Sitting of 13 September 1956

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS
  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  Proceedings on the Motion relating to the Adjournment (Autumn) exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]

SUEZ CANAL
2.37 p.m.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): I beg to move,
That this House condemns the arbitrary action of the Egyptian Government in seizing control of the Suez Canal; endorses the proposals adopted by the 18 Powers at the London Conference which would ensure that an international waterway so essential to the economic life, standard of living and employment of this and other countries would not remain in the unrestricted control of any single Government ; welcomes the sustained and continuing efforts of Her Majesty's Government to achieve a peaceful settlement; and affirms its support for the statement of policy made by the Prime Minister to this House on 12th September.
After listening to the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell), yesterday, I re-read the speech which he made to this House on 2nd August. The contrast between the two speeches was very great. His speech of 2nd August was a very different sort of speech from the one which he made yesterday. He then took exception to Colonel Nasser's action on three grounds. First, that the purported act of nationalisation had been carried out with regard to a Company which was not an ordinary Company conducting ordinary activities. The right hon. Gentleman objected to the ownership and control of that Company passing within the power of a single country. He rejected the assurances of Colonel Nasser that the 1888 Convention would be respected and he based himself for that part of his argument on the action
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of the Egyptian Government in regard to Israeli ships. That was his first point.
The right hon. Gentleman's second reason for taking strong exception to Colonel Nasser's action was the manner in which it had been carried out. It had been done, so the right hon. Gentleman said,
"without negotiation, without discussion, by force, and … on the excuse that this was the way to finance the Aswan Dam."
The right hon. Gentleman's third reason was the political background, the repercussion of the whole of this episode in the Middle East. He said :
"We cannot forget that Colonel Nasser has repeatedly"
proclaimed his ambition
"to create an"
Egyptian
"empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. The French Prime Minister, M. Mollet, the other day quoted a speech of Colonel Nasser's and rightly said that it"
would
"remind us only of one thing—of the speeches of Hitler before the war."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1620.]
On the first of the right hon. Gentleman's points, the maintenance of this international highway, I should have thought there would be agreement everywhere that it is vital to Western Europe, but much more than that, that it is vital to the oil-producing countries themselves—[HON. MEMBERS : "No."] It is certainly important to them if their products are to reach their customers expeditiously and cheaply. It is vital to the countries of Asia if the manufactures and the machinery and plant of Western Europe are to reach them for their development by the cheapest route. This is a world interest. It is not a case just of the United Kingdom and France against Egypt, or of Europe against Asia. It is a truly international problem.
With regard to the right hon. Gentleman's second point, I remind the House again of what he said about this operation having been carried out by force. On the third point, I refer to the words he used, which were that M. Mollet had rightly said that it reminded him of Hitler. The right hon. Gentleman himself referred later in his speech to Hitler and to Mussolini. If there is any question of building up Colonel Nasser by comparing him with those people the right

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hon. Gentleman cannot altogether escape responsibility.
In his emphasis upon these three points the value of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was that he was speaking as Leader of the Opposition and, therefore, he was registering a degree of unity on this matter in this House. I do not believe that opinion in this country has altered upon these three points. I only wish that equal emphasis had been given to them in the speeches which came from the Opposition benches yesterday. That is the basis from which we begin. I still believe that the overwhelming majority of the people of the country uphold those three points.
Faced with that situation, the right hon. Gentleman, on 2nd August, suggested that we should take certain action. He said that there had been much talk about a conference and he hoped that it would take place. He said that he approved entirely of the idea of international control and indicated that he would like any control agency that was set up to be associated with the United Nations. He said that the first thing was to get the conference and to get a plan for international control and that it would be common sense to invite Egypt to the conference.
The right hon. Gentleman then stated that he believed that the economic measures taken by the Government were fully justified. He expressed the hope that investigations might take place on alternative routes round the Cape, in which I think the right hon. Gentleman is interested. Finally, he said that in his view we should be very careful what we said on the use of force. He said :
"It is unwise to discuss hypothetical"
situations in the
"present conditions."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1624.]
He indicated—to be fair to the right hon. Gentleman—that we should only use force in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
In the light of those points, let us consider for a moment what the Government have done. First, with regard to the conference. Our first instinct on hearing of Colonel Nasser's action was to have immediate consultations with our French and American Allies and we agreed with
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them to summon a conference. There was no pressure upon us to do this; it was in our thoughts from the beginning and it had been already decided upon before the right hon. Gentleman made his speech. It had been decided to invite Egypt and the Soviet Union to that conference. I think that the membership of the conference was reasonable. After all, it is not a bad thing to discuss matters once in a while with the people who are primarily concerned.
The action taken was directly in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter. Russia and Egypt were both invited and it represented a genuine attempt to work out a reasonable basis for settlement. The Conference succeeded in arriving at an international plan to which 18 countries subscribed, representing about 90 per cent. or more of the user interest in the Canal. They arrived at a plan for its operation.
In that plan, or in any plan to deal with the operation of the Suez Canal, it seems to me that there had to be three ingredients. First—and I do not think that sufficient importance has been paid to this point—the organisation must give the employees, and particularly the foreign employees, who are essential for the operation of the Canal, sufficient confidence in the system under which they work. Secondly, such a system would be much better if it gave confidence to those who have to produce the capital which will be needed to an enormous extent if the Canal is to be maintained, increased and developed as it should be. Thirdly, the scheme has to have the confidence of the users.
It was made clear at the Conference, as had been in our minds from the beginning, that the international agency should have a relationship with the United Nations. I think that anybody who reads the statement of the plan in its final form will see the scrupulous regard that has been had for the susceptibilities and interests of Egypt. It is a very fair plan.
I would remind hon. and right hon. Members of what was said in the White Paper, referring to Mr. Menzies' mission. In page 10, that document says :
"There are in our proposals marked advantages for Egypt which we have discussed at length but which we now summarise as follows : —

(a) Egypt's ownership of the Canal being recognised, it is to her great advantage to

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have the Canal maintained and improved and made more profitable as the years go on.

(b) The future financial burdens involved in such maintenance and improvement would be carried and handled by the new body and therefore, Egypt would in fact be relieved of them.

(c) Egypt alone would draw profit from the Canal.

(d) A just and fair method of compensating the shareholders of the Suez Canal would have been agreed upon.

(e) The dangerous tension now existing internationally would be relaxed on terms satisfactory to the user nations and entirely consistent with Egypt's proper dignity, independence and ownership,"

This plan was put to the Egyptian Government with skill and patience by Mr. Menzies' mission and with complete unity on the part of his four colleagues. It was flatly rejected. I confess that I should have thought that the one thing which would have been done firmly and unequivocally from every quarter of the House was to express regret at that action of Colonel Nasser's and to emphasise how thereby he has weakened his international position.
It has been said that we should immediately refer this matter to the United Nations—"long ago", I think one hon. Member said. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened. At the London Conference the representative of the Soviet Union made it quite clear that he would not support our plan for international control. He sought at the Conference to assert a veto. He said that the Conference could come to no conclusion except on a basis of unanimity, but that view was not accepted and the 18-Power plan was produced. I must say that the Soviet representative did everything in his power to make it difficult for Egypt to accept the plan or even to negotiate within the framework of it.
What would have happened if we had gone to the Security Council and put the plan to it? It is obvious what would have happened ; there would have been a Soviet veto and no resolution at all would have been passed. What next? It may be said that we should then have called a special Assembly of the United Nations. What would have happened there? [HON. MEMBERS : "Ah."] I have some small experience of what happens there. I am dealing with a plan for an international agency, a plan of which the Front Bench of the Opposition have said
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they approved. We would have called a special Assembly of the United Nations. Whether or not, in the end, a two-thirds majority was obtained for any resolution, there would have been weeks of debate, innumerable amendments and, finally, at the most, a recommendation.
Mr. James Callaghan: Let us get on with the war.
Mr. Lloyd: Instead of that we have made effort after effort to procure by peaceful means a satisfactory method of operating the Canal. So far as the United Nations is concerned, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has stated the position of the Government— that it may be necessary to go to the Security Council, and we shall go not as a formality but in a genuine effort to improve thereby the prospects of a peaceful settlement.
Mr. R. T. Paget: I have been trying very hard, and not un-sympathetically, to follow this argument. If going to the United Nations is such an entirely futile performance—and I tend to agree with that—why does the right hon. and learned Gentleman say that we may have to go there?
Mr. Lloyd: The hon. and learned Member has not followed me with his customary attention. I was dealing with the putting forward of this plan for an international agency, and with the point that we should, at the beginning, have gone to the United Nations—that that was the way to get a satisfactory solution. I was saying that if we had gone to the United Nations we should have had the Russian veto; and had we had a special Assembly I do not believe that the plan for an international agency would have emerged.
At all events, if it had emerged—and this is the plan which the right hon. Gentleman says is a good plan—it would have emerged only after weeks of debate and after innumerable amendments tending to whittle it down. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite have their own recollection of what happened when these procedures were used in regard to Abadan. I say that even if the necessary majority had been prepared even for a recommendation, it would have taken infinitely longer than it took us at the meeting of the 22 Powers to get this international plan. [Interruption.]

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Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen should remember, also, that the General Assembly has power only to make a recommendation. The body which takes the executive action is the Security Council, and action on that body can, of course, be barred by the veto. I shall return a little later to deal with this Opposition Amendment.
Mr. Sydney Silverman rose—
Mr. Lloyd: The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition was, I think, allowed to make his speech without any intervention.
There has been some criticism of the military precautions taken by Her Majesty's Government. I agree with what was said yesterday by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman). I hope that right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite will have read what he said. He said that the Prime Minister would have been guilty of a grave dereliction of duty if he had failed to take the measures which he has taken. To quote the hon. Member :
"If there had been violence in the Middle East and he"—
that is, the Prime Minister—
"had neglected to prepare the necessary forces to safeguard our proper interests he would rightly have been held guilty by Parliament and by the whole country of having failed to make provision for circumstances which might well have arisen, and which indeed may arise in the future."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th September, 1956; Vol. 558, c. 109.]
I think that that is a very fair statement of the position.
I want now to deal with the users' organisation. This was immediately denounced by the Leader of the Opposition as provocation. One would have thought that on a matter of this seriousness he would have at least taken a little time to consider it, to ask some questions, before doing his best to ruin the chances of this organisation, because, of course, the right hon. Gentleman having said that, it is very much more difficult for Colonel Nasser to accept it or discuss it.
I want to say a word or two to the House about the legal position of this users' organisation, because I think that there was some challenge as to its juridical basis. The 1888 Convention, together with the Company's concessions,
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constituted a balanced scheme. Egypt's position was covered by the Convention and by the fact that the Canal was within Egyptian territory and under Egyptian sovereignty. The position of the users, on the other hand, was safeguarded, partly by the Convention and partly by the fact that the Canal was operated by an international company whose operation of it formed part of the basis of the Convention.
The Egyptian Government, by destroying the balance of this scheme, by taking out the operation of the Canal by the international company, have removed one of the guarantees afforded under the Convention to the user interests. Egypt is not entitled to substitute herself for the Company as the operating authority. This is contrary to the scheme assumed by the Convention.
It is quite true that the user countries may not be able to prevent the Egyptian Government from purporting to nationalise the Company under Egyptian law or, indeed, to exclude it from seeking to carry out some of the operating activities, but the Egyptians, for their part, cannot require the users to recognise the validity of this state of affairs, or to recognise the Egyptian operation of the Canal in lieu of that of the Company. The user Powers retain their passage rights under the Convention and are not obliged to make use of, or to limit themselves to, the facilities provided by Egypt. That is the legal position and, therefore, I say that we are absolutely right to seek to form some sort of organisation of users. That is the first point.
Secondly, the skilled pilots and other expatriate employees of the Company will not work for the Egyptian Board, and there is, therefore, the risk of traffic breaking down. Therefore, it is right, I maintain, to try to keep them to work for an organisation which they are prepared to serve.
Thirdly, although the dues are to be paid to the organisation, Egypt will receive appropriate payment for the facilities made available. Of course, there are grave practical difficulties in carrying out the scheme—of course there are. But those practical difficulties are not of our seeking. [Interruption] We have not created the situation; the right hon. Gentleman referred to it in his speech of 2nd August. The scheme has full

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United States support and participation and the United States Secretary of State will be making a statement about that. To deal with the point raised by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Montgomery (Mr. C. Davies), we propose to call a meeting of the main users in the very near future in order to get the plan working.
Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: Do I understand from what the right hon. and learned Gentleman now says that he maintains that the users' association is perfectly lawful and entitled to be formed under the Convention even though Egypt is entitled to nationalise the Company? Secondly, how does he reconcile the juridical basis which he has just given with the provision in the Convention that the Convention shall continue even after the operation of the Canal, and the Suez Canal Company and its operations, have reverted to Egypt itself?
Mr. Lloyd: So far as the hon. and learned Gentleman's second point is concerned, the position which I am maintaining now is certainly valid up to 1968. As to what happens at the end of the period of the Concession, I agree with him that that might very well produce a different legal situation, because the concession was for a hundred years, and I say that until 1968 the international Company is an essential part of the operation of the Canal. Whatever Egypt may be able to do according to her domestic law with regard to a company which is registered in Egypt, she is in breach of international law in taking that Company out of an international obligation.
There have been complaints about the attitude and the action of the Company in respect of its pilots. The Leader of the Opposition inferred that there had been some sort of wrongful collusion between Her Majesty's Government and the Canal Company. I repeat that Her Majesty's Government have in no way sought to influence the pilots to leave. It is certainly true that we were aware of the Company's request to its employees to state whether they wished to maintain their contract of employment with their lawful employers or whether they wished to leave Egypt. I cannot see anything wrong in that.
But on two occasions we did intervene to keep the pilots in Egypt and at work, first, while the London Conference was
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taking place, and again when Mr. Menzies' mission was trying to secure Egyptian agreement at the conclusion of the Conference. But there really is a limit to what free men can be expected to undergo. So far as I know, these men are now working under martial law of another country.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: So are the soldiers.
Mr. Lloyd: How many expatriate soldiers are under martial law of our country? They are our own nationals. I am dealing with people who are not nationals of Egypt, but who are expatriates. I find it extraordinary that anyone should deny the right of these British citizens to withhold their labour, or complain because their employers propose to give them compensation for loss of employment.
Mr. William Warbey rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman does not give way, the hon. Member is not entitled to remain on his feet.
Mr. Lloyd: The suggestion was made that the pilots were called out in order to make possible the formation of the users' association. I categorically deny that allegation. It was the likelihood that the pilots would not remain at work which was one of the reasons for seeking to set up the users' association.
The Leader of the Opposition and some of his right hon. Friends yesterday tabled an Amendment to the Government Motion which has now become an Amendment of censure upon the Government. I must confess that I think it is a somewhat extraordinary Amendment. It condemns
"the arbitrary methods employed by the Egyptian Government in respect of the Suez Canal Company …"
That condemnation is already contained in the Government Motion. It asserts a resolution
"to support the legitimate rights of the users of the Canal …"
That is precisely what we have been seeking to do. It is precisely what the course of action announced by the Prime Minister yesterday is designed to do—to support the legitimate rights of the users of the Canal.
The Amendment then
"deplores the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to invoke the authority of the United Nations over the dispute …"
It is not true that Her Majesty's Government have refused to invoke the authority of the United Nations. That is a wholly false charge. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear the position of the Government yesterday. We have been acting in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter from the outset. We have circulated to members of the Security Council a statement of the position and we have thus prepared the way for a reference to the Security Council, should this seem to be the right course, at any given time from now onwards.
How can this be termed a refusal to invoke the authority of the United Nations? Article 33 enjoins upon members to seek every means of settling their disputes and finding a solution among themselves before bringing their case to the United Nations. That is precisely what we are still trying to do. The London Conference and the Menzies mission were both designed to this end. Now we are setting up a users' association, which is a further attempt by peaceful means to get a satisfactory method of operating the Canal in accordance with the rights of the users, as I have already indicated.
The Opposition Amendment then
"calls upon Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations …"
Apparently the Opposition hold the view that no further means of settlement now exist outside the United Nations. We do not agree. I have already dealt with the question of the procedures in the United Nations.
The rest of the Opposition Amendment calls upon the Government
"to declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and to refrain meanwhile from … provocative action."
We have repeatedly said—and I said so in a broadcast which I made before the Conference—that we have acted, and we intend to act, in the spirit of the Charter of United Nations and in such a manner as to uphold the rule of law. We do not seek to provoke.
Mr. S. O. Davies: What are the Government doing, then?
Mr. Lloyd: After the way in which this country, with our Allies and associates, have been so consistently provoked by the Government of Egypt and have met each provocation with new efforts at consultation and agreement, I find it amazing that hon. Members opposite should think it their duty to utter warnings to the Government to refrain from provocative action. I should have thought that that warning might really have been addressed to Cairo and not to Downing Street.
I know that there is a natural desire on the part of the Opposition to score off the Government of the day. It is part of our party system, in which we all believe. In the realm of foreign affairs, moreover, the Opposition, of whatever party, have an advantage over the Government of the day because the Government of the day cannot reveal the confidential negotiations and discussions which are taking place, and no wise Government would set out step by step and stage by stage exactly how they proposed to protect the interests of the country. To do that would be the negation of diplomacy and would make all negotiation quite futile.
My sorrow in this debate is that the Leader of the Opposition has yielded to the temptation of trying to use a grave international situation for party advantage. [HON. MEMBERS : "What about Abadan?"] If the position of this country has been weakened, that is what has weakened it. That process is carried a stage further by this Amendment, which goes out of its way to pick a quarrel and to divide Parliament and the nation. It is, as I have indicated, based on false suppositions and definite untruths, and I believe it mars what might have been a great Parliamentary occasion showing the strength and the resolution of our people. However, the responsibility is ours and we shall discharge it. We are not prepared to let unrestricted control of the operation of this Canal pass into the hands of one Government or of one man, and upon that issue we are not prepared to compromise.
3.11 p.m.
Mr. Alfred Robens: I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof :
"while condemning the arbitrary methods employed by the Egyptian Government in

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respect of the Suez Canal Company and resolved to support the legitimate rights of the users of the Canal, deplores the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to invoke the authority of the United Nations over the dispute, and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations, to declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and to refrain meanwhile from any form of provocative action."
We have just been given a lecture by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs upon the functions of the Opposition in this House. I want to remind him and tell him quite plainly that it is also the function of the Opposition to try to restrain a foolish and strong-headed Government from taking this country into war—
Mr. Harold Davies: Answer that one.
Mr. Robens: —and that we shall do. It is no use the right hon. and learned Gentleman talking about a grand Parliamentary occasion and wanting to use the Opposition to bolster up the Government's wild schemes when he should know, if he reads the newspapers at all, that over half of the nation is against the use of force.
We have read the declaration of the Trades Union Congress, which cannot be disregarded. The speeches were quite statesmanlike. The T.U.C., representing many millions of organised workers in this country, made its position plain. Its position is not in relation to the settlement of the Suez Canal problem on the basis of some form of international control ; it is that the use of force should be conditioned only by and on the authority of the United Nations, if force has to be used.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that when Mr. Menzies and his friends went to Cairo on behalf of the 18-Power Conference, Colonel Nasser turned down the plan flat; and he seemed to be surprised. What was he surprised about? Did he really think that, after the Prime Minister had gone on the world radio to insult Colonel Nasser three days before, Colonel Nasser was waiting in Cairo with a rubber stamp? The right hon. and learned Gentleman should realise that Britain is a great Power and Egypt is a very small nation, and that it is very easy to wield the big stick in
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relation to a small nation but that does not necessarily bring results.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman dealt at great length with the speech of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. As my right hon. Friend will be winding up tonight, he will be able to answer for himself. I would say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman only that there is nothing in the speech of my right hon. Friend on 2nd August in contradiction of what he said yesterday.
We have condemned time and time again the methods by which Colonel Nasser took this action. We do it in the Amendment which I now move. Of course, it was wrong for Colonel Nasser to take that action. No one justifies it at all. The problem that we have to face is how we can meet this new situation without recourse to war, and I understand that that is also the intention of the right hon. and learned Gentleman and of the Prime Minister, although the events which have taken place and the Prime Minister's speech yesterday did, in my view, nothing to lift the shadow of war from the scene.
The words that he used yesterday—were they not provocative? What did he say when he told us rather skimpily about the canal users' association? Before any negotiations took place, before the proposals were put to the Egyptians, the Prime Minister in this House warns Egypt in advance that if they refuse to grant facilities which the canal users' association will demand, we—that is, the three Powers, Britain, America and France.—[An HON. MEMBER : "America?"]—Oh, yes, the right hon. Gentleman was ready to explain to us that America was in this—were free to take such further steps as might be required, either through the United Nations or by other means for the assertion of their rights.
What did the right hon. Gentleman mean? I can tell him what most people have interpreted that as meaning. It means the threat of force. If he has had an opportunity of looking at the tape this morning and seeing the reaction from countries throughout the world, not only from places like India and Ceylon but also Australia, he will see that they feel not only very doubtful about this scheme but very hurt at not knowing something about it before the Prime Minister

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announced it in the House. I myself, would have thought that if, indeed, this canal users' association is a good thing, it would have been sensible to put that proposal to the nations which met at the London Conference. Even Mr. John Foster Dulles is reported as having been annoyed at the disclosure, or method of presentation, by the Prime Minister, reflecting, as he is reported to have said, as though it were power politics. I do not think that the Prime Minister will find himself very popular in one or two quarters if this conference to which the Foreign Secretary has referred is called upon to deal with this new idea of a users' committee.
I do not understand what has changed the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, with a long and distinguished record in the political and diplomatic field, has, always been an upholder of the United Nations and of the old League of Nations—[HON. MEMBERS : "No."]— Oh yes, indeed he has, and he has paid great service and lip-service to the idea of collective security. In fact, as recently as 21st February, 1946, which is postwar [Laughter]—I want to differentiate between the old League of Nations and the United Nations—this is what he said in this House :
"We have all pledged ourselves to observe the Charter which we drew up at San Francisco. If we carry out that pledge, not only in the letter, which is always so capable of argument and interpretation this way and that, but in the spirit, then the nations can move forward to an era of prosperity greater than has ever been known."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1946; Vol. 419, c. 1347.]
Compare that with what the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Foreign Secretary said this afternoon.
I wonder what it is that has changed the Prime Minister from that line which he has advocated for so long. The reason is, of course, that the Prime Minister's own personal position is at stake. When the troops left the Suez Canal, the rebel group in the Tory Party made its position very plain, and as soon as Nasser seized the Canal the rebels said to the Prime Minister, "We told you so". From that moment, he had to justify himself before his rebel group. In fact, there is not a Suez rebel group any longer in the Conservative Party ; they have all joined it, including the
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Prime Minister. He had to show himself as a resolute and a strong character.
Yesterday, he did not deny all that my right hon. Friend said about the use of force and the threats which had emanated from the Foreign Office and from 10, Downing Street. He went to great pains to justify his position by talking a great deal about appeasement, giving a warning that one must be firm with appeasers, because of the events of the 1930s. He compared the German scene with the Egyptian scene. It was not a real comparison, was it?
The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): If the right hon. Gentleman will allow me to say so, it was the Leader of the Opposition who first made the comparison.
Mr. Robens: But, of course, that is not a real comparison. The technique of Hitler is the technique of any dictator, large or small; but the comparison between Hitler and Nasser as such, or between Germany and Egypt, is obviously not a fair one. It was not at all the comparison my right hon. Friend made. The truth is that Hitler had broken international law on two occasions before he marched into the Rhineland. He had raised an air force and he had introduced conscription. There can be no comparison at all between the position of Germany at that time and Nasser's seizing of the Canal within Egyptian territory. All the Prime Minister did in talking in that fashion was done, of course, to build up Nasser and make him appear a very much more powerful man than he is.
The Prime Minister yesterday rather over-egged the pudding on this matter of appeasement. The truth is that he is out on a limb and he does not know how to get back. [Laughter.] Hon. and right hon. Gentlemen who are laughing now will, in a few months' time, be the first to push the right hon. Gentleman out of office.
Force in itself cannot possibly bring about the internationalising of the Suez Canal. It is quite impossible. Even if by force one were able to put back an international organisation to run the Canal, one could not at any time guarantee the things one would want—free use and so on—because free use of the Canal and its maintenance for international shipping must in any event

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depend upon the co-operation of the country through which the Canal passes. With modern techniques, commandos and all the rest, the Canal could be made unusable under any scheme which man cared to devise if in fact the Arabs decided the Canal was not to be used. The right hon. Gentleman must know that.
It is no use building up a situation in which going to war can be made easy. We talk about force and the threat of force. We do not use the ugly word "war", but when we talk about the threat of force, we mean going to war. Going to war over this case of the Suez Canal would not only weaken the Commonwealth—and I am referring not only to India and Ceylon but to Canada and Australia, who would have grave reservations about the use of force, according to the latest statements—but it would unite the whole of the Arab and Asian peoples against us, and this country would stand condemned at the bar of world opinion. Finally, going to war is not a permanent solution.
The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister told us something, not very much, about another new idea, a canal users' association. My right hon. Friend asked him what was the real intention of this organisation. I repeat the question. Is the operation of this new organisation intended to lead to negotiation, or will it turn out to be an act of great provocation?
If it is intended to force negotiations, I do not understand why it is formed ; negotiation could be conducted by reference to the United Nations. The right hon. Gentleman was wrong in thinking that the only thing the United Nations had to decide about was the plan agreed on by the 18 nations. The reference to the United Nations would be free of any plan which has been agreed upon. The United Nations would be free to discuss the matter and discover the best way of bringing about what everybody wants, without recourse to war. It is, therefore, no use the right hon. Gentleman hawking a particular plan around. There would, therefore, be no need for an organisation of this kind if it is intended to be used only as a source of negotiating power. The matter could go to the United Nations without it.
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This organisation is much more likely to be provocative. What did the Prime Minister tell us about the canal users' association? He said it would employ pilots; it would undertake responsibility for the co-ordination of traffic ; it would receive the dues, and it would pay Egypt for the facilities afforded. It cannot do any single one of those things, with the exception of employing pilots, unless the Egyptians agree to its doing so.
It must be said to the credit of the right hon. Gentleman that he did concede at one point that the attitude of the Egyptian Government will have an important bearing on the capacity of the association to fulfil its function. Then he went on to say—and I repeat the words I quoted at beginning—that
"if the Egyptian Government should seek to interfere … or refuse to extend to it the essential minimum of co-operation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th September, 1956 ; Vol. 558, c. 11.]
the Government, and others, will be free to take such further steps, through the United Nations or by other means—[An HON. MEMBER : "What other means?"] The "other means" can only mean, of course, the use of force.
The Prime Minister: Why?
Mr. Robens: If the other means do not include the use of force, why has mobilisation gone on at the magnitude it has, to deal with a nation of about 20 million people, half of whom are illiterate? Does it really mean that a small nation, illiterate and poverty-ridden, is such a menace militarily that we have had to build up to the state we have done, and to put French troops into a British colony in Cyprus, if it is not the intention of the Government at some time to use force?
I warn the Prime Minister that any force used in relation to the settlement of this issue in Egypt will not be confined to Egypt. There will be repercussions all over the world. Already there has been a note in the Press from the Plantation Workers' Union in Ceylon. I do not know the size of that union or whether it has any influence, but I do know that if the plantation workers in Ceylon were to carry out the threat which has been reported today—that if action is taken in Egypt they will take action on British-owned rubber and tea plantations—that movement would rise wherever there are British interests in Asian countries. The right hon. Gentleman's friends laugh this

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off. They would not be laughing if this eventuality were to arise.
Any resort to force would put British interests in the whole of the Asian and Arab countries in jeopardy and would not guarantee anything about the free use of the Canal. I say again that international usage can be secured only if we can get Egypt to agree to a formula to settle the dispute. The use of force might easily overthrow Nasser. It would not destroy Arab nationalism and it would not destroy the rising feeling of people of this kind for independence and for freeing themselves from what they call imperialist domination. People on the other side of the House may laugh to hear those phrases but that feeling runs deep in Arab and Asian peoples and finds its expression in many actions which we do not like and for which we have to find the solution as between our two countries.
We can live only in a world in which nations of their own volition will cooperate and reach agreement and understanding. The Prime Minister has had long experience and has had many successes in peaceful negotiation. He has often told us that it requires patience. He should act now on the advice he has given to others. The Suez Canal problem cannot be settled by war. The final and lasting settlement can come only from a freely negotiated agreement.
If the plan which has been produced is really intended only as a method of seeking negotiation, or, in other words, an alternative to the 18-nation plan, there may be something in it—
Mr. Cyril Osborne: Withdraw the Amendment.
Mr. Robens: There may be something in it if it would mean the start of fresh negotiations, but in our view the right place for that is at the United Nations and not to continue with the idea that the great Powers can bludgeon Egypt into some sort of settlement, because I do not think they will succeed in that.
Are the differences between Egypt and ourselves negotiable? I believe that they are, because the Government, as have the 18 Powers, have already conceded that the right of Egypt to own the Canal is accepted. That was conceded in the Declaration made in the exchange between Mr. Menzies and Colonel Nasser.
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There is no disagreement on compensation. Nasser's declaration shows that he is prepared to agree to compensation. The 18-Power plan proposed that there should be compensation. On the principle of compensation, there is no difference. [An HON. MEMBER : "Where is the money coming from?"] We can go into that quite easily. We owe Egypt £120 million straight away, so we can deal with that problem as it arises. The truth is that there is no difference in principle either in connection with compensation or with the ownership of the Canal by Egypt.
The requirements of the maritime nations are uninterrupted use of the Canal without discrimination, fair tolls, the development of the Canal to meet future traffic and the technical efficiency of the Canal. The White Paper issued by the Government gives the statement made by Colonel Nasser. What did he say were the intentions and policy of his Government?
"… the policy of my Government"—
he said—
"remains to be—

(a) the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and its secure use without discrimination"—

that is precisely what we asked for :

"(b) the development of the Suez Canal to meet the future requirements of navigation"—

that is precisely what we asked for :

"(c) the establishment of just and equitable tolls and charges"—

that is precisely what we asked for ; and :

"(d) technical efficiency of the Suez Canal"

which is precisely what we have asked for.
Our apprehensions lie in our doubt as to the ability of the Egyptian Government to carry out the technical and administrative work involved. Secondly, there is apprehension or doubt that for political reasons the Egyptian Government would not carry out its obligations on non-discrimination and tolls. That is a fair statement of what is agreed and where the apprehensions arise.
The differences are so narrow as to the method by which we can ensure that these undertakings are carried out that if this matter were referred to the United Nations, who could set up an appropriate committee—[HON. MEMBERS : Oh."] It does not matter if it takes time. If a

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committee were set up to negotiate and to narrow this final difference, I do not believe it is beyond possibility that agreement could be found acceptable both to the users and to Colonel Nasser.
If it takes a long time to do that, we should encourage pilots to carry on with their jobs until the negotiations are over. I accept at once what the Foreign Secretary said, that no one has the right to keep a man at his job if he wishes to leave it. At the same time, it would be quite wrong if anyone were to offer financial inducements for men to leave their jobs to make it more difficult to negotiate. What I say, therefore, is that the differences now are so narrow that there should be reference to the United Nations. Take the issue out of the hands of power politics and put it into the hands of the United Nations. Let these discussions go on and encourage the pilots to keep the ships moving along the Canal. Even if it takes time, it is far better than going to war to enforce a solution which would be only temporary.
I see no reason why at the end of the day there should not again be a convention, not with a particular group of Powers but with the United Nations itself. There is no reason why we should not create some precedents if we are wanting to try to build up international law and order. If a convention that was agreed with the United Nations were broken, all the resources of the United Nations would be available to deal with such a breach. [Interruption.] Certainly, Remember that a breach of a United Nations convention would be a challenge to world authority, and no Government could successfully do that if the United Nations is to survive. If there were a convention with the United Nations and that convention were broken, it would mean the end of the United Nations.
Finally, this is not merely a dispute about Suez. It is to decide the kind of world in which we want to live, the world of law and order, or the world of the jungle ; a world in which the sovereign rights of nations are respected and in which sovereign countries are conscious of their responsibilities and obligations to one another, a world in which the rule of law takes the place of force. Britain today has a supreme opportunity, in this matter in which we are so deeply involved, to provide an example of moral leadership and wise statesmanship. To
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vote for the Amendment is to support sanity in world affairs. The Government's policy can lead only to conflict.
3.42 p.m.
Sir Lionel Heald: No one can regard the situation in this House today without profound anxiety and even distress. It is a tragedy that there should be this division of opinion, a division of opinion on party lines on an issue of this magnitude. I shall not willingly say one word to provoke any further recrimination. On the contrary, I want to see whether, even at this late hour, it is still possible for us to avoid, by our votes tonight, giving the appearance, not only to the country but, what is more important even than that, to the world, that this House and this country are split asunder on a matter of this kind. If we can do no more than reduce the number of those who really believe it right and their duty to vote against the Government on this matter we shall have achieved something at least in that direction.
I think we start with this fact, that no responsible Member of this House, no responsible organ of publicity in the country, has suggested that in no circumstances should force be used in relation to Egypt over this matter. There have, of course, been some who are against it in any event. I respect their views though I have always disagreed with them, but they do not command any large support in this House.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: It is growing.
Sir L. Heald: Therefore, we start with this, that we all agree that in some circumstances it may be necessary to resort to force. No Government, of course, could possibly pledge themselves against such a thing. They would be failing in their responsibility to the country. There again, I believe, all of us, with that exception—a perfectly honourable exception—of a few Members, are in agreement.
The question is : in what circumstances should force be used? In the first place that must, in any democratic country, be for the Government to decide. Of course, their view must be endorsed by Parliament, but it is the duty of the Government, and the Government alone, to decide, and the Government must be

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trusted to do what is right. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] As a proposition, I believe that there is no responsible Member of Parliament who would differ in principle from what I have said. So far, we are in entire agreement.—[HON. MEMBERS : "NO."]—How then does the present situation in this House arise? It arises, I believe, largely if not mainly because a number of Opposition Members and a number of people in the country have a belief, which I believe to be a perfectly unjustified and wrong belief, that the Government intend to use force in violation of our international obligations. [Interruption.] If I may be allowed to develop my argument I should like to do so, and it will save time if I am allowed to do so without interruption.
There is, I believe, a great deal of uncertainty and some ignorance as to just what our international obligations are. Listening to some speeches in the House on these subjects one does rather wonder whether hon. Members have really considered what our position is, and therefore I believe that it will not be doing a disservice to the House if, very briefly, but I hope clearly, I indicate what precisely our international obligations are, because I myself am not prepared to support any action which would involve a breach of our international obligations, having myself had the honour of representing Her Majesty's Government as a delegate at the United Nations and having also represented Her Majesty's Government at the International Court at The Hague. Therefore, I think it is right for me to state in these circumstances what I understand our obligations to be and what I believe we are bound to do as a matter of law.
I start with Article 2 of the Charter, and will just read to the House two short paragraphs which state our fundamental obligations. The first, which is paragraph 3, is :
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
Paragraph 4 of Article 2 says :
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
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other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
That is the fundamental obligation which is undertaken by every member.
Under Article 33 there is the obligation in the first instance to do one's best to solve problems by negotiation. As the Foreign Secretary has pointed out, that was the action which was taken in summoning the 22 nations. Perhaps I should read the article so that we may be quite clear. It states :
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation …"
That was undertaken with full agreement of all parties in the House and of all reasonable people in the London Conference.
What follows after that? Suppose that these efforts are not successful. Article 37 states :
"Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33"—
and I think that everyone will agree that that is the nature of the present dispute—
"fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council."
Therefore, as I understand it, there is no doubt at all, under the Charter of the United Nations, that if the London Conference plan or the amended plan, as we now understand, is to be discussed by the same nations and if that fails to gain acceptance there is a clear obligation under Article 37 that—with one exception—before resort is had to force, the matter should be referred to the Security Council.
The exception is in Article 51, which reads as follows :
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
I cannot believe that anyone could seriously argue that Article 51 would be complied with in a case where some

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requirement was insisted upon and resisted by another party. Therefore, I believe it to be the position that under our international obligation, if there was a refusal to comply with the request made to set up this organisation and to carry it into effect, we should be bound, before resorting to force, to refer the matter to the Security Council.
I do not believe that the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister or any other member of the Government has ever thought or suggested otherwise. [HON. MEMBERS : "Why not say so?"] Hon. Members ask, "Why not say so?" and that brings me to the point that I am making. I believe that if that is said a great deal of the steam will disappear. I find it most difficult to see why it is necessary for the Liberal Party to have placed on the Order Paper their Amendment to the Government Motion, which seeks to delete the words of the Motion after "any single Government", and to add
"but regrets that Her Majesty's Government did not issue a further invitation immediately to the 22 Governments who were invited to and attended the first conference so as to discuss with them what further steps be taken to ensure the future of the Suez Canal for world use, and failing any agreement by negotiation to refer the matter then to the United Nations in conformity with the United Nations Charter".
The Liberal Party Amendment starts by regretting that the 22 member Governments are not being called together. We understand now that they are to be called together. Therefore, I think that we need not trouble about that part of the Amendment. As to the rest, the Amendment is simply on the very point that I have mentioned, which is that the matter, if agreement by negotiation is impossible, shall be referred to the United Nations in accordance with the Charter. I believe that that is the right thing to do and what the Government intend to do. If they do that, surely it would be a disastrous thing for us to have a vote.
Mr. J. Grimond: If the right hon. and learned Gentleman is speaking for the Government, so far as I am concerned I should be perfectly satisfied that our Amendment would not be necessary. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has raised an extremely important point. If this canal users' association, of which we have been
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told very little, is simply a further step by the 18 nations, and if it is to be rejected, and the matter is then to be taken to the United Nations, I entirely agree that our Amendment is unnecessary. But we have never been told that by the Government.
Sir L. Heald: Of course I cannot speak for anyone except myself, and I speak with no authority except that I happen to know that a person of vastly more authority in these matters than myself, namely, the President of the International Court of Justice, has said what I believe to agree precisely with what I have said.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. James Griffiths rose—
Sir L. Heald: When the tumult has subsided I would rather continue myself. Let me make my position perfectly clear. The matter is not by any means ended when we arrive at the Security Council. In the House and in the country we must face sooner or later this position. At the present time there are no teeth in the United Nations Organisation. It may well be that a reference to the Security Council still leaves the great problem open. That is a matter which we must face and deal with, but that is no justification for breaking our own international obligations. If a reasonable and proper plan, supported by 18 or 12 nations or whatever the number may be, is put forward to the United Nations and approved there, then I personally will be perfectly willing to support the Government in any measure they then think it necessary to carry out.
Let there be no question of appeasement in this matter. I am not afraid of my own record in that matter, for I came into conflict with my own party in the years before the war and I spent four years in Army uniform in the First World War and six years in the Royal Air Force in the Second World War. I do not want a third war, or I shall probably spend ten years in the Navy. There is no question of cowardice or appeasement in an attitude of that kind.
Let us suppose that the position which I have suggested arose. We should not have a great deal of opposition against us. We should have an enormous amount of support behind us, and I believe that we should have it in the House as well. What a fine thing it would be

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if, after all this heat has been generated, we should end with the position that we all agree that we will comply with our international obligations—[HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear."]—but—and I hope hon. Members opposite will equally cheer this—that we will insist on Colonel Nasser complying with the reasonable views of 18 nations.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) has made a remarkable speech, and in view of his admirable attempt to try to achieve a greater degree of unity here, I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he is now prepared to make a declaration that Her Majesty's Government will use force only in accordance with our obligations under the United Nations Charter?
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is to answer the debate, and the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has sufficient experience to know that these matters are much better not dealt with by question and answer. At the moment, we are seeking a settlement of this matter under Article 33. We intend to make every effort we can to obtain a peaceful solution under that Article. Only when we are satisfied that those efforts have failed does the question of a decision as to the next step arise.
Hon. Members: Resign.
Mr. Speaker: Order. This debate ought to proceed in an orderly fashion. It is concerned with very grave matters. Mr. Shinwell.
4.1 p.m.
Mr. E. Shinwell: The speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) has, so it appears to me, created a quite new situation, of which no doubt the Government will take full cognisance. I note what the Foreign Secretary has just said, and I gather that at the close of the debate some reference will be made to the substance of that speech. It may be that in the course of my observations I shall myself make some reference to the point.
The Foreign Secretary, in a skilful Parliamentary performance, accused the Leader of the Opposition and the Members of the Labour Party of making
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political capital out of a grave situation. That was not only unworthy of the right hon. and learned Gentleman but, on his own showing, was contrary to the facts. After all, it was with almost hysterical exultation that the right hon. and learned Gentleman drew attention to the speech of the Leader of the Opposition on 2nd August, and indicated that he was in a substantial measure of agreement with the then Government policy. To some extent that was reiterated in the course of the debate yesterday.
The position of the Labour Party has been made abundantly clear. Generally speaking—indeed I think it could be said universally, so far as this side of the House is concerned—we condemned the action of Colonel Nasser because in our judgment it was arbitrary in character. Moreover, in our considered judgment, before Colonel Nasser decided to take the reins of Canal government out of the hands of the Suez Canal Company he might at any rate, apart from international law and as a matter of courtesy, have entered into negotiations with the Suez Canal Company and with some of the users of the Canal. But there was no consultation, and no effort was made to promote negotiations of any kind.
These are facts which are inescapable, and naturally the Government resented the action of Colonel Nasser—in our judgment quite rightly. My right hon. Friend said so on 2nd August. He said so yesterday. After all, it was not to the advantage of the users of the Canal. It could hardly be regarded as beneficial in the sphere of international relations. It could make no beneficial contribution to the people in the Middle East to undertake an arbitrary act of that character, completely ignoring every other consideration. Therefore we condemned it. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman is hardly on safe ground in accusing us of making political capital out of this affair when, in fact, we were in cordial agreement with the Government on 2nd August.
So far as I can recall, no exception was taken to the decision of the Government to convene the 22-nation committee, which subsequently became the 18-nation committee. Nor was exception taken to the action of Colonel Nasser in nationalising the Canal. And, by the way, that decision was endorsed by the 18-nation committee, so far as I can gather.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd indicated dissent.
Mr. Shinwell: If it was not endorsed, it was not objected to.
Mr. Lloyd: I must correct the right hon. Gentleman because that is really not the position. Representative after representative said that he did not accept that the action was lawful; nevertheless, it having happened, we had better see whether any plan could be constructed for the future. But its illegality was strongly maintained.
Mr. Shinwell: There is not a great deal between us on this issue—[An HON. MEMBER : "Ah."]—Well, that is how it appears to me, but to the experienced Parliamentarian on the other side of the House, who has just interjected, it might appear quite different. It was regarded as a fait accompli and therefore inevitable in the circumstances. Its legality has not been questioned. That we can understand.
Over and above that, on what almost appears to be the primary cause of division, namely, the decision of the Government to undertake precautions of a military character, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, on 2nd August, and also in the course of his speech yesterday, agreed that it was natural that a Government, within their discretion and responsibility, should act in that fashion.
Let it not be forgotten that there was an occasion when a Labour Government had to undertake precautionary measures, which were not taken exception to by any member of the Labour Party nor by my colleagues in the Labour Cabinet. These matters are not in dispute. They cause no division, and no capital of a political character is being made by the Labour Party out of those issues.
But there we part company. After all, why should we not part company, even on a matter of international relations, and on foreign affairs? Are we to act as a kind of rubber stamp for the Government? That could hardly be expected of us. This is a free democracy. We are men and women of independent character, apart from an occasional use of the Whip. [Laughter.] Therefore, we are entitled to express our opinions. It occurs to me that although it is true that there have been interjections
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from this side of the House, some of them sound, some of them substantial, some a little foolish, some unnecessary, I can recall some nasty things that were said on the other side of the House. I want to say this : that if ever we should be embroiled in war, and God forbid that we should, however capable the Government may be, or think they are, they have to rely on the support of the Opposition—
Mr. Ellis Smith: And of the workers.
Mr. Shinwell: They cannot conduct a war without a united nation. Therefore, there is no advantage in being nasty and malicious towards us simply because we express opinions in which we happen sincerely to believe.
As I say, there we part company. What was the precise point at which we separated? No exception was taken to the convening of the meeting of the 18 nations, the discussions and the decision to send the Menzies mission to Cairo to discuss these matters with Colonel Nasser, though it did not really come within the category of negotiations ; those matters merely being presented on a plate to Colonel Nasser.
Then the Menzies mission returned. One would have thought—to me, this is a matter of bewilderment—that the Government's first act would have been to reconvene the meeting of the 18 nations, present those nations with a report on what had transpired, and again ask their consent to further action if it was regarded as necessary. It may well be that the 18 nations could have devised some scheme. It may be that they might have proposed a compromise with Colonel Nasser. I am not saying that they would have done so, but they might well have done so. They might very well have proposed that the matter should be referred to the Security Council. But they were never given the opportunity. That was a profound error of judgment. It created a false impression in the country.
Moreover, on this matter of military precautions—I am bound to say this—some of my hon. Friends have taken the view that in no circumstances should force be used. I think I heard one of my hon. Friends say yesterday that we should use

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force only in self-defence. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish), who comes from the docks, that that sort of technique would never go down with the dockers. My experience as a seamen's organiser was that it was essential to anticipate moves now and again and act expeditiously ; otherwise I might not have been here at all, and that would have been a great disadvantage for the House. It is sometimes necessary to take action, having responsibly invoked all the resources available. It is not a question of whether one should use force, because all Governments have to act in circumstances thrown up by events not within their own control.
The position as I see it is as follows. Like other hon. Members, I have an ear to the ground. I read the newspapers, such as they are, and I hear what people say. The real danger is that there has been created in the country an impression —I do not say that it is valid; I do not go so far as saying it is completely justified—that the Government intend, in certain circumstances and without obtaining the consent of the Security Council or the Assembly of the United Nations, to go to war. This country does not want another war. I do not believe—I hope that my hon. Friends will not pounce upon me because of what I now say ; I say it sincerely—that the Government want another war.
Mr. John Hynd: They do.
Mr. Shinwell: My hon. Friend says "They do," but I should not come to such a firm judgment. I do not believe that the Government want another war. If they do they are insane, and I do not believe they have reached that point yet, although I sometimes think that they are not very far from it.
The refusal of the Government to refer the matter to the Security Council is based, according to the Foreign Secretary this afternoon, upon the belief of the right hon. and learned Gentleman— perhaps it is a conviction—that if it had been referred to the Security Council there would have been trouble with the Russians through the veto, to begin with, and, in any event, if the matter had been referred to the Assembly, all it could
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have done was to make a recommendation, and that would take weeks and weeks. In fact, according to the Foreign Secretary, neither the Security Council nor the Assembly is of any value at all.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I have followed the right hon. Gentleman's argument with interest, and so far he has put matters very fairly, but he is not fair in that last remark. The whole of my point was that Article 33 is more likely to produce results if we make use of it first.
Mr. Shinwell: When the right hon. and learned Gentleman refuses to accept my argument, what can I do? I will say no more about it, but I still believe that my argument has some validity.
To proceed to a further point, the right hon. and learned Gentleman says that that is not the real trouble. He says that we might try other expedients before we go to the Security Council and, if need be, to the Assembly. Then, what are we trying out? That is the whole point. If we were trying out some sound scheme without complications, something that everyone could understand, something not likely to give rise to more difficulties than there are at present, it would be a different matter.
What are the new methods? There is the canal users' association, which was pitchforked into the debate yesterday, and about which none of us knew anything. It was a new device. Where it came from we are not quite sure. I suspect that it came from the United States. I know that this may be disagreeable to a lot of people, but I cannot help saying, because I believe it, that I am very suspicious of United States diplomacy in the Middle East. I am not against Anglo-American co-operation, but I do not want to see our great country, for which I have an undying affection, made a pawn in American diplomacy. This sort of thing has been going on for a long time. It began at Abadan with Mr. Magee.
We made an effort to promote international understanding about oil resources. Perhaps I might tell the House about something with which I had some connection when I was Minister of Fuel and Power. I do not like to talk too much about that—[Laughter.]—but this is in a different context from that imagined by hon. Members. It may be that the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill)—we are always glad to

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see him here beaming and smiling and wishing he could get up and go for us— will recall the circumstances in which Lord Beaverbrook was sent to the United States to negotiate an oil agreement with the American Government. He failed. When the Labour Government came into office I was asked to undertake the task. I did not fail; but then that is natural.
We entered into negotiations with the late Mr. Harold Ickes, who was the Secretary of the Interior, and he brought with him not only his oil officials but a group of independent Texan oil producers. Such a collection of "gangsters" had never been seen. This, of course, is not an attack on the American Government.
In spite of it all, we got an agreement, and the substance was that we should promote an international organisation to deal with the production and distribution of oil resources throughout the world, making no exceptions. We did not require to ratify it. It was not necessary, because it had been accepted by the Government. The American Government never ratified it. If it had been ratified and if an international organisation had been created, it might have helped to clear away some of the muddle, some of the controversy and some of the conflict that surround this question of the production of oil and the use of oil resources in the Middle East and elsewhere.
I suspect that there are elements in the United States which would like to clear us out of the Middle East, so far as oil is concerned, and I do not like that. It may be that occasionally they do not mind embroiling us in little bits of trouble, when it suits their book. I hope that I am wrong; perhaps I am too suspicious, but somehow or other, I think all this links up with this decision to create a canal users' association. Then, having agreed to it, Mr. Dulles seems to be quite miserable about it. He is not quite sure whether it was wise. Perhaps we shall learn later in the day, as the result of his Press conference, whether he is in favour of proceeding with the users' association, and, secondly, whether he is prepared to back it up in the event of difficulties emerging.
The Foreign Secretary, who with his legalistic mind and logical style of expression can state a case clearly, unlike those of us who have had no training of that kind, sought to
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clarify this issue concerning this users' association. I am bound to say that I was more confused than ever after listening to him. What was it all about? Let me take one point that occurred to me. I noted a number of them, but I will deal with one.
We decided, through the Suez Canal Company, but perhaps with some inspiration by us, that the pilots should withdraw, but now we are to set up a users' association and we are to use some of these pilots in order to take ships through the Canal. But we have said—at least, I think it was the Prime Minister who said it—that the reason why the pilots want to go is because of uncertainty. There is an awful lot of uncertainty for the pilots in the new scheme. There does not seem to be any question of superannuation.
There are a great many points about this; I will deal with another that occurs to me. In spite of all that has been said about Colonel Nasser—and I dislike him, not because he is a dictator; we have so many in the world still, and sometimes a democratic Prime Minister can be dictatorial, as one knows, though I am not here speaking of the right hon. Gentleman opposite—after all, so far as I can ascertain, Nasser never did decide to impede facilities for the use of the Canal. All ships were still to pass through the Canal. Then why the need for this users' association? It would have been a different matter if Nasser had used his power in order to prevent ships passing through the Canal, but so far he has not done it, except in the case of Israeli ships, and I shall say something about that in a moment. We must not forget these matters.
So far, there has been no impediment in the use of the Canal by Nasser's decision on nationalisation and his refusal to accept internationalisation. Therefore, there does not seem to be any reason why this new association should have been promoted at all. Some have said that it is provocative. I do not believe that it is so much provocative as stupid. I do not think that anything will come of it, but maybe I am wrong, and I shall be ready to apologise if I am proved wrong.
It may be that Colonel Nasser will be inspired to agree to negotiations and will come to a more reasonable frame of

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mind. It may be, but I doubt it, and I think that some new idea will have to be devised. If there is to be a new idea devised, it may as well be done, to begin with, either through the 18-nation committee, which ought to be convened at once, or alternatively by referring the matter to the Security Council.
Let me now say a word on this matter of the United Nations. I said a moment or two ago that it seemed to me to be valueless, in the light of what the Foreign Secretary had said. For many months, I have said that there was not very much in it, and somebody else has said that there were no teeth in it. The right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) said that there were neither teeth nor tail, but perhaps there is more tail than teeth.
The fact of the matter is that, if the Prime Minister, who in difficult circumstances in a national emergency we are bound to wish well, and we cannot help doing that because we love our country, had come to the House yesterday and said that it is an accord with our international obligations that this matter should be referred to the United Nations, the right hon. Gentleman would have captured the imagination of the House. Even if the United Nations, as a concept, is difficult, and if it means shilly-shallying and dilly-dallying and all the rest, I think that would be better. Let us try the users' scheme for a day or two, and if it does not work, then take the matter to the United Nations. Let us take a chance. If we say that the Canal should be internationalised, there is no reason why we should not take an international issue to an international organisation.
Now, I want to leave that point, because other hon. Members will have a lot to say about these matters, and there are two further points that I want to make. I am sorry that the Foreign Secretary did not tell us this afternoon about arms for Egypt. What a glorious opportunity it was for him to do so. [HON. MEMBERS : "Israel."] No, arms for Egypt.
For a long time, we have been asking the right hon. and learned Gentleman questions about the export of arms to Egypt, about Centurion tanks for Egypt. What a calamity, what a disaster it would be, and what an unflattering commentary
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on the Government's professions if war should occur between this country and Egypt, and Centurion tanks and other weapons were used against our boys. I wonder whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman would reply to me, as he frequently has done when I have asked him for details—not precise details, but a general idea—about the export of arms to Egypt, by saying to me, "You refused to give the information when you were Minister of Defence", though in a quite different situation. That is not good enough, but there it is.
By the way, what about Jordan? How long are we going on paying millions of pounds in subventions for Jordan, a country that can no longer be trusted so far as our interests are concerned? How long are we to do that? Does anybody think that this is a contribution to the promotion of British interests in the Middle East or elsewhere?
Finally, what about Israel? If this matter should go to the United Nations some day, or if we are able to negotiate with Colonel Nasser and come to a reasonable compromise, do we clearly understand that the shipping of every nation will be allowed to pass through the Canal and that no impediment will be placed in the way of Israeli shipping? Why should the Israelis be made the outcasts? Indeed, it may be asked why did the Government never take appropriate action to deal with that situation?
May I say to the Prime Minister that, in this Middle East situation, it is not merely a question of Egyptian intransigence with which we are concerned in relation to the Canal, but a question of what Egypt may do in implementing its threat against the State of Israel. Anything can happen. What should we do? Shall we invoke the Tripartite Declaration? If we do, what will be the effect on Egypt, on Iraq, on Jordan and the other Arab countries? These matters have to be thought out. We are entitled to know where the Government stand in relation, not merely to one part of the Middle East, but to the whole of the Middle East. Anyway, there I will leave the matter.
I believe that my party has a sound case, not because of the Government's rejection of Nasser's attitude, not because of his arbitrary action, not because of taking precautions of a military character,

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not because of convening the 18-nation committee and the like. All those things we accept. The Government stand condemned because the one thing that they ought to have done in all the circumstances which would have satisfied the public sentiment was now to say, "We will take it to the United Nations". If it is thought by some people that to do that now would seem like weakening, would seem almost like humiliation, I do not so regard it. It would be a greater humiliation to find this new users' association scheme break down and fail to reach a compromise about the Canal.
That is the position of the Labour Party. For that we need not apologise. In a situation of this kind we have sometimes to clear party views out of the way. That is true of both sides when it comes to a national emergency, or when one is apprehended. It is essential and indeed inevitable, but in view of the Government's attitude my party is justified in its condemnation and in asking the House to accept the Opposition Amendment.
4.33 p.m.
Mr. C. E. Mott-Radclyffe: The tone of the speech of the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), made with the authority of an ex-Minister of Defence, was rather different from the tone of the speech of the right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens). When my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary opened the debate this afternoon, he very properly drew attention to the very different tone of the speeches made by hon. Members of the party opposite yesterday and today with that of the speeches made earlier in August when this crisis first burst upon us, just before the House rose for the Summer Recess. Indeed, when the right hon. Member for Blyth moved the Amendment on behalf of the Opposition I began to wonder whether at one stage he had forgotten the first sentence which reads :
"… while condemning the arbitrary methods employed by the Egyptian Government in respect of the Suez Canal Company …"
He was so vehement in his denunciation of Her Majesty's Government that it seemed that it was Her Majesty's Government and not Colonel Nasser who had forceably seized the offices of the Suez Canal Company.
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At the beginning of August, with very few exceptions, the House was united in its determination that Colonel Nasser should not be allowed to retain sole control of this vital waterway. If I were Colonel Nasser, I should in no way be discouraged—and I am sorry to say this of the right hon. Member—by the tone of the speech of the right hon. Member for Blyth. Still less would I be discouraged by the tone of the speech of the Leader of the Opposition yesterday.
I should have thought that on this issue it would be agreed that the matter goes to the very root of all international relations, because the real issue is whether any agreement or treaty is worth anything at all. If it is not, then of course, as hon. Members have said, we are back in the days of international anarchy. Let us look at Colonel Nasser's record. Almost exactly two years ago, in October, 1954, we made an Agreement with Colonel Nasser under which we withdrew British troops from the Canal Zone. At that time that Agreement was hailed by him as opening a completely new era of Anglo-Egyptian relations. A new era would dawn and the last remaining point of conflict would be swept away. There were assurances in that Agreement about freedom of passage through the Canal, and so on.
Hardly had the ink dried on the document than we had abuse heaped on our heads. Britain was vilified in the Egyptian Press and radio to an almost unprecedented extent, even in this propaganda age. Even hon. Members—presumably of all parties—were flooded with propaganda leaflets emanating from Cairo. I had some myself and I expect that most hon. Members had them. They were sent by air mail. The technique is very familiar. Just as the Soviet Union always attempts to drive a wedge between us and the United States, so at least one of these incredible pamphlets in a very clumsy way attempts to drive a wedge between us and the French.
The one which amused me most was addressed "To All Britons." I do not know whether hon. Members have seen this. Addressed :
"To All Britons
who believe in international co-operation …"
the pamphlet says :
"War is a terrible thing."

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We all agree with that. The pamphlet adds :
"It is even more terrible when it is fought for a senseless purpose like the internationalisation of the Suez Canal."
I always used to think—it was always held to be the case in the old days—that it was nationalism which was the threat to peace. Now apparently we have moved out of that phase and the real threat to peace, according to this incredibly funny leaflet, is internationalism.
We fulfilled our part of the bargain in the 1954 Treaty and we did better than the timetable. We kept both the letter and the spirit of the 1954 Agreement with Colonel Nasser. The last British soldier left the Suez base about a week before the actual time laid down in the original Agreement. In spite of this we have not only been abused, but last July we had the forcible seizure of the Canal Company's offices.
The right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) tried to argue last night that Colonel Nasser's action in respect of the Suez Canal Company's offices and employees did not really constitute aggression. It is quite true that no shots were fired, for the simple reason that the Canal Company's employees were not armed and were not expecting shots to be fired, but it is a curious and rather narrow interpretation of aggression to say that before an act of aggression takes place shots have to be fired and somebody has to be killed. There are all sorts of other forms of aggression, just as dangerous as that of the use of armed force. I would have thought that Colonel Nasser's action in seizing the Canal Company's offices and threatening its employees constituted a quite obvious act of aggression.
Anyway, what is quite clear is that the pledges made by Colonel Nasser in 1954 bear no relation to his actions in 1956— and there is no reason to assume that any pledges he may make in 1956, either about the passage of ships through the Canal or in connection with any form of international control of the Canal, will bear any relation to what he may do either later this year, in 1957, or in any other year.
If the Suez Canal is not a vital international waterway, it is not anything at all. Unless it is an international waterway,
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through which the ships of all nations pass, it is of no use to Egypt or anybody else. It is in fact, to a very substantial degree, the lifeline of our country, of a large part of Europe and also of much of Asia. We really cannot leave this vital lifeline in control of one man, even if it were the Archangel Gabriel, let alone Colonel Nasser. If we leave Colonel Nasser in undisputed control of the operation of the Canal we are mortgaging our standard of living, the maintenance of full employment, and the whole future of our economy, into the hands of one man.
That obviously cannot be allowed, but if nothing more than pious hopes are expressed ; if there is nothing more than the raising of hands in horror, or the passing of resolutions which are quite ineffective, it makes absolute nonsense of any form of international law and order. It also does something else—and this at least should interest hon. and right hon. Members opposite. It makes complete nonsense of any attempt to develop the under-developed countries of the world. What Government or company will sink capital, provide plant or send their technicians to the under-developed countries of the Middle East or anywhere else if the general pattern of subsequent behaviour is to follow that set by Colonel Nasser in the seizure of the Canal? Of course no Government and no company will do so.
I should have thought that this was an issue about which any good internationalist would agree. I should have thought that all good Socialists—and, of course, all hon. Members opposite are good Socialists, apart from all the good Liberals, who are good internationalists, too—would be united about it. Apparently that is not so. From the various arguments of hon. Members opposite, be they Liberals or Socialists, it is obvious that they are not at all agreed that it is necessary to enforce international control.
Some say, "Well, why worry about the Suez Canal? Let Nasser have it; it is Egyptian anyway." That argument has been advanced not only by hon. Members opposite but by the Left-wing Press. "Let him have it," was the argument used about Hitler. It was said, "Let him have the Rhine; it is German. Let him have Austria; it is German-speaking. Let him have the Sudetenland ; the majority of the people"—

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so it was alleged—"want to join Germany."
Mr. J. Hynd: Who said that?
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: It was said by hon. Members opposite. [HON. MEMBERS : "Nonsense."] A large section of the party opposite, who took the view that it was not worth worrying about Hitler marching into the Rhineland, have, in retrospect, cashed in on the delightful phrase "collective security," which, in their minds, is a kind of general anaesthetic. I am all for collective security, provided that it is properly interpreted, but too many of the party opposite mean by "collective security" that someone other than themselves might provide the security. So long as no one is prepared to provide it, collective security becomes collective insecurity, and we know what the end of that is.
I am not against taking this issue to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, neither is the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister. At no stage in this story have we done anything whatever outside the spirit or the letter of the Charter of the United Nations. All we have done is to get a plan agreed by 18 out of 22 nations, which represents over 90 per cent., within a time limit which certainly could not have been achieved with the cumbrous machinery of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
We must face facts. It is no good burying our heads in the sand about the United Nations. The difficulty about it is that because of the operation of the veto the machinery for enforcing action by international authority is completely stultified.
Mr. Harold Davies: We were quick enough in Korea.
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: I am glad that the hon. Member made that interjection, because that was what I was going to deal with. Why did it work quickly in that case? It was for the simple reason that it so happened that on one particular morning the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council. Therefore, there was unanimity and no veto. I would ask the hon. Member this question : suppose that on that particular morning the Soviet Union had not boycotted the Security Council, and suppose that the veto had been applied. I wonder whether the party
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opposite would have been quite so keen to send troops to prove that aggression did not pay in Southern Korea? In that case action was taken because the Americans took the lead. It is a very partinent question what the Labour Government would have done had there been no unanimous resolution.
Mr. Kenneth Younger: The hon. Member will be aware that it was precisely on account of the misgivings which he has expressed that, immediately afterwards, at the following meeting of the General Assembly, steps were taken to enable the General Assembly to act, not quite in the same way as the Security Council, but when there is strong moral authority.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: After action.
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: The General Assembly can give strong moral authority to a number of sovereign States, but unless these sovereign States are prepared to take action there is no action at all. We have therefore to be careful that when we talk about collective security we mean collective security and not collective insecurity.
I have another example. Let us take the case of the Berlin airlift. I agree that it is not a complete analogy—
Mr. S. Silverman: It is a very bad one.
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: —but there was a threat of aggression at the time of the blockade of Berlin and hon. Members opposite, when they sat on these benches, very properly dealt with that threat in an expeditious way, and I gave them wholehearted support. They stepped up the rate of airlift, by I forget how many flights a day, in order to feed Berlin. There was a danger that one or two planes would be shot at; in fact, I think they were, but the step-up of the Berlin airlift went on for three months before hon. Members opposite made any reference whatsoever to the Security Council.
I am not blaming them for that. They took matters into their own hands in order to deal with an emergency in the most expeditious way and at the earliest opportunity.
Mr. Callaghan: We were not proposing to commit aggression, and this Government is.
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: The Leader of the Opposition criticised the Government very much yesterday for what he called "sabrerattling", by the assembling of troops. [HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear.] Hon. Gentlemen opposite say "Hear, hear". Do not they think that, if it is necessary, the Government should take certain steps to protect the lives of British nationals?
Mr. Denis Healey: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: No.
I think that the hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) who does not agree with me, was Civil Lord or Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty—I am not sure which— at the time of the Abadan crisis. What happened then? There was a clear threat to British nationals living in Persia. What did the party opposite do then when they were in power? They sent out there two destroyer flotillas and a biggish cruiser— I forget its tonnage—and I think about four fighter squadrons. I was in Shaiba at the time and I remember seeing these forces very well. Was not that done in order to protect the lives of a large number of British nationals?
Mr. Callaghan: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for giving way to me, as he has referred to me. Is not he aware that the indictment against the Government at present is that they have allowed the impression to grow uncorrected that it is they who intend to launch the aggression, and no assurances that we have—[HON. MEMBERS : "You have said that."] Obviously hon. Gentlemen opposite do not read their own Press if they really believe that this has been confined to us. This impression has grown, and it should have been removed both by the Prime Minister and by the Foreign Secretary, but neither has done so. So long as that impression remains, many of us will believe that the Government intend provoking an issue in which they could justifiably pretend to use force.
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Nobody would have thought that the assembly of troops to protect British nationals was sabrerattling, had it not been for the fact that the Opposition seized on that for their own rather petty party gain and to suit their own needs.
Mr. Healey: Will the hon. Gentleman give way to me now?
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: Of course it is right and of course Her Majesty's Government are trying by every possible means to get a peaceful settlement and of course they will go on doing so.
Mr. K. Zilliacus: They have not even negotiated yet.
Mr. Mott-Radclyffe: But all these efforts, including reference to the United Nations, and so on, may conceivably be unsuccessful. If that be the case, we shall reach a stage in which we have to recognise, as a world Power, in company with other nations who are world Powers and whose economies are threatened, that there are certain vital issues which cannot be ignored. When and if that crucial point be reached, it is for hon. Members opposite to make up their minds whether or not to back the Government and uphold international law by taking action, or whether they propose to run away with their tails between their legs and tear up all the speeches they have made about appeasement.
Mr. Callaghan: That is the typical voice of the Tory Party.
4.53 p.m.
Mr. F. J. Bellenger: I am sorry that the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) has left the Chamber, because I want to pay a tribute to his courageous, frank and lucid speech. Being party politicians, we all know how difficult it is for individual Members of Parliament to go against the current of the party stream. This afternoon, the right hon. and learned Gentleman gave us what I am bound to say was an authoritative legal opinion, because he has been a prominent Law Officer of the Crown. By doing so he has turned this debate into something entirely different from what it was when it started, or at any rate when it started today.
I have not the slightest doubt that when my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition makes the winding-up speech for this side of the House, and when the Prime Minister replies, as I understand he will, both of them will take cognisance of the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey. I should have thought that the Prime

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Minister could not let such a powerful speech from one of his own prominent back benchers go unanswered. I shall have something to say later about the effect which it might have on hon. Members on both sides of the House—or, at any rate, on hon. Members on this side —were the Prime Minister to endorse the views expressed by his supporter.
During the 21 years that I have been an hon. Member of this House I have seldom known a debate change its course so positively as has happened this afternoon, following the independent speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman for Chertsey, and I can do no less, therefore, than congratulate him; although perhaps congratulations from this side of the House may not be something which he would desire. Right hon. and hon. Members will know that I have myself spoken independently and given my own views in the past, and what I am saying today about the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey is my sincere opinion.
I regret that the Foreign Secretary should have used this occasion to attack the Opposition, or, at least, to attack my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, in the way he did. The right hon. and learned Gentleman reduced the whole debate to a sordid party squabble, which it really is not. If ever there was an occasion—as was said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell)—when Her Majesty's Government should ask for the co-operation and support of Her Majesty's Opposition, this is such an occasion. Such co-operation was apparent during the war, when hon. Members on both sides of the House recognised the issue. Let right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite be under no illusion about the fact that we recognise as well as they do what is the real issue today. I venture to suggest that the real issue has not so far been mentioned, and I hope to mention it in my speech.
It would be distorting the whole perspective if we tried to relate Nasser too closely to Hitler. The circumstances of the pre-war period, which I remember so well, were entirely different from the present circumstances. Hitler was quite a different "cup of tea" from Nasser. Hitler knew what he wanted and went
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straight for it without any divergence whatever. But it seems to me that Nasser does not come from the same breed.
Nevertheless, Nasser is showing many of the characteristics displayed by Hitler before the war. He has not yet assumed the proportions which Hitler reached by 1939. But do not let us forget that Hitler had to make a start somewhere, and that is precisely what Nasser is doing. He is made of the same material. He is a revolutionary. He has secured his position by revolution. He makes similar inflammatory speeches, full of hatred, and no man can call himself the leader of a nation or a statesman if he is always exuding hatred, instead of trying to suggest positive measures for the betterment of his people.
Nasser might well look to his own country. He has told us that 80 per cent. of his own people are on the verge of, or actually in, poverty-stricken conditions. I should have thought that in such circumstances a real statesman and a leader of his country would have welcomed the co-operation of the Western democracies in trying to introduce better conditions, both industrial and agricultural, in that country so that he might alleviate the lives of those miserable people the fellaheen of Egypt.
We should consider how King Farouk was overthrown, and his corrupt system may have necessitated revoluntary action. But although Nasser, or, rather, Neguib, started off with the good will of many people of different nations, what has Nasser done? Whatever may be the outcome of this dispute, Nasser has reduced his country to a condition which may not mean only the overthrow of Nasser himself, but may produce a revolutionary condition in the country which will not benefit the Egyptians.
That, I maintain, is the background of this debate. I remember it being said so often in this House before the war— I am not going to identify those who said it, although some of them are still here and they are not on this side—that it was no concern of ours how dictators governed their countries. Before the war many shut their eyes to Hitler's "mobocracy" or Goering's genial rascality. What was the result? We were led straight and inevitably into war. It behoves those who take part in the debate not to mince their words either about Nasser or our own

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Government. We are here for that purpose, either to support the Government or to oppose the Government, and in the Amendment we have put on the Order Paper we are expressing our disapproval of the ineptness of the Government in their diplomatic handling of this issue.
We do not deny for one moment all the evils that can be attributed to Nasser— they are many—but what we say is that we as a nation cannot alter that situation by "going it alone". That is the reason we have included in our Amendment the proposition that the Government should get this matter before the United Nations. I well understand, indeed I sympathise with, the Foreign Secretary. He has had so much experience in United Nations conferences of the stonewalling, the discourtesy, the rudeness of the Russians, who hold the record for the number of occasions on which they have used the veto.
The United Nations Charter was never conceived for those circumstances, otherwise I doubt very much whether the veto would have been included. Nevertheless, the Charter is there; the United Nations organisation is there. We are members of it. We subscribed to the Charter. Who are we, of all nations, to run out on the code of rules which we helped to formulate? It seemed to me that that was what the Foreign Secretary was suggesting this afternoon when he tried to find excuses for the Government not taking this matter in the first place to the Security Council.
I have not the slightest doubt that the Foreign Secretary is right and that Russia would use her veto. Very vell, but what is the Foreign Secretary saying as a lawyer? He is saying, "I will not present my case to the court because I do not believe that the court will do me justice." If he and the Government believe that, the United Kingdom should resign its membership of the United Nations and try to formulate a better system ; but so long as we subscribe to that institution I maintain—so far as I understood the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey also maintained—we should stand by its principles and operate them. That is the real difference between the Government and the Opposition this afternoon.
There are only one or two features of the dispute which I want to outline.
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Although my hopes may be falsified, I hope that the Prime Minister may be able to say something towards the end of the debate which might mean that no Motion or Amendment need be involved and put to the House. I am one, especially on foreign affairs issues like this, who believes that there should not be these clear divisions between the Government and the Opposition. If we should come to war, as has been suggested by many who have spoken before me, it would be inconceivable that the Government could carry on a war with half the nation—the Opposition represent half and perhaps a little more than half the nation—even under localised conditions in Egypt, without the support of Her Majesty's Opposition.
I hope that the Joint Under-Secretary will convey to the Prime Minister the views which have been expressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easing-ton and in what I am saying, which I also hope that the Leader of the Opposition will say in winding up the debate. We dare not use issues like this merely for party gain or advantage. If hon. Members opposite think that there is any political advantage to be made out of it by the Opposition they are making a profound mistake. Many members of my party bitterly resent the actions of Nasser and fear the unemployment which might come to this country if Nasser prevented the proper using of the Canal. Under proper conditions those hon. Members would support any action, provided it were legal, to stop any dictator from taking steps like that.
I agree with what the Foreign Secretary said this afternoon on the question of pilots. The pilots are British and French; I speak only for the British. They are free men, the same as we are. They have the same rights as any British trade unionist. They have the right to withhold their labour if they feel so disposed. I do not know how far the action of the Suez Canal Company has induced the pilots to reach a decision which, I understand, has now been reached, by which they want to leave Egypt or not to serve under Nasser. I do not know; I suspect that the Suez Canal Company, by way of financial inducement and other methods, did a great deal to make up the minds of perhaps some of those pilots who were wavering. I am certain that the pilots had every reason to doubt the

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word of Nasser, because already Egypt is in default with many British citizens, especially teachers, who have been denied their proper pension rights by that dictator.
Therefore, I say that the pilots are entirely right if they doubt Nasser's intentions. Indeed, they have written cause for it. The hon. Member for Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe) has referred to some of the paper propaganda which has been flooding to Members of Parliament from Egypt. Among that lot of paper— most of which went straight into my wastepaper basket—was a very illuminating document giving details of the nationalisation law. What did Articles 4 and 5 of that law say? The Foreign Secretary was quite right this afternoon when he said that these pilots are operating under martial law. They were threatened—not only they, but others, also—with imprisonment if they dared to leave their posts under the new nationalised institution. I am sure that not one of my hon. Friends could subscribe to that. It is something which, if it happened in this country concerning British trade unionists, would cause a riot.
I say that the pilots have every reason to fear their future under Nasser and that if they want to leave that boss they should be entitled to do so. They should be entitled to be remunerated or recompensed by way of pensions for which they have worked. In that connection, I would only say that if the Government are prepared to take this issue to the United Nations I hope that they would do their best to induce the pilots to carry on in their jobs and not to work under the new organisation which has been mentioned. I ask that if they take that step the Government should give the pilots an absolute guarantee, so far as they are able, that their lives and property will be sacrosanct and that their pension rights, to which they are entitled, will be recognised by the Government, even if they are not recognised by Egypt, as they ought to be.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: Much has been said in this debate about the pilots being at liberty to leave their employment. Does not my right hon. Friend think that the soldiers who object to being sent to Suez are also at liberty to refuse to go?
Mr. Bellenger: My hon. Friend knows the answer which I could give to that question, but I will not waste my time in answering a question which is not at all relevant to the issues which I have raised. I am sorry to appear discourteous to my hon. Friend, but I do not think he resents that. He and I understand each other, and we will leave the matter there.
Turning to the question of the Government's military precautions, I endorse what my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said on 2nd August. In his speech yesterday I do not think that he attempted to run away from what he said then. I was here, sitting immediately behind him, and as far as I was able to tell, he acquiesced in what he had said on 2nd August. The only divergence concerns the proper use of force. That is the only divergence as far as I can see.
If the Government had taken precautions, as they should have done and as a Labour Government would have had to do in similar circumstances, and left it at that, there would not have been the criticism of the Government which we are making today. As my right hon. Friend said, the whole criticism turns on what the Government have done in addition to taking reasonable precautions.
I do not want to give Nasser any more ammunition which he can fire back at us, but I say to Her Majesty's Government that they have indeed rattled the sabre ; and, that being so, the Opposition cannot support them in that action.
I said earlier that we understand the issues. I hope we all do. The real issues concern not only Nasser's attempt to nationalise the Canal. Nasser has been supported all along by Russia, and Russia's policy today is no different from her policy under the Czars. The imperial policy of the Czars is today reproduced in the Communist Kremlin. What is it? In the Middle East it is to deny Britain a waterway to the remainder of the Southern Hemisphere and to deny Britain access to the oil deposits in those countries on which we so much depend for our industrial and military potential. That is probably the reason that Russia has backed Egypt in her obstinacy. I do not know. Probably the Government know more about it and why Nasser has not so far been prepared to negotiate.

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These are the real issues, and many of us in the Opposition understand them only too well. Let hon. Members opposite understand this, too : we do not burke those issues. All we say is that these are not days when Britain alone, or with France or even with America, can go into wars with solid world opinion or substantial world opinion against them, because once war is enjoined we do not know where it will stop.
In view of what I have said so far, I regret having to say this, but looking back at the Government's record in foreign affairs it seems to me that their diplomacy has been without direction, hesitant and sometimes very changeable. I hope that the Government will change their mind to-night, because if they do it will be in the direction I want; but so often the Government, by their hesitant policy, have created such situations as have arisen today.
Of course, we do not know how far those two traitors, Burgess and Maclean, have assisted. The Government may say what they like, but I believe that some of these malevolent but clever people are at work guiding Moscow, as they have been over Cairo, in their actions against this Government.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: Are they advising the Prime Minister?
Mr. Bellenger: I hope that my hon. Friend will have an opportunity of putting that point to the House. We shall all listen to him with great respect and interest.
I wonder, as did my right hon. Friend, the Member for Easington, how far our United States ally will stick with us. I do not think I have ever said anything which can be interpreted as being anti-American. I may not be pro-American, but I am not anti-American. They were our allies in the war and they are our allies now. But I am bound to say that their foreign policy and diplomacy have sometimes been very embarrassing for this country. Sometimes they have blown hot and cold, like a woman's hair dryer. We do not know whether the hair will be dry or left in the same humid condition.
Some of us who have held Government office in these circumstances know
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how difficult it has been sometimes to get our American allies to march in step. I believe that it would not be at all harmful to our relations with them for us to say in this Parliament, in the friendliest possible way of criticism, that we expect America to support us as we supported America.
Mr. S. Silverman: In doing what?
Mr. Bellenger: In pursuing a foreign policy which I hope my hon. Friend supported when a Labour Government were in office, even if he does not support the foreign policy of the present Government.
If the latest idea of a users' association has come from America, I hope that the Americans will understand what it may possibly mean and I hope that they are prepared to go all the way with us. I have said that we cannot "go it alone", but I hope that the Americans are prepared to understand that they have to "go it" with us, otherwise, I am afraid, the pillars of Western Union, Western defence, Western understanding and the democratic way of life will be endangered. That will do only the Communists good, and certainly not ourselves.
In the absence of a Government statement which will convince the Opposition that the Government consider that the exposition by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey was right, I shall, of course, go into the Lobby to support the Amendment. The Government will no doubt get their majority, but I do not think that that will be the end of the affair. A bitter taste has been left in the mouths of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen in the Opposition and confusion and consternation has been left in the minds of many loyal people in this country. I suspect that there are some hon. Members opposite who understand this. Let them urge their own Government to take steps to reassure us tonight—steps which may result in the Motion and the Amendment not being put to the test.
5.19 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth Pickthorn: I think the right hon. Member for Basset-law (Mr. Bellenger) is misinformed about some topics—I should have thought, for instance, about women. I should not have thought that it was their hair dryers which blow hot and cold.

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In general, the trend of his remarks makes it easier for me to do my best to resist the temptation with which I started to say some things which might be thought unnecessarily quarrelsome. No doubt I shall say one or two things which will be thought controversial, but I will do my best to keep them to a minimum and I will resist the temptation to say some things which might be thought really quarrelsome.
Mr. Healey: Be yourself.
Mr. Pickthorn: In these matters of war or peace, or the potentiality of war or peace round a neighbouring corner, it is always difficult to draw the line between properly saying what one thinks in such a way as to try to get the minimum of disagreement from all of one's countrymen and the point at which it becomes necessary to say even what one may think is evil about those of one's countrymen with whom one does not agree. I am inclined to think that this is one of those days when we should all try to be moderate, so I am going to try to be moderate.
The right hon. Member for Bassetlaw —my neighbour, if I may say so—who has just addressed us, referred to the paper propaganda which has been reaching this country, and if the House will forgive me I want to begin by reading a few extracts from the last bit to arrive. I think it is the last bit because it was handed to me only twenty minutes ago. I think this is the up-to-date view of Colonel Nasser's intentions. There is a list of his major projects, and there are various of them with which I will not trouble the House. Then he comes to what I suppose he considers the most important of the lot, the major project for oil.
"Formation of an Egyptian-controlled pan-Arab marketing organisation to ensure that all Middle Eastern oil is used for the benefit of Egypt and the Arab countries. While Egypt's enemies will thus be deprived of oil, Arab countries enjoying the goodwill of Egypt will have their supplies assured. Since most of the Middle East oil already goes through the Suez Canal, Egypt is the natural centre for the future pan-Arab marketing association."
I leave out some more and come to the second half of the next paragraph which says :
"Owing to the strategic position of the Suez Canal, other Arab oil-producing countries will find it advantageous to join the pan-Arab marketing organisation while Egyptians, by virtue of their control of the Canal, their
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unrivalled commercial experience and their exclusive access to Soviet-bloc supplies (equipment, tanks, tankers, pipelines, etc.) will undertake the building and management of the new base."
The final paragraph states :
"This pan-Arab marketing organisation will make the Arabs masters of their oil,"
and so on.
I quote this leaflet, which I think is the latest information, by way of endorsing the last, or almost the last, remarks of the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw when he spoke of what are the realities of this matter with regard to the competitiveness of power politics, and there is no other sort. I know that today we all have to talk about people's democracies and we shall have to talk some day soon about pacific peace. But politics are something which involves power, and I quote that leaflet, which I think is the last declaration of Nasser's intentions to reach this country, by way of endorsing what the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw said about what is the big reality in the strict sense of politics in this matter in the Middle East.
I beg right hon. and hon. Members not to think that any amount of victory, of scoring for their party in this country or even for their way of looking at the universe all over the world could compete with that; I beg them to pause, I do not say on moral grounds, but upon the risk they may be taking even with opinion in this country if they judge of what are the real politics of the Middle East and the Canal without anything in their heads but the reality of politics.
I want to say one or two things about the speech made by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. Of course, I do not complain of his not being here. There is no reason in the world why he should be here to listen to me, but I am sorry that he is not here. I know that when people say that they are thought to be reproaching somebody, but I am not really reproaching the right hon. Gentleman. I listened to the right hon. Gentleman's speech yesterday and I read it again today. I am not now giving the impression made by my reading of the speech, though I think it was identical with the impression I gained by listening to it. I am giving the impression of my hearing. Here we make speeches to be heard ; we do not write to be read.

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It is an accident that this happened to be a two-day debate, so the speech could be read, but it is an impression left on a candid and not unintelligent hearer of what was said. [HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear."] I say "not unintelligent" and that is reasonably modest : I do not think that hon. Members opposite ought to try to take any prep school advantage of that. Hon. Members cannot with any intellectual honesty assert that any of them who listened to the speech made yesterday and who listened to the speech made on 2nd August were not struck by the very remarkable difference. I am not referring to any of them who dictated either of the two speeches or who compared the printed versions of the speeches. What I am saying is that there is no one of intellectual honesty on the other side who heard the two speeches who was not struck by that very remarkable difference. A lot of water has passed over the dam since then. [HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear."] It was not only the force of gravity that pushed some of the water. A lot of water has passed over it. The impression left on my mind the first time was that the right hon. Gentleman thought, as we all did, that this was a horrible mess. He thought that, on the whole, what the Government were doing was right enough. The impression I got on the second occasion was that really he had to find some way of quarrelling with the Government. [HON. MEMBERS : "Oh."] Certainly. I am telling hon. Members as honestly as I can the impression I got.
It really boils down to three things upon which the right hon. Gentleman disagreed with the Government. One of them was that the Government ought to say that it would not use force except with United Nations approval. I find it difficult to be sure that the one thing one must do in this situation when we know that the United Nations approval is subject either to veto or to inordinate delay is to say one will not use force except with United Nations approval.
The second cause of quarrel was that the matter of nationalisation of the Canal should go to The Hague. I could say a lot about nationalisation, and inter-nationalisation, but I want to stick to the point that matters—why was it that the matter ought to go to The Hague? I am
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not a lawyer, but I am credibly informed that The Hague has not got jurisdiction. The strong probability is that The Hague has no jurisdiction and I am again credibly informed that, whether or not it has jurisdiction, it quite certainly has no power of enforcement. So what is the use of that?
Mr. Healey: Will the hon. Gentleman give way for a moment?
Mr. Pickthorn: I am sorry, but I really cannot give way.
Mr. Healey: The hon. Gentleman made an incorrect statement.
Mr. Pickthorn: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will have an opportunity to correct it. I am no Nina Ponomareva in a police court being cross-examined. I am, hon. Members will do me the justice of admitting, generally good enough at giving way whatever may be said about me in other respects. I am now trying to make a not very easy speech, which is a debating speech and which has in no way been prepared, with almost no notes. If I sit down I shall get into a muddle, I fear. [Laughter.] I hope some hon. Gentlemen opposite who are laughing may one day get out of their muddle.
The third thing which the Leader of the Opposition found to argue about yesterday was the military precautions. Here I am bound to say that it becomes difficult for persons of my prejudices and experience to speak—[HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear."]—I am conscious of my prejudices. If everyone were conscious of his prejudices it would make argument easier—on this matter. The Leader of the Opposition yesterday permitted himself a great deal of use of evidence which could not be adduced for cross-examination. In such a matter as this I find that conduct a little difficult to forgive. There was a great deal of allusion and of "What I feel sure happened this way," "What I know happened that way," and so on. That is no way to argue a matter of this sort. Where there is no evidence it is much better not to make assertions or innuendos.
I come back to what after that matter of politics and the relation of the Canal to oil, and so on, I come to what after that is the main matter, to that borderland where there is morals or politics, or both. What has been the gravamen

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of the charge against our side from most of the speakers, and almost all of the back-bench speakers, of the Opposition? The ground of this quarrel with us is whether the use of force must never happen and is always wrong except in the two proper cases of the positive authorisation of the United Nations or in self-defence and resistance to the use of force. I think I understood the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens), who is occupying the foreign affairs front, so to speak, for the Opposition, and other hon. Gentlemen opposite, all to be agreed on that point.
Many appeals have been made to this side that we should not want to use force and that we should stop the Government from using force by snowing we are all against using force. I could quite understand that appeal if the same argument were put to our enemies. Was it the use of force or was it not when Colonel Nasser used armed soldiers or police to take over papers, machinery, premises, persons, administrators, officials, and so on? If everybody on the other side who keeps on telling us that the use of force is always wrong would begin by saying, "We will not admit Colonel Nasser into the court of world opinion so long as he is enjoying that successful use of force", the rest of the Opposition's case would be formidable. Until that is said the Opposition's case is not formidable at all.
There is one other thing I ought to say as a matter of candour. It is always difficult for me to take part in debates on the Middle East. Older Members may remember but I have spoken little lately on this or indeed any other topic, so many will not remember that I always believed that political Zionism was a mistake and was wrong. [Laughter.] I see nothing derisory about that. Almost all the debates on this subject are carried on upon the assumption that the one thing that must not happen is the use of force against the Zionist State. It is not fair to make that assumption without candidly admitting that in the eyes of any Arab that was an extreme case of colonialism and imperialism. It was the forcing upon a long-settled society, partly by force and partly, I feel bound to say, by fraud, of persons from outside who
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were bound to disturb that society and bound to create there a festering sore which has gone on pouring out human misery ever since, as we all know it has.
It makes it awfully difficult both to think straight and to seem to ourselves and to others to think straight about this matter, if one has prejudices opposite to the normal ones on the subject. I think it was the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) who begged us to see ourselves and the world through foreign eyes sometimes. Hon. Gentlemen must not take for granted too easily the assumptions about Israeli ships. I cannot speak as a lawyer but I feel some sympathy with Egypt about the Israeli ships. Law must have some relation to the way in which real people behave, and it is a little much to ask people to guarantee free passage through the Canal for the benefit of a country with which they think and say they are at war. I do not know the answer : I fully admit that the establishment of the Zionist State in the Middle East makes it impossible to say clearly, "This is the right thing" or "That is the wrong thing to do".
On this matter of the Canal I cannot doubt that we are now in a position of defence. Perhaps hon. Gentlemen will forgive me a moment of personal reminiscence. I am almost the first man in my family for 250 years who has been able, I do not say to earn, but to get, a living in this country. All the others have had to do it by going overseas or by spending their time at sea. Those whom I knew, in the last generation or two, would have hardly believed that the British House of Commons would speak as though Britain's frontiers were only Britain's shores. They would say that the British House of Commons must be aware that arbitrary interference with international highways puts us into a state of self-defence. They would not believe it possible that any other view could be held. The frontiers of our country, which can feed only half its people, are not only the three-mile limit. We have to make sure that men and goods can pass freely on their lawful occasions. I beg hon. and right hon. Members opposite to think it possible that even some of their supporters of whom they feel most sure may also at some hours take this same view.
5.40 p.m.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: I think that there is, at any rate, one criterion which we might all apply to our speeches in this debate today. It is, quite simply, that it is not ruled out by the Prime Minister that this country may use military force before the House meets again. Certainly, therefore, every hon. Member opposite ought, when speaking, to attempt to try to explain why he thinks that that is justified, so that his constituents may read and understand it. I have been a Member of this House for only six years, but I have never been more glad to be a Member than I am today, and I feel a compelling obligation to explain to the people who sent me here what are my views on this subject. It is only in that spirit that I make the remarks about the situation that I do.
Let me say, first, that I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger), who said that the former Attorney-General, the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), had completely changed the course of this debate. Indeed, I am told that Mr. Dulles now has a statement on the tape in which he says that he will not use force to go through with the users' association. This debate, therefore, changes its course as it proceeds and, indeed, in a sense, it is not the vote tonight that is important so much as the answer which we must get from the Prime Minister to the question put by the right hon. and learned Gentleman opposite.
At the same time, it is worth looking back at the justification of their position which the Government now present to us. I want to say, quite frankly, that I have never believed for a moment that the nationalisation issue and the so-called illegality of nationalisation was the point on which the Government were basing themselves at all. The International Court is there to decide these matters. It is no good saying, as the hon. Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) has said, that the Court might decide that it had no jurisdiction. If the Court decided that it had no jurisdiction that would be a judgment for Egypt. That is why the Government do not take it to the International Court; because they are frightened that the Court will come out and say that this is an Egyptian matter.
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Then we come to the question of the pilots. We ask the Government, "Why did you pull the pilots out?" and they say, "We did not pull the pilots out—the Company did." The Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot, at one moment, have it that the Company is a great international authority, responsible to world opinion and, at the next, a private company conducting its own contracts with the pilots in the operation of the international waterway.
Then we are told that it is an act of aggression. I ask the Government "Can it possibly be an act of aggression to anticipate something that would be lawful in twelve years' time?" I put it as a very serious consideration that if the Government are basing themselves upon the Convention of 1888 they have themselves had to admit that the users' association will disappear, or is likely to disappear, in 1968. No; I believe what the Foreign Secretary said in his broadcast to the nation in August, that we must look at "the substance and not at the technicalities." It is to the substance we should look when we consider the situation in the Middle East.
What is the first complaint against Colonel Nasser? It is that he dreams of empire. The party opposite objecting to dreams of empire! What about Cecil Rhodes who dreamed of controlling Africa from the Cape to Cairo? What about Disraeli? What about the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill), who sits there? He dreams of empire in the books he writes of our glorious past. It is we, on this side, who object to dreams of empire, because we think in terms of free association and we believe that the empire that was built up was based on force and domination by this country. Therefore, let criticism of Colonel Nasser come from this side and not from the empire builders opposite.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke rose—
Mr. Benn: I shall be dealing with the noble Lord in a moment. I am glad that he is here.
Then we come to the character of Colonel Nasser. When the Foreign Secretary made his broadcast, what did he do? He went through all the things that Colonel Nasser had done. First, he said that Colonel Nasser has abolished the

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monarchy. To people who read only the Daily Sketch, the monarchy is just all the things we think of in our own Royal family, but there is really very little sense in asking us to withdraw our Amendment in favour of King Farouk.
The truth of the matter is that if the Government do go to war—and, of course, they do not want war ; no burglar wants to hit one on the head if one is ready to give him what he wants without his doing so—it will be a preventive war to prevent Colonel Nasser doing what he has in mind; and I shall come back to Colonel Nasser's intentions in the Middle East in a moment. As far as the illegality of nationalisation is concerned, the Government have not a case, and they know that they have not a case.
Now we come to what the Foreign Secretary did when Colonel Nasser's act of nationalisation was promulgated. First, he summoned a conference to decide the future of the Canal. That Conference was a packed jury of the users of the Canal—as they are called, but actually they are only the countries whose ships use the Canal. The fact is that the goods of many other countries go in those ships, so one cannot see how the interests of the Canal were those only of the nations summoned to the Conference.
When we come to the international plan, to internationalisation, we come to the ludicrous position of hon. Gentlemen opposite being in favour of internationalisation. May I ask any hon. Gentleman opposite today whether he would favour colonial development on the basis of the London plan for the Suez Canal? There is not a single Conservative who believes that colonial development should be run without profit, and although I have many criticisms of the London plan it is a plan that gives no profits on the operation of the Canal.
We, on this side, are the people who believe in internationalisation ; we are the ones who today stand in favour of the use of the world's resources for the benefit of the people—and we are told that the Conservatives, who built an international capital enterprise, would take the country to the brink of war in favour of a nonprofit making scheme. If it were not tragic, it would be enough to make us, on this side, sick with laughter.
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The truth is that internationalisation makes sense only if it is done by consent. Internationalisation, like pacifism, involves an attitude of mind. It is not something that can be imposed on anybody, and neither I nor any of my right hon. and hon. Friends believe that we can impose internationalisation on Colonel Nasser. Suppose that we tried to do it, and said, "We take the Canal; we take this strip of water and make it international." The first thing that happens, according to the Prime Minister, is that we need a new and bigger Canal. Where do we get the land for the new Canal? We have not got it—we have only internationalised the existing one. We then have to go to Colonel Nasser and say, "Give us a bit more sand. We want another Canal." No—internationalisation cannot be imposed, and that is the bitter fact which the Government cannot face, and that is why they are building up this hysteria over the present situation.
Next we are told that the Canal is vital to the economic interests of the country. I do not deny that international trade is the basis of our life, but let us take the subject of the dues. I am told that if Colonel Nasser quadrupled the dues it would mean merely an extra 1d. a gallon on petrol; but if I accept the estimate given in another speech yesterday, and say that it would mean an extra 5d. a gallon, well, we ourselves have a tax of 2s. a gallon on petrol. We say that oil is too cheap for the British consumer and use the tax to finance our ordinary domestic expenditure. What right has a rich country like this to use the low price of oil and its transport to finance our own expenditure, for whatever purpose? I say that we have no right, and no right to impose it.
The real question is whether or not Colonel Nasser would leave the Canal open, and I am content to rest my case on what the Secretary of State for War said in the debate on the Suez Canal Base Agreement in 1954. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) was then talking about the danger of the Canal being closed, and the Secretary of State for War said :
"I do not see the slightest reason why the Egyptian Government should close the Suez Canal, because it is as much a life-line to them as to anyone else."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 760.]

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We are not relying on promises—those are the words of the Secretary of State for War, the man who is now moving the troops of this country in defiance of his own prophecy. He did not rely on a promise by Colonel Nasser. Neither do I. He relied on the hard economic facts of the situation that Nasser needs the Canal, that Egypt is a poor country with only two assets—a river and a Canal— and that she wants the profits from the Canal to help her to use the river. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the manner of nationalisation, in terms of the needs of the Egyptian people the Aswan Dam is absolutely vital.
After all, we have debated this matter today as if Egypt came onto the map about the year 1954. But the history of Egypt goes back a very long way. I will not weary the House with the history of the Pharoahs, but I will take the House back to 1882, when a British Government —and it was a Liberal Government—sent troops into Egypt to pay the foreign bondholders because of the bankruptcy of the Egyptian Government. They used the revenues of Egypt to pay the private capitalists. Is it any wonder that international control and management stinks in the nostrils of the Egyptian people today?
We said that Egyptian sovereignty would always be recognised. We said that when we set King Fuad on the throne after the First World War. We said it in the 1936 Treaty. Sovereignty means that one is free not to enter into international control of one's own resources, although everyone here earnestly wishes that sovereign States will get together. But if the Government want to be taken seriously on the question of international control there is a simple remedy. Let them recommend international control of the oil in the Middle East, at the end of the debate tonight, and I will join the Conservative Party first thing in the morning.
The real tragedy is that just as Mr. Khrushchev has buried Stalin, the Prime Minister has exhumed Karl Marx. This is exactly what Marx said would happen when the international capitalists got up against the wall; they would use force and would try everything they could to maintain political power for themselves. Those like the hon. Member for
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Windsor (Mr. Mott-Radclyffe), who talk about the battle for men's minds and that sort of thing, had better look at the material which we have been providing for the battle for men's minds during the last five weeks. I am tempted to put a wreath on Karl Marx's grave tonight with the inscription, "With love from Anthony Eden."
We come to the real question, which is the only question that we can seriously consider tonight in terms of our vital national interests, and that is free passage through the Canal. The users' authority will look peculiarly stupid when Nasser says, "Do not bother with your own pilots. We have a pilot here and he will take your ship through." There will be a shortage of pilots, but there will be no stoppage.
Let us consider the 1888 Convention, upon which everything is based. Does any hon. Gentleman opposite know that Britain would not sign it in 1888 because it was said that the Convention would fetter Britain's control of Egypt? So when we have a great blowing up of moral indignation, let us remember that for sixteen years we would not sign the Convention because we said that it did not recognise our unrivalled power and position in Egypt.
The second point about the 1888 Convention is that we did not enforce it. We allowed Israeli shipping to be blockaded when we had troops in the Canal Zone. Let nobody be deluded by what M. Pineau said yesterday, that we are going to use Israeli shipping and take it through under cover of the users' authority and its pilots. However, I do not like to bring Israel into the discussion lest people think that I am going to recommend a certain course of action.
I accept the view that this is an international company ; that the British Government, being a 44 per cent. shareholder, is responsible for the company, and that by withdrawing the pilots and re-engaging them with another organisation we are in violation of the Convention of 1888. If anyone doubts that, let him read Article 12, which says :
"The High Contracting Parties … agree that none of them shall endeavour to obtain with respect to the Canal territorial or commercial advantages or privileges in any international arrangements which may be concluded."

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If having one's own authority which sends ships through without paying a penny to Egypt is not getting a commercial advantage I would like to know what is. My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South-West (Mr. Bowden) described the situation yesterday in this way, that it was like going to a cinema with one's own usherette and then refusing to pay the admission charge.
Let us not have any humbug about Britain basing itself on the 1888 Convention. I do not deny that free passage through the Canal is absolutely vital for Britain and for every other country which uses it. The question is : did we make any attempt to get this matter raised and brought up to date with the Menzies mission? The answer is that there were no negotiations of any kind with Colonel Nasser in Cairo. Mr. Menzies was sent there to explain and persuade, but he was not empowered to negotiate.
We are told that the Prime Minister's patience is exhausted. We talk about dictators, but some of us are wondering who is who in this matter. I am told that the Prime Minister's patience is exhausted, and yet he has not given any opportunity for free negotiation with President Nasser about the future of the Canal.
Sir Lancelot Jovnson-Hicks: Is the hon. Gentleman quoting the Prime Minister as saying that his patience is exhausted? Will the hon. Gentleman say what are the sources of his information for making that statement?
Mr. Benn: The phrase "my patience is exhausted" comes from a pre-war period, as hon. Members know. I was making a humble comparison with one of the earliest phrases that I remember from my pram. I heard of the Japanese attack on Manchuria and later, when I was able to walk, I heard about the Spanish war. If there is anybody in this dispute whose patience is advertised as being exhausted, it is the Prime Minister's and not Nasser's.
Mr. Reader Harris: This is most unfair. The hon. Gentleman should not put words into the Prime Minister's mouth and compare him to Hitler. It is a smear campaign.
Mr. Benn: I am merely saying that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have said that it is no use going
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on with negotiations with Nasser. If we are considering who is the aggressor we can only judge by who does what. One reason why we have tabled our Amendment is that, in our view, if Britain were to attack Egypt we would be the aggressors.
Let me quote again from the debate in 1954, and I quote from a Member who may or may not be in the Chamber; I have only just found the quotation and I have not had an opportunity to give him notice that I should refer to it. I refer to the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing (Brigadier Prior-Palmer). He was talking about us having British troops in Egypt without the Treaty being in operation. He said :
"Should we not be in a sorry position if Egypt took us to U.N.O. and if we were branded by U.N.O. as an aggressor …?"
This is the hon. and gallant Member for Worthing speaking.
"Carried one stage further, if we insisted on remaining there"—
he was speaking about the Canal Zone Base—
"would not U.N.O. have a perfect right under the Charter to send in a combined force to turn us out, as they did in Korea?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th July, 1954; Vol. 531, c. 789.]
That is exactly the situation which we believe would develop if we were to use force.
I come now to the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke). The noble Lord had a brilliant suggestion. When the hon. and gallant Gentleman said this, the noble Lord said :
"Does not my hon. and gallant Friend conceive it possible that for once we should use the veto in our own interests?"—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 29th July, 1956; Vol. 531, c. 789.]
When the noble Lord's leader says that we cannot take it to the United Nations because of the Soviet veto, it is a little hard for the noble Lord to say that if we were branded as an aggressor we would use the veto ourselves.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Gentleman's party subscribed to the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations incorporates the veto. If there is a veto in the United Nations Charter, why should not we use it?
Mr. Benn: Mr. Deputy-Speaker, you will be as surprised as I am to find that

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the noble Lord has got the point. This is exactly what my right hon. Friend is saying in the Amendment. Although there is a veto in the United Nations and although the General Assembly may not agree, let us take it there. If the position taken by the noble Lord is that with or without the veto we stick by the United Nations, I am entirely with him and I will pass to my next point.
Mr. Robson Brown: The hon. Gentleman made great play with who is the aggressor. Does not he realise that Colonel Nasser already has been the aggressor in the act that he has done, and, what is most important, would he answer this? What does he think of Colonel Nasser's threat to put into prison British nationals if they refused to work under him on the Canal?
Mr. Benn: I do not know whether the hon. Member was present at the beginning of my speech. I devoted a great deal of time to arguing whether Nasser was guilty under international law, and I said that, in my view, there was the International Court to decide that. If the hon. Member likes to get up after that and say that Nasser is the aggressor, I am afraid that he is tempting me back to that part of my speech which I have already passed.
I now come to the question of force. No one pretends that hon. Members on this side of the House do not say that there are certain circumstances in which force is lawful. If Egypt attacked Israel, the Tripartite Declaration would come into operation at once and we should use it against Egypt. We should use it, if the United Nations sanctioned it, or if we ourselves were attacked, but not otherwise.
I have here some quotations which, so far as I am concerned, completely settle this matter for me. They are quotations about the functions and responsibilities of a great Power in a situation like this. It is quite simply a quotation from a speech made at the beginning of the United Nations Organisation. It says this :
"At intervals in history, mankind has sought by the creation of international machinery to solve disputes between nations by agreement and not by force. Hitherto all these endeavours have failed. Yet no one here doubts that despite these earlier failures a further attempt must be made. … Great Powers can make a two-fold contribution (1) by the support of this organization; (2) by setting themselves
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certain standards in international conduct and by observing them scrupulously in all their dealings with other countries. The greater the power any State commands, the heavier its responsibility to wield that power with consideration for others and with restraint upon its own selfish impulses."
This is what the Prime Minister said at San Francisco. If the Prime Minister would repeat those words tonight, my right hon. and hon. Friends might think twice about pressing our Amendment. The fact is that the Prime Minister has used all these speeches and we all have made these speeches about upholding the rule of law, but the test comes when we think that we have been wronged, and that is what we urge tonight.
I would like to say a word about Israel. There is a temptation, particularly among my hon. Friends who, like myself, believe that Israel must survive and develop in peace, to use Israel as an excuse for turning on Colonel Nasser. There can be no greater friend of Israel in this House than I am. I say that quite sincerely. I have pressed that Israel should have arms in the present situation. I believe that if ever there was a case for it, it is today, with the massive supply of Russian war materials now going into Egypt, and that Israel should have more arms at once.
I do not believe that any settlement of the Canal dispute can be regarded as final until the Israeli flag is going up and down the waterway of this Canal. But to use Israel now, after we have ignored her for five years, will be to pave the way for the destruction of Israel and her elimination from the Middle East. I say that for this reason. Israel can only survive in the long run if she can live with her neighbours. Now that the Western Powers, by their acts of violence and threats of violence against countries of the Middle East, are in such a grave position and are so weak—[An HON. MEMBER : "What acts?"] Does not the hon. Gentleman remember that in Cyprus today, and in Algeria, very great violence is being used? I suggest that the Western Powers are maintaining themselves by violence, and if Israel is used as a pawn by us, I believe that it will ultimately destroy her.
The tragedy of this policy is quite simply this : if it succeeded, it would fail. Supposing that we had now, on the tape, a message that Colonel Nasser had agreed to international control. Suppose he

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said, "We will have the London plan." Where further would we be in this House? Where nearer to any solution of the real problem of the Middle East? The truth is that it would mean that a couple of dozen of international bureaucrats would go into Cairo to set up their international organisation. The pilots would go home. There would be no British troops in the Canal and Colonel Nasser could close it any time he liked. There can be no security except the security of good relations with Egypt.
This country is not willing to face up to the new implications in world affairs. There are four problems in the Middle East. There is, first, Arab nationalism. Now that we have aligned ourselves with the French in Algeria any ultimate hope of having Arab nationalism on our side is lost. There is the Arab-Israeli dispute. We can only settle that by pacification, and, as the Prime Minister said two years ago, pacification means being on good terms with both Jew and Arab.
There is the problem of the cold war, and we cannot settle that problem while we go on bidding with the Russians as to who will provide more arms for the Arab countries. Until we get rid of the Bagdad Pact we shall never get the Russians to agree to peace in the Middle East, so that whether the bureaucrats are members of the users' association, or whether they are in Cairo itself, is as nothing to these great issues that are being decided in the Middle East today.
The problem of the Middle East is poverty. When a great rich country like ours threatens sanctions against a poor country like Egypt, however great the provocation and however much we may dislike the man, world opinion will say, "This is not right," and we shall lose the claim of having influence in that part of the world.
I say finally to the Prime Minister that I believe that we could have peace ; there is a prospect for peace in the Middle East if only the party opposite could forget its dreams of other empires in the days of its youth. Any hope for peace in the Middle East centres upon the solution of the problems which really confront the people who live there. If the Prime Minister is not willing to give an assurance tonight in answer to the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey, I say to him that
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he may very deliberately provoke a war. This House most vote tonight. Let us warn him that this would be a war without national unity at home and without allies abroad prepared to support us in it. It would be a war without purpose and without hope, and, for all we know, a war without end as well.
I say quite sincerely to the Prime Minister that even if it succeeds in the short run, which is by no means certain, it can never succeed in the long run. I believe that it will bring disgrace, dishonour and possibly disaster to this country. I say this quite sincerely and I urge all my hon. Friends to vote for the Amendment tonight.
6.10 p.m.
Mr. David Price: Having been away from the House for some time, I am interested to find that the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East (Mr. Benn) continues to have that fairy-book mentality which sees everything in terms of good fairies of the extreme Left and bad fairies of the middle Left, Centre and Right. On this great issue which we are discussing he must bring us back to the sort of Victorian pantomime which seems to form his general scheme of values in relation to the modern world.
I am aware that there are one or two people on the other benches who have, by their noises, made it quite clear that their only desire is to promote their own party interests in this two-day debate. I am very glad that they form a very small minority, though they do appear always to be able to sit on the benches longer than more moderate-minded hon. Members.
My justification for intervening in this debate is this. In my constituency many months ago I warned my constituents not only about Colonel Nasser but about the possibility of him seizing the Canal. The Canal problem, as many previous speakers have pointed out, is not an isolated incident; it is part of the general problem of the Middle East and cannot be looked at in isolation.
There is one statement which has been made in this House and in the Press which should not, I think, be completely accepted, namely, that there is unanimity of Arab opinion. In fact, there is a dichotomy. There is an overall pattern of Arab nationalism; that is undoubtedly true. On the other hand, there are very

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intense jealousies and rivalries between the various Arab countries, that being particularly true of those who are benefiting most out of increased oil revenues.
I would suggest that one of the reasons which prompted Nasser to take his step was his realisation that if Egypt does not make her bid for the leadership of the Arab world now or in the next year or two, her appeal to the other Arab countries will have gone because they will be far more self-sustaining. The building up of their oil industries, the impact of modern technology and so on will give them futures and destinies of their own quite independent of Egypt. If Egypt wishes—as it would appear from Colonel Nasser's book that he does—to have a great imperial design for the Arab world under his leadership, then she must make her bid now. I feel that that is a very relevant consideration in judging this whole problem. Time is against Egypt.
There is a further factor which I do not think has yet been fully assessed, namely, the impact of Russian influence in the Middle East. I do not mean only the general Russian influence, the influence of Communist doctrine and so on, with which we all have to live—as farmers have to live with thistles and docks, so do we have to live with Marxists. I am referring to the more direct and considered effort of Russian penetration. I am not myself one of those who believe that the Czech arms deal was just a little buying arrangement done between Cairo and Prague. If one looks at the equipment which has been going there, one cannot believe that it is just surplus stores left over from the Second World War. The tanks are of a very modern type and of very considerable size. That should be borne in mind, not only in relation to the Canal but in relation to a potential threat to world peace in the Middle East. I should have thought that those on both sides of the House who feel deep concern for the future of Israel ought to give that factor further consideration.
Turning to the question of the Canal itself, I had thought, until I heard the speech of the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East, that it was generally agreed by everybody that the seizure of the Canal had been an illegal act. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] Evidently there are more who entertain the hon. Member's
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folly. The hon. Gentleman raised the question of why this matter cannot be, or has not been, taken to the International Court. I am advised by my legal friends that when there is a dispute between a private company, although of an international character, and a sovereign Government, it cannot go before the International Court.
We must in this House recognise that one of the many weaknesses of the International Court lies in the fact that bodies other than sovereign Governments have no standing at The Hague. That is a very grave weakness. In my opinion we should try to establish in international law some form of body which is recognised at The Hague, having a status below that of a government, rather in the same way as trade unions, friendly societies and joint stock companies are recognised here.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: If the Foreign Secretary's argument is correct and the company is written into the Convention, then, of course, the parties to the Convention could carry the matter to the International Court.
Mr. Price: I bow to the hon. and learned Gentleman's legal opinion ; I will not argue with him about that. But when it comes to the actual position of the Suez Canal Company, that Company did not come into existence by virtue of the 1888 Convention ; it was already in existence, going back to the time of its original Concession. That is what I had in mind. I agree entirely with the hon. and learned Gentleman that it may be that some aspect of the matter may be taken to The Hague; but one does recall here the judgment given in the Persian oil case.
Mr. Paget: Surely, the situation is this. It is either illegal by Egyptian law or by international law. It is not illegal by Egyptian law, and if the Court of International Law at The Hague has no jurisdiction, it is not a matter for international law. There is no illegality about it.
Mr. Ronald Bell: I wonder if my hon. Friend would allow me to add just one point to his admirable submission. Egypt has never thought fit to sign the Statute of the International Court.
Mr. J. Hynd: She did.
Mr. Price: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. It only goes to show the confusion there is over this business.
I should like to make it perfectly clear that nobody could want more than I do to see established the international rule of law. But it is never contended that there is an international rule of law similar to our domestic rule of law; the whole question of the recognition and the enforcement of its authority poses serious practical problems which must be faced. With this great weakness in international law at the moment, I do not believe that one can, with quite the confidence of the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East, advocate—
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is on this confusion of law that the Government's plan to force their way through the Canal under the users' association is based?
Mr. Price: The hon. and learned Gentleman is jumping a stage in the argument. I do not believe that my right hon. Friend would advocate anyone at the moment forcing anything through the Canal, and certainly I do not.
Mr. Paget: What on earth is the hon. Gentleman saying?
Mr. Price: I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman will admit that he is jumping a stage in the argument, on the facts as presented to you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
It follows that we must give great cognisance to the arguments advanced last night by the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) with regard to the creation of new international bodies. I felt that the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East displayed his fairy-book mentality when he threw doubt about the sincerity of anyone on this side of the House who might be anxious to create more international bodies. We do not need to go the whole way and agree entirely with his view of a sort of world international Socialism in order to be internationally-minded.
The next point which has not been developed sufficiently in discussing negotiation is that one does not negotiate in vacuo; one negotiates with specific people. In the case of Egypt, the specific person is Colonel Nasser. Hon. Gentlemen sitting at what I might term the "mountain" end of the House seem to
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ignore that. Negotiation here is conducted not with some nice Liberal humanist or Christian Socialist; hon. Members must not exercise their imagination in terms of Fabian debating societies.
We must look at the character of the man with whom we are asked to negotiate. When one does that, it does not mean that there is no negotiation but it does mean that any agreement, to be satisfactory, must have in it clauses that are mainly self-sustaining rather than clauses which depend entirely on the continued good will of a single individual. I should have thought that to a party which wishes always to broaden the base of decision-making, the idea of one man at that end having the control and making the decision would be anathema to them, but apparently it is not on this occasion.
When one views the actions taken by Her Majesty's Government, I think they have followed entirely the correct pattern for those who wish for an international solution. The doctrine laid down by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was one that was subscribed to by the Opposition Front Bench in the early days of this issue. The calling of the London Conference seems to me to have been an absolutely proper and justified act, and it is not stretching Article VIII of the 1888 Convention too far to regard that as one's authority, not to mention Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.
Mention has been made of troop movements. From both sides of the House we have had justification for them as a precautionary measure, but subsequent speakers from the Opposition benches have given the idea that they have been on a massive scale quite out of any proportion to what was necessary as a precautionary move to rescue British lives if they were imperilled.
It is rather interesting to see the recent News Chronicle public opinion poll, which asked the question :
"Do you think we were right or wrong to take military precautions and step up our military forces in the Mediterranean?"
The people who carried out that poll discovered that 59 per cent. of Labour voters thought it was right; 75 per cent. of Liberal voters and 80 per cent. of Conservative voters. That does not suggest to me a state of national alarm over the measures that have been taken.

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We are left with the problem, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister put it to us, of what is the next step. The House must face the fact that there is no completely satisfactory solution to that problem. There are only varying degrees of unsatisfactory solutions, some of them less unsatisfactory than others. There is not one that is completely satisfactory. If this matter is to be dealt with by negotiation, clearly one cannot get one's own way completely. I thought that the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) put that issue incredibly well.
Hon. Members: Hear, hear.
Mr. S. Silverman: Why incredibly?
Mr. Price: The question of timing in this issue is a matter upon which I am not in a position to have any opinion. We know that there are subtleties and ins and outs in diplomatic timing, but I believe that hon. Members who have been worrying about the intentions of my right hon. Friends on the Front Bench, and particularly of the Prime Minister—that he is prepared to cast aside the United Nations like kicking an old salmon tin down the road and will then plunge us off on military adventures—simply are not dealing with the facts as they are.
I was astonished, when I came back to this country a couple of weeks ago, to pick up some of the more popular newspapers and to see presented as the view of Tory backbenchers views that at the most may be held by 20 of us. That was being put over as the view of the Conservative Party. The idea that one was going back almost to the Drake and Hawkins type of approach to these matters bears no relation to the facts.
I realise that certain people, like the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East, with his fairy-book mind, see us in that rôle, and cannot see the facts of the situation so that they can deal with Members on these benches as they are and not as hon. Members opposite imagine us to be. We know our own views better than does the hon. Member for Bristol, South-East. That sort of thing may be good election stuff at a conference at Margate or Brighton but it bears no relation to the facts. I suffer from the disadvantage of having had a rather scientific education and, therefore, am interested more in facts
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than in a mere miasma of emotion. We should do well to follow the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey, which, I believe, has set the pattern for the debate.
The hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) made slight modifications on the theme that the Government were responsible for sabre rattling. He accused the Government of wanting war because they had not stopped rumours. But who started the rumours? They were not being pushed out by the Conservative Central Office. Is it suggested that representatives of the Foreign Office were going around the bars of London hawking these rumours? We all know where they started. The hungry imagination—
Mr. Percy Shurmer: Hear, hear.
Mr. Price: I am delighted that the hon. Member sees himself as one of the characters in the picture that I am painting. He looks very well on it.
It must be said here and now that we on these benches are no more anxious to use force than are hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition benches. I do not say that because I feel it necessary to tell it to our own Front Bench, whose occupants know it and are in touch with us. I say it because, going out from this House, one hopes that the sentence or two of one's speech that are quoted may do something to offset some of the vivid articles that we have read in the Press recently. It seems to me that they have been having a go at the "Thousand and One Nights" and going from the sturdy masochism of the Daily Express, through the simpering seduction of the Manchester Guardian, to the prostituted and lascivious assaults of the New Statesman and Nation. We on this side of the House are as much opposed to force in the context in which we are accused of warmongering and sabre rattling as are hon. Members opposite. I ask them to do us the courtesy of crediting us with holding our own views sincerely and to be as generous to us as, I trust, at least some of us on this side of the House are generous to them.
A point that I hope will be made from the Opposition Front Bench by the Leader of the Opposition when he winds up the debate from his side of the House is that we shall be paying an economic

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cost for restraint and upholding international law, because this issue will take time. It will affect our trade. We do not yet know to what extent. If the Canal were closed, it would certainly affect our balance of payments.
I plead with the Leader of the Opposition, in return, as it were, for the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey, that somewhere in his remarks he introduce the thought that the idea of economic progress, greater leisure, a higher standard of living, and similar aims would be affected by our determination to go through the slow and, I believe, proper method of the international machinery, and that at the end of it we may have no solution at all. That is the implication of pursuing the international process. It is something on which, I hope, hon. Members opposite agree with me. The test will be whether we are prepared to accept these extra burdens on our economy.
I could not help feeling—I may be sounding slightly contentious—that when at Brighton the T.U.C. passed a resolution about going to the United Nations, a resolution with which I do not disagree, the Congress subsequently put forward a lot of suggestions for what trade unionists often demand. Without going into all the aspects of the matter, I would observe that there is no doubt that if we do take the Suez dispute to the United Nations the economic conditions necessary to meet the demands of Mr. Cousins and others would be prejudiced, though none of us can say by how much. I should like some of the many hon. Members here who have influence with the trade unions to point that out before the debate is concluded.
6.30 p.m.
Mr. Christopher Mayhew: The hon. Member for Eastleigh (Mr. D. Price) invited us to deal with hon. Members on his side of the House on their merits and not to attribute to all of them the views of a small minority of them. I think that that is what we have felt very inclined to do tonight, especially since we have heard one speech of outstanding wisdom and integrity, that of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald). It tempts me to suggest that the very bitter and clear division between the two sides of the House on the main point at issue
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over Suez may blind us to the fact that there is a wide amount of agreement on some of the other matters we have been discussing.
When the Foreign Secretary began the debate today he made extensive quotations from the speech which the Leader of the Opposition made on 2nd August. I find that I can still perfectly well agree with those quotations, those references to the ambitions of Colonel Nasser and to the vital importance to this country of free passage through the Suez Canal. It seems to me that they constitute ground common to both sides of the House.
I hope that it will be also agreed that the suggestions that we on this side of the House have some special affection for Colonel Nasser—that has been implied a little in the debate—fall very wide of the mark, especially when we remember the attitude this party has adopted on the other critical issue in the Middle East, that of Israel, for we have been criticised in the past for showing undue prejudice against Egypt's case and against Colonel Nasser in particular. Nor can anyone suppose that the party which sent troops to Korea, which authorised armed action in Malaya and in Kenya, which accepted the principle of German rearmament, is a pacifist party or a party which is reluctant to fulfil its proper obligations under the United Nations, even if that involves the use of armed force.
All of this, of course, in one sense only emphasises the extremely sharp difference of view on the main point at issue, that whereas hon. Members opposite feel that if they cannot get an acceptable settlement of the Suez Canal dispute the Government are prepared and are entitled to use force with or without the authority of the United Nations—
Mr. Osborne: That has not been said by us, and it is important to have this matter right. We on this side of the House are as determined as hon. Members opposite that force, if it should be needed—and we do not want to have it —shall be used only after we have the support of the United Nations.
Mr. Mayhew: I accept what the hon. Member has said as valuable and helpful. We do not want to discourage hon. Members opposite from asking their

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leaders to make this matter clear, because there is no point in exaggerating the differences between the two sides on this matter. We on this side say that the use of force, assuming that Nasser does not attack us first—which we can assume— can be justified only with United Nations' authority, and I hope that we shall not attempt, on either side of the House, to widen the gulf between us, but realise that, in truth, both sides of the House want to settle this matter peacefully. We need to get a statement from the Government themselves to that effect.
Mr. Robson Brown: Would the hon. Gentleman clarify that statement in one important particular? When he refers to the United Nations does he mean the Security Council?
Mr. Mayhew: Yes, I think that that is what we mean.
We have stated in our Amendment that we regard the nationalisation of the Canal as having been done in an intolerably arbitrary and provocative way. No one will doubt that. However, our point is that that is not an act of war. It amounts to a threat of robbery, a very serious threat to our material standards. It amounts by itself to a threat of robbery, and we say it is wrong to answer a threat of robbery with a threat of murder, and even worse to answer a threat of robbery with an act of what would be murder. Thus the main issue between us is really a moral one, an issue that is difficult to argue about, the judgment of Tightness and wrongness.
Personally, while I have never doubted the Government's resolve to use force in the last resort, I have also always felt that, faced with the reality of the act, faced with the embarrassment of firing the first shot, an embarrassment which has led to the formation of the canal users' association to try to avoid the embarrassment of firing the first shot, the Government would see that that would be an action which a really democratic Government could not take. I still feel that, faced with that problem, the Government probably will not use force. Therefore, let us try to encourage the Prime Minister to make clear that the Government will not use force without prior reference to the United Nations on this issue.
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There are the practical implications of the use of force, implications which many of my hon. Friends have made clear. It is difficult to speak on this subject now without repeating what has been said already, and I shall not attempt to do so. However, in addition to the practical consequences of using force, we now have the knowledge, as have the Government, that that action would be taken in defiance of half of British public opinion, led by the Labour Party and by the T.U.C. In these circumstances, I do beg them to understand that it is just not possible to take that action.
It is true that in our history we have fought wars despite a very great body of opposition in this country to them. The South African War, for example, was fought despite a very great body of opposition in this country to it. However, that was a long time ago. That was before the emergence of the organised Labour movement in this country. I doubt very much whether if, at the time of the South African War, the degree of opposition to war had existed then which exists now and if we had had then the organised Labour movement, the South African War would have been possible.
The Government, somehow or another, will have to climb down on this issue. I hope that they will do so, even though, of course, it will involve us in terrible national humiliation. [HON. MEMBERS : "Not us."] I mean, it will involve the country in humiliation. There is no doubt about that. The Government have led us to a position where we cannot now climb down without a great blow to our prestige and reputation abroad.
Mr. Ellis Smith: That does not apply to the people whom we on these benches represent, and the people in general.
Mr. Mayhew: We have to consider what the effects of a climb down would be on Britain's relations with her Allies in N.A.T.O. and in the Commonwealth. So far as they are concerned, I think there can be no doubt that what I am saying is true.
What are the lessons that we ought to draw for the future from this position that we have got into?
Mr. Paget: To climb down now means the end of the Bagdad Pact.
Mr. Mayhew: There would be quite a number of consequences. Obviously, our prestige in the Middle East would be seriously affected.
How can we avoid a repetition of all this, and what lessons can we learn from the appalling situation into which the Government have landed us? The first lesson is that we can no longer protect our prestige and material interests in the Middle East with our warships and aircraft. That is to say, military power, on which so much Government policy in the Middle East has been based, is far less valuable and vital to us than they have understood.
The position of the Soviet Union seems instructive from this point of view. Today, the Soviet Union has more power and influence in the Middle East than we in this country have. The Soviet Union has a greater capacity for getting the countries of the Middle East along the paths it wants them to take than we have, and yet the Soviet Union has no military bases in that area. There is no Red Army or Red Fleet within hundreds of miles. If the Red Fleet enters the Mediterranean it will do so on a courtesy visit by invitation of the Egyptian Government, and that conceivably may happen.
The Soviet Union understands better than we do that power and influence in that area depend no longer on building military forces but on the cultivation of political support among the new forces there. Part of its success is due to unscrupulous exploitation of Arab hatred of Israel, but the bulk of it comes from skilful support of the legitimate aims of the Arab peoples in that area.
The Arabs want sovereignty, racial equality and an end to colonialism, and they want trade without strings. The Russians are doing their utmost to identify themselves with these demands and they have actually capitalised their military weakness as a means of flattering Arab desires for sovereignty. They have backed all this with a skilful, expensive and effective propaganda machine.
It is not so easy for us to acquire political influence. We have inherited a great mass of bitter hatred and prejudice against this country in past history. We have still in that area a whole lot of commitments embarrassing to us, which we cannot liquidate overnight. But we
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could certainly do a lot better than we have been doing. We could begin by renouncing the use of force over Suez outside the Charter of the United Nations. We could put our oil contracts on a more normal commercial basis and adopt a less repressive policy in Cyprus, beginning by inviting French troops to leave as soon as possible.
We could show a less equivocal attitude on some of the colour problems in Africa and always, above all, show ourselves good neighbours and genuine supporters of the United Nations. I should like to see this fresh political approach, backed by a vastly improved effort in the field of public relations and propaganda. It was typical that on the very day that Colonel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal the B.B.C. announced that, owing to the stinginess of the Treasury, it had been unable to overhaul any of its overseas broadcast transmitters for fourteen years.
The Treasury shows unvarying meanness and hostility towards anything savouring of publicity for Britain in overseas countries. When it is publicity for private firms it is a different matter. If a company director wants a gold-plated car for publicity, the Treasury jumps to assist him and encourage him ; but if it is a matter of information service or the B.B.C. broadcasting service or the British Council, that must be done on a shoestring.
Therefore, the general conclusion for the future is that if we are to recover our influence in the Middle East we must change our whole approach and try to increase our political and economic power in the Middle East rather than go ahead with the traditional policy of increasing our military influence. The times have changed and the whole nature of power in the Middle East has changed with them. It is seventy-four years since the British Fleet, at its leisure, could casually steam towards the Port of Alexandria and bombard it. It may not seem such a long time ago to hon. Members opposite, but times have changed since then and somehow we must change our whole approach to these Middle Eastern countries.
I do not doubt that behind the attitude of hon. Members opposite there is an honest desire to see this country great

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and a great Power, but their conception of national greatness and national power is seriously out of date and dangerously so. World opinion is less and less inclined today to regard as great countries which have colonies or countries which threaten smaller Powers with armed force. Conceptions of national greatness are beginning to change. It is inevitable in a nuclear age, and when other countries have weapons of absolute destructiveness, military power may cease to be the criterion of national greatness altogether. Nations may come to be judged by other criteria.
If we want to recover our position in the Middle East it is no good yearning for our lost colonial power or trying to recover the privileged position which the British Navy once gave us in that area. We must adapt ourselves to the new situation in which we find ourselves. I am not certain that that is fully understood by hon. Members opposite, and that is why peace and the reputation of our country is safer in our hands than in theirs.
6.47 p.m.
Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: After having listened to the debate throughout yesterday, and having listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), I was going to say that the two sides of the House were divided by only a very narrow issue. I am not so sure of that, after having heard the speech of the hon. Member for Bristol. South-East (Mr. Benn). I think that there are some fundamental issues between us. The hon. Member says, for instance, that he was surprised that the Conservative Party objects to Nasser having dreams of empire. I should have thought that dreams of empire were the first things to disturb the peace of the world. The hon. Member also said that the Government had no case over the nationalisation of the Canal
I shall devote myself first to the very narrow issue which divides the majority of the House. Hon. Members opposite want us to go to the United Nations immediately and place this matter on its lap and await the result in due course, however protracted and however ineffective the gaining of that result might be. We on this side of the House hold that there are many other courses open to us,
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and we are going to make all kinds of efforts to secure results. We visualise, for instance, economic efforts.
If I have a dispute with my neighbour I do not have to rush to court immediately to try to get a settlement. I can try negotiation, discussion and inquiry, and that is still our position. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter is being invoked, and we are first attempting negotiation. We have informed the Security Council of the dispute, and under Article 34 the Security Council may
"investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."
So it is up to the Security Council, if it wishes, to take cognisance of the dispute that is going on.
So far, I am convinced that all the steps which the Government have taken have been approved by the majority of the people of this country. But are we satisfied that we are all agreed on the fundamentals? In all the debates and propaganda all over the world we have to keep quite clearly in mind that Colonel Nasser and Egypt have broken a Concession and an Agreement which has another twelve years to run, and Britain is not going to be fobbed off merely with a claim for compensation. We want specific performance of the agreement that an international company shall run the Canal. As the largest shareholder, with 44 per cent. of the shares, and the largest user of the Canal, we have the biggest responsibility and the greatest rights in this issue. It should not be overlooked that in the case of our own domestic nationalisation the shareholders and users had the right to vote at the General Election, whereas in this case no such opportunity has been presented to us.
Now I shall refer briefly to the history of the building of the Canal. That is of great interest because its construction was due entirely to the fiery genius, the unquenchable will and idealism of Ferdinand de Lesseps, who, of course, had a large staff of French technicians and European contractors to help him. During a large part of the 15 years which followed he had the support of Mohammed Said, the Viceroy of Egypt, as I am the first to admit, but his real

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supporters through all the rebuffs and intrigues and negotiations which were encountered during the period of construction were the business and commercial classes of Britain, France and the other European countries.
Those are the people who are most concerned to ensure that nothing will be done to add 4,000 miles to the journey from the Persian Gulf and India to this country or to Western Europe. Such a journey would add to the cost of the oil, the tea, the rubber, the jute and all the other materials which we bring from the Middle and Far East. Such a journey would mean that ships could make only two-thirds of their annual round trips, and freight charges might have to be doubled or trebled, with corresponding additions to the cost of living.
After hearing the debate yesterday I made inquiries, from which I found that the transport element in the cost of bringing a gallon of crude oil to this country is about 3d. That might easily be doubled or even trebled. When that is related to the cost of crude oil, which is between 8d. and 1s., it will be realised that about 50 per cent. would be added to the landed cost of the oil.
Mr. R. R. Stokes: May I interrupt on that point, because the figures given by the hon. Gentleman conflict completely with mine, and I have just checked with one of the oil companies. They have confirmed what I said in a letter to the Manchester Guardian last week, that the cost of bringing a gallon of oil round the Cape, as compared with through the Canal, is of the order of ¾d. extra.
Mr. Gresham Cooke: There are, of course, other considerations, such as whether fresh bunkering would be necessary, and whether freight rates would rise steeply owing to the demand for tankers, and so on.
Mr. Stokes: They might come down.
Mr. Gresham Cooke: I am advised that the cost might be 3d., 4d. or even 6d. At all events it is vital to our cost of living.
Reverting for a moment to the propaganda of Colonel Nasser and the Egyptians over the building of the Canal, the point has been made that the Canal was built by slave labour, with a
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great many Egyptian deaths. It is interesting to know that de Lesseps gave his workers one-third more wages than were usually paid in Egypt. In addition, he gave them food and accommodation, medical and welfare services, which were introduced for the first time, even including Europe. Of course the corvée, the call-up as it were, of men for the building of the Canal was not in the form of slavery but was a national institution rather similar to the call-up we have today. The latter part of the Canal was built with free labour and high wages, and labour rushed in from all countries to help in its completion.
Much was said last night, and has been said again today, about Hitler marching into the Rhineland. I took the opportunity last night of looking up what the Socialist Party said when the Rhineland was entered. Two days afterwards, in a debate on 9th March, 1936, Mr. Attlee introduced a Motion which was a mass of verbiage, criticising everybody, calling on everyone in general to do nothing in particular except, of course, stating that he was opposed to rearmament. Yet in all books, such as "Guilty Men" and "Your M.P.", about which we have heard so much, it is always the Tories who are criticised for appeasement, giving the impression that Labour would have stood firm and would have dealt with the situation at once.
In case there are any budding Michael Foots on the other side of the House who may try to prove in five years' time that if Labour had been in power Nasser would have been stopped once and for all, I place on record that every speaker in this debate from the other side of the House has merely asked that we should refer the matter to the United Nations organisation. This, of course, is the attitude taken by the Trades Union Congress. For instance, in comparing the present situation with 1939, Mr. Geddes said, a few days ago :
"The finger is on the trigger … We must tell the Government that if they take this country into an unnecessary war the nation will be roused to a deep, implacable bitter anger such as has never been seen before."
He went on to talk about putting the matter before the bar of the world.
So there are no bold words there about stopping Nasser. Yet there may be, and there is indeed every risk of there being,

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serious incidents in the future. Dr. Mustafa Hifnawi, who is now on the board of the new nationalised Egyptian company, stated in a book about the Canal which he wrote a few years ago, that once Egypt has the Canal,
"It will not be easy for any country to offend Egypt, for she will own and will have control of the keys to the gateway between East and West, and she will know how to use the gateway by opening and closing it in time of peace and in time of war."
What if Nasser blocks the Canal, or commits any other kind of aggression? I would remind hon. Members that at the time of the aggression in Korea the Security Council was informed of the active aggression of North Korea on 25th June. On that day it called on North Korea to halt. It learned the next day that North Korea had not halted, and two days later, on 27th June, it authorised military action, which had actually been anticipated slightly by the United States. [An HON. MEMBER : "Slightly?"] By a few hours. If the worst comes to the worst, that is the kind of action which we shall call for from the Security Council at the appropriate time. If the Security Council does not act in that way then we shall have to think again, and no doubt that is where the question arises as to what action we should take in such an emergency. So much for the future. Let us hope that it will never be necessary. In the meantime—
Mr. Paget: Will the hon. Gentleman permit me to ask one question? On two occasions the Prime Minister has said very clearly that we shall never tolerate a single Power having control of the Canal. It is true that we are trying to negotiate. Are we going to make those words good by force of arms, or are we not? It is not a question of a future blocking, it is a question of who is controlling the Canal.
Mr. Gresham Cooke: What we are trying to do at present is to get settlement by negotiation. That is all that has been agreed.
Mr. Paget: We want to know the method.
Mr. Gresham Cooke: There may be other ways of bringing Nasser to his senses—by economic sanctions or the blocking of Egypt's sterling balances,
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which would be a serious blow to her. Nasser is already in difficulties and has had to restrict imports. He uses sterling to buy raw materials. There may be other possible lines of action which we can take within the next few months.
If Egypt is arbitrarily going to break treaties, she must remember that she is very dependent upon a number of treaties, such as the Nile Water Agreement. In any international anarchy in the way of treaty-breaking, Egypt would be the first to suffer. Apart from the question of the construction of the Aswan High Dam, Egypt is dependent upon the good will of the Sudan and a number of other countries for her water supplies.
When it was built, the Suez Canal was idealised by millions as giving rise to hope for future peace and prosperity. Perhaps out of this dispute will come a permanent internationalisation of the Canal. In the meantime, it is our clear duty to pursue the aim—there are many methods of achieving it—of keeping the Canal clear for the commerce of the world. In that aim we have the support not only of the whole of this country but 99 per cent. of the world.
7.1 p.m.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: If I do not follow the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) in all the interesting points which he has developed, I hope he will not regard it as any lack of courtesy towards him or lack of interest in his arguments. The reason is that when so many hon. Members are endeavouring to make a contribution to the debate, it would be a mistake to take up time in mere argumentation between one hon. Member and another. I will, however, make two very short comments on his speech. I do not expect him to agree with them, but I hope he will refrain from defending himself against me in the interests of the time of other hon. Members.
First, the hon. Member seems to have a very strange idea about what is meant by "negotiation". He was challenged by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) to say whether he thought the Government ought to be in favour of using force, and he replied, "We are not at that stage yet. We are still negotiating. We can apply economic sanctions. We can do

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something about sterling balances". It is clear that what he was intending to convey was that in his mind "negotiation" means first making up one's mind about the minimum that one will take, declaring to all and sundry that one is not prepared to compromise, and then using any kind of pressure short of actual war to make the man with whom one is in dispute agree with one. If that is what one means by "negotiation", one is entitled to pursue one's negotiation if one thinks it useful to do so, but one must not be surprised if the man on the other side takes one at one's word and negotiates in that way too.
My other comment is about what the hon. Gentleman estimated to be the extra cost of oil, on which, I fully agree, all our industry depends, if we were to by-pass the Canal and avoid the risk of any stoppage and of any war by taking the ships another way. Quite apart from politics, on a matter of that kind, if the hon. Member says one thing and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) says another, I should on the whole prefer the opinion of my right hon. Friend. Even if my right hon. Friend is wrong and the hon. Gentleman is right, I most earnestly invite the hon. Gentleman to consider whether even the extra cost at his estimate would not in the end be much cheaper not merely for this country but for the world than any other course which might land us in further adventure.
Our partner in the new adventure, the United States, has just declared that it will be no party at all to forcing any ships through the Suez Canal under this or any other plan. The United States will take the alternative method, with all its cost, and it has said that if any of the smaller and poorer nations which require the oil are not able or prepared to pay the increased cost, the U.S.A. will provide them with the extra dollars to enable them to do so.
Mr. Stokes: Perhaps I might interrupt my hon. Friend in support of what he is saying. Is he aware that there need be no extra charge on the Persian Gulf oil? The oil companies make £3 10s. per ton clear profit, while the estimated increase is equal to about £1 per ton.
Mr. Silverman: I am perfectly prepared to accept the view of my right hon.
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Friend, as I was his estimate of the extra cost. All I am saying is that if my right hon. Friend turned out to be mistaken and the hon. Gentleman opposite to be right, the extra cost would—for once in a way I agree with Mr. Dulles—be amply justified.
Mr. Osborne: The offer of the United States is very generous.
Mr. Silverman: I am sure it is generous, although the United States is not always so wise. On this occasion, I think the United States is both wise and generous.
Mr. Stokes: The United States can take it out of the oil companies.
Mr. Silverman: I am being led further than I wished about this.
In the end, the issue which the House has to decide tonight does not depend on any technical interpretation of law or of the United Nations Charter. Let us assume, as I think we may fairly do, that there is here a legitimate dispute about an important matter between this country and Egypt. The question that we have to consider is whether the Government, in the conditions of the mid-twentieth century, are taking the right course in dealing with the dispute.
I hope hon. Members will not think my argument too academic. This country is not inhabited in the main by pacifists; nor is Egypt, America or the Soviet Union. All these countries are inhabited by human beings with all the old prejudices, impulses, selfish desires and aims. When they are attacked, they still want to defend themselves. When their interests are, in their opinion, violated they want to take the law into their own hands and secure justice for themselves on the basis that there is no authority that can do it for them. When their vital interests are, in their opinion, affected, they are not always careful to consider where justice lies. They are inclined, as all of us are, to assume that justice lies with them and that it is for them to take the law into their own hands and secure their interests for themselves.
The world today is no different in any of these respects from what it has been at any time in its history, but there is something different. What is different is the revolutionary change which has

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taken place in the character of the weapons available to men and nations to defend themselves or their imagined interests. Anyone can say when a war may start, because he can start it himself. Anyone can say for what reason or in what circumstances he will set these weapons in motion. However, as was pointed out long ago, it is much easier to decide when one will start a war than when one can stop it.
I dare say that there are in some Government circles—I have been told there are—some ideas that this could be a quick operation, that all we should need to do would be to land a couple of divisions, occupy Alexandria one day and Cairo the next and everything would then be easy. The whole operation would be over in three or four days. I have heard that said before. I heard it said in August, 1914, when we were told that it was a simple operation and that it would all be over by Christmas. Sir, it is not over yet. We paid 20 million lives for that mistake in 1914 and another 30 million lives in the last war. Now, we are equipped with weapons whose free use would amount to the voluntary suicide of the human race.
What is the background against which we have to see the threat of force? What is the essential central problem of the twentieth century? It is not how to make men and nations pacifists, because we shall not do that, if we do it at all, for many generations. It is how, somehow or other, we can prevent their national passions, prejudices and emotions bringing down the whole world in irretrievable catastrophe. That is the problem.
How are we trying to do it? We are trying to induce men and nations, and especially nations, not to become pacifists, not to renounce the idea of force in any circumstances—we accept that that is beyond human attainability in any for-seeable time—but we are trying to substitute for the right of self-judgment in the use of force a reference to some third party, to substitute for the anarchy and chaos produced when every nation is entitled to use force for itself as and when it deems advisable the collective organisation of peace.
When a situation arises in which we feel most keenly that our rights have been unjustly attacked, that our future depends on justice being done, it surely becomes
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the most elementary duty of the Government in charge in those circumstances to make it absolutely crystal clear, plain beyond argument or equivocation, in what circumstances and for what purposes they will take the enormous risk of starting a chain of warlike operations the end of which no man could foresee.
The charge against the Government tonight, as was seen so very clearly and explained so very lucidly by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), is that they have done the one thing which no responsible statesman is entitled to do. They have left in doubt, uncertainty and ambiguity whether and in what circumstances they are prepared to use force to get their way.
Sir L. Heald: I have not said at any time that I condemned, or thought wrong, the action of the Government. It would not be fair to suggest that, and the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) is always fair in these matters. I do not want to interfere with his argument, but it would be quite wrong if I were to be represented as having made any such suggestion. In fact, I said I was convinced that the Government never had intended to take the action that was suggested, and I have not gone further than that. I am sure the hon. Gentleman would not want to put me in an unfair position in that way.
Mr. Silverman: The right hon. and learned Gentleman is perfectly right, and I apologise to him if I have seemed to read into his speech more than he actually said, but I hope that he, in order to protect himself from the embarrassment of my agreement with him, will not say anything to take anything away from the very excellent contribution which he made earlier. While he believes that the Government do not intend to use force otherwise than in accordance with his interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, the right hon. and learned Gentleman called upon the Government to make that clear.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman cannot call upon the Government to make that clear without entitling me to say that the right hon. and learned Gentleman himself is not satisfied that they have made it clear already. That is all I said. I said that the Government had left it

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in doubt. I do not say that the Government have said that they were going to embark on war. I agree that they have never said that.
My charge against the Government is quite different. I should prefer them to say that if that is what they mean, but my charge is exactly the same as that of the right hon. and learned Gentleman. It is that they have left it uncertain whether they intend to do so or not, and that is even worse than saying that they intend to use force.
Those who have lived through what the right hon. Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) has called "this terrible twentieth century" from early manhood till now, through two world wars, with all that they have meant to the world and to the fortunes of this country, will remember how frequently it was said, both at the time of the 1914 War and in the 1930s—"For Heaven's sake, make your position plain ; do not mislead the people." It has been said that if only we had in 1914 made it clear that if Belgium were invaded we should use force, Belgium would never have been invaded. I do not know whether that is true or not, but, obviously, there is a great argument for it; and the same applied to the middle of the 1930s.
It is equally true to say that we must not leave the world, or the people with whom we are in controversy, in doubt on the other side. If we mean to use force, then let us say so. If we do not mean to use force, then say that too. If we mean to use force in some circumstances and not in others, then we must define quite clearly when we will use it and when we will not. The worst thing to do is to leave everybody in doubt about what we will do until we find ourselves drifting from one position to another and in the end find ourselves engulfed in the final catastrophe.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: The hon. Gentleman is arguing in favour of an ultimatum to Egypt—that we should declare beforehand that, in certain eventualities, we shall resort to war. That is the policy he is in fact advocating.
Mr. Silverman: The noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke) must not anticipate. He probably thinks a lot faster than I do. I do not know whether that is so or not,
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but whether he thinks faster than I do or not, he certainly thinks faster than I can speak, and where my argument is leading me the noble Lord must leave to me to explain myself.
Mr. Geoffrey Wilson: The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), like myself, is a solicitor. Would he say that when instructed to arrive at a settlement, he would announce in advance that in no circumstances he would sue?
Mr. Silverman: The hon. Member for Truro (Mr. G. Wilson) is really not doing himself justice, or I am even more obscure in expression than I usually am. I am saying exactly the opposite. In any negotiations, if one wants to use force, and the hon. Gentleman has instanced the parallel of litigation, one must say in what circumstances one will use it and in what circumstances one will not. That is the point I am making. The whole gravemen of the case which my right hon. Friends are making against the Government is that they are taking the gravest and most unnecessary risks to the peace of the world, in circumstances in which if they cannot maintain the peace they cannot maintain organised society at all, by leaving in doubt in what circumstances and for what purposes they are prepared to use force.
That does not mean, as the noble Lord the Member for Dorset, South thought, that I think that we should present an ultimatum to Egypt and say that we will go to war if she does not accept it. I am saying what the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey said. I say that there are circumstances in which force can be justified. They are circumstances which were defined by the right hon. and learned Gentleman and which are summarised in the Amendment in the sentence which says that force shall not be used at all except under the authority of the United Nations.
That does not necessarily mean that one must always have a decision of the United Nations. I think that it is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which makes it perfectly clear that if there is an armed attack upon one, one can defend oneself without going to the United Nations or anyone else. It makes it perfectly clear also that that right is not merely the right of an individual nation, but a collective right, too.

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People talk about Korea. I shall not argue the merits and substance of the Korean war. Someone asked, supposing the Russians had delivered their veto, would we still have been entitled to act in the Korean war? Assuming that one was right in one's case against North Korea, one did not need the decision of the Security Council at all. Collective self-defence is well within the Charter, but no question of collective self-defence arises here.
This has nothing to do with whether what the Egyptians have done is a breach of the law. Who says that every breach of the law must be treated as an act of aggression and that all the forces of armed warfare available to the United Nations must be used in every case wherever any scintilla of some treaty or some obligation in international law has been broken? No one would be so senseless as to say so. I do not know whether Egypt in this matter has broken any law. I think that it is very difficult to say that she has.
One cannot commit an illegal act unless the act one commits is in breach of some known law. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Northampton pointed out in an intervention, certainly what was done is not in conflict with Egyptian law. If it is in conflict with international law, then the International Court has jurisdiction to deal with it. If it is said that the International Court has no jurisdiction to deal with it, that can be only because there is no breach of international law either.
Suppose there has been a breach of international law; we have an extremely easily arguable case against Nasser, not merely about the Canal. We should have had a stronger case against him if we had really interfered on the only occasion when there has been any breach of the right of free passage through the Canal. Let hon. Members not blame the weakness of the United Nations for that. The United Nations did everything it could. Without any veto at all it passed a unanimous Resolution of the Security Council and if that Resolution was not honoured, if ships are still not going through, it is not because the United Nations failed. It is because we failed.
We were in charge of the Canal. Only we could have done it. According to
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what the Government are now arguing, if there were any such interference without reference to the United Nations, the country whose rights were infringed would have the right to force its ships through. Was that the advice given to Israel at the time? Did we say to Israel, "You have the unanimous decision of the Security Council in your favour. Force your ships through "? No, we counselled them patience. We cannot conduct our foreign policy on the basis that if we want a military base anywhere, the most effective way to get it is to antagonise the local population as fast and as furiously as we can, and that if some tinpot Hitler is arising in the world, the best way to bring him down is to make him a national and international hero, and that if we want to defend international rights, we lie low and say nothing like Brer Rabbit while everybody else's rights are infringed and shout like blazes when we ourselves are hurt.
That is what the Government have been doing. I say to them in all sincerity that we can no longer swash-buckle our way in the leadership of the world. In this great adventure of the mid-twentieth century on which the future safety of mankind depends, this substitution of collective authority for individual anarchy, either this country takes the lead or ceases to command any authority of any kind in the councils of the world. That is the issue between the two sides of the House tonight. Are we to use the circumstances, grave as they are, to make more effective such tentative beginnings as we have of the machinery of international order, or are we to use them to set the whole world rattling back into barbarity and catastrophe?
7.27 p.m.
Mr. Gilbert Longden: We are debating in these two days a matter which vitally affects the safety, honour and welfare of this country. The tone of the debate today has been as different from the tone of the debate yesterday as the Opposition's case yesterday was from its case on 2nd August. The persuasive arguments of the right hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) and the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) gave me a clearer insight into the difference between the tone of the opposition set by its Front Bench yesterday from that set on 2nd

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August. It gave me more insight into it, but not sufficient.
On this side of the House we cannot help feeling—and in saying this I do not mean to be offensive—that some partisan reasons have been working in the Opposition for the differences in their tone. I believe that it is not possible for the Opposition to have raised such a mountain of misunderstanding in their own mind if they had really followed the course of events. Even the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), who always expresses himself so clearly, seems to have been deceiving himself in certain respects to which I shall shortly refer.
The difference between the two sides of the House is simply about means. What is the best means of arriving at the end which we all want, a just, peaceful and honourable settlement? I do not think, therefore, that it is very worthy of certain hon. Members opposite, as they did yesterday, but not, I think, today, because they disagree with the means which we on this side of the House think to be best, to accuse us of wanting war, to be "hell bent" on war.
If the right hon. Member for Easington were in his place, I should ask him whether he thought that hon. Members sincerely believed that. I do not believe that there is a single hon. Member opposite who sincerely believes that anybody on this side of the House wants war. I do not reciprocate. I am quite prepared to believe that the Leader of the Opposition and his hon. Friends want peace as much as we do. I am not talking about the very few to whom the enemies of this country are ipso facto friends. I am talking about the bulk of the Opposition. I believe that those hon Members want peace as much as we do. I do not think that they are doing the Government justice about the means they are striving to take. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne today, and the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) yesterday, seemed to excuse the inefficacy of the United Nations by saying that it was the fault of the nations themselves, but I cannot see the difference. The United Nations stands or falls by the nations which make it up.
Mr. S. Silverman: I do not excuse the inefficacy of the United Nations upon
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that or any other ground. I say that we are in the beginning of a great and necessary adventure, and that we have to take the risks of inefficacy at the beginning if we want it to become more efficient later on. It is no good saying, "This is inefficacious and, therefore, we will have nothing to do with it." That is how the League of Nations was killed.
Mr. Longden: We are not saying that we will have nothing to do with it. We have never said that we will have nothing to do with the United Nations. What killed the League of Nations was simply the fact that it never had the power to assert its will. There is no group in the whole wide world which is less entitled to blame the League of Nations for that than the party opposite.
As the burden of my speech this evening was going to be—and will still be; it will not be a long speech—the necessity for an international rule of law, supported by the necessary sanctions, I naturally associate myself with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) in what he has said this afternoon. It would certainly be impertinent of me to try to explain his argument to the House, but as I understood it—and he is in his place to correct me if I am wrong—it was no indictment of Her Majesty's Government in which he was indulging. He was appealing to us to support our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, and that is precisely what Her Majesty's Government have done so far.
There are two methods open to the members of the United Nations to settle their differences, and one is provided for in Article 33. It is under that Article that Her Majesty's Government have so far tried to settle this difference, and I think that it is perfectly fair and natural that they should have done so. In our experience this method is so much more likely to be effective than the method provided for by Article 37. If action taken under Article 33 fails, then there is Article 37. I was horrified to hear the hon. Member for Woolwich, East (Mr. Mayhew) say that it would be a "climb-down" on the part of this country if, having tried its best to achieve a settlement under Article 33, it felt it proper to make an approach under Article 37.
There are at least four aspects of this problem—moral, legal, political and

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economic. I want to deal mainly with the legal aspect because, far from it being academic or dry as dust, I regard it as being the most important aspect in the long run. Unless we are able somehow, and soon, to establish a rule of law among the nations similar to the one which obtains within all civilised nations, backed by adequate sanctions, we shall never be free from the recurring threat of war.
In this instance it appears, as usual, that international lawyers disagree, but can there really be any doubt that President Nasser has broken a law of some kind? At least Professor Goodhart and Lord McNair, as I understand from their letters to The Times, think that there is no doubt about it—and they are good enough authorities for me. I hope that the House will bear with me while I explain why I believe that there has been a breach of law. The Agreement of 22nd February, 1866, made between the Khedive of Egypt and the Suez Canal Company, was confirmed a month later by the Sultan of Turkey.
In that Agreement all the earlier concessions, decrees and agreements since 1854 were summarised, and a system was laid down whereby the Company should operate the Canal. This Agreement was expressly referred to in the Convention of 1888, by which the nine Powers agreed
"to establish a definite system, destined to guarantee, at all times, and for all Powers, the free use of the Canal, and thus to complete the system for its navigation,"
which was set up in the Concession of 1866.
Lord McNair, than whom there can be hardly any higher authority, in his letter to The Times of 10th September gives it as his view that the Convention thus linked the Company with this "definite system", and that the agreement of 1866 is an "integral part" of the Convention. We know that Article 15 of the Agreement of 1866 declares that, after ninety-nine years from the date of the Canal's opening, unless a new agreement had been reached between the Company and the Egypian Government, the Concession would expire. That means that, apart from any new agreement, the Concession cannot expire before 17th November, 1968.
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In the Treaty of 19th October, 1954, Great Britain and Egypt
"desiring to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship,"
—that sounds somewhat ironic now, but I supported that Treaty at the time because I genuinely believed, and still believe, in the sincerity of our intentions —expressed their determination "to uphold" the Convention of 1888, of which the Concession of 1866 formed an integral part, in Lord McNair's view.
Yet, on 26th July of this year, President Nasser who, far from having tried to make any new agreement with the Company, had, only a month before, expressed his complete confidence in it, declared it nationalised, thereby tearing up the Concession, which has still twelve years to run, and which he had himself endorsed only two years ago. If that is not a breach of international law, I do not know what is.
Mr. S. Silverman: Of course it is.
Mr. Longden: Let us suppose that it is. I develop my argument from there. One appreciates that a newly-independent State is jealous of its sovereignty, but every nation has to understand that sovereignty does not mean absolute power. If it does, then—according to Professor Brierly in "The Law of Nations"—
"sovereign States cannot at the same time be subject to law … and International Law is nothing but a delusion."
That is quoted by Professor Goodhart in his letter of 11th August to The Times. He also quotes, from Oppenheim's "International Law : Peace":
"Like independence, territorial supremacy does not give an unlimited liberty of action,"
and one example of a limitation is stated to be
"by treaties with other States."
Egypt had entered into treaties with other States, and President Nasser, after the usual habit of dictators, has unilaterally torn them up. Whether his motive is, as he has himself told us—for dictators are always very frank—to take a first step towards the establishment of an Arab empire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, no doubt with himself as the new Caliph, I do not know, but I do know that acts such as this breed like rabbits,

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and, unless prevented, lead inexorably to war.
Then there is the question of nationalisation. Professor Goodhart's view is that
"it is clear that such a step cannot be taken if there is a specific agreement prohibiting it."
But in the absence of such agreement he concedes that the problem is more difficult. Nevertheless, he adds :
"The argument that foreign property can be nationalised arbitrarily, because it is necessary to augment the national income, will, if accepted, destroy the good faith on which all international commercial relations must be based."
Of course it will.
That brings me to the question, which has already been raised in this debate, of aid for under-developed countries. We hear a good deal about that from hon. Members opposite, yet some of them are apparently prepared to condone an act which, if it succeeds, must surely deal a mortal blow to such financial aid. Who will invest in territories if it is believed that independence may produce a Government which will scrap treaties, default on their obligations, and perhaps liquidate any assets which they have given as security?
This is an example of a case where seizure of other people's property, even accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation, is not good enough, because Egypt wants full and sole control as well as ownership, though the two could be separated, as we see in our own nationalised industries. But Egypt could not control the Canal. She is technically and financially unable to do so.
Egypt is incapable even of its day-today administration—there are only 30 out of 200 pilots and about half the workmen and technicians who are Egyptian—and she is certainly incapable of the absolutely essential maintenance and development of the Suez Canal. Therefore, until we can find other means of transportation and bring it into use—which could not be for some years—we should suffer widespread unemployment and shortage at home. So much for the legal and economic aspects.
The political aspect was admirably stated by the Leader of the Opposition in his speech on 2nd August. Yet, in spite of that speech, in spite of the other speeches on that day, no sooner was the debate over than the air was rent with the clatter of chattering teeth. The New
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Statesman, and the Communists and crypto-Communists—not surprisingly— and the Manchester Guardian—more surprisingly—tumbled over each other—
Mr. Cyril Bence: And The Times this morning.
Mr. Longden: —in their panic to excuse Nasser and to cry, "My country … always wrong". They were like so many Kleinzacks, and the click-clack of their knocking knees could be heard all over the world, including, of course, in Cairo. If these craven voices really represent the British people today, which I deny—
Mr. Hunter: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Longden: May I complete my sentence? If these craven voices really represent the British people today, which I deny, all I can say is that we had better give up any pretence at attempting to be, a great Power.
Mr. Hunter: If a man wants to keep his fellow-countrymen out of war, you call him craven?
Mr. Longden: I call him craven in some cases.
I wish to turn for a moment to the moral aspect, because the right hon. Lady the Member for Warrington (Dr. Summerskill) wrote a letter to The Times about this. I wish to try to divine what motivates these people. She wrote in The Times of 10th August :
"This incident should have given us an opportunity to establish that morally we are second to none."
She adds that millions of "inarticulate but informed people" in Asia and Africa are watching us. It is a good thing that they are inarticulate, or they might make a rude noise in the direction of the right hon. Lady.
Dr. Edith Summerskill: I did not realise that the hon. Gentleman was referring to my clacking teeth and knocking knees—
Mr. Longden: I was not.
Dr. Summerskill: —but if he reads that letter I think he will agree that it reflects the views of his right hon. Friends; it reflects the views of Lord McNair; it reflects the views of hon. Members opposite who have spoken, and if my

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advice had been followed by the Government in August they would not find themselves in the embarrassing position in which they are tonight.
Mr. Longden: What I was trying to point out to the right hon. Lady is that I do not think that at that stage of the negotiations then going on under one of the Articles of the Charter of the United Nations it was very advisable to make plain to the world that under no circumstances should we do anything—because that is really what it boils down to. What I want to ask the right hon. Lady—
Dr. Summerskill: The hon. Gentleman should read the letter.
Mr. Longden: I have the letter here. I have read it several times. Is it really immoral to refuse to defend one's legitimate rights and interests? Is that wrong morally?
Dr. Summerskill: The hon. Gentleman asks me a question. In that letter—
Hon. Members: Order.
Dr. Summerskill: May I finish?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): The right hon. Lady must not intervene unless the hon. Member gives way.
Dr. Summerskill: He has done so.
The hon. Gentleman asks me a question. In that letter, if he will read it— and the more I think of that letter the mere right I realise I was at the time— I was saying that the whole matter should be referred to the United Nations. That is precisely what the Government have to do, and the United Nations would see to it that our legitimate rights are defended.
Mr. Longden: The right hon. Lady has very much more confidence in that than I have. I quite agree with her that if the procedure under Article 33 fails then we shall have to go, but I do not think it is right—
Dr. Summerskill: That is my advice.
Mr. Longden: I think the right hon. Lady was giving her advice out of time, and I think that the now justly famous leading article in The Times of 27th August was absolutely right. All this
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betokens the "flight from responsibility" which is the curse of our age—the urge to postpone the evil day and to shuffle off our duties on to other shoulders which, so far, have proved incapable of bearing them.
The point I wish to leave with the House is this : if we are to achieve freedom from the fear of war, we have to establish a rule of law among the nations. On that, I think that probably everyone in the House is agreed. But it is the next step about which I feel that some people are not agreed, because the rule of law is futile unless it is backed up by effective sanctions. And sanctions mean force. And force may mean war. If that can be done, if this could be done through the United Nations, of course so much the better. But we must be prepared to give it teeth and to do our fair share of the biting.
Mr. S. Silverman: At the end of his speech this afternoon the Foreign Secretary said that we will not compromise. That means that the matter is decided. Does the hon. Gentleman mean that unless we can persuade the United Nations to give us what we want the United Nations will have failed?
Mr. Longden: I think that unless we can persuade the United Nations to—
Mr. Silverman: Allow us to be judge in our own cause?
Mr. Longden: No, not be judge in our own cause. But the one thing which is vital to us and all the other users of the Suez Canal is that its management should not be left to a sole country, and that country Egypt. That is not only our view, it is the view of the vast majority of all the users of the Canal—
Mr. Silverman rose—
Mr. Osborne: No, not again. The hon. Member has made his speech.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman has said that that is the view of the vast majority of the users of the Canal. Why, then, is he afraid that the United Nations will come to the wrong decision?
Mr. Longden: I have never said I was afraid that the United Nations would come to the wrong decision. What everybody must anticipate somewhat fearfully —if I may be allowed to use that word—

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is that the Russian veto would be used at the Security Council, and that is why I think that Her Majesty's Government are right to try the other method first.
I warn hon. Members opposite that if we purchase peace by unconditional surrender now we shall make our difficulties a thousandfold worse for ourselves in the Middle East and shall probably find ourselves defending Israel against the Arab League before we are very much older. I therefore support my right hon. Friends in the actions they have so far taken which, I believe, were strictly in accordance with the Charter.
I should like to take the opportunity, although my right hon. and learned Friend is not in his place, of congratulating the Foreign Secretary on his speeches in the Conference which appear in Command Paper 9853. For years we have done our utmost to be friends with Egypt despite every indication of her hostility to us. I am glad that The Times published Nasser's speech of 26th July in full in its issue yesterday. Of course, months of preparation must have been necessary before he walked in like that. Now, in collaboration with as many of the user nations as we can muster, I think we should warn him categorically that, subject to the United Nations agreeing— I cannot think that if it ever gets there it would go against us—any interference by him with the Canal would be resisted by force. I shall continue to support Her Majesty's Government in anything they do to that end.
7.52 p.m.
Mr. Michael Stewart: By now what is the real issue dividing the two sides of the House is sufficiently clear. It is concerned with the circumstances in which military force might be used, or to put it quite plainly, the circumstances in which war might be waged. The Government, partly by what they have said and partly by what they have failed to say, have given us to understand—and given the world to understand—that there are circumstances in which, if they could not get the solution they want peaceably, they would wage war, even though that was in breach of this country's commitments under the Charter of the United Nations [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] There is no doubt about that; it was the inescapable inference from the television speech of the Prime Minister.
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Although we cannot hold the Government directly responsible for some inspired statements that have appeared in the Press, when very large and normally responsible sections of the Press are saying proudly that this is an ultimatum and that we will "go it alone", surely some responsibility rests on the Government of the day, if that is not their view, to make clear to the country that it is not their view. Far more serious is the fact that right down to yesterday and today the Government have been and are still giving us to understand that there are circumstances in which they would use force inconsistently with our obligations under the Charter. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] That has been brought out.
I trust that hon. Members who disagree with me will give careful attention to what I am now going to say. I know the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) cannot be present whilst all of us, one after another, refer to what he said, but I do not think that I am misrepresenting him in saying that he was sure that the Government were not going to use force except as provided for in the Charter. He was convinced that that was how the Government would behave, and he thought that our Amendment was unnecessary because he said he was sure that the Government would not use force, except in accordance with the terms of the Charter.
Do the Government agree with the right hon. and learned Member on that point? At the moment the right hon. and learned Member is in the position of an able and conscientious lawyer, trying to do his best for his client, who has decided that the best defence for the client is an alibi. He is urging the alibi as strongly as he can but, alas, cannot get the client to go into the witness box to give the necessary evidence in support of it. I am only speaking from the back benches but this surely is a matter on which the whole country must be clearly informed. We cannot be content with the mere repetition of prepared notes from the Tory propaganda office, such as we had from the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West (Mr. G. Longden), when faced with an issue of this kind.
Do the Government say what the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey said? Are they prepared to say that this

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country will not use force except in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations? They have not said that yet. The Foreign Secretary had an opportunity to say it during his speech, but did not take the opportunity, and I I do not believe that it will be taken. If it is taken, and if they now say, "We will not use force except in accordance with the terms of the Charter", they will say something different from what the Prime Minister said yesterday.
I know that the hon. Member for Hertfordshire, South-West is content to dismiss the half of the nation who support us as cowards with weak knees. It is a good thing he is not in charge of the affairs of the nation, for if he were and we were going to war he would realise what I expect more responsible people than he realise—that it is necessary to convince the nation as a whole and not just a few Tory propagandists on this point. Do the Government say, "We will not use force except in accordance with the terms of the Charter"? That is what we are waiting for them to say. It is a perfectly simple categorical question.
We all know now the circumstances in which the Charter justifies the use of force. The first is if there is explicit approval of the use of force by a judgment of the Security Council. Quite frankly, no one expects that situation will arise in this dispute in anything like the foreseeable future. Secondly, it would be justified as part of the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack on a State member of the United Nations.
Whatever one may say in condemnation of what Nasser has done, it is perfectly clear that he has not committed an armed attack on another State. I make no defence of what he has done. He has behaved in a crude, uncivilised manner, and without that decent respect for the opinions of mankind which civilised nations ought to show, but he has not committed an armed attack on a Member state. Therefore Article 51 of the Charter does not arise.
Sir L. Joynson-Hicks: The hon. Member has not dealt with the third point— he has dealt with the first two—the situation which would arise if the Security
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Council either failed to come to an agreement or decided that Nasser's action was not one with which it could deal.
Mr. Stewart: I am obliged to the hon. Member. I am coming to that, but I would point out that if that happens there is nothing in the Charter to justify using force then. We are still bound by out obligations in the earlier Articles not to use force except in the two specific circumstances I have mentioned. By their failure to reassure the nation on this vital point the Government have got themselves, and unfortunately the nation as well, into a position—let me put it quite plainly—in which they have either to face a severe humiliation or we shall be engaged in a dangerous and a wicked war. The Government have arrived at that appalling result after starting from a situation in which they had much in their favour.
I have mentioned my condemnation of Colonel Nasser's behaviour. If the Government had handled this issue aright we should have been able, by setting an example of civilised behaviour, to mobilise much opinion on our side in contrast to his behaviour. Secondly, the Government have been provided with everything for which it is reasonable to ask from an Opposition in a time of international crisis. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition approved the precautionary measures which they had taken. He further said that he did not rule out the use of force in all circumstances, but that it must be in conformity with our obligations under the Charter. That is what the Government were entitled to, and which they got in full measure, and they heard the statement on where the Opposition stood.
The various attempts which had been made by the Foreign Secretary and other hon. Members to suggest that there has been any inconsistency between what my right hon. Friend said then and the attitude which we are taking now have been as clumsy as they have been disingenuous. The Foreign Secretary, with great pomp, said he would demonstrate the inconsistency. He recited to us what we knew already—all the things which my right hon. Friend said in August. We all waited to hear what were the inconsistencies, and at that moment the Foreign Secretary switched to another branch of the argument. That has

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happened in the case of every hon. Member opposite who has tried to follow this line, which is apparently the party instruction to hon. Members opposite in dealing with this matter.
The Government have landed us in this position. May I return for a moment to the very critical question of our obligations under the United Nations? I have emphasised that if the Government take the view which we are urging them to take and which the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey, with I am afraid more charity than discretion believes they are taking, but which they are not themselves prepared to say they are taking— in other words, if the Government say, "We will not use force except in conformity with the Charter," then they have to face the situation indicated by the hon. Member for Chichester (Sir L. Joynson-Hicks).
Suppose this matter goes to the United Nations. Let us suppose that there is the worst possible result from our point of view and from the point of view of mankind—that the matter drags wearily along, with the use of the veto and other procedural difficulties, and that no clear judgment or recommendation comes out of the United Nations. That, we know perfectly well, might happen.
We are not entitled to assume that it is bound to happen, and I think it is a great pity that when the British Foreign Secretary speaks in the House of Commons the only part of his speech which has real life is a thoroughgoing sneer at the procedure of the United Nations. We are not entitled to assume that the worst result will occur, but in order to meet the anxieties of some hon. Members opposite, let us suppose that the matter drags on and that we can get no clear recommendation, advice or settlement, that in the meantime the operation of the Canal proceeds with periodic crises, that we live in a state of nerves and crisis such as that which occurred during the Berlin airlift, and that ultimately we have to accept a solution which is far nearer to the wishes of Colonel Nasser than to the wishes of the 18 nations. I know perfectly well that that is what may happen if we say that we stand by our obligations under the Charter not to use force except in accordance with the terms of the Charter. That is what may happen. I am putting the matter at its worst.
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I will not enter into the argument which is advanced as to exactly how many pennies that might add to the price of petrol. I sometimes think we must have taken leave of our senses if we start considering whether 1d., 2d., 3d. or 5d. a gallon on petrol is a sufficient justification for going to war.
To put it at its highest, if we cannot get a kind of solution which we feel— which I think most of the House feels— is just, this country may be put to very grave difficulties concerning its standard of life. Nobody will dispute that. The Government, if I understand them aright, go on from there to say, in effect, this : "We are entitled, in order to deliver ourselves from certain grave anxieties about our standard of life, to impose our will on a country possessing an important means of communication". They are saying, in effect, "The Suez Canal is so vital to our standard of life that if we cannot get an agreed settlement we are entitled to impose a settlement by force." If there is any sense at all in the Government's argument, that is, in effect, what they are saying.
I ask them to consider some of the repercussions to that. If the Suez Canal is vital to our standard of life because of the oil which comes through it, the oil itself is vital. Are we to go on and say, next, that we have the right to decide exactly how the oil is dealt with in its country of origin and to prescribe certain regulations as to how it shall be extracted, with the threat of force if they are not carried out? If we behave in that manner on the Suez Canal we invite every nation in the world which possesses some vital resources to feel that it may be in danger of having a solution by force imposed upon it.
Sir James Hutchison rose—
Mr. Stewart: I do not propose to give way, as other hon. Members wish to take part in the debate. I shall refer to the hon. Member for Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison) in a moment, and I will give way afterwards, if necessary.
He made an interesting comparison between the Suez Canal and the Nile. The Nile is as vital to Egypt as the Suez is to us—possibly, I should have thought, more vital. Would that justify Egypt in saying, "We are greatly concerned about

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what happens in the territories in the Upper Nile Valley and about what happens to the waters of the Nile. We shall therefore prescribe a plan as to what shall be dons in matters of irrigation and control of the waters and, in extremity, we shall impose it by force"? If Egypt had the power to do that, and if she accepted the logic which we have had from the Government Front Bench, she would have the moral right to do it.
Sir J. Hutchison: That is precisely what Egypt has been doing for many years—claiming the right to say what shall be done there.
Mr. Stewart: She has been claiming that right, and this country has been denying that she has that right.
Sir J. Hutchison: That is where the hon. Member is misinformed. He must study the subject. In 1929 there was an exchange of letters referring back to this point and, surprisingly, agreement by this country that Egypt had such right.
Mr. Stewart: The hon. Member is not correct. No one has ever conceded to Egypt the right to say, "We shall determine what is to be done about the water in the Upper Nile Valley, and if we cannot get our way we are entitled to impose a solution by force". Yet that is what this country is saying about the Suez Canal.
I invite hon. Members opposite to consider the kind of balance sheet which has to be struck in this matter. I have suggested what may happen at the worst if the United Nations produces a most unhappy and unsatisfactory result. If we say, "Because we want to avoid that we will use force outside the terms of the Charter"—that is to say, not in defence against armed attack on ourselves and our Allies and with no recommendation of the Security Council to justify our action—what is the position?
Suppose the Government carry their military preparations and thinking to the point of considering a landing in Egyptian territory. If we look merely at the practical and not yet at the moral significance of that, it is quite clear that they would be engaged on an extremely risky adventure, that they would be engaged on it against the will of at least half and possibly three-quarters, or more, of
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the people of this country, and that they would be engaged on it with more than half of the population of the Commonwealth opposed to what they were doing and with the rest of the population of the Commonwealth not having ventured to express any kind of positive approval of the course on which they are engaged. That is the situation in the Commonwealth at the moment.
Further, they would be engaged on it not knowing what other allies might come to our side or what other enemies might appear by Egypt's side in the course of the struggle. A disgraceful attempt was made—I am bound to say this—by both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary to suggest by implication, without using the actual words, that the United States was prepared to back this users' plan, if necessary using force. We now know that that is not so, and that this risky adventure would therefore be undertaken without, in the last analysis, the support or approval of the United States.
All that is dangerous enough, but I would add one other thing. Suppose all went well for the Government; suppose all the risks turned out on the right side, and they stood triumphantly astride the Canal, after a few weeks' campaign, with a prostrate Egypt, and able to make such arrangements for its future as they thought fit, the rest of the world having stood still while all those things happened, they might say that what they did was not dangerous, that it was successful.
There is, however, a graver argument against it than saying it was dangerous, and that is that it is wicked. To use force in the world at the present time, except in strict conformity with one's obligations under the Charter, is one of the most dreadfully wicked things that any nation or Government can do. It is always the duty of civilised men to try to act in accordance with such legal institutions as there are, but to defy them at a time in history when weapons of destruction are what they are today is the most evil thing that can be imagined.
If we won such a victory, in what sort of world should we live? It would be a world in which every nation would say to itself, "Egypt was battered down because she had not got some powerful ally who could get his blow in first". Every nation would be watching every

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other nation with a grim suspicion, and we should all know at the bottom of our hearts that, however long some nominal peace might last, all hope of really securing the rule of law in the world would have vanished, and the world would be inescapably on the way to destruction by atomic warfare.
In the acceptance of the rule of law, there are two things which a nation must observe. It must be prepared, even at the risk of loss of blood and treasure to itself, to back up a collective decision against an aggressor. I am proud that the Labour Party, when the test came in Korea, was prepared to take that course. But the other side of the medal is that when a nation is itself engaged in a dispute it does not commit aggression, however vexatious the process of law may appear to be. If we act outside the Charter on this matter, we make nonsense and a mockery of the sacrifices which this nation went through in the Korean campaign to try to establish the rule of law and open a door of hope for peace for mankind.
8.12 p.m.
Mr. A. E. Cooper: I rather suspect that we on the Government side of the House are the victims of one of the biggest political confidence tricks for many years. The Opposition, both through the voices of hon. Members and through the journals in the country which support them—notably the Daily Mirror and the Daily Herald—has fostered the campaign that we intend to go to war without first fulfilling our obligations under the United Nations Charter.
What real evidence is there to support this charge at all?—[HON. MEMBERS : "The Prime Minister's speech."] The most careful reading of both my right hon. Friend's speeches, the one in August and the one yesterday, and also his broadcast, will disclose no sentence whatsoever which could possibly bear that interpretation.—[HON. MEMBERS : "By other means."]—We are concerned with—[An HON. MEMBER : "Does the hon. Gentleman remember what was said by the hon. Member for Stafford and Stone (Mr. H. Fraser)?"] I am not concerned with what an individual backbencher from this side of the House might say, any more than the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of
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the Opposition is too bothered about what an individual backbencher from his own party may say. We are concerned with the actions of the Government. There is no action which has been taken or word said by Her Majesty's Government which could lead to the interpretation that we were going to war without fulfilling our obligations under the Charter.
Do hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite really suppose that more than 300 Members on this side of the House are not very conscious of the views of the people of this country? Are they really suggesting that every one of us on this side is prepared to throw overboard the solemn obligations to which we have subscribed over many years?
Mr. E. Fernyhough: The Tories did it before
Mr. Cooper: No. I heard the speech made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) this afternoon. I know he said what most of us on this side of the House would like to have had an opportunity of saying.
Mr. Wilfred Fienburgh: Except the Prime Minister.
Mr. Cooper: I have no doubt that in due time the Prime Minister, as head of the Government, will make such statements about Her Majesty's Government's policy as he may think fit. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite, particularly those who have in the past had some responsibility in government, must recognise that the Government must keep in their hands the timing of the making of announcements of policy.
It may be argued that they might have made a statement on this matter before. That is, at least, an arguable point, but what I am saying is that so far there has been no action taken and no word spoken by any Member of Her Majesty's Government which could create the impression either here or in any part of the world that this nation was going to war without first fulfilling its obligations under the United Nations Charter. That has to be said and repeated over and over again because, though I am sorry to have to say this in a matter of such grave national importance and urgency, there are hon. Gentlemen in Her Majesty's Opposition who are using this opportunity to smear

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the Conservative Party up and down the country.
May I compliment the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) on what I thought was one of the finest speeches I have heard him make since I have been a Member of this House? He certainly restored, so far as the Opposition was concerned, some sanity and coherence to their case which was sadly missing after the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens). I thought the right hon. Member for Easington presented his case very sensibly and properly.
This is a matter which ought to be above party politics. It is a matter on which we should try to get a united House, not only for our own satisfaction here at home but in order that we can give to the world an idea that in this matter at least we are standing together as a united country. I should like to say to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister that I hope sincerely that, either tonight or in the very near future, it will be possible for him to say words such as were indicated to him by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey. I would go so far as to say that if the Prime Minister is able to use such words tonight I have no doubt in my own mind that there will be no Division in this Chamber. I really think we should try to avoid a Division on this issue if at all possible.
Our nation depends for its livelihood on trade with foreign countries. Over the years we have built up the reputation that an Englishman's word is his bond. The enormous fund of good will which has been created by years of honest trading can be dissipated overnight by a wrong action taken at any time. We are at present discussing a very serious breach of international law. I would say to my right hon. Friend that we do not correct that breach if we ourselves are guilty of another breach.
I want to make one or two other comments about the proposed users' association. These, however, are matters of detail which it may not be possible to answer tonight. The creation of such an association seems to me to carry the germs of a good idea, something which, if there
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is co-operation and good will, could be worked out into something which could be for the benefit of us all.
It is, however, a voluntary body. It is not mandatory upon anybody to join. What happens if countries who are important users of the Canal but do not wish to join take their ships through the Red Sea and want them to pass through the Canal? To whom will they pay their dues? By whom will pilots be allocated?
Secondly, what is to be the position of the new association vis-à-vis the Egyptian Government in relation to the maintenance and development of the Canal? Is the users' association, perhaps by force, to put on Egyptian soil engineers and mechanics to maintain the Canal? Perhaps these are the points which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister had in mind yesterday when he said that there must be some form of co-operation with the Egyptian Government. I do not want hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite to sneer at the idea of a users' association. Somehow or other, and at some time, this question of the Suez Canal will be settled. This is a positive proposal which carries with it the germs for success.
The comments made yesterday by the Leader of the Opposition on these new proposals were unhelpful and dangerous to its success. If this proposal fails, the responsibility for its failure can be shared in large measure by the Leader of the Opposition.
Mr. Harold Davies: The hon. Member has accused my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition of making dangerous comments about the users' association. After the very careful questions which he has asked, and with which I agree, does the hon. Member not now realise that his own right hon. Friend, in telling the House that the U.S.A. would be a party to the proposal, misled not only the House of Commons but the whole world? I consider that to be a dastardly action at this dangerous juncture in history.
Mr. Cooper: My criticism of the Leader of the Opposition is that within a few moments of these proposals being made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, they were condemned out of hand. I am asking my questions tonight, some 36 hours after the original proposals were made. We have had time

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to think about them. We may have second thoughts about some of them, but at least we have had an opportunity of thinking about them.
I turn for a moment to the point just made by the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) concerning the Prime Minister's comments. Presumably, the hon. Member was referring to the comments by Mr. Dulles which appeared on the tape machine. I do not consider that they are inconsistent with what the Prime Minister has said. There have been two sets of statements from Washington. The first dealt simply with the situation which will arise if American ships are prevented by force from going through the Canal. Mr. Dulles said that in those circumstances the American Government would not shoot their way through the Canal. The second published statement, which was made at a Press conference, said quite clearly that the American Government wished to take part in the users' association, that arrangements were being worked out to get the plans working as soon as possible and that it was hoped that proposals would be available for discussion by next week. I see nothing which is inconsistent in those two things or which conflicts with anything which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said yesterday.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Has the hon. Member been told by the Government what the House has not been told : that is, what action will be taken by our Government with our ships if Egypt refuses to let us go through the Canal?
Mr. Cooper: Unfortunately, I am not in the confidence of the Government to that extent. I have no doubt that in due course, when the arrangements for the association are worked out, we shall know something about it. All I am asking hon. and right hon. Members opposite to do is not to condemn the idea until we know more about it.
Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We ought to have been told.
Mr. Cooper: We on this side would like to know much more about the details—of course we would. Undoubtedly, we shall know more in due progress of time.
What we have to do now is to try to close our ranks in this country and to
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let Colonel Nasser and all the would-be wrongdoers in other parts of the world realise that the lion's tail can be twisted just so far and that there are times when it is rather too much to expect us to be insulted beyond a certain point. If my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, who is at the moment occupying the Government Front Bench, can have any conversation with the Prime Minister before he winds up the debate tonight, I repeat that if the Prime Minister can utter the words which so many of us on this side of the House would like him to utter, I am sure that this emergency Session of Parliament will end on a united note, which can redound only to the benefit and credit of this country.
8.26 p.m.
Mr. Julian Snow: Quite a few speeches have been made from the opposite side of the House during this debate which, as I understood them, challenged our sincerity in the things that we have been expressing. I have not been a Member of the House very long—only about 11 years, which is considerably less than many hon. Members have been here—but it has always seemed to me to be a bad rule to doubt the sincerity of people with whom one disagrees. Listening to the two Front Bench speeches this afternoon and appreciating the atmosphere after those two speeches were made, it seemed to me that the mere idea that the dispute should be referred to the United Nations was the equivalent of supporting Nasser. That, of course, is quite wrong. It is an idea which has been bolstered up by editorials in the Beaverbrook Press, etc.
I make no apology for referring once more to the speech by the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), because it seemed to me that from that moment the Government were placed in a position very different from that which had been demonstrated when the debate began. The Government cannot afford to ignore a Member who has held high office in the Administration and who, in effect, says very diplomatically, "Look here, you people on the Front Bench, you have not got the country behind you. By and large, the country is solid behind first reference of the dispute to the United Nations."

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Subsequently, I felt almost sorry for the Government Front Bench when Mr. Dulles's statement was recorded on the tape machine tonight. It seemed to me that that statement has completely scuttled the whole case put by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. Rhetorically, several Members from the back benches opposite have said in their speeches, "Do any hon. Members on the Opposition side really think that there are Conservative Members who want a war?" I will answer then with great sincerity : Yes, I do. Not only because they have said so. One makes due allowance for the heat of the moment and for the sort of things which are said on political platforms in moments of excitement, but in a state of affairs like this we inevitably find in the Conservative Party elements which cannot realise the whole meaning of modern warfare and still think that this dispute can be localised, and limited to a short, sharp war to trample down Nasser.
Reference has been made to the fact that he is a dictator. I do not dispute that. He is a small dictator of a smallish country. I do not think he is at all comparable with Hitler. That is my opinion. However, just as Hitler was the product of the social and economic conditions which followed the First World War, so I believe that Colonel Nasser is logically and inevitably the sort of man to come forward in the social and economic conditions of Egypt.
People have underestimated the conditions in that country. Those of us who have worked in Egypt know the deplorable social state of affairs there, which has been sustained by Administration after Administration in this country when we had a say in matters there, bolstering up a corrupt pasha-dom and a system of land tenure which in this century could not possibly be justified on humane grounds. I think that Colonel Nasser, or somebody like him, almost inevitably had to come along to get rid of the parasitical appendages like Farouk—and Fuad was not even an Egyptian, but an Albanian tribal chief brought in by some sort of deal done after the First World War.
I do not think the Government have given a statesmanlike lead on the question of oil. Whether the Government's policy succeeds or not, they know perfectly well that the next step will be an
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Arab demand for economic freedom to dispose of their oil as they want to. I should have thought that in the present circumstances the Government would have taken time by the forelock and have presented a case which would somehow or another have met the inevitable demands of the Arab oil-bearing countries. Because it is going to come. It is going to come as those small nations develop their economic strength.
After all, let us face it, the wealth which is being earned in those Arab countries now is certainly not permeating amongst the ordinary people. Far too much wealth is concentrated in feudal hands. I should have thought that we could have done a great job in our traditional rôle of trying to improve the conditions in those countries if we had presented a case which would in the end have resulted in a more equitable distribution of that wealth.
Hon. Members on both sides of the House have referred to France and to the positioning of French troops in Cyprus, poised, presumably, to take action if necessary in the Suez area. As a lover of France—I make no apology for it—I am very sorry that this action was permitted by our Government or suggested by the French Government. I believe that the time will come when France will say, "We helped you over Suez and Cyprus. Now you must help us over Algeria."
Do not let us forget that Algeria— I am afraid some of my hon. Friends will not like this, but this is what I feel—is, strictly speaking, a domestic problem of France. It is not a colonial problem in the accepted sense because the minority, if one can call it a minority, of the "colons" in Algeria is 1¼ million strong, and they are not settlers as there are settlers, for instance, in Kenya, but people whose families have been there for generations and who are in fact Mediterranean people. I think it has been a gross error of policy to permit French troops to go to Cyprus because it is tantamount to saying, as the French will construe it, I fear, that if they help us we shall be under a moral obligation to help them in Algeria, and I do not think anybody in this House wants to be involved in Algeria.
The statement of Mr. Foster Dulles has produced a new state of affairs. I do not know where the Government think they

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have friends in the Commonwealth, for every single Dominion seems to me to be either cool or actively hostile towards what the Government are saying and doing.
Indeed, I sometimes wonder whether the Conservative Party and the present Government are not listening too much to the Beaverbrook Press. I heard an hon. Member say just now that the Beaverbrook Press does not represent Conservative Party opinion. I cannot believe that myself. The Beaverbrook Press for a long time now has been pleading the idea of a Commonwealth based on a white European element and it has suggested, chiefly because of its hostility to India, that the Commonwealth should not be multi-racial and that we should get rid of those Dominions which are not of European origin.
Be that as it may, certainly India and Ceylon are hostile to the Government's policy. So far as I can judge, Australia is hostile. Certainly it is very divided, just as we are here; and Australians are very far from satisfied about the attitude displayed towards them by this Administration, which has always prided itself on being a great supporter of the Imperial theme.
I was talking to an Australian and, not too seriously, I was suggesting that Australians might like to shoulder a small proportion of the cost of our Monarchy, because I thought that it would be a good thing to have a better sharing of the time of the Monarchy. This Australian, a man of no small calibre, said "Good heavens, are we not maintaining your economy? All our foodstuffs exported to the United Kingdom are at a price 20 per cent. less on average than the current world market price." This is under an Administration which has been in office just over six years and now, in the atmosphere of this critical situation, we find that Australia, a major user of the Suez Canal so far as goods are concerned, was not consulted but was informed.
Is it to be supposed that the other countries, the small people, will take their lead from this Government and not from what Mr. Foster Dulles has said tonight? In the United Kingdom itself at least half the population appears to me to be hostile to the idea of armed intervention without reference to the United Nations or without its authority.
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I made it my business in the last few days to go into the sort of places where one would expect to hear reactionary opinion. I looked in at a well-known hotel and had a whisky and listened to what the stockbrokers were saying. They do not like the Government, because they know that if the Government's policy of taking individual military action goes through they and the City of London will be the first to suffer. The Government can find no friends except among the paid party hacks of the Conservative Party. The handling of this problem right from the beginning was subject far too much to party considerations, and for a very good reason. I do not doubt the sincerity of the Government in acting in this way, but their political stock is low. They think that they are the best Government we could have, and there is nothing that rallies Conservative opinion so much as a little bit of judicious sabre rattling.
8.40 p.m.
Mr. Ronald Bell: The speech of the hon. Member for Lichfield and Tamworth (Mr. Snow) was, unfortunately, typical of many to which we have listened during this two-day debate. We have heard an acrimonious tone of debate from the other side of the House and, therefore, not unnaturally, also in answers from this side of the House.
The responsibility for that must lie not on anything that has happened in the last six weeks, since 2nd August, when the House heard a debate in a very different atmosphere, but on the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition yesterday, which set the keynote of the whole debate. It was a speech which I can only call embarrassing to our country, because I think it weakened the prospect of a peaceful settlement of this dispute, and embarrassing to everyone who listened to it because it showed the right hon Gentleman's abject capitulation to the Left-wing of his own party.
We all know what has happened since 2nd August. The very day after that debate the Tribune published a bitter attack on the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. It said that he had outdone the Tories. From that day on gradually one has seen the leadership of the party opposite shifting its position, trying still to maintain a tenuous

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contact with the attitude and the opinions which it had expressed on 2nd August, but always trying to shift further to the Left to catch up with its own militant wing. [An HON. MEMBER : "The right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey."] I thought the speech of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) a most important speech, whereas the speech of the Leader of the Opposition, which set the tone of this debate, was frankly unfortunate.
This is a very important matter, and, while I believe that there is a difference between the two sides of the House, I think that that difference has been exaggerated and misrepresented fairly consistently throughout this debate ; and it is not in the public interest that this should occur.
The fairest way of dealing with the point of view of the party opposite will be if I take the speech of its Leader yesterday as setting it out fairly, and I will accept the challenge made by one hon. Member and try to follow out the charge of inconsistency, making that the theme of what must be a short speech as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition wants to get up at five minutes to nine o'clock.
That speech consisted of two parts. The first was an attack on the Government for what hey had done during the past six weeks. That consisted primarily of a round-up of the Press, of reading Press extracts about what various newspapers, in bits of speculative writing, had suggested that the Government would do. On that I can only say that the right hon. Gentleman forgot that the only tied newspapers in this country are those of the Left-wing, the Daily Herald and the Daily Worker ; and that the papers which are commonly thought to support the Government—though their support is, naturally, variable—are free to say what they like. Indeed, it would be a very dangerous principle if it were the duty of the Government to disown every statement in a newspaper which they felt did not accurately represent the policy of the Government.
The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition then went on to the affirmative part of his speech, in which he reached the first inconsistency with
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what he had said on 2nd August. On 2nd August the right hon. Gentleman based himself on three points. I will come to his third point immediately, because he made it his main one. The right hon. Gentleman said, at columns 1620 and 1621 of HANSARD, that this was a part of the battle for the Middle East. He said that Nasser had raised this issue in a way meant to challenge the West frontally, and would say, "I have challenged them and won".
The right hon. Gentleman said this was a most important consideration, the importance of which should not be underestimated. He indicated that if something was not done about it the whole of the British position in the Middle East would deteriorate. He looked at the Government of Iraq and said that they might be replaced by one unfriendly to this country if Nasser were allowed to get away with his deliberate challenge to the West.
The right hon. Gentleman said something had to be done about it. What did he say had to be done about it? He said the first thing was to call the Conference of 18 nations and draw up a system of international control—not supervision or an advisory commission. The right hon. Gentleman's comparison of Nasser with Hitler and Mussolini has been referred to many times. Equally significant was what he said then and repeated yesterday, that he would not trust Nasser's word. On that the right hon. Gentleman has remained steady. He said that we had assurances from Nasser that he would respect the 1888 Convention, but he added that he did not suggest that we could trust his word on that. In fact, he said he knew that we could not. That is true, and both sides of the House agree about it.
If that is true, the situation begins to be clear. None of us wants war ; we all want some kind of negotiation. However, it is agreed on all sides of the House that the solution that we have to find is one where Nasser is tied by something more than his signature to a list of assurances. Nasser has broken enough treaties, and, as the right hon. Gentleman implied, another simple one of that kind is not much good to us.
We have to find a system of international control. Those are the words of

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the right hon. Gentleman, and I do not think he will want to go back on them. As the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) pointed out yesterday, we do not have complete security with a system like that. Unless we have large military forces on the Canal, we have not got absolute security. But we are not dealing in absolutes in this world. In this problem we have to get the best we can, something that is better than a mere assurance signed by a man whose word cannot be trusted. That is why the Government, with the express approval of the Opposition, selected the instrument of international control.
The negotiations have taken place, and they were not successful on that basis. What then? It has been suggested that the fundamental clash between the Government and the Opposition is the issue of the United Nations. I cannot agree with those broad terms. The Government have clearly been acting under Article 33 of the Charter. It has been pointed out already that it has not attracted much attention that Article 33 is not just one available alternative or optional clause but is a compulsory procedure. It reads :
"The parties to any dispute … which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements …"
I draw attention to these words :
"…or other peaceful means of their own choice."
The procedure adopted until now has been under that Article. The procedure now proposed is also under that Article. The Government have been- advised that the users' association is legal in international law, and so it is a peaceful attempt to resolve the dispute. [Interruption.] I have read the words, but as there is a certain amount of noise in the Chamber the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies) may not have heard them.
Negotiations is only the first word in a list of possible activities in Article 37, which concludes :
"and other peaceful means of their own choice."
If the words "of their own choice" are held to imply agreement, I can only say that the 18-Power conference was not based on Egyptian agreement at all. I do not believe that these words in any
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way imply that the attempt at a peaceful settlement should have had at its inception the consent of both parties. That would not make sense.
Her Majesty's Government are now proposing to continue under Article 33, and the Opposition Amendment attacks them for doing that. It says, "No. The matter should be referred immediately to the Security Council." ; that is, under Article 37. Why are the Government to abandon all further attempts under Article 33? We have not heard any good reason why they should. The Government are being pressed to announce in advance a particular date or juncture at which they will abandon attempts at settlement under Article 33 and switch over to Article 37.
Why should they? It may be an expedient thing to do, but I should have thought that it may well be against the national interests and the interests of peace to do so. If this users' association does not succeed, why should the way have been blocked by a formal declaration by Her Majesty's Government that they will not try any other method under Article 33 before referring the matter to the Security Council under Article 37. What is meant by that?
I prefer to leave that to the judgment of those who, on Britain's behalf, are continuing these negotiations. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] I am satisfied with the general assurance that the Government are acting in conformity with their duty under the Charter. What is their duty under the Charter? As I understand, it is that, after Article 33 is exhausted, they should act under Article 37, and here I come to what is perhaps the true difference between the two sides of the House. I do not know, but it is quite possible.
Suppose we have recourse to the Security Council, and that that recourse is frustrated by the veto of the Soviet Union. What then? The Leader of the Opposition gave his answer—an unexpected one to me—yesterday. The right hon. Gentleman said, "Well, if that happens, we shall have to build more tankers and send them round the Cape." [HON. MEMBERS : "Dulles said so."] The right hon. Gentleman said that if, as we are told by the Prime Minister, it would take a long time to build those tankers—and I think that a period of two or three

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years has been mentioned—the Canal is open in the meanwhile.
Is that the alternative policy which the right hon. Gentleman was describing—the policy of the alternative government? Is it the policy, if Russia blocks us with the veto in the Security Council, then we will go on using the Canal for two or three years, and then, when the tankers have been built, we will say, "You remember that dispute back in 1956? Now we are going to stop sending our tankers through the Canal, and we are going to send them all round by the Cape." Is anybody else ready to do that? [HON. MEMBERS : "Yes, Dulles."] Of course, the United States will send its tankers round the Cape immediately. The United States can do so, but Britain cannot.
Therefore, I say that the national interest in this matter is best served by doing everything in our power, by good will and ingenuity, to resolve the dispute under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. If we are driven to using Article 37 by the failure of our earlier attempts, and if, by misfortune, that should be blocked, then surely it would be legitimate for us to say, as the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) said yesterday — [HON. MEMBERS : "Time."] I shall not deprive the right hon. Member the Leader of the Opposition of his time ; I was told that he would not mind an extra few minutes.
The hon. and learned Member for Northampton said :
"I find this a little difficult. … If one says that force cannot be used except in pursuit of a decision of the United Nations, that is a general licence for lawlessness—the police are on strike, and, therefore, I must allow my house to be burned. That being the situation, surely Professor Goodhart is right; old international law stands, and people, in the absence of a real international authority, have to support their vital interests."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th September, 1956; Vol. 558, c. 120.]
I will certainly not stand between the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition and the House, but I hope that what he has to say tonight will be better than what he said yesterday.
8.57 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: This debate and the debate yesterday have abundantly justified the recall of Parliament. Whatever our views may be, I do
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not think that it will be denied that in some measure at least the debates have served to clarify the main issues in this matter and to indicate more precisely the differences between the parties and in the country. There is perhaps one exception to this, and that is the canal users' association.
On that matter I confess that I am still somewhat bewildered. During the course of the evening we have had Mr. Dulles's statement and I have been trying, in the short time available, to reconcile it with some of the things which the Prime Minister said yesterday. When I referred to this matter in the course of my speech yesterday I said that it was possible that this users' association would be valuable I said that
"if it were the purpose of the organisation to provide a bit of machinery for negotiating with Egypt, I should not object to it."
I said that there were
"good reasons for having an association of user nations to conduct negotiations."— [OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th September. 1956; Vol. 528, c. 25.]
I am glad to say that in some of his remarks Mr. Dulles interprets the association in that way. According to the report which I have before me, he said "such an association would act as agent for the users and exercise on their behalf the rights which are theirs under the Convention of 1888, and seek such cooperation with Egypt as would achieve the results designed to be guaranteed by that Convention." I do not think that there is anything wrong with that. He went on to mention some other things, to which we would not object, and said :
"It is normal for users to seek to work in association when rights which they possess jointly are in jeopardy. So we think it is wise that voluntary co-operation among users of the Canal should continue."
So far as it goes, that is satisfactory. But the truth of the matter is that there seem to be involved in this proposal two very different ideas. In part, at any rate, of what Mr. Dulles says, and to some extent in what the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Sir R. Boothby) said last night, it seems to be envisaged that this users' association is a kind of alternative to the 18-Power proposals— an alternative about which negotiations are to take place with Egypt. Presumably, if that is the right interpretation, the idea would be that we should

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say to the Egyptians, "Here is another plan. You do not like the 18-Power plan ; here is an alternative. The alternative is that we, the users of the Canal, should employ pilots and you, the owner of the Canal, should look after its maintenance. We will work together, and there will be an arrangement about how much you get and how much we get of the dues," and so on.
If that is the correct interpretation, I would make these comments. First, it seems to me, technically, an extraordinarily difficult plan to operate unless there is universal membership among the users. If there were not such universal membership one could conceive of a very great deal of muddle and confusion arising. Secondly, it is perfectly clear that it could not possibly work unless it were agreed by Egypt, and full cooperation were conceded. If that were not the case, the dangers to the convoys and the danger of ships actually sinking in the Canal, through collision, would be very serious.
Indeed, it is inconceivable that without that co-operation the ships would get through at all. I understand that signals have to be operated and, quite apart from that, presumably the pilots will have to be lodged somewhere; there will have to be an office somewhere, and, as I say, without agreement with Egypt it seems to be a rather impossible conception.
But if that is the idea; if the Government's intention is genuinely to seek the agreement of Egypt, I would ask the Prime Minister to tell us tonight exactly how he envisages those negotiations being conducted. Reference has been made to Article 33, and the desire of the Government to continue to work under that. Is there to be, then, as it were, a repetition of the last four weeks? Are we to have, first, the conference of the 18 Powers, and perhaps some other Powers as well, working on the details of the matter? Is the conference then to send another mission, under Mr. Menzies or somebody else, to talk to President Nasser in Cairo? Finally, if this is the case, why are the Government so determined that these negotiations should be conducted in this manner—a manner which did not succeed on the previous occasion?
If this is the intention—and I am giving the Government the benefit of the
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doubt, for the moment—would it not really be better to go to the United Nations and put forward this proposal there, and conduct the negotiations at once under its aegis? I do not know exactly what relationship the new association is supposed to have to the United Nations, but that is something which could be more easily dealt with if the negotiations were conducted in that way.
I must also ask one other question. Do the Government really feel that this plan is superior to the 18-Power proposal? If they think it is, do they also think that it is more likely to be accepted by President Nasser? Does it in fact cover the aims set out in the 18-Power proposal, which are agreed everywhere as our aims, and accepted also by Colonel Nasser; our concern, as users, with charges ; with the development and maintenance of the Canal, and with free passage and no discrimination?
I can see some connection between the aim of free passage and this plan, but it does not seem to have any special relationship to the other aims which we must have in mind. It leaves the development of the Canal entirely, so far as I can see, to Egypt, which therefore does not, I should have thought, meet the requirements of the Conference in London. Perhaps the Prime Minister can help me and help us by telling us a little more about that.
But while that is one idea, there is also a totally different one implied in this plan, and certainly this totally different one was the impression which the Prime Minister gave us yesterday afternoon. He said— he implied at any rate, if I may say so to him—that it was the intention of those putting forward this plan to go ahead at once without Egypt; without, necessarily, negotiations; without any agreement; and that if Egypt refused to co-operate, if Egypt refused to allow the pilots on the ships coming through to go through the Canal, if Egypt would not accept the plan that the dues would be paid to the association, then, so we learned from the Prime Minister, that would really be a challenge.
Egypt, he said, would be in breach of the 1888 Convention, and there is no doubt at all that he gave the impression —not only to hon. Members on this side of the House but, I think, to many hon. Members on the other side—that that

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would be, first, a better justification for taking the matter to the United Nations —if it were so taken—and, secondly, a justification for the use of force. That is the impression which he created, and hon. Members cannot deny it.
This evening we heard that Mr. Dulles has said that "the United States does not intend to shoot its way through the Suez Canal if Egypt tries to block the passage of United States ships travelling under the auspices of the proposed new users' association." He said that instead it has already been decided to take the United States tankers cut of "mothballs"—the reserve fleet—and divert the oil and other traffic round the Continent of Africa, if anything should happen to deny passage of the Canal. That seems to me to suggest that the name of the association should be changed to the "Cape users' association."
I must ask the Prime Minister to tell us tonight whether he will say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that they, too, have no intention of shooting their way through the Suez Canal. The country and the world will be waiting for his answer to that.
Mr. Dulles has said that the United States will send its ships round the Cape. Personally, I think that that is a very sensible proposal—I even suggested it myself yesterday. He also said that the cost would not be economically catastrophic. He is perfectly right, it would not be. The hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, East challenged my figure on the addition to the cost of oil. I said 1d. a gallon. I have made further inquiries and I wish to correct that. The latest information I have is that it is 1½d. a gallon. I do not think that that is economically catastrophic. Indeed, if I may remind hon. Members who have seen it, the Financial Times this morning gives a break-down of the cost of petrol, and the total cost of ocean transportation is 2¾d. a gallon.
Mr. Dulles said something else at his Press conference. He said that the Suez problem, he believes, is "solvable if it is reduced to the question of practical details and taken out of the realm of national pride and emotions." Those are very wise words and I commend them to the Prime Minister. [HON. MEMBERS : "They apply to Egypt."] Certainly, of course they apply to Egypt, but they
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apply to us as well and we happen tonight to be particularly concerned with what Her Majesty's Government are going to do.
I wish to revert to the main issues of the debate. Many have said—I said so myself yesterday and a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House have agreed—that the issue in this debate is not whether we think Colonel Nasser a good or a bad man, or whether we think what he did in nationalising the Canal was or was not justified. If there be any doubts about that, a reading of the Government's Motion and our Amendment to it should make it plain that that is not the issue. The Foreign Secretary, in the opening of his speech today, referred to my speech on 2nd August and chided me for not having repeated what I said on that occasion. If I may say so, I think he was not entirely fair to me. I began my speech by saying that I stood by everything I said on that occasion. I did in fact draw out exactly the same reasons for our objections to Colonel Nasser's action as the Foreign Secretary did in this afternoon's speech.
If it is of any interest to hon. Members I will repeat it. I stand by what I said on that occasion about the implications and the nature of that action of Colonel Nasser. I want to make it perfectly plain that we on this side of the House fully realise that Colonel Nasser can be very dangerous, that we understand there are threats involved in this but so far they are threats only.
I think there are two particular aspects of what Colonel Nasser has done to which we have to pay attention. There is, first, the more obvious one, the threat —it is only a threat, but it is a threat— to the users of the Canal lest they might not be able to exercise the rights to which they are entitled. Our Amendment, of course, covers that point completely. I do not think I need go over the rights; I have already mentioned them this afternoon and there is no dispute about that.
But I want to ask the Government if they have come to the conclusion that negotiation on this matter is impossible? If they believe it to be possible, are they prepared to negotiate? I am not talking specifically about the users' association ; I am talking about the whole position of the users of the Canal and

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the aims which were specifically laid down in the 18-Power proposal. If they are prepared to negotiate, will they negotiate under the United Nations?
There is, however, a second aspect to this action of Colonel Nasser. Perhaps the real difficulty here is the fear expressed by several hon. Members on the benches opposite that we cannot afford to allow President Nasser to "get away with this." I do not think anybody has defined precisely what they mean by that phrase, but I do not propose to question it. Let us accept that it means in some way or other that the disturbance to conceptions of international contract and the like which were involved in President Nasser's action, and perhaps the threat to the Middle East to which I referred on 2nd August, must somehow or other be avoided and we must not allow the man who has done that to get away with it, as it were, without any reaction—without any difficulty whatever.
I do not disagree that there is force in that argument. I think that this, together with the comparison made by hon. Members with the pre-war situation in Germany, is really the reason why they take a different view from us on the use of force.
I understand this attitude of hon. Members, or rather the emotions which they feel about the pre-war situation, but I want to say straight away that in my view a strict comparison with our relations with Hitler Germany before the war does not apply. It is perfectly true, as the Prime Minister said, that in my speech I said that the words which Colonel Nasser used reminded us of Hitler. They do. That is quite true. But it does not mean that the whole situation is by any means the same.
I want to give the Prime Minister, if I may, three reasons for which I think there is a difference. First of all, there is not the slightest doubt that what we were objecting to in the case of Germany was the use of armed force against frontiers or going into territories into which she was not entitled to go, starting with the Rhineland and going on with Czechoslovakia and Austria. Secondly, in the case of Germany we were, after all, dealing with a nation which I think most of us regarded as certainly the strongest
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military power in Europe, if not in the world. Of course, we cannot say the same of Egypt. I have already said, I agree, that there are dangers to us, but let us keep a sense of proportion in this.
The third point of difference which I want to make is that at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland and the later events which we remember all too well, the League of Nations was already largely moribund. It became moribund when it failed to enforce effective sanctions against Mussolini on the invasion of Abyssinia. I must add, in all fairness, that the League of Nations, not having the United States or Russia as members, or in fact Germany, was not in the same position as is the United Nations today I may be optimistic but I believe that the United Nations is still far from moribund.
On the wider issues of Colonel Nasser and letting him get away with it, I think we must ask ourselves what it is precisely that we are frightened about. What do we think he is going to do? I will give at any rate one answer to that, and I have given it many times in the past. There is a danger—of course there is—that at some time he will launch a war against Israel. We cannot deny that. But what is the right answer? If that is what the Government fear, surely they should do what we have again and again pressed them to do—allow Israel to purchase arms.
Mr. Julian Amery rose—
Mr. Gaitskell: I hope the hon. Member will forgive me if I do not give way, but I have little time. He knows my views on this ; goodness knows, I have expressed them often enough.
If that is the anxiety of hon. Members —and I know it is and I think I understand it—I must ask them this question : do they believe that the use of armed force and going to war with Egypt will also solve this problem? That it may lead, that it probably would lead, to the fall of Colonel Nasser is no doubt true, but as my right hon. Friend said this afternoon, it cannot possibly be regarded as solving the problem of the Middle East as a whole. On the contrary, there is no doubt that if, in defiance of the Charter and with public opinion against us, we were to take this action, we should be

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creating for the future an even worse position than we have today.
There is one other danger which we must not overlook. We talk about the anxieties which we have that Colonel Nasser will gain a prestige victory. Let us be careful that by our actions we do not give him an even greater prestige victory.
Finally, is there not another way out even to meet hon. Members who feel that we have to do something to prevent Colonel Nasser from getting away with it? I venture to say that there is another way out. I venture to say that we should not suppose that negotiation will fail to stop Colonel Nasser. On the contrary, I think there is a possibility of successful negotiation which may even now—though, goodness knows, it is rather late—involve some loss of face by ourselves and the West but also some loss of face by Colonel Nasser as well. There have been times during the last four weeks when world opinion was undoubtedly moving in favour of the users of the Canal. I think the London Conference did a lot to help that. If we can get world opinion more on our side, Colonel Nasser himself is not in a position to ignore it.
Secondly, if I am asked again what will I do if Colonel Nasser refuses to negotiate, if he is obdurate and unwilling to listen to any plans, I say that I believe that the line taken by Mr. Menzies in his letter to Colonel Nasser and the line adopted by Mr. Dulles today—that we should then use the alternative route round the Cape and should develop additional pipelines— will have a salutary economic effect upon Colonel Nasser.
The Foreign Secretary complained that the United Nations was a place where action was too slow, and that if we took the dispute there, there would be weeks and weeks before anything was done. What is wrong with weeks and weeks elapsing without war? The implication of the right hon. and learned Gentleman's statement was, of course, that we were losing ground all the time as the weeks went by. I do not believe that for one moment. There is indeed only one explanation of that point of view. We are losing ground if it is the Government's view that we ought to go to war and they want to keep the temperature up; but if they take the view that we want a peaceful settlement, why should they not
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take the view, as I do, that time is on our side and that as Colonel Nasser comes to realise the foolishness of his point of view, to which the Prime Minister himself referred yesterday, his prestige may indeed suffer far more seriously as a result than it would from any threats of force by us?
But this means something else; it means that we must then behave in a way which wins the support of world opinion over to us. It is precisely to this end that the last part of our Amendment is directed. First, we say that the dispute should be referred to the United Nations for action now. That would dispel doubts which have been sown about the Government's attitude to the United Nations. Secondly, it would get us in first. Let us be sure that we get in as a plaintiff and not as a defendant. In the third place, I believe our case is a good one, and I believe the Government think the same. Do not let them prejudice it in any way by unnecessary actions.
The next thing we must do, and we ask for it in our Amendment, is this. The Government should refrain from any form of provocative action. There is one simple thing which can be done tonight. I have already mentioned it. The Prime Minister can say that, as far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, they will not try to shoot their way through the Canal. That would be a help. There are a good many other things which could be done as well, but that is the immediate danger of the situation, and I ask the Prime Minister to remove any misapprehensions, if they are misapprehensions, in the House and in the country by making that perfectly plain.
The third thing we ask for is a declaration that force will be used only in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. I ask the Government in fact to disavow the stories which have appeared in the Press quite frequently in the last few weeks that they intend to impose a solution by force.
During the course of this debate, we listened to a very remarkable speech by the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald). I do not think that the Prime Minister heard the speech but I hope that he has been told what it contained. I ask him to endorse what the right hon. and learned Gentleman said. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that, as far

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as he was concerned, he would not support force outside our obligations under the Charter. That is all we are asking.
In another place yesterday, Lord McNair, the President of the International Court, made an immensely impressive speech. Under the Rules of Order I cannot quote from it, but I must say that the criticism from this eminent lawyer of what the Government have done so far, his description of the change of the law in relation to force over the last 50 years, his analysis of the Charter and his conclusion that there was no justification as far as he could see for the threat or the use of force to impose a solution, seems to me to be something that the Government cannot possibly ignore.
Therefore, I now beg the Prime Minister to seize his chance, to say that he will ask the United Nations for action and to give us an assurance that he too, like Mr. Dulles, has no intention that we should shoot our way through the Canal. Above all, I ask the Prime Minister to declare that he accepts the word of Lord McNair and that the Government have no intention of using force except in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
In 1945, when the Charter was being ratified by this House, the Prime Minister declared that the United Nations was humanity's last hope. Let him, by his words and his deeds, strive to sustain and encourage that hope and not join in seeking to extinguish it.
9.27 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): I will certainly deal in my remarks with the points which the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has made about our attitude both to the Charter and to the United Nations. I hope I may be forgiven for saying that in my view, naturally, every step which we have so far taken, as I will strive to show, is in accordance with the terms of the Charter. If I had not thought so, I would not be standing at this Box tonight.
First, however, I must deal with one or two other points that the right hon. Gentleman made yesterday after my speech. I was genuinely sorry to hear him say that many hon. Members did not want a settlement at all. That really is
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unworthy, and it is a cruel and unjust charge. It echoes the 1951 accusations of warmongering.
The right hon. Gentleman might consider that our whole record over the last five years emphatically denies it. A peaceful settlement was our aim in Korea, in Indo-China, in Trieste and in Persia, and we got them all. We have no record in that respect of which to be ashamed—
Mr. William Hamilton: Cyprus.
The Prime Minister: —and it is our aim in this endeavour and in this effort too.
I find it difficult to believe that there are many countries which will believe, or many people in this country who will imagine, that we have now turned our backs on that road, a road which we have been treading for some time, not without a measure of success.
It sometimes seems to me, and I dare say it does to others of my generation, that ever since the first years when one was very young and in uniform and in war right up to the present time, one has always had war or the threat of war as the background to one's whole life. I would beg the House to believe that, that being so, there can be no conceivable thought in our minds that that is the kind of thing we want to repeat in one way or another. I know it is true of every part of the House of that generation and of others. I think we may start by accepting that peace is the aim of all parties.
But I must add this. If my long— someone generously said the other night my too long—span of public life of 35 years has taught me anything it has taught me this. I do not believe that true and lasting peace can be bought at the price of the surrender of rights and legitimate interests to outside pressure and force. I have found that before.
I do not think I have ever inflicted a quotation of my own upon the House, but I am going to do so tonight, from something which I said when I parted with my Cabinet colleagues in 1938, because I think it still applies. I listened with great interest to the right hon. Gentleman's passage about how to analyse the threat of Nasser, and I want to comment

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on it because it is part of the most important element of our discussion tonight. What I said then was this :
"I do not believe that we can make progress in European appeasement"—
Europe is still there—
"…. if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure … progress depends above all on the temper of the nation, and that temper must find expression in a firm spirit. That spirit, I am confident, is there. Not to give voice to it is, I believe, fair neither to this country nor to the world."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1938 ; Vol. 332, c. 49–50.]
I do not think that that is menacing language in the temper of the situation in which we are now. It is what many of us feel. The majority of the country did not agree with me then. My right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) agreed with me, and he tells me he agrees with me now. But we have, I believe, all of us in all parties learned our lesson since then. Do not let us, I implore the House and I implore the country, unlearn that lesson now.
Let us have a look at what the right hon. Gentleman rightly said about the proper perspective in which to put what Nasser stands for at the present time. The hon. Member for Coventry, North, (Mr. Edelman) said in his speech yesterday something which I thought was absolutely true for the present time. He said this :
"The Suez crisis is not the—I repeat 'the' —crisis. If this crisis is solved—or rather if this crisis is allowed to settle itself in conformity with the present attitude taken up by Nasser, then, indeed, it will be merely the beginning of a whole series of crises of different kinds. I think that it was Trotsky who once spoke of 'permanent revolution'. I think that the crisis which confronts us today will merely become the beginning of a permanent crisis which may well end in disaster for all of us."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 12th September. 1956; Vol. 558, c. 112.]
I agree with every single word of that statement, and I really do not think that anybody who has read Nasser's speech when the Canal was seized could really doubt the force of the hon. Gentleman's observation or could really pretend that that was a speech about nationalising anything at all. It was an assault on the Western Powers, on their economy, on their position in the world. And what will the next step be? I join with the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition in asking what the next step
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will be if Colonel Nasser is allowed to succeed in the action he has already taken.
I have no doubt what it will be. I do not think the House has any doubt— Israel. "The stooge of Imperialism" Nasser described it, in the very speech in which he nationalised the Canal. That is what he called it. Do hon. Members really believe that if Colonel Nasser has his way in this business of the Canal we who have undertaken these obligations under the Tripartite Declaration—within and without the United Nations be it noted—and have reaffirmed, and reaffirm tonight, our intention to discharge them, do they really believe that we shall be in the same position to do so then as we are today, or as we were a few months ago?
Does the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition really think, to use his own phrase, that if Colonel Nasser "gets away with it" our position will still be such that we can do as much militarily to go to the help of Israel if she is attacked as we can today? [An HON. MEMBER : "Why not?"] I can only give the House my own forecast. I have the responsibility to do it. My own forecast is that if the "getting away with it" takes place, then there will be such a rush of power, such a haste and hurry to get on the bandwagon of the Egyptian dictator as has not been seen in our generation in respect of any country at all.
Mr. Gaitskell: I am not saying that we should let Colonel Nasser get away with this entirely. [Laughter.] I really must ask hon. Members to try to follow the argument. What I have argued is that the threats of force, far from not letting him get away with it, are increasing his prestige all the time. I am asking that the Government should pursue a different and peaceful method, with the full support of world opinion. Why will the Prime Minister not answer my question? Will the Prime Minister say why the British Government continue to refuse Israel the arms which she needs for self-defence?
The Prime Minister: I was not discussing the question of arms for Israel. I was discussing our own national obligations, which still exist. I am not prepared to make a public statement on anything that may be happening on the

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other account at the moment, but I should like to say this on this very topic. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the moving of troops, to what other people have called our threatening attitude. What we have done in this respect the right hon. Gentleman says is uniting the East against us. There is no evidence that we have from those lands of anything of the kind. It shows rather the contrary—what my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Sir R. Boothby) said last night—that there is a watchfulness and a concern, and by no means all the Arab lands are looking forward to a success for Col. Nasser. Some people in their speeches seem more eager for it than the Arab lands themselves.
Then there is the charge which we get so often, not made now, about Western imperialism. There is just one fact about which I would like to remind this House. It is not widely known. We are charged by Nasser and others with Western imperialism, but as regards the Owen Falls, does the House know that within their control, quite rightly—it was done by the Socialist Government in 1949, as the right hon. Gentleman will remember—we then stipulated that the Electricity Board there should regulate the discharges to be passed from the dam on the instructions of the Egyptian resident engineer?
That is still going on. The dam is on British territory. It is owned by a British colonial Government. Egypt is a user and she is not sovereign over the dam. And yet, by peaceful agreement, Britain submits to Egyptian user control of a project vital to Egypt. There is no suggestion that it is in any way derogatory to British sovereignty that Egypt has this special position. It seems to me that the parallel with Western requirements in respect of the Canal is very, very close indeed.
Now may I mention one topic before I come to the right hon. Gentleman's questions, and that is about the pilots, to whom he referred in his speech yesterday. I want to say a word more so that their position may be clearly understood. The right hon. Gentleman said yesterday that we should renew the appeal to the pilots asking them, despite their difficult conditions, to do everything they could to keep the Canal open.
Mr. Stokes: Hear, hear.
The Prime Minister: I do not believe that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, or even the right hon. Gentleman whose voice I recognise so well, fully understood the conditions under which the pilots are working. In the first place, since the seizure of the Canal they have been overworked because the pilots on leave have not been willing to return, and those who were left have had to carry on without any prospect of getting their annual leave at all. Secondly, the Egyptian Government have not only subjected these pilots to threats of imprisonment, but they are working in a police State, with all that that implies. I need not go much further. I am sure the House will feel that it would not be right for Her Majesty's Government to ask British pilots to continue to endure these intolerable conditions for more than a very limited period.
The right hon. Gentleman suggested that the Government were deliberately withdrawing these men in order to impede the operations of the Canal. I can assure him that that is not so. The Government have not asked these men to withdraw from their employment. On the contrary. As I have said, twice we asked them to stay and they accepted, but they are not under our control. They are free men, and many weeks ago they declared that they were willing to go on only until the end of these discussions. I think I ought to let the House know that the Minister of Transort this morning received representations from the Merchant Navy and Airline Officers' Association, to which organisation the British Canal pilots belong. I believe it is technically a trade union. The following points were made.
First, that British pilots were physically at the end of their tether, due to the very difficult working conditions and long hours to which they have been subjected. It was the view of the Chairman of the Association that whatever representations had been made to them by the Government, or any Governments, they could not have stayed longer at their posts ; that they have entirely lost confidence in the new Egyptian Canal Company and its capacity to operate and maintain the Canal at a proper level. I thought I ought to say that, in order to clear up any doubt that this is due to action on our part.

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Now I would like to come to the main points which the right hon. Gentleman put to me in his speech. First, however, I think it would be well if I said something on the topic of the users' association. In that connection I would like to give the House and the right hon. Gentleman some information.
First I think it should be made clear to the House that the offer of the Menzies commission so-called, the work of the 18, still stands. The offer has not been withdrawn, and it is still open to acceptance by Egypt. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will welcome that. In that sense, therefore, this is not an alternative proposal. This is, as I said yesterday, I thought quite clearly, a provisional plan to meet an immediate situation. In that respect, the British, United States and French Governments are in complete agreement. The United States Government will participate. I shall have a word more to say about that in a moment.
We are in the closest touch with the two other Governments, and I have no doubt that there will be a meeting in the next few days to decide how to put the plan into effect. The meeting will not be long delayed. I gave the House advance information of our intentions yesterday, because as the House was meeting I thought that the explanation was due to it.
I want now to deal with one of the things on which I was challenged last night—I do not complain of it—particularly by the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) when he wound up for the Opposition. I was very much accused in respect of what the position would be if the Egyptian Government did not take measures to ensure the execution of the 1888 Convention. That was the point; everyone was worked up about it.
I should like to read what Mr. Dulles said about this. He replied :
"if the Egyptian Government sought to interfere with the operations of the organisation or refused to take the necessary measures for ensuring the execution of the 1888 Convention, as it was bound to do, that would be a breach of the Convention by Egypt."
That is exactly what I said last night. Mr. Dulles added :
"In this event, the parties to or beneficiaries of the Convention would be free to take steps to assure their rights through the
304
United Nations or other action appropriate to the circumstances."
That is almost verbatim what I told the House.
The right hon. Gentleman asked, what other action? I think I made that clear too. I said that if they did this, then the Egyptian Government would be once more—this was my phrase—in contravention of the 1888 Convention. [Interruption.] That is the American Government's view and ours. Mr. Dulles is a good lawyer, perhaps almost as good as the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), though I do not know. That is the view that he holds, and that is the view which has been stated. If that happens, Egypt will be once again, according to our view, in breach of the Convention, and the case to be brought against her at the Security Council, or by a similar method, will thereby be infinitely strengthened. [Interruption.] That is certainly one of the purposes which Mr. Dulles and we have had in mind.
I want for a moment to go through the issues, because before we vote I think we ought to see how far apart we are, where we are apart, and where the assurances which I can give—which I am afraid will not be new—or the explanations I can give may meet the House. First, there are certain things that we are agreed upon. We are agreed that the action of the Egyptian Government in seizing the Canal was arbitrary. There is no need to deal further with that. If the Egyptian Government refuse co-operation, then that strengthens the case for the Security Council on our part.
Mr. Gaitskell rose—
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Gaitskell: Hon. Members ought really to want to hear the Prime Minister's answer to this point. Is he prepared to say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that they will not shoot their way through the Canal?
The Prime Minister: I said that we were in complete agreement with the United States Government about what to do. I read out from this paper, and I said—[HON. MEMBERS : "Answer."]— and I repeat that the first action—I said this yesterday—was to ask the Egyptian Government. We cannot do this without

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some co-operation with the Egyptian Government. We propose to ask for that co-operation. We have said here that if they do not give it, they are, in our view, in default under the 1888 Convention, but if they are so in default, we should take them to the Security Council—[Interruption.]—
Mr. Speaker: Order.
The Prime Minister: I wish now to deal with certain other points which have been raised in the debate. I think the first and the most important of them is that there has been agreement on the various stages that have been taken up to and including the actions of the London Conference and Mr. Menzies' mission out there. Now we come to the first of all the points of difference, and I come back again at once to this question of the Security Council. I hope that the House will give me five minutes in which to make an important point in this connection.
The first point is when and how we should make use of the Security Council of the United Nations. I ought to begin by making it clear to the House that we have been acting in strict conformity with United Nations procedure for the past seven weeks. We have been following the course enjoined by Article 33 of the Charter to seek, first of all, a solution
"by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation.."
Our efforts have not succeeded, and we have now taken the further step, as I told the House yesterday, with the French Government, of informing the President of the Security Council of the situation which has arisen. That action was taken in accordance with Article 35, which enables us, if we want to, to submit any matter rapidly to the Security Council.
The real difference between us is not so much one of substance on the issue as one of timing. The Opposition have asked questions which have been repeated again tonight. They have said "Submit the question to the Security Council now". I should like to remind the House that we are not handling this problem entirely on our own. We are dealing with it in association with allies and with a number of other countries too. I believe that it is the wish of the House that we should act in concert with them.
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As I told the House yesterday, and I repeat now, I must therefore ask the House to allow the Government to judge, in the light of their continuing consultations with other Governments, what is the best moment at which it may become advisable to have recourse to the Security Council. Our letter which we sent to the President yesterday is a sufficient indication of our intentions.
There are certain parallels about the delay. We have heard a great deal about the delay in going to the Security Council. Some hon. Members of this House may agree with me that probably the most critical issue since the war, apart from this one, was the Berlin air-lift. I have here the speech which Mr. Bevin made when he was asked to take the matter to the Security Council. He said this :
"There have been suggestions that the Berlin question should be referred to the United Nations, but the Charter requires that several steps should be taken before this matter could be referred. It has to be dealt with between Governments as the first step, and the point made by the right hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington"—
and that happened to be me—
"of dealing with it in Moscow at the appropriate moment is very much in our minds." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th June, 1948; Vol. 452, c. 2233–4.]
Look at what happened. I asked that it should be dealt with in Moscow; not in the United Nations but in Moscow. This is the point I want to make. Three and a half months passed before the Labour Government then took that vitally important issue anywhere near the Security Council. Having said that, I make no point of the fact that it was immediately vetoed by Russia—straight away.
I want finally to deal with a question asked by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) and repeated by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. [Interruption.] We are not the aggressors now.
Mr. Callaghan rose—
The Prime Minister: I have been asked this question by the Leader of the Opposition. Even the aggressor is allowed to reply. I want to deal with the question : would Her Majesty's Government give a pledge not to use

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force except after reference to the Security Council? If such a pledge or guarantee is to be absolute, then neither I nor any British Minister standing at this Box could give it. No one can possibly tell what will be Colonel Nasser's action, either in the Canal or in Egypt.
Nevertheless, I will give this reply, which is as far as any Government can go : it would certainly be our intention, if circumstances allowed, or in other words, except in an emergency, to refer a matter of that kind to the Security
Council. Beyond that I do not think that any Government can possibly go.
But I repeat that the Government must be the judge of the circumstances. That is something that no Government, no Executive, can share with anybody else, either with Parliament, or any other. I am confident that Parliament itself, on reflection, will believe that to be sound doctrine.
Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question : —
The House divided : Ayes 321, Noes 251.

Division No. 278.]

AYES

[9.58 p.m.

Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

Dance, J. C. G.

Hirst, Geoffrey

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Davidson, Viscountess

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Alport, C. J. M.

Davies, Rt. Hon. Clement (Montgomery)

Holt, A. F.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Hope, Lord John

Amery, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Deedes, W. F.

Hornby, R. P.

Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Arbuthnot, John

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Armstrong, C. W.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Ashton, H.

du Cann, E. D. L.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Howard, John (Test)

Atkins, H. E.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Duthie, W. S.

Hughes Hallett, Vioe-Admiral J.

Baldwin, A. E.

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Barber, Anthony

Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir A. (Warwick&L'm'tn)

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Barlow, Sir John

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Hurd, A. R.

Barter, John

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Hutchison, SirIanClark (E'b'gh, W.)

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Beamish, Maj. Tufton

Errington, Sir Eric

Hyde, Montgomery

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Erroll, F. J.

Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Iremonger, T. L.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Fell, A.

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Bidgood, J. C.

Finlay, Graeme

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Fisher, Nigel

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

Bishop, F. p.

Fort, R.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Black, C. W.

Foster, John

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Body, R. F.

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Boothby, Sir Robert

Freeth, D. K.

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Bossom, Sir Alfred

George, J. C. (Pollok)

Joseph, Sir Keith

Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

Gibson-Watt, D.

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Glover, D.

Kaberry, D.

Boyle, Sir Edward

Godber, J. B.

Keegan, D.

Braine, B. R.

Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Gough, C. F. H.

Kerr, H. W.

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Gower, H. R.

Kershaw, J. A.

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Graham, Sir Fergus

Kimball, M.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Kirk, P. M.

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Lagden, G. W.

Bryan, P.

Green, A.

Lambert, Hon. G.

Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

Gresham Cooke, R.

Lambton, Viscount

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Grimond, J.

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Burden, F. F. A.

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Leather, E. H. C.

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A.(Saffron Walden)

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Leavey, J. A.

Campbell, Sir David

Gurden, Harold

Leburn, W. G.

Carr, Robert

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Cary, Sir Robert

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Channon, H.

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon. A. T.

Chichester-Clark, R.

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Llewellyn, D. T.

Cole, Norman

Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (SuttonColdfield)

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Hay, John

Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Longden, Gilbert

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Crouch, R. F.

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

McAdden, S. J.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

Cunningham, Knox

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Currie, G. B. H.

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Osborne, C.

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

McKibbin, A. J.

Page, R. G.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Partridge, E.

Storey, S.

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Peyton, J. W. W.

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Studholme, Sir Henry

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Pitman, I. J.

Summers, Sir Spencer

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfie'd, W.)

Pott, H. P.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Powell, J. Enoch

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Teeling, W.

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Macpherson, Nail (Dumfries)

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Maddan, Martin

Profumo, J. D.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Raikes, Sir Victor

Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Ramsden, J. E.

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Rawlinson, Peter

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Redmayne, M.

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Rees-Davies, W. R

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Marples, A. E.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Turner, H. F. L.

Marshall, Douglas

Renton, D. L. M.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Maude, Angus

Ridsdale, J. E.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Rippon, A. G. F.

Vane, W. M. F.

Mawby, R. L.

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Robertson, Sir David

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Robson-Brown, W.

Vosper, D. F.

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Wade, D. W.

Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh

Roper, Sir Harold

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Moore, Sir Thomas

Russell, R. S.

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Wall, Major Patrick

Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Nairn, D. L. S.

Sharples, R. C.

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Neave, Airey

Shepherd, William

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Nicholls, Harmar

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Nicolson, N.(B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Soames, Capt. C.

Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

Nugent, G. R. H.

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Nutting, Rt. Hon. Anthony

Speir, R. M.

Wood, Hon. R.

Oakshott, H. D.

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Woollam, John Victor

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'g'tn, S.)

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Orr, Capt. L, P. S.

Stevens, Geoffrey

TELLERS FOR THE AYES :

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Mr. Heath and

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Grey, C. F.

Albu, A. H.

Cronin, J. D.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Crossman, R. H. S.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Daines, P.

Hale, Leslie

Anderson, Frank

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Awbery, S. S.

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Hamilton, W. W.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Hannan, W.

Baird, J.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Deer, G.

Hastings, S.

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Hayman, F. H.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)

Delargy, H. J.

Healey, Denis

Benson, G.

Dodds, N. N.

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Beswick, F.

Donnelly, D. L.

Herbison, Miss M.

Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Blackburn, F.

Dye, S.

Hobson, C. R.

Blenkinsop, A.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Holman, P.

Blyton, W. R.

Edelman, M.

Holmes, Horace

Boardman, H.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

Houghton, Douglas

Boyd, T. C.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Brockway, A. F.

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Hubbard, T. F.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Burke, W. A.

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Burton, Miss F. E.

Fernyhough, E.

Hunter, A. E.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Fienburgh, W.

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Finch, H. J.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Callaghan, L. J.

Fletcher, Eric

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Forman, J. C.

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Champion, A. J.

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Chapman, W. D.

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Janner, B.

Chetwynd, G. R.

Gibson, C. W.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Clunie, J.

Gooch, E. G.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn&St. Pncs, S.)

Coldrick, W.

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

Greenwood, Anthony

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Cove, W. G.

310

311

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Orbach, M.

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Oswald, T.

Stones, W. (Consett)

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Owen, W. J.

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Padley, W. E.

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Paget, R. T.

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Kenyon, C.

Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

Swingler, S. D.

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Palmer, A. M. F.

Sylvester, G. O.

King, Dr. H. M.

Parker, J.

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Lawson, G. M.

Parkin, B, T.

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Paton, John

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Lee, Miss jennie (Cannock)

Peart, T. F.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Lever, Harold (Cheetham)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Thornton, E.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Popplewell, E.

Timmons, J.

Lewis, Arthur

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Tomney, F.

Lindgren, G. S.

Probert, A. R.

Turner-Samuels, M.

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Proctor, W. T.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Logan, D. G.

Pryde, D. J.

Usborne, H. C.

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Viant, S. P.

MacColl, J. E.

Randall, H. E.

Warbey, W. N.

McGhee, H. G.

Rankin, John

Watkins, T. E.

McInnes, J.

Redhead, E. C.

Weitzman, D.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Reeves, J.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

McLeavy, Frank

Reid, William

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

West, D. G.

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Wheeldon, W. E.

Mahon, Simon

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Wigg, George

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Ross, William

Wilcock, Group Capt. C. A. B.

Mason, Roy

Royle, C.

Wilkins, W. A.

Mayhew, C. P.

Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley

Willey, Frederick

Mellish, R. J.

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Williams, David (Neath)

Messer, Sir F.

Short, E. W.

Williams, Rev Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Mitchison, G. R.

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Monslow, W.

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Moody, A. S.

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Mort, D. L.

Skeffington, A. M.

Winterbottom, Richard

Moss, R.

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Moyle, A.

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Woof, R. E.

Mulley, F. W.

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Snow, J. W.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Sorensen, R. W.

Zilllacus, K.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Sparks, J. A.

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

Steele, T.

TELLERS FOR THE NOES :

Oliver, G. H.

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Mr. Bowden and Mr. Pearson.

Oram, A. E.

Main Question put : —
The House divided : Ayes 319, Noes 248.

Division No. 279.]

AYES

[10.10 p.m.

Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Deedes, W. F.

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Digby, Simon Wingfield

Alport, C. J. M.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Bryan, P.

du Cann, E. D. L.

Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William

Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Arbuthnot, John

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Armstrong, C. W.

Burden, F. F. A.

Duthie, W. S.

Ashton, H.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir A. (Warwick&L'm'n)

Atkins, H. E.

Campbell, Sir David

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Carr, Robert

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Baldwin, A. E.

Cary, Sir Robert

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Barber, Anthony

Channon, H.

Errington, Sir Eric

Barlow, Sir John

Chichester-Clark, R.

Erroll, F. J.

Barter, John

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Fell, A.

Beamish, Maj. Tufton

Cole, Norman

Finlay, Graeme

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Fisher, Nigel

Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

Cooper, A. E.

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Fort, R.

Bidgood, J. C.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Foster, John

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Freeth, D. K.

Bishop, F. P.

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

George, J. C (Pollok)

Black, C. W.

Crouch, R. F.

Gibson-Watt, D.

Body, R. F.

Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

Glover, D.

Boothby, Sir Robert

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Godber, J. B.

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Cunningham, Knox

Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. J. A.

Currie, G, B. H.

Gough, C. F. H.

Boyle, Sir Edward

Dance, J. C. G.

Cower, H. R.

Braine, B. R.

Davidson, Viscountess

Graham, Sir Fergus

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Grant-Ferris, Wg. Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Rawlinson, Peter

Green, A.

Llewellyn, D. T.

Redmayne, M.

Gresham Cooke, R.

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. G. (Sutton Coldfield)

Rees-Davies, W. R

Grimond, J.

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Remnant, Hon. P.

Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Renton, D. L. M.

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

Ridsdale, J. E.

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Longden, Gilbert

Rippon, A. G. F.

Gurden, Harold

Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouth, S.)

Robertson, Sir David

Hare, Rt. Hon. J. H.

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Robson-Brown, W.

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Harris, Reader (Heston)

McAdden, S. J.

Roper, Sir Harold

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

Harrison, Col, J. H. (Eye)

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Russell, R. S.

Harvey, Air Cdre, A. V. (Macclesfd)

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

McKibbin, A. J.

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Hay, John

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Sharples, R. C.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Shepherd, William

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfie'd, W.)

Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Soames, Capt. C.

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Speir, R. M.

Hirst, Geoffrey

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Holt, A. F.

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Hope, Lord John

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Stevens, Geoffrey

Hornby, R. P.

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Marples, A. E.

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Marshall, Douglas

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Maude, Angus

Storey, S.

Howard, John (Test)

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)

Mawby, R. L.

Studholme, Sir Henry

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Summers, Sir Spencer

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Hulbert, Sir Norman

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Hurd, A. R.

Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh

Taylor, William (Bradford, N.)

Hutchison, SrilanClark (E'b'gh, W.)

Monckton, Rt. Hon. Sir Walter

Teeling, W.

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Moore, Sir Thomas

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

Hyde, Montgomery

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Iremonger, T, L.

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Nairn, D. L. S.

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Neave, Airey

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Nicholls, Harmar

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Jennings, Sir Roland (Hallam)

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Johnson. Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Nicolson, N.(B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Turner, H. F. L.

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Nugent, G. R. H.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Nutting, Rt. Hon. Anthony

Vane, W. M. F.

Joseph, Sir Keith

Oakshott, H. D.

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Kaberry, D.

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

Vosper, D. F.

Keegan, D.

Orr, Capt. L. P, S.

Wade, D. W.

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Kerr, H. W.

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Kershaw, J. A.

Osborne, C.

Walker-Smith, D. C.

Kimball, M.

Page, R. G.

Wall, Major Patrick

Kirk, P. M.

Partridge, E.

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Lagden, G. W.

Peyton, J. W. W.

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Lambert, Hon. G.

Pickthorn, K, W. M.

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Lambton, Viscount

Pitman, I. J.

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Pott, H P.

William, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Leather, E. H. C.

Powell, J. Enoch

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Leavey, J. A.

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

Leburn, W. G.

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Wood, Hon. R.

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Profumo, J. D.

Woollam, John Victor

Lennox-Boyd, Rt. Hon, A. T.

Raikes, Sir Victor

TELLERS FOR THE AYES :

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Ramsden, J. E.

Mr. Heath and

Mr. T. G. D. Galbraith.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Brockway, A. F.

Albu, A. H.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)

Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Benson, G.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Beswick, F.

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Blackburn, F.

Burke, W. A.

Anderson, Frank

Blenkinsop, A.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Awbery, S. S.

Blyton, W, R.

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Bacon, Miss Alice

Boardman, H.

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

Boyd, T. C.

Callaghan, L. J.

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315

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Champion, A. J.

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Randall, H. E.

Chapman, W. D.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Rankin, John

Chetwynd, G. R.

Janner, B.

Redhead, E. C.

Clunie, J.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Reeves, J.

Coldrick, W.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn&St. Pncs, S.)

Reid, William

Collins, V. J.(Shoreditch & Finsbury)

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Cove, W. G.

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Cronin, J. D.

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Crossman, R. H. S.

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Ross, William

Cullen, Mrs. A.

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Royle, C.

Daines, P.

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Kenyon, C.

Short, E. W.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

King, Dr. H. M.

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Deer, G.

Lawson, G. M.

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

Delargy, H. J.

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Skeffington, A. M.

Dodds, N. N.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Donnelly, D. L.

Lewis, Arthur

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

Lindgren, G. S.

Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)

Dye, S.

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Snow, J. W.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

Logan, D. G.

Sorensen, R. W.

Edelman, M.

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Sparks, J. A.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

MacColl, J. E.

Steele, T.

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

McGhee, H. G.

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

McInnes, J.

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Stones, W. (Consett)

Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)

McLeavy, Frank

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Fernyhough, E.

Mahon, Simon

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Fienburgh, W.

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)

Swingler, S. T.

Finch, H. J.

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Sylvester, C. O.

Fletcher, Eric

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Forman, J. C.

Mason, Roy

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Mayhew, C. P.

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mellish, R. J.

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Gibson, C. W.

Messer, Sir F.

Thornton, E.

Gooch, E. G.

Mitchison, G. R.

Timmons, J.

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Monslow, W.

Tomney, F.

Greenwood, Anthony

Moody, A. S.

Turner-Samuels, M.

Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

Morris, Percy (Swansea, W.)

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Grey, C. F.

Mort, D. L.

Usborne, H. C.

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

Moss, R.

Viant, S. P.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Moyle, A.

Warbey, W. N.

Griffiths, William (Exchange)

Mulley, F. W.

Watkins, T. E.

Hale, Leslie

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Weitzman, D.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Hamilton, W. W.

Noel-Baker, Rt. Hon. P. (Derby, S.)

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Hannan, W.

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

West, D. G.

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Oliver, G. H.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Hastings, S.

Oram, A. E.

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Hayman, F. H.

Orbach, M.

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)

Healey, Denis

Oswald, T.

Wigg, George

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Owen, W. J.

Wilcock, Croup Capt. C. A. B.

Herbison, Miss M.

Padley, W. E.

Wilkins, W. A.

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Paget, R. T.

Willey, Frederick

Hobson, C. R.

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Williams, David (Neath)

Holman, P.

Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Holmes, Horace

Palmer, A. M. F.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Houghton, Douglas

Parker, J.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Parkin, B. T.

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Paton, John

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Hubbard, T. F.

Peart, T. F.

Winterbottom, Richard

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Popplewell, E.

Woof, R. E.

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

Hunter, A. E.

Probert, A. R.

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Procter, W. T.

Zilliacus, K.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Pryde, D. J.

TELLERS FOB THE NOES :

Mr. Bowden and Mr. Pearson.

Resolved,
That this House condemns the arbitrary action of the Egyptian Government in seizing control of the Suez Canal; endorses the proposals adopted by the 18 Powers at the London Conference which would ensure that an international waterway so essential to the economic
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life, standard of living and employment of this and other countries would not remain in the unrestricted control of any single Government; welcomes the sustained and continuing efforts of Her Majesty's Government to achieve a peaceful settlement; and affirms its support for the statement of policy made by the Prime Minister to this House on 12th September.

ADJOURNMENT
10.21 p.m.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): I beg to move,
That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd October.
As the House will realise, this Motion provides for the resumption of the Adjournment until 23rd October. This was interrupted by the recall of the House to discuss the Suez situation. There is no need for me, I think, to make very many remarks when moving this Motion, but I should simply like to remind the House that the powers under Standing Order 112 will, of course, still operate. These provide authority for a further recall of the House by Mr. Speaker if the Government make representations to Mr. Speaker.
I repeat to the House the undertaking which I gave on 1st August, namely, that if the public interest so requires, we shall ask for recall of the House. This was the course we adopted on this occasion when we had representations from Her Majesty's Opposition and when we considered it in the public interest to recall the House in the manner prescribed by the Standing Order.
It is the Government's desire to work with the House of Commons. We think we have done right in responding to the request and in exercising our powers on this occasion. I give the House a further undertaking, quite regardless of any differences which we may have had in the debate which has taken place, that it will be our constitutional practice to recall the House, if the situation so demands, at the special instance of the Opposition or taking into account any representations made by hon. Members, but at the discretion of the Government, under the Standing Order.
10.24 p.m.
Mr. James Griffiths: I rise to oppose this Motion on behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, and to ask the Government that arrangements shall be made for maintaining Parliament in continuous session during this crisis.
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In the opening sentence of the magnificent speech with which my right hon. Friend closed this debate, he said that the two days' debate which we have had upon this crisis abundantly justified the recall of Parliament.
Many people have spoken about their memories of this House. I have some too, and I can remember an occasion when from the other side of the House came a call to this side to speak for the nation. My right hon. Friend this evening, by his speech and intervention at the end of the debate, has extracted a promise from the Prime Minister that has served and saved the nation.
The events of the past six weeks have clearly indicated that the present Government are not to be trusted without Parliament being in session. At a time— [Interruption.] I will wait. We can afford to wait. Our patience is not exhausted.
We are facing a grave situation still. For that reason, I think that the House and the country also realise that at a time like this, the Prime Minister does not speak for all the nation. He has won tonight but he has won by a party vote. We say that it is essential that in a period of such deep crisis as this, the House should be kept in session, and that the nation needs the services of the Opposition and the services of the Leader of the Opposition.
Many questions which were raised in the debate still remain unanswered. Were it not for the last promise which has been made, the debate would have left the House and the nation feeling disturbed and confused at the lack of leadership by the Government. For that reason in particular—there are others too—we owe it to our constituents and to the nation to continue Parliament in session. It is our duty to stay, and it would be a dereliction of duty to go away.
There would be no difficulty in arranging business for the House to discuss. For example, we could spend more than one day next week and the following week discussing the increasing gravity of the financial and economic position. For obvious reasons, the impact of the crisis and all that has taken place in the financial and economic sphere have not been touched upon in the debate, but they

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deserve to be mentioned. There are others, too ; all kinds of problems. I believe that in asking to remain we are asking for what the nation would want us to do as Members of Parliament—to stay here at our job, to maintain this Parliament in continuous session.
The speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) transformed our previous debate tonight. In addition to the House being here in this debating Chamber, there are other gatherings in this place. There are interesting rumours about how during the day back-bench Members behind the Government have been meeting, and the rumours say that during that meeting the Suez boys were beaten by the Chertsey lawyer. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey has secured that victory he has rendered a service to the nation.
Sir Lionel Heald: In those circumstances, would the right hon. Gentleman tell us what is the use of our all remaining here, except to listen to him?
Mr. Griffiths: One use would be to enable the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) to listen to the right hon. and learned Gentleman. One other use would be to enable other Members of his party to listen to him. They need to. I hope the right hon. and learned Gentleman will speak in our subsequent debates. What he said tonight was abundant justification for our Amendment which we moved. It proved our case up to the hilt.
In opposing this Motion we are doing what our constituents want us to do. They will want us to stay. They are anxious; they are worried ; and they have a right to be anxious and a right to be worried. Therefore, for my hon. and right hon. Friends I oppose this Motion. We shall vote against it in the Lobby. It is our plain duty to stay at our job, and so we must oppose this Motion.
10.33 p.m.
Mr. Leslie Hale: Yesterday morning I received a message from Oldham from a Labour constituent of
320
mine. She was an out-patient at the infirmary. Her husband had been serving for years in the Navy, and had just completed his service and returned to Oldham on six weeks' demobilisation leave, and had obtained work and a good position at a local dye works. He had not been in a home port for years. He received orders to leave at once for the Mediterranean, and was flown to Malta, and the lady wants to know what is happening, what she is to live on, what her position is to be, and when she may see her husband again.
I feel ashamed to think that we are to go away on holiday while problems like that are arising every day. I have no doubt that my constituent's husband, when he reads of the debate we have had today, will be a little relieved. When he reads of the somewhat belated undertaking that we are not going to use force in the Mediterranean I have no doubt he will be pleased, but probably the first thing he will do will be to write me another letter to ask me to explain why in those circumstances he was sent there at all. That is one of the questions I should like to stay here to ask and to have answered next week.
The right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) asked what are we going to do? As my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) said, there are a number of matters to discuss. Tomorrow at two o'clock I shall receive in this House a deputation of workers from Lancashire whose factory is being closed down, and 1,750 of whom, textile engineers, are facing unemployment. Is that the sort of thing which we ought to ignore, while we go away to Brighton and Dover? Shall we, by going away, be doing our duty while all those sorts of things are being done?
I was rung up last night to be told the Minister of Education had cut Oldham's educational programme, and that the grants for two important schools had been refused. [Laughter.] The Chief Whip laughs, but he has sufficient experience to know that the first day of the Parliamentary holiday is the day when every Tory Minister does the things which he has been contemplating for months but has been too ashamed to announce. Every time Parliament adjourns,

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a whole series of unpopular decisions which have been hanging fire for months are taken in the hope that criticism will be avoided, and in the hope that after a long vacation some of the worst atrocities will be forgotten.
Mrs. Harriet Slater: Especialy in education.
Mr. Hale: Two schools which have been contemplated for years are not to be built on two great housing estates in Oldham where no one would doubt the need. I have to hope that I shall find one of the Ministers in London and have the opportunity of discussing problems like that.
Today it was announced that the trade gap has widened again and the Chancellor's miserable economic policy is showing the failure which we warned him was inevitable when he introduced it. Is Parliament to adjourn and not have the opportunity of discussing the economic situation of the nation? Here is a Government who were talking yesterday about war over 1½d. a gallon on petrol and are now saying that we shall not discuss a widening trade gap, a loss of gold reserves and a loss of confidence. [Laughter.] If hon. Members opposite who are jeering at this moment would look a little more at their papers they would see that the result of their policy is that the mark in Germany is likely to be appreciated in value, on the recommendation of the European Payments Union, which is virtually further devaluing the £ in connection with one of our important competitors.
These are all grave matters. The Prime Minister, in what appeared to be his political swan-song a few minutes ago, said that it was impossible to say what Nasser would do and it was impossible to envisage what events might transpire in the next few days or in the next few weeks, and therefore it was impossible for him to forecast what he would do. I agree, on the experience of the last few days, that it is exceedingly difficult to forecast what the right hon. Gentleman will do, though I could make a suggestion as to what he should do next.
In these circumstances it is a negation of democracy for this House to adjourn at this moment. I personally would much rather be on holiday with my wife
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than be here, if I consulted my own personal desires—[Laughter]—but it is a negation of democracy for the House to adjourn at a time like this. I am always happy to give hon. Members opposite some opportunity for mild amusement because they have had a very depressing time today. But let them remember that 20,000 men, called from their homes, their wives and their families, and taken to the Mediterranean, are probably not seeing the joke.
It is our responsibility to be here and to see that this very grave procedure of conscripting men who have completed their engagements, making them break their employment and tearing them away from their homes, should be followed only in the gravest emergency and should continue only for the shortest possible time. Now that the Prime Minister has changed his mind and is going to refer to the United Nations and is not going to shoot his way through the Canal, surely the time has come for this wholly unnecessary mobilisation to be cancelled. But I am not sure that that will be done if we do not remain here. That is why I suggest that there is an overwhelming case today, in the interests of the preservation of democracy, for this House to continue to sit until it has grappled with some of the gravest of the problems that confront us.
10.41 p.m.
Mr. Harold Davies: I should be out of order if I were to raise certain points which have not yet been raised on the Suez Canal issue. Therefore, I believe that it is of paramount importance for us to be here during the rest of this week and the week after.
This country is saying that it should be strong, but I will give one example of how, because of muddle, engineers and farmers are being called up at the present moment. British agriculture has had a distressing harvest and there, on the opposite benches, sit the people who promised the country at the last General Election that they could be trusted to bring down prices and to preserve peace. Yet had it not been for the Opposition tonight, Britain would have been nearer the brink of war than she was in 1938. So tonight the Opposition can claim that it has saved the country and has extracted promises from the most muddled Prime Minister of the twentieth century.

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We have had from the right hon. Gentleman the promises we needed, but I say categorically that had Parliament not been recalled, we should probably have been at war before our return in October. [Laughter.] I am not concerned about the laughter or smiles of the Tories. Sometimes the distance between laughter and a death rattle is not very great.
We have been told this evening the exact situation regarding the users' association, but we have not yet been told how it was that French troops went to Cyprus. Were they invited by the Prime Minister of Britain or did M. Guy Mollet ask Britain to put French troops there? These matters should be made clear. I would remind the party opposite of Egyptian history. There was a time when, up to 1882, the competition between the French and British for the control of Egypt was of vital importance. Are we now working together in the Middle East?
There is another question which has not been answered. When in 1954 we retreated from the Canal area and the Government agreed that the Suez Canal would come under Egypt's control, the Prime Minister did not then put forward this theory. The right hon. Gentleman said in the August debate that this was an absolutely new policy, and it has not been explained in this debate.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): Order. So long as the hon. Member is connecting his argument with the Motion for the Adjournment, but without going into details of the subject itself, and merely using it as an instance of why the House should not adjourn, he is in order.
Mr. Davies: I agree with your Ruling. Mr. Deputy-Speaker, but I am in order in giving reasons why this House should not adjourn, and one reason is this sentence of the Prime Minister :
"No arrangements for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which could, as recent events have shown, exploit it for purposes of national policy."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th July, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 923.]
Was that the policy of the Government in 1954? Did they tell that to Egypt then?
Hon. Members: Order.
Mr. Davies: It is for Mr. Deputy-Speaker to tell me whether I am out of order, not the Government Chief Whip or other hon. Gentlemen opposite. At this juncture the British people have to bear pretty well the highest cost of living in the world, when they were promised the cheapest. Our farming industry is now in dire peril, and we are almost on the brink of war. If there was ever a time when the British Parliament needed to be in session, it is at this moment. Therefore, I believe that we will be fully justified in going into the Lobby to demonstrate to the country our belief that the Opposition are indeed the guardian of the rights of the British people at this juncture.
10.45 p.m.
Mr. John Strachey: I want to pursue a point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West (Mr. Hale) on the topic of mobilisation and the retention by Parliament of its watch in these very grave circumstances of the partial but considerable mobilisation of our Armed Forces. It will be recalled that on 2nd August we were given a pledge by the Prime Minister, repeated in more specific terms by the Secretary of State for War, that mobilisation would not be taken further than the point which was defined quite carefully in that debate—which was the calling up of those members of the forces for whom no Proclamation was needed, and a very few additional men—without the recall of Parliament
We accepted that pledge. Now Parliament has been recalled. Therefore, in a sense the Secretary of State for War is released from that pledge. If we cannot have the retention of the sitting of Parliament during the period of this crisis, as we have asked tonight, can we at least have a renewal of the pledge that there will be no further measure of mobilisation without the immediate recall of Parliament?
It is by no means a complete substitute for keeping the House sitting during the next few weeks. That is a much preferable course and one for which we shall vote. However, the very least that could be given is a renewal of the pledge that no extension of the already very considerable degree of mobilisation will be made without the immediate recall of

325
Parliament. Before we vote tonight we should have an answer to that.
That is a mere minimum and does not satisfy our conditions. We do think, as has been pointed out, that on this mobilisation issue alone, when a very considerable number of our fellow citizens have had incomparably greater disturbance in their lives than the mere disturbance of our holidays through sitting in Parliament, almost the least we can do is to have Parliament to watch over what is being done with the men in the Mediterranean. After all, on 2nd August we were given an assurance that they were called up as a purely precautionary measure. Since then there have been many statements about what the purpose was. Tonight, again, there has been a contradiction of those statements and it is very difficult for any man who has been called up now to know the reason.
For all those reasons, by far the best thing to do would be to comply with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) has proposed and keep Parliament in session. If that is not done, if that suggestion is resisted by the Government, may we at any rate know that the military measures of mobilisation, which are a grievous burden on our fellow citizens, will not be extended at all beyond their present point without the recall of Parliament?
10.50 p.m.
Mr. Frederick Lee: In addition to the very weighty arguments which have been adduced by my right hon. and hon. Friends, I should like to put a point of some importance about our methods of procedure which the House should now consider. It has for long been our custom that the Government of the day should make their decisions in Cabinet in the secrecy of their own meetings and that they cannot inform the House or any other body in the country of the nature of their proposals until they are revealed in the House.
That may be all very well in matters of internal policy, because, in the main, the Government's proposals will be crystallised in Bills which the House can discuss upon several occasions ; in Second Reading debates ; in Committee ; on Report, and on Third Reading, or in the debate upon the Budget, which, again, must go through its stages and be
326
crystallised in a Finance Bill. In that way the House has an opportunity of amending the decisions of the Executive, either by deleting or adding to them. In that way Parliament keeps a certain sovereignty over the Executive, which is altogether desirable and wholesome for British democracy.
When we are discussing the Suez crisis and matters of foreign policy of that type, however, it is quite impossible for the House to maintain that degree of supervision over the Executive. Indeed, when policy matters pertaining to Suez or other foreign issues arise if the House is not sitting, there is no need for a Bill to be introduced or for the House to be called to consider the decisions of the Executive; those decisions will be put into operation without the House being called together at all.
During the past five weeks it is no exaggeration to say that a very great proportion of the people of the world, and certainly a large number of people in this country, have felt that the Government were dragging us into war without their representatives in the House having the opportunity to vet the decisions of the Executive or to comment in any way in reflecting public opinion upon those decisions.
Although it is possible for the House, in the processes of a Bill, to alter the decisions of the Executive by amending that Bill as it goes through the House, it is utterly impossible for the House, being brought back once a state of war has been brought into being, to cause any amendment to be made. If the House is not in session when great issues of foreign policy are occupying the attention of the country and the world there is no democratic life within Britain.
It is purely a question of the decision of, it may be, a slender majority of the Cabinet as to what actions this nation shall take. I submit that my right hon. Friend, in asking that the House should be kept in session, has in mind the fact that British policy in the field of foreign affairs, especially on the issue of the Suez Canal, cannot be vetted and agreed by the House of Commons unless it is called into session during the period when the Government are making their decisions.
For those reasons I should have thought that it would be wrong for the House to be sent into recess again until a date

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probably about two months from now. Looking back upon the great crises of this century, we can see that on each occasion when world war has broken out it has been in the month in which Parliament goes into recess—August; that period signalised the start of the First World War and the war which began in 1939. I put it to hon. Members opposite, whose frivolous conduct during this debate must have shocked the whole nation, that this is not a frivolous matter.
It is not a frivolous matter when one remembers that the decisions of the Executive itself cannot be criticised or subjected to those pressures of public opinion which hon. Members are able to appreciate during the course of their visits to their constituencies. I submit that that is the very negation of democracy and that unless, when a great crisis of this type is upon us, the decisions of the Executive can be tempered by the pressure of public opinion, we are in very grave danger.
I submit that in the last two days we have witnessed the truth of what I am saying. Yesterday, the Prime Minister told us that the Government had made up their mind that they were going to pursue a particular course which, in the opinion of my right hon. and hon. Friends and myself, would have brought war very near indeed. I feel that, because the House was in session for these two days, much of the cloud has now disappeared from the international horizon. I know that the Prime Minister could call in aid the fact that even if his speech yesterday was correct, he has been double-crossed by Mr. Dulles. He could call that in aid if he wished, and some of us would understand if he did. But I put it to hon. Members that unless we had been in session Mr. Dulles would not have been greatly perturbed about the sort of speech which the Prime Minister intended to make yesterday had Mr. Dulles not interfered with him. Therefore, for all those reasons—
Mr. F. A. Burden: This is a bit involved.
Mr. Lee: I wish that the hon. Gentleman would listen to what I have to say instead of making silly frivolous remarks. From the tenor of his speech yesterday, he needs to learn a lot.
Mr. Burden: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Lee: I am trying to address a serious argument to the House, that because of the nature of our Constitution, because of the procedure under which we debate matters of importance in this House, matters of the importance of the one which we have been discussing, there is no possibility of amendments being moved which could temper decisions of the Executive unless the House is in session. I should have thought that that was a very great principle which is enshrined in our democratic constitution and without which Britain could not very well function.
I wish to put a further issue which has arisen from our debates. We have now learned that the canal users' association, or whatever it may be, is not to have the support of the United States Government. We have learned that the United States Government is, to use its own term, taking its reserve tanker fleet out of "mothballs."
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: The hon. Gentleman now appears to be entering into an argument about the Suez Canal.
Mr. Lee: No. It looks that way, but I assure you, Mr. Deputy-Speaker, that I am not.
What I want to ask is this : in view of that decision, are the Government still determined to "go it alone" over Suez? In other words, this involves the question of whether we have a sufficient reserve tonnage of tankers to adopt that alternative. That issue has not yet been discussed in this House and I feel that it would be wrong for the House to go into recess again without knowing whether that alternative is available to this country, as obviously it is to the United States.
That is just one of the issues which I believe we could discuss with benefit to the country. But, in the main, I rest my case on the principle which I have outlined, that when we have the Executive taking decisions which are not capable of being vetted by the House, which do not depend on a Bill being submitted to the Commons, it is the very negation of that Parliamentary democracy on which we pride ourselves.
Because that is one of the issues of the type I have tried to mention, I support

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my right hon. Friend in his belief that only by keeping the House in session at this period can we represent the wishes of our people, can we submit to the Executive evidence of the stresses and strains under which our people have been living for six weeks, and, in that way, faithfully represent the views of our constituents to the Executive who cannot know of them unless the House is in session.
11.0 p.m.
Mr. R. E. Winterbottom: Mr. Deputy-Speaker—[HON. MEMBERS : "Divide"]—I hope that hon. Members who are calling that we should divide will listen for five minutes to a matter which I believe to be of immediate importance and one about which the Government or the House can do nothing in recess.
That is the question of the recall of National Service men and the payment they receive. When the recall took place in August I was firmly of opinion that National Service men would be excluded from the call-up. I readily confess my mistake; I did not know at that time that the Emergency Reserve included Category II of National Service men. National Service men have been recalled to serve during the emergency. I wrote to the Prime Minister to ask what the situation of National Service men would be in relation to pay because many were losing heavily in comparison with wages paid in ordinary employment. I think hon. Members will agree that this is a matter of immediate importance.
The Prime Minister referred the matter to the War Office. I do not know whether the War Office has yet made an announcement about the pay of National Service men recalled to serve in the emergency. If the War Office has been negligent in making an announcement—I do not know whether it has—I will make the announcement here and now. I received a letter from the War Office that National Service men recalled during the emergency will receive the rate of pay given to Regular soldiers. I do not know whether that is generally known.
Many anomalies arise out of that. What happens to the National Service man whose two years' service has expired and who is kept in a unit because of the emergency?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am waiting to hear whether the hon. Member is going to relate that argument to the Motion before the House.
Mr. Winterbottom: I am relating the argument to the Motion as a reason why the House should not go into recess again.
I believe that to be a matter of immediate importance to the House of Commons, one which ought to be debated and time provided for a debate on it. There are National Service men whose two years have expired and who are in units which have been sent to the Middle East. Those men are not to receive the Regular soldier's rate of pay according to the letter I received from the War Office. Therefore, there are anomalies in the pay of National Service men serving in the emergency. I say quite categorically that that is a matter which ought to be decided upon by the House of Commons. If the decision of the Government that we should go back into recess until 23rd October is agreed to, there will be no opportunity for the House to consider the position of these men. If only for that reason, especially when selective service is growing, this question should be considered.
If only because of the financial consequences to these men, I say that a Government which go into recess when such an issue is undecided are cowardly to the men they have recalled for this emergency. I therefore support the suggestion that the House should not go into recess at any rate until the soldiers who have been recalled for this emergency have had the consideration of the House and, through that, have been properly provided for.
11.6 p.m.
Mr. Stephen Swingler: There are some serious matters which ought to be discussed and it would be shocking for the House to disperse now for another month without more than half-an-hour's discussion of the fate of the men whose families have been the principal victims of this crisis up to now. It was left to the foresight and public spirit of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) to get an Adjournment debate last night in order to be able to raise some questions of

331
major significance about the position of the Army reservists.
I want to support what has been said by my right hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey). We are asked by the Leader of the House to support a Motion for Adjournment for more than a month without a single assurance about the position of these reservists or about the use of the very extensive powers which now lie in the Government's hands. We have not even been given an assurance that there would be a recall of Parliament if further reservists were to be called up. At least, we ought to have from the Leader of the House a definite assurance that, in the light of the statement extracted from the Prime Minister tonight, no further reservists will be recalled without Parliamentary discussion.
The Government have power over more than 400,000 men and can recall them at any time, disrupt their family lives and interfere with their careers and with production in the factories—to send them where the Government will. We do not know officially how many have been recalled. It is rumoured that the number is 20,000. Certainly, it is many more than were indicated by the Secretary of State for War when he talked about a very small and limited number when these powers were given on 2nd August.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I think that the hon. Member is not quite right in his facts. A clear assurance was given by myself and the Prime Minister on 2nd August that if a marked increase were to be made in the recall of reservists, the House would be recalled. Further, last night I gave an assurance that there had been no marked increase in the recall of reservists from the original intention and that if such an increase occurred that undertaking still stood firm—that if there were a major increase in the recall of reservists the House would be recalled.
Mr. Swingler: I am grateful for that intervention. I understood that that assurance had expired as the House had been recalled. It was understood by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley that because the House had been recalled that assurance given by the Prime Minister at the beginning of August had
332
expired. I now take it that the Secretary of State has given an assurance that although Parliament has been recalled once, any further call-up of reservists will be postponed until Parliament is recalled again. We may take that as a definite assurance that there will not be a further call-up without the recall of Parliament.
Mr. Head: I did not say that. I said any large increase in the recall. An individual reservist might well be called up after today. I am dealing with large numbers, not the single, individual call-up.
Mr. Strachey: Could the Secretary of State make that quite clear? What we have in mind is that there should be no extension of the categories which are called up and no extension on a wide scale of his present powers to call up ex-National Service men—powers which are very wide indeed. Of course, individuals might be called up. This is a very important matter.
Mr. Swingler: A lot depends on what is meant by "large." I do not think that it was conceived before that 20,000 men would be called up without a recall of Parliament. I think it would have been understood that the assurance to recall Parliament would be implemented automatically if 20,000 men were to be recalled. At any rate, we appear to have extracted some assurance that there will be a recall of the House if any substantial additional number of reservists are to be called to the Colours.
That is not, however, completely satisfactory. We ought to stay in session to discuss the fate of many of the men who have been recalled and the position of their families. The position in regard to these military preparations, or precautions or manoeuvres, has been altered somewhat by the development of today's debate. At the end of it, we now have from the Prime Minister the assurance that the Government will not shoot their way through the Canal and will not take any forceful action before there has been a reference of the Suez dispute to the Security Council.
We have the argument of the Foreign Secretary that the processes of the United Nations are protracted and, therefore, that negotiations through U.N.O. might take time. Are we satisfied that all these

333
reservists should be held in the Army during the long period of these negotiations? Should we now have these extra 20,000 men who are said to have been recalled? Should we not at least have a Parliamentary discussion of whether that large additional number ought to be retained in view of the changed policy, as it appears, of the Government?
What has happened in the course of today's debate and what the Prime Minister has said tonight make urgent a discussion of the defence situation and the military aspect of these operations and the cost of the military precautions and other consequential matters. We should not be doing our duty to the men who have been recalled and to their families if we disperse without any discussion of their fate, of the effect on the economy of the country or of the way in which these extensive military powers in the hands of the Government are being used.
Today's debate has shown what Parliament can do. It has been a great victory for democratic processes. In the course of the debate, opinions have been altered, new voices have been heard and there has been some sobering up in certain quarters. Are we to return to Government by Press hysteria? Are we to have another month of the same kind of campaigning and then, when Parliament meets, repudiation of articles by Members saying that they have never said such a thing as "shooting our way through the Canal"? Would it not be better to keep the House in session so that we may continue to cross-examine the Prime Minister, with beneficial results, and continue to cross-examine other Ministers, with beneficial results to their constituents, to the country and to world peace?
11.13 p.m.
Mr. Ede: During recent years, many speeches have been made in the country indicating that Parliamentary democracy is a thing that has had its day and that we should look for something fresh. If we need any comment on that, the difference between the speech made by the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon and that made this evening is an eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the Parliamentary system of Government.
We have lived through two very dramatic days and there have been exceedingly
334
dramatic moments during their course. I first came to this House thirty-three years ago and during that time I have seen a great many episodes that will be part of Parliamentary history, but I have never seen anything as dramatic, or as great a justification for the Parliamentary process, as what happened during the speech of the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) this afternoon.
When he rose I thought that we were about to have another legalistic disquisition proving that, after all, it does not matter very much—we are within the law. What happened afterwards indicated how important it is that Parliament should be in session during these moments of great crisis, for what happened when the right hon. and learned Gentleman sat down? My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition asked a question. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not give an answer, but I noticed that a few minutes afterwards the Leader of the House whispered a few words to the noble Lord the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Viscount Lambton), and he left the Chamber.
A few minutes later the Prime Minister himself came in and there were private whisperings between Ministers which indicate that something important is being decided. I do not suggest that those conversations had any great effect on them, but I do say this : that the world tonight feels a great deal safer than it would have done had Parliament not been in session—although we have not yet had a complete repudiation of what was causing fear throughout the world.
I was recalled to the House from Switzerland, where I was attending a congress of young people from many countries. In addition to this country, America, Denmark, Germany, France, Holland, and possibly some others were represented. What this country had been doing was a lively topic of conversation in the common room during every recess in that lecture course ; and what has happened in this House during the past two days will, I am sure, restore the faith of a good many young people in the efficacy of our system of Government.
I ask the Leader of the House, who I know is a great believer in the Parliamentary

335
system and who, if I may say so, is a great practitioner of its best arts, to agree that we should remain in session until this great issue has been settled one way or the other. It is quite clear that had the Prime Minister's statement been made today instead of yesterday much of the information that we now have would not have been available to us.
This crisis may pass through various phases and it may be very important that the Government should be able to sound the opinion of this House on any given day when some fresh phase emerges. I appeal to the right hon. Gentleman, in this age when Parliamentary democracy is still on its trial, to realise that this House is the greatest exponent of the efficiency of that system and that what has happened during the past two days indicates that if we are to remain a democracy we cannot better strengthen our position than by having Parliament in session while this crisis continues.
11.19 p.m.
Mr. Hector Hughes: I want to put a consideration which has not been put in this short debate, and I hope to put it with that brevity which is characteristic of me, I think. The House will have noticed that during the days of the special sittings there has been no Question time. During the six weeks of the Recess a number of Questions have arisen to be put to Ministers. The speeches which have been made here tonight show how many problems are outstanding. A glance at the forthcoming Questions standing in my name will tell what special interest I have in that. Apart from my special interest, I suggest that the speeches which have been made tonight, adumbrating various problems requiring attention, are sufficient in themselves to justify the House sitting next week and having a Question time.
The Government have reversed their policy once tonight. I ask them to reverse it on this very important matter. The other aspect of this question has been stressed, that we are living in a time of crisis. Tonight it may well be that this country has been saved from war. I am not going to stress that, but, taking that aspect in conjunction with the aspect that I have just put about Question time, I appeal to the Government to allow the
336
House to sit next week in regular fashion and to have Question time.
11.22 p.m.
Mr. R. A. Butler: It would be courteous to say one or two words in reply to the debate. The Government must adhere to the Motion we have put to the House at this late hour. We have listened with interest and, indeed, some sympathy to the arguments put forward by hon. Members.
The right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) who, I hope, will permit me to call him my right hon. Friend, because we worked together on one occasion, spoke about the importance of Parliamentary democracy. The House may take it that the Government desire to work with the House of Commons, and that the undertaking that I have given that the House will be recalled in circumstances which the Government regard as vital to the nation, and, indeed, to Parliamentary democracy, will be implemented in exactly the same way as we implemented our pledge given when the House rose at the beginning of August. I repeat that pledge, and I undertake to the right hon. Gentleman and to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths), who spoke first on behalf of the Opposition, that we shall listen to any representation made to us and be ready to exercise our privilege under the Standing Order.
The only other observations I would make are that the points raised about the reservists and those who have been called up, which are human matters, which were raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey), the hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. R. E. Winterbottom) and the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) in particular, were shortly answered by the Secretary of State for War. It was, I think, seen that the Government are adhering to their undertaking given on this subject on 2nd August and the undertaking given last night by the Secretary of State for War in answer to the Adjournment debate initiated by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). Thus we are not introducing any new factor there, although these human questions of those who have been called up should, I think, be handled by

337
hon. Members, during the time that the House is not sitting, with the Departments concerned.
Mr. R. E. Winrerbottom: The question of payment and the financial consequences of the call-up to so many of the men who have been called up, and especially the National Service men, has not been dealt with in this House. It was not dealt with in the statement by the Secretary of State for War last night. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge no announcement has been made about the payment of these soldiers. Consequently, I must impress upon the right hon. Gentleman that thus is a matter which ought to be discussed and decided, because the people whom we have called up in our name are suffering financial hardship in consequence.
Mr. Butler: I have already drawn that matter to the attention of my right hon. Friend, and I have examined the speech he made last night on the subject, which bears the interpretation given by the hon. Member. This debate is one in which it is, as I understand it, in order only to refer to questions which would be reasons for keeping the House sitting. It so happens that the hon. Member's intervention has made an impression upon my right hon. Friend, and, therefore, the debate has served a useful purpose besides supplementing the argument for keeping the House sitting. Further than that I cannot go. If the hon. Member has any questions he likes to put either to me or the Secretary of State for War he is at liberty to do so.
Mr. Arthur Lewis: The right hon. Gentleman suggested that if we had any difficulties we should raise them with the Department concerned, but is he aware of the growing practice, under this Government, when the House is in Recess, of having both the senior and junior Minister of a Department absent? [Laughter.] It is not a laughing matter. We cannot have the House in session and the right hon. Gentleman says that we should take matters up with the Minister but we have both junior and senior
Minister away on holiday. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] I am sorry, but I have had that experience. [HON. MEMBERS : "With whom?"] The Secretary of the Department replies that in the absence of the Minister he or she will deal with the matter. Cannot the Leader of the House give an assurance that during the Recess one of the Ministers will be present to deal with questions?
Mr. Butler: One of the remarkable features of the activities of the Secretary of State for War, for which I am sure he claims no credit whatever, is that he has been on constant duty the whole time, like some other Ministers, who, as far as I can see, if they are to do their duty will have to be on constant duty for a long time ahead. I will, however, draw the attention of the Prime Minister to the point. He has already circulated my colleagues with a request that hon. Members' letters should be answered with the utmost expedition.
Mr. William Warbey: Will the right hon. Gentleman draw the attention of the Foreign Secretary to the same point and ask him to reply to questions put to him by hon. Members when the House is not sitting?
Mr. Butler: As far as I know, the Foreign Secretary and his able team of Ministers handle questions put to them by hon. Members with the utmost expedition, but I will do my duty and pass on that request to my right hon. and learned Friend.
The right hon. Member for Llanelly said that the House should be in continuous session. I do not feel that that would lead to the best functioning of Parliamentary democracy. I think that we want a little change from one another from time to time, but provided that I stick to my undertaking given at the beginning of my remarks I feel that we shall be in session when the urgency of the occasion demands it.
Question put : —
The House divided : Ayes 300, Noes 232.

Division No. 280.]

AYES

[11.29 p.m.

Agnew, Cmdr. P. C.

Ashton, H.

Baxter, Sir Beverley

Allan, R. A. (Paddington, S.)

Astor, Hon. J. J.

Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

Alport, C. J. M.

Atkins, H. E.

Bevins, J. R. (Toxteth)

Amery, Julian (Preston, N.)

Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

Bidgood, J. C.

Amory, Rt. Hn. Heathcoat (Tiverton)

Baldwin, A. E.

Biggs-Davison, J. A.

Anstruther-Gray, Major Sir William

Barber, Anthony

Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel

Arbuthnot, John

Barlow, Sir John

Bishop, F. P.

Armstrong, C. W.

Barter, John

Black, C. W.

Body, R. F.

Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

Mawby, R. L.

Boothby, Sir Robert

Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.

Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

Bossom, Sir Alfred

Henderson, John (Cathcart)

Medlicott, Sir Frank

Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon, J. A.

Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

Molson, Rt. Hon. Hugh

Boyle, Sir Edward

Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

Moore, Sir Thomas

Braine, B. R.

Hirst, Geoffrey

Morrison, John (Salisbury)

Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

Holland-Martin, C. J.

Mott-Radclyffe, C. E.

Bromley-Davenport, Lt.-Col. W. H.

Holt, A. F.

Nabarro, G. D. N.

Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry

Hope, Lord John

Nairn, D. L. S.

Brooman-White, R. C.

Hornby, R. P.

Neave, Airey

Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

Nicholls, Harmar

Bryan, P.

Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

Howard, Gerald (Cambridgeshire)

Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

Bullus, Wing Commander E. E.

Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

Burden, F. F. A.

Howard, John (Test)

Nugent, G. R. H.

Butcher, Sir Herbert

Hudson, W. R. A. (Hull, N.)

Nutting, Rt. Hon. Anthony

Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)

Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

Oakshott, H. D.

Campbell, Sir David

Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

O'Neill, Hn. Phelim (Co. Antrim, N.)

Carr, Robert

Hurd, A. R.

Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

Cary, Sir Robert

Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

Channon, H.

Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

Chichester-Clark, R.

Hyde, Montgomery

Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston

Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

Osborne, C.

Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

Iremonger, T. L.

Page, R. G.

Cole, Norman

Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

Partridge, E.

Conant, Maj. Sir Roger

Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

Pickthorn, K. W. M.

Cooper, A. E.

Jennings, J. C. (Burton)

Pitman, I. J.

Cooper-Key, E. M.

Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

Pitt, Miss E. M.

Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

Powell, J. Enoch

Corfield, Capt. F. V.

Johnson, Howard (Kemptown)

Price, David (Eastleigh)

Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey (Hall Green)

Price, Henry (Lewisham, W.)

Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

Joseph, Sir Keith

Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

Crouch, R. F.

Johnson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

Profumo, J. D.

Crowder, Petre (Ruislip—Northwood)

Kaberry, D.

Raikes, Sir Victor

Cunningham, Knox

Keegan, D.

Ramsden, J. E.

Currie, G. B. H.

Kerby, Capt. H. B.

Rawlinson, Peter

Dance, J. C. G.

Kerr, H. W.

Redmayne, M.

Davidson, Viscountess

Kershaw, J. A.

Rees-Davies, W. R

D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, Sir Henry

Kimball, M.

Remnant, Hon. P.

Deedes, W. F.

Kirk, P. M.

Renton, D. L. M.

Dodds-Parker, A. D.

Lagden, G. W.

Ridsdale, J. E.

Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. McA.

Lambert, Hon. G.

Rippon, A. G. F.

du Cann, E. D. L.

Lambton, Viscount

Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. Sir T. (Richmond)

Lancaster, Col. C. G.

Robertson, Sir David

Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

Langford-Holt, J. A.

Robson-Brown, W.

Duthie, W. S.

Leather, E. H. C.

Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

Eccles, Rt. Hon. Sir David

Leavey, J. A.

Roper, Sir Harold

Eden, J. B. (Bournemouth, West)

Leburn, W. G.

Ropner, Cot. Sir Leonard

Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

Russell, R. S.

Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

Sandys, Rt. Hon. D.

Errington, Sir Eric

Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

Farey-Jones, F. W.

Linstead, Sir H. N.

Scott-Miller, Cmdr. R.

Fell, A.

Llewellyn, D. T.

Sharples, R. C.

Finlay, Graeme

Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

Shepherd, William

Fisher, Nigel

Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)

Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

Fleetwood-Hesketh, R. F.

Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

Foster, John

Longden, Gilbert

Soames, Capt. C.

Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

Spearman, Sir Alexander

Freeth, D. K.

Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

Speir, R. M.

Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh

Spence, H. R. (Aberdeen, W.)

George, J. C. (Pollok)

McAdden, S. J.

Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

Gibson. Watt, D.

McCallum, Major Sir Duncan

Stanley, Capt. Hon. Richard

Glover, D.

Macdonald, Sir Peter

Stevens, Geoffrey

Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan

Mackeson, Brig. Sir Harry

Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

Gough, C. F. H.

McKibbin, A. J.

Steward, Sir William (Woolwich, W.)

Gower, H. R.

Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

Stewart, Henderson (Fife, E.)

Graham, Sir Fergus

McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

Grant, W. (Woodside)

Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

Storey, S.

Grant-Ferris, Wg Cdr. R. (Nantwich)

Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

Stuart, Rt. Hon. James (Moray)

Green, A.

McLean, Neil (Inverness)

Studholme, Sir Henry

Gresham Cooke, R.

Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfie'd, W.)

Summers, Sir Spencer

Grimond, J.

MacLeod, John (Ross & Cromarty)

Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

Grimston, Sir Robert (Westbury)

Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)

Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)

Tavlor, William (Bradford, N.)

Gurden, Harold

Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

Teeling, W.

Hall, John (Wycombe)

Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury).

Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)

Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

Thomas, P. J. M. (Conway)

Harris, Reader (Heston)

Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

Markham, Major Sir Frank

Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

Marlowe, A. A. H.

Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

Harvey, Air Cdre, A. V. (Macclesfd)

Marples, A. E.

Thornton-Kemsley, C. N.

Harvey, Ian (Harrow, E.)

Marshall, Douglas

Tiley, A. (Bradford, W.)

Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

Maude, Angus

Tilney, John (Wavertree)

Hay, John

Maudling, Rt. Hon. R.

Turner, H. F. L.

Head, Rt. Hon. A. H.

Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.

Tweedsmuir, Lady

Wall, Major Patrick

Williams, R. Dudley (Exeter)

Vane, W. M. F.

Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

Wood, Hon. R.

Vickers, Miss J. H.

Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

Woollam, John Victor

Vosper, D. F.

Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)

TELLERS FOR THE AYES :

Wakefield, Sir Wavell (St. M'lebone)

Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

Mr. Gerald Wills and Mr Godber

Walker-smith, D. C.

NOES

Ainsley, J. W.

Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

Orbach, M.

Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)

Hamilton. W. W.

Oswald, T.

Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

Hannan, W.

Owen, W. J.

Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

Harrison, J. (Nottingham, N.)

Padley, W. E.

Awbery, S. S.

Hastings, S.

Paget, R. T.

Bacon, Miss Alice

Hayman, F. H.

Paling, Rt. Hon. W. (Dearne Valley)

Baird, J.

Healey, Denis

Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

Bence, C. R. (Dunbartonshire, E.)

Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

Palmer, A. M. F.

Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S. E.)

Herbison, Miss M.

Parker, J.

Benson, G.

Hewitson, Capt. M.

Parkin, B. T.

Beswick, F.

Hobson, C. R.

Pearson, A.

Bevan, Rt. Hon. A. (Ebbw Vale)

Holman, P.

Peart, T. F.

Blackburn, F.

Holmes, Horace

Plummer, Sir Leslie

Blenkinsop, A.

Houghton, Douglas

Popplewell, E.

Blyton, W. R.

Howell, Charles (Perry Barr)

Price, J. T. (Westhoughton)

Boardman, H.

Howell, Denis (All Saints)

Probert, A. R.

Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S. W.)

Hubbard, T. F.

Proctor, W, T.

Boyd, T. C.

Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)

Pryde, D. J.

Brockway, A. F.

Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

Pursey, Cmdr. H.

Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

Rankin, John

Brown, Thomas (Ince)

Hunter, A. E.

Redhead, E. C.

Burke, W. A.

Hynd, H. (Accrington)

Reeves, J.

Burton, Miss F. E.

Hynd, J. B. (Attercliffe)

Reid, William

Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

Robens, Rt. Hon. A.

Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

Irving, S. (Dartford)

Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

Callaghan, L. J.

Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)

Castle, Mrs. B. A.

Janner, B.

Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

Champion, A. J.

Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

Chapman, W. D.

Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn&St. Pncs, S.)

Ross, William

Chetwynd, G. R.

Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

Royle, C.

Clunie, J.

Johnson, James (Rugby)

Shawcross, Rt. Hon. Sir Hartley

Coldrick, W.

Johnston, Douglas (Paisley)

Short, E. W.

Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

Jones, Rt. Hon. A. Creech (Wakefield)

Shurmer, P. L. E.

Corbet, Mrs. Freda

Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

Silverman, Julius (Aston)

Cove, W. G.

Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)

Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

Skeffington, A. M.

Cronin, J. D.

Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)

Slater, Mrs. H. (Stoke, N.)

Crossman, R. H. S.

Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)

Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

Cullen, Mrs, A.

Kenyon, C.

Snow, J. W.

Daines, P.

King, Dr. H. M.

Sorensen, R. W.

Dalton, Rt. Hon. H.

Lawson, G. M.

Sparks, J. A.

Darling, George (Hillsborough)

Lee, Frederick (Newton)

Steele, T.

Davies, Harold (Leek)

Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

Stewart, Michael (Fulham)

Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

Lever, Harold (Cheelham)

Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

Deer, G.

Lever, Leslie (Ardwick)

Stones, W. (Consett)

de Freitas, Geoffrey

Lewis, Arthur

Strachey, Rt. Hon. J.

Delargy, H. J.

Lindgren, G. S.

Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

Dodds, N. N.

Lipton, Lt.-Col. M.

Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

Donnelly, D. L.

Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

MacColl, J. E.

Swingler, S. T.

Dye, S.

McGhee, H. G.

Sylvester, G. O.

Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

McInnes, J.

Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)

Edelman, M.

McKay, John (Wallsend)

Taylor, John (West Lothian)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

McLeavy, Frank

Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)

Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)

MacMillan, M. K. (Western Isles)

Thomson, George (Dundee, E.)

Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

Thornton, E.

Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

Mahon, Simon

Timmons, J.

Evans, Albert (Islington, S. W.)

Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfd, E.)

Tomney, F.

Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

Mann, Mrs. Jean

Turner-Samuels, M.

Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

Fernyhough, E.

Mason, Roy

Usborne, H. C.

Fienburgh, W.

Mayhew, C. P.

Warbey, W. N.

Finch, H. J.

Mellish, R. J.

Watkins, T. E.

Fletcher, Eric

Mitchison, G. R.

Weitzman, D.

Forman, J. C.

Monslow, W.

Wells, Percy (Faversham)

Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

Moody, A. S.

Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

Mort, D. L.

West, D. G.

Gooch, E. G.

Moss, R.

Wheeldon, W. E.

Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

Moyle, A.

White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

Greenwood, Anthony

Mulley, F. W.

White, Henry (Derbyshire, N. E.)

Grey, C. F.

Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

Wigg, George

Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)

O'Brien, Sir Thomas

Wilcock, Croup Captain C. A. B.

Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

Oram, A. E.

Willey, Frederick

Hale, Leslie

Williams, David (Neath)

342

343

Williams, Rev. Llywelyn (Ab'tillery)

Winterbottom, Richard

Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Zilliacus, K.

Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

Woof, R. E.

Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

Yates, V. (Ladywood)

TELLERS FOR THE NOES :

Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

Mr. Wilkins and Mr. Simmons

Resolved,
That this House, at its rising Tomorrow, do adjourn till Tuesday, 23rd October.

AGRICULTURE (HARVESTING)
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Mr. Redmayne.]
11.39 p.m.
Commander J. W. Maitland: I suppose that it is inevitable, even in moments of great national crisis, for an Englishman to refer to the weather. I make no excuse whatsoever for doing that today, because I want to take this opportunity to draw attention to what might well develop into a great national crisis, namely, the problem of the harvest for the British farmer and farm worker. We have been discussing for two vital days the possibility of wars and rumours of wars—and those rumours have been going on for many, many years. But the problem of getting enough food has gone on since man was born.
We have been experiencing one of the most difficult harvest periods for many years. It is quite true that in recent days the weather has turned, and I am certain that the whole House hopes that it will be possible to regain much of what appears at the moment to have been lost, and even to make good something. But there will inevitably be losses. Therefore, it is only right that the Government should be afforded an opportunity to make a statement to the House about what has been happening, and to tell us what are their plans and their hopes to alleviate the problems which may arise.
All farmers realise that good harvests and bad are part of the day's work, and they are taken into account in the prices which the farmers receive for their goods. We have had a good many bad harvests lately. I hope that we may be able to get the harvest in, but to do so we shall have to work very quickly. The first thing I want to know from the Government is what plans they have made with the various Departments to see that we mobilise all the extra labour which is available, and which will be needed.
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There are two morals to be drawn from this very difficult situation. The first is the vital need for more storage accommodation for grain. Incidentally, we must consider the fact that not only is there difficulty with grain; peas and potatoes are in just as bad a situation, and in many cases a worse one. The need for storage and drying capacity is absolutely vital, and I hope that when those of us who farm try to raise capital to add these vital necessities to our farms, as we have realised we must, the Treasury will not frown too much upon our efforts.
Secondly, the bad weather has drawn attention to the need for better drainage. It is a fact that where efficient drainage has recently been carried out not nearly such a disastrous time has been experienced. The real disaster arises as a result of the softness of the land. It is incredibly soft, even for this country. I hope that both main drainage and field drainage will continue to receive the Government help which they are now receiving, and that there will be no restrictions. I hope that the Government will smile upon our efforts to improve our land through drainage. As I have often said in this House, good drainage is far and away the best way of improving production.
It is very fitting that this great problem is the only domestic one which has engaged the attention of the House during these vital days, and I hope that the Government will be able to give us a full account of what has been happening.
11.45 p.m.
Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: The hon. and gallant Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) has rendered a useful service in raising this problem, and I hope that we shall hear something from the Parliamentary Secretary about the intentions of the Government. It is true that the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food has been on a tour of some of the afflicted areas where the position is indeed serious. We have a long-term drainage policy which is absolutely essential, but it will not help the farming community during the next few months.

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We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the present harvest has been adversely affected both in quality and yield. The Minister has uttered a few encouraging words, but we should like to know how those words are to be translated into some material advantage for the farmers. I know that the Government have provided additional facilities for drying grain and that sort of thing, but, as a result of the poor grain harvest, the pig producer and the livestock producer generally will be more than ever dependent on imported feeding stuffs. What is the policy of the Government about that? One of the difficulties has been that the price of feeding stuffs has been going up and I am afraid that, with the fall in the home grain harvest, and the inevitable increased dependence on imported feeding stuffs, livestock producers will find things extremely difficult.
I will not go into the situation as it affects the beef producer, but pig producers, if they have not already done so, will no doubt bring their difficulties to the notice of the Ministry before very long. We wish to know something now and not have to wait until 23rd October. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will be able to tell us something of the tangible and practical assistance which the Government propose to afford to the farmers to tide them over their difficulties.
11.47 p.m.
Mr. David Gibson-Watt: I am able to say from practical experience that this harvest has not only been wet, but very wet. A year which started too dry has finished too wet. Although the constituency which I represent has not suffered so badly as other parts of the country, particularly in the north of the country, it is true to say that only three days ago only half of the grain harvest was in, though I hope that the position has improved by this time.
Farmers in this country, as in other countries, accept the risk of bad weather, but it is something about which there can be no compromise. I speak tonight to help to bring home to the general public, and particularly to the urban public, the gravity of the situation of all those who work on the land in this country. They have had a difficult and miserable harvest and can look forward to a much reduced income for their labours at the end of the year. In his visits to the
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worse affected areas my right hon. Friend the Minister has done a great deal to make the agricultural public realise the serious way in which the Government view this problem. His action in releasing grain dryers is appreciated by the farming community as a whole. I wish to add my weight to what has been said in this debate.
11.51 p.m.
Mr. Douglas Marshall: I wish to thank my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) for raising this subject tonight. I am looking forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in reply. I make no apology for turning my mind from Pharaoh to the harvest, as that is a very natural thing to do.
The figures for the banks' farming facilities have, in fact, risen during the course of last year yet, at the same time, the difficulties of credit may very well be the restriction of credit to the merchants, as their figures do not appear in the agriculture figures. I ask the Minister to take note of that arising out of the point made by the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton). As there may be a demand for extra feeding stuffs to be imported, greater facilities may be required by merchants and farmers generally. I trust that my right hon. Friend will see that those views are expressed in the quarters which grant finance to the agricultural industry.
11.52 p.m.
Mr. Brian Harrison: I am delighted that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) has raised this subject, because I received a telegram this evening from my local branch of the National Fanners' Union, saying :
"Report harvest position most serious. Well over 8,000 acres cereals yet to combine. Greatest need is drying facilities and storage. Urge you press for all national silos to be opened and working 24 hour day, also all airfield hutments made available."
I wanted particularly to put that before the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, and also to say that, owing to the energetic representations of my Member of Parliament, my hon. Friend the Member for Colchester (Mr. Alport), we have had the greatest co-operation through the Ministry in opening silos. I hope that that cooperation will continue and that my hon.

347
Friend will do everything possible to see that they work 24 hours a day.
Owing to the shortage of corn because of the bad harvest the price which will be paid for non-malting barley will be higher than normally it would be and as a result the deficiency payment will be calculated at a lower rate. Therefore, farmers will get less in deficiency payment than they would have under normal conditions. Although I do not expect an answer tonight, I should be grateful if the Minister would consider that point. I wish, also, to emphasise the importance of keeping drying facilities open all the hours of the day.
11.54 p.m.
Air Commodore A. V. Harvey: After the all-important debate of the last two days it is proper that we should be able to discuss the problems of agriculture, because, as has been emphasised, probably the harvest this year is the worst we have had within living memory ; and there was a bad one two years ago.
I am personally satisfied that my right hon. Friend and the Joint Parliamentary Secretary, with their advisers, will do everything possible, but I think it will encourage the industry to know that we have had even a short debate tonight on these very acute problems. May I have an assurance that there will be no question of calling up farm workers for National Service until the crisis in the industry is over? Farmers are facing a very justified wage claim and that is another problem they have to meet. They are worried about imports of beef. I do not want to go into details, but they are very much concerned.
I should have thought that if we have foreign currency available it ought to be spent on ensuring that we have food supplies available for cattle. Otherwise, beef producers will have to sell store cattle and farmers will not have food for the cattle they keep. We must keep the industry buoyant. It is often said that too much milk is produced, but it is rare that we have too much on our hands.
Even if we are fortunate enough to get a few more days good weather, this year's harvest will have a very poor yield. Even now, in many counties it is impossible to get a tractor on the land.
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On my own farm, and in Cheshire generally, that is the problem, quite apart from the question of getting a combine on the land. The root crops are poor and hay will be practically nonexistent early next year.
I ask my right hon. Friend to give consideration to all these problems and I ask that the Treasury should not be mean—I know that my right hon. Friend will not be mean—in giving real assistance where it is needed. I am sure that they will do so. I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) for having raised this subject tonight, because I think it will help and spur the industry on in its great task.
11.56 p.m.
Sir Harold Roper: One point which has not been mentioned in the debate is the unfortunate fact that this very bad harvest coincides with a period of very low beef prices. During the coming months the farmers will be faced with higher prices of feed resulting from this harvest. I hope that that will be borne in mind by the Joint Parliamentary Secretary. I would mention, also, that I and my hon. Friend the Member for Bodmin (Mr. D. Marshall) are particularly affected, representing constituencies in the more distant areas, because the prices we get for our beef are lower than those over the country as a whole.
11.58 p.m.
The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. G. R. H. Nugent): May I, in replying to this brief but important debate, congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle (Commander Maitland) on his wisdom and good fortune in securing the Adjournment tonight and express my appreciation of the comments and the support which my hon. Friends have given to him on his able speech. I also congratulate the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) on upholding the case from the other side of the House with his customary vigour. What he lacks in numbers on that side of the House he makes up in his own personal qualities.
The general concern expressed by my hon. Friends, as the House knows, is fully

349
shared by my right hon. Friend and myself. It is, I think, right that despite the preoccupation of the House with the great dangers and difficulties which face the nation abroad, we should find time to spend a few minutes while Parliament is sitting to discuss the difficulties and hazards which our farmers face at home in dealing with this harvest. It is indeed a harvest of exceptional difficulty. At present, I am glad to say, it is not quite as bad in most places as 1954, but it may well become as bad.
The common experience which farmers and farm workers throughout the country had during August was almost daily a shower of rain. Each time they got out the combine or the binder they were sent back again because of this inevitable shower of rain. Those who have taken part in these operations know that there is nothing more discouraging than getting everything ready day after day and then—down comes the rain and one is unable to start. It is a very trying experience for them to sit there day after day watching the crops being spoiled and being unable to get them in. All the inventions of the scientists and the engineers have not taught us a means of cutting wet straw. We can dry the grain once we have it in, but we cannot cut wet straw.
In many parts of the country the rainfall has been more than three times the average for August. With this rainfall, almost a daily shower, the work has been terribly impeded. As a matter of interest, the Meteorological Office told me that the summer this year, to the end of August, had been the wettest at Kew since 1941 and the fourth wettest since 1871. My memory does not go back as far as the earlier date but it certainly seems to me the wettest summer I can remember.
The state of the cereal harvest, which, I am sure, Members will be interested to hear, is roughly this. About one-third is cut and about two-thirds uncut. For wheat, about one-quarter is cut, most of it combined. A little of it is in stook but most of it is in. Half of the barley is cut, most of it combined. Nearly all the oats have been taken by binder. Three-quarters is still out in the fields in stook and some of it, I am sorry to say, is beginning to grow out. Some areas, of course, are better and some are worse, but that is the broad national
350
picture. In some areas the floods are very bad and the corn is flattened by high winds, but in the main the corn that is still out is standing astonishingly well. In passing—let us pay tribute where we can—this is a great tribute to the work of the plant breeders over the past 10 to 15 years. It is quite remarkable the way the corn has stood.
As a basis of comparison of the condition of the harvest today with normal, usually by the end of August in England and Wales about three-quarters of the harvest is gathered and by now, by the middle of September, most of it would be in. This week, as my hon. and gallant Friend said, the weather has relented and the work has been going ahead extremely well in most parts of the country. If we can get another three weeks of this, despite everything and all the depressing features, the greater part of the harvest will be safely got. The yields, of course, will be down and will, I think, be less than average. It is too early yet to say what they will be but certainly they will be less than the record levels of last year. The quality will probably be down too.
Cereals are not all. In expressing our sympathy, we must not overlook those who grow the pea crop, which has been very badly hit indeed, and those on the heavier soils with potatoes, who, I am afraid, will suffer from blight and at present are having great anxiety about getting the potatoes at all. We must not forget the horticulturist. The fruit growers in Kent particularly, who were struck by the hailstorm, and in Suffolk, have had severe losses in small areas, as have the hop gardens. Other horticulturists have suffered too in this difficult weather.
I certainly join with my hon. Friends and with the House as a whole in my tribute to the farmers and farmworkers in coping with the difficult job this year. They make good use of any time they can get when they can get the harvest in, both in their interest and in the nation's interest. It is too soon to predict what the final result will be, but I do not doubt that if we get another two or three weeks' fine weather they will get most of the harvest. If the weather turns bad on us again, however, we may well see a disastrous situation. At any rate, for the present the weather is being fine and there is hope for us.

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The hon. and gallant Member for Brixton asked what the Government would do, but I think that all my hon. Friends struck the same note, that farmers expect to bear the harvest risk. In a good year, like last year, when yields are well above average, we as a Government do not ask them to pay something back, and in a bad year they do not expect the Government to pay something extra. They take the harvest risk, as any other industry has to take risk, taking the rough with the smooth.
We have a long way to go yet before we see exactly how the harvest turns out. Although we provide a great range of grant payments, advisory services, and so on for the farming industry we cannot protect it from bad weather because the sky is the industry's factory roof. But there are ways in which we assist and we are anxious to do everything we can to help. My hon. Friends have mentioned that my right hon. Friend the Minister has authorised the reopening of recommissioned mills. This is of great help to farmers throughout the country in giving them drying facilities and storage space. It is, incidentally, a reversal of Government policy and a considerable additional commitment of public funds but we felt that it was fully justified in these exceptional conditions.
My hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr. B. Harrison) asked whether we could work day and night. The answer is that we are doing so in the silos where we have the labour and where the need exists. All silos are not working to capacity even now, but in his area, if the need is there, we will certainly do it there as well if it is possible to find the extra labour. This evening I had a telegram from the Warwickshire N.F.U. asking if the Atherstone silo could be opened. There are still two silos not opened, and we are willing to open those two additional silos as soon as we see that the need is there. I will have that matter looked into in the morning. If we are satisfied that the need is there we will open that one as well.
We are able to help farmers by a liberal interpretation of "millable wheat" so that they can qualify for deficiency payment. We are also able to help where farmers are unable to harvest their crops.
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Under the 1955 scheme of deficiency payments for barley, oats and mixed corn we can still pay a deficiency payment on unharvested crops. In those two cases we can help farmers who are in difficulty.
I turn to the labour position referred to by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey). The position is that the call-up was suspended for a period of 14 weeks in order to assist the harvest. This period is arranged locally in order to fit the harvesting periods of the different regions of the country. The earliest time at which this 14 weeks ends in any region is 6th October. My right hon. Friend is now in consultation with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Labour and National Service to consider whether some extension is necessary. Certainly, if my right hon. Friends are satisfied that the need is there they will be willing to make such an extension.
As far as possible reservists have not been called up. Inevitably some have been, but as far as possible reservists have not been called up where they were needed for the harvest. My right hon. Friend is also looking into the possibility of making again the same arrangement as that which we had in 1954 when a special leave scheme was arranged for all farm workers serving in this country who could be spared to go back to the farms to work.
Finally, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Horncastle mentioned land drainage. These schemes are going ahead despite the necessity for economy in capital expenditure. We have had to make some cut there, as elsewhere, in capital expenditure. However, since restriction of capital expenditure began we have refused only about 50 schemes amounting to a total of £500,000 and we have allowed to go forward nearly 150 schemes estimated to cost just over £2,250,000. These are all schemes in the hands of river boards.
I was glad to hear the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton acknowledge that my right hon. Friend had been visiting the worst areas in the country, which I am sure has done much good. My right hon. Friend and I are deeply concerned to do all we possibly can to help farmers and farm workers with their extremely difficult job of getting in the harvest this

353
year—both the cereal harvest and the potato harvest. We are in day-to-day touch with the situation and, as it unfolds before us, if there is anything further we can do to help farmers the House can certainly count on us to do it.
Let me assure the House. If either my right hon. Friend or myself were forgetful or failed to notice we should be very quickly reminded by my hon. Friends. We shall continue to watch the
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situation and to do all we can to help our farmers.
The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock on Thursday evening and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at ten minutes past Twelve o'clock.

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.

Prayers
The Earl of Stradbroke—Took the Oath.
The Lord Ramsay (E. Dalhousie)—Took the Oath.

SUEZ CANAL COMPANY EMPLOYEES
2.36 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I desire to ask Her Majesty's Government the following Question, of which I have given Private Notice: Whether all employees of the Suez Canal Company were yesterday handed a circular instructing them to stop work at midnight on Friday, as requested by the Governments, and whether and when Her Majesty's Government made such a request.
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords. the answer to the first part of the noble Lord's Question is, "No". The second part of the Question does not therefore arise. The noble Lord may have based his question on an inaccurate version of the message issued by the Board of the Company to its employees on September 11, the authentic text of which is as follows:
" The Board has asked me to thank the non-Egyptian employees still working in Egypt for the effort they have made for nearly seven weeks in the service of the international waterway which has not ceased to be the concern of the Company. The Board is aware of the very great difficulties these employees have had to face and the distressing moral atmosphere in which the Company has asked them to work, in response to the wishes of the British and French Governments, who were anxious to facilitate first the work of the London Conference and then the mission of the Committee of Five presided over by Mr. Menzies.
"This mission now being completed the further period of work called for by the Company a fortnight ago is now coming to an end. Consequently, all non-Egyptian employees who, before August 15, asked to be repatriated, thereby intimating that they did not accept any
726
contract with the de facto Egyptian Authority, are authorised to stop working on either the 14th or the 15th September, according to the particular requirement of the Department in which they are employed. They should forthwith make arrangements for repatriation, with the assistance, if required, of diplomatic and consular representatives."
Her Majesty's Government regard the decision of the Canal Company employees as entirely one for the employees themselves as free men.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I am very grateful for that statement. Is the noble Marquess aware that my Question was based entirely upon a statement from the special correspondent of the Daily Telegraph at Suez'?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I am not aware from what authority or source the noble Lord derived his information. That is less important than the fact that the information I have now given him is an exact reproduction of the Company's document.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, would the noble Marquess say what notice these employees should give, according to their contract; and, secondly, whether, when they return, they are on full pay or terminate their engagement with the universal Company?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, the question of notice is a matter between the employees and the Company, and so, I should have thought, was the other point. These are matters between the Company and those who have been their employees, and it is for them, and not Her Majesty's Government, to settle such matters.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, would the noble Marquess permit me to remind him that we are dealing with public funds? Four million pounds of stock in this Company are held by Her Majesty's Government and the yield thereof appears in the Estimates. It is not, therefore, within the competence of the Company to use this money to pay employees to come home.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, this is not a question of the Company paying their employees to come home. It is a question of the Company paying what they, in their judgment,

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consider to be proper and adequate compensation to persons who have been put in a position of difficulty through no fault of their own.
VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, are Her Majesty's Government aware that the majority of noble Lords in this House are deeply grateful to employees of the Suez Canal Company for remaining at their posts in exceedingly difficult circumstances and decline to be associated with the innuendoes made by the noble Viscount Lord Stansgate.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I think that not only Members of your Lordships' House but the whole of the public have good cause to be grateful to these employees, as the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle suggests, for the restraint they have shown in carrying on their employment during the past weeks.

THE SUEZ CANAL
2.42 p.m.
Debate resumed (according to Order), on the Motion moved yesterday by the Lord Chancellor: to resolve, That this House condemns the arbitrary action of the Egypian Government in seizing control of the Suez Canal; endorses the proposals adopted by the eighteen Powers at the London Conference which would ensure that an international waterway so essential to the economic life, standard of living and employment of this and other countries would not remain in the unrestricted control of any single Government; welcomes the sustained and continuing efforts of Her Majesty's Government to achieve a peaceful settlement, and affirms its support for the statement of policy made by Her Majesty's Government to this House on September 12.
EARL ATTLEE EARL ATTLEE rose to move, as an Amendment to the above Motion, to leave out all the words after "House" and to insert: "while condemning the arbitrary method employed by the Egyptian Government in respect of the Suez Canal Company, and resolved to support the legitimate rights of the users of the Canal, deplores the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to invoke the authority of the United Nations in the
728
dispute; calls upon Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations and to declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligation under the Charter of the United Nations; and to refrain meanwhile from any form of provocative action." The noble Earl said: My Lords, I am sure we are all fully seized of the serious issues which we are discussing to-day. I have had some experience of these matters. We had the experience over Persia, where we had, not an international agreement but an agreement, torn up. I am well aware of the temptation there is to think one could obtain a solution by force. We could not do it in the case of Persia, because we were bound by our obligations under the United Nations. We regret that we are unable now to support the Government, not from any factious or Party reasons but because we believe that the course they are following is fraught with the gravest danger to peace, is dangerous to the position of Britain in the world and endangers the whole position of the British Commonwealth.
There is no disposition whatever on this side of the House to support the action of Colonel Nasser. It has been represented in some quarters that if one criticises the Government one is. ipso facto, on the side of Colonel Nasser. That is entirely false. We do not approve of the action of Colonel Nasser: and in our view he is an imperialist dictator. We can say that, but I am bound to say also—though I may be accused of addiction to the diplomatic usages of the past—that I cannot feel that it is a very good thing. if you think you are going to negotiate with someone, to tell him that he is one of the worst people in the world and that you cannot trust a word he says. I think that is a fault of the new diplomacy over the wireless.
The first issue that arises is this question of breaches of International Law. The Lord Chancellor was at pains to explain at some length his view that Colonel Nasser's action was a breach of International Law. I do not think that we in this House needed much convincing of that. Perhaps what the noble and learned Viscount said was intended for external consumption. Personally. I am content to rest on the judgment of Lord McNair. I also had a feeling that the Lord Chancellor stressed that point so

729
much because he did not much like the pronouncement of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, as to the position of this country and its actions of the past few weeks in the light of International Law. I thought Lord McNair's speech most impressive and his statement that the Government, in their assemblage of armed force, were guilty of a breach of International Law deserving of our very serious attention. I am not an expert in these matters, but I am bound to say that I was not in the least convinced by what I considered the rather special pleading of the Lord Chancellor. However, I am sure my noble and learned friend Lord Jowitt will deal fully with the matter.
I entirely agree about the importance of upholding international obligations. It was stressed by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House and by the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord. Chancellor. But you cannot uphold the sanctity of International Law by committing breaches of it yourself. Two wrongs do not make a right. I found the speech of the noble Marquess disturbing, as I did the speech of the Prime Minister in another place. when read it. Throughout these weeks there has been in the background all the time a kind of vague threat of using force, a rather ostentatious moving of troops, suggested to be for the protection of our nationals but always with a kind of thought behind it that there may be other things for them to do. And this did, I think, amount almost to a threat. Coupled with that has been reluctance up to now to use the machinery of the United Nations. I am well aware that under the Covenant it is open to us, and our right, to use other methods of conciliation. But there seems always on the part of the Government an attempt to put everything before going to the United Nations. Our view is that that is where this quarrel should go.
There have been attempts to draw an odd kind of comparison between this and some of the controversies of the pre-war years. It has even been suggested that we on this side of the House are appeasers. As a matter of fact, our position has been precisely consistent, both before and after the war. We were always endeavouring to support the authority then of the League of Nations and now of the United Nations Organisation as against unilateral action, whether
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it was unilateral action under the Hoare-Laval Agreement or whether it was unilateral action by one of those States today. It seems to me that the Government are in effect laying themselves open to the charge of taking upon themselves the use of force without the sanction of the United Nations Organisation. They seem reluctant to act through the United Nations. I am well aware of the difficulties of going to the United Nations, of the trouble about the Veto and all the rest, but it is of supreme importance that we should not do anything to lessen the authority of the United Nations Organisation. And if we say that we will not go there because we are afraid that we shall not get a verdict, we are in effect sapping the whole foundations of the United Nations Organisation.
As has been said already in your Lordships' House by my noble friend Lord Silkin, and in another place, we are entirely with the Government in their endeavours to get some conciliation in this matter. We think the assembly of nations was a good thing. I think myself that it might have been wise to have included one or two other States, particularly Yugoslavia but that is a comparatively minor matter. I think that there has been a good attempt. We all owe our thanks to Mr. Menzies and his colleagues for their efforts. But I cannot think even now that the way of conciliation is entirely blocked. I cannot think that the gulf is so great that it cannot be passed.
That brings us to the initiative of the Government, in company with France and, so I understand, the United States of America, in forming this new organisation. I do not think that this can be regarded as a method of conciliation. Frankly, I do not much like our going forward in this matter with France. I have a great respect and affection for our French friends, but it is a fact—and it is no good blinking the fact—that in Africa and Asia to-day France is regarded as the last protagonist of the old colonialism, and therefore it is unfortunate that we should go forward in association with them. They are also considered, rightly or wrongly, to be merely concerned with their position in North Africa, rather than with the upholding of International Law.
Then there is the United States of America. I am always willing to go forward wherever possible, but you want to

731
be very sure where you are. I am told that this plan (I do not know whether it is true) originated with Mr. Dulles. In my experience I have had plans that were put forward by one part of the American Administration, and when one tried to implement them one found that they had not been fully considered, or were turned down by the Senate. And with no wish whatever to say a word against the United States of America, I think one must bear in mind the difficulties they have in their Constitution; that their Administration is far less master than is the Government of this country. Furthermore, that they are always in a great difficulty in making any positive commitments in election year. I have had long experience of dealing with elections coming on of one kind or another, and I know how difficult it is to get any real, firm agreement. And I am bound to say that there was some discrepancy between the Dulles Plan and America coming in on this new plan and the words of President Eisenhower with regard to the use of force. Some pertinent questions have been asked about what is really intended by the United States in this matter.
The next point I would make is: why could not this plan have been put forward by all the eighteen nations? Why is it put forward by three, with the others invited to follow on later? I would far rather have a wide action than a narrow action in this matter, because the fact remains that it does look as if one or two big Powers are trying to dominate the whole scene. That does not look quite like the upholding of International Law, for which we stand. Then I would ask: are we sure that we have the Commonwealth behind us? I have not heard yet what are the reactions of Canada, or of India, or of Pakistan, and I do not know yet what has been the result of the talks the Cabinet are having in Australia. It is very difficult to go forward with a plan like this unless you are sure where you are with our friends in the Commonwealth.
Then we come to the new plan itself. I may be very inexperienced, but I cannot quite understand the new proposal of the Canal Users' Association. What is it supposed to do? Apparently you set up an organisation the functions of which are to collect the dues. Then the
732
ships are supposed to go through the Canal. So far as I can understand, the Canal is still left entirely in the hands of the Egyptians. I thought that all the stress was on the need for seeing that the Canal was properly kept up and properly developed. I am bound to say that if I were Colonel Nasser, I might have accepted this plan. It seems to me to give him complete sovereign power to open and close the Canal and he has all the collection of dues done for him. But suppose he does not accept it, what happens then? A ship comes along with its pilot. What happens if they say, "No, we do not accept your pilot. You must have one of our pilots." What then? I think we ought to hear from the Government what they expect to follow. It is so easy to advocate a course of action without following up the other steps.
Here we come to one of the gravest questions of all, one that has not really been faced. Both the Prime Minister, in another place, and the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, here, have talked about the alternative of using force. Have they worked out what that means? We all remember that in the days of long ago there was the bombardment of Alexandria. That is not a feasible proposition to-day. Do they mean to occupy the Canal Zone? Do they mean to overthrow the Government of Colonel Nasser? Because you must consider just where you are going. Suppose you were to enter into the Canal and occupy the Zone, you might have just the same kind of opposition you had in other places where you occupied them against the will of a people. I doubt whether you would get a puppet Government—I think it would be too risky an occupation for anyone to take up. What are you going to do? Are you going to stay there and run Egypt? We have not been told the least thing about this use of force.
I think it is almost as bad to have this plan, of which we know so little, as to have the uncertainty that has been hanging over us for weeks, in which there has been a kind of threat to do something, though we do not know what it is. I do not think it was wise to have such a great parade of troops sent to Cyprus, and particularly to send French troops there. The Government seem to have managed, rather ineptly, to set the whole of the Middle East against us; they

733
almost go out to unite the whole of the Middle East. I do not shoulder them with complete responsibility, but the fact is that we have hardly a friend left in the Middle East.
One has to think seriously of our position in the world. Here I come back to the principal theme—namely, that in these days Great Britain's influence in the world depends far more on moral leadership than on force. The old days of Gladstone, or the noble Marquess's grandfather, when we had an overwhelming navel force in a world where sea power ruled. have gone for ever. We are not now in a position suddenly to send the Fleet somewhere. Our influence depends on moral force; and our moral leadership depends on a respect for the rule of law. Despite all the arguments of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, I cannot think that he was convinced when he tried to suggest that, somehow or other, by this action we were upholding International Law and ideals of justice. I want our country to remain as the great moral leader in the world.
Then, our strength rests largely on the Commonwealth. which comprises not only people of European stock but also people of Asia. The facts one has to remember are the growth of Asiatic consciousness—that is one thing; and it goes for India—and also the awakening of Islam—arid that affects Pakistan. We hear a good deal about Colonel Nasser wishing to make for himself a great Empire and to be dictator of all the Arab world. I am afraid that the kind of attack which is being put up now helps him in those views. It is a great mistake to think that you necessarily destroy a person's position by attacking him—often you make him. In the political life of this country, I see people abused by every newspaper. The result is that they attain immense popularity. If you attack Colonel Nasser you may raise him up to a position where he is regarded not only as the hero of Islam but the hero of the darker-skinned races against the white. That would be a great disaster.
We come back to what can be done. Our view is that it is not enough to say that, when all else fails, we may apply to U.N.O. There has not yet been a proper application to U.N.O. We demand immediate reference of the matter to
734
U.N.O. That is the forum of world conscience. It is not ideal, but it is all we have to prevent us from slipping back into a welter of anarchy and war. I beg to move the Amendment to the Motion.
Amendment moved—
Leave out all the words after (" House ") and insert (" while condemning the arbitrary method employed by the Egyptian Government in respect of the Suez Canal Company, and resolved to support the legitimate rights of the users of the Canal, deplores the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to invoke the authority of the United Nations in the dispute; calls upon Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations and to declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligation under the Charter of the United Nations; and to refrain meanwhile from any form of provocative action.")—(Earl Attlee.)
3.6 p.m.
LORD HORS-BELISHA: My Lords, I think some of your Lordships must have listened with pain to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. He said that he had great experience in these matters, and no-one will deny him either that experience or a most notable part in forwarding the interests of Britain in the past. However, I think it is relevant to ask ourselves what constructive contribution his speech has made to the settlement of our difficulties. It is true, of course—and nobody would allege to the contrary—-that the noble Earl is not a supporter of Colonel Nasser. Such a suggestion, which the noble Earl thought it necessary to repudiate, would occur to no-one. But that Colonel Nasser must derive aid and comfort from that speech is beyond dispute.
The noble Earl, having on previous occasions enjoined on us the necessity for working with our friends abroad, thought fit to complain that we had worked with France on this occasion. France happens to be governed by a Socialist Government, and it is rather a high price to exact for the noble Earl's difference of opinion with M. Mollet that he should repudiate the co-operation of our great Ally. The noble Earl said that he would be willing to go forward with the United States, wherever possible. What a picture of allied solidarity to present to an aggressor at this fatal hour!I earnestly deplore that

735
speech, because I think it has been unhelpful.
The noble Earl spoke of the reluctance of Her Majesty's Government to use the machinery of the United Nations. But the Amendment to the Motion does not speak of any "reluctance" to use the machinery of the United Nations; it speaks of the blank "refusal" of Her Majesty's Government to use that machinery. Why put down a vote of censure in these harsh terms and come here and put a gloss upon it? The noble Earl spoke also of the British Commonwealth and, unable to point to any division in our ranks, he even asked Her Majesty's Government whether they had inquired of Australia what her attitude would be. My Lords, Mr. Menzies has played the most notable part in helping us out of difficulties. Surely, he is the person who could have addressed Her Majesty's Government upon that subject, and would it not have been courteous, at any rate, after the great services he has rendered, to await his return to Australia to hear what he had to say?
It is true that the noble Earl has experience of Abadan, and he has cited that precedent, if it be a precedent, this afternoon. Others also have experience of Abadan, but none had a closer contact with those events than Mr. Morrison, who was Foreign Secretary at the time. I am afraid that Mr. Morrison, rather than Her Majesty's Government, must deserve the censure of the Party of which he has so long been Deputy Leader, for his views were completely out of accord with the speech to which we have just listened. Mr. Morrison "pooh-poohed" the United Nations. He said that he had experience of the United Nations dealing with Abadan, and he went On to say [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 557 (No. 205), col. 1666]:
"I say to the United Nations that if it wishes—as we would wish it—to become the great moral authority of the world and the great decisive instrument, it must stop dodging vital international issues."
For months past we have been listening to a complaint that the United Nations have done nothing to insist upon Israeli ships going through the Canal. How, then, are we to expect them to insist on our ships going through the Canal? And that is presumably what Mr. Morrison has in mind when he talks of the United
736
Nations dodging vital issues. Mr. Morrison went on to say:
"If our Government and France "—
because Mr. Morrison is more friendly towards France, I am glad to see, than the noble Earl, Lord Attlee—
"and, if possible, the United States "—
he, in his broad-mindness, would consent to work with the United States, without qualification, in these matters—
"should come to the conclusion that in the circumstances the use of force would be justified, then I think that it is up to each honourable Member of this House "—
that is the other place—
"to tell the Government whether we would support them or whether we would not. For my own part, in principle, if, after an elaborate and proper consideration the Government and our friends"—
that is, France and the United States—
"come to that conclusion, I think that in the circumstances of this particular case it might well be the duty of honourable Members, including myself, to say that we would give them support."
That is a speech made by a right honourable gentleman who has been a colleague of the noble Earl in the most influential position outside the first position in the Socialist Party, for many years. It does not express the attitude of Her Majesty's Government, who have never threatened to use force in any circumstances, and it would be a salutary restraint upon the lips of the critics of the Government if they reserved the word "provocative" for the actions of the man who is threatening the safety of Britain and of the whole commercial world.
I say—and I say it with deep regret—that the performance of the Socialist Party on this occasion is deplorable. Mr. Gaitskell went so far yesterday as to say in another place that the alternatives before Her Majesty's Government were the use of force or "the greatest diplomatic climb-down in our history" [OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, Vol. 558 (No. 206), col. 24]. It would be no greater exaggeration here to say that, in the case of the Socialist Party, we are in the presence of the greatest political volte face in our history. I ask the House to bear with me (for this is a matter of life and death to Britain and the whole Western world) while we examine what is at stake. What a difference in attitude between what we have heard to-day together with what

737
we heard yesterday in another place, and what we heard when we were first challenged by the seizure of the Canal!On August 2, the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, who always speaks so competently and soberly on all matters, expressed the attitude of Her Majesty's Opposition, and Mr. Gaitskell expressed it in another place. What did they say? They denounced Nasser in no unmeasured terms. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, this afternoon said that it was preposterous, or words to that effect, to speak of Nasser as Mussolini or Hitler. He said that that was not the way to conduct a successful negotiation—to describe your enemy as a dictator. That is exactly what Mr. Gaitskell did. He said that Nasser was a reincarnation of Hitler and Mussolini in this matter.
EARL ATTLEE: May I point out to the noble Lord that I was talking of the relations of Governments. It has always been open for independent Members of either House to say what they like, but I suggest that it is not the best way of diplomacy for the head of a Government or a Foreign Secretary to indulge in that kind of thing.
LORD HORS-BELISHA: I have always thought it better, in circumstances of great importance, to call a spade a spade. If a man is a dictator, it is no good speaking of him, for diplomatic reasons, as a high-minded representative of a democracy. If his actions resemble or are modelled on those of his less for tunate totalitarian predecessors, I should conceive that he could not be otherwise than proud of the comparison. However, that is, after all, a small matter. With the indulgence or latitude which the noble Earl says should he reserved for the Opposition or non-members of the Government—this man was described by Mr. Gaitskell in the horrific term of, "dictator". His actions were likened to those of Mussolini and Hitler.
Having denounced him, these two spokesmen of the Party—because they took exactly the same line, naturally—went on to say that, in their opinion, Nasser was guilty of an illegal act. And not only that he was guilty of an illegal act, but that the manner of his performing the act was also an illegality. They then went on to say—these were the words of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—that in i he circumstances they "cordially
738
welcomed the statement of Her Majesty's Government." The statement of Her Majesty's Government in essence was that, speaking for Britain, we would not tolerate the control of this Canal being in the unfettered hands of Nasser. It was also made plain that we would rest content with nothing less than international control of the Canal, the reason being that unless we did so insist there was nothing to give us protection or to preserve our standard of life in the future. That policy was given what was called a "cordial welcome" by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.
Then he went on to say—rightly, as I think, because a bi-partisan foreign policy is the best weapon with which we could confront our external enemies—
"We welcome the discussions that are taking place."
That is, he welcomed the course taken by Her Majesty's Government in consulting with the Foreign Minister or Prime Minister of France and with Mr. Dulles of the United States. He did not take the view expressed by the noble Earl this afternoon on this or any other matter. He said that he welcomed this common action with France and the United States and he hoped it would go further—not, your Lordships will notice, to the United Nations. He hoped it would lead to a larger conference of all the maritime nations—that is what the noble Lord said and that is what Mr. Gaitskell said—and they hoped that Egypt would be invited and also that Russia would be invited.
The reason why the noble Lord, Lord Silkin wanted Russia to be invited, he said (and Mr. Gaitskell said the same in another place), that was in 1946 she—that is, Russia—took the view that an international control by the nations concerned, through a United Nations Agency was essential. Russia took that view in 1946. She did not take it in 1956 because, as everybody knows—not being a member of the Government I may speak candidly about these countries—she adjusts her views to her immediate interests and to the attitude which will cause the greatest trouble at the time. She did not take the attitude that she wanted this worked through a United Nations Agency. But Russia was invited and came: Egypt was invited and did not come, and the conference, I recommended so sagaciously by my noble

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friend Lord Silkin, took place. He wanted this conference to take place partly with a view to creating a world opinion—and all this was before any mention of the United Nations. The matter was not to go to the United Nations; it was to go to a conference; and he said we should certainly bring—
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: A very unusual thing is taking place. A debate in another place is being analysed and answered by a Member of this House.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: No, it is not. I am quoting the noble Lord, Lord Silkin.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I bring a point of order to the notice of the Leader of the House. I understand that it is quite irregular and will, I am afraid, result in your Lordships' speeches being examined in the same hostile spirit in another place. That has always been forbidden because we desire to avoid a clash of opinion between the two Houses.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: As my noble friend Lord Cherwell beside me says in language which I know is familiar to the noble Viscount, Il n'y a que la verité qui pique,
which, being translated, means that obviously the noble Viscount and others feel the force of what I am saying am analysing—
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I would remind the noble Lord that a smattering of French—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The long-established practice of the relations between the two Houses—
LORD HORE-BELISHA: My noble friend—for he is my noble friend—does not appear to realise that I am quoting from a speech made in this House. I am quoting from a speech which defined the attitude of Her Majesty's Opposition on a previous occasion. I am amplifying it because one can only be authoritative by saying that in another place the Leader of the Party said exactly the same thing. The two speeches are practically identical except perhaps that, being in this House, I ought to say that that of the noble Lord. Lord Silkin, had all its usual grace and charm; but the points are
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exactly the same. My noble friend was advocating that any control commission which might be set up as a result of this conference should be a United Nations Agency. That was what was said. He went on—because there were other points of agreement, and very few of disagreement—to approve the economic action of the Government against Egypt. This was the policy enunciated on that occasion. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, made a very short speech. He identified himself with that policy and he said:
"We support the Government in whatever action is necessary provided that we act within the sphere of International Law."
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD HORE-BELISHA: Nobody is suggesting, surely, that anything that has been done by Her Majesty's Government is outside the sphere of International Law. It was the policy enjoined upon Her Majesty's Government by the Opposition. It was carried out to the letter. The conference which they recommended took place. Mr. Menzies took the proposals to Nasser. The proposals contained the recommendation that the Board to be set up—it is all in the White Papers (Cmd. 9853 and Cmd. 9856)—should be a United Nations Agency, should be brought into relationship with the United Nations on the lines of the International Bank and should make periodic reports to the United Nations. In addition to that, Her Majesty's Government have referred this matter, as we were told yesterday, to the United Nations.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No, no.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: To the Security Council.
LORD PAKENHAM: No, no.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: They have informed the Security Council.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Ah!
LORD HORE-BELISHA: Nothing more than that was asked by the Opposition; not even that was asked. I point this out to my noble friends opposite: that they have been at pains to stress that Britain is not alone concerned in this matter. There are eighteen nations who have acted together in this matter and not one of them has asked for this matter to be debated in the

741
United Nations. We and France are the only two Powers who have gone to the United Nations with the information that this dispute is in progress, and we have acted, therefore, hitherto entirely in accordance with what has been suggested to us by the Opposition.
LORD PAKENHAM: No.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: It seems a shame in the eyes of history to make a breach in the domestic front where there is in fact so much agreement. But we are not here dealing with a theoretical question and merely with principles of international justice; we are dealing with the day-to-day livelihood of the British people and of the Western world. The Canal has to be run. We cannot wait while there is a long process of adjudication for running the Canal. Surely nobody in the Opposition would expect that. Accordingly, Her Majesty's Government have taken action to protect this country, and other countries have been associated with us. A number of pilots are leaving their posts. That is entirely, as is admitted, within their discretion. A number of administrative officers are leaving their posts. We should be confronted with a complete breakdown of the Canal if we took up a purely negative attitude and said, "While the United Nations is discussing this we shall do nothing about it."
We have to see that the Canal operates, and, accordingly, a Users' Association has been established with France and with the United States. What is wrong about that? Egypt is invited to co-operate. If she co-operates, well and good; the matter is settled, at any rate temporarily. I really cannot see why we should divide this nation and revive again the cry of "Whose hand is on the trigger?" and suggest that Her Majesty's Government are acting provocatively and trying to manœuvre us into a situation—all that was stated in another place—in which we could make another war. There is not the slightest foundation for that charge. The noble Earl objected to the movement of troops, and he quoted another speech to say that this was in breach of International Law. But Mr. Gaitskell, speaking for the Opposition in another place, said that any Government would take some action. He said:
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"I do not object to the precautionary steps. I think that any Government would have to do that "—
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL. (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, the last thing I want to do is to interrupt the extremely interesting speech of the noble Lord. As the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, questioned me a little earlier, I would say that I believe the noble Lord may paraphrase, though he may not quote, what is said in another place.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: I preferred to be accurate, but if that offends the noble Viscount opposite, I quite understand. I will parenthetically say that he always brings much entertainment to us not only by his own speeches but to the speeches of others, in most of which he participates gaily, and I am grateful. However, if I may paraphrase it, the official attitude of the Opposition was that the movement of troops was justified. And whose movement of troops was occupying the attention of the world? —the Egyptian Minister of War has prided himself on this. The movements were, first of all, those of Egyptian troops and aircraft; and the Egyptian Minister of War claimed that he was ready to the last gaiter button. What a neglect of duty if Her Majesty's Government had not done what was necessary in those circumstances!
My Lords, I feel that Her Majesty's Government have acted rightly and skilfully in defence of the interests of this country; but I do not think that we should delude ourselves that we are going to reach a satisfactory and permanent solution of this question by political or diplomatic means. It will be for the business men and scientists to give us the solution of this problem. What we need is something of that vision which inspired de Lesseps and Brunel, and, in the political field, Disraeli. They found solutions relevant, to the era when our motive power was dependent upon our own indigenous resources and a great commercial system was built up upon coal. To-day again we need imagination, and we shall get it.
I do not want to ride a hobby horse, and particularly to ride my alternative Canal. All I should like to say to your Lordships is that, after I last spoke upon this subject, a Member of your Lordships'

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House told me that his grandfather, in the time of de Lesseps, had surveyed the Mediterranean-Akaba route, and he had the plans and he found it an entirely practicable proposition. That is all I say about that. The Iraq Petroleum Company is talking now about making a pipeline by-passing Syria. So there is some solution to be found in alternative pipelines. There is a partial solution to be found in super-tankers. Here, it is necessary that we should have the terminals, and I am glad to see that the British Petroleum Company is making another large terminal here. Of course, with the tankers we use to-day it is now more costly to go round the Cape than to go through the Canal. but, in view of the height of the Canal dues, it is not more costly if tankers of 80.000 tons are used. Then, perhaps, there is an economy. I am glad to see that in Britain some very large tankers are being built—in fact, more large tankers are being constructed here than anywhere else in the world. That is a possible help towards a solution. I understand that the Americans have a Committee which is examining ways of increasing the flow of supplies to us from the New World and of giving us dollar assistance in the event of our being deprived of our Middle East oil supplies, in whole or in serious part. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, can tell us about that. Undoubtedly, there are illimitable resources of oil in the world, both potential and probable, which have not yet been exploited. There is also. of course, atomic energy.
Therefore, as it seems to me, we can say to Colonel Nasser that in the long run he is going to be the loser, for human ingenuity is never beaten. Spain lost her position in the world through taking the view that gold and power were good things in themselves and through failing to use fruitfully the resources which nature had given her. Let Nasser take heed. We are not without alternative means, and if he persists in this conduct, not only will he not get his Aswan Dam but no one will invest in Egypt; and if the Arab world follows his suit, no one will invest in the Arab world. There are other sources and resources open to mankind, and I think that we should look to them. In the meanwhile, I think the Government have done what a Labour
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Government ought to have done, and I hope would have done, had they been in office. I think it is a shame to make a breach in this nation and to let the people believe that our action is intended for war. We ought to have national solidarity. The Government have secured international solidarity among eighteen nations, at any rate, and it is a pity that the only gap in our armour should take the form of this vote of censure.
3.37 p.m.
LORD BEVERIDGE: My Lords, after the disagreements which have marked some of our recent moments in this House, I should like to begin with something on which we shall all be agreed—a reference of gratitude for the admirable speech with which the Lord Chancellor ended our proceedings last night. For myself, I accept without question, as I think we all do, the whole of the first half of that speech—his description of the Suez Canal as international. I think that it is clear that there are a good many parts of the world which ought to be regarded as international rather than at the will of one particular small ruler or dictator. I need not discuss these other possible parts; and I think we all accept this for the Suez Canal. I personally, as I am sure do all of us, accept also the judgment passed by the Lord Chancellor upon Colonel Nasser as a man who is thoroughly untrustworthy. I hope that nobody who has anything else to do at all will feel bound to spend time in examining alternatives put up by Colonel Nasser for dealing with the Suez Canal problem.
But when I come to the latter part of the Lord Chancellor's speech, the part leading to the Resolution which we have before us, committing us to approval of the whole of the speech made by the Leader of the House, with deep regret I find myself unable to give the same assent. I notice that in the other place, quite unknown to me, the members of my Party, the Liberal Party, are proposing an Amendment to leave out the two final sentences of the Resolution that we have before us. I rather hope that we shall agree to leave out those sentences and in due course, also, a great deal of the Amendment moved by the official Opposition. I shall end by a few suggestions on that point.
On the Resolution asking us to approve practically the whole statement of policy

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contained in the speech by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House I am in this difficulty. Listening to every word of that speech, and writing down certain striking phrases from it, at some points I felt very unhappy. There was a moment when, having described some of the mis-demeanours of Colonel Nasser, the noble Marquess the Leader of the House declared [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 199, col. 639]:
"The time to call a halt is now."
The noble Marquess went on to say It may be that we shall have to choose between peace and the sanctity of international agreements". I want to ask: who are "we" for that purpose? I would remind the noble Marquess the Leader of the House that he went on immediately afterwards to explain, as one of the possible purposes of our troop momements, not the defence of British citizens against murder but the purpose of deciding between peace and the sanctity of international agreements. Does not that all come really to using force, which means making war against Egypt, in order to ensure our view as to how the Suez Canal should be managed? I find it difficult to avoid any other conclusion. I wish I could do so, and I hope that before this evening is finished I shall be able to accept a different view; but it did not sound like it.
In case my interpretation is not wholly wrong may I go on to argue that no rational person can propose a war upon Egypt and a military occupation of Egypt for the sake of maintaining the international character of the Suez Canal. Just think of the possibilities of that war upon Egypt by us or by any allies with us to-day!The first possibility is the destruction of the Canal itself in the whole process of war. The second possibility is a third world war affecting all of us; and at the end of it, assuming we are successful in our war upon Egypt, we shall he sitting down there, in charge of the Canal, among a people permanently hostile, enslaved by us for a purpose which they have rejected. I suggest that the idea of going to war with Egypt—and that is what using force means—in order to internationalise the Suez Canal is the way of madness.
Are there no alternatives? I suggest that there are two at least. Instead of the use of armed force against Egypt by any
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one nation, or group of nations, there is the obvious and essential course of direct reference to the United Nations. In spite of the ingenious explanation put forward by the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor for the delay in the taking of that simple and immediate step by Her Majesty's Government—and why we should not take that step—I want to say at once that, while we all know what the United Nations is like, and how it is governed by a Veto in the Security Council so that we cannot count upon any good, positive result, in my view we ought to try the United Nations and go through all the necessary motions of invoking it for the settlement of this international dispute.
I come to a second positive alternative —a serious exploration of alternatives to the Suez Canal as a means of passage of goods and ships. I use the word "serious" with reference to some of the remarks made by the Prime Minister in another place yesterday. The Prime Minister then made some perfunctory reference to this idea as being not really practicable, and went on to explain that the building of large oil tankers would take several years and that the longer sea haul would raise the cost of living in Britain. Well, with the Suez Canal stopped while we are conducting our war, would it not take more time to get our supplies? And with a war going on, would not the cost of living rise in other ways? It seems to me that the use of feeble arguments of that kind, about loss of time and raising the cost of living, show that the Prime Minister and his advisers have not considered with the care it deserves this positive alternative of using other routes for the traffic of goods and ships. I was much impressed, as, I believe, were many others in this House, by the very different approach to this problem that was made by the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford, as a shipowner who knows what are the problems of moving things about the world. I wish Her Majesty's Government would invite all shipowners to come together and sit down and give their considered judgment as to how long it would take to get an alternative route for a certain amount of the traffic that goes now through the Suez Canal; how much it would cost and how the difficulties could be overcome.

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I have a further suggestion to make on that point. Is this not a matter on which, above all, we ought to bring the United States into consultation, alliance and friendship with us? After all, the United States are the people who could carry us over the first five years of difficulty. There will be difficulty if whether through war or for other reasons, the Suez Canal is not fully used. The United States have committed themselves to the Menzies plan and are really committed to helping the world in its difficulties. I would make an appeal to them to help us in these difficulties for the next five years. That would be the alternative to asking them to help us by coming into a war—a thing which they will not do, anyhow. If it were made clear that we and other nations were making not a frivolous ruling-out investigation of alternatives to the Suez Canal as a means of moving goods about the world, but were taking that matter thoroughly seriously, there is nothing that would more certainly bring Nasser to his senses and his heels. That, economic force, not military force, is the way to get the Suez Canal back into general use again.
I want to conclude by two negatives and two positives, to which I should add an appeal for the agreement of the leading Members of this House. My two negatives are: clearly, we should decline to accept anything less than the Dulles-Menzies plan for international control of Suez Canal operations. We should not waste our time in talking to Colonel Nasser or any of his friends upon the conditions which he has laid down. Secondly, we should decline to go to war with Egypt by our own decision, and to enforce acceptance of our plan or any other. Those are the negatives. Now for the positives. Let us refer the dispute positively, at once, to the Security Council. Let us make it clear (this is where I am deeply moved by what the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor said about the responsibility that rests upon all nations who understand the sanctity of international relations for using force if needs be to support it) that if the United Nations needs force to take action which it decides to take we will render our share of that force; we will face that responsibility. In other
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words, whatever force may be needed, under the directions of the United Nations, to maintain the Suez Canal as an international waterway, or to maintain other elements of international agreement, we are there and ready to provide it. I come to my other alternative. Let us explore practically and immediately an alternative to the Suez Canal for world traffic and appeal to the United States to help us and the world in overcoming transitional difficulties. I press that last proposal, both for its own sake and because it seems the most hopeful way of bringing Nasser to his senses, if he has any.
May I end with a different appeal, an appeal to the Government and to the principal Opposition to find a way of agreement between the Motion of the Government and the Amendment put forward by the Opposition? It is not only speeches which are normally improved by being shortened: the process also rather improves Motions and Amendments. I have been through the Motion and the Amendment without putting a single word into either but striking quite a number of sentences out of them. I have made them into something which I should be proud to have published as the considered and agreed judgment of the people of Britain. Let us try to avoid ending this debate without anything agreed, because I do not believe that we are really disagreed. I hope that the Lord Chancellor will allow me to hand him my improved Amendment to his Resolution and the Amendment of Lord Attlee and that he, with others, will consider it.
3.54 p.m.
THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, the speeches to which we have already listened have underlined the gravity of the crisis with which this nation, and indeed the world of nations, is faced, and we must all desire that our nation should be united in its attitude to this crisis. All serious citizens realise the responsibilities and the difficulties; nor is there any difference of opinion that Colonel Nasser's action is not only arbitrary in a high degree but a breach of his pledged word as well as highly damaging to British interests and the interests of very many other nations. I have no hesitation in condemning Colonel Nasser's action very definitely and very

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strongly. But I believe that only a solution through the agency of, and by direct reference to, the United Nations can be both morally satisfactory and lasting.
I am not opposed to the use of force in all circumstances, but before the use of force can be contemplated two questions have to be considered: first, the necessity of its use as opposed to peaceful methods; secondly, the authority under which force actually comes to be used. In yesterday's debate—for my absence from which owing to inevitable engagements I apologise—there was a most valuable discussion on the question of the legality of Colonel Nasser's action, particularly on the point as to whether or not it was a breach of International Law. Like other Members of your Lordships' House, if it is not impertinent for me to say so, I find myself in wholehearted sympathy with the opinion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair. Also there was a valuable discussion on the meaning of "acts of aggression" and "a breach of the peace" as those terms are understood in a technical way in the United Nations Charter.
I believe that the question of the legal relationship of the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government and of the Egyptian. Government and the British Government is by no means a simple question. The Report issued only a few days ago by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, on Britain and the Suez Canal—a very valuable and objective Report as it seems to me—makes this and other matters rather plain. It says:
"An examination of the agreements…shows the extreme difficulty of fitting either the Canal or the Company's management of it into the convenient pigeon-holes of national sovereignty or international agreement."
And, again in this style of objective reporting. this Report speaks of the Canal Company as occupying a position of peculiarly difficult character, peculiarly designed, the Report says, to awaken nationalist suspicion. It is a quasi-national body, negotiating on equal terms with nations and operating in the interests of international commerce. It is a very complicated situation, from both the legal And the administrative points of view.
The Report goes on to remark, concerning the Canal, that it has an anomalous position as it has always been emphasised in the agreements signed by
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the British Government that the Canal is an integral part of Egypt; also it is an international waterway in which many other nations are concerned. Then I call attention to this phrase:
"It might be held, however, that so long as the Canal 'were maintained as it now stands, at its present level of efficiency, the Egyptian Government: would be fulfilling all the obligations which might lie upon it."
I only mention that, without comment. It is said that a great wrong has been done and a crime has been committed. It may be that it is undesirable and a waste of time to take advantage of Article 36 of the Charter, which says that as a general rule legal disputes should be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. On the other hand, when we come to an act of aggression or a breach of the peace, there is a particular obligation set out in the Charter which gives the determination of the fact to the Security Council. Article 39 reads:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall he taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
In the opening of his speech, the noble Marquess the Leader of the House very properly remarked that up to the present time the action taken by Her Majesty's Government has been in strict conformity with Article 33, in which the parties to a dispute are invited, if they can do so, to settle disputes by conciliation, arbitration or (I underline this) "other peaceful moans of their own choice." The proposals of the eighteen nations were, as we all agree, a valuable contribution to those peaceful means, and it was hoped by many that negotiations would follow on a not too inflexible pattern. But those negotiations have broken down, and it is with the next step that the speeches made in both Houses by the Leaders have been concerned. The original signatories to the Convention. the present users of the Canal and the United Nations are all involved. Obviously, as the Government have said repeatedly, it is the desire of everybody that there should be peaceful negotiations, and everybody will he behind the Government so long as their action is within the terms of Article 33—namely, the use of whatever peaceful means they might prefer.

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But the proposal which the Government bring before Parliament to-day is a proposal which is beset with certain difficulties. I would humbly suggest that there are two sides with regard to the workability and fitness of that proposal which have to be considered. It is a proposal for the formation of a Users' Association. So long as the Users' Association is a voluntary body, holding a watching brief and competent to give advice—though I know that that is not sufficient—perhaps there is a great deal to be said for it; but when it comes to the exercise of certain functions which are proposed, a two-fold difficulty arises. It is proposed that the Users' Association should undertake the responsibility for co-ordinating traffic through the Canal and for exercising the rights of the Canal users. The first question which seems to me to arise, if the act of undertaking responsibility for exercising users' rights is to be pursued, is the relation of this to the territorial integrity of Egypt on the one hand, and to the duty of the Egyptian Government for the defence of the Canal on the other. I am told that this duty belongs to them. The Report to which I have referred says:
"By the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal base of October 19, 1954, which terminated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance and secured withdrawal of all British Forces from Egyptian territory, it is to be assumed that the political responsibility for the defence of the Canal, except in the circumstances which provided for the reactivation of the base under Article 4, passed into the hands of the Egyptian Government."
I should like the Government to consider this question carefully—it is not a purely theoretical one: what would be the legal and the moral position of the Users' Association and the power which belonged to them if they did not secure the co-operation of Egypt, and assumed control of the Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, in the face of paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of United Nations:
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations "?
Or if the Powers behind the Users' Association took from Egypt their responsibility, if that responsibility is, as I have quoted, for the defence of the Canal? It seems to me that in this aspect of the case
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the proposal to set up a Users' Association which has executive and controlling authority has very grave risks—this, quite apart from any incident such as might occur through an act of the Egyptian Government themselves. We must consider how we should defend the action of the Powers involved if a member charged the Powers involved with an infringement of Article 2, paragraph 4. of the Charter. It is not a question of the use of force, as such, but of whether or not the use of force has the authority of the United Nations behind it.
Up to the present moment, as I have attempted to say, Her Majesty's Government have been acting thoroughly inside the terms of Article 33. But it is when those "other means" are brought in, as a menace—a remote possibility maybe, but anyhow a possibility of the future—that it is so disturbing. The noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, quoting the Prime Minister, said that in certain circumstances, if there were interference or an incapacity for taking the action proposed with regard to the exercise of the users' rights, we should be obliged
"to take such further steps as seem to be required, either through the United Nations or by other means for the assertion of their rights."
Few people would quarrel with taking further steps through the United Nations. It is the contemplation of further steps, apart from and independently of the United Nations, that is so troubling.
I am in agreement with those who urge Her Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned to take the whole matter now, by direct reference—not simply information—to the United Nations. I know that such action may be highly inconvenient and may involve a considerable delay, but the present position has more alarming possibilities if it is pursued. And the present position with regard to the use of the Canal is damaging not only to us, but to President Nasser. He may be mad—I will not indulge in epithets for a description of his temperament—but it surely cannot be very long before (as happened in the Persian case) President Nasser wakes up to the extreme damage done to Egyptian interests, if he persists in his policy.
We must all be very happy that the United States, France and the United Kingdom are together at this moment. It

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is, as has been said from the other side of the House, extremely doubtful whether the United States means anything by that phrase "other means" when it comes to taking forcible action. But it would be far more satisfactory if the action which these three Governments, whatever it may be, had behind it the whole power and authority of the United Nations; not, I know, unanimously, but had behind it the opinion and judgment of the Security Council or the Assembly—and I know that there is a great difference between the two.
I think we roust take a long-term view of the right thing to do. We may be thwarted and frustrated with regard to this immediate grave crisis, but more than the present crisis is involved: it is the future of United Nations, even its existence, that is at stake. Reference was made in another place to the days before the Second World War, when aggressive acts were taken and the necessary steps from us did not follow. But one of the reasons why those necessary steps did not follow was because Britain and France tried to do it alone and avoided consultation with other great Powers. What is disturbing now is that with this new climate of opinion we are losing the respect and the great confidence of Asia and Africa. As the noble Earl, Lord Atlee, said, the moral leadership of Britain is really its greatest asset. I believe that to act by other means than the means of the United Nations would be detrimental to our interests, to our position in the world and to the whole of our importance in these great, new, undeveloped but rising territories in Asia and Africa.
4.17 p.m.
LORD VANSITTART: My Lords. I congratulate Her Majesty's Government on the way that they have handled this crisis so far. I do not think that they could have clone less, and I am glad that they have done no more at this juncture, because I do not think there is yet sufficient ground for the use of force, and I have always felt from the very start that we should do well to exhaust our orthodox remedy by recourse to the United Nations. The moment of going, of course, must be for the Government to choose, but we should have to go without illusion. We all know very well that the Security Council is paralysed by the
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Soviet Veto—they have exercised it nearly eighty times. The Assembly is a body divided into blocs: the Arab bloc, the Communist bloc and the Latin-American bloc, and I suppose that now we shall have the eighteen countries bloc; and we all doubt whether we should get action or impartiality from such a body. Therefore, it may be said that by having recourse to the United Nations we are dodging a vital issue into a blind alley. Nevertheless, I think it is a legitimate tactic.
But we need not leave it in a blind alley. In particular, we should have nothing to do with the doctrine which proclaims that nothing can be done without the consent of the United Nations, because that would put a premium on anarchy; it would be a safe conduct to any malefactor and would enable every rogue with Russian approval to do just what he liked. The rest of us would have no remedy, and that would he to defeat the very purposes for which the United Nations were founded. Therefore, I think Her Majesty's Government have been wise to take their precautions. There has been some criticism of them from the Opposition Benches, but, if I recall aright, they also sent warships to Abadan, and I thought that that was a very legitimate precaution. We must remember that only a few years ago British subjects were being disembowelled and roasted by the mob in the streets of Cairo. Surely, we do not want that to happen again, and we must guard against any risk of it.
My chief grievance against post-war Governments has been that they have not done enough to safeguard British subjects. Many years ago, when I was still foolish enough to make many speeches—to which, of course, nobody ever listened—I made a long speech in this House asking whether it was safe to be British, and I answered, "No, of course it is not." There are some people who still say so. But if they would only follow the Cairo radio or, indeed, the whole outpourings of the Eastern Press, they would see that this Egyptian rabble rouser is highly dangerous to human existence, and they would recognise in him a naked aggressor without even the loin cloth of pretence. Give him a little more licence and he will set the whole

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East alight, beginning with Israel, just as surely as success was Hitler's fuel.
Quite clearly, Nasser's aim, after destroying the Jews—and note again the parallel with Hitler—is to unite all Arabs and Africans against the West. He has given perfectly clear notice of this: it is quite unmistakable. On the very day that he seized the Canal he said that Arab nationalism had been set on fire from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf. What more do you want? I hope the West will sit up and take notice a little more quickly now than it did in the 'thirties. In 1936 Hitler seized the Rhine. The whisper went around at once, "Why should not a man do what he likes in his own country?" You know the consequences. When Nasser seized the Canal the same whisper started again. We are told that there is disunity in the country. Of course there is. Of course there was disunity then, and that was the whole trouble. That is precisely why many countries were destroyed, 30 million lives thrown away and Britain reduced to a second-rate Power. That was the consequences of disunity. Cannot everybody see now that 1936 was our last chance of avoiding disaster in Europe, and that 1956 is our last chance of avoiding it in the East?
Some years ago Sir Winston Churchill said, "I have not always been wrong." May I, at long last, say this, because I am profoundly grieved to see great national and international issues like this taking on the shape of a Party struggle? I have worked hard and faithfully for all your three Parties; I did my utmost for you all. Perhaps you will allow me very humbly to give one more warning, and that is that if we persist in disunity we may lay up for our people another terrible price such as we have paid in the past. I hope to God we shall avoid that! I hope we shall refuse to go on being chivvied by blind mice. Even the farmer's wife rounded on them in the end. I hope we shall drop the policy of cold feet in a hot climate. I hope, too, that this Government—indeed, any other Government—will be firm and resolute to defend British interests against the encroachments of any dictators.
I repeat that I do not think that the moment for force has yet come. But I fear that it may, because Nasser exudes
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megalomania with every word and from every pore. That is why I venture to conclude with a suggestion which might perhaps secure our legitimate objectives and, at the same time, ease the qualms of noble Lords on the Left. It arises thus. You all know the methods of police States, of which Nasser's is one. They always think that they can bolster themselves with spy trials, and they pick their victims and soften them up. Quite plainly, they pulp them: they pulp them to extract a confession, as juice is extracted from a lemon, and that is what has been going on in Egypt. I do not say there is physical torture, but you know all the other methods. I said long ago that Petkov would be the last man ever to be able to resist. The Russians started that game in 1933. You all remember the case—or many of you do —and I said that if they were allowed to get away with that, then no foreigner would be safe in Russia again. So I persuaded the Government—a reluctant Government—to clap an embargo on trade with Russia until those men were out—and they were out very quickly.
Now I recognise, of course, that there have been great changes between 1933 and 1956, but I should have thought that if the pressure of one country on an enormous country like Russia could be effective, perhaps the joint pressure of twenty or twenty-five countries on a weaker country like Egypt might produce results without recourse to bloodshed. I hope, in any case, it will be tried, because these poor victims deserve it. All nations should join with us in the effort, because other foreigners will be equally unsafe and already Italians have been roped in. I do not expect the noble Marquess to give me an answer to-day, but I hope at least that this policy will be considered, because it might have a double effect. At any rate, before I die I should like to see again a day in which it is safe to be British.
4.27 p.m.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, I speak purely as an individual, with that sense of freedom which comes from having no official position, to express my own personal point of view. Speaking for myself, I confess that I regret that at the present time the country appears to be so hopelessly divided. I am sure that it would be much better for

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us if we could all speak together and follow one common policy. Of course, in a democracy you cannot expect people to do that, if it involves a refusal of what they believe to be essential rights. Speaking for myself, I have no complaint whatever against what the Government have done down to this point. I thought that the conception of the twenty-two Power Conference was very sound. I thought that getting Mr. Menzies and the particular composition of the Five Power Mission was really a brilliant piece of inspiration. I have many times been opposed to Mr. Menzies in the courts, and I know the power of advocacy that he has. You could have lied no one better. I have no doubt that the scheme was expounded and put forward with all possible skill. In my belief, the scheme was an eminently reasonable scheme, and I do not think that anything much less than the scheme which Mr. Menzies put forward could possibly be satisfactory.
So far, as I say, I have no complaint at all. Neither have I myself any complaint whatever, so far as I know the facts, on the issue of the pilots. This year, in January and again in March, I passed through the Suez Canal, and on both occasions I was in a fortunate position in that I was authorised and was in fact spending my time on the bridge. I therefore spent many hours on both occasions talking to the pilots. You have two pilots to take you through each way, so in fact I spoke to four of them, three of whom were British and one Dutch—though I did not find that out until afterwards; his English was so perfect that I thought I was talking to an Englishman. In those days (it was, of course, before the seizure of the Suez Canal) the situation of the pilots was getting difficult. They all told me that. They were all wondering how long they would stick it out there. The social position in which they were placed was awkward, and their apprehension of what might come to them was awkward, too. I am not at all surprised to hear that the non-Egyptian pilots have decided to come home. If it had been the fact that positive advice had been given to the pilots to come home, I should have thought that deplorable; but in the situation as it is in Egypt to-day I think a Government or the Company would take a very serious responsibility if they positively advised those men to
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stay. I think the only course they could take was to say, "Well, you must decide for yourselves what line you want to take." As I understand—I speak for myself alone—that is the line that has been taken. There has not been positive pressure to get those people to come away. If so, I think that that is right.
The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, enjoyed himself thoroughly, and I enjoyed his speech too, though I am not sure that, until he got to the end of his speech, he made any very constructive suggestions. At the end I thought he did. It behoves us now not to get bogged down in Party controversy, but I want to try to explain, as clearly as I can, what I think is wrong at the present time, and why I am concerned about the position. For better or for worse, in this Year of Grace we live under a wholly new system, not at all the system under which we were brought up when this country, by its strong right arm, would see that international justice was carried out. I am not suggesting, let me make it quite plain. that the Government is modelling itself, so to speak, on Hitler, or that the noble Marquess who leads this House is qualifying as an embryo Hitler, or that he likes war any more than any of us do—obviously not—but I do say this. Having, for better or for worse, entered into those international obligations, we must adhere to them. We must do nothing which would enable anyone to point the finger of scorn at us and say. "You, too, are breaching your obligations."
Of course, I accept the fact—the noble and learned Lord. Lord McNair, the Lord Chancellor and the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, have all stated it—that there can be no question that Colonel Nasser, by his condact, is in breach of his undertaking. Moreover, he knew that he was in breach, because he took this action as a counterblast to the American decision not to finance the building of the Aswan Dam; and, as the Lord Chancellor, I think it was, said yesterday, he fact that Colonel Nasser had been in plain and obvious breach with regard to the passage of Israel ships through the Canal for some five or six years showed that he was a man on whose word little reliance could be placed.
When I have said all that, what disturbs me, oddly enough, is passages in the speed of the noble Marquess who

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leads this House, because underlying that speech there is the plain implication, as I read it, that we may resort to force without going to the United Nations. I want to make that quite clear. At the bottom of column 635 of yesterday's OFFICIAL REPORT, in a passage which the noble Marquess told us was very carefully considered—indeed, he read it, contrary to his usual practice—after discussing the new arrangement about the Canal Users' Association, he said that if Nasser does not accept that he will be again in breach of the Convention of 1888, and went on:
"And in that event Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required, either through the United Nations "—
that is quite all right—
"or by other means for the assertion of their rights."
These "further steps", observe, are not to protect British nationals who. I agree with the noble Lord. Lord Vansittart, may suffer terribly. They are not for that purpose. For that purpose they might be justified under the United Nations Charter because you are entitled to take steps to protect your nationals; and if you are entitled to take steps to protect them. surely you are entitled to take steps to see that this does not happen to them. Here. however, the further steps are "for the assertion of their rights".
At Column 640, the noble Marquess makes the position absolutely plain. as one would expect of him. He says, truly:
"We have done our best,"
and adds that he would like to have
"a solution which safeguards both peace and the sanctity of international engagement.…It may be that we shall have to choose between them. In that situation. I think there can be no doubt which alternative we ought to choose. We must support respect for international engagements."
As I understand it, that can mean only that if we have somebody who is in breach of an international engagement, we ourselves can resort to force to assert our rights. It seems to me that that follows necessarily from what the noble Marquess said, and I readily agree that he would not do so lightheartedly or in-advisedly, or without realising the terribly serious consequences.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It does not say that it should be done without recourse to the United Nations.
EARL JOWITT: No, it does leave that position open.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Yes, but the noble and learned Earl implied—
EARL JOWITT: If I have put it too strongly, I am sorry. The noble Marquess made it perfectly plain that he reserved to himself the full right contemplated of going to the United Nations; and, so far as that goes, I have no quarrel. But, as I read his speech he did say or imply further, that he might, without going to the United Nations, use force in respect of a breach of an international obligation. That is a statement of doctrine. I am trying not to make a speech which is the least tinged with Party feeling. If I had known that the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, was going to be here. I should not have come down from Scotland but, not knowing that he was going to be here. I felt that I ought to come down to say, in effect, though in not nearly such good language as he employed, what he said. As things are today, I do not believe we have the right to use force without recourse to the United Nations to assert our rights or in support of our claims.
I look at the Kellogg Pact—it was quoted, I think, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, in his speech. It contains two clauses. The second of those clauses, as he rightly said, is the more relevant one. The Lord Chancellor did not in terms refer at all to the second clause. In the first clause, the clause which says that the signatories renounce war as an instrument of national policy, the Lord Chancellor commented on the use of the word "national". The second clause is in these terms—and remember that both Egypt and ourselves are parties to this Treaty:
"We pledge ourselves that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise between us shall never be sought except by pacific means."
That is the agreement or treaty which, for better or worse, we entered into. Reading the speech of the noble Marquess, who is as peace-loving a man as anybody in this House, I ask myself:

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Can I square that speech with that clause of the Briand-Kellogg Pact? Frankly, I cannot, and I humbly express my concurrence with what Lord McNair said.
It may be that the wholly unjustified seizure of the Canal by Colonel Nasser was an act of aggression, though I myself am far from sure that that is so. But do not, for goodness sake!let us act on the assumption that it was and, assuming that it is an act of aggression, take remedies which would be appropriate under, I think, Article 51 if there were an attack by armed force. The word "aggression", the fact of aggression, is exceedingly difficult to define. It is impossible to give a definition of "aggression", and that. I venture to think, is why, in Article 39 of the Covenant, the fact of aggression has to be determined not by one of the parties to the dispute but by the Security Council.
I beg your Lordships because, quite inevitably and naturally we feel strongly about what has happened, that this country should not put itself in the wrong by taking steps which the noble Marquess has left open, and find ourselves branded before the International Court as the aggressor. To my mind, that would be a situation which would be quite deplorable. I hope Lord Vansittart will observe that I am not saying anything about what should happen after we have gone to the Security Council or the United Nations; I am saying merely that, before anything else takes place, we must go there. When we have done all we can by way of peaceful settlement, we must go there; and we must not contemplate the use of force in support of our rights.
I remember a somewhat analogous case during our Party's term of office, when the Russians were blockading Berlin and the problem arose as to what we were to do. We did not go to war but we managed, by an air-lift, to provision Berlin. As we know, when the Russians saw that we could do it and that we were going to continue to do it, the Berlin blockade was lifted. I very much hope that we shall, though at great cost (because I realise this is a vitally important thing for us), in some way tide over the difficulty and manage in this matter with the help of America, which surely should be given.
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I therefore say that I cannot square (I hope I am putting it moderately) the implication of the speech of the noble Marquess with the obligations that we have undertaken under that Pact. Further, I could not contemplate the use of force without going to the United Nations as anything other than a breach of our obligations tinder the Charter. I look at Article 2, sub-clauses 3 and 4. The first sub-clause says:
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
Sub-clause 4 says:
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
My Lords, to this instrument we have set our hand. It may be right or it may be wrong; but that is what we have done. That is the undertaking we have entered into. That is the new conception of a new world for which we hope, and though reference to the United Nations has often proved unavailing, yet I believe that, on balance, it is much better for us to adhere to the bargain which we have made than to try, because we find ourselves faced with grave peril at the present time, to undertake a different course. Therefore, I beg Her Majesty's Government to alter their outlook and to make it quite plain that, after they have exhausted all the peaceful means possible under Article 33, of whatever sort they may be, then the proper course is to go to the Security Council, Thereafter we can consider the whole position. If they take any other course, then I think that they are putting themselves entirely in the wrong.
4.47 p.m.
LORD BAILLIEU: My Lords, may I join with many other friends in welcoming the maiden speech of Lord Rathcavan yesterday. We were glad to hear his voice and his views, and I join with those who express the hope that he may come among us often again and give us the benefit of his wisdom and experience. May I also, I hope without impropriety, join in the tribute to my distinguished fellow-countryman, Mr. Menzies. The job was unsought. The invitation to him to undertake it was a high tribute to the man himself, and his acceptance of that task was a reflection of his natural courage, of his

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devotion to the interests of this Commonwealth and Empire and the wider unities of the nations, and also of his profound belief in the justice of our cause and in the basic fairness of our proposals. I join with the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, in everything he said. I feel that in the report which Mr. Menzies issued of his mission we have the best story extant to-day of the basic difference between our own proposals and the views of President Nasser. President Nasser insisted that the control and management of the Canal should be directly under the jurisdiction of Egypt which I gather to be in flat defiance of the 1888 Convention.
May I also venture to remind this House that the safety, the solvency, the security of the people of these Islands rests upon the continuing leadership of the British people in this Island. This seems to me to require the development of national policies that cannot be planned in vacuo. They must rest on a broad agreement with the Commonwealth and with those other nations like France and the United States with whom we cherish an underlying identity of purpose and resolve. It also implies that on issues affecting the life and safety of the nations the great parties of the States should constantly seek the widest common measure of agreement.
It seems to me, following the course of debate here and in another place, and the movement of opinion generally, that there is broad agreement on the objectives of policy—namely, that Egypt is definitely in breach of her obligations in violently, arbitrarily, and with full use of force, expropriating the Suez Canal Company. I think it is agreed by all concerned that this action must be resisted, and that ways and means for the full restoration of some effective system of international operation of the maintenance and development of the Canal must be found. All Parties have, I think, united in support of the Dulles proposals, and in paying tribute not only to the way that the issue has been handled to date by Her Majesty's Government but in the work of the Menzies Mission. But in recent weeks and days there has been a growing and, as I conceive it to be, a highly dangerous cleavage of opinion, culminating in the debates in this House and in another place. This has been a difference on ways and means, not on the objectives of policy.
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Shortly stated, this difference seems to rest upon the insistence of the Opposition on at once taking the issues with Egypt before the United Nations; their demand that Her Majesty's Government should formally abjure any use of force, except as authorised by the United Nations; and their criticism of certain preliminary military measures as highly provocative. Whilst I respect all those who utter those opinions, I have my reservations. We must remember that here we are not moving alone, but with Allies, and that any reference to the United Nations must, or should, be taken in conjunction with them. Her Majesty's Government seem to me to have cleared the way for just such a reference by the letter which has been sent to the President of the Security Council.
I fear that a declaration of the kind that has been sought from Her Majesty's Government would be finally and irrevocably to surrender to the pretensions of Colonel Nasser and would make a mockery of our devotion and our efforts to maintain the rule of law over a generation or more. For, as we know, all law and all national policy must rest upon an adequate basis of force, both physical and moral; and it seems to me that not to hold force in reserve, either to resist its further use by Egypt or to restore our just rights, would be a weak and untimely abdication of our duty. No-one wishes to use force, least of all, I conceive, this Government and the men who lead it. No-one does in any of Her Majesty's Dominions; no-one does in this House or in another place. We are all far too close to the memories of two World Wars. We must not, and we do not, prefer the use of force. We must not and we do not, promote the idea of force. But we must not, and in my view if we are honest with ourselves we cannot, exclude the use of force to secure a just respect for law.
For these reasons I believe that the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to place our country in a better posture of defence were the very minimum they could take consistent with their responsibilities. After all it was Colonel Nasser who resorted to force and to do less than we did would have heartened our enemies and shattered the confidence of our friends and would have been a weak refusal to face the facts of a very grave situation. So I venture to say to our leaders that within the framework of such

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a policy based upon such principles it is their prime duty as I conceive it to concert a national policy which will be understood and fully supported by the mass of opinion, here and overseas. We cannot permit the division of opinion here on ways and means to continue without grave danger to this Realm and Commonwealth. Twice in a generation we have rallied together from all Parties in the State to confront and overthrow the tyranny of strength. We are new confronted by the tyranny of weakness, holding a world to ransom by playing upon our divisions and our fears. If Nasser were to succeed it would be due to the failure of our leadership of all Parties, and of public understanding, here and abroad, of the moral and material challenge to our future well-being.
We should continue with our policy of firmness and patience, in the hope of achieving a peaceful settlement. Such a policy may take time. It will cost money; it will involve sacrifices, but it will be cheaper than any precipitate resort to arms. It will teach some salutary and overdue lessons to many in the East and the West who think of the issue to-day in terms of Western gain, Western exploitation and Western advantage, and who fail to realise how closely allied to, and interdependent on, Western skills, Western capital and Western consuming power is the whole vast area east of Egypt. We, as a nation, should suffer by the increasing economic stringencies arising from the slowing-down of the passage of the Canal, but in my view the whole of the Arab world, and what lies beyond, will stand to lose much more. This salutary lesson, which perhaps can be learned only by time and patience, having once been absorbed, may serve to keep in check within the confines of the rule of law the aggressive actions and policies of those who, like Colonel Nasser, threaten the livelihood of their own peoples, as they disrupt the peace of the world.
And arising out of the present conflicts there is, too, a lesson for the Western World—that is, that whatever settlement we reach to-day with Egypt, whatever may be the planned development of the Canal to meet growing demands, we must, here and now, concert alternative means for the movement of oil and other products from the Middle East, the Persian Gulf
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and beyond. Failure to do so would leave us in mortal peril. It is not too early to start upon a planned development of ocean transport, supported by the vast resources of the N.A.T.O. Powers and pressed forward and vigorously supported by our full productive, technical and financial resources. Such a policy would soon bear fruit in lessening our dependence on the Canal and in giving greater flexibility to our economy. I see that the noble Lord. Lord Geddes, is due to speak, and I hope that he may feel disposed, from his intimate knowledge of that particular issue, to tell us his own views.
Finally, may I remind noble Lords that this is not an issue between East and West, as Nasser has tried to present it. One has only to look at the composition and agreement of the Suez Conference and the Menzies Mission to see what a distortion of truth this is. May I also draw the attention of noble Lords to the Supplement written by Mr. Menzies in his Report? He says:
"One remarkable fact about our discussions both inside the Committee and with the Government of Egypt has been that representatives of five nations nom five different Continents have been able to work together in such harmony and with such unanimity. I am greatly indebted to my colleagues who have brought this about. Their energy and steadfastness have been a great strength for me upon whom a good deal of the oral argument devolved. From first to last we were all sustained"—
as the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, just reminded us—
"by a belief in the justice and fairness of our proposals."
This country, in the great moments of its history, has been sustained by great leadership—supported by a remarkable unanimity and harmony of public opinion. We have chosen at these great moments to die on our feet as free men, rather than to live abjectly on our knees. From this has sprung the energy and steadfastness which have helped to carry this country. and the Coalitions of which it has been a leading member, to final and complete victory in two World Wars. So I venture, with all sincerity, in this solemn hour of crisis, to say to our political leaders, of all Parties, that their first and inescapable duty is to restore the underlying moral unity of this people, to unite the nation in agreement, not only on objectives but on ways and means. This done, we shall go forward in unity, with honour and with success.
5.3 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, I shall be as short as I possibly can. A certain amount I can take for granted—for instance, that Colonel Nasser has been guilty of what is, in effect, whatever it may be in law, an act of aggression—offensive, destructive of all the restraints of International Law and an immediate threat to our economic welfare and, indeed, to our economic existence. I can take it for granted, secondly, that no nation can face a more searching test of its national wisdom and character than to meet such a challenge. I should like to take it for granted, thirdly, that the burden of responsibility resting upon the Government acting for us all is almost intolerable, and they deserve our utmost sympathy. In one respect, to which I shall return, the Government have exposed themselves to a great deal of criticism, but apart from that, I would say, as the noble and learned Earl said just now, that the Government seem to me to have acted so far with great patience and great restraint, and have shown obvious anxiety to seek by all means possible a peaceful settlement and have, with great wisdom and right-mindedness, shared the burden of their responsibility with other users of the Canal!the twenty-two nations of the London Conference. It will be tragic if, as a result, there is in Parliament a Vote of Censure which, though defeated, will reflect a divided nation. Not only will it be tragic, but it will gravely and vastly weaken our own just cause, and, in effect, it will largely paralyse our power to bring good out of this evil situation.
Where have the Government exposed themselves to criticism? First, by their military precautions. It is, I think, quite impossible to prove by argument whether these military steps have done more harm than good or more good than harm. It is altogether reasonable in itself that the Government should take such precautions if it was clear that they were precautions only. But they were obviously open to misunderstanding; and the manner of them, and all that was said about them, made it certain that they would be misunderstood. And, of course, it was also certain that Colonel Nasser would exploit the making of them for his own advantage. Fortunately, as I think, it is possible even now for us, if we will, to remove most, if not all, of the damage
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due to that misunderstanding. To do that we shall require help from the Government and from the Opposition, each going as far as they can to find unity. And, if I dare say so, I feel that the Opposition have been somewhat pitiless in their criticism of the Government on this and similar points.
A more serious criticism than that made on military precautions is the criticism that the Government will not rule out the use of physical force in the last resort. And may I, following the example of the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, substitute for "physical force" the word "war"—because it means war, and nothing else. I have noticed in the papers a lot of talk about what should be done in the last resort. Every kind of periphrasis is used except the word "war". But let us face the fact that any use against Egypt of physical force is war. I believe that the gap between the Government and the Opposition is, in reality and in substance, so small that, with good will on both sides, it can be bridged—indeed, I would say that it must be bridged. That is the first necessity, if we are to play any profitable part in this dispute at all. And I would say that it would be a shame on Parliament if we cannot somehow recover complete unity as to the next steps, even if we cannot go much further than that.
A divided nation, on a fundamental point like this, is necessarily weak and ineffective. In particular, I believe, it is quite unthinkable that in any circumstances the Government should go to war against Egypt without the general support of the whole of Parliament or, in an emergency, of the leaders of all Parties. If they did, it would be a catastrophic thing to do. I believe that if we do not try to look too far ahead, agreement between all Parties is not difficult. The Opposition want the matter at once referred to the United Nations and the use of physical force openly rejected. The Government, I think, really intend and want precisely that same thing; but they wish, as a Government, to be prepared for all eventualities, and therefore insert at every point a saving clause. So the Prime Minister and the noble Marquess in this House speak of taking such further steps as seem required
"either through the United Nations or by other means for the assertion of our rights."

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I can add nothing to what the noble and learned Earl said, but this same point has been referred to again and again. I appeal to the Government to look again, and to see, whatever their intentions may be, what these words convey. Surely they convey that it is accepted that war is a possible alternative to be adopted without going to the United Nations, I do not believe that the Government would ever do that, but their words carry that meaning, and the Opposition rightly resist the possibility of any such alternative action. So, I believe, does the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor— I am sorry that he is not here to check me. He believes precisely what I am saying, for yesterday he claimed, quite rightly, that everything done so far conforms to Article 33 of the Charter. I agree. Even the Users' Association conforms to the Charter. I do not know that it will be very effective. I rather doubt whether it is wise. It can create more difficulties than it might solve but, so far as it goes, it is unexceptionable. It is an entirely legitimate thing for the users of the Canal to get together to do the best they can to protect their own interests. I do not call it in itself provocative, saving the fact that anything we do would be regarded by Colonel Nasser as provocative.
The noble and learned Viscount went on to say [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 199. col. 720]:
"But after Article 33 there is Article 35,…Then there is Article 37, which says that if what you do under Article 33 fails, then you shall bring it to the Council."
I had hoped to hear the noble and learned Viscount say, "And this, of course, is precisely what we shall do." But it was exactly at that point, for understandable reasons, as I said, which have governed the Government, that the argument falters. The noble and learned Viscount, quoting the Prime Minister, then said:
"That arises under Article 37 when Article 33 has failed. I certainly do not exclude that —quite the contrary it may well be necessary."
What the Opposition are asking is that the Government, instead of saying, "may well be necessary," should say, "will, of course, be done." That is the issue. If the Article under which all the present operations are included fails, then the words the noble and learned
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Viscount quoted will apply, and under Article 37 appeal to the United Nations will be made. If that could be said, it would at one blow, as I think, unite the Opposition and the Government. It would do something far more important. It would bring, as I have seen in the last few days, relief to a vast number of citizens who are perplexed, unhappy, uneasy and. frankly, frightened about what may happen. Is it too much to ask the Government to go that far and to say that if everything now done under Article 33 fails, then Article 37 shall be operated and reference will be made to United Nations'?
The trouble, of course—let us face it—is that the United Nations is still a very insecure instrument for the upholding of International Law. It may be indecisive. It may be dilatory. It may give a decision against our own interests. If it is indecisive or dilatory, of course we have every right to reclaim our freedom to take our own course of action. If it fails to act as umpire, then we have every right to proceed on our own. If it comes to a decision which we approve, we can take steps, with other nations, to see that that decision is implemented, just as happened in Korea. If it comes to a conclusion unacceptable to us, I would say, frankly, that it is our duty to accept it—our duty before the world, our duty before the law and our duty before moral claims; for it is a rule of every occupation that you obey the umpire, whether you agree with him or not. But our case is so overwhelmingly strong that I have not the slightest doubt that it will not be an adverse decision, especially when we remember how many nations have already been associated with us in all the steps we have taken. To pursue the argument still further, I am prepared to say that every nation, like every individual, has the right to rebel. If the conclusion were so against our rightful interests that we could not sit down under it, we should still have the right to rebel, but that would be possible only if the nation were absolutely united behind us and a large number of other nations were ready to associate themselves with us. However, that is looking far farther ahead than we need to look.
Cannot we all agree, for the sake of our unity and effectiveness, for the sake of the cause we are upholding, on the Chancellor's ladder (if I may so call it)

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of Article 33, Article 35 and then, without doubt, Article 37. I have put down on paper here a suggestion of what the Government might agree to, what the Opposition might agree to and what I believe everybody else might agree to. I put in a proviso of importance—namely, provided that Colonel Nasser takes no further action which by the general voice of Parliament would require the use of physical force. That is important, because it saves us against things which might occur and which we cannot foresee, and it puts the responsibility then not on Government but on the whole of Parliament; and that would always mean the association of other nations. I suggest, then, these words as a basis for agreement.
"Provided that Colonel Nasser takes no further action which by the general voice of Parliament (or, in an emergency, of its leaders) would justify the use of physical force, the Government will use only pacific means to safeguard our rights under International Law, and if they provide no solution "—
that is not quite so fast as the Opposition want to go, but cannot they slow down their demands in order to get t agreement?—
"will refer the whole matter to the United Nations. In the meantime, subject to the aforesaid proviso, the Government will not employ any act of physical force "—
let us say, "war"—
"against Egypt."
That statement seems to me to be near enough to the proper wishes of the Government and to the proper desires of the Opposition, near enough to the realities and necessities of the situation, to enable an agreed end to this debate and a policy on which the whole nation can unite. As I have said—and I want to say it again—we must be united to be in the least effective in the situation which confronts us. The noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, said that same thing; and the noble Lord, Lord Baillieu, has just said it, too. We must be united. Then let us unite.
I do not want to repeat arguments used, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, made a speech of profound weight. He said—and do not let us forget it—that fifty years ago Governments were free to use armed force, at their discretion. But that is no longer so. Arguments drawn from before the war arc completely out of date and completely irrelevant. We are midway—let
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us see where we stand, and let us have no talk of cowardice, appeasement or putting it off—in a risky and hazardous attempt to substitute collective security for the separate actions of individual nations, by making U.N.O. the ultimate umpire and the guardian of law and justice. We have been pursuing that path for ten years. We have been imploring other nations to accept it. We have been saying to Jordan and to Israel that it is a precept they must obey.
The noble and learned Lords, Lord Jowitt and Lord McNair, have argued, as I think irresistibly, that we cannot depart from this precept without breaking the bond that we have given, never to use physical force of our own initiative, without first going to the United Nations. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack emphasised passionately that it is the duty, as he said. "of us all" to uphold International Law, and his implication was, even by force. But who are "us all"? I ask that in the same way as the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, asked, "Who are 'we'?" Not a nation by itself. "Us all" must mean many nations. We decided once and for all, when we entered into these Pacts, that we should never claim to be our own judges in our own case. And we must, in honour of our word, obey that to which we have pledged ourselves.
I pray that together, unitedly, Government and Opposition each giving away something in order to come together, we may agree to pursue the path I have suggested, with a proviso which guards against emergency; an undertaking only to use pacific means, and if they fail, then to go to the United Nations at once. I cannot see any objection, in principle, to that course. The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, ended his speech with these words:
"In any case let us remain firm and united."
My Lords, the tragic thing is that we are not now united. I have suggested that we first recover our unity, and then will follow the firmness which only unity can give.
5.25 p.m.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, I am happy to follow the most reverend Primate, because I cordially agree, subject to certain further points I shall attempt to make a little later, with the appeal he has made to Her Majesty's

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Government and, through them, to the other Governments associated with them, to refer this dispute, at the appropriate moment, and before using force, to the United Nations. I also agree with him as to the disaster it will be to us and to the world if our voting on Motions and Amendments gives to the world and to President Nasser the impression that we are a profoundly divided nation.
At this stage, I think it is more froth-able to discuss not the past but future procedure and policy, starting with the Users' Association which was announced to us yesterday. As to the past, I will say only a few words. That President Nasser's action is inadmissible in International Law, and inconsistent with the generally accepted code of international conduct, has, I think, been amply shown, both by the Lord Chancellor and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair—indeed, it is also recognised in the speeches of the Opposition leaders. But, as Lord McNair said, improper action on Egypt's part would not in itself justify force or the threat of force except as enjoined or allowed under the United Nations Charter. Just what our obligations under that Charter are I will discuss in a moment. In the meantime, let me say this.
I do not allege that Her Majesty's Government have acted inconsistently with their Charter obligations. In many respects, it is obvious that our diplomacy has been both correct and skilful. 'The London Conference deserves all the praise it has received. The Menzies' Committee was well conceived and conducted. The participation of the United States in both this and the new Users' Association is of the greatest importance. And I would add that a precautionary movement of troops was both prudent and permissible. All that is true. But it is true, also, I think, that some things said, and some things not said, in these last six weeks and in these last thirty hours, have caused genuine and not unreasonable anxiety, both at home and in friendly countries, as to our future intentions.
Those who have been abroad, either on the Continent, or, as I have been, across the Atlantic, will, I believe, agree with that statement. I would urge Her Majesty's Government, if they can, to make it clear now, beyond doubt, that they will not use force except in con—
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formity with our United Nations obligations. I do not intend to imply blame for what they have done or have not done up to this moment; and in so far as it might have been desirable to go earlier to the United Nations, I do not suggest that the sole or even the primary responsibility rests upon us. We are acting, and have to act, with other Allies. However, I do suggest it is of the utmost importance that it should be made clear that we should never use force except in the cases and under conditions prescribed or allowed iii the United Nations Charter, by which we are bound.
It is not enough in itself, I suggest, to have informed the President of the Security Council of the situation. That might or might not be a prelude to a reference of the dispute to the Security Council. It is not enough, I suggest, for the Prime Minister to say that the Government may act either through the United Nations or by other means for the assertion of their rights, or that the Government do not exclude reference to the United Nations. I am bound to add that the noble Marquess the Leader of this House did not go even so far as that, and (I say this with deep regret) I share some of the sentiments expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, and the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, as to a possible interpretation—though I hope largely removed by the interjection of the noble Marquess—of the latter part of his speech yesterday.
The setting up of the Users' Association now, in my view, makes an explicit assurance on this question more important and more urgent. True, the inclusion or America is an immense and, it may be, a decisive factor. May I say, incidentally, that in all our Middle East problems the essential condition of success, in my view, is that America should be with us and be known to be with us. That applies to Cyprus, to Israel, to the present case, to the Baghdad Pact, and to all our problems in that part of the world. That may, of course, have the result of sometimes modifying or restraining our action. That may sometimes be salutary. After all, in other parts of the world, the rôles have been reversed, and our influence has been exerted in moderating action in areas which had a more direct and primary interest for our great Ally than for ourselves.

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I hope I may assume that the addition of America to the Users' Association means that in any action we take, through that Association, or otherwise, we shall be acting in full concert with America, and under conditions which mean that we accept the joint responsibility for consequences that may result from that action. May I add this? The Users' Association will, I hope, as I am sure the Government hope, have an adequate membership. The three members already announced are only the beginning. I hope it will enlarge itself to something like the twenty-two London Conference members, or possibly an even wider membership. I hope, too, that it will enlarge its functions beyond those mentioned yesterday. The users defined their goal at the London Conference. It is surely now opportune for them to concert their steps towards that goal. These may include many forms of collective or co-ordinated economic action, both economic assistance and pressure; help to those who may suffer most from the reduction, or delay, or from increased expense of their imports. These are only a few examples. Consideration of alternatives, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, by sea, by new canals or new pipelines, is among the dozen or more purposes that might be usefully considered by that Association.
The reason why I say that the setting up of the Association makes a declaration of policy in regard to the United Nations more urgent, is this. We must clearly contemplate the possibility of a ship presenting itself with a Users' pilot and being debarred passage. Let us be clear that in such a case the first action must be, not the use of force but reference to the United Nations or, possibly, on some points, to the International Court. May I summarise what this means and the overwhelming case for action on these lines? The objectives of our policy are, of course, first, to preserve the Canal as an effective international waterway, and, second, and more important, to prevent Egypt's action having disastrous consequences throughout, and even beyond, the Arab world. To achieve this second purpose, it is, I suggest, equally necessary that President Nasser should not achieve a dramatic success by our surrender, and also that we should not act in a way that alienates the Arab world and the uncom
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mitted world, or divides us at home or in the Commonwealth, or from our Allies. If we are to avoid this later danger it is, I suggest, essential that we ourselves should strictly observe the rule of law, which means acting in accordance with the Charter.
What does this mean? First, under Article 2, and Articles 33 and the following Articles, we must, as the most reverend Primate has said, after trying, as we are now doing, to secure a peaceful settlement, refer to the United Nations before using force, except in the closely defined case—not likely to be here relevant—where immediate force is specifically permitted. Secondly, the case having been referred to the Security Council, we must not act against a valid decision by that Council. It is, of course, said, and said truly, that such a decision is not to be expected because each of the great Powers has a veto. Yes. But reference to the Council will have brought overwhelming gains. We shall have kept the law. Our case being a good one, we may expect, especially with the advantage of appearing as plaintiff and not defendant, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord McNair, yesterday, to secure the public support of almost all—perhaps nine out of eleven—of the members of the Council. If your Lordships fear a political bias which would deprive us of justice, I would ask you to consider in detail the actual membership of the Council and the record in regard to this dispute of each of the member States.
Lastly—and this, I think, is a point of great importance that has not so far been sufficiently considered—if, as is likely, the United Nations fail to give a valid decision through the Veto, we have not abandoned our right to use other means, including both economic measures and even, in the last resort, force—though I am not implying that I think the use of force would, even in that case, be necessarily desirable. But we shall not have abandoned our right to use force by going to the Security Council. On the contrary, we shall have freed ourselves from our present obligations which bind us not to use force until we have resorted to the Security Council. We shall, in that case, and in that way, have the inestimable advantage of enlisting the support of other countries, both material and moral, which we should otherwise have alienated. The price is only a period of

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delay and the loss and inconvenience we may suffer during that period.
But is such a delay, on balance, to be regretted? Surely, this is eminently a case where we should play slow; where we should play for time, and even pay for time. Is it a bad thing that all those concerned should have time coolly to calculate the consequences? Is it a bad thing for the world to have time to reflect calmly on the intrinsic merits of our case during a period when we are obviously and scrupulously observing our Charter obligations? Is it a bad thing that the Arab oil-producing countries, after their first fevered reaction to a challenge of colonialism, should have time to reflect coolly on what a serious disturbance to the sale of their oil might mean to them—, time for each of them, Iraq and Saudi Arabia among them, to consider whether they really want to come under a new dictatorship? Is it a bad thing that President Nasser himself should have a further opportunity of making some new financial calculations? Lastly, is it a bad thing that the large part of the world which uses the Canal, either for its ships or, like the Continent of India, for the passage of its imports and exports, should have time to calculate what the future management of the Canal is likely to mean to them? For those advantages a temporary inconvenience and loss is, I suggest, a small price indeed to pay.
I do not myself doubt that the Government will, in fact, act in conformity with their Charter obligations, and I cannot support the Amendment which deplores their refusal to refer to the United Nations—partly because they have not refused. I do not know whether or not the best moment for that reference has yet come, and I do not know that the decision at this stage not to refer to the United Nations is primarily our own decision rather than that of our principal Allies. But I do suggest that it is of the utmost importance that we, in concert with our Allies, should make it quite clear that, before there is any use of force, we will comply with our specific obligations under the Charter. I am confident that the Government and their Allies will so act, but I do think that at this time, when we are engaged, and must be engaged, in making an immense diplomatic effort to ensure the sympathy and support, moral and material, of the world, the Arab world and the uncom-
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mitted world. To ensure unity in our own country among ourselves, it is of the utmost importance that we should make it clear that we are not playing with the idea of using force in breach of our engagements under the Charter. I therefore beg to add my appeal to that which has been made so much more authoritatively and eloquently by the most reverend Primate who has just spoken.
5.41 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I shall not immediately fellow those who have spoken lately, with whom I am rather out of sympathy in a great many respects, but I shall comment on some of the things they said in the course of what I have to say. Most of your Lordships know that I am a director of the Suez Canal Company. I have been associated with Egypt for over fifty years and there is not one problem of Egyptian defence, the defence of the Canal or the modern politics of Egypt with which I am not acquainted. I know every inch of the Canal. I have spent hours and hours standing behind the pilots learning what could of the problems. But to-day I am speaking solely on my own responsibility as a Cross-Bench Peer and for no one else at all.
I think that the noble Marquess the Leader of the House began his brilliant speech yesterday three years too late. 'The story began in 1953 when we were being shouted out of the Suez Canal zone. On December 17, 1953, in a speech in this House containing warnings of certain consequences, of all the consequences of the proposed military evacuation of the Suez Canal zone, I included the following [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 185, col. 210]:
"Another contingency which is not provided for is that at some future date an Egyptian Government, under some unpredictable internal or external pressure…might seize and occupy the Canal before the end of the concession."
I also warned the Government on the same occasion that they were heading for a catastrophic disaster and that evacuation was a gamble on the good faith of a dictator which might lead to another Munich. It was neglect of these and other personal warnings by people who knew, two of whom were sitting beside me on the Bench just now, that was the cause of the present crisis. The Government of

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that day and the Parliament that supported it, which included. I think, certainly in this House the Opposition, must take the responsibility.
I do not recall these things for my own glory. I hated saying them at the time and I hate to repeat them, but memories are short and I feel that if I do not remind your Lordships of them you may refuse again to listen to warnings that I am going to give to-day which are equally important. If that was the cause, the pretext for the aggression was the refusal by the United States Government of the offer of financial aid in the construction of the Aswan Dam on which Egypt laid great store. I must say that they had a great deal of justification, with Colonel Nasser's acceptance of Communist revenues and skilled personnel. Nevertheless, it was the pretext for Nasser's coup, and the United States Government bear the responsibility. I myself regretted it most deeply. During practically the whole of the present year I have had opportunities to study not only the Canal problem in relation to Egypt but also the High Dam project, and I had reached a very definite conclusion that our troubles with Egypt could best be solved by taking those together. That, of course, has been put out of the picture for the present by what has happened, but I am perfectly certain that eventually a solution will be found by a combination of these two problems which I could show, if time permitted, are really one problem.
I have taken the cause and the pretext. The occasion of the flagrant aggression—because I think it was a flagrant agression —was skilfully chosen by Nasser at a time when the U.S.A. were in the throes of a Presidential Election, when France was in difficulties as a result of troubles in North Africa fomented from Cairo, which were also foreseen by the critics of 1953, and with Great Britain unready. So he struck the decisive blow at the decisive point at the decisive moment. Of course, it was prepared. Why were not we? But that must keep for another occasion. I must say that, unless our response when we have gone through the interminable international procedures now involved is equally decisive, no great international or national enterprise will be safe from the attacks of predatory tyrants.
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Her Majesty's Government's first reaction was beyond praise. It was quoted by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House yesterday. I think it cannot be quoted too often.
"No arrangement for the future of this great international waterway could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in the unfettered control of a single Power which, as recent events have shown, exploits it purely for the purposes of national policy."
In addition to that, the movements of ships, troops and aircraft and the calling up of reservists were well timed, in my opinion, and responded well to the mood of public opinion at that moment. Sivis pacem, para bellum.
I have the gravest doubts about the criticisms that I have heard in the latter part of this debate. I am sorry even to have to venture to disagree with the most reverend Primate and with the noble Earl who has left his seat. In my view, these inhibitions on taking prompt action require to be overhauled. They must be overhauled. When you think that we live in the atomic era and that if some nation perpetrates an aggression we have got to go through all these endless formalities with all kinds of other nations, and eventually with the United Nations, which never decides anything, long before we have done we shall find that the other nation has exploded a hydrogen bomb over London and destroyed the whole capital. With that situation as a real possibility nowadays, you have to modify these arrangements. I am not urging any immediate action, but I suggest that these arrangements ought to be overhauled at the United Nations. By their action and by their statement, the policy of Her Majesty's Government now and hereafter must be judged.
Unfortunately, from that point to this day the story is not so good. No less than forty-nine days have passed since Nasser's coup. While we have been caught up in the paralysing meshes of international entanglements. Nasser has had seven weeks in which to get experience and to consolidate his position; he still has unfettered control over the Canal, and looks like being there for some time, I am afraid. During those seven weeks the Government had to put pressure on the Company of which I am a member, to keep their pilots and officials in their places. Therefore. Nasser has had seven

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weeks to dig in and to get the "know-how" of running the Canal. That is a serious commentary on the Government's initial statement. During this period we ran the whole gamut of international bodies. There was a short two-Power conference which lasted only two days, a three-Power conference and a twenty-two Power conference. With the exception of Great Britain and France, and perhaps some of the Dominions, not one of those Powers would move a man or a ship or an aeroplane to come to our aid if the matter degenerated into serious business as it very easily may.
Now it is proposed to have yet another body. We have had a two-Power conference, a twenty-two Power conference and a five-Power committee going to Cairo. Here, I must join in the tributes to Mr. Menzies of whom I saw something when he was in London (he is an old friend), and for whom I have the highest admiration. He was exactly the right man to do the job, and he did all he could. But running right through all these organisations and committees, as described in the White Paper, is that this
"international Suez Canal Board should be responsible for operating, maintaining and developing the Canal, and enlarging it to increase the volume of traffic in the interests of world trade and of Egypt."
I rubbed my eyes when I read that. T had come straight back from a meeting of the Board of the Suez Canal Company and had spent the night in the train. I asked myself: "What have I been doing these last ten years, going to Paris week by week to the meetings of the Suez Canal Company, if it is not just to help in carrying out this exact function for which you want to set up a new organisation?" Of course it is exactly what the Suez Canal Company is doing. Nobody could say that we have done it badly. We have done it 'very well. The Prime Minister's broadcast on the eve of the Conference, the Foreign Secretary's speeches at the Conference, the speech of the noble Marquess yesterday, the international Chamber of Shipping, British shipping and American shipping, have all testified to the efficiency of this 100-years old company.
Almost in the same sentence as he praised the Suez Canal Company to the skies, the Leader of the House proposed
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to demolish it. I ask myself, why do you not retain what is good and replace what is bad? There is no need to replace the Suez Canal Company; it is a perfectly good affair, as I shall show in a moment. But there is a real need to replace Article 8 of the Suez Canal Convention of 1888, which provided a sort of arbitrary body, a high level body which was supposed to settle the difficulties, but which never met. I am not quite sure why, but I think it never met because there were always internal difficulties. My noble friend Lord Killearn is going to speak later and he might possibly be able to throw some light on it. But it was a dead failure and it would be a valuable thing if, instead of messing about with the details of the Suez Canal, the Conference had provided for that contingency.
The curious thing is that the desiderata laid down in the eighteen nations' proposals for the Suez Canal Board are all realised 100 per cent, in the day-by-day working of the Suez Canal. Just glancing at page 11 of the White Paper I. quote from paragraph 2, which reads:
"Such a system which would be established with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt, should assure:—
(a) Efficient and dependable operation, maintenance mid development of the Canal as a free, open and secure international waterway in accordance with the principles of the Convention of 1888."
I really do not think I need develop that because it is 100 per cent. realised by the Company—1888 is practically our Bible. Then there is sub-paragraph (b), which reads:
"Insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation."
I have been in the Company for 18 years, but never yet have I known any discussion about the politics of any nation. It is quite true, as in other nations, that the politics of Egypt have undergone great vicissitudes: there has been a change from a kingdom to a republic. Every Government by their legislation affect a company living in their country, but the company does not interfere or have anything to do with the legislation; it just conforms.
Then, sub-paragraph (c) reads
"A return to Egypt For the use of the Suez Canal which will be fair and equitable and increasing with enlargements of its capacity and greater use."

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That is what we are always doing. The Treaty of 1949 made a number of provisions, including greatly increased emoluments for Egypt, and there was another in 1956 just before this blow fell. We had just paid into banks in Egypt £10 million out of £21 million which would have been spent in the next few years, to be invested in Egypt in order to help the Egyptian exchange. Such things are going on all the time. Regarding keeping "tolls as low as possible," I really wish the Conference had asked the views of the shipping communities, the International Chamber of Shipping, American shippers and our own shipping people questions about that matter. We discuss these tolls with representatives of the International Chamber of Shipping every year. At that time all the facts are put on the table and are at their disposal and agreement is reached on tolls.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, I apologise for interrupting the noble Lord, but does he wish to convey to the House that none of this very important information to which he is referring ever came before the Conference?
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his question with which I shall deal in a few moments, and perhaps he will not be surprised at the answer. I ask permission of the House to speak on one other quality in addition to those I have mentioned, which is almost peculiar to the Company—that is, the Canal Company has an extraordinary esprit de corps running right through the whole concern from top to bottom. There is an extraordinary loyalty which reminds me of my own corps, the Royal Marines, though other noble Lords would speak of the Guards or whatever their regiment was as having the same spirit. But it is something very exceptional and one can see it peeping out very strongly in the articles by pilots that have been published in some papers. Again and again they testify to their loyalty to the Company. One can see the quality again in the loyalty of the non-Egyptian staff in Egypt in carrying out the Company's orders, insisted on by the British and the French Governments, to remain at their posts in almost intolerable conditions; and if time permitted I could give innumerable examples of a personal character from my own experience.
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I need not labour the point about the Company being international, because the noble Marquess the Leader of the House made the point yesterday with far more eloquence than I can command; but I was rather concerned to hear that the members of the Users' Council were to be chosen by Governments from the principal users. The noble Marquess did not say whether the principal users would be decided on the basis of shipping tonnage or goods, but I think geographical position also conies into it. I have noticed, climbing up the list of users which I get every month, that Russia is coming rather high, and I believe there would be great difficulty in an international committee in keeping Russia out. I do not think that the communisation of the Suez Canal Company would he advantageous, either to the personnel or to the shipping using it or to the Egyptians; but I think there is grave danger and I believe there are other great weaknesses in this arrangement for an international committee.
Let me ask your Lordships a test question: Does anybody on the Government or Opposition Front Bench, or on any Bench, believe that a new international Suez Canal Board, improvised by this Conference or conjured up by the prospective Users' Association, can conceivably do the difficult job better than, or as well as, the old Company, which alone in the world possesses the experience, the material resources, the loyal and skilled personnel, and the "know-how"? It seems to me a most extraordinary thing that the Conference should have fallen into that error.
That brings me to the procedure of the Conference and to the point just mentioned by my noble friend, Lord Teviot. I think the House ought to know how the Conference fell into making this decision to entrust the Canal to an improvised and inexperienced body. It was because the Suez Canal Company were never allowed to give any evidence or to make their case in any way before the Conference. At an early stage the very able President and the Secretary-General of the Company came to London and offered help, and needless to say they were kindly and hospitably welcomed; but the President returned to Paris without any connection being established and, in fact, the Company had no connection

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whatever with the Conference while it was on. Monsieur Georges-Picot, the Director-General, remained, and I gave him all the help I could. Both he and I were sought out by other delegations, but he had no status in the official machinery of the Conference.
Here I must mention a matter of which I have given notice to my noble friend who is to reply. An August l4, immediately after the opening of the Conference and the appointment of its President, an official letter was handed in at the Secretariat-General stating the Company's case in writing arid asking that it might be circulated to the whole Conference. Days elapsed before its receipt was even acknowledged, with apologies for delay and a promise that it would be circulated; but to the best of my knowledge—and I have made many inquiries—that promise has not been carried out.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, as this point is rather out of the current of the rest of the discussion, it might be of advantage if I tell the noble Lord that the letter was circulated by the Secretary-General of the Conference to the head of every delegation present at the Conference.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, could the noble Marquess give me the date on which it was circulated?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: Yes, on August 21.
LORD HANKEY: The Conference began on the 14th. It is a very curious thing, but I asked several delegates and officials who were looking out for this document about the matter. One of them was actually sitting next to me at the Suez Canal Company Board, and he had been concerned at the time when it was drawn up. I asked him whether he had ever seen it in circulation and he said: "No; I have been on the lookout for it". Another even more distinguished person gave me the same answer. He was very much concerned about it. I think that this is a matter which must be looked into a little more closely. At any rate, the company certainly never had an opportunity to make this case before the Conference.
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So the Conference, most of whose members knew very little about the Suez Canal Company, though many of them were interested, was quietly shepherded into this well-nigh hopeless scheme of a new International Suez Canal Board. Why do I say it is well-nigh hopeless? Not only because of its intrinsic defects—it really has not got any of the apparatus; it does not know the personnel it has not got the "know-how"—but because Nasser, after his refusal to yield to the powerful persuasiveness of Mr. Menzies' group, stated definitely in public that he would never accept it. And if that is the case I think his people are behind him. I am afraid so. That means that the whole population would refuse to work the scheme. There would be strikes and every kind of obstruction.
If your Lordships want to know the real reason why the truth was concealed from this Conference, I would refer you to the following extract from an article by the Washington correspondent of a leading newspaper published on September 11:
"For internal reasons it was always difficult for the United States to appear to be aligning itself with colonialism or imperialism. The Cairo discussions have helped to insulate the Canal dispute from these two emotional concepts and bring to the fore the problem of assuring free and equitable operation of the Canal."
In the Conference circles it was put in rather rougher language which I will not quote. I think that the mistake of condemning the Suez Canal Company unheard was very serious, and I once more warn the Government that it is gambling on a dangerous experiment which is not calculated to ensure that the Canal will not remain in the unrestricted control of Egypt. But I believe there is still time to rectify that mistake.
The first thing that will have to be done after this affair is over—as I say, I think it is going to be a very long time—will be to get the Canal started up when you have it free from the unfettered control of a single Power. It may be that by that time the Canal will have deteriorated very appreciably. There is only one authority in the world that can start it up again—namely, the Suez Canal Company. And with its usual foresight, as your Lordships are aware, the Company has made provision for the maintenance for a certain period of the non-Egyptian personnel now leaving Egypt and which

787
consequently could, at the right moment, get together again. I venture to suggest that the new Users' Association mentioned at the end of the speech of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House should be instructed to ask the Suez Canal Company's advice on two points: one, how best to start up the Canal again when the trouble is over, and, two, whether and in what respect it would be willing to modify own structure and methods if necessary to meet the desiderata of the International Conference. I can assure your Lordships that if you approach them you will find no recrimination and tremendously keen help. One thing I can tell you, with the utmost confidence and certainty: that neither the proposed Suez Canal Board nor the Users' Association—nor even the Suez Canal Company—can get ships through that canal without Egyptian cooperation or military occupation. I shall not follow that further, because it would bring me into much larger political and military aspects of this matter with which I have no time to deal to-day.
EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, there are about another twelve noble Lords who wish to speak, so it is suggested that we sit through dinner. Dinner can be provided here, but it would be convenient if those noble Lords who want it would let Miss Hoath know.
6.17 p.m.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, it is very hard to have to speak in competition with the seductive offer that has just been made by the noble Earl, but I shall do my best. It seems to me that in this debate perhaps the best and most helpful speech we have heard yet was that just made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey. I remember the noble Lord's war book, and in the First World War I had the privilege of being associated with him. He has rendered great public service during his lifetime, and I think he has never rendered better service than he has by his speech to-day. I will come back to that shortly, but I should first of all like to ask your Lordships to have less unction in your debates. It is sometimes very difficult to stomach when you are aware of the history of the Suez matter. When you think how we opposed the Canal, and of how we would not join in the 1888 Convention; when you think how we stirred up the Porte to
788
put every obstacle in the way of de Lesseps, and how we demanded special rights for our position, to listen to all this talk of the Canal coming under the sole control of one dictator being a thing no honest man could bear stirs one's inside in a most unpleasant way. After all, we are all accustomed to a little banditry—we belong to the British Empire. But banditry should not be preceded by a prayer meeting.
I will take first the point made by Lord Hankey in his interesting, constructive and helpful speech. What is there, in that speech, that would prevent the present Suez Canal company from being the property of Egypt but controlled and managed as it is to-day? That is the nub of the whole business. I am going to come to that because that is what is stirring the Arab world their freehold rights. But before I come to that I must ask the noble Lord whether he cannot clear up this business about the pilots. We understand that the pilots, on the word "go", were all to be withdrawn. I remember that M. Georges Picot made a speech (I can give the reference) in which he said, "If we withdraw the pilots we can wreck the company."
M. Georges Picot pointed out that the company is now in a position to use the loyalty of the employees to paralyse the Canal at any time it chooses: but, he said, the Government do not want them to do that. That is what we want some light on. I asked the Government what is happening financially about these pilots. Are they being paid? And I was dealt with in the haughty, businesslike way the noble Marquess adopts.
THE EARL OF WARWICK: My Lords, the noble Viscount is on difficult ground. I feel that anything of that nature would bring the same answer as a question about our difficulties over here between labour and employers. I think that it would be invidious of the noble Viscount to pursue this any further.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That may be so. I do not want to discuss what is rather a parallel than an absolutely relevant point. But I should like to know who is paying the money to the pilots to come home and do nothing. That is a question I asked the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, and also the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, who said in effect, "I know nothing about

789
the pilots", and added, "The Government of which you were a distinguished member (I hope Lord Attlee took notice of that) did the same thing, and I might as well ask what salary was paid to inspectors of the Potato Marketing Board." But this is a vital thing in one or two ways. You are trying to wreck the show and make it impossible for Colonel Nasser to win by time.
THE EARL OF WARWICK: My Lords, is the noble Viscount suggesting—
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Sit down.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I will give way willingly; I have never failed to give way when asked. First of all, the pilots come home and apparently are put on paid leave. They are vital. I believe the French arc more numerous than the British.
A NOBLE LORD: No.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: They are not? But they are both important. I believe there are also some Greeks and Danes. But, as M. Georges Picot says, they can paralyse the operation of the Canal. That is a very powerful thing and we should know something about it. The noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor replied: "How can I tell you? I do not know what contracts there are. I know nothing about it." Well, does he know anything about it? Can he tell me who is paying the paid leave of the pilots while the Canal is being paralysed? That is the point.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I do not think that there is any harm in my answering this question. At the outset, like all the rest of the personnel—and there are a great many more people than pilots involved in this—the pilots were very anxious, and I can tell your Lordships that some of us were very anxious, too. I had been in Egypt shortly after the troubles of 1954, when there had been a great deal of shooting. Pilots had been shot at driving to and from their work and women did not dare go out of their houses. They were not allowed to cross the bridges to buy cake for tea. It was a very serious business in many ways, and the people in Egypt had that memory, as I have. I remember that in Cairo two people of mine in another concern with which I am associated, the Nile Insurance Company, had been in the
790
Jockey Club when it was destroyed, and I had heard innumerable stories of the uncomfortable time our people had in the Canal Zone too. Naturally, the wish of the Company was to get the pilots home if they wanted to come home. That is all the policy of the Company has been.
Certainly there has been no deliberate policy of putting pressure on Egypt by that means, though in fact, if you had withdrawn them, I think the whole thing might have been over by now. When the pilots came home on leave they were given certain dates and the dates were prolonged owing to Mr. Menzies' mission. Eventually the date by which they could come home if they wanted to, so far as the Company was concerned, was prolonged to September 15, and they are coming home now. Of course, the Company goes on giving them their pay. As I said in the course of my speech, the Company is maintaining them on full pay for periods varying from one to three years, so that we can get them hack when we can restore the Canal. But there is no "nasty stuff" about it. if I may put it in that way.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord for this information. But the money with which the Company is paying the pilots is a diminution of the dividends which should be paid to this country. Every year a paper called Finance Accounts—not the Finance Bill—is laid before this House, and in these Finance Accounts your Lordships will find how much money we have received from our dividends from the Suez Canal Company. Therefore it is a valid Parliamentary point to ask how the money is being controlled and whether or not this House would approve the withdrawal on pay of a number of pilots up to long periods and for most laudable motives of friendship but to the ruin of traffic through the Canal. And when you see that Egypt is pushing convoys through so far as possible, with one exception which I will come to in a moment, and when you see that Egypt has observed the 1888 Convention, while M. Picot says that when we withdraw the pilots—and they are withdrawn on full pay—it could make the operation of the Canal collapse, you begin to wonder who is disobeying the 1888 Convention, which guarantees the free passage of the Canal to the ships of all nations. This point I must he cleared up.

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I should like to ask this question, which I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, can answer but which I think the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, can: who is going to pay the expenses of the Users' Association? Is it going to be on Parliamentary Votes? It will cost something. I suppose the famous Conference from which the Suez Canal Company, the only people who knew anything about it, were rigorously excluded, is on the Foreign Office Vote. As regards this new contraption that we heard of for the first time yesterday—the "Users' Club" or whatever it is called—who is going to pay the expenses of that? Perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, can tell me. I would willingly give way. Perhaps he might give the information to the House. But first of all I would draw the noble Marquess's attention to the fact that the Canal money is public money and, presumably, the Users' Club comes under the control of Parliament.
There is a second way in which we are proving to Colonel Nasser that time is not on his side. The first thing was to take away the best pilots. The next thing was to tell people not to pay. When I asked the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford, this question the other day, he said, with a certain amount of glee, "We pay the money to the people we have always paid." But suppose the people getting the money are not rendering any service. If a ship goes through the Canal—it does not matter if it is a British ship or not—we say, "Pay in London," knowing very well that payment in London is blocked. The Egyptian Government cannot get it. So Colonel Nasser—this wicked fellow—permits the ship to navigate the Canal, pays the pilots out of Egyptian money, out of the Egyptian pocket, and takes no dues—and he is the man who is breaking the 1888 Convention!We have taken away the pilots; we have "bagged" the money that belongs to the Canal Company; and Colonel Nasser is charged with being the man who is breaking the Convention of 1888.
LORD HANKEY: I do not think it is right to say that we and the French have taken away the pilots. We have given the pilots the right to go if they want to go, if they feel that they are not working under proper conditions. They are still
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under contract to us, not under contract to Egypt. Most of them prefer to go, except, as somebody said, the Greeks.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes. I think it is possible that we may find that conditions will be made so favourable for them that they will go back—at least I hope so. In the meantime, do not let us have any mistake about the facts: namely, that the hindrance to the 1888 Convention at the present time comes from us. Certainly it comes from us. Two noble Lords contributed brilliantly in two languages to the debate a little earlier. Perhaps they will tell me how they harmonise the disappearance of the most experienced pilots with a desire to keep the Canal running. That is a matter that I do not understand. Another thing that I do not understand is, who is getting the dues? Where is that money going? Suppose a ship goes through and the owners say they are accustomed to paying in Paris or London, and they pay in London, and the Egyptian officer says: "Very well; I will take that as a receipt". He does not get the money; Egypt never gets the money. Who does get the money? Does the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, consider that as not relevant to the debate? Somebody gets the money. Does the Canal Company get the money?
LORD HANKEY: The Suez Canal Company gets as much of the money as it can. It ought to get it all, in our opinion, but we get as much as we can. Money paid in London goes to our account, but, as the noble Viscount has said, it is frozen. Money paid in Paris would be collected there. A good many of The American ships, I believe, are paying in Egypt. Your Lordships have probably read the curious letters they send accompanying it. And there have been some ships that have got through without payment, although there are ways and means of dealing with those.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: All this is very peculiar finance: you collect money for services you do not render and give it to pilots whom you put on full pay on retirement. That is the finance of the Suez Canal Company at the present moment. It is not at all satisfactory. It is really no good for the Government to say, or for the Lord Chancellor, with all his august authority, to say that we must

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not mention a thing like that; that we never did it in our Government with our numerous Boards. People are talking. They are saying that this is the way we are going to get Nasser out. The Times said something about the economic squeeze: deprive him of his revenue, freeze his assets, take away his pilots and he will soon learn reason. Is that the way to get this problem settled? A good deal of light has been thrown on it by the debate this afternoon, and I hope that we shall hear more from the Government sources, because they are able, as large shareholders in the Canal Company, to exact, either from the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, or this new Users' Club. wherever it lives, and whoever it is, all the information that is required.
I leave that point, because I do not dare to speak for too long. This Users' Club is going to collect the dues. They will say to somebody: "We will provide you with a pilot when you turn up at Port Said." Maybe the Egyptians will say: "If you pay, he is a good pilot, and we will let him go through." I should not have thought that that was very good organisation to do it in that way. Then he will say: "I have paid to the Users' Club and I have here my card of membership." But the Egyptians may say: "Yes, but we are rendering the service now and we are maintaining the Canal. The Users' Club does not live here but in Kensington—the pilots practise on the Round Pond. You are rendering us no service. Why should we let you through? "Hitherto, apparently some have got through without paying, as the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, has said.
This is the dangerous thing. We are asked in the Resolution to-day to endorse the statement made. I find that very difficult to accept. What do we know after the eloquent speech? It was not a statement or anything concise, but it had this in it: that the Users' Club was going to take charge of the shipowner and was going to take his money in London and guarantee him a safe passage through the Canal. Suppose he arrives at the Canal and somebody says: "You have not paid. We will not let you go through." What do you do? Then the Government use force if necessary. How they do it I have not the faintest idea. I do not know if the lock gates at Port Said are shirt—I have not been there for some time. But
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do they shove the gates open and push the ships in? The whole thing is not thought out. One clear point in the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, was that this thing is a cockered up thing by five people who met together and have now dispersed to the ends of the world without leaving a proper plan behind them. The dangerous thing is, that if somebody gets thwarted, the Users' Club, there is the possibility of a shot being fired.
The third point about the Users' Club is this. What is the position of the United States about it? It seems very difficult to understand. My noble Leader, Lord Attlee, said that this time of the year is a difficult time for Americans, and I read a longish article in The Times headed (in The Times the headings are not the news but the politics) "United States to Join the Plan." You say: "Right, I need not spend any more time on that; I will turn to the crossword puzzle." But if you read on, you find not a word to that effect. What it says is this:
"It will exercise on behalf of the users the rights which are theirs under the 1888 Convention,"
Nobody has ever disputed that. The 1888 Convention, which I say we refused to sign, provided for the agents of all the countries to come and see that the job was done. Who stopped them? We did. We were there in 1888 and we called but one meeting of the agents. If you could put the 1888 Convention on its legs and make it work, with the good will of Colonel Nasser and the expertise of the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and his Company, then you would have something of a working Kind. But if you say that the Users' Club is to be provided with a gun, and in the absence of Parliament a shot may he tired, then I cannot understand that. One point about which I did not agree with the most reverend Primate, if I may say so respectfully, was when he said that unity is everything. Justice is everything—not unity.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My point was that you cannot get justice unless you have unity first.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I could not possibly subscribe to that: I am a Nonconformist. Will the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, in his reply, say whether if the Users' Club, this highly decorative body, find that when they have taken a

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due from a ship, and the ship goes to the Canal and cannot get through, they will guarantee that before they send an armed guard for the ship they will call Parliament together? I believe the most reverend Primate, the Archbishop of Canterbury, asked that. He said that it could not be done without Parliamentary control. But I read in this Motion an assent to the assertion that this policy has the approval of Parliament, and therefore the Government can go ahead without calling Parliament together. That is a point that must be cleared up. If we can be given an assurance that Parliament will meet before the Users' Club gets busy, then we shall have got some way forward. That is all I want to say on that point.
The other point—your Lordships will not be pleased with it, but it will be brief —is this. I love Egypt, and I love the Egyptians; and they have been very badly treated by us. They have been made the washpot of Europe: British and French jealousies, fighting over their plains. Who cared about the fellahin? We governed well when we governed and had Lord Cromer there; we governed justly when we governed. But it was always the bondholders who counted. I have been reading little books about this. Lord Milner's book says that in the 'eighties 60 per cent. of the revenue of Egypt went to the bondholders. It is said: "We must not have the Canal in the hands of one Government". But that was de Lesseps idea. I understand that his idea in distributing the capital was to get many countries interested, and Egypt was to be primarily interested. The Khedive—he was not the Khedive then; I suppose he was the Pasha—had an enormous share, and had 15 per cent. of the profits. He was the governing figure up to the time when Disraeli scooped the pool one Sunday and bought up his shares. But why? What did the Pasha have to do with the money, the money which was Egypt's property in the Canal? He had to give it to pay the foreign bondholders, and Egypt lost her 15 per cent. of profits in the same way in order to make her budget balance. Sound finance is very unpopular now, but in the 'eighties and 'nineties it was highly thought of. Lord Cromer was a man who was going to make the budget balance. He said
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in his second book that he considered two things his triumphs in Egypt: one a balanced budget and the other telling Abbas II where he got off. Those were the two achievements of his policy. All this is in the minds of the Egyptians. Look at it from their point of view.
Two things I forgot to mention at the beginning. In two ways Nasser has broken the law. It was not Nasser, of course, but King Farouk who forbad Israeli ships to come through. It was the King's Government who did it. When the Foreign Secretary made a speech the other day he said that one of Nasser's crimes was that he had expelled King Farouk. Is it British policy to restore Farouk? "Shall we join the ladies?" is that our latest? Why did he say that? Because passion must be worked up against this man. It is not only the question of the Canal; it is that Colonel Nasser is too big for his boots. Why are Pineau and Mollet so keen? It is not the Canal they are thinking of; they are thinking of Morocco, Tunis and Algiers. "Here is a man who is getting too big, and we will make the English join us and put him in his place."
LORD KILLEARN: With respect. you can hardly blame them. I hold no brief for the French if they feel like that. but it is a natural sort of fear on their part.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Entirely. No one understood firm action better than the noble Lord, Lord Killearn, when he sent the tanks in in 1942 to put Farouk in his place. If we are going to engage in the laudable task of assisting the French in putting the Arabs in their place, let us know it. But do not let us pretend it is in the cause of keeping the Canal open.
The two things I was going to mention were these. Farouk's Government stopped Israel's ships going through the Canal. That was continued by the régime of Neguib and Nasser. Neguib himself from time to time showed surprising signs of friendship for the Jews. I remember at one time the talk was that he had gone into the Mosque on a Friday, and they said, "You must have made a mistake General; this is not a synagogue." That is all very good. But the Users' Club, the Canal Company and the Government should say here and now to Colonel Nasser, "You have broken the law. Here is the 1888 Convention which you have

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broken. Here is a ship called the 'Tangia ', loaded with cement, and you have kept it for five weeks messing about in the Canal. That ship has got to go through." If they did that they would vindicate the law, and would show that the 1888 Convention is in fact a reality. The other thing I would mention in passing is that we have to think of the effect of this massing of arms on the relative strength of Israel and Egypt, and the 1950 agreement. Is it possible for the Government to argue that Israel has the strength to defend her soil?
Finally, about this dreadful act. Twelve years hence the Canal becomes the property of the Egyptian Government. Nasser has anticipated by twelve years the rights which are bestowed upon him by Article 10 of the Concession. The Lord Chancellor made a most brilliant forensic speech yesterday, and he convinced everyone. In fact, so great was his enthusiasm that the noble Marquess, Lord Aberdeen and Temair, there and then moved a vote of thanks to him and carried it unanimously. But the Clerks forgot to put it in the Minute. We enjoyed a little of what is called "Rock 'n' roll", which shows how flexible and charming the procedure of this House can be. But the Lord Chancellor said that this is a breach of international law. He never put that point to the eighteen or twenty-two countries. It was never mentioned in the document after the Conference had risen. I do not think that Mr. Menzies could have got unanimity on the point in his Committee of five. I have no doubt the Lord Chancellor is right, but why cannot he put that point which he made so vividly, effectively and convincingly yesterday, to the International Court? He says it is because Egypt has not subscribed to the optional Clause. Nasser, in his speech, challenged him to do it. I say that the first thing we could do to help our position in world would be to put this issue of the illegality of the premature entry into this property before the International Court.
How does Egypt feel about it? Egypt is a poor country. Her people are half starved. Their families are increasing, and there are now about 20 million people with a low standard of life. All the time they have toiled and have had one great asset: they had their geographical position. That was the one asset they
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had, just as we have tin and rubber from which we get dollars. Said Pasha entered into a contract to let their country for 99 or 98 years to a Company. The Company did well year after year, and the volume of trade and passengers increased. Money was made, and it went into the coffers, quite rightly, of the concessionaires. But in Article 10 of the Concession it was promised that at the expiration of that Concession the Egyptian Government would take the place of the Company and enjoy the rights without reservation:
"The said Government will enter into full possession of the Canal and of…all the establishments connected therewith, the indemnity to be allowed to the company on the relinquishment"
That was the assessment of the value of the property. I should like to ask the Government whether they admit the validity off this heritage belonging to Egypt. Do they say that in 1968 the Egyptian Government would enter lawfully into possession of this great asset which has enriched so many, and which belongs to Egypt? That is the nub of the whole thing, and all this talk about its being international cannot cover the act that the Egyptian people were selling their birthright, given the agreement made with them 98 years ago. If the Government would say now that this is an interim arrangement, and that the Users' Club will own it for twelve years and that is all, but they are not taking away Egypt's freehold, then I think we could do something for the appeasement of Egypt and for our own honour.
LORD HANKEY: If the House would permit, I could throw a little light on this. So far as the Suez Canal Company is concerned, we have always recognised that the end of the Convention comes on November 17, 1968, unless there is agreement to continue it under some modified form or otherwise. The Company has gone as far as this. In 1949 they concluded an Agreement, which I took part in negotiating, for the Egyptianisation of the Company. They have already gone a considerable way. Among the workmen class there is a very high percentage. Among the other classes, except in the very high and responsible posts where great experience is needed, the Egyptians have risen quite high. It is an odd thing, but I was told the other day by one of our officials who is out

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there that none of these people who have been trained and put in rather high posts have been promoted by the present Egyptian Government. Those men always told me that they were regarded as collaborateurs, in the French sense—that is to say, collaborating with the enemy. I myself told the Minister of Finance this story and said, "They are not collaborateurs; they are collaborators in the best sense of the word, all of them, and are doing their best for the Company, and are your main hope for the future.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That confirms me in my belief that the good work done by the noble Lord and his Company has always been bedevilled by the differences between Egypt and Britain and the occupation lasting too long. If that were out of the way and the expert assistance of the Canal Company were available, and the good will of Nasser were won by a frank recognition of Egypt's right to the freehold in the Canal, then I think you might he at the end of your difficulties. This is a moral issue; it applies not only to Egypt. Everybody who has got something which the world thinks is necessary finds speeches made about its being "by Divine Providence that that thing is needed and therefore we must have it." They are getting anxious about it. There is no difference between a pipeline and a canal. A pipeline is only an embedded canal. Why should not the Lebanon, in their turn, nationalise their pipeline? They give a concession and they will stand by it, but if they are to be told that at the end of the concession somebody will get up and say, "We are sorry but the world need requires that we should take what you have got", that will do more to unite the oil-bearing countries and the Arab countries than anything in the world.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Has anybody ever said that?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: Yes.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Has anybody ever said that at the end of the concession they shall not have it?
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: No. The most reverend Primate is helping me very much. If the Users' Club is going to come to an end in 1968 and then Article 10 of the Concession is to be valid and the
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Egyptian Government enters into the full possession, the freehold possession, en plein droit—those are the words of the Concession—if we are going to say that, then I think we are a long way forward. But what they arc afraid of is that all these organisations that we are bringing in are trying to rob them of the one little precious asset that they have which might raise them from a starving race into a prosperous peasantry. That is the case, and if any parts of it can receive the attention of the noble Marquess when he comes to speak, I shall be grateful to him.
6.54 p.m.
LORD TEVIOT: My Lords, when I heard the first part of the noble Viscount's speech, I began to think that he must have lost a lot of money in Suez Canal shares. He seemed so concerned with the economic situation. I hope that is not true but it would appear that he had —perhaps the noble Viscount will give me his attention. I am sorry that the noble Lord who kept on referring to "our attack" apparently on Nasser and his regime has gone, because I was going to refer to various remarks made during his speech. We have not attacked Nasser. We have done nothing whatever that could be described as an attack on Nasser and his régime. I am sorry the noble Lord is not here. I should like him to explain what he meant by that. When he returns, perhaps I shall have an opportunity of finding out what he meant.
The Agreement that was entered into by ourselves and the Egyptian Government was carried out and honoured by us, as noble Lords know. We carried it out, but the present Egyptian Government have not carried out their part of it. We carried out our part of it because we never envisaged a change in maintenance, installations or ownership of the Canal. If we had known, when the proposition was put up to us, that that was going to happen, we should never have evacuated the Canal Zone.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I must interrupt the noble Lord. It is a most amazing thing. He is talking as if the evacuation of the Canal—will he allow me to continue?
LORD TEVIOT: Yes, certainly.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The noble Lord is talking as if the evacuation of the Canal zone were a sort of prize given to

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the Egyptians. It was a contract entered into by the Conservative Party.
LORD TEVIOT: I am not going into who did it, but it was a definite arrangement between this country and the Egyptians that if we evacuated the Canal Zone, then things would continue as they had in the past—the maintenance, installations and freedom of access through the Canal. We have carried out our agreement but they have not done so. The appalling thing to-day, one of the things that must be worrying every noble Lord in this House, is the fact that, whereas in the old days, with the individuals of the world, their word was their bond, that does not now apply. That is why we are getting into these troubles at the present time.
Abadan has been mentioned. It was a most regrettable incident which damaged our prestige. The noble Viscount who has just sat down began to talk about who is going to pay. I do not know that anybody has paid for the frightful losses owing to the Abadan incident. Who has done that? It must have come out of the hands of the shareholders. I am quite certain that one battleship and a hundred Marines, right at the beginning, with people with "guts" behind the Government, would have settled the whole thing in five minutes. Here we have this unilateral action on the part of the Egyptian Government which automatically invalidates the Agreement which we have honoured. I have already referred to that. I will put this point to your Lordships. Has any noble Lord gone into a piece of business where he may have sold something to somebody else or entered into an agreement with somebody else to do certain things? If one side does not comply with the bargain, does not that wash out the whole thing?
Certain people in this country have suggested to me that, in view of what the Egyptians have done in this case, we should be perfectly justified in reoccupying the Canal Zone base. I do not agree with that view now, but that is the sort of thing that is in the minds of a great many people; they think it would be a perfectly legitimate and equitable thing to do. If anybody is a brave man the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, is—I know it, and I have great admiration for him. If he had been at
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Alexandria the other day, listening to that bombastic speech of Nasser, I wonder whether he would have taken the line that he has been inclined to take since this crisis has been in the picture? I do not think he would. I think that he would have taken a very strong line in antagonism to Nasser. Nasser did this without notice. That brings me, just for one moment, because the noble Viscount mentioned it in a question yesterday, to the matter of the pilots. As the noble Viscount is aware, the pilots were definitely urged by the Company to remain on until the result of the discussions that took place between Mr. Menzies and his Committee and President Nasser were known.
During this debate there has been mentioned something that touches me greatly —namely, the question of appeasement, and references to the appalling conditions of the 'thirties. Who then, to a great extent, were responsible for our unpreparedness?—the peace balloters. I can remember before the First War, in which the noble Viscount opposite and I took part, that our men were refused access to the schools in the London County Council area to drill and prepare themselves for what Lord Roberts at that time thought was a certain war. I have never forgotten that—one does not forget. Then again, we only just—this is not laughable to me. I do not know whether the noble Lord opposite took part in that war, but I did and our unprepared-ness was most unpleasant.
LORD SILKIN: Since the noble Lord has appealed to me. I would only say that I do not think his remarks are particularly helpful.
LORD TEVIOT: I am quite certain that what the noble Lord said yesterday, and the content of many of the speeches that have been made, particularly on that side of the House, have been most helpful to Nasser and not at all helpful to us. With regard to that unpreparedness, it was only with the greatest difficulty, and due to the heroic efforts at the Battle of Britain, that we managed to get through and win. I have always wanted to find out from those who were against what happened at Munich what they would have done in these circumstances. I have never yet had an answer from one of them.

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What has been offered here? We have offered to be the tenants of a landlord, that landlord being Nasser and his Government. I am afraid that noble Lords on both sides of the House have been inclined at times to dwell on the subject of force and war, and on that side of the House in particular, on the subject of the people of the country not being behind the Government, and that the Arab States will be alienated from us and all that sort of thing. I do not believe one word of it. I believe, as has been my experience, that the people of this country are solidly behind the Government, that they should stand up for the rights of the people here and do everything they can to avoid war—which they are doing. With regard to the Arabs, we know that they produce and we buy. I am quite certain that in a short time we shall find the Arabs saying to themselves, "This is no good to us. We have lost our business or a part of it", and instead of having a luxurious time they will find themselves having a bad time.
Then, I have heard mentioned the question of the people of this country. Nobody in more keen for the Government to stand up to the situation than the old soldiers of our day, and also those of the last war. I happen to have landed at Khartoum, on the Nile, on the day that the Battle of Alamein started, and I saw the great Egyptian nation lift not a hand to help us when our men were going up in their thousands to protect the Egyptians and to drive Rommel back We lost thousands of men in that operation. Have we had any recognition for that? Not one word of recognition or gratitude. I think the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford, spoke yesterday about ships going through the Canal and not paying their dues. I am director of a shipping line. We had a couple of ships going through, I think, on Friday and Saturday, and I believe that the captains were perfectly right to pay the dues where they had always paid them. Everything is in a quite chaotic state at the moment, but they are paying all right, and I am quite certain that the Egyptians will get what they are entitled to in payment.
Now a word with regard to this preparation— this army, as it has been called. How could we not do something? what
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have we had? We have had this massacre in the Jockey Club, already referred to this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, when various people were killed and others ill-treated by the Egyptians. It is perfectly ridiculous to suggest in regard to this "army", or, rather, this partial mobilisation, that we should not be prepared, should something of that sort happen on a big scale. Nasser is most bellicose. What would noble Lords opposite say if we had no means of protecting our own people and property?
Now I come to another question. Here we have a Canal which, as has been said over and over again during the debate, is vital to our interests. It is vital to the welfare of the people of this country: their standard of living is dependent on it. The waters of the Nile are vital to the lives of the people of Egypt. The head waters, the sources, of the Nile are in British territory. Supposing we had said to "Master" Nasser: "We propose to divert the Nile and put a little fertility into the Sahara and Ethiopia where it is badly wanted, so that we shall not be able to let you have the amount of water you used to get", I wonder what he would have had to say. This seems to be an exactly analogous case. Let us have no more of this nonsense about colonialism. I wonder what Russia calls Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Roumania and Eastern Germany. What is their answer there, while they are shouting about colonies? And while India is shouting about colonialism, what about Goa and Kashmir? Such talk is absolute nonsense, and we ought to ignore it altogether. There is no doubt whatever that if Nasser has his way he is not only going to wreck and ruin an enormous number of people in Western Europe but he is going to wreck completely the interests of the Arab States; and one day, quite soon, he will find out that they have realised that.
I will say one word in regard to the legal side. I listened with the greatest interest to the noble and learned Lord. Lord McNair. As a layman I know nothing about the law, of course. Then I listened to the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor, and I came down 100 per cent. on his side, because I could understand what he was talking about. I could not entirely

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understand what Lord McNair was talking about—he was somewhat "over my head." The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack was a little "over my head" too, but I understood what he was getting at. If I could not manage to understand the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, it was no doubt my fault and not his.
I should like to say a word about unity, in view of Mr. Gaitskell's attitude. He was all right in the beginning, and his Party seemed to be following; but now the position is quite changed and I fear that the "Peace Ballot" mind of the Socialist Party has got to the top. I see great difficulty in agreeing with their point of view on this very important question. Of one thing I am quite certain—the organisation which the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, refers to as the "Users' Club" is something which gives President Nasser a chance to alter his mind. He has "fallen out" with the existing state of affairs, and I feel that here there is something new about which ire might say: "Here I see an opportunity to negotiate with these people." I wish to give my full support to the proposal for the Users' Association mentioned yesterday by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I hope that, as a result of this step, we shall get a better understanding and that President Nasser will realise that he now has something on which he can "bite" so that we can come to a solution of the difficulties from which we are both suffering.
7.15 p.m.
LORD KILLEARN: My Lords, there are nine other names on the "batting list," and obviously the hour is getting late and your Lordships are getting hungry. I had not originally meant to speak at all and would not have done so: but purely fortuitously I received this very morning a letter which seemed so interesting that I thought I might read it to your Lordships as being of topical interest, and I propose to do so later. Meantime, in the course of this debate one point has been mentioned which leads me, before reading the extracts from that letter. to refer to an earlier matter which arose principally, I fancy, out of the admirable speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, about the arrangements for the safety and security of navigation on the Canal when we got out in 1954. I have very vivid recollections
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of that affair because I took one view, some of my good colleagues took the same view and others took another view. We were overruled and our troops were got out. I am not going to challenge that decision now: but at that time it was borne in on some of us, and especially on myself, that we had certain inherited obligations in Egypt under the 1888 Convention for the safe and secure navigation of the Canal.
We felt so strongly about it that in October, 1954, several of us wrote a joint letter to The Times. I believe that it was a pretty good letter and if any of your Lordships need a little light reading, you might read that letter sometime. At the same time I put a Question on the same subject in this House. It is always boring to have old things brought up, but if I may say so, without immodesty, this is one of the rare cases of wisdom before, rather than after, the event. It sounds conceited to say that, but it is true. I asked a Question and a supplementary, and though the supplementary is the pertinent one I am afraid that I must inflict the main Question on your Lordships first, to make things clear. The Question which was put on July 15, 1954, and appears in the OFFICIAL REPORT for that date (Vol. 188, col. 1087) was:
"To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they consider that in the terms of Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the Egyptian Army is now in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of the Suez Canal."
That Question drew from the noble Marquess the Minister of State, who I understand is to reply tonight, the following Answer:
"My Lords, as the noble Lord is very well aware,"—
which was rather "a nasty one," suggesting that I ought to have known better than to ask the Question—
"complex and delicate negotiations are at present proceeding between Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government for a settlement of their differences in regard to the Canal Zone. In those circumstances I am sure that the House will understand if I say that. in the interests of these negotiations, I am nor prepared at this stage to make public the opinion of Her Majesty's Government on the issue raised in the noble Lord's Question."
I followed that up with a supplementary question in these words (col. 1088):
"My Lords, in thanking the noble Marquess for his reply, which the House will fully understand, may I put to hint the following

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supplementary question: Whether the possibility has been studied of adapting our direct and inherited obligations under the Suez Canal Convention of Constantinople of 1888 into some form of effective—and I emphasise the word effective '—international guarantee of the free navigation of the canal in time of peace and of war? "
That supplementary question drew this reply:
"My Lords, I am afraid that what I said in answer to the noble Lord's original Question must apply with equal force to the supplementary. I think it would be highly undesirable if we were to imperil the progress of these negotiations by discussing these matters at this moment in your Lordships' House."
I put it to your Lordships, looking back, as we do to-night, that it would perhaps have been rather wiser, shall we say, had Her Majesty's Government taken that question a little more seriously. After all, what is all this present pother about now? Precisely the point specifically raised in my supplementary question two years ago. It is unusual that one happens to be right in advance. Now, my Lords, I was not proposing to take that specially to my credit, but I think it was a great pity that at that time we were "brushed off." We are always apt to be "brushed off in replies from the Front Bench on matters concerning the Foreign Office. I am not the only one who has said that. Others have said the same thing. We are getting accustomed to that sort of treatment.
However, I did not put my name down to speak to-day in order to raise this point: I put my name down because I received a letter this morning which was about other things. And it is only because the point was brought up in Lord Hankey's speech about arrangements now being made that I have brought it up now. I might add en passant that I personally should be very grateful, and I am sure many others of your Lordships would also, if we could know a little more about this Users' Club, or whatever it is called, which has been suggested. It seems to me that the formation of such a body is probably a very ingenious thing, but it seems rather vague. As I listened yesterday in another place I thought: "This is probably terribly clever and a very good thing, but what precisely does it mean?" Nor do I yet know what it does mean. Does anyone else know?
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It bears on a point which I imagine the Minister who is going to wind up will speak to. For it bears very much on what Lord Hankey said. What have the present Canal Company done that is wrong? We are seemingly abolishing that Company, and are going to insert in its place an odd body whose functions we do not know and who certainly do not, and cannot, know the technical matters and functions of the Canal. It would be most helpful if we could be told something more about this. I do not say this from the point of view of criticism—on the contrary, on leaving your Lordships' House last night I said: "Thank God we have got action at last!" But what is the action?ߞthat is what I am puzzled about. If it could be explained, either in the Press or in some other way, just what this organisation is and how it is going to work, it would be very helpful and illuminating. My inclination is entirely to back it. I shall certainly vote for the Government if it comes to going into the Division Lobby tonight.
Now I conic to the point about which I rose to speak. I know that your Lordships do not like long quotations, but it happens, as I have said, that I received a letter bearing on this subject this very morning. It is not easy writing and I have had some difficulty in reading it. It comes from a man who has spent a large number of years in Egypt—I will not mention his name, but the letter is at the disposal of any noble Lord who would like to see it. As your Lordships know, however, there are reasons why it is better not always to say who your correspondents are. I will now read a few excerpts which may provide a little light relief for your Lordships after the rather heavy materials which we have had to browse upon this afternoon.
My correspondent writes:
"I know we have to consider world opinion, but world opinion will not help us much if Abdel Nasser gets away with his last coup."
The writer then talks about some publicity which he is going himself to do. He may be writing an article or so to show what in his view Nasser intends doing after his Canal coup—that is, of course, assuming that he gets away with it. The writer goes on:
"Russia will not go to war for him, but Russia will do everything to keep Abdel Nasser

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as a thorn in our side. Few would believe me in April, 1953, when I said that the junta—"
that is, the Egyptian military Government
"was completely involved with the Soviets. His plans"—
that is, Nasser's plans—
"include (1) general oil nationalisation; (2) blackmailing the Sheiks of Bahrein, Kuwait, etc., into subsidising Egyptian industry and the dam; (3) picking a quarrel with Ethiopia, in order to take control of the Nile so that the Sudanese will be at his "—
that is Nasser's—
"mercy in order to establish himself opposite the Yemen."
My correspondent goes on to say that he has just been in the Yemen and that
"Nasser is sending agents everywhere. En the Ahram "—
that is one of the well-known Arabic papers published in Cairo—
"of the 11th July, the names of 1,664 Egyptian ' teachers ' are published with their destinations covering twenty-three other African and Asian countries, in addition to what he already has. I have spent six months in Libya and have watched the hundreds of Egyptians corning in as officials in the Government and for other purposes … I saw one of the camps where Algerian guerrilla fighters are trained by Egyptians. One of Nasser's next actions will be the confiscation of all our key installations in some form or other as part of the nationalisation of Egyptian industry."
My Lords, I was going to stop there, but a passage comes now which, at the express request of Lord Vansittart, I propose to read. It is in connection with the arrests of these so-called "spies", and Lord Vansittart begged me to read it. The writer says:
"It is positively disgusting. all this arresting business of British subjects. I am told 'that Nazi methods are used to force these men to make confessions—even by using special injections of drugs. He has three German advisers at work for him secretly in the interior. AI arc well-known ex-Nazis."
There follows a lot more which I will not inflict upon your Lordships. It happened that that letter arrived this morning and I thought that it would interest this House.
There are just one or two other matters that I should like to mention before I sit down. Of the arrests I have already spoken. Now as to possible forms of pressure. Various suggestions as to forms of pressure of all sorts have been mentioned. One has been called "water pressure." This, of course, is a question relating to the water of the Nile. You
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cannot deflect the Nile, but you can do other things if you are going to be really "tough." It is a commonplace that the Nile is the jugular vein of Egypt. It is a very enthralling study—the question of the various reservoirs of the Nile along the course. I am not sure whether your Lordships know that for only three months of the year does the Nile water run directly into the sea. For the other nine months the whole of the water of the Nile is penned in reservoirs. "dished out" in feeders and eventually, after use, into so-called "drains"—you can always tell a drain because there is usually refuse or loose herbage floating upon it; they look otherwise Like ordinary irrigation canals. For nine months of the year Egypt lives on the water which has been impounded in these barrages. admit that this is not a thing that we can lightheartedly or possibly do at all. It happens that at this moment it is the season of the high Nile, during which the dams and sluice gates are open all the way up the river and the water rushes down, unimpeded, and out into the sea, so that this, the summer, is not the time when one could be really "nasty" if one wished to be so. Now I do not know if I may say so within the precincts of your Lordships' House. but if one were to "pull the plug" at the wrong time—that is, at the time when the water would normally be impounded in all the reservoirs—and the reserve irrigation water —went "swooshing" down over the country, it would finish off Egypt. That is beyond dispute, and it is probably a comparatively easy thing to do. I am not suggesting that we have reached that stage or that we ever shall, but you never know; and I should like to know—perhaps the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, could mention it—whether that question of water pressure has been studied.
The reason I now mention this idea is that, after all, we had two years' full notice. We signed the Agreement to get off the Canal in October, 1954, and this Canal crisis broke in August, 1956. Apparently it caught us absolutely and completely "bending." Yet if there was one thing on which the betting was 100–1 on, it was that after we had got oil the Canal, the Canal Company would he the next target. It was as sure "as eggs is eggs", if I may use a common expression. And what had been done in this interval

811
of two whole years? What are General Staffs for? What are pigeonholes and studies for? When the thing hit, it so happened that the King of Jordan was dining at No. 10. The Press told us the lights were on until the early morning; everybody was rushing about, and yet, seemingly, nobody did a thing. I was told —I should not have heard, but one hears these things that it would take a full month before we could do anything. If that was so, surely somebody is blameworthy? We had two years of comparative peace before the obvious thing came down on us like a ton of bricks and we apparently had not done a thing to prepare for it, dead certainty though it was. That seems to me most peculiar and very shaking.
Only one other thing I would mention to your Lordships which, so far, nobody has referred to in this debate—to wit, the extremely important matter of insurance. I know nothing about it, but I presume that every ship using the Canal is insured and that shipowners have to pay a premium; and presumably that premium depends on the conditions of adequate pilotage and so on. I cannot see Lloyd's risking a ship worth, say, £2 million. Many of your Lordships have been through the Canal, and know that if there is a variation of half a foot, the ship is "for it". There is, in the nature of things, little steerage way. The work of the Canal pilots is accordingly most highly skilled. One cannot just say, "Be a pilot", and even if one could, I imagine that nobody in his senses would insure such a ship. I merely suggest that this subject of insurance might usefully be discussed, together with that of pilotage, already under such active discussion.
7.34 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, we have been debating the Suez Canal crisis for more than ten hours and I think it is extremely unlikely that a Back Bencher is going to say anything new or anything that your Lordships have not thought of already. I should like to say at once that I am in full support of the policy of Her Majesty's Government. One of the reasons my support is so wholehearted is that I see that the Government are determined to uphold inter. national law. I speak as one of the under forty-five years-old Members of your Lordships' House—I think I am the only
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person under forty-five who has spoken to-day—and though I speak only for myself, I think it is possible that my views are shared by others of my age and younger. I would say that all of us, of all ages, had great hopes of the United Nations Organisation. May I remind your Lordships of what my noble friend Lord Linlithgow said last night in a moving and sincere speech? He said to your Lordships rather sadly:
"I not this where we came in before?"
I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Marquess. As I see it, this is exactly where we came in before, and exactly where we shall come in again until the United Nations Organisation is made an effective organisation.
I am certain that noble Lords on the other side of the House and on this side share the determination that if possible we should not use force, but I cannot see that any Government could tie its hands absolutely and say that in no circumstances will it use force. The suggestion is made that we should appeal to the United Nations Security Council. May I remind your Lordships, with all respect at this late hour, for we have been talking for a long time and perhaps we may have strayed a little from essentials, of the words of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor in his (if I may say so without impertinence) remarkable speech of last night [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 199, col. 721]:
"The Assembly has no executive power but only powers of recommending. A resolution of recommendation in the Assembly may be blocked by one vote over one-third. That is the position. I say that there should go out from your Lordships' House and from all men and women of good will the hope that, if it does come, if it is necessary, if our action fails. the United Nations will be inspired by the duty of preserving international treaties and obligations."
I pray that we also will be inspired by the duty to uphold international obligations. It may well be that to do so it will be necessary to have recourse to force. I feel that what I have said is perhaps easier for a humble Back Bencher to say than for anybody else in your Lordships' House. No one dislikes the idea of force. of war, more than I do; but I would much rather that we fought, if fight we must, than go down shuffling off the responsibilities on to a United Nations which we are perfectly certain is going to take no action at all.
7.39 p.m.
LORD GEODES: My Lords, the point has already been developed in this debate that the crisis which has been created by Colonel Nasser's action was in any event likely to confront us in 1968. A conservative estimate of the oil traffic from the Middle East indicates that the present rate will be more than doubled by 1965, and that that figure will again be doubled by 1975. The present Canal will be quite inadequate to carry such a load, and until two months ago there was a question, as yet unsolved, whether Western civilisation should invest vast sums, perhaps in return for an extended concession, in either duplicating or greatly enlarging the Canal, or alternatively to assume that it would be maintained at something like its present capacity to handle the passenger liners, the dry cargo ships and the smaller and older tankers, and instead to expend those sums on other means; for example, a pipeline or additional ships for the Cape route to carry the additional traffic. Part of the answer to this problem lay in the vitality of what the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, yesterday described as "that delicate flower, international confidence". It seems to me that on July 26 Colonel Nasser crushed that flower, and, to that extent, has helped towards a solution of this problem. For, whatever may be the outcome if the present troubles, he would be an unwise investor who would place vast sums of new money under such an unstable political control. Moreover, by showing his hand now, instead of waiting until the end of the concession, when the increased traffic and adjustments to world trade would have been much more onerous, I believe that, from his own selfish point of view, Colonel Nasser has made one of the great mistakes of history.
The Canal was conceived and built in the very early years of the steamship era, in a day of ships of 1,000 tons and 1,000 horse power. Even as late as fifteen years ago a 15,000 tons tanker was thought to be too large for normal use, and he was regarded as a daring shipowner who took the risks—such as a fracture—with a ship of 25,000 tons. The maximum draught for ships in the Suez Canal to-day is about:35 ft., and those who have been planning new tonnage have been working on the assumption that within the next two or three years the operating draught will be 36 ft. In terms
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of ships, that means that it is almost impossible to design a tanker over 40,000 tons which can carry a full cargo through the Canal. The risks of building a hull of such a size have, until the very recent past, been thought to be unacceptable.
It has long been known that there is a size of ship which could carry oil around the Cape more economically than it can be carried through the Suez Canal by a ship restricted by the Canal dimensions. Based on present Canal dues and transit times, for a voyage from the Persian Gulf to the United States a ship's economic size is approximately 65,000 tons; and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, has said, for a voyage to North-West Europe its size is of the order of 80,000 tons. Within the recent past tankers of 84.000 tons, and even one of 100,000 tons, have been provided. Therefore, now, and only now, the economical ship for the Cape route has become a reality, arid it is now no longer true to say that the Canal will always be an essential link in the chain of oil supplies to the Western Hemisphere. Weigh those words, my Lords. We have heard too much of the "lifeline of oil supplies" in regard to the Canal. Temporarily it is true, but in the long term it is no longer true that the Canal is the lifeline of Western civilisation. The big ship has been created and can now trade more economically around the Cape, and we find ourselves back in the position where our forefathers were one hundred years ago. The Cape route will be the normal route to the Middle East for the biggest ships which can carry oil.
To build these large ships—which I hope I have shown have now become essential—there are required quantities of steel greatly in excess of anything that at present seems likely to be available. One of the great shipbuilders of this country has recently said that, though he had the facilities to build several tankers at a time of 80,000 tons or more, to do so would consume so much steel that on present availability his other berths would have to stand idle. The same point is illustrated in another way by the fact that a tanker which could be put economically on the Cape route erected in the United Kingdom to-day would not come into service until 1962. While I do not by any means dissent from any of the plans announced by Her Majesty's Government to deal with the immediate

815
position, I urge that we should now face the probability that for years to come it is unlikely that there will be any major increase in the size of the Canal, and we must therefore strive vigorously to make or acquire greatly increased quantities of steel and so enable our shipbuilders to build the ships which have now become necessary for the Cape route in the foreseeable future.
7.46 p.m.
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I count myself lucky at my position in following the noble Lord who has just spoken, since he is extremely knowledgeable in these matters where shipping is concerned, and my own knowledge of the matter is restricted. 1 was glad to hear him say that the supply of oil through the Canal could be, and probably would be, diverted to other routes. I open my remarks with those words because I feel that the whole of this question which we have been debating for the last two days is really more one of prestige than a question of oil supplies, important though that is. There is a lot of difference between a thing's being of great importance and its being vital.
The only reason why I have intervened in this debate is because I returned in the early hours of yesterday morning from China, after three or four weeks in Communist China, coming out through Hong Kong, where I was able to spend a few days. I can assure your Lordships that in those parts of the world this issue of the Suez Canal is watched not only daily, but hourly, by everybody: not only by the British in the Colony of Hong Kong, but by the Chinese as well. And the Chinese in Red China, with such Press as they have—and it is not much—giving coverage of the story every day, are most interested in it, and I doubt whether the subject of oil is uppermost in their minds.
We have heard to-day and yesterday a number of points put forward by Labour Members of your Lordships' House, one of which was that a Gallup Poll which was held lately seemed to show that a majority of people in this country were opposed to the line which the Government have seen fit to take. I should have thought that the Gallup Poll would have died at the time when Mr. Truman was
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re-elected as President after a Gallup Poll had given Mr. Dewey a ten-to-one chance at the Election. One would have thought that that would have been the end of Gallup Polls, and I am sorry to see that it was not. A more misleading way of discovering public opinion has never yet been invented. It is a matter of how the question is put, and it can be so put that you can produce an answer of your own selection quite easily—and I should say it probably has in this case.
To turn to the question of "the use of force", this phrase has been used by one speaker after another. What exactly does it mean? At what point do you use force? We have heard about "sabre rattling". That is an expression used much in the Press lately, in another place, and in your Lordships' House. Since when has reasonable strategic deployment been sabre rattling? The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, mentioned this yesterday, and looking round the House at that time I saw no fewer than three ex-First Lords of the Admiralty in your Lordships' House, quite apart from the present First Lord. Since when has the reasonable movement of the Fleet, which has always gone on, so far as I am aware, been considered sabre rattling?
The late Secretary of State for Air has also been in your Lordships' House to-day. As far as I know no movements of squadrons have ever been queried in the Press or by anybody else, or looked upon as menacing or threatening. But the moment the Army moves anybody, the Press are on it at once. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, referred to the "ostentatious movement of troops." What did he mean by "ostentatious"? If the Press like to give it coverage, certainly everybody knows, but it is nobody's fault that the Press should see fit to do this. Ostentatious movement of troops "I thought was a particularly unfortunate expression in that connection. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, also referred to the use of the term" dictator. "He said that it should not be used, and that if you want to do business with a man you should not use a term of opprobrium. I am not convinced that the term "dictator" is a term of opprobrium. If anything, in Portugal President Salazar, who is certainly a dictator, is an exceedingly popular man, and runs his country extremely well. We are not complaining about the power held by this or that

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leader in a country, but how he exercises it. That is what we are concerned with in this case.
I should like to refer to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Vansittart, who spoke from his enormous experience in these matters. The realism which he introduced into his remarks came to me as a refreshing change. One only wishes that Members of your Lordships' House and another place half his age would speak with that amount of realism and force. The noble Lord put the case, which has been argued in your Lordships' House to-day, that the similarity between the position to-day and that of 1936, when Hitler marched into the Rhineland, is not in fact an analogy—historians could possibly find differences —but generally speaking the attitude, the atmosphere engendered by that type of action, is exactly the same. I agree with the noble Lord that the day Hitler marched into the Rhineland he not only impressed the country and the world but his own great General Staff, which is a much more important: matter. Up to then they had been against him. After that, they were for him, because they saw that the bluff worked. It could be that a similar situation is developing to-day in another part of the world.
We have had much talk of the legality of what is going on. The legal experts in your Lordships' House have given their views at great length, and they are interesting to those of us who understand these matters, but less interesting to those who do not. It seems to me that one of the people least interested in the legality or otherwise is Nasser. He has done a certain thing for a certain reason, and it is now for us either to take a firm line or to let him have what he likes. There is little point in playing cricket with somebody who has never heard of cricket. because it is unprofitable—it does not get you anywhere. I do not think Nasser is interested in the legal aspects of this matter.
The last thing I have to say is this. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in his speech to-day used the words:
"Labour do riot oppose the Government for any factious or Party reasons."
But yesterday evening, as I went into the House of Commons, I heard these words—I wish to quote only a line or two, and as the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, is not here to stop me perhaps
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your Lordships will allow me to do so. This gentleman said that if the Tory Government can keep the country out of war they have such a good case to put up before the people that a great deal of Labour Party propaganda will be needed to keep the Tories out of office at the next Election. If that is not Party politics, I should like to know what is. Later on the sonic gentleman stated:
"I will fight the Government on this issue. I will take the fight down to the docks".
If that is not a threat, I should like to know what is. But if the gentleman in question or, for that matter, the Labour Party think that considerations of that sort will divert the present Prime Minister from doing what he considers his duty to the British Empire, the Commonwealth and the civilised world, in my view they are mistaken in their man. What I am saying is my own view. I understand that a little later in the debate my noble friend Lord Layton will be speaking briefly and giving the views of the Liberal Party. I have merely made a few points of my own, and I am grateful to your Lordships for listening to me.
7.56 p.m.
VISCOUNT ASTOR: My Lords, I venture to address your Lordships only because during the war I spent two and a half years in a humble position on the staff of the Admiral commanding the Suez Canal area. By the end of those two and a half years I knew every kilometre of the Canal. I have also been in the closest possible touch with the Suez Canal Company, and have seen the great difficulties under which they worked and their great technical achievements. I think it is right that from this House there should go out a tribute to the Canal Company, a model employer, under whom every Egyptian wanted to work and who were technically efficient and far-slighted. It is only right to pay tribute to the pilots, who are a magnificent body of men and who rendered a wonderful service for the Allied cause in the war. Once I was sent down single-handed to receive a large liner at the time the French gave in, and the liner was manned entirely by French Canal pilots who did a most wonderful job on our side.
I want to look at this problem from the humble point of view of somebody who knows a little about the work of the Canal to see whether this scheme of the Users' Association, so far as it was

819
explained to us by the Lord President yesterday, is a practical one. This Canal is 100 miles long. There are only certain places along it where convoys can pass, where one lot of ships tie up and the others come by. The timing and coordination of these convoys is the most delicate matter in order to get the volume of shipping through. Ships coming through at night have to pick up special searchlight equipment provided by the Canal Company. The traffic control, rather than merely the pilotage, is the key. This depends on the traffic office at Ismailia, which is in touch with signal stations every ten kilometres along the Canal. These signal stations report any untoward incidents; any ship getting across the Canal, which happens fairly frequently, and the right time for ships to move. This traffic control produces the tugs which go along and rectify any mistake that may have arisen. There is also the continuous problem of silt in the Canal, which has to be worked on by dredgers. operating under the Canal Company.
The right comparison of the Canal is not that of a road, but a railway. It is not a road 100 miles long, where you put your own drivers in the cars going through and let them somehow find their way along a difficult route: it is more like a single-track railway, with sidings, with a vast volume of trains which can work only if there is this highly technical co-ordination of traffic control. It seems to me that the idea that ships should arrive with their pet private pilot at Port Said, and expect to go through, is completely impractical unless there is the active co-operation of the guards and the traffic control. The Egyptian Administration has only to withhold, perfectly passively, that cooperation to make this scheme an entirely impractical one. It is exactly as if. when the railways were nationalised in this country, some private users thought they would run a second lot of trains on the G.W.R. There would be nothing but smash-ups and trouble.
This new scheme will not work, therefore, unless either we have the co-operation of Egypt or we are prepared to occupy, take over and run the whole land installations which make the Canal work. I do not see the Egyptian Government giving the visas to do this. If they withheld the co-operation, the only thing to
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do would be to take the Canal area by force. But we know that you cannot isolate the Canal zone from the rest of Egypt. In the first instance, every drop of water that is drunk on the Canal comes from the Nile by the Sweet Water Canal. Whoever is in control of the Nile could cut off the water supply of the Canal at a moment. If you took over, you would have all the problems of civil government, of internal security and of trying to get the essential Egyptian labour and co-operation to make this work. If the Egyptians merely withheld their labour and their administrative services, the whole thing would break down.
What is the next stage—an advance to Cairo, kicking out the Egyptian Government? I am sure the British Army can do it, but then we are faced with the reestablishment of the Protectorate which was given up in 1920, with the same type of guerrilla resistance that we have seen in Cyprus and which has gone on in French North Africa. Perhaps Colonel Nasser in Damascus would be a far bigger nuisance, as the head of the free Arabs, than he would ever be in Cairo. Some of my friends who are greater experts on the Middle East believe that a policy of force is the only thing which impresses the Arabs. I may be wrong, but I think the people who say that are many years out of date. The French tried it. They used force on the most extensive scale in Morocco and Tunis. And it failed. They have been trying to use it in Algeria, and again it is failing. So I do not think this policy, if carried to its logical conclusion, is at all a practical one.
That is the purely local problem. What of the international implications? The real problem of the world to-day is that there are the democracies on the one side, and Communist Russia and China on the other, with a great uncommitted world, from Siam to North Africa. It is the way the world is going to swing on which the fate of the world will depend. Lord Vansittart's comparison with the 1930's is not entirely valid—for this reason: that, while Germany was a real menace in itself, having the machinery, the iron, the steel and the technology to be a real concrete force, none of these Arab countries is in itself capable of being a real aggressive force. They have

821
not the industry, the iron or the steel. Most of them, especially Egypt, have severe food and population problems. But they have the potential of the oil, seven-eighths of the world's oil reserves, and that is placed in strategic areas on which the aerial communications of the free world depend and which, if that goes over to the other side, really changes the entire strategic position, to our detriment. I think that Arab nationalism and Moslem nationalism is a real thing that cannot be ignored or laughed off. It will not disappear before a display of force. In the years after the war we gave up trying to keep the East on our side by force, and we tried to bring it by persuasion into the Western camp. We shall lose the whole uncommitted world if we arouse Arab nationalism arid Eastern nationalism against us and throw them into the side of the Communists.
I believe that, if we got into a shooting war with Egypt at this stage, we would risk losing a great amount of the uncommitted world. I think that, while this is a false path, we have many other cards in our hands that we can play. Our basic objective, surely, must be to isolate Colonel Nasser and Egypt from the rest of the uncommitted world, not to make their hero. The importance of the Suez Canal has tended to be slightly exaggerated. If there had been an earthquake and the whole thing had caved in a month ago, it would have been a great inconvenience, but it would not have meant the death of this country. I have been in touch with friends in the shipping world and in the petroleum industry, and I gather that by a redeployment of our tankers, using half on the Caribbean route and half round the Cape, the problem is solvable. That was deployed in a paper far from Socialist, the Financial Times. It would certainly cost us less in dollars than a war, with all the dislocation that it would involve.
The Arabs are odd people. There are some very moderate leaders in many of the countries, like Iraq and Jordan and elsewhere, but there is this undercurrent of nationalism among the young which can be turned against us. We must give help to those moderates and not rouse that undercurrent. If we merely divert our shipping to the maximum possible, Colonel Nasser will rapidly be left with
822
a wasting asset. He will have no revenue, no surplus, no talk of a High Dam, no foreign exchange. He will then have his own countrymen turning on him. We had the example of Mossadeq. We applied that strategy to him, and where did he finish? He was put in gaol by his own people. If we divert our shipping away from the Canal, we shall soon find the countries of the East saying to Nasser, "Look what a mess you have landed us in!" All the oil-producing companies of the East would find their revenues, their development plans, going down and getting into a great mess. India would feel at once the difficulties of the extra charges of exporting and importing round the Cape. There would be great pressure from the East on Egypt to come to a proper settlement.
By those non-violent and perfectly legal methods of diverting our shipping and putting on financial pressure, we can get the uncommitted world on our side and against Colonel Nasser. On the other hand, if we follow the logical lines along which this idea of the Users' Association may lead us, we may lose the uncommitted world and we may largely split the Commonwealth. I do not know whether noble Lords read the survey of Australian opinion in the Manchester Guardian yesterday. It quoted the Melbourne Herald as follows:
"From Australia's point of view the issues involved arc tremendous. The loss of 2i direct route through Suez would be a serious blow to us, but if we were to join in any military action against Arab countries at this stage it seems almost inevitable that the whole of the work that we have put into developing Asian good will will be swept away with ore stroke. That. for Australia. would be far more serious than the loss of Suez. communications."
Therefore, let us have the Users' Association, Put let us not attempt to make it an operating body. Let us make it a negotiating body, to negotiate terms as the situation develops; then we shall get world opinion on our side. That, I believe, is the correct way to avoid what I think makes technical nonsense—this idea of the Users' Association appearing with their pilots, trying to go through with no traffic control. It might also well be political disaster.
8.0 p.m.
LORD COLERAINE: My Lords, my mood this evening is very much what I fancy, if we could see into each other's hearts, is the mood of all of us: the

823
mood that was so well expressed by my noble friend Lord Ballieu and by the most reverend Primate, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. Whatever dangers we stand in—and I believe that the dangers are very great indeed—they have been immeasurably increased by the appearance, at any rate, of disunity which has developed so sadly in the last few weeks. Like my noble friend and the most reverend Primate, I do not believe that this division is very real, and like them I believe that it can be halted, and that it has got to be halted if we are to survive, and indeed if Western civilisation is to survive, this crisis.
It seems to me to be a very odd thing about this debate, as it has developed, not only in this House and in another place but outside Parliament altogether, in the Press. that there should be so great a disposition on the part of those who are doubtful about the wisdom of the Government's policy to claim for themselves an absolute monopoly of enlightenment, of common sense and even of humanity. I am not surprised that noble Lords opposite insist so strongly upon the importance of maintaining the rule of law and asserting the rule of law in an international affair. I am not surprised that they warn us of the danger of accepting the law of the jungle, because if we do the jungle is likely to overwhelm us. I am not surprised that they insist upon the subordination of national sovereignty to an international system. I am not surprised by this, because I feel it all so passionately myself. What does surprise me and, if I may say so, shocks me, is that they are so ready to believe that Her Majesty's Government take a different view. I do not understand how anyone in this House or outside it—the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, if he does—can possibly believe of a Government of which the present Prime Minister is the head that it can be careless of the obligations that are due to an international society. That seems to me to be absolutely inconceivable on the record. Whatever views noble Lords may take of the idiosyncrasies of the Tory Party. of the weaknesses of a Tory Government, I do not see how they can possibly believe that a Government not merely presided over but so clearly led by the present Prime Minister would do anything to
824
weaken the rule of law in international affairs.
Surely one thing has been evident right from the start of this crisis. The whole aim of Government policy has been to substitute an international system for a national system and to subordinate the idea of national sovereignty to the idea of the international law. Sometimes, listening to the debate and reading leading articles in the newspaper, one might suppose that it was Her Majesty's Government which was insisting on the importance of national sovereignty and Colonel Nasser who was denying it. One might suppose, indeed, that it was Colonel Nasser who had summoned the Conference of twenty-two nations and Her Majesty's Government who had refused to attend. I find it difficult to understand the objections which have been voiced in some quarters of the House to the Users' Club. It does not seem to me to be anything like as dangerous as my noble friend Lord Astor suggested it was. It seemed to me that the most reverend Primate was nearer the mark. The Users' Club is surely nothing but another opportunity given to the Egyptian dictator to reach a settlement within the framework of the United Nations. There is no element of provocation in it that I can see. The dictator may brush it aside. It will be unfortunate if he does, but the responsibility for that is not the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government.
There has been a great deal of talk about sabre rattling—my noble friend Lord Windlesham referred to it in the very interesting speech which he made. But before we allow ourselves to become the prisoner of phrases of that kind, is there not one simple question that we might ask ourselves? When the burglar alarm is sounded, who is the criminal? Is it the citizen who sounds the alarm? May it not possibly be the burglar? I would go so far as to say not only that the attitude of Her Majesty's Government and the French Government has been right throughout, but that if they had not in fact adopted that attitude there would be no question to-day of international control of the Suez Canal—once again national sovereignty would have asserted itself over the rule of law, and the resulting resolution of the Assembly of the United Nations (for of course there would have been one by now) would have

825
joined the resolution on Israeli ships in whatever pigeon-hole is reserved for resolutions of that kind in that gorgeous palace on the banks of the East River in New York City.
I have said that the difference between Her Majesty's Government and the Opposition is not as deep as it seems. I believe that to be true, but I also believe that there is a difference. If your Lordships will bear with me I will attempt to define it, because when we do define it I believe it becomes apparent that the difference is not so deep; nothing like as deep as would, for example, justify the kind of leading article that has appeared recently in the Manchester Guardian, leading articles which seem to me to be inspired by no rational calculation but simply by malice and spite against the Prime Minister. I believe there is a difference but I do not believe that it is such a fundamental difference.
I say at once that in my own view and, so far as I am concerned, the difference between noble Lords opposite and myself, as those noble Lords have expressed their view, in fact concerns the United Nations and the function that the United Nations can perform in this crisis. It is not a difference in the sense that noble Lords opposite believe in the United Nations and I disbelieve in it or that noble Lords opposite want to make it work and that I do not want to make it work. For my part, I am absolutely convinced that it is essential to maintain and indeed expand the prestige and authority of the United Nations. But I am convinced of something else, too: that Her Majesty's Government, just as much as noble Lords opposite, believe in the United Nations and hope and seek to make it an effective factor in this crisis. The difference between us, I think, is simply that we on this side, or at any rate I, believe that if too much responsibility is put on the United Nations it will break down, physically and morally, so far as to be incapable.
I do not want to remind the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, of anything from his past that he would prefer to forget, but he and I were once colleagues in the same Administration, he a very senior Minister and I a junior Minister. I do not think the noble Earl will think it offensive of me if I say that together we had a good deal to do with the early
826
days of the United Nations, before the war ended and before the San Francisco Conference. I would imagine that in those days the noble Earl would have shared my view of the possibilities of the United Nations Organisation. That view, roughly speaking, was that the United Nations Organisation was not, and was not designed to be, a unitary, federal world government. It was, on the other hand, a collection of independent foreign States who undertook certain obligations to work together to maintain peace and security in the world. At that time it seemed to me, and I think it must equally have seemed to the noble Earl, that an organisation of that kind could work at 100 per cent. efficiency only if there was broad agreement among the great Powers. If there was no such agreement, if there was serious division among the great Powers, then the United Nations could not be relied upon as a wholly effective substitute for the, until then, prevailing system of international politics.
I may he putting into the mind of the noble Earl. Lord Attlee, ideas which he did not have, but I believe it is fair to say that when he himself was Prime Minister he must have held the view which I have tried to express, because, after all, that was implied in the foundation of N.A.T.O. and everything that N.A.T.O. stood for. As I understand it, the only reason why N.A.T.O. was founded was that the United Nations did not and could not operate at 100 per cent. efficiency in the light of the Russian attitude, and so measures had to he taken, in a sense outside the United Nations but in the real sense within the United Nations, to buttress the structure of world security and world peace.
That seems to me a precise analogy with what has been happening in recent weeks and with what Her Majesty's Government have been seeking to do. Within the framework of the United Nations the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, the United States, and fifteen or sixteen other countries, have sought to create in the Canal area a system of security which would be more effective than a divided United Nations could possibly be. Following from that, it seems obvious to me that there is no real possibility of the United Nations functioning effectively in this crisis except on the condition that Powers like ourselves, the French (I do not share the

827
poor opinion of the French held by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee), the Americans, and countries like us who really believe in the new idea of an international society, are prepared to take responsibility upon themselves. Otherwise I believe the United Nations cannot possibly deal with a crisis of this kind.
I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge—with much though not all of whose speech I found myself in agreement—who said that we should guarantee to take our share of any measures that might be necessary if the United Nations decided on certain action. I do not believe that that is enough. I do not consider that it is necessary only that we who really believe in an international society—ourselves, the French, the Americans and the remainder of the eighteen nations—should just take a limited commitment to do our share and no more. I believe it is essential for us to realise that this is a responsibility which we must shoulder wholeheartedly if the operation of the United Nations is to be effective. And I am sure of two things. I cannot speak for Her Majesty's Government, but I am sure that they have kept within the framework of the United Nations and that they will continue to do so. I am sure that the line which they have taken so far has been absolutely right.
A lot has been said—I have said some of it myself—about mistakes made before the war. It has been said of those mistakes that had they not been made it would have meant that the war might have been avoided. I do not want to go into the question now of appeasement, Danegeld and so on. But there is one point upon which, if we look back honestly upon what happened, I think we must all agree. Noble Lords opposite would say, no doubt, that the Conservative Government of the day did not take the League of Nations sufficiently seriously. I thought at the time that the Conservative Government did not take it sufficiently seriously and I said so. I would say, looking back, that the reason they did not take it seriously was because they knew that very little reliance could be put upon it. But on one thing I think there can be no dispute, and that is that in the public mind, irrespective of Party, it was felt that the League of Nations was used for the purpose, above all else, of
828
shouldering off disagreeable responsibilities and putting them on to some outside body which would bear all the responsibility and all the disadvantages if any there might be. And it seems to me—as I say, I am not trying to be provocative; I do not want to be provocative—that there is a tendency among some critics of the Government to treat the United Nations in the same way. They say, in effect, "Let's put our burdens upon it, then we shall be free to shorten hours, develop the Welfare State and have a grand old time "—or whatever it may he. If that is what happens to the United Nations, then the United Nations will go the same way as the League, and the United Nations will become as discredited as the League was.
It seems to me that in our thinking on this general problem it is necessary to clear our minds at any rate about one thing. Is this a problem about the Suez Canal? In form, that is what it is: it is a problem about the control of the Suez Canal. But in reality I do not believe that that is the real problem. The real problem is not how to control a canal but how to control a dictator. It seems to me that one of the grave weaknesses of the policy of the Opposition Party, the policy of the Labour Party, was expressed inadvertently by Mr. Gaitskell in another place yesterday afternoon when he said, in effect, that the purpose of referring the problem to the United Nations was really to gain further time for further negotiations. If the problem is a problem of controlling a canal, that makes sense. But if the problem is a problem simply of controlling a dictator then, as Lord Beveridge, I think, indicated in his speech, it is surely nonsense. You cannot negotiate with a dictator of the nature of Colonel Nasser. You can state to him as fairly as possible, as politely as you can, as reasonably as you can, the conditions upon which he will be permitted to enter the international society. But you cannot, in my submission, negotiate with him about that. From the nature of the problem, there are limitations set upon the field of negotiations. But they are not limitations set by Her Majesty's Government or the French Government; they are limitations set by the dictator himself.
LORD BEVERIDGE: As the noble Lord has again referred to me, may I take the opportunity of referring to what he

829
said about a previous remark of mine concerning taking our fair share in giving force to the United Nations. I most gladly accept his comment as a definite improvement upon what I said. If I had talked with him before I spoke I would have said what he has said.
LORD COLERAINE: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord; we must have some more talks in the future.
There was one point in the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, which impressed me very much and which I thought was capable of a different construction from that which he put upon it. It was when he said that if our action against Colonel Nasser was too severe there was a danger of his becoming the hero of the darker-skinned races against the white. That is a danger, but I should have thought that the danger would be enormously intensified if Colonel Nasser were allowed—in the vulgar phrase—to "get away with" what we all, I think, really accept in our hearts to have been a blatant, visible and undisguised act of aggression. If that happens I have little doubt that he will become the hero of the dark-skinned races against the white, and, I think, deservedly so.
My noble friend, Lord Astor, spoke a great deal, and with much force, about the uncommitted nations and how the whole purpose of policy ought to be to get their support. I agree that it is extremely important to get the allegiance of the so-called uncommitted nations. But I am not certain that you will necessarily get that allegiance by running off to them, because I think that if they form the opinion that we are on the run they will keep us on the run. Lord Astor talked about alternative methods of dealing with the Egyptian dictator, and subjecting him, subjecting the whole Arab world, to financial pressure. I am not sure that that would necessarily achieve the desired result. Because politics is not only a matter of financial inducements—life would be much simpler if it were, and I think our American friends have found that out—or of financial disabilities. It is still true, whether you are committed or uncommitted, whatever the colour of your skin may be, that strength ma integrity count for a very great deal.
I have spoken at far greater length than I intended and I apologise to your Lordships. I have only one further comment
830
to make. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that the Government had embarked on a dangerous course. I agree. The Government have embarked on a dangerous course because the world is in a highly dangerous condition. Whatever we do now, whatever we could have done from July 26 onwards, presented its own particular danger. This is a dangerous position. Any policy by any Government must be a dangerous policy, but there is surely one thing upon which we can all agree and it is this: dangers do not become any less if we run away from them or try to push them aside or lock them in the cupboard; they become greater.
8.42 p.m.
LORD LAYTON: My Lords, it is late and we have listened to many speeches. There have been remarkable speeches among them, but I think that the lawyers have carried away the palm. Certainly the speeches of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, and of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor yesterday and, to-day, that of the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, have unquestionably helped to clarify our minds and to sharpen up the position in which we are placed; and the most reverend Primate made good use of the effect that had been produced by that clarification. Twenty-four hours ago there were many things I was burning to say, but they have been said several times and much better than I could say them. Therefore, I have left my notes on the Bench and rise only to express what noble Lords sitting on these Liberal Benches wish to happen to-night and what we are prepared to do.
The speeches we have heard have served not only to clarify the situation but also to indicate a surprisingly greater degree of unity than might have been supposed from reading the Motion and Amendment on the Order Paper. I am certain that we all feel not only that the problem we are facing to-day is of great importance but also that unity is important. I am not quite sure whether that comes before justice or not. but certainly it is of the greatest importance. The debate has tended to show a certain agreement on certain important points—first, the international character of the Canal anti the extent to which the situation in Egypt is proving international and involves us all in obligation, and secondly, the question of the use of force.

831
I am certain that the reason there has been such an evolution of opinion in two different directions in the last few weeks is the instinctive concern and fear in the public mind of the possibility of what, for shortness, I would call private war. I think that to-day's debate, following the expositions of yesterday, has brought out that that is the common background to our thinking. We are obligated, with certain very limited exceptions, not to resort to war on our own decision. Private war is "out." I am certain that that is the instinct of the people of this country. It is not merely a legal matter. It is not merely that we are pledged not to go to war and, therefore, are in honour bound not to do it, but we believe that, in the nature of things, there is no future except in a world that accepts the rule of law.
It may be thought that we can get away with limited wars, but it is not worth while in this debate, at this time, to argue that question. When we remember how many wars started that were to be over in three months or six months, or were to be limited in this direction or the other, the answer seems to be clear. Since the Great War closed, we have had two localised wars. I looked up the figures this morning, and found that the war in Korea cost 1½ million casualties on the Allied side alone, and that the other "little war" in Indo-China cost 200,000 casualties on the French side—that is without either of them developing into a greater war.
Another impression that this debate has left in my mind is that so little has been said about "lighting matches in the powder magazine" the danger of a world conflagration. It is assumed that we do not risk an atomic war. Can we go on assuming that private wars will remain private wars, and that next day somebody else's private war can be carried on? Can we always assume that? I think that that is the sort of uneasiness that is in the public mind.
On the other hand, we on these Benches feel that at this grave moment it is most undesirable that we should show all the signs of a Party wrangle. We wish that there should be a united front on a common policy, which is so near; yet we do not find in either the Motion or the Amendment something that expresses our desires and on which we can vote unitedly. Many of us have much
832
sympathy with the Labour Amendment when it
"calls upon Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations and to declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligation under the Charter of the United Nations."
But in the light of this debate, it seems strong language to speak of
"the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to invoke the authority of the United Nations …"
It is true that there has not been a reference to the United Nations so far, but the words may be used to imply a censure of the Government because it is not the intention to refer this to the United Nations and there is some other plan that is going to side-step the United Nations.
We can interpret this debate as our own minds dictate, but certainly the speech of the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor showed that he, at all events, in the Government, most profoundly desires—and nobody questions his sincerity in the slightest—to move certainly and sure-footedly to the United Nations, in the profound conviction that private war, in the sense that I have used the words, is "out." In the light of the statement that he made, from his position, some of us are prevented from accepting the words of the Labour Amendment as it stands.
On the other hand, we cannot vote for the Government's Motion as it stands, and in particular because of the phrase which refers to
"support for the statement of policy made by Her Majesty's Government to this House on September 12."
The most reverend Primate, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, has already referred to this matter. The motion implies support for the statement made by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House thirty hours ago. Rightly or wrongly, we believe that that statement leaves a gap for private war that is much more widely open than we feel, and I think the country also feels, is in the interests of the nation. We cannot leave it as that. But, as I have said, we very much desire to avoid the appearance of a split, and in saying that I am only repeating in other words what has already been said from the Bench opposite. If the Government Motion stands as at present we shall abstain. On the other hand, if the Government speaker, in the final speech made from the Government Front

833
Bench, can give an interpretation of Government policy, and can assure us that they will refer the dispute to the United Nations under Clause 37, and will not use force except in accord with oar international obligations, then we shall he glad to vote for the Government.
8.54 p.m.
LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, it is the first quality of a speaker to enjoy his own speech but I cannot pretend that I rise with any special pleasure tonight to speak, from a strong sense of duty, on what, as it stands, amounts to a vote of censure on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government in a most grave matter. We have listened, as one would expect, to a number of distinguished speakers. From our own Front Bench and from other Benches the House has been addressed this afternoon by an ex-Prime Minister, an ex-Lord Chancellor, and the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, with a long and, in his own way, unique experience of Egypt. And yesterday the main case, from the point of view of the Labour Party, was unfolded with special authority by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. In the circumstances I know that other speakers will not expect me to reply in a systematic or detailed way to the many important points that have been made.
We have, I am bound to say, listened, among those speeches, to two which will, I suppose, arouse special attention for a long time to come. I suppose that we all cherish in our own minds certain speeches as the great speeches of our time. Some of us think of the speech of the late Lord Keynes on the American Loan. But it' a greater speech has been made in the experience of Members of your Lordships' House than that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, it has not been during my ten years' membership of this House. I know that the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has won many triumphs in this House, but he will not mind my saying that for once his main argument was completely defeated. The ease that he relied upon, obviously after great consideration, was the legal point of view; he relied on the argument that we must stand by law. The noble Marquess appealed to Caesar, and the highest international lawyer in this House, and I daresay in the world, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, repudiated the main line of his argument.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I still maintain my argument, in spite of what, if I may say so respectfully, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, said. What he said was that we were bound by certain obligations into which we had entered, which, as I understood him to say, we could not evade. But the effect of his argument was that there were circumstances in which, under International Law nowadays, nobody could deal with somebody who offended against the law, and there was no recourse which could be had. If that is true, then I feel that nations who feel a duty to uphold International Law must have the right to presume their own freedom of action
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble Marquess hat omitted the question of whether the remedies have been exhausted or not. I do not want to repeat the whole speech of the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, who supported the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, on the question of law, but it was argued strongly by Lord Jowitt that the noble Marquess, in the course of his speech—and my noble and learned friend quoted passages—was reserving the right to take action which, according to the highest opinion of any international lawyer in this House would be contrary to International Law. I must be allowed, at any rate. to offer the opinion that the argument of the noble Marquess for once was destroyed by the argument of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair.
We find a sharp division of opinion. I think it is not too much to say that the country is split wide open. At times this morning, talks in two great Parties ranged solidly and bitterly against each other. I do not think one can question the fact. do not agree with noble Lords who said that the gap is perhaps not as wide as it appeared—it may or may not be, and I do not offer an opinion on that—but, on the views that have been expressed so far from the other side, however they may be modified later, one is bound to take note of this great divergence. I share the opinion of those—the most reverend Primate, the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury among them—who regard this as a tragic situation, from which no-one can get any kind of pleasure, that our great country should at this moment

835
be so deeply divided on the highest level. I do not find it altogether surprising.
The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, delighted us all. Apart from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, he was one of the few speakers who produced any laughs, and I think that in two days' prolonged speaking we must be grateful for that. If I sometimes make a joke, I am accused of smelling of the Oxford Union. The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, was one of the most distinguished Presidents of the Oxford Union, and I thought his speech in the highest tradition of the Union manner. I think the bust of Lord Curzon at the Union would have smiled down on him had he been speaking there. But I am bound to say that the noble Lord, in what he quoted from speeches here and in another place, was even more selective than we usually are.
He talked as if there had been general agreement in this House when we discussed this matter at the beginning of August. Without going back over that ground, I must refute the idea that there was this agreement, though I note that noble Lords opposite were ready—as I thought over-ready—to find it. I am sorry that the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, for unselfish reasons, has had to withdraw, but I have given him notice that I should quote him, merely because I think he represented the point of view of the elevated Back Benches opposite. He said [OFFICIAL REPORT. Vol. 199 col. 610]:
"What we are saying is that the Government should be firm.…We are all agreed that that is our desire. It is an easy thing to say, but no one has a right to make such a request of the Government unless he is prepared to back the Government if they are driven to the use of force.…Having said that, I do ask the Government to be firm, it possible in concert with the United States of America. But if the United States of America will not come with us, I trust that we shall not allow ourselves to be deflected from our right policy."
If I recollect rightly, that statement, or his speech in general, was loudly applauded. In other words, he was prepared to go to war (because I agree with the most reverend Primate in saying that these words should not be covered up) even without the United States. That, clearly, would not be any kind of United Nations war. That statement was loudly applauded.
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The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, informed us in the same debate that he doubted whether he had ever listened to a debate in which there was a greater unanimity of opinion. There was a general feeling among noble Lords opposite that the whole House was solidly behind this "tough" policy, as illustrated by the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr. I ventured to intervene to say that I could not go along with them at the kind of pace they were going. When the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, spoke (and this I feel the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, might have referred to), he used these words (column 617):
"If we allowed this to be a purely British move, or even an Anglo-Franco-American move, we should lay ourselves open to the charge of carrying on what is regarded as an old Imperialist tradition.…"
So a very clear warning was issued by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the ex-Prime Minister in that debate.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: What is the noble Lord quoting?
LORD PAKENHAM: Column 617 of the OFFICIAL REPORT for August 2. I am only saying that to refute any suggestion that the line of our Party has changed, either here or in another place, since that debate.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: The noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, is one of the fairest, as well as one of the most skilful and kindly of debaters. He said that I had been selective. I should be very ashamed if I had misrepresented any speaker. I read with extreme care the speech of the noble Lord. Lord Silkin, and likewise that of the right honourable gentleman, the Leader of the Socialist Party in another place. I do not think I selected anything that was unfair. I took textually everything that they had said, and it was, surely, a complete approval of the Government's policy. There may have been small points of difference here or there, but the intention of the speakers, surely, was to approve the policy of the Government as announced, of establishing an international control of the Canal and of having a general conference, every item of which has been carried out by the Government. I do not think I selected anything. I did not intend to select anything unfairly.
LORD PAKENHAM: Of course, the noble Lord would never intend to be unfair, but we have all got to select: we can take only a few sentences in any case. But it was my duty, in view of this eloquent argument by the noble Lord, to make it plain, by one quotation among many, that no change has, in fact, occurred.
But that is not the main issue we are concerned with this evening. I thought it right to say that in view of the criticism on the other side. The last thing I wish to do is to exaggerate differences; I would far rather underestimate differences than exaggerate them. We can agree. I think, after hearing the noble Lord, Lord McNair, the noble and learned 'Viscount the Lord Chancellor, and other speakers, that it is fairly clear that Nasser has acted in an illegal fashion. I think we can satisfy ourselves on that point. It was not so clear a month ago. The lawyers obviously had to look into it fairly carefully, but I think we can now, at any rate, avoid further controversy round that particular issue. Speaking for myself and, I think, perhaps many of my colleagues, I would agree with the noble and learned Earl. Lord Jowitt, in paying a tribute to the work done at the London Conference. We cannot evaluate all the details of that scheme, but I have no criticism on the Resolution and I think one must agree that it was a considerable diplomatic end. Where one is criticising, I think it is only fair to give credit where credit is due.
It is when we come to the method by which it is sought to induce Egypt to accept these arrangements, and the attitude to any alternative situation that would arise if Egypt did not accept them, that a sharp difference occurs. There are four points of difference stated in the Opposition Amendment. I need not run through them seriatim—we can take them as read. But I will touch on one or two points, merely to repeat what has been said already, without claiming that these in themselves would afford material for a vote of censure, which is a very grave step when our country is facing a large emergency.
I am not going to deal to-night—it has been dealt with thoroughly already—with the Users' Association. The proposal does not attract me. I am rather sorry
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that we were not given more time (I suppose there was not much time available) to study it before the debate. It seems to: is to be provocative, rather than helpful, but as The Times says, the proposal is not clear yet. I do not know whether it will be clear at the end of the debate. I think we all share a disquiet, on legal and other grounds, about the scale of the massing of the forces. I am not going to be involved in a controversy over that. The noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, is very expert in that field and he argues that the forces were I the minimum required. As I am not in possession of any inside information, I should not like to challenge that information. but I am bound to notice that the noble Lord, Lord McNair, considered that if you are trying to negotiate with a man, to put a pistol as close to his head as that, even to protect yourself, in case he hits you, is regarded by all international lawyers as a highly dangerous step.
It may be argued, too, that the matter should have been taken to the United Nations more promptly, and I have that feeling also. But that again could he rectified, and I am bound to say that, speaking as one person, I had thought, when I approached this debate, that we should be told the Government were taking it to the United Nations at once. I think most of us expected an announcement of that sort. But the failure—I must call it the serious delinquency—of the Government is, in my view, a twofold failure, and one which entirely justifies the step we arc taking. There is the failure to say definitely that they will take the matter to the United Nations—I say all this, of course, subject to the possibility that the noble Marquess. Lord Reading, will be able to help us on this side and in other parts of the House where there are grave anxieties. I said there were two memorable speeches. There was also a memorable speech by the most reverend Primate. It may be hat his suggestion, or those of the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, will evoke from the noble Marquess a statement which will relieve anxiety on some of these points.
But I am afraid it is my duty, as I have not been given any information as to anything the noble Marquess will say, to ask if he will not be in a position to modify seriously what was suggested by the noble

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Marquess who leads the House. Secondly, there is this failure to declare that the Government will not use force, except in conformity with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. I think we gained a fairly good impression yesterday of the attitude of the Government. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, quoted passages in the speech of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, which aroused in me, and, I think, in others, the greatest disquiet—I need not quote them again. But after the intervention of the noble Marquess, I think it right to interpret the announcement of the Government with regard to the use of force in this way.
As we understand it, the Government consider that Colonel Nasser must be compelled to accept an international system; if possible he should be persuaded to do that without the use of force, but that the Government must reserve the right to use military force, even without recourse to the United Nations, if necessary alone or in company with the French. If I am misinterpreting the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, I am sure the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, will put me right, but that is how we understand it: that they reserve the right to do something which, in our view, is flagrantly illegal. As that is the position, I am afraid we cannot possibly have any lot or part in the policy of the Government until it is at any rate re-defined.
Most of us are not lawyers. I do not know whether the House feels that we are mistaken in taking the findings of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, as sufficient guidance. I should think very few people would wish to question his authority, although eminent lawyers sometimes differ. The noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, supported him, and as regards the most powerful and deeply felt speech of the Lord Chancellor, I should have ventured to say, with great respect, that that particular point was evaded by the Lord Chancellor. I do not think that he offered an opinion on the particular point I am discussing, as to whether one is entitled to use unilateral or bilateral force, even when one is attacked, without recourse to the United Nations. I am not aware that the Lord Chancellor gave any ruling on that point. Therefore, we must take it that the legal opinion is as stated by the noble and learned Lord. Lord
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McNair. I am told that in another place an eminent lawyer in the Conservative Party has given some opinion to the same effect, but I should not like to speak with much competence as to that.
That being so, we consider that the Government are reserving a right to do something which is contrary to international law. if the noble Marquess can relieve our anxieties, well and good, but I am bound to tell him that what I call the two-fold failure of the Government seems all of one piece. There is the failure, as it seems to me, to recognise the modern view of international law, which undoubtedly, it seems to me, restricts our freedom of action since the emergence of these international institutions; and, coupled with that, there is this sluggishness—the noble Lord, Lord Layton, does not like the word "refusal the word we have used—this "reluctance" or "sluggishness", at any rate, up to the present to go to the United Nations. If I am asked why the noble Lords opposite should be ready to interpret the law in this way or, at any rate, to set aside the interpretation of the law as given by the most authoritative lawyers, and why they are so reluctant to go to the United Nations, I am afraid I am bound to say something which will cause a little offence opposite.
We on this side do not consider that noble Lords opposite believe in the United Nations in the same sense as we do. The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, said that he and his political friends believed in it as much as we do. They believe in it, but they refuse to operate it or use it to the same extent and as readily as we should. Therefore, whatever they may feel about the possibilities of the United Nations in the year 2000 A.D., in the year 1956 they have not the same belief in its possibilities as is possessed on these Benches. Talking privately—for we all have friends in other Parties, and not only for the last few days but for the last few years—I think that they sometimes discount our belief in the United Nations. They doubt if we are serious. I must assure them that we are. I am speaking now not as one unimportant person but as representing, for the moment, the millions who take our view of things, not only those in the Labour Party but also many distinguished international experts, members of the Liberal Party and, no doubt,

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some Conservatives. There is this tremendous difference: that the Conservative Party on the whole regard the United Nations as a visionary idea, something to be worked for. They regard it as a visionary idea but as something which cannot come to our assistance to help to save peace at this juncture; while we believe it is the main hope of the world.
LORD COLERAINE: Would the noble Lord allow me to ask him this question? Does he believe that the United Nations, in the light of the policy of the Soviet Union in the last ten years, can be 100 per cent. efficient for these purposes? Can it really be the institution which it was designed to be at the end of the war?
LORD PAKENHAM: If I am asked if any institution is 100 per cent. efficient, the answer is, clearly, No. The noble Lord will forgive me for saying it, but that does not seem to be the most difficult of questions to answer.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am the only person in the House who actually signed the Charter and I do not accept what the noble Lord says. I believe in the United Nations. I think you muss look at it realistically.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Hear, hear!
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, whose posture at this moment is just that in which we wish to see the keeper of the Navy and whom I congratulate on an elevation which was long overdue, which reflects the greatest credit on those who appointed him, says "Hear, Hear!" to these observations of the noble Marquess. I am afraid that this personal appeal does not weigh with me as much as it should. The noble Marquess says. "I signed it". The noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, says, "Surely noble Lords on the Labour side must agree that any Government presided over by Sir Anthony Eden will not fail in its obligations." I admire the noble Marquess and I have a considerable regard, though I do not know him very well, for the Prime Minister. But I am rot talking in terms of personalities; I am judging by results, and at this juncture the Conservative leaders have not given clear evidence that they believe in the United Nations. That is our opinion.
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It is there that the noble Lord has failed to convince us that this belief is genuine.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I must say this to the noble Lord. I think the most reverend Primate was much fairer to the Government than the noble Lord is. There, is nothing that the Government have done up to now that has not been in strict conformity with the Charter. We acted throughout as we were directed to act under Article 33. The noble Lord is perfectly entitled to say that the last proposal which has been put before us, the proposal which was announced yesterday, was not what he would have put forward; but it is put forward under Article 33. The noble Lord is not entitled to say that there is anything that we have done yet which is not in full conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble Marquess says I am not entitled to say it. This is still a free country—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Will the noble Lord tell me what we have done which is riot in conformity with the Charter?
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, expressed anxiety yesterday about the massing of troops. I wondered whether that was in conformity. If the noble and learned Lord expresses anxiety, I am at least entitled to say that anxiety can legitimately he felt.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have asked the noble Lord a definite question. What have we done which is not in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations?
LORD PAKENHAM: If the noble Marquess wants a straight answer, he can have it. He has failed to take this matter to the United Nations when it was his clear duty to take it there.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: But is there anything in the Charter of the United Nations which says that a member of the United Nations may not use Article 33 before it proceeds to other measures?
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble Marquess reserves the right to break internatioral law. That is what he has done,

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if he wants it. The noble Marquess reserves the right to break international law. He said it in his speech yesterday.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The noble Lord has evaded the question. In his earlier remarks he said that the Government had not acted in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. That is not true.
LORD PAKENHAM: I am in the recollection of the House, but the noble Marquess will not find that I said that. I was saying it was an opinion that could be held, but I did not say, to the best of my recollection, that the Government had acted against the rules of the United Nations. I have in mind what I said. I never said—
EARL. DE LA WARR: Does the noble Lord believe that the Government has not?
LORD PAKENHAM: Let me answer. The House is always out to be fair. I am accused by the noble Marquess, who has not withdrawn the accusation. I had hoped that in view of his large majority he would feel it safe to withdraw the accusation—but he has not done so—that I made a statement which I have not made. I am quite ready to allow him to remain in his position.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, may I intervene to say that a great number of us here care for nothing but the restoration of unity between the two Parties upon this matter, and it cuts me to the heart to have a dispute going on like this about whether or no the Government believe in the United Nations. We can only trust to action, and it is wrong to get a dispute on the motives and beliefs that are behind this action.
LORD PAKENHAM: The noble Marquess will agree that he has interrupted me at least half a dozen times, and I cannot feel that I have caused any stirring up of feeling in regard to whether the noble Marquess has said that the Government believe in the United Nations. I can only say that if one is repeatedly interrupted by a great Leader it is impossible for one to carry on. I shall, I am afraid, adhere to my very simple statement, although noble Lords may not believe it, that there can be a genuine
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difference in this—a deeply felt difference. I am afraid that it is because there is this difference that we are pressing this matter tonight.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: Could the noble Lord tell us, at what stage the Government have diverged from the course of action which he would have recommended? When did they fail to show respect to the United Nations—at what stage?
LORD PAKENHAM: They diverged from it yesterday, in referring to their right to break international law. If that is not plain enough, I do not know what is.
LORD HORE-BELISHA: How do you break international law?
LORD PAKENHAM: It is a breaking of international law, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord McNair, yesterday.
A NOBLE LORD: Nonsense!
LORD PAKENHAM: Some noble Lords may regard it as nonsense, but I was asked a question and I have given an answer.
My Lords, we have those deep convictions, and I return to the point at which I would gladly have remained, with the most reverend Primate the Archbishop. If the noble Marquess, even at this late hour, is able to relieve anxiety, if he can say that all that I have told the House to-night is a complete misunderstanding of their position, if he can say that the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, misunderstood the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury yesterday, he will not find us stiffnecked or fanatical; he will not find us desiring to divide the House. We have not had a Division on foreign affairs in this House since the war, except on one occasion when we were dealing with the Bonn Treaties, and on that occasion I diverged from my Party. So the noble Marquess can believe me when I say that I regard bi-partisanship in foreign policy as an ideal for which much must be sacrificed. But one cannot sacrifice principles. We may be mistaken. It may be that the noble Marquess can prove that we are mistaken. But if he cannot do so, reluctantly, without any pleasure and heavy heartedly, we shall go into the Division Lobby, because we believe every Member of this House has only one thing more precious than his life, and that is his

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conscience. If we do divide the House to-night, I hope that the vast majority who will no doubt vote us down will realise that the conscience is at least as strong on our side as it is on theirs.
9.24 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, at, the end of a very lengthy debate I confess that I regret the speech which the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, has just made. To challenge other people's convictions, to compare your own with other people's consciences, particularly after the speech which the most reverend Primate made at an earlier stage of this debate, does not seem to me to be very helpful in regard to producing a conclusion.
LORD PAKENHAM: I do not wart to interrupt the noble Marquess because I feel that, on the whole, interruption has been carried far enough. But I certainly did not suggest that our consciences were more sensitive than those of noble Lords opposite; I said they were at least as acute. If that is to be called a comparison between consciences, suggesting that ours are more refined than those of noble Lords opposite, although the noble Marquess is trying to pick a quarrel he will not succeed in finding an opposite number.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: The noble Lord in his speech referred to my noble friend Lord De La Warr as an elevated Back-Bencher." I am not at all sure that I do not prefer an elevated Back-Beecher to a depressed Front-Bendier. But may I come to the more relevant parts of the noble Lord's speech, in which he said, I think with hope, that much of this debate had been taken up with two questions?
The first question, as he put it, was the failure of the Government to say definitely that they would take this matter to the United Nations; and secondly, the failure of the Government to declare that they would not use force except under the authority of the United Nations. Both these matters have been dealt with at some length from the time when my noble Leader opened this debate, and I do not propose to elucidate the already lucid. But perhaps I might just add these further words in relation to both those topics. As I am replying on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, they represent, of course, the views of
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Her Majesty's Government on these two points. As my noble Leader has just said, in the course of certain discussion with the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, in our view throughout this matter we have been acting in strict conformity with United Nations procedure. For the past seven weeks we have been following the course enjoined by Article 33 of the Charter, to seek, first of all, a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation or conciliation. These efforts have not yet succeeded; but, equally, they have not yet been completed. We have now taken the further step, jointly with the French Government, of informing the President of the Security Council of the situation which has arisen. I his action was taken in conformity with Article 35 of the Charter, and it enables us to act rapidly in any submission to the Security Council.
The real difference between us is, I think, not so much one of substance on this issue as one of timing. Noble Lords opposite have asked that the question should he submitted to the Security Council immediately. But I would remind the House that we are not handling this problem purely by ourselves— we arc dealing with it in consultation with the United States, with France and with a number of other countries; and it is, I believe, in accordance with the wish of all Parties in this House that we should proceed in harmony and in concert with these like-minded nations. We must therefore, as a Government, ask the House to allow the Government to judge, in the light of their continuing consultations with the other Governments concerned, what is the best moment at which it may become advisable to have recourse to the Security Council. Our letter to the President of the Council which was announced yesterday is surely sufficient indication of our intention.
LORD SILKIN: Before the noble Marquess leaves that point, can he go just a little further and say that we will go to the Security Council at the right time—that is, obviously, before going to war?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, what I have said I must adhere to: that in the light of continuing consultations with other Governments concerned, Her Majesty's Government must

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choose what is the best moment at which it may become advisable to have recourse to the Security Council.
EARL JOWITT: My Lords, may I intervene for a moment, for I think this is so deplorable. I saw the point of the noble Marquess on what is the right moment and he must be the judge of that, in connection with his Allies; but could he not say definitely, here and now, that the Government will not resort to war unless and until they have gone to the Security Council?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, that is the other point to which I was just coming. The second point raised in this debate, and again presented to the House by the noble Lord, Lord Pakenham, was one which has been asked by a number of speakers. Substantially it may be put in this form: would Her Majesty's Government give a pledge not to use force except after reference to the Security Council? That is the point which the noble and learned Earl, Lord Jowitt, has just made. Frankly, if such a pledge or guarantee is to be absolute, then no British Minister could give it from this Box. I think the most reverend Primate answered that when he said he assumed that Her Majesty's Government wished to he protected against all eventualities—I believe that that was the phrase he used.
No one can tell what the actions of Colonel Nasser will be, either in the Canal or in other parts of Egypt. The duty of protecting British lives and fulfilling British obligations is certainly one which every British Government must retain. I would, nevertheless, give this reply: that it would certainly be our intention, if circumstances allowed—in other words, except in an emergency—to refer such a matter to the Security Council. But I repeat that Her Majesty's Government must be the judges of those circumstances. That is a duty which the Executive cannot share, either with Parliament or with any other body; and I should hope that Parliament itself would feel that that was the only sound doctrine.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Marquess to read again those precise words.
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I believe the words which the most reverend Primate wants are these: It would certainly be our intention if circumstances allowed—in other words, except in an emergency—to refer such a matter to the Security Council.
THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, may I ask the noble Marquess whether he can be more precise about the meaning of the word "emergency"? Does he mean that as the equivalent of self-defence, as defined in the Charter of the United Nations?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I should have thought that the definition of an emergency was a matter which neither the noble Earl nor nor probably any other. Could, for this purpose, define. Having pledged themselves to that, the Executive must decide whether in a particular case an emergency had arisen. I certainly could not possibly attempt to define within the narrow limits of a few words what an "emergency." in that context, meant.
LORD BEVERIDGE: My Lords. would the noble Marquess allow me to ask him a question which is deliberately intended to help him and not to put him into difficulties? When I was speaking on the use of force, all I urged was that we should undertake not to use war for the purpose of getting control of the Suez Canal. Would the noble Marquess see any difficulty in assenting to that?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I must leave it to the noble Lord to apply to any individual case the words which I have used in general: to refer such a matter to the Security Council if circumstances allowed—in other words, except in an emergency. That seems to me to be quite a wide and generous interpretation of our intentions, and I should have thought it would give satisfaction to most noble Lords opposite, as I trust it may to the most reverend Primate who took so active and valuable a part at an early stage in discouraging the extension of any gap between the two Parties.
Passing from those two main questions, may I deal, very briefly, with one or two others? The main burden of the debate has fallen upon the two points with which I have already dealt, and in which I have endeavoured to give your Lordships the view of Her Majesty's Government. In

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the course of this debate a good deal has been said about provocation. I do not want to go into that in any detail, except to say that I believe we have given remarkably little provocation and received an exceedingly great amount; and that, all things considered, we have been extremely reticent, patient and restrained in our dealings with these matters.
There is one particular aspect with which I want to deal—the question of the pilots. There is a suggestion that we have taken some provocative action in causing the pilots to withdraw in order to put the Canal out of action, and thereby confront Colonel Nasser with an insoluble difficulty. That charge is utterly unjustified. We did not encourage the resignation of the pilots. We certainly strongly represented to the Suez Canal Company that no action should be taken by them with their employees which would in any way imperil either the London Conference or the subsequent Menzies Mission. Surely in the interests of everyone we were right in doing that. The Company interpreted that general appeal by telling their pilots that they should remain in their positions until the time came when either success or failure had definitely followed upon the Menzies Mission and the situation would be crystallised one way or the other. At the instigation of the Company the pilots overcame their not unnatural reluctance to stay on, and complied with that request, though I do not doubt that, left to their own volition, most of them would long since have departed.
On the other hand, it would not have been fair to suggest that prolonged pressure should be exercised upon them. With the unhappy failure of the Menzies Mission the Company concluded that the moment had come, not when we should urge them to go—for that we have never done—but when it should be left to them to decide freely, on their own behalf, whether they remained or resigned. Her Majesty's Government felt justified in assenting to that view. As I said earlier this afternoon, in another context, these men are free agents. The Egyptian Government, even if they purport to nationalise the Canal, have. I hope, no power to nationalise men.
It was said that our attitude towards Colonel Nasser had been based hitherto only upon apprehensions which might never be realised. Well, the reprint in
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The Times of yesterday of the speech which Colonel Nasser made on July 26 gives in fairly concentrated form ground for a certain number of apprehensions, and the kind of propaganda which has emanated over the past months from Cairo—the Egyptian broadcasts, the "Voice of the Arabs "—has certainly done nothing to minimise those apprehensions. Certainly, the pilots' apprehensions must have been real enough, for they have had hanging over their heads ever since July 26 the threat of imprisonment if they failed to continue to work for this new Egyptian Canal Authority, with whom they had never had any contract of service of any kind and to whom they owed no allegiance of any sort. Surely that kind of measure is only too good a cause for apprehension.
Nor is it, after all, only we timid people in this country or in this Government who have had apprehensions. There were sufficient apprehensions to bring to this country representatives of twenty-one other countries from all over the globe in order to concert a policy for dealing with the situation, the dangerous situation, which in the view of practically all of them had been created in Egypt. One of the strangest arguments and one of the most ingenuous that keeps on confronting me when people talk about this is that which says: "Oh, but Colonel Nasser has kept the Canal open all this time". Surely nobody in his senses would have expected even Colonel Nasser to close the Canal during this crucial time when the whole discussion was going on about what the future of the Canal was to be. It was obviously entirely to Colonel Nasser's advantage to prove himself to the world for that limited period a monument of competence and reasonableness. And if he has not entirely succeeded he has at least made what was no doubt a very prudent effort.
We have been asked why we did not negotiate with Colonel Nasser on the basis of offers he has made. Is not the more pertinent question: Why did he not offer to negotiate with us before he took this drastic action over the Canal? Why did he not attend the London Conference to discuss the position with the others present there? Why did he not suggest to Mr. Menzies and his colleagues when they were there that he had these other ideas, which he preferred to make known

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a day or two later by circulating them to all and sundry who would read them? There is much more that could be said on this matter, but a great deal of time, thought and attention has already been given, and I want to cut down anything I may have desired to say to a minimum. I hope, from that point of view, that noble Lords who have raised issues during this two-days' debate and have not had an answer will forgive me if I do not select their particular queries for individual attention at this stage of the debate.
I want to say just this one thing more. There have been questions raised about this Users' Association, and I think it was perhaps a pity that in both Houses those who made the first speeches for the Opposition leapt into the breach armed to the teeth with the word "provocative", though that word is beginning to get a little dulled by frequent use. The point of the organisation of the Users' Association was this: that Colonel Nasser, by his action, his unilateral action, had destroyed the international character of the operation of the Canal, and there must, therefore, be some sort of organisation of users to take the place of what had been destroyed.
The pilots, to whom I have already referred, were not willing to work for the Egyptian Board. Therefore there was the risk of the traffic through the Canal breaking down. It was right, therefore, to make the effort to set up some organisation which would be able to retain their services, keep them at work and keep their experience at the disposal of owners of ships passing through the Canal. And although dues were to be paid to the organisation the intention certainly is that Egypt should receive proper payment for the facilities made available. There are difficulties—I do not pretend that there are not. But the scheme is in an early stage. It is intended to be informal in character. It is intended to be provisional in duration until something more substantial and permanent can be set up. But it is an ingenious attempt, I believe, to bridge the gap and to continue the Canal in efficient work during an interval until a more permanent scheme has been produced.
I have dealt with the view of Her Majesty's Government towards the two
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main points and some of the other minor points. Whatever view we may take about the question of the United Nations, about the question of consulting the Security Council before any warlike step is ultimately arrived at, I think all your Lordships will agree, in this context, upon one thing: that in this vital issue of the Canal we all, and all those who share both our anxieties and our responsibilities in regard to it, must spare no effort to avoid either stalemate or stranglehold.
9.47 p.m.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, I had hoped that we might have had a statement from the Government which would be sufficiently satisfactory to enable us to withdraw our Amendment. But in both Houses of Parliament statements were made which were understood by all to mean that the Government left it open for the use of force in order to get what they considered necessary—they called it "the upholding of international law"—without first going to the United Nations. I had hoped that we might have had something perfectly clear and distinct on that matter. We have not had it. Therefore, if the Government nut their Motion to the House we shall have to press our Amendment and vote on it.
9.48 p.m.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, the noble Marquess expressed the hope that I should be satisfied by what he said. Might I be allowed to say just a word relating to my own vote, in the same way that Lord Layton referred to that of the Liberal Party? I am extremely grateful for the obvious trouble which has been taken to try to make some further statement by the Goyment which would allay some of 'our anxiety. I could not possibly vote for the vote of censure. It is frankly, to my mind, ungenerous, in view of the fact that the Government have shown the greatest possible care and restraint and. so far as their actions go, have been well within the terms of the Charter. I want to vote for the Government, if possible, but I find that as the Resolution stands at this moment I cannot, because the last part endorses the statement of policy made yesterday—that is to say, it endorses just those very words that have been causing the acutest possible anxiety.

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Is it possible to add to the Government Motion, after the words "September 12" the words "September 13", which would cover the statement of the noble Marquess. Lord Reading, tonight? I understand the extreme difficulties in getting any modification of a Government statement of policy at short notice, especially when other Governments are involved. I believe that the Government have honestly gone as far as, at short notice, They find it possible to go, though it does not go far enough to satisfy the Opposition. I am sorry to say. It does, however, go far enough to enable me to take the rest on trust, for I believe that what the noble Marquess has said means that, save for emergencies—and no one can doubt that they may arise—the Government will use only pacific means, and if they begin to fail will go without doubt to the Security Council. In that trust and belief I shall vote for the Government, if the words "September 13" can be added to cover this extra statement.
LORD SALTER: My Lords, may I associate myself with what the most reverend Primate has said? I made a similar point in my speech earlier, and I am sure that it would greatly help people who think as I do if that small addition to the Motion could be made. May I add the fact that of course the Charter of the United Nations itself contemplates action in emergency without prior reference to the Security Council?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I. should like to say immediately that we shall be very happy to accept the Amendment to the Motion proposed by the most reverend Primate. The statement which I made yesterday was intended to cover the position, and if it had shortcomings, I am sorry. But I hope that the elucidation which has now been provided by my noble friend Lord Reading has put the matter in a clearer perspective for many noble Lords who were still in doubt. If that is so, then the Government will be happy to accept the proposed Amendment of the most reverend Primate so that the two Government statements can be read together.
LORD REA: My Lords, my noble friends on these Benches feel the same slight disappointment as the most reverend Primate that the Government
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were not able to go further, but the ingenious suggestion of the most reverend Primate, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Salter, does, I think, make it possible for us, in spite of our disappointment, to follow the Government. particularly with the idea of showing some unity and of supporting them as far as we can, though I hope that very soon they will be able to give us more. The noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has convinced me that he has certainly filled that lacuna, that gap that we felt existed yesterday after the first speech of the noble Marquess who leads the House.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, since we are all out of order, perhaps I may say a word. I hoped that it would have been possible to part this evening without a Division. One simple way of achieving that is for the Government to withdraw their Motion, and I see no inherent difficulty in their doing so. With the great part of it we are in. agreement. My own difficulty, and the difficulty of some of my friends, is in affirming our support for the statement of policy made yesterday. If the most reverend Primate were to move an Amendment substituting "September 13" for "September 12," that might be a different matter: but it is the statement of policy made yesterday which worries us. Since we want unanimity, is there really any need to have a Resolution of this kind passed at all? As I say, with the great part we are in complete agreement, and the speeches that have been made on all sides of the House would indicate that we arc in agreement. Cannot we leave it at that?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I suppose we are all out of order, but this House has very broad rules of order. I should very much have liked to meet the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, but it seems to me difficult to go beyond what we have done. He is worried, and it is clear from the Amendment that the Opposition are worried, about certain things. The Amendment:
"deplores the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to invoke the authority of the United Nations in the dispute.…"
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, would agree that the statement that my noble friend Lord Reading has made to-night goes far to remove his anxiety in that matter. There can be no

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doubt what the implications of that statement were—at least, I should have thought, to any thinking man.
Then the Amendment:
"calls upon Her Majesty's Government to refer the dispute immediately to the United Nations and to declare that they will not use force except in conformity with our obligation under the Charter of the United Nations.…"
My noble friend said, quite rightly, that no Government could give an absolute guarantee, and I do not believe, though I am open to correction by the noble Earl. Lord Attlee, with his long experience, that any Government have given an absolute guarantee of that kind. What we have said is that we will not use force except in emergency: that is to say, we do not use force as an instrument of normal policy; but when some emergency arises, then we reserve the right—and I think every Government must reserve that right in an emergency—to do so.
Having gone as far as that, and I can assure noble Lords opposite that I have done my utmost all this afternoon and evening to try to find some form of words that would make possible unanimity of expression in this House, I feel sad that they are not able to support the Motion as moved by the Government or to withdraw their Amendment. They might say that they did not feel able to accept the Motion in its original form without the explanation given since. but explanations have been given and I had hoped very much that they might have removed the difficulties.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, may I ask a question? If, in an emergency, in the circumstances described, the Government feel obliged to use force, will they call Parliament together beforehand?
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think any Government could give this absolute assurance. After all, it is an act of the Executive, and I have always understood that the Executive take responsibility for that, and it is for Parliament to turn them out if they do not agree. I do not think that it is by any means a tradition of our country that approval must be sought beforehand. In an emergency, action may be an immediate necessity, and that action the Government must take. No
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doubt they would call Parliament together, but it might he necessary to take action before Parliament was called.
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords. may I ask the noble Marquess this question? Surely it is in conformity with the United Nations Charter that in a state of emergency one has the right of defence or attack. The point is that one is not entitled to use force to insist on one's own will outside the United Nations altogether. I cannot see the difficulty. I understand that a statement has been made in the United States of America saying that force will be used only in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, cannot the noble Earl accept the phrase of the Government, which is entirely with the Charter: "save in emergency"—and the noble Lord. Lord Salter, said that the Charter provides for emergency the Government will not use force before going to the Security Council?
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, there is no need for the words. "save in emergency", unless there is the intention to act outside the Charter of the United Nations.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: I implore the noble Earl not to be so ungenerous.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am not yet clear about what the noble Marquess said. An emergency of a few hours—that one understands. But the question is: in such a situation, will Parliament be called together? That was done in 1914 in similar circumstances. If the noble Marquess could give that pledge, that would be some safeguard.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: As I say, I do not think any Government can give any absolute guarantee that they will not, in an emergency, take immediate action if necessary.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I do not deny that.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I have not the slightest doubt that if we were obliged to take action of that kind. Parliament would be immediately called. But I do not want the noble Viscount to be under the misapprehension that we

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should not take action in an emergency, if it were necessary, without first getting the approval of Parliament. I must be absolutely clear about that.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, the Question I now have to put to the House is that
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided:—
Contents, 18; Not-Contents, 145.

CONTENTS

Attlee, E.

Archibald, L.

Lawson, L.

Jowitt, E.

Boyd-Orr, L.

Macdonald of Gwaenysgor, L.

Listowel, E.

Burden, L. [Teller.]

Pakenham, L.

Lucan, E.

Crook, L.

Pethick-Lawrence, L.

Darwen, L.

Quibell, L.

Stansgate, V.

Haden-Guest, L. [Teller.]

Silkin, L.

Winster, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Canterbury, L. Abp.

Elibank, V.

Glyn, L.

Falmouth, V.

Grantchester, L.

Kilmuir. V. (L. Chancellor.)

FitzAlan of Derwent, V.

Gretton, L.

Gage, V.

Gridley, L.

Salisbury, M. (L. President.)

Goschen, V.

Harmsworth, L.

Hailsham, V.

Harvey of Tasburgh, L.

Aberdeen and Temair, M.

Hampden, V.

Hatherton, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Kemsley, V.

Hawke, L.

Reading, M.

Knollys, V.

Hayter, L.

Leverhulme, V.

Hore-Belisha, L.

Albemarle, E.

Margesson, V.

Hylton, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Monsell, V.

Jessel, L.

Bathurst, E.

Ridley, V.

Killearn L.

Brooke and Warwick, E.

Runciman of Doxford, V.

Kindersley, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Samuel, V.

Layton, L.

Coventry, E.

Leconfield, L.

Craven, E

Sheffield, L. Bp.

Lloyd, L.

Crawford, E.

Luke, L.

Cromer, E.

Ailwyn, L.

Mancroft, L.

Dalhousie, E.

Astor of Hever, L.

Melchett, L.

De La Warr, E.

Baillieu, L.

Merriman, L.

Ferrers, E.

Bennett of Edgbaston, L.

Middleton, L.

Fortescue, E. [Teller.]

Birdwood, L.

Milne, L.

Gosford, E.

Brand, L.

Milverton, L.

Grey, E.

Broughshane, L.

Monk Bretton, L.

Halsbury, E.

Bruntisfield, L.

Mowbray and stourton, L.

Hardwicke, E.

Burnham, L.

Newall, L.

Home, E.

Carnock, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Howe, E.

Cawley, L.

Rathcavan, L.

Iveagh, E.

Chatfield, L.

Rea, L.

Lonsdale, E.

Cherwell, L.

Remnant, L.

Macclesfield, E.

Clitheroe, L.

Rennel, L.

Malmesbury, E.

Coleraine, L.

Rennel, L.

Morley, E.

Colwyn, L.

Rochdale, L.

Munster, E.

Conesford, L.

Rochester, L.

Onslow, E. [Teller.]

Congleton, L.

Romilly, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Cornwallis, L.

Russell of Liverpool, L.

Selborne, E.

Cottesloe, L.

Salter, L.

Selkirk, E.

Croft, L.

Sandford, L.

Shaftesbury, E,

Denham, L.

Sinha, L.

Stair, E.

Derwent, L.

Stamp, L.

Stradbroke, E.

Digby, L.

Strang, L.

Woolton, E.

Dinevor, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Dovercourt, L.

Strathclyde, L.

Astor, V.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

Stratheden and Campbell, L.

Bridgeman, V.

Foley, L.

Templemore, L.

Bridport, V.

Forbes, L.

Teviot, L.

Camrose, V.

Fraser of North Cape, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Crookshank, V.

Freyberg, L.

Tweedsmuir, L.

Davidson, V.

Geddes, L.

Walsingham, L.

De L'Isle, V.

Gisborough, L.

Wolverton, L.

Resolved in the negative, and Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

the original Motion, with the addition of the words "and 13th", be agreed to.
On Question, Resolution agreed to.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past ten o'clock.