of their somnolence and took the problem up, and so the Turkish minority was supported 100 per cent. by the Turkish Government while the Greek Government 100 per cent. supported the Greek Cypriots, although neither Government had been really interested before, and so inside two years there came this desperate situation we now face precisely because of governmental participation.
I agree with my hon. Friends who say that we should like to get back to a situation where the British Government could talk to the Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks. I must say that I have some sympathy with the Government, for I doubt whether that situation is revocable and whether we can bring it back into being a nice local dispute, the local colonial dispute it used to be. I doubt whether we can turn it into a colonial dispute between the local people and ourselves. I think it is a permanent international matter.
That is why I am prepared to take this plan and consider it extremely seriously, because of this new internationalisation of what used to be a secondary local quarrel. That is why I want to be fair, although I must say that I think the Government's attitude about the British base made the internationalisation unnecessarily difficult.

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It has almost been forgotten that for years this Government asserted that we were not going to be content with a British base on Cyprus but that we had to have the whole of Cyprus as a base and keep N.A.T.O. out. Those were the years in which the Government insisted on this and so held up any possibility of a solution at a time when tempers were less hot than they have been recently. There might have been a case for postponement but they continued to assert that they required the whole of the island as a British base.
Now, faced with a well-nigh insoluble problem, we have to look at any solution however desperate, but I would suggest that really that does not mean that because we are desperately keen on a solution we should follow the view that this solution must be correct. Nothing is more dangerous than to say that though we are genuinely anxious for a solution we must swallow this or any proposal uncritically. It really will not do any good for Cyprus for this Committee not to consider this proposal in detail and to ask ourselves very seriously whether it is workable in its present form and to consider how, if it is not, it could be made workable.
I find it difficult to believe that anybody, after this debate, can still continue to think that this thing in its present form, this so-called plan, which is not a plan at all but is a series of heads of a plan, whether this collection of heads taken by themselves, will provide either a workable plan or, what is the same thing, a plan in which the Greeks and Turks will fully collaborate. One of the reasons why they will not is one thing said by the hon. Member for Torquay, because if it is true—and it is true—that this plan creates institutions which prevent any possible chance at any time of self-determination, then the Greeks will not collaborate in it. Why should we ask the Greeks to collaborate in a plan which excludes constitutionally and deliberately what four-fifths of the people of the island desire? We may well say let us postpone it, but it is totally unreasonable to ask them to accept a plan designed to exclude this possibility and to substitute the proposed tridominium for self-determination. I agree entirely with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton that
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that is not a starter for any reputable Greek on the island.
It is clear that we must responsibly tell the Government that if they want to have this international arrangement they must face the fact that they have to meet the Greeks. Is it so unreasonable to ask that? To answer that question we must ask another question.
Let us compare the Radcliffe plan with the Foot plan. Those are two very intelligent men and they are two men who were working for the same Administration. I must ask myself somewhat cynically: what is the reason for the tremendous change from the Radcliffe plan to the Foot plan since that change is in the same direction, into building into the plan more and more guarantees for the Turkish minority and removing out of the plan more and more advantages for the Greek majority? What happened in between the Radcliffe plan and the Foot plan to cause that difference? We all know what happened. Turkish pressure of a very extreme form. That is what happened. I do not say any more about that. A Greek can notice that. Let us hope that he will not draw the obvious conclusion. That is exactly what we have to avoid; that is why the balance has to be redressed. It is obvious that it has reached, if not exceeded, the limits of concession to the Turkish minority.
It is no good talking about creating unity and self-government if we do not have the institutions which make it possible for the two peoples to work together. I regard the chance of this coming off as small but it must be tried, because the alternative is not the perpetuation of British rule. The alternative is, in the end, civil war, if not general war in the Mediterranean.
If we cannot get these people to work together, we will not stay there for ever. We know our fellow-countrymen. We know what happened in Palestine. If this goes on for seven or ten years and the British get all the kicks, in the end some Government or other, of either party, will throw in their hand and say, "We are sick of all this. We shall hand it over to the United Nations," and then there will come the disaster that we saw in Palestine in an even more hopeless form, for in Palestine something came out of it but I can see nothing but disaster coming out of a general war

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between Greeks and Turks, ending in an impermanent solution.
That is why we have to tackle seriously the problem of getting the two peoples together, but I echo the views of those who have asked, "How can you pretend that a constitution which deliberately and artificially separates the two and treats them as separate communities brings them together?" How can we conceivably say that a constitution which lays it down that every Turk shall be a loyal member of a Turkish community and not a Cypriot, and every Greek a loyal Greek instead of a loyal Cypriot, is designed to bring them together? These are divisive elements. They cannot work to bring them together. A plan to bring Turkish and Greek Government representatives to sit on a Council and combine in some mysterious and imaginary way all executive and administrative functions could only have been thought up by a colonial governor-general and not by a politician. This is a centralisation of executive and administrative power, and into this tiny group is to be inserted one Turkish Government representative to ensure that if there was any possibility of the two sides coming together a directive would come from Ankara to say, "Disagree".
This constitution, whether it was designed to do so or not, if it were put into effect, could only perpetuate division and stimulate mutual hatred. But we have nothing to fear from it, because there is not the slightest chance whatsoever of its ever being put into operation. There is no chance, as it stands, of Archbishop Makarios accepting and working this plan; and it is utter delusion for hon. Members opposite to believe that they can spellbind the people into it, and that the Greeks have lost all backbone and will surrender.
We have to ask ourselves what advice we give to the Government when they put forward this unworkable and divisive constitution. I agree that the first advice that we could give is that if there are to be institutions they must be unitary institutions. If there are to be legislative assemblies, there must be one Cypriot legislative assembly. In other countries, there are different communities who work a single legislature. This is recognised in every civilised community where there are racial minorities. It is a perfectly common thing. Why this unique element
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in Cyprus? Therefore, we suggest to the Government that they should look again at this and not have this passport nonsense and seek to build a common Cypriot feeling if they possibly can.
I cannot help asking myself why it was that the six Suez rebels all chose this occasion to rejoin the Tory Party. They tell us that it is because this constitution has restored their confidence in the party. I am inclined to agree with their diagnosis of the constitution, because I have observed a very strange thing—that we have had from some back benchers speeches which said, "Let us hope that what this does is to perpetuate British rule in Cyprus and that this is the effect of the constitution."
What does that imply about the constitution? It is that it achieves the object of holding the two communities so much apart that they will require the British to keep law and order on the island. Therefore, the Tories who say that have diagnosed correctly what the ultimate effect of the constitution will be, and they are supporting the constitution not because they want to see a settlement but because it holds the two communities apart and that will be an excuse for us to stay on the island. But I have already said that the idea of staying on the island is a mirage. The only way in which we can retain our influence in or our base on the island is by achieving self-determination as the end of a process of self-government.
I am aware that Archbishop Makarios and the Greeks rightly feel that they have made an enormous concession by already admitting that they will not insist upon a time limit to self-government before self-determination. I agree that they have made a big concession, and must expect an equal concession from the Turks in reply. But the Greeks will make the gravest mistake if they say that they refuse to negotiate. It is absolutely essential that they should negotiate. We would say to them, "Do not negotiate about the terms of negotiation too long. Do not let us have another Palais Rose conference in which months and months are spent in negotiating what is to be negotiated. Put in your central chamber as a point for negotiation and as a basis. Come in and talk."
If we say that to the Greeks, as we ought to do, and if we say, "Be flexible

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and be prepared to make this work," we must also say to the Government, "You must be flexible, too." I had a horrid feeling during the speech of the Colonial Secretary that the Government were saying, "This is the last word. This is the covenant, and you can change it only in detail."
Mr. William Yates: My right hon. Friend said that "acceptance in every particular is not required."
Mr. Crossman: I know. The right hon. Gentleman also said "detail". We, of course, are not asking for detailed replies to our comments on the constitution, but what we have a right to ask from the Prime Minister is whether he is prepared to consider changes even in one or two of what are called the basic principles. We are not asking what in particular he is prepared to consider changing, but is he prepared to be flexible enough to do that? I believe that if he says, "Yes" the Greeks will come and talk straight away. If he does not, it will be extremely difficult to persuade Archbishop Makarios at any point to talk with the Government. Therefore, the whole purpose of this debate must be to get flexibility on the part of the Greeks and the Turks, but also on the part of Her Majesty's Government
I would say to the Government, "Look back at the history of Cyprus in the last six years. You have had to retreat from position after position, and disastrously. You have always retreated so late that we have had no advantage from the retreat. For heaven's sake this time be ready to negotiate. Do not stand on your pride. Negotiate a workable constitution."
8.19 p.m.
Mr. Philip Goodhart: I have often admired the cold logic of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman), but I was sorry this evening to find him drifting back into the rather cloudy hope that what we want to do in Cyprus is to build a common Cypriot feeling if we possibly can. The essence of the situation was described by the hon. Gentleman when he said that in the past we had peace and quiet, but that now we have a new situation in that it had been internationalised. It seems to me that this internationalisation of the
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Cypriot problem has had the somewhat wrenching effect which the Zionist movement had in Palestine. It is no more relevant to say today that the Greeks and Turks have lived peacefully side by side in Cyprus in years gone by than it was in the 'forties to say that Arab and Jew had lived peacefully side by side in the Middle East. The situation has been transformed, and so this desire to build a common Cypriot feeling is doomed to disappointment because of the new internationalised situation of which the hon. Gentleman has spoken.
Mr. Crossman: I said that my hopes of doing it were slender, but that I thought we had to do it because the alternative would be so disastrous.
Mr. Goodhart: The alternative is plain, but I agree that the situation is essentially perplexing, indeed just as perplexing as the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) indicated in his burning speech earlier this afternoon. It is particularly perplexing, because in most international disputes one can assume that the parties concerned will be motivated by national interest. National interest is the excuse for the Soviet campaign of murder in Hungary, for the Indian policy over Kashmir and for the Nationalist Party policy in South Africa over apartheid. When one looks at the Cyprus situation, the curious point emerges that all the policies of all the countries and communities seem to be at cross-purposes with the real national interest.
I do not want to re-cover the party politics of the last few years, or to apportion blame between the Government and the Opposition for our past policy over Cyprus. Suffice it to say that there are four main objectives set out in the White Paper and that one cannot say that any one of those objectives has been achieved.
It is difficult, looking at the Greek policy, to say that it is in the best interests of the Greek nation. Certainly, Enosis, carried to its logical conclusion, would bring into the Greek political community a highly volatile element. One cannot really say that Enosis, carried to its logical conclusion, would be a good policy for the Greek community in Cyprus. Those in the forefront of the struggle might well suffer most. The Greek Orthodox Church would certainly

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lose most of its temporal power. The Greek students who have been rioting would be subject to Greek National Service. The Greek businessmen, who at times supply funds to E.O.K.A., would be subject to Greek taxation and to the vagaries of Greek administration.
At the same time, one cannot really say that the Turkish policy contains many elements of sense. Partition would certainly earn Turkey, if pushed to extremes, the enmity—perhaps the undying enmity—of the Greek Government and Greek people. It would earn the disapproval of the United States of America, and we know how dependent the Turkish economy is on the support of the United States. Nor can one say that the policy taken up by the Turkish community in Cyprus really fosters the best interests of that community because partition, if pushed into practice, would surely lead to disaster for many of the Turkish peasants living in that island.
In other words, it seems that all the principal actors involved have got themselves backed into positions of extreme illogicality and a shock has been needed to shake up the situation, to shake the countries involved out of their old established pattern. That shock has been applied by the new proposals of Her Majesty's Government.
But I think they have done more than provide a shock for all those involved. They have also provided a much needed carrot to dangle before the noses of the communities on the island. In the past we have had a stick with which to beat those who have stepped out of line, but there has been no tasty carrot to hold before the nose of the donkey. Now, in this plan, there is such a carrot because if one side accepts and the other side does not, and the Government decide to implement their proposals—as I hope the Government will decide if one side accepts—then those who stand out will have to watch that the other people enjoy their joint citizenship, their communal assembly. The pressure on the outsiders to agree to conform, to come in, to reach agreement with us, will be considerable.
I hope that the Government will go ahead if one of the two sides agrees to participate. If one side agrees to participate, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will lean over backwards to
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consult—if one can lean over backwards to consult—the side that does not agree. And there will have to be a tremendous amount of negotiation over the terms of what are communal affairs and what sort of independent tribunal can be set up.
Finally, I am conscious of the effect which words can have on the violent people in Cyprus. This is the one colonial-international dispute above all others which is changed by what is said in the House of Commons. This afternoon harsh words have well been stifled. I remember the time when I was a newspaper correspondent in Cyprus and an occasion when a group of journalists were talking together and saying that if the E.O.K.A. terrorists wanted to capture the attention of the people of this country and of the world at large they should murder a British journalist. Within 48 hours of that casual remark being made within the hearing of a number of Greeks, a British journalist was murdered in Cyprus. I hope that no words said in the House of Commons this evening will lead to any further bloodshed in Cyprus.
8.32 p.m.
Mr. M. Philips Price: With few exceptions, speeches tonight have maintained a relatively objective view of this intractable problem, and the speech of the hon. Member for Beckenham (Mr. Goodhart) was an example. It is not useful at a serious time like this to go bandying about party clichés. We have had one or two speeches from hon. Members opposite like that, especially from the hon. Member for Windsor (Sir C. Mott-Radclyffe) who is not in his place. On the whole, however, the debate has been at a high level.
The debate has shown a considerable degree of agreement on general principles, but considerable divergence, very naturally, on detail. That is as it should be, and we of the Opposition have stressed those differences of detail without committing ourselves too far, as we do not have responsibility. It is our job to criticise, and no doubt in due time we shall be in a position of responsibility.
I am glad that the Government have produced a plan for the solution of the Cyprus problem, and I do not resent the fact that they have taken a considerable time to do so, because I appreciate

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the difficulties of dealing with the psychology of the Greek and Turkish Governments and the population of Cyprus. In eschewing party criticism as much as I can, I cannot help but say that to some extent the Government are responsible for the situation, because for a long time they persisted in regarding this as a British colonial problem which concerned only us and no one else. Since the Greek and Turkish Governments are directly concerned, and since the Powers of N.A.T.O. are concerned with the defence of the Eastern Mediterranean, that is an impossible attitude, and I am very glad that the Government have now dropped it. It is high time that they did. The Government cannot be held to have no responsibility for the bitter situation which has arisen because of the long delay.
It seems that the Government have succeeded in getting at least the moral support of the N.A.T.O. Powers. I do not know how much they are concerned in detail, but, to judge from the Prime Minister's recent statement, it looks as if we have their support. This is very important and in every way desirable, because we have the moral support, at least, of the United States. The United States will no longer be able to stand on the sidelines and criticise, which is what they have been doing until now. At last, people in America have begun to realise that if they are to play any rôle in the Middle East, they must work with us and, particularly, with the other Powers of N.A.T.O.
I am afraid that our influence in Turkey is not very great at the moment. The influence of the United States is much greater. I shall not go into the reason why we are not particularly popular in Turkey today. This state of affairs may pass. I know that, on the last occasion I was in Turkey, two years ago, I heard much criticism of our attitude in not accepting partition in the way they wanted it. However, although the Turks will not now be prepared to listen to us very much, they will listen to the United States, especially since the United States is their principal supplier of armaments and supports their military defence on the Eastern frontier.
Although I may not, perhaps, have the agreement of everyone here in this, I feel that, for the time being at least, there is nothing wrong—indeed, there is some-
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thing to be said for it—in a sort of condominium as a temporary measure. In this case, it is a tridominium, associating Greece and Turkey in the government of the island. About eighteen months ago, during a debate on Cyprus, I dared to make this suggestion. I said that I believed that, at any rate for the time being, some such solution was necessary. I was arguing that the Government must move away from their position of saying that they alone were responsible for the government of Cyprus and that, it being an international matter, we must bring in other countries in some way. I am, therefore, very glad that the Government now seem to have accepted that view, although I consider that the arrangement proposed should not be anything more than temporary.
Within the proposal to bring representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments on to the supreme Council to advise the Governor, there is the provision referred to in the White Paper for appeal in case of disagreement:
"The representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments will have the right to require any legislation which they consider to be discriminatory to be reserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal."
That is going a long way, and I commend the Government for it. It will, to some extent, limit our authority. The Government are right in this respect, but I should like to know just what is meant. To whom are the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments to appeal if there is disagreement on an important issue? What is the impartial tribunal to be?
It is sometimes argued that condominiums, or tridominiums, associations of more than one Power in the government of a country, are necessarily a failure. That is not a sound argument. In the Sudan, it is said, such a plan did not succeed because we were the senior partner and pushed the Egyptians out. I do not think that is quite true. It is, of course, true that when we fell out with Egypt we became the senior partner and Egypt's word did not count. For a long time, until we did fall out and until the Nationalist movement in Egypt became so strong that they began to wish to edge us out, it could not be said that the condominium over the Sudan was a failure. It all depends on the measure

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of co-operation which there is between the suzerain Powers.
I think that we must aim to get this. Neither Greece nor Turkey has a right to veto the proposals in Cyprus. Their point of view must be considered. We must seek their co-operation. Tri-dominium, however, cannot be an end in itself; it must be only a temporary solution. Self-government and the handing over of the island to Greece seems to me to be impossible. Whether in the far distance it is possible, it is not a matter of practical politics now. The same applies to partition. So both the Greeks and the Turks have to get down off their high horses.
However, I believe that with a period of government along the lines suggested in the Government's White Paper, if we can get that for seven years, it is just possible that feelings may die down, and it may be possible to approach the problem again and seek for a further solution which may include dominion status with the right to self-determination, as they have under the Statute of Westminster, the right to go out of the Commonwealth. In this way it seems to me that it is possible that development may take place, but today that is impossible.
I should not like to see any term given. I do not think that it is wise even to put in seven years. It may be much longer or it may be shorter. That will depend on whether the Greek and Turkish communities succeed in getting on with each other, which at present, of course, they cannot and will not do.
I cannot agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) when he takes the line, as he did in his speech, that it is all hopeless, that the atmosphere between the Turks and Greeks is so bad that it will never be any better. I happen to know that it is quite different. It is true that the old struggle between the Ottoman Turks and the Byzantine Greeks, ending in the capture of Constantinople in 1453, does have the old historical hostility, but one must not forget the fact that when Mohammed the Conqueror entered Constantinople, the first thing he did was to summon the Greek patriarch and say, "You will now govern the Greek population as head of the Church and collect the taxes for me."
The whole system of the Ottoman Empire was built up on self-government
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and the co-operation of the peoples. It happened later on, in the nineteenth century that nationalism upset all that, but, even so, after the bitterness of the Greco-Turkish war, after the First World War, when the Greeks were thrown out of Anatolia after the battle of Sakarya, things settled down and were not too bad.
I have had conversations with eminent Turkish statesmen in the last two years, men who were the colleagues of Ataturk and who took part in the great struggle ending in the defeat of the Greeks. They looked back, when I talked to them, with nostalgia on the relations which existed between Greek and Turk after that period. They said, "If only it could be like that again." That was nearly thirty years.
Following the exchange of populations, relations between the Greeks and the Turks could not have been better. Football matches were played at Athens and Ankara between Greeks and Turks. I remember seeing some when I was there. I remember seeing a military parade in Istanbul on the anniversary of the Battle of Sakarya, and Turkish papers filled with the glorious victory. But no one could tell that the enemy was the Greeks because the Turks did not want to upset Greek susceptibilities. It is only recently that this state of affairs has changed, and there is no reason why we should look at Turco-Greek relations with such a jaundiced eye as does my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton. I believe that that state of affairs can return, but it will take a long time.
The Government must not make this plan like the law of Medes and Persians Times may change and tempers may cool and there must be provision in the plan for that. I hope that the Government will consider, as was mentioned in his speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), whether we can have some institution elected on a common roll between Greeks and Turks to prepare the way for something beyond purely community representation. That may not be practical in the immediate future, but we must look ahead. I wonder whether the Government would consider introducing something like that now, even though it may not be used immediately. I feel that there should be nothing which would prevent

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developments of this kind which in the future may prove useful.
We all feel the grave danger of this hour. Most of my hon. Friends have shown that they feel the gravity of the situation and do not wish to say anything which would make impossible the task of finding a solution in the immediate future. I think that the Government are at fault by having delayed so long in taking this line, and by saying that this is not an international question but one which affects only us. It is the dusty of hon. Members on this side of the Committee to be constructively critical, to keep our eye all the time on what people abroad are thinking and to work for a solution which will receive international approval.
8.49 p.m.
Mr. Patrick Wall: The hon. Member for Gloucester, West (Mr. Philips-Price) is always listened to attentively by the House, and he and his hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) always speak of the problem of Cyprus with impartial fairness both to Greece and Turkey. I am bound to say that had more hon. Members opposite taken the same line in the past we might not have found ourselves in the trouble over Cyprus which confronts us today. But that is not the message which much go from the House of Commons as a result of this debate.
The message which must go out to Cyprus and the world is that for the first time for several years, or as long, at any rate, as I have been a Member of the House, there is a degree of unanimity between the speeches of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House. We need not go into the reason for that. Probably it is because we are all conscious of the probability of civil war in Cyprus, which could lead to a war between Greece and Turkey and the break-up of N.A.T.O. and the Bagdad Pact, so that we are all being very careful about what we say.
I wish to go back to the speech of the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). As I understood him, he accepted the Government's plan as a basis for discussion. I understood what he meant was that all the discussion in the past about self-determination for five years, then Enosis or partition, or a federal arrangement, are now out of con-
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sideration because of the dangerous background in the island and in the Middle East. I believe that no back bencher on either side of the Committee has definitely and categorically turned down this plan. Some have criticised it destructively and some very constructively. Very few if any have said, "This plan will not and cannot work." One reason for this is that hon. Members know, as everybody in Cyprus knows, the dire alternative.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East criticised the Government on two main counts. He said that the plan would mean eventual disunity in Cyprus and the division of the two communities. It has been British colonial policy under all Governments to bring all Colonies to full self-government within the Commonwealth. It must be said, at least for publication outside, that four years after Britain took over the control of the administration of Cyprus in 1875 representative government was started in that island on the elective principle. That lasted until 1931. Since the end of World War II, Cyprus has been offered new constitutions each with a majority of Greek Cypriots in the Government on three occasions, 1948—when the Opposition were in office—1954 and 1956.
The three constitutions offered to the people of Cyprus were rejected by the Greek Cypriots and by the Greek Government because they felt that if they could get self-determination and could get the backing of Her Majesty's Opposition, they would then have Enosis. Naturally, they were not willing to accept anything less than Enosis; if they thought they could get the lot. For that reason, the fears of the Turks started to grow until we got the sabre-rattling which we have had in the last few months.
I hope that the Committee recognises the Turks' strategic requirements in Cyprus. They fear not only discrimination against the Turkish minority but, and much more important, they fear absorption of the island under Greek sovereignty and the possibility of Communist domination at some future date. For those reasons Turkey could not possibly acquiesce to self-government if this means Enosis; she must have guarantees that that will not happen.
I say to my Turkish friends that the plan put forward by Her Majesty's Government provides guarantees that the

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island can never become wholly Greek or wholly Communist. In return for accepting this guarantee, the Turks must give up the idea of partition. To the Greeks it must be obvious by now that Enosis means civil war, with all the consequences that flow from it. This plan gives to Greece a say in the administration of the island and a guarantee that Greek Cypriots will not be de-Helenised and a perpetuation of the spiritual and cultural ties with Athens that Greeks in Cyprus so often long for.
Britain must also compromise. I have no time to go into the question of the importance to us of bases in Cyprus, or essential command and intelligence centres. But to have to compromise by giving up some degree of our sovereignty so that later it may be shared among Greece, Turkey and Britain. The plan is a compromise and, as such, it commends itself to all hon. Members. [Interruption.] Well, its basis commends itself to all hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. I believe that it is the only acceptable alternative facing us today. It can endure perfectly happily for seven years, and we hope that during those seven years the two communities will have learned to live together. The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) does not think they will, and I am inclined to agree, but we all hope that they will settle down together.
We hope to see Cyprus progressing along on the normal channel towards self-Government and independence with the Commonwealth. If that does not happen, the alternative is not partition or Enosis, which are ruled out, but probably federation with a central Government running the island but with local autonomy for each sector, British, Turkish and Greek. That, indeed, may be the solution seven years hence.
The message which I hope will go to the people of Turkey, the people of Greece and, above all, the people of Cyprus, is that hon. Members here on both sides of the House want to do the best they can for the people of that island. We recognise that fear is rampant in that island today. The people of the island now recognise that their best safeguard against fear is the presence of British troops in the island. I hope they will recognise the basic unity of thought in this House on this compromise plan and
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that the people of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece and Turkey will agree to use the plan as the basis for the future of the island at least for the next seven years.
8.56 p.m.
Mr. Aneurin Bevan: I think that hon. Members in all parts of the Committee will be aware that this debate is being followed very closely not only in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, but also throughout the Commonwealth. In the whole of the debate there has not yet been sufficient attention given to how our speeches here will be interpreted, not only in the Mediterranean area, but in Africa and elsewhere. Many of the people in our dependencies will begin to look, maybe, on what we are doing this evening as a blueprint for what we might intend to do elsewhere.
That will really cause trouble for the Colonial Secretary and the House, especially if it follows some of the speeches we have heard from the benches opposite, because many of them have given the unfortunate impression that the hostility between Turks and Greeks on the island of Cyprus is not something to be deplored, but something behind which we can hide. They have been exaggerated to a very great extent. Some hon. Members opposite said—and one on this side of the Committee said the same—that they could never foresee the day when Greeks and Turks would live peaceably together again on the island of Cyprus.
I think, therefore, that when we approach this problem we must always keep in mind that very many people in our dependencies always believe that there are people in the House of Commons—there is historical justification for their fears—who maintain divisions in order to maintain rule. So let us be very careful indeed lest we approach this problem of Cyprus in a way which might create problems elsewhere. It has always been our position in the Labour Party—and I should like to state it at the very beginning—that full self-government is the same thing as self-determination, but self-determination is the last phase in the development of self-government. It is a contradiction in terms to say that a nation can have full self-government and yet not have

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self-determination, because with full self-government go all the complete sovereign rights.
The trouble in Cyprus has been that self-determination has always been muddled up with the beginning of the process and not with the end. That has been the difficulty all the while. They started by speaking about Enosis when all of us should first have been speaking about a constitution for Cyprus which might in the course of time be consummated in the decision of the people of Cyprus either to be in the Commonwealth or to go outside.
As has been said on several occasions, the Statute of Westminster laid it down quite clearly that the members who belong to it are sovereign States who can leave the Commonwealth if they wish. In fact, when final negotiations have taken place—I remember some of them very well myself—we have always been able to obtain membership of the Commonwealth by first of all laying it down quite clearly that if a nation concerned did not want to do it, then it could go outside. The fundamental basis for fellowship inside the Commonwealth resides in the right of each one of them to go out if it wishes to. It has always been accepted that any attempt on the part of the mother country even to appear to be resuscitating Imperial claims would rupture the connection. There is, therefore, no doubt at all about our position here and there ought to be no confusion anywhere. We believe that every dependency inside the Commonwealth, using the term "Commonwealth" in its widest connotation, has the right to look forward to full self-government, carrying with it the right of self-determination.
If we therefore put it in its right perspective in this problem, what we say is that we have never departed from that position, and it would do no good at all to relations between Cypriots and ourselves if they thought that we had departed from that position. When hon. Members opposite have sometimes jeered and chided us this evening, and when some newspaper articles have suggested that we are being put in a very difficult position, I point out to them that if it were understood in Cyprus that Her Majesty's Opposition shared a point of
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view which made it appear that we had deserted that position, hostility in Cyprus would be greater, because then the people of Cyprus would say that neither Her Majesty's Opposition nor Her Majesty's Government could be trusted with the future of Cyprus. We are perfectly clear about this matter.
There are different conditions in which these principles are applied—historical differences, differences of geography, differences of juxtaposition between the country coming into full maturity and countries nearby, as is the position in Cyprus. There is, of course, also difficulty in Malta. But despite those varying differences we must be faithful to that principle or we shall have deserted the finest tradition that we have built up. We ought not, either, to allow anybody to assume that that position of ours is modified in the very least degree by considerations of security, because one cannot deny another man his liberty in order that one may defend one's security.
Many of the speeches which have been made this evening are exceedingly dangerous, because they have been trying to run two different attitudes, one that we cannot give self-government to Cyprus because the Greeks and the Turks will not live peacefully together, and the other that we cannot give it because we cannot afford to let them have it. Hon. Members cannot run those two. They cannot say to the people of Cyprus that they need to have Cyprus as a fortress for Britain and that that is the reason why we are there; because that is not a statesman's solution. It is a soldier's solution, a military solution with a military reason, and what we have to find for Cyprus is not a soldier's solution but a statesman's solution.
When we are told—and we are, indeed, told frequently—about the way in which our people conduct themselves on the island, we are all very proud of it. I understand that we now have about 37,000 of them there, whether for the situation in Cyprus itself or as a hint to someone else, I do not know. Nevertheless, it is our duty here not to rely upon the tact, the good manners, the restraint and gallantry of British soldiers when we put them in dangerous circumstances, but our duty to assemble peaceful conditions where their lives will not

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be at risk. That is what we have not done. We have not, in this case, persistently and patiently pursued solutions under which our soldiers could live without risk. It is of no use hon. Members opposite saying "Nonsense", because if they do say "Nonsense" this is something that is most easily proved.
We on this side of the Committee have also done our very utmost to try to persuade the people of Cyprus not to commit acts of violence. Eighteen months ago I myself at this Box made an appeal, when I was responsible for colonial affairs for the Opposition. There was a truce. For the first time in years, British soldiers were dancing in the streets of Cyprus with Greeks and Turks. That truce was thrown away. Month after month went by, and no statesmanlike use was made of it.
It is no good hon. Members opposite trying to throw the responsibility for that situation on this side of the Committee. We have done our very utmost by restraint. We have been commended by the Prime Minister and by the Colonial Secretary for showing that restraint—although we have not had a quid pro quo.
We have also tried from time to time to point out that we cannot get a solution to this problem in circumstances of civil violence. It is very important for us to get one thing clear. We must not be prepared to surrender to violence from one side what we are not prepared to surrender to the other. In recent weeks there has been a very strong suspicion that Her Majesty's Government have been influenced in the formulation of their proposals by threats of increased violence from the Turks. That is not a wise thing to say. [Interruption.] It has been said, but it is not a wise thing to say because, if it is believed by the Greeks, they, of course, will know what to do.
Hon. Members opposite must allow me to make my own speech in my own way, for had I allowed myself to be taunted to reply to some of the speeches I have heard this evening from those benches, I should be using very much stronger terms. The important thing to remember is that if violence does die down it must not be made an excuse for doing nothing. That is what has happened. When we have had a cessation of violence on the island, we have had the Colonial Office sitting back. Therefore, if we do have a period
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of peace now, I hope that we shall take advantage of it and try to get a settlement.
We are not responsible for the Government's proposals. Our responsibility went only as far as to advise that they should, first of all, be submitted to the N.A.T.O. Council before being made public. We have all along believed that, as there is such an interest in this matter in Turkey and in Greece, and as they are both members of N.A.T.O., if we were to create a favourable background for the acceptance of proposals, however bad they might be, it could best be done by inviting the co-operation of N.A.T.O. That is what has happened.
We do not commend these proposals. They are not our proposals; we cannot commend them. But we advise the Greeks and the Turks not to reject them out of hand. We would like to formulate it in this way—not that these are necessarily the basis for negotiations but the opening phase of negotiation in the hope of a negotiated settlement for the Cypriots' problem. I earnestly beg the Government not to take up a final position tonight. We are going to make certain suggestions, and I think we are entitled to make them. We are entitled to have them listened to respectfully and not to have them rejected out of hand.
If it is admitted, as it has been admitted on all sides in the debate, that we carry a very heavy burden of responsibility for what might happen in Cyprus as a result of the positions that we take up, there is a natural corollary to that, which is that that responsibility should be met by the Government by respectfully listening to our suggestions. It would be intolerable if the Government said, "We have said this, and this is final as far as we are concerned, apart from some details at the end." That would be intolerable, because it would put the Opposition in the position of having this heavy responsibility without in any way being able to influence the policies of the Government. Therefore, I hope that the Prime Minister will listen to what we have to say.
I hope also—I do not ask him to do so tonight; I do not expect an immediate answer to the suggestions we are going to make—that he will say that he will give our suggestions earnest attention. Of course, there is no reason why the

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Prime Minister cannot change his mind. It is not the first time he has done it. It is not the first time the Government have done it over Cyprus. They have changed it quite frequently. When opening the Tripartite Conference in August, 1955, in London, the right hon. Gentleman, when he was Foreign Secretary, said:
"It is, as you know, a basic principle of the policy of Her Majesty's Government, that the internal affairs of Her Majesty's possessions cannot be discussed with foreign Powers."
There has been a slight departure from that. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say:
"It is perhaps hardly necessary to say this; for it is fundamental to the existence of any State that it should have full control over its internal policies. This principle lies at the basis of our present community of nations."
When the Prime Minister takes up a position of this sort he never lets it alone. He went on to say:
"It is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations where it is stated that there shall be no interference—I quote the words—'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.' In convening this Conference of their own initiative, I wish to make it clear that Her Majesty's Government are not in any way departing from this principle. Indeed, they take this opportunity to re-affirm it."
After that very firm stand we have this statement.
It reminds me of a story, which I am told is apocryphal, of when President Gomulka visited Belgrade with Prime Minister Cyrankiewiez and Tito met them at the airport. Tito turned to Gomulka and said, "How does it come about that you seem to have got the same Prime Minister all the time in Poland?" Prime Minister Cyrankiewiez replied, "That is not true. I am changing all the time." It is not necessary or in accordance with precedent for the Prime Minister to take up an adamantine position and say that these are written in letters of brass and cannot be changed. On the contrary, we are hoping that the Prime Minister and the Colonial Secretary will have their usual open minds in the matter.
One of the difficulties we see about these present proposals is this. It has been mentioned several times. It is how they will be regarded outside and among many of our dependencies. They will examine them thoroughly to find out in what way the present proposals for
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Cyprus appear to make way for and to facilitate the emergence of self-government for Cyprus. That is how they will examine them. They will say, "Are these putting obstacles in the road to self-government, or are they facilitating it? Are the British Government now saying that this is the first step towards self-government and that this is a good way to do it?" Or will they say, "They are taking advantage of the difficulties in Cyprus at the present time to put up insurmountable barriers against the emergence of Cyprus as a self-governing nation"?
And if they say that, on the face of it they will have some justification, because the fact is that these proposals provide for the spiritual separation of the islanders. The difficulty is that there is no point in the constitution, there is no place in the hierarchy, where the Cypriot people as such meet. They are separated vertically from top to bottom. Therefore, as the days go by, and as the social and political climate improves in Cyprus, there is no symbol of growing Cypriot unity. There is nothing to which they can attach themselves. There is a permanent dichotomy.
Therefore, we would say that the first criticism we have to make is this, that we believe that the proposals should be modified so as to provide an elective chamber where Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks can meet to discuss the common affairs of the island in a common legislative assembly. And even if they will not meet now it should be there for them to meet in.
It is to this chamber, if we are to follow our normal constitutional precedents, that the powers and the functions of Her Majesty's Government would gradually be decanted when the final stage is reached when the nation can have complete self-government. If that is not inserted into the constitution, then they will infer, and it will be inferred outside, that we are deliberately erecting obstacles and barriers against the emergence of self-government in Cyprus. That is the first important point of criticism which we have to make.
In present circumstances I must also believe, because of the hostility, because of the dangers, that it is probably a wise plan to try to get the co-operation of

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Greece and Turkey; in present circumstances, it is useless for us to deny that if these two nations do not want peace in Cyprus there will not be peace there. Therefore, it is quite correct, I think, at this stage—it need not have been done earlier, but now it is probably right—that we should associate the Governments of Greece and of Turkey with the emergence of new constitutional proposals for Cyprus. That probably is correct, but we want that association to be for the purpose of facilitating agreement about the constitution, and not to be a part of it.
If I might use a metaphor derived from the past, I would prefer that the direct representatives from Ankara and from Athens should be regarded not as High Commissioners, but as midwives calling the baby nation into existence and, after it has been properly born, going away. It is not necessary for the midwife to stay in the house when the baby has grown to manhood. Therefore, if it is the Government's case that the friendship and assistance and good will of Turkey and Greece are necessary in order to launch the new constitution for Cyprus, they should provide for it in circumstances that do not arouse the suspicion that they are going to be there permanently.
I, therefore, make the second suggestion, that the Government should agree that the tenure of office should be shorter than the period of seven years by a substantial amount, and that when we have a constitution for Cyprus of the kind at which I have hinted, and when there is peace there, and when Turkey and Greece are on better terms with each other, it would be highly desirable for the Turkish and Greek representatives to go home and leave the future of Cyprus between the new constitution and Her Majesty's Government. But I agree with some of my hon. Friends that direct representation of this kind may prove to be an insurmountable barrier to negotiations, because the Greeks will feel that we have enshrined Turkey in the constitution of the island, not only unnecessarily but provocatively, and the Turks might say the same thing about Greece.
We beg the Prime Minister, therefore, to consider putting a term to the presence of these people because, furthermore, we do not believe that this will make for
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peace between Britain and Turkey and Greece. It will be a source of continual friction. Those who have been at the Ministry of Labour will know that one of the cardinal principles which guided the Minister of Labour so successfully in his recent activities is that one should never try to encourage compulsory arbitration, because, if one does, all the conciliation machinery is unused. For if people at the beginning know that at the end they are going to arbitration they do not have conciliation. Therefore, it has been a fundamental principle of relations between trade unions and employers in Great Britain to try to build conciliation machinery and not to have compulsory arbitration.
What have we here? The Colonial Secretary told us today that if a High Commissioner thought that a piece of proposed legislation was discriminatory—and this is the language—he could have it sent to the arbitration tribunal; in other words, Her Majesty's Government would have nothing at all to do with it. He could send it immediately. That seems to me a source of continual friction, and highly humiliating. Talk about interference in another nation's affairs! Here we are to be arbitrated about. I wonder the Suez group have not gone apoplectic about it. The only explanation is to be found in the fact that they find the rest of the proposals so agreeable that they do not object to this.
But there never has been in the history of Great Britain a provision of this sort, where we do not have negotiations between sovereign States, between high contracting parties. No! If some High Commissioner who sits in the legislative council says, "I think this is unfair to the Turks or to the Greeks"—as the case may be—"I want it referred to the arbitration tribunal", Her Majesty's Government then sit down and await the results of the tribunal and legislate in accordance with its decisions. So low has our pride fallen. And this is supposed to be an imaginative piece of machinery. Well, it is imaginative, no doubt. It is so imaginative that it is almost out of this world.
If, therefore, we had two changes in the constitution of the kind I have suggested, it would seem to us on this side of the Committee that, if these are negotiated and agreed, it is quite unnecessary, and opposed to the spirit of that

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amended constitution, to speak about having dual nationality. Because if, in fact, what we are trying to do all the time—and that has been said and I hope it is sincere—is to try to create in Cyprus a constitution that the people will eventually work peacefully, it is not necessary to envisage dual nationality in Cyprus. But the very envisaging of dual nationality envisages the worst thing, and that is permanent separation of Greek and Cypriot.
Now, I want to sit down because I promised the Prime Minister to give him thirty-five minutes. May I say, however, that I most sincerely hope that the Government will go away from this debate this evening feeling that the House of Commons is doing its very best to try to provide a climate of opinion in which we can make a fresh approach to the solution of th Cypriot problem. There is nothing to be gained by anyone at all, certainly by no politcal party in this country, if all the time we have to send our young men to be killed because we have not got enough wisdom to solve the problems ourselves.
9.27 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): I am sure that the Committee will feel that the whole tone and character of this debate has been fully consonant with the importance and seriousness of the occasion. All the speakers on all sides of the Committee have acknowledged the need for restraint. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) showed great restraint, I think. The old Adam broke out every now and then, but I will try to follow the example which he gave me when his better self predominated.
The reason is that we know that this may well be a turning point in the history of Cyprus. For a very long time now—I think it is a year, certainly several months—the Government have gladly paid tribute to the patience and understanding of all parties in the House, and I should like to repeat that. There has been on all sides a general realisation that, as feeling in Greece and Turkey has increased, so we have had all the greater need for restraint and statesmanship.
In this debate we have had a maiden speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South-East (Mr. Peel). I should like to congratulate him upon it.
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He could hardly have chosen a more important debate to which to make his first contribution, a contribution which was both thoughtful and constructive. We shall all look forward to hearing from my hon. Friend again.
Many speakers have paid tribute to the purposes—I would almost say the imagination—which lie behind the proposals of the Government, but some have asked, and perhaps not unnaturally, why we have had to wait so long before putting forward a policy of this sort. The answer is really this, that the Government—indeed all of us—have for a long time realised that the problem of Cyprus was not a colonial problem, or not essentially a colonial problem. We have had and we still have many colonial problems with which successive Governments of both parties have dealt, with a great deal of success—and the growth of the Commonwealth is the living proof of that.
However, in Cyprus, behind the rival claims of the Greek and Turkish communities in the island, there have always lain the national interests of Greece and Turkey. Cyprus is and, therefore, must be regarded as a problem with international as well as internal aspects. It has, therefore, not been possible in recent times for a solution to be found without regard to those international considerations and that, essentially, is why previous plans for a solution—and there have been many—have so far proved unavailing.
If anybody thinks that this period has been easy to endure, they are very wrong. It has been a very unhappy one, unacceptable in every way to the Government and to the House of Commons. Apart from all the other troubles, British lives have been lost, both civilian and military, as well as Cypriot; and I should like—and I know that I speak for the whole Committee here—to pay tribute to the fortitude of the Administration, of the police, and of the Armed Forces.
Many efforts have been made in recent years. I do not propose to go through the history, or to try to allocate blame or praise, but what we must now do is face the facts as they are. The right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale, at the end of his speech, very helpfully took that view. The facts are, whether we like it or not, that both Greece and Turkey, as well as Great Britain, have a fundamental interest in the future of this island.

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The Turks—I am putting their view—regard Cyprus as an extension of the Anatolian Plain, a kind of offshore island with vital significance for their defence and their security. They say—this has been their argument up to now—that the Turkish-Cypriot community must not be ruled by a Greek-Cypriot community and they have advocated the physical separation of the two communities by means of a territorial partition. That is their view of the situation.
The Greeks feel that since the great majority of the population of Cyprus is Greek in thought, tradition, habits and religion, they have the right, should they wish it, to join the mother country by the vote of a majority, and that is what they mean by self-determination.
However, we cannot reach a settlement either upon the basis of past history, or on the basis of extreme present claims. We must concentrate upon the future and not upon the past, and we must try to find a solution which is realist and practical. It is with that object that we have put forward the policy which the Committee has been debating today.
Of course, it would be very foolish to disguise from ourselves that the Turkish and Greek Governments have made clear to us the difficulties which they see in our plan. I know that, but we must not lose heart. It would be equally wrong for us not to note the very high degree of sympathy and support which the policy has received, not only in this country, but in many other countries, both in the old world and the new. My right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary has already spoken of the help we have received and, I am happy to say, are continuing to receive from our Allies in N.A.T.O. I feel that I should mention it again in order to mark once more our appreciation of their efforts.
How do we stand? What are we now to do? As I said, we propose to go forward with the application of our policy in the island, and we hope that it will be accepted as a basis for constructive discussion and agreement. As I said in the House on 19th June—I venture to repeat my words now—
"There are, of course, many details which will require to be filled in after discussion. We are, therefore not asking for immediate accept-
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ance of our policy in every particular."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th June, 1958; Vol. 589, c. 1324.]
We never expected immediate or unanimous agreement. If agreement had been possible, it would have been reached long ago. We have been searching for it long enough, in all conscience. It would be asking too much—it is important to bear this in mind—to expect the Greek or Turkish Governments to abstain from criticism of our plan or of the aspects of it which did not appeal to them. There are, nevertheless, some elements in their reception of the plan which give grounds for some cautious optimism.
The Greek Prime Minister, in replying to my personal message to him, referred to the postponement of self-determination until a more appropriate time, and to a temporary solution on the basis of democratic self-government. He then said that the Greek Government would be prepared to help wherever they could usefully act in a mediatory way, mediatory, that is to say, between ourselves and the Greek Cypriot population. The Turkish Foreign Minister, for his part, in a public statement on 19th June, spoke of the possibility of reconciling the British and Turkish principle, and he referred with gratification to the efforts which are being made among the Allies in N.A.T.O. to reach a solution.
I regard this as a constructive and not a negative response. Dealing with all these replies, while they do not, of course, go as far as we might have desired or, perhaps, hoped, the response to our initiative has certainly not been a complete rejection but rather one which contains some constructive elements. That is something which we can all welcome.
The Committee may have observed that, in commending our plan to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, I offered to meet them separately, or together, if they thought that it would be to our mutual advantage to have a personal exchange of views rather than continued correspondence. What I actually said on this matter is as follows:
"A personal discussion is often more fruitful than the interchange of messages and telegrams. We could meet together or, if such an idea appealed to you, we could perhaps so manage it that the other Prime Minister was present, and indeed I am sending him a message on similar lines."—

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this was to Greece—
"It might perhaps be most convenient to have an informal meeting at an intermediate point like Rome or Geneva."
I was not then thinking of a formal, tripartite conference but rather of a number of informal discussions. I think I may say that both M. Menderes and M. Karamanlis have responded to my suggestion in a friendly way, although each has qualified it in his own way. For my part, I can only add that I remain ready and anxious to meet anyone or to go anywhere if it can in any way help to bring these discussions to a satisfactory conclusion.
That is how we stand as regards the reception of the plan by these two countries, and, to some extent, I think that the same may be said about the reception which the Governor has received from representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot opinion.
I have been asked a number of questions about the details of the plan, in particular by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). I should like to pay tribute to the speech with which he opened the debate for the Opposition, which I think the whole Committee regarded as very helpful in our difficulties. Other questions about the plan have been asked from both sides of the Committee, including some by the hon. Gentleman the Member for Pembroke (Mr. Donnelly) and, of course, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Ebbw Vale, who wound up the debate for the Opposition.
I hope that they will not think it discourteous of me if I do not try to give an answer to them, or, at any rate, a final answer to them, or deal with them in any detail. Of course, in a debate like this, where we try to pool our thoughts for the common purpose, everything that is said by all Members on both sides of the Committee, Front Bench and back bench, will be most carefully considered and studied by us as a contribution to the problem. I think that it would be an error if I were to try to deal with them in detail today and would not serve the purpose that they have in mind. I might perhaps sum up our approach to them like this.
We have of course no special pride of authorship which will make us stick
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obstinately to this or that detail of the plan. Our purpose is to reach agreement and bring peace. Many of the matters which have been raised are capable of discussion, adaptation and development, and we shall certainly be flexible so far as we are concerned.
But I must remind hon. Members of this. We must not be so pliant as to add to the rigidity of the other contending parties. A concession or alteration must be judged not as to whether the British Government are willing to make it. That is not the test. The test is, is it a contribution to get the Greeks and Turks, both national and in the island, to agree. Therefore, while we must not stand firm out of a false pride in the details of the plan, we must not give in here or there in such a way as to add to our difficulties rather than reduce them. Having said that, I would add that we must be not only flexible but fair, and in the management of these very difficult negotiations we must be prudent.
There are one or two points on which I should like to say a word. First, the impartial tribunal. I think that there has been some genuine misunderstanding. This White Paper is very short and does not go into much detail. Since any new constitution must be a written constitution, unlike our own, there must be machinery for seeing that it is scrupulously observed and the Governor primarily will have that duty. But we have thought it desirable that he should be supported by a tribunal, probably of a judicial character, which would examine any complaint that the principle of the constitution had been violated, either by law or decree or even, perhaps, by an administrative act.
What is this first principle on which everything must depend if we are to get the confidence of both sides? It is simply this. There must be no discrimination either against the Greeks or against the Turks—I mean the local Greeks and local Turks. It is in this context—having got a written constitution, having got this principle which must underlie it—and only in this context that we have thought that such a tribunal might have a useful place.
The second point, on which I sympathise, was made by the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East and repeated by the right hon. Gentleman the Member

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for Ebbw Vale and by several other hon. and right hon. Gentlemen. It is this. That there is danger in putting so much weight on communal machinery rather than on the essential unity of the people. Of course, that is a strong point but I think we have to face realities. It is a paradox, but it is true, that we have to get a start with separate responsibility in order to lead on, step by step, to a larger unity. The unity at the moment, I admit, is represented in a single Council, which is something, as hon. Gentlemen have pointed out, which would combine legislative and executive functions.
Hon. Members who are well acquainted with our colonial history will remember that organisations of this kind are often enlarged and adapted to wider responsibilities. We cannot say—who can say—how they will develop. But if only we can make a start by general agreement, I do not think we need look too meticulously to what the end will be. The question has been asked—[Interruption.]—I am afraid, Sir Charles, that it would be contrary to order to refer to that interruption, but no doubt it represents the working of the cross-bench mind—though I do not know which side.
The question has been asked: what will happen if this British plan fails? What will happen if the whole thing fails? I must repeat and ask the Committee to give me its support when I say that the plan must not fail. As I said in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, South (Sir R. Robinson) on 19th June:
"I do not want us to think in terms of failure. Let us think in terms of success, and starting from today, of a new approach."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 19th June, 1958; Vol. 589, c. 1324–6.]
I went on to say that, of course, if, in the long run, our hopes are dashed and every effort fails, if we are thrown back on other solutions which we all agree would be undesirable, then Her Majesty's Government will stand by their pledges. These, of course, include among others that contained in the statement which my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary made on 19th December, 1956. I must add that we shall stand by them in the form in which they were given. I have noticed that sometimes phrases have been quoted out of their full context.
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What is this new approach for which I am appealing? The right hon. Gentleman chaffed me on a change of view in this matter. I have all the quotations on this subject of Ministers responsible five, six or seven years ago, but I do not think that that is the spirit we want here today. What is this new approach? I say it is based, curiously, upon the point which the right hon. Gentleman, unlike some of his hon. Friends, seemed rather to object to. It is based on the principle of partnership and that is why we have made these preliminary suggestions about dual nationality. It is based upon partnership, which we think the only possible approach in view of the dangers which confront us. Of course, in every country there are forces that look backwards and not forwards. Of course, in every country there are forces of what might be called isolationism; but the whole tendency of the post-war period has been based upon a different concept which, put in its simplest form, is partnership.
It is this concept which inspires the N.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., Bagdad Pact and other military alliances. It is this concept which is the basis of the various organisations which have grown up in the world in the economic field. It is, above all, the concept of partnership that holds the Commonwealth together. Indeed, unless this concept can be developed and unless it can be made active through all the countries in the free world, then indeed the outlook is dark. Partnership, interdependence, call it by what name you will. [Interruption.] There is the cross-bench again. I therefore do not apologise, nor do my right hon. Friends, for having introduced into this plan this concept of shared responsibility and partnership.
We try to introduce it during the first period, the seven year period, where we want it to grow. We add, at the end of the White Paper that if, as I believe, this concept does grow, then, so far as we are concerned, subject to our immediate military needs, we should be prepared to make our contribution by surrendering our total sovereignty and setting up some system of joint sovereignty.
In many parts of the world and in many of the problems that confront the world, that may be a very fruitful thought for the future. At any rate, the problem of

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Cyprus, a small island in itself in population and size, may now become a proof of our failure in the free world to solve these things together or it may be—we must pray that it will be—a symbol of our success. I do not believe that the problem of Cyprus can be solved by the Turks alone or by the Greeks alone or even by the British alone.
Therefore, is it not worth while at least to do our best to see whether we can solve it together? As I have said, I am grateful for those replies of both Greek and Turkish Governments. I read some hope into them and I will do all I can to work for the acceptance of this policy as the basis for a constructive solution.
I also believe, as I think we all believe, that the population of the island in their hearts long for a settlement. I believe they will be ready to join in consultations with the Governor and with the British Government in working out the plan. They will naturally look for the help of their own mother countries for guidance and support, but I believe in their hearts they are ready and anxious to see that a solution based upon this plan should come about.
At any rate, we can say with truth that nothing has been said in the debate today which would injure that hope, and that the whole of this Committee of the House of Commons, whatever may be the divergences upon this or that detail, joins in this message of good will, and would like to send out from here to all peoples concerned a message of confidence, of sympathy and of hope.
Whereupon Motion made, and Question, That The Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again—[Mr. Legh.]—put and agreed to.
Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORY, POOLE
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Legh.]
9.55 p.m.
Captain Richard Pilkington: It is part of the genius of Parliament that it is able in a moment to switch from dealing with a worldwide problem such as Cyprus to a matter which, in its essence, is a local one, although no less important for that. I am very grateful to Mr. Speaker for his selection of this problem tonight, since it deals with the livelihood of 600 to 700 men and their families and also affects the well-being of the area of the Borough of Poole.
The background to this problem is that since the war the Borough of Poole has become, comparatively speaking, very heavily industrialised. A large number of new firms have come to the area, and many of those new firms wish to expand. I think it right to say that those who have the best interests of the borough at heart want any further expansion done with restraint and discrimination, as otherwise we shall lose all the open spaces which at present make the borough a very distinguished one and so pleasant for those who live therein.
With that background, the Royal Ordnance Factory there has been for many years a most successful institution and also a very happy one. Tribute should be paid to both the management and men that that should have been the case. From that point of view, it is indeed sad that the factory is now to close. At the same time, I have no doubt most people would agree that it is a good thing if the nuclear deterrent, besides making war less likely, should permit economies in conventional arms, but when the application of that policy means the closing of a particular factory, in this case the R.O.F. at Poole, at once the question arises of the future of the men who work there.
The local branch of the A.E.U., which is a very efficient one, made a good case for continuing the factory as a producing unit. If that had been possible, it would have meant that there would be no breaking up of a team which had been working

733
very well together. It would have avoided rooting up people who had lived in their homes a great many years and did not wish to move and would have kept the men concerned in employment. When the news came through originally, I said to the Minister—and I think he was not unsympathetic—that a certain number of firms to whom I have spoken about this question had plans for expanding and I thought they would be interested in the possibility of making that expansion take place in the existing factory.
That alternative, provided those firms could have taken on the bulk of the men working there, seemed a very satisfactory solution, and I hoped that it would materialise. I also hoped—indeed, I expected—that, in view of the contact I had had with him, the Minister would keep me informed as to the progress of events. I had specifically asked whether he could do this. It was, therefore, with some surprise and, to be frank, some indignation, that I heard, not from him—
it being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Chichester-Clark.]
Captain Pilkington: —but from Poole, that all had been decided and that the factory was to go to the Nuclear Graphite Limited, no doubt an excellent firm, but not a Poole firm, and, apparently, not one which was to employ anything like 600 or 700 men. I must repeat to the Minister what I have told him already—that there has been grave dissatisfaction both about what was done and about the way in which it was done.
When I learned this news I at once put down a Question which had to be for Written Answer because the Minister was at the end of the list for Oral Questions that week. A large part of the Question which I had hoped to put down appeared to be out of order. Nevertheless, the Minister gave what answer he could, and I am grateful to him for that, but I think he owes a full explanation of what has been done and why it has been done. I am extremely grateful to the Parliamentary Secretary for the great trouble which I know he has already taken over this problem, and I look forward to hearing what he has to say.
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There are three further points which I want to mention about the complaints which have already been made. These were made by the secretary of the local branch of the A.E.U., and they appeared in the Poole Herald. The first is: was the disposal of the factory widely enough advertised? Secondly, was there a proper effort on behalf of the Minister to continue the factory as a going concern? Thirdly, was it right that improvements in the factory which the union had urged for some years should be carried out, at public expense, only just before the change-over was decided upon?
Turning to what is to happen to the men concerned in the future. I should like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary how many men working at the factory have already left, and secondly, how many of these are still out of work. I know that that is not primarily his responsibility but the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, but I know that he is working in harmony with that Ministry. In any event, I hope that very few of these men are still out of work. How many men previously working at the factory are to be taken on by Nuclear Graphite Limited? Finally, what are the prospects for the remainder?
There is one other question which I should like to ask and which deals with a certain proportion of the men concerned. Can the Parliamentary Secretary repeat to me the assurance which he gave in answer to an earlier Question about all the elderly established workers? I have a case in mind with which the Parliamentary Secretary is familiar. Will he give an assurance that all these more elderly established workers will be offered alternative work in other Government employment if they wish such an offer to be made to them?
I realise that the Ministry has not an easy task when it is confronted with the necessity to make economies such as this, but we are concerned with men who have served the State well, and they are entitled to every consideration that we can give them.
10.5 p.m.
Mr. F. H. Hayman: I should like to support what the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Poole (Captain Pilkington) has said, because although one normally

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thinks that Poole is outside the South-West—I suppose that it is really on its eastern fringe—what has happened there is happening elsewhere in the South-West, particularly in the engineering industries. I do not know precisely what Nuclear Graphite Limited makes, but it would seem that it is not an engineering concern. Further, although there may now be only about 600 workers in the Royal Ordnance Factory at Poole, at one time there were between 1,100 and 1,200 men working there.
I also support the hon. and gallant Gentleman's appeal because I know that in my own constituency and elsewhere in the South-West, particularly, say, in Gloucester, people are extremely apprehensive about the future. The local authorities are disturbed because they have to provide the capital for all the social services. This closure means that although this factory may not be entirely abandoned, the men whose skill has gone into it will have to move elsewhere. Although Poole may be growing industrially, I should imagine that it has not a very great industrial future. Placed as it is close to Bournemouth it would have no easy access to fresh work for the men displaced—
Captain Pilkington: It has a very distinguished industrial future.
Mr. Hayman: I am glad to hear it. I am always very glad to hear of any place in the South-West that has an industrial future.
One feels that, perhaps, the Government are committed, for doctrinaire reasons, to giving up State factories, but this is a case that the Parliamentary Secretary might ask his right hon. Friend and the Government to look at afresh, because I believe that the private firms that manufacture articles similar to those that this factory has manufactured have full order books for years to come. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will reconsider this and do what he can to give his hon. and gallant Friend what he asks for.
10.7 p.m.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. W. J. Taylor): First, may I thank my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Poole (Captain Pilkington) for the compliments that he has paid to the Royal Ordnance factory
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organisation. Since I have been at the Ministry, I have had a great deal to do with both managements and workpeople at the R.O.F.s, and have visited many of the factories. I can most warmly endorse what he has said about their efficiency and about their excellent industrial relations.
I fully appreciate that the subject we are discussing is one of great importance to many of my hon. and gallant Friend's constituents. I know that he has taken a keen personal interest in the future of the factory and in the welfare of the workpeople employed therein. He has been in constant touch with my right hon. Friend and myself about this matter for many months past. I appreciate his kind words about the attention that he felt my right hon. Friend and I had given to it, and I assure him that after this debate we shall continue to co-operate with him, and, indeed, with all the local interests, to make the impact of this very severe blow to Poole as light as possible.
Perhaps I may now briefly state the reasons for the closure of the factory. The background to this decision, which was announced by my right hon. Friend on 15th July last, has been explained in this House on several occasions. That announcement was the outcome of a careful review of the production capacity in the Royal Ordnance factories in the light of the probable future requirements of the Service Departments.
The review led to a clear conclusion that the total capacity that we had available was much greater than would be required either for current production or for emergency capacity so far as we were able to assess it. The only way to reduce capacity economically was to close complete factories and to keep the remainder at as high a level of utilisation as possible. This is largely an industrial matter. I must say that it would have been completely uneconomic and would have imposed an unnecessary financial burden to leave all the factories open by running them at a very low level having regard to the orders we had in hand or in prospect.
Poole was concerned principally with small arms production, and the decision as to which factory to close lay between Poole, Enfield and Fazakerley. I assure my hon. and gallant Friend and the hon. Member for Falmouth and Camborne

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(Mr. Hayman) that the decision to close Poole was taken after the most expert examination of all the factors involved and was, in fact, inescapable on technical grounds.
My hon. and gallant Friend asked why the factory was not retained for the production of civil goods. I have explained my right hon. Friend's policy in this matter on several occasions, and on the last occasion on 6th May, 1958, in an Adjournment debate I went into it in some detail. I explained then why we were not prepared to retain entire factories for the production of goods for the civil market. There are many reasons, which I do not want to repeat here, why that is quite uneconomic and, indeed, impossible to do in the new competitive world in which we live.
I was a little concerned to hear the strictures which my hon. and gallant Friend placed upon my Department in connection with the disposal of this factory and the arrangements which have been made to deal with it. My hon. and gallant Friend expressed regret that the factory was not taken over by a local firm, and I know that he will expect from me a direct and clear answer to his questions.
May I give him the facts. Last August, shortly after the closure was announced, he wrote to my right hon. Friend enclosing a letter from a solicitor who is a director of a local firm, and this letter expressed an interest in the premises. In response to this letter, my Department wrote to the solicitor concerned offering to make arrangements for representatives of the firm to see the factory and to discuss the matter. Only a formal acknowledgement was received to the Department's letter and, in fact, the offer was not taken up.
In February of this year the Department wrote again to the solicitor, and also to a number of other firms who had shown interest in the factory, stating that the premises were about to be advertised in the Press and offering to send particulars of the property if his firm was still interested. We received no reply to that letter. Advertisements were duly placed in a wide selection of local and national newspapers. I cannot accept the charge that this matter was handled in any inefficient way. We really would not deal
738
negligently with a matter of such financial importance.
After a suitable interval, when the time came to make a decision, there was only one firm in a position to make a firm bid for the factory. Negotiations were accordingly opened with this firm, and I am glad to say that arrangements have been made for it to take over the factory on 1st October this year; that is, on completion of its work for the Ministry of Supply.
I can well understand my hon. and gallant Friend's desire that this factory should have been taken over by a local firm, but I am sure that he will see that in the circumstances the Department took the only course that was open to it. I should like to take this opportunity of recording my personal satisfaction that it has been possible to reach a solution as favourable as this one from the point of view of the workpeople and from the points of view of the taxpayers and of the Department. I shall be glad indeed if we can find equally satisfactory solutions for the other Royal Ordnance factories which are being or have been closed and are available for disposal at the present time.
As to the number of workers to be employed by the new firm, my hon. and gallant Friend will appreciate that my right hon. Friend has no responsibility for the staffing of a private firm which leases the factory. I can, however, confirm his statement that the new occupiers hope to employ up to about 200 people.
I have given some details about the progress of the negotiations. I am very sorry that my hon. and gallant Friend should feel that he has not been treated with due courtesy by my right hon. Friend. I can assure him that no discourtesy was intended. When a decision has been reached in a matter of this kind both the Minister and I endeavour to inform hon. Members concerned before a public announcement is made, and it was my right hon. Friend's intention, as he said in his letter to my hon. and gallant Friend on 22nd April, to make an announcement about the future of the factory through a Question tabled by him. My right hon. Friend did write to him as soon as the negotiations had been completed.

739
Unfortunately, although no announcement was made by the Ministry to the Press, they had already obtained the news through their own efforts. I think hon. Members will agree that it is very difficult in large industrial establishments of this kind, as indeed elsewhere, to control the workings of the "jungle telegraph." Much as I regret any offence which this process has apparently caused my hon. and gallant Friend, I cannot agree that the Minister of Supply should accept, in addition to his already arduous duties, responsibility for controlling local rumour or its progress from factory level to the Press.
I was asked some specific questions about the labour position at Poole. When the rundown began in October last year there were 686 industrial employees at the factory, of whom 282 were established. Since then the industrial strength has been reduced by 344. I am glad to say that at present only 30 of those are registered as unemployed at the local offices of the Ministry of Labour.
The remaining 342 employees, of whom 278 are established, will leave the factory at the rate of approximately 120 a month between now and the end of September. An office of the Ministry of Labour and National Service has been set up in the factory to provide redundant unestablished employees with the earliest advice and help in getting other work. The figures which I have quoted speak for themselves in showing how successful our efforts have been in easing the difficulties at local level.
As to the position of established workers over 60 years of age, my hon. and gallant Friend referred to a small number of established employees at Poole who were over 60 and who wished to transfer to another Government establishment. It is the Government's policy to encourage the employment of elderly people, both in their own Departments and in outside industry. Nevertheless, as my hon. and gallant Friend will appreciate, the present circumstances of our Royal Ordnance factories are quite abnormal.
The Royal Ordnance factories organisation has been steadily contracting and will continue to do so for some time to come. Indeed, no fewer than eight factories are at this moment running down
740
to closure. The result is that the age distribution of workpeople, which is already very high, is steadily worsening and is causing much concern to managements. We shall have to aim at a more balanced age structure if the factories are to do their work efficiently and economically.
We do not help matters if we transfer to the remaining factories men over 60 years of age, the great majority of whom are able to retire and draw pensions. Nevertheless, I have a certain sympathy with the men at Poole who wish to transfer in these circumstances. Arrangements are being made to transfer them to other establishments provided that the numbers are small and the men concerned are suitable for the work which can be offered to them elsewhere.
The unestablished employees will receive the improved gratuities which became applicable from May last year. These are not ungenerous. I think that my hon. and gallant Friend will have already the information in detail about these gratuities, but in brief I would say that the redundant employees are now much better off than they were before May of last year, in the matter of the terms of compensation.
I should like to say a few words about expenditure on the factory since the decision to close it was announced in the House. It is not a bad principle when one has an asset, particularly a real estate asset as this is, to maintain it in reasonable order during the period between the end of the old use and the beginning of the new, and we have really not spent excessive sums on items which are not required to maintain the premises in good order for the new lessees. Many items with which we would have proceeded, such as a large central heating plant, have been cancelled as a result of my right hon. Friend's decision to close the factory.
The closing of a factory is a sad business and it is a task which no one enjoys. It brings many problems for workpeople and management alike, and it means the break-up of an industrial team which has given valuable service for many years. My right hon. Friend and I are very conscious of the difficulties and problems which face workpeople in such circumstances, and we have tried to do all we

741
can to make the run-down and take-over of the factory as smooth as possible. I believe that our efforts have met with a large degree of success so far, and I assure my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Poole and the hon. Member for Falmouth and Camborne that we shall continue to do our best to ease the difficulties that remain.
Captain Pilkington: Before my hon. Friend sits down, and in thanking him for what he has said and for his sympathy, may I ask him a question? Although I realise it is not his responsibility, can he suggest to Nuclear Graphite Limited that they should take over as many men from the old factory as they can?
Mr. Taylor: I am glad that my hon. and gallant Friend has asked that question. We will make a request to Nuclear Graphite Limited to that effect, and we will do all we can to induce them to take on the maximum number of people.
Mr. Hayman: Just as the hon. Gentleman was finishing his speech he referred to lessees. Can he say whether the factory is being leased or sold?
Mr. Taylor: It is being leased, but we hope that at the end of the lease, or during it we might make a suitable arrangement to transfer it permanently to the new users.
Question put and agreed to.
Adjourned accordingly at twenty-six minutes past Ten o'clock.

NATIONAL FINANCE
  Sovereigns
  Sovereigns
  EURATOM
  EURATOM
UGANDA AND KENYA
  Women Teachers
  Women Teachers
  Rent Control
  Rent Control
COLONIAL TERRITORIES
  Emigration
  Emigration
TANGANYIKA
  African National Union
  African National Union
HONG KONG
  Employment Bill
  Employment Bill
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Fleck Committee (Meetings)
  Fleck Committee (Meetings)
  Potatoes (Prices)
  Potatoes (Prices)
  Cherry Fruit Fly
  Cherry Fruit Fly
FORESTRY COMMISSION
  Land, West Riding
  Land, West Riding
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Fire, Cardiff
  Fire, Cardiff
  Murders
  Murders
  Shops and Offices
  Shops and Offices
  National Association for Mental Health (Letters)
  National Association for Mental Health (Letters)
  Hairdressers (Registration)
  Hairdressers (Registration)
POLICE
  Pensions
  Pensions
  Annual Reports
  Annual Reports
  H.M.S. "Ceres" and Thorp Arch Ordnance Factory (Use)
  H.M.S. "Ceres" and Thorp Arch Ordnance Factory (Use)
CANADA
  Mr. William Robertson (Emigration)
  Mr. William Robertson (Emigration)
NEW ZEALAND
  Assisted Passage Scheme
  Assisted Passage Scheme
CEYLON
  Disturbances
  Disturbances
EDUCATION
  Education Act, 1944 (Section 27)
  Education Act, 1944 (Section 27)
  Empire Day
  Empire Day
  Lyme Regis Grammar School
  Lyme Regis Grammar School
  Students (Vacation Grants)
  Students (Vacation Grants)
  Mental Hospitals
  Mental Hospitals
  Basildon and Brentwood
  Basildon and Brentwood
  Secondary Schools Examination Council
  Secondary Schools Examination Council
  Maintained and Assisted Schools (Pupils)
  Maintained and Assisted Schools (Pupils)
PENSIONS AND INSURANCE
  London Strikes (National Assistance)
  London Strikes (National Assistance)
ROYAL NAVY
  H.M. Submarine "Turpin"
  H.M. Submarine "Turpin"
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
  Officers (Retired Pay)
  Officers (Retired Pay)
EMPLOYMENT
  Agricultural Workers (Call-up)
  Agricultural Workers (Call-up)
SCOTLAND
  Glasgow—Carlisle Road (Abington)
  Glasgow—Carlisle Road (Abington)

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord De Ramsey—Took the Oath.

FALMOUTH HARBOUR BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION BILL
Read 2a and referred to a Select Committee.
SHELL (STANLOW TO PARTINGTON PIPELINE) BILL
Read 2a and referred to a Select Committee.
PENYBONT MAIN SEWERAGE BILL
Read 2a and referred to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

TRUSTS AND PREMIUM BONDS
3.5 p.m.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are now prepared to accept purchases of premium bonds in the names of trustees.]
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, the Government are prepared to accept purchases of premium bonds from any individual over sixteen, but such bonds must be registered only in the name of the individual purchaser. Moreover, premium bonds are generally unsuitable for investments for most trusts since they produce no income, the prizes being
290
regarded as an accretion of capital. Noble Lords will also remember that there is a strict limit on individual holdings, that the bonds are not transferable and that they must be encashed on the death of the registered holder. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, went into the question in considerable detail in the debate on the Finance Bill on June 18, 1956, and he then explained that he thought it unlikely that trustees would purchase these bonds, as this could be done only in the case where there was a single trustee and no beneficiary was entitled to enjoy the income of the trust fund.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for his long list of difficulties, of some of which we were aware, I would ask whether he would convey to his right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer the view that this has proved to be the most successful method of borrowing new money from the people of this country. And would he look further into the question of allowing the purchase by trustees, particularly in view of the fact that he already allows purchases by parents on behalf of children?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord that my right honourable friend is aware of what he has said, but I will see that the noble Lord's suggestions are passed on.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, I am not quite sure from the reply of the noble Marquess whether there is any statutory objection to the adoption of the suggestion contained in the noble Lord's Question.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: No, my Lords, these bonds do rate as Government securities, and they are therefore an authorised trustee investment. But for the reasons which I explained to your Lordships, they are usually unsuitable as trustee investments.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, might I ask the noble Marquess whether it is not wholly undesirable that a widespread practice should arise in which trustees, necessarily having to secure a regular income for the beneficiaries under the

291
trust, should be led into a gamble on income for any part of the stock covered by the trust deed? I hope that nothing very revolutionary will be approved by the Government in that respect.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I think, my Lords, with all due respect, that the noble Viscount the Leader of the Opposition perhaps has not quite followed my explanation. These bonds do not in fact produce what is described as an income—I can see that the noble Viscount appreciates that. The prize is considered to be an accretion of capital, as I explained, and therefore any trust in which the beneficiary of that trust should get an income cannot buy these premium bonds.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am very much obliged. I hope that that principle will be steadily followed.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, is my noble friend saying that the trustees are not to be the judge of whether they are suitable investments?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: No; I think the trustees must surely be the judges of whether they are a suitable investment; but if the trust deed is so drawn that the beneficiary has to receive income from the investment of the trust, then these premium bonds are not suitable and should not be purchased.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, perhaps my noble friend would suggest that they should be allowed to buy them where the trust deed is suitable.

FERTILISERS (UNITED KINGDOM) SCHEME, 1958
3.13 p.m.
THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL ST. ALDWYN): My Lords, This Scheme extends for a further year from July 1 the arrangements for paying the fertiliser subsidy, and increases the rates of subsidy for nitrogenous fertilisers in accordance with the Price Review award of an additional £1½ million. The production grant is now a familiar feature of our support for agriculture, and I am sure that your Lordships are familiar with the
292
great benefits which result from the greater use of fertilisers In the last fertiliser year, 1956–57, the usage of nitrogen and potash showed a further increase, and since the supply position for nitrogen is still improving, it was decided at the Price Review to allocate this further sum to nitrogen. The total cost of the scheme is expected to be rather more than £25 million. I beg to move that the Scheme be approved.
Moved, That the Draft Fertilisers (United Kingdom) Scheme, 1958, be approved.—(Earl St. Aldwyn.)
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, we are obliged to the noble Earl for what he has said on this matter. There must be general agreement in your Lordships' House on the benefit of the use of fertilisers to cropping of all kinds—and we are treating grass as a crop to a greater extent than we used to do. There is a strong case for this rather small increase of £1½ million in the fertiliser subsidy for this year, because of the tens of millions which the Government have knocked off what we considered to be the just amount of guarantees for agricultural prices. This increase will enable a little of the increased efficiency, which is so often saddled upon the farmers as a condition, to be made up. When dealing with a subsidy of this kind, we are almost bound to pay some attention to the fact that few firms in this country are producing these fertilisers. I am under the impression that this is one of the industries which has been referred to the Monopolies Commission; if that is so, I should like to know whether any progress has been made in their consideration of this matter.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, the noble Viscount is quite correct; this industry has been referred to the Monopolies Commission. I am afraid, however, that I cannot give him any information about the progress that has been made.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

AGRICULTURE BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

LITTER BILL
3.17 p.m.
Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Earl Waldegrave.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD TERRINGTON in the Chair.]
Clause 1:
Penalty for leaving litter
(2) In England and Wales, without prejudice to the powers of any other person, any of the following bodies shall have power to institute proceedings for an offence under this section, committed within their area or on land controlled or managed by them, that is to say, the council of a county, county borough, metropolitan borough, non-county borough, urban district, rural district or rural parish, the Common Council of the City of London, a joint body constituted solely of two or more such councils as aforesaid, and a joint board such as is provided for by section eight of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949.
LORD BURDEN LORD BURDEN moved to add to subsection (2):
" and, where the offence was committed within the limits of any clock, harbour or pier undertaking, the undertakers."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment was put on the Order Paper after prolonged negotiations. At one time it was understood that the Member in charge of the Bill in another place was disposed to accept the Amendment, but since then farther information has been received which makes it unnecessary for me to proceed with the Amendment and develop the arguments, as I understand them, in its favour, particularly as every reasonable person must welcome the provisions of this Bill. I am authorised to say that the Association of Dock and Harbour Authorities give it a cordial welcome and will do all in their power to make it a success. As the Amendment was on the Order Paper. I felt that it was only fair that the noble Earl, Lord Waldegrave, in charge of the Bill, should have an opportunity of saying a word or two in regard to it, and after that, I shall ask leave of the House to withdraw my Amendment. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 28, at end insert the said words.—(Lord Burden.)
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Burden, for the way in which he has moved this Amendment and for the inference we may draw from what he said, that he does not propose to force it to a Division. I think that I can help both him and the dock and harbour boards, whose interests he has so much at heart in this matter, because I can say straight away that dock and harbour boards, like other statutory authorities of that nature, have power to prosecute under the Bill. I think that there may have been a slight confusion of thought in the minds of certain people—though not in the mind of the noble Lord I am sure—because certain authorities are cited at the end of the Bill, and it might appear that others are not covered. Parliamentary Counsel advise me, however, that such is not the case, and that the reason why such bodies as are named are mentioned in the Bill is that if they were not expressly mentioned they would not have the power to use public funds and might be surchargeable by the Public Auditor. I am advised that this is not the case with undertakings like dock and harbour boards, who already have the power to prosecute. It would be redundant if this were explicitly stated in the Bill, and it might even throw doubt upon what powers they have under other Statutes, which would be unfortunate, because no doubts exist. I am grateful to the noble Lord for the way in which he has moved this Amendment. I am afraid that I cannot accept it, and I hope he will agree to withdraw it.
LORD BURDEN: I am grateful to the noble Earl for that explanation, and I beg leave to withdraw—
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Before the noble Lord withdraws his Amendment, I should like to say a word or two. I am not sure that this does not leave a gap which ought to be closed. The noble Earl, Lord Waldegrave, said that the dock and harbour boards have the powers to do what is necessary under the Act. But what about the pier undertakings? Have they also power? And what is the nature of the statutory powers which the dock and harbour boards and the pier undertakings already have? What I want to be sure of is that there is no gap left

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open by the withdrawal of the Amendment which would allow a continuation of these things which we are all trying to stop.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I am advised that there is no gap. May I repeat what I said on Second Reading, on which of course I had advice? The reason why the bodies specifically named are named is that they have not at present any such general power to incur expense in instituting prosecutions. But these other statutory bodies have such powers under their by-laws, and they will be able to institute prosecutions and to use their funds for that purpose. That is the advice I have been given, and I think it is unnecessary to bring in any other powers for harbours, railways or anybody else.
LORD REA: Would the noble Earl not agree that subsection (2) says:
" In England and Wales, without prejudice to the powers of any other person, any of the following bodies shall have power …"
Is he satisfied that other bodies have the power, despite those words?
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I am advised that I should be satisfied, and I hope that your Lordships will be satisfied. If you mention one person, then you must mention others, if they are to be included. The group of people who are specifically mentioned are the local authorities; they are using the rates, and they would have no general power to do so unless it were given to them in this Bill. I understand that other statutory authorities, such as the dock boards, already have the power and that it is unnecessary to put them in the Bill. That is my advice, and I can go no further than that.
LORD CHESHAM: Perhaps it might be for the convenience of your Lordships if I say a few words now. I, too, am advised that my noble friend Lord Waldegrave is quite correct in saying that there are no gaps left here. Dock, harbour and pier undertaking authorities have sufficient powers to operate this Bill when, as we hope, it shortly becomes an Act, and therefore the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Burden, is unnecessary. I should like to say that I, too, am grateful to him for having seen the point and for his attitude to it.
LORD SILKIN: I had not intended to take part in this discussion, but since
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I have heard it a doubt has been left in my mind, not on the point that has been raised but on a different one. This is a Litter Bill, and we are all anxious, so far as we can, to get rid of litter. In the docks and harbours the greatest sinners are the dock and harbour authorities themselves. If they are the people who are to have the responsibility for taking proceedings, one can be certain that they will not take proceedings. What I should like to have clear is this. Does the local authority have the sole responsibility, or are there two authorities that can take proceedings? Is there a diarchy inside the docks? Can the local authority take proceedings in default of action by the dock authority? Have they both responsibility, or what? That is not clear from this clause.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I am advised that there is a diarchy—I do not know whether there is such a word as "triarchy "—and that the dock authority, with their own police and by-laws can certainly prosecute under those by-laws or, if they choose, under this Bill. The local authority, through their inspectors, can institute a prosecution; I am informed that it is open to any member of the public to institute a prosecution, if he is prepared to go through with it; and the police can also do so. That is my advice, and I hope that it may satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: I hope your Lordships will forgive me for speaking again. My only desire is to see that none of these human pests escapes the net. I wonder if the noble Earl could tell us on the Report stage—and this would clear up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—the Statutes under which these authorities will be acting and whether they overlap with the local authorities.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: I am afraid that, being no lawyer, I cannot do that "off the cuff," and I had hoped that it would be your Lordships' wish to proceed straight to the Report stage to-day, if there is no Amendment to the Bill, so that we can get forward with it. Unless the noble Viscount insists, I hope that we may proceed to the Report stage straight away.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Naturally, I accept what the noble Earl has said.
LORD BURDEN: It was because my information accorded with what the noble Earl, Lord Waldegrave, has said that I ventured to say earlier that I did not propose to press the Amendment. I am sure your Lordships will agree that we have had a useful discussion, and I think it will have cleared up any doubts that may have existed in anybody's mind. We are all agreed on the aims of the Bill, and we wish it a speedy passage. I therefore ask leave of your Lordships to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD HAWKE: I should have raised this point earlier, and as I have not given my noble friend who is sponsoring the Bill notice of it, I cannot expect an answer now; but perhaps he will be able to give one on Third Reading. In Sussex we have many woods, forests and ponds, and it is an old Sussex habit to fill up the ponds with bicycles and bedsteads—I once found even a very promising motorcycle in a pond. Sometimes these ponds are just the other side of the hedge, and sometimes in the depth of the forest. I take it that the people who throw bicycles into the pond over the hedge will come within the purview of this Bill but that, on the other hand, the people who walk through the hedge to put their bicycles in by hand will presumably not come within the Bill and would have to be prosecuted under some other law. If it were possible to bring within the Bill people who step off the highway in order to deposit bicycles and so on in their neighbour's pond, I think it would be a great help in preserving the beauty of the Sussex countryside.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: As my noble friend Lord Hawke said said, I have had no notice of this intricate question of ponds. If the Committee will permit, I should prefer to give my noble friend an answer on Third Reading. I think there is no difficulty. but without notice, I would rather do it in that way.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Remaining clause agreed to.
House resumed.
Bill reported without Amendment.

DRAINAGE RATES BILL
3.30 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, this is a short and essential Bill. It is of national importance, though its background will be more familiar to those of your Lordships whose homes and property lie in the Eastern part of England. It is of national importance because a considerable part of the total productive area of this island has been at some time reclaimed from swamp or flood danger and remains protected from that danger by such works. The total area covered by internal drainage districts amounts at the present time to 3,187,958 acres. The whole agricultural and industrial potential of the country is in this way increased, though most of the territory affected in fact lies in the Eastern Counties.
This is a Private Member's Bill which has already passed through another place without dissent. I should say that when the sponsor invited me to pilot it through your Lordships' House I frankly confessed my inexperience in these procedures, as well as my lack of any instruction in the law. This did not seem to deter my honourable friend, however, from which I conclude that her confidence is based on the virtues of the Bill, rather than in my ability. Apart from this fact, I am particularly pleased to play my part in commending the Bill to your Lordships, since the importance of reclaiming and protecting land has long been recognised in this country, and as a Lincolnshire landowner myself I am closely aware of it.
If your Lordships will excuse a brief historic reference or two, I am eager to pass on my discovery that the first officially approved work of this nature was ordered in 1258 by King Henry III, when he issued a Commission of Sewers by letters patent to Henry de Bathe to cover part of Holland, in Lincolnshire. So, by coming exactly 700 years later, this small Bill marks in some form the seventh centenary. The granting of such commissions was systematised during the Middle Ages by successive Monarchs and the Commissioners of Sewers (as drainage works were then called) became important and respected officers of the Crown. In

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the closing years of the 15th Century a predecessor of my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack gave his name to perhaps the most famous of all these works. He was John Morton, Chancellor of King Henry VII in 1486, who built Morton's Dyke, running from Peterborough to Wisbech, twelve miles long, 40 feet wide and 4 feet deep. It became the pattern for such works during many centuries. Since your Lordships have so far shown what I take to be indulgence, perhaps I may dare to mention that a member of my own family made a somewhat smaller though lasting contribution of this kind at the beginning of the 18th century, in the shape of Sir Rowland's Drain, which runs from Appleby to the River Humber.
My Lords, the administering of these works was brought closer to the present system, which gives rise to this Bill, with the passing of the Land Drainage Act of 1861. That Act established in place of the old Commissioners, who were appointed by the Crown, drainage boards, elected by the ratepayers of the area over which they had jurisdiction. Subsequent legislation has kept this system broadly up to date, though, as I shall seek to show your Lordships, not completely up to date in at least one important respect. It is this anomaly which the present Bill seeks to rectify. To-day an internal drainage district covers, in the words of the Land Drainage Act of 1930, an area
" which will derive benefit or avoid danger as a result of drainage operations."
This district, as explained, will normally be under the jurisdiction of an elected drainage board.
It will be clear to your Lordships that such works have to be constantly financed in regard to extensions, improvement and maintenance. The boards are authorised to levy rates for this purpose on all hereditaments in their district. Such rates, under Section 29 of the 1930 Act, are assessed on the annual value as determined for the purpose of Schedule A of the Income Tax Act. These annual values are used because, as your Lordships are aware, agricultural land is not liable for the general rates; but since drainage is principally of benefit to farmers it is clearly right that they should contribute to the cost.
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This basis of assessment caused no sort of dispute or difficulty until lately, because it was taken to mean the annual value "as signed and allowed"; that is to say, as estimated for income tax purposes. But almost exactly two years ago a judgment was given in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, which defined this basis of assessment in such a way as to disable drainage boards from collecting their rates in certain circumstances, and affecting in fact the great majority of hereditaments in all drainage areas at any given time. As it was this case which brought forward the need for the present Bill, I shall ask your Lordships' permission while I briefly outline the arguments presented.
The British Petroleum Company have a large refinery, whose property lies partly in the district of the Kent River Board and partly in that of the Lower Medway Internal Drainage Board. In May of 1955 the company appealed against their Schedule A assessment, which had been raised to £1,140,000 from the £149,000 of the year before. The appeal has not yet been heard, and I understand that it may not be heard for some years to come. In the meantime, it has been ruled by the judgment in the High Court that, so long as this appeal is outstanding, no assessment of Schedule A tax can be quoted, since the sum is still the subject of an appeal. Consequently, the Boards concerned have no basis on which to assess and levy the rates, and are unable to do so, despite the fact that the refinery is protected by sea walls, reconstructed by one of the Boards at great cost after the floods of 1953, and maintained by them, and despite the fact that the refinery is obviously of great value, even if the assessment of £1,140,000 should be in the end reduced on appeal. What in fact the Court did by its decision two years ago was to disallow entirely the drainage rates which had been levied on the refinery for the year 1955–56 and for all subsequent years until the appeal was decided. The burden which this places on the two Boards and on other ratepayers in their districts is plain. The effect would have been even more serious last year were it not that the British Petroleum Company made voluntary contributions to the rate funds of the two Boards. But for the year 1957–58 and for the current year 1958–59 the Company

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have refused to make any contribution whatever in aid of the drainage rates of either district.
The effect beyond Kent and throughout the country is more far-reaching than may be seen at first sight. Each year a taxpayer has a right to appeal against his Schedule A assessment, even if it has remained unchanged from the previous year. If he appeals, there is no time set within which the appeal must be heard. When such an assessment is finally determined after appeal it provides the basis, under the 1930 Act, for drainage rating for the current year. But there is no power to make any adjustment retrospectively beyond that. At the start of the next fiscal year after the decision, the assessment again becomes subject to the right of appeal. The decision of the Court has thus brought to light a defect in the rating provisions of the Land Drainage Act, 1930, which leaves a drainage board with no legal basis for levying drainage rates on the great majority of hereditaments in its district. I do not wish to take your Lordships over the complicated legal paths which led to this decision, even if I could follow them myself. But I should like to quote Mr. Justice Donovan who, in giving judgment, said:
" Clearly some amending legislation is now required to deal with the new situation."
The present Bill is designed to satisfy that need.
Clause 1 defines the annual value in the same way as the Court defined it—that is, the value according to Schedule A assessment, after a decision on appeal or after the time for appeal has expired. But it goes on to say that, if at the time the rate is levied, the annual value has not been determined in this sense, then the rate is to be based either on the annual value as estimated by the Commissioners of Income Tax, or on the annual value as last determined, whichever is the less. There is a further provision that if the annual value as finally determined, after payment, differs from that on which the drainage rate was based, that difference shall be made up, either through an additional payment by the ratepayer, or through a refund by the drainage board, whichever is called for.
The provision that the drainage board should take, as the annual value, the last
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determined value where it is less than the estimated value, has been put into the Bill for the ratepayers' benefit, to meet the sort of case where the property concerned has been developed, for instance by the building of a house, with a consequent increase of the Schedule A assessment. It seems fair that the ratepayer should pay only on the old assessment until the new one has become final. Arising out of this point there is one query that may tax your Lordships' minds, as it taxed mine. If it is argued that a ratepayer should not be asked to pay a sum which may in the end prove excessive, even though a refund by the board is provided for, I think your Lordships will find the answer incorporated in the terms of the Bill. It will be seen that where there are two differing values, the estimated value and the value last determined, the board are bound to take the lesser of the two. Only in very rare cases would there be any question of a refund by the board; in almost all cases the board would eventually collect the difference.
My Lords, I have tried to explain the general scope of this Bill, and I do not think you would wish me to elaborate on the other subsections, which are mainly machinery but on which, naturally, I will try to answer questions if any arise. I hope that I may be forgiven for having elaborated on its more remote background. I think the House will agree that drainage boards should have a firm basis of assessment, and that in seeking to give them this the Bill also takes into account the ratepayers' interests. In the meantime, I must pray that the qualities and purpose of the Bill will have made up, in your Lordships' judgment, for any clumsiness in its presentation. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord St. Oswald.)
3.43 p.m.
LORD DE RAMSEY: My Lords, I feel that in my capacity as President of the Association of Drainage Authorities, I ought to commend the Bill to your Lordships. The noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, has stated the object of the Bill and the means whereby it is proposed to secure this object. I believe that I understand the provisions thoroughly, but, as with all rating measures, these are technical and I do not want to get involved in the

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technicalities. I should, however, be lacking in my duty if I did not stress how vitally important this Bill is to drainage authorities. As the mover has explained, they are at present deprived of any certain basis of assessment. I think the House will agree that it is essential that this be restored to them. The noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, has said how vital land drainage is to agriculture. I think that this fact is well known to the House, and I do not propose to waste any time elaborating that aspect. I will only say that, as one who lives on the edge of the Fens and farms in the Fens, I am all too conscious of it.
3.44 p.m.
LORD WISE: My Lords, from these Benches I personally should like to commend the Bill to your Lordships, and I would congratulate the noble Lord who moved the Bill on the most interesting way in which he spoke of drainage activities in the past and the explanation he was able to give in regard to Schedule A and rating assessments. There are many virtues in the Bill. It will overcome difficulties which have arisen in the last two or three years and with which I am conversant, and it will help the drainage authorities and the various boards to carry out their work more effectively and to adjust their finances accordingly. I hope, therefore, that the Bill will pass through your Lordships' House quickly and will become the law of the land.
3.45 p.m.
EARL ST. ALDWYN: My Lords, my noble friend Lord St. Oswald, has explained very clearly why this Bill is necessary and what it seeks to achieve. I rise merely to explain the Government's attitude to the Bill. It is that we welcome it because it will remove an impediment to the proper functioning of river boards. Put shortly, owing to the High Court decision to which the noble Lord has referred some doubt has been cast on the powers of drainage boards to levy rates. I am sure that all your Lordships will admit that if these boards are to function effectively they must be able to levy their rates.
It is for this reason that the Government welcome this Bill and give it their wholehearted support. It only remains
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for me to commend the Bill to your Lordships.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

DIVORCE (INSANITY AND DESERTION) BILL
3.47 p.m.
Amendments reported (according to Order).
LORD SILKIN LORD SILKIN moved, after Clause 1, to insert the following new clause:
Power of court to find cruelty notwithstanding insanity
"2. For the purposes of any petition or action for divorce or judicial separation the court may hold that the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty or, as the case may be that the defender has been guilty of cruelty towards the pursuer, notwithstanding that a disease of the mind prevented his acts from amounting to cruelty, if the evidence before the court is such that the court would have so held apart from the disease."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, who has his name down to the Amendment after Clause 1, has asked me to apologise to the House and to say that he regrets that he is unable to be here to move the Amendment himself; and he has asked me to do so in his place. This is an Amendment which is similar in purpose, though not in language, to an Amendment which was moved on the Committee stage of the Bill. The object of the Amendment was, and is, that where a person files a petition for a divorce or for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty, it is not to be a defence that the person committing the cruelty was suffering from a disease of the mind at the time.
I, with other noble Lords, argued this on the Committee stage, and I myself put the position that there were two sides to this matter: there was the hardship to the petitioner in not only suffering cruelty but in having to be saddled with a spouse who was of unsound mind; and there was the legal doctrine that a person of unsound mind is incapable of committing an act of cruelty which presupposes a deliberate act or series of acts. But, on balance, I thought, and so did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, that the hardship to the spouse

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who had suffered the cruelty was greater than the hardship to the person of unsound mind who had inflicted the cruelty. We were supported in our contention by the unanimous report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce. As most noble Lords will remember, that Report was by no means unanimous in many of its recommendations, but on this one it was; and the members of the Commission had obviously given a great deal of time to it.
We were supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morton of Henryton, who was Chairman of the Royal Commission, and I had thought that a good case had been made out. I hope I may say that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack was impressed by the case; at any rate he gave an undertaking that he would consider it carefully before the next stage, and we have put down this Amendment in rather better language than the other, in the hope that he may be able to give us a favourable decision. I have stated very briefly the purpose of the Amendment and I do not think I need pursue the matter. I beg to move.
Amend rent moved—
After Clause 1, insert the said new clause.—(Lord Silkin.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, Lord Silkin has stated with complete correctness the position on this Amendment. I promised that I would consider it and that I would have certain consultations in regard to it; and as the noble Lord has indicated, the difficulty which arose when the Amendment was discussed and which was recognised by the Commission over which my noble and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton presided, is the conflict of hardship that arises. On the one hand, if the Amendment were accepted, it would mean that a husband was branded with cruelty when at the time he committed the alleged acts of cruelty he did not know what he was doing or did not know that what he was doing was wrong. On the other hand, there is the hardship that the wife will be unable to get a divorce on the ground of cruelty—which otherwise, of course, she can get without delay—but will have to wait for a period of years until it is determined that the insanity of the husband is of a permanent kind.
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That is a very difficult conflict of hardships, and your Lordships may remember that my noble and learned friend Lord Merriman, President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, informed your Lordships that he had consulted his colleagues and had found a serious difference of opinion. Consultation was necessary, not only on his part but also on my part, because this is a Bill that so far has dealt only with desertion. The question of cruelty was not raised in another place, nor does this Bill raise it; and no Amendment similar to this was moved or discussed there.
I have made the consultations and I find that this is a matter of acute controversy and that among those I have consulted very strong views either way are held. I put the two points, and many people felt that to take the course advocated by this Amendment would not only be an injustice to the person who is of unsound mind but would have other effects on which I need not enlarge. Equally, others felt strongly, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has said, on the other side. In these circumstances I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, not to press this Amendment, and I am sure my noble and learned friend Lord Denning will assent to that course if he thinks it good.
In its present form the Bill does most useful work in relation to desertion outside the field of controversy, and it would be most unfortunate if we were to jeopardise that advantage by going into the controversial field. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, understands that this is not one of those cases to which he has objected in past years, where I am putting the argument simply on the absence of time. I am putting it on the controversy which my consultations have assured me will arise.
There are two matters on which I should advise the Committee, in consolation to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and my noble and learned friend Lord Denning. The first is that, as I have told the House before, I am periodically taking stock of all the recommendations of the Royal Commission presided over by my noble and learned friend Lord Morton of Henryton and have already put a number of them into operation by administrative action with the assistance of my noble and learned friend Lord Merriman. Through the co-operation of honourable Members

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in another place and especially of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, here, we have also advanced in the field which requires legislation. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, that that will go on. All outstanding matters will be considered, among them the point brought up by this Amendment.
The other consolation I offer the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—and I apologise for inflicting it upon the House as a whole, because it is rather more a lawyer's point—is one on which I hope my noble and learned friend Lord Merriman would agree with me. It lies in the two cases which clarify and focus the doctrine with which this Amendment deals—both Court of Appeal cases. The first is the case of Swan in 1953. In that case the Court of Appeal, faced with this problem and having stated the law in the way in which it is now sought to change it, then said that there could not be condonation to a person of unsound mind because one could not exercise forgiveness to such a person. That revived the anterior cruelty and upon that they founded the decree; so that the petitioner, although losing this point, gained another point through the existence of the doctrine.
In the second case, that of Palmer, the Court of Appeal applied in its severity the doctrine of the M'Naghten Rules, and in so applying that doctrine found that although there was unsound mind there was clear evidence that the husband knew that what he was doing was wrong and contrary to law. The Court applied the doctrine strictly to the letter, as we are familiar with it, and in that case also the wife got a decree. I thought that that might be some reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, as showing that although the doctrine exists it had this compensatory factor in those cases.
I am sorry that I have to ask your Lordships to avoid a decision on this point. I put it on the firm foundation that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has produced a most valuable improvement in the law and I should not like that to be jeopardised by controversy which I have found to exist in the circles I examined and which my noble and learned friend Lord Merriman found to exist among his colleagues. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press his Amendment to-day.
4.0 p.m.
LORD DOUGLAS OF BARLOCH: My Lords, I certainly should not like anything to be done by this House which would imperil the passage of this Bill, but I must confess that I am a little surprised to hear that this matter is of such acute controversy when the only point of objection which the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has mentioned is that it would be an injustice to the spouse of unsound mind to be branded with the offence of cruelty. Surely the basis upon which cruelty is made a ground for obtaining a divorce is the injustice which is done to the party that is injured, and that injustice remains, whether the party inflicting the injury is of sound mind or not; and, indeed, so far as the injured party is concerned, the injustice may be said to be all the greater because he or she suffers not merely the cruelty but also the pain and suffering which arise out of the mere fact of having a spouse who is of unsound mind. I should have thought, therefore, that the case for this reform was really overwhelming, and I hope that the research upon which the noble and learned Viscount is engaged will result in the introduction of some amending legislation at an early date.
LORD SILKIN: The noble and learned Viscount will not be surprised to hear that I am profoundly disappointed with his reply, as I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, on whose behalf I am speaking, will be. But I am bound to accept what the noble and learned Viscount says. I do not propose to force this matter to a Division. The reply is disappointing because it means that those who take what I regard as the less enlightened line, as against the enlightened line taken by the unanimous membership of the Royal Commission, are able to exercise a veto on something which, I should say, most people would regard as desirable. However, I am impressed with the thought that if this Amendment were pressed to a Division and if it were successful it might mean endangering the whole Bill, and in those circumstances and in the hope and belief that this matter can be brought forward on a later occasion when the noble and learned Viscount has

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carried out his further activities on the law of divorce, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES (PROPERTY AND MAINTENANCE) BILL
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.

OPENCAST COAL BILL
4.6 p.m.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE MINISTER OF POWER (LORD MILLS): My Lords, I beg to move the Second Reading of the Opencast Coal Bill. Opencast coal operations are now carried on under the Defence Regulations. The Government believe that these wartime Regulations have gone on long enough. We have already revoked about three-quarters of them, and this Session we intend to pass legislation which provides for the repeal of the Defence Regulations relating to land, and their replacement, so far as is necessary, by peace-time statutory provisions. Your Lordships have already discussed the Water Bill and the Land Powers (Defence) Bill which form part of this operation; but the main purpose for which these Defence Regulations are now used is opencast coal production, and the present Bill is the last and largest step towards getting rid of them.
I am not going to-day to explain every detail of this long and complicated Bill. I want instead to try to do three things: first, to explain why, when there is at the present time a substantial surplus of some coal, we need to continue with opencast coal production; secondly, to explain why we need new powers for this purpose, and thirdly, to describe the main features of the new arrangements which will come into operation with this Bill.
Opencast coal working on a substantial scale began in this country in 1942 to help to relieve the acute shortage of coal which had then developed. Since that time the opencast sites have produced 160 million tons of coal. This coal was won at a time when we were having the
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greatest difficulty in balancing coal supplies and demand; indeed, we were able to do this only by curtailing exports and in some years by making substantial imports of coal. The opencast coal has made an essential contribution to our coal supplies and, an important point, it has been obtained from slightly less than 110,000 acres of land; most of this land was agricultural but it represented only about one quarter of one per cent. of the total acreage of agricultural land in the country.
Opencast coal output is now running at about 14 million tons a year. If, from now on, we brought no new sites into production, output would fall in two or three years to about 4 million tons a year. About a quarter of the 10 million tons of coal which we should lose would be large coal, of which, even to-day, there is no surplus. A loss of output on this scale in the next two or three years would inevitably mean a resumption of imports, particularly of large coal, and would compel me to reconsider the decision to remove restrictions on house coal supplies. To avoid this we must maintain a substantial level of opencast output for some time and we shall probably need some opencast output for the next ten years. The National Coal Board are, however, now reviewing their general coal production plans; this review includes opencast coal output. The Board will inform me of their conclusions, and I can assure your Lordships' House that I will give very close attention to their plans for opencast coal output. My aim will be to ensure the maintenance of adequate coal supplies while doing the minimum of damage to agriculture and amenity.
In the meantime the Government will continue to examine the Board's proposals for working individual sites on their merit. We will try to weigh the gain to the national economy from working the coal in these sites against the agricultural and amenity disadvantages, and we will continue to exempt from working sites which are on exceptionally good agricultural land or which are part of a landscape or close to a building which forms a part of our national heritage. Indeed, I hope that our improved coal situation will enable us to be a little more selective, and I am glad to say that in recent months we have been able to defer indefinitely the working of several sites

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which, in a more difficult coal situation, would not have qualified for exemption.
My Lords, I have given you in those few words our case for continuing with opencast coal production. The next question is: why do we need new legislation? Why cannot the National Coal Board manage to obtain sites by agreement or by using existing legislative provisions? The Board have authorised me to say that when this new Bill comes into operation they intend, whenever possible, to obtain the land or rights in land which they need for opencast working by agreement. They will be willing, if the landlord so wishes, to buy the land outright and when they do this they will dispose of the land when they have no further use for it. We cannot, however, just leave it at that. There will be cases when an owner or occupier flatly refuses to do a deal and so prevents the working of a large quantity of coal. In other cases the owners and occupiers may be willing to do a deal, but coal working may be prevented by restrictive covenants on the use of the land. Without new powers the only way in which the Coal Board could possibly overcome these difficulties would be for them to satisfy the High Court under the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, that the other parties were acting unreasonably. Such legal actions would be too uncertain in their outcome, and too slow, for us to rely on them in this important matter. We should run the risk of a serious loss of opencast production which might be greater than the country could afford.
A second serious objection to relying on existing legislative provisions is that there would be great difficulty about town and country planning control. Under the Town and Country Planning Act, responsibility for authorising the working of new opencast coal sites would rest with the local planning authorities. Our general policy is to delegate as many decisions as possible to local authorities and to reserve as few as possible for Whitehall, but there are two special difficulties in this case. In the first place, the level at which it is necessary to maintain opencast coal production must be decided nationally, in the light of the coal situation as a whole. This level of production can be achieved, however, only if the right decisions are taken about the working of new sites. I think it
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follows that these decisions must also be taken for the country as a whole by the Government, who have full information about the general coal situation as well as the opencast coal position in all parts of the country.
In the second place—and this is a matter to which the Government attach the greatest importance—we have, during the past years, developed a high standard of agricultural restoration after opencast coal working. We all want to see that standard maintained; and that means imposing on the Board detailed conditions about working and restoration. It is doubtful whether the local planning authorities have the power under the Town and Country Planning Act to impose these conditions, and, through no fault of their own, they certainly have not the necessary technical knowledge which is at present concentrated in the agricultural Departments. To ensure a high standard of agricultural restoration we must make special arrangements for the close Ministerial control of opencast coal production. For these reasons, the Government have come to the conclusion that if opencast coal production is to go on at all, new legislation is necessary to replace the Defence Regulations.
I should now like to outline the main provisions of this legislation. I shall concentrate on the first few clauses of the Bill, which provide for ministerial control over opencast coal working in place of the normal town and country planning control and which give the Board reserve compulsory powers to obtain certain rights in land. Ministerial control of opencast coal working is secured by Clauses 1 and 2 which prevent the Coal Board from working coal by opencast methods except under an authorisation granted by the Minister of Power. When applying for this authorisation the Board will have to go through the procedures set out in the First Schedule. They will have to publish in the local Press and in the London Gazette and the Edinburgh Gazette a notice of their intention to seek the authorisation, and to serve notice on all the main local authorities concerned, and on the owners, lessees and occupiers of the land. There will be an opportunity for objections, and if these come from an owner, lessee or occupier, or from a local authority, the Minister will be obliged to have them heard at a

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public local inquiry. The Board have told me that, in addition to these formal requirements, they will, before they apply for the Minister's authorisation of opencast coal working, discuss their plans informally with the owners and occupiers of the land, the local authorities and other public bodies likely to be interested. The Board's aim in these informal discussions will be to work out a detailed proposal which is acceptable to all the parties concerned.
These procedural proposals go far beyond our present arrangements and are, I think, in accordance with the spirit of the Franks Report. We propose, however, to supplement the statutory provisions by certain administrative arrangements designed to implement the main recommendations of the Franks Committee. From the start of the new procedures I am going to require the Coal Board to make a full statement of their case available to objectors in good time before a public local inquiry. I will give full, reasoned decisions in all opencast coal cases, and I will make copies of the inspector's report available to the parties to an inquiry. Moreover, public local inquiries under the Bill will not be conducted by officials of the Ministry of Power. In England and Wales, the inspectors of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government will do the job, and in Scotland, in accordance with the normal Scottish practice, I shall appoint suitably qualified independent inspectors.
Under Clause 2 the Minister can attach to his authorisation of opencast coal working a direction giving what we call a "deemed planning permission"; this means that planning permission is given for the working of the site. Such directions can include all the normal planning conditions and, under Clause 2 (2), they must include conditions to secure the restoration of the site. In the case of agricultural land, these conditions must normally provide for the restoration of the land so that it is reasonably fit for agricultural use. I should like to take this opportunity to state quite categorically that it is the Government's intention at least to maintain present standards of restoration, and, in particular, to require the Board, in the national interest, to restore all agricultural land to the general standard laid down in a code of restoration which was adopted in 1951 and which is now being improved as a result
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of discussions which my Department and the National Coal Board have recently had with the agricultural organisations.
This code provides for five years' special treatment of restored agricultural land. This treatment is now carried out by the Agricultural Departments and, as has already been announced in another place, they will continue to do this job as the Board's agents for this purpose under the new arrangements. The Forestry Commission will act similarly in the case of woodland. This means that the knowledge and experience which these Departments have accumulated will still be available to secure the best possible restoration of the land taken for opencast coal working.
Before I pass from this subject, I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to Clause 3. This clause is modelled on Section 37 of the Electricity Act, 1957, which was added to that Act when it was before your Lordships' House. It requires both the Board and the Minister to pay full regard to the preservation of natural and man-made beauty when carrying out their functions and duties under this Bill. The inclusion of the clause means that in their statement of the case for an authorisation, the Board will have to argue on all the points it mentions; that the inspector who holds a public local inquiry will have to deal with these points at the inquiry and in his report, and that the Minister will have to address himself to them in his published decision on the Board's application for an authorisation.
I turn now to the Board's reserve compulsory powers to obtain the rights in land they need for opencast coal working. These are contained in Clauses 4 and 5, which empower the Board by means of what is called a "compulsory rights order" to acquire the right to occupy land for a limited period, which must be stated in the order and which must not exceed ten years. In addition, Clauses 4 and 6 empower the Board to acquire the rights needed to hold, for up to ten years from the commencement of the Act, land which is at present held under requisition for opencast coal disposal points and stocking grounds. This provision was added to the Bill in another place. The Board have valuable equipment on this land and this equipment could be dismantled and re-erected elsewhere only at the cost of considerable

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inconvenience and expense. The power to hold this land under Defence Regulations expires at the end of 1960, and the Board would clearly be in a very weak bargaining position if they had to negotiate its purchase or lease before then without any reserve compulsory powers in the background. We are not, however, giving the Board compulsory powers to obtain land for new disposal points and stocking grounds. For these, the Board have some choice of sites, and their position is no more difficult than that of many other industrial concerns who have a limited choice of sites for their works but who do not enjoy powers to obtain land compulsorily.
A power to obtain rights in land for a limited period is, I think, without any major precedent in peace-time legislation. We decided to make this novel provision because we thought that it would be wrong in principle to give the Board a power to purchase land compulsorily when they need to occupy it for only a few years. I am quite sure that this general decision was right, but it is largely because of it that the Bill is so long and complicated. We have had to work out a new and detailed code of compensation to the owners and occupiers of the land which is taken, and we have also had to include complicated technical provisions adapting the whole of the law dealing with relations between landlords, tenants and others with an interest in the land. I do not want to wander far over this very technical ground, but I should like to make four points about compulsory rights orders.
The first point is that under Clause 4 (1) no compulsory rights order for a production site may be made after ten years from the date of operation of the Act. As I have already said, we think that some opencast production will be necessary for the next ten years. Thereafter, our energy supplies will be more flexible and we hope that it will be possible for any continuing opencast output to be obtained by the Board without these special compulsory powers. We think it is right that the farmers and others affected should have this assurance that the use of compulsory powers to opencast coal working is not going on indefinitely.
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The second point is that we think it wrong to take people's homes and gardens for opencast coal working against their wishes. We have therefore provided, in Clause 9 (1), that no compulsory rights order may be made against an occupied dwelling-house, its garden and certain other land held with it.
Thirdly, every compulsory rights order will be subject to confirmation by the Minister of Power under a procedure which will give all persons with a legal interest in the land or a right restrictive of the use of the land a right to object and to have their objections heard. This procedure also provides extra protection, including "special Parliamentary procedure" for certain types of land such as common land, land owned by local authorities and land held inalienably by the National Trust.
Finally, I come to the compensation provisions. Our general aim here has been to replace the present rather arbitrary code of compensation by a new system which is designed to work out fairly in the individual cases. The tenants and owner-occupiers of land which is comprised in a compulsory rights order will receive rental compensation equal to the annual value of the land which is taken, plus an annual sum designed to compensate them for any further loss which they suffer as a result of the order. This latter sum may, quite fairly I think, be reduced by any sums which the occupiers could have earned if they had taken all opportunites which are reasonably open to them of mitigating their loss and which would not have been open to them if there had been no compulsory rights order. For example, a farmer who loses his entire farm can reasonably be expected to seek another farm or take another job, if there is a suitable one available, while the Board are in occupation of his land, and his compensation will be assessed on the assumption that he does this. Landowners will continue to receive rent from their tenants; they will get compensation from the Board for the injurious affection of any other land which they own, and they will get their lands restored to a high standard. In addition, the Board, after the end of their occupation, will have to pay the costs reasonably incurred in carrying out the work needed to complete the restoration of the land to its former condition, and landowners will also receive terminal

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compensation equal to the diminution in the value of their land caused by the Board's operations, but taking account of the Board's liability to pay for further works of restoration. This new system of compensation is certainly fairer than the existing system and, on the whole, I think that it will also prove more generous.
There will be a later opportunity to examine in detail the other provisions of the Bill, but there are two or three to which I think I should draw your Lordships' attention. Clause 15 empowers the Minister to make orders temporarily suspending footpaths which cross opencast coal sites. There are various safeguards, including provisions about the provision of suitable alternative rights of way, the restoration of the footpath after working, and the revocation of the order as soon as it is no longer required. Clause 39 gives the Coal Board a power to enter land compulsorily to prospect for coal workable by opencast means and for certain other purposes. Normally, the Board will seek to prospect by agreement with the owners and occupiers of the land, but as large tonnages of coal could be sterilised if an owner or occupier refused to agree to prospecting, the Board must have a reserve compulsory power. Clause 48 and the Tenth Schedule contain the detailed provisions needed to ensure a smooth transition from the existing requisitioning arrangements to the new system.
My Lords, this is a complicated Bill and I am sure that your Lordships will have many important points to raise on it. I hope, however, that it will, in principle, commend itself to all sides of the House. A high level of opencast coal production will probably be necessary for some time, and it is very desirable that the war-time requisitioning powers should be replaced by new peace-time legislation which contains more adequate safeguards for the people and authorities who are affected by opencast coal working. This is what this Bill seeks to do, and it is on that basis that I commend it to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Mills.)
4.40 p.m.
LORD MACDONALD OF GWAENYSGOR: My Lords, in listening to the noble Lord, Lord Mills, and
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in reading the debates in the other place, my mind went back sixteen years to this very month, when I was persuaded by my noble friend Lord Attlee and the late Ernest Bevin, along with the noble Viscount, Lord Tenby, to leave the House of Commons and to accept an administrative post in the then new Ministry of Fuel and Power. The post I was given was Controller of the North West Region. I had in mind mainly deep coal mining, but it was not long before I found out that there was another aspect of the problem, which was opencast mining, and I am not too sure that opencast mining did not cause me more headaches than deep coal mining. I can well remember that when some sites were suggested for prospecting, the landowner, the farmer, at once got in touch with me, sometimes privately, to ask whether something could not be done to prevent it. When agreement there was reached, I then found that those fine voluntary bodies concerned with the preservation of natural beauty wanted to know what I was going to do here, there and everywhere.
The reason for opencast mining in those days was that the output of the ordinary mines was inadequate and did not meet the domestic and industrial needs for coal. Therefore it was necessary to find some other coal somewhere, and it was decided to go to opencast. Opencast mining during the war provided many millions of tons of coal which were sorely needed in this country. I found myself fairly often faced with the initial problem of agreeing that certain sites—some very near my home—should be allowed to be dealt with on opencast mining lines. The difficulty I had in many cases was to satisfy the landowner, the farmer, that this was in the national interest, but I was helped in particular by one consideration, namely, that there was a war on, and it was not as difficult as it might have been to get agreement, especially if we had had a few air raids the week before. All interested parties then realised the importance of getting along with the war effort and the part opencast coal would play in that.
But things have changed. To-day the ordinary collieries of this country can produce all the coal required for the domestic and industrial needs of this country. There is no need to-day to

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supplement the output of the ordinary collieries; they can produce sufficient; they can meet the need. But, despite that fact, it is said that we shall continue opencast mining. It is not this Bill that continues opencast mining. Opencast mining is going on and will continue to go on. But those of us who were in the coal industry and closely associated with all its activities are a little concerned. The ordinary miner is unable to understand why certain collieries are closed for economic reasons and yet here we have this kind of coal production; and there is an element of dissatisfaction right through the coal industry because of the continuation of opencast mining. The miners thought that if any legislation was required it would be to end opencast mining.
Personally, I am inclined to think that the case put forward by the Minister goes a long way to answer the question of why opencast mining should be continued. After all, over a million tons of coal every month is sure to mean something; it is bound to play some part, if not an important part, in the economy of the country. It may help—I think it will help—to eliminate the need to import coal, and I am not so sure that it could not be a means of helping to export coal, which we all know to be of great advantage to the national economy. Therefore, on the question whether the case has been made out, personally I am not too happy, but I feel that the case made in the other place and made to-day by the Minister goes a long way to satisfy me on the issue.
I should like to ask this question. The period of ten years has been mentioned many times this afternoon. I should have thought that a shorter period would have been better; that the rate of opening up new sites could slow down and that opencast mining should be given five, six or seven years in which gradually to cease. It is a big thing to dismantle the tremendous organisation involved in producing opencast coal on hundreds of sites throughout the country. I should have preferred some gradual close down of opencast mining, and a concentration on deep coal mining. But if I accept the need for continuation of opencast mining, then I accept this Bill, and I think the Bill is a step forward. The
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problems I had to deal with are dealt with in this Bill. I am quite certain that what is in the Bill to-day would have helped me immensely during those four years of operation in the north-west.
But the problems are not easy. Think of the problem of compensation referred to by the noble Lord in his closing passages. I always felt during the war, and have felt since the war, that the previous compensation arrangement was rather ungenerous. I think that the new proposals will be more generous. I think so; I am not too sure, because I find that the National Farmers' Union (and I have no doubt other Members of your Lordships' House have seen the circular statement which they sent out) call attention to a point covered by the Minister—I would not say covered adequately, but covered by the Minister fairly well this afternoon. They refer to a provision in paragraph 8 of the Sixth Schedule, which imposes on the occupier upon whose land a compulsory rights order operates an obligation to take all reasonable steps to mitigate his loss of profit.
The Minister referred to the possibility that a whole farm had been taken. You then set about assessing compensation for that whole farm and you say to yourself, "Taking the whole farm has liberated the farmer and made him find another job. Therefore, we assess the compensation bearing in mind the other job he has found." It may be that he has taken another farm. I can see the power of the Ministry's argument that since you have liberated him to take another job—and maybe, judging, from farmers' complaints, the other job is better than a farm—therefore one should say, "He has earned more than if we had not taken his farm; therefore compensation should be paid accordingly." But I have a feeling in my mind that there is something here that is slightly ungenerous. After all, that farm is his livelihood. He has lived there—and probably his parents and his grandparents before him—and he has suffered some loss. It may be difficult to translate the loss into pounds, shillings and pence, but I do not think the Bill need have been so ungenerous as it is in that particular respect. Generally, in regard to compensation I think that the provisions of the Bill are adequate.

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Restoration was never easy, and it is not easy now. The difficulty lies in determining the degree of fertility of the land before it is taken over for opencast working, and to contrast that with the fertility of the same piece of land some time after restoration. I found a tendency to claim that it was the most fertile land in Great Britain before we took it over, and the poorest land for fertility after we had restored it. It is not too easy to determine whether there has been a change. I had letters of thanks from farmers for the improvement of the land as the result of restoration following opencast mining. On this particular issue, I hope that regard will be had to the fertility of the land before and after the Operation.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Silkin that it is a question of how long the site is going to be worked. There are sites which will go on for years. I had sites in the North-West which went on throughout my official career there. What happens? The topsoil is taken and put in a heap to await completion of the extraction of coal. The site is eventually filled up and the topsoil brought back. But the fact that it has stood there for perhaps two or three years does not always improve the topsoil. To assess exactly when a site is restored to the degree of fertility required is not easy. This Bill makes better provision for restoration than the present Act. I agree entirely that we should get away from the Defence Regulations. I am quite certain that the machinery laid down here will be much better for dealing with this difficult problem and its many different aspects than the machinery now in operation. The result is that, on the whole, since it has been decided in the interests of the country to continue opencast mining. I find this Bill acceptable.
I want to emphasise the words "this Bill" because I am speaking of the Bill introduced into your Lordships' House, and not the Bill as first introduced into another place. I was pleased that both the Minister and his colleagues were so reasonable and so wise (I have no doubt whatever, under his guidance) in dealing with the hundreds of Amendments that were suggested. Seldom have I seen a piece of legislation so greatly amended between its introduction and its Third Reading in another place. I feel that this Bill is a serious attempt to deal with
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a difficult problem, and that it is an improvement on the present machinery provided for dealing with the various aspects of the problem. I feel certain that all the interests here involved—those of the landowner, of the farmer, and of the cottage owners—are served. I have plenty of sympathy in regard to the question of gardens. I was called to many places to see sites where gardens were in danger. In every case I did not hesitate to do what I could to prevent gardens from being endangered. I am glad that this Bill does the same thing. Since it is considered necessary to continue opencast mining, I personally extend a warm welcome to the Bill.
4.54 p.m.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: My Lords, in addressing your Lordships on this Bill I ought in some sense to declare a personal interest in the matter, as is usually clone by those Members of your Lordships' House who have interests involved. I have, in fact, experienced the working of opencast mining on land belonging to me for a matter of fifteen years or so, and I have had the misfortune to come closely in contact with the working of the present machinery. I can, however, absolve myself, I think, from any real interest of that sort in the matter because I intend to contract out of it. In fact, the Minister has said that the Coal Board are willing to make voluntary agreements for the working of coal without compulsory orders.
We are in great difficulty here because of the importance of the land, on the one hand, and the need for coal, on the other. May I say at the outset that I have heard—and I believe it to be quite true—that in some parts of the country, on certain types of soil, land has been worked for opencast mining and has not been damaged. I have, indeed, heard, and again it may be true, that in some cases the land may have been improved. There is, no doubt, however, that some kinds of land, mainly on heavy clay subsoil, are considerably damaged, even after restoration—drainage and so on. So that at least on some types of land there arises the question of the usefulness of the future state of the land. It is not entirely a matter of coal. As the noble Lord has just said, it was impossible during the war to argue very much about the absolute and overriding necessity of coal being

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got for the national need. It is more difficult to-day to accept that argument so completely. We know about the stocks of coal in hand and of pits slowing down, and I think one feels a little more doubtful about this opencast working than one used to do.
I remember that a few years after the war those concerned about this matter from the agricultural point of view almost had a promise that opencast coal mining was going to stop in (I think it was) three years. But when those three years had passed it was said, "No, we must go on for longer." So this type of working has continued, under the requisitioning system. I appreciate that the noble Lord in charge of the Bill has to some extent made a case, on the score that certain qualities of coal are needed which can be got in this way. I feel that however much, from the agricultural point of view, we dislike this method of working, it would be wrong to oppose this Bill on this ground, although I think that, had it not in other ways been amended in another place, we should have felt compelled to oppose it in this House, so as to get the improvements that are now evident. In fact, in the other place the Bill was changed radically to meet these views.
On the question of coal as against land, I think one must admit that there are occasions when the interests of the country in regard to its need for coal must override the agricultural view. The agricultural view, I think, should properly be, and I believe is, based first of all on the importance of preserving the land, both for the present and the future, and, secondly, on the proper protection of the present owners and occupants of the land concerned. I think that that view would be met if there were in the Bill a statement to the effect that the Minister should not enforce opencast coal mining in any particular case unless at that time it was in his view clearly in the national interests that such work should proceed. That is the assumption underlying the Bill, although it is not, I think, actually stated. I think one would feel easier in one's mind about accepting the Bill if that were categorically stated in an early and prominent part of the Bill itself.
There are many people who say—I personally do not say this, but I have
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heard it said—that there is a strong vested interest among those who are employed on working opencast coal and who have invested in machinery and so on, so that there is a strong motive to have the system continued. I am not saying that, but I have heard it, and I am repeating it. It is certainly true that the National Coal Board find opencast coal more profitable to mine than deep-mined coal, and some people have a feeling that that may influence the attitude of the Minister in making a compulsory order. I am not saying that the Minister would be so influenced, but I feel that all doubts would be removed, both now and for the future ten years, if there were at the beginning of the Bill a categorical statement that the Minister must not enforce these arrangements unless at that particular time—and that is the operative point; at the time—there was a national need for this coal and it could not be got in any other way.
In practice, the objections to the requisitioning procedure were mainly two. One was that there was no provision whatever for appeal. In the ordinary way there was no provision for anybody whose interests were affected by an order even to say that he did not like it or that he hoped it would be varied in some way. That, of course, is the inevitable nature of a requisitioning power which is intended for war-time use. The other objection was that, at the end of it all, the various interests, the owners and occupiers-whether tenants or owner-occupiers—felt that financially they had been rather harshly treated. If, therefore, this form of coal production is to continue, one cannot but welcome a Bill which has as its objects something in the direction of meeting the two main difficulties about requisitioning to which I have referred.
The point about the Bill which strikes one most is its extreme length, difficulty and complication. It seems that it must inevitably involve a great deal of work, trouble and misunderstanding for the sake of working to a system laid down by the Bill itself. I had hoped that we could have a much simpler Bill which would re-enact a small part of the Compensation (Defence) Act, with the alterations on the two points to which I have referred. The point is that although those affected by the Compensation (Defence) Act and requisitioning object on the ground that

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they have no say and because of the strict limits of compensation which are imposed in that Act, the whole procedure—the way the land is restored and drained—is really working reasonably well. During the last six or seven years, since the National Coal Board took over responsibility from the Ministry, this Act has become much more easy to work from what I may Call the "victims' "end than it used to be. Perhaps it is not going too far to say that from the very beginning, driven on by the urgency and necessities of war, those who came from various Government Departments and initiated these proposals were not always as tactful as they should have been in their approach to farmers and owners of land. I am glad to say, however, that it is the experience of most of those affected that the National Coal Board have been seriously trying to behave—and I believe they are succeeding—in a reasonable and practical way, which is a great advance on the conditions that existed originally.
As it has been decided not to tinker with the requisitioning powers and the Compensation (Defence) Act, the structure of the Bill itself makes matters extremely difficult, and I doubt whether in many ways it is practical. As a first step, the authorisation by the Minister (which gives the Board power to work, whether by voluntary or compulsory arrangements) has been hinged on planning legislation: it has become a matter of planning. I entirely agree—and practical experience on a planning committee would tend to make me agree—that proposals of this kind for working large areas of coal can be decided only, on planning grounds, by the Government Department concerned. I cannot imagine how a planning authority could be in a position to know enough about the overall position of the needs of the country for coal and so on, and all the other factors which go to justify an authorisation. So one must admit that it is reasonable enough that the Minister, in making the authorisation, should also be able to give planning permission.
The defect of the Bill in this respect is that the really important thing, which is the restoration of the land—a matter which runs all through the Bill—is not included somewhere in the Bill on its own merits. It is simply hinged on to the planning permission, in the Part of the Bill dealing
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with the authorisation by the Minister. Far too little is said about restoration. The Minister is told that he must restore agricultural land except under certain conditions, but he is not told to what standard the land is expected to be restored. That provision is very loosely worded, and it leaves out entirely forestry land, which requires restoration in exactly the same way. Whether land is afterwards to be used for forestry or for agriculture is perhaps beside the point, because in many cases the two are interchangeable. Where difficulties may arise is about who is to enforce the conditions. The conditions in the authorisation made by the Minister are presumably the conditions which the National Coal Board will have in their contract with the contractor. The National Coal Board will supervise the contractor's work, but if it goes wrong, it is not clear who will have the duty of getting in touch with the National Coal Board and seeing that they get those conditions seen to.
Coming now to compulsory orders, I am glad that the Minister has repeated what has already been said in another place: that after the authorisation a great deal of this work will be done by agreement, and that the National Coal Board have expressed their intention of following that course. Nevertheless, this Bill is a little formidable. It is true that in order to make a voluntary agreement it is necessary to have authorisation, but the voluntary agreement is not mentioned at all anywhere in the Bill. It looks as if the policy of Her Majesty's Government is that there should be compulsory orders. It may be only a question of appearance, but I believe that it is important that in a Bill of this kind the Government's policy should be expressed; and I believe that, as a matter of policy, there should be a reference to the fact that, if possible, voluntary agreements are to be the normal procedure.
One would like to see somewhere in the Bill that the Minister may not confirm a compulsory order unless he is satisfied that the National Coal Board have made a proper attempt to reach agreement with the owners, occupiers and other interests. It is reasonable to suppose, and one believes, that the National Coal Board will try to do that, and in practice I do not feel there should be much difficulty. But I believe that it is good for the policy to be in the Bill. It is to last for ten years,

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and there may be different people and different Ministers in charge—though we hope not. These things should be written into the Bill, and I hope the House will agree with me that, as a matter of policy, that should be done.
The combination of two public inquiries, one if people object to authorisation and another if they object to a compulsory order, seems to me very difficult to envisage. I take it to mean that an owner may object on planning grounds, for instance, because his land in his view is too good to be used for these purposes and should therefore be exempted; then if he finds that the Minister gives authorisation he may be willing to make the best bargain he can. Whether he will be in a position to do that or not, or whether he will find that there is also a compulsory order made against him before he has had the opportunity of coming to a voluntary agreement, I do not know, but I think we need to be careful on that point.
I sense all the time a feeling behind the Bill that "We want to push these things through as quickly as ever we can". That, of course, is right enough: we want to keep the production going and we must prepare the sites in reasonable time. But these things cannot really be done as quickly as all that. Voluntary agreements are going to take a long time to make, whatever we may wish to do. I am at this moment engaged in trying to make a voluntary agreement which will operate if this Bill becomes law, but with the best will in the world, it is not the sort of thing one can do quickly. One has to give a farmer who is perhaps a tenant or perhaps an owner, and who may have been in occupation for a long, long time, some opportunity to look around him. One may want him to move right out and go to another farm or give up half his land, and he must have time to look around and see what he can do and how he is going to farm. The alternative to ruthless and quick legislation is, in fact, a certain amount of delay so that people can be given the chance to accept things with more or less good will and can have time to make their plans.
I feel that there is difficulty about another point in relation to compulsory orders, and that is the situation that arises when property is excluded. As I understand it, if one owns a rather large house
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with a garden all around it, the house and garden cannot be taken for opencast coal working under a compulsory order. But if one lives in a very small house in a village and it has a diminutive garden or no garden at all, the land can be taken up to the very walls of the house. I have had this point explained to me: that if one lives in a cottage one is not the legal occupier of the land around and one has therefore no interest in the matter and so should not be considered. I do not think that that is in any way reasonable or fair, whatever the legal position may be. People have had such working quite close to them. In fact, I have been living for the last two years or so with working 200 yards away from me. It is tolerable, but it is by no means pleasant. It is noisy, it is dirty, there are violent explosions, and there are lights on all night; but one just has to put up with it and keep on hoping that there will not be too much damage to the land at the end of it.
I simply cannot imagine the condition of anybody living in a small cottage in a village or the outskirts of a town with this sort of thing going on right up to the walls of the house. It seems to me absolutely fantastic and perfectly ridiculous that a large and substantial garden around a big house should keep that house safe and enable it to escape, whereas not even fifty yards around a small house should be protected. I should have thought that, quite apart from legal arguments (which I am quite certain are impeccable and which I cannot oppose), there are several grounds of simple humanity for saying that this sort of thing should not be perpetrated within at least fifty yards of anybody's house. It seems to me to be an extraordinary thing that this should not be so. I must not get too far into the argument on this matter because I am afraid it is verging on a Committee point; but one of the difficulties about this Bill is that there are so many complications and so many Committee points that altogether they seem to add up to some point of policy which is perhaps more properly dealt with on a Second Reading debate. I think the House will be wise to give very serious attention to that point when it comes to the Committee stage.
There is another point of policy which I think is going to be extremely difficult to decide. The Government have always

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taken the line (and it is in the Bill now and was so discussed in another place) that land which has once had a compulsory order made in relation to it cannot by law have another one put upon it. Immediately one asks, what is the reason for that? In this Bill land which has been requisitioned—and that, in effect, is the same as having a compulsory order made upon it—is capable of having such an order put upon it. We know why that is done. It is done because in the early days of working, coal was capable of being got out from sixty, seventy-five or eighty feet, and then the time came when machinery became available which could go deeper and they wanted to come back and take out a seam again. I should have thought that in the next ten years or so it was more than likely that machinery could be developed which would make it equally sensible to come back to the land which had been the subject of the compulsory order, and ask for another one.
On the other hand, on grounds of proper use and care of the land, one might well argue that land which had once been disturbed and consequently damaged had far better be taken again, if possible, than land which had not yet been disturbed, because the disturbed land had already depreciated considerably. But whether the land is taken by compulsory order or by requisition, at least the treatment should be the same in both cases.
The next most difficult thing starts with Clause 10. This concerns the treatment of timber. I am perhaps rather taking this out of order in the Bill, for it starts in Clause 10 and goes on through, I think, four other clauses, and ends up in a Schedule. The question is, how timber is to be treated and paid for. I am quite clear that there is every intention in the Bill to pay the proper value of the timber and to do it in the reasonably sensible way, but I am afraid that the method adopted is an extremely difficult one. At present, if land is requisitioned the procedure is very simple. The timber standing on the land is valued, the price agreed, and that is the end of it. In this Bill, Clause 10 starts off by saying that all timber on the land when the order is made belongs to the Board. Then the other clauses go on to deal with the matter, and the end of it is that when the land is handed back in ten
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years' time, the same timber is, so to speak, replaced on the same site in the same condition as it was in the beginning, and if it is not in that same condition, the difference is paid. That seems to me really too far-fetched and too imaginary a system to be practicable.
There are various cases of plantations of different ages, where it is possible to envisage that the owner might get the proper increment on the present timber during those years; and there are other cases where he might not. Certainly in the case of land with fully-grown timber all of which was mature and ready to sell, the owner cannot prove what the difference in value would be in ten years or what would be the difference in value of the land if the timber had been on it. In fact, it may be that the opposite happens, so that the owner of the timber gets paid ten years ahead and gets no interest on his money. I am quite certain that it is not the intention in this Bill to do anything which is unfair, but I think it will inevitably happen as I have suggested, and I should have thought that there was a simple solution. The well known practice about which there has never been any difficulty and which has usually been quite easy has been to buy the timber as it stands and for what it is worth and be done with it.
Now there is the question of annual compensation. The system proposed in the Bill, though complicated, has the appearance of being extremely fair, but it is based on the necessity for the occupier of the land to demonstrate what he has been making out of it; and for many small farmers that is an extremely difficult thing to do. Although the intention here is to be fair to all, rather than to go on the old rough and ready system in requisitioning, based on so many times the rent, it seems to me that it is making a mountain out of a molehill. I believe, in fact, that although from the point of view of annual compensation many occupiers will perhaps be slightly better off under this Bill, there will be some who will be worse off; and I think it is impossible to suggest any means of writing a sort of bottom limit into the Bill. It would probably have been better to have something more like the rough and ready system which goes on in the matter of requisitioning.

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I cannot help but refer to the matter of diminution of compensation, to which the noble Lord opposite referred. It is reasonable enough to assume, if a man has a certain sum paid to him by way of compensation (that was one of the things referred to in the Sixth Schedule), that he will invest it and the income from it should be taken against the compensation he is to get. It would be reasonable enough if a man could take over a farm at any time he liked. But that will not always apply; there are not many farms to let. A man could not be expected to take a farm at any time. He could hardly be expected to take a job as a farm manager at any time, because there are few jobs of that type. To expect him to change his occupation and to go to work for the Coal Board or anyone else is totally unreasonable. Such people cannot be expected to work in a subordinate position on work they do not know and understand, wasting all their skill and training; I think that that is really too harsh. There may be some logic in saying that a man must mitigate his compensation to a certain point—in a minor way that is reasonable—but I am certain that the matter goes much too far in this Bill.
Again trying hard to keep out of detail, I would say that there are some terrible difficulties in the terminal compensation. The system proposed in this Bill when it was first introduced has been changed round almost entirely in another place. I would suggest that it has been considerably improved, but I think that it needs more work done on it. There is such a complicated relation between restoration and compensation that the two can hardly be considered separately. May I refer briefly to what happens now?—I do not mean in regard to compensation but in regard to what is done to the soil. The coal having been removed, the overburden is put back, followed by the subsoil and then the top soil. That, in the jargon of those who deal with this matter, is called "restoration".
On top of that there are the questions of fences, gates, water supply, water mains, roads and so on; and these are dealt with nominally on a like-for-like basis. That is to say, the land is not supposed to have more amenities of that sort than it had before; but it need not be in the same condition. That being so, the land is kept under requisition for five
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years and the Ministry of Agriculture try to improve it. That is known colloquially as "rehabilitation". The things which can be done under rehabilitation are cultivations, fertilisations, subsoiling and operations of that sort. After five years it is generally felt that rehabilitation has been taken about as far as it can go, except in the matter of drains. They have been removed and are not put in again, and the policy so far has been not to put them in for fifteen or twenty years from the date of working. I think the trend of opinion now is to put them in sooner, but they are not put in when the land is handed back. The owner gets a promise from the Government to drain the land when it is suitable, and he gets what I would describe as a "mingy" undertaking to keep the drains working for three years only. On the basis of that promise for the drains, the owner puts in his claim for diminution of the value of the land as it is assumed it should be when the drains are put in.
The complaint about the present system, from the point of view of the owner, is the very narrow limits imposed by the law under which requisitioning is done and the amount of compensation one can get for the diminution of the value of the land. To put in under this Bill a very elaborate cost-of-works payment, which may continue for fifteen years after the work on the land by the Coal Board, seems a complete misconception of what is intended to be done. Also, the drainage cannot be dealt with at the time, and the cost cannot be estimated at the time, because, with changing prices, no one knows what the cost will be ten years hence; and apart from drainage only minor things can be done. About the only thing that would be reasonable for a claim would be the removal of stones and rocks, although I think it is true to say that the later method of restoration does avoid that, and rather exceptional repairs to fences over the first few years, because they are put into soil which is not in good condition and they tend to move because the ground tends to move.
Why it is necessary to provide for costs-of-works payment to landlord or tenant for fifteen years it is very difficult to see. One would have thought it better to settle up when the Coal Board go out,

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and to make a definite arrangement—so much for the diminution in the value of the land, with a promise to drain the land and maintain it for five years afterwards or whatever the period may be. That course seems so much simpler. I do not think it is really fair to land on the Coal Board an unknown amount in respect of cost-of-works payments for fifteen years. They cannot know what is going to be involved and there will be endless arguments. The point is that whatever you do you cannot get the land back to its value. Its value is not spoilt only because of the condition of the top-soil; the question involves what is underneath—certainly in the sort of clay land which I know so well. It is packed so hard and so solid that water and air cannot get through it, and no amount of fertiliser will overcome that. It is only time that will do it. It has to be watered for years and years—at least that is how we understand the position to be, although I do not think anyone really knows.
What one wants is a promise by the Government to drain the land when it is ready for it, and for the bargain to be made at the time the Coal Board go out, and be done with it. That seems to me to be the really practical way of dealing with the matter, and I am alarmed at the difficulty that will arise for people who are faced with the Bill as it is. This Bill needs a lot of work done on it, and there is not much time. Whatever happens, it is going to be a very complicated Bill, and when it becomes law it will be necessary for people to know what it is all about arid how it affects them. I think that one can ask that there should be a certain amount of publicity about it in simple language, so that those affected in various parts of the country should get to learn what their position is. They will find that this Bill is so difficult, complicated and frightening that they will make a bargain with the Coal Board at any cost whatever, to avoid their being subject to the compulsory provisions of this Bill.
The owners or occupiers feel that they want more than they are getting because the basis underlying the compensation side is so small in relation to the scale of operation and profit of the Coal Board on opencast coal mining. They put their profits at 6s. to 7s, a ton. We all want to see the Coal Board make a profit and be
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successful, but I do not think that anybody, either the Government or the Coal Board, wants to make a profit at the expense of other people. The noble Lord who introduced the Bill quoted the figure of 1,500 tons an acre for opencast coal working. I have known cases where the estimated amount was 6,000 tons an acre, but if we take the figure of 1,500 tons as an average, at 6s. to 7s. a ton there appears to be a profit of £500 an acre, and the sort of figures that make people dissatisfied and sore do not come to more than £30 to £40 an acre. It seems to be out of all proportion to be so strict and severe on all these points.
In spite of that, I think that the Government have gone the right way in introducing this Bill, and I hope that it can be improved in its passage through your Lordships' House. There will be a number of Amendments of which I know, and I hope that other noble Lords will have some more. I hope that we shall have adequate time to deal with them. At this time of the year there is often trouble about changing the times at which Bills are taken, and I hope that the dates in respect of this Bill which have been announced will not be changed.
5.33 p.m.
EARL WALDEGRAVE: My Lords, I do not intend to detain your Lordships long, but I have a point to raise in connection with the water industry. Perhaps I should declare an interest, because I am a director of a statutory water company, but this is a general point and I think a proper one to voice on Second Reading. Naturally water undertakings have considerable concern with the advent of this Bill. Their own statutory duties, which are extremely important, are to provide adequate supplies of unpolluted water and to see that their works are safe and not a public menace. For instance, a dam which gives way would become a public menace.
These requirements of the statutory water undertakings are naturally in jeopardly with opencast coal mining. It does not take much imagination to realise how easy it is for underground pipes to be destroyed or water-bearing strata to be seriously disturbed; for water sources to be polluted, or even for the structures of water works to be damaged or for the major calamity of their collapse. It is not a question of monetary compensation.

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The payment of a sum of money to a water company, even if possible, will not provide water for a town. This is a small country, and if one source of water is damaged it may well be that there are no other sources upon which to draw. The ideal solution to the problem, from the point of view of the water industry, would be an absolute ban on opencast coal mining in areas which are the gathering grounds and reservoirs under the control of the water undertakings. I can understand that the Government may find it difficult to accede to such a request, because often the gathering grounds lie in mineralised regions where there may be large quantities of coal; and these gathering grounds are extensive. But it has to be considered that this Bill is only for a ten-year programme, and I wonder whether these grounds could not be immune for ten years from the ravages of opencast coal mining. Perhaps that point can be considered as the Bill progresses.
The position would not be ideal, but it would be largely safeguarded if it were made clear that this Bill did not confer any overriding power over the Statutes under which the water companies operate. This point was discussed at length when the Bill was in Committee in another place. On April 29, Mr. Ian Horobin, the Parliamentary Secretary, said:
" I think I can assure my honourable friend that the Bill has been carefully drafted on the basis that authorisation gives no right to override."
He went on to make the specific statement:
" The Water Act, 1945, and the by-laws made under it cannot be overridden."
On that basis the various Amendments that had been tabled were withdrawn and the water industry felt itself, though not in an ideal position, to be reasonably safe. Unfortunately, there appears to be some doubt about the validity of that statement and as to whether the Bill is, in fact, so drawn that the Minister can give that absolute assurance. I should like to quote a letter sent by the Ministry to the water industry. The letter states:
" We have been looking again at this point and we are now advised that although our previous statements were broadly speaking correct, the rights of controlling the use of land which statutory water undertakings may enjoy under the 1945 Act or by-laws may sometimes fall within the class of rights restrictive of
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the use of the land. In that case they would be overridden by a compulsory rights order."
So there is this element of doubt, and we in the water industry are back where we were before we received this assurance.
I am sure your Lordships realise that it is a disturbing position for the water industry to be in, and that it is right that the point should be ventilated. I have every hope that the Minister will be able to meet us on the point and give us an assurance that if the Bill, as drafted, does, by implication, have this effect of overriding the Water Act, 1945, the matter will be put right so that it does not do so, because I understand that that is not the intention. The Ministry have been at pains in drafting this Bill and, as I understand it, the interests of coal-winning by the opencast method are not to be at the expense of that other statutory use of land (if I may so call it) for the provision of water. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to satisfy us on this point and give us an assurance that the necessary steps will be taken so that we may be safeguarded.
5.42 p.m.
LORD MILVERTON: My Lords, while regretfully accepting the view of the Government that the continuation of opencast mining is necessary, and recognising the sympathetic and fair-minded attitude of the Minister as exemplified in his speech and in this Bill, there are three points that I should like to mention. Clause 4 of the Bill provides that opencast coal a working may be carried on by the National Coal Board under the authority of a compulsory rights order made by the Board and confirmed by the Minister which will enable the Board to carry on opencast working under compulsory powers, provided, however, that no such order shall be made after the end of a period of ten years from the commencement of the Act.
In another place Amendments were moved during the passage of the Bill which were designed to cut down this period, in view of statements which had been made, I believe by the Minister, that it would not be necessary to continue opencast working at the present level for more than five years. It was, however, pointed out that these Amendments were misconceived, because Clause 1 of the Bill will enable the Minister to grant an authorisation to the Board at any time to work by opencast operations, and the

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Board could make voluntary arrangements with landowners for that purpose. One would therefore like to see some sort of limit placed on the powers of the Minister under Clause 1 of the Bill. If only in the light of the increasing stocks of coal, the diminishing demands from industrialists and the appalling damage and substantial annoyance which is caused by these workings, it would seem that further justification of the powers contained in Clause 1 is certainly needed.
My second point is this. Clause 2 provides that if the Minister grants an authorisation to the Board and gives them planning permission for opencast working, he must impose such conditions as he thinks reasonable with respect to the restoration by the Board, or at their cost, of damaged land. That is, of course, a most necessary provision, but the clause makes special mention of conditions (although perhaps it does not go, as the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, pointed out, into adequate detail about it) as to restoration of agricultural land. It is understood that this proviso is included especially because most opencast coal sites are on agricultural land. But a number of sites are, or may be, on other land—for instance, highways or public open spaces. Surely any land used for public purposes and subsequently taken for mining operations should be restored to its former use without any distinction. Thirdly, the machinery for notifying possible objectors is contained in the First Schedule of the Bill, and so far as local authorities are concerned it requires the National Coal Board to serve notice of their application for authorisation upon all local authorities in whose area any part of the land to be worked is situated. Cases have arisen where a local authority has been seriously concerned at opencast working immediately outside of its area, where the effect of the working would be felt inside its area. It would seem reasonable to ask for an extension of the right to service of notice of application for authorisation and the right to make objections to local authorities whose areas adjoin a site proposed to be taken for such workings. I do not propose to detain the House further on many points which might be mentioned, but which will properly be considered in Committee, where, as noble Lords have pointed out, we shall be faced with a
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large number of attempts to improve the working of this Bill.
5.47 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, I should be grateful if your Lordships would allow me a minute to ask the Minister if he would consider one point between now and the Committee stage of the Bill. Against the admitted advantages of opencast there are also, of course, admittedly, certain grave disadvantages, both as regards agriculture and as regards amenities. I think many of us were probably disappointed at the mention of ten years as the period which we must apparently wait before opencast is given up. It is a distant prospect, and an uncertain one, because, as the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, reminded us, we have had dates indicated to us before—and nearer dates; but as we have got nearer to those dates the date has receded, and the period offered as a possibility has now become a good deal longer.
The point I want to ask the Minister to consider is this. I do not contest that opencast coal may be necessary for some time, but, as the Minister has admitted, the actual necessity for opencast coal is at least now much less, having regard to the changed relations between the supply of deep-mined coal and the demand, than it has been hitherto. Under this Bill the Minister of Power decides whether or not opencast shall be permitted and naturally he decides upon the advice of the experts in his own Department. When it comes, however, to balancing between the need for coal, on the one hand, and the damage to amenities or to agriculture, on the other, it is, I think, no reflection upon the Minister or his departmental advisers to suggest that they must inevitably be somewhat biased in their judgment by the fact that what they are concerned with departmentally is not agriculture or amenities, but coal.
I quite understand the Minister's point that the decision on such a question as amenities, for example, cannot be left to purely local planning authorities; some national guidance is needed. That is true. But it is also true that the Minister has amongst his own colleagues Ministers who are responsible for agriculture, and also, in the person of the Minister of Housing and Local Government, a Minister who is departmentally concerned with amenities. Could he not

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see that there is a provision in this Bill to ensure that before the decision is taken giving coal priority over agriculture or amenities there is some procedure which enables the competing interests to be weighed impartially? There is a danger in the Bill as it stands of a departmental failure to judge judicially because of the Department's preoccupation with one of the competing interests, a danger which is perhaps even greater in the case of the keen and good official than in the case of those who are more indifferent. The point to which I am referring is of course one that is relevant rather to the Committee stage than to the Second Reading of a Bill. I mention it at this moment only to ask if the Minister would consider whether something could be done between now and the Committee stage to meet this point.
5.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, it is not my intention to detain your Lordships for long, but my noble friend Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, who has had to leave, has asked me to say a few words in relation to this matter. I want to express to the Minister our thanks for his explanation of this Bill. It is a complicated Bill and, as has already been pointed out by the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, is very different from the Bill which was originally introduced in another place. I thought then that it was a very complicated Bill; it consisted of some 53 clauses and about 8 Schedules, and occupied 70 pages. The clauses have increased, the Schedules have increased, and the pages have gone up by nearly 50 per cent. If the Minister is going to take heed of what has been said by the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, and by the noble Lords, Lord Milverton and Lord Salter, then I am afraid there is going to be another mutilation of this Bill.
I must say that, after reading the proceedings of another place and seeing the attitude of the Opposition, I thought that the Bill, which had long been awaited, was welcome—welcome from the angle that at last it is ridding us of Defence Regulations and emergency powers and putting opencast mining in its proper perspective and making it the law of the land at its own calling. As most noble Lords know, I am interested in coal;
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I have been associated with it all my life, and I think that work in opencast coal is quite alien to this country. We have sufficient deep-mine coal, we are told, to supply the requirements of this country for another 150 or 200 years. Opencast coal working was first brought into operation during the First World War, but at the end of that war the getting of opencast coal was discontinued, It was essential to have opencast coal again during the period of the last war, but no one ever expected that it would be carried on, even to the extent that it is at the present time. I certainly never expected that that would be so; but there it is, and I think that good reasons have been given for it. Nevertheless, I hope that the National Coal Board, and indeed the Ministry of Power, will address their attention to the importance of discontinuing opencast coal working as soon as possible.
I agree with much that has been said about the restoration of agricultural land, the improving of amenities and compensation and all those questions. They are very important points. But one of the most important matters is the inconvenience and the nuisance caused by opencast working to the population of the mining areas in this country. All opencast coal is produced in the coal fields, and very little consideration has been given to this aspect. The noble Lord, Lord Mills, referred to the fact that 160 million tons of coal have been produced by opencast in this country from the time when it was started during the war. That coal has not been produced from a mine, which had all the facilities of screening, and where there were railway facilities for taking it away: most of it has been carried through the valleys, through the townships, to the railways, night and day, by heavy lorries. Dust is being blown about; some of the areas where these heavy lorries have to travel are nothing but mud-tracks.
One aspect of the matter with which the Bill does not deal is the question of the prevention of working with these huge floodlights, and all the detonations for blowing up the rock at night-time, when the people should be able to rest in their beds. That is the inconvenience which the people who have lived in the mining valleys during the whole period of this opencast coal-getting have had to suffer. I am not suggesting that this Bill ought

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not to be passed: it should be passed; it is necessary that it should be passed. But I do not want it to be regarded as something that will encourage the continuation of the getting of opencast coal, even for ten years. I am certainly very sceptical whether we ought to be getting opencast coal, and also about its value. The noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, said that we are producing opencast coal at the rate of about 14 million tons a year. We must ask ourselves what quality coal it is. We are producing in this country about 205 million or 210 million tons of deep-mined coal. The problem of the coal mining industry in this country at the present time is the quality of the coal that is produced.
The Minister said that we were producing 14 million tons of opencast coal, much of which is of low grade, and he mentioned that 25 per cent. of that coal was large coal. Seventy-five per cent, is small coal. Indeed, the production of large coal by opencast methods is lower than the percentage of small coal in deep-mined. The Minister very kindly—I am grateful to him—wrote me giving me the figures, and he will not mind my just dealing with them. Deep-mined coal, large and graded, is a most useful coal. What it amounts to is this: large (screened, over two inches) deep-mined, 24 per cent.; graded (mostly doubles)—which is a very useful coal—21 per cent. That makes a total of 45 per cent. of what I would regard as most valuable coal.
As to opencast, the figures are: large coal, 23 per cent.; graded, 4 per cent. That makes a total of 27 per cent. As to small coal, opencast accounts for 65 per cent. and deep-mined for 46 per cent. I should not like to ask the noble Lord for the figures of the stocks of small coal in the country at the present time. As one passes up and down on the railway one sees the growing mountains of small coal. In my opinion, all that you are really getting from opencast of great advantage is not 14 million tons, but 27 per cent. of 14 million tons. I do not suggest for a moment that that is not of great value. I hope, however, that consideration will be given to the aspect of the problem which I have mentioned.
I am not going to deal with the matter any further because it is really one which we can deal with fully in a debate on
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coal. If we could make greater use of the smalls by turning them into briquettes—I know what it costs—or turning them into Phurnacite and selling it at a reasonable price, then, instead of households taking almost one half of the large coal, that large coal could be used to a great extent for export. We have been losing our export trade. Last year we exported less than at any time since the war. Five million tons less coal was exported from this country last year than in 1955, and something like 3 million tons of the 5 million tons was large coal. That is the problem. If that problem can be solved, then I think we could do away with opencast mining. But I suppose it must go on until such time as we can bring about the change which I have suggested.
I saw in one of the newspapers this week—indeed, I have the cutting here—that only fifteen pits are going to be closed by the National Coal Board during the period of the economy campaign. I have no doubt that the Minister and the Coal Board have good reasons for closing down these pits. But this would not be necessary in my view, even if they are uneconomic, if we could find something to do with the smalls. We cannot go on piling up the smalls which have been stocked in this country because we cannot sell them abroad. Nothing will be more uneconomic than to produce 14 million tons of coal by opencast in this country if you sell the large coal and stock the small coal. I hope that the Minister and the Coal Board—I am sure they are—are giving attention to that aspect of the matter.
I believe it is important that this Bill should be passed. I do not think that any Bill for some time past has had a more agreeable and comfortable passage in another place. The debates were conducted with every good will. The remarks on the Third Reading of the Bill were so complimentary to the Government, to the Minister, to the Paymaster General and to the Minister's Parliamentary Secretary, that they almost made me blush. If opencast mining is to be carried on, this Bill is a most necessary one. I know that the Minister has Amendments that he is going to put down. We should like to have a word with him about those Amendments; but, so far as we are concerned, we shall do all we can to assist him in the passage of the Bill.
6.8 p.m.
LORD MILLS: My Lords, I ask leave of your Lordships' House to reply to the points raised in the debate. I feel that we have had a most useful and instructive debate, because there are noble Lords on both sides of your Lordships' House who know a great deal about this subject. I think we are all united in our desire to go cautiously in this matter of opencast coal mining. But unfortunately at the present time we need to produce enough large coal to enable me safely to go forward with ending rationing and to do without imports. I am most grateful to noble Lords, and particularly to the noble Viscount, Lord Hall, for what they have had to say on that subject.
Perhaps I should say a word or two on the need for opencast coal. In introducing the Bill this afternoon I gave your Lordships some idea of the important part opencast coal has played in meeting our coal requirements. Unfortunately, we need the large coal in opencast output to reinforce the production of coal from deep mines. I should not like to tie myself to an estimate of how much opencast coal we shall need in the future: that will depend entirely upon the way in which the coal situation develops. But unless we continue to rely upon Defence Regulations, which I am sure none of your Lordships would desire, we cannot be sure of being able to carry on opencast operations on a sufficient scale without the power which this Bill makes available.
I should like to repeat the assurances that I gave in my opening speech; that in the exercise of these powers Her Majesty's Government will continue to examine on merit the proposals of the National Coal Board for working individual sites; and in considering such proposals I assure your Lordships that, in so far as the coal situation permits, I shall make it my object to reduce to the absolute minimum the inconvenience and annoyance that such operations are likely to cause. At this point I should like to refer to the question of whether we could have a shorter period than ten years in the Bill. I went into that question very carefully and I came to the conclusion that it would be wrong for Her Majesty's Government to suggest any shorter period than ten years. After all, this is only an enabling Bill; it only enables these powers to be used. We
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have also to take into account the nature of opencast operations and the fact that plant has to be purchased and provided.
Perhaps I may now refer to one or two of the many other points that have been made, and then I will deal with particular questions. It was suggested that we should write into this Bill a clause requiring the Board to acquire land on a voluntary basis—in other words, that reference should be made in the Bill to the fact that the National Coal Board must try to obtain land voluntarily before resorting to compulsory powers. I have every sympathy with that proposal, but it just is not practicable to put it in the Bill. The Board do not require powers to act on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, I can assure your Lordships that it is my intention to see that every effort is made to deal with these matters on a voluntary basis before authority is given for the exercise of compulsory powers.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, dealt first with the point about a shorter period, which I have tried to explain, and then spoke of mitigation of compensation in relation to the earnings of a man whose land had been taken over. It appears to me that profits can be earned only by the employment of time and capital and when land is taken over under a compulsory rights order, clearly the occupier has both spare time and capital. If there were no mitigation provision he would receive full profits in the form of compensation without the trouble of earning them. I suggest that in assessing his compensation account should be taken of the opportunities he has to employ his spare time and capital. The principle of mitigation is established in general law and we feel that it must be maintained. But we do want to avoid hardships, and we shall be only too happy to consider suggestions for detailed changes.
The third point raised was the question of supervision of restoration, mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of Gwaenysgor and Lord Ridley. There is concern that the conditions about working and restoration of the land which the Minister imposes on the National Coal Board should be carried out. I can assure the House that I share this concern, and I have looked very carefully

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into these arrangements. In fact there is a three-fold check on the enforcement of the Minister's conditions. First, the National Coal Board are a public authority who will try honestly and sincerely to carry out these conditions. They will embody the conditions in their contracts with the civil engineering firms who actually carry out the work on the sites, and they will keep a very close watch to see that the terms of the contracts are carried out.
Secondly, as a I stated in my opening speech, the Agricultural Departments have agreed to act as the Board's agents on the agricultural treatment of restored sites. As the effectiveness of this treatment may depend on the way in which the site has been worked and restored those Departments' services to the Board will include consultative duties during the working of the site. Thirdly, and as a last resort, the Minister's conditions will be planning conditions. They will be enforceable by the local planning authorities, and if they fail, the Minister of Housing and Local Government and the Secretary of State for Scotland have default powers to enforce the conditions themselves. I think that this three-fold line of defence should be adequate to ensure that the Minister's conditions are observed.
I was most impressed by the contribution of the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley. I am sure that we must all have been impressed with his knowledge of the subject. He raised a large number of important points, and I think they deserve a more detailed answer than I can give them now. I hope that he will not mind if I suggest that he raises them on Committee stage when they can be more thoroughly discussed. I could not help being impressed with the work that he promises me by his talk of hundreds of Amendments which we shall have to face; but that is part of my job. There are, however, two points on which I should like to comment now.
The first is the noble Viscount's suggestion that we could have a much simpler Bill by putting into statutory form the present arrangements. We considered that possibility very carefuly, and I can assure your Lordships that it was not without its attractions; but we decided against it for three main reasons. The first is that the existing powers, although
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administered sensibly, are very sweeping. The whole object of the revocation of the Defence Regulations is to replace these sweeping general powers by specific limited powers. Secondly, the existing compensation arrangements, although working quite well, are very arbitrary. Farmers get an annual rent plus supplementary compensation equal to three times the rent to compensate them for loss of profits. Some farmers make profits which are more than three times the rent and they now suffer quite a considerable loss when their land is taken. Others make profits which are less than three times their rent. Such an arbitrary system would, in the Government's view, be inappropriate to peace-time legislation and should be replaced by general principles which will work out fairly when applied in individual cases. Thirdly, the Government feel that proposals for opencast coal working which would cause inconvenience to many people and might mean serious damage to amenity must be subject to a public local inquiry, whether the land is obtained compulsorily or by agreement, and that these inquiries must be conducted in the spirit of the Franks Report.
The second point on which I should like to comment is the noble Viscount's suggestion, if I have understood him correctly, that the cost of works terminal compensation payable when the work of restoration is carried out after the end of the Board's occupation should be replaced by a lump sum paid to the landowner at the end of the Board's occupation. That, my Lords, would mean reversing the main change made in the Bill in another place.
VISCOUNT RIDLEY: I do not seem to have made myself clear. What I was really trying to say was that there was only one cost of works which is really important, and that is drainage and maintenance of drains, and that is to be left as it is in the Bill. But the other thing which has been completely undone is not such that it should continue for fifteen years, and I should have thought, taking into account these matters, that an item could be agreed at the end of occupation so that the Coal Board would know where they were in the matter,
LORD MILLS: I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his suggestion and

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I will consider it. What we were concerned about was that if the amount were paid by the Board when they went out, there would be no guarantee that the money would be spent on the land, and that would defeat the main object of the cost-of-works system. It was the general view in another place that this was the right system, both in the national interest and in the interests of the tenant farmers, who would not get the lump sum compensation but who had got to go on using the land. Therefore, I am doubtful whether we could advise such a change; but perhaps we can consider that further in Committee.
The noble Viscount also referred to the question of the land around a house. I have a good deal of sympathy with the noble Viscount's view on this matter, but I am afraid it does not seem practicable to make any condition which would be satisfactory and which would not result in the sterilisation of large tonnages of coal. On the other hand, it is a point that I am sure every Minister, whether myself or my successors, would have closely in mind. The nuisance of opencast mining next to a dwelling house is fully appreciated and I have already myself taken action to prevent some cases.
The noble Viscount referred to the question of timber and said that compensation for matured timber should be paid at the beginning of the Board's occupation of land taken compulsorily. This is sometimes done at present in return for a waiver of the terminal compensation payable under the Compensation Defence Act, 1939. It is not possible to fit such arrangements into the scheme of terminal compensation under this Bill. The main item in the terminal compensation will be the cost of restoring the trees, and that will be paid only when the work has been carried out. It is essential, we feel, that compensation for woodlands should remain on this basis. It was clear from the discussion in the other place that all Parties attach the utmost importance to the replanting of trees, and this will be carried out whenever reasonable and practicable.
The woodland compensation provisions are quite fair to owners. If the timber is mature when the Board enter the land, the owner will receive compensation during the Board's occupation for the
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loss of profits which he would have made in those years. If the timber is immature, his diminution in value terminal compensation under Clause 22 will take account of the fact that although the trees are being restored at the expense of the Board, the Board's operations have set back by many years the time when they will reach maturity. If the noble Viscount would permit me to deal with his points generally in Committee, I should be very grateful.
The noble Earl, Lord Waldegrave, spoke about the effect of opencast coal working on water supplies. I myself am not entirely satisfied that the Bill adequately covers the matter, and perhaps in due course I may have a word with the noble Earl about that subject. So far, there has been very little working on water-gathering grounds, and I hope we shall be able to steer fairly clear of them in the future. We do not intend that the powers conferred on the National Coal Board by this Bill should enable them to override the Water Act, 1945, or the by-laws made under it; and if it appears that they do in any way override that Act and by-laws, it will have our attention.
Lord Milverton raised three points which, again. I think we could usefully deal with in Committee, if he agrees. Lord Salter raised a point and he was good enough to ask me to consider it. I would rather, however, if he is agreeable, deal with it now. Under our system of collective Cabinet responsibility a decision by any Minister, as I am sure the noble Lord knows well, represents the views of the Government as a whole, and is given only after full consultation with all his colleagues concerned. Your Lordships can be assured that there will be such full consultation in all opencast cases. But it would be contrary to normal constitutional practice to write provisions into the Bill requiring such consultation between Ministers. The arrangements for consultation are an internal matter for the Government, and to include provisions in the Bill would weaken the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, perhaps I might just remark that I am, of course, fully aware of the principle of Cabinet responsibility. In this case, however, some of the Ministers concerned are not members of the Cabinet and do not, therefore, perhaps, have quite an equal

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say with the Minister, or their officials quite art equal status in this matter with his officials. I do not think that it is without precedent to write into Bills something that requires consultation between a particular Minister concerned and another Department. It is very frequent, for example, to make such a provision with regard to the Treasury, as the noble Lord will realise. However, I shall not argue my point further at this stage.
LORD MILLS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. If I in any way wrongly stated, or over-stated, the case I hope he will let me know, but as advised at present I should find considerable difficulty in doing what the noble Lord suggests.
My Lords, I am sorry to be the means of conveying to you such a long and a complicated Bill. We shall have full opportunities in Committee of debating its various clauses, but I think we should keep in mind that it is an enabling Bill, to enable us to do certain things which we now do under the Defence Regulations, and I believe that in many respects
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it is a great improvement on current procedure. I share with noble Lords their anxiety to get our fuel position in such a state that we can go on being more and more discriminatory in regard to opencast sites, in order that we may see that the least damage to land and amenities is inflicted.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

DISABLED PERSONS (EMPLOYMENT) BILL
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

LICENSING OF BULLS AND BOARS BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment.
House adjourned at twenty minutes before seven o'clock.