Sitting of 31 July 1957

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  POST OFFICE

    Telegrams
    Mr. Vaneasked the Postmaster-General why the same charge is made for telegrams which are telephoned to the addressee as is made for those delivered by special messenger at greater cost to his Department.
    The Assistant Postmaster-General (Mr. Kenneth Thompson): Because a reduction for telephone delivery could not be justified in face of the heavy loss per telegram. This loss far exceeds the average saving from such delivery, as compared with delivery by hand.
    Mr. Vane: Is not my hon. Friend's reply really too defeatist? Is it not time that the Post Office went out and tried to get some more revenue? Would it not be a fair experiment to see whether we cannot revive the decaying telegraph service by trying to make the rate cheaper for those who do not ask the Post Office to provide a special messenger for delivery? That surely must be the cause of the bulk of the cost.
    Mr. Thompson: We are not defeatists in any way in this matter. The fact is that in many cases telegrams delivered by telephone cost as much as, and sometimes more than, telegrams delivered by messenger, and we have to be free to choose which is the more economical way of delivering a telegram in order to give the most efficient service.
    Mr. C. R. Hobson: Will the hon. hon. Gentleman make a further statement if a Question is put down upon this subject? It seems almost unbelievable that a telegram telephoned to a person's address
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    is dearer than or even the same price as one delivered by hand, particularly in view of the facts given by the right hon. Gentleman concerning the loss involved in the delivery of telegrams by hand; indeed, he makes that the chief reason for the loss in the telegraph service.
    Mr. Thompson: I shall always be pleased to answer any Questions which the hon. Member or any other hon. Member cares to put down, on this or any other subject. I gave my Answer after a very careful analysis of the cost of delivering telegrams by various means.

    Inland Letter Rate
    Mr. Vaneasked the Postmaster-General how much revenue he estimates that he would lose if the proposed new charge for inland letters were to be 3d. for two oz. and 1½d. for the next two oz. instead of the scale set out in the General Post Office paper of 18th July.
    Mr. Russellasked the Postmaster-General what would be the estimated cost to the Revenue of his Department of making the new charge for letters 3d. for 2 oz. instead of only 1 oz.
    The Postmaster-General (Mr. Ernest Marples): The Answer is nearly £3 million in a full year.
    Mr. Vane: Does not my right hon. Friend consider that this, again, is something that may be worth while? The proposed increase in postal charges is not merely the halfpenny that it was put up; in fact it means that a letter weighing two ounces will cost 4½d. instead of 2½d., and is likely to encourage less use of the service. Whereas Members of Parliament may be pleased to see their postbags getting smaller, I do not think that it is for the good of the country.
    Mr. Marples: I appreciate my hon. Friend's point, but I am bound to say that, according to the Daily Telegraph, one can for one ounce get in 11 octavo sheets, and experiments that I have made show that it is possible to get in 16 octavo sheets for under an ounce. I can place samples in the Library for hon. Members to see. The main point is that with this increase in postal charges there is no need, if people are so minded, for a reduction in their letter-writing activities.

    Charges
    Mr. Lewisasked the Postmaster-General on what basis it is estimated that the increased postal charges will only increase the retail price index by one-tenth of one per cent.; and to what extent in these calculations the direct and indirect effects of such increases on local authorities, nationalised boards, Government Departments, and private business, in addition to the effects on private individuals have been included.
    Mr. Marples: The figure I gave was a rough estimate of the effect on the retail price index in so far as Post Office charges enter directly into the calculation of that index. Indirect effects through the prices of other components of the index could only be guessed, but would be quite small.
    Mr. Lewis: If the Postmaster-General does not know, how can he guess whether it is larger or smaller? Can we be assured that his action in again increasing these prices is but another step in the implementation of his promise to reduce the cost of living, "mend the hole in your purse". and make the £ worth something?

    TABLE I

    ESTIMATES FOR MAIN ACCOUNTS, 1956–57 TO 1958–59 (After tariff changes)

    1956–57

    (£ million)

    —

    Postal

    Telephone

    Telegraph

    Total

    Cumulative Total

    Income

    …

    …

    174·2

    163·5

    18·3

    356·0

    Expenditure

    …

    …

    177·5

    164·5

    20·3

    362·3

    Surplus

    …

    …

    - 3·3

    - 1·0

    - 2·0

    - 6·3

    - 6·3

    1957–58

    (£ million)

    —

    Postal

    Telephone

    Telegraph

    Total

    Cumulative Total

    Income

    …

    …

    190·3

    183·5

    18·9

    392·7

    Expenditure

    …

    …

    190·9

    178·5

    22·2

    391·6

    Surplus

    …

    …

    - 0·6

    + 5·0

    - 3·3

    + 1·1

    - 5·2

    Mr. Marples: The increases in charges was made to correct the wages of Post Office workers and to bring them into line for the first time with those of outside industry. If the hon. Member does not want that he should oppose the wage increases.
    Mr. Winterbottomasked the Postmaster-General (1)the extra sums he estimates that he will receive for each item of the recent increased charges this year, and in a full year;
    (2)which of the Post Office services will be making a profit and which a loss, and what is the amount in each case, consequent upon the changes proposed in the recent White Paper on Post Office Finances.
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Postmaster-General the estimated profit or loss on the telephone and postal accounts. respectively, for 1956–57, 1957–58, and 1958–59 after allowing for the proposed new charges.
    Mr. Marples: As the Answer involves two lengthy tables, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Following are the tables:

    1958–59

    (£ million)

    —

    Postal

    Telephone

    Telegraph

    Total

    Cumulative Total

    Income

    …

    …

    204·2

    193·7

    19·0

    416·9

    Expenditure

    …

    …

    199·8

    184·4

    22·5

    406·7

    Surplus

    …

    …

    +4·4

    +9·3

    -3·5

    +10·2

    +5·0

    Cumulative Total

    …

    +0·5

    +13·3

    -8·8

    +5·0

    TABLE II

    DETAILS OF TARIFF YIELDS AND PROFITS OR LOSSES

    —

    1957–58

    Yield from tariff changes

    Profit/Loss

    £m.

    £m.

    Postal

    Inland

    Letters

    6·1

    +10·2

    Postcards

    0·25

    -0·05

    Printed papers, samples, newspapers

    1·35

    -1·05

    Parcels

    0·75

    -4·25

    Registration

    —

    -1·9

    Miscellaneous

    0·15

    -0·05

    Overseas

    Surface and "all-up" letters and postcards

    0·65

    +0·25

    Surcharged air mails

    —

    -0·2

    Printed papers and samples

    0·75

    -3·05

    Parcels

    0·45

    -0·25

    Registration and insurance

    0·1

    -0·3

    Miscellaneous

    0·05

    +0·05

    Remittance

    Postal orders

    0·8

    +0·7

    Money orders

    —

    -0·8

    11·4

    -0·6

    TELEGRAPH

    Ordinary inland telegrams

    —

    -3·7

    Inland private wires

    —

    +1·2

    Inland telex

    —

    +0·1

    Other inland services

    —

    -1·1

    Overseas services

    0·1

    +0·2

    0·1

    -3·3

    TELEPHONE

    Rentals, connection and removal charges

    7·8

    -5·1

    Subscribers' local calls

    2·3

    +1·0

    Subscribers' inland trunk calls

    0·1

    +9·7

    Call Offices

    0·1

    -3·1

    Inland private wires

    —

    +1·5

    Other inland services

    —

    -0·3

    Overseas services

    —

    +1·3

    10·3

    +5·0

    TOTAL

    21·8

    +1·1

    Note

    The yield from the tariff changes in a full year will be double that for 1957–58 except in the case of (a)Subscribers' local calls and (b)Subscribers' inland trunk calls and call offices, for which the full year yield will be £2·0m. and nil respectively.

    Mr. Watkinsasked the Postmaster-General whether he has considered abolishing the extra charges asked of telephone subscribers who live three miles or over from a telephone exchange or to increase the radius from three to five miles or more.
    Mr. Marples: Yes, Sir; but these lines are very costly to provide and it would be unreasonable to ask all other subscribers to share the whole burden. I understand that in most other countries an extra charge is made for lines much shorter than three miles.
    Mr. Watkins: Would the Postmaster-General look at this matter again in view of the fact that it is one of the factors which retards the re-population of the countryside? It is rather important. It has been on the Statute Book, at least by regulation, for a very long time.
    Mr. Marples: A survey was made in 1955 and it showed that the annual charges for maintenance, interest on capital, and depreciation totalled £16 to £29 per mile. The present charge is £12 per mile—£6 for a shared telephone—and the new charge still does not always meet the actual cost.
    Mr. Sorensenasked the Postmaster-General what rearrangements or economies in the postal service he is considering that may enable him subsequently to modify the prospective increase in postal charges; and how far economy is possible through the institution of certain deliveries of letters at lower postal rates outside peak delivery hours.
    Mr. Marples: We shall continue to look for all practicable economies, but I see no prospect of modifying the increases in charges which I announced recently. Schemes of the kind the hon. Member mentions in the second part of his Question have been gone into very thoroughly on many occasions in the past; they have always been judged to be impracticable and uneconomic but we are going to look into the possibilities again.
    Mr. Gower: Would my right hon. Friend agree that the large number of Questions on the Order Paper on this matter indicates a fairly widespread concern in the community that the services administered by his Department, particularly the telephone service, should not increase in cost in future years or at an
    1238
    early foreseeable date? Would he agree that, despite the increases in wages to which he has referred, the general prosperity of the country since the war has enabled the Post Office, and the monopoly services administered by his Department, to acquire a great number of new customers, and should not that be taken into account?
    Mr. Liptonasked the Postmaster-General why he has increased the postal charges to provide an estimated surplus of £5 million by March 1958.
    Mr. Marples: The hon. Member is mistaken. The prospect of a £5 million surplus does not arise before 1959.
    Mr. Lipton: Will the Postmaster-General nevertheless explain why the poor old British public has to be soaked to the extent of £5 million more than is necessary to maintain the present postal services? What is the right hon. Gentleman going to use this £5 million for?
    Mr. Marples: As the turnover of the Post Office is £400 million a year, the surplus of £5 million is not excessive. When the Labour Party was in office the Post Office had a surplus of 8 per cent. of its turnover. If we had budgeted for that surplus we should have been budgeting for a surplus of round about £80 million.
    Mr. Woodburn: Would the surplus be increased very much if less transparent envelopes were supplied at the post office to hon. Members? We could almost have a system of letter tapping as well as of telephone tapping, the envelopes being so transparent that anybody might read the letters.
    Mr. Lipton: In view of the complete failure of the Postmaster-General to answer this Question satisfactorily, I hope to raise the matter on the Adjournment as soon as possible.

    Rent Act (Form G)
    Mr. Fernyhoughasked the Postmaster-General if he will arrange for Form G, on which tenants must list repairs they think necessary before they pay increased rent under the new Rent Act, to be available and on sale in Post Offices.
    Mr. K. Thompson: I would refer the hon. Member to the statement made last

    1239
    night by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Housing and Local Government.
    Mr. Fernyhough: I did not hear that statement but I am quite sure that it did not meet the purpose of my Question. I should like to ask the hon. Gentleman why his Department is so reluctant to do anything to help the tenants when he and his hon. and right hon. Friends have been so anxious to do everything they could to help the landlords. Does not he realise that there are far more post offices than town halls and that it would be much more convenient for people if they could get this form from the post offices which most of them visit at least once a week?
    Mr. Thompson: That is a gross and provocative distortion of the facts. In his statement my right hon. Friend made it clear that the form would be available very widely through local authority offices, and I have nothing to add to that.

    Premium Savings Bonds
    Mr. Fernyhoughasked the Postmaster-General the number of prizes, and their value, won by unsold bonds since the inception of the Premium Bonds Scheme.
    Mr. K. Thompson: None, Sir. The whole prize fund goes each month to the eligible bonds, and a bond is only eligible when it has been sold.
    Mr. Fernyhough: In view of that, does not the hon. Gentleman think that his public relations officer has been a little bit slow? Has not he seen letters in the Press which have been consistent with my Question, and does not he think that, if he wants Premium Bonds to be a success, when erroneous letters and statements are made it would be as well if his public relations officer gave the public the correct information?
    Mr. Thompson: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for helping us to have our public relations deficiencies put right, and I hope that the attention he has drawn to this matter will correct any misapprehensions there may be.

    Commercial Accounts (Surpluses)
    Mr. Ness Edwardsasked the Postmaster-General what would be his estimate of the commercial account surpluses for the years 1958, 1959, and 1960
    1240
    if he presented them in the form prevailing for the years 1946 to 1955.
    Mr. Marples: There are two differences in the form of the accounts. First, at present the £5 million annual contribution to the Exchequer is charged as an expense before arriving at the profit or loss. Secondly, the eventual surplus or deficit is carried forward for the benefit of the Post Office. Previously all surpluses were in fact surrendered to the Exchequer. These averaged £15 million a year under the Labour Government and compare with £5 million paid now. If the old system had applied to present estimates, the cumulative surplus at 31st March, 1959, would have been £20 million instead of £5 million. But of course all this surplus of £20 million would have been paid to the Exchequer and the Post Office would have been £5 million worse off.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is it not then the fact that by changing the form of the accounts a profit of £20 million has been made to look like a profit of £5 million? Has not that been the basis of the right hon. Gentleman's increased charges?
    Mr. Marples: No, I could not accept that assumption. What has really happened is that since 1955—I repeat myself again—for the first time depreciation of Post Office assets is on current costs, so that when a telephone exchange breaks down in Caerphilly we have sufficient money to renew it. If we do not make such provision it cannot be provided when the exchange has broken down.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that this is a bookkeeping account that we are talking about—a commercial account, and not a cash account—and that irrespective of whether the cash is or is not in the commercial account, the money is there to repair the telephone exchange in Caerphilly? I put it to the right hon. Gentleman, is not it the case that what he is doing is something that the Inland Revenue never allows either he or his friends to do, that is, to regard supplementary depreciation as a charge on the current account?
    Mr. Marples: What I should like to know from the right hon. Gentleman—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—a whole series of Questions put down on the Order Paper by a previous Postmaster-General

    1241
    have been against the principle of providing for depreciation at current cost. Does the right hon. Gentleman object then to the principle—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I am aware that some of these questions may be of the rhetorical variety, but the right hon. Gentleman should not reverse the rôles of questioner and answerer.
    Mr. Marples: May I put it again? The right hon. Member for Caerphilly (Mr. Ness Edwards)when he was Postmaster-General did provide additional depreciation over and above historic costs. The amount he provided was to replace the assets.
    Mr. Woodburn: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell the House of any firm of chartered accountants which insists on commercial firms charging depreciation at current cost? Can the right hon. Gentleman cite any example where the Inland Revenue will allow that as a charge against Income Tax for any commercial firm in this country?
    Mr. Marples: I agree that the Inland Revenue does not allow it. All I say is that the latest Labour Party pamphlet recommends the nationalised industries, such as electricity and coal, to generate more of their own capital, and that is precisely what this nationalised industry is doing.
    Mr. Woodburn——
    Mr. Speaker: Order. I am in some doubt about which Question the right hon. Gentleman is answering. Is it Question No. 15 or Question No. 16?
    Mr. Marples: It is Question No. 15.
    Mr. Speaker: Depreciation seems to cover the next Question, and if it is depreciation that we are talking about, perhaps we might get an answer to Question No. 16.

    Depreciation
    Mr. Ness Edwardsasked the Postmaster-General why he has raised the supplementary provision for depreciation for the £12,500,000 provided for in the White Paper to £18 million this year when it is estimated that a loss of £6 million will be sustained.
    Mr. Marples: As two of the three figures in the Question are wrong the right hon. Gentleman places me in a difficulty. The gross supplementary provision estimated to be required in 1956–57 was not £12½million, but £14 million. The loss of £6 million refers not to this year but to last year. The increase in depreciation from £14 million in 1956–57 to £18 million in 1957–58 was determined by the Post Office in accordance with the principles laid down in the 1955 White Paper—paragraph 5 (ii)of appendix 2. It takes account, of course, of the growing size and value of the system.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the reference to £12½ million in the White Paper was to the amount that was in the White Paper, and that the reference to £18 million in the Question relates to a figure which the right hon. Gentleman gave last week in an Answer to me? Will he explain how it is that in a year when he has budgeted for a profit of £1·1 million he increased his supplementary depreciation by £5½ million? Is it in order to transform the size of the surplus?
    Mr. Marples: It is to provide for the growing volume of assets to be replaced when they fall into disuse and disrepair. If the right hon. Gentleman will look again at the White Paper, three lines above where the figure of £12½ million is mentioned, he will see the words:
    "To place the system on a sounder economic footing it is thus necessary to budget for a supplementary provision of £14 million."
    I am afraid the right hon. Gentleman has misread the White Paper.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is not it ordinary commercial prudence to provide depreciation at current cost and is not my right hon. Friend to be congratulated on adopting that method?
    Mr. Marples: I think it only prudent to provide that the present assets when they fall into disrepair shall be replaced out of income.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that we agree it is prudent to provide for the replacement of worn-out capital, but that what we object to is the fact that he takes this extra money for supplementary depreciation out of his surplus before calculating

    1243
    his surplus, and in that way he falsifies the accounts?
    Mr. Marples: If I am to provide a depreciation account, I must do it out of gross income. There is no other way of doing it, and that is precisely what we are doing.
    Mr. Winterbottom: Will the Postmaster-General agree that the complicated nature of the commercial accounts of the Post Office, especially in relation to depreciation, calls for a much more radical change in their presentation? Will he assure the House that in future the commercial accounts of the Post Office will faithfully record the transactions of the Post Office, including its relationship with State Departments?
    Mr. Marples: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that supplementary question, because I think that the commercial accounts as they stand at present are too complicated. For that reason I called in a prominent firm of chartered accountants—there is a Question on the matter later on the Order Paper—to advise the Post Office what to do. I received its report this week, and I hope that if I accept most of it, the result will be an improvement and simplification of the accounts.
    Mr. Winterbottom: In view of the statement which he has made, will the right hon. Gentleman make available the report of the firm of chartered accountants so that hon. Members may know the opinion of experts on these complicated accounts?
    Mr. Marples: There is a Question on that subject later on the Order Paper.

    Accounts (Examination)
    Mr. Frank Allaunasked the Postmaster-General the name of the firm of chartered accountants which he has called in to examine the Post Office accounts; when the report of its examination will be ready: and if it will be made available to the House.
    Mr. Marples: The firm to which I referred is Messrs. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Consultations are still in progress and I should not wish to restrict the form or content of their advice by undertaking to publish any documents
    1244
    that may be exchanged. I hope, however, that the results will be seen in future issues of the Post Office accounts.
    Mr. Allaun: May I ask the Minister first of all why, if the Post Office is paying for this investigation, the results of it should not be revealed to the House of Commons; and secondly, may I ask the Prime Minister—[Interruption.]—
    Mr. Ellis Smith: Not yet.
    Mr. Allaun: I meant "may I ask the Postmaster-General" what area of the Post Office accounts will be covered by this examination?
    Mr. Marples: I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I do not think that it would help the firm in question if the report were published. I asked it if it would make this investigation and report direct to me. It never considered that the report would be published, otherwise it might have done differently. I did this on my own initiative and I hope to incorporate most of what is recommended in the actual accounts. I think that hon. Members in all parts of the House will realise, when they see the commercial accounts, what an improvement they are.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: May I compliment the Postmaster-General on his initiative in this matter? These commercial accounts are extremely difficult to understand and they have always been a mystery in this House. Will the right hon. Gentleman consider publishing or making available to Members, even if it is only placed in the Library, the recommendations of the chartered accountants? If he does that he will assist the House.
    Mr. Marples: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his complimentary remarks about my initiative. I realise that quite a number of hon. and right hon. Gentlemen do not understand the commercial accounts. For that reason I called in the firm of chartered accountants.
    Sir R. Jennings: As this investigation is being paid for by public money, why should not the report be published?
    Mr. Marples: Because when I asked the chartered acountants for the recommendations they agreed, on the understanding that the report would be confidential.

    Sub-postmasters
    Sir I. Fraserasked the Postmaster-General if he will do his best, consistent with the public interest, to appoint ex-Service men, and especially disabled ex-Service men, as sub-postmasters when vacancies occur; and if his officers will consult the local British Legion officials.
    Mr. K. Thompson: A determining factor must be the position and suitability of premises offered by applicants for appointment; otherwise preference is given to ex-Regular and disabled ex-Service men. Any representations that local ex-Service men's organisations may make about a particular appointment are carefully and sympathetically considered.

    Newspapers and Periodicals
    Mr. Mulleyasked the Postmaster-General whether, in view of the proposed increases in postal rates, he will amend his regulations concerning the registration of newspapers and periodicals to allow monthly journals to qualify for registration and lower rates of postage
    Mr. Marples: No, Sir.
    Mr. Mulley: Will not the right hon. Gentleman reconsider the matter, in view of the very great difficulty experienced by the publishers of monthly journals without this additional very severe charge on their postage? If these monthly periodicals can be sent to Canada under these arrangements, why cannot they be distributed in this country?
    Mr. Marples: If monthly periodicals were included we should have to include fortnightly, yearly and half-yearly journals, and the loss of revenue of £1¼ million could not be afforded.

    Envelopes
    Mr. J. Edenasked the Postmaster-General what will be the weight, respectively, of an envelope, A and C, which he proposes to put on sale at a cost of 4d. each from 1st October.
    Mr. Marples: About·13 and·12 oz. respectively.
    Mr. Eden: Will my hon. Friend give an assurance that these envelopes, which previously were franked, will be of less weight in future in order to take account of his new provisions?
    Mr. Marples: I will look at that, but I do not think so, because I am not sure that that would not compete with many firms in the stationery trade producing these envelopes.

  TELEPHONE SERVICE

    Charges
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware of the difficulties which will be caused to old people with small fixed incomes who are living alone by the proposed increases in telephone charges; and if he will consider the possibility of allowing them to pay reduced rates for telephones in their houses.
    Mr. Deedesasked the Postmaster-General whether he has considered the problem arising from increased telephone rentals for the aged and invalids of small means who have had the telephone installed on medical advice as a lifeline rather than a convenience; if he is aware of the anxiety which many of these are now expressing; and what steps he proposes to take to assist them.
    Lieut.-Colonel Cordeauxasked the Postmaster-General if, when the increased telephone charges come into force, he will permit elderly people with small fixed incomes who are living alone to continue paying for the telephone service in their houses at the existing rates.
    Mr. Marples: I have every sympathy with people in such circumstances but, much as I would have liked to avoid tariff increases, it would, I think, be impossible to single out groups for special concessions. Reduced charges to particular groups would need to be made good by higher charges to other telephone subscribers, and this could not be justified.
    Mr. Johnson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that these telephones are not a luxury? They are possibly the only means of summoning aid in case of sickness, and this increase is a very real hardship to these old people. Is he further aware that an ounce of help is worth a pound of sympathy?
    Mr. Marples: I quite agree with my hon. Friend in his last remark but, in practice, it is awfully difficult to know where to draw the line. There are the

    1247
    disabled, the blind and then there are the charitable and social services—and if we have a large category of people and say that we will give them cheaper telephones we will have to look into the bona fides of every applicant and have them continuously under review, which would be rather repugnant to us.
    Mr. Deedes: Would my right hon. Friend consider those who use a telephone as a lifeline and, if it were found that a small number required them, upon a doctor's certificate, would he be prepared to consider anything in that line?
    Mr. Marples: I do not think that I would.
    Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux: May I ask my right hon. Friend not to brush aside these requests quite so brusquely? Does he realise that there are many thousands of people in this country to whom the telephone has given a real feeling of security against illness, accidents and housebreaking, and also a relief against loneliness? These new charges will really be crippling to those people. Does not he feel that this concession would provide concrete evidence that the Government are sincere in their many protestations that they have the interests of this class of people really at heart?
    Mr. Marples: Quite honestly, it that class of person has to be helped, I think it would be better if they were given direct assistance rather than subsidies by the Post Office.
    Mr. W. R. Williams: Will the Minister try to convince his hon. Friends behind him that tomorrow there will be an opportunity for them to assist the old-age pensioners in a much more practical way than the ways they are suggesting this afternoon?

    Telephone Communications (Interception)
    Mrs. Castleasked the Postmaster-General (1)the cost to his Department of the labour and installations required for tapping the telephones and recording the conversations of Mr. Billy Hill;
    (2)tinder what headings in the commercial accounts of his Department are to be found the cost of the premises, installations and labour used for tapping telephones and recording conversations.
    Mr. K. Thompson: As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Home Affairs has told the House, it would not be in the public interest to give information about these operations, either individually or as a whole. As with other expenditure the cost is distributed between appropriate headings in the commercial accounts according to its characteristics, and an equivalent credit is taken under income.
    Mrs. Castle: Is it not outrageous that the House should be denied this information and this possibility of exercising restrictive control over the finances of a Government Department? Is it not a fact that a special room has been opened in London by the Post Office for the tapping of telephones, where there is tape recording machinery installed at considerable cost and where Post Office engineers are involved in the maintaining of these tapping services? Therefore, cannot it be deduced that a considerable part of the increase in telephone charges is due to the increase in telephone tapping?
    Mr. Thompson: I can assure the hon. Lady that any services rendered by the Post Office to other Government Departments are adequately accounted for on the credit side in our accounts.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: To return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle), is it not a form of deception of the House when an item of this sort is buried in the accounts? Does it mean that we are passing accounts of which we have no knowledge? Is that the effect of the hon. Gentleman's reply, and is not that really being unfair to the House?
    Mr. Thompson: I cannot recall protests made by the right hon. Gentleman when previously Government Departments have concealed as much as £100 million of expenditure in a year.
    Mr. Ness Edwards: Will the hon. Gentleman answer the Question? Is he aware that he is deceiving the House in not disclosing the amount which the House passed for this specific purpose?
    Mr. Thompson: It is proper and in accordance with respectable and well-established precedent that in the public interest certain matters should not be revealed.
    Mr. Gibson-Watt: Will my hon. Friend tell us how much tapping was done between 1946 and 1951, and what was the cost of it?
    Mr. Thompson: I have no details of the activities of my predecessors.
    Mr. S. Silverman: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the gentleman referred to in Question No. 9 was apparently the subject of telephone tapping not for security but for police purposes? While one recognises that there has been a long tradition about not answering Questions even about expenditure where the security services are concerned, this has never applied to the police. The accounts of the criminal investigation department and all the other necessarily secret services of the police department have always been subject to the scrutiny of this House. Would he explain further in what way this tradition which he has in mind prevents him from giving the information asked for in Question No. 9?
    Mr. Thompson: Quite clearly it would not be possible to separate some small section of the activities referred to in the Question in the way required, and I have nothing further to add to my original reply.

    Subscribers (Withdrawal Notices)
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Postmaster-General how many telephone subscribers in Scotland have asked for their telephones to be withdrawn since his recent announcement of increased charges.
    Mr. Marples: One thousand and twenty-nine. This figure includes withdrawals for all reasons, and represents less than one quarter of one per cent. of all the telephones at present working in Scotland.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the Postmaster-General tell us if he has made any estimate of the unemployment that may come to Post Office workers if people stop using the telephone? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that while he has been posing as fairy godfather to the Post Office workers some of them may be getting the sack as the result of his policy? Also, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, although we all agree with increasing the standard of
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    life of Post Office workers they are going to suffer as the result of the Government's failure to deal with inflation?
    Mr. Marples: The general secretary of the major union concerned with the Post Office is consulted on important questions of redundancy quite in the early stages and long before it occurs. I can assure the House and the hon. Member that redundancy in the Post Office is dealt with in a very humane way indeed.
    Mr. Gibson: How many telephone subscribers have cancelled their contracts in the London area?
    Mr. Marples: I could not say without notice, but in Scotland, where the people know how to get value for their money, cancellation is relatively less than in England.
    Mr. Russellasked the Postmaster-General how the number of telephone subscribers who have given notice to discontinue their telephones since the announcement of increased charges compares with the number before the announcement; and how many of those on the waiting list have cancelled their applications.
    Mr. Marples: Between my announcement on 18th July and the 26th July about 20,000 withdrawal notices were received. The previous average, for the same length of time, was 4,500. Two thousand outstanding applications were cancelled between 18th and 26th July, this being 200 more than the previous average.

    Kiosk, Ventonleague
    Mr. Haymanasked the Postmaster-General whether he will give special consideration to the need for a rural telephone kiosk at Ventonleague, Hayle, Cornwall, as recommended by the Hayle Parish Council and by the West Penwith Rural District Council.
    Mr. K. Thompson: I shall be glad to do this as soon as a line is available. A new cable will be needed.
    Mr. Hayman: While thanking the Minister for that Answer, may I ask him to bear in mind the fact that a lot of old people live in Ventonleague and that there is great need for a kiosk?
    Mr. Thompson: Yes, we hope to deal with the matter early next year.

    Emergency Calls
    Mr. Atkinsasked the Postmaster-General if he will abolish the charge for an emergency call to the fire, police or ambulance services made from a private telephone, in view of the fact that similar calls from a public call box are free.
    Mr. K. Thompson: No, Sir. I would refer my hon. Friend to my Answer of 3rd July to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wembley, North (Wing Commander Bullus).
    Mr. Atkins: Would it not be more in keeping with the spirit of the age that the Department should be prepared to provide this service free of charge to all people in distress rather than to some of them?
    Mr. Thompson: Strictly speaking, a charge should be levied on all forms of emergency call but because of the difficulty of finding coins to operate a call box we allow these calls free.

  WIRELESS AND TELEVISION

    Television Scripts
    Mr. Roy Jenkinsasked the Postmaster-General whether his attention has been drawn to the breakdown of negotiations between the Television Writers' Council and the independent television programme companies; and what action he proposes to take, in view of the fact that the behaviour of the companies in treating written material sold to one of them as being automatically sold to all of them is a contravention of Section 5 of the Television Act.
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that the Independent Television Authority is in breach of its statutory duty under Section 5 (2)of the Television Act, 1954, in so far as it is allowing programme contractors to set up a cartel preventing competition between them for the rights in television scripts; and what action he is taking.
    Mr. K. Thompson: I understand that this dispute between the Television Writers' Council and the programme contractors has now been brought to the notice of the Independent Television Authority. Section 5 of the Television Act does not apply and my right hon. Friend has no power to intervene.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that this widely representative body has been trying to reach agreement with the programme companies for two-and-a-half years, and that it has become increasingly clear that the programme companies are opposed not so much to any particular terms of the agreement as to the principle of the agreement as such? Is not the one principle on which they appear to stand that written material sold to one programme company is automatically, without any further payment to the author, the property of all the other companies, a clear breach of Section 5 of the Act which says that the companies shall compete?
    Mr. Thompson: I am advised that it is not in contravention of Section 5 of the Act which does not apply to this aspect of what the hon. Gentleman has referred to as competing. In any event, we had better await whatever developments there are from the meetings which probably will follow from the attention of the Authority having been drawn to this dispute.

    Sound Broadcasting
    Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Postmaster-General what discussions he has had with the governors of the British Broadcasting Corporation regarding proposals put forward by a deputation from the Sound Broadcasting Society and communicated to him.
    Mr. K. Thompson: None. Sir. These are matters for the British Broadcasting Corporation.
    Mr. Robinson: Is the assistant Postmaster-General aware that the deputation included Mr. T. S. Eliot, Dr. Vaughan Williams, and Sir Laurence Olivier and reflected the very serious anxiety felt among serious listeners to sound broadcasting? Did not the suggestions made by the deputation merit more than the somewhat offhand reply sent by the Chairman of the B.B.C. Governors? Could not the Postmaster-General at least give an assurance that the B.B.C. will not be forced on grounds of economy to depart from the very high standard of sound broadcasting that has been set in the past?
    Mr. Thompson: We discussed this matter on an Adjournment Motion not

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    very long ago, when I think the burden of what I had to say then to the hon. Gentleman was very much in satisfaction of the question he has now asked.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: Could not the Postmaster-General have answered this Question, dealing with a matter of very high policy for his Department? Will he assure the House that he is aware of the public disquiet on this matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson)?
    Mr. Thompson: My right hon. Friend did me the honour of asking me to reply for him. I think it is within his province to decide that sort of thing, and that it is not for outside interests at all. The fact is that these matters are very properly left to the B.B.C. to decide, and that, unless there is any major departure from general policy by the B.B.C., we must leave it where it is.

    Licences, Sheffield
    Mr. Mulleyasked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that television and wireless licences have not been available in post offices in Sheffield for some days; that applicants have been told that licences will not be issued until 1st August; and by what authority persons are thus encouraged to have a television or radio set without the proper licence.
    Mr. K. Thompson: Television licences renewable on 1st August will not be available until that date. We have asked those seeking to renew in advance television licences not expiring until 31st July to renew them on or shortly after 1st August.
    Mr. Mulley: Does the hon. Gentleman realise that this action on the part of the Post Office, making people renew their licences after the due date with a view to getting extra money, has created a bad impression? Does he realise that it is not really understood by the staff and that people seeking new television licences have been told to wait until 1st August? Is that part of the policy of the Government?
    Mr. Thompson: There would have been little or no advantage to anyone who sought to take out a licence in advance of 1st August. Since licences are dated
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    the first of the month in which application is made for them, we could not issue August licences before 1st August. We should require the Royal Assent to the Finance Bill before doing so.

  ROYAL AIR FORCE

    Married Quarters, Habbaniya
    Sir A. Gomme-Duncanasked the Secretary of State for Air how many airmen's married quarters there are in Habbaniya, Iraq; how many married airmen are waiting for quarters; and when it is expected that those waiting will be accommodated.
    The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. George Ward): There are fifty-four married quarters for airmen at Habbaniya. One hundred and five airmen are on the waiting list. The average waiting period is between nine and twelve months.

    P1 Fighter (Development)
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Secretary of State for Air when he expects to have the English Electric P1 fighter in squadron service.
    Mr. Ward: Development of the P1 is going well, but it is still too early to give a date for its entry to squadrons.
    Mr. de Freitas: Will the Secretary of State carefully avoid the ridiculously optimistic delivery forecasts which his predecessors gave in respect of the Hawker Hunter, because those optimistic forecasts caused great disappointment in the Air Force?
    Mr. Ward: Yes, Sir. I think it is always very dangerous to prophesy in these matters.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: Has an exact study been made of the likely tactical and strategic rôle of this weapon in any conceivable war we are likely to fight? Surely the programme of equipping the Royal Air Force at this time when we are making substantial economies in defence in a rather more vital held should be looked into very carefully?
    Mr. Ward: We have studied very carefully the likely threat in the various years ahead and I can assure my noble Friend that we certainly shall need this aircraft.

    Air Trooping
    Mr. Liptonasked the Secretary of State for Air whether the nationalised air Corporations were allowed to tender for the air trooping contract between Singapore and this country awarded to Airwork and recently extended for a year.
    Mr. Ward: The current contract for air trooping to the Far East and the new contracts which will replace it next September are all long-term contracts and the Corporations were not therefore invited to tender for them.
    Mr. Lipton: Why are the Government so persistent in their campaign not to provide the nationalised air Corporations with the same opportunities for tendering as private firms? Are not Service men entitled to the best possible air trooping facilities quite irrespective of who provides them?
    Mr. Ward: Yes, and there is no reason why they should not be provided with the best possible means of transport by these charter companies, provided the companies are encouraged and not killed.
    Mr. de Freitas: Will the Secretary of State really look at this matter? Why should not the Service men have the best trooping facilities which can be provided by competitive tender open to all British aircraft?
    Mr. Ward: They will be getting them.
    Mr. H. Morrison: Is it not the case that one of the classical doctrines of the Government is to encourage competition? Why is it that in this instance the public Corporations are forbidden to tender by the political acts, discriminatory acts, of Ministers? Why should there be this discrimination merely for the purpose of the Government protecting their friends in private industry?
    Mr. Ward: The policy of the Government has been made quite clear on many occasions, both by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport and myself. We believe that the Corporations should concern themselves primarily with the operation of scheduled services.
    Mr. de Freitas: Will the Secretary of State look again at this matter and consult with his colleagues? It is quite ridiculous that because they are long-term, and, therefore, profitable, these
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    contracts should be given entirely to private companies. Why cannot we have the best that can be produced in British aviation?
    Hon. Members: Answer.
    Mr. Ward: I have already answered that there is no reason on earth why troops being flown by the civil charter companies should not fly in aircraft every bit as good as those which the Corporations can provide.
    Mr. Lipton: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the replies, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment.

    Compensation Scheme
    Mr. de Freitasasked the Secretary of State for Air whether he is aware that under the compensation scheme set out in Command Paper No. 231 a Royal Air Force general duties officer will receive less terminal grant and special capital payment than a Royal Navy officer or an Army Officer retiring at the same age after the same number of years of reckonable service; and whether he will raise the terminal grant and special capital payment for these Royal Air Force officers.
    Mr. Ward: As explained in paragraph 2 of the White Paper, one of the factors which had to be taken into account in devising the scheme of compensation was the period by which service was cut short.
    R.A.F. officers of the general duties branch normally retire at an earlier age than officers of equivalent rank in the other Services. At a given age therefore, their expectation of further service is less and it is reasonable that the special capital payments compensating them for premature retirement should also be less.
    The rates of terminal grant are the same in all three Services.
    Mr. de Freitas: Will the Secretary of State look at this again, because it seems to these general duties officers—and, I understand, it applies also to certain N.C.O. pilots—that they get less compensation than equivalent ranks in the other two Services who have served for the same period of time and who are the same age? It really seems most anomalous.
    Mr. Ward: The comparison is complicated because the scales vary between different branches of each Service to take account of the different retiring ages. We must compare like with like in these matters. If the hon. Member looks, for instance, at the scale for squadron leaders in the R.A.F. Regiment he will find that normally they retire at the age of 45. Therefore, what they get compares with what an Army major who also retires at that age gets.
    Mr. de Freitas: It does not help the general duties officer if the R.A.F. Regiment man does well.
    Mr. Ward: They retire at an earlier age, so they are not giving up so much service.

    Greenham Common Airfield (Noise)
    Mr. Hurdasked the Secretary of State for Air if he is aware of the hardship imposed day and night last week on the people of Newbury and the neighbourhood by the persistent low-flying of jet aircraft operating from Greenham Common airfield; why the noise and vibration have become worse than when this base was in operational use last year; and what action is being taken to mitigate the nuisance.
    Mr. Ward: The programme includes no more flying than took place last year, and the aircraft are of the same type. The U.S.A.F. authorities are doing all they can to reduce the disturbance to an absolute minimum.
    Mr. Hurd: Even though that be so, will my right hon. Friend remind visiting United States Air Force men that ever since his predecessor in office in 1950 agreed to the use of this airfield—only two miles from Newbury—by heavy jet bombers, repeated undertakings have been given to the people of Newbury that everything will be done to restrict, limit and check the amount of noise and nuisance caused? We do not want to have a repetition of the kind of hell that was let loose last week.
    Mr. Ward: I am in constant touch with the United States Air Force authorities on his problem and I am satisfied that they are doing all they can to minimise the noise, but this is a very important N.A.T.O. base. I am sure that anything else they can do they will do.
    Mr. A. Henderson: Can the Secretary of State say whether any progress has been made in the research work that is being carried on with a view to reducing the amount of noise caused by jet engines? Is close contact maintained with the United States authorities, who apparently have stated that they are making very great progress in that direction?
    Mr. Ward: Yes, research is going on to minimise noise on the ground and in the air. Progress is being made on the ground, but noise in the air is a much more difficult problem. Research is continuing.

  RAILWAYS

    Invalid Tricycles (Disabled Civilians)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will give a general direction to the British Transport Commission that the concession now extended to disabled ex-Service men of free journeys on British Railways for their invalid tricycles should be extended to disabled civilians, including sufferers from poliomyelitis.
    The Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Harold Watkinson): While I have every sympathy with disabled civilians, it would not be appropriate that I should give a general direction to the British Transport Commission on this subject.
    Mr. Brockway: I am sure that reply will have been heard with disappointment on all sides of the House. While welcoming the fact that disabled ex-Service men get free transport for their motorised tricycles, may I ask if the needs of polio victims and victims of injuries are not just as great? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the cost of transport of these tricycles for a single journey is actually more than the cost of an ordinary passenger's ticket? Cannot the Minister at least enable this to be done once a year for a return journey for a holiday for these people?
    Mr. Watkinson: The hon. Member and I, with the Commission, have had some correspondence on this subject. He knows, and rightly says, that the Commission is making a good many concessions already to disabled ex-Service men.

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    I am perfectly willing to draw the attention of the Commission to this matter again, but it is only fair to it to say that it has already looked at the question very carefully.

    Stations (Taxi-cab Ranks)
    Mr. Brockwayasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation what conclusions he has now reached regarding the maintenance of privileged taxi-cab ranks at railway stations following his discussion with the British Transport Commission.
    Miss Baconasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he will make a further statement about taxi ranks at stations.
    Mr. Watkinson: I regret that my consideration of this problem with the British Transport Commission is not yet complete.
    Mr. Brockway: As we have been communicating with the right hon. Gentleman's Department on this issue for seven years, will he speed up a decision about it? Does he think that when we resume in November after the Recess he will be able to give a reply to these Questions?
    Mr. Watkinson: The undertaking was given on 5th June, not seven years ago. I then said that I would look into the matter personally with the Chairman of the Commission. Perhaps during the Recess I shall have an opportunity to do So.
    Miss Bacon: In considering the matter, will the right hon. Gentleman take into account the fact that it is not only the amount paid which is in question, but that only a selected few taximen are able to ply for hire?

    TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS (INTERCEPTION)
    Mr. Liptonasked the Prime Minister whether he will now state when the Privy Councillors' report on telephone tapping will be published.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I have been asked to reply.
    I am not in a position to make any statement today.
    Mr. Lipton: That means that we shall not get any statement for many months. Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance, first, that the report of the Privy Councillors, when it is presented, will not be too savagely censored by the Prime Minister, and, secondly, that it will be published, if necessary, during the Recess and not held up until the House reassembles?
    Mr. Butler: I can give no assurance until I see the report and my right hon. Friend sees it, but it is certainly the intention of the Prime Minister to make known all that can be disclosed consistent with the public interest. There is no question of savage censoring.
    Mr. Gaitskell: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall the Prime Minister giving the House an assurance that the decision about what should be published would be left to the Privy Councillors themselves? Will he confer with his right hon. Friend and find out what the position is? Might I also ask him whether, assuming that the report is published during the Recess, the Government will find time for a debate in the first week after we resume?
    Mr. Butler: The latter point, I think, should be discussed through the usual channels, which we might do quite conveniently very soon so that we are able to consider debating this matter at the earliest possible opportunity, if necessary, after our return. With regard to the former point, the interests of the Privy Councillors are, of course, of paramount importance in publishing the document. We must be satisfied that they are satisfied with what is published, and we must also be satisfied that what is published is in the national interest.
    Mr. Gaitskell: The right hon. Gentleman is really evading my question. I asked him whether he will confirm that the Prime Minister told the House that it will be left to the Privy Councillors themselves, with a full sense of responsibility, to decide what to publish in the report?
    Mr. Butler: The right hon. Gentleman has asked me to confer with my right hon. Friend, which I will willingly do. [HON. MEMBERS: "Confirm."] I will both confer and confirm with my right hon. Friend. I cannot divest Her Majesty's Government of all interest in

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    what is published, because of the national interest, nor should I divest the Privy Councillors of the responsibility of publishing what they think is right.
    Mr. Gaitskell: Can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that if there is to be any change from the statement about the matter already made by the Prime Minister it will be announced to the House before we go away for the Recess?
    Mr. Butler: The conference and confirmation which I am to have with my right hon. Friend may well reveal the best result, which can then be disclosed to the right hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Shinwell: Can the right hon. Gentleman say why there has been so much delay in coming to a conclusion on this apparently very simple matter? What is wrong with the Privy Councillors, with very great respect to them? Why is there all this hesitation in coming to a decision? In view of the delay and because we are going on holiday, or shall at least be in recess for three months, may we have an assurance that telephone tapping will be suspended during the Recess?
    Mr. Butler: The answer to the latter part of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question is. "No, Sir". In answer to the earlier part, I think the Privy Councillors have been extremely busy. They were appointed on 29th June, and as far as I know they have made excellent progress with their work. I cannot say anything beyond that.

  TRANSPORT

    Dahl Safety Barrier
    Mr. Gresham Cookeasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether his attention has been drawn to the road safety features of the Dahl safety barrier; and how far experience up-to-date on its use in this country indicates that it is responsible for reducing the number and mitigating the severity of accidents at corners.
    Mr. Watkinson: A number of experimental installations of the Dahl safety barrier have been set up by my Department in conjunction with the Road Research Laboratory. The evidence so
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    far available of the effects on accidents does not enable me to draw reliable conclusions, but I expect to have a report from the Road Research Laboratory in the near future.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Will my right hon. Friend take note that I have seen a demonstration of the Dahl safety barrier and am satisfied that it has considerable safety features? Will he also bear in mind that some county surveyors have reported on it very favourably, and will he watch its progress sympathetically?
    Mr. Watkinson: Yes, Sir.

    Old-age Pensioners (Travel Concessions)
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is aware of the hardship caused in newly developing areas by the provision in existing legislation limiting travel concessions, to old-age pensioners and others, to those routes in operation in 1954; and whether he will introduce amending legislation to provide for the needs of new estates.
    Mr. Watkinson: The purpose of the existing legislation was to avoid the hardship which certain people would have suffered if they had been deprived of benefits which they had been enjoying for some time. I am not prepared to introduce amending legislation.
    Mr. Wilson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the excellent Measure introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Central (Mr. Short)was emasculated in this one respect in order to get it through before the General Election in 1955—and that was at the request of the Government? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in newly developing areas—I would instance the case of Kirkby in my own constituency—old-age pensioners have been moved from the city where they have lived and have lost previously-held concessions at a time when their living costs have risen? Will he agree to receive representations and to study whether more legislation should be introduced?
    Mr. Watkinson: I would certainly not refuse to receive representations. There are, however, two points to be borne in mind, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. One point is that the Act was introduced

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    only because of a decision of the courts which had to be dealt with. The other is that the procedure of Private Bills is open to any authority which wishes to put forward a Private Bill to allow it to make concessions through its own transport.
    Mr. Wilson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he is really running away from the problem? In the case I have in mind the old-age pensioners are now living outside the area of the local authority which is responsible for the transport services. Does he appreciate that the old-age pensioners have lost concessions which they had two years ago and that this is due to their having removed outside the area of the local authority? Will he look into the whole question again?
    Mr. Watkinson: I shall be only too pleased to have representations from the right hon. Gentleman if he likes to make them to me, but it must be without any commitment on my part to introduce legislation.
    Dame Irene Ward: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that if we could fix up something for old-age pensioners generally it would be acceptable? Why do some Ministers argue that they cannot do anything to help old-age pensioners, and then when there is something that can be done the Minister finds difficulty in doing it? Will he give a sympathetic ear to something which at any rate deserves consideration.
    Mr. Watkinson: Perhaps my hon. Friend would like to make her representations, too.
    Dame Irene Ward: I should.
    Mr. Short: Does the right hon. Gentleman appreciate that in the cities and towns where the Act applies, considerable anomalies are arising because of the extension of the towns outside the city boundaries? This also happens in towns where the legislation does not apply. Is he aware that every local authority which has applied for the powers since 1954 has had the appropriate provisions removed
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    from its Bill by the House? Is not it time the Government introduced some general enabling power to enable local authorities to do these things?

    Accident, Newcastle-upon-Tyner
    Mr. Shortasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation whether his regional officials have considered the causes of the accident, involving two deaths, which occurred on 7th July at the junction of Benton Lane and West Farm Avenue, Newcastle-upon-Tyne; and what steps he proposes to take to prevent further accidents at this junction.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. G. R. H. Nugent): I have heard of this unfortunate accident with great regret. As the circumstances in which the accident occurred are still under consideration by the police, I would prefer not to make any further statement at present.
    Mr. Short: Is the Minister aware that two of my constituents were killed in the unfortunate accident, and that certain measures have been taken at the junction but, because it is a very deceiving junction, they are quite inadequate? Will he please do something more soon and not wait until another fatal accident occurs there?
    Mr. Nugent: The junction was substantially reconstructed last year, but if the hon. Member has any suggestions as to how it might be further improved, I should be very willing to listen to them.

    A.5—A.38 Crossing
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation if he is aware of the delay caused to motor vehicles where road A.5 crosses A.38; and what his proposals are to improve this crossing.
    Mr. Nugent: Yes, Sir. We are considering the possibility of constructing a new section of A.5 from its southern junction with A.38 to a point on A.5 west of Wall. This would obviate the need for "Halt" signs.

ST. JAMES'S THEATRE
Mr. K. Robinsonasked the Minister of Housing and Local Government what are the intentions of Her Majesty's Government with regard to St. James's Theatre.
The Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs (Mr. Henry Brooke): The House will be aware that a Motion was carried in another place last night by 22 votes to 18 in the following terms:
"That in the opinion of this House no action should be taken to demolish or otherwise prejudice the continued use of St. James's Theatre as a theatre pending a decision on the matter by both Houses of Parliament."
I thought it right to invite Mr. Fenston, believing him to be the present owner of the theatre, to come and see me today, in order that I might communicate to him officially the terms of the Motion carried in another place.
I must make it clear to the House that nothing can secure the continued use of St. James's Theatre as a theatre unless the owner is willing to have it used as such, or is willing to sell it to someone who will so use it.
Mr. Robinson: Is it not a fact that the right hon. Gentleman has the power, if he wishes to use it, to preserve this theatre? Does he not recognise the widespread support there is for this campaign to save the theatre, and the many offers of financial help, including one from his right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill)? Will he not, even at this eleventh hour, recognise his public duty and alter the decision that he has reached? How can he ignore the decision of another House, expressed in very clear terms, merely because it was carried against the advice of the Government?
Mr. Brooke: The action that I could take would be to direct the London County Council, as planning authority, to revoke the planning permission which it gave. That, of course, would not in any way secure the continuance of the St. James's Theatre in use as a theatre. The present owner could turn it into a cinema or to other uses, so that it is a complete error to suppose that all this turns on the revocation of the
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planning permission. The revocation would, of course, involve a substantial sum by way of compensation, and I explained the position in an Answer that I gave yesterday to my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Teeling).
I am not sure whether the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson)is asking me to make a building preservation order under the Town and Country Planning Act. A building preservation order can be made by the planning authority or, in default, by the Minister, but it is my duty under that Act to take expert advice, and I have an Advisory Committee on Buildings of Historic and Architectural Interest. That Committee has expressed the view to my predecessor that this is not a building that deserves to be put on the statutory list. In those circumstances, I do not think that I would be right to reverse the decision that I have already announced to the House.
Mr. Gresham Cooke: Has my right hon. Friend seen the opinion of a prominent architect that this is really a second-rate building, and not very convenient as a theatre?
Mr. Brooke: I am aware that, in different quarters, very different opinions are held on this matter.
Mr. G. R. Strauss: The Minister will surely not deny that, if he wants to use it, he has the power to get the London County Council to revoke this licence. The question that we want the Minister to answer is this. In view of the decision of the House of Lords yesterday, and of the undoubted fact that practically all the people in this country who are interested in the welfare of the arts are most anxious to preserve this theatre, will he approach Mr. Fenston and express to him not only the decision of the House of Lords but the general desirability that, if possible—and if the money is available that appears to be available, and on which the whole question of preserving and maintaining the theatre hinges—the theatre should be preserved?
Mr. Brooke: If I were to direct the London County Council to revoke its planning permission, that would, of course, involve the payment of a substantial sum by way of compensation,

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half of which would fall on the ratepayers of London and half on the general taxpayers. But it would by no means preserve the St. James's Theatre for use as a theatre. That would depend on the action of the owner.
I should make it clear that I acted quickly in this matter. I have already seen Mr. Fenston.
Mr. Walter Elliot: Does not my right hon. Friend admit that this, by universal agreement, was got through by a slip—a mistake—and that, in fact, there is no reason why a similar set of arguments should not be adduced in favour of demolishing the whole of this quarter of London? There are many, or several, small buildings, that give character to that part of London, that are of no particular architectural or historic interest in themselves; yet the destruction of them would greatly alter the character of that part of London. Is it not desirable that this piece of rank bad planning should be revoked?
Mr. Brooke: As to other theatres in the West End of London, if my right hon. Friend is referring to them, my predecessor has already written words into the London Development Plan which will ensure that a decision on a planning application which would have the effect of converting a building now in use as a theatre to offices, or demolishing a theatre for the purpose of building an office, will not be reached until the matter has been fully ventilated.
But I must emphasise to my right hon. Friend, whose sympathies in this matter I fully understand, that the problem would not be solved by the revocation of planning permission. The problem will be solved only if the present owner is prepared to decide to keep the theatre in use as a theatre or, alternatively, is willing to sell it to a purchaser who will do that.
Mr. Bellenger: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the interior of this theatre, as is the case with many other London theatres, does not come up to the requirements of those who pay to listen to the actors who are now causing widespread agitation for their own publicity?
Mr. Brooke: I am aware that this theatre has great theatrical associations
1268
and, at the same time, that it has internal defects from the audience's point of view.
Mr. H. Morrison: Is the Minister aware that there are a good many of us on this side who agree with his resistance to the pressure being put upon him? Is he aware that the London County Council is a popularly elected public authority of considerable magnitude and importance and that it has taken all the matters into consideration, including the consequences that he has mentioned? Would it not be a serious thing for this House to press the Minister to over-ride an elected local authority that has taken all the considerations into account? How long has it been the practice that Members of this House of Commons, the supreme House of Parliament, should urge that a decision of another place, on a private Member's Motion, should determine the action of the Government?
Mr. Brooke: Mr. Speaker, I have sought to be completely frank with the House. I am the Minister responsible, and it seemed right to communicate the decision of another place as rapidly as possible to the present owner of the theatre. I have, in addition, answered the Private Notice Question which was put to me, and I have explained as clearly as I can the position as I see it. I stand by what I have said.
Mr. Walter Elliot: Is my right hon. Friend not aware that that piece of rank bureaucratic complacency which we have just heard from the right hon. Gentleman opposite is exactly the sort of thing which makes us distrustful of the judgment which has been arrived at—[An HON. MEMBER: "Get back over the Border."]—and that if it were not for us provincials coming down here the prosperity of London would be very much less than it is? This is exactly the case where the provincials desire to rescue London from the unfortunate consequences of its bureaucratic officialdom.
Dr. Stross: Is it not a fact that, despite the safeguards that now pertain due to the action of the Minister's predecessor, there is literally nothing that can prevent the owner of a theatre pulling down his theatre and leaving an open space until the pressure of the ulginess created will force the London County Council to allow the owner to build again?
Mr. Brooke: I certainly agree that there is nothing which can compel the present owner of the theatre to retain a theatre on that site.
Several Hon. Members Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. There is no Question before the House. This is not the occasion on which we can debate this very interesting matter.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): May I make a short statement on business?
As the Motion relating to my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Mr. N. Macpherson), the Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, remains on the Order Paper, it will be set down for consideration at the beginning of business tomorrow, Thursday, before the Opposition Motion relating to retirement pensions is moved.

BILL PRESENTED
  NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (AMENDMENT)(No. 2)
  Bill to amend section thirty-eight of the National Health Service Act, 1946, and for purposes connected therewith, presented by Mr. John Hall; supported by Mr. Ronald Bell; read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 126.]

CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT, 1907 (AMENDMENT)
Mr. Montgomery Hyde: I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to provide for leave to appeal to the House of Lords in criminal matters being determined without a certificate of the Attorney-General.
The Bill which I am seeking leave of the House to introduce this afternoon has a simple and straightforward object. It also has the support of hon. Members of all parties. It is to put appeals from the Court of Criminal Appeal to the highest judicial court in the land, that is, the House of Lords, on the same footing as appeals in civil matters in this country and appeals in criminal matters from the colonial courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
At present, an appeal to the House of Lords from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal can only be brought by leave of the Attorney-General who issues a certificate, or fiat as it is sometimes called, for this purpose. The intention of this Bill is to dispense with that requirement and to leave it to a judicial body, namely, the House of Lords itself, acting through its Appeals Committee, to decide whether a prima facie case has been made out for bringing such an appeal.
I wish to make it clear at the outset that in asking leave to introduce this Bill I am not making adverse reflections on the conduct of my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General or any of his predecessors in office in exercising this power of granting or withholding a certificate. Indeed, throughout the past half century, during which they have exercised this power, it is right to say that successive Attorneys-General have, by and large, been more than fair to appellants and, in some cases, have granted certificates when the Law Lords would have refused leave to appeal if the matter had rested with them.
In one such case, which was heard on appeal by the House of Lords in 1918, the late Lord Sumner defined the Attorney-General's power in these words:
"The certificate of the Attorney-General, which is the condition precedent to an appeal to your Lordships' House from a decision of

1271
the Court of Criminal Appeal, is granted in his discretion and is the subject neither of review nor of criticism …"
That did not prevent Lord Sumner from proceeding to criticise the then Attorney-General in the strongest possible terms for allowing an appeal to be brought which, in Lord Sumner's view, should never have been brought at all.
Until 1907, there were no means whereby a person convicted at assizes or the Old Bailey could appeal against the judgment of the court. The Criminal Appeal Act, which was passed in that year, altered the position by creating the Court of Criminal Appeal, consisting of the Lord Chief Justice and the other judges of the King's Bench Division, and also providing in certain circumstances for appeals from that court to the House of Lords.
The relevant section of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, is as follows:
"If in any case the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the Prosecutor, or defendant, obtains the certificate of the Attorney-General that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal involves a point of law of exceptional public importance, and that it is desirable in the public interest that a further appeal should be brought, he may appeal from that decision to the House of Lords …."
There are, therefore, three points which must be satisfied before the Attorney-General issues his certificate. The ground must be a point of law; it must be one of exceptional public importance; and it must be in the public interest that the appeal should be brought.
I think it is right to say that when the Liberal Attorney-General, Sir John Lawson Walton, in 1907, was moving the original Clause, it contained no reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and it was only at the instigation of a Member on this side of the House, Mr. Cave, later Lord Chancellor, who asked that the Director of Public Prosecutions should be responsible in case the prosecutor appealed from the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal, that the Director of Public Prosecutions' name was inserted in the Clause.
Therefore, the Attorney-General did that at the same time and added the phrase about public interest, so that it should be clear that the Attorney-General would issue his certificate in the case of such an appeal only where he considered
1272
that it was in the public interest that the Director of Public Prosecutions should appeal.
The reason why I am opposed to the continuance of the present system does not rest upon technical grounds. It is a matter of principle. My reason is that the question whether the appellant in a criminal case in the Court of Criminal Appeal—he may be either the prosecutor or the defendant—should or should not go to the House of Lords ought not to be decided by a Minister of the Crown—that is, the Executive which is responsible for the prosecution. It ought to be the decision of a judicial body. This body, in my submission, should be an absolutely impartial body which can weigh the evidence as between the subject and the Crown, removed from any possibility of political considerations or prejudices.
When the Clause was originally moved by Sir John Lawson Walton, he said that its object was this:
"In cases where strong public feeling was excited and jurists were divided in opinion, it was only the judgment of the highest court of the realm that would be universally accepted."—[Parliamentary Debates, 19th July, 1907; Vol. 178, c. 1063.]
Some people, particularly some lay members of the public, think that this object has not always been achieved, and certainly one experienced criminal lawyer, who is now a judge at the Old Bailey, his honour Judge Maude, a Member of this House in 1948—he was then Member for Exeter—had this to say—and I apologise for this quotation, but I think it is very important:
"… I believe that the present situation is intolerable … Take, for example, an ordinary murder case. There, the ordinary practise is that either the counsel appointed by the Attorney-General—counsel to the Treasury at the Old Bailey, or, in the provinces, counsel nominated by the Attorney General of the day—appear for the prosecution. The man, who now, possibly, is about to be hanged, then feels that it would be wise, in view of what has been said by his legal advisers, to appeal to the House of Lords, because he believes there is a matter of law involved which is of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be allowed. No one in his senses, if he came from a foreign country, would imagine that the English Parliament had so arranged matters that it was impossible for such a person to go to the House of Lords, unless consent was obtained from the head of the Department responsible for the prosecution or … from the very person who may

1273
have appeared for the Crown, particularly for example in a poisoning case …."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee A, 9th March, 1948; c. 1387–8.]
The cases which have disturbed the public mind have been those in which the barrister in charge of the prosecution has been the person who refused the certificate. The most notorious and often quoted case is the prosecution of Sir Roger Casement for treason, in 1916. I myself believe that there is little doubt that the Attorney-General was right in law in refusing a certificate, but to the outside public it did not seem to be in accordance with the British tradition of justice and fair play that the decision should have been taken by the barrister who conducted the case for the Crown throughout, and conducted it with some heat, since, as Sir F. E. Smith, and later, Lord Birkenhead, he was bitterly opposed politically to the prisoner.
More recently, there has been the case of John Willson Vickers. I do not wish to say much about that, because it is to be discussed tomorrow. No doubt, in refusing his fiat, my right hon. and learned Friend gave the matter his fullest consideration, as, indeed, he has himself told the House. What the public, particularly the lay public, finds difficult to appreciate, particularly the public outside the House, is why my right hon. and learned Friend found himself unable to certify that a point of law of exceptional public importance was involved when, first of all, the Lord Chief Justice in the Court of Criminal Appeal has said that the case was one of great importance, and, secondly——
Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman should not anticipate tomorrow night's business. I understand that his Bill states a general proposition. Although he may illustrate it by examples, I think that he should avoid an example which is to be the subject of discussion tomorrow night.
Mr. Hyde: With all respect, Mr. Speaker, I did say that I did not wish to say anything more about that, except to remind the House that it was a case which had excited a certain amount of public feeling.
There is a very old legal maxim which must be familiar to everyone in the House:
"Let justice be done, though the heavens fall."
I have been trying to find out when this maxim was first referred to in this country, and I have discovered that the earliest reference to it was in 1603, by a barrister of the Middle Temple, John Manningham, who was, I believe, an ancestor of my right hon. and learned Friend. By another coincidence, the first word of this maxim in Latin is "fiat", in the phrase "Fiat justitia"—"Let justice be done".
So long as my right hon. Friends fiat is required for these appeals, justice may well continue to be done, but, in my submission, it cannot be seen to be done with that clarity and certainty which we in this country have been accustomed for generations to expect under our judicial system. That is the primary reason that I now seek the leave of the House to introduce the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Hyde, Sir Beverley Baxter, Sir Robert Boothby, Mr. de Freitas, Mr. Donnelly, Mr. Gower, Mr. Grimond, Viscount Hinchingbrooke, and Mr. Hector Hughes.

CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT, 1907 (AMENDMENT)
  CRIMINAL APPEAL ACT, 1907 (AMENDMENT)
  Bill to provide for leave to appeal to the House of Lords in criminal matters being determined without a certificate of the Attorney-General, presented accordingly and read the First time; to be read a Second time Tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 125.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION)BILL
  Considered in Committee; reported, without Amendment.
  Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES
  3.58 p.m.
  Mr. Alfred Robens: It was inevitable, when the Government announced their new defence policy in their White Paper, that there would be a great deal of disturbance in industries supplying the Armed Forces and repercussions in other supplying industries. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Royal Ordnance factories maintained and managed by the Ministry of Supply should form the subject of a short debate this afternoon, because, as the Minister has already said, about 7,000 of his employees will be declared redundant over the next two and a half years. Therefore, all the difficulties which go with the transfer of established staff, and so on, will have to be met.
  I do not propose to deal with any particular factories, because in the very short time at our disposal many constituency points will require to be put by hon. Members, on both sides of the House who have detailed knowledge of the factories in their areas and will express the considerable anxiety that the proposed changes cause to individuals. Although the unsettlement may not appear to be large in the context of the whole employable population, nevertheless to those affected within their communities it is a matter of grave anxiety.
  I hope that hon. Members, recognising that we have only three hours for this debate, will exercise a self-denying ordinance and say what they have to say in the shortest possible time, so that as many constituency points as possible may be put by hon. Members. For my part, I shall do my utmost to set a commendable example by the brevity with which I introduce this subject.
  I have already said that there is bound to be a good deal of disturbance, physical
  1276
  and otherwise, to the people employed in these factories. I want to say right away, as one who has had experience in the industrial field, that I always regard it as a very bad principle to move people from the place where they are living and from the factories in which they have been accustomed to work. I have always regarded it as a much better principle to bring the work to where the people live, to where they have their homes and the facilities exist and where the local authorities have provided all the necessary services within the community.
  In the organisation of our industry, we ought as far as possible to utilise to 100 per cent. all the factory capacity that we have available. An empty factory in Britain today is, in my opinion, an indication of gross inefficiency on somebody's part whilst, at the same time, vast factory buildings are being erected and others extended in other parts of the country. Therefore, when any factory, whether Government or privately owned, becomes empty, there is no reason why every effort should not be made to bring work to that factory. If possible, the work brought to it should be within the compass of the workers already attached to the factory. In other words, if a factory were to have 1,000 workers declared redundant, it would be wrong to turn it into a warehouse employing only a small number of people, probably mostly unskilled.
  All this requires a good deal of planning and effort. Our complaint today is that we do not feel that the Minister of Supply and his advisers have done all that they can to mitigate what I regard as a serious nuisance to those concerned and they have not done all that they can to use efficiently the vacant factory space that is bound to result from their decision. That is why we want to put to the right hon. Gentleman a number of suggestions to help these factories to remain under Government control and, above all, to preserve the teams of workers that have been got together, with great effort, over a number of years and who have learned to work and to use their skills together for the good of the nation. It is important that personnel within the factories should be maintained as far as possible as teams.
  The question is: can this be done? Is it possible for these factories, for which there is no further work because of the

  1277
  complete change in our defence methods, to continue with some other production that can maintain the personnel as a team? Let us consider why we have Royal Ordnance factories at all. The Minister will agree that they have two main purposes. The first is to provide for the current needs of the Armed Forces and the second is to maintain a reserve capacity for a military emergency.
  I know that the right hon. Gentleman has some views about the second of those purposes, the maintenance of a reserve capacity for a military emergency. He probably holds the view that there would be no long-term war if such an eventuality happened again and that we do not, therefore, need to reserve what we used to call "shadow" factories, working on other productive processes but readily available to turn back to a military purpose. I imagine that the right hon. Gentleman does not believe that that is likely to happen in any future war.
  I accept that there might not be the same scale of requirement for the shadow factory as such, but I do believe that it will be necessary to have a reserve capacity for military emergency, and it is highly important that that emergency reserve capacity for the production of armaments should be under Government control and Government auspices. I would regret very much indeed if the Government were to proceed with their schemes for selling or leasing the Royal Ordnance factories, except under certain stringent conditions, with which I shall deal presently.
  The assumption in closing the Royal Ordnance factories is not that there will be insufficient armaments work, even under the revised defence programme, for these 23 factories. It would be absurd to suggest that we could not keep 23 factories going on the contracts that will have to be placed, even after the cuts are made. But the traditional work is going out, the work that has been done in these factories—certainly, in the case of Woolwich—for several hundred years, and the new work on guided missiles, electronics, atomic energy, and the rest, has been moving over steadily to private enterprise, where it very largely remains. That is another quarrel that we have with the Government.
  I think I would be expressing the views of my hon. Friends if I say that we believe
  1278
  that, while we have to have armaments, they should as far as possible be produced under Government control. That is the principle which we would try to operate ourselves as a Government. We recognise, however, that a good many of the defence weapons are associated with some other aspect of work that is done in factories owned by private enterprise. It has frequently been the case that research work and work on prototypes has been done under Government auspices and then transferred to private enterprise to carry it out.
  It is because the Government have neglected to take into consideration the change which is required in the Royal Ordnance factories, if they are to retain control of the manufacture of defence weapons, that they have now reached a situation in which they find that at least seven of the factories under their control are completely obsolete and none of the new weapons can be put into these factories, for the simple reason that the Government have virtually pushed over the whole of the new weapon manufacture into the hands of private enterprise. We think that that is a mistake.
  The research teams should have been built up and some of these factories could have provided the nucleus for first-class work on research, prototypes, and so on, which, done in conjunction with private enterprise, because of the scale of production, would enable, at the time when these things were, unfortunately, necessary, a very big speed-up in production to be achieved and would enable the requirements of the Services to be met without let or hindrance.
  There are four possibilities that lie before the Government and which were outlined in the recent statement by the Ministry of Supply. First, there is the possibility that if the Government accept the principle that they should keep these factories and the personnel as teams together, they could put into the factories other Government work than armaments. The right hon. Gentleman, as Minister of Supply, is the biggest contractor or supplier to the Government as a whole. Therefore, in the placing of contracts, the question of placing other Government work in the Royal Ordnance factories which he now contemplates closing is a matter within his personal control.

  1279
  There is no reason at all, as I have previously said, why he should not introduce much more speedily than apparently he is work on the new sort of atom age weapons which inevitably will be required. He has said he will do what he can to place the production of these new weapons in the Royal Ordnance factories. We have talked to officials of the trade unions and representatives of the workers in these factories, and they advise us that they have seen very little of that being done.
  There are some grave allegations that a great deal of the work which was being done in those factories and could be done in those factories has been transferred from the Royal Ordnance factories to private enterprise. I am not saying that these allegations are right or wrong. I am asking whether they are right or whether they are wrong, because it is important that matters such as these should be cleared up.
  The second possibility is to provide brand new work for the factories but entirely on Government account or on account of the nationalised industries. A vast amount of supplies is required by the Government in one way or another, and a vast amount of supplies is required by the nationalised industries.
  The third possibility is to lease the factories to private enterprise. I regard that as most unsatisfactory. In the first place, in leasing a factory to private enterprise there is no guarantee that the labour associated with the factory will be the labour the new tenant of the factory requires. If it is not, then that labour team will be broken up. In the second place, the right hon. Gentleman is not in a position to give anybody security of tenure. At any moment, he may have to say, "I am very sorry, but within a month this factory must make atom age weapons and we must get it back to the work it was doing."
  The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head, as much as to say that that is not so, but I can tell him that H. J. Heinz and Company are leaving the factory at Standish and building a new factory because they cannot get security of tenure. A firm will not develop its organisation at a factory it leases unless it can be guaranteed the tenure of the premises it is occupying and can know that it may
  1280
  remain in possession of the premises for a considerable time. If these factories are to be regarded as "shadow" factories, to revert to Government work if an emergency arises, then, of course, no security of tenure can be given to the premises, and the tenant must be ready to get out quickly. Indeed, if the factories are to be "shadow" factories that is a reason why they should remain under Government control and not be leased, even if that means that they are employed on work other than that which they are now doing.
  The fourth possibility is that the Government should sell the factories to private enterprise. I understand that the right hon. Gentleman has stated that he is thus disposing of a factory in Scotland to a well-known firm of boiler makers. I would myself consider that to be a great mistake, for some of the reasons which I have explained.
  If the right hon. Gentleman is anxious to maintain these factories at a high level of employment, and with the skilled labour they have, it will be his duty to make a great deal of extra effort to try to bring that about. He will remember that a number of these factories, including some which, he has announced, he is about to close, were specially placed in areas where there was a high degree of unemployment. It would be quite wrong at this stage to close a factory in an area where there may be unemployment.
  My hon. Friends who represent the Potteries have made this point in defence of the factory at Swynnerton, where unemployment is higher than the average. Why add to that unemployment? To close that factory will only add to the unemployment in that area. The established staff will have to be found jobs elsewhere, and if, for instance, they were to be sent to the North-East for jobs—and that area has an unemployment problem—that would mean that, say, 300 established staff already in the North-East would have to be pushed out to make room for 300 established people from Swynnerton. This means simply pushing the unemployment round the country. That is not a very sensible thing to do.
  I shall not say much about the Swynnerton factory, because so much has been said about it already in the House by hon. Friends of mine——
  Mr. Ellis Smith: And a lot more will be said about it yet.
  Mr. Robens:—and if my hon. Friends catch the eye of the Chair they will say a good deal more yet about Swynnerton.
  There is, however, one question I would ask the right hon. Gentleman about it. I understand that this factory is well qualified in pyrotechnics, and I would ask the right hon. Gentleman whether that work is to be sent out to private enterprise. That is one of the allegations to which I referred a little while ago, and it is extremely serious. I cannot understand why, when a nationalised industry like the coal mining industry uses an enormous amount of explosives, a factory like this cannot do some of that explosives work for the nationalised industry.
  I understand that the British Oxygen Company is building, with Government aid, a huge new plant for the production of new-style weapons which, I am advised, could be produced, if some small changes were made in the factory, at one of these Royal Ordnance factories which is to be closed. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will tell us whether that is right or not. I am also told that an immense amount of money is having to be spent on adapting the most difficult of these factories to other production, but the layout of explosives factories and their machinery are not dissimilar from those employed on making fertilisers, and it would seem that that could be another way in which the right hon. Gentleman should be able to use his factory space.
  Because of the time limit that there is on this debate I have tried to put the case for the Royal Ordnance factories in the shortest possible time, and now I will summarise what I have said. First, we are clear that these factories should remain in Government ownership. We are clear that the factories and their manpower should be kept together for useful production for the benefit of the nation as a whole. We think it is important to keep their productive capacity in being. We are satisfied that useful work can be found for the factories.
  I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to consider this suggestion. If he really believes, as we do, that he ought to keep these factories under his control for the reasons which have been stated, why does
  1282
  he not use the machinery in which he sometimes takes a pride, machinery in his own Department, the Ministry of Supply Joint Industrial Council, which represents the workers in the factories, on the one side, and his officials and himself on the managerial side, to inquire into the future of the factories? Why does he not set up a joint working party representative of both sides to examine carefully the proposals he has made, and to consult the nationalised industries and other Government Departments, which are purchasers of a tremendous amount of equipment?
  I said other Government Departments, but I am thinking not only of the General Post Office, for instance, but of the Atomic Energy Commission, and, also, I am thinking of the vast electrical programme of the Central Electricity Generating Board. Then there is the railway modernisation programme. The productive capacity of many factories will have to be increased to deal with the orders to help with that programme. There is a vast number of outlets. There would appear on the surface to be a vast number of opportunities available of useful work for the Royal Ordnance factories, work which they can do while being maintained under Government control and remaining as production reserves in time of emergency.
  I believe that the workers at the Royal Ordnance factories have a point of view which should not be ignored. I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that he set up a working part of the Joint Industrial Council, giving it a reasonably free hand to consult the other Government Departments and public authorities. They will know precisely what can be done, what adaptations in the various factories may be required to enable them to do the work which is readily available. There is time for this, because under his own programme he is not to close the factories for some considerable time.
  These factories can make a very valuable contribution to the nation's economy. I urge the right hon. Gentleman to utilise this factory space which is available, to keep these teams of skilled people together, and so to keep always this adequate and useful production reserve for the Government in time of emergency. I hope that in replying to the debate the right hon. Gentleman

  1283
  will say he is quite prepared to have such a working party examine the proposals he has made.
  4.20 p.m.
  The Minister of Supply (Mr. Aubrey Jones): The right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens)has expressed himself with brevity and temperateness and I hope that I shall succeed in following his example. He confined himself to issues of general policy. Again, I will try to follow him, and possibly, later, my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary will deal with points raised in the debate. I do not agree with all the points of view put forward, but perhaps it would be better if I started with the area of agreement and proceeded insensibly to areas of disagreement.
  First, I agree that, certainly in the short term, the most important industrial effect of the Defence White Paper is on the Royal Ordnance Factories. In the longer term its importance to the aircraft industry is much the greater, but in the immediate future I agree that it is the Royal Ordnance factories that receive the heavier blow. The whole history of the Royal Ordnance factories since the war has been an extremely fluctuating one, reflecting the fluctuating demand for arms. I do not want to bore the House, but the history is somewhat relevant to the points at issue between us.
  When the war ended, there were 44 Royal Ordnance factories. The post-war Labour Government decided to retain 21 for the two purposes mentioned by the right hon. Member for Blyth—to meet the current demands of the Services and to provide a reserve of capacity for emergency. It so happened that, on the morrow of the war, the Services no longer needed equipment. They were choc-a-bloc with it and, at the same time, there was a great dearth of civil goods. Since the whole problem of moving over from war to peace was rather formidable it was thought right, and I am not disposed to question it, to mitigate the problem by introducing civil production into the Royal Ordnance factories, but, and this is very relevant, only five years later we had the Korean war and with it the threat of a still bigger conflict.
  Civil production was hastily thrown out. Machinery was discarded, even
  1284
  before it had amortised itself, and civil production gave way once again to the production of arms. Indeed, the demand for arms arising out of the Korean War overflowed the Royal Ordnance factories, and private industry had once again to be pressed into arms production. Not only was this happening at home, but foreign countries were rearming, too, and certain export orders came the way of the Royal Ordnance factories. All in all, the Royal Ordnance factories were fully employed, but in the last two or three years a change has been taking place.
  One cannot indefinitely go on with rearmament when there is no war. Demand for armaments has been declining on all the counts that I have mentioned. This change was in being before the Defence White Paper was issued, though I grant that the Defence White Paper has aggravated the change. The decision to move from a large conscript force to a smaller volunteer force, for instance, aggravates the change, but the decline was already there. This is not the only change, and for my part. I do not think that it is even the change of greatest significance.
  There is a still more significant change. It is a change in our conception of the size of the reserve capacity which ought to be held against a state of emergency. When the Labour Government, in 1945–46, decided on the retention of 21 factories—it was only later that the number grew to 23—the emergency which they had in mind was a repetition of the 1939–45 war. In such a war, the first brunt of arms production would fall on the Royal Ordnance factories. They would hold the breach, as it were, until private industry had moved over from peace to war and subsequently come to their aid.
  How many of us really believe that the emergency facing us now is of that kind? The right hon. Member for Blyth tended to the view that I thought that no reserve capacity ought to be held against an emergency at all. I do not take that view. We need a reserve of capacity for limited war. If I may express a personal view, I would deprecate so great a preoccupation with total war that we failed to provide for the needs of a limited war.
  Mr. Denis Healey: The right hon. Gentleman should tell the Minister of Defence.
  Mr. Jones: I am not in any way disagreeing with my right hon. Friend, but the reserve of capacity needed for limited war is much smaller than that appropriate to the last war.
  As to major global wars, we hope that they do not come—God forfend—but, if they do, they would be fought with nuclear weapons. In that case the war, instead of moving up to a climax as did the last war, would show its violent phase in its opening, initial period. In other words, the old conception of the Royal Ordnance factories holding the industrial breach, so to speak, while the rest of industry came to help them, is now out-of-date. That is the real change.
  Some hon. Friends of mine, a few years ago, blazoned on their shield, "Change is our ally". I do not think that I would go so far as that in this context, and I am not sure what the phrase means, but when a change in circumstances like this takes place we ought to adjust ourselves to it. I agree with the right hon. Member for Blyth that we ought to do what we can to mitigate the change, and I should like to examine what we can do.
  When I made my statement on the Royal Ordnance factories I was asked by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition whether, for the conventional arms, those factories would be given preference. The answer is, "Yes". The right hon. Member for Blyth, without quoting details, referred in general to the fact that certain contracts were with outside private firms. I am perfectly happy to examine individual cases, but what happened was that, at the height of the Korean rearmament boom, private industry was brought into arms production. There still may be relics of that state of affairs, and orders then placed not yet fully discharged.
  The policy now is that the Royal Ordnance factories shall be given preference, with one important qualification. I have a duty, and I fully accept it, to the Royal Ordnance factories and those employed in them, but I also have a duty to the Armed Forces. It might well be that occasions might arise when, for instance, the interests of the Services were better served by a design developed by an outside firm. Were that to be the case, it would be right that production should follow. In other words, the Royal Ordnance factories must not get
  1286
  into the habit of thinking that they have an automatic protection.
  Subject to that, other things being equal, they will be regarded as preferred sources and, granted a lessened demand for arms, I think that private firms would accept that.
  Dr. Barnett Stross: Does the right hon. Gentleman's statement mean that, from now on, if in a Royal Ordnance factory a weapon was developed it would not then be handed over to private enterprise for contracts?
  Mr. Jones: By and large, yes. The right hon. Member for Blyth made the point. As far as I am concerned, design and development, on the one hand, and production, on the other, ought to go together. There may be exceptional instances, but, generally, I see no reason why they should be segregated.
  The right hon. Member for Blyth spoke about the newer weapons, and he asked whether they could be introduced into the Royal Ordnance factories. To some extent, they already are introduced. Royal Ordnance factories are already producing rocket launchers and rocket components, and have started electronic repair work, but I hope that none of us will fall into the mistake of thinking that guided weapons can be a substitute for the mass production of the conventional arms which we have had in the past.
  The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), who is not present today, is always asking probing questions about the price of guided weapons. Obviously, I cannot always give details, but the fact is that they are extremely expensive. We cannot, therefore, produce the expensive en masse. But that is not the only difficulty. I think the right hon. Gentleman who opened the debate accused me, not in so many words, but certainly by implication, of ideological prejudice in placing orders for guided weapons with private firms.
  As a matter of fact, guided weapons did not begin with me. They did not even begin with a Tory Government. They began long before, in 1948–49, when right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite were in office. It was right hon. Gentlemen opposite who took the decision to place the design and development

  1287
  of two aspects of guided weapons—flight and guidance—with the appropriate industries, aircraft and electronics. They could not, in the circumstances of those days, have done differently, because the Royal Ordnance factories were reasonably fully employed and the Ministry of Supply's own establishments were fully engaged on basic research.
  If it is now suggested to me that I should reverse the procedure, let us look at the difficulties I shall get into. The Royal Ordnance factories will have to re-man themselves with a new type of technician such as they have not got, and re-equip themselves with facilities which they do not possess, and they can only do this by duplicating what is already present elsewhere. In other words, to do this, I would plug the hole in the Royal Ordnance factories at the cost of creating holes elsewhere in the aircraft and electronic industries. With the best will in the world, this suggestion does not make sense.
  Mr. J. T. Price: On the question of research and development and production going together, which I understand to be the principle which the Minister has ended by favouring, is it not a fact that, as far as rockets are concerned, a tremendous amount of research and development is going on at his own Ministry of Supply establishment at Pyestock? Where does the gap arise between capital expenditure devoted to research and development needed for such processes and the manufacture on licence of the actual weapons themselves?
  Mr. Jones: I think there is some confusion here. The basic, fundamental, theoretical research is going on in Ministry of Supply establishments, but the development of weapons and engines, for that is what we are talking about in the main guided weapon field, is done by private firms. My establishments are not equipped to do it. There is a distinction between theoretical research and applied research.
  I was seeking ways and means of mitigating the problem of excess capacity in certain limited ways, and I concede that we can mitigate it, but I would emphasise that the ways are limited. We are still faced with the question that we have more Royal Ordnance factories than
  1288
  is warranted in the changed strategic circumstances, even admitting the need to retain a certain reserve, which I do admit. The problem is what do we do with the factories? Do we retain them in Government possession and turn them over to civilian production, or transfer them to private firms already engaged in civilian production?
  I was not clear about the point of view which was being put by the right hon. Gentleman opposite. As I understood him, he was saying that the factories should be retained primarily for defence, but that temporarily they should be switched over to civilian production. It is a very interesting point of view, but it leads to the very difficulties which the right hon. Gentleman pointed out—the very difficulties which arose, in fact, in 1950. None of us knows when these factories will be required once again for defence purposes. When the day unexpectedly arrives, the civil machinery will once again have to be thrown out and arms production substituted for it, but what chance do I have in these circumstances of attracting civilian work in competition with private firms entering into long-term contracts? There is a real, practical difficulty here.
  If, on the other hand, we look at the other alternative of switching them over permanently to civilian production, I think that there are difficulties here, too. I am not trying to be ideological about this. We ought to look at it as a practical issue. What does a private firm do in similar difficulties with its surplus manufacturing capacity? Clearly, it looks round to see whether it can find a new product, and it may find one, but the right hon. Gentleman never suggested one to me today. As a matter of fact, the Government are in great difficulty in hitting on a new product which has been totally neglected by the outside world. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because it is the function of industry constantly to scan the horizon for a demand for a new product, and to provide for it.
  Mr. Stephen Swingler: Is the Minister saying that his experts are not aware of the shortage of capital equipment in British industry today?
  Mr. Jones: That is something quite different. I am talking about new

  1289
  demands and new products totally neglected elsewhere. There may well be cases where the capacity for a particular thing is insufficient, but for Royal Ordnance factories to undertake production of such a thing would be to enter a field where they have no experience, where they would be putting themselves in competition with firms which have experience, and where they would be duplicating organisations already exising. This is a misconcepion.
  If the hon. Gentleman will bear with me, I should like to quote from the Fourth Report of the Committee on Public Accounts for the 1950 Session, which adverts to the production of civilian goods in Royal Ordnance factories between 1945 and 1950. This is what the Committee said:
  "In his Report on the Trading Accounts for 1948–49 the Comptroller and Auditor General called attention to a number of orders for civil work on which the Ministry had incurred heavy losses. They attributed these partly to disproportionate overheads attaching to low levels of production and partly to other causes, such as inexperience of manufacture, short-runs and use of unsuitable plant."
  Mr. A. Woodburn: I can appreciate, from a technical point of view, that Royal Ordnance factories starting on somebody else's production might conceivably not do it efficiently, but is there any reason—if their surplus capacity is required by other firms—why particular firms should not send their experts into the Royal Ordnance factories to supervise and guide production with their "know-how", so that the goods could be efficiently produced?
  Mr. Jones: As a matter of fact, something of that kind, though not entirely, has already been agreed with Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox in the Dalmuir factory, pending the change-over.
  The right hon. Gentleman also talked about the nationalised industries, and referred to them as though the Government had control over the orders placed by them. He and his hon. Friends ought to know, as the authors of the nationalisation Statute——
  Mr. Robens: The right hon. Gentleman could give a direction in the public interest.
  Mr. Jones: This direction is used with great rarity, and so far as commercial
  1290
  matters are concerned the nationalised industries are free agents. I doubt whether any Government would, even in the public interest, instruct a nationalised industry to place an order where, on purely commercial grounds that industry would not otherwise have placed it.
  Hon. Members: Why not?
  Mr. Robens: Throwing away the strategic reserve.
  Mr. Jones: I am not throwing away the strategic reserve. I did say that we have to maintain a certain reserve, but the point is what is to be the size of that reserve. It is no good trying to maintain a reserve such as we have now, which is related to the conditions of the last war.
  Mrs. Harriet Slater: An admission of defeat.
  Mr. Jones: It is not an admission of defeat.
  Let us take the Dalmuir acquisition of Babcock and Wilcox. It means that firms all over the country are moving into the field of nuclear power, which we want them to do. Babcock and Wilcox find that, having regard to all their activities, their present facilities are inadequate and unsuitable. The facilities at Dalmuir are suitable for their purpose and they are, therefore, taking the factory over. Is it not a far more sensible thing that Babcock's should take in this factory in the course of their expansion rather than that the Government should set out to copy and rival that which Babcock and Wilcox already do?
  Mr. Robens: It would not do Babcock's any harm to have a rival.
  Mr. Cyril Bence: The hon. Member was talking about the factory in Dalmuir and about the processes established by Babcock and Wilcox—the techniques which they can undertake and which cannot be undertaken by Government agencies. That can be done in the factory in Dalmuir, but it cannot be done in any of Babcock's factories. That is why a lot of Babcock and Wilcox's and Weir's work was done in Dalmuir.
  The right hon. Member should reveal the fact that for the last two years the Atomic Energy Authority has advertised in Scotland for mechanical engineers to evolve mechanical means of using atomic

  1291
  energy, and that those means evolved by the Authority have been handed over to Babcock's to have manufactured. But Babcock's cannot do it and they have sub-contracted to another company. Why not take it direct to Dalmuir and keep Babcock's out of it?
  Mr. Jones: The hon. Member is under the impression that Babcock and Wilcox are to undertake atomic work in the Dalmuir factory, but that is not so. They propose to produce quite conventional equipment—cranes and large vessels The atomic work is being done elsewhere, and they do not consider the Dalmuir factory suitable for their atomic work.
  In other words, I have a moral obligation to the workers in the Royal Ordnance factories, but I do not consider that I should discharge that moral obligation by embarking upon the hazardous and risky course which the right hon. Gentleman has suggested. The best way to discharge my moral obligation is by integrating the factories in concerns which have the experience and are well-established.
  Mrs. Slater Mrs. Slater rose——
  Mr. Jones: I have already given way a certain amount, and I do not want to protract the debate.
  Since we have been talking about Dalmuir there is one aspect of that transaction to which I want to draw attention. Babcock and Wilcox will feed in their work gradually as the defence work declines. There should, therefore, be every prospect of ensuring a stable level of employment in that factory, and I hope to be able to contrive similar arrangements in other cases.
  If we succeed in passing over most of these factories to existing firms most of the displaced workers will be found an alternative home and the back of the redundancy problem will be broken. I agree that there will still be some redundancy and that it will be worse in some areas than in others. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour is very conscious of that fact and it is precisely to mitigate the resulting redundancy that I have decided to give notice of the closures a long time ahead, and to give as long notice as possible of the discharges to come.
  1292
  I think that that will help. I do not want to underrate the problem. On the other hand, we should not exaggerate it. We are talking of 7,000 workers out of a total labour force of about 21 million or 22 million, and an unemployment percentage of 1·5. Surely, with those figures, the economy ought to be able to absorb the displaced workers. Indeed, only last week the Opposition were criticising the Government for inflation. They cannot both complain about inflation and at the same time complain that there is likely to be an insoluble problem of redundancy.
  Captain Richard Pilkington: They can.
  Mr. Jones: They can, but it is not a legitimate argument.
  I want to say a word about the factories to be retained. I think that the duty of any Minister in charge of these factories is to try to provide for the people in them well worth while careers, but to do that the factories must be well equipped. They have to be up to date; they have to be technological leaders in their field, and their rate of utilisation must be reasonably high. It is precisely to ensure that that rate is reasonably high that I have decided to dispense with certain factories. I do not rule out civil work completely in the factories to be retained. I do not admit it in a big way because—I do not want to develop the argument ad nauseam—if I tried to enter into it in a big way I should be in exactly the same difficulty that I mentioned earlier.
  The ordnance factory is primarily an arms factory and would, therefore, be in the greatest difficulty in attracting civil work when everybody would know that it would be only temporary. But I admit it in a limited way. If defence demand is temporarily lowered it would be perfectly right to feed in an amount of civil work so that the nucleus of management and labour which would be needed later for the discharge of defence work could be kept in being. I accept that the factories can suitably do civil work when they can eke out a shortage of capacity in general industry.
  The burden of maintaining the reserve of capacity for defence must clearly fall upon the State—and I use the word "State" instead of saying that it will fall on the general body of taxpayers. It

  1293
  would be quite wrong to try to shift the burden of carrying this reserve of capacity on to general industry by hurling the reserve into competition with general industry, but when the reserve is short in general industry and the factories can eke out the shortage the undertaking of civil work is perfectly legitimate. That is consistent with the primary defence purpose of the Royal Ordnance factories.
  To conclude, I think that we would all agree that arms production should be cut down. I hope that we are all agreed that we ought to try to find an alternative civil home for the displaced workers. The dispute between us, therefore, is as to which is the better method of securing this objective. The right hon. Gentleman has put his point of view which, as I understand it, is that the sacred fact is that I, the Minister of Supply, have so much labour and so many factories and, therefore, I should adapt my purposes and my organisation to these factories and this labour, even though it means entering into fields where I have no experience, pitting myself in competition with firms which have the experience and introducing complications and divisions of purpose into the organisation of the Royal Ordnance factories.
  The Government, on the other hand, take a different view. The primary thing is the purpose which the factories ought to serve, and the primary purpose is a defence purpose. Their organisation and capacity should, therefore, be compactly related to their purpose—that is the best guarantee of efficiency—and any resources in the way of assets and labour not required for this purpose are best placed in other organisations, which have clearly defined purposes and which, for that reason, have a much stronger chance of commercial survival.
  I submit that it is the second of these views which is in the better interests of the country, and I venture to say that in the longer term it is also in the better interests of the employees who now happen to be under my care.
  4.51 p.m.
  Mr. Scholefield Allen: We on these benches have learned over a period of years to have considerable respect for the Minister because of his defence, in particular, of the fuel and power industries against ignorant, outrageous assaults
  1294
  by the hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro), but my hon. Friends and many people throughout the country—hundreds of thousands of them—will be extremely disappointed with his speech today, and especially with some of his more flippant remarks. One example was his statement a moment ago that he had no advisers to direct his attention to various projects. The Ministry of Supply have as good technicians, in my submission, as have Babcock and Wilcox.
  My interest in this matter is that I represent the constituency of Crewe in which is situated one of the finest organisations and factories in the country, Radway Green. When the statement was made by the Minister a few weeks ago, the hon. Member for Southend, East (Mr. McAdden)said:
  "Would he suggest to hon. Gentlemen opposite that it is rather hypocritical of them to argue that there ought to be a run-down in armaments and then to argue that people ought to be continually employed on producing them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th July, 1957; Vol. 573, c. 764.]
  That raised a cheer from the crowded benches opposite. Those benches are not crowded now, because hon. Members opposite are not as interested in providing employment as in laughing at suggestions from this side of the House.
  In any event, it is not the submission of this party that there should be no reduction in armaments. Obviously, we all support a reduction in armaments. What we are demanding is that there should be a full use of Government-owned factories. The principle for which we stand is that of keeping the production of arms in the public sector of industry, wherever that is possible, rather than in the private sector.
  One can hardly imagine a private company, with a factory and labour facilities for producing an article which it requires, ordering that article from a competitor or from a Government-owned factory. The private company would see to it that it produced the article itself in its own factory. That is what we are asking the Government to do in this case. It is bad for business for the private man to sub-contract, and it is equally bad for business for the Government to subcontract. Yet we know that there is a great deal of sub-contracting and that some of it comes back into the Royal Ordnance factories.

  1295
  Radway Green is one of the most up-to-date engineering establishments in the country. It is exceptionally well sited, it is four miles only from Crewe, it has adequate sidings and marshalling yards, it is on the main line between Crewe and Derby and the new Birmingham-Preston by-pass is to pass its door. There has been considerable modernisation recently for the production of small arms ammunition. The plant is second to none in the country.
  What has been the fate of this factory? The fate of the factory has caused considerable local disappointment and apprehension about the future. From October, 1956, to February of this year no fewer than 570 industrial workers were declared redundant. In May or June of this year 610, and 50 non-industrial workers, were declared redundant, making a total of 1,230 workers discharged from this small area. One must add a wastage of about 300 people, who in normal circumstances would have been replaced and who have not been replaced. I make that a total of 1,530 workers discharged in that area in less than twelve months. The wind-down is from 3,500 to 2,000 workers in a factory which, I understand, during the war employed about 16,000 people.
  The level of unemployment in the adjacent Potteries, which is the district which relates to Radway Green, is above the national average; it is 1·9 as against 1·5. I am sure that my constituents and those hon. Members who represent the adjacent constituencies were very relieved when they heard that Radway Green would not be axed completely. The Minister has told us that Radway Green is to be "a preferred source." That is not good enough; it does not go far enough. Government contracts are being given to private firms. I have sent instances to the Ministers, supplied to me by my constituents working there. The answers which I have received are far from satisfactory. Recently I called attention to a case in which a contract which could have been carried out in Radway Green was contracted out to a private firm and then sub-contracted back to Radway Green. That is a process of which we totally disapprove.
  The other example of which the Minister is well aware arises from the fact that there has been installed at Radway Green
  1296
  equipment to manufacture 30 mm. drawn steel shells. I am told that the cost of that equipment was nearly £1 million. Yet those shells, which could be produced at Radway Green, are at the moment being manufactured by private enterprise. I have given the Minister the name of two firms, which I will not repeat now, and another firm about which the information is doubtful. I am informed that the cost of those shells under private enterprise—being paid for by the Government—is from a half as much again to twice as much as the cost of production in Radway Green.
  Mr. Harold Davies: Is that true?
  Mr. Scholefield Allen: If my hon. Friend will allow me to read it, I have in my hand the Minister's reply, dated 12th June this year. The letter does not deny that fact. That is a very significant omission. The Minister writes:
  "It is perfectly true, as your correspondent says, that there is capacity in private industry as well as in the R.O.F. for the production of 30 m.m. D.S. shells, and it is true that some of that is being done by private enterprise."
  There is not a word in that letter denying the allegation which was made in the letter which I forwarded to the Minister—the allegation that the shells cost half as much again or twice as much as they would cost if they were produced at Radway Green. If that statement was not true, it was extremely neglectful of the Minister not to deny it, but it probably was true, and, therefore, it was ignored.
  Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: In making this comparison, will the hon. and learned Member say whether Radway Green is making the same shell at the present time, or whether it was a past production order, and what were the relative quantities?
  Mr. Allen: It is being made now.
  Sir A. V. Harvey: What are the relative quantities?
  Mr. Allen: I do not know. Only the Minister knows the quantities. If the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey)is attending this debate to defend the Government, we know where he stands, but I rather thought he was trying to do something for Swynnerton.
  Sir A. V. Harvey: That is an unfair allegation. My first query was to elucidate a point concerning the relative production orders. I am not defending the Government. I am merely listening. If the hon. and learned Member waits, he will, I hope, hear my remarks in due course.
  Mr. Allen: If the hon. Member is assisting us to get from private enterprise into Government factories work which ought not to be in private enterprise factories, so much the better. I hope he will devote a large part of his speech to that aspect.
  What we say is that the Royal Ordnance factory should not be a preferred source, but that it should be the only source of all that is capable of being produced in Royal Ordnance factories. These factories cannot go out, as private enterprise can, and canvass work. They are in the same position as members of the Bar waiting for briefs to be brought to them. Private enterprise can go and wait on the Minister's doorstep. It can take steps to get the orders. The least that the Government can do with their own factories is to make them, not a preferred source, but the only source for goods which they can produce.
  Another aspect of the matter which, I hope my hon. Friends will develop concerns Admiralty contracts. I am told that the Admiralty, being the senior Service—the Board of Admiralty is a very ancient body——
  Mr. David Griffiths: An ancient monument.
  Mr. Allen:—does not act through the Ministry of Supply, but goes out for contracts on its own. I notice that the Parliamentary Secretary agrees with me. In my opinion, it is about time that the Admiralty fell into line with the other Departments and made the Ministry of Supply the source of its contracts. I do not want to develop that theme, because there may be Members representing deck-yard constituencies who know the whole story, but I hope that the Government will note that it really is time that the Admiralty fell into line and placed its contracts through the Ministry of Supply.
  I have pledged myself not to speak too long. [HON. MEMBERS: "Go on."] Very well, I am encouraged. I do not want to
  1298
  sit down without putting the viewpoint of the Radway Green factory and what it is capable of producing. We believe that it can make a contribution to the nuclear power stations. Because it has the means to do so, the factory is manufacturing what, I understand, are called fuel channels. That name means nothing to me, but it means a lot in power stations. There is considerable skill at Radway Green. It can be used for that purpose, and I hope that the Minister will develop this possibility of work at Radway Green, work which it is already doing, and doing well.
  The next project on which it is engaged and from which more work could flow is the modernisation plan of British Railways. The Radway Green factory is very well sited. It is four miles from Crewe and it has sidings, marshalling yards, main roads and everything to link it up with the modernisation plan. One particular aspect concerns wagon braking. Wagons are being converted from hand-operated to vacuum braking and it is considered that this kind of work could well be carried out at the factory. There are other aspects of the same kind of work. The workers at the factory consider that they have all the means of undertaking part of the electricity plant, for instance, for the Manchester to London line.
  Further work that the factory could do is in connection with civilianisation. The Wolfenden Report, as we all remember, suggested that a lot of work now being carried out in the Services could be undertaken by civilians. Under the new dispensation, a great many people will be discharged from the Forces and a lot of work that is now done by National Service electricians and technicians could, we submit, be done at Radway Green. I hope the Minister will consider the possibility that when the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers cease to function as part of the Armed Services, the overhauling and reconditioning of equipment could be done cheaply and efficiently at Radway Green.
  I turn now to civil work which could be undertaken at Radway Green. We have there a foundry and rolling mills—a self-contained unit—which could be exploited. This unit is capable of producing non-ferrous material for the defence programme and there is also surplus capacity which could, and should, be used for the production of high grade

  1299
  commercial sheet and strip up to a width of 16 ins.
  It is suggested that that plant should be used for commercial purposes and to extend the work which is done at the factory. It can make, and is making, small non-ferrous castings. This is a technical matter, but I hope that the Minister will inquire into the possibility of extending the use of this plant for the benefit of the men in the area.
  Other civilian work which could be undertaken is the mining mechanisation programme and the making of sparking plugs, neat flame burners for gas cookers, multiple sprinklers and reflectors for electric fires, in addition to coal-mining equipment for the Coal Board and machine tools.
  These are concrete suggestions which have been made, not by me, but by the highly technical committee which sat at Radway Green, consisting of the staff side as well as workers, and compiled an excellent report. I hope that the Minister will study it and that before long something will be done, not only to bring an end to the redundancies at Radway Green, but to add to the labour force there. I end as I began. In my submission, it is the duty of the Minister to employ nationally-owned and equipped factories first and foremost for Government work.
  5.9 p.m.
  Mr. Hugh Fraser: I promise not to delay the House long and I hope that some of the hon. Members opposite who are concerned with north Staffordshire may also catch your eye, Mr. Speaker. To those who are concerned with that area, it must, of course, be a heavy blow that the Swynnerton factory should be closed down. No blow is ever heavier to a politician than the blow around the parish, because people know what it means and it is a big matter for us in the area.
  Nevertheless, as a general case, I think that we must take the broader view on the question of these factories. I see no possibility of a large filling factory such as Swynnerton being maintained at its present level. It would be wrong of hon. Members on either side of the House to give the impression that
  1300
  that can be done. I and one of my colleagues have spoken quite openly about it with the responsible representatives, and I think that the first duty of a politician is to attempt to say truly what can be done. Swynnerton has been a filling factory for fourteen years, but it does not now fit into the new military pattern following on the White Paper.
  I wish to turn to the two problems which have been raised, and I will deal first with the human problem which must arise from the movement of 2,300 people. As the House is aware, of these 2,300 people roughly 1,000 of them are established and about 1,300 are not established. This is typical of all filling factories. I want to put to the Minister two ways in which to mitigate the inevitable hardships which the movement of these people will involve, and, first of all, in connection with the non-established persons.
  As the House is aware, a filling factory is not without its dangers, though, of course, the dangers which existed during the 1914–18 war of various types of poisoning have largely been eliminated. However, it is true to say that there are still certain dangers connected with filling factories. Certain persons who are not established have worked in Swynnerton for many years and they feel outside the general scheme.
  I congratulate the Minister on making it possible for people to receive a gratuity after five years instead of seven years. That is an improvement, but I would ask the Minister to do what every good employer does, and that is to give special consideration to the cases of what I might call the "Old Joes" in the factory who are in their fifties and sixties. Such people should be given this special consideration in precisely the same way as people employed by private employers are given it when a factory is closed down. I believe that is quite a problem.
  Dr. Stross: Has the hon. Gentleman also noted the answer given on Monday by the Minister that since 1950 some 250 of the personnel in this factory have been declared to have suffered from dermatitis or some other form of industrial disease? As that is a high figure, will the hon. Gentleman extend his plea for special consideration to those still left and who have so suffered?
  Mr. Fraser: I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and I hope that they also will be given special consideration.
  One does not wish to exaggerate the cases, and the National Health Insurance scheme looks after the more desperate cases which can be registered. But I think that the cases of these persons who have been employed in the factory for many years should be given particular attention by the Minister, the cases which cannot be covered by the general rules and regulations which apply to industrial civil servants.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: Like the officers in the White Paper.
  Mr. Fraser: Perhaps the hon. Member for Stoke on Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith)will catch your eye later in the debate, Mr. Speaker.
  I now turn to the established civil servants. With the movement or dismissal of some 7,000 people, the Ministry will undoubtedly be faced with a difficult problem in finding employment for those who have the right to establishment. The problem facing the Minister is how these people can be fitted in. Contrariwise, there is the matter of the hardship in certain categories of those who are established. What will happen to them?
  I want, first, to take the case of those people whom one might call the partially established and to whom the Ministry has a duty to give employment, but who, because they may have failed to pass the necessary medical tests, cannot receive pension rights. Theirs is a hard case, especially when it is going to be difficult to find employment for them within the Ministry's establishments.
  There are, I believe, between 30 and 100 such people in the Swynnerton factory and they will definitely suffer hardship. The Ministry will find it extremely difficult to place them. Of course, if these people say that they will not accept the Ministry's offer of further employment, which may involve the down-grading of their rank and a reduction in pay, they will be faced with the fact of only receiving the gratuity and not what I believe is technically known as the phased pension on reaching the age of sixty.
  Then there is the question of the married women employed in the factory.
  1302
  Married women have been employed in the factory for a long time. Undoubtedly a lot of them came forward to help when 20,000 people were employed at Swynnerton in war-time. Many of the women have married and have settled in the district. It will be very difficult for some of them to accept the Ministry's offer of further employment when it means breaking up their homes and moving elsewhere. Here, again, it is a question of about 100 people, and I have tried to keep the figures in proper proportion.
  There are other obvious cases with which I hope my hon. Friends will deal, but I have mentioned three categories employed in a factory which has done well for the country, which has been operating for some forty years and in which the average age of the women employed is around forty years and the average age of the male workers is around fifty years.
  I believe there is a chance that a certain use could be made of the existing factory and that its use is only limited as far as the Ministry of Supply is concerned. It is possible that the firing ranges could still be used and that something could be done on the pyrotechnical side and, possibly, that some sort of use could be made of the factory for the strategic storage of munitions which are now stored in the south of England in a place the name of which escapes me, but in which they are not stored so effectively. I am told that there are better storage facilities in the Swynnerton area.
  When the factory is closed I think that it should be offered to private enterprise. I will not pursue the debate that we have had on that point, but I believe that an opportunity should be given to the City of Stoke-on-Trent and to other people to make use of the factory space. Whilst that is being done it is essential that the factory should be maintained in a proper state and I suggest to the Minister that those employees of the factory who become redundant should, as far as possible, be employed in the maintenance of the factory.
  This is a deep human problem for many in my division and in the divisions of my hon. Friends and neighbours. Those who will suffer real hardship are, I think, comparatively few. I believe that it merits the investigation of the Minister or his officers to see, without any

  1303
  breach of the general agreement for the superannuation of civil servants, whether it is possible to do certain things in an ex gratia manner which would enormously help the men and women who have served their country so well.
  5.20 p.m.
  Mr. Christopher Mayhew: The hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser)made a number of constructive points which I think, will be generally acceptable to both sides of the House, and I reinforce his plea to the Minister to look into them urgently. If I may say so, the hon. Gentleman stated his case a great deal better than the Minister, whose speech was extremely disappointing, and I agree with what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Crewe (Mr. Scholefield Allen)said about it. Not only did the principles of the Minister's policy seem doubtful but, in addition, there is a great gap between the priniciples which he laid down this afternoon and the practice we see going on' in our own constituencies, in the R.O.Fs.
  I am speaking for Woolwich Arsenal and many of my hon. Friends will give other instances. The Minister made the important point—important for Woolwich Arsenal—that where a new weapon or process is developed by a R.O.F., its production should go to the R.O.F. The right hon. Gentleman also said that the Services had given contracts to private industry because it had produced the design and development and therefore should get the production contract. I will give the Minister one instance. Recently a number of R.O.Fs. and private firms were asked to produce a steel cartridge case to be drawn out of a solid steel disc, which is an exceptionally difficult task. All the competitors failed, including one or two R.O.Fs. which shall be nameless. Woolwich alone succeeded in this difficult undertaking and produced a steel cartridge case which passed the test.
  What happened? These processes cannot be kept secret in a R.O.F. as they can be in private industry. The production orders went to private industry and not to Woolwich, which could perfectly well do the work. They went to private firms which were already over-employed when Woolwich Arsenal is under
  1304
  employed. How does this square with the principle laid down by the Minister at the Box this afternoon, that where a ractory develops something, it gets the production contract? I would like this specific case looked into, and I urge the Minister to reconsider the matter in the light of what I have said. [An HON. MEMBER: "Did they make it under licence?"] I do not know. That is not the only case. In Woolwich we have all the necessary facilities for this development work.
  I am anxious that the point of view of the oldest R.O.F. should be heard. I promised that I would not take long. And I intend not to take long, as well as promising not to do so. I mean this, because I know that there are hon. Members with R.O.Fs. in their constituencies which have greater problems than Woolwich Arsenal. However, we are the oldest R.O.F., and I can say without exaggeration that we have probably done more for the nation, over a longer period, than any other industrial unit in the country. We are equal to any industrial unit in our record of skill and good spirit. I have said before, and I repeat, that far more battles have been won for Britain on the broad acres of Woolwich Arsenal than on the playing fields of Eton.
  First, I want to stress that we are not asking here to be given work on the basis of the past. All that Woolwich people ask is to be given a fair and equal chance of adapting themselves to the new situation side by side with private industry. We want to be given a chance to be proved on our merits, and unless we can show that we are more efficient, or equally efficient, I do not urge that we should be given contracts on any basis of past performance.
  I am not reassured by what the Minister said today. I am not satisfied that we shall not be ruled out of our opportunities for production because we are Government owned and not privately owned. The Minister put it this way. He said that he would permit civil work in R.O.Fs. when it was needed to keep them as reserve defence capacity. But I ask whether it would be fair, simply because a R.O.F. is not needed to be kept for reserve defence capacity, to rule it out from civil work even though it could do /that as efficiently, or more efficiently, than private industry? The only real test

  1305
  is whether it can do the job efficiently. If it can do that, it should get the job whether or not it is needed for reserve capacity and, indeed, whether or not there is a great shortage in that industry.
  I may be getting a little confused, but the Minister himself was not clear. The right hon. Gentleman also said that he would allow civil work for R.O.Fs. where there was a shortage of capacity in private industry. This must be looked into more carefully. Which industries has he in mind?
  As I have said, I am speaking for Woolwich Arsenal, which is the most versatile R.O.F. in the country. For instance, it has even produced oil-drilling machinery. I want to be sure that Woolwich Arsenal gets the chance of entering an industry for which it is suited.
  On the arms point, again I am not satisfied. Like my hon. and learned Friend. I feel that it is not enough simply to say that R.O.Fs. are a preferred source. Over and over again we find arms contracts going to private firms while we get the little sub-contracting jobs. For instance, a contract for nine six-inch naval guns was given to Vickers recently and Woolwich Arsenal made the barrels. Yet we were making guns more efficiently than Vickers centuries ago. Why should Woolwich be under-employed when Vickers, I believe, is fully employed, and why should the Minister give a contract for naval guns to Vickers and ask us to carry out the sub-contracting work on them? That policy needs to be looked into and changed.
  Finally, may I ask a specific question? In reply to a Question of mine recently I was told that there would be redundancy in Woolwich this year. I ask the Minister how much redundancy will there be, and in what trades?
  5.28 p.m.
  Mr. Douglas L. S. Nairn: I shall also be brief, because the case I want to put has already been well stated by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser). The factory he was talking about is similar to one in my constituency which is being closed, the T.N.T. factory in Irvine. I do not think that anyone can believe that there is any great future for any Royal Ordnance factory at present manufacturing T.N.T., and the
  1306
  Irvine factory has not been making it for some time but has been employed only on dismantling ammunition.
  My first point is to maintain that a dying factory should not be kept in being. If a factory is dying it is far better to close it and put a new and expanding industry in its place. However, the Minister must be a little more specific than he has been so far. The people working in each Royal Ordnance factory want to know why that particular one was chosen to be closed. In this case, I know that the amount of ammunition to be dismantled is decreasing—war stocks are going down—but there is still a certain amount which has to be dismantled and I understand that, in the future, ammunition which has been dismantled at Irvine—

  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES

    ROYAL ASSENT
    5.30 p.m.
    Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;
    The House went:—and, having returned;
    Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

    1. Finance Act, 1957.

    2. Army (Conditions of Enlistment)Act, 1957.

    3. Road Transport Lighting Act, 1957.

    4. Geneva Conventions Act, 1957.

    5. Naval Discipline Act, 1957.

    6. Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation Act, 1957.

    7. Affiliation Proceedings Act, 1957.

    8. Housing Act, 1957.

    9. Agriculture Act, 1957.

    10. Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Special Provisions)Act, 1957.

    11. Coal-Mining (Subsidence)Act, 1957.

    12. Federation of Malaya Independence Act, 1957.

    13. Winfrith Heath Act, 1957.

    14. Governors' Pensions Act, 1957.

    15. Greenock Port and Harbours Order Confirmation Act, 1957.

    1307

    16. Clyde Navigation Order Confirmation (No. 2)Act, 1957.

    17. Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order (County of Berks (Consent to Letting))Act, 1957.

    18. Reading Corporation (Trolley Vehicles)Provisional Order Act, 1957.

    19. Doncaster Corporation (Trolley Vehicles)Provisional Order Act, 1957.

    20. Durham County Council (Barmston-Coxgreen Footbridge)Act, 1957.

    21. Tamar Bridge Act, 1957.

    22. B.P. Trading Act, 1957.

    23. Portslade and Southwick Outfall Sewerage Board Act, 1957.

    24. Barry Corporation Act, 1957.

    25. Workington Harbour and Dock (Transfer)Act, 1957.

    26. British Transport Commission Act, 1957.

    27. Dartford Tunnel Act, 1957.

    28. London County Council (General Powers)Act, 1957.

    29. Hastings Tramways Act, 1957.

    30. East Ham Corporation Act, 1957.

    31. Esso Petroleum Company Act, 1957.

    32. Milford Docks Act, 1957.

    33. Finsbury Square Act, 1957.

    34. Arundel Estate Act, 1957.

    CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION)BILL
    Question again proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES
  5.46 p.m.
  Mr. Nairn: After that traditional break in our proceedings, I feel that I must try to be even more brief than I had intended.
  Work in connection with the breakdown of ammunition is running out and I understand that in the future a certain amount of the work which has been done in Scotland is to be transferred to Wales. If it can be done more cheaply in Wales at a factory which is doing a lot of other things as well, we cannot justify keeping the work in Scotland. But the Minister must make that clear, and give us figures, so that we can convince the people who are being put out of work that this move is essential. If that can be done, it will help considerably.
  We appreciate the fact that two years' notice has been given to the people concerned, but that by itself is not enough. Something more must be done. Unless the Minister can tell people a year from now what will happen to them in 1959 the fact that two years' notice has been given does not amount to much. These people want to know whether all of the establishment men will be re-employed. Those that cannot be given employment want to be told at least a year in advance that there will be no work for them when the factory closes.
  Those who will not be employed want to know the terms of the compensation they will get. Naturally, they have looked at the White Paper announcing the terms for personnel in the Army, Navy and Air Force, and these established people expect to be given compensation at least on somewhat similar terms; although I admit that people working in an industrial ordnance factory would find it easier to obtain work than would a soldier. Nevertheless, the terms of compensation which have been published set a pattern.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: May we absolutely rely on the support of

  1309
  the hon. Member in our campaign to obtain for these redudant workers the same compensation as for colonels?
  Mr. Nairn: I could never guarantee to give my support to the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), because he is so irrational that I should never know what he might say next.
  The people who will be moved to employment elsewhere at the end of the two years want to be sure that they will not be moved without any prospect of having a house for their wives and families. It may be reasonable for established people to be moved round, but it is not reasonable to move them unless houses are available for them within a reasonable space of time.
  I cannot altogether agree with the right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens), who opened the debate, when he said that these factories should be kept in Government ownership on a care-and-maintenance basis. I would agree if the factories can be kept in production, but there are factories, like the one in my constituency——
  Mr. Robens: I did not use the phrase "care-and-maintenance" basis. I said that they should be put to some productive economic purpose.
  Mr. Nairn: I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman if I made a mistake. I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that he wanted the factories kept in Government ownership.
  Mr. Robens: Yes, I did say that.
  Mr. Nairn: It is no use letting a factory like the T.N.T. factory in my constituency stand idle. It would need to be completely pulled down and rebuilt.
  People in my constituency want to know what the Government are doing to find alternative employment for them. I know that it is difficult when negotiations are going on, or are perhaps not yet started, for the Ministry to say what are the prospects of selling a factory to a new expanding industry, but people must be told something about what is going on. It is not enough to say that the Minister of Supply, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the President of the Board of Trade are doing their best to look for a buyer; they must be clearly seen to be doing their best.
  1310
  I hope that the Ministers will do their best, and will try to advise the hon. Members concerned in this matter what the prospects are, not necessarily week by week but every month or two. We should like to know whether a factory is likely to be sold and what the position is likely to be at the end of the two years.
  5.52 p.m.
  Mr. Cyril Bence: We have had discussions for a very long time with the Ministry of Supply on the disposal of the Royal Ordnance factory at Dalmuir and with the Parliamentary Secretary. I was shocked today at some of the statements made by the Minister, especially when he referred to Dalmuir.
  We have been informed from time to time that the purpose of turning the Dalmuir factory over to Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox was that it should be used by them for the machining of atomic energy equipment. It is not true to say, as the Minister suggested, that the plant is unsuited to the machining of atomic energy equipment; that is exactly what it has been doing for the last few years. Messrs. Weir, of Cathcart, have accepted orders from the Atomic Energy Authority for heavy machined steel castings. Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox have accepted contracts from the Atomic Energy Authority, but have not had facilities or space. By "facilities" I mean heavy-capacity machine tools. They have sub-contracted the work to the Royal Ordnance factory at Dalmuir. That fact is known to the Minister and to the Parliamentary Secretary. I was therefore surprised when the Minister suggested that the factory was not suited and that Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox were not going to use it for this purpose, but for the purpose of constructing cranes and steel structures.
  We have been assured time and time again that if Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox took over the factory at Dalmuir the existing personnel would be employed by that firm, but if what the Minister says is true then the previous statement is absolute nonsense. The nature of the work at present carried on in the Royal Ordnance factory at Dalmuir is engineering. It is machining, as many of my hon. Friends know. Crane work is 80 per cent. structural engineering. It is work for structural engineers, boiler-makers and

  1311
  platers, whereas the work being done in the Royal Ordnance factory is for highly skilled machine operators.
  If Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox took over the factory for the purpose suggested by the Minister, 95 per cent. of the men now on the floor of the factory in Dalmuir would not be acceptable to that firm because their skills are in different directions. Make no mistake about it; if the factory is to be used for the assembling and building of cranes, the men wanted will not be machine operators but structural operators, what we used to call "iron fighters." My hon. Friends the Members for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith)and Newton (Mr. Lee)will know that what I am saying is true. If the nature of the work in this factory is to be changed, more than 90 per cent. of the men in Dalmuir will be redundant.
  In England and Wales, established men who are made redundant in one factory are informed by the Ministry of Supply that they can be transferred to another part of England and Wales with their families, that is, if housing accommodation can be found for them. Must we talk about transferring from Scotland to England men of fifty years of age with families after they have been working in a Scottish Royal Ordnance factory for the last eighteen years? Where else in Scotland can established engineering workers, members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, find alternative occupation? Nowhere. They must come South, perhaps to Woolwich Arsenal, or Leeds. It must be down here, because the Dalmuir factory is the only Ministry of Supply engineering establishment in Scotland.
  What a stupid thing, in the present conditions of the United Kingdom, to transfer skilled men of fifty years of age from Scotland to England, There are already too many people down here. The place is getting congested. Scotland is losing too many skilled men. Why keep on bringing them down here and overcrowding this area? If we travel in the City of London, for example, we can see that the place is chock-a-block. This is happening in the Midlands. We talk about road development and the high cost of congested traffic. It is because of the foolish, ad hoc method of building factories anywhere and everywhere in congested areas
  1312
  because there is presumed to be a market there and a pool of labour. This is becoming an overcrowded corner of the island, while Scotland is losing its skilled population. The Minister of Supply is helping this process.
  Men in Dalmuir have already received a circular telling them that within fourteen days they have the option of submitting to the Ministry of Supply to what part of England they would like to be transferred. They are being given that choice. The circular goes on to say that the Ministry will do its best to find them an occupation similar to that which they were performing in Dalmuir, but if they refuse to accept the transfer they will be subject to discharge. By that they will lose everything they have built up over the years in which they have served the Ministry. That is the rule.
  Some of these men in the R.O.F. are highly skilled, specialised machine tool operators who operate heavy machine tools working to very fine limits. If they were transferred to other sections of the Ministry of Supply they would be likely to suffer a decrease in remuneration of anything up to 60 per cent. It is true that the Ministry says it will pay for moving their furniture and will give them an allowance because they have to maintain two homes, but that will not compensate them for the fact that they have to change from using one skilled technique to another in a field in which they are not experienced.
  I know many of these men. Some of them live in Glasgow and many in the Burgh of Clydebank. Many of them have children between the ages of 12 and 18 attending schools in Clydebank and Glasgow. It is a different matter to move a child out of the Scottish educational system into the English system from transferring a child from Cardiff to London. The educational structure and the general curriculum is similar all over England and Wales, but it is entirely different in Scotland. A child would be taken out of its environment and plunged into another environment at a very difficult period of its school life. That could have serious consequences on the child's education.
  The problem of bringing the men here with their children at those ages is a very difficult one for the men concerned. Men have come to see me privately from the

  1313
  R.O.F. and said they are worried to death. They have shown me school reports of their children who hope to go to Glasgow University within a few years, but, if the families are transferred to the different conditions here those children might be denied opportunities of entry to a university because of the difficulty in fitting into the new educational curriculum.
  These things are important to these men as individuals. If something frightening happens to one person, that is not considered to be a tragedy. It has to happen to millions before it is considered a tragedy. I have always felt that for the individual concerned it is as great a tragedy as if it happened to a million people. In Clydebank we are shocked that these men should have to submit to this circular, which almost gives them the alternative of transferring to England or losing their job. If they have not the type of skilled labour which Babcock and Wilcox want, the Ministry suggests in its circular that within fourteen days they should submit to the director of the R.O.F. whether they would like to be transferred.
  I see my hon. Friend the Member for Dunbartonshire, West (Mr. Steele)present. No doubt he has received the same communication as I have. We are faced with the prospect of 300 men being made redundant at the Blackburn Aircraft factory in Dumbarton and there are also the 400 at Dalmuir who will be redundant because Babcock and Wilcox will not want them. If the Ministry are to take 400 men down South, what is the use of all the pronouncements of the Secretary of State for Scotland, who says that he is doing all he can to maintain full employment in Scotland and to keep skilled labour there?
  I cannot allow the Minister to get away with the statement which he makes repeatedly. The Parliamentary Secretary knows that it is an over-simplification which does not hold water. He says that certain things cannot be done in the Royal Ordnance factories because the men there have not the experience, the knowledge and the techniques. It is absolute nonsense. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith)is, I believe, a pattern maker. I am a tool maker. My hon. Friend has made patterns and I have worked from
  1314
  his patterns and made tools, but I have not known what they were for. He can read the drawing and I can read it, but we do not know what part of the machine the tool is to go into. When people talk about engineers not being able to produce certain things because they do not understand what they are for, those people do not know what they are talking about.
  I get annoyed when I hear those statements because, in 1939, I worked in a factory where there were 7,000 people turning out bicycles. The war started and within twelve months 14,000 people were in that factory turning out Bren guns, shells and parts of aeroplanes. The pattern makers were making the patterns and we in the tool rooms were making the tools while girls were operating the machines. We are told that we cannot do these things in the R.O.F. because engineers and technicians in the R.O.F. in peacetime are not so adaptable as they are when we change from peace to war. No one will accept that; we know it is nonsense. A British engineer will produce anything that is wanted if he is given the drawing. As the Atomic Energy Authority and the Ministry of Supply can supply Babcock and Wilcox, Vickers, or anyone else, with appropriate drawings, so they can supply the Ministry of Supply.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew)has spoken about the technicians and engineers in R.O.Fs. who can do the job if it is submitted to them. If designs come to the Atomic Energy Authority, the engineers and production planners in the Ministry of Supply can do the job as well as any private firm in the country. I hope the Minister will think again before he allows the highly skilled works in Dalmuir to be closed down and handed over to crane production, which must drive these men out of the factory.
  My hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes)made reference to Army colonels. I can assure him that the skilled engineers in Dalmuir have done as much in the defence of this county in eighteen years as has been done in eighteen years' service by some of the colonels. Therefore, they are entitled to compensation on as good a scale as the colonels.
  6.9 p.m.
  Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: I understand that I have to be brief. I shall therefore try to condense my remarks into a few minutes. We have had quite a useful debate. I hope that where the future welfare of 7,000 of our people is concerned we shall, so far as possible, approach this problem not in a party political way. After all, their whole future and livelihood depends on what happens in these discussions.
  I thought that the hon. and learned Member for Crewe (Mr. Scholefield Allen)was unnecessarily rough when he turned on me when I asked the question to elicit information. My only interest in this debate is concerned with Radway Green, which is in the hon. and learned Gentleman's constituency and is where a number of workers go from my constituency, particularly from Congleton and its neighbourhood. The area around Congleton was nearly a distressed area before the war, but it was not classified. It is certainly better today, but it has not got great industries which can sustain recession. I am particularly concerned that the people in the area should have continuity of employment.
  In correspondence with the Parliamentary Secretary, I have been given an assurance that no fresh orders will be placed elsewhere for the time being—that is something at least—but my hon. Friend cannot exclude the possibility that that might have to be done at a future date. I can understand that my hon. Friend had to cover himself, but Radway Green is a specialised, very modern factory and I think there is scope in it for industrial work.
  My criticism in respect of the Ministry of Supply and the Royal Ordnance factories is that the public relations side is deplorable. In connection with my business interests, I have found that one of the major factors is to keep one's executives and workers informed of what is going on and what will go on in the future. There is nothing like it. The troubles in the aircraft industry have been mainly because of ups and downs—cancellations of orders and then big orders being thrust on the industry. The result of this is that men eventually lose heart and look for jobs in industries where they can have more assured prospects. It is very important that my right hon.
  1316
  Friend and my hon. Friend should keep in close touch with the factories and pay as many visits to them as they can. Bosses ought to go round their factories and be seen.
  I understand that Radway Green can undertake nuclear power work. Strange to say, I believe that the brief of the hon. and learned Member for Crewe is the same as mine. I would emphasise that the proposed Hunterston power station in Ayrshire will consist of two reactors each containing 3,288 fuel channels, and these could be made very satisfactorily at Radway Green. I hope the Minister will look into the matter to see what can be done. The work should be spread out. No doubt some of it could be done in Ayrshire.
  Reference has also been made to the modernisation of the railways. Radway Green and other Royal Ordnance factories should be allowed to undertake some of this work. I am convinced that free enterprise and the Royal Ordnance factories can work if they are brought together. Certainly the nationalised industries can work with the Royal Ordnance factories. There is a lot of work to be done on the railways, and £1,000 million to be spent.
  Mr. James Harrison: It might be helpful to the hon. Gentleman if I told him that the Royal Ordnance factory at Nottingham has done a lot of railway work—re-equipment, tunnelling, wagoning, and so on.
  Sir A. V. Harvey: That is also my information.
  I want also to refer to the disadvantages of the Royal Ordnance factories. Undoubtedly, in skill and ingenuity they are comparable with any other organisation in the country, but when it comes to taking a broader view and perhaps going to the United States or Germany to find an end-product needed in this country to secure future production, they are at a real disadvantage compared with ordinary industrial firms. The Ministry of Supply itself has some excellent technical people, but my experience has been that when they become very good they are taken away by free enterprise. It is not a bad thing for these men to circulate, but the Ministry is at a disadvantage in giving the assistance to the Royal Ordnance factories which they might expect.

  1317
  In Britain today we need every ounce of production that we can obtain. The inflation problem is due to lack of increase in production, though in the last month, fortunately, there has been a sudden turn in the right direction. We must move heaven and earth to use these factories for whatever production is available, provided it is economical. We cannot sustain any factory, civil or Government, if it will lose taxpayers' money. Provided that the factories can compete economically, we must use them to boost our production, particularly of exports. I ask my right hon. Friend to take a very broad view and to go ahead, and, if necessary, to call upon hon. Members on both sides of the House to help if they can be of any use to him in ascertaining what can be done and getting on with the job.
  6.15 p.m.
  Mr. Frederick Lee: The more I listen to the debate and realise the great interest taken in the matter by hon. Members in all parts of the House, the more I wonder why the Government did not provide a full day for the debate. After all, the issue has been brought about by Government policy. We can, of course, argue whether the policy is right or wrong as we go along, but it is rather disgraceful that the House should go into recess for three months and leave an issue of this sort unresolved, without the Government having attempted to find a minute for the House to discuss it.
  Naturally, the discussion has centred upon the Royal Ordnance factories. We know that in the last twelve months the numbers in these factories have run down from 46,500 to 40,000. We also know from the Minister's statement that as a result of the operation that we are now discussing a further 7,000 persons will be rendered redundant. The total at the end of the next two years, including the past year, will be between 13,500 and 14,000.
  That is not the whole story. I have figures to show that Admiralty depôts, R.A.F. stations and R.E.M.E. institutions of all types and descriptions are being run down. I should not be very surprised if, at the end of the day, there was a decrease in personnel of nearer 50,000 than 13,000. If the Parliamentary Secretary can give an indication of the global figure, as distinct from the figure in respect of Royal Ordnance factories, we
  1318
  should be most grateful. We ought to review the present policy in the light of the fact that some 50,000 people may be displaced because of the Government's policy.
  I have a number of interests in this matter. I have an R.A.F. establishment at Padgate, in my division, and an Admiralty station, at Risley, which are being closed, and I also speak as Chairman of the Engineering Group in the House. Needless to say, the A.E.U. is very disturbed at the manner in which the Government are proceeding. We are not arguing that every factory which has become obsolete should be maintained merely to provide employment. We believe that in the Royal Ordnance factories we have teams of skilled men whose worth to the nation has been amply proved. We believe that these men possess the required skill. We also believe that the Royal Ordnance factories either possess the necessary plant, or could have installed in them the necessary plant, to cope with either conventional weapons or the new types of weapons that we are to have.
  As I said at Question Time the other day, we believe that, despite what the Minister says, there is about this matter more of an ideoligical complex than a defence complex. We know that there would be a need in the Royal Ordnance factories for some drastic alterations of plant layout, and so on, to cope with the new types of weapons. Private enterprise has to adapt its factories to ever-changing designs and ever-new types of products. Why should it be supposed that it is impossible for Government institutions to do likewise?
  The right hon. Gentleman has to face that, and I do not think he has done so this afternoon. We know that his Department now employs a great many extremely able theorists, specialists, people with great knowledge, scientific capacity and the rest who could undertake—who, indeed, are now undertaking—a great deal of research, and we think that there is point in the argument that whereas public money can be spent on the theoretical research, once the product is developed to the point where there will be a profit from it, it will go to private enterprise.
  Therefore, the right hon. Gentleman has not answered the case put by my right

  1319
  hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens)and others of my hon. Friends. We argue that the change in the type of product is a challenge to the Minister to modernise the Royal Ordnance factories and not an excuse to emasculate them. That is the real difference between us.
  In his statement the other day, the Minister talked about the Royal Ordnance factories as preferred sources for the production of conventional weapons. I do not know whether my colleagues in those factories are expected to get much solace from that, because that statement, read in conjunction with the White Paper on Defence, means that a constantly-decreasing supply of the conventional weapons will be needed, and if they are merely to be a preferred source for the supply of things which will shortly be almost redundant, and what sort of guarantee is that? As a matter of fact, it is almost a threat.
  I should have thought that the right hon. Gentleman, instead of merely talking in terms of preferred sources, could now say to the Royal Ordnance factories that wherever there is a possibility of weapons being produced for the production of which they are now equipped, those factories will have a monopoly. Some of my hon. Friends have mentioned specific weapons, tanks, for instance. Let us take the factory at Leyland. Why did the Government decide to sell to Leyland's—I understand at something like a knockdown price—one of the most modern tank factories in Britain almost at the same time as the receipt of the order for Centurion tanks?
  At Barnbow, near Leeds, we have a modern tank factory which was built for the production of Centurions and which is now sub-contracting to Vickers for the order that Vickers received, despite the fact that it is able at least to compete on terms with the parent factory of Vickers. But the right hon. Gentleman goes on saying that it had to be handed back to private enterprise and, therefore, had to be closed by the Government. If the Minister says that private enterprise can make profits by sub-contracting to Royal Ordnance factories, that is the greatest compliment he can pay to them, but, at the same time, he prefers to deal them a death blow.
  1320
  As I have said, we cannot hope to keep factories open merely against a background of products which have now gone. We know the Minister's knowledge of industry. How many of the great firms which he and I can think of are now producing the same sort of components by the methods of ten years ago? The whole history of British industry is its capacity to change rapidly, the secret being that we have a greater reservoir of skilled manpower per head of population than has any other nation in the world. As a result, as one of my hon. Friends has said, we have the power to base our products not merely on line production in the robot way used in the United States, but on the great skill of our people. Really, the right hon. Gentleman has not answered this type of argument at all.
  I agree that the right hon. Gentleman is right in one thing. He said that if we are now to go into public production of the new weapons it will mean the spending of a great deal of money. I accept that at once, and, in any case, if we do not do it, private enterprise will. I know that he can argue that private enterprise is setting up the research teams. He himself has told us that in theoretical, as against fundamental, research he now holds all the cards. But the House will see the danger if private enterprise is allowed a monopoly of fundamental research of the whole development of these new weapons. If that type of semi-monopoly—and it must be a semi-monopoly, because the day has gone when small engineering firms could contract—obtains a complete monopoly of arms production because private enterprise has the background of development, and the blueprints for the production of hydrogen and atomic weapons.
  It can be said that Socialist theory demands that where arms are produced they should be produced by public enterprise and under public control. That is a fundamental issue. But millions of people today, some of whom have never accepted Socialist theory, would never agree, in this day of hydrogen and atomic weapons, that private enterprise should have the monopoly of production in order to make profits from those weapons. That is more especially so at a time when we are hoping—though that is an awful word to use in this context—to

  1321
  export these armaments to other countries in a rather big way.
  The nub of this argument is that the Government must get control of the production of the new types of weapons. Unless they can do that, then we are, without doubt, putting ourselves completely in the hands of those private monopolies to whom we will be giving control.
  I turn to compensation. On 6th June I asked the Parliamentary Secretary how the Government proposed to deal with redundancies, especially where people were being asked to travel long distances from their homes to their work. He replied:
  "Those long-serving employees at Royal Ordnance factories who are established have accepted the obligation to transfer as a condition of their establishment. If their work at any particular factory comes to an end, the Government will honour its obligation to provide alternative employment for them elsewhere in the Government service. Employment locally will be the first aim, but failing this, they will be required to transfer."
  He went on to say:
  "If an offer of employment at a new station is refused by an established industrial employee, he will have to be discharged unless he elects to resign. Either course would involve, in accordance with the provisions of the Superannuation Acts, forfeiture of all superannuation rights except as stated below."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th June, 1957; Vol. 571, c. 150–1.]
  Here we have a Government which, by their own policies and not by something which has been thrust upon them, deliberately bring about the redundancy of, as I believe, some 50,000 people but, while doing that, refuse to budge one inch from the basis on which men accepted establishment, believing that the normal processes would obtain.
  I turn now to the position in the R.E.M.E. establishments. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Feltham (Mr. Hunter)is concerned at the position of many of his constituents. He has been discussing with the War Office the question of pension rates for people in R.E.M.E. establishments. Established people have to serve seven years before qualifying in any shape or form. Imagine a man with a family, who may have served the Government well for six years and ten months and who, because he has not served the requisite seven year period, is thrown out on his ear without any sort of compensation. Can
  1322
  this sort of thing be permitted by the same Government who were so tender towards our military brethren a few days ago?
  I do not want the House to get me wrong. I am very glad indeed when men of any type who have served the country well are treated generously. I do not sneer at them. It is right and proper that the nation should do its very best for these public servants, but I object most strongly when a person with a military career which has been terminated by Government action is recompensed at a terrifically high rate, while a good ordnance worker, who has served his apprenticeship, has given of his skill and has done his best for the nation, receives a pittance from the Government. Indeed, we understand that if such a man refuses to go to another place, some miles away, he will be sacked, or will be given the "privilege" of resigning.
  This is the sort of thing which is detrimental not only to those who are now having to lose their jobs, but to those who remain. Those of us who have worked for many years in the engineering industry, and know the background of the development of engineering technique, can tell harrowing stories of the feelings of those who remain after their colleagues have been dismissed. At a time when there is a run-down in the factory, men are uncomfortable. They look for opportunities to get work elsewhere. They cannot possibly give undivided loyalty to their employers, no matter what type of employers they may be. At a time when we are thinking in terms of new weapons, the right hon. Gentleman ought to try to understand the damage that he is doing to the morale 9f those who remain, quite apart from their colleagues who are to be dismissed.
  Several hon. Members have mentioned civil work in the Royal Ordnance factories. There was a time, when we on this side of the House were in office, when one-third of the products of these factories was civil work. I am not going to argue that they were all completely economic in contrast to private enterprise, but when we get a situation in which this nation is losing a percentage of its world markets every year and when this has gone on for five consecutive years, when it is so essential that every wheel which can turn to produce goods which we can

  1323
  export should turn, how wrong it is that factories, some of them very modern, should be allowed to close or go on a half cock basis, when they are capable of helping the nation by producing articles which we know them to be capable of producing.
  Let me mention some of the articles which were once produced in the Royal Ordnance factories. There were concrete railway sleepers, locomotive convertions for China—that is an export to which my hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies)has referred—steel railway wagons, laundry machinery, wood cutting machinery, the overhaul of Bedford lorries for U.N.R.R.A., the overhaul of Matador lorries, oil well drilling equipment, stocking looms and clock mechanisms. One could go on for a long time reciting other items.
  I want to put a specific point to the Minister. What is the method by which the R.O.F.s are managed? Who decides whether civil work is undertaken or not? My information is that the scope for R.O.F.s to handle alternative work to armaments is completely limited. I am told that superintendents of factories are permitted to engage in small orders for alternative work locally, but that large orders must go through the contracts branch of the Ministry of Supply. Here, such work becomes subject to Government policy itself.
  I am told that a significant feature of the board which controls the R.O.F.s is that 50 per cent. of the seats are held by representatives of private industry. Is this true or not? If we now have a situation in which those who determine whether civil orders go to R.O.F.s or not are those who want to push them into their own factories, we come up against a very dangerous problem. I can understand that engineering technicians at the R.O.F.s will be very willing to undertake orders suitable for manufacture in the R.O.F.s, whether they be armaments or civil work, but I believe that the secretarial and administrative side of the Ministry of Supply headquarters have had far too much to say on general policy and matters outside their legislative purview. I ask the Minister to give the House all the information he can on who, in fact, determines the R.O.F. capacity to take civil orders.
  1324
  I have said that I feel that the Government are not really attempting either to utilise the R.O.F.s to the full or so to alter the capital equipment of the R.O.F.s so that they may be made capable of competing with other types of work. Primarily, I do not want to see R.O.F.s compelled to run on a civil production basis, but in this day and age, when we see fearful new weapons being developed, and when we know that now more than ever in our history is it essential that public control of those weapons should be the order of the day, it is so vital to the welfare of the nation that we should have the products of that type under Government ownership and public control.
  For my part, because I do not feel that the Government are imbued with any concern for that matter, but feel rather that this is a field for private enterprise, I condemn their policies. I know that on a day such as this, when we are subject to other rules, we cannot divide the House on this issue, but I hope from what has been said that the Government will be under no delusion that we believe that their policies are bad and wrong for the nation and for the future of the R.O.F.s. We believe that they are merely trying to ensure that this profitable field should be left to private enterprise which has their sympathies.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. W. J. Taylor)The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. W. J. Taylor) rose——
  Captain Richard PilkingtonBefore my hon. Friend replies, may I ask whether he realises that there are many other hon. Members who have sat here throughout the debate and have hoped to intervene? Will he give an undertaking that he and the Minister will give full consideration to the points which hon. Members will send to them, in my case the point relating to the small arms factory at Poole?
  6.40 p.m.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: May I raise a point of order, Mr. Speaker, based upon the Standing Orders and linked with Parliamentary practice? I am making no reflection upon the Chair. I understand that we are now discussing the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)Bill. If I correctly understand the Standing Orders, before

  1325
  Parliament votes Supply grievances should at least be ventilated or remedied. I have a grievance affecting 2,500 men and women, as good as any in the land, who are now to be discharged.
  Mr. Speaker has been good enough on several occasions when we sought to raise matters on the Adjournment to ask us not to pursue them unless the Minister could be present. The logic of that advice by Mr. Speaker is that the Minister should not now reply until our grievances—in my case, that of the 2,500 workers—have been stated. I should be pleased to have your advice, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. Speaker: It is true that the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)Bill, with which the House is now dealing, is an opportunity for raising points of grievance and difficulty in the constituencies, and I should not feel disposed to stop an hon. Member from doing so. At the same time, I have to remember the general convenience of the House. Besides the subject which we have been discussing, there is a large number of other subjects which hon. Members wish to discuss, all equally in order on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)Bill.
  My endeavour will be to try to help both sides of the House to such an apportionment of the time at our disposal and for Ministers' replies as suits everyone best. That is all I am trying to do. If, however, the Minister rises, it is my duty to call him. He is the next speaker on the Government side. But it is entirely a question for him and for the House if he cares to delay his reply at this time and if hon. Members wish to make short interventions. I should not feel it my duty to the rest of the House to delay the debate too long, because the general subject has been covered fairly well, but if hon. Members can draw attention to their constituency points I should have no objection to the Minister deferring his reply until after that has been done.
  Dr. Stross: Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I have your advice on this point? If by chance the Minister were to rise now and you called him to reply, surely that would not merely deprive us of opportunities of speaking, but would mean that the Minister would not be able to speak again without the leave of the House—or he might even have gone—and you might then rule that
  1326
  other Members should have the opportunity to speak?
  Would it not therefore be correct to say that if a number of us limit ourselves to short speeches and the Minister does not intervene now, we could, perhaps, within an hour or so, get some representation of our grievances without denying anyone else?
  Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith)referred to my frequent deprecation of subjects being raised on the Adjournment without the presence of a Minister to reply. My point was that the Member who raises such debates gets no satisfaction and neither does the House. That was the basis of my Ruling on these occasions.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: I very much appreciate the advice you have given, Mr. Speaker, but too much is at stake, because this can be taken as a precedent to allow the matter to go in this way. There is an important constitutional right that before we vote Supply, grievances must be remedied. I was here in the days when there were two or three million unemployed and I know what this means. Now we have 2,500 who can be unemployed. My point is that it is Parliamentary practice based upon generations of understanding that on an issue like this we should have an opportunity of ventilating our grievances before the Minister replies.
  6.45 p.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply (Mr. W. J. Taylor): I join with hon. Members opposite in the disappointment that this debate has been so short as to preclude hon. Gentlemen from raising matters which are vital to them and which affect factories in their constituencies, but I feel that it might be for the convenience of the House and of those Members who have already spoken if I were to make a brief reply and attempt to cover some of the points that have been raised.
  Mr. Speaker: That is perfectly in order. It does not put an end to the debate by any rule of which I am aware.
  Mr. Taylor: First, may I reply to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Poole (Captain Pilkington)by saying that my right hon. Friend and I will be

  1327
  very glad to consider any representations that my hon. and gallant Friend makes concerning the Poole Royal Ordnance factory, or from any hon. Lady or Gentleman in any part of the House who seeks to make such representations to us.
  We are, indeed, very concerned about this matter. I sympathise with the feelings of hon. Members, which have been expressed from all sides, about the closure of the seven Royal Ordnance factories. I should like to take this opportunity of paying a tribute to the splendid services of those who are threatened by these closures. It is, as I have said, a matter of the greatest regret to my right hon. Friend and myself that we have to take this step, but it was inevitable in view of the change in the Government's defence policy and all the consequences that ensue.
  In making our decisions and drawing up our plan, it has been the constant aim of my right hon. Friend and myself to reduce hardship to the absolute minimum. The House will know that these closures of factories are to be spread over a period of two and a half years. This will do much to ease the absorption of redundant workers into other jobs. As my right hon. Friend said, we are hopeful that the example set in the case of the disposal of the Dalmuir factory may, in spite of what was said by the hon. Member for Dunbartonshire, East (Mr. Bence), provide a useful precedent and example of what may happen elsewhere, although there are individual factories, particularly the filling factories, which have their special difficulties which will not be easy of solution.
  I think that, in the limited time available, the House would wish me to refer to the terms of discharge of redundant workers. It has been clear from the course of the debate that the main concern of hon. Members is not so much with what is to happen to the factories, although that has been discussed at length, as what is to happen to the people who have worked in the factories. That is the most important aspect of the whole matter. There are many of these people who have given long and valuable service to the country. In the Royal Ordnance factories, most of them are established Government servants, and
  1328
  they will be offered work in other Government establishments.
  In view of the criticisms which have been made from the benches opposite of the establishment scheme, perhaps I might be permitted to remind the House that in return for the security of guaranteed employment which a worker receives when he becomes established he accepts the obligation to be transferred if the needs of the public service so require. Each worker is free to accept or reject establishment as he wishes, and his attention is drawn at the time to the obligation to transfer. If we were to allow this obligation to transfer to lapse, the scheme would be inoperable; we really could not guarantee security without retaining flexibility in this matter. We shall, however—I give the House this most serious and sincere assurance—do our very best to avoid any unnecessary disturbance. We are prepared to look as closely as possible at individual cases where special hardship may occur.
  Dr. Stross: On the point of special hardship, does the Minister not agree that there is no definition of such a term? He can, therefore, give no guarantee as to how it may be interpreted, and nobody in his Department can possibly define what is meant by it.
  Mr. Taylor: I agree in general terms with what the hon. Member has said. Those of us who have had experience of local government and social work will know how difficult it is to define the word "hardship." Many of us have sat for thousands of hours trying to deal with cases which were marginal, when the word "hardship" could not be clearly defined. All I say to the hon. Gentleman is that this is really a matter of common sense and good faith on the part of the Department concerned. I hope that this Department of mine may, in spite of what has been said, have a reputation for good sense and sympathy in a matter like this.
  There always is a great deal of movement going on in the Civil Service as a whole. One must admit that the financial arrangements for transfer are not ungenerous. The hon. Member for Newton (Mr. Lee)mentioned a Question to which I gave a Written Answer on 6th June, in which I stated fairly fully the terms of the financial arrangements.

  1329
  Workpeople who are not established and who will have to be discharged when their work comes to an end will be given—I repeat now what my right hon. Friend and I have said many times at this Box—as long notice as possible of the actual date of discharge. My right hon. Friend went out of his way on 15th July to give very long notice indeed of these closures of Royal Ordnance factories. After all, two and a half years is a very long time within which both the Department and all those concerned can be thinking about what the future holds and what arrangements can be made. At any rate, my right hon. Friend deserves the thanks and appreciation of the House for the very long notice which he has given.
  The unestablished people, if they have put in five years service or more, will leave with the improved gratuities provided by the Superannuation Act of 1957.
  Mr. A. E. Hunter: What is to be the position of anyone having done four and a half years?
  Mr. Taylor: I am afraid that anyone who has done only four and a half years is not eligible for payment under this scheme. If the hon. Member for Feltham (Mr. Hunter)will raise a particular case as an example to put to me, I will give him a detailed reply and see whether there is any arrangement by which such a person can benefit by a payment. But I have not that information here now. My information starts at the minimum period of qualification, namely, five years service. I feel that the provisions in the Superannuation Act of 1957 are fair and reasonably good.
  During the debate, an attempt has been made to draw a parallel between these redundancies and the contraction in the Armed Forces which arises from the same change of circumstances. It has been argued that the terms of compensation for enforced premature retirement from the Armed Forces should be matched by similar arrangements for those who become redundant in the Royal Ordnance factories. But, surely, there is no parallel between these two things. In the one case, a specialised and chosen career is being ended, and, as it were, a contract of service has had to be terminated. In the other case, no such thing is happening. The "regulars" in the Royal Ordnance factories, that is, the established
  1330
  people, are not being retired at all; they will be transferred to other work, or, at any rate, they will be offered transfer to other work in the way that I have just described.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Minister not turning down the suggestion made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Mr. Nairn)?
  Mr. Taylor: I should hesitate to comment on any suggestion made by the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire without notice; he makes so many suggestions and so many comments that I am not sure which one he is referring to.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Minister not aware that what I was drawing his attention to was the remark made by his hon. Friend the Member for Central Ayrshire, who made the comparison between the colonels and the ordinary people in the factories?
  Mr. Taylor: I do not want to pursue that at this particular moment.
  I should like to make a short reference to the disposal of surplus factories. My right hon. Friend and I regard the problem of finding new occupants for the factories no longer required for defence production as one of the greatest urgency and importance. I will, in close collaboration with my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade, take an active interest in the disposal of each of those factories, and my Department will do all in its power to meet the wishes of prospective buyers and ensure that no time or opportunity is lost. I shall be present tomorrow at a meeting between the President of the Board of Trade and Members representing north Staffordshire constituencies at which the future of the Royal Ordnance factory at Swynnerton is to be discussed.
  Mr. Harold Davies: Would the Minister add this one word? We are grateful to him for that answer, as it affects north Staffordshire, but in a Written Question, not for Oral Answer, I put to him some time ago I asked whether he would be prepared, in respect of these factories in north Staffordshire, to come with his advisers and discuss the matter with the local authorities in the area, with the City of Stoke-on-Trent, with the county council and the local chambers of commerce.

  1331
  That would be worth while in this case, and we should like him to give an answer about that.
  Sir Roland Jennings: Will my hon. Friend consider this position as it affects every place, wherever it may be? I am sure that that would be the general wish.
  Mr. Taylor: I will certainly consider representations from any quarter which can be of help in this matter. In reply to the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), I should like to say that I have already seen representatives of local authorities, and we are quite prepared at any time to see anyone who feels that he can help us about it.
  I felt that many of the speeches in the debate struck a gloomy and despondent note, unnecessarily so, I believe. We are passing through a time of transition in our defence policy. The fundamental decisions have been taken and the effects are gradually working their way through the economy. This is bound to cause some temporary dislocation, and the effect is, perhaps, greatest at present on the Royal Ordnance factories. But I think that it is generally recognised that the requirements of defence have placed too great a burden on our nation in recent years, and that, when the period of transition is over, we shall be able to progress more rapidly and more surely as a result of the change.
  For our part, we are determined that such Royal Ordnance factories as remain must be live, progressive and fully up to date. It is our intention that, within their own fields, they shall be leaders in technology, enterprise and good management. We shall keep these factories equipped with the most modern plant. I assure the right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens)and his hon. Friends that we
  mean to ensure that their staffs are assured of worthwhile careers and that the splendid spirit of loyal service which has characterised those factories for very many years shall be maintained and strengthened in the future.
  In conclusion, may I say that I shall, in reply to questions from hon. Members, draft answers for them and write to them, since I obviously have not had time to reply to every point raised today.
  6.59 p.m.
  Dr. Barnett Stross (Stoke-on-Tent, Central): You will remember, Mr. Speaker, that a little while ago we obtained, at any rate, your tacit consent to prolong this debate for a short time. I shall be very brief, as I suggested that I——
  It being Seven o'clock, and there being Private Business set down by direction of The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF WAYS AND MEANS under Standing Order No. 7 (Time for taking Private Business), further Proceeding stood postponed.

  LIVERPOOL CORPORATION BILL [Lords]
  As amended, considered.
  Standing Order No. 205 (Notice of Third Reading)suspended.—[The Deputy-Chairman of Ways and Means.]
  Motion made, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
  Queen's consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.
  Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time:—
  The House divided: Ayes 175, Noes 79.

  Division No. 177.]

  AYES

  [7.2 p.m.

  Ainsley, J. W.

  Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

  Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

  Aitken, W. T.

  Boyle, Sir Edward

  Cooke, Robert

  Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

  Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

  Cooper-Key, E. M.

  Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

  Braine, B. R.

  Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

  Alport, C. J. M.

  Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

  Dance, J. C. G.

  Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

  Brown, Thomas (Ince)

  Davidson, Viscountess

  Ashton, H.

  Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

  Deer, G.

  Bacon, Miss Alice

  Bryan, P.

  Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

  Balniel, Lord

  Burke, W. A.

  Doughty, C. J. A.

  Barber, Anthony

  Butcher, Sir Herbert

  Drayson, G. B.

  Benson, G.

  Campbell, Sir David

  Elliott, R. W. (N'castle upon Tyne, N.)

  Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

  Carr, Robert

  Erroll, F. J.

  Blackburn, F.

  Castle, Mrs. B. A.

  Fletcher-Cooke, C.

  Blyton, W. R.

  Chichester-Clark, R.

  Gammans, Lady

  Glover, D.

  MacDermot, Niall

  Ross, William

  Glyn, Col. R.

  McInnes, J.

  Russell, R. S.

  Godber, J. B.

  Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

  Sharples, R. C.

  Goodhart, Philip

  McKibbin, A. J.

  Shurmer, P. L. E.

  Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

  McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

  Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

  Graham, Sir Fergus

  Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)

  Skeffington, A. M.

  Green, A.

  Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

  Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

  Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

  Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

  Steele, T.

  Hall, John (Wycombe)

  Mahon, Simon

  Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

  Hannan, W.

  Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

  Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

  Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

  Mann, Mrs. Jean

  Stones, W. (Consett)

  Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

  Marples, Rt. Hon. A. E.

  Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

  Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.

  Mathew, R.

  Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

  Herbison, Miss M.

  Maude, Angus

  Temple, John M.

  Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

  Mayhew, C. P.

  Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

  Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

  Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

  Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

  Hobson, John (Warwick & Leam'gt'n)

  Moody, A. S.

  Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

  Holland-Martin, C. J.

  Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

  Thornton, E.

  Holmes, Horace

  Mulley, F. W.

  Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

  Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

  Nairn, D. L. S.

  Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

  Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

  Oakshott, H. D.

  Tilney, John (Wavertree)

  Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

  O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

  Tomney, F.

  Hurd, A. R.

  Ormsby-Gore, Rt. Hon. W. D.

  Turner, H. F. L.

  Hutchison, Michael Clark (Ed'b'gh, S.)

  Page, R. G.

  Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

  Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

  Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)

  Vane, W. M. F.

  Hyde, Montgomery

  Pargiter, G. A.

  Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

  Hynd, H. (Accrington)

  Partridge, E.

  Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Derek

  Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

  Pentland, N.

  Wall, Major Patrick

  Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

  Pitman, I. J.

  Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

  Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

  Popplewell, E.

  Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

  Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

  Powell, J. Enoch

  Wheeldon, W. E.

  Joseph, Sir Keith

  Prentice, R. E.

  White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

  Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

  Price, David (Eastleigh)

  Wigg, George

  Kimball, M.

  Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

  Williams, Ronald (Wigan)

  King, Dr. H. M.

  Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

  Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

  Lambert, Hon. G.

  Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

  Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

  Lambton, Viscount

  Proctor, W. T.

  Winterbottom, Richard

  Lawson, G. M.

  Profumo, J. D.

  Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

  Leavey, J. A.

  Raikes, Sir Victor

  Woof, R. E.

  Lee, Frederick (Newton)

  Redmayne, M.

  Yates, William (The Wrekin)

  Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

  Renton, D. L. M.

  Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

  Lindgren, G. S.

  Ridsdale, J. E.

  Lindsay, Martin (Solihull)

  Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

  TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

  Logan, D. G.

  Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

  Mr. Norman Pannell and

  Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

  Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

  Mr. Kenyon.

  Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

  Roper, Sir Harold

  NOES

  Albu, A. H.

  Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

  Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

  Awbery, S. S.

  Grimond, J.

  Pearson, A.

  Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

  Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

  Pott, H. P.

  Bidgood, J. C.

  Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

  Probert, A. R.

  Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

  Healey, Denis

  Randall, H. E.

  Carmichael, J.

  Holt, A. F.

  Redhead, E. C.

  Champion, A. J.

  Houghton, Douglas

  Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

  Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

  Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

  Short, E. W.

  Crossman, R. H. S.

  Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

  Silverman, Julius (Aston)

  Cullen, Mrs. A.

  Hunter, A. E.

  Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

  Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

  Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs, S.)

  Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

  Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)

  Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

  Stoddard-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm

  Davies, Harold (Leek)

  Kerby, Capt. H. B.

  Swingler, S. T.

  Davies Stephen (Merthyr)

  Lipton, Marcus

  Teeling, W.

  Delargy, H. J.

  Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

  Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

  Donnelly, D. L.

  McKay, John (Wallsend)

  Timmons, J.

  Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

  Mackie, J. H. (Calloway)

  Viant, S. P.

  Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

  Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

  Wade, D. W.

  Farey-Jones, F. W.

  Mawby, R. L.

  Wells, Percy (Faversham)

  Fernyhough, E.

  Medilcott, Sir Frank

  Wilkins, W. A.

  Finch, H. J.

  Monslow, W.

  Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

  Garner-Evans, E. H.

  Moore, Sir Thomas

  Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

  George, Lady Megan Lloyd (Car'then)

  Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

  Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

  Gibson-Watt, D.

  Mort, D. L,

  Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan

  Moyle, A.

  TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

  Gooch, E. C.

  Nabarro, G. D. N.

  Mr. Tudor Watkins and

  Gower, H. R.

  Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

  Mr. Idwal Jones.

  Greenwood, Anthony

  Padley, W. E.

  Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

  LIVERPOOL CORPORATION BILL [Lords]

    CONSOLIDATED FUND (APPROPRIATION)BILL
    Postponed Proceeding resumed on Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
    Question again proposed.

  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES
  7.10 p.m.
  Dr. Stross: I am sure that all of us who are interested in continuing for a little longer the debate on Royal Ordnance factories are delighted to see that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply has courteously resumed his seat and is prepared to listen to us. It may well be that it will be within the bounds of order for the hon. Gentleman to speak again when he has heard a few hon. Members make their own short interventions.
  I was particularly interested in hearing the Parliamentary Secretary and the Minister of Supply speak of a period of two-and-a-half years for winding up the factories that have to be closed or handed over to other authorities. If it be two-and-a-half years it will be at least some satisfaction to us, because we have been told that the Royal Ordnance factory at Swynnerton is closing in one year. That would not have given sufficient time for the displaced workers to find other occupations. We are very happy to have further confirmation tonight that about two years is the period in the Minister's mind and not about one year.
  The Minister said that there are special difficulties with these filling factories. This we appreciate and understand. The Parliamentary Secretary will know that a filling factory very like that at Swynnerton was handed over at Kirby to a great local authority which has turned it into a successful trading estate. We should very much like to see the same thing happening to the factory at Swynnerton. The factory covers 2 square miles of installations, separated by large distances because of the special hazards of shell-filling. As a result, overhead charges are tremendously heavy. Maintenance charges are also heavy and only a comparatively small section of the factory could be taken
  1336
  over immediately by a private or municipal enterprise. Indeed, only the engineering and one other section would be of any good to anybody. Nobody would want the rest of the installations at all, unless there was a very unusual type of applicant.
  Although the City of Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire County Council are, together not great or rich authorities like Liverpool, if they were brought together with the Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade it might be possible for a scheme to be worked out that would be to the benefit of the country as a whole and of the people of Staffordshire in particular, and something that would prevent, this area becoming derelict and a tremendous loss to us all. I sincerely hope that something of the kind may be possible.
  I still feel that it is a mistake to say that men who are declared redundant in the Armed Forces cannot be compared with those declared redundant in these installations. The right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill)said on more than one occasion during the war that these men and women, many of whom were decorated for their services and some of whom are still employed, were as much in the front line as any serving men. Their industrial risk has been higher than that of those in most other occupations.
  Many of them, whom I used to see during the war, suffered industrial injury or disease. It is not true to say that they do not suffer handicap, even when they appear to have recovered, or that there is no prejudice against cases of industrial dermatitis not only on the part of employers but on the part of other workers who through ignorance are nervous and frightened.
  A sergeant in the Regular Forces, at 35 years of age and after seventeen years' service, is pensioned off at £2 15s. 5d. a week, with a gratuity of £1,475, if he is declared redundant. At this factory the average age of the men is 49 years and of the women 42 and when they have to go and they are not established, but have served just over five years, they receive five weeks' wages. Like everyone else, I am glad to see that we can afford to be generous to the men who have served in the Armed Forces. I do not grudge the colonels, the brigadiers, the sergeants, or anyone else a farthing. How can we reduce the Armed Forces if we do not play

  1337
  fair by these men? If I were a brigadier or a sergeant I should be very irate if I were treated unfairly. But when these unestablished men and women who are employed in these factories and who, during the war, were described as heroes and heroines are turned off with a miserable pittance, it is not fair. We have every right to say that they have a grievance and to speak on their behalf.
  7.16 p.m.
  Mr. Ronald Williams: I am most indebted to the Minister and the Parliamentary Secretary for being in their places on the Front Bench at this time, having regard to the fact that the debate apaprently was to conclude at seven o'clock. I am particularly glad because, as it happens—and in this nobody is in the least to blame—with one exception this is the first speech made from this side of the House on a case in which a clear statement has been made concerning the closing dawn of a factory.
  On 15th July, the Minister of Supply said:
  "Fourthly, on present estimates of work available, it will be necessary to close down the shell factory at Wigan and the small arms factory at Poole sometime in 1959–60."—[OFFICIA1 REPORT, 15th July, 1957; Vol. 573, c. 762.]
  Until this afternoon I felt that if an appeal were made in a temperate and fair way to the Minister he would be receptive of the arguments submitted to him. I hope that in receiving the contrary impression, which I did from the right hon. Gentleman's opening speech today, I was mistaken. It is in the hope that he will take into account my argument that I rise to make a short intervention now.
  When the right hon. Gentleman made that statement on 15th July, he obviously thought that he was doing something which was helpful in giving what he called a long period of notice. I ask him to consider another aspect of that announcement, because it is one thing to give a long period of notice when all the arguments to which he referred apply and there is no possibility of anything happening but the factory closing down. It is quite another thing to give a period of notice like that when the factory is engaged in work which may be very much prejudiced by that notice being given.
  As it happens, the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan has become engaged in civil work. This is not a case where we
  1338
  are saying, "Please keep the factory open because by retooling and re-equipping we could do civil work with this labour force and do it on competitive terms." We are saying that it is a fact that the civil work is being done. Not only is it being done, but there is another point about the work. According to my information, which I submit as strongly as I can to the Minister, part of the work which is being done on the civil side is concerned with the forging and machining of Dowty buffer cylinders and pistons. So far as I know, it is only at the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan that that work is being done and these supplies are being made, and they are being made for a private firm.
  Mr. W. J. Taylor: Had it not been for the orders placed by this private firm, the level of employment at Wigan might have been very much lower than it is today.
  Mr. Williams: So be it, but the order was placed and is there now, and there is a twelve months' minimum programme.
  Let us suppose that the Royal Ordnance factory was not there—and I put this question to the Minister in all seriousness—where would the supplies come from? If my information is correct, and if it is only from this very well equipped and modern factory that these supplies can be obtained, is the Minister saying that, if he gives notice that he is going to close down the factory then, between now and the date when it will close down, some firm will come along and take over the equipment, some of the staff and produce the supplies through private enterprise? If that be the answer, then the Minister's claim that there are reservations in the case where the Royal Ordnance factory can do the job better than anyone else is open to very serious qualification.
  If, in fact, the work is being done, why should it not continue to be done? The intervention of the Parliamentary Secretary would have had some point if this was something which was being done to help the Royal Ordnance factory. In fact, this factory can produce more competently and efficiently than anybody else. The factory is prepared to stand the test of being in competition with anybody who may come along. It is confident that, with its existing staff and equipment

  1339
  it can do better than anybody else. Why waste this asset? This is part of the national production, and something where private enterprise is being fed by the job which is being done, and done so well, in Wigan. Why on earth should the Government say that, in respect of work such as that, it must come to an end when, obviously, from every standpoint, everybody is benefiting as a consequence of it?
  In other words, these facts being as they are, this is an argument that the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan should continue, and not an argument that it should come to an end. Although it may come to an end in two years' time, it means not only that the people in the factory are put into an insecure position, but that the supply of these commodities to the private firm may also be jeopardised. I would have thought that the Minister would have taken this into account, and would have said that this was an aspect of the work of the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan which was justification for it not being closed.
  Let me put one other point to the Minister, since he has referred to mitigation. This afternoon he said that in respect of conventional arms, the Royal Ordnance factories were given preference, and that disturbs me very much. If it is true, I am not in the least disturbed, but it does not coincide with the information which I received concerning the position of the factory at Wigan. There, according to my information, and I have been very careful to check it, it is a fact that a certain type of shell has been and is being produced in large quantities. I think it would interest the Minister to know, if he does not know already, that during the period of research, there were forty-seven alterations of the design. That means that a terrific amount of work was done before they reached that standard of precision when they could supply this shell. The Ministry wants many more of these shells supplied, and the Admiralty also wants to receive considerable further quantities of them.
  I could quite understand the Minister saying that they will not want them indefinitely, but they will want them for perhaps another two years or so, and then the orders will be tapering off and will come to an end. The sad fact is
  1340
  that in this case a very large capital sum has been invested in a private firm which has demonstrated its incompetence at this job, and which has had to go to the Royal Ordnance factory seeking for help and even for equipment. Even today, this private firm would not be in a position to perform this work. That being so, would not the Minister feel that the right thing to do would be to say that, since we have got a team of workers there and equipment there, and that they are doing the job to the highest standards of precision, work should continue?
  Certainly, as we run down the arms programme and need fewer shells, the point will arise at which we shall have no need for the contribution of these shells from the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan. But there is no case at all for saying that, because we are running it down, we must take all this work and put it into incompetent private hands, and build up the efficiency of a private firm on the basis of something which is being done so well in this modern and well-equipped factory.
  Further, I put it to the Minister that he knows as well as I do that, without going into the details of the factory itself, the air conditioned gauge room in the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan is probably one of the finest things one will find in any factory under private enterprise or even in any other Royal Ordnance factory. I am delighted to see the Parliamentary Secretary nodding his head in agreement. Here is a first-class factory, which has been fully equipped in the most modern way since the end of the last war, and in which a great deal of equipment has been installed in the last two years. Why waste these assets at the very time when we want all the production that we can get and when we need so badly the contribution which nobody can make better than the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan? No private firm or combination of private firms can do this job as well as it is now being done and could continue to be done in this Royal Ordnance factory.
  My final word concerns the Minister's observations about being under a moral obligation to workers. What saddens me, and I think it will sadden him, is that in this disturbance, much of it inevitable,

  1341
  the closure of the Royal Ordnance factory at Wigan is not in the least necessary. In this matter there are human factors from which he cannot escape. I have submitted to him particulars of one case. There are others, but I think the House should know about this case. I am not going to refer to the person by name, because that would miss the point. It is the nature of the case which is of importance.
  It is the case of a man 61 years of age, who has served the country, in this case in a clerical capacity, for over seventeen years. What is going to happen to him and his wife and family now, since he is declared redundant and has to go? The Minister of Supply expressed his regret in the clearest terms to me, but very little can be done on the Ministry of Labour side in the case of a man with specialised experience like that. Therefore, he has to go. We have to send him out as a consequence of Government policy, and this in an area which has suffered in the most ghastly way from unemployment and where even today the figure of unemployment is higher than the national percentage.
  We have had enough of this in Wigan in past years, and we do not want to see it happen again. I think that the Minister will make a most ghastly mistake, cause very grave hardship and harm and do no good at all if he pursues his decision to close this factory.
  7.30 p.m.
  Mr. W. T. Proctor: The most hopeful statement made by the Minister this afternoon is that the implementation of this policy dealing with the Royal Ordnance factories will take about two and a half years. By then we are hopeful on this side of the House that somebody else may be able to deal with the question.
  In my Division the Patricroft Royal Ordnance factory employs 1,000 men. It is in an industrial community, and the staff take a great interest in their work and in the affairs of other Royal Ordnance factories throughout the country. They feel that the nation is not dealing fairly with the personnel of the R.O.Fs. The workers have no security, and security is one of the most vital things in the life of a community, especially for the workers.
  1342
  The factory in question was a private enterprise one before the war. Immediately war started it was taken over by the Government and was used for the production of guns. Subsequently it produced tanks and a great variety of war materials. It made a great contribution to our war effort, and at the end of the war, still under public ownership, it returned to civil production. It produced railway equipment, steel railway wagons, oil tanks for converting coal-fired boilers to oil burners, lamp standards for British Railways, mining equipment and a host of other civilian products. The factory was doing well until 1951 when, as a result of the Korean War, it went back to armament production. Machinery was introduced on a large scale.
  I have no information about how much capital was used, but I have been told that a very large sum was spent on re- equipping the factory. At the present time it has a steel-making plant, with heavy forge and heat treatment shops, full laboratory equipment, a well-equipped tool room and general machine shops. It covers approximately eighteen acres, and of this there are ten acres of buildings. It is felt that the factory should remain in public hands, that there should be no redundancy and full-time employment.
  Happily this is not one of the factories listed for disposal, but the staff feel insecure and, as I have said, these people take an intelligent interest in what is going on. They tell me that one of the most disturbing features is the building of a new factory by Beans Industries Limited of Tipton, for the sole purpose of producing the type of shells that could be produced at Patricroft R.O.F., and that these shells are for the Admiralty.
  Is there any truth in that statement? If it is correct that capital is being used to build a factory to do work which could be done by the R.O.F.s, it is scandalous. The Navy is the Senior Service. I hope that that information is not correct, and I should like an answer from the Minister when he winds up the debate. Certainly there is a strong case for an inquiry as to whether the Navy is making the use of the R.O.F.s which it could make.
  As regards Royal Ordnance factories generally, I suggest that we should use them for the benefit of this nation. They

  1343
  represent valuable capital equipment. Whilst there is a difference of opinion between the two sides of the House on public ownership and private enterprise, we on this side are concerned about private enterprise from the point of view of the wages and conditions of work and the welfare of those employed in it. We on this side of the House are not prejudiced against private enterprise from the point of view of dealing with it fairly and efficiently and helping it to serve the true interests of the nation. However, I have always a suspicion that hon. Gentlemen opposite are prejudiced against public ownership and that efforts are made not to give it the same chance as would be given if those opposite had a greater affection for public ownership. The thing which struck me most during the period of the Labour Government was when the late Stafford Cripps was responding to the call for increased production. He used the R.O.F.s to help private industry. He said, "If you fall down on any job, let me know what it is, and I will hand it over to the Royal Ordnance factories." In that way many production bottlenecks were solved. That is still a sensible proposition. Private enterprise has not the same resources for research as the nation has, and it would pay the nation to use these factories for experiments, research and development in order to help private industry to become more efficient.
  We all hope to see fewer armaments produced, and we should take a broad international view on these matters. There is no more wonderful story than that of the creation of the Royal Ordnance factories in this country and their use in both the First and Second World Wars. Now that we are speaking in terms of peace in the world, we ought to use this valuable capital equipment for producing needed goods. This nation could do nothing better than use it for the development of the undeveloped areas, for providing capital goods for export and also for the Point Four American programme. Therefore, I ask the Government to think not in terms of closing down the Royal Ordnance factories but of using them as a framework for British industry, since they are amongst our most valuable assets. These factories can be used to boost our industrial output, to increase our research resources, and can remain a great reserve potential in case of any
  1344
  emergency. The staff are eager to serve the nation. All they ask in return is fair conditions of service and reasonable security of employment.
  7.38 p.m.
  Mr. Stephen Swingler: I want to make three short points. In the first place, I ask the Minister to carry out a ruthless investigation in his Department into the application of the principle of preference for Royal Ordnance factories, which is of special importance to those which are to be maintained, such as Radway Green.
  Since the announcements have been made, those who represent workers employed at the R.O.Fs. have had presented to them a large amount of evidence that the principle of using R.O.Fs. as a preferred source of supply is not being applied. The Minister will have heard in the debate today more allegations that work is still being given to private firms which could be carried out in the Royal Ordnance factories.
  I firmly believe that arms manufacture should be brought under public control. That is why I want the Minister to make a thorough inquiry to ensure that the work which the existing R.O.Fs. can do will be concentrated in them, and that there will be a reduction of arms manufactured by profit-making private enterprise.
  The second thing I want to say is that I deeply deplore the sterile attitude of the Minister towards the conversion of these factories. We all welcome the reduction in the manufacture of armaments. Here is a great opportunity. Here we are presented with a number of assets and a considerable labour force which can be liberated from the inflationary process of making shells or tanks or guns and can be put to peaceful, constructive work.
  We are hearing all the time the cry, "Production, production, production". The Minister should therefore have seized this opportunity. The Government were responsible for this labour force and for the factories, and I believe that the Government should have taken the responsibility themselves for converting these factories to peaceful purposes and for providing alternative employment for the workers in them.
  One can only conclude from the Minister's statement that purely doctrinaire

  1345
  reasons have led to this policy being rejected. The Minister has been head of the Department of State which is most closely concerned with the nationalised industries. He knows full well of the shortage of capital equipment and of the great need to improve the tools of those industries. He knows full well that although he may not issue directions to these industries as to where they should buy machinery and equipment, the Minister and the Government have great influence with the boards of the public corporations. Here was an opportunity to call the heads of those boards into consultation and to say to them, "Here we have a number of assets and some excellent sites, with a labour force of engineering workers available. How can we best plan the peaceful use of these resources to overcome some of the shortages of capital goods which exist in the publicly-owned industries?"
  For doctrinaire reasons the Minister has rejected that policy and is determined to hand these assets over to private enterprise. That being so, I want to ask him some questions about Swynnerton. Last week the Minister told me that he expected that all production will have ceased at Swynnerton within twelve months. Is that correct in the light of what the Parliamentary Secretary said about giving two years' or two-and-a-half years' notice? Are we to take it that there will be a longer period of rundown at Swynnerton or is it correct to assume that it will be closed as an R.O.F. within the next twelve months?
  We should like an answer to that question, because it is a very serious question for north Staffordshire. There is 2½ per cent. unemployment in my constituency and 2 per cent, unemployment in north Staffordshire generally. The rate has been higher than the national average for a considerable time. We have been faced with a gradual decline in the pottery industry. The President of the Board of Trade knows well that there is a great need for more variety of industry and employment in north Staffordshire.
  The Minister's policy will therefore be a serious matter for those workers and their families, because alternative employment does not exist and will not exist unless it is created by the Minister's own action. That is why we ask the Minister, before he decides on any definite programme of run-down at this factory, to
  1346
  call a conference locally in the West Midlands, calling together the heads of the local authorities, who are deeply concerned about this, and the representatives of the trade unions in order to discuss what is to happen. He should do that before we disperse this labour force, which consists of a group of workers with very high morale who made a very big contribution to the war effort.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: Is my hon. Friend aware that an announcement was made at the factory yesterday—and I have been awaiting an opportunity to say this—that 1,000 would be discharged by the end of November, another 1,000 by the end of next June and that the rest would be transferred?
  Mr. Swingler: I thank my hon, Friend for that information. It is a very serious matter indeed in the light of the present unemployment figures there and the lack of alternative employment. I know that the Minister of Labour is fully conversant with the unemployment situation because we have been making him conversant with it for the last couple of years—in fact, ever since the Government reimposed the Purchase Tax on pottery, with the effect which we all know.
  I therefore ask the Minister either to stay his hand in closing the R.O.F. or to take immediate action to call together those who are locally concerned in north Staffordshire—the local authorities, the leaders of industry and the leaders of the trade unions—in order to discuss this situation, unless he is to take the responsibility for accentuating an unemployment position which is already grave. This is a matter on which we shall press him strongly tomorrow.
  Mr. W. J. Taylor: If I may speak by leave of the House, I should like to say that my right hon. Friend and I have listened with interest and attention to the further points which have been made by hon. Members opposite and——
  Mrs. Barbara Castle: On a point of order. Is not this intervention, for a second time, by the Parliamentary Secretary a calculated insult to those of us who are still waiting to speak, and who might have points to put to him about our own R.O.F.s which we have not yet had an opportunity to put? Is the Parliamentary Secretary trying in this way to closure us on a free debate?
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Major Sir William Anstruther-Gray): The Parliamentary Secretary can speak for a second time only by leave of the House. I understood that that had been granted.
  Mrs. Castle: In view of that, I should like personally to refuse that permission to the Parliamentary Secretary until those of us who have points to put have had a chance to put them.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: That being so, the Parliamentary Secretary is prevented from speaking. Mr. Wigg.

  DEFENCE
  7.47 p.m.
  Mr. George Wigg: I believe that future historians will note with interest, if not with amazement, that this House is departing for the Summer Recess without any discussion of the two White Papers which the Government have presented for consideration, one dealing with the future organisation of the Army, and the other dealing with compensation.
  I had the good fortune to have an Adjournment debate a week ago, and in it I expressed the view that I raised the subject only because I doubted whether facilities would be available for a discussion of the principles upon which that reorganisation is based. I still express the most profound astonishment, not that the Government have not found time for this debate, for I can well understand them not wanting to debate defence or the principles on which their reorganisation is based, but that my right hon. Friends have not seen the wisdom and the duty of presenting the Government's policies to the most careful and critical examination.
  This time of the evening is available for back bench Members, and I must express my gratitude to the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War for coming to the House this evening to answer the debate. Nevertheless, it is essentially a back bench debate, although in my judgment it ought to have been an official debate in which the Opposition put its case.
  It is a matter of some interest that we had a debate on defence a year ago today, and it is fascinating to read what was said in that debate and to trace through the Government's Defence White
  1348
  Paper, the various speeches which have been made on the subject, and, finally, these two White Papers. I must congratulate the Secretary of State for War on the reorganisation White Paper; I think he has done very well, and I believe that every hon. Member will hold the same view and will congratulate him on the White Papers, but always with one reservation—that of the regiment in his own constituency. Of course, I have ruled myself out of that.
  Mr. Ede: And the regiment in which he served during one or other of the last two wars.
  Mr. Wigg: I accept that addition—and the regiment in which he served. In my Adjournment debate I pleaded that the approach to the problem should be on the basis of the public good. The public spirit which exists in all branches of the British Army is not less than mine, but the amalgamation of regiments touches feelings which go very deep. I respect those feelings, and I am sure that they are respected in all parts of the House.
  Perhaps I may be forgiven for making one parochial comment. I have had a communication from the Worcestershire Regiment and members of the Worcestershire Regiment Old Comrades' Association and others protesting about the abolition of cap badges. The Secretary of State has done well in this matter in deciding that this and kindred subjects should be decided not by the War Office—except in the last instance—but by colonels who can fight it out among themselves.
  However, I associate myself with the protest of a senior officer who wrote to me that once again the Brigade of Guards had been given a special privilege. I had the pleasure of broadcasting with the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer), and he was not surprised when I observed that the Guards were keeping their cap badges while the poor old county regiments were losing theirs. Having made my protest on behalf of the Worcestershire Regiment, I think that the Secretary of State's policy on this matter is right. We certainly do not want to have these arguments across the House. We would not get very far that way.

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  One other specific aspect of the Government's proposals concerns bands. This penny has not yet dropped. As I understand it, all the bands are to be abolished with the exception of one band per brigade and with the exception of the Brigade of Guards, which is keeping all its eight bands.
  That is "a bit swift." Bands are very important morale builders. There is many a regiment which is not very good at football and which has more than its share of "jankers," but which is very proud of its band. This is "a bit of a swift one" which has been slipped through. Coupled with the decision about cap badges and the preservation of the Guards' cap badge, it appears that privilege has been at work again.
  As I have said, I readily accept the principles upon which the reorganisation White Paper is based. They are sound and brave. The Secretary of State did some things which I did not think he would have the guts to do, things which I thought ought to be done which he has done. I believe that he is profoundly concerned with the interests of the Army. However, having dealt with matters which if not minor are on the fringe of things, I want to examine the overall policy of which the White Papers are the last step. I shall not go back very far, not more than to the debate on the Defence White Paper a year ago.
  Reading again that Defence White Paper and studying the debates and public utterances since then, one is forced to the conclusion that the Defence White Paper was not a military document. It was a political document, a document borne of political expediency. My first evidence in support of my view is the publication of the Secretary of State's two White Papers on the eve of the Summer Recess. I am convinced that that was not the work of a smart aleck. This was not a Minister trying to be slick and to avoid discussion and criticism. The poor chap could not publish earlier because the military thinking which produced the White Papers should have taken place before the publication of the Defence White Paper and not after.
  In the last week there have been one or two penetrating articles in the Press. The picture they have painted is accurate. I am not one of those who ran away
  1350
  when the heat was turned on the hydrogen bomb issue. I am sorry to use the expression "turning on the heat" in that connotation; it has a sinister ring, and I did not mean that. When the decisions were announced and the necessity of having the hydrogen bomb was debated in the House, In association with my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)I wrote an article which appeared in the New Statesman.
  In that article I took the view that we lived in a world of the hydrogen bomb, that we could not run away from it, and that therefore we had to live with it. I suggested that if we tried to base our defence policy on the hydrogen bomb, the means to carry it, ballistic missiles, a great Army, a great Navy and a great Air Force, we should inevitably fail. We had to make a very difficult choice, a choice which no man, however wise or courageous, could be sure was correct. We had to be prepared to change our minds.
  In the past year, the Government have taken two decisions. I am not sure whether they are clear about the nature of those decisions. One decision taken a year ago—I regret to say under pressure from this side of the House—was to get rid of National Service, or to say that we could get rid of National Service, irrespective of the facts. A year ago I opposed my own party. I am exceedingly proud of having opposed it, because I believe that I was right and that it was wrong. However, the Government then found that politically the Labour Party was getting round their left flank, as it were. So they, too, had to come forward with proposals to get rid of National Service.
  Both parties engaged in outbidding each other in cutting down conventional forces and in suggesting National Service could be abolished, irrespective of whether it could be abolished. It is fascinating to examine the figures given in debates a year ago, figures which at that time were not seriously challenged and which have not since been seriously challenged. Here I quarrel with the Secretary of State and with the Prime Minister. When the Prime Minister made his announcement about the White Papers, I asked him the question which I have been asking for a year and for even longer. It was whether he

  1351
  was satisfied that the proposals which the Government were putting forward were of a character which would enable the Government to be absolutely certain that they could recruit on a voluntary basis the manpower which they needed to provide a force of 375,000 men. The Prime Minister, with that adroitness which has taken him from the back benches to 10 Downing Street, dodged the answer. Hon. Members can see that for themselves in column 229 of HANSARD for 23rd July, 1957.
  Last week, the Secretary of State broadcast in "Press Conference". He did very well, but he, too, dodged the column. He was pressed on the same question. He said that he was determined to get rid of National Service, and later he said that he had "faith." One of the men who had a great influence in my life was the late Lord Lindsay, and I never tire of paying tribute to his wisdom. Lord Lindsay always told me that if one wanted to form a judgment of a man one should always be careful about thinking that he was dishonest. One should always go for the belief that he was not dishonest but stupid. I think that the Secretary of State is stupid, and I am paying him a compliment when I say that. Clearly, he has not done the arithmetic.
  This is a matter not of determination or faith but of fact. My view, which I have often expressed, is that the Government will not get more than 12,000 Regular recruits. They can stand on their heads but they will not get more than 12,000. The size of the Army will, therefore, depend on the length of engagement which those men undertake. I have bored hon. Members with this many times before, but I hope that they will forgive me if I say it again. That is a fact.
  Last year, the Minister of Labour wrote the figures down much more. He said that the number in the age groups with which we are dealing was of the order of 310,000. Knock off 90,000, those medically unfit, and it is 220,000. Then, if we deduct miners, agricultural workers and other categories of those who are exempt, which would be of the order of 50,000—last year, the Minister of Labour did not make that deduction—the number is 170,000. Can any hon. Member really seriously believe that we can get 30 per cent. of that number to undertake a
  1352
  Regular engagement in a period of full employment? If so, he is living in a cloud cuckoo land. The figures do not permit us to do that.
  The Services have done a very interesting trick. I should be interested to hear from the Secretary of State for War if I am wrong, but I am quite sure I am not. Each Department has been asked, "What is the total number your Department thinks it can recruit on a voluntary basis?" The Admiralty then gives its number, the Air Force number is added and the Army number is added, but would anyone in this world who knows anything about it assume that if a man opted for the Navy and could not get into the Navy he would necessarily join the Air Force or, if he could not join either of those Services, he would join the Army? Of course he would not. The choices do not overlap.
  I very much regret that the Labour Party, I understand with the authority of the National Executive, has recently been committed to the other argument. My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey)said that in this grave dilemma:
  "Frankly, an increase of pay seems the only quick way".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th July, 1957; Vol. 572, c. 1522.]
  A year ago, the Government instituted a new policy, at a cost of £62 million a year, for increased pay and it has not produced any more recruits. Of course it has not produced any more recruits, because the recruits are not there. Hon. Members and the Secretary of State have to learn the simple facts of life. Before the war, mining and agriculture were depressed industries and were the major recruiting resources. Before the war, the Royal Air Force had only 35,000 men. Now the Royal Air Force is competing, and successfully competing, for men.
  I should like to hear from the Secretary of State for War in categorical terms, and I should like to hear from my right hon. Friends, whether they still believe, whether they are convinced, whether their policies are based on the raising of a Regular Army of 175,000 men by 1962. If that does not come off, what are they going to do? The Government have been hedging. In the Defence White Paper, there was a way out. In paragraph 48 they said:
  "It must nevertheless be understood that, if voluntary recruitment fails to produce the

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  numbers required, the country will have to face the need for some limited form of compulsory service to bridge the gap."
  I thought I knew what that meant, but each Ministerial statement runs further away from that. Who knows what the international situation is going to be at Christmas, never mind about 1962? It would not have been so bad if there had been a qualification in the statement which said, "However, if we do not get the recruits and the international situation worsens, we have liberty of action". Both parties have played a game of what I should call political dodgers, never making up their minds but waiting for the facts to make up their minds for them and then coining out with a proposal like Moses coming out of the bulrushes or down from the mountain—I do not know which.
  That is where this country has got, and it is about time a halt was called. Even if the people of this country are kept in organised ignorance of the true facts of the defence situation, that is not true of the Americans nor the French, nor the Germans, nor, may I say, the Australians. Ever since this Defence White Paper has been published, the principles on which it is based—I prefer to say the lack of principles—have been debated in those countries to see what they mean. I do not charge the Government with duplicity. What I charge them with is dashing into commitments in a hasty way in order to get rid of National Service regardless of the consequences and, as a corollary to that decision, putting all our weight on the hydrogen bomb without ever stopping to realise what was involved.
  When will hon. Members really get down to brass tacks and stop talking stratospheric nothings? When will they realise that when we talk about the hydrogen bomb, we have also to take about the means of delivering it? Once we engage in the policy, not of manufacturing the bomb, which is comparatively easy and cheap—that is the horror of it all—but the means of delivering it and think in terms of rocket aircraft, counter-rockets and counter-measures the costs are fantastic. I believe the Observer last Sunday was absolutely right.
  Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett: Why does the hon. Member think it would be more
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  expensive to develop devices for delivering the hydrogen bomb than to develop devices for delivering any other kind of bomb?
  Mr. Wigg: I am much obliged to the hon. and gallant Member, It is a little difficult in a speech of this kind to break off, but I will answer the hon. and gallant Member. On two or three occasions during debates on Suez I drew the attention of the Government to the withdrawal of a specific piece of machinery which we could not manufacture but the Americans could. It was called "inertial guidance" and is about as big as a billiard ball. It is a contraption which brings the missile back on its course. The device has stamped on it, "Honeyball. Minneapolis" and it costs about £20,000. I may be wrong, but my information is that English Electric has permission to manufacture it. I think it will strain the resources of English Electric, or, indeed, any firm to manufacture it. The precision is in terms of a millionth of an inch, and the cost is so great that the wholesale manufacture of such equipment would strain the economy and indeed, break the economy of any country, even of the United States.
  The P.1 of which we have heard, when stripped clean—flying not as a military aircraft—can break the speed of sound. It has broken the world speed record. I was unimpressed by that, because the Swift did the same a few years ago. The Swift and the P.1 flying operationally with a guided missile have a speed of about 1·2 mach. We have just about one aircraft which will break the sound barrier. If the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, North-East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett)will pursue his researches, he will quickly discover that the capacity of this country, or any country outside the two senior members of the club, to deliver the hydrogen bomb is just a non-starter. Even supposing he were right and this could be done within the capacity of our engineering industry, we would also have to earn our living and compete in the markets of the world in which America has enormous productive surpluses which can be used for that purpose.
  Mr. R. T. Paget: What worries me a little is that we are thinking in terms of the deterrent. Will the

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  Russians really base their policy on the bet that, although we have the hydrogen bomb, we cannot get it on to one of their cities? It would be a very rash bet for them to make even if we have not the latest devices.
  Mr. Wigg: I do not want to become involved in stratospherical arguments. I do not know the Russian intentions, and I do not think my hon. and learned Friend does. Nevertheless, I want to be fair. If a point is made against me, I want to deal with it, even if it is a little nonsensical. I respect my hon. and learned Friend's view——
  Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: The hon. Gentleman did not answer my question. He evaded it completely. I was asking why all these wonderful gadgets—I did not say we could afford them—are less necessary if we are using T.N.T. than if we are using hydrogen bombs.
  Mr. Wigg: I should have thought the answer was fairly simple. If we use T.N.T., we work on a range in terms of thousands of yards. If we use hydrogen bombs with ballistic missiles, we are thinking in terms of a range of 5,000 miles. I should have thought that the delivery of a thermo-nuclear weapon was a totally different problem from that of the delivery of a T.N.T. missile.
  I do not want to become involved in technicalities, and I wish to return to the line that I was following. If I have misunderstood the hon. and gallant Member, I apologise. My point was that the method of delivery was so expensive as not to be a starter. I was making the additional point that, as the Observer said last week, if we can make our contribution to the thermo-nuclear deterrent of the West it represents the difference between 3 per cent. and 5 per cent.
  We live in a world in which we have a thermo-nuclear deterrent, and we have the means of delivery if we think in terms of the V bombers, and it may well be that eventually we shall produce a ballistic missile. I want to point out the terrible danger of basing one's defence policy exclusively on the thermo-nuclear deterrent and the consequences involved in our relations with our Allies in both Europe and the United States.
  Clearly, one of the consequences of the failure of the Government to think out
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  their proposals and the implications of the White Paper was that when the Prime Minister went to President Eisenhower and talked to him he failed to explain the policy in such specific terms that the American General Staff knew what it was all about. The consequence now is that as the implications of our policy become known, and as doubts arise about our ability to hold our position in N.A.T.O., or, indeed, not only our ability but also our intention to maintain our units on the Continent, the great question which the Americans are asking themselves is: "Where do we stand in this? If the British are out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, can we hold the Atlantic bloc and the Atlantic lifeline in the event of hostilities? Also, what are we holding on for if our units are unsupported by British units?"
  One has to face the fact that the Government have come forward with reorganisation proposals in which they reduce the regiments of the line from sixty-four to forty-nine. We know only too well that during the last few years one of the major causes of our weakness has been units which have been under establishment. If by 1962 the Government reduce the number of units to forty-nine and then find themselves in the position that many units have found themselves in during the last two or three years, where will British prestige stand? What use will the nuclear weapons be to us if we are faced with another Suez or Oman or Korea or any brush fire in any part of the world? This insatiable monster which consumes vast sums of money also prevents us from undertaking the reconstruction of barracks and providing transport aircraft and all the necessary equipment of conventional forces which may be required in a brush fire war.
  If one understands it aright, that is the position the Government are now in. We are told that we are almost at the point of no return. This may be because of mistaken opinions about the basis of policy or because the Government have been lured on further by the siren voice of political expediency and seek to cut down defence and to cut down Income Tax in order to win the next General Election. The Tory Party may win the next General Election, but the position of Britain in the world will be disastrous. We shall be a crumby edition of Portugal,

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  with a few Colonies tagged on to us which we are incapable of defending.
  I want to put a specific question to the Secretary of State for War. On my assessment, we need at least 120 Beverley aircraft to do the job. We also need at least 100 Brittanias. Some months have now gone by, and I should like to know whether he is satisfied with the number of Beverleys that we have and with the number of Brittanias. Would he like to tell the House how many we have? I gave the figures in the debate on the Air Estimates, and will not repeat them, but the position is disastrous. If the Oman situation goes seriously wrong, we are as incapable of dealing with it as we were a year ago.
  I do not hold the view that because we are a second-class power we are a second-rate power. In our long history it is only for a comparatively short period that we have been one of the front-ranking members of the club. The tradition of these islands is that we have been a second-class country, but we have not been a second-rate power. There is nothing more certain to make one a second-rate power than for one to undertake military policies whose implications one does not think out and which one has neither the guts nor the economic strength to maintain.
  That seems to be the position we are in today. The Secretary of State for War is in a very hot spot. I wish him well. I repeat what I have said to him previously, that I do not want him to fail. I shall be delighted if he can get his 175,000 recruits, but I am sure he will not. If I am completely right and the figure in 1962 is about 100,000, then I do not think either Front Bench will have the brazen-faced audacity to try to palm it off. However, if the figure is 125,000 or 130,000, I can imagine all the wonderful speeches and all the excuses which will be made from the Dispatch Box in justification of an Army of 125,000 as the best of all possible armies.
  Hon. Gentlemen who, like myself, have served in the Army know there is nothing more hateful than to serve in a unit which is at half establishment and which one knows well would not be worth two-pennyworth of cold gin in a fight. For the right hon. Gentleman's sake, for the Army's sake and for the country's
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  sake, I beg the Secretary of State not to base himself on determination. He is a determined, honourable man, and of course he wants to do his best. All of us want him to do his best. He ought to have faith, but only faith after he is intellectually convinced that it is not faith alone which is needed but that a little work must come into it, and that the target at which he has aimed is a possible one. As I have previously said, I frankly do not believe it is a starter.
  I wish to express a view which I have expressed many times previously, and I do not apologise for repeating it. The position the country and the House find themselves in is caused by the fact that for six years and more—it goes well back into the period when there was a Labour Government—defence and defence subjects have been used as the cat's-paw of party politics. In some way or another, if there is to be any future for us, our national genius has to find a means of getting the whole subject away from the clash of headlines and away from the clash of party environment. I say that having fully in mind my conviction that there is no political advantage in it. That is the paradox.
  This subject is treated as if it will win votes. Hon. Gentlemen believe that by being in favour of conscription or by being against conscription their popularity grows. Perhaps I may quote as an example my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes)who, if I may say so, has made some very useful contributions on the subject of defence. He suffers no political disability in his constituency because he wants to do away with the Forces altogether. He wins at a canter at every Election—but so do I taking a completely opposite view. The British people will never turn us down if we speak the truth as we find it, but they will turn and rend the political party that uses defence as a stalking horse, and one day they will wake up and find that they have been led up the garden path.
  Another paradox is this. I believe that some hon. Gentlemen who take strong lines about the hydrogen bomb may be creating just the conditions in which its use is inevitable. We have to face that fact. In the kind of world in which we live—and, heaven knows, I regret it—the place of the conventional force is

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  clear to see, and if we throw that away and put all our money into this weapon—which I am sure that Professor Oppenheimer is completely right to describe as this absolute weapon which renders us absolutely powerless—we face a disastrous position.
  It may be that I have made mistakes in the past—if so, this is the moment of retraction—but what I plead for, as I have pleaded for so many times previously, is that we should approach defence matters on the basis of an objective analysis of what we are arguing about. For example, if I am right, the argument about whether the Government can get the 175,000 men or not is an argument based on facts, because if the men have not been born, if they do not exist, what the heck is the good of doubling the rate of payment?
  I notice that whenever hon. Gentlemen, in all parts of the House—and there are plenty on that side, and plenty who have held Ministerial office—get into a jam about what to do with the Forces, they always say "put up the pay". Heaven knows, I am in favour of putting up the pay. In fact, when I look at the rates of compensation that have been announced I wish that I had not come into the House of Commons but had stayed in the Army and was just leaving it now. Hon. Gentlemen may perhaps be interested in the pay warrant that I got just before the war, after a lifetime in the Army. I did not get £6,000 free of tax—I got £2.
  Therefore, we have to be very careful about easy solutions. There is no easy way. We have to search our minds and consciences, because we are dealing with forces the power of which we only begin to understand. As I have said, I do not apologise for raising this subject tonight. I wish that it had been raised by my own Front Bench. I believe that they have neglected their duty in not raising it, but I have done so because I think that it is right to do so. I want this subject brought into the open as a first step towards educating a sound public opinion, and in order to get a defence policy which we can sustain and which we will not have to change every five minutes.
  8.26 p.m.
  Mr. Angus Maude: I am extremely glad that the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)has raised this
  1360
  question tonight, because I think that it is right, before we rise for the Summer Recess, that we should discuss it, question some of the assumptions on which the Government's policy has been based, ask for certain items of information and for certain assurances where doubts have arisen.
  The White Paper on defence policy was welcomed by me and, I think, by the country primarily for one reason. It was a policy, and it was about time that we had a defence policy. For many years it had become increasingly obvious to large numbers of people that the concurrent determinations to make a substantial contribution to the allied cause in a nuclear third war, and to keep large conventional forces for Commonwealth use and for use in emergencies overseas, not in pursuance of our N.A.T.O. commitments, were very difficult ones. The burden of providing these Forces was going up every year. The White Paper stated that it would have been £1,700 million in the ensuing year. It is now to be cut to below £1,500 million gross, that is, before deducting the incoming contributions from overseas.
  As the hon. Member for Dudley has said, we have not yet completely solved this difficulty about knowing whether we are getting the best of one world or the worst of both. The White Paper puts, with immaculate clarity, the needs of a British defence policy. It says:
  "Britain's armed forces must be capable of performing two main tasks: (i)to play their part with the forces of Allied countries in deterring and resisting aggression; (ii)to defend British colonies and protected territories against local attack, and undertake limited operations in overseas emergencies."
  The main weight of the British contribution to the Allied, the N.A.T.O., effort is to be shifted more in the direction of the nuclear deterrent and forces armed with tactical nuclear weapons. What we do not know is whether such figures as are contained in the White Paper form a definitive policy which has to be stuck to no matter whether the international situation changes, whether it becomes apparent that we cannot meet all our commitments whilst sticking to those figures, or whether it is to serve as a framework towards which we shall work, but which shall be flexible according to the needs that arise. The one thing that

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  is certain is that it would be absolutely disastrous if, in order to try to save another, let us say. £100 million in defence expenditure, the Government succeeded in producing defence forces which were inadequate to perform the secondary rôle, that is, the conventional rôle, in the world at large.
  There is, of course, something to be said for having no defences and spending no money. There is something to be said for spending more than £1,500 million and having very good defences. There is absolutely nothing to be said for spending £1,400 million and having ineffectual defences. It is precisely on that point that I think a number of people in the country want some further reassurance from the Government and would like to ask questions.
  There have been a number of somewhat disquieting rumours in the last few weeks of disputes and decisions which have been taken and which were being resisted, and they have prompted certain newspapers to ask extremely pertinent questions of the Government. Such experience as I have had of defence experts and enthusiasts makes me believe that they are sometimes apt to be a little more alarmist than is necessary. In exactly the same way I have noticed that when an art gallery is threatened with having its grant reduced, or not increased, it always threatens to close its most popular, successful and important galleries rather than close down something that nobody ever goes to. So, when the defence chiefs are threatened with a cut, they do not immediately say they must abolish the Royal Army Education Corps. They warn that it will be necessary to cut the forces by at least two divisions in Europe and thus render them much less effective.
  Nevertheless, there is clearly a doubt and a danger here, and I think we have a right to know what are the strategic implications of the decisions which are being taken. What is the safety margin in any further reductions, and what is the order of priorities if we run, as has been suggested we might, into serious difficulties in recruiting for the Regular Forces?
  If, for example, the rate of Regular recruitment into the Army fell really seriously below the projected figure at the same time that the reorganisation of the Army based on the new figures was
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  being carried out, the results might be quite catastrophic from the point of view of the Army. We might, in fact, be left with virtually no effective Army at all for a period of up to two years, as I see it.
  That seems to me to be a risk which is so serious that one needs a considerable reassurance from the Government. I can see risk that if the Defence Estimates are subsequently cut substantially below the figures which we understand the Government now have in mind, the Royal Air Force might also be seriously affected and we might find difficulty in providing even the Army, Navy and Air Force contribution to N.A.T.O. which the White Paper envisages.
  It looks, for example, as if our N.A.T.O. contribution might have to be reduced from four divisions to two, and, remembering at the same time that we are already, in the White Paper, writing off the commitment of two Territorial Army divisions which were to have been available in an emergency to N.A.T.O., it looks as thought it might happen that the Royal Air Force contingent in N.A.T.O. would have to be reduced even below the level of one half the number of aircraft which is projected.
  At the same time, there is the question of the overseas commitments—the Colonial Empire, the protected territories and the defence of our communications with our sources of raw material and the defence of our trade routes. The central reserve which is projected—and most of us can remember the promise we had that an effective strategic reserve would result from the withdrawal of our troops from the Suez Canal base in 1954—did not turn out to be a very effective strategic reserve which could be readily and quickly mounted into an effective operation when an emergency came.
  We should like to know that the central reserve will be more effective next time, and, in particular, we must know that the supply of transport aircraft to make the central reserve mobile is really adequate and is kept up to schedule. If we do not get enough volunteers for the Army, how can we possibly meet the overseas commitments which are envisaged in the White Paper? For example, the White Paper says, quite rightly, that our policy is based on the maintenance in Cyprus of aircraft which are capable of carrying

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  nuclear weapons. That seems to me an essential of British strategy, because it is largely on the promise of British nuclear power in the Eastern Mediterranean that the Bagdad Pact may in the future be held together.
  If we are to be able to fly British aeroplanes carrying nuclear weapons from Cyprus, then we must be able to hold Cyprus, and it may be that we shall need 25,000 troops in Cyprus just in order to hold it. If that is so, can we maintain that number of troops in Cyprus, our central reserve, enough troops to man the new Kenya base, and to meet emergencies in the Persian Gulf and so forth? If not, what is expendable? Is it Cyprus? If so, our relations with Turkey and other N.A.T.O. partners will become much less cordial, the Alliance much less effective, and the support we can give to the Bagdad Pact will become much less effective too.
  The effects in Europe have already been unfortunate. A week or two ago I came back from an international conference in the United States on the future of N.A.T.O., to which there were delegates both military and governmental, official and unofficial, from all the N.A.T.O. countries. It was clear that apprehensions in Europe, and not merely apprehensions, but the perception in America of what the new British policy might involve with N.A.T.O., were very acute. People had very little doubt as to what it might mean.
  As I said before, the Government were faced with the choice of deciding whether they ought to devote a great deal of money and resources to the nuclear deterrent or should seek to put our conventional forces in the first priority, building them up beyond any doubt as to their efficiency. It was an agonising 'decision to make. I have myself no doubt that they were right to decide that the nuclear deterrent was absolutely essential and they must have it, if only for the reason that, looking ahead a certain number of years, it cannot possibly be regarded as certain that, indefinitely and in all circumstances, the United States would be prepared even to threaten the use of the nuclear deterrent in defence of Western Europe.
  At the moment, Western Europe is certainly not expendable, in the view of the
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  United States. It is not expendable because it is an essential part of her strategic planning, and, moreover, the nuclear damage which the United States might suffer from Russia is considerably less than the United States could inflict on Russia. But when we get to the point when the United States stands to risk almost total destruction from nuclear attack by Russia, Western Europe will not be worth the risk from the point of view of the United States. Then, if we do not have the nuclear deterrent ourselves, we may very well be left completely defenceless.
  If we are to have the nuclear weapon, does that mean that our conventional forces cannot be effective? It does, if two things happen. First, it will mean that we cannot afford to maintain them if we are determined to reduce the total defence budget below a certain level. It will mean that they will not be effective also if the Regular, voluntary recruitment which the White Paper envisages does not take place.
  We need, and must ask for, two definite reassurances from the Government: first, that total expenditure on defence will not be allowed to fall in real terms below at the least the figure which is budgeted for in the White Paper, and, secondly—a very important reassurance which I hope the Secretary of State will feel able to give—that if by the end of 1960 it becomes clear that the voluntary recruitment target will not be met, the Government will be prepared to reintroduce some form of selective or non-selective compulsory military service. Without that reassurance, it seems to me that we have no hope whatever that we can meet the second of the two minimum requirements which the White Paper lays down.
  The White Paper ends with these words:
  "The Government are confident that this defence plan, while helping to relieve the strain upon the economy, will produce compact all-Regular Forces of the highest quality, armed and organised on the most up-to-date lines."
  That objective might still remain and the Forces might still be totally inadequate to the commitments. We ought to know, therefore, that steps will be taken to make them adequate to the commitments; or, if that is not to be done, we should know what commitments are to be dropped.
  8.41 p.m.
  Mr. Denis Healey: I find myself in substantial agreement with the main tenor of the criticism by the hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude)of the Defence White Paper, but I cannot help feeling, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), that one perhaps does the White Paper a little too much credit by treating it too seriously as a defence document.
  To me, one of the most distressing things about the White Paper is that it seems to be another instalment of what has become general Government policy of substituting slogans for policy, except that in this case the slogans are neither original nor British. They are secondhand American slogans. There is the slogan of massive retaliation "—the idea that we can meet any local upset by inter-continental warfare against the Soviet Union; and there is the slogan "a bigger bang for the buck"—the idea that if we concentrate on long-range thermo-nuclear destructive power that will somehow be cheaper and do the same job as conventional forces but at a lower price.
  Both of those slogans have already been discovered to be dangerously misleading by the Americans, who invented them, and it is ironic—indeed, tragic—that Her Majesty's Government should have picked them up just at the moment that their real danger and inadequacy has been proved in practice in another part of the world.
  I want to deal with an aspect of the defence problem which has already played some part in our discussions on the bill, but I want to deal with another and, to my mind, extremely important aspect of it. We all want defence at the lowest possible price. We can argue about what sort of arms and what sort of forces we need for it, but when we have agreed on what sort of arms and forces we need there still remains the problem of how we can provide them at the lowest possible cost to the country.
  I suggest that at present the Ministry of Defence is failing to exploit to the full a very priceless national asset which we built up successfully for defence during the Second World War, namely, the Royal Ordnance factories, of which there were 44 at the end of the Second World War, producing fully half of all our total muni-
  1366
  tions. The number of factories has been reduced already to 23 and is to suffer a further reduction to 14 in the next three years.
  The cost of this deliberate Government policy of allowing the Ordnance factories to rust and rot is not only tremendous in human inconvenience and even in suffering; this was an aspect of the problem which was dealt with at length earlier in today's debate. The cost is also very substantial indeed in the taxpayer's money. It is mainly to that aspect that I wish to devote myself.
  I must admit that, like so many who have spoken about this matter earlier today, I have a constituency interest to declare. I do have a Royal Ordnance factory in my constituency.
  Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: On a point of order. I am not quite sure what it is we are allowed to debate. [HON. MEMBERS: "Anything."] We have been debating Royal Ordnance factories the entire afternoon. Is it in order to continue to debate that subject now? I ask, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, simply to clarify the situation a little.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is certainly in order to refer to the previous subject. I understood that we had turned for the time being on to the subject brought up by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), and it was on that understanding that I called the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), who has the Floor; but if he chooses another topic he is not out of order.
  Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
  Mr. Healey: I intimated to Mr. Speaker at an earlier stage of the debate the subject on which I intended to speak, and he was kind enough to suggest that it would not only be in order but appropriate to deal with it during this discussion. Furthermore, I warned the Minister of Supply that if I had the good fortune to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, I should be raising certain very important matters which had not been earlier discussed and which are very germane to this topic.
  As I was about to say, although I have a constituency interest in the sense that the Royal Ordnance factory in my constituency has suffered a redundancy of 30 per cent. in the last three years, I believe

  1367
  that there is an even more important national interest to protect, because the British taxpayer is losing at present £10 million a year because Royal Ordnance factories are unable to operate at an overall profit owing to the deliberate Government policy of allowing them to run down.
  I suggest that if they were rightly used they would not only wipe out that loss but produce a very substantial and valuable profit indeed, not only in the production of arms for our own forces, but, even more, through the production of armaments for our friends and allies.
  Mr. E. Fernyhough: Nasser, for instance.
  Mr. Healey: Like many of my hon. Friends, I am not happy that the manufacture of weapons, whose only purpose is to kill men, should be open to private manufacturers whose main aim is to make a profit, but, also like many of my hon. Friends, I have been able to see that under previous strategic programmes there was a strong case for spreading arms production outside the Government's factories and into the factories of private producers, first, because it was desirable, in case the country was attacked, to disperse the main centres of production as widely as possible, and, secondly, because if war arose—this was the old concept—one hoped somehow to hold the enemy in the early stages while we built up a large potential for winning the war in the later stages, as we did in the Second World War, behind that shield.
  However, the Defence White Paper has completely overturned this concept, and I think in this it is absolutely right. It is inconceivable that if this country were under attack it would not be in a war in which hydrogen bombs were being indiscriminately exchanged by both sides, and, therefore, there can be no question of a prolonged campaign or war during which we could build up our munitions potential. The only arms which will count in any war in which our own islands are directly under attack are those which are actually in being on the day when the attack begins, and for that reason there is no longer any case whatever for giving the manufacture of armaments to private individuals to make a profit out of, and, indeed, there is much
  1368
  less occasion than ever before in our history for distributing arms production, often uneconomically, widely over the country as a whole.
  There is no economic problem here for the private manufacturers. They are, almost without exception, major engineering companies which have infinite opportunities of markets both in Britain and abroad if they are prepared to turn over from warlike to civil production. At present, most of our engineering industry is heavily overstrained. Last year we imported, mainly from Germany, ten times the value of machine tools which we imported in 1955. Our railways are crying out for rolling stock and our mines for machinery. There is an infinite range of possibilities for private arms manufacturers to turn to if the Government decide to concentrate arms production entirely in the public field.
  The extraordinary thing is that, at a time when the taxpayers' factories are making a loss of £10 million a year and suffering a heavy redundancy, the Government have adopted the deliberate policy of starving Royal Ordnance factories of arms contracts and overloading private firms which have as much to do as they can manage.
  Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: The hon. Member should not be allowed to get away with that. He must know that the present broad pattern of the way in which arms contracts are placed was decided, for better or worse, five or six years after the war and that to turn over these factories to advanced nuclear weapons would not cost £10 million but hundreds of millions of pounds.
  Mr. Healey: I would have reached that point in a moment. I am not suggesting that there are not some new weapons, particularly unconventional weapons, in connection with which private factories have been allotted responsibilities which they should be allowed to continue and taper off. But I am sure that the hon. and gallant Member will agree that so many new weapons are being developed in so many fields that it is entirely a matter of choice for the Government whether they propose to start new development in Government factories or in private factories. Both are equally unequipped for that sort of development at present.

  1369
  I can give an example of the kind of problem that worries me. The Royal Ordnance factory at Barnbow, at a time when it suffered a redundancy of 400 a year, had to transfer to private firms contracts for 15,000 tank components, and the only tank design teams now in Britain are no longer in Royal Ordnance factories, but are located in private firms.
  The greatest scandal of all is that arising out of the Government's present policy towards foreign arms orders. There is no doubt that at present—and here I am on common ground with the hon. and gallant Member for Croydon, North-East (Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett)—the countries which are wanting more conventional armaments are mainly not Britain. It may well be that the Swedes, the Swiss, the Indians, the Pakistanis and the Germans are showing much greater wisdom than we are in putting the major weight of their effort into conventional arms, but most of these countries at present are totally incapable of meeting all their own arms needs. Germany, for example, had to agree a few years ago to offer about £200 million worth of arms contracts to this country.
  Production in our own arms factories could be stimulated and increased beyond all the bounds of existing possibilities if the Government were prepared to compete on equal terms with private industry for the acquiring of arms orders from foreign Governments. At present the Minister is actually preventing Royal Ordnance factories from submitting competitive tenders.
  I should like to give one example. I have it on official authority that already the German Government have placed contracts for £62 million worth of armaments in this country. Only £9 million worth of these contracts have been placed through the Ministry of Supply, and it may well be that the Ministry itself did not pass even all these contracts on to the Royal Ordnance factories, but diverted some of them to private firms. This is a field in which it is very difficult for a private Member to get an overall figure, and I would simply deal with two examples which constitute a public scandal on which a Minister should be asked to reply, if not on this occasion then at some later date.
  I am told that the Royal Ordnance factory at Leyland was sold last year to a
  1370
  private firm for a price roughly equivalent to the value of the bricks and mortar involved. There was almost nothing added on for the arms producing machinery inside the factory, because the firm said that the machinery would be of no value to it. Within a few months of taking over the factory, the private company which had bought the factory at this risible price from the Government turned out to have secured a £25 million arms contract from Germany.
  It is at present making a tremendous profit out of the capital equipment which it has bought for nothing from the Government by producing tanks for the Germans which ought to be produced by Royal Ordnance factories, thus producing profits for the taxpayer and eliminating this serious loss. I hope that the Minister will tell us whether or not the facts as I have stated them are fully true and cover the whole of the case.
  On the second case which I wish to raise, I have been able to satisfy myself that the facts I am about to give are accurate, but I regret to say that I have also been able to satisfy myself that the facts as given to me in this House on Monday by the Minister of Supply were totally inaccurate. If the Minister believes, as I am sure he did, that the facts he gave me were true, then something is very seriously wrong in his Department.
  Two years ago, the British firm of Vickers-Armstrong secured a contract to provide 100 Centurion tanks from the Swiss Government. They secured that contract, as it now turns out, after bribing the Swiss Military Attaché in London by appointing his brother as its representative in Switzerland on the condition that he would receive I per cent. of the value of any contract for Centurion tanks which the Swiss Parliament was prepared to vote.
  These facts were all published in Switzerland a month ago, after an official inquiry by the Swiss Parliament into the conduct of its Military Attaché. Reporting on this affair, the Swiss Parliament made it clear that, although the Attaché had behaved quite improperly in coming to this arrangement with Vickers-Armstrong, the Swiss Government had decided, in any case, that it was going to buy Centurion tanks and that it had not lost any money in consequence of the Attaché's conduct.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. I do not want to interrupt the hon. Member, but Her Majesty's Government are not responsible for what the Swiss Government may or may not do.
  Mr. Healey: I believe, with respect, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that it may appear from what I am about to say that in this case they were, if you will allow me to develop my argument.
  Mr. Charles Pannell: Further to that point of order. My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)is, of course, raising a matter which also concerns another Department—the Ministry of Supply—which is disadvantaged by what has happened. I would, with respect, suggest that if you hear my hon. Friend a little further, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, you will appreciate the extreme relevance of what he is saying. I happen to represent the same city as my hon. Friend, and I am acquainted with the same facts, and I assure you that they must be well within the control of this House.
  Mr. Deputy-Speaker: So long as the responsibility of a Government Department is affected, then it is in order.
  Mr. Healey: I was saying that the contract, in the first case for 100 Centurion tanks and increased later by a contract for another 100 Centurion tanks, was secured by Vickers-Armstrong from the Swiss Government. This seemed a little odd to me, because I happened to know that the Royal Ordnance factory at Barnbow, a factory laid out since the war exclusively for producing Centurion tanks, can produce them between 20 and 30 per cent. cheaper, according to its monthly output, than any private firm. In this case, I was rather surprised that the Swiss Government had not preferred to buy through the Ministry of Supply itself rather than from a private firm.
  I asked the Minister a Question about this on Monday, and he gave me the answer. He said he understood that the Ministry was not in a position to tender for the contract, because there are neutrality laws in Switzerland which forbid the Swiss Government from buying arms direct from a foreign Government. I made inquiries of Swiss officials today, and find that that is completely untrue. Not only is there no
  1372
  legal or conventional objection to the Swiss Government approaching foreign Governments on arms contracts, but it did, in fact, approach the Ministry of Supply on this occasion.
  The reply from the Ministry of Supply was that the Ministry was incapable of producing tanks any cheaper than anywhere else in England, and that it would be incapable of producing these tanks as fast as the Swiss Government wanted them because it was over-committed. This was at a time when the output of Centurion tanks from the Royal Ordnance factories had already fallen to half its maximum and it was known that it would fall, as it has now, to about 3 per cent. of its total tank production a few years ago.
  To crown the irony—the scandalous irony—of this case, I managed to discover from the Minister of Supply, on Monday, that it now turns out that Vickers-Armstrong has had to subcontract half of its Swiss order to the Royal Ordnance factory are Barnbow because it is incapable of meeting it in time.
  I suggest that this is a matter of major public importance, and I hope that the Ministry will take an opportunity of publishing the figures at which it accepted this sub-contract. I reckon that if it accepted the sub-contract at its normal production price Vickers-Armstrong is making a profit of up to £2 million through acting as a middleman for a contract which it obtained by bribery because the Ministry of Supply, for some reason or other, was unwilling to submit a competitive tender.
  So far as I have been able to discover them, the facts I have given are exactly accurate and they are totally contradictory to the answer given to me on Monday by the Minister of Supply. I have only quoted two examples of what is happening in this field, but it is a field which involves total possible orders for this country of up to about £500 million, with potential profits for the Royal Ordnance factories running at approximately £50 million or £100 million. I suggest that one way of cutting the cost of defence is for the Minister not only to allow, but to encourage, the Ministry of Supply to put in really competitive tenders for arms contracts to foreign Governments.

  1373
  We all know the Minister of Supply and we respect him. We know that he is a competent business man in his own right, apart from being a politician, but I am afraid that he has not been able to transfer his competence into his office. What can we think of a Government Department, or a Government, which at a time when its own assets are wasting, when it is losing £10 million a year on its operations, passes by the opportunity to make profits running into £10 million, £50 million or £100 million?
  I believe that the facts I have unearthed are only typical of what must be happening throughout the range of foreign arms contracts in the Ministry of Supply. Although I am well aware that some of my hon. Friends have been slightly impatient at my apparent reversion to a subject which was dealt with earlier—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—I hope that I have succeeded in bringing some new facts to light which urgently demand comment by the Government before we rise for the Recess.
  9.4 p.m.
  Sir Thomas Moore: Now to come back to the White Paper on the Future Organisation of the Army. Speaking for myself, and, I imagine, for many others, also, I think that the scheme evolved by my right hon. Friend and the Army Council is well-nigh perfect, subject to the limitations imposed on them by the Minister of Defence.
  I now intervene in the debate with reference to the speeches of my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude)and the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). I cannot believe that the recruits for the Regular Army anticipated by my right hon. Friend will be forthcoming under existing circumstances.
  First, we must establish three definite principles. One is that every Regular soldier and officer must be taught a trade or profession while in the Army; secondly, he must be guaranteed a job when he comes out, irrespective of when he comes out; and, thirdly, he must be guaranteed a home. Married quarters and pay and other amenities come afterwards. Those are the three principal qualifications which will make or unmake the Regular Army of the future. I cannot believe for one minute that the National Service system will be abolished in our
  1374
  time, or at least until those qualifications are fulfilled.
  I turn to the very few remarks I want to make about the merging of regiments. I should like to refer to a debate which has taken place this afternoon in another place on this subject in which I am very interested—the amalgamation of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Highland Light Infantry. A noble Lord in another place referred to the fact that one was a kilted regiment and the other a non-kilted regiment. To my horror, the Minister—I hope that my comments will reach his ears in some way—said that both wore the kilt. Speaking on behalf of a Lowland regiment, I submit that that is a confession of ignorance, to put it at its mildest, by a Minister.
  In the Government's scheme for the reorganisation of the Army, well-nigh perfect as it is, there is one flaw, and that brings me back to the subject of my remarks this evening. In my opinion, there is no possible explanation for the proposed amalgamation of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Highland Light Infantry. One is a Highland and town regiment, and the other is a Lowland and country regiment.
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Which is which?
  Sir T. Moore: The Highland Light Infantry is a Highland regiment and a city regiment, too.
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Surely the Highland Light Infantry are recruited entirely from Glasgow.
  Sir T. Moore: That is what I am saying; the Highland Light Infantry is a City of Glasgow and a Highland regiment and wears the kilt. The Royal Scots Fusiliers is a Lowland regiment and wears trews. Perhaps my hon. and gallant Friend will come to Scotland some time and we will then explain it to him.
  We feel very strongly about this amalgamation, but I will make no further reference to it tonight because we still hope that the amalgamation may be regarded as sub judice. I therefore content myself by saying that I hope that the Government's reorganisation scheme will prove a success and by wishing it god speed.
  9.8 p.m.
  Mr. R. H. S. Crossman: I should like to speak on the subject which my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)raised and to ask the Secretary of State for War one or two further questions. I think that this is a very proper day on which to discuss the subject, because when one starts a White Paper one makes the final decision, and I believe that the final decision on our defence policy will probably be taken in the next few weeks. It is when we decide on the second year's precise priorities between the different services that we make the irrevocable decision.
  One of the reasons that my hon. Friend and I were so anxious to raise this subject today was our awareness, either from the Observer or from The Times today, that in the next few days the final decisions will be taken on the shape of our Armed Forces. It seems very proper that the House should have a debate this evening on what I gather to have been discussed in the Cabinet today and what will be discussed tomorrow, the final and ultimate decision on what our Forces will look like in the next five years.
  One of our difficulties has been, and my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley put it only too clearly, that we as back benchers speak with the grave disadvantage of not knowing all the facts. We can only elicit one or two facts from the other side of the House. Although when we debated the Defence White Paper last spring there were virtually no voices on the other side of the House and very few on this side who said that the White Paper was wrong or badly wrong, there has been a steady increase of anxiety about it. There have been more second thoughts and I notice that, for instance, the hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude), who is not now in his place, showed the utmost enthusiasm for the White Paper last April, but is beginning to share some of the doubts expressed on this side of the House about it when we first debated it.
  This was no matter which divided the Opposition as a whole. We thought that it was reckless irresponsibility to put all our weight on nuclear weapons and to risk the virtual dismantlement of our conventional Forces. We warned the Government against that, although agreeing that it might sound very attractive.
  1376
  The Government put it in a very attractive way. They said that we could not get rid of National Service unless we relied almost exclusively on nuclear weapons.
  It is always tempting to the British public to believe that by having a few hydrogen bombs we can get rid of National Service, but is the price worth paying? I was glad to notice that in the debate today, there were hon. Members opposite who were beginning to realise that the decision had been taken recklessly and irresponsibly. It is reckless and irresponsible for four reasons. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley referred to some reasons, but there were one or two which he did not mention.
  Ironically, the first is cost. It was the great belief of the Minister of Defence and of all those who supported the Defence White Paper that we should spend very much less if we concentrated on nuclear weapons. I very much agree with what was said in a leading article in The Times this morning. Some of us said it four months ago. It was that the belief that it would be cheap to be the third of the three great nuclear Powers was a complete illusion. The idea that one can join the "Nuclear Club" and stay in it on the cheap is absolutely crazy.
  Let us be honest about it. The reason we joined it was not for defence against Russia. The reason, as The Times said this morning, was for national prestige. I am greatly relieved that even in these last days before we go on holiday we can say to the Government that it is crazy to base a defence policy on prestige. Defence should be based on defence considerations and the one thing which gives us no defence is adding to the American deterrent. It may give us a certain satisfaction to have a few bombs marked "H-bombs," "B for Britain" and the "hydrogen bomb," but having a few marked "B for Britatin" in no way adds to the security of this country. We may possibly add to its political independence—that is a very open question—but no defence is achieved by the addition.
  Therefore, the first thing we have to realise is that those who advised us to put all our money on the nuclear weapon because it would be cheaper are already beginning to discover that it may not be cheaper after all, that it may be found

  1377
  that the amount of labour, resources, manpower and money locked up in this desperate attempt to keep up as a super-Power alongside Russia and America will be far more than the country can afford.
  Alternatively—and it is about this that I want to press the Secretary of State—in order to keep up, we may cut the conventional Forces still further in the view that we have only so much to spend and, being committed on the nuclear weapons, must keep them as top priority, thus having further and further cuts in conventional Forces. That is much more likely to happen. We shall have the Government saying that we must continue with the nuclear job, that that is the one thing we want, and that the others can be allowed to diminish.
  I see no reason to doubt the extremely well-informed story in the Observer on Sunday, that at long last the Colonial Secretary has shown an interest in this policy. A policy which concentrates on nuclear weapons and says, "We shall give third or fourth priority to conventional forces" is a policy which, from the point of view of the Colonial Secretary, is utterly disastrous.
  It is about time that we began to think of what the actual forces will look like by 1962 if we try to remain a nuclear Power and to keep our budget below £1,400 million and cut it for the Election of the year after next. That is what the Chancellor of the Exchequer intends to do. We all know it is an attempt to get a budgetary victory in the Election by those means. I can see why the Colonial Secretary has been a little interested to discover what our responsibility will be.
  I turn to the second problem, that of Europe. I was over in Western Germany last week. It is not news to this House, because other hon. Members have been there, to tell of the disastrous effect which this White Paper has had in Western Germany and in France—disastrous because it has encouraged all the enemies of this country and disheartened our very few friends. A White Paper which says that we are going to reduce our four divisions in Germany, that we are going to rely on the hydrogen bomb and that we, the British, are going to be the third of the nuclear Powers can only please those Germans who want themselves one day to produce nuclear weapons.
  1378
  After talking to Germans I came back persuaded even more of something I said in the defence debate. If this country goes in for the nuclear policy outlined in the White Paper it is absolutely inevitable that within two years the French will get the H-bomb and in some period, in five or ten years, the Germans are bound to produce their own nuclear weapons for the same reason as we are to produce them—national prestige. It was just possible to conceive of nuclear weapons as the monopoly of the two great Powers, America and Russia. When this country said "We want to join the club" every secondary Power was bound sooner or later to follow us into the club. Therefore, we ought to be quite clear what we are doing, even in these last days before we go on holiday, because this policy gives us no security but runs inevitably to a German nuclear bomb.
  I say with great respect to the Secretary of State for War that every decent German I talked to is appalled at this prospect. Not a single German who cares about democracy does not say, "For God's sake can you not stop compelling us as a nation to follow your example and caring for national prestige? We happen to be a very fragile democracy. If our people are given the choice of having conscription or the nuclear weapon there is not much hope of saving democracy." We are bound to consider seriously the repercussions of what we do in Germany.
  If this country says that we must have nuclear weapons because we cannot trust the Americans, the Germans will say the same. This is the most anti-European policy the Government can have because it disintegrates N.A.T.O. If in N.A.T.O. we say that we must make our own H-bomb because the Americans might not start the war when we want it, but that we want the H-bomb so that we can start it when we want it because we are afraid the Americans will not do so, could there be a reason more disintegrative of N.A.T.O.'s common will? What about the Germans? Why should they not decide in due course that they want to start a war at the time they want it to begin and must have the nuclear weapon for that purpose? I am glad to find that The Times, in its leading article today, is saying the things that we were saying from these benches when the White Paper was first discussed a few weeks ago.

  1379
  The third reason is perhaps the most ironical of the lot. The irony is that as a result of this defence policy the British Government are now the major obstacle to any agreement, short-term or long-term, on disarmament. Let us be perfectly blunt about it. Why is Mr. Dulles here? It is because agreement cannot be obtained, and the major obstacle is the British Government in saying, "We want to get a good stockpile of these damned things before we have a close-down on production." One of the major obstacles to disarmament is the demand of the British Government to be given time for this country to become a nuclear Power. Does any hon. Member challenge that?
  Vice-Admiral Hughes Hallett: How does the hon. Gentleman know?
  Mr. Crossman: I will give the hon. and gallant Gentleman the answer. The British Government have been making every possible difficulty about the suspension of hydrogen bomb tests, saying that they will not have the tests suspended unless there is a suspension of production as well. What does that mean? It means that we do not want a suspension of tests because it will mean that we shall be prevented from going ahead fast with production, and we do not see why we should not get ahead, for we are behind the others.
  The hon. and gallant Gentleman should study the objections which have been stated at the Disarmament Sub-Commission. If he reads the American Press and its reactions to the British arguments, he will find that the overwhelming belief in the American Press is that the British Government want to be quite sure that if they make what the Prime Minister the other day called "the great sacrifice" of giving up tests, they will get a tremendous return for it. I should have thought no sacrifice to this country would be involved in an international agreement to stop tests, but for those who want us to become a minor nuclear Power there is the sacrifice of the stockpile which would make us a nuclear Power, and they feel that they do not want to make that sacrifice except in return for tremendous concessions from the Russians.
  That is why there was a difference between this side of the House and the
  1380
  Government side on the subject of nuclear tests. That is why in the debate on disarmament we were insistent that we should accept an agreement with the Russians about nuclear tests even if there was no other agreement with it. The Government insisted that it should be linked with all sorts of other agreements. Why was that? It was because the Government are so keen on their nuclear power.
  I seriously suggest to the Secretary of State for War that he should think it over again. I know he has not the power to make these decisions; he can only report back to the Cabinet. All we can do is to ask him to think over again whether the White Paper was the last word in human wisdom. Was it really the last word in human wisdom for Great Britain in 1957 to announce itself as the third nuclear Power and to say, "We will sacrifice everything in the struggle to become a nuclear Power"?
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Everything?
  Mr. Crossman: It is almost everything, as the hon. and gallant Gentleman will discover during the next three or four years when he sees what is left of our conventional forces as the result of our struggle to become a nuclear power. There will not be much left. Indeed, I think that my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes)will find us converted against our will to a pacifist country which has almost destroyed its defences in order to contribute to the deterrent.
  I would tell the Secertary of State for War that the thing that has shocked me more profoundly than anything else is the cynicism of the Tory Party in this matter. I know what has happened. The Tory Party knows that the Labour Party hates conscription. That is true. The Tory Party has, therefore, deliberately said, "We will outbid those boys on conscription, and we will do it by this devilish method of saying that we will go nuclear and get rid of conscription." That is what it has done. That is the trick it has used on the British people in the White Paper. It said, "You can get rid of conscription by 1960 if you will only let us be nuclear-minded and rely on nuclear weapons."

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  That was a terrible disaster for this country. It was a terrible disaster because it rendered us impotent. It did not give us independence. We lost authority in Europe. It did not give us any power abroad. We had the hon. Member for Ealing, South saying that we should have nuclear weapons and nuclear bombers stationed in Cyprus—to help us, I suppose, in Oman. Would it really make us any better liked in the Trucial sheikhdoms to have nuclear bombers based on Cyprus? That is the terrifying thing—that the party opposite should say that we must have this base on an island which, on admission, will take 25,000 men to guard. That is the strategy that is outlined to us by the Tory Party.
  To add insult to injury, we recently had the announcement of the compensation to be paid to the 14,000 officers and N.C.O.s to be axed as a result of the policy. I do not think that it is any secret that when any serving officer or N.C.O. first saw the proposition he thought it unbelievably generous. It interests me a great deal to wonder why the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have said, without the flicker of an eyelid, "Of course, I have £50 million for that." The amount is £50 million for 14,000 people. The Chancellor brings that out easily. There is not £50 million for anything else, but there is £50 million for these 14,000 people.
  Why is that? I am afraid that I get a little suspicious and have to ask why that £50 million was forthcoming. I think that some high-ranking officers now know why. It is because the Government know that their defence policy is criminal, and they have bribed silence among the party opposite. There would have been much more opposition——
  Brigadier Sir Harry Mackeson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The word "bribery" applied to hon. Members on this side is surely un-Parliamentary?
  Mr. Speaker: Words can be used of a party as a whole that would be intolerable if applied to an hon. Member. I did not hear the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)single out any particular Member. It was a general accusation against the party opposite, but I think that that is quite common, and is not out of order.
  Mr. Crossman: I am grateful to you, Mr. Speaker. It is clear that I was not saying that the hon. and gallant Member, or any of his hon. Friends, was offered, individually, a lump sum by the Minister of Defence. What I do say is that the most powerful pressure on the back benches opposite is, of course, the professional officer pressure. That was miraculously relaxed after the £50 million was offered.
  Major H. Legge-Bourke: The hon. Gentleman must not believe that the professional officer always has his own way in the Tory Party
  Mr. Crossman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman does not get his own way, perhaps, but, on this occasion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer decided that it was worth £50 million to quieten certain consciences on that side, and certain voices that might otherwise have been raised against the defence strategy that is now in question. It was a very shrewd economy on his part for, if he could achieve his end of slashing defence and get away with it for £50 million that was O.K. for him. I notice the miraculous silence we have had—only one speech this evening from the other side, and that from one of the more notorious rebels over there. We know perfectly well that a lot of hon. Members opposite have the gravest doubts about the defence policy——
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: How does the hon. Gentleman know?
  Mr. Crossman: Well, we know, of course, because we read what they say in the newspapers, we hear what they say, and we feel that they have sufficient intelligence to be seriously doubtful about the policy now in progress. That is why we have raised this debate this evening, because we felt that they would join with us in pleading with the Government to think again before allocating the priorities, even for next year's Budget, in such a way that in a few years we shall have a few absolutely useless H-bombs and nothing else at all.
  9.30 p.m.
  Mr. Walter Elliot: I do not wish to detain the House for long, but it really is impossible to sit still while the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)lays bare his twisted

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  soul in such detail before the House of Commons and presents it as a contribution to our debate. This psycho-analysis is all very well, but it should be done in the psychiatrist's studio. Nearly ail his arguments are completely self-destructive, and when they are not self-destructive they are murderous. His argument that we should engage forthwith in a heavy preventive war against any country which seeks to create a hydrogen bomb is the sort of thing which one would expect——
  Mr. Crossman: With great respect, I think the right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that I said nothing of the sort. Even at his worst, he could not attribute that to me.
  Mr. Elliot: That only shows, what the House already recognises, that the hon. Member does not know the meaning of his own words. He said that we must at all costs prevent any other country joining what he called the hydrogen bomb club. I take it that he does not mean merely the friends of this country; he means the enemies of this country also. What would his view be towards China if that country proposed to join the hydrogen bomb club, or towards any of the other countries which might in their wisdom wish to do so? Does he think that their decision one way or the other would be entirely influenced by whether this country has refused to make a hydrogen bomb or not? It cannot.
  I give the hon. Gentleman, at any rate, the credit for following out the logical consequences. The logical consequences of what he was saying tonight are that the thing has got to stop and if anybody else tries to come in they are to be prevented—and obviously he must, mean by force, if necessary.
  The hon. Gentleman went on to a remarkable series of inversions about the voluntary Army. I am not sure whether he thinks it is a good thing or a bad thing. There was a time when he was in favour of it. Is he still in favour of it? He does not answer.
  Mr. Crossman: I will answer if the right hon. Gentleman wishes me to do so.
  Mr. Elliot: Let us hear the answer. I do not wish to do the hon. Gentleman an injustice. I take it that he would be in
  1384
  favour of a voluntary Army in preference to a conscript Army. He nods his head. Can he not see that all this Machiavellian rubbish that he was letting off about giving adequate compensation to people axed in the middle of a military career is completely meaningless unless we are going on after that to a conscript Army and not to a voluntary Army? He says that there is nothing like a satisfied customer. What about the dissatisfied customer? What about the 14,000 N.C.Os. and officers, every one of whom, according to his own view, and according, it may be, to the view of hon. Members on this side of the House, would have suffered an injustice? Is that the way to recruit a voluntary Army? The question answers itself.
  If we are going to make a voluntary Army a success, as we all believe it ought to be, we must ensure that there will be a career in it for officer, N.C.O. and man in this new Army, and that if, for any reason, the engagements solemnly entered into have to be broken, compensation on a generous scale shall be paid. There is no other way in which one can have a voluntary Army.
  Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman would be a little more convincing if he were more sure of his facts. He overlooks the fact that there was a definite breach of engagement of Regular soldiers only a few months ago at the time of Suez when warrant officers, N.C.O.s and other ranks, the expiry of whose engagements was held up, had no compensation paid to them and it was specifically stated that a state of war did not exist.
  Mr. Elliot: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman, whose debating skill we all respect, can hang his argument on an emergency. He knows as well as I do that in an emergency emergency steps are taken at short notice.
  Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman is also a very skilled debater. The fact is that never before in his memory or in mine, in any circumstances whatever, have terms as generous as these been paid. I do not deplore it. My hon. Friend has made a point of it, but surely he is quite right. He is not being Machiavellian. He is being honest in asking the Government why it is that these fantastically generous terms were given at this juncture by a Government

  1385
  which is under great pressure to stop inflation. Surely he is right in asking that question. It is wrong of the right hon. Gentleman to twist and turn about because he has come late in the debate and has not looked up his facts.
  Mr. Elliot: Really, the hon. Gentleman knows as well as anybody what is the necessity for generous compensation and generous terms of pay. if one is to have a voluntary Army—and no one has preached it more vehemently than himself—the necessity is obvious. He and I are at one; we agree that there ought to be a voluntary Army. We agree that it ought to be well paid. It is then automatic that, if people are stopped in the middle of their careers from continuing, there must be compensation which will not only seem to them to be generous but will seem to those entering the career to be generous. That is the answer, and I am sure that it is a much more convincing answer than the extraordinary argument given by the hon. Member for Coventry, East.
  If we are to have a voluntary Army, then it must be paid on a scale comparable with what is found in civilian employment. There is one oustanding example of a voluntary Army in the Western world, an Army raised without conscription in a country of full employment, the neighbour of that "Mecca" of prosperous employment, the United States. I mean the Canadian Army. There is in Canada a voluntary Army raised on terms comparable with those given in civilian life.
  Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well that that is obsolutely fantastic; the total strength of the Canadian Army is only 40,000,
  Mr. Elliot: It may well be that the total strength of the Canadian Army is 40,000, but if Canada did not give adequate payment she would not get 4,000 or even 400. A good illustration was given recently. Somebody said that it was very difficult to get cooks, and asked one of the Canadian staff officers what his position was. He said, quite simply, that the Canadian Army advertised for them. The answer came that he could not expect to get them if a man could walk across the road and get a full-paid cook's civilian employment at the Château
  1386
  Laurier. "You will not get them to come into the Army", it was said, "just because you advertise for them". The staff officer replied that in the Canadian Army a cook got only 10 dollars less than he could get at the Château Laurier, and, said the officer, "our pension terms are better." In that sort of way one can get the cooks. We have gone nothing like as far in our compensation or, indeed, in scales of pay as has the United States Army or the Canadian Army. The hon. Member for Coventry, East must face the facts.
  Here is the great difference from the old days. We are moving into a period of recruiting against full employment. Time and again, from hon. Members on that side of the House we have been told in the past that hunger is the best recruiting sergeant for the British Army. Recruiting Sergeant Hunger has been led out and shot, and we are now recruiting against full employment and most prosperous conditions in our country. Obviously, in such conditions as that, if we do not give compensation to the men who are going out, we shall not get new men to come in. It seems to me that that, in a sentence, is the answer to the extraordinary arguments advanced by the hon. Member for Coventry, East.
  I do not want to take too long; I know that there are other hon. Members who wish to speak, and I do not wish to presume on the undoubted privilege which a Privy Councillor has of being called, even though I am the only Privy Councillor here this evening, and some of the other Privy Councillors who take up more time seem to be away on this occasion.
  Mr. Ede: The right hon. Gentleman should not tempt us to join in.
  Mr. Elliot: I am not speaking of From Bench Privy Councillors; they are a law until themselves. I am speaking of Back Bench Privy Councillors, and it is against those that the "slings and arrows" of outraged junior hon. Members are more usually directed.
  While these particular matters are being debated tonight, we must have in mind also the very foundation stone of all Army policy, that is, the regimental policy of Her Majesty's Government. On this, I confirm what has been said

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  by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore). In so far as the scheme affects the regiments with which he and I are both closely concerned—the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Highland Light Infantry—I do not think that these proposals are satisfactory. The hon. Member can laugh. It is no laughing matter to the Highland Light Infantry or the Royal Scots Fusiliers.
  Mr. Wigg: I laugh only for this reason. I said earlier that every hon. Member claims that the proposals of the Government are first-class, except, of course, for the regiment in his own constituency.
  Mr. Elliot: That may be. I am putting the case simply as it affects two regiments of which I have a certain amount of knowledge. The Government's argument seems to me not to realise the fact that Glasgow is a great Highland city. It is the largest of the Highland cities and is the capital of the West Highlands. Many bodies meet there. One of the Highland county councils—and other county bodies meet there. It is notably a Highland city. If its regiment is treated as a Lowland regiment, I do not believe that it will get that support which is necessary if the voluntary system is to prevail; and it is of the voluntary system of which we are speaking tonight.
  It may be that I am wrong and that the hon. Member for Coventry, East is completely correct and that this is a Machiavellian scheme by which the Government seek to destroy our defences—it seems an odd thing to do—and are spending this enormous sum of money to disarm the country for the purpose of ingratiating themselves with the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes).
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the right hon. Gentleman tell me how many recruits joined the Highland Light Infantry in the first six months of this year?
  Mr. Elliot: Certainly not. If the House wished me to go into a close statistical analysis of all these problems, I would be very glad indeed to do so, but that is not my desire. When the right hon. Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede)said "Do not tempt me", he was not on his feet. I say to the hon.
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  Member for South Ayrshire, "Do not tempt me—for I am on my feet."
  I merely wished to enter a protest against this aspect of proposed reorganisation and to say that, as I understand it, Members on both sides representing both the city and the county are at one on this issue. I understand that the Corporation of Glasgow, which is seldom unanimous, is likely tomorrow to support unanimously opposition to this proposal.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: No.
  Mr. Elliot: The hon. Members knows a great deal about almost everything in the world. When it comes to knowing about Glasgow, however, I claim that I am at least equally well informed as the hon. Member—I do not put it any stronger. I was on the telephone to the Lord Provost's office an hour ago. It may be that the hon. Member has been on the telephone since then. I do not claim anything exceptional, but simply the average knowledge of an ordinary back bench Member representing the City of Glasgow. I am saying that, in my opinion, the City of Glasgow also shares the uneasy view that the proposal which is made is not a sound one.
  There are tonight before us two big considerations. The first is the great consideration of strategy. On this we should do our best to examine the proposal with a firmer grasp of the obvious than the hon. Member for Coventry, East has shown tonight and with a less intricate approach. Secondly, we should look at the fundamental question of the regiments, upon which, after all, the whole of the voluntary system is based and upon which the Army will be increasingly based if we move, as we all hope to do, from a conscript to a voluntary Army. In particular, therefore, I say that the example of which I have personal knowledge—the suggested amalgamation of the Highland Light Infantry and the Royal Scots Fusiliers—is, I believe, not a sound proposal and will prove not to be sound in practice.
  9.45 p.m.
  Mr. John Strachey: As we are not debating under our customary time limit, if I offer one or two observations now I shall not be cutting out any hon. Member on either side of the House. I want to offer, first, a remark on the original proposition put before the House

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  by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)and which has been referred to by the right hon. Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Walter Elliot)about regimental reorganisation. I, like them, am not offering any general criticism to the Secretary of State. I would agree that, if he had this very unpleasant and unpalatable job to do, he has on the whole, as far as I can judge, gone about it in a workmanlike way.
  I want specially to consider one point which has been made and which is of some importance, and it is this. The Secretary of State is transferring, as I understand, the cap badges of the regiments to the brigade which is to become in many ways a new unit of the infantry, a new unit of the Army, and in doing that he is attempting, to a very considerable extent, to transfer the fundamental loyalty from the regiment to the brigade. At the same time, his whole scheme, of course, is based on an attempt to maintain regimental loyalty as well. I fear that he is in danger of falling between two stools there.
  There must be hon. Members on both sides of the House who know this issue far better than I do because I have not had the honour to serve in the Army, but there seems to me to be a real danger here. The cap badge is something of a fetish, something of a symbol. I cannot see it is a necessity to make this transfer of the cap badge from the regiment to the brigade, and for the brigade to have a common cap badge, for the brigade necessarily has nothing like the traditional loyalties that the regiment has. I cannot see the wisdom of the transfer, and I hope the right hon. Gentleman will comment on that. It is a small matter, but as, I think, he has taken so much care to do the least possible damage to regimental loyalties and traditions I think he may reconsider it.
  Before I come on to the main themes which we have discussed I should like to emphasise what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)off the main point of the debate, and that was on the question of the Royal Ordnance factories and their contracts. My hon. Friend called it a scandal, and unless he can be contradicted I think it certainly is a scandal, and unless that can be contradicted the Government really cannot go away for three months and
  1390
  allow this matter to rest after those words have been used in the House and those accusations against the Ministry of Supply have been made. They must either be contradicted, or some action must be taken. We on this side of the House feel very strongly about this matter and we do not think it can be let rest.
  I come to the main issues which have been discussed in the debate and which were raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley. The first of the themes he raised was that of National Service. He very strongly urged the view, as he has urged it before in the House, that there was no chance of our recruiting that number of men the Government have set before themselves as the target. He talked of 175,000 for the Army. The Government have set themselves a target of 165,000.
  Mr. Wigg: About that.
  Mr. Strachey: It comes out to about 165,000——
  Mr. Wigg: My right hon. Friend is quoting the Minister of Defence, but he used the word "about." I say, about 165,000 or 175,000.
  Mr. Strachey: I was going on to say that we need not argue the figure and that it was about that.
  At any rate, I would agree with my hon. Friend in this that if no more measures are to be taken by the Government than have been taken so far, if they simply let matters drift in the way they are drifting at present, then, of course, my hon. Friend will be proved abundantly right, and there is not the faintest hope of getting that number of men. I have said repeatedly—I think I have said it three times in this House already—and I think it is vital to say it again, that we are convinced that most drastic measures must be taken in recruiting and that there is not a moment to lose in taking those measures. They must be taken in the next few months. This process must be begun now to produce the requisite number of men when conscription comes to an end at the end of 1962 when the last con-scribed man leaves the Forces.
  We do not see anything even in the Government's forecasts which could produce the numbers of men. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley takes me to task very heavily because I mentioned pay in

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  this connection. He is quite right in saying that pay is not everything, but what I have said and repeat, and what I make not the slightest apology for saying, is that adequate pay is an absolute prerequisite for getting these men. Of course, it will not do it by itself, but I think that my hon. Friend has a tendency to use this as an excuse for not paying what turns out to be the market pay necessary to get these men.
  The right hon. Member for Kelvingrove gave the example of recruiting cooks for the Canadian Army, and I agree that it is relevant. The rates of pay will have to be looked at in a new light if we are to have a wholly volunteer force. They will have to be looked at in the light of what proves to be the rate which is competitive with civilian employment of the same kind, with all the advantages and disadvantages weighed between the two.
  I do not know what the figure will be, but I should have thought that the Government will have to be able to make an offer of about the current average rate of weekly wage in civilian life in this country, plus the benefits in kind which the Army gives to outweigh the disadvantages of Army life—something of the magnitude of £10 a week and all found as the start. I am not saying that it is the only thing, but it is the only quick thing that can be done, and it is the necessary foundation for all the other methods, such as barrack improvements which are of the utmost importance if there is to be any hope of getting the men.
  We shall certainly drift into an abominably dangerous situation if nothing is done and National Service is brought to an end and in that time the absolutely indispensable inducements for all-volunteer forces have not been brought forward.
  Mr. Wigg: I could understand my right hon. Friend's argument and I might accept it if, a year ago, when this controversy was at its height and when the Government brought forward proposals for increased pay costing £67 million a year, he and those like him in my party who argued for the abolition of National Service had raised the issue of pay and demanded further increases, but they did not. My right hon. Friend charged me and those who thought like me with being pessimistic, for he thought recruit-
  1392
  ing was satisfactory and he has raised the pay issue specifically in the last few days only after the Government have spent £67 million and obtained fewer recruits than they did a year ago.
  Mr. Strachey: My hon. Friend is misinformed. He does not do me the honour of either listening to or reading my speeches. He will find repeated references in my speeches to pay, and he has protested against the fact that I proposed higher pay. I have done it repeatedly and my hon. Friend knows that perfectly well.
  There is only one simple point I want to make particularly to my hon. Friend on this issue with reference to the argument which he has put forward today and which he always puts forward with great force. It is that we must have conscription in this country in perpetuity. That is the only possible conclusion that one can draw from his argument. We on this Bench do not accept that conclusion. We do not think that that is the case, and we do not think that it is the proper way of raising the vitally important conventional, non-nuclear forces which, we entirely agree, are an absolutely indispensable part of our defence effort.
  I will put one other point to the House in that connection. Let us take my hon. Friend's own hypothesis. He raised the issue—quite a possible one, though he may be too optimistic, unless the Government really do something to get the recruits—of a partial failure of the Government's recruiting drive, which left the forces, say, 30,000 or 40,000 short of their target. He said what a dangerous national situation that will be, and so it will. But how would he use the instrument of National Service to bridge that gap? Selective service for raising a small number of men is surely an almost impossible instrument.
  How could we possibly pick out 30,000 or 40,000 or some number of that sort from the youth of this country and say that those particular young men and nobody else will be conscripted for two years? That does not seem to me to be a practical proposition.
  Mr. Wigg: Of course, I agree, and have always said this, as the right hon. Gentleman knows perfectly well. The basic controversy between my right hon. Friend and myself has never been on

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  pay until I was proved right beyond the possibility of denial on the period of the three-year engagement. I have always said, and I will give him 20 references if he likes, that once the three-year engagement had gone on for a long period, there was no quick way back.
  The Government have now abandoned the three-year engagement, and the right hon. Gentleman must face that debacle and the consequences. For the responsibility for the continuance of National Service is tied round his neck and that of the right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head). As well as the ever-increasing burden of pay we have to face the fact that we have had the three-year engagement for six years and only now that it has been abolished can we get our Service structure right.
  Mr. Strachey: That has nothing to do with the point I made to the hon. Gentleman. The point I made was the quite simple one, namely, what use is the retention of the instrument of National Service to fill a gap of 30,000 or 40,000 men? The hon. Member went off on a tirade about his old hobby-horse of the three-year engagement, which is nothing to do with the matter.
  Mr. Wigg Mr. Wigg rose——
  Mr. Strachey: No, I have given way a good deal to the hon. Member, and he is just bringing in the three-year engagement, which was not introduced by me, but by the right hon. Member for Carshalton (Mr. Head). It is perfectly true that I was never willing to join with him in his crusade against the right hon. Member for Carshalton for introducing the three-year engagement which, during the currency of National Service, but no longer, had quite a good deal to be said for it and did secure the Army quite considerable numbers. There were quite serious objections to it as well, but the hon. Member is now very much more friendly with the right hon. Member for Carshalton, who at that time, he regarded as the architect of ruin and now regards him, or is bracketed with him by the Observer, as one of the only two people who understand the problem at all. These little changes go on.
  Major Legge-Bourke: Would the right hon. Gentleman say which he thinks is worse—the kiss of Massingham, or the kiss of "Cross-Bencher"?
  Mr. Strachey: That is a point which I could not possibly answer.
  The hon. Member for Dudley has shown himself unable to answer the simple point that, for the purpose of bridging a relatively small deficiency of a few tens of thousands of men, which, as he said, is quite likely the result of the Government's policy, his own panacea for keeping National Service in existence does not foot the bill. I cannot believe that he can say that we can take 30,000 or 40,000 men at random, by lot, and permanently conscript them, and, therefore, I think that the Government have committed the country to raising all voluntary forces in practice. I repeat again: what are they doing about it? I entirely agree with the hon. Member that unless they take the most drastic measures of inducement they will not get those forces.
  Now I want to say only one or two words about the issue of the H-bomb, because this is not the time to reargue the question of nuclear warfare, although it has been argued a good deal from both sides of the House in this debate. As my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)said in his opening remarks, it is true that both from this Front Bench and from the back benches we said, when the White Paper was presented to us, that the Government were going from one extreme to the other; from having a highly conventional defence policy they seemed to us to be going to the other extreme and pinning everything on nuclear defence. I certainly think that they went too far on that.
  On the other hand, some of the arguments used by both my hon. Friends tonight do not seem to me to be really sound. After all, this country began the construction, the preparation, of nuclear weapons with the concurrence of both sides of the House, with the exception of individual pacifist Members on this side, and with the concurrence of both the hon. Members who have spoken today in such strong criticism of that policy that we should have a nuclear element in our defence forces which would not absorb all our defence effort—that certainly would be madness.
  This is all that is at issue here. We agree with them that the Government's White Paper gave the impression that they

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  were going far on to the nuclear extreme. After all, the only answer to these arguments as to our having opened the nuclear club to full membership, by ourselves going in for the nuclear weapon, is international nuclear disarmament on international agreement. If we had abstained from constructing nuclear weapons, what guarantee would we have had that third, fourth, or fifth nations would have abstained from doing so? Only the conclusion of a workable convention on nuclear disarmament is of any real service there. I, personally, would strongly criticise the Government's policy in that respect, and their reluctance to lead the way in securing such a convention, but that is another theme of debate.
  Finally, to what does our criticism of the Government tonight add up? It adds up to this, that as regards National Service as regards preserving an adequate balance between our conventional and our nuclear Forces, there is great public concern that the Government thought in the White Paper not only about the necessity of having nuclear forces, with which I agree, but that this would be a wonderful short-cut to economy in defence. We have had a great deal of such suggestion, and when we see the necessities of the thing, when we see what we have to pay to get our voluntary forces, I do not believe that there will be appreciable financial economy if adequate conventional forces are to be maintained.
  I believe that the leading articles in The Times and the Observer, which have been referred to, express that concern in the country. It is a very real concern and I think it is justified, because if the Government think that they have here a wonderful short-cut to economy over defence that would be playing politics with defence. That would be going over to the extreme of nuclear defence and neglecting our conventional forces.
  I do not think that those forces must be large and I do not think that the figure given by the Government is too small, but in my opinion it will be a very expensive matter to raise this number of forces voluntarily and adequately to equip them. I believe that the Government owe it to the House to give us some reassurance, not merely in words, but a reassurance in their actions
  1396
  during the coming weeks, that they are facing this issue and will not leave the country short of the conventional forces which, for obvious reasons, are the more important of the two in the short run and which, in the short run, are the forces which can prevent incidents from blowing up into world wars.
  It is because the country feels that the emphasis has gone too far the other way that there is public disquiet. I therefore ask the Government to give us reassurance on this issue before the House adjourns.
  10.7 p.m.
  Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: I apologise for intervening in the debate which has been raging on the other side of the House, as it always rages on these occasions, but I have remarks to make other than those which have been made already.
  The right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey)very nearly fell into the same error as that committed by his hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). At one time I had hoped that I would follow the hon. Member for Coventry, East, because I should very much have enjoyed taking the pants off him in an argument, but in fact it was much more effectively done by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Walter Elliot). The right hon. Member for Dundee, West very nearly fell into the same error and very nearly used the same words, "Entirely going over to a nuclear defence." That had been said about five times in different ways by the hon. Member for Coventry, East. We have by no means gone over entirely to nuclear defence, and it is an entire misconception to suggest that we have.
  What the right hon. Gentleman seems to forget is that we are now doing what we have been trying to do for a very long time, and what the international situation has previously prevented us from doing. We have now been able to withdraw troops from North Africa, from Korea and from other parts of the world, and we have announced, with the agreement of the N.A.T.O. countries, our intention to withdraw a certain number of troops from Europe. The number we are to withdraw from Europe has been very considerably exaggerated. I wish people

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  would not talk about divisions, because that gives an entirely false impression. The number of troops to be withdrawn is by no means equal to the number of divisions which have been mooted. Furthermore, those formations which are to be retained in Germany will be strengthened in the relationship between teeth and tail. They will have more front-line troops than before.
  The result of these moves is that, for the first time since the last war, we have in this country a mobile reserve of a considerable size. This has enabled us to breathe again. There were many months when my heart was in my mouth because I knew that we had not one single reserve unit in this country, except for the demonstration battalion at Warminster. We now have a reserve.
  I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on what he has done in the short time that he has been at the War Office. He has had a desperately difficult task and desperately difficult decisions to make. I congratulate him, first, on his decision when he set his face against the complete abolition of battalions or regiments and decided on amalgamations. That was a major decision, a courageous decision, and in my view a correct decision.
  Certain officers quite naturally feel extremely upset about the amalgamations which have been announced, but when they blame the politicians I hope they realise that the politicians have very little to do with it. I agree that in the final analysis my right hon. Friend has the responsibility for anything which is done but, as politicians, we all know perfectly well that although the broad basis is laid down for them, the details are worked out by the professional soldiers in the War Office. If they have any grouse about the way the details will work out, let them remember that we politicians have had very little to do with it.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: That is democracy.
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: Am I not right in suggesting to the hon. Member that that applies to every Department of Government?
  Resettlement is another aspect which has not been mentioned, and again I congratulate my right hon. Friend for
  1398
  setting up the committee which is to see to the resettlement of officers when they leave the Forces. I do not want to go into detail, except to say that I hope that that committee will have a subcommittee to act as an advisory body to those officers on how to deal with the money. There will be grave danger. There will be gentlemen sharpening their knives and offering "a nice little directorship" for only £800,
  I implore those officers to take advice from people who understand these things before they squander their little money. Let us have no more "chicken farms", no more "small horticultural estates". No horticultural business will stand for more than three years, unless behind it there is a very large amount of capital and unless it is equipped with the latest machinery and capable of continuing to have the latest machinery. There have been hundreds of cases of people who left the Forces after the war going into businesses like that and going broke in three or four years. I hope that the committee will deal with that aspect, as well as with the many others.
  We have talked about recruiting, and I should have liked to have dealt with it at length, but it is now too late. It is no good bringing men back from magnificent German barracks in B.A.O.R. and sticking them in Colchester or in any of the other places which were condemned many years ago. Quarters are a top priority, and I do not care if their provision costs money. For heaven's sake, let us get this task done. Bad quarters are one of the greatest deterrents to recruiting.
  Another is education for the children of Service men. A little while ago we got a concession about that, but the Civil Service was too strong for us. We got a concession, a family allowance for education, only for those serving abroad. The differential between the Civil Service and the serving Forces had to be kept, and as there was no such thing for the Civil Service in England we had to go without it for our forces in England. I hope that my right hon. Friend will examine that when he has more time to see whether greater justice can be done. It is one of the greatest deterrents to recruiting, and when people find that their children are not being educated as well as those

  1399
  of people outside the Army they want to leave the Army.
  I will not give details about disturbance. There is another word for it in the Army, which I could not use here. When there is disturbance there should be adequate compensation for it and not just a lump sum paid for one move when people have to move two or three times a year and pay for the moves out of their own pockets.
  We must have a decent walking-out dress. Battle-dress is finished, and there is now no raison d'être for battle-dress. It is a most hideous thing, and it takes a British soldier to make that ghastly piece of uniform look at all reasonable by pressing it under his mattress. Let us have a decent walking-out dress. I saw a picture in a newspaper suggesting such a uniform, but must we have the side-cap? What is wrong with the old peaked cap? It is by far the smartest ever invented with all due respect to the beret, which is a battle honour and which should not have been given to anybody but the Royal Tank Regiment. The peaked cap is the smartest cap of all. Let us not copy nations and have all sorts of funny side hats.
  In the old days, the Army used to be a way of life. It used to be jolly good fun. There were times when we did very little work and there were times when we were grossly overworked, to such an extent that no union would stand it for a minute. It was fun and exciting and a way of life, but conscription killed all that. National Service put an end to all that. For the Regular soldier, the N.C.O. and the officer, who, goodness knows, works very hard, it was one long drudgery from one year's end to another. They were operating a sausage machine, and when they had finished one operation they began all over again.
  Now this voluntary Army is envisaged, let us get back to the old way of life with a little more imagination in our training. We can have a number of battle drills and practice and get them right, but having done that, there is very little more to do. We want a little more of the "outward bound" spirit, a little more imagination and adventure—and danger, for oddly enough that is what people like. Why do the Parachute Brigade, the Marines and the Commandos
  1400
  become over-subscribed? It is because people like excitement. If regiments want recruits, they can get them if they have a reputation for being an exciting and even a dangerous regiment, I hope that something on those lines will be done to encourage my right hon. Friend.
  I do not believe we have the slightest need to fear a major advance by large Russian forces across the Elbe. There was a danger of that, but because of the preponderance of the nuclear deterrent—it is not a question of starting a war as the hon. Member for Coventry, East said, but it is a deterrent to stop war—and also because of the state of the satellite countries, Poland, Hungary and so on, through which the lines of communication of a vast invading Army would have to pass, there is not the slightest chance of it happening. What might happen would be an inroad into Western Germany, as has always happened before when these tactics have been played, not by the Russians, but by East Germans. They might advance overnight 20 miles, sit down and say, "What are you going to do about it?" That is the sort of thing we have to meet absolutely at once the following morning. Are the forces we are leaving in Western Europe adequate to deal with that kind of thing?
  The rôles of our troops can be divided under two headings. There is the fire brigade rôle, police action, where all that is needed is well trained men with personal weapons on a jeep-borne basis. There is supposed to be a brigade training somewhere in Yorkshire. A year ago, we were told that they were ready to go off at a moment's notice on that basis. I should like to know if they are really ready to go off tomorrow morning, or how long it would take, and whether they have aircraft to carry them? We have only to provide aircraft. There are aircraft available capable of carrying a brigade, even if they be civilian aircraft. They must be trained to be able to get into an aircraft at a moment's notice. I have seen a brigade capable of waking up in the middle of the night on an alarm and being on the road within 20 minutes with everything they needed for war. Is that brigade ready to do that if we rang them up this evening, or would it be ready by 11 o'clock tomorrow morning? I bet it would not, and I hope something will be done about that.

  1401
  What is much more disturbing is the other rôle, that of using troops of all arms in a limited war breaking out in any part of the world for which we must have our tanks, our guns, our workshops and our supporting units of every kind. Suppose they are to be stationed in England, and suppose we give up all our forward bases. I am not referring to Cyprus. It is not a base; it is a headquarters. It has been proved not to be a base. It is no use as a base. [HON. MEMBERS: "It is an air base"] Yes, but it is no good for the purpose of military operations.
  If our Forces are stationed in England and we give up our forward bases, how shall we get our men and equipment quickly to the scene of trouble? I do not even begin to know the answer to that problem. They cannot be taken by air. If we are to take them in landing craft, it means eight knots an hour, or ten knots if we are lucky, but no more; and it is 3,000 miles to anywhere, and that will take time. Hon. Gentlemen should think that out when they talk about Kenya as a base. Let them look at the map. Kenya is 3,000 miles from the Middle East. Therefore, we are not very much better off if we go there.
  Something must be done about this. Some real thinking must be given to the problem. Without having the facts and figures, because I am only a back bencher, my answer is: What about a floating base? The Americans have shown us how to do it. We could have all our tanks, heavy guns, workshops and everything else floating on a mobile base which could be taken from one part of the world to another. We could keep our reserves in this country and train them on duplicate equipment. Then, on the word "Go", we could fly them out and put them on the floating base.
  This is a problem that we have not solved and do not look like solving yet. I do not expect my right hon. Friend to answer tonight what I have said, but I hope that during the Recess he will give my last two points, if nothing else, very serious thought.
  10.22 p.m.
  Mr. Henry Usborne: I hope that the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer)will forgive me if I do not follow him on the subject of the intricacies
  1402
  of a floating base, or in a discussion as to the form of caps which the various regiments should wear, for the hon. and gallant Member is an expert in these matters and I am not, because I have had no Service experience.
  I think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman was right in one thing that he said, that if we want an efficient Army the people in the various regiments must be proud of their regiments, for they will otherwise not be efficient. In my view, that, in the last analysis, is the real argument for the abolition of conscription. With conscription we may force people to join regiments, but regiments of that kind are no use for the purpose for which we have recruited them.
  I shall have to cross swords with the hon. and gallant Gentleman, or he will have to do so with me, about one thing that he said earlier. He said that he wished he had followed my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)because he would have enjoyed "taking his pants off." If the hon. and gallant Gentleman proposes to do that sort of thing, he will have to take two pairs of pants off, because I happen to agree very largely with my hon. Friend. If there is an argument as to whose pants come off, I am not sure that it will be the pants on our side which will come off.
  I want to take up a point which I believe is related to what the hon. and gallant Gentleman has been talking about. I shall deploy my argument not at great length but in some detail, for it will otherwise not be intelligible, to show how we can get what we really want, which is peace and security, and how we are not likely to get it in the way we are now attempting to obtain it.
  The basic dilemma which appears to have emerged from the debate so far is that if this small country of ours attempts to arm itself with hydrogen bombs and atomic weapons, the kind of gear that one would need to make a contribution in a third world war, and simultaneously to have troops for conventional policing operations in Colonial Territories, and so forth, we shall succeed in doing neither. I think that almost everyone who has spoken has agreed that this is true.
  I hold very strongly that our contribution in the world today should be almost wholly concerned with the second of

  1403
  these essential tasks, namely, how to provide that kind of force which may be used for bush fires, peripheral wars, or whatever we call them—the minor engagements that have to be handled and prevented from spreading into the kind of engagements that draw in the two giants. This is a problem that, I believe, we are uniquely positioned to tackle, but I am convinced that we cannot do that job if we also try to do the other one.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), I think understandably from his point of view, said that the trouble is that we do not really want to have an atomic and nuclear armoury of our own, but that we cannot possibly consider going without those weapons, or scrapping them, unless and until all the other nations will come to an agreement to do likewise. In other words, "Alas," he said, "we must have these ghastly weapons, we have to attempt to be a nuclear Power because, for the moment, the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations has not succeeded in getting agreement for universal effective disarmament and the control necessary to enforce it."
  I suggest that if we wait until the disarmament conference that has been going on almost continuously since 1947 achieves the kind of universal disarmament that my right hon. Friend requires in order to make it unnecessary for us to have nuclear weapons, all I can say is that we shall go on having nuclear weapons until kingdom come—and kingdom come will not be so far off.
  There is another aspect of this problem which is very seldom considered and to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. It was exemplified in an intervention that took place in the debate on disarmament on 23rd July. The Minister of Defence, perhaps effectively but rather unkindly, quoted from a speech that my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker)had made in his constituency some three years ago. Thereupon, my right hon. Friend leapt to his feet and said:
  "… we had never stood for unilateral disarmament but that we thought those weapons ought to be abolished by international agreement …"—[OFFFICIAL, REPORT, 23rd July, 1957; Vol. 574, c. 346.]
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  In other words, he was saying that we are not in favour of Britain having a unilateral disarmament policy. We want all the nations of the world simultaneously to agree to disarmament. I believe that almost everybody in the Parliamentary Labour Party has, of recent years, been hoping against hope, and has been discussing ad nauseam how we could achieve multilateral disarmament, and what we were to suggest at Disarmament Sub-Committee meetings to get American and Russian agreement.
  Our attitude to disarmament, that it must be simultaneous and universal if any progress is to be made, is not held only by the Parliamentary Labour Party. It is held equally strongly by the Americans. I have here in my hand a report issued by a conference that took place recently in the United States which was attended by a very large number of very distinguished Americans. It took place at Arden House, which is apparently on the campus of Columbia University. In the report the heading of the first paragraph is, "What we want". It then goes on to say:
  "We want the achievement of universal, controlled and complete disarmament under a strengthened U.N. or a disarmament authority created by it."
  I believe that if we expect America and Russia, together with ourselves, to agree to effective disarmament, then we are not entirely, but very nearly, wasting our time. I believe that there is another way of getting at this problem of disarmament, but before we can get at it we must realise what we mean by disarmament.
  There are two meanings of the word "disarmament". One is the proposal that sovereign nation States, while retaining their right in the last analysis to maintain their self-defence, should agree with one another to curtail somewhat the burden of the armaments which they find necessary to maintain their self-defence. This is the control or limitation variety of disarmament. It has been discussed ever since disarmament conferences were first held after the First World War. For over thirty years, goodness knows how many hours of time have been spent, and millions of words spoken, on this, and never has one of these conferences succeeded.
  I often wonder why Secretary of State Dulles should fly in such great haste to the United Kingdom to take part in a conference, once more to say that he is

  1405
  full of hope and that we are very near a moment when spectacular results may be achieved—or, if not spectacular, at least worth-while results. For thirty years no results have been achieved, and I believe that they cannot be achieved at all in that way.
  The first reason is that the sovereign nation States are not now, in fact, afraid of the armed forces which potentially hostile sovereign States are at present deploying. What makes them arm as sovereign States in order to take care of their self-defence is the power potential of the nations that they regard as potentially hostile. Power potential is not altered or affected at all by the number of troops which a nation may happen to have in uniform at any given time. Power potential, which is economic potential coupled with the determination to use that economic potential to produce aggressive power at a given time, always remains unaffected so long as a nation is sovereign.
  I think it is possible, in certain circumstances, for America and Russia to get to understand one another, to size one another up, to come to gentlemen's agreements between the two, to reduce as much as they can and in a balanced form the number of weapons and hydrogen bombs which each feels it must have at any given moment. But it has to be a gentlemen's agreement. There is no method of enforcing it. What must surely worry these two great Powers as much as it worries us and as much as it appears to worry other people is how many other nations will in due course become nuclear Powers and what will they do with their sovereignty if and when they get the power substantially to affect the world as a whole.
  What happens if Germany decides, as my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)said she inevitably would, also to join the club of the nuclear Powers? What about France, too? What happens if Colonel Nasser decides that an Arab federation also could afford to get the prestige of a modern sovereign State by joining the "rat race"? All these are unpredictable sets of circumstances, which must make it infinitely harder for Russia and America to take care of each other and agree, honestly and genuinely, on mutual reductions.
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  I am absolutely convinced that, so long as Britain is determined to be one of the three nuclear Powers, we are compelling other nations also to join the club, whether they like it or not: France must follow, Germany must follow, and all the others must follow one by one, joining the "rat race". Heaven knows where that will end. It must lead to chaos, ultimate confusion and war. Nobody wants that to happen. The United Kingdom says that she obviously must stay a nuclear Power, but other nations ought not to follow that example. It is my belief that the safer way would be for Britain to admit that, for the foreseeable future, the form of disarmament which America and Russia might succeed in agreeing to would be very useful and well worth while for those two countries together, with their immediate satellites, to adopt—the open skies policy, some mutual control of testing, and so on—but that that form of disarmament is not good enough for other nations.
  The other form of disarmament, of course, is the complete transfer from the nation State to a supranational organisation or authority of the business of defence. This is the kind of disarmament which, in the eighteenth century, the American Colonies chose when they joined together and formed the Federation of the United States of America. This seems to me to be the only kind of disarmament which now makes any sense for countries such as France, Germany and Britain, and all the other countries which are determined that it would be wrong if many of them—certainly wrong if all of them—became nuclear Powers, but who are convinced that a line ought to be drawn somewhere between the two mammoth Power complexes and all the other lesser nations, down to the smallest.
  The line must be drawn somewhere. The question is where it should be drawn. My belief is that it should be drawn between the two big ones, America and Russia, and all the rest. It is not enough for all the rest merely to say that they do not wish any of them to become nuclear Powers. If they do not wish that—and I am convinced that that is so—the time has come for that group of nations in the middle world to try and set up an authority which can enforce their good resolution, that can see to it that they not only wish to stay dis-

  1407
  armed in nuclear weapons but have no opportunity ever thereafter to change their minds.
  Unless one can make sure that their good resolution is kept, the passage of a motion in their Parliaments to the effect that, for the time being they will not make nuclear weapons, or that, if others do not, they will not make them, will not afford security to anybody. After all, it was only a few years ago that the French Prime Minister said categorically that France would never make nuclear weapons; and no one believes that categorically any longer. The Germans are saying that they do not want to make nuclear weapons, and nobody has any great faith that they can, in present circumstances, maintain that excellent resolution for very much longer.
  I believe that the really important thing to do now is to find a formula by which the sovereign States of the middle world, the lesser Powers, can get together and agree to set up over themselves a controlling agency which can effect upon them, at any rate, the kind of disarmament which we say we want the United Nations Sub-Committee ultimately to find for all the nations of the world, namely, the kind of disarmament which removes all the fear which is the prime cause of international anxiety.
  I believe that the time has come when the jump from the sovereign State structure to the federal system has, sooner or later, to be taken. I am aware of the argument that this will one day certainly be required, but that, in the meantime, we had better take the thing step by step. My view is that we can take a great many functional steps which are eminently desirable to prevent the national sovereign States from cutting each other's throats too continuously, but finally a chasm divides the sovereign State structure which tries to collaborate and the community which is effectively disarmed and is supranationally governed; and this chasm has to be crossed in one big jump.
  There is no way of taking a lot of steps between the sovereign State and the province inside the federal system. Nor, I believe, is there any way to escape the conclusion that if disarmament is to have any real meaning the nation has to give up the notion that, in the last analysis, it must take care of its own self-defence, be-
  1408
  cause just so long as we say that nations have the right and the duty in the last analysis to take care of their self-defence no substantial disarmament and no change in the attitude of mutual fear can ever occur.
  Immediately, however, that we accept the proposition that a nation ought no longer to be burdened with the need to defend itself, then we come to the conclusion that the business of defending its citizens must be transferred to another authority which has the power to defend them. In other words, this authority must have at its disposal an armed force which is extremely powerful.
  No nation would allow its destiny to pass into the hands of a supranational force which had the power completely to control its destiny unless by some democratic process its citizens had a fair share in controlling that force. In other words, I am saying that if nations are ever to give up the business of defending themselves they must go into a federal system which has not only a federal force but also a federal Parliament, and then the transfer from the sovereign State to the supranational federal structure becomes complete. But between the one and the other a chasm lies.
  I shall be told that we cannot possibly give up, much as we might like to, the right to have a nuclear armoury of our own because, as an hon. Member opposite said earlier in the debate, in the last reckoning we cannot be sure that the Americans might not assume that part of Europe or our own country might be expendable. In the last analysis, therefore, we must be prepared to defend ourselves and to have our own massive deterrent in order to take care of the Russian threat in Europe, which, in certain circumstances, we can imagine the Americans might not care to tackle.
  I am always amazed at that argument. It is invariably trotted out as though it was decisive. I am amazed at it because not very long ago, towards the end of last year, a series of circumstances occurred which were without parallel and which, I hope, will never be repeated.
  I suppose everybody here would agree that in November of last year Anglo-American relations were at their lowest ebb. Never could the disagreement between our two countries have been more deep or more bitter. On 31st October, the Anglo-French bombing of Suez

  1409
  began. On 5th November, the Anglo-French forces started their landings and on that same day Bulganin wrote a note to Sir Anthony Eden in which he indicated that, unless Britain and France gave up this intervention, it might be necessary for Russia to take severe measures.
  On 7th November, a couple of days later, Marshal Zhukov, speaking in the Red Square, made an extremely belligerent speech—no doubt he had not been noticed recently—in which he indicated that if the British and the French went on with this, Russia would be obliged to atomise London and Paris. That was at a time when economic sanctions were being imposed by the Americans against us, when the Americans were voting on the side of the Russians against us in the United Nations and when relations between our two countries had never been worse and could not, I believe, ever get worse.
  Nevertheless, in spite of all that, on 13th November, General Gruenther, an American general retiring from supreme command of S.H.A.P.E., in Paris, decided to call a Press conference and solemnly announced to the Press that if the Soviet Union went on with their threat, or ever contemplated carrying it out, then
  "just as day follows night retaliation will follow and the Soviet Union will be destroyed by American forces."
  And we heard no more from Marshal Zhukov or from Bulganin. At that moment, when, if ever there was such an occasion, we might have been let down by the Americans and given a smart lesson, the possession by America of a sufficient number of hydrogen bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles was instantly used to deter any nonsense from Soviet Russia.
  I happen to believe, therefore, that it would not be too dangerous if we were to rely on the Americans again. I am not suggesting that to do so is a path of absolute certainty or safety. I believe that the choices which we have to make in the coming years are choices between dangers and evils. Whatever we do will be desperately dangerous and cannot be certainly right. We therefore have to choose between two alternative policies, either of which will be dangerous. We must choose which we think will be the least dangerous.
  As I have already argued, if Great Britain insists upon remaining a nuclear
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  Power then, in the first place, we will almost certainly get the worst of both worlds and go economically bankrupt. Secondly, in the process which will be begun by our example other nations will make themselves bankrupt if they should follow our stupid lead to obtain the same national prestige: nationalism brought to its fantastic conclusion. On the other hand, we could decide that the proper course is now to admit that we were wrong when we decided to go in for making British atom and hydrogen weapons.
  I believe that when we originally decided to do so—it was certainly before 1954, but I cannot tell, and I do not think many people know, at what date the decision was first made—I think there was a much stronger argument then for having British atom and hydrogen weapons than there is today. A number of circumstances in the last few years, even in the last year, have changed and made the choice which was then possibly reasonable now considerably less reasonable.
  I think that we ought to annul the decision that we made in 1954, destroy the atomic weapons of our own which we possess, and give up making any more, admitting that we can do this and must continue for a long time to have the chance of doing this, largely because the Americans are "carrying the can" for us, that is to say, are taking care of the Soviet threat.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: What does that mean—"carrying the can"?
  Mr. Usborne: It means that they have to expend a large amount of their money on making weapons to use any of which would be mass suicide.
  They have a vast armoury of weapons which, as everybody knows, can be used only if the human race decides to destroy itself. I believe that as long as Russia has this sort of weapons one other nation must also have it, namely, America. As long as one nation has it, it is the duty of the other also to have it. It is an argument to adopt whichever side of the Iron Curtain one is on. If one is on the other side of the Iron Curtain, desperately fearful of American capitalism attempting the imperial domination of the globe, that argument also applies. It is the argument that each of these two nations must take care of the other's aggressiveness so

  1411
  that the rest of the world shall have time to carry out an experiment, which must be attempted, and must be proven to be successful, if, ultimately, the peoples who live in those two great countries also are to come to their senses one day and give up the business of defending themselves by the process of being ready to blow the human family to extinction.
  The experiment which has to be tried somewhat has, I believe, to be tried now by a number of nations willing to make the attempt. And there will be no nations willing to make this surrender of sovereignty irrevocably to a supranational authority which takes care of the business of their defence so that their disarmament can be total and effective unless Britain is prepared, with other nations—as many others as possible—to go in for the experiment on the basis of equality with them.
  It is no good our saying to France, or Germany, or any of the other countries. "You people must not join the nuclear club. You must have a self-denying ordinance. If you do not mean what you say, or we cannot trust you to mean it, the big boys of the nuclear club will see that you do not have these weapons. We shall deny them to you by force." That does not work at all. That attitude is the very thing that would make the other countries insist upon joining the nuclear club, not because they wanted to but simply because they were being told that we did not wish them to join. And we do not really believe that we would exercise the power to stop them.
  The non-nuclear Powers, and as many nations as possible, ought to start studying what is actually involved in real, effective, enforceable disarmament. Let us see what we really mean when we tell our delegates at Lake Success, or at Lancaster House, to make suggestions about disarmament and talk in terms of control. Let us see what that means and be prepared sincerely to discuss it and work it out, because we are sincerely prepared, if it is possible to do so consistently with freedom and justice, to go wherever it takes us with the French and other nations.
  We could do this if we could explain to ourselves, the Russians and the Americans, that we are prepared to follow what I believe to be the path of civilisation and that while we divest our
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  selves of the weapons of gangsterism—the weapons of a sovereign State—and do what is proper, we fully understand that the Americans and the Russians, for the time being, cannot do so. The worst possible attitude would be if the middle world tried to make itself into a third force, as Kenneth de Courcy would have us, either to rival the other two, or to say, "A plague on both your houses. We will have nothing to do with either of you." If we take the attitude that we are to be a third military Power comparable with the two big boys, those two big boys will not encourage us and our integration will not happen.
  We must take the view that it is the function of what I call the federation of nations, in years ahead, however long it may take, to get together to create a federal force which obviously would be the aggregate of all the national forces that the nations surrendered to the federal authority. That federal force would have to be available to the United Nations on call, if and when the United Nations needed to invoke its collective security action.
  I can very well envisage the possibility of trouble in some part of the globe where the United Nations would wish some force to be used and where it must be perfectly clear that neither Russia nor America could exercise their force, because if either did the other must, and if either moved it would mean a third world war. It would be better if there were an integrated force of all the other nations which could act jointly or not at all, and which would have not nuclear weapons but weapons that would cause the minimum destruction and loss of life.
  Mr. Ray Mawby: Why not bows and arrows?
  Mr. Usborne: I have often wondered why not. I have argued that the United Nations simultaneously should have a U.N. constabulary, and to them I would not give even bows and arrows—perhaps only tin hats for their own protection. It may be true that if the world had available contingents that were exactly appropriate to the trouble, one might not have to use the force at all. I think we are in a difficulty today because there is no United Nations permanent constabulary, or light force—we had not got it to wrap round the State of Israel a year and a half ago—nor have we got the effective

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  forces of the conventional kind which can be differentiated from atomic weapons, which, once used, must drag in everyone and everything.
  I have taken rather a long time, but there is, on this one occasion, all night before us, and it is traditional for grievances to be raised before Supply is granted. I have one considerable grievance, shared by all my constituents. They object strongly, as I do, to the necessity to spend £1,500 million on making what is now, apparently, to be largely an armoury of weapons which they believe are unnecessary, because the Americans have enough to do the job. To have them ourselves indicates that we do not trust our ally, that we think that in a pinch they would sell us down the river.
  Major Legge-Bourke: There is the fire brigade.
  Mr. Usborne: I do not think that it necessarily follows that the fire brigade should always take with it T.N.T. and the paraphernalia of warfare. There is a great deal to be said for fire brigades going in without too much gunpowder and explosive. I am saying that one should divide what is needed for a particular function from what cannot be used for any other function except destroying the whole globe.
  My constituents feel that this country has a vital part to play in this atomic era, which is different from anything that we have ever attempted to play before. It is, however, familiar in this respect: We have a reputation, as a people, well earned, for being able to experiment and to invent political institutions. Now comes the moment when we should admit that we are not a great Power, but set about becoming a great nation—and there is a great difference.
  If we are to be a great nation, we must try to create as soon as possible a situation whereby nations can become civilised. But if we are to be great and civilised I am convinced that we cannot continue to be one of the three nuclear Powers.
  I hope that the Minister will not think that he has necessarily to reply to what I have said. It is a new idea, which I would far rather people discussed among themselves and thought over for a long time. I do not think that I should like any off-the-cuff observations which the Minister might find it necessary to make,
  1414
  and, therefore, I would rather he did not make them.
  11.4 p.m.
  The Secretary of State for War (Mr. John Hare): Since I have been in the Chamber, which is from the moment when the hon. and gallant Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg)rose to speak, we have covered an immense amount of ground. I am not here to sum up the debate. I wish, with the permission of the House, merely to comment on some of the points which have been made on both sides. I will take the hon. Member for Yardley (Mr. Usborne)at his word and not risk making any comment "off the cuff" on the very detailed remarks he has made.
  One of the two main features of the discussion so far has been the doubt whether the Government had the determination, the will or the ability to carry out the policy outlined in the White Paper issued in February of this year. There seems to be a general anxiety about whether a proper balance will be kept between what is necessary to provide for the deterrent and what is necessary to provide for the conventional weapons.
  That feeling was expressed from both sides of the House, by some hon. Members more luridly than by others. The hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman)tried to give the impression that, unless we were very careful, the whole of our resources would be spent on nuclear weapons, with nothing left for conventional weapons. Others put it a little more calmly. I can assure the House that the Government fully intend to carry out the policy which they laid down in the White Paper and that they believe that they have the ability so to do.
  No one imagines that one can have defence on the cheap, but the entire House will agree that we have already been able to secure very considerable economies in defence expenditure. We should not imagine that it will be possible to continue those savings on the same scale as we have reduced expenditure this year and prevented it from rising, inevitably it would have done if in the White Paper we had not laid down the policy of which the House has approved.
  I do not subscribe to the theory, certainly expressed by the hon. Member

  1415
  for Coventry, East, that the cost of nuclear weapons will be allowed to become so great that it will be impossible for the Government to carry out their conventional rôle in their alliances and Commonwealth policing operations. People are rather apt to think that conventional weapons cost nothing and that only nuclear weapons cost money. We well know that conventional weapons cost a great deal of money. Her Majesty's Government intend to keep a proper balance between the two and, certainly, as I am connected with the Army, I have a very vested interest to see that they do so.
  The second main issue which concerned hon. Members was the problem which probably affects me as Secretary of State for War more than the two other Service Ministers, of whether we will get the voluntary forces for which the White Paper provides. In passing, I want to thank the hon. Member for Dudley for the very kind remarks he made about the reorganisation plan for the Army, before he started castigating me and warning me that I would not get the recruits I wanted, and describing me as very stupid.
  The expression of concern was a very proper one to be put by hon. Members, I do not for a second submit that this will not be an extremely difficult task, but where I part from the hon. Member for Dudley is that, stupid as I may be, I am allowed to have my own opinion, and my opinion happens to differ entirely from his. I believe—I am not using the words "faith" or "determination"—that we shall be able to get these men. I may be wrong; nobody is perfect.
  I want to emphasise—I hope this is comfort for the hon. Member for Dudley—that it is clearly laid down in paragraph 48 of the White Paper which was quoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude)and by the hon. Member for Dudley in their very able speeches. What was said was:
  "It must, nevertheless, be understood that, if voluntary recruiting fails to produce the numbers required, the country will have to face the need for some limited form of compulsory service to bridge the gap."
  I should have thought that that was clear enough.
  If that is not clear enough, I should like to quote what the Minister of Labour said in the defence debate:
  1416
  "It is only if our expectation that plans to build up Regular recruitment will provide us with the number of long-service Regulars we need is falsified, that we shall have to consider the need for a limited form of compulsory service of the kind indicated in paragraph 48 of the White Paper. In these circumstances, in the classic words, a new situation will arise. But we regard that as a quite separate problem which could be dealt with only if and when it arose."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17th April, 1957; Vol. 568, c. 1952.]
  I should have thought that those two statements were perfectly clear. They cater for the position if we fail to get these recruits.
  I want to say a word now about the problems which will obviously face us in the recruiting of these forces. I want to speak particularly from the point of view of the Army, because it has the biggest problem. I cannot accept the pessimism of the hon. Member for Dudley. He is expert, but I think that he is basing his conclusions, which are definite ones, on too many imponderables. Life has changed immensely since the years between the two wars.
  I am not making a political speech; we can all take pride in the fact that our social conditions are infinitely different today from what they were between the wars. After 1939, we had six years of war. Since then we have had twelve years of National Service, plus the different form of life now existing in the country. Consequently, I think that the experiences on which the hon. Gentleman is trying to have his conclusions are falsified by the more recent conditions.
  There are a number of things about which we ought to think. First—I want to face this—I am not satisfied with the present recruiting figures. I did not expect that I should be. I expected that, from the moment the White Paper was issued, until we could give the Army the plan for its reorganisation, until we could remove the agony from the minds of officers and men who thought that they would be affected by the reorganisation, recruiting would be bound to decline.
  The recruiting figures of male adults have been unsatisfactory, as both sides of the House know, but I am pleased and surprised that that bad trend in adult recruiting has not been followed by an equally bad trend in the recruiting of boys. There, I am glad to say, we show an appreciable increase over the figures of last year. This is very important, because I am convinced that the future

  1417
  of the Army is largely dependent upon our being able to train our own experts and technicians, and, therefore, on increasing the recruiting of boys and apprentices.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: What are the figures?
  Mr. Hare: They are 1,200 in the six months of last year compared with 1,500 this year.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: How old are the boys?
  Mr. Hare: Between 15 and 16.
  I do not want to get into the trouble between the hon. Member for Dudley and his right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey)and I will merely say that, having established the confidence of which I have spoken, there are a number of things which we must do to attract these extra recruits. The right hon. Member said that we must get on with the job, and I agree that we must not delay, but I do not want to be hurried into making false decisions. These are important decisions. Look at the differences which exist between the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend the Member for Dudley on whether pay has any effect on recruiting. Both the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friend know what they are taking about; they are both very wise men. For me to rush into decisions when intelligent men can differ so much would be extremely foolish.
  In addition to pay, there are the various questions of allowances, some of which may not be just and which may cause irritation. I have mentioned these in previous speeches. I am also convinced—and I believe that I have the right hon. Member for Dundee. West with me in this—that buildings and general living conditions in the Army must be improved. These things are all being thought about and considered, and I hope that we shall be able to weld them into a great programme which will, I hope, falsify the prophecies of the hon. Member for Dudley.
  I do not want to take up too much time, but a number of points have been raised. My right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Walter Elliot)and my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore)raised the question of the amalgamation of the Highland Light Infantry and the Royal Scots
  1418
  Fusiliers. I hope that the House realises that I have the greatest sympathy with all these regiments of the Line which have had to amalgamate and also with the regiments of the Cavalry and the Royal Tank Regiment. I also know that this particular marriage, if I may so call it, may be the most difficult of those which I have to impose. But I feel that we must keep a sense of balance.
  My right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove talked about the Highland City of Glasgow. I do not want to get too much involved in this, but I would say that the H.L.I. is a regiment with a most honourable history; it was formed in the days of Cardwell between the 71st and 74th. They were given the name of light infantry, although they do not carry out light infantry drill. The officers of the regiment became members of the Highland Brigade Club when it was formed in 1914. In the Second World War the regiment fought in the Lowland and not in the Highland Division, and, I think for the first time, wore the kilt in 1946 or 1947. Before that it had worn the trews.
  The other factor is that since those great regiments were formed in the eighteenth century such a large proportion of the population of Scotland has moved from the Highlands to the central belt, and it seemed to us essential, to get a fair balance between the Highland and the Lowland Brigades, that each should have four regiments.
  I am sorry that this decision has caused such anxiety, but I would point out that, as I think my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer)said, taking last year, as an example, the Highland Light Infantry recruited from the Highlands only six of its total number of recruits. The vast majority came from within the City of Glasgow.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the recruiting figures for the Highland Light Infantry and for the Royal Scots Fusiliers are going up or down at present?
  Mr. Hare: I hope that they will be going up as a result of the various encouraging speeches which, I hope, hon. Members will make, perhaps, after I have sat down. Obviously, at the moment, I cannot answer that question, but the hon. Gentleman knows that I am genuinely

  1419
  sad that this amalgamation has proved to be necessary.
  The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)made a speech that I think he would have preferred to have made about half an hour earlier, when my right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply would have been in his place. However, I am sure that my right hon. Friend will read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the various points and allegations made by the hon. Gentleman. I think that I am more or less protected, as I am sure that the hon. Gentleman did not expect me to give a very detailed reply.
  I do not agree with right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who talk about this compensation as being generous. I hate quarrelling with the hon. Member for Dudley, but I will not accept that this is such a generous compensation. If we remove a man from his chosen career at its very peak, when he could look to good prospects of promotion, it is difficult to say, in terms of money, how generous is the treatment. I believe that, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said, the terms of the compensation are fair and honourable and that that is a far better description than those used by the hon. Members for Dudley and for Coventry, East.
  Mr. Wigg: My views on this subject are conditioned by what I have seen happen over the last twenty years and more. Compared with what Governments have ever done, these figures are staggering in their generosity. If, however, the principle contained in the White Paper is to be standard Government practice for all sections of the community, irrespective of whether or not it is politically convenient to the Government of the day, I am delighted, and I would withdraw the words "staggeringly generous" and apply them to the Government and not to the terms.
  Mr. Hare: That is very nice of the hon. Gentleman, but what I think he is really saying is that the Army has been badly treated in the past and that, at last, it has a Government which treat it very well.
  Mr. Fernyhough: Can the Secretary of State say whether a Supplementary Estimate will be necessary for this compensation, and how far it will affect the savings supposed to have been made on the defence programme this year?
  Mr. Hare: A Supplementary Estimate will, so far as I know, not be necessary, because this compensation will not be paid out until the next financial year.
  The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West mentioned resettlement, as did other hon. Members, and I fully agree that we have to do everything possible to see that the officers and men who become redundant and eligible for this compensation use the money wisely and do not get into the hands of "sharks", as one hon. Member warned. We have already thought of that, and the point will be energetically dealt with. There is the committee under Sir Frederic Hooper, and the Ministry of Labour is on this point, and interviewing panels will see that officers and N.C.O.s are given advice as to the sort of thing they should do and give the sort of warning which hon. Members had in mind.
  Major Legge-Bourke: My right hon. Friend had left me, at least, with the impression that there is no compensation in this financial year. Is that what he means, or can he correct that?
  Mr. Hare: The compensation will fall on the Vote of the next financial year.
  I should like to get on as quickly as possible, because I want to answer as many points put by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen as I can.
  Next, the cap badge, about which several hon. Members have spoken. As I see these brigades, they are to foster and nurture the regiments within them, and there has, consequently, to be this dual loyalty. Those who served during the last war in the Army had a dual loyalty to their regiment and to the division and, in view of the fact that so much is to centre around the brigade and since every recruit has to be trained at the brigade depot, the brigade will mean a great deal to all who are in it.
  Furthermore, since officers and senior N.C.O.s will be on the roll for promotion prospects—that is, from colour sergeant and major upwards, respectively—there will have to be a good deal of interposting from regiments within any brigade.
  I think that the cap badge is a good idea for avoiding what I think is an appalling indignity for any man; that is, to have to take off his cap badge when posted from one regiment to another. We are doing all we can to retain the regimental traditions by the fact that men

  1421
  will retain their collar badges and everything below.
  I apologise for keeping the House for so long, but so many interesting points were raised. I would like to end by saying that the Army as a whole has generously accepted the need for this reorganisation and that is a great tribute to the loyalty and sense of realism which exists. Much of the anxiety and uncertainty has been removed and, to use the term which the hon. Gentleman the Member for Dudley has used, we shall continue to try to see that we get the all volunteer Regular Army on which I have set my heart and which, I think, in his heart of hearts, the hon. Gentleman wants and thinks we can get.

  ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORIES
  11.30 p.m.
  Mr. Ellis Smith: It is now 11.30 and I have sat here since 2.30. I welcome an opportunity to use the right of an elected Member to speak on behalf of his people. I am not saying this is any complaining sense, for those of us who belong to the working class, and who speak on their behalf, will be tested more than we have been in the past. Knowing the historical development of the movement of which I am a humble member, I am determined to play my part in accordance with our democratic rights which we have won at such terrible sacrifices.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)has made some startling revelations. I have seen a great change. I have known the days when this House was dynamic, and when support would have been given from both sides of the House to a demand for an undertaking by a Minister, representing the Government of the day, that at least a searching investigation would be made into those startling revelations. If there is any truth whatever in those allegations, they constitute a grave national scandal and a reply should be received tonight, or, failing that, my right hon. Friends should seek an undertaking that before we break up for the Recess the Government will make a public statement in answer to those allegations as soon as possible.
  The Minister of Supply, who should be present, stated that approximately 7,000 people would be discharged from
  1422
  Royal Ordnance factories within the near future, including those at Swynnerton within a few yards of the border of my division. There, 2,500 men and women served in the last war and made their contribution as other people have done. I take second place to no one in my admiration for our young men who served in our Armed Forces during the last war, but, at the same time, credit should be given to those who served in the Royal Ordnance factories and provided the Forces with the tools to enable them to save us all. They died that we may live.
  An undertaking was given that those who served in the forces and in the Royal Ordnance factories would be treated in accordance with certain terms. An announcement was made yesterday afternoon—not in this House, but in the factory itself. Question after question has been asked by my hon. Friends in the House, but a definite answer has not been given to them. The answer was given in the factory itself yesterday. It was said that 1,000 would be discharged at the end of November this year, 1,000 more would finish by the end of June next, and the others would be transferred in accordance with the arrangements made.
  Not a word has been said in this House about how they are to be treated with regard to the payment of their rents, when they have got to move, and so on. There is ample generosity in the payment of compensation to officers, but the people whom we on this side of the House represent have to go to the employment exchange and get a mere pittance, after their service in the last war. It would be cowardly of us to sit silent, having established our right after many years to raise grievances. I am not complaining, for, after my experience in the school through which I have passed, one becomes steeled to this sort of situation and does not complain when faced with a matter of this sort.
  I owe a great deal to one of the finest men who ever served in this House. The working class has good reason to thank a small group of aristocrats and members of the middle class. We give credit where credit is due, and I have no hesitation in giving it to Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, who was as good as a father to me and helped me in my early life in many ways. Colonel Wedgwood,

  1423
  Arthur Hollins and Will Bromfield time after time went to various Ministries before the war about the unemployment we were suffering in our area. I played only a modest part in those efforts.
  The Secretary of State for War won the good will of almost every hon. Member in this House for the modest manner in which he spoke just now and for the way in which he dealt with questions in his speech. I only wish that there were more of that kind of thing, for that is the way to win people's good will. He dealt with questions as they should be dealt with, giving reasoned replies, instead of handling them in the way too often heard in the House today. Moreover, he replied question by question, not treating his questioners as we have been treated when presenting our grievances about how the Royal Ordnance factories are to be affected.
  Having been called, I intend to state the case as it should be stated, so that it shall be on record. My friend Josiah Wedgwood and others went to Ministry after Ministry. I played only a modest part because I was very young then, though I learned a good deal, and supported them in every possible way. We had pockets of severe unemployment in the area at that time, as my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Fernyhough)will be able to confirm, since he was born and lived there in those days. All the time, we were told by different Ministers and Ministries that the international situation was worsening, and that they would see that, when necessary, should things come to that, two Royal Ordnance factories would be sited in our locality. As a result of those assurances, our agitation for further action was staved off.
  In 1940, two large Royal Ordnance factories were sited in our area, one at Swynnerton, employing 30,000 during the war, and one at Radway Green, employing approximately 25,000. Those two factories have a record which will bear the closest investigation; indeed, we would welcome it. The situation then growing worse, the Ministry also took over a large number of factories which had been closed and, ultimately, we had a hive of activity there.
  It was acknowledged by all those who knew about these things that what was most urgently needed in the north
  1424
  Staffordshire area was the diversification of industry. Government Department after Department was sympathetic, and they were on the verge of taking special action on Development Area lines when the war came. As I have said, the result was that these Royal Ordnance factories were sited in our area.
  We have now been given notice that one of the factories is to be closed. Radway Green is to be kept in being, and we welcome that. All we ask is that it should be given an opportunity to compete for orders with firms in other parts of the country. I have sufficient confidence in the management and the men of Radway Green to believe that, given a square deal, that factory will hold its own in any competitive tendering that takes place.
  In 1946, the Board of Trade issued a statement about our area. Solemn undertakings were given to us by various Government Departments that if only we would accept their proposals they would see that this work was carried on after the war. I now challenge the Government to reply to what I am going to say. The Government are under an obligation to fulfil their oath to the people living in that area that they would maintain full employment, our people having served so well during the war and having such a great record in these two factories, as have the people in the other factories which are to become derelict.
  The Government are equally as much under an obligation to these men and women as they were to the officers whom they are now to compensate. Therefore, if the treatment proposed for the officers in the White Paper is correct, it is equally correct treatment for the men and women to whom we belong.
  I have before me the results of the Development Area policy. The number of unemployed in the North-East is 1·4 per cent.; in South Wales it is 2 per cent.; in south Lancashire it is 1·5 per cent.; and in north-east Lancashire it is 1·1 per cent., whereas in our area it is 2 per cent. of the total insured population. When these 2,500 people are discharged the percentage will be even greater. In our area we have one of the finest motor tyre concerns in the country, employing approximately 3,000 people. It has an enlightened management with a business outlook, excellent relations between management and men, and it was pro-

  1425
  posing to extend its factory with a view to employing another 700 workers. Yet the Board of Trade comes along and suggests that this factory should be sited in northeast Lancashire—and uses its influence to see that this is done—where the unemployment figure is only 1·1 per cent., thus taking it away from our area where the unemployed represent more than 2 per cent. of the population.
  These are the facts. This year there are approximately 12,000 fewer people employed in the pottery industry than there were in 1937 in spite of the fact that, at the same time, we have an increase in population of approximately 40,000, roughly half the people living in the north Staffordshire area. These are the results of the industrial favouritism which has now been meted out for far too long—in the North-East, where unemployment is 1·4 per cent.
  No one supported this policy more strongly than I did before the last war, but there has been such a change since the end of the war that I am now contrasting one area with another in order to place on record the need for justice being done to the areas which are suffering in the way that our area is suffering. In the North-East, where, as I have said, unemployment is 1·1 per cent., £16½ million has been spent; in South Wales, where unemployment is 2 per cent., £21¼ million has been spent; in Scotland, about which we hear so much, and where the unemployment figure is 2·5 per cent., £24,843,000 has been spent, whereas in our area, where, prior to the recent discharges, the unemployment figure was 2 per cent., not one penny has been spent of this enormous sum of £71 million.
  It is understandable, therefore, that some of us have a sufficient grievance to take advantage of our constitutional rights on this Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)Bill to state our case. It is for that reason that my hon. Friends have been asking Question after Question during the past fortnight to get the figures officially on record so that we can deal with the matter in the way I am doing tonight.
  This morning, I received this letter from the Urban District Council of Kidsgrove. It says:
  "You will probably recall that before the war, Kidsgrove was hit more than anyone else and total unemployed at one period reached 76 per cent. of the insured population. Since
  1426
  the war steps have been taken by the Council to see that there should be no recurrence of this and, as a consequence, a number of new industries have been introduced. Unfortunately, the position is by no means as satisfactory as it appeared likely to prove …"
  because factory after factory is now closing down. When one remembers that, before the war, 76 per cent. of the insured population was unemployed, it is understandable that the indignation should reflect itself in speeches such as mine, because we are determined that there should not be a recurrence. While one cannot do very much, we ought to do all we possibly can to ventilate the grievance of these people to prevent a similar recurrence.
  The two Royal Ordnance factories are magnificent sites and have valuable capital equipment. I dread Swynnerton being made a modern Gretna Green. I remember often travelling to Clydebank and seeing the "Queen Mary" rusting away there until this House took action, largely as a result of the then David Kirkwood and others speaking in the way that I am speaking tonight. It was because of that kind of action that the Government undertook responsibility for the building of that ship, which has earned its great record. What could be done in those days with the "Queen Mary" can equally be done in these days if we are determined to do it.
  As I travelled to Clydebank and passed Gretna Green, after the First World War, I saw that valuable site and equipment being allowed to rust, until weeds of all descriptions, shrubs and trees grew over it. I thought what a tragedy that was. We must be determined not to let that occur at Swynnerton, where our people have served so well.
  There are excellent communications for this valuable site, measuring approximately four miles by three miles. It has excellent transport communications and a railway station in the centre of the site. Running parallel with the site is one of the finest railways in the world from north to south and sidings which are a credit to all concerned.
  There is at Stafford one of the largest electrical concerns in the country, whose managing director, Sir George Nelson, checked my work when I was young and has worked his way through on merit. The company is considering increasing its capacity.

  1427
  I am asking the Government to regard this matter with a sense of urgency, because the House will be adjourning in a day or two and we do not want our skilled labour to be sent ruthlessly to the employment exchanges, or be broken up and sent to various parts of the country. This is capital equipment which is too valuable to be treated in the same old way, but that is what will happen again unless hon. Members representing these areas assert themselves in the House of Commons.
  I am asking that the great industrial monopolists such as Associated Electrical Industries, English Electric, Imperial Chemical Industries, General Electric, huge concerns of that kind, should be now called upon to accept some social responsibility in taking over these sites, so that full employment can be maintained in areas as mine. This is now a matter of great urgency.
  The City of Stoke-on-Trent, to its everlasting credit, has two industrial estates for which, up to now, it has not received a penny from the Government. I now ask the Government to consider taking over those municipal industrial estates, to give them the same concessions and inducements as are given to other Development Areas. I say "Good luck" to the Development Areas. I have supported them in every possible way in this House.
  First, twenty years ago, there were the Special Areas, and then, later, there were the Development Areas under the Distribution of Industry Acts. However, if in those days, and under that legislation, it was right to apply a special policy to those areas, it is equally right now to apply the policy to the more limited areas of the character of that for which I am speaking. Therefore, I ask the Government to give urgent consideration to the need to take over the Newstead and Stoke industrial estates, to give them the same facilities and inducements as are given to the Development Areas.
  My hon. Friends and I spent Friday visiting the Swynnerton site. I admit right away that it would be no bad thing if a bulldozer were to be run into some of the buildings, but a number of them are very valuable, and I refer to those in what is known as Group 10 A, with their engineering facilities. I am a judge of them. I cannot judge everything, as
  1428
  some legal people can, but I can judge something I know something about, and I can judge those buildings. In that Group 10 A there are excellent engineering facilities, including a drawing office. It would be a business proposition for any firm which requires to increase its capacity to take them over en bloc. I ask the Government to give early consideration to that.
  Although the Newstead estate has been designated for industrial development for many years there is hardly a building standing, but a few yards from there is one of the finest pottery manufacturing firms not only in this country but in the world. I refer to Wedgwood's. That factory was started when it needed great courage to start one. I give great credit to men like the Wedgwoods, who had the great courage to embark on that large-scale capital expenditure in 1938 and 1939, when the world was in such a serious situation. But courage always pays, and that venture has proved to be a great business proposition.
  It is in a lovely environment, and that induces the workers to give of their best, and the relationship between the management and the men and women workers there is among the best industrial relationships in the entire country. The result is that output has increased remarkably. Output there per man-hour has gone up as output per man-hour has not gone up in any other factory. That is an indication of what can be done by applying mid-twentieth century methods.
  If we are serious about the need to increase our exports, and especially to the dollar markets, we ought to be encouraging other pottery firms to modernise themselves in the way Wedgwood's have. I have sufficient confidence in my fellow countrymen employed in that area to say that, if that were done, our exports of pottery would be increased to a great extent to America and Canada, and to other Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand and Australia.
  The Board of Trade Journal records the large numbers of industrial buildings that were built in the last quarter of last year. That building has continued this year and I ask that some of it should be carried out at Stoke-on-Trent, where so much industrial work is done and so much export trade is carried out, where the output per man employed at the coal face is as high as, if not higher than, that

  1429
  in any other part of the country and where enormous developments in mining are taking place. In view of all these local developments, the area should have every encouragement from the Government.
  If the Government feel themselves to be under an obligation to officers of the Armed Forces, how much more are they under an obligation to those who served them so well in industrial life during the war and suffered in consequence. Many men and women employed at Swynnerton risked their all in explosions at the factory and in the preparation of various powders, in the course of which they contracted industrial diseases. These people have now reached an age at which they cannot hope to have other employment. I say without hesitation that no one can deny that the nation is under a moral obligation to these men and women and that it should treat them in a manner similar to the treatment offered to those named in the Government's proposals for dealing with redundancies in the Forces.
  I recently received letters from the Lord Mayor and the Town Clerk of Stoke-on-Trent. On the closing of the Swynnerton Royal Ordnance factory, the Lord Mayor says:
  "I feel that it is useless to press the Government that the factory should be continued on its present basis as an arms factory, and I think that the Council should take the following steps:
  … to ask the Government to take all possible steps to transfer the factory for industrial work; to press the Board of Trade for new Industries to be allocated to the district; and to ask the Board of Trade to give the same assistance to the city as they would give to a development area."
  The Town Clerk wrote today and said that he understood that I and my colleagues were seeing the Minister of Supply this week and he hoped that if we had the opportunity of speaking today we would put forward the main points contained in the Lord Mayor's letter.
  I have done that and I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government will undertake to report to the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Supply. I have now had the satisfaction of doing what little one can do. I have had the privilege of having retained the confidence of the people of the area for a fairly long time. I hope to continue to serve them in the way I have done hitherto. We owe so much to one
  1430
  another. They served us so well during the war that the least we can do now is to speak on their behalf.

  SLUM CLEARANCE (COMPENSATION)
  11.59 p.m.
  Sir Alexander Spearman: The subject that I want to raise quite briefly at this late hour is the compensation paid for houses that are taken over under a compulsory purchase order. I am speaking particularly of houses in four areas in Scarborough and in Bank's Yard and Hamilton's Yard, Whitby—although it does apply to houses in other towns throughout the country.
  I realise that the State has the right and duty to acquire property when it is important in the public interest so to do, and to protect the taxpayer or ratepayer from paying a fancy price by fixing arbitrarily the price that will be paid. But I maintain that they must be scrupulously careful, if they fix the price, to see that it is a fair one.
  It is sometimes thought that owners of small houses and property are rich, ruthless plutocrats who make a lot of money out of it, but in my experience most of these houses are owned by people who have put all their savings in one or two houses, and, indeed, a constituent who came to see me last week had put all he had into one small house, for which he is now told he is not to get anything at all, or only £1.
  I think that the Ministry's inspector is sometimes rather harsh in his judgment on these houses, in that I have seen houses in Scarborough which he said are of no value, but which I would have thought are in a condition to justify their getting a payment as being well-maintained.
  But tonight it is not on the value of the house that I wish to speak, but on the value of the site on which the house stands. In the statement made at the inquiry at Scarborough in November, it was shown that there were 40 houses to be taken over, whose average site amounted to 78 square yards. There were 13 that amounted to 76 square yards, and eight which were rather smaller. Now, land for building purposes

  1431
  on the outskirts of Scarborough is valued at about 10s. a square yard. In the centre of this town—and it is rather a fine town—I would have thought that 15s. a square yard was a fairly low price, and I have taken that figure allowing for the fact that demolition expenses had to take place. If it is being used for commercial purposes, I think it is worth at least 30s. a square yard.
  If we take a house standing on 78 square yards. at 15s., the value is £58, and if at 30s., to be used as a warehouse or for commercial purposes, it is £117. But the people who are compelled against their will to sell these houses are not given half or even a twentieth part of that amount. They have been offered £1 for the site for each of these houses, and my constituents, not unnaturally, asked me why this is so.
  The only answer I have been given is that under the Housing Act, 1936, it was said that these sites must be valued on the assumption that they were to be used only for rebuilding purposes—the rebuilding of houses—and not for commercial purposes. But the byelaws in most towns prohibit houses from being built on sites as small as that, so that, in fact, the State so arranged it that the sites have no market value. It seems rather like a man winning a game by changing the rules in the middle.
  In the largest area in Scarborough, if those 40 houses all belong to one man, then, as a valuation for commercial purposes, it would be worth £4,680; but if, as in fact is the case, they belong to a lot of different men, they get only £1 each, or £40 between them.
  This opens up possibilities of undesirable speculation. Supposing that a shrewd speculator heard that houses were to be compulsorily purchased and went to their owners and said, "Last year the chaps got only £1 each; I will give you £5"; supposing that he bought 40 houses at £5 each, that would cost him £200 and he might get £4,680. The whole area in question is one acre and that in the middle of the town is being bought for £61. That is not the price of good farm land. It is not the council's fault. It is the fault of the artificial conditions which are imposed on the valuer.
  1432
  I am not asking the Minister for a decision tonight. Only a very small amount of money is involved, but an important principle is involved, whether we should establish a precedent of taking over houses without compensation. I ask him to say only two things. The first is that he believes that there is no sin in being a landlord and that if, in the public good, houses have to be requisitioned, there will be no discrimination against the landlord, any more than there would be against any other property owner. The second is to tell me that this matter will be considered entirely afresh.
  That is what I ask and I profoundly hope that he will make those two statements.
  12.6 a.m.
  Mr. I. J. Pitman: The point I wish to raise will also be shortly made and it is identical with that of my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby (Sir A. Spearman). It, too, relates to a clearance area scheme, the Snow Hill clearance, in Bath. Equally, in that case derisory figures have been paid as compensation. My case is even worse, because the highest figures is 20s. per house and the lowest is 1s. per house. Again, in my case the council is very anxious to pay reasonable and fair compensation, but has been debarred from doing so by the Minister's Department under threat of a surcharge if it pays more than those ridiculously small figures.
  Before the war, when slum clearance areas were established, Section 25 of the Housing Act, 1936, applied. Under that provision 5s. a square yard at pre-war prices was paid and 15s. a square yard at present prices, it is generally agreed, ought to be paid in the new conditions. As my hon. Friend said, 15s. a square yard would give a very considerable sum per acre, compared with less than £50 per acre at which the property is being purchased by the local authority.
  The Town and Country Planning Act. 1947, was intended to be an improvement on the 1936 arrangement. It was contemplated, with that Act, giving a development value which would depend on the use to which the land might be put. If the land was used for shops, instead of houses, it could be a very much higher figure that the 15s. a square yard about which we have been talking.

  1433
  The position now is that the two Acts have to be taken in conjunction. Under the 1947 Act, there is a critical date which is, or was, 30th June, 1949. In Bath, the decision to declare the area as a clearance area was advertised in the local Press 23 days after that date, and I believe the Minister is under the impression, wrongly, that in that case the 23 days are relevant and make the case not correct. In point of fact, a direction under Article 5 of the Provisional Town and Country Planning Act General Interim Development Order, 1946, had been made as early as June, 1946, and there is clear proof of that. Certainly, as early as 1939 the clearance scheme was postponed because of the outbreak of the war.
  It is just not true that it is not open to the Minister to allow—indeed, I would say that he really has to provide for it—a payment on lines which are fair and reasonable and not the derisory lines at present adopted. At any rate, we in Bath can quote actual examples in Leicester, Plymouth, Exeter, South Shields, and Camberwell, where the district valuer has been allowed to make an interpretation which gives the right values and not these derisory values.
  I would ask the Minister genuinely to go into this matter and consult my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby and myself to ascertain whether something can be done to redress a very real grievance which is sincerely held by the people of Bath, by the council, and by everybody who knows the case, and is not confined to the owner-occupiers of these houses.
  I should like to read to the House from the recent Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries, known as the Oliver Franks Report. In paragraph 278, in page 61, page 61, it says:
  "One final point of great importance needs to be made. The evidence which we have received shows that much of the dissatisfaction with the procedures relating to land arises from the basis of compensation. It is clear that objections to compulsory purchase would be far fewer if compensation were always assessed at not less than market value. It is not part of our terms of reference to consider and make recommendations upon the basis of compensation. But we cannot emphasise too strongly the extent to which these financial considerations affect the matters
  1434
  with which we have to deal. Whatever changes in procedure are made dissatisfaction is, because of this, bound to remain."
  So I join with this very important Committee in making a plea to the Minister to use his undoubted administrative facilities in this respect to ensure that a fair compensation is given in these cases and the ones in Scarborough and elsewhere.
  12.14 a.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government (Mr. J. R. Bevins): Perhaps I might say first, in reply to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith), though he is not present, that I will certainly draw to the attention of my right hon. Friend the observations which he had to make earlier.
  Secondly, I would say how grateful I am sure the whole House is to my hon. Friends the Members for Scarborough and Whitby (Sir A. Spearman)and Bath (Mr. Pitman)for the exemplary brevity which they have displayed in putting forward their case. I shall try to emulate it. Both expressed their disquiet about the level of compensation for freeholds payable under compulsory purchase orders for slum clearance. This is a matter of valuation assessment rather than a matter for my right hon. Friend, and in the event of a dispute between the parties there is a right of appeal to the Lands Tribunal.
  I think that in fairness to my hon. Friends I ought to go a little further than that and to indicate that as far back as the Housing and Town Planning Act, 1919, it has been a fundamental principle of all slum clearance legislation that where houses are unfit for human habitation it is wrong that local authorities should have to pay compensation for the bricks and mortar. That, I think, is right, and certainly it has always been acceptable to the House. There are certain modifications to this general rule to which I will refer in a moment, but, generally speaking, compensation has been limited to the value of the site of the cleared buildings.
  Since it is the site alone which ranks for compensation, the method of valuation for compensation is that which is common to all compulsory acquisitions. It is as laid down in the Town and Country Planning Acts of 1947 and 1954. The

  1435
  compensation is made up, first, of the value of the site restricted to its present value plus the development value of the site, if any, valued as at 1st July, 1948.
  It may often happen that sites on which slum property has stood are in themselves too small to permit of redevelopment. This is a point on which my hon. Friend touched earlier. They may be too small to permit of redevelopment for either the existing use or any other use within the standard of the existing byelaws. It is in those cases that the existing use value of the individual site of land may be held to be purely nominal. In other words, the structure itself is unfit and the bricks and mortar are held to have no value, and what remains—that is to say, the site itself—has practically no value, because it would be impossible to develop it within the standard of the byelaws.
  It also often happens that these sites suffer from such factors as bad access and overshadowing by over-congested buildings in the locality. In addition, there are sometimes ground rents chargeable on the land, which, naturally, have the effect of diminishing the value of the site.
  Sometimes these reasons combine to reduce the compensation payable to a very small amount, and in such circumstances it is only when the local authority has itself acquired a number of these sites and has, as it were, married the sites together into one large site that the authority is able to undertake a rehousing operation over the areas as a whole. It is then that the site gains in value for development.
  Where a number of adjoining sites happen to be in the same ownership, where one person owns a terrace of unfit houses, half-a-dozen or a dozen in a single street, for instance, valuation would be made on the basis of what that owner could put back on the site within the framework of the existing bye-laws. For example, it might be permissible within the scope of the byelaws to build on every second site or every third site. Where an individual cleared site is capable of being redeveloped as a site within the local byelaws, the compensation payable would be very little less, if any less, than the current market value of the land.
  1436
  Briefly, what I am pointing out is this: according to the law of the land as it stands at the moment, compensation is composed of two elements, first, existing use value, which may be nominal owing to the factors which I have mentioned, and, secondly, development value, which in these cases is often negligible. All this is not to say that there are not modifications to the general rule of compensation to which I have referred.
  Governments in the past have introduced provisions which have been designed to mitigate cases of special hardship. For example, in 1956, as the House knows, there was the Slum Clearance Compensation Act, which attempted to lessen the hardship imposed on owners of single properties purchased immediately after the war, often at inflated values. As a result of this piece of legislation, those owners were able to secure not merely compensation for site value but compensation for the property itself.
  It is also the case, as my hon. Friends know, that my right hon. Friend's inspectors, when holding these inquiries in different parts of the country do have regard to well-maintained properties, and there is provision for what we call "well-maintained payments" which are made to the landlord or the tenant according to who has been responsible for the maintenance. Under the 1954 Town and Country Planning Act there is what is popularly called the "Pilgrim Clause" and, extended to that, very briefly, there are provisions for ex gratia payments in certain circumstances.
  My hon. Friend the Member for Bath referred very briefly to the Franks Committee, which recently reported. That Committee, I understand, included in its Report the recommendation that there should be the possibility of an appeal to the Lands Tribunal on questions of fitness rather than on questions of compensation. No doubt, that particular recommendation will be most carefully examined by my right hon. Friend and his colleagues in the Government, but the terms of the reference of the Franks Committee did not embrace the general question of compensation in the case of compulsory acquisitions, and although there was some small reference to that point in part of the Report, it did not, as I say, fall within the terms of reference.

  1437
  All I can say in this very brief intervention is that I have listened, not without sympathy I do assure my hon. Friends, to what has been said, and that while I can give no undertaking that the Government will take action on the lines requested by them, I hasten to assure them that we do not regard all, or even some, landlords as wicked men. I shall certainly draw my right hon. Friend's attention to what has been said tonight.
  Mr. Pitman: We have not asked for any action, or undertaking to act. The only undertaking for which we have asked is that he would consult with us and go thoroughly into the matter. Do I understand that my hon. Friend would or would not be willing to do that?
  Mr. Bevins: I think that my hon. Friend knows me too well not to realise that I am always happy to consult, at all times, with any hon. Member on this vexed question. I shall certainly take the opportunity to have a consultation with him.

  POLIOMYELITIS VACCINES
  12.23 a.m.
  Mr. John Cronin: I wish to draw the attention of the House to certain matters arising out of poliomyelitis vaccination which are causing some disquiet among the public and among the medical profession. I am very much obliged to the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health for being in his place to consider what I have to say, and I am sorry to have to raise this subject at a time when the Minister of Health is away ill.
  I am sure that I speak for all hon. Members in the House when I express great sympathy with the Minister, and the hope that he will soon be well. But I feel some sympathy this evening for the Parliamentary Secretary, because he is carrying a very heavy burden in the Minister's absence. If I may say so, he appears to be carrying it extremely well.
  I would like to make four suggestions to the hon. Gentleman. First, that poliomyelitis vaccination is progressing rather too slowly. Secondly, that the Ministry of Health should use the imported Salk vaccine. Thirdly, that the public relations aspect of poliomyelitis vaccination is being handled rather unhappily at
  1438
  present. Fourthly, that the Parliamentary Secretary should remove the present virtual embargo on the importation of the foreign, Salk vaccine.
  I do not propose to make this discussion in any way a technical one. I have considerable sympathy with the Parliamentary Secretary in that he does have to rely to a very large extent on medical advice. Medicine, even in these days, is a science of sometimes embarrassing inexactitude. Anyone who has to deal with it may find some very serious problems. This is a grave subject, and one which should not be used for any party advantage at all. We should discuss this matter purely on its merits.
  There are some background considerations which I should like to put to the House before coming to the four points which I have mentioned, and, first, we should remember that there are three types of poliomyelitis. There is the non-paralytic type, which is comparatively unimportant, the paralytic type, and that which is fatal. The paralytic type varies from a transient paralysis to those unfortunate cases—those tragic cases—where practically the whole body becomes paralysed and the victim has to spend often the rest of his life in what we have come to know as the iron lung. Between these extremes, there is a wide variety of paralysis and deformity, with some people crippled and having the most grotesque limps and disabilities; there are many varieties of human misery between the two points.
  Fatal cases are comparatively uncommon, and represent only about 5 per cent. of all cases, but the paralytic cases constitute probably nearly half the total of all cases. Last year, there were 1,700 paralytic cases; but last year was comparatively good, for in 1947, 1949, and 1950, there were no fewer than nearly 8,000 paralytic cases. The worst time for poliomyelitis is late summer and autumn, so it is too early to give a true picture, but it does appear that this year the number of cases is rising; there is evidence that this will be a fairly bad year so far as paralytic cases are concerned.
  One can obtain a very large measure of protection by the use of vaccines, and the country which has the most experience of vaccines, and which also has the largest output of them, is the United States. Vaccines are being produced

  1439
  here, although it is too early to form any final opinion about them, but it is generally agreed that they are satisfactory and that they are safe. The most stringent precautions are being used, and this, of course, is very wise.
  The Salk vaccine is freely available for import into this country, being produced now not only by the United States, but also by Canada and Australia. Importation of it is subject to the provisions of the Therapeutic Substances Act, 1946, which lays down that a licence must be obtained from the Minister of Health before any therapeutic substance is imported. I understand that no licences are being issued for the importation of foreign-produced vaccines, so that there is virtually a complete embargo.
  Having dealt with these general considerations, I will pass to my four specific points. The first one is that the poliomyelitis programme is proceeding too slowly. As long ago as January of last year, the Minister of Health promised that enough vaccine would be available for 300,000 to 500,000 persons to be vaccinated by June, 1956. But it subsequently emerged that only about 200,000 children were vaccinated by the end of 1956, and I think that quite recently the Parliamentary Secretary said in the House that roughly half of the children actually registered for vaccination had been vaccinated. Enough vaccine had been issued in this country for only half of those who were registered.
  However, of the children eligible for registration for vaccination, only about 30 per cent. have been registered. Of the age group for registration, which is for children from the ages of 3 to 10—although recently children from one to 2 have been accepted for registration—the registrations requested represent only about half the total number of potential cases of paralytic poliomyelitis. Therefore, so far, quite a small proportion of the possible future victims of poliomyelitis have had the opportunity to be vaccinated against it.
  The Parliamentary Secretary said recently that the only firm which is at present producing poliomyelitis vaccine is to increase its production by 50 per cent. That firm is Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. He also said that Burroughs,
  1440
  Wellcome & Co. will be going into production next year. I think we would all like to know why it has only just recently been decided to increase production of the vaccine at Glaxo Laboratories by 50 per cent., and why only 50 per cent., when there is this urgent need, and why Burroughs Wellcome is only coming into production next year.
  I am not suggesting that it is the fault of these firms. It is, after all, the Government's duty to place the contracts on such terms as will produce rapid fulfilment of the demand. But we have to accept the fact that with this probability of thousands of victims of paralytic poliomyelitis, unless production is greatly increased, thousands of people will be crippled or maimed as a result of illness this year and, certainly, hundreds may well die.
  My second point is that the Minister should use the foreign-produced Salk vaccine. As I said, this is available for import from the United States, Canada and Australia. The Minister did announce at the annual conference of the National Association of Maternity and Child Welfare on 26th June that he accepted expert medical advice that Britain should not run the risk of importing poliomyelitis vaccine. I think that the Minister is to a certain extent justified in being cautious, because we know that in 1955 there were a couple of hundred cases in the United States which arose directly from the vaccine manufactured by a firm called Cutter, and some precaution was obviously desirable in view of that somewhat disastrous result.
  However, I would like to know whether the Minister is being, overcautious, because after that Cutter incident, regulations in the United States were tightened up very considerably, and so far over 100 million injections have been given of the United States produced vaccine without any serious ill effects.
  I should like to quote from a letter written by Professor Trueta, who is probably one of the greatest authorities on poliomyelitis in this country, to the British Medical Journal on 15th June:
  "After nearly 100 million inoculations without mishap in America and Canada of the Salk vaccine since the Cutter incident, no one could object as to the safety of the American vaccine as prepared by the best drug firms. I do not see any other reason which could be adduced against the immediate use of the

  1441
  American Salk vaccine, as in matters such as these national pride is not involved, the virus being an international aggressor, and the vaccine being prepared with the same virus."
  That, I suggest, comes from a very formidable authority on the subject.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. J. K. Vaughan-Morgan): The hon. Gentleman has quoted from a letter from a professor who is a very great authority. Is the professor in question a virologist or immunologist and, therefore, particularly expert in this aspect of the matter?
  Mr. Cronin: The professor in question is the surgeon who deals almost exclusively with poliomyelitis cases in a special hospital, the Wingfield Morris Hospital.
  One can deduce from the Minister's own action that he must himself be, to some extent, convinced of the safety of the foreign vaccine, because there is one exception to this embargo on imports. Unsolicited gifts of vaccine are permitted to enter the country. If the vaccine were in any way dangerous, surely no vaccine whatever should be imported. There seems to be no logical reason why the receivers of unsolicited gifts should be subjected to danger more than anyone else.
  I think that the House would like to be reassured that the ban on the Salk vaccine being imported is not purely for research reasons. It has been suggested that the Medical Research Council is anxious to have the results of the English-produced vaccine assessed without the complication of a foreign imported vaccine to interfere with the figures. I do not think that that is the case, but it has been suggested and we should be grateful if the Minister would deny it.
  Another possible reason for not importing the Salk vaccine is that there might be some variations in its potency. But I think that it is generally agreed, on medical grounds, that the American vaccine is entirely satisfactory in doing its job. As an example, the Board of Health of Chicago published figures showing that it had managed to have over 1 million children vaccinated. Later, there was an outbreak of poliomyelitis in Chicago, and among those children who had not been vaccinated the incidence of
  1442
  poliomyelitis was 358 per 100,000. For those who had received two injections, the incidence was 14 for every 100,000, and for those who had three injections the incidence was nil, there being no cases at all in that group. It seems, therefore, that the American vaccine certainly does the job.
  I cannot imagine that the Minister is banning the foreign vaccine for financial reasons. In fact, the American vaccine is cheaper than the British produced vaccine. Of course, from the general financial point of view, using vaccines would be very much cheaper than paying the quite enormous cost of hospital treatment and appliances necessary for the victims. I cannot imagine that financial reasons would seriously influence the Minister in a matter like this.
  It has also been suggested that the British vaccine is more suitable. I should like the Minister to tell us whether there is any real evidence of this, because the British vaccine is of comparatively recent origin. Is there any evidence at all to suggest that the American vaccine would not give just as much, or nearly as much, protection as the British vaccine? As the American vaccine has not been tried out here, are we sure that it is not better than the British? It is quite possible that it is much better.
  The Minister may well be striving to get the perfect vaccine, but while he is trying to attain perfection there is this constant flow of victims. In this case the Minister is rather like a bystander who sees someone drowning, but will not throw him a serviceable lifebuoy because in a factory a better lifebuoy is being produced.
  I now turn to the public relations aspect of poliomyelitis vaccination. When the scheme was first announced, in January, 1956, the Ministry of Health completely failed to give any of the facts to the medical Press although the facts were passed on to the national Press. It seems to me quite extraordinary that the medical profession should have been completely ignored when this information was available.
  Why is it that only one-third of the age group chosen was actually registered? Why did two-thirds of parents for whose children vaccination was available not take advantage of the offer? It suggests

  1443
  that there was not much in the way of really favourable publicity. When one considers that in Denmark, for instance, four-fifths of the whole population under the age of 45 has been vaccinated——
  Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I am sorry to keep interrupting the hon. Gentleman, but when he is discussing Denmark will he tell the House the form which vaccination in that country takes?
  Mr. Cronin: The Danish vaccination is substantially the same as ours, but perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will elaborate the point when he replies.
  One wonders why the Minister gave such optimistic figures last year when the actual result was rather poor in regard to the number of vaccinations performed.
  Finally, why was this curt announcement recently given to the Association of Maternal and Child Welfare concerning the risk of importing vaccines? Why were no reasons given? Why is the medical profession in complete ignorance as to the reasons which made the Minister take this decision? If they are good and valid reasons, there is no reason at all why they should not be published and made available for the medical profession to study.
  I now come to the last matter—the refusal of the Minister to allow the importation of the Salk vaccine for private use if anyone wishes to use it. The present position is that one can obtain the Salk vaccine from the United States or Canada provided it is sent as an unsolicited gift. Why should members of the general public be deprived of a means of protecting themselves and their children from poliomyelitis when there is available a vaccine of known value? Why is there this interference with a doctor's right to prescribe any drug he thinks fit when that drug has been used extensively all over the world with marked success?
  Another aspect of the matter is that the privilege of unsolicited gifts must, in the nature of things, be confined to people who have either travelled in the United States or who have connections with it, and it tends to give a privilege to a very limited class. If unsolicited gifts are being allowed in there is obviously a tendency for a species of smuggling to develop, and this is happening on
  1444
  a large and increasing scale at the present time. One feels that the law is being brought into contempt.
  This privileged traffic is now gradually approaching black market proportions and there are very real dangers. The vaccine requires special skill in handling and storing. If it is coming into the country furtively, in small quantities, one does not know whether it is retaining its potency and being properly handled. There is great danger of the development of a black market in which unscrupulous persons either import the drug or even manufacture what appears to be this drug and pass it on to the public. There is often great parental anxiety to protect children from this dreadful disease. There seems, therefore, to be a real danger of this unsolicited gift system developing into an extensive black market.
  I have put these considerations to the Minister and I shall be very interested in what he has to say. He is in a difficult position and one feels considerable sympathy for him, because he is carrying a heavy responsibility. If he makes the wrong decision, it is likely that thousands of people will be maimed and crippled and a large number of people will die. He has a frightening responsibility and he carries, for this reason, I am sure, the sympathy of the whole House. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give these matters very careful consideration. Quite properly, he may not wish to commit himself tonight, but if he assures us that he will look into the matter carefully he will be giving us some satisfaction.
  12.47 a.m.
  The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health (Mr. J. K. Vaughan-Morgan): I make no complaint about the manner in which the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin)has dealt with this difficult and delicate subject and I hope that my remarks may enable him and the House to see it in its right perspective.
  The hon. Member ranged widely and gave a survey of all the problems. I am grateful to him for his sympathetic remarks, not only about the illness of my right hon. Friend but about the decision taken by my right hon. Friend—I do not envy him in having to take it—which, in my view, was entirely the right one. It was a decision which. I think, any man

  1445
  in my right hon. Friend's position, having had the advice which he had then and which I have now, would still take.
  It is difficult for a layman such as myself to contend against a doctor such as the hon. Member for Loughborough, but I am not so much further away from being an expert than he is. This is not simply a question for doctors as such. It is one in which I or the Minister have to rely on the very best specialist opinion in the subject—that is, on virologists or immunologists, whose speciality this is and whose advice is given to the Minister by the Medical Research Council.
  Let me give an idea of some of the difficulties with which we must deal in the way of technicalities. The hon. Member referred to Denmark and said that four-fifths of its population was covered. The simple answer is that the dosage and method of administration in Denmark are entirely different. The Danes have their own approach, which is quite different from that of any other country. They give two small injections, each of which is approximately one-tenth of a normal dose. In those circumstances, it becomes 'rather easier to cover the population. Who is right, is not for me to say.
  Mr. A. Blenkinsop: Is it not the case that in this country only two doses are given, whereas in America, for example, three is the normal number?
  Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: That is exactly my point. That is why I say that these comparisons are irrelevant. It is true that the Americans give three doses as against our two, but we are using an entirely different type of vaccine. It is no good comparing Denmark with us and saying that the Danes have complete coverage, because it is not so: they have it on an entirely different basis from ours. I say that not to contradict the hon. Gentleman, but to point out the difficulties of the subject.
  I come to the question of imports which are taking place of Salk vaccine by private citizens. The hon. Gentleman referred to smuggling. All I can say is that I should have been happier if he had produced more evidence before making such a statement. Smuggling, as such, is a matter for the Customs and Excise. No doubt, the hon. Gentleman will draw the attention of the Customs
  1446
  to any evidence he has. I am concerned with unsolicited free gifts which come into the country. It may be well that I should give fairly detailed attention to that.
  As the hon. Gentleman said, under the Therapeutic Substances Act. 1956, the import of vaccine requires to be licensed. It is still not thought appropriate to make arrangements for the general import of Salk vaccine, and, therefore, no licence has been issued under the Act. This being so, import is prohibited, and any consignments which arrive are detained by the Customs.
  We have not wished, however, to exercise a rigid control over individuals who have been sent gifts of small quantities of the vaccine for family use and, therefore, we have authorised the Customs to release such packages where it is clear that a doctor has taken responsibility for injection. In each case we follow that up by explaining to the doctor concerned that the vaccine does not necessarily conform to the standards of potency and purity required of the English vaccine.
  A Board of Trade import licence, carrying with it authority to incur dollar expenditure, is not available for such purchases and no parcel has been reported to us which has not been a gift. It may be of interest to know that the numbers of such parcels for the last three months were 33 in May, 48 in June, and 53 in July. In addition, there may be parcels brought by travellers—small quantities of vaccine for their families. It has never been the practice of the Customs and Excise to prevent the import by travellers of small amounts of medicaments for their own use, and no change in this practice seems to be called for.
  This escape clause was originally planned so as to ensure that a diabetic bringing sufficient insulin to tide him over a short period should not be deprived of the means of maintaining life. There seems to us absolutely no reason to alter the instruction that small amounts of poliomyelitis vaccine for travellers or their families may be permitted.
  So far as we know, there is no evidence that larger quantities for other than personal use are being brought into this country. I am keeping the question of the entry of these small personal packages under review, but unless there is a radical change in the present pattern I should

  1447
  not feel justified in interfering with what is a personal decision of individual parents who have been sent gifts of Salk vaccine, or who bring small quantities in with them on their return to this country and whose doctors—I repeat—are prepared to take responsibility for injection. Our responsibility is to see that those who receive these gifts are made fully aware of the issue at stake.
  I come to the wider question of the importing of Salk vaccine on what I may call the national basis. I do not know why the hon. Gentleman referred only to my right hon. Friend's speech to the Maternity and Child Welfare Conference. I should have thought he would have gone back to the statement which my right hon. Friend made in this House on 15th May.
  I quote his words:
  "I have seen suggestions that arrangements should be made to import vaccine from America. When drawing up our scheme we decided, on expert advice, that the vaccine to be used in this country should have a composition different in certain respects from that of American vaccine which is made from strains of virus including the virulent Mahoney strain. That advice still stands, and, while the situation will continue to be kept under close review in all its aspects, my right hon. Friend and I do not consider that any departure from this policy is warranted in existing circumstances."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 15th May, 1957; Vol. 570, c. 411.]
  I have nothing to add to that statement of policy. The advice given to me by the Medical Research Council and others concerned has not changed. If, in the light of experience, other and different expert advice is given we shall, of course, be ready forthwith to reconsider our policy.
  Mr. Cronin: Obviously, the hon. Gentleman cannot ignore his medical advisers, but he certainly has the right and the responsibility to point out to them the fact, which he will accept, that 100 million injections of the Salk vaccine have been given without any untoward incident at all. Therefore, how can there be any serious question of the vaccine being dangerous?
  Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: How easy it is to make a remark like that! How easy it is to suggest that I should interfere in any way with advice given to me by the Medical Research Council, which, I am sure, is as well aware of these facts
  1448
  as we are. At what stage does it become safe? How many years after the Cutter incident is it safe? Is it for the hon. Member or for me to try to counter the advice of our experts? If that advice changes we must reconsider the matter, but we should not lightly bandy about the House the risk involved. The Cutter incident was very serious indeed. If one litre of the stuff goes wrong, and a litre is enough to vaccinate 500 children, we might have a repetition. Is it not clear that we should keep absolutely to the high standard we have already observed? We have never had anything go wrong with the British vaccine.
  The advice that I have received still stands. The reason for it was the prevalence in the Salk vaccine of the Mahoney strain, which we do not have in our material and which is much more virulent than our own Brunenders strain. If any virus survives the manufacturing process and remains undetected by tests, the Mahoney strain is a paralysing virus and the Brunenders strain is not. That is something to which we should pay continuing regard. The hon. Member talks about the prevalence of polio in this season and what we could do by importing Salk vaccine, but it is surely quite inconceivable that we should import it on any scale without the very careful tests which the Medical Research Council applied.
  Let us remember that these tests are very careful and that they take three months to apply. If we add to those three months the time for distribution we shall have made it pretty well impossible to distribute the vaccine so as to be of any help in the coming year. Quite apart from that fact, there is the fact not generally realised that the time taken to achieve immunisation, which varies with each individual, can be anything up to six weeks.
  I turn to British production. I shall not make any prophecies. We have had far too many difficulties and dangers in the way and so many pitfalls in the course of achieving production. After all, this is a fairly new project. There was no such thing as a polio vaccine even three years ago. Therefore, I do not think that we can blame the manufacturers or ourselves too much.
  Mr. Fenner Brockway: Would the hon. Gentleman pay

  1449
  some tribute to the firm and the workers in Slough who produce this valuable vaccine?
  Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: The hon. Gentleman should give me a chance. I have not got as far as that yet. I was about to announce that the firm in Slough is to be able to increase its production by 50 per cent. It is a little hard when the hon. Gentleman interrupts me, because I was going to give the firm a real pat on the back.
  We hope that the other firm will come into production next month, but we have had so many disappointments that I really cannot commit myself too far to any kind of future programme, though I may say that I am beginning to be a little more hopeful that we may have a substantial increase in the course of time.
  Finally, I should like to say a word about the incidence of the disease. I have provided myself with a mass of figures, and could detain the House for a long time, but I shall refrain from that. The hon. Member for Loughborough referred to the fact that this was the worst year for poliomyelitis since 1950. I wonder whether it will help the House to get it into proportion when I say that the worst year we have ever had, which was 1950, was less than the lowest year they have ever had, for example, in the United States of America.
  Even despite everything, I am told—though I have not had absolute confirmation of these figures—that in this heavy year for us and this light year for the United States, the incidence is still very comparable. That is not in any way to minimise the grimness of this disease, but that is the total number of cases, and includes both the paralytic and non-paralytic, and among the paralytic the very large number who recover.
  It is difficult when one is dealing with and seeing cases of this kind not to be shocked; indeed, none of us would be anything else. But we must try to get the incidence into a sense of proportion. As time goes on, and more protection is available, I pray that this will be yet another of the diseases which we shall have driven from our midst. I hope these few words will give some satisfaction to the hon. Member. We are always on the alert to any possible change in the situation which may affect what is still our current policy.
  Mr. Blenkinsop: Could the hon. Gentleman explain why, if he has decided to allow the unsolicited gifts to come through and to be used, and, therefore, not destroy the individual decisions of parents provided that the doctor is willing, similar provision cannot be allowed for those parents who are willing to pay for the import of Salk vaccine—again provided that it is administered under proper medical supervision and with proper medical guarantees?
  Secondly, could he say whether it is true that this year a higher proportion of adults are suffering from poliomyelitis, and that this may suggest some change in the strain of poliomyelitis in this country, and would he ensure that if that were so it would be taken into account in any future decisions he may make? Will he ask for some further examination of the fairly complete information that we now have about the Salk vaccine being used all over the world?
  Mr. Vaughan-Morgan: I cannot give the hon. Member the information about the breakdown of the cases for which he asked. I will examine that point and see whether I can find out. As he knows, there has been an international congress on the subject when opportunity was taken to exchange views, but I have not yet had different advice—that is the point I was trying to get over to the House. His other comment was a little inconsistent with some of the remarks of his hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough about creating two classes, the privileged and unprivileged.
  Our policy is perfectly consistent. If the vaccine is an unsolicited gift, it is allowed to come here. What we have been discussing is the Salk vaccine as opposed to the British vaccine. There is no change in our view about that.

  OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICES
  1.6 a.m.
  Mr. John Harvey: I wish to raise a matter arising out of the Government's White Paper on the overseas information services. I am aware that it is always easier to find reasons for spending money rather than saving it, and I want to avoid falling into the error, which it is so easy to make, both inside and outside the House, of

  1451
  deploring inflation one day and asking the Government to spend more money the next.
  When I first read the White Paper, I felt inclined to agree with The Economist which, in a leading article on 20th July, said:
  "By and large the new programme has a reasonably well proportioned look and, even where one is regretful, one cannot cavil at details too much when the overriding need for economy is so obvious."
  Since then, I have examined the matter a little more deeply, and I find myself particularly disturbed by the proposals to cut certain of the B.B.C. services to Western Europe. The cuts are designed to save about £200,000 a year, but at what cost are those savings to be made? It is important that the House should note these things.
  I want to make a number of comments and to ask my right hon. Friend a number of questions in the light of which I hope that he will undertake to examine the savings again and see whether they are real savings in the best national interest. In paragraph 14, the White Paper says:
  "The Drogheda Committee recommended the complete abolition of the French, Italian, Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and Portugese services."
  In paragraph 15 it says:
  "Nevertheless, the Government have decided against the complete abolition of all these services"
  In a debate in another place on 6th February, the noble Lord the Earl of Drogheda said:
  "We did make a few suggestions of economy, but they were not, of course, very well received by anyone—except possibly the Treasury. I am not sure now that we should have suggested cuts in the Western European services to which the noble Lord has referred. I do not think that we should have done so at the time, had it not been one of those times of financial crisis which are now endemic."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 6th February, 1957; Vol. 201, c. 551.]
  In those circumstances, the Government cannot seek shelter behind the noble Lord over the matter of the proposed cuts.
  As a boy, I was educated for many years on the Continent of Europe, and I still retain a live connection with many people in different countries of Western Europe. Is my right hon. Friend aware that, without the proposed cuts, even
  1452
  Poland broadcasts more hours a week to other European countries than does the B.B.C.? The Communist bloc, taken as a whole, does five times as much broadcasting to Western Europe as the B.B.C. does—before these projected cuts. Of course, there is the "Voice of America," but if it is proposed to rely on the "Voice of America" to take more of the load, let me say, without intending any unkindness to our American friends, that the voice of Britain has enjoyed an incomparable reputation in Europe ever since the war, and many would be sad indeed to hear it muted.
  If the Government believe, with The Economist, that
  "there is force in the argument that public money (even though the amount involved is relatively small)need no longer be afforded to maintain these particular contacts with the friendly peoples of friendly States …"
  may I ask my hon. Friend whether he realises that the same argument could have been applied to Cyprus when the B.B.C. Cypriot service was abolished in 1951 and 1952?
  May I ask my hon. Friend whether he is aware that the largest Communist Parties outside the Communist bloc exist in the friendly States of France and Italy? May I ask him whether, to take one specific point, Britain's future relationships with the Common Market may not well call for our point of view to be clearly put to our friends? May I suggest to him that our trade with our friends in Western Europe may well have gained much impetus from the prestige advertising of British pioneering and British achievement which the B.B.C. has been able to put over among its influential listening public in those friendly States?
  May I in this connection ask him whether he is aware of a statement put out by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders on 17th July, in which it said:
  "While the Society is very glad to learn of the Government's proposals to increase its Information Services abroad, it is extremely sorry that it should have been found necessary to make substantial reductions in the trans- missions of the B.B.C.'s European Service …. In their industrial and news programmes, the B.B.C.'s broadcasts to Western Europe carry an amount of information about the activities of the British motor industry. These transmissions, which helped in their own way to support the industry's own press work, are now to be terminated in the cases of Portugal, Holland and Scandinavia and reduced for

  1453
  France, Italy, Austria and possibly Germany. For a saving of £200,000 a year this seems a great pity."
  I should like to ask my hon. Friend whether he realises, too, that the B.B.C.'s broadcasts on tourism in Britain have brought to this country many visitors from these friendly countries in Western Europe, and this has assisted Britain's tourist trade.
  I could quote many more facts and figures in support of my argument. Already the Communist bloc broadcasts to Sweden for some 33 hours a week against the B.B.B.'s three and a half hours, and now we are to discontinue this service altogether. The Communist bloc broadcasts to France some 78 hours a week against our 21 hours, and now we are likely approximately to halve this service.
  I wonder whether my hon. Friend saw the French newspaper, Le Monde, on 17th July. At the risk of detaining the House a little while longer, because I believe this is important, I should like to quote two paragraphs:
  "Great Britain is to increase its propaganda effort all over the world. But if the B.B.C. and the British Council are to lavish greater care on the Near and Far East, it will be to a certain extent at the expense of Europe At a moment when Britain's rôle on the Continent is giving rise to undeniable misunderstandings, such a decision will doubtless come as a shock to those countries who will no longer hear the traditional announcement first heard during the war years 'London calling' …
  The argument advanced to justify this policy is that democratic countries are sufficiently well-informed. Some people in London even consider that British 'propaganda' to such countries might be considered an impertinence. It seems too that in many ways this reorganisation of English radio transmissions reffects the illusion—a very widespread one in Great Britain—that European countries are 'necessarily' friends, and that it would be superfluous to give these countries a clearer idea of the attitude of the British Government."
  I wonder whether my hon. Friend saw the Portuguese Diario Popular of 16th July. I will not quote the whole of this. [Laughter.] My hon. Friends may laugh, but this is a matter of Britain's influence among her friends in Europe, and I find nothing to laugh at in any diminution of that influence. The Portuguese newspaper deeply regretted this decision.
  1454
  In Norway, the same day, the Aftenposten said:
  "There is no foreign radio station transmitting in Norwegian which is listened to so eagerly as the B.B.C. A very great number of Norwegians listen regularly to the news and other Norwegian programmes from the B.B.C. We believe that they have contributed much towards the understanding of British problems, and the transmission will certainly be missed".
  I do not think that my hon. Friends will laugh at this, perhaps the most important of all the quotations, from the Copenhagen Dagens Nyheder, which said,
  "With some regret and a touch of dismay it must be affirmed that it is the voices of the West which are disappearing or becoming muted and it is the propaganda blast from the East—where no dictator needs to request Congress or a Parliament for grants—which is increasing in stridency."
  I make no apology for raising my voice in the House tonight in support of what I believe to be part of the essential defences of democracy. If we take this step back in order to save £200,000, let no one imagine that we can easily move forward again if we decide at some future date to reverse British policy. The Scandinavian expert cannot change into a Middle East expert and the Spaniard cannot readily be switched to the Rumanian front in the propaganda battle. If the Government insist on saving this £200,000, they will not be putting the machine into mothballs for possible future use but will be dismantling it, dispersing its staff and destroying its effectiveness. I hope I have shown that it will alarm many of our friends, dismay many of our traders and comfort only those who have no great love for us.
  May I urge my hon. Friend, with all the force I can command, to take the case which I have presented tonight back to those of his right hon. Friends who share the responsibility for these decisions and to ask them to reconsider again whether in all the circumstances this would be £200,000 well saved.
  Doubtless my hon. Friends want to get home, as I want to get home, and they will be glad to know that I have reached the last part of what I want to say. It is one more quotation from the Copenhagen Dagens Nyheder:
  "England's B.B.C. is abolishing its long-established broadcasts in Danish to Denmark … The Information Department of the American Embassy in Copenhagen has been

  1455
  required to cut down its budget by 40 per cent. which, for the moment, means the dismissal of eight officials and reductions in the Library and Film Department … Soviet Russia is opening an Information Office in Copenhagen …"
  1.18 a.m.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Ian Harvey): I should like at the outset to express appreciation of the very close interest which my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow, East (Mr. J. Harvey)has taken in this subject, and I should like to give him a very full assurance that all the considerations which he has deployed this morning were very carefully considered by the Committee over which my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster presided during the last six months.
  Of course, I sympathise considerably with those who have been closely associated with these services, and I want to pay a tribute to all those who have worked in the B.B.C. on these overseas services which, in their day, have played a very considerable part in Britain's overseas information effort.
  It would probably be in the best interests of the House at this late hour if I dealt first with the points made by my hon. Friend. First of all, he referred to the demands for economy. Undoubtedly, in our consideration of these new proposals, the question of economy did arise, but I should inform the House that that was not the predominant consideration. What we had to gauge was what would be the most efficient way of deploying Britain's overseas information effort.
  At the very outset, I should like to underline the point on which I am sure all those who were associated with me in this matter would support me, and that is that broadcasting must be considered in relation to all the other methods and means whereby Britain's voice and influence are expressed. If I may say so, my hon. Friend—though I quite realise his anxiety for brevity at this hour—disregarded entirely the other ways in which Britain's influence makes itself felt in the countries of Europe.
  I accept at once the contention that it is very dangerous to assume that all the countries of Europe are necessarily
  1456
  friendly to Great Britain, and that, therefore, we can relax our efforts in that direction. But when one considers the activities of the Soviet bloc and our own activities, it is also important to recognise that because of the different and quite close relationship that exists between our countries there are other means whereby communication can be, and, in fact, is established.
  I think, therefore, that my hon. Friend's observations must be looked at in that full context. If I may say so with respect, I do not think that he deployed that full context tonight, and his speech was really one of special pleading for British broadcasting overseas services. It was a very good case for the point, but what had to be sought when these decisions were made was a balanced view of the whole of the information effort throughout the world, and a balanced view of the information effort towards Europe and at home.
  Of course, very important indeed was my hon. Friend's point about the Common Market and our trade with Europe at the present time. That was and must be a prime consideration. It was felt that the B.B.C. services, although they played an important part, did not play such an important part that they could not be subjected to the reductions that have been recommended and which, in fact, are very shortly to be carried out.
  I accept, and the Committee accepted, the point that my hon. Friend made; that this is a decision that cannot be reversed easily or swiftly. That was considered before the decision was made. Admittedly, this is a small reduction, but all small reductions when added up come to a larger one, and if one is never prepared to make a small reduction, on the ground that it is a small reduction, one will probably never make any real economies at all. We were fully alive to that particular factor.
  I now want to say something to my hon. Friend which may sound rather platitudinous but is something which has been overlooked by some of the greater enthusiasts for broadcasting. Whereas broadcasting is very important, listening to broadcasts is even more important. Broadcasts may not be heard because they are technically not strong enough to compete with the activities of the home country. One has, after all, to put oneself in the same position. How many of

  1457
  us here listen very acutely to overseas broadcasts, as opposed to the programmes of the B.B.C.? There are also other media of communication, such as television, which is a growing influence and one competing for the attention of those who have the time and inclination to watch and listen.
  My hon. Friend referred, as I had a feeling that he would, to the years of war. Of course, that is a different matter. During the war years there were justifications for broadcasting to Europe which do not now exist, but one can say that the way in which broadcasting was carried out then was a great tribute to all concerned, maintaining the high reputation for broadcasting which this country has always had. But it is no use being nostalgic, for the situation is different now in the light of new conditions and in the light of the resources available.
  I have no doubt that the decisions made are the right decisions or that the balance struck is the correct balance, and it is with regret that I have to tell my hon. Friend that we cannot accede to his request, which is to ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who is primarily responsible, to look at this again. The simple fact is that it has been most carefully examined; the Drogheda Committee dealt with it most carefully, and there has been much other thought given to it, and this is a decision by which we must stand.

  AFRICAN TERRITORIES
  1.32 a.m.
  Mr. A. Fenner Brockway: I must express my personal regret to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, to the Minister, to the staff of the House, and to my colleagues for keeping them at this hour of the morning, but I make no apology for raising the issues to which I wish to draw the attention of the House.
  This is an historic occasion; the occasion when hon. Members may raise grievances before voting Supply. We should remember that this House represents not only about 50 million people of the United Kingdom, but also about 70 millions in the Colonies, Protectorates, and Trusteeship areas of the Commonwealth. We should be failing in our duty if we allowed the vote to be taken this
  1458
  morning without first drawing attention to some of the grievances from which those people overseas are suffering.
  I have given notice that I wish to raise, particularly, questions related to three Colonial Territories. These are urgent issues as we are about to adjourn for the Summer Recess, and long before the three months of that Summer Recess are passed, action by the Colonial Secretary may be found necessary because of the intensity of interest upon these issues.
  The first territory is that of Nigeria. There has recently been in London a conference of representatives of Nigeria to discuss its constitutional problems, and at the end of that conference disappointment was expressed by the leaders of the three regions of Nigeria—the north, the west, and the east—that it had concluded without a date for the independence of the country having been settled. The basis for discussion at that conference was that there were certain issues about which the Nigerians themselves were divided. There was, for example, the question of the regions and the creation of new States; the question of revenue allocation between the Federation and the regional areas, the question of the basis of the franchise, and even the boundaries of constituencies. There was the question of the control of the police force as between the centre and the regional areas. The Colonial Secretary urged that these issues should be settled before the date for independence was decided.
  I want to take this opportunity to urge that an entirely different policy should have been pursued on that occasion, and I think the precedent is to be found in the case of India. There were there problems just as wide and deep as the problems unsettled in Nigeria, but the British Government at that point had the wisdom to say, "We will withdraw from India in August, 1947; settle for yourselves these problems in relation to that date of withdrawal." If first on the agenda of the Nigerian conference had been the date of independence, which was unanimously supported by all the delegations at that conference, if that had been settled first, the problems of states, of franchise, of revenue and of police would have fallen into place and the delegates would not have gone back to their Colony disappointed as they are now.

  1459
  We now run the risk of losing the confidence of the people of Nigeria, the largest remaining British Colony, with 30 million people. I feel that the disappointment which was very moderately expressed by the Prime Ministers in London may be expressed more vigorously by the people of that territory.
  There is one particular question which I want to put to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. Both in London and in Nigeria the view has been expressed that the reason why no definite date was set for independence for Nigeria was the fear of its reactions in Central Africa; its reactions upon the African populations of Central Africa who, after the independence of Ghana, if that were succeeded by a definite date about Nigeria, might be unwilling to accept the European domination of that territory; also the reaction of the European leaders in Central Africa who would be indignant if the independence of Ghana were followed by the independence of Nigeria while the independence of the Federation of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias was not promised.
  No one would welcome the independence of Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Central Africa more wholeheartedly than we would if that independence were based upon democracy, but I suggest that there is no reason why, because of the absence of democracy in Central Africa, the attainment of independence for Nigeria should be postponed. That was the first issue I wanted to raise with the Parliamentary Secretary.
  The second issue relates to Kenya. I first went to Kenya in 1950, and I had a dream then of the great possibility of realising in that territory, with its African, Asian, Arab and European population, a real human society in which colour and race would be lost in equality and cooperation. One of the memorable events of my life was an occasion when, in 1950, representatives of the African, Asian, European and Arab races in Kenya gathered together, and we urged human equality between all races for the future of Kenya.
  I do not want to go back over the history which has followed. I recognise that the realisation of that ideal is difficult because of the different social patterns, different cultures and different
  1460
  ways of life of the races. But I want to urge tonight that the time has come, if we are to move forward in Kenya to that ideal, when all communities in Kenya should declare as their purpose and goal a democratic society which would not think of colour or race but think of human beings as equals in society. We have gone a long way in that direction. We now have the very striking fact that the leaders of the Asian community, of the Arab community, and of the African community have all declared that to be their purpose. The only community in Kenya the leaders of which have not declared that to be their purpose is the European.
  Something very significant has recently occurred. For the first time in Kenya there has been the direct election of African representatives. There were candidates who stand for black nationalism, who stood for Africa for the Africans, for Kenya for the Africans, who were anti-White and anti-European, wanting to drive the Europeans out. Every one of those candidates was rejected by the African electors. The representatives of the African community who are now in the Legislative Council of Kenya all stand for the human society and equality between races of which I dreamed seven years ago.
  I ask the Parliamentary Secretary to use what influence the Colonial Office has here to get the leaders of the European community in Kenya to say what the leaders of the African, Asian and Arab communities have said about their desire for an egalitarian democracy in which man shall have a vote as man and woman shall have a vote as woman, the issue no longer being decided by colour, community or race. I am aware that those things are sometimes said by the leaders of the European community when they are in London. We are now asking them to say them when they are in Nairobi.
  There is an immediate test to the principle which I have been urging, and that is the claim of the Africans for greater representation in the Legislative Council of Kenya. There are 6 million Africans in Kenya; there are 300,000 Asians, Europeans and Arabs. At the present time 50,000 Europeans have equal representation in the Legislative Council to the 6,250,000 of the other three races.

  1461
  The Africans are now making a very moderate and reasonable demand. They are proposing that 6 million Africans should have equal representation to the 300,000 of other races. The Asian leaders have agreed; even the sections of the Asian leaders have agreed—the Hindu leaders and the Muslim leaders. The Arab leaders have agreed. The only obstruction to the proposal comes at the present time from the leaders of the European community. They have recently issued a statement saying that they are willing to accept some increase of African representation, but they go on to state that they are not prepared to accept the domination of any one racial group over the members of the other racial groups, either one or all the other groups together. I have tried very hard, but I cannot find any mathematical process by which one can have representation of four groups and be able to say at the end of one's calculations that neither one group nor three groups have domination over the others.
  There have been discussions recently in London with representatives of the Africans and of the European community. I would urge that the matter cannot be left like that, and that during the Summer Recess the Secretary of State for the Colonies should himself go to Kenya and seek to convince the European representatives and leaders, as the Asian and Arab leaders have already agreed, to accept the African demand that 6 million people should at least have equal representation to the 300,000 who represent the other races.
  Before I leave this subject, I want to urge that we ought to be turning away from the thought of races altogether in Kenya. We should be turning our minds in the direction of a common roll for human beings as human beings. I welcome the publication today of the report of the delegation which has recently been in Kenya and which gives some endorsement to that conception. As long as there are racial groups and candidates must make their appeal on racial grounds, a multi-racial society will remain in Kenya. There will be a human society—an inter-racial society—only when men and women are voting on a common roll as human beings and no longer as racial groups.
  1462
  The other subject which I indicated to the Minister I wished to raise tonight was the suggestion that there should be a military base in Kenya. We have found it difficult, from White Papers and from Ministerial statements, to know the Government's decision in this regard. The Governor of Kenya stated on his recent visit to this country that all the communities in Kenya would welcome the establishment of a military base there. This is not so.
  The African community, by far the largest, would not welcome the establishment of a military base in Kenya. That has been stated in the most emphatic way by the leaders of the African community with whom the Secretary of State for the Colonies has been in discussion during the last few days. They are aware of the political implications of any military base in Kenya.
  One of the remarkable features of the British Empire at the present time is that territories like West Africa, Malaya and the West Indies are rapidly moving forward to self-government and independence. There are only two groups of territories which are not moving forward in that way. One is the group in which there are strong European settlements—East Africa and Central Africa. Kenya already has to face that difficulty. The other is the group of territories which are of military strategical importance to this country, such as Cyprus. I beg the Minister not to add to the difficulties of Kenya in moving towards political independence the additional reason that it should become a military base and that on this account the offer of recognition of self-government and independence will be delayed.
  The third territory to which I wish to draw attention and of which I have given the hon. Gentleman notice is Central Africa. I want tonight, calmly but nevertheless strongly, to emphasise the danger of the psychology which is arising in that area. This House and this Government have special responsibility for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. No one can have contact with those two territories without understanding how strong is now becoming the opinion among the African populations of antagonism to the British representation in those areas.
  We have the extraordinary situation in Nyasaland that the Nyasaland African

  1463
  Congress has actually expelled three leaders from its membership because they would not withdraw from the Federal Parliament. I am in touch with the leaders of the African Congress in Northern Rhodesia and they are at the moment a little nervous because the opinion of their membership is becoming stronger than the expressions which they themselves are giving of its policy. I warn the Under-Secretary of State that a situation is arising in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia which, unless we are prepared to meet genuine African grievances, may become exceedingly dangerous.
  I am going to leave to my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse)the subject of racial discrimination in those territories. I want particularly to raise two matters before I proceed to a rather wider one. The first is this: fifty-four officials of the African Miners' Union in the Copperbelt and members of the African Congress have been arrested and deported to an outlying district. I ask the hon. Gentleman how long they are to remain isolated in that way. I understand there is to be a review in October. I very strongly urge upon the Under-Secretary of State that those men should be liberated at the earliest moment possible, if the good will of the African population in the Copper-belt is to be obtained.
  The second specific question I want to ask is this. Yesterday a cablegram was received in this country from the leaders of the African Congress in Northern Rhodesia, which lead as follows.
  "Mass arrests in Northern Province. Maximum sentences. Appeals disallowed. Congress banned."
  That is in the Northern Province, and the telegram arrived yesterday. That is an indication of the dangerous situation which I have been trying to describe. I appreciate that it is too early to get from the Under-Secretary of State the full facts tonight, but I ask the hon. Gentleman if he will look into that situation and if he will try to prevent that situation which has apparently developed in the Northern Province from becoming still more dangerous.
  I wanted especially to deal with the Constitution (Amendment)Bill in Central Africa. I recognise that here I have to
  1464
  be careful because the authority of this House and of the Government in this matter is strictly limited. There are only two spheres in which in this matter we now have the right to express our opinion or to intervene. The first is when the African Affairs Board draws attention to a differentiating Measure. It has done so in the instance of the Constitution (Amendment)Bill. Its opinion is so important that I want to read it in detail as it is reported in The Times this morning:
  "Sir John Moffat, chairman of the African Affairs Board, today presented to the Federal Parliament on behalf of the standing committee a report giving the opinion that the Constitution (Amendment)Bill is a differentiating measure. It is differentiating, the report says, because African peoples of two protectorates would suffer a relative diminution in the small powers they now possess and because of the fact that the Federal House would be increased by a ratio of two-thirds.
  The board goes on: 'It is as absurd to suggest that African influence is preserved by merely increasing the respective numbers of Africans and elected members in constant ratio as it is to suggest that the influence of elected members is preserved by maintaining the present actual majority of elected members over the rest—namely, 17. The true answer lies between these two methods of assessment, but the fact remains that in the … Bill Africans have suffered a loss in degree of power or influence when compared with the original constitutional provisions.'".
  In view of that opinion expressed by the African Affairs Board and its distinguished chairman, Sir John Moffat, assent should not be given to the Bill.
  The second sphere in which the House and the Government are concerned is that this Bill must be endorsed by the Legislative Councils of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and it is open to the Secretary of State for the Colonies to advise the Governments of these territories to reject the Bill. I raised this matter with the Secretary of State on 9th July. He said that he had then advised the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that he saw no reason to object to the Bill.
  The Bill povides for two electoral rolls. One is a general roll with high economic or educational tests. An income of £60 a month or land valued at £1,500 will require no educational tests. If the income is £25 a month or the land is valued at £500, the Cambridge Overseas School Certificate will be required. On that general roll, 99 per cent. will be

  1465
  Europeans, and those Europeans will elect 44 out of the 59 members of the Assembly.
  That electoral roll will be supplemented by a special roll, where an income of at least £15 a month or possession of land valued at £500 will be required. There will be a considerable number of Africans on this roll, but we have the astonishing proposal that the electors on the general roll, who already have the right to elect three-quarters of the House, shall also be placed upon this special roll and shall be able to influence the return of the nine members who will be elected mostly by Africans. I am not surprised that The Times has criticised that provision in the Constitution (Amendment)Bill.
  African opinion in Central Africa is incensed against this Measure. There are only 200,000 Europeans there, and there are 6 million Africans. It is said in Central Africa that the Secretary of State for the Colonies came to an understanding with Sir Roy Welensky, while he was in this country, to support this Measure. If that is the case, it is the worst day's work done for Great Britain by any Secretary of State, so far as its influence on the Continent of Africa is concerned. It means this: gone is the day of the paramountcy of the interests of the indigenous people. Instead, the Government are now committed to the paramountcy of the interests of the European minority. There is not only African opposition. There is the African Affairs Board, with its distinguished European chairman; the European members from Southern Rhodesia, where a more liberal franchise has been proposed; Alexander Scott, the Independent Member for Lusaka; the two specially appointed European Members for the Northern Territory in Central Africa—all of them are opposed to this Measure.
  I do not want to see a race war in Central Africa, but I give warning to the Government that by supporting this Measure they are encouraging that psychology. I welcome the extension of the franchise to British-protected persons, but this gesture will now be forgotten under the terms of this Bill. There is the danger that the Africans will boycott the special roll——
  The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. C. J. M. Alport): May I ask to what Bill the hon. Member is referring?
  Mr. Brockway: I am sorry, but I have referred to it a number of times. It is the Constitution (Amendment)Bill.
  Mr. Alport: I think the hon. Gentleman is referring to a Bill regarding franchise, and that Bill has not been tabled.
  Mr. Brockway: I am sorry to controvert the hon. Gentleman's view. The Times this morning reported the debate in the Federal Assembly on this Bill.
  Mr. Alport: It is important to get this clear. The hon. Gentleman referred to the Constitution (Amendment)Bill, but in most of his speech he has been referring to a Bill regarding the franchise. The Constitution (Amendment)Bill has no relation to the franchise. There is no Bill so far tabled containing any of the details to which he has referred regarding the franchise.
  Mr. Brockway: The relationship is so close that it cannot be separated. The Constitution (Amendment)Bill which has been before the Federal Parliament is for the enlargement of the Assembly. The enlargement is dependent on the new electoral proposals which I have summarised.
  Mr. Alport: But it is important to get these matters accurate. The proposals which the hon. Gentleman is summarising are proposals which he has obtained from a source which I do not know but which are not at present contained in any Bill put forward by any Government in the Federation.
  Mr. Brockway: Again, I am very surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who is Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Commonwealth Relations Office, does not know the source of the franchise proposals which I have put to the House. They have been published. They have been put forward by Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation. Does the hon. Gentleman really mean that he occupies that office and is ignorant of those proposals?
  Mr. Alport: I know exactly what has been said. What I have pointed out to the hon. Gentleman, who has referred on a number of occasions to a Bill which contains franchise proposals, is that there

  1467
  is no Bill at present presented to the Federal Parliament regarding the franchise proposals. Therefore, when he is informing the House that such information is contained in some Bill which the Federal Parliament has been asked to consider, that is not, in fact, the case.
  Mr. Brockway: The hon. Member is quite wrong. I have referred to the Constitution (Amendment)Bill, the purpose of which is to enlarge the Federal Parliament, but the enlargement of that Federal Parliament is associated with the franchise proposals and quite inseparable from them. If the hon. Member is suggesting that I am wrong in linking the franchise proposals with the Constitution (Amendment)Bill, he is unaware of what Sir Roy Welensky and other spokesmen of the Federation have said in Central Africa.
  There is a danger that the African population in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia will boycott registration for the special roll under these proposals. I beg the Minister—and the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, if I can have any influence upon him—to reconsider whether our Government ought to support proposals of this kind. If they do, they will intensify the racial antagonism in Central Africa which it is the desire of us all to end.
  2.7 a.m.
  Commander C. E. M. Donaldson: Mr. Speaker, at this time of the night you will expect me to be brief, and I shall. I have been a Member of this House for five and a half years. I have listened to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway)on many occasions on this and associated subjects, and I have never heard him say a good word for the white population who inhabit the parts of Africa to which he has been referring tonight. I have never heard him give a word of commendation, and I deprecate his neglect in that matter.
  Mr. Brockway: The hon. and gallant Member cannot have listened very carefully. I have made hardly a speech without paying tribute to some Europeans, and I have done so tonight in giving a series of names of European leaders.
  Commander Donaldson: I will concede part of what the hon. Member has just said. However, the hon. Member would do himself, his country and the Africans better service if he would try to reach a balance between the African population and the white population who live in those territories in which he is most interested.
  I go further and ask where the African people would be if the white settlers who have used their own money and deployed their own energies and intelligence and willingness to work and strive for Africa had not done so. Where would they be with the increasing amount of self-determination which has been given to the people of Africa?
  The hon. Member made a comparison between African and West Indian Federation which is about to come into being. In years past, when I was in the Navy, I travelled about the West Indies, and I believe the West Indians would resent the comparison of conditions which the hon. Member has sought to impose on the House.
  I can tell him with absolute sincerity from my own observations that the coloured people in the West Indies are among the most loyal, upstanding and forthright subjects of the British Crown, of the Commonwealth and Empire whom I have ever seen in my travels about the world. They will not like the comparison he has made tonight with what is taking place in Africa. They will not like him for what he has said, and he will hear more about it from them in due course.
  2.10 a.m.
  Mr. John Stonehouse: In following the hon. and gallant Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Commander Donaldson), I think it should be made clear that hon. Members in all parts of the House who have experience of these African countries are well aware of, and fully appreciate, the contributions that Europeans have made in them. I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Brockway)would agree wholly with that. Those of us in the House who take an interest in colonial questions have no desire in any way to underrate the practical and valuable contributions which the European communities make to the

  1469
  development of the economies of these countries.
  The hon. and gallant Member must not, however, run away with the idea that everything which is good in Africa has been done purely and simply by Europeans. I would remind him that a great deal of the agricultural produce in African countries comes from peasant farms. If he will compare, for instance, the economies of Kenya and Uganda, he will find that Kenya has a permanent deficit in its balance of payments with the outside world and that Uganda has a very substantial balance in its trade with the rest of the world.
  I expect the hon. and gallant Member knows the economies of those two countries and will not need me to remind him that the economy of Uganda is almost wholly based on the peasant agriculture of millions of farmers on their shambas producing cash crops such as cotton and coffee. If he wants to compare those two countries further, he will find that the amount of progress made in the production of these cash crops in Uganda is every hit as good as the progress made in Kenya. The African peasant farmers of Uganda have shown that they can produce cash crops on an ever-increasing scale, and they have not only made a valuable contribution to the building up of the economy of Uganda but have made an indirect contribution to upholding the stability of Kenya itself through the linkup between the two countries. If the hon. and gallant Gentleman wants to compare progress in others of these countries, he will recognise that progress in Nigeria and Ghana is almost wholly dependent on the work that is done by the African population.
  I do not want the hon. and gallant Gentleman to think that in saying these things I am throwing any aspersions on the European communities in those countries, for they make a very fine contribution indeed, but the Europeans in those countries must not expect to have any privileged economic position in them. They have their contribution to make. They will, indeed, probably earn a higher income than the mass of the communities there by virtue of the special contribution which they can make and the special technical skills that they have, but they still depend on the endeavours of the mass of the population, and without the work
  1470
  of the Africans in those countries the economies would be very weak indeed.
  I agree wholly with what my hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough said at the outset of his remarks. It is regrettable that we have to delay the House at this hour, but the subjects which we raise are important ones and we have not had very much opportunity in the past few weeks to obtain proper answers to our questions. I am glad to see the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies following this point, and I should like to put it to him directly.
  For example, we on this side of the House have been trying for weeks to find out what is the Government's policy in respect of the establishment of a military base in Kenya. We still have no decision. The Minister of Defence went on a tour some weeks ago and, on his return, made a statement at London Airport that he would soon be able to state his intentions about the establishment of a base in Kenya. We are still awaiting that statement, and it ought to have been made to the House, because the House is entitled to debate the statement, not only in view of its great importance to the defence of this country and to the burden which we shall undertake with the establishment of that base but also in view of the important political considerations involved.
  We are beginning a Recess of three months, and in that time Ministers will be taking decisions on this very important subject; and we shall be unable to question them in any way. We have done our best. We have put down Questions week after week, but the Minister has continued to evade them and to decline to give a satisfactory answer. I have just received a written reply from the Minister of Defence on this very Question. All he can tell me is that he has nothing to add to his reply of 10th July to my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper Mr. G. Brown). That reply was:
  "…. When the policy is decided. I will make a statement to Parliament."—[OFFICIAL REPORT. 10th July, 1957; Vol. 572, c. 50.]
  Yet The Times, in an obviously inspired report, stated categorically some weeks ago that a military base was to be established in Kenya, and I have seen no correction in that newspaper. It is about time that hon. Members were given

  1471
  answers to Questions which they put on the Order Paper.
  This is an important subject. If a base is established in Kenya—and I sincerely trust that it will not be established there—it will involve us in considerable expenditure. We have to judge whether that expenditure is justified. A military base in Kenya will not produce all the advantages which some hon. Members opposite expect it to produce. I refer particularly to the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser), who was a great advocate of this base a few weeks ago. I hope that it will not be established there, but if further consideration is to be given to its establishment I urge the Under-Secretary of State to consult his right hon. Friend and to make sure that the African people in Kenya are consulted on this vital question. The days have long passed when it was possible for this country to decide these important questions without consultation with the indigenous populations.
  We have already made a great mess of an attempt to establish a base in Cyprus, wasting a lot of money at the same time, and it is no good transferring that base——
  Brigadier O. L. Prior-Palmer: Who were in office at that time?
  Mr. Stonehouse: I was referring to the base in Cyprus. My right hon. and hon. Friends have been very critical of the policy followed recently in establishing this base in Cyprus.
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: It was never a base.
  Mr. Stonehouse: A great dead of money has been spent on that base and on sending troops there.
  Brigadier Prior-Palmer: It is a headquarters.
  Mr. Stonehouse: Hon. Members on all sides recognise that we have got ourselves into a terrible mess in Cyprus. We are at last, I hope, beginning to extricate ourselves from it. Do not let us make the same mistake in Kenya. We want to go into this question very thoroughly and consult indigenous populations before we rush into the establishment of this base.
  1472
  Certainly, there are very strong military arguments against its establishment. It has been suggested that a naval base should be established at Mombasa but, as some well-known naval experts have already pointed out, it would be very dangerous to establish a naval base at that port. There are strong arguments against the establishment of this base, and I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will at least give an undertaking that his right hon. Friend will ensure that the African representatives in Kenya are consulted.
  Before I leave Kenya, I want to refer to the problem of economic development there. We have not yet had—although we have had several debates on colonial affairs and one on the Dow Report—any proper statement from the Colonial Secretary on the Government's policy in regard to Kenya's economic development. What, for instance, do the Government intend to do about the White Highlands? I am glad that the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations is here, because some time ago he said in public that he believed that the sanctity of the White Highlands—I do not know that I quote his exact words but this was his meaning—must go——
  Mr. Alport: I think that it would be helpful to the House, and, perhaps, to me, if, before the hon. Gentleman quotes from a speech that he alleges I made, he took the trouble to look at it to make sure that he quotes it exactly.
  Mr. Stonehouse: I would be very glad if the hon. Gentleman would correct me if I am under any misunderstanding about this. As I understand it, the Under-Secretary said some time ago that he believed that African farmers should be able to farm in the White Highlands. I hope that that is the case, because there have already been a good number of conversions on this subject. We see that even Mr. Michael Blundell, for instance, has at last agreed that African farmers should be able to farm there.
  I hope that, before very long, the Government will be able to announce their intentions as to the White Highlands and the opening up of the unused land in that part. A very recent agricultural report indicated that 10 per cent. of the land in the White Highlands—good farming land—was not being used. I very

  1473
  much hope that the African farmers who are now living in overcrowded reserves in Kenya will have the opportunity of moving into the White Highlands, with proper schemes of agricultural development to enable them, not only to increase their own standard of life, but to make a contribution to the improvement of the economy there.
  I hope that when these moves are initiated, the Government will bear in mind the very useful contribution that co-operative farming can make. There is no doubt that the success of the Gezira scheme in the Sudan shows what valuable results can flow from the co-operation of peasants and a body allowing them the credits to develop the area concerned. Some such co-operative scheme of development would, I think, be very useful for the White Highlands.
  We have heard the very useful franchise proposals for Uganda. Although they do not go as far as some of us on this side would like, we congratulate the Government on steps taken in the right direction. We do that sincerely. I think the Government will recognise also the contribution that African leaders, in particular the Uganda National Congress, have made to the realisation of these constitutional developments. These franchise proposals will, we hope, enable a democratic representation to be established in Uganda, and very soon we also hope that a common roll will be established so that there will be no continuation of any racial or colour distinction so far as the electoral roll is concerned.
  When, however, one turns to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, one sees what a really terrible contrast exists in the Government's policy for Uganda and that for Rhodesia and Nyasaland. I very deeply regret that the Africans' position in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is likely to be very seriously jeopardised if the present franchise proposals being put forward by Sir Roy Welensky are allowed to go through. They hold out no real hope at all for African advancement, and we should remember our responsibility to those millions who look to us for support. They are fearful that the position in the Union of South Africa will be repeated northwards and that if these proposals go through and give more responsibility to the Federal authorities in Salisbury they will lose the few rights which they have.
  1474
  Let us look at the franchise proposals. We will find that all liberal opinion condemns them. My hon. Friend the Member for Eton and Slough has already referred to the African Affairs Board, and particularly to the statement by the chairman. I hope that, before we disperse for the Summer Recess, the Under-Secretary will tell us what he thinks of this forthright statement. The chairman asks this Government, here, to veto these proposals because he believes—and let us remember that he is on the spot—that they will seriously undermine the Africans' position. [Interruption.] The Under-Secretary apparently says he did not say that, but I think that he will agree that the chairman has specifically asked this Government to veto these proposals. I hope that we shall be given an answer on that specific point.
  Millions of Africans and the chairmen of the African Affairs Board are awaiting a reply, and I hope that before we adjourn we shall be able to send some comfort to them. Before we judge whether these franchise proposals are of any assistance to these African people, let us remember that they must have an income qualification or high educational qualifications. The income qualification is made so high that very few Africans will be able to qualify. For instance, the minimum qualification for the special roll is £180 income a year: but according to the Brannigan Report, the average income in the Northern Rhodesia mining industry is £160 a year. So, many of the Africans, even in one of the industries where the highest incomes are paid, will not qualify even for the special roll, to say nothing of the ordinary roll.
  When we look at the other industries in Northern Rhodesia we find that the position is far worse. Take the building industry, for instance. The average income for Africans in the building industry is £58 a year, a little over El a week, and the minimum franchise qualification is £180 a year. Do hon. Members really believe that this is a wonderful franchise advance? There are over 30,000 Africans employed in the building industry and 46 per cent. of them receive the minimum wages, so that very few people in the building industry in Northern Rhodesia are likely, unless they are White, to qualify under these electoral rolls.

  1475
  If we look at the other industries the same position applies. In the chocolate and sugar confectionery industry the average African wage is £83 a year; miscellaneous food preparations, £29 a year; tobacco manufacturing, £60 a year. I am quoting from figures given in the Barclays Bank Overseas Review for June last. How can we claim that these franchise proposals are an advance for the Africans? Their average incomes are so low that only a miserable number of them will qualify.
  Turning to Nyasaland, the position there is even worse. The statutory minimum wage in industrial areas outside the main towns, for instance, is 1s. 3d. a day—£19 a year. In the townships they have slightly more—2s. a day. We are told, according to a reply which the Under-Secretary of State gave some weeks ago, that the food allowance is 4d. a day. What a miserable amount that is to add to the basic minimum wage.
  Another example that I would like to quote is uranium prospecting in Nyasaland. It is a new development, and yet the basic pay is 1s. 6d. for a five hour day. How can it be claimed that these Africans will ever have an opportunity of earning £180 a year, which is the minimum qualification?
  I should like to refer now to the position of civil servants in Northern Rhodesia, because here is a field where the Government can have some influence on the African's opportunities for advancement. We are told that the average income for African civil servants in junior division posts, with educational qualifications below Standard 6, is £91 a year, and in senior division posts with a minimum educational qualification of Standard 6 their salaries average £143 a year. In these two grades, in which are the mass of the African civil servants in Northern Rhodesia, very few will qualify even under the special roll. Graduates, it is true, have an average salary of £518 a year, but how many African graduates are there in Northern Rhodesia who are employed in the Civil Service—very few indeed.
  In the reply which the Secretary of State for the Colonies gave me on 30th July, he said that Africans can obtain awards of Government bursaries to enable
  1476
  them to train for the more senior positions in the Civil Service. But, as I understand it, there are only 32 bursaries for the whole Federation, and only four of those are available for candidates in Northern Rhodesia. What opportunity for advancement is that? Surely, we can do better than that. Surely, we can make more facilities available for the African civil servant in the lower grades to acquire the qualifications which would enable him to go into the higher grades with the income to qualify him for the franchise.
  All talk of the franchise developing in the Federation is worthless unless the African people have the opportunity to advance. They have not got that opportunity today, because many of the skilled jobs are closed to them, and many of the skilled occupations which they could take on after training in technical schools and apprenticeships are denied to them. Africans in Northern Rhodesia today have very little opportunity for advancement.
  There is hardly any opportunity for basic education. I believe that there are only a few secondary schools in the whole of Northern Rhodesia. There is one in the Central Province at Lusaka, which takes boys to form VI, and the other a mission school at Chikuni in the Southern Province, which also takes boys to form VI. There is a girls' school also for ages 12 to 25, but there is no school certificate course there. Those are the only secondary schools with adequate facilities available in Northern Rhodesia. Less than 700 students out of a total African population of 2½ million, therefore, can have proper secondary education. There is very little opportunity for technical education. The only technical college in Northern Rhodesia, the Copper Belt Technical Foundation, is available for whites only.
  I hope that the Government will use all the pressure they can to enable Africans to have further opportunities for education, particularly for technical education. I ask them also to bear in mind the possibility of making it a statutory obligation on employers in Northern Rhodesia to allocate a proportion of their skilled occupations to African employees, without making any conditions regarding the trade unions to which those employees should belong.

  1477
  I know that there are hon. Members who still imagine that the Africans of Northern Rhodesia are primitive and backward people who could not take on any skilled occupation, even if they had the chance. Anyone who thinks that need not go many miles from Lusaka to find Africans of the same tribes undertaking very skilled occupations indeed, having had those jobs for a long time. I am referring, of course, to the Belgian Conga, where many Africans have been holding skilled jobs, for a great many years. I believe that, in many respects, we are well ahead of the Belgians in Colonial administration, but in this we are well behind.
  I hope that the Government will closely examine the measures which they could take to help Africans to move into the skilled occupations in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, so that they may have an opportunity of earning the higher incomes which will bring them within the range of income qualifications necessary to enable them to exercise their rights as voters in their own countries.
  2.40 a.m.
  The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. John Profumo): Twenty minutes to three in the morning is a little too early for me to be absolutely certain that I have been able to take in all the points made by the two hon. Members opposite who have spoken. Therefore, I give the undertaking that I will study what they have said at a more reasonable hour of the day. I will try and answer very speedily some of the points made by the hon. Member for Eton & Slough (Mr. Brockway), because he was kind enough to give me advance information of what he was going to say. I cannot deal with the detailed points raised by the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stone-house), because I did not know that he was going to make them. That does not mean that they were not interesting or that I shall not consider them.
  I think I ought to put on record, because I would not like it misunderstood by people in the Colonial Territories, that although between them the two hon. Members opposite have spoken for nearly an hour, they are the only two Labour Members present in the House. There is no one on the Opposition Front Bench at all. I think I ought to make it quite
  1478
  clear that there was not a Member on the Front Bench opposite to listen to what the hon. Members have been saying.
  I do not think that I can comment on the constitutional problems in Kenya at this time. The House knows quite well the Government's view, which is that it is a problem that must be thrashed out locally. I am glad to know that it is in action at the present time. There were some lengthy discussions in London.
  Both hon. Members opposite raised the matter of the establishment of a United Kingdom military base in Kenya. The hon. Member for Wednesbury read out the latest Answer given by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence, which I am afraid I had not seen. If my right hon. Friend, whose problem this is, says that he has nothing to say on the subject, I certainly have nothing to say about it at this time of night except to assure the House—and this is important—that no final decisions have yet been taken and that on questions of this sort my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies will be consulted before any decisions are reached.
  Mr. Stonehouse Mr. Stonehouse rose——
  Mr. Profumo: No, I am afraid that I cannot give way to the hon. Member.
  The hon. Member who was just about to speak again complained that he had not enough chance of raising these matters with my right hon. Friend and myself. I should like him to know that, on average, the Colonial Office has about 1,000 Questions a year. We have now given the Opposition two days a week on which to ask their Questions, so that there will now be the opportunity to ask 2,000 Questions a year and, no doubt, the hon. Member for Wednesbury will take advantage of that fact.
  I will certainly look into the questions raised about the problems in Central Africa. I want to say a word about the Central African franchise and the Constitution (Amendment)Bill which was mentioned by both hon. Members. The position is that if the African Affairs Board after what it has done report against this Bill to the Speaker of the Federal Assembly as a differentiating Measure, then it will become a matter for my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Under the

  1479
  Constitution the Governor of the Federation has to send the Bill to my right hon. Friend, if passed, for signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. It would be wholly wrong for me, as the matter is sub judice—and I think the hon. Members opposite recognise this—to comment any further about the problem.
  I will give a very short answer to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough—I hope that he will not think it a dusty answer—about the date of Nigerian independence. I would refer him to the reply which I gave last Thursday when I told him that this matter of independence was thoroughly discussed at the recent Nigeria Constitutional Conference. I want to argue against him that he was wholly wrong in saying that we had lost the confidence of the people of Nigeria. Had he been able to be at the conference he would have seen that the very reverse was the fact. It was a most successful conference, and these people went back to their country full of confidence in the Government and in my right hon. Friend.
  The only difference of opinion was on the question of the final date. If the hon. Gentleman cares to look at the Report of the conference, Cmd. 207, if he has not already done so, and if he will read paragraphs 48 to 54, that will save me making a long response at this time of the morning. I am quite sure that any hon. Member who reads that will disagree profoundly with the conclusions reached by the hon. Member.
  We ought not to be mesmerised by an actual date for independence. Twenty years from now, neither the Nigerians nor we will argue whether Independence Day should have been on 2nd April, 1960, or on some other date close to that. All that will matter is that the country will have been well prepared for independence when the day comes. With these remarks, I am sure that the House is well prepared to hear me end my speech.

  BRITISH ARMY (REGIMENTAL AMALGAMATIONS)
  2.46 a.m.
  Mr. William Yates: I have been in the House for the past eleven hours, and I am sorry that I have not been able sooner to catch Mr.
  1480
  Speaker's eye to deal with a subject which concerns us deeply. It was mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kelvingrove (Mr. Walter Elliot), who during the afternoon discussed for a brief moment the reorganisation of certain Army units. I am sorry to delay hon. Members with this matter, but if their regiments were being amalgamated I am sure that they would be the first to detain the House for a few moments to mention the matter.
  The Queen's Bays—I must, of course, declare that I have served in the Bays—do not in any way object to amalgamation with the King's Dragoon Guards. The question that arises is the method which was used to select the regiments for amalgamation. This problem can only be known by those who understand something about the Army. Amalgamation took place after the First World War and on that occasion the amalgamations were arranged by seniority of regiments. I am referring only to the cavalry. Now, I wish to discuss the method of selection chosen on this occasion as I have been told about it.
  At the meeting of the colonels of cavalry following the war memorial ceremony late in May, they expressed doubt about their future. They were given an undertaking by General McCreery that he was considering the matter under the authority of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Those colonels of the regiments heard nothing about these plans until the selection had been made.
  On 16th July, without any warning, they were confronted with a fait accompli. When told the news, they had a vote on it and by a majority the recommendations made by the three officers—General McCreery, General Keightley and General Wheatley, I understand—were defeated, not necessarily by simply the regiments which were to be amalgamated, but by the consensus of opinion of cavalry colonels present at that meeting. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as adviser to the——
  Major H. Legge-Bourke: Can my hon. Friend say whether the meeting to which he refers was a meeting in confidence? If so, has he the permission of everybody present at the meeting to say what took place?
  Mr. Yates: I have no permission to state the facts as they occurred, but as a Member of this House and having been in contact with those interested in the matter, surely this is the place for me to raise such an important subject, namely the method of selection of regiments of the Royal Armoured Corps for amalgamation as set out in the White Paper. With permission, therefore, I will say exactly what occurred.
  The Chief of the Imperial General Staff then had to advise the Government on what action should be taken, and without any qualms at all——
  Major Legge-Bourke: I am sorry to interrupt my hon. Friend again, but I think he slightly misunderstood the point I put to him. I am not for one moment questioning his right to comment on what has happened and what decisions have been taken. What I am questioning is whether the description my hon. Friend is now giving is of a meeting which was confidential. If it was confidential, it seems to me it would be normal practice to make sure that everybody at the meeting agreed that this should be made public.
  Mr. Yates: I cannot possibly answer for all those present at the meeting. All I can say is that the information I have been given is that this was the method of selection and that my regiment is one which is affected by this method. It is only the method about which I complain.
  After that, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff advised the Government that, this method having been selected, it should be carried out. I understand that this matter was immediately referred to the Sovereign and agreed. I wonder whether hon. Members consider this was a particularly fair way to deal with the matter.
  Mr. Godfrey. Nicholson: Does my hon. Friend not realise that by giving—I am not saying it is a full or accurate account, or that he says it is, either—what purports to be an account of a secret, confidential meeting he may be causing an immense amount of trouble? People at the meeting will be asked whether this account is correct. They will be in great difficulty to know whether to deny or to confirm it. It puts them in an impossible situation. Will my hon. Friend accept it from me—for
  1482
  I am convinced of this—that he is going to cause an enormous amount of bad blood?
  Mr. Yates: There is no question of bad blood being caused in the matter. It is only the method of which I complain. I accept the amalgamation of the regiment. I knew it had to come. Everybody was prepared to accept it. Surely, however, the colonels of the regiments should have been consulted on the matter?
  In any case, it will be understood by those officers and men of the Queen's Bays that they would expect me as a former serving officer of the regiment and a Member of the House to give the House all the information I have on the subject. I am certain I have not caused any upset by saying that once the method had been accepted the only possible thing for the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to do was to recommend it. However, I do think it should have been handled, not by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as it was, but by some people outside the army.
  What has happened is this. People are blaming the Government for this decision. It was not a Government decision. All I need to say now is that it is no use blaming the Government for the arrangements that were selected. The arrangements selected were those accepted by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in person. That is all one can possibly say on behalf of the regiments which have been amalgamated. I would have accepted it readily had it been done in other ways and in better ways than those selected recently.
  Major H. Legge-Bourke: I should not have intervened but for the last remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates)about the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. There is no Minister here to speak on his behalf. I would place on record that, however sincerely my hon. Friend may believe that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff is, for want of a better expression, the nigger in the woodpile——
  Mr. W. Yates: No.
  Major Legge-Bourke:—I would say that there is no doubt whatever that there is no single officer in Her Majesty's Army today who has paid more attention to finding the best way possible of

  1483
  avoiding any amalgamation whether of cavalry regiments or others. He knows perfectly well, having served all these years, that this is bound to be a painful operation. From the information I have, I know that no one has made more considerable efforts to avoid hurting anybody than has the Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself.
  Question put and agreed to.
  Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

  BRITISH ARMY (REGIMENTAL AMALGAMATIONS)

    ADJOURNMENT
    Resolved, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. R. Thompson.]
    Adjourned accordingly at five minutes to Three o'clock.

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Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers

  ARUNDEL ESTATE BILL [H.L.]
  2.36 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the consideration of the Commons Amendments read.
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DROGHEDA): My Lords. I beg to move that the Commons Amendments to this Bill be now considered.
  Moved, That the Commons Amendments be now considered.—(The Earl of Drogheda.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENT
  [The references are to the Bill as first printed for the House of Commons.]
  In the Title, leave out ("to preserve Arundel Castle for the benefit of the Nation and as a residence for the Earl Marshal of England and").
  THE EARL OF DROGHEDA: My Lords, all the Amendments to this Bill really hang together, and perhaps you will allow me, in moving that we agree with the Commons in their first Amendment, to speak on all of them. The House may remember, in connection with this Bill, that by an Act passed in 1627 certain lands and houses in Sussex and in and about the Strand in London were entailed and made inalienable so that the entail could not be broken except by a subsequent Act of Parliament. The Arundel Estate Bill, as it was first introduced, had two objects: the breaking of the statutory entail, to which I have referred, and the preservation of Arundel Castle as a building of national, historic and architectural interest and as a residence for the Earl Marshal of England for the time being. The Bill would have charged the Strand estate with the establishment of two funds—one for the upkeep of Arundel Castle and the other for the provision of compensation for those persons whose potential interests would be affected by the removal of the restraints under the Act of 1627.
  396
  The Bill, in its present amended form, omits all the provisions regarding the preservation of Arundel Castle and all reference to the Earl Marshal, and it also omits all the provisions relating to the formation and application of a compensation fund. It now does nothing more than remove the restrictions imposed by the Act of 1627, and the effect is simply to put the Duke of Norfolk. in dealing with this parliamentary estate, in the same position as any ordinary tenant in tail.
  I ought also to say a word about the result of the omission from the Bill of the provisions respecting compensation. The Standing Orders of this House relating to Private Bills say that the consent of all parties concerned in the consequences of a Personal Bill shall be proved to the satisfaction of the Committee on the Bill, and, more particularly, that infants so interested shall be represented by a person appointed by the Lord Chancellor for that purpose. In the present case, the consent of all parties concerned was duly proved before the Committee, the consent of the infants being expressed on their behalf by the Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee.
  This is not, of course, the Committee stage of the Bill, and it may be that, under the strict letter of our Standing Orders, we are not concerned to see that, in the altered circumstances, the consents have been given. But I think that under the spirit of our Orders we ought to do so, and I must explain to your Lordships what has happened in this respect. The Duke has signed an undertaking that, if all the necessary consents are given and the Arundel Estate Bill is passed by Parliament this Session in the form in which it left the House of Commons, he will execute a settlement which provides compensation on the same scale as that provided by the Bill in its original form. I have seen this undertaking and consents signed by all the persons concerned, including the Official Solicitor and the Public Trustee, and I think that the House can feel assured that this aspect of the matter is quite in order.
  My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in the first Amendment to this Bill—namely, in the Title to leave out the words "to preserve Arundel Castle for the benefit of the Nation

  397
  and as a residence for the Earl Marshal of England and".
  Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—(The Earl of Drogheda.)
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, we are most grateful to the noble Earl for the great care which he has taken in explaining the position to the House. We understand entirely what has happened. We were concerned on the Second Reading of the Bill at the possible increase of statutory authority, as it were, for certain permanent positions in the State like that of the Earl Marshal. We drew attention to it, and it has been dealt with in another place. I think a proper settlement has been reached in the Amendments which have been made. It is obvious that the Lord Chairman has taken every possible care to see that the conditions required have been fulfilled. Therefore, I think that if we state from this side of the House on this first Amendment that we agree, we can take the other Amendments as being consequential.
  THE EARL OF DROGHEDA: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, for what he has said. As he has indicated, the other Amendments to the Bill really hang together and are consequential upon the first Amendment, except so far as they deal with the omission of the provision for compensation of which I have already spoken.
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  COMMONS AMENDMENTS
  In the Preamble, page 2, line 40, leave out paragraph (5).
  page 3, line 11, leave out ("(6)") and insert ("(5)")
  page 3, line 11, leave out ("the said") and insert ("Henry")
  page 3, line 12, after ("Rising") insert ("(the second son of the said Henry Frederick Earl of Arundel and Surrey)")
  page 3, line 15, leave out ("(7)") and insert ("(6)")
  page 3, line 28, leave out ("(8)") and insert ("(7)")
  page 3, line 40, leave out ("(9)") and insert ("(8)")
  page 3, line 43, leave out ("(10)") and insert ("(9)")
  page 5, line 32, leave out ("(11)") and insert ("(10)")
  page 5, line 41, leave out ("(12)") and insert ("(11)")
  page 6, line 3, leave out ("(10)") and insert ("(9)")
  page 6, line 9, leave out ("(10)") and insert ("(9)")
  page 6, line 10, leave out paragraph (13).
  page 6, line 20, leave out ("(14)") and insert ("(12)")
  page 6, line 36, leave out paragraph (15).
  page 6, line 41, leave out ("(16)") and insert ("(13)")
  page 6, line 41, leave out from ("expedient") to ("that") in line 43.
  page 6, line 45, leave out ("these estates") and insert ("the parliamentary estate")
  page 6, line 46, leave out lines 46 and 47.
  page 7, line 1, leave out ("(17)") and insert ("(14)")
  Clause 2, page 7, line 22, leave out lines 22 to 43.
  Clause 2, page 8, line 4, leave out lines 4 to 21.
  Leave out Clause 3.
  Leave out Clause 4.
  Leave out Clause 5.
  Leave out Clause 7.
  Leave out Clause 8.
  Leave out Clause 10.
  Leave out Clause 11.
  Clause 14, page 14, line 19, leave out ("Frances") and insert ("Francis").
  Clause 14, page 14, line 23, leave out paragraph (22).
  Clause 14, page 14, line 29, leave out ("(23)") and insert ("(22)").
  Clause 14, page 14, line 30, at end insert ("and").
  Clause 14, page 14, line 31, leave out ("(24)") and insert ("(23)").
  Clause 14, page 14, line 31, leave out lines 35 and 36.
  Leave out the Third Schedule.
  Leave out the Fourth Schedule.
  THE EARL OF DROGHEDA: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I will now move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their remaining Amendments to the Bill.
  Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendments.—(The Earl of Drogheda.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  EXPORTS TO CHINA
  2.43 p.m.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will state what is the principle which determines at what quantitive level non-strategic materials for export to China become strategic and therefore subject to embargo.]
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I regret that I cannot state what is the principle which determines at what quantitative level non-strategic materials for export to China become strategic and therefore subject to embargo, since the strategic criteria on which the security export controls are based are confidential. It would not therefore by consistent with either our international obligations or our own security to define the principles which govern the control of items on the quantitative control list. It may, however, be some comfort to the noble Viscount to know that there are only twenty-five items on the quantitative control list, as compared with nearly 270 items dropped from the China embargo list last May.
  VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Marquess for his courteous reply. Of course, the number of items has nothing whatever to do with what I asked. It depends on what the materials are, and the question I should like to put to the noble Marquess, which I think can easily be answered, is: how do you prevent the Chinese, when they get materials that are on the allowed list, from transferring them to military use?
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I think the noble Viscount will agree that that does not form part of his original Question. If he wishes to know what the twenty-five items are, they were published in the Board of Trade Journal on June 7.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, may I ask the noble Marquess this question? Although the Government are unable to state what is the principle which determines at what quantitative level non-strategic materials for export to China
  400
  become strategic, nevertheless it is the secret Committee sitting in Paris, which makes no report to Parliament, which decides that very thing, and British exporters desiring to do trade with China are subjected to the confusion that arises.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I think that the noble Viscount has a similar Question tabled for tomorrow, but I will endeavour to reply to what he has said to-day. There are no fewer than fifteen countries involved; as I have tried to explain in my original Answer, we have our international obligations to these fifteen countries. There is also, as the noble Viscount is fully aware, the Consultative Group. That Group is sitting now in Paris. We have not yet heard the final results of its deliberations, but we understand that the quotas will be fixed very soon now.
  VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, may I ask whether the Government will some day so direct their activities that this secret Committee will report to Parliament?
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I think that the short answer to that question is, No.

  BUS STRIKE INCIDENTS
  2.47 p.m.
  LORD ELTON: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government in how many instances acts of assault and violence are known to have been committed in furtherance of the bus strike and in how many instances prosecutions have been instituted.]
  THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION (VISCOUNT HAILSHAM): My Lords, I am sorry to say that this information is not available. Responsibility for enforcement of the law in any area rests with the chief officer of police concerned. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary received reports during the course of the strike of a number of incidents which led to prosecutions and of others which the police were following up with a view to prosecutions, but it is not possible to give comprehensive information.

  401
  I should say, however, that my right honourable friend is satisfied that the police in all parts of the country were well aware of their duty to exact compliance with the law, and acted accordingly.
  LORD ELTON: My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Viscount very much for his Answer. I think he will agree that the overall picture which it suggests, both of the conduct of the strikers and the enforcement of the law, is more reassuring than might have been gathered from the Press accounts during the first day or two of the strike.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I think that it is also right to say that unlawful conduct on the part of strikers was not at all widespread, and I do not think that I should give the impression that it was. One always sees reported the things which go wrong, but never very much the greater number of things which go right.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble and learned Viscount. Would he agree that there is no industrial country in the world in which there is less disturbance at times of industrial strife than this country?
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I should think that that is very probably correct.

  THE THIRD BATTALION GRENADIER GUARDS
  2.49 p.m.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
  [The Question was as follows:
  To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are aware that the Third Battalion Grenadier Guards is the oldest battalion of the British Crown, and whether that is the reason for its selection to be placed in suspended animation.]
  THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD MANCROFT): My Lords, I believe that the Third Battalion the Grenadier Guards, although older, is junior to the First and Second Battalions of my noble and gallant friend's Regiment. The companies from which the Third Battalion was derived were raised
  402
  in Holland during the exile of King Charles II and did not serve in this country until after the formation of the original companies of the First and Second Battalions. It was, unfortunately, a necessary part of the reorganisation to reduce the Brigade of Guards by two battalions. The battalions selected, after consideration of recruiting figures and the number of officers available, were the junior battalions of the Grenadier Guards and Coldstream Guards. These are at present the only Regiments in the Brigade with three battalions each.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the battalion which has the oldest continuous history as a battalion of the Crown is the Third Battalion of the Grenadier Guards? It was raised by King Charles II, as he said, in Flanders in 1656. When it was brought home at the Restoration, it was joined to what are now the First and Second Battalions of the Regiment but was given the lower number of companies: the First and Second Battalions were from 1 to 12, and the Third Battalion was from 13 to 24. I do not think my noble friend can deny that that makes the Third Battalion, as I said in my Question, the oldest Battalion of the Crown still existing with a continuous existence.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, while my respect for my noble and gallant friend's Regiment is unlimited, I am sorry to say that my knowledge of the finer points of its history is not. However, I should remind him that the Major-General commanding the Household Brigade gave full agreement to the decision which obviously causes the noble Lord so much unhappiness.

  GOVERNORS' PENSIONS BILL [H.L.]
  Returned from the Commons, agreed to.
  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I have to inform your Lordships that it has been agreed through the usual channels that this House will meet tomorrow at 4.45 p.m., and not at 2.30 p.m.

  ARMY ESTIMATES AND REORGANISATION
  2.52 p.m.
  VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN rose to call attention to the explanatory statement of the Secretary of State for War relating to the Army Estimates (Cmd. 150) and further Government statements connected therewith, including that on Compensation for Premature Retirement from the Armed Forces (Cmd. 231) and Future Organisation of the Army (Cmd. 230); and to move for Papers. The noble Viscount said: My Lords, as your Lordships know, the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper was originally down for an earlier date, but it was found that by postponing the Motion until today we should have the opportunity of discussing not only the Explanatory Statement on the Army Estimates, but also the two White Papers on compensation and reorganisation of the Army which have come out since. I feel sure that that arrangement will have been to your Lordships' convenience. All these Papers cover a great deal of ground and, therefore, I know I shall be forgiven if I treat some of the points rather shortly, and I shall do so in the confidence that some of my noble friends will speak on the same subjects at greater length later in the debate.
  What we are going to talk about to-day is, I think, all consequential on the decisions which were announced in the Defence White Paper itself, which we debated. as your Lordships will remember, on May 8. So far as I can see, there is nothing in the Army White Paper which suggests that there has been any change in the basic policy for the Army or any other Service since the Defence White Paper was published, and, therefore, as I have said, we are dealing with matters which are consequential on those major decisions which were published in the Defence White Paper and which were debated in this House.
  Perhaps I might quote one important sentence from paragraph 14 of the Defence White Paper. There it says:
  "Pending international agreement on disarmament the only safeguard against major aggression is the power to threaten retaliation with nuclear weapons."
  If that is true, then I hope we can also accept the converse of that statement, which I take to be that the only proper
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  safeguard against minor aggression is adequate strength in what we now call conventional forces. I should have thought that that idea was also implied by my right honourable friend the Minister of Defence when he spoke in another place and used the words, "delicate and critical balance of the Forces." So I think we get a position where both the nuclear pattern and the conventional pattern are required strategically if we are to match our responsibilities to this country, to N.A.T.O. and to our other international obligations. Therefore, I would take issue with the view which I thought was suggested in one of this morning's newspapers: that the nuclear pattern had only a political, and not a strategic, value.
  I now come to the Explanatory Statement on the Army Estimates itself. I think we were all glad to see that clear and lengthy operational statement and the map which went with it. I felt that we could have had a slight improvement in the map if the marking on it showed which were United Kingdom troops and which were Colonial and local forces doing their work all over the world in the overseas garrisons; but perhaps that is a secret which we ought not to know. Even so, since we are dealing with the Army White Paper, and since we are dealing only with the United Kingdom Forces, however good this Explanatory Statement is, it can give us only the narrower picture; it cannot give us the broader picture which would show how the defence commitments of the Commonwealth and Empire are being met by the military forces at the disposal of the Commonwealth and Empire. Nor can it give us a complete picture of Commonwealth and Colonial manpower, because we are limited in this debate to dealing with those people and those things which are an expense on the War Office Vote. I am not suggesting that that is anything but right, but I am making the point because it is an important one and because we want to keep in mind the whole picture while we are debating this aspect of it—I shall come back in a moment to the cuts in establishments.
  I do not think it follows for a moment that because the establishment of United Kingdom troops has been cut, therefore our commitments are necessarily less. I

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  should take the opposite view. We may decide to do away altogether with some commitments which we now have and which we think we can give up without serious danger—we shall probably have to do that. We may be able to offset the cuts in United Kingdom troops by recruiting (shall I say?) more Colonial troops in Africa, or by relying more on the new Federation of Malaya to look after their own defence; or, for all I know, we may have been able, at the recent Commonwealth Conference to reach agreement among Commonwealth Prime Ministers in such a way that certain tasks will be re-allotted as between the military forces of the Commonwealth. Anything which Her Majesty's Government can tell us about that, now or later, will, I am sure, be welcome; and, as I say, it is hard to make a fair judgment of these cuts in establishment without having some idea of their repercussions on our operational commitments. By that, of course, I am thinking for the moment of their effect on overseas garrisons in peacetime, which is quite distinct as a problem from that of what saving in personnel we can achieve by replacing conventional with nuclear weapons.
  But the emphasis which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War has placed on the operational tasks of the Army certainly, to my mind, indicates the need for a balanced Army. All the time we are being told by superior intellects of one kind or another, and told for different reasons, that nuclear weapons can do everything that is wanted. But to my mind, the statement of the Secretary of State for War in these operational paragraphs makes it abundantly clear to anybody with any knowledge of the problem that they can do no such thing, and I am glad that my right honourable friend has made it so clear in his statement.
  My right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary, in the disarmament debate in another place, used some words which I think are in point, when he said that we wanted disarmament, but that the Government had to insist that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be tied up together. I am sure that is right, although I do not very much like the word "conventional" to describe the things we are talking about. It seems to my mind to set up a
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  barrier on what should be a road of continuous progress in armament. Looked at from ten years hence, I do not believe that that barrier will still be there, and I certainly think that it is a barrier to clear thinking now. We should look upon every development in armaments, great or small, as being one more stage in progress, and should not confuse our thinking by classifying certain weapons into one moral or political category and certain other weapons into another, because that is not the way to conduct our operational affairs.
  Now we come (still on the Army Estimates) to the section on organisation. I think we should certainly welcome the trend towards brigade groups. Here I am talking about the operational brigade groups and not of the administrative brigades, to which we shall come in a moment in discussing the White Paper on the Future Reorganisation of the Army. I think that all the lessons over the last fifteen years have tended towards the proposition that the division, under modern conditions, is too large and too unwieldy to be the most suitable permanent formation and that the most suitable permanent formation should be the brigade group, or what the Americans call the combat group. That decision seems to have been taken now, and certainly it has taken a considerable time to reach. It was suspected to be the answer, as I well remember, in some of the early armoured exercises in this country over twenty years ago. It was certainly included in the evidence given by Lord Gort's Staff to the War Office after the Battle of France in 1940. I am quite certain that if the brigade group is now adopted as standard to Army organisation, that decision will be the right one.
  I thought it rather strange that, although the central reserve was mentioned in the Defence White Paper, it does not seem, unless I am wrong, to have been mentioned in the White Paper on the Army Estimates. But I am quite certain that that central reserve is the right idea. It has a good many aspects, and we shall come back to some of them again before long. But it will be much more useful and handy if based on a brigade group basis, rather on divisions. I think my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War said something

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  of that sort in the debate on the Army Estimates in another place.
  Now we begin to come to the effect of all these changes on what one might call the traditional organisation of the Army. In the old days, under the cadre system, we had a certain number of units overseas, most of them in India, and we also had a certain number of units and formations at home which were intended to be the basis of any expeditionary force which might be required for any world war. Now we shall have a slightly different picture, and that picture, I am bound to say, is not entirely clear from the statements published by the Government. Undoubtedly we shall have our overseas garrisons in certain places. Undoubtedly, we shall have our central reserve. It does not look as if that central reserve will be stationed at home in the same way as, pre-war, it was stationed at home in respect of every theatre outside India. There may be a certain amount of difficulty in fitting into our picture of the overseas garrisons in the central reserve the proper balance between the number of troops and their families at home and abroad. I mention that point because I think that before long we shall be entitled to have a little more information on that point. I am not complaining that we have not got it now; I am merely saying that we shall need it in order to complete the picture. That information, of course, will vitally affect such things as posting, barrack construction, married quarters, and all the rest of it. I am going to leave that aspect now, because I hope that some of my noble friends will deal with it more fully in the course of the debate.
  Coming now to the Territorial Army and Reserve Forces, most of us will have noted that they appear to be getting a slight rest from reorganisation, which I do not think is an entirely bad thing after the reorganisations they have gone through consequent upon the disbandment of the Anti-Aircraft Command. Now it is beginning to look as if, after what we know to have been the serious and important discussions early in the year, their rôle has begun to be set and, therefore, we can look forward to a time when the Territorial Army and all those who are in it understand exactly what they are supposed to do, on what occasions and in what places. That is
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  very necessary indeed, because until those matters are understood it is not to be supposed that volunteer recruiting to the Territorial Army will go with a swing. So we have reached a stage where the Territorial Army will need a great deal of explanation and help, in order that Territorial commanders can make good their word (which they have expressed so often in so many places) that if they are left to themselves they can produce the recruits as volunteers.
  The paragraphs in the Army Estimates do, none the less, go a long way to give a clear lead as to what is wanted of the Territorial Army, and I sympathise with my right honourable friend and his advisers, who are constantly being asked to give some idea of what the next war is going to be like, and how we are going to fight the next Battle of Britain. I quite appreciate the difficulty there, and certainly I should not like to give an opinion myself. None the less, some idea must be given to the reserve forces if recruiting and, later, proper training are to take place; and those two things go together. But it is difficult because, in a peace-loving country like this, I think we do not always remember that the pace for the next war, and the tactics to be employed and defended against, are not set by people like us. They are set by the aggressors, whoever they may be; and therefore, in the conditions under which we live. we are always at a disadvantage in that respect—and I hope we always shall be, for the reasons I have given.
  It certainly looks as if the most likely rôle of the Territorial Army is home defence. Some other tasks may emerge later when we see the position more clearly, but that is the first task which has emerged, and no doubt a good deal of work will be done in the coming months to integrate the command of the Territorial Army more closely than it is now integrated with the command of the Civil Defence Forces. I am going to leave it at that. In the same way, I am going to make no comments about the section in the White Paper dealing with weapons, because I think that everything in that section points to the fact that development is going on on the right lines and that the money is being spent in the right directions.
  There is one quite important section which deals with the cadet forces and,

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  by implication, with the enlisted boys. There is no doubt, in my mind, that once we gel to a volunteer basis, the pre-Service units of enlisted boys have a great importance. I must I am afraid, for the sake of good order, draw attention to a War Office "howler" in paragraph 67 where it says, speaking of the Army Cadet Force:
  "There has been no examination of this force since 1936".
  I regret to say that I do not think that is true. What is true is that there was no examination by an outside Committee between 1936, at the time of the Munster and Strathcona Committees, and the present examination by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War. It does not follow, however, that no major examination was made. The Army Cadet Force was examined from top to bottom in 1942, as part of the war effort, and I am sorry that my right honourable friend should have been misled by those War Office minds who cannot believe that the people in the War Office can examine matters for themselves.
  Now, my Lords, I come to the major question of the day, as I am sure it is, the White Paper on questions of manpower and reorganisation. We ought to be clear, as I said before, how the Government reasoning starts, as expressed in the Defence White Paper. You could ask, if you like, whether the hen or the egg came first. Did the Government decide, first of all, that we had reached the stage in nuclear development where it was safe to foretell the end of National Service, or did they decide that it was necessary to foretell the end of National Service and then decide that nuclear development has reached that point? Or were we very fortunate in that those two stars were in conjunction at the right moment? For the moment I will leave it at that.
  However that may be, the fact that the end of National Service has been announced does, I think, commit us to an all-Regular Army, at a figure which I believe to be somewhere between 160,000 and 170,000. Therefore, if, when the time comes to reach this figure of volunteers, we fall short of the required total, we shall be faced with a choice of evils. Either we shall fail to meet our operational commitments or we shall be
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  forced to reintroduce National Service; and that, would be a dilemma for any Party which happened to be in power at the time. We should realise quite plainly that if we are to achieve the target of a Regular strength of 170,000, we shall have to recruit far more men than the average numbers shown in Appendix B in the Memorandum on the Estimates. In other words, we shall have to recruit 45,000 to 47,000 a year, as compared to the present average of, say, 35,000, a figure which has been running for a long time past. A jump like this in Regular recruiting has never been achieved before in peace time, so far as I know, and I want to tell your Lordships, as straight as I possibly can, that no such figure will be achieved unless we have considerable changes in the handling of the Regular soldier, considerable changes in recruiting policy and also unless we have the most active support from every quarter. I feel that I must make this absolutely plain, as I am sure it is plain to my noble friend in front of me. I hope that we shall not be told later on that, although Her Majesty's Government meant to do all sorts of things for Regular soldiers, another credit squeeze has arrived and that these things cannot happen.
  I say plainly that, unless the volunteers are looked after in these directions; over barracks (and we still have not had the Report of the Weekes Committee published), and over a proper walking-out uniform and all the rest of it, the Government plan will fail; and we should not be honest if we did not utter this warning now. This plan must get off to a good start in the public esteem, as I think many of us ventured to say in the debate on the Defence White Paper on May 8. If we find one case of "stinginess", one border-line case put on the wrong side of the border, it will do an unfortunate amount of harm. Therefore, I hope Ministers will take care to see that they are not let down by well-meaning people in the Departments and then have to go and stand the shock in public. After all, you never know—some zealous official may well charge purchase tax on the forms on which officers are to claim their compensation. I do hope my noble friends in front of me will not misunderstand when I say all this. I am saying it because I am convinced that action like this is required, not only on ordinary

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  grounds of fair dealing but because future recruiting absolutely depends on it.
  May I now leave that topic and come for a moment to compensation and resettlement. I think most of your Lordships would agree that the terms in money are fair terms, by any standards—I am talking now about the people on permanent commissions. I should just like to add that there is the category of officer not on a permanent commission. Very little information is given about him in the White Paper, and therefore I must reserve what would otherwise be my unrestricted approval of the terms for the permanently commissioned officers, simply because I do not think we know enough to form an honest judgment about the temporary people. But I would add this: while I unreservedly welcome the White Paper on compensation, we ought to remember that that money will not have been well spent unless it produces satisfaction; and that money alone will not produce satisfaction unless the terms for compensation are matched by adequate arrangements for resettlement. I know that it is early days to expect a lot to be said on that, because the Committee under Sir Frederic Hooper is only just assembling; but here again I think we should be right to make the point in this debate.
  I come next to the White Paper on The Future Organisation of the Army. Whatever may be our feelings about individual regiments and details of all kinds, I think that most of us would be bound to admit that, in so far as a plan of this sort can be acceptable, this one is so. I would put it down as a fair and a careful plan, once it is assumed that the manpower cuts to this extent are necessary; and that, I think, we must assume, having accepted the Defence White Paper. Certainly I would agree every time that the amalgamation of infantry and armoured regiments is far preferable to disbandment. Perhaps here I may take one point of detail, as a "Green Jacket" I feel quite certain that my noble and gallant friend Lord Wilson will agree with me when I say that the idea of bringing the Oxfordshire and Bucks. Light Infantry into the "Green Jacket" group is an excellent example of the constructive use of a tradition which was founded in the Peninsula War.
  My Lords, any one of us who has been a professional soldier understands very well the sort of dilemma in which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council have been placed, and particularly the military members whose profession it is and of whom so many are regimental soldiers. I think that we ought in this debate to pay tribute to the care, the thought and the sympathy which they have tried to give, for the most part so successfully, to this very difficult problem. They have had to try to combine two almost opposite requirements: on the one hand, to avoid violence to tradition, and on the other to produce an organisation which will stand the test of war. And, of course, it has been impossible to please everyone. There is every sort of problem; the kilt, the army bands (where we may still be engaged in a running fight with the Musicians' Union) and the buttons—all those aspects have their problems, and most of them have yet to be overcome. Therefore, I hope that, so far as is humanly possible, my right honourable friend will listen to the views put up by the regiments, nearly all of whom, I believe, have already shown their willingness in principle to do all they can to make this reorganisation a success.
  As a first requirement, however, any plan of this sort must be statistically sound. By that, I mean that it must be possible in the ordinary way to reinforce the field force units, in peace and in war, by men who genuinely belong to the same regimental group—once the regiment, but now the brigade. the administrative brigade, as I said, and not the combat group. And, of course, it has been known for a long time that, by this standard, the arrangements which are now being superseded do not in the least fill the bill. Anybody who has watched the difficulties of keeping individual battalions up to strength in Korea, and has seen how impossible it has been to find reinforcements of the same regiment, or sometimes even of the same group, is well aware of the problem. After all, every reorganisation that has taken place since the introduction of the cadre system between 1870 and 1881 has been an adaptation of that system, and that system was designed to deal with operational situations where half the

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  Army, fortunately, was abroad and the other half, fortunately, was at home.
  The present requirements, as detailed in the White Paper on the Army Estimates, do not really bear any relation to those Cardwell requirements at all, and therefore I am sure that we have been right to discard the last pretence of working the Cardwell system anti, if we are to have a further reform, to do it properly, as I believe is being done now. Many of us have been told in our youth that, "If you cannot kill the bird clean, it is best to miss him altogether," and that "The worst thing of all you can do is to wound him." The 1922 "axe" wounded the Army, since not nearly enough people were "axed", and those who were left had their promotion prospects impaired for life.
  The changes in 1946, which were a great deal more complex than the earlier changes, were an expensive and not particularly efficient compromise between the traditionalists and the supporters of the Corps of Infantry, although, in the circumstances, I believe that what they did was actually right at the time, though not in practice and not in theory. But now we have reached a state of affairs where, clearly, we cannot maintain that number of infantry regiments in a proper state of health; and we shall never have that proper state of health with one-battalion regiments because they will always have serving with them many people who do not belong to them. Therefore, having accepted a situation which calls for this treatment, I welcome it in principle. I do not myself regard it as being inconsistent with tradition that we should discard a piece of organisation which was invented eighty-seven years ago, which worked satisfactorily for about fifty years but has been unrealistic ever since.
  I would, however, say this to the Government. I most earnestly hope that they will not be persuaded by anybody to do anything which interferes with the statistical basis on which these reforms have been calculated. Equally, I hope that, within this limit, and within reason, they will go to the greatest lengths to meet the wishes of the regiments, just as I am sure that the regiments themselves will go to the greatest lengths to fall in with the wishes of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council.
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  All this, all the details, remember, have yet to be thought out, and good will is needed on all sides. We must get through this reorganisation period as soon as we can, because, until we do, it is not likely that volunteer recruiting will settle down as it should to produce the numbers I was talking about a moment ago.
  This plan of Regular recruiting will, amongst other things, involve, I hope, the final disappearance of the low-grade soldier, and that is why I welcome the reference in the White Paper (I think it is in paragraph 15) to an increase of civilians, which I know will be good and I know will be economic. In the new Army, as it has been designed and presented to us, I am quite sure that we cannot afford low-grade soldiers who have been the curse of the Army for so many generations past. Some of your Lordships may remember an old West Country song in which there is a line which runs:
  "Never despise the soldier boy though his station be but low."
  There we are. For many generations the Army was cursed with low-grade Irish militiamen; now they have gone. Some people say that National Service was a curse for the Regular Army. That is a view with which I do not agree. National Service may have had its bad points—it certainly had its good—and assuredly I should not mind seeing the disappearance of the "teddy boys" whom I see in the train every week-end, rather thinly disguised as members, shall we say, of the Royal Pioneer Corps.
  And so the Army starts again. It must be, in the minds of all of us, an honourable calling, with the social status that it should have and the material rewards for service which men of the type which we wish to recruit of all ranks would expect to get in whatever profession they took up. The rewards for the Army, if they are to help meet the Army's requirements and repair the shocks—and shocks they are—of the cuts we are going through now, will need to be the very best. The effort which the Army is being called upon by the Government to make, in order to see it through this reorganisation and meet the requirements of the modern scene, will need all the help that everyone can give it, all the help the Government can give it, all the help that Parliament can give it, and all the help that that great mass of people outside this House who love the Army and sympathise with

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  its trials also can give it. I beg to move for Papers.
  3.28 p.m.
  LORD NATHAN: My Lords, it will be agreed throughout your Lordships' House that it would scarcely have been seemly, at this crucial moment in the history of the Army, that we should disperse without giving careful consideration to the proposals to which the noble and gallant Viscount has referred and which are embodied in the White Papers recently issued. The House is indebted to the noble and gallant Viscount for having afforded us this opportunity, for the range of his survey of the subject and also for having postponed his Motion in order to give an opportunity to-day of surveying the situation realistically in the light of what we now know to be the Government's intentions.
  The way in which the Army should be regarded, in the form in which it emerges from the Memorandum on the Army Estimates, is as a projection of the policy laid down in the Defence White Paper. The policy which was there set out was obviously the result of careful study. It was a serious contribution to a main problem of our time. As I ventured to point out in the debate upon the Defence White Paper in May, it was based upon a single hypothesis, the hypothesis that nuclear was is inevitable, and in that every possibility of ignoring or of minimising nuclear war was discarded.
  But, as I ventured then to point out, it was a rash assumption of a narrow contingency that we in this realm could afford to confine our efforts, on the footing that nuclear warfare alone would be the kind of warfare which we should need to face. That we should abandon (as the Government's policy as we now know it indicates) conventional warfare, conventional weapons and conventional forces, in the form in which we have known them hitherto, is to ask from us a belief that no longer will the kind of warfare to which we have been accustomed be essential or practicable, but that nuclear warfare will be substituted for all that. I agree with what the noble and gallant Viscount said: that when we speak of conventional warfare, armies and arms we do not necessarily mean them as they exist to-day. Inevitably, there are continual changes in
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  these branches of human endeavour, as in others. I speak of conventional warfare, forces and weapons in contradistinction to nuclear warfare.
  I believe that we ought to inquire how far the policy to which it is thought we should commit ourselves has been influenced by strategic considerations; how far, by political considerations—in which I include considerations of domestic politics—and how far by financial considerations. It is curious to note, on reading the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War, that almost every paragraph making some more or less new proposal indicates that the proposals it contains will mean a saving in money. Far be it from me to suggest that there should not be, and that we do not need, the utmost economy in all public expenditure on the Armed Forces, as in every other sphere of public activity; but I must confess to some alarm when I find that the Secretary of State for War indicates that finance—the saving of expenditure, has apparently been a foremost, if not the foremost, consideration in embarking upon the changes, some of which are now before your Lordships, so far as the organisation of the Army is concerned.
  My Lords, I am not alone, nor are my noble friends on these Benches, in wondering whether the form of the Army, as indicated in the documents before us. is soundly conceived. I find, in the formidable leading article in The Times of to-day, the sort of speech which, if we were again debating the Defence White Paper, I should have liked to address to your Lordships. It is mainly a warning notice that we may be making a mistake. The warning comes from a responsible source, and it draws attention acutely to the possibility that too much attention may have been given to the political aspect, and too little to the military and the strategic aspects, and to the needs for the defence of the country as a whole and in all its aspects. It is a criticism of the policy set before Parliament by the Government far more formidable than any that could be expressed by me from this place in your Lordships' House. It is a factor which certainly Her Majesty's Government will have to take into account. It is not the only place or occasion within recent weeks that these criticisms have been directed at this rearrangement of our

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  martial affairs. Perhaps the noble Lord who is to reply may feel it possible to say something about this point.
  From the contemplation of all these proposals, whether one looks at them as presented by Her Majesty's Government or even from the standpoint of this formidable article in to-day's Times, there emerges inescapably the necessity and urgency for pursuing disarmament by all possible means. If I say, as I have said to your Lordships before, that the choice with which we are confronted is the grim alternative of "disarm or die", that is not made less clear by what the Government are now proposing to us. I am glad to think that disarmament is once again being kept foremost upon the stage by the arrival of Mr. Dulles, at the behest of President Eisenhower, within the last day or so. It is a great thing to be able to keep the talks going, and I hope that not only will they be kept going but that something will emerge, as indeed, when we last debated this matter, we had reason to think might shortly be the case. It seems impossible to believe that the nations are so far apart that not even a beginning can now be made. I refuse to believe it, and I hope that the attention which has been directed throughout the world to the events of the present time, as a result of the action taken by President Eisenhower, will have some positive effect.
  Having made those general observations I must direct myself, and your Lordships' attention, to some of the points which seem to me to arise out of the White Papers recently published. So far as the future organisation of the Army is concerned, I share with the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, the feeling of satisfaction that the policy pursued by the Government has been not disbandment but amalgamation. I know well that there will be those in each of the amalgamated regiments who will consider that the end of the world has come. But it is mainly those who are past members of a regiment who feel that most, because for them it is the regiment as they knew it, which means everything as they look back. Those within the regiments at the time of amalgamation will each feel that its old tradition is being halves and shared. Those who come new into the amalgamated regiment in the future will feel that they have a
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  double share of glory through inheriting the traditions not of one but of both the amalgamated regiments. A youngster posted to the 17th/21st Lancers acquires a famous motto: "Death or glory". He does not greatly mind—or even know—whether the motto comes from the 17th or from the 21st, that, for him, is his motto for the future: he is the heir of both those famous regiments. I believe that that is the spirit which will be found in the new regiments soon after amalgamation and reorganisation have been effected.
  I think that I may speak with a measure of recent personal experience, drawn, indeed, not from the Regular Army but from the Territorial Army. As your Lordships will recall, two years ago there was a reorganisation of the Territorial Army which involved, at all events so far as the regiment with which I am associated is concerned, its amalgamation with two other regiments—I will tell your Lordships which they were, because that may give point to the story. My own regiment, to which I was appointed twenty years ago, was the St. Pancras Rifles, founded in 1798 at the time of the projected Napoleonic invasion. The two other regiments—founded in the same year and for the same reason—amalgamated with mine in 1955 were the Tower Hamlets Rifles and the Finsbury Rifles, the latter being the regiment in which Field Marshal Sir John Harding began his military career, as a rifleman. I was invited to continue as Honorary Colonel of the combined regiment. Naturally, I felt that there was quite likely to be a good deal of difficulty between these regiments, each of which was to be represented by a battery in the amalgamated regiment. I set myself the task of seeing whether, out of those three notable regiments, we could produce a single harmonious integrated unity. I am glad to tell your Lordships that, after two years of experience, I am able, hand upon heart, to say that where there were three units, there is truly now one.
  When I was in camp with them, two or three weeks ago, on the coast of Norfolk, I spoke to the officer at the control post. The battery sergeant major was, I knew, like the officer, a member of the St. Pancras Battery. I said, "This looks like a St. Pancras Day." He turned upon me and replied, "No. Sir: this is Q Battery and this is the 512th Regiment

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  of Royal Artillery". I accepted the rebuke, which was deserved, but I felt that it was also a tribute to the fact that the amalgamation had truly been effected and had proved successful. I believe that the same will apply in the Regular Army when the scheme put forward in this White Paper is carried into effect. If I may give one piece of personal advice to the noble Lord opposite (he may or may not care to take it, but it is based on experience), I would say to him that in his amalgamation he will be faced first with the question of who is to be the commanding officer of the new amalgamated regiment. Naturally, the better man will be selected but I would suggest to him that care should then be taken to see that the new Commanding Officer of the amalgamated regiment having been selected from one of the regiments, the Colonel of the regiment should then be selected from the other. I believe the noble Lord would find that that would have a great effect in ameliorating feelings. That at least has been my observation.
  I now turn to the White Paper on Compensation. If I were to say that the terms of compensation take me somewhat by surprise, because they are very generous; or if I said (which I do not) that they are meagre and insufficient, the noble Lord opposite might say that it is very difficult to do right—and so it is. But on the whole, speaking at all events for myself, I believe that these gratuities are fair and on the generous side, rather than otherwise. And they should be on the generous side, in the conditions with which we have to deal. But do not let us overlook the effect that this may have in other directions as regards pension rights or compensation for those in civilian life—for instance those in ordnance factories—who, owing to a reduction in the necessity for armaments may lose their jobs. The answer may be, and I daresay is, that they have a much better chance of finding a job elsewhere in these days, with the technical skills which they are able to bring to hear. Nevertheless, it is a factor to which I suppose attention has been given, along with the effect from the inflationary aspect.
  Speaking of this compensation as compensation to these officers and other ranks, in the circumstances I think it is fair enough, and even generous. At
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  present rates of taxation, it would take years for these officers to amass the capital sum which they are now to receive as compensatory payment. I hope they will not jump for every "wild cat" scheme that is presented to them for the investment of these sums of money, for, as a broad generalisation, they will not be able to amass that amount of capital again for many years, if at all. So let them stick to it whilst they have it. Seeing the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, sitting opposite I have wondered whether perhaps this was not an opportunity for reviving something in the nature of the citizen's advice bureaux, in which during the war the noble Viscount took so much active and invaluable interest, so that those bureaux might advise officers and other ranks on the manner in which they might best deal with their compensation, and also give warning and advice when they thought that those men were going to make a mistake. I throw that out as a suggestion.
  How are these officers who are to leave the Army going to be selected? I understand the programme is that volunteers will be called for, and it will then be seen whether enough volunteer to answer the requirements. if more volunteer than are required, the War Office will have to exercise a certain power of selection. If too few volunteer, then the War Office will have to add to the number others who have not volunteered. This is the difficulty, for those who volunteer may be drawn from some of the most promising of the younger officers—those who have been through the Staff College and been marked down for promotion to higher rank in the future; and those who do not volunteer may be those who prefer to feel safe in the job they have in the Army.
  If many of the better qualified officers volunteered, and their number was disproportionate to the others, so that when they had gone the Army would be left with the second quality men, the War Office would then have to say to those of this higher quality who had volunteered: "We cannot let you go. You must remain in the Army and we will substitute for you someone who has not the same high qualification." I very much doubt the wisdom of that course of action, for if a man is asked to volunteer to leave his profession, and agrees

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  to do so, it is rather hard to be told afterwards: "After all, you are too good and are not to be allowed to leave the Army." Moreover, the better qualified men probably will not volunteer to leave unless they have made arrangements to go to some particular post or into some particular business. To withdraw from them the power to leave after they have been invited to do so seems to me to put them into a very indifferent position and to bring them back into the Army not in the best mood. On the other hand, if the less qualified men are substituted for them, when those men seek employment prospective employers may ask: "Were you a volunteer or were you nominated to leave?" and I believe that those who have been nominated will have less prospect of finding a useful job in civilian life because of this differentiation. It is an awkward situation, which the noble Lord may think it worth while to look into. I very much doubt the practicability and profitability of calling for volunteers, except on the footing that those who volunteer are, in fact, to be allowed to go.
  As regards resettlement, which is a vital matter, the prescription is very much "the same as before." The arrangements which are now contemplated do not, so far as my recollection goes, differ greatly from those made after the last war, and I will warn the noble Lord that the departmental arrangements of the Ministry of Labour, at Tavistock Square, with which I had a good deal to do in one way or another, certainly were not as satisfactory as one would wish. This was partly owing to the fact that those who were employed to find jobs for officers who had left the Army were drawn from the Services, and had neither the aptitude nor the necessary knowledge of civilian life for the work. The way to get military men into civilian jobs is not to have military men to advise them where to go but to have civilians to look after them. That is no aspersion on the military men, who are devoted public servants, but it just is not the sort of business for which they have any particular qualifications.
  I would express the hope that, among other occupations open at all events to the younger men, may be the professions, and that arrangements may be made for the younger men to be able to spend some time in articles either in the accountants'
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  or the solicitors' professions, or other similar professions, where men of good quality are always wanted. And I would express regret for the past and hope for the future—regret for the past that it has not been done, and hope for the future that it may be done—namely, that during, at all events, the last year of a serving officer's time in the Army, and that of other ranks, there may be a year's training in some occupation likely to be useful to him in civilian life. That, again, should be undertaken under civilian and not under military supervision and direction. All these questions of compensation, redundancy and resettlement are, as the noble and gallant Viscount has told us, wrapped up with the whole problem of recruiting. Whether it is recruiting for the Territorial Army or whether it is the more difficult recruiting for the Regular Army, these things are closly interlocked with the impression that is going to be made on the public mind as the outcome of the payment of the compensation and the arrangements for resettlement.
  I would urge the noble Lord that there might be a little realism about all this. I am very much impressed by Welbeck College, which I hope may provide young officers of good quality for the Army. I have every reason to think that it will. I am told, however, that the other day the Chief of the Imperial General Staff held at Sandhurst a meeting with the headmasters of various public schools, and that he exhorted them to encourage their boys to take commissions in the Regular Army, holding out to them the fine prospects that there are in the Army to-day. But what is the use, at the very moment when officers are being asked or forced to resign, with their careers so much destroyed that they have to be paid compensation out of public funds, of exhorting youngsters to join the Army because it offers a considerable career?
  One headmaster told me that the effect was lamentable; it seemed to be wholly unrealistic. He said that at a "leavers' meeting" last week, just before the end of term, the one subject of conversation among those who had intended to make the Army their career was that that profession was now gone; and he added that on one day—or it may have been one week—four parents had gone to him and said: "What are we to do now? It is no use sending our son into the Army."

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  I am not suggesting that that was a correct assessment by parents or boys of the future; but I am saying that this was, of all moments, a wrong moment to take these steps and to hold out before these youngsters the prospects of a tine career in the Army, because those who held out those hopes were simply challenging rejection. It is a great pity, I think, that what might have been a good chance, if left to the right moment—
  LORD MANCROFT: What is the right moment?
  LORD NATHAN: I can tell the noble Lord what is not the right moment—that is, when hopes are destroyed and when prospects are undermined; it is not the right moment when the Government have to pay £40 million in compensation to officers whom it is discarding. That is not the moment at which to suggest to youngsters that they should join the Army becaust it offers a steady and a splendid career. I say, give it a little time; let the new Army have the chance to mature a little; let us see what shape it is going to take; let us find the new spirit which inspires the new Army; let us see the effect when new quarters and other amenities and improvements of a material nature are satisfactorily arranged.
  Finally, I should like to ask the noble Lord a question which I hope he may be able to answer. I think it is of importance that your Lordships should know how recruiting for the Regular Army is going. So far as I am aware, the last returns were published at the end of March. Returns, I think, are normally due at the end of June, and it may be that they are to be published quite shortly. So far as I can make out, the trend, roughly, in recent months has been hard to follow, because the total figures have jumped up and down, and there has been no clear separation between the recruits of various categories. What I should like to know is, on the present trend of engagement, re-engagement and prolongations, the size of the Army, as the Minister is now able to contemplate it, in 1960 and 1962 when the last National Serviceman is due to leave the Forces. That, as I think the noble and gallant Viscount pointed out, is really a vital question, because if the figures point to an Army on a volunteer basis of much less than 160,000—and at that one that is ageing
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  and tending further to decline—clearly, we must go on with National Service, or we shall have to be content with a smaller Army to meet the contingencies we are likely to have to face from 1962 onwards. So I ask the noble Lord (I have given him notice of the question) whether he can give us some details of the recruiting figures during the past few months.
  My Lords, I conclude on this note. What I have said with regard to the effect of all this upon prospective young officers is, in a sense, by the way and an indication of how things might better not be done. But I should hope that there are many young men who, as the Army evolves a new system, better amenities and wider responsibilities, may feel that there is to be found in that Army a vocation which they should adopt, a vocation honourable in itself, honoured by and useful to the country.
  4.0 p.m.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, with reference to the Motion of my noble friend Lord Bridgennan, which I support, I wish in the first place to refer to Command Paper 230, The Future Organisation of the Army, and particularly to that part which refers to the Brigade of Guards. The main reductions in the Brigade include, in the first phase, placing the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards in a state of "suspended animation", as it is euphemistically called, and, in the second phase, the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards is to be similarly treated. Whilst no mention is made of it in the White Paper, it is understood that the Training Battalion at Pirbright is also to be abolished. That would be a considerable economy and quite reasonable, so long as there are enough battalions in London—and this is a big point—to admit of the necessary proportion being spared for training in their duties in the field.
  It is stated that the proportion of "teeth" arms compared with administrative services is to be increased in the Army generally, but this does not appear to be the case so far as the Brigade of Guards is concerned. As was made clear, I hope, by the Question which I put to-day, the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards and the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards are in one sense, and in one sense only, not comparable with one another. The 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards is the oldest battalion of the

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  British Crown. The 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, which I know from having commanded it and having a good deal to do with it, is a first-rate battalion, and one of the youngest battalions of the Crown, having been raised during my own service in the year 1898. The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers is one of the old Brigade of Guards. It served in the Peninsula, at Waterloo and in the Crimea. But it is to be dealt with simply as a battalion, or as a third battalion.
  The 3rd Battalion was one of two battalions of whom it is recorded that Sir John Moore, on the retreat to Corunna, when sadly watching the confusion and disaster into which the majority of his army had fallen owing to the hardships of the retreat, said, when he saw two completely orderly battalions approaching, "Ah, those must be the Guards from the way they are marching." And presently the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the First Guards passed him in perfect order. And that tradition still persists. I have recently seen a letter from a lieutenant-colonel of the Line describing how he saw that same 3rd Battalion come down to the Mole for embarkation from Dun-kirk on June 1, 1940. After having heavy losses and after the hardships of the retreat, they were completely disciplined and every man in his place and in step.
  These may be dismissed as sentimental reasons, but, sentiment apart, there are very sound reasons for not reducing the Brigade of Guards. Presumably there is no intention of reducing the state associated with the British Crown. If that is so, it must be pointed out that there are now normally only two battalions of the Guards in London doing the same duties that were formerly done by five battalions, and that not infrequently involves men being on guard up to ninety-six hours a week. Perhaps it might be said that that is nothing; it is what they are there for. But if we keep men on guard like that, with little sleep and wearing uniforms and boots night and day, we must give them rest in between guards. And if they are to get rest, they cannot be given the proper training in field duties, even if the necessary ground were available and handy in London. As it is, they are apt to get stale from excessive guard duty, as well as lacking the necessary training in duties in the field.
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  There should be at least four battalions—I should prefer to see five—for duty in London. And both Wellington and Chelsea Barracks ought most certainly to be rebuilt to take two battalions each. That, to my knowledge, certainly in the case of Wellington Barracks, has been put off year after year for at least the last thirty years—I should say for longer—and I do not suppose that there are such bad barracks anywhere in the Army as Wellington Barracks, which were built in the reign of King William IV.
  It is my personal opinion that there ought also to be two battalions at Windsor to admit of the duties there being properly done and time given to have the necessary field training. If London and Windsor are to be properly garrisoned and the duties about the palaces to be properly carried out, then there cannot be as well large reductions of numbers, besides having Guards battalions serving in Germany, Cyprus and elsewhere in the world. I suggest, therefore, that it is a mistake to reduce either the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards or the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, especially the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, with its antiquity and its great record of service. Both are necessary if the ceremonial duties about the Court are to be properly carried out and if at the same time the troops of the Brigade are to be properly and fully trained, as they ought to be and as they always have been.
  I would say a word about the future organisation of the rest of the Army. First, I would speak of the Royal Armoured Corps. I wonder whether it would not be better to keep intact more of the cavalry regiments, whose traditions are great, especially for rapid movement and seizure of opportunity, rather than maintain so many battalions of the Royal Armoured Corps, which, after all, is a new corps. As regards the Infantry of the Line, the scheme has been sprung upon the regiments. Surely time is required for due consideration of these schemes. These marriages (if I may call them so) of regiments may be suitable on paper, but if one partner does not see eye to eye with the other—and there are some such cases—it does not make for a happy union, as it should be and as we hope these unions will be. I can suggest one which is certainly not suitable, I would

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  have said—that is, the one which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Bridgeman.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, would my noble and gallant friend refresh my memory and tell your Lordships what one he has in mind as an unpromising amalgamation?
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, I have several in mind, but the one which was mentioned by my noble friend, who moved this Motion, was that of the Rifle Regiments and the red-coated Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, may I get this point straight, to avoid misunderstanding? I was under the impression that my noble friend Lord Bridgeman—I may have misheard him—quoted that as an amalgamation which was likely to be successful.
  VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, my noble friend did not mishear me.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My noble friend suggested that it was not very promising.
  VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I am afraid I did not suggest any such thing. I beg my noble and gallant friend's pardon if I did not make myself clear.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, I am afraid that I misunderstood my noble friend and I withdraw my suggestion about that. But I do say that there are other cases—I will not quote them, because I may be mistaken again—where there are doubts as to the success of amalgamation.
  Then there is the proposed grouping in so-called brigades. A brigade is a tactical formation, and it is going to remain a tactical formation, although not exactly in its present form. I would suggest that these so-called brigades might be better named groups. Here again, it is necessary that these brigades or groups should be composed of regiments that have friendly feelings for one another and for their union, especially as non-commissioned officers and men are to be liable to transfer within the brigade, and senior officers are to be liable to transfer within the brigade on promotion. There is also the matter of the one cap badge for each brigade. I cannot help
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  thinking that this, as well as, in my view, being unnecessary, will be unpopular. Regiments value their badges, which mean a lot to them. I wonder, too, whether one other matter has been fully considered—namely, whether it will be possible to raise by voluntary recruiting sufficient men for even the much reduced numbers which are contemplated. I suggest that that is an important matter to consider.
  For all these reasons I hone that time will be given for further consideration of these various questions, and that decisions taken will not be considered as being irrevocable. I wonder, too, whether we are not cutting our conventional forces too fine. There are bound to be incidents, such as that of Oman, which is going on now, or larger incidents such as Korea, where it will be undesirable to use nuclear or hydrogen missiles but with which we must deal firmly and effectively. Generally, I would suggest that, though from the air it is possible to terrify and destroy, yet it is only a man on the ground who can occupy, administer or pacify. That is a matter which is sometimes forgotten by people nowadays.
  As regards the question of compensation for premature retirement from the Forces, I know well that other noble Lords have already dealt with this matter and that others still will do so. I will, therefore confine myself to saying that, while it is difficult to calculate in pounds, shillings and pence fair terms of compensation for the upsetting of all the prospects—for it means all in many eases—to which officers and warrant officers have been looking forward, yet, if it is to be, the terms set out seem to be not unreasonable, and, in fact, some of them seem to be generous, especially in the case of warrant officers. So much is this so that, in the event of a substantial number of warrant officers availing themselves of the new terms of retirement and the capital payments, it is questionable whether it will be possible in the immediate future adequately to fill their places; and it will be most important to do so. Particularly will it be important if a considerable number of warrant officers avail themselves of these promised terms and at the same lime enlistment and recruitment fail to produce the number of recruits that are desired.
  I wonder whether these matters have not been sprung upon the country at

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  rather short notice, in the hope that there will not be much discussion about them. It is the "fag end" of the Session, and these terms have only recently been produced and sprung upon the nation. I hope that time will be given for adequate consideration of these matters and, as I said earlier, that decisions taken will not be regarded as irrevocable. I hope very much that this scheme, or some such scheme, may be successful but, none the less, that it will receive further consideration and will not be rushed through in very quick time.
  4.16 p.m.
  LORD TEMPLEMORE: My Lords, this is the first occasion on which I have had the honour to address your Lordships' House, and I must apologise for occupying valuable time in an important debate of this nature when I am sure you are wanting to hear other noble Lords far more qualified to discuss military matters than I am. If it is some slight consolation, I will not detain your Lordships for many minutes. I wish to comment upon only one aspect of Army reorganisation—namely, that of the amalgamation of certain regiments of the cavalry of the line. As your Lordships will see, six regiments are going to be amalgamated, making a net reduction of three cavalry regiments. Before I go any further I must make it clear that I am not against amalgamations, as such. Obviously, they are to be preferred to disbandment, and the taxpayer cannot be expected to finance regiments which are no longer needed. But what I have been wondering, with great respect, is whether alternative methods for dealing with this situation have been fully explored.
  To return to the question which I have uppermost in mind, certain possibilities have been mentioned to me regarding amalgamations, and I propose to repeat them to your Lordships in the hope that they may, at least, ensure a stay of execution. I am not going to pretend to your Lordships that in all this I have no axe to grind; I have. In the words of the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, I am a past member of a regiment, and I want to ensure that my old regiment, the 7th Hussars, is at least the cavalry to save first, or, failing that, to amalgamate last. As I see it, when National Service has been abolished recruiting is going to be the major difficulty to be faced by the
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  Army in the future, and in these days of full employment it is not going to be at all easy to obtain enough recruits. In this respect, I am informed that the 7th Hussars have the highest number of Regular long-service content, as opposed to men enlisted for three years only, of any cavalry regiment. They disembarked only this morning at Southampton after returning from Hong Kong, but I am informed that they have enough Regular enlisted men at the present moment to go on active service, if they had to, next week. They have not at the moment many recruiting difficulties, for various reasons with which I will not detain your Lordships now. They have contacts which ensure a regular flow of boys as Regular recruits and, unlike most of the Army, the 7th Hussars know for certain that they can keep up to strength in Regulars for at least the next year or two.
  This business of recruiting brings me to the first of two suggestions which I am going to make. At the moment, the armoured divisional signals regiment is provided—it always has been provided and, I think, is going to be provided in the future—by the Royal Corps of Signals who, I understand, are finding difficulty in recruiting enough Regular men. If a cavalry regiment replaced the Royal Corps of Signals in this particular job, as was actually done by the Cheshire Yeomanry in the Middle East in the last war with great success, recruiting difficulties would be solved in this respect at least, at no extra cost to the Government at all. That is one possibility.
  Furthermore, it has occurred to me that within the next two or three years the country may be faced with the hard necessity—I hope it is not, but it may be—of creating a light armoured regiment which could be airborne and which could accompany the infantry brigade which, I am informed, is going to be specially maintained as a kind of Imperial "fire brigade". In this respect, it is worth mentioning that two light tank regiments of this nature, in so far as equipment is concerned, would cost only the equivalent of one normal heavily-armoured regiment. I imagine that the reason for that apparently rather astonishing statement is the cost of the tanks. That is what I am informed, at any rate. Also, in this respect, it is worth

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  bearing in mind that Russia maintains airborne armoured regiments.
  In respect of these suggested alternative rôles for avoiding, or, at least, postponing, amalgamation, I should like to close by emphasising that cavalry always welcome, and always have welcomed, change. In the past, cavalry regiments have fought on horses, as commandos, as infantry battalions, as machine-gun battalions, as armoured regiments, as floating tank regiments, and as glider regiments. They are the most versatile people in the Army. And in all these varied and many-sided rôles they have never lost their spirit of aggression and improvisation. They have retained unimpaired their traditions and incidentally, their cap badges. Surely, a way can be found of avoiding the sacrifice of these priceless assets. My Lords, I beg to support this Motion.
  4.25 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLS-BOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure that all noble Lords present will, with me, give a welcome to the maiden speech that we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Templemore. We have been expecting that he would join us earlier than he has in contributions to the debates in this House, because we have recollections of his respected father who rendered so much public service in the past, especially to the Party to which the noble Lord himself belongs, and whose services here were always appreciated. The noble Lord has spoken to-day with the experience and the view of an experienced soldier. We have been glad to have his views, and I am sure we shall all listen to him on future occasions with great interest and pleasure.
  The debate which has been opened to-day by the noble Viscount. Lord Bridgeman, has seemed to attract more attention in your Lordships' House than the debates upon the Ministry of Defence White Paper, upon the Royal Navy or, so far as we have attended to it in full, the debates on the Air Estimates. We have a long list of speakers, and we have come to view the severe cuts in the Army Estimates as being likely to focus attention upon the great decisions that have to be made this year and next year with regard to the future formation of our defence services.
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  It is perhaps valuable to those who have expressed some doubts about the ultimate programme which will result from the Defence White Paper, that to-day we have had such a lead given to us in The Times leader—the "formidable leader," as my noble friend Lord Nathan referred to it to-day. It has taken up a phrase which both of us have used previously from this side of the House, which is that the decision of the Government, in its White Paper policies of the last two years, to regard the nuclear weapon as the ultimate deterrent, and taking fully into account in estimating what we could afford, has meant that we have now reached "the point of no return." That point of no return means that we have to decide how far we are going to concentrate almost entirely upon the production of an expanded programme of nuclear weapons, not only of the kind we have seen in connection with air-conveyed missiles, but in the very large and long-distance ballistic rockets. I think is of fundamental importance to remember what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, pointed out to us this afternoon when commenting upon the Army White Paper. I think his reference in drawing your Lordships' attention to the map at the back of the Paper is very important. It gives a quick picture of the kind of commitments we shall have to keep in mind when we are drafting and drawing up our programme for the effective defence, not only of the home base, but of all the widespread commitments that we have to cover.
  I must say that I feel very much with the writer in The Times this morning that if we cannot afford to maintain the full development of all the nuclear weapon programme which has been proposed up to date, and which might still further be expanded, as well as maintain the full numbers and equipments of the conventional forces to meet our commitments, then we had better think again before we give up so much of our programme of what is called conventional defence. I was rather interested in what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, said about the use of the word "conventional" in these matters. I suppose it is meant to represent all those weapons which have never yet had to be prohibited by an international convention. I suppose that is the way in which the word has arisen. But

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  it is certainly a horrible thing to think that we might go along the road he suggested, and gradually go on expanding these horrible and fearful methods of war, with no obstacle in the way of their becoming the conventional weapons.
  Nevertheless, with regard to those that we look upon as conventional up to the present, I must say that there is a growing and widespread feeling in the country that perhaps we are cutting too deeply and too quickly into them, and not for the best reasons, at a time when, if we held on to a reasonable quantity of conventional weapons, we might have a far better bargaining position in any situation which might arise out of the Disarmament Conference which, in the first place, seems to be largely directed to dealing with nuclear weapons.
  We are, it seems to me, likely to pursue a policy in general in our disarmament and international conferences of saying that we must retain a nuclear weapon, provided, of course, that if there is any restriction or banning of nuclear weapons, there is at the same time equal emphasis upon conventional disarmament; otherwise we should be in a very serious position. But if we pursue the kind of policy which has been adopted in these Estimates for the Army, we may find ourselves in a situation where, having reached an agreement for preliminary or partial banning of the use of the H-bomb or atomic weapons, we then turn to discuss reduction of conventional arms; but having already made a greater contribution than we ought to have done at this time, we cannot be expected to make it again at the next stage of negotiations. It seems to me that that is a quite serious point which should be observed.
  I beg the Government to think particularly of one phrase that I spotted in The Times leader. It was this:
  "A Cabinet decision is urgently needed to ensure that next year's defence expenditure will be determined by what is militarily necessary and not by what is politically expedient."
  I think anybody who has had any experience at all of being responsible for a military defence policy knows perfectly well that in the end, in order to deal with the matter satisfactorily, political decisions and desirabilities have to be put very much on one side if there is to be a fair assessment of what is the right
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  military defence programme to adopt. It seems to me that we have been rather hurried into this situation by the fact that it has been necessary to save a great deal of money as quickly as possible, and that the hurried decision has been come to without any real working out of the tactical and strategical position which is likely to face us after this has been done.
  I should like to ask some questions of the noble Lord who is in charge this afternoon, Lord Mancroft. We always look forward to his replies to these debates because he is so careful and gives so much attention to detail. The first question I would ask him is: was this programme for the reduction of defence provisions, including these reductions in the Army Estimates and personnel, ever a matter of consultation between our Minister of Defence and, say, the military sections of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Council? Was it agreed to? Has it already been inquired into in regard to the effect it will have upon the rôle of the Army in Europe, for example, in the next few years? It would be interesting if we could find that out and see, therefore, upon what basis we are likely to be working out our defence programme.
  Then I should like to ask about something that struck me in the speech of Viscount Bridgeman, and that was the question of reserves, and his reference to the central reserve. It is very interesting to look briefly at paragraph 5 (d) of the Memorandum, where reference is made to the contribution that the Army will make to the reduction. It is said that part-time training in the Reserve Army has been restricted to volunteers and has led to the consequent reduction in Vote 2. I think it would be for the guidance of the House if the noble Lord in charge could tell us in the course of his reply what is going to be the actual strength of the reserve, both voluntary and compulsory, for, say, at least the next two years to which this programme looks forward? What is going to be the strength of both the voluntary and the compulsory reserve, and what is going to be the training time that is to be given to the volunteers? If, of course, we are going to rely in future entirely upon voluntary forces for our Regular Army, it seems to me to be a great pity that we should be disbanding so rapidly many

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  of our voluntary auxiliary organisations, because in times of stress and struggle and major crisis in the past they have been such a great stand-by to us in every one of the Services.
  The other thing I should like to talk about this afternoon is partly in relation to these reserves and is the question how soon the Government consider that switching over to the attempt to get a Regular Army of 160,000 to 170,000 men is going to be successful? How soon do the Government consider that they will be able to get an Army of that strength ready to act in meeting all our commitments? I think that we have been banking much too heavily upon being able to recruit soldiers into the Army merely by offering more money for signing on. I think the motions which have been made so far by the Government towards trying to get longer periods of enlistment are an excellent thing, but that when they begin to offer the suggested financial inducements for voluntary enlistment they should be careful to make it clear whether or not the terms offered are going to be a contract and whether the contract is going to be kept: whether, for example, if there is another crisis, credit squeeze, or something of that kind in two, three or five years' time, the people who are to be engaged under the new voluntary recruitment on terms now to be drafted, can rely on those terms not being reduced.
  I must repeat what I said to the noble Lord on the Second Reading of the separate Bill which he introduced in the House a few days ago: that if you look at the experience of the Royal Navy at Invergordon in 1931, you find that the principal cause of the mutiny which so unfortunately happened was just that. I repeat what I said the other night: that the men who enlisted pre-1925 in the Royal Navy were the people who caused the mutiny, because they had been told that in no circumstances would their contract conditions be reduced, but they were all brought down in the common reductions that took place in September and October, 1931. In the present circumstances, in which the Forces of the Crown are coming in for such a slashing as is taking place now, I think it is fundamental that you should say whether or not the terms of cash in the numerals in which you state them are to be the minimum for the whole contract of service of
  436
  these people. I did not get an answer to that point the other day in the debate, but I think it is of fundamental importance if we are to maintain not only the flow of recruits that we want but are to have the best possible spirit in the Forces at any time and in any financial circumstances that the country has to face.
  Now I come to the question of the arrangements which are being made for reducing the establishment by way of amalgamation of regiments. I do not have to go into details of regimental considerations, as the noble Lord. Lord Jeffreys, and the noble Lord, Lord Temple-more, did. I never held a commission, except in the very much despised Labour Corps and in general service on the Staff, but I do say that it seems to me to be the best possible thing that instead of disbandment there should be such other reductions as are possible, if we have got to slash, and that we should amalgamate rather than disband. I dare say my noble friend Lord Ogmore, who is to speak later on in the debate, may have something to say about these regimental traditions; he knows more about them than I do. But I think that in what you have to do at the present time, according to the policy of the Government, it is better to amalgamate than to pick out a smaller number for absolute destruction and disbandment.
  I should like to come to the conditions which have been published for compensation to the various sections, commissioned ranks and non-commissioned ranks, in each of the three Services. I think the comment of the weekly newspaper, the Economist was probably the right one: it indicated that the compensation was not only adequate but probably more than generous. That may be an opinion held by many people. It emphasises in my mind the point made by my noble friend Lord Nathan earlier this afternoon: that is, that as these quite considerable capital sums will come into the hands of officers, some of whom have not been connected with commercial life, and also into the hands of, say, senior non-commissioned warrant officers—£1,500 or £1,600 at a time, plus an attenuated pension—the word should go out in some ways or the other from the Service Departments that they would be well advised not to fall for the snares of that

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  class of people who are sometimes described as "City sharks" and who put forward all kinds of new schemes and ideas by which any person who can put up a small capital will make a very large return. I hope that some means will be found to give advice and warning in those respects. Otherwise, I feel that having regard to the width and depth of the slashing of the Forces in this year's White Paper, it was no more than justice for Parliament to ask the Government that the compensations which were to be given should be fully adequate.
  In conclusion, although perhaps many people of my own political views in the country may not agree with me (because they have always been very keen on having no National Service and on having a voluntary Army and Air Force; there has never been much difficulty in getting a voluntary Royal Navy), I must say that I view with considerable concern the situation which has arisen and which I understand now from the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, would not have been avoided under the actual drafting of the previous Statute on National Service. If there should be any real failure in achieving by voluntary enlistment the strength of Forces which will be the absolute minimum necessity, then you will have to revert to National Service, and that means—as I hoped it did not mean—entirely new legislation to re-impose National Service. I think myself, although I am certainly not speaking at the moment for my Party as such on this particular point, that the country as a whole say that if you do riot get the voluntary enlistment required it is the bounden duty of any Government which has the responsibility of the defence of this country to get the people required by other means. It is essential that we should make that clear at the present time, even although, as I say, I cannot say at the moment that I am speaking for the National Conference of the Labour Party or any overwhelming Labour point of view in the country.
  If you can get voluntary Forces adequate, sufficient, and able to defend our country as the home base and our widespread commitments overseas, very good; but if that is not so—and I could not find it to be so myself in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949—the one trap into which you must not fall is to be left without
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  your minimum effective defence. I wish the Government every success in getting the voluntary Regular Forces, but, whatever else happens, whilst we shall do all we can to co-operate with others who think with us and have the same principles, in the end the nation is responsible for its own defence and Parliament must see to it that it is adequately equipped.
  4.45 p.m.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, with the last sentiments of the noble Viscount opposite, I entirely agree. We must, if we cannot get sufficient Forces by voluntary means, use other means, as he has said. I am very glad that he has said so, and it does him the greatest credit, because I know that he has always had the real interests of the Services and National Defence at heart. We have sometimes differed on principle, but in this we are at one. I was not quite sure what be was referring to in his remarks about the nuclear deterrent (I have not read The Times leading article) but I have always had the greatest admiration for the noble Viscount, in that he was the Minister responsible, I think, and was certainly at the foundation of our nuclear experiments which had the successful outcome in the atom bomb.
  I must say, though the matter is complicated and the economics difficult, that I cannot conceive that we could do anything more unwise than at this juncture to discard what I might call the "Ace of Spades." All of us wish to see disarmament on the widest possible scale, but unless we have that weapon—we must face it—we shall become completely a client State of Russia or the United States. When I recall the attitude taken, not only by the noble Viscount's Party, but a great many other people as well, about the American policy in the Far East, and how loud were the cries that we should dissociate ourselves from the United States in that policy, I find it hard to conceive that the noble Viscount's Party should now wish to give up the one power we have of having any independent policy at all.
  My Lords, we are really to-day discussing the three R's of reorganisation, resettlement and recruitment. I listened, as I must, deeply affected, to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, as I have had the honour to serve in the

  439
  regiment which he commands. Although I realise the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government, I hope they will ponder upon what he said about the necessity to have a viable Brigade of Guards. I should like to add that, as recruitment of volunteers is going to be supremely important in this new Army of ours, I believe that the regiments who are losing battalions will find it far easier to get the voluntary recruitment than a good many other regiments, not necessarily on grounds of superiority, but because they have a three-year and nine-year engagement.
  I should like to pay this compliment to Her Majesty's Government They have been long in labour but they have not brought forth a mouse. I believe that, on certain assumptions—and they are very important ones—the schemes and policies which the Government have laid down in their White Paper are workable. Moreover, I think the announcements that have been made to the public and the Services have been intelligibly and sympathetically made. I myself have no personal repentance that I urged the Government to make these statements at the earliest possible date. After all, public Departments are not noted for over-haste in these matters: it is far more likely they would miss the bus than be there too soon. If I may mix the metaphors, they have just caught the train when the guard was waving his flag and blowing his whistle; they have got there breathless, but just in time.
  The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and others have naturally, in a debate of this character, referred to those two great Secretaries of State, Lord Cardwell and Lord Haldane. What seems to me so important about the policies of these statesmen was that they were very clearly founded. They knew exactly the organisation of the Army which they wished to produce, and, because they were clear-sighted and prescient, their reforms endured. Lord Cardwell's survived, in essence, both the South African War and the First World War. We must ask ourselves: does a similar prospect now face us in the reorganisation which is now being produced to us?
  I take it (though I am not sure that it is absolutely stated in terms in any of the recent White Papers) that the Army's
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  prime task remains to uphold British interests overseas. We naturally have to defend these islands, but we do not necessarily defend them by troops on the ground in these islands. The whole success of this reorganisation will, in my view, depend upon obtaining a proper balance between the Home Establishment and the Forces overseas. If you cannot gain and maintain that balance, if you get turbulence and short-term postings, you will never get a happy and contented Service which can rely on definite tours of duty at home and abroad, arranging its domestic and professional life in accordance; and you will not get the voluntary recruits. When I talk about "home service" I make this allowance: that you may have to group home service with service in Germany. That will be because they are, or should be, two relatively stable areas. But, as the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, has said, all planning, whether in connection with weapons, barracks, married quarters or supplies of all kinds, depends on the maintenance of a stable balance between the Home and Overseas Establishments.
  Therefore we must have clear thinking, as I see it, about the "fire brigade." I think it right that we should have somewhere, not necessarily in the United Kingdom, a centrally placed Reserve. I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, to give his attention to this point when he replies. I hope that the Government will not think that the "fire brigade" will count as Home Establishment. If, for example, it is to spend a year or so, let us say, in Kenya, fighting Mau Mau, then you must count the "fire brigade" as part of your Overseas Establishment, wherever it is situated. I think that Lord Cardwell's greatest monument is the permanence of the arrangements which he introduced, and perhaps the supreme test of all is the regard which we all have for the county regiments. It seems to us the natural order of affairs; we regard them as if they had always been. That is the success of the Cardwell experiment.
  Under the changed conditions which now confront us, I am sure that strict regimental promotion, whether for officers or N.C.Os., is out of the question. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, who has a far more intimate experience of these matters at the War Office, has told

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  us that we must get the statistical basis right if the new set-up is to be a success. With great respect, I agree with him. But when Lord Cardwell introduced his reforms, he incorporated the existing regimental system and made use of the great traditions which were already there. I ask this question. Is it the intention of the Army Council primarily to permit within the new structure cross-postings only where necessary, or is there to be a common list for field officers and above, and for senior N.C.Os? It seems to me that, if the latter is to be the case, it will inevitably destroy the regimental system. An officer who wishes to join, for instance, the King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry hopes one day to command it. If, when he reaches field rank, he is not given a better chance than an officer in another light infantry regiment, in due course that spirit will be destroyed; and you cannot be sure that you are substituting another spirit equally as good. I have been thinking about these matters—not from a hostile point of view—and I wonder whether it is right to have a common cap badge. We should think about that again. I am sure that that will be taken as a gesture that it is not the regiment which is to be preserved but a new entity which is to be created.
  I have talked about reorganisation. I wish now to refer briefly to resettlement. Like other noble Lords who have spoken, I regard the compensation terms in general as fair. I am glad that the Government have deliberately not used the word "generous", because compensation is strictly an exchange of equivalents, and there can be no exchange of equivalents when a man's career on which he had set his heart is removed from him. Naturally I am pleased, because I am an associate of Sir Frederic Hooper in business and I have a high regard for his talents. I think he is the right man in the right place. I am equally glad that the director of this scheme is to be Sir Ronald lvelaw Chapman, who has been a colleague of mine on the Air Council, and for whom I have the highest regard. Naturally, the form in which industry is approached will be extremely important in this matter. That is why it is so important to have an industrialist on the spot. A great deal of responsibility (and I think this ought to be said in this House) is placed upon the larger firms in industry
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  to bear a disproportionate part of the burden, for only the larger firms can have the resources to afford to train these officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers and to forgo the fruits of their training in the meantime.
  There is one aspect of this problem which gives me special personal anxiety—I refer to what I may call the regimental officers. It is the pride and glory of our fighting arms in particular, and of the Services in general—but I am thinking at the moment, perhaps, more especially of the Army—that they have attracted the type of officer who wishes to lead and command troops. His ambitions may not be very extensive. He may wish perhaps, as all good officers wish, to command his regiment. He may succeed or he may not, but he is an officer, but he is the officer who, when times are at their worst, bears the heaviest responsibility of all. He is much more difficult to place than anyone else. Therefore I hope that my resettlement scheme will take especial care of that type of officer, because it is our duty to the past and our promise for the future.
  There is one other aspect, if I may touch on it, and I put as a question to the noble Lord. Lord Mancroft: Can he assure us that this resettlement scheme which is to be introduced, and which we all trust will be successful, will be on a permanent basis? It is not only in the interests of individuals that it should be so but it is in the public interest as well. I believe that, in the career structures which I understand the Services are working out, it is most important that they should be so shaped that an officer has an incentive to retire when he can no longer give of his best. We do not want a large number of officers to be in jobs to play out time. It is useless to pretend that establishment committees, however severe they are, can prevail against the shaping of what I may call the career pyramid. If you have not a good job for an officer, and he has to go on serving for his pension or gratuity, a job will be found in the establishment, and there will be a corresponding lowering of efficiency throughout the Service. I attach enormous importance to raising the efficiency of the Services at every level, and particularly the rearward services.
  I wonder if I may take the liberty of quoting from a hook by Lord Biddulph

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  on the work of Lord Cardwell, which recounts the history of the War Office: It says:
  "When"—
  in 1855—
  "the War Office was reconstructed it was formed by what in geology is called a catastrophe. It consisted of part of the old Colonial Office, part of the old Ordnance Office, all of the Secretary at War's Office, part of the Treasury and a little bit of the Home Office."
  I think that a good many of those origins have been submerged, but a good many noble Lords and others who have served in the Army may detect that little bit of the Treasury sticking out still. The test of the efficiency of the public service is not arrived at by "squeezing" the Estimates to the last possible degree every year; the test of efficiency is a policy extended over the years, aiming not necessarily at small economies in the present but at large economy in the future—if need be, by spending now.
  My Lords, I hope that wise and long-sighted counsels will prevail over what I may call, perhaps unflatteringly, "the Treasury mentality." We shall see whether or not the policies are wise when the question of the third "R"—that of recruiting—comes to the front. It is no good thinking of anything less than a 95 per cent. success. Anything less than that will be of no value. If you do not get your 95 per cent. you will not get viable units—units that can be trained and posted abroad, and units which will give stability of career. It must be a success, and it will not be a success unless great attention is given to conditions of service.
  I know that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for War has this matter very much in mind. But he will need all his persuasion, all his determination, if he is to succeed; and he must strike while the iron is hot. Let us have better barracks now, not in the future. Let us continue to build married quarters in the places where they are needed. Let us have far better facilities for the education of Service children; and let us see that the uniform of the men who come and volunteer is worthy of their spirit. These are some of the conditions of service which require the immediate attention of the right honourable gentleman. All Service Departments of the Government and, also the Treasury,
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  are on trial. But the War Office bears an especially heavy burden because of this major reorganisation of the Army, and an especially heavy burden for the national safety and for the Army's reputation.
  A young cavalry officer some sixty years ago, taking part as an observer in a frontier action in India, said this about the British Army which he then saw in the field:
  "Perhaps he"—
  the soldier—
  "remembers that he is sprung from an ancient stock. and of a race that has always known how to die; or more probably it is something smaller and more intimate, the regiment, whatever it is called, 'The Gordons' 'The Buffs', 'The Queen's'; and so nursing the name, only the unofficial name of an infantry battalion, after all, he accomplishes great things and maintains the honour and the Empire of the British people."
  The writer of that passage is still the Colonel of the 4th Hussars, and has twice been Prime Minister. If the policy of Her Majesty's Government is successful, if the British soldier is wisely administered and well led, although the circumstances of the British Empire may have changed, he will still be the worthy upholder of the country's honour.
  5.5 p.m.
  LORD WILSON: My Lords, in the Memoranda before the House to-day, dealing with reorganisation and the rundown in numbers of the Services, the Army has had a hard knock. The Army is accustomed to that, and I am certain that it will take it in good spirit. I am certain that if you were to raise that well-known shout in which soldiers used to indulge—namely; "Are we downhearted?" the answer would come back, "No". But I feel that in the defence policy which Her Majesty's Government have put forward, the aim is the production of a long-service, voluntary Army, and the problem of recruitment therefore becomes a primary consideration—a matter which has been already enlarged upon by previous speakers.
  There is one condition in the White Paper which I feel will probably militate against recruiting; that is, the imposition of the brigade cap badge. Those regiments which have been selected for amalgamation must, of necessity, choose an agreed cap badge. That is just too bad,

  445
  but unavoidable. But I ask your Lordships to consider whether it is necessary to penalise the other infantry regiments by taking away their cap badges, which carry their honours and traditions, and of which their counties and cities are very proud. Psychologically, that is bad and cannot but cause resentment and friction.
  Take, for example, the Gloucestershire Regiment, who have the privilege of wearing the cap badge both before and after their caps. This privilege was gained on the field of battle. Then consider some problems that might arise with the North Irish Brigade, which has two Fusilier Battalions and one Rifle Battalion; or with the Welch Regiment, which has one Fusilier Battalion and two Infantry Battalions. I fear to contemplate what will take place in Scotland—I dare not venture on that. I feel that the introduction of a brigade badge cannot be put down to a desire for economy in the Ordnance Services. Rather is it due to the desire of the War Office to foster an illusory esprit de brigade. The Continental regiment of three battalions is a combat formation which trains and fights together: but that is not the case with the proposed organisation of the British infantry, as this brigade is to be entirely for administrative and recruiting purposes. Except possibly in the case of the Brigade of Guards, one cannot visualise three regiments of a brigade fighting as one formation; overseas commitments will prevent it.
  Is it therefore necessary to ride roughshod over regimental traditions and sentiment with this object in view, remembering that with the Cardwell system it took the best part of a generation for it to be reconciled within the Army—and that was just about the time when I joined it? Surely a distinctive flash on the shoulder would meet the case and proclaim the brigade designation? The effect on recruiting is bound to be adverse, and one cannot see a recruit of the future offering himself for enlistment in the Midland or Home Counties Brigade. An anomaly is also created by the fact that the Territorial Army and the Cadets are to retain their present regimental badges. They will be very pleased, but the Regular soldier, on the other hand, will not be so pleased. Old soldiers always like to see their old cap badge at regi-
  446
  mental reunions and other "get-togethers." Finding the badge changed, they will not be so keen to persuade their sons and grandsons to follow in their footsteps.
  Another point which I should like to put to your Lordships is the question of bands, which in future are to be brigade bands. Bands in isolated stations help to sustain morale; and in the past, as I knew as a commanding officer, they provided a good quota of the senior warrant officers; but I am told that if battalions are to have their own bands it will mean the loss of more fighting units, and that therefore the demise of the old battalion band must be accepted. But it is to be hoped that these brigade bands will be allowed a higher establishment and an increased band allowance to enable them to make a good impression as an incentive to recruiting.
  Previous speakers have already mentioned the question of improving the dress of the Army, and I would ask, especially as regards the Regular soldier: Has not the time arrived for a smarter and more attractive dress to be produced? One cannot help feeling that seeing a soldier in the street in battledress is not likely to attract a possible recruit. I would forward the suggestion that, if financial restrictions are so acute in regard to the provision of a good uniform for the Regular Army, then soldiers might be allowed to buy authorised and smart walking-out dress on the hire purchase system.
  The Memorandum on the Army Estimates refers to the Army Cadet Force as a valuable recruiting ground. It is to be hoped that the Committee now sitting, under the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, on the subject of the Army Cadet Force, the Report of which it is hoped will be available before the autumn, will remove certain anomalies as between officers of the Cadet Force and officers of the Territorial Army. It must be remembered that the Army Cadet Force belongs to the national youth movement and, as such, is also responsible for citizenship training. The results to be obtained from these cadets depend on the platoon and company commanders who have to "put the Army across" not only to the boys but to the parents as well, by pointing out that a career in the Army is well worth while. In their

  447
  responsibilities in this respect they should not be allowed to be out of pocket in travelling to their drill halls or welfare huts. The good will of the parents is very important for recruiting. A boy of eighteen does not consider what he will be doing at forty, but his parents will do so.
  To produce long-service soldiers, a reasonable prospect of employment should be offered, not only in connection with the present run-down hut with the Army of the future, so that those who join may have something to look forward to, possibly in the form of an integrated career in Government and in the Services. I raised this question some six years ago, but nothing concrete has so far emerged upon it, only the appointment of Committees. The future of the Army is so dependent on recruiting that I trust that the points that I have raised will be considered favourably.
  5.18 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I should not have ventured to intrude as an amateur in what must be primarily a professional discussion had it not been for the presence in the White Paper The Future Organisation of the Army of one terse and trenchant paragraph dealing with the Territorial Army. It so happens that I have been associated with that Force in various capacities almost, I am afraid, since its inception. I cannot profess to state a view which is anything but a personal one, but I believe that it would be shared by most of those who share with me a deep affection and admiration for the Territorial Army.
  Before I turn to that more limited topic, may say a word or two upon the main topic of reorganisation, as one who has always been interested in the general problem of the Army. Accepting, as I think we must, that great changes are to-day necessary, it seems to me that the Army Council have conceived for those changes plans which are both sensible and sensitive. I believe that all who consider the general foundation of the scheme must be of the common opinion that to prefer the principle of amalgamation to that of disbandment was essentially the proper choice. For one thing, it has succeeded in preserving, at least in some form, so
  448
  far as one can see, the title of a number of famous regiments; and in that connection titles are of enormous importance, for in them is centred and symbolised a great deal of proud history and devoted loyalty. We have most of us read in the past few years of surgical operations designed to separate Siamese twins. It seems that the Army Council is now setting out not to separate Siamese twins—perhaps to be modern one ought to call them Thai twins—but rather to create new, close-knit couples on the same model. I believe that the operation will prove successful, but some considerable period of convalescence may well be required before recovery is complete and the Army leaves the operating theatre ultimately better equipped to face the new conditions which prevail to-day.
  The Territorial Army is now nearly half a century old, and during that half-century we have seen many changes in the Army as a whole, though, perhaps, seldom such drastic ones as those now under review. During that period, those of us who have been interested in the Territorial Army have at least thought, rightly or wrongly, that we detected that the "bludgeonings of fate", represented for that purpose by the Army Council, were apt to descend with a resounding thud upon the Territorial Army as the first victim. We were prepared, with our usual blend of apprehension and resignation, to receive once more something of the kind with the publication of the present White Paper. Our long experience led us to expect that "reorganisation" might once again be synonymous with "disorganisation".
  But this time we have had a shock—and though a gratifying and uplifting shock, a shock it remains from—which we ere still slowly recovering, because on this occasion the Territorial Army has been allowed to achieve the height of its modest ambition, which is to be left alone. That is, already, a not inconsiderable advance. The whole picture of the Territorial Army is not one into which I propose to go tonight except to say this: that, of course, the Territorial Army, due to many circumstances—and not least among them the long-established administrative and recruiting system—is essentially an organisation which is based upon a local mechanism.

  449
  In the case of the Regular Army, if a man joins at Brighton he can, presumably, other things being equal, ask to be posted to the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. A man joining the Territorial Army has, perforce—if he is to have any hope of carrying out the obligations which he is assuming—to join 'a unit which is within reasonable distance of his home. In that way I think you get, to a very high degree, the close connection of the officers and men of the Territorial Army with the unit; and not only with the unit with which they are serving, but with the county in which it is based. I hope that with the publication of this scheme, which I greatly welcome, we have arrived at a point at which for some time to come the composition and the character of the Territorial Army may remain unaltered in order that it may go forward with at least a prospect of being undisturbed for several years ahead.
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Marquess to suggest that this would be a convenient moment to adjourn for the Royal Commission?
  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  ROYAL COMMISSION
  5.30 p.m.
  The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

  Finance,

  Army (Conditions of Enlistment),

  Road Transport Lighting,

  Geneva Conventions,

  Naval Discipline,

  Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation,

  Affiliation Proceedings,

  Housing,

  450

  Agriculture,

  Registration of Births. Deaths and Marriages (Special Provisions),

  Coal-Mining (Subsidence),

  Federation of Malaya Independence,

  Winfrith Heath,

  Governors' Pensions,

  Greenock Port and Harbours Order Confirmation,

  Clyde Navigation Order Confirmation (No. 2),

  Ministry of Housing and Local Government Provisional Order Confirmation (County of Berks (Consent to Letting)),

  Reading Corporation (Trolley Vehicles) Order Confirmation,

  Doncaster Corporation (Trolley Vehicles) Order Confirmation,

  Durham County Council (Barmston-Coxgreen Footbridge),

  Tamar Bridge,

  B.P. Trading,

  Portslade and Southwick Outfall Sewerage Board,

  Barry Corporation,

  Workington Harbour and Dock (Transfer),

  British Transport Commission,

  Dartford Tunnel,

  London County Council (General Powers),

  Hastings Tramways,

  East Ham Corporation,

  Esso Petroleum Company,

  Milford Docks,

  Finsbury Square,

  Arundel Estate.

  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  ARMY ESTIMATES AND REORGANISATION
  5.45 p.m.
  Debate resumed.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I ought to apologise to your Lordships for doing this double act, and perhaps, in particular, for disappointing those of your Lordships who thought that I had finished when the House adjourned; but I shall not cause them discomfiture for long. In the White Paper on The Future Organisation of the Army it is pointed out that the new arrangement. of grouping the regiments by brigades is to be purely administrative and not in any sense operational; and the necessity for that, in so far as it affects the Regular Army, one can, of course, well see, because, as the noble and gallant Field-Marshal pointed out a few minutes ago, the three or four battalions constituted in a particular brigade may at a moment of necessity be situated anywhere on the face of the globe.
  But though that may apply to the Regular Army, it does not apply to the Territorial Army, the units of which are, for the most part, static except at the time when mobilisation is taking place. I therefore venture to hope that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to preserve in being the Territorial brigades and divisions which are at present constituted upon a more or less geographical basis, even though it may be necessary to make some minor alterations in the layout. It would, I suggest, be a great pity to break up those existing formations when it is not easy to see any direct reason for so doing.
  There is another question, an answer to which I do not expect even in my most hopeful mood this evening but to which I think we must have a reply before very long. It is a matter referred to by my noble friend Lord Bridgeman in the course of his speech, and although he gave reasons which I fully accept for the difficulty of precision in this particular matter, none the less, I think it is obligatory on the part of the Government to give at no very remote date some more specific indication of the role, in general terms, which it is intended that the Territorial Army should perform in the unhappy event of war. I realise that it would be difficult to give detail, and that
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  the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, will not be able to do what one of your Lordships, in a moment of aberration in talking to me the other day, called "dot the t's and cross the q's" at this particular moment. But we have to remember this: that the abolition of the compulsory Reservist training for National Service men has inevitably caused a certain depletion in the ranks of the Territorial Army. It has, of course, the advantage now of having produced once more a body of a homogeneous nature.
  But if we are to get suitable recruits to fill the vacancies, then I urge that it is only fair that they should know, in general terms at least, the kind of task which is going to be required of them in the event of hostilities. Are they to be civil defence? Are they to be home defence? Or are they to be a potential element in an expeditionary force? It may be that the answer is that they are to be two, or even three, of those things, but they ought to know, because they must feel that they are being given proper training for the sort of work which they are going to be asked to fulfil. Therefore I hope that that matter may be considered and answered before too long a time has gone, because I am quite sure that there is at the present moment uncertainty, and that that uncertainty retards recruiting and, at the same time, impairs efficiency.
  The Territorial Army has one dominant need, and I regard this White Paper as some further evidence that the authorities in whose hands it lies to fulfil that need are taking at present a more imaginative and sympathetic view than has always been the case in the past. The Territorial Army's need is that it should not only be regarded, but should be seen to be regarded, as an integral and indispensable part of the Armed Forces of the Crown. During the war, the War Office, with its usual verbal felicity and inventiveness, coined the expression, "a prime mover" for a vehicle which was capable of moving under its own power and did not require any form of tractor to give it mobility. In my submission, the Territorial Army desires and deserves no more than this: that it shall be regarded as an intrinsic part of a prime mover, the Army as a whole, and not as a mere trailer to be towed along behind without power or direction of its own.
  5.53 p.m.
  LORD OGMORE: My Lords, I welcome this debate this afternoon, and I am glad that the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, put his Motion on the Order Paper. I feel that if the House had adjourned for the Long Recess without discussing the important Papers that are now come before us, we should have been doing far less than our duty. I am also certain that the Army, and a large number of people interested in the Army, will read with considerable interest the results of our deliberations.
  We are now about half-way through the debate, or perhaps a little more, and we have had a number of interesting and constructive speeches. So far as I can recall, there has not been one case in which any noble Lord has attempted to raise points of detail which we feel should not have been raised. Such matters of details as have been raised have been well worth while. For my own part, I would say that the Government's plan, or the War Office plan, as a whole, having regard to the Government's intentions which the Army have to carry out, is as good as we could expect. There are one or two points that I should like to criticise later on, but, broadly speaking, I think we could not have expected a much better plan than they have evolved, having regard to the intentions of the Government.
  Now what are these intentions? First, the testing of and the ability to deliver a nuclear deterrent; and, secondly, the provision of well-equipped forces, ready to play their part as elements of an international force, and in defence of British overseas territories and interests. To some extent, of course, although those two functions are complementary, they are also, as we have heard from many speakers to-day, competitive. My noble Leader, the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, has drawn attention to two very serious aspects of the Government's policy. But, accepting for a moment those two premises, and accepting that the nuclear deterrent has to be provided, I would ask the Government to set a ceiling to the amount that we are going to spend on the nuclear deterrent, and to provide a floor for the amount we are going to spend on what are called (rather, I think, to the dismay of the noble Viscount. Lord Bridgeman) the normal forces of this country.
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  In my view, there are three main reasons against what The Times calls jettisoning pretty well everything else in blind faith in the bomb. There are three main reasons against the policy that The Times has criticised in that way. The first main criticism of it, I would say, is that we may overstrain ourselves financially and go to the wall, as earlier empires have gone before, because we could not afford the military measures which we were taking. The second objection to the course of spending vast sums on the nuclear deterrent is that, in my view, it is a weakening element for people to think that somebody, or something, will defend them rather than they themselves. This again has led in the past, particularly in the case of Rome, to the collapse of great empires. It does not seem to me to matter whether the force you believe will come to your assistance, and upon which you can depend without doing anything yourselves, is a human or a mechanical force. The idea in people's minds that the "push-button" deterrent can, in fact, take the place of the normal forces, is one which I think we should discourage, because I am quite certain that, in the final resort, any country has to defend itself with all the forces at its disposal; and it cannot depend upon "push-button" methods.
  The third objection, I would say, is that it is devastating to the morale of the Army to live in a period of such uncertainty as we are now going through, when officers, warrant officers, N.C.Os. and men do not know what is going to happen to them, and when they see large numbers of their comrades going out in the prime of life to civil life, having to abandon the careers that they have chosen. The fourth objection to it is because the policy may be fruitless anyway; and we may find that we have depended far too much on the nuclear deterrent and have not the normal forces to meet the dangers which may eventuate, particularly having regard to the fact that we form part of the N.A.T.O. resistance to aggression, and also that we have commitments in various parts of the world, which have to be met by the ordinary normal forces of the Crown—your Lordships will notice that throughout I have avoided using the word "conventional" which attracted the displeasure of the noble Viscount Lord Bridgeman.

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  I must say that the Government's judgment in this matter is of paramount importance. Here on these Benches, as in fact on the Back Benches opposite, we do not know all the facts and the factors which the Government have to take into consideration. That is why, to some extent, in defence debates, and in debates on the Army, Navy and Air Force Estimates, we are always at a disadvantage. The Government can always say, "Of course what you say is perfectly true, but you do not know all the facts," and for this reason we have to depend to a very large extent in these debates on the Government's judgment.
  Quite frankly, however, I am not by any means satisfied with the Government's judgment. Over the last few years the Government's judgment does not seem to me to have been one upon which a reasonable man could rely with any certainty. Take, for example, Suez. It has become almost improper to mention the word in this country; but Suez. as we know, through no fault of the Armed Forces, was a deplorable incident in our history. Take the handling of the economic situation, about which we heard yesterday. That does not inspire any confidence in the Government's judgment. Over recent years there have been a series of problems which have been handled by the Government in what we regard as a doctrinaire fashion; they seem too often to have been blinded by prejudice. That. I think, is probably the reason why The Times to-day says that it hopes that defence expenditure will be determined by what is militarily necessary and not by what is politically expedient. The inference is that the Government are determining defence expenditure, as my noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough said, not by what is militarily necessary but by what is politically expedient.
  So I would ask the Government this question: whether they will try to restore confidence by giving an assurance to the Army that the present structure is likely to last, at least for some years to come. I think that is most important. I know the difficulties. I know that the Government may well say "We do not know what the future is going to bring." But you really cannot pull up the roots of the Army every few years and have a look at them; you must allow them to
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  develop and to create a fine and fruitful plant. You must encourage stability in the Army in that way.
  As to the strength of the Forces, we are told that they are to be 375,000 by 1962, and that we are going to rely on voluntary enlistment. The War Office were good enough to give my noble friend Lord Pakenham, who in turn has been kind enough to hand it to me, a statement showing the Regular Army recruiting for the last eight years. I notice that over those years, starting in 1949, the annual total of recruiting for the Regular Army has been down as low as 14,000. That was in 1949. It was 43,340 in 1952—the highest year—and for the last four years, not counting this year, the figure was between 21,000 and 32,000. Unless there is to be an enormous spurt in recruitment, these figures do not give us any confidence that the voluntary system will provide the men we want. My noble friend Lord Alexander of Hillsborough has already made that point. It is dangerous to rely upon the voluntary system if you have no belief that the voluntary system is going to provide the men you want.
  What are the Government going to do if the voluntary system does not provide the necessary recruits? The noble Lord, Lord Templemore, in a very interesting maiden speech, speaking on behalf of the cavalry, said, possibly rightly, that it was very difficult in a period of full employment to obtain the numbers that we required by voluntary methods; and both he and the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, asked whether the Government were prepared to take the necessary measures to encourage recruitment. Lord Bridgeman instanced a number of means by which he hoped that such recruitment could be obtained, as did the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle,
  VISCOUNT DE LISLE: I do not want to ask a leading question. but I hope the noble Lord will tell us, before he finishes this part of his speech, whether he thinks the Government ought to have done away with National Service or not. It is important, I think, and I should like to know.
  LORD OGMORE: I myself am doubtful about it—I am not speaking for my Party on this matter. To be candid,

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  I am doubtful. I am making no Party point on this, because I do not think we ought to make Party points on a matter of this kind. I think we ought not to fool ourselves about it. We ought not at this stage to go to the country and tell them that it is all right; that we can get quite enough people from voluntary recruitment and that we do not need National Service any more and shall never need it any more. Quite frankly, on the basis of facts, I cannot see how we are going to get the recruits by the voluntary system.
  I was interested to hear what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, said, and I nape that the Government will take notice of it. I sincerely hope that the Government will obtain the recruits that they need from the measures that he proposed. But if they do not—and the country had better know this now—who ever is in power, it will be necessary to have National Service again, either by selective call-up or otherwise. We must face that fact and make no bones about it. It may be necessary for a Labour Government to do it; they are no more able than anyone else to conjure "Private Atkinses" out of the air; so the country should be told now that that is a possibility. I may say that no one can hope more than I do, as an old volunteer, that the voluntary system will succeed. I will leave it at that.
  As to the changes themselves, so far as they affect me personally and my own regiment, the Welch Regiment, and its sister regiments of Wales, I must say that we are very much relieved and are very glad that the Government have brigaded the three Welsh regiments of the line in the Welsh Brigade, and that they have not touched the Welsh Guards. We have only four battalions of infantry, so that if there had been any diminution in the numbers we should have felt it most unfortunate. To us, these regiments represent the ancient martial tradition of the Welsh, and in them we see enshrined the military virtues and the hardihood that have perpetuated the Welsh as a nation and enabled their soldiers for many centuries past to play a substantial part in Britain's wars. As I have said, we should have felt any diminution to be a serious blow to the national identity and pride which these regiments exemplify.
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  I should have thought that the idea of having a Welsh Brigade, a Highland Brigade, a Lowland Brigade, and a North Irish Brigade, was a very good one. I like the flavour those Brigades connote, and I do not altogether agree with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Wilson, on that point. The sole criticism of the method of the Government that I have to offer is with regard to the bands. It might be thought by those who have not served in the infantry that this is a small point, but in fact it is a very big point to the infantry.
  Under the present system there NI, ill be one regimental band for each brigade depôt, and two, or in some cases three, bands will have to go. This, to the Welsh regiments, is particularly unfortunate. I need hardly remind your Lordships that the Welsh are a very musical nation. To us, music is not just "noises off"; it is part of our existence. We feel that to be deprived of our bands is a hard blow. In the case of the Welsh Brigade only sixty men are involved. I would say that bandsmen, as such, are not necessarily likely to be re-enlisted as soldiers of other types. A bandsman is a bandsman, and nothing else. If he is not a musician in the Army, he will probably go and be a musician somewhere else.
  These bands, moreover, give colour to the regiments. They are an aid to recruiting, and as the regiments are so often abroad in foreign stations, they serve as a link with the civilian population. The bands play in the centre of the town; they play at fêtes and so on; they are a way in which the regiment can help the civilian population, whether at home or abroad, to enjoy itself, and they can make a contribution to the life of the locality. That fact cannot be over-stressed, because it is an important point. The drum and bugle bands do not suffice for this purpose. As the three regiments of the brigade—four in some brigades—will be scattered, what is to happen to the bands? One can just imagine the case where one regiment is in Cyprus, another in Hong-kong, a third in Germany, and the fourth (if there is a fourth) in Kenya. What is the band—a sort of peripatetic musical force which journeys round the world? What sort of saving would there be in moving bands of thirty players round the world by air to serve the various

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  regiments? There would be no saving in that.
  Whilst I appreciate the suggestion made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Wilson, I myself cannot feel that it would be any answer to increase the band by a third, because there would still be the same problem of transporting the bands around the world. I remember that, before the war and during the war, Regular Artillery officers (in those days they used to subscribe to the band) used to complain that they had been in India ten or fifteen years and had never heard their band play. They said they had paid all those years, but had never heard the band play once since they left the "shop". That is the sort of problem that will arise, accentuated when there are regiments of different origins. So I cannot believe that the whole scheme will fall down, or even have to be adjusted, to allow for a few regimental bands. I believe that the total number of men involved is about 900. I cannot really believe that the Government, spending these enormous sums, can truthfully say, "We cannot make a saving anywhere else and we must do without bands. If we have bands, another couple of infantry battalions must go." I cannot believe that it is impossible to effect a saving in some other direction for this important purpose with regard to the infantry.
  My Lords, I should like, in conclusion, to say one word about the Territorial Army, upon which the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has spoken so eloquently. I entirely support him in his desire for a statement at an early date on the rôle of the Territorial Army. I think it is most important. They must know exactly what is expected of them, and it is too bad to keep them hanging about, as it were. I have heard it said in Wales, in my part of the country, that they believe the Royal Air Force made a very great mistake in doing away with the auxiliary air squadrons. They feel that this was due to an inability on the part of the Royal Air Force to appreciate properly the sort of service the Royal Auxiliary Air Force was able to provide in the links forged by the Auxiliary Force with the local population. I am glad that the War Office have not fallen into that trap, and I am glad that the Territorial Army
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  remains and is to be maintained as an integral part of the Army.
  My own division, the 53rd Division, is one of the two referred to in the White Paper. It is now one of those which is assigned to the aid of N.A.T.O., and we see that we are to fall back and form part of the general Territorial Army, with the rôle of the Territorial Army, whatever it may be, as a whole. My own battalion, the 6th Battalion, Welch Regiment, I am glad to say, has been restored as an infantry battalion after many years; so it does look as if the War Office and the Ministry of Defence are fully aware of the great importance of the Territorial infantry.
  I hope that in the era we are now coming into the War Office will realise that the Territorial Army on a voluntary basis is quite different from one in which large numbers of men are there because they are National Servicemen and who may, indeed, be rather reluctant soldiers. These are volunteers; and we who are old members of the Territorial Army, who served in it when it was a Territorial force, know that you cannot treat volunteers in the same way as National Servicemen. They are there because they want to be there, and, as we all know, the spirit is a remarkably fine one. But it does mean that orders and regulations, and so on, issued from on high are sometimes to be tempered with common sense; and it also means that the War Office must at all times realise they have, or soon will have, a fully volunteer force. For instance, the question of selection of annual training sites is a most important one. In the old days we always, if possible, had the annual camps somewhere near the seaside for obvious reasons. That sort of consideration will come up in the future with regard to the Territorial Army.
  All of us on this side, I am sure, would wish to join in wishing the Army, whether Regular or Territorial, the greatest success in its new rôle. We are sympathetic with those regiments that have been amalgamated, but we are quite sure that the spirit of the British Army will be as fine in the future as it has always been in the past.
  6.18 p.m.
  EARL BATHURST: My Lords, I wish that I could rise and give unqualified support to the noble Lord who will be

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  replying to the debate, and to his right honourable friend, on the new skeleton framework, outlined in the three White Papers, of the new Army that we are to see in the future. On listening to your Lordships' debate, initiated by my noble and gallant friend Lord Bridgeman, I cannot help feeling that many of us will have still more doubts than we had on reading through carefully these three White Papers. I address your Lordships only because I suppose of your Lordships I am of the nearest age to the sort of man that the noble Lord will be asking to join this new force.
  I am perfectly willing to agree that this skeleton framework has not been brought out of the cupboard in Whitehall by the noble Lord's right honourable friend, although other gallant and noble Lords have suggested that this might be so. I am willing to believe it is a new framework designed to meet the situation as it is to-day, in the time of the megaton bomb. But I wonder whether this new framework will really meet these demands. I feel that the framework has been designed—and we should congratulate the noble Lord's right honourable friend on the sympathy with which he has designed it—but the body which is going to be hung upon this frame is a new and streamlined body. That streamlining of the body consists mainly of asking men who have been dedicated to the service of Her Majesty's Forces for many years to retire voluntarily.
  That body consists now of something like 373,000 troops—that is, officers and men of all categories. The streamlining will mean asking a proportion of these men to resign. Some may not wish to resign. On the other hand, I think we can fairly agree that they are being compensated as fairly and as humanely as possible in these times. I fear that there may be many—and especially in the more senior N.C.O. category of men in the Regular Forces—who would be only too pleased to resign, and the noble Lord's right honourable friend may be faced with a flood of resignations from first-class senior and junior N.C.O.s who, in the future, in only three years' time, will be needed to be the backbone of Her Majesty's Army.
  Out of that 373,000 total of all ranks, we are told, in paragraph 51 of the Defence White Paper, that 164,000 men
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  are Regulars of all categories. But, looking at the very next paragraph, we see that, out of that total, only 80,000—that is, rather under half—are serving for more than three years. That is a very small percentage of what the Army calls a real Regular soldier, the sort of man who would be required in the near future to be the body on this skeleton framework to which I have referred.
  Furthermore, on page 14 of the Estimates, paragraph 90, we see that the Army received its share of National Service men to the extent of 111,000. That was in 1956–57. Next year there will not be another 111,000, nor in the year after; it is finished. In two and a half years' time, something in the region of 300,000 men must be lost, if my mathematics are correct. I agree that some will probably have signed on this year, but, I fancy, not very many. In three years' time there will be a severe shortage of the right type of young man who has gone in compulsorily through National Service. Referring to paragraph 43, page 6, of the Defence White Paper, I agree that we shall have a big saving in first-rate men who are being used to train these National Service men. In all three Services, it is said that there are 150,000 men so engaged, presumably as instructors and in all the ancillary departments that are involved with National Service training.
  Could we say that, possibly as far as the Army is concerned, 70,000 men may be saved? I believe that, when this saving has been made, it will be essential that regiments, many of which have seconded those men at great sacrifice to themselves, should be able to receive them back again to their own units. I hope that some appreciation can be made of the almost back-breaking, heartrending service that these men give in the training of National Service men; and possibly, when that time comes, after phase one of the run-down, the noble Lord or his right honourable friend will be able to make an appreciation of the efforts that have been made by officers and N.C.O.s in units to make this National Service programme possible and as popular as it has been in times of peace.
  Those 70,000 men, approximately, will be available for the "teeth" arms. We

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  sincerely hope that this skeleton framework and the streamlined body put upon it will make an effective percentage increase in "teeth" arms, as opposed to the service and supply arms, which are, of course, essential in their own way. But, going straight back to recruiting and after hearing what noble Lords have said, and especially the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Jeffreys, and the noble Lord, Lord Templemore, in his excellent maiden speech, I cannot believe that some of these initial plans for this skeleton framework will help recruiting. I cannot believe that to use the knife or the axe on units which are already going concerns and have been made so by the care and the trouble of their officers and men and by the spirit and the traditions which have been built up in their counties or in their unit towns is the right way in which to go about increasing recruiting.
  I beg to refer your Lordships, without wishing to weary you, to what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Jeffreys, said with regard to the battalions of Guards in London. It is impossible to get recruits for a fine unit, even so fine as Her Majesty's Brigade of Guards, if you are going to make those men stand on guard duty week in and week out. If that should be done, as I believe it inevitably will should these cuts take effect forthwith, it must have a bad effect upon the recruiting rates of even Her Majesty's Brigade of Guards, and we shall see a run-down in those battalions which will make the position in three years' time even worse than it is to-day. As regards the new brigade set-up for the infantry regiments of the line, I should like to welcome that, as I know noble Lords would like to; but would it be really effective in a recruiting drive when we need new members in these brigades? The regiments are there, the regiments have their traditions, and most, in fact, if not all, of those regiments will be so brigaded and will, under their own auspices, be able to obtain their own recruits. I cannot believe that the simple replacing of a cap badge with a brigade cap badge will bring in any new recruits.
  It may seem at this late hour not important to talk about cap badges, but, for the soldier, there is absolutely no doubt that if you remove or in any way tamper with his cap badge, there is trouble. It happens when troops are
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  posted from one regiment to another, as indeed used to happen during the war. There was always trouble over the man's cap badge. I think that the idea of changing to a brigade cap badge—unless there is anything to the contrary in what the noble Lord who is to reply will say—should be reconsidered if possible, by the noble Lord's right honourable friend. It is a fact that to-day regiments which have the greatest traditions and about which we have heard this afternoon, are the regiments that are full of recruits. Those are the regiments that will go on being filled with recruits. Should the roles in these new times be varied or changed. I believe that a regiment which is a good regiment can forthwith change its role, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Templemore, and I think it could probably be carried on right through the Service. After all, there are new techniques required all the time and a good regiment will be able to find men who can take on these new techniques that are required.
  If these new recruits are to be obtained—and they should be needed very soon indeed; I fancy in a shorter time than most people would think—something must be done to encourage recruiting. I have said that I do not believe that changing the cap badge will help recuiting. Men want a smart uniform—we have heard that referred to to-day. All in all, the battledress is probably the best dress for working and for military duties. The No. 1 dress is a new dress for Her Majesty's Forces. There are many doubts about this No. 1 dress. When we saw it for the first time at the Coronation it looked, from a distance, a smart uniform and it had smart equipment to go with it. But will it really stand up to the test of military duty? The No. 1 dress is supposed to be a ceremonial dress, and is also to be used for smart occasions whilst a man is in barracks and when walking out. I doubt whether the quality or the cut of that dress will in fact stand up to hard ceremonial wear, and I hope that Lord Mancroft's right honourable friend will be able to give an assurance that the No. 1 dress will be of the best possible quality that can be obtained.
  I should also like an assurance that it is going to be issued in much greater quantity than it is so far. The noble and

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  gallant Field-Marshal has suggested that men may be able to buy their own No. 1 dress or equipment, as indeed happens to-day, especially in the Territorial Army. For £14 it is possible to buy a tailor-made No. 1 dress—anti a very smart dress it is. It should be possible, when this No. 1 dress is issued, for men to be able to buy their own private walking-out dress at possibly a cheaper price; and one can foresee that a colonel of a regiment would be able to authorise certain differences, certain regimental monograms and so forth, as part of that No. 1 dress.
  One thing that a soldier really likes when walking out is to be different from the other soldiers, for whom he has words that many of your Lordships know only too well. Even with a battledress one can do the most extraordinary things with an iron, a certain amount of weights and so forth, and blanco and toothpaste, in order to make it entirely different from that of the next-door man; and when a whole unit does that, it makes an esprit de corps for some extraordinary reason which should not lightly be put aside.
  Attraction No. 3 for recruiting is, I believe, sport. Whatever else happens. I am certain that the noble Lord's right honourable friend must see that it is possible for all ranks to carry on sport of all sorts. One of the things that the young man who is wanted in the Forces wishes to do is to ride a motor bicycle too fast. Sooner or later he will be in trouble—in fact, it is usually sooner—with Her Majesty's police force. These young men must have a chance to ride motor bicycles, to drive racing cars, it may be, to play cricket and football and to swim. Anything in competitive sport should be encouraged to get the right type of recruit. As your Lordships see in the Sunday newspapers every week, it is difficult to get into a high-class professional football team. At any rate, it should be made extremely easy to get into a first-rate international Army football team. That would be a big draw to the right type of recruit, and I hope that everything possible will be done in order to foster sport. I know that there are Army societies of all sorts which foster sport, but there is still plenty that could be done to be of assistance, so that,
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  especially, international sports can be competed in.
  Next, we have heard about barracks and barrack conditions. Those are being improved, and we must congratulate the noble Lord's right honourable friend for the improvements that have been made. I have seen some of the Tidworth and Aldershot barracks that have been newly constructed and they are magnificent. The Army want more, and more must be done to refurbish and replace the old London barracks if troops are to be kept here. According to the Army Estimates, twenty-two sites are under construction and fifteen new sites are being embarked upon between 1957 and 1958. Would it not be possible to raise that number to twenty? That would make a further and a concrete start towards helping to obtain the new recruits that we wish for.
  My Lords, possibly the most difficult problem for the Army to-day—or, from the officers' point of view, to satisfy men to-day—is the problem of food. It is becoming more and more difficult to recruit suitable and competent staff to deal with food in bulk in Army units, and to compete with the sort of food that to-day "Mum" is able to produce with her gas stove. I think it is almost impossible for the average, well-trained maybe, Catering Corps sergeant and his assistants—who, after all, are probably largely fatigue men of one sort or another—to provide the sort of food that is required. Some units can do it, others cannot. Those responsible, if only in a small way and for a small amount of food in a unit, are getting headaches galore. I believe that the Women's Royal Army Corps will be able to provide a big help in that direction, and that within that Corps there should be specialised units—cookhouse units which could be merged into a particular unit. That system worked magnificently with the Auxiliary Territorial Service during the war and, by and large, the quality of a cookhouse which was run by a good A.T.S. sergeant-major was much higher than the quality of a cookhouse run by one ordinary Catering Corps sergeant-major, if one was lucky enough even to have one.
  I can see no reason, in these times, why the Women's Corps should not be completely integrated within the Regular Army. If any of your Lordships doubt

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  that that can be done, it is well worth referring to the exploits of the Israeli Army in their Forty-four hours to Suez, the book which has recently been published. I understand, if that book is correct, that practically all the services—the feeding service especially—were run with great success in the most difficult circumstances by Israeli women volunteers. Something will have to be done, and I hope that the noble Lord's right honourable friend will be able to show how feeding can be brought up to the standard that the modern recruit and the good type of recruit expects at home. It is difficult enough in an hotel. How much more difficult is it in an Army cookhouse!
  We have referred to bands; but I think it would be worth remembering that the Russians pay the greatest attention to bands in their forces. Although their music may be somewhat different from what one is accustomed to hear from a regimental band in this country, I understand that their bands still go into action with their hordes of infantry, and they create quite a fervour the night before their attack. I have had this information from members of the Gloucestershire Regiment—of course, that referred to Chinese troops trained on Russian methods. They make practically a religious fervour of the music that is played by their bands. I cannot help thinking that it would be a great mistake in any way to cut down the good feeling and the sense of esprit de corps which, without doubt, is created by having a regimental band; and if in this brigade group any colonel is able to find young men to raise a band, then he should be given every encouragement and opportunity and grant so to do.
  My final point on recruiting is about publicity. It is not good enough nowadays for Army recruiting staff to go round to the police stations and pin posters upon the wall. We need much more publicity than that. There must be a highly skilled and trained staff of men going into the schools, which obviously will be the first place for recruiting, and into the factories—in fact, anywhere where there are young people gathered together who would come forward to join Her Majesty's Forces. One of the most obvious ways of recruiting is on television, and the Forces must take time on the
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  Independent Television and, if possible, on the B.B.C. to "put over" recruiting. There is no doubt that television is having the biggest effect on careers, on knowledge and on the learning on all kinds of young people in this country; but, so far as I know, little has been done to show Army or Service films on television, except as news films.
  Films of our Forces in action are the kind which have the greatest interest to young people in the country to-day, and I hope that every possible effort will be made to publicise the new life that will be available to young people in Her Majesty's Army; for, after all, there will be a growing number of young people leaving school—more than ever before—who will have to ask themselves or their parents: "What am I going to do now?" I believe that a great many young people will decide, particularly when industrial work becomes more competitive and repetitive—frankly, boring—that the Army will be the life for them. That idea only wants "putting over" to them. There will be the Territorial Army to compete with, but I believe that Her Majesty's Regular Forces should be well able to compete in the manpower market.
  If the noble Lord's right honourable friend can give some assurance on these six points, which I do not think would be too expensive to the taxpayer, or, at least, not so onerous that they cannot be met, I believe a very big fillip will be given to recruiting in the near future. But if these things are not done, I cannot but conceive that there will be a serious run-down, hastened by the weakening of the regimental tradition. I cannot but see that happening, if the policy on the lines propounded by the noble Lord's right honourable friend is really carried out. I beg him to reconsider some of the proposals he has put forward.
  6.43 p.m.
  LORD STRATHEDEN AND CAMPBELL: My Lords, like many of your Lordships, I should like to express my gratitude to my noble friend Lord Bridgeman for putting down this Motion so soon after the publication of these two most important White Papers. I would begin by expressing a point of view slightly different from that of my noble friend Lord Jeffreys, with deference to his long experience. I believe that we in the Brigade of Guards are prepared,

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  when it is really necessary, to take our share in the difficulties of the rest of the Army. Nobody enjoys losing battalions, and I entirely agree with my noble friend that the loss of these two battalions will make the problems of the public duties of the Brigade of Guards much more difficult; but I am quite certain that the Brigade is sufficiently resilient to meet the situation and that, with careful rearrangement of the stationing of battalions—which obviously will have to take place—the results will not be so serious as has been foretold.
  A great deal has been said in this debate about the difficulties and problems of these amalgamations, but little has been said on the spirit of determination, which I know exists in a large number of units, to make them work. In this connection I should like, if your Lordships will allow me, to quote from a letter which some of your Lordships may not have seen, as I believe it was published only in Scottish papers. It is from the Colonel of the Seaforth Highlanders and the Colonel of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, and says:
  "It would be an admission of failure of our two regiments, with our great records, if we cannot produce between us an even better regiment in the end; and we are, therefore, determined that a union between us can, and will, be made a truly happy 'marriage'."
  I am sure that that statement expresses the feelings of a large number of the regiments which will be affected, and of those in them, from the colonels to those serving in the ranks.
  One section of the Army has not been mentioned at all in this debate, yet by their nature they are going to suffer very severe cuts as a result of the amalgamations—I refer to the administrative service. They will also have a problem in re-adapting themselves to a much smaller framework and, in many cases, working in much more closely with a larger number of civilians—which obviously will not make things easier for them. But I am quite certain that the difficulties will be overcome. On the question of compensation, there is nothing that I want to say, except that I entirely agree with what other noble Lords have said; that the proposals are fair to the three categories of people mentioned in the third paragraph of the White Paper.
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  However fair this compensation may he, it is not a substitute for finding employment for the officers and other ranks who will have to leave the Service. I know that my noble friend who is going to reply has been in close touch with the Ministry of Labour, and that a scheme is now being worked out for the solution of this problem and that the Regular Forces Resettlement Service has been set up under the chairmanship of Sir Frederic Hooper. A most satisfactory aspect of it is that I understand he is quite convinced that one of his most important tasks will be the canvassing of industry to make sure employers realise the quality of the people whom the Army will be able to supply.
  The problems of the employment of officers and of other ranks are quite different. The record of other ranks employment is good, and almost all are absorbed into industry quite soon after they leave the service. But the full employment of all these extra men who will be coming out cannot be taken for granted, for there is a tendency for the pensioners to have a better record of quick employment than the younger men. Here the attitude of the Trades Union. Congress will be extremely important. I know that in the past they have done a great deal and have come a long way towards accepting the Army standards of craftsmanship as qualifying with their own standards; but more than now exists is needed to make sure that the retired other rank gets the full advantage of his skill in his trade.
  The figure which I now give is quoted only from a newspaper. and I stand subject to correction, but I believe that in the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers some 23,000 men will become redundant. A very large number of these men will be craftsmen—not craftsmen just in the Army sense of that word, as denoting junior rank, but actual craftsmen in various forms of engineering. I think it would be an excellent thing if the local branches of the National Association for the Employment of Ex-Regular Sailors, Soldiers and Airmen were helped to get into the closest touch with branches and lodges of trade unions in their areas to make sure that these men were taken into industry—where there are certainly vacancies—at the level for which they are qualified by their craftsmanship.

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  For the officers, the problem will be more difficult, because the majority of officers who will be leaving have not craft skills of that type. There was an article in the Economist on the 13th of this month which I think was fair, but too optimistic in its assessment of the employment prospects. It did not take full enough account of the impact on the market of the large number of officers who will be coming out. I am extremely glad. as I mentioned before, that the Ministry of Labour have already started dealing with this problem. I am sure that my noble friends will not mind if I put forward one or two points which I think are of great importance in this connection. The most important thing is to make certain that the officer does go into a job for which he is fitted—I do not mean merely that he should not go straight out and start a chicken farm, but that in going into industry itself he should select something which he can do.
  I believe that advice boards are already being set up, composed (at least, I think they should be composed) partly of representatives of industry and partly of Service people. People from industry should certainly be on these boards, and I think it is important to have a number of people who realise the experience and the probable knowledge of the officer himself, so that they understand the background of his problem. And they must realise that it will be a slow business. It means interviewing each officer individually, and working through with him the various possibilities of employment, cutting them down gradually until finally coming to one type, or possibly two types, of job which he could probably do. These boards, I think, should exist overseas as well as at home, so as to give the overseas officer as good a chance as possible of finding a job on his return. This stage must then be followed up by a course of instruction into one or other of a group of industries—heavy and light engineering, insurance and such like—to give these officers a knowledge of the job they are going to do. These courses, I understand, are not difficult to start. I am told that the Polytechnic, in Regent Street, is already running one, at the request of the Officers' Association, for senior officers, going up, I understand, to the rank of Admiral, and it is proving a great success.
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  There is yet another possible opening for the employment of officers, and that is in the teaching profession. As your Lordships are well aware, there is a great shortage of teachers, especially teachers of mathematics. A number of officers will be coming out of the Royal Engineers who hold science degrees. These men are graduates and, speaking from what I know of the method in Scotland, I would say that there is no reason at all why they should not go to one of the teachers' training colleges and into teaching. They are graduates; and therefore there is no reason at all why the profession should fear any dilution or any lowering of its standards. They are as highly qualified as any other graduate going into the teaching profession. If these schemes are worked out fully and sympathetically, I think it will do an enormous amount to help these officers to find satisfactory employment.
  Recruiting has been mentioned several times, but there is one aspect which has not, I think, been mentioned in this debate so far. I mentioned it myself on another occasion, but on rather a different line from what I am going to say now—I refer to the question of pay. The pay of the Army is always difficult to assess as compared with pay in industry. There is no doubt, as your Lordships know, that when young men get together they start comparing the size of their wage packets. And it is what is actually inside the wage packet that counts. if the soldier thinks for an instant that a great deal of his pay is in free housing, free food and free clothing, that does not increase the size of the pay packet in his eyes. Whether it would ever be possible to make the two packets—those of the soldier and of the civilian—look the same, I do not know. Obviously, there would have to be some sort of arrangement, because equal pay packets, with half the necessities of life provided free in one case, would not be a practical proposition.
  Another incentive to recruiting, I am certain, is bound up with the question of amenities in the barracks. That, I know, is a matter which is going to be mentioned by at least one other noble Lord, so I will say no more about it now. But there is one aspect of it about which I am not entirely happy. In the Memorandum on the Army Estimates, paragraph 34, there is mention of the possible

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  stationing of Forces in East Africa. Although I know nothing at all of the plans, I have seen in the newspapers some talk of Mackinnon Road. Now Mackinnon Road, though it is undoubtedly very suitable as a stores depôt, is not, in my opinion, a suitable place to station troops. It is in a completely waterless area. There is a piped water supply, and I believe that that has now been made more satisfactory than it was. But there is no possible kind of outside amusement for the families of troops; and if you are going to keep soldiers on the long-service engagement, you must realise that their families are an extremely important factor.
  As I say, I do not know what the plans are, but I would suggest that the vicinity of Nairobi would be a much better place in which to station troops. I know that area; I have worked out training schemes and found training areas there, and it is extremely good. I do not think that the question of distance would be so important. If Nairobi is at too great an altitude for troop carriers to land, perhaps it would be possible for the airlift to be organised to put down troops at sea level at Mombasa.
  One final aspect of the recruitment of officers which came to my notice the other clay is that boys are despondent at the shape in which they see the Army now. I should like to say in the strongest terms I can, that. I think this attitude is absolutely wrong. The Army is not going to become a few dozen i "push button" experts. The Army s going en, and there will be just as good prospects—in fact, I would say that at the moment there are better prospects of a satisfactory career than there have been for a very long time for an ambitious young man—and not necessarily such an ambitious young man. I think that it would be of great help if this reorganisation were reinforced by some statement from the Government doing away with this idea that these cuts are merely the beginning of further cuts. The Army has been re-shaped and the Army is going to retain that shape for some considerable time to come.
  7.2 p.m.
  LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, let me assure your Lordships that my contribution will be brief and will deal with one point only. Before I deal
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  with that one point, I should like to remind your Lordships that two or three weeks ago we had a debate on the Air Estimates, in which noble Lords forecast, some with optimism and some with pessimism, the terms of compensation for redundancy. Let me say at once that I feel that, by and large, those terms are fair and just.
  The one point I wish to deal with concerns the amalgamation of two regiments. I believe that the general overall plan for the reduction of the infantry of the line is sound, and it has been labelled as such by your Lordships, endorsed by the Press and the public, and, most important of all, as we have read from outside and heard from several noble Lords to-day, it has been accepted in the proper spirit by the units affected. My noble friend Lord Nathan, dealing with the position of critics, said that the critics were those who lived in the past; that it was the young who had the future and they took no exception to the amalgamation proposals. That was a bold point. Applying the noble Lord's views to the future, I would ask Her Majesty's Government for reconsideration of one amalgamation: that of the Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Highland Light Infantry, which has been described widely in the Press as illogical, inexplicable and unworkable. Let us look for a moment at that descripton.
  I think that the description "illogical" is justified on examination. In all other amalgamation proposals, except one, there is a common territorial boundary, and in all of them, including the one I have spoken about, there is some local affinity between the two areas. In this amalgamation there is no common factor at all to be found except, as has been said, in the brass button. On one side of the Clyde there are the Highlanders and on the other side the Lowlanders of Galloway; there is Glasgow and Galloway, town and country. The Highland Light Infantry are surrounded on three sides by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and on the fourth side by the Cameronians. The Royal Scots Fusiliers are surrounded by the Argylls to the north and west, by the Cameronians to the East, and by the King's Own Scottish Borderers to the South. Then there is a question of dress. One regiment has the kilt and the other has the trews. What

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  complication is there to be if both exercise a self-denying ordinance—
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, they both have the kilt.
  LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: The H.L.I. have the trews.
  LORD MANCROFT: I think that was changed to the kilt in about 1947.
  LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: I withdraw that at once, if that is so. So there is no conflict on the nether garments. It is about the only place where there is no conflict in this proposed amalgamation. The Colonels are convinced that this arrangement will not make a happy marriage. Taking Lord Nathan's point again, and looking at the future, I should say that the recruitment of officers is going to suffer. Young men are not going to go into this one amalgamated regiment; they will choose to go into the Argyll's, the Black Watch, or the K.O.S.B., according to their locality. For the future, while the Government are so intensely anxious, and rightly anxious, that we should recruit sufficient long-term service men, we are deliberately prejudicing the prospects in this one amalgamation.
  There are three alternative possibilities. The first would be for the Royal Scots Fusiliers to be amalgamated with the Scottish Rifles. They have a common boundary, they are both Lowland regiments and they have much the same seniority. The second would be for the Highland Light Infantry to be amalgamated with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders almost surround the H.L.I., for the Argyll and Sutherland's territory includes Renfrewshire, Dumbartonshire, and Stirlingshire. In fact the H.L.I. are a small enclave in Argyll territory. The Army Council, however, have already committed themselves by telling the Cameronians and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders that they are not to be amalgamated, and I doubt whether the Army Council would go back on their word—indeed, it would be difficult for them to do so, however desirable the course I have deployed might be.
  If that is so, there remains only the third course—that would be, to allow the regiments to remain as they are and
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  accept the fact that there should be sixty-one battalions instead of sixty. I do not know what the solution is, but I do know that this is one blot on an otherwise good general scheme. I know that to-morrow the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, and the Secretary of State for War are to receive a deputation of Members of another place. Could I say this to the Minister? It is always a temptation for Ministers and Service chiefs who have architected a big and finely designed scheme to feel that that scheme must not be altered: to feel a sort of personal pride in it, and that it must be forced through in the shape in which it has been submitted and made public. It is only natural for all of us to be a bit stubborn sometimes, and a little what is called "tough" when schemes which we have proposed are criticised and great pressure is 'brought to bear to have them altered. But I know that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for Air are efficient and big men. It is not toughness and stubbornness that makes them big men; it is gentleness and consideration of the other point of view, and an endeavour always to meet, where possible, the other point of view. Though I do not expect the Minister to-night to be able to make any declaration on this question, I think it is not unreasonable to ask him to say that the door is not closed and that the Ministers who have architected this great deployment of our military forces are, in their wisdom and with their breadth of vision and character, willing to consider the modification, where necessary, without any loss of pride but only gain for the efficiency of the whole of their plans.
  7.12 p.m.
  LORD ST. OSWALD: My Lords, I should like to speak briefly on one or two aspects of this new policy, which in the main I support fully and cordially. It seems to me that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State has undertaken a greater task than was embodied in either the Cardwell or the Haldane Reports. He has been required to reduce, quite arbitrarily, one part of the Army, that is to say, officers, warrant officers and N.C.O's., while increasing another part, the Regular other ranks. He has been required, in fact, to carry out two tasks pulling against each other. In taking on that organisational paradox

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  without resort to half-measures or timid compromise, I feel that those responsible have done well, by the Army and by the country. I still feel that the success hinges, as many noble Lords have said, upon recruitment, and of course my right honourable friend is more conscious of that than anyone. He made a point of it in the interview he had some nights ago, when he replied to the professional despondency of his questioners quoting recent recruiting figures, by pointing out the uncertainty in the Army in the past few months as to its future. I am sure that he was justified in making that point. But also submit that there is not much to inspire actual buoyancy at the moment, and that recruiting remains the major challenge.
  I am one of those who believe that the brigade cap badge will adversely affect recruiting. I appreciate the Government's desire to widen regimental loyalty into brigade loyalty, and the logic behind that desire. But I very much doubt if it can harmonise with their other declared desire of maintaining regimental traditions; in fact, I think it is almost bound to work counter. I spoke the other night to officers of an infantry depôt near my home in Yorkshire, who have had a most succesful record of late in recruiting in Sheffield. They were quite unanimous in their opinion that this new measure would harm the recruiting effectiveness of the Army generally in our part of England.
  I have a point of detail, and I hope it is permissible. Moreover, I do not know if there is any Rule of Order which protects your Lordships from hearing four cavalry officers in one evening. I take a slightly different view from that taken by my noble friend Lord Templemore on the question of amalgamation. We have heard a great deal to-day about the matrimonial problems of regiments. My belief is that the marriage between the 4th and 8th Hussars is certain to be a happy one. My own anxiety refers only to nomenclature. The 8th Hussars will be the last Irish cavalry regiment to be amalgamated and I hope sincerely that the Irish connection can be maintained. Among other things, it appeals, and can go on appealing, to the Roman Catholics in Southern Ireland, who join this regiment in large numbers. I think I must declare an interest—-possibly two interests—in that I am an 8th Hussar and also, as a devout
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  Anglican, I have the greatest respect for the fighting qualities of Roman Catholics.
  Noble Lords have spoken about uniform, and all I want to do is to support their views as strongly as I can. It is important to restore (and I use the word "restore" advisedly) the feeling in the Army of being an elite element of the nation. But the real recruiting draw will be exerted by Service conditions. I want to add only one thing to what has already been said in great detail and with great pungency by my noble and gallant friend Lord De L'Isle. I have one proposal to submit that I do not think has been put up before.
  The life and health of a unit are built to a considerable degree round its messing; and the morale of a unit is often directly linked to the standard of messing—and I mean the messing in the officers' mess, sergeants' mess, corporals' mess, and most importantly, the men's mess. I should like to see instituted a grant for messing, issued to commanding officers, fully accountable, but destined to reinforce the totally inadequate P.R.I. funds which, at the moment, have to be raised by the unit itself. In this I would again lay emphasis on the men's messing. In my military experience, and from visiting units since I was a serving soldier, I have been struck by the extraordinary differences in messing between one unit and another. Recently, in Rhine Army in Germany I saw one unit which had merely a noisy, bare N.A.A.F.I. and another which had a sort of a club, run by the W.V.S., where there was a gramaphone, carpets and armchairs, places to write letters and even an "Interflora" system open to the troops. The difference in comfort was extraordinary. I am sure your Lordships will be in agreement when I say that it is wrong that there should be "haves" and "have-nots" as between units in our own Army, serving in the same sort of theatre. I should like to see this plan considered, because I feel that it has practical and useful possibilities.
  There is one other aspect affecting recruiting. It is not mentioned in the White Paper, and it is, in fact, outside the sphere of my right honourable friend, but I believe it has great bearing on recruiting and I mention it briefly without any particular apology. Such work as I have done with the British Legion in

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  recent years has made me conscious of the limitations imposed by law on the natural sympathy of local pensions officers towards old soldiers down on their luck or suffering misfortune which is traceable, but not always actually provable. to war service. There is an impression—these are hard words. I know—dating back many years that this nation has no time for its old soldiers once they cease to be battleworthy. Since young men will not go into the Forces if they have evidence in their family, or even in their street, of callous treatment of friends or relatives after service, I feel that this point is of the greatest importance. I can think of no heavier drag on the recruiting effort now required.
  There is one paragraph of the Defence White Paper, paragraph 44, which I feel positive will bring the greatest encouragement to units in every branch of the Army. That is the paragraph which deals with the increased employment of civilian labour. I have always been quite flabbergasted to read in the Press of units which have to find or invent work for the troops to do. It comes under the generic name of, I understand, "bull" It is a name which I never heard in my own Service, fortunately—perhaps because I was serving in efficient units. My only experience is a wide memory of commanding officers, squadron leaders and company commanders, frustrated beyond self-expression by the impossibility of training their whole unit at the same time, due to unavoidable extraneous duties such as cooking, coal-heaving and barrack repairs, and odd jobs of a hundred different kinds. I myself believe that all barrack maintenance, as opposed to military maintenance, should be placed in the hands of civilians. It would be done more efficiently; it would relieve the troops for full-time training and it would bring greater contentment and efficiency to every unit in the Army.
  I appreciate that this is a debate on men and weapons, and not on strategy. But the men and weapons required depend on the overall strategy, and I cannot feel that it is altogether wrong to make a brief reference to this matter, and to air my views upon it. We are gearing our whole defence to a new type of Army, and I hope that we are also gearing it to a new type of strategy. I was disturbed lately by a Government
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  reference to one strategic term which seemed to me to be used in a completely outdated sense. "Defence in depth" was spoken of as being in hundreds of miles whereas, I think, "defence in depth", if it is to mean anything whatever in this atomic age, and the age of guided missiles, must be reckoned in thousands of miles. If we stick to the old scale, we shall tie down our military and political strategy to old ideas. It will prevent any measure of disengagement in Europe such as I hope to see, and such as I think feasible, and even vital, to the new theories of defence which are being developed and which are described in these White Papers. It is no good reducing our Army, as we are almost all agreed that we must, and at the same time pretending that the new, smaller Army can stop the Russian military monster if it sets out to drive through Europe to the Atlantic seaboard. Our thin khaki line, the whole N.A.T.O. line, would be swept away like chaff. What this whole policy requires is a disengagement, the two antagonists stepping back from the Iron Curtain on both sides, to establish a kind of glacis, across which, or on to which, either Army would venture at its peril—at the peril, that is, of nuclear retaliation.
  My Lords, I realise that this has been less a speech than a series of rather scrappy comments, but that, I feel, must often happen at the end of a debate where so many authorities have already spoken and left so little to say. What I regret most is that I seem to have expressed my doubts without expressing my admiration for this brave new policy. I do admire it, and I hope it is plain that my words have been dedicated to the hope that it will prove as sound in wind and limb, and in application, as it is in conception.
  7.24 p.m.
  LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, when one comes in towards the end of a debate, it is extremely difficult to avoid being repetitive, but some of us feel very strongly on what might be regarded as small, unimportant points, but which are, of course, extremely important to those affected. So whereas seven or eight speakers make a point, it can only help the cause if the ninth speaker rubs it in a little more. So I ask your Lordships' indulgence if here and there I touch upon points which have already been covered.

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  I do not know whether some of your Lordships noticed the latest tradition to be under the fear of destruction—Nash's glorious terraces in Regents Park. It seems to me that, in times when we appear to be deliberately destroying traditions in architecture, drama and such like, we can draw comfort from the fact that at least in this sphere there is a recognition of the value of tradition—a rearguard action to retain those traditions of the British Army around which so much of our history has been made. My mind goes back to 1922, when my own regiment in the Indian Army had to face amalgamation with a famous unit, and I recall that for a day or so we glared at each other in resentment. But it was all put behind us very quickly, and I would agree with, I think it was, the noble Lord, Lord Stratheden and Campbell, who emphasised the fact that sometimes these amalgamations profit, rather than lose, in the process.
  As an officer of the Indian Cavalry, it is in any case wrong for me to enter the ring in a contest concerning the British infantry. But it so happens that my father started life in the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and I feel that perhaps I should say what I believe he might have said. I am not going nearly so far as the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, to propose possibly three alternatives. I think it is very wrong indeed to sow this doubt in the minds of officers and men who may have to face an irrevocable decision. It is not quite fair to them. Equally, I could remind myself that perhaps the Highland Light Infantry are recalling today that Welsh commentary about the mountain sheep being fleeter, and the valley sheep fatter, and adding, "We of the Highland Light Infantry, therefore, deem it neater to carry off the latter". I would say that if this decision is irrevocable, the way out might be for the War Office to have second thoughts, and to agree to one more battalion of British infantry.
  I have only one or two small reservations to add about bands and badges. As regards bands, I fully support the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore. As I see it, a brigade band which has to go perhaps from Germany to the Middle East, to the Far East, and back to the home centre, is in danger of becoming a kind of elevated E.N.S.A. party. As to badges, noble Lords have stressed the effect on
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  recruitment, and that kind of thing. I should like to draw attention to the practical difficulties. Is the brigade badge going to be a kind of synthesis of all the regimental badges concerned? If so, it is going to look rather like a Christmas tree. One can think of certain cases where embodiment of the badges would look like a Zoo. On the other hand, is the alternative going to be a complete cut away from the past? In that case the Yorkshire Brigade would presumably adopt a cricket bat as a badge emblem. I make this plea. There is no sense in this brigade badge, even from a practical or psychological point of view.
  Having said that, I think we should pay our tribute to a band of officers in the War Office who have given fair and sympathetic handling to as difficult a task as any band of officers has ever had to face. With regard to compensation, I looked up the terms which were offered to Indian Army officers in 1947, and I came to the conclusion that the War Office and Treasury between them had based the present concessions on those former concessions. An Indian Army colonel, ten years ago in 1947, received £4,125 at the age of forty-four. To-day an officer of the same rank and the same age is to receive £8,640—just double. So, allowing for the rise in the cost of living. I do not think that we have any valid complaint as to ungenerous treatment. nor do I think that the officers concerned are prepared to say that they have been cheated in so far as compensation is concerned.
  So I am not going to be concerned any more with the fait accompli and I turn to matters of the future. I would touch on one aspect of recruitment which I do not think has been mentioned. Many of your Lordships have stressed the recruitment of the man. I want to refer to the recruitment of the future officer. In these new measures we acknowledge, in some sense, a debt to a certain type. The regiments have in the past thrived in the knowledge that there would be at their disposal a number of a particular type of young men, members of whose families had served in those regiments before them. They should be able to continue to thrive in that way.
  But there is one factor that weighs heavily in the ability of a young officer to continue to be able to hold out hope

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  that his son will be able to carry on the good work, and that is his means to educate his son. It seems that another tradition of ours may shortly be assaulted—I refer to the doubts as to the continuation of the public schools. Assuming that they survive, I suggest to Her Majesty's Government that the most certain of insurance policies to take out to ensure that the future officer of the right type comes forward for the Army, would be a generous tax-free allowance of about £200 a year for every child between the age of eight and eighteen to cover his education. That would compare, I think, with £70 at the moment which is subject to tax.
  My Lords, I pass from small points of administration to something rather more fundamental—I refer to what the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, mentioned and what my noble friend Lord Bridgeman referred to in opening the debate, and that is some doubt as to whether the whole structure of the Army is satisfactory to meet its future purposes. I would draw your attention to paragraph 8 of the White Paper on Defence, issued in April, which defines our tasks under two headings: first to play our part with our allies in deterring and resisting aggression—in other words to be ready for the war of the guided missile and the megaton bomb, in association, as my noble friend Lord St. Oswald has reminded us so vividly, with an effective trip-wire over on the other shore; and, secondly, to be ready to defend; British Colonies and protected territories against local attack and to undertake limited operations in overseas emergencies. The operations may be limited but they are very frequent these days.
  I do not know whether Her Majesty's Government had in mind any order of priority when they put those two tasks in that order. I personally would place both of those aspects of the task on an identical level. I would remind your Lordships that in the last ten years there have been no fewer than seven occasions meriting the label "operations," from Korea down to British Guiana. In not one of those operations could it be said that the great modern edifice of scientific war, with all its emphasis on higher mathematics and technology and invoking the brain of Harwell, has been
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  other than redundant. I can quote occasions when the aircraft used have, in fact, been too good for the job. So when, in the White Paper, Her Majesty's Government take the credit for increasing the ratio of the "teeth" arms to the administrative arm, I trust that the day-to-day demands of the small wars are going to be borne in mind.
  In meeting these demands, if it is in order for a comparatively junior officer to issue a note of warning, I would make this submission and in doing so ask the noble Lord who is to reply for clarification on this issue of the rôle of the central reserve. It is a point that the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, and others have referred to. Command Paper No. 150 on the Army Estimates, in paragraph 57, says that the central reserve is to be organised for either limited or global war. I believe that that dual responsibility, involving as it does a wide range of training for very different conditions, imposes an almost impossible task. The same paragraph goes on to say:
  "It will be our policy as the overseas garrisons are reduced to ensure that the elements of the Central Reserve can be moved to any point of danger where they may be needed by air."
  That idea is reinforced in paragraph 33 of Command Paper No. 124, which speaks of the growing capacity to send reinforcements rapidly from Great Britain.
  My Lords, there is the conception: a central reserve which can either take its place in global warfare or be ready to be moved by Transport Command to meet any contingency which our enemies could think up for our annoyance. It looks very neat indeed on paper, but, if I may be permitted to introduce psychology into warfare, it cuts across important psychological factors. A man flown from England, even if he arrives in the theatre of war before the man who is in the area already, is not going to be so useful or so effective. When the modern "Fuzzy-wuzzy" gives trouble, it is easy enough to bring him to his knees with attacks by Venom fighters and follow them up with troops flown in from a distant reserve. But the psychology of the matter is not so much that the man has been beaten in battle as that he feels he has been cheated of a battle which, in his belief, he might have won; and though,

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  indeed, the immediate effect may be satisfactory, it may not last.
  If you want to avoid trouble for the future and insure for the future, you have, submit, to fight these particular enemies in their own way, only tight them just a little hit better. That involves local forces, well trained, well equipped, and, above all. well led by officers who, in every sense of the word, are specialists. And you do not find specialists of that nature in the central reserve. In former clays the purpose of a reserve, as I see it, was to provide an expeditionary force for Europe; but to-day the expeditionary force is already on its ground—four divisions in Germany. I submit that that lends weight to the argument that the reserve may be regarded as available for these constant demands of the conventional war.
  At the same time, if what I have said makes sense, I would indicate that we could, with advantage, afford to disperse that central reserve to a certain extent. Paragraph 31 of Command Paper No. 124 reminds us that now we have a Commonwealth strategic reserve made up of British, Australian and New Zealand forces. It is in the extension of that kind of technique in strategy, with locally-placed reserves trained and acclimatised to local conditions and local situations that perhaps there is some answer to this mild dilemma. I would ask for an assurance from the Government that they are balancing these constant demands against the more massive requirements of global strategy and the deterrent. I think it was the late Gilbert Murray who said:
  "If there is slave raiding in Africa, piracy in the Yellow Sea, if there is plague in China, if the pilgrim routes to Mecca are endangered, if the buoys in the Persian Gulf are badly placed, at once Great Britain is expected to attend to the matter, and Great Britain always accepts the responsibility."
  My Lords, I think it would be a sad day if, in continuing to accept this responsibility, Her Majesty's Government were to find that the men who had to do the job had been swallowed up in the atomic artillery of the future or as interplanetary pilots in the war with Mars, which presumably will never come.
  7.41 p.m.
  LORD MATHERS: My Lords, as the noble Lord sits down may I take one minute to endorse what he said about the undesirability of the amalgamation of the
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  Highland Light Infantry and the Royal Scots Fusiliers. I have discussed this. and it is the only amalgamation I have heard that is seriously criticised. The opposition to it is intense from both sides; I can confirm that, and I ask the Minister to note that. Indeed, my informant, from the side of the H.L.I., said that they would rather have the regiment abolished altogether than be merged with the Royal Scots Fusiliers. And so far as the Royal Scots Fusiliers people are concerned, I have been told that they say most emphatically that the amalgamation as proposed will not work.
  7.42 p.m.
  LORD FREYBERG: My Lords, I did not come here prepared to speak to-day, but we have heard a great deal about reorganisation and very little about the effect this change will have upon our tactics. I am interested and glad that this reorganisation has received such a good response. I am only doubtful on one count, the tactical value of the brigade group. We win our wars, certainly against the Germans, by pinning the enemy on to the ground and then breaking their resistance by massed artillery fire. The brigade group can neither pin nor has it the artillery necessary to break their resistance.
  I speak with a certain amount of experience of the brigade group. For two years, 1941 to 1942, in the Western Desert you heard of nothing but columns and brigade groups; and disaster after disaster followed. We had defeats: we lost Tobruk; we lost Mersa Matruh; we lost thousands of unwounded prisoners—and a great many Generals lost their jobs. On October 3 there was a complete change of command in the Western Desert. I went to see the Army Commander (and he. in his book, says that I looked very unhappy), to find out from him whether he intended to fight the battles as brigade groups or as divisions. He gave me the assurance that he was going to fight as a division and, furthermore, that he was going to adopt Rommel's plan of permanent corps. That was twenty days before the Battle of Alamein.
  On October 3 (and the document is in the collection of documents of the New Zealand Government) I cabled the New Zealand Prime Minister and said that the benefit we had got from the changeover of command was that they

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  now insisted that divisions must fight as divisions and not as brigade groups. They had gone even further: they were fighting as permanent army corps. And I ended by saying that the result of this simple decision would be evident in all our future battles. Twenty days after that, on November 3, ten days after the start of Alamein, I wired the New Zealand Government and said that I had been in the front line and how well we were doing. I said, "The enemy has now been broken, through our massed artillery fire in the last ten days". I then said, "I know that it is rash for anybody to make a forecast in the Western Desert, which has produced so many difficulties and disappointments, but, for what it is worth, here is my opinion: the Germans are broken; they will go back to the frontier, and in certain circumstances we shall get them right out of Africa". That telegram is an official document with the New Zealand records.
  My Lords, I agree with the general terms of the White Paper. I beg to support it. I am only doubtful about the value of the brigade group. I wonder how it will be received in places like New Zealand and Australia, whose Forces fought in the Western Desert and not in North-West Europe.
  7.47 p.m.
  LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I know that the House wishes to hear the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, as soon as possible, and I will therefore not take longer than is absolutely necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, to whom I listened, as always, with much pleasure, has instituted a custom which, within certain limits, might be agreeably followed in your Lordships' House, asking himself what his father would have said and then offering those hypothetical views to your Lordships. My father commanded the 2nd Life Guards, and I can imagine what he would have said: that I had no right to be speaking in a military debate after a military hero like General Lord Freyberg, V.C., or a debate in which another holder of the Victoria Cross participated, as well as a Field Marshal, and Sir Winston Churchill's Commanding Officer.
  The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman. used an expression which Sir Winston Churchill used himself in this kind of
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  connection, "other Paladins". I feel very humble in taking up your Lordships' time at all. I did have the experience as a small boy, of being brought up within the atmosphere of the 2nd Life Guards to the extent of regarding the 1st Life Guards as "not quite", and "The Blues" as definitely "Non-U"—though that was before that expression was coined. Two wars have passed since then, and these little differences, I suppose, have been more or less overcome, and we can face these amalgamations and formations of groups with a certain confidence that in time to come any sentimental troubles will be cured.
  I feel that we are all very much indebted to the noble Viscount Lord Bridgeman, not only for giving us the chance of discussing these vital questions but for the thoughtful and, as always, thoroughly expert speech that he has delivered. If I may say so, he made only one remark which I hope perhaps, when he says the last word, he will recall. There was a somewhat slighting reference to "Irish militiamen". I do not know quite whom the noble Viscount had in mind or how far back he was going, but I felt all that was put in very much better perspective by the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, when he made some very feeling references to the valour of Irishmen a little later. I have one or two brief points to put to the noble Lord who is to reply, and then, before I close, I should like to submit a short thread of argument.
  The first two or three points must be a little disconnected. The noble Earl, Lord Lucan, was unfortunately prevented from being with us, and he asked me to put a question to the noble Lord which he had himself intended to put. He recently visited Shrivenham, which I believe has also recently been visited by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft. He hoped that the noble Lord might say something which would give still more confidence to those in the Army who are trying to secure a higher position for science within the military ranks. I understand (I hope I am not breaking a confidence) that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed the Commandant that he was out to make science education popular in the Army. I hope in the deepest sense that that is the object of the noble Lord and his colleagues. I expect the noble Lord will have some

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  thing emphatic to say on that. I know that, in view of his recent visit, he is qualified so to do.
  There have been many strong points made by my three Front Bench predecessors from this side of the House—the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, the noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, speaking as always with much shrewdness of analysis, and the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, who has given many years of devoted service to the Army both in peace and in war. I do not know whether there are any noble Lords of the seniority of the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, who has recently been in camp. If not, I feel that we on this side of the House have an advantage over noble Lords on the other side. The noble Lord looks so young after his experience that it does not surprise anybody when I mention this. It is something of which we have every right to be proud. I think the noble Lord spoke to us this afternoon as someone who is in close touch with the living Army, and he spoke, no doubt, in consequence of that.
  There is a general issue upon which I will not dwell, though I cannot refrain from mentioning it yet again because it is right that all who speak from this side should express disquiet. On the whole, in these Army debates we try to keep to detail. In a way, I think that at times we keep to too much detail, leaving the wider issues sometimes for the Defence debates. All my three noble friends from this side of the House have, not unnaturally, fastened, I think properly and rightly, on the first leading article in The Times to-day. Some of your Lordships may have read a very lively but disquieting article by the Political Correspondent of the Observer on sunday in which he said, referring to the Defence programme of the Government:
  "It can be said that Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Sandys who still stand by the original programme are now practically isolated."
  Your Lordships may say that the Political Correspondent of the Observer is not necessarily behind the scenes, but that statement has been made; and in view of what The Times says to-day, we cannot treat the situation just as one where there are differences—no doubt friendly differences—of emphasis between colleagues. So far as we can make out, there is a
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  crisis in the defence set-up on the highest level.
  I realise that the noble Lord who has many preoccupations may not have been present at those critical talks. Perhaps the Leader of the House has attended them but, unless he is able to deny what we see in the Observer, The Times and other papers, it will go out to the world that there is a very critical situation on the highest level of defence planning.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS AND LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, to put the mind of the noble Lord and the mind of the world at rest, I may say that it is a complete fabrication. There is no split at all.
  LORD PAKENHAM: I, of course, take the word of the noble Earl—as applying to the leading article of The Times?
  THE EARL OF HOME: As applying to any suggestion from any quarter that there is any split of any kind within the Cabinet.
  LORD PAKENHAM: I am afraid that, although I am not old in politics, I am too old to be very much impressed by that statement.
  SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Oh!
  LORD PAKENHAM: I am afraid that I am never impressed by the denial of a split. A split does not occur until somebody resigns. But right up to the time of the split it is the duty of those concerned to say there is no split.
  THE EARL OF HOME: Shall I say, to be more specific, that there is no difference of opinion within the Cabinet on these matters of defence?
  LORD PAKENHAM: That is a very important statement to have drawn from the noble Earl who leads the House. I am very glad, in my humble way, to have been instrumental in producing a statement which flatly denies the opinion which is being widely propounded by non-Party organs of the kind I have mentioned.
  LORD MANCROFT: By the noble Lord.
  LORD PAKENHAM: That is the feeblest of interjections. I said it was propounded by these organs. I was raising it so that the noble Lord could deny it. It has been now denied by his Leader, the noble Lord perhaps being regarded as being unworthy of such an onerous task of making a denial.
  LORD MANCROFT: If the noble Lord was raising that to be helpful, I must say I greeted that sentiment with some doubt.
  LORD PAKENHAM: I was raising it to give the noble Lord a chance, which he has now taken, in his usual gifted manner; but, if he is anxious at some time or other to address the House, no doubt he will wish me to proceed. That is important—I am not denying it at all—and the world will now sleep more easily to-night.
  But let us now pass to the question which the noble and gallant Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, was the first to raise, and in a sharp form, though it has been raised by many other speakers since. The noble and gallant Viscount referred to the "three R's." I think they were reorganisation, resettlement and—was it recruiting?
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: Recruitment.
  LORD PAKENHAM: The noble Viscount, I think, rightly referred to the first two as being dealt with more or less satisfactorily by the Government plans, and I do not want to take up much time now quibbling over those; but obviously a good many points could be raised, and some were pertinently raised by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye. The only remaining point with which I wish to deal is recruiting. When that question comes up, my mind turns back, perhaps a little naturally, to the first time that I had the honour of replying as the Under-Secretary at the War Office, in 1946, when the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, tabled a Motion to call attention to the recruiting position for His Majesty's Forces. The noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, spoke with brilliance and charm, as I think I said at the beginning—and I was rebuked by the New Statesman for saying it. I say now, to make amends to the noble Lord, if I spoke sharply to him just now, that I do not think the years have withered the infinite variety of his brilliance and
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  charm. I am not trying to catch any more interjections from the noble Lord because I might mistake them for irony.
  I will therefore remind the House, in just two or three sentences, of some of the proposals made at that date by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman—I will not mention them all. I think, in fact, they are the same proposals as have come up in Army debates for the ten years subsequently, and they have come up again, in one form or another, to-day. We have heard some particularly expert suggestions, some of them of a fairly minute character, from the noble Earl. Lord Bathurst; but, by and large, we are back where we always were on the old question of pay, barracks, married quarters and, above all, jobs after service. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, said something about this. Perhaps I may be allowed to quote, from an old debate, a part of his speech, which is well worth reading. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 143, col. 168.]
  "We must decide now that those who join the Regular Forces can be given, if they wish it, a life career in the service of the State."
  The noble Viscount said that in 1946. It has been said repeatedly since. I am not quite sure how the House as a whole would feel as to whether we have achieved that object. "Not perfectly" would be the view of noble Lords, I expect. It has been treated as a kind of target by noble Lords from that day to this, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, will say something fresh on that subject, though it may not be easy for him to do so.
  The fact is that all these devices, which in one form or another have been brought up to-day, except where they are devices, so to speak, to prevent things from getting worse, are devices which were sympathetically considered by the Labour Government and then, during the last six years, by the Conservative Government. I am afraid that I would apply to the recruiting performance here these words (I know that National Service has cut across it) with which the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, began his speech in 1946. He said on that occasion, over ten years ago (Col. 176):
  "My Lords, I am afraid that it has been perfectly obvious that so far as the Army is concerned the present recruiting campaign has failed."

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  That was his view in 1946, and I do not think it is too much to say that, taking the eleven years that have passed since—and I distribute the responsibility equally; I shared in it as an Under-Secretary for War at one time—the words used then by the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, have been proved accurate. If we failed then to get the recruits that we required, I cannot see any evidence to suppose that we now have a better way of obtaining them.
  The noble Lord, Lord Ogmore, gave certain figures that the War Office had supplied. I will just run rapidly through the figures of the total of Regular Army recruiting. They were 14,000-odd in 1949; 16,000-odd in 1950; 16,000-odd in 1951, 43,000-odd in 1952; 32,000-odd in 1953; 29,000-odd in 1954; 28,000-odd in 1955; 21,000-odd in 1956; and for the present half-year they are 13,000. I do not want to quibble over details, and, of course, there are many circumstances which have to be allowed for in the reorganisation. There may be nothing at all in these figures, with National Service cutting across the whole situation, but if we are setting ourselves up to secure a Regular Army of something like 160,000 to 170,000 in a few years from now, there seems to be no evidence in any Defence Paper that we shall attain the figures. Simply as a proposition and as a prediction, it would seem almost certain that we shall fail. To put it bluntly, I think we shall fail if we follow any methods that have either been adopted or seriously suggested in the past.
  The noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, candidly faced the situation that would arise when he said that this Government must have recourse to other methods, whatever form they may take, to improve recruitment. That must be the position of anybody who accepts responsibility for government in this country or who hopes one day to share in it. But which of us really supposes that, once conscription in fact has been abolished, it will be reintroduced in peace time or will be reintroduced at all except under the threat of another war? It seems that if the recruiting campaign fails, then the whole strategic plan of the Government and of the country will fail with it. So we come down to recruiting as the core of the whole issue.
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  I will say only two or three words more before I close. We have all heard almost every year that recruiting for the Army should be considered from the point of view of a guaranteed career in the service of the community in some shape or form, but we must give the Army a higher status if we are going to secure any more recruits. It is not a question of getting a few more or of preventing the figures from dropping; it is a question of getting vastly more than there are signs of obtaining at the present time. In practice, I would say that there is only one answer to that—publicity. If the House asks how much is spent on publicity, the answer given to me by the War Office was that, taking it all in all, in 1957–58 (when the figure was considerably increased) the total spent on Army publicity by the Central Office of Information was £275,000; by the Stationery Office, £29,000; and by the Army itself, £219,000, making something over £600,000. If you take the publicity for the Regular Army, as distinct from the salaries of the public relations staff, and entertainment, travel and various other items, you find that in 1956–57 Regular Army publicity cost £21,000. Let me be fair about this. In 1957–58 it totaled only £40,000—against an Estimate, I suppose, of £400 million. Taken in those terms, the figure is almost negligible. I suggest that something totally different has to be attempted and that a sum of money several times larger will have to be set aside if we are going to make a success of recruiting.
  Some years ago I was asked to be the chairman of a recruiting sub-committee in the War Office. Of course publicity was considered then, but it was always a question of money, and the subject was never regarded as being on a high enough level to obtain the kind of funds available. I recollect what the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, was good enough to say, and in spite of my waspishness I hope that he accepted it in his usual kind mood. He, said at the end of his speech in 1946 (col. 180) that he wished us
  "the very best of luck in our dealings with the Treasury, because it is there that the major attack must be made, and there that the answer to this problem is to be found. The noble Lord must by now, I think, be quite clear where he can look for allies."
  I will say to the noble Lord that he can be quite clear, when looking for any

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  allies in any efforts to obtain these extra sums to raise the supply of Army recruits, that he need look no further than these Benches. I have not consulted other noble Lords before making that statement, but I know that, looking around this House, we are entirely united in our anxiety to help the Army; and I feel that the noble Lord, when he rises to reply, can speak to a House not of political partisans but of those united in their desire to see that the British Army achieves an ever stronger position in the life of Britain, because we all look to the Army to look up to and enhance the wonderful traditions of the past.
  8.7 p.m.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, my noble and gallant friend Lord Bridgeman, who opened this debate with such an authoritative speech, originally put down his Motion on the Order Paper to concern himself solely with the Army Estimates. He later added the two White Papers and one statement which has subsequently been published, and it is upon those documents and that declaration of policy that most of your Lordships' remarks have been directed this evening. I will do my best to answer the points that your Lordships have raised. These three documents are of great importance and complexity. I think that the complexity of the proposals put forward has explained to your Lordships why there has been the delay, for which Her Majesty's Government have apologised to your Lordships and to the country on more than one occasion. The reasons are now clear, and I can assure my noble and gallant friend Lord Jeffreys that the reasons were not dishonourable proposals by the Government to spring a surprise on the country at the last minute just before we were going away for the holidays—nothing could be further from the truth.
  In the defence debate I ventured to offer two suggestions to your Lordships concerning these proposals. I said that I thought that compensation must be fair, not only in the eyes of the public but in the eyes of those who were going to receive it, for the practical reason that a disgruntled ex-Serviceman makes a very poor recruiting officer. The second idea that I advanced then was that the changes which were going to be brought about should be brought about in such a way
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  as to trample as little as possible upon those regimental traditions and loyalties upon which so much of the morale of the Army is based. I suggest—and I think that your Lordships' remarks this afternoon bear me out—that we have achieved both these objects. The compensation scheme was generally acceptable to your Lordships as not only generous but, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, as indicating that the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence are indeed true allies. We have honoured an obligation which I am sure the country wished to be honoured. The compensation scheme has been a difficult scheme to work out and a most complex one. I do not pretend that there are not anomalies here and inconsistencies there, and we may be able to straighten out a few individual cases. But by and large, I believe the scheme is good and just and is acceptable to the country.
  Resettlement occupied many speakers this evening. Resettlement plans have been announced in great detail by my right honourable friend the Minister of Labour and National Service. The Advisory Board under Sir Frederic Hooper, with Sir Ronald Ivelaw-Chapman as his director, is, I believe, an earnest of our intentions. We hope that it will be a success. The way in which we propose to choose men to leave is by asking them to volunteer. It is not a foolproof system. the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, criticised it but did not put forward any better plan. There may be one, and, if so, we shall move to it; but at the moment this seems to us the best, but not an infallible plan. In the end, however, the War Office will have to control the numbers to make sure, as the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, hinted, that we do not get too many of the wrong class, trade or age group going out and unbalancing the Forces.
  I can assure my noble and gallant friend Lord Bridgeman that Her Majesty's Government take this matter very seriously, and we shall do all we can to make certain that these officers and men are properly resettled—and not on chicken farms, as has so often been mentioned this evening, but in worthwhile jobs. I was mentioning this very point at a meeting which I was addressing the other evening, for I know that chicken farming has become a sort of peg on which we hang this idea. It was not until some time later that I

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  discovered that the chairman himself kept a chicken farm. Her Majesty's Government will do and are doing all they possibly can, but the Government alone cannot solve this problem. What is required, as has been frequently said this afternoon, is good will on both sides of industry and of employers in every kind of commercial, professional and industrial field. It is very encouraging to find a number of people of good will in all walks of life, big and small, who think they may have suggestions and jobs to offer and who are coming forward to make their suggestions. It is the attitude of the public towards the men who have had their careers prematurely ended which will determine the measure of success of our resettlement plans. Her Majesty's Government have complete confidence in counting on the generous and willing help of all who can assist.
  The next topic which has occupied your Lordships most this afternoon has been the subject of regimental reorganisation. Whatever was done over this was bound to cause tears. Whatever policy had been decided on was obviously going to have its opponents. I think we have great sympathy with the point of view put forward by my noble and gallant friends Lord Jeffreys and Lord De L'Isle, from their own regimental point of view. We all sympathise with them, and feel for them too. But the fact is that since the war we have been trying to bolster up a system which could barely be made to work, and I believe we were risking making the young soldier cynical about the regimental spirit and thus defeating our own object. So we have made this plan. It has been well received on the whole, and the skill and impartiality of the Army Council have been recognised. Traditions have been respected wherever possible. After all, the changes and reductions in the infantry, although they are considerable, are part of a continuous evolution in the organisation of the infantry which has gone on since the Army was raised. I believe that the reasons for the reductions are understood and accepted, even though they may not be much liked.
  There is one amalgamation in particular which I know has caused much trouble. I refer to the amalgamation of the Highland Light Infantry and the Royal Scots Fusiliers. Here I owe my noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye an
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  apology: I misheard him and thought he said that both regiments wore the trews. I thought it had slipped his memory that the Highland Light Infantry, which used to wear the trews, has gone back to the kilt since 1947. We are now at one. Most speakers on the subject were at one in not liking the amalgamation of the Highland Light infantry and the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The Scottish amalgamation has been particularly difficult. At present there are ten regiments, four in the Lowland Brigade and six in the Highland Brigade. The recruiting figures unfortunately show that it is not possible to sustain this number, so the Army Council decided on the reduction of two regiments. Nearly half the Regular recruits come from the Glasgow area. On the trend of the recruiting figures, it would have been fair to reduce the size of the Highland Brigade more than the Lowland Brigade. Another factor was that the best size of brigade for drafting and posting is three or four regiments. Colonels of regiments in the Lowland and the Highland Brigades were given an opportunity to discuss means of making reductions and submitting their recommendations.
  As your Lordships will know, the Highland Light Infantry is a City of Glasgow regiment, and it follows that if a regiment is to be transferred from the Highland to the Lowland Brigade it should logically be the Highland Light Infantry. Both regiments draw the bulk of their recruits from the Glasgow area, so that the most logical solution to the problem is the amalgamation of the two regiments in the Lowland Brigade. Logic does not always make for happiness. I appreciate the points which the noble Lords, Lord Balfour of Inchrye, Lord Mathers, Lord Birdwood and others have made. Any other amalgamation of any two Scottish regiments would have caused equal trouble. But I am not pretending for a moment that this is an ideal or thoroughly acceptable amalgamation. I can make no promises this evening except to say that I am well aware of the heartburning which this amalgamation has caused. I have put the reasons for it frankly before your Lordships and I hope you will bear them in mind. I promise to bear your Lordships' suggestions in mind and see that they are conveyed immediately to the proper quarter. I am afraid that I cannot go further.

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  I turn now to the cavalry, in which we have several dashing and gallant officers. There was a particularly gallant speech by the noble Lord, Lord Temple-more. I am sorry that he was not able to stay until the end of the debate—he told me why—because I should have liked to congratulate him in person on a very fine speech, particularly as his father was kind enough to congratulate me on mine; and I have much greater cause than had Lord Templemore's father. The cavalry are slightly different. May I put before the noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, and other cavalry officers what is behind this. The cavalry had already been drastically reorganised in the 1920s, and this was borne in mind when the new organisation was discussed; but, of course, the amalgamation of cavalry regiments is equally painful. It has been less complicated because there are fewer territorial affiliations.
  We decided to keep as entities the Dragoons and Dragoon Guards, the Lancers and the Hussars. Within these categories the selection of regiments for amalgamation was done by eliminating those with the best claim to remain independent. The first with this claim were those regiments which had already been amalgamated. Other considerations were recruiting figures, and the retention of the two regiments which opted for mechanisation nearly ten years ahead of the remainder. Virtue sometimes does have its reward. The noble Lord, Lord Templemore, mentioned two other possible roles for the 7th Hussars. Frankly, I was not very enthusiastic about them and I wondered whether his regiment would be either.
  I should like to emphasise the point about the cavalry and I do so because of a particularly distressing letter which appeared in the Manchester Guardian on July 29, signed by "Cavalryman", which has had wide circulation, particularly in cavalry circles. This letter seriously suggested that the amalgamations had been brought about because the Committee consisted of certain distinguished cavalry officers all of whom were determined, bluntly, to "work a fiddle" so that their own regiments were not touched. That is such an ignoble and unworthy thing to say that I have thought fit to mention it and to say that nothing could be further from the truth. The
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  reasons for the amalgamations I have given. The final answers were "vetted" by the Army Council, and if personalities came into it at all—and not the sensible reasons that I have given—I have already pointed out that the 4th Hussars is one of the regiments which has been amalgamated.
  Lord Stratheden and Campbell read us an extract from a letter about Scottish amalgamation which I thought set the tone of what I am certain will be the spirit behind these amalgamations. May I read your Lordships an extract from a letter which I personally received from an old brother officer who served with me on the divisional staff of a regiment which I must obviously disguise:
  "As you know, we are to go in with the Loamshires. I suppose this is logical and inevitable, but none of us pretends to like it. The Loamshires were always a rum lot, but I suppose it might have been worse; Sappers or Scotsmen or Lord knows what!
  "However, the point is not to moan about the past but to get on with the job of making our new regiment the best regiment in the British Army as soon as we possibly can; and this we propose to do."
  I think that that will be the spirit of most of the amalgamated regiments. I hope that there will be a great deal of looking forward to the day when the new regiment is formed, instead of looking back with regret because the old regiment is changing its identity.
  Mention of badges occurred in nearly every speech which was made this afternoon. There is a cynical but very amusing little article on this subject by Peter Simple in the Daily Telegraph to-day. I disagree with it profoundly. I think that these things are most important. Though they may seem to the outside world a little trivial, to the Army they are extremely important. This question of a common cap badge I know has caused much trouble. One of the things we have been trying to do is to do away with the difficulty of changing regimental badges every time a man changes his regiment. Shortage of regiments and shortage of battalions has meant that changes came too often. A man would be posted to another regiment, it might be the Gloucesters or the Suffolks, although preferably in his own brigade, but the change was still there. We hope that the problem of changing badges when there is cross-posting between regiments is now eased. It is an attempt to

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  get the best of both worlds and save too many changes, thereby enabling officers and other ranks to get the benefit of cress-posting within the brigade organisation, so that a man can get on more quickly and have more opportunities than otherwise.
  The question of new titles, new badges and uniform to be worn by new regiments was also raised in the debate. This is a matter for the regiments themselves and for their colonels. The War Office, of course, is available to assist, if needs be, and to referee should there be any dispute. The noble Lord, Lord St. Oswald, raised the question of names. I hope that imagination will be used in some cases where names are not easy to find for amalgamated regiments and that over-cumbersome titles will be avoided. The Yorkshire Post has published an interesting suggestion for a title for the new Yorkshire amalgamated unit. They suggest that it should be known as The Princess Royal's Own. I express no opinion on that matter—it would be most improper for me to do so—-but it strikes me as something which is worth considering.
  Many noble Lords have raised the question of bands. I agree with much that has been said on the subject and that hands undoubtedly have an effect on morale. This decision with regard to bands has been taken with great regret. It is purely a manpower decision and it will effect a very considerable saving of manpower. If, by any chance, the manpower situation should improve—as we hope it will—we should be able to look at the band situation again. I do not want to close the door definitely on that matter.
  I turn now to the important question of the Reserve Army, on which both the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, went into some detail. No one cart forecast accurately the course of any future war, and it is essential to have a reserve available which can meet unforeseen eventualities. The country's insurance in this respect consists of the Army Emergency Reserve and the Territorial Army. Its role, therefore, is to provide the nation's reserve of organised and disciplined manpower in formed units, trained to fight in any emergency or to
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  take part in home defence. Now that part-time training for National Servicemen has been suspended, the Reserve Army is once more, in effect, a volunteer force. Because it is deployed all over the United Kingdom it is able to make the fullest use of the volunteer spirit throughout the country—which still, I am happy to say, exists in great strength—and can provide a valuable steadying influence in time of national crisis and a reserve to deal with the unexpected.
  The main task of the Reserve Army remains that of home defence in all its aspects, but some parts of the Reserve Army will still be needed to reinforce the Regular Army overseas. The reduction in our Regular forces, in fact, gives increased importance to this aspect. Clearly, certain adjustments will be necessary in the Reserve Army as a result of the change in the shape and size of the Regular Army. But, as your Lordships understand, the titles of units in the Territorial Army will not be affected by amalgamations which will take place in the Regular Army. This new shape has not been fully worked out. I can assure the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, and the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, that the divisional organisation as we now know it, is likely to remain for some while; but if the Regular Army should go over from the divisional organisation to the brigade group organisation, I imagine that the Territorial Army organisation might well follow suit. There is now great need for new recruits for the Territorial Army, and I am glad to say that they are coming in well. In February of this year the number was 580. Now we have switched to an entirely volunteer force and you can notice the change, for whereas in February the number was 580, last month it was 1,500.
  While talking about the need for volunteer recruits of this sort, may I also mention the Women's Royal Army Corps, to which the noble Earl, Lord Bathurst, referred? There have been suggestions in the Press—notably in the Sunday Press—that the Women's Services are a waste of time and money and should be disbanded. The policy of Her Majesty's Government is exactly the opposite. We wish to have more recruits in all three Services. There is a great deal of work that they can do. There is an increasing number of jobs which Service women can

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  do as well as men. And the important factor of morale enters into this. In stations abroad, the presence of British girls sharing the work of the Servicemen in foreign countries undoubtedly has a very beneficial effect on morale.
  EARL BATHURST: Will the noble Lord forgive me for interrupting him? Do I understand that the Women's Royal Army Corps are responsible in any way for cooking and maintenance services for the serving Army? I think that that is not so. If it could be so, and they could take over cooking or those other sorts of services for which they have special knowledge, I believe that it would make them that much more valuable.
  LORD MANCROFT: We are seeing whether there is not an extended range of duties which the W.R.A.C. can take over. We are going into that matter very carefully.
  Perhaps the most important point in the debate with which I am now left to deal is the question of recruiting.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: Is the noble Lord going back to the question of the balance of the home and the overseas establishments?
  LORD MANCROFT: I was not going into that matter in great detail, but I shall touch on it shortly. The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, read out a passage from a speech which I made in your Lordships' House on this subject some ten or eleven years ago. It was remarkable to me that I found that I agree with nearly everything I then said. That seldom happens.
  I think all your Lordships who have spoken have expressed concern about the way in which Regular recruiting is going, and whether the Services are attracting sufficient men to enable them to build up the all-Regular Forces of the kind which we set out in the Defence White Paper. This applies, of course, particularly to the Army. Her Majesty's Government are well aware that there has been a sharp fall in the rate of Regular recruitment over the past months. The noble Lord, Lord Nathan, asked me for figures. They are to be published in detail to-morrow, but I can give them to him in advance. He will not like them: I certainly do not. The first figure
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  I will give him is of 1,890 in June. Before that, in January, February and March, there was an average of 3,300. I am sure that the noble Lord will not like that. But it is not really surprising, when the radical changes in policy of the kind we have been discussing, of the kind set out in the Statement on Defence, are announced. I do not think these figures are a reliable guide to the future. I believe that when the new policy is fully understood, the trend can be, and will be, reversed
  I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, when he criticises the timing of the visit of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to Sandhurst. It strikes me as being the correct time—a time like this when there is doubt and anxiety—for someone with the authority of the C.I.G.S. to go and explain what is in the minds of those in control of the Army and in the minds of the Government. What is essential to bring home is, first, that the new Forces will still have tasks to perform that are vital to the interest and security of the nation. The second point is that the Services still have a place of honour and distinction in the life and society of the country. I believe that these things, intangible though they may be, count quite as much in deciding men to make their career in the Armed Forces as do more material conditions, such as pay and conditions of service.
  I am sure that there is not much use thinking that we can bribe men into the Forces by lavish rates of pay. We may get the men, but would they be the right men? Would that policy attract the people we want? In any case, to bribe by higher pay would be extravagant. We must spend our money with discrimination in the way we think will do the most good and, in particular, give attention to pay and standards of living in comparison with those in civilian life. As your Lordships may be aware, I am chairman of a small committee, consisting of my three colleagues in the Service Departments and other officials, to inquire into the whole, question of recruiting. There is no "gimmick", no one trick we can pull out of the hat to bring recruits pouring in. All the old things we talk about—the education of children, barracks, breaks in service, smarter uniforms, exciting sport, better food, more money for publicity, science (which the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, mentioned; and I entirely

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  agree with his remarks)—all these add up to something. If there should be some panacea" some new idea, which would bring in recruits, then we should like to know about it. But I do not believe that such an idea exists. I believe that only a combination of all these things, carried out with vigour and enthusiasm, will give us the results.
  LORD OGMORE: My Lords, if there is no panacea, and if the other measures have not been successful in the past, is it not dangerous for the Government to pin their whole policy on the fact that we intend by recruiting to get a voluntary Army?
  LORD MANCROFT: I do not agree with the noble Lord. These things have not been tried vigorously enough in the past, and they have not been tried with an. Army that is going back to an entirely voluntary basis. I believe that change to be al'-important. The change has been quickly reflected in the Territorial Army recruiting figures, and I believe that if we carry out our policy of reviewing the whole question with vigour and enthusiasm we shall get recruits.
  LORD OGMORE: May I ask the noble Lord whether it is not misleading to use the Territorial figure? Is it not the fact that Terirtorial recruiting has always gone up in. May and June, because of the proximity of the annual camp?
  LORD MANCROFT: Of course it does. They are seasonal figures, and I would say that this is also reflected in recruiting for the Regular Army. I believe that, with the Regular Army going on to a voluntary basis, we shall find an increase in recruiting. But we are not relying primarily on that, or on any one thing. We realise that the recruiting campaign must be pursued with the utmost vigour and by everybody. What it amounts to is that the Forces must have a fair deal, and this Government are determined to see that they get it. Times change and the Services change with them, but their job, which they have always carried out with distinction, will be as vital in the future as in the past, and that is what recruits must be made to realise.
  We believe that the challenge of these new techniques and new weapons, combined with the old sense of service and tradition, will attract men of sufficient
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  quality and in sufficient numbers to give us the Forces we need. These will be entirely voluntary Forces, to which most of the men who join will be able to devote their lives. They will thus be far more effective, man for man, and more attractive as a career to the potential recruit, than the present mixture of long-service, short-service, and National Service men can ever be, in spite of the excellent contribution which National Service men have made and continue to make.
  All this is not to say that Her Majesty's Government are under any illusion about the formidable nature of the task which they have set themselves. I want to put that before your Lordships as plainly and as bluntly as I can. I accept that point, which has been made by every noble Lord this afternoon. We are determined to do whatever is necessary to fulfil that task. We are devoting intensive study to the whole problem of recruiting. I have occupied an unconscionable amount of your Lordships' time and have tried to answer as many questions on important matters as I can. I know that in seeking to achieve the success to which I have been referring, and upon which the Government place so vast an amount of importance, we can rely on the full support of Parliament and of the country.
  8.35 p.m.
  VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords in all parts of the House for the way they have supported this debate during the last six hours, and I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Mancroft for the detail into which he has gone and the care he has taken in answering all the points made this afternoon. I should like to associate myself with everything he has said about the noble Lord, Lord Templemore. Beyond that, I know that he would agree with me that I should make no more comment on his speech to-night, and that we should read it carefully in the OFFICIAL REPORT in the morning.
  I hope that my noble friend will leave the debate realising how intensely anxious we all are that this reorganisation, having once been decided on, should be a success. We have shown him plenty of green lights, a few amber lights, and, I admit, one or two red lights. I know that he will realise that we shall follow

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  the progress of this reorganisation sympathetically, we hope helpfully, and certainly with the greatest possible attention. The conventional weapon of a Motion for Papers seems to me to be a particularly inaccurate one tonight. We have discussed three Papers; we have been able, within the range of the Motion, to include two more, and therefore I know that your Lordships do not wish me to ask for any more of them. At the same time, I must say to your Lordships, and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, that I do not withdraw anything of what I said either earlier this evening or ten years ago, except, of course, one thing—that is, my Motion for Papers, which I now beg leave to withdraw.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

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