Sitting of 12 September 1956

Preamble
The House—after the Adjournment on 2nd August, 1956, for the Summer Recess—met at half-past Two o'clock, notice having been given by Mr. SPEAKER, pursuant to Standing Order No. 112 (Earlier meeting of House in certain circumstances).
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
WRIT ISSUED DURING THE ADJOURNMENT
Mr. SPEAKER acquainted the House that he had issued, during the Adjournment, a warrant for a new Writ for Chester-le-Street, in the room of Patrick Bartley, esquire, deceased.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he has any statement to make on business?
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The House has been recalled in order to discuss the Suez Canal situation.
It is proposed to move the Motion for the Adjournment of the House and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister will open the debate. The debate will be continued and brought to a conclusion tomorrow.
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At the request of the Opposition, arrangements have been made for a debate on Cyprus to take place on Friday.
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Heath.]

SUEZ CANAL
2.37 p.m.
The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): The debate which took place at the beginning of August revealed, I think it will be agreed, a remarkable measure of unanimity of opinion in this House and in the country. There was, I think, general agreement that the measures which the Government had taken in dealing with the crisis up till then had been wise and had been timely. There was also general agreement that Colonel Nasser's arbitrary action in seizing operational control of the Canal could not be allowed to prevail.
There was wide acceptance of the proposition that to prevent any interference with the free use of the Canal, and to maintain the efficiency of its operation, the Canal should be placed under an international system designed to secure the rights of all users. There was also acceptance of the view that the precautionary military measures taken by the Government had been justified. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] I am talking about our August meeting. The Leader of the Opposition himself said that any Government would have had to take them. Other speakers, including the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Gentleman

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the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), agreed that circumstances might arise which would necessitate the use of force.
Nothing which the Government have done since that debate took place has in any way changed the policy which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and I described in our speeches on that occasion. On the contrary, the Government have done and are doing everything in their power to obtain a peaceful settlement which takes account of Egypt's legitimate interests and which adequately safeguards, as it must, the interests of the many nations vitally concerned in the Canal.
The operation, the maintenance and the freedom of navigation through the Canal touch the lives and the prosperity of everyone in these islands. That is true not only here but in Western Europe as a whole, and in many eastern lands. Our economy is increasingly dependent upon oil, much of which has now to be brought through the Canal. In this country alone our oil consumption has doubled since 1949. It has increased by 8 per cent. in the last six months. More than half of Western Europe's oil passes through the Canal. That concerns not only the consumer countries ; it is vital to producers as well. I give just one example. A large part, for instance, of Persian oil production, which is now steadily rising, and upon which Persia's prosperity largely depends, is shipped through the Canal ; and for other eastern lands the Canal matters almost as much, for purposes of ordinary trade.
In the weeks while we have been away many alternatives have been canvassed, with zeal and, sometimes, excessive optimism. The fact is that none is immediately practicable. The alternative route round the Cape would be very expensive and there are not the tankers to maintain the supplies we need. It is true that larger tankers are being built, but it would take several years before they could be ready in sufficient numbers, and the capital cost would be enormous. Meanwhile, the longer sea haul would increase the freight charges and would add to the cost of production and the cost of living in this country.
It is, therefore, beyond dispute that any prolonged interference with the traffic
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through the Canal must be a grievous blow to the economy of Western Europe. In this country, at least, there would be serious industrial dislocation and un-employment. It has been said that what matters is the right of free passage through the Canal, which is granted by the 1888 Convention.—
Mr. S. O. Davies: We have got it still.
The Prime Minister: —and that so long as Colonel Nasser is prepared to uphold that Convention all will be well. I have two comments to make about this. First, the 1888 Convention is not in itself sufficient to safeguard the rights of the user countries. The 1888 Convention, and the various concessions granted to the Company, are, in fact, closely interlocked. Not only is the Suez Canal Company mentioned in more than one Article of the 1888 Convention, but the Preamble to that Convention states that the purpose of the Convention is to complete the system under which the navigation of the Canal was placed by the concession granted to the Canal Company.
In other words, the operation of the Canal by the Suez Canal Company was part of a comprehensive system, designed by the Agreement of 1888 to ensure the free use of the Canal for all the Powers concerned, and by purporting to nation alise the Company Colonel Nasser has destroyed the balance of this system—
Mr. Davies: Nonsense.
The Prime Minister: —and removed one of its essential guarantees. In all the circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the White Book published by the Egyptian Government on 12th August last—I have a copy here—in quoting the 1888 Convention, omits the Preamble.
But there is more to it than this. As the House knows, the rights of the user countries are not derived from the 1888 Convention alone. They have also become established by long and uninterrupted use of the Canal. They are not limited to the right of free passage defined in the 1888 Convention. The users are also entitled to insist upon the efficient operation, administration and maintenance of the Canal, in the interests of all countries, without any discrimination. They have also the right to expect that the level of

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dues shall be reasonable, and it follows from this that the Canal and its revenues cannot lawfully be exploited by one country for its own purposes.
It may be argued that the Canal Company is an Egyptian company and that in nationalising it Colonel Nasser is only exercising his sovereign rights ; that he is only doing what we have done here. That is not so, of course. The Canal Company has always had an international character, and with the passage of time this character has become increasingly apparent. For many years the British, French and Egyptian Governments have had the right to appoint directors to the Board, and it now includes also directors from the United States, the Netherlands and Norway.
By the terms of the original statutes of the Company it conducts its affairs according to the principles of French company law. Again, under the statutes, the administrative headquarters are in Paris. So I say that, quite apart from the international character of its functions, it could hardly be argued that such a Company was a purely Egyptian enterprise. What Colonel Nasser has, in fact, done is to take away the international character from the Canal Company. There is really no analogy whatever with the industries which have been nationalised here and which were and are entirely our domestic concern. Nationalisation—if I may dare to define it—in the accepted sense of the term, means the transfer of an enterprise from private control to public control. It does not mean the transfer of an enterprise from international control to national control.
"Nationalisation" is, indeed, a wholly inappropriate word to apply to Colonel Nasser's action. I suggest that the word "seizure" would be more accurate, but if that should offend anybody—and I do not want to offend anybody—we shall have to coin a new and hideous word, the accuracy of which cannot, I think, be challenged. What Colonel Nasser has done is to "de-internationalise" the Canal.
I submit to the House that it is quite certain that no nation has the right, unilaterally and in defiance of existing agreements, to remove its international character from the most important waterway in the world. To do so is entirely
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an illegal act. It is the breach of a contract—it is implicit in the Preamble to the Convention of 1888 that so long as the Canal Company's concessions exist the operation of the Canal should not be entrusted to any single Power, but that it should be operated by the Canal Company for the benefit of all nations.
As Mr. Unden, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, has rightly pointed out in a recent speech, Colonel Nasser could have sought a revision of the terms of the Canal Company's concession by negotiations with the other interested Governments, if he had wished to. The sudden dissolution of the Company twelve years before the Concession runs out must clearly be regarded as a breach of Egypt's international undertakings. If the House wants further evidence of that, it has only to read the full text of Colonel Nasser's speech at the time, reported in The Times today.
In those circumstances, including the way in which the Company was seized and its valuable assets confiscated, it is hardly surprising that Her Majesty's Government and the other nations principally concerned found themselves unable to accept the assurances which Colonel Nasser has so far been willing to give. They decline to leave the operation of this Canal, on which the livelihood of so many nations depends, in his hands alone.
The last time I spoke in this House about the Suez Canal we were in consultation with the French and the United States Governments, and I was, therefore, unable to give any details of the ideas we had in mind. A very few hours afterwards we were able to announce agreement to call a Conference of the principal maritime Powers. In view of the completely unjustified charges that have been made against us, I must repeat what was said by the Foreign Secretary weeks ago ; that it was from the first our intention that there should be such a Conference. It is ludicrous to pretend that we were dragged into it ; we promoted it. It took place here in London, and the Powers invited were selected by agreement between ourselves, the United States Government and the French Government, after discussions, according to three categories. There were, first, eight parties to the Convention of 1888, including Egypt. There were, next, the

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eight maritime Powers most concerned in the use of the Canal through ownership of tonnage ; and there were, thirdly, the eight nations most concerned by reason of the pattern of their trade. We thought that this was a fair arrangement.
There were many—and I do not blame them at all—who had little hope that the Conference could achieve results. There was always the possibility that, having agreed to come, some of the Powers would engage in wrangles over procedure—such things have been known to happen before—and we had no code of rules at all. And, of course, the greatest difficulty of all was to secure agreement to a common view. However, in the event all these fears were falsified and the Conference, in fact, showed a remarkable consensus of opinion. No fewer than 18 nations, with the one reservation by Spain, supported the plan put forward by Mr. Dulles.
That this result was achieved was due, I must say, in large measure to the skilful and patient steering by the chairman, my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary. I have heard that on all sides from the foreign Powers who were present. It was also due to Mr. Dulles' effective and vigorous advocacy of the plan, and it was a notable feat to reach so much agreement on so com plicated an issue in so short a time. I regret to say that the only Government which appeared consistently to be opposed to any form of internationalisation of the Canal was the Soviet Government. The Soviet representative perpetually repeated attacks on the alleged colonialism—
Mr. S. O. Davies: Hear, hear.
The Prime Minister: —of the maritime Powers. He constantly ignored the fact that, alone among the 18 nations, Soviet Russia had in the years since the war enormously extended its territorial boundaries and increased the number of its subject peoples.
Mr. Davies: Nonsense.
The Prime Minister: As to what we sought to do in these proposals, they recall, of course, the words of the Preamble of the Convention of 1888. This provides for the establishment of a definite system guaranteeing at all times for all Powers the free use of the Suez Canal. In the view of the 18 Powers—that was
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what was agreed on—such a system should be established with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt and should assure the efficient operation, maintenance and development of the Canal ; the insulation of the operation of the Canal from politics, a fair return to Egypt and Canal tolls as low as is consistent with their payment.
To achieve these results the 18 Powers maintained that there should be established by a Convention with Egypt institutional arrangements for co-operation between Egypt and the other interested Powers ; that the operation, maintenance and development of the Canal and its enlargement in the interests of world trade would be the responsibility of a Suez Canal Board chosen from among the States parties to the Convention. That, I think, is a fair summary of the proposals of the 18 Powers and I do not believe that many, indeed any, hon. Members of this House will dissent from them or think that they are in any way unfair to Egypt. On the contrary, hon. Members may well consider that they represent the minimum requirement in the light of what has happened and of the interests which all the user nations have at stake.
The 18 Powers having agreed within a week on these proposals, the next question was how to present them. To this we gave much thought. The proposals could have been, and our first thought was that they might be, handed over through the diplomatic channel by the chairman of the Conference. That would have been quite usual. But we thought that this would not be the best method, since we were the principal users of the Canal and, in that sense, the party most concerned in the business.
A few days before the Conference I had invited the Prime Minister of Australia, who was then in Washington, to return to this country and to join in our counsels. I was delighted that he was able to do this. A further fortunate outcome of his visit was that the 18 Powers were able to invite an able and experienced chairman to lead the carefully selected team to present these proposals. There were representatives from Australia, Ethiopia, Persia, Sweden and the United States—one drawn from each Continent, the four corners of the earth.
Mr. Menzies and his colleagues went to Cairo. They explained the proposals

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of the 18 Powers with great care and patience. They did all they possibly could to persuade Colonel Nasser that the agreement which they sought was reasonable, fair and, indeed, profitable to Egypt. They made it abundantly clear that such an agreement would fully recognise Egypt's sovereignty, and they explained that it would provide the basis of confidence for the maintenance and future development of the Canal.
But unfortunately, despite the fair and eloquent pleading of Mr. Menzies, supported by his colleagues with unanimity—I ask the House not to fail to note that, including a country like Sweden which, I suppose, even hon. Members opposite would not regard as bellicose compared with the present Prime Minister of this country—unfortunately, despite the fair and eloquent pleading of Mr. Menzies, supported by his colleagues, no progress was made in Cairo.
Colonel Nasser rejected the proposals without weighing their merits or listening to reason. That was certainly no fault of those who travelled so far to see the President of Egypt ; the committee of five worked with unity and wisdom. Mr. Menzies led it with a distinction which was recognised not only by his colleagues on the committee, but by all the nations represented.
Colonel Nasser was surely ill-advised not to heed so powerful a combination of nations, representing more than 90 per cent. of the traffic which passes through the Canal. I cannot help feeling that when the history of these times comes to be written President Nasser's refusal of the plan brought to him by the committee of five will be quoted as a classic example of how a man threw away a great chance of permanently benefiting his people.
Not everyone yet realises the advantage the 18-nation plan offered to Egypt. The traffic, of course, particularly in oil tankers, is steadily increasing. It is, indeed, expected to double in normal conditions within the next ten years. The Canal needs constant maintenance. It is going to require major capital expenditure. The latest estimate is that £100 million or more will have to be spent there if it is to continue to handle the expanding traffic—
Mr. Joho Rankin: It should have been spent.
The Prime Minister: It might be yet.
The Menzies mission's offer to Egypt was that this great financial responsibility should be taken over by an international authority while Egypt should be internationally recognised as the landlord and should draw an income based on the traffic passing through the Canal. This plan has now been rejected out of hand ; the more the pity.
I think that the House will agree that the 22-Power Conference in London and the mission of Mr. Menzies' committee represented a very considerable effort to reach a solution by agreement. That offer has failed. In consequence, we have carefully considered, in consultation with our French and American allies, what our next step should be. We have decided, in agreement with them, that an organisation shall be set up without delay to enable the users of the Canal to exercise their rights.
This users' association will be provisional in character and we hope that it will help to prepare the way for a permanent system which can be established with the full agreement of all interested parties. Although discussions are still proceeding between the three Governments—the United States, France and ourselves—about the details of this plan, I can now give the House the broad outline, by accord with the other countries.
It will be as follows : the members of the users' association will include the three Governments I have already mentioned—the United States, France, and ourselves—and the other principal users of the Canal will be invited to join. We hope that the pattern of membership will be as representative as possible. The users' association will employ pilots, will undertake responsibility for co-ordination of traffic through the Canal, and, in general, will act as a voluntary association for the exercise of the rights of Suez Canal users.
The Egyptian authorities will be requested to co-operate in maintaining the maximum flow of traffic through the Canal. It is contemplated that Egypt shall receive appropriate payment from the association in respect of the facilities provided by her. But the transit dues will be paid to the users' association and

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not to the Egyptian authority. Through this organisation it should be possible to establish a system of transit of the Canal for a substantial volume of shipping. Of course, we recognise that a provisional organisation of this kind, designed to meet an emergency, cannot be in a position to provide for the major developments which are becoming urgently necessary if the Canal is to continue adequately to serve the interests of its users and we also recognise that the attitude of the Egyptian Government will have an important bearing on the capacity of the association to fulfil its functions [Laughter.] Yes. But I must make it clear that if the Egyptian Government should seek to interfere—
Mr. Harold Davies: Deliberate provocation.
The Prime Minister: —with the operations of the association, or refuse to extend to it the essential minimum of co-operation, then that Government will once more be in breach of the Convention of 1888. [HON. MEMBERS : "Resign."] I must remind the House that what I am saying— [An Hon. Member : "What a peace maker."]—is the result of exchanges of views between three Governments. In that event Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps—
Mr. S. O. Davies: What do you mean by that?
The Prime Minister: —as seem to be required—
Mr. Davies: You are talking about war.
The Prime Minister: —either through the United Nations, or by other means, for the assertion of their rights. [HON. MEMBERS : "Oh."] I think that hon. Members might let me develop this. There is more to come.
I shall no doubt be asked what are the intentions of Her Majesty's Government about the reference of this dispute to the United Nations. As I stated just now—if it was heard clearly—I certainly do not, and Her Majesty's Government do not, exclude that. Quite the contrary, it might well be necessary. Meanwhile, we have considered it our duty, jointly with the French Government, to address a letter to
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the President of the Security Council informing him of the situation which has arisen.
That letter does not ask for any action at this stage, but it puts us in a position to ask for urgent action if that becomes necessary. At the same time, there are certain considerations about a reference to the Security Council which we should face—which the House should face—frankly.
Let me take the Abadan precedent as an example, because the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South mentioned it in our last debate on this subject. The Government took that issue to the Security Council. They tabled a resolution which was opposed by Russia and Yugoslavia. In an attempt to meet this, our resolution was whittled down. Even so, the Soviet Government would not have it and, consequently, the resolution was made dependent on the final findings of the International Court. I make no criticism of this ; it is quite inevitable in view of the existence of the veto. When it reported many months later, the International Court said that it had no jurisdiction, and, therefore, our resolution before the Security Council lapsed and we never went there again.
I say that because we have to face the realities of this situation. I also recall that the Labour Government of the day, in their wisdom, uttered a warning that the Security Council's failure to act effectively might create a most serious precedent for the future. I think that they were right.
I must now make some reference to the question of the pilots. The Company agreed, at the earnest request of the French Government and ourselves, to urge the pilots to remain at their posts, first, until the London Conference had taken place and then, again, until Mr. Menzies' mission was completed. How little they liked this can be illustrated by some comments of a Swedish pilot. I do not choose a British or a French pilot. He said :
"I have no intention of going back to Suez so long as the Canal is under Egyptian administration, and the same applies to my 60 colleagues who are at present in Europe."
He went on :
"I have no confidence in the Egyptians. I was there during the days of terror in 1952. For my part, I hope no sea captains get caught on Nasser's hook."

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After Colonel Nasser's sudden seizure of the Canal Company it was not, I think, unnatural that the non-Egyptian staff of the Company should consider their own future very carefully. They were expected to work for a Government to which they owed no allegiance—and the House should not forget that they were threatened with imprisonment by the Egyptian Government if they did not continue at their work.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: What about the reservists?
The Prime Minister: They deserved to be threatened with imprisonment? I hope that the hon. Member is almost alone in his view. I do not know how he reconciles it with the right to strike.
Mr. Hughes: I am not alone this time.
The Prime Minister: If these pilots decide to leave Egypt it will clearly, in our view, be the responsibility of the Egyptian Government. It is they who created conditions in which these men have taken the decision that, despite their many years' service on the Canal and their many personal ties, they feel that they must leave. [An HON. MEMBER : "What have they been offered?"] In view of certain statements which have been widely made, I must make this clear beyond any mistake : it is not the Government who have taken out the pilots. On the contrary, twice, as I have mentioned, our efforts have been made to keep them in, to give negotiations a chance, although keeping them in was, of course, facilitating Colonel Nasser's task in working the Canal. But there really is a limit to which men can be pressed, and this limit has been reached.
There has been much public discussion about the question of the use of force in relation to these events in the Canal. I must point out that in this instance it was Egypt who used force. The operation of the Canal has been taken over in complete disregard of Egypt's international obligations. The assets of the Company and its offices were seized by armed agents of the Egyptian Government. As I have said, the Company's employees were compelled to continue at their work under threat of imprisonment. To condone such actions is to invite their repetition and, I think, to bring international law into contempt.
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In recent weeks certain military preparations have been made in the Mediterranean. They are limited in scope. On account of them we have been charged in some quarters with sabre rattling. How ludicrous that is. It might be regarded as provocative if I were to retail all the circumstances which could arise in Egypt. I will, therefore, mention only one, for hon. Members will recall it. I have not forgotten the appalling massacre of foreigners which took place in Cairo in 1952. Many people of several nationalities, not by any means only our own, and including 10 British, were murdered in the most brutal conditions. I happened to be in charge of the Government here at the time, for my right hon. Friend the Member for Woodford (Sir W. Churchill) was on his way back from the United States.
It is quite true that on that occasion the Egyptian Army intervened to stop further bloodshed, but hon. Members must judge for themselves how much that action was due to the knowledge that we had a plan to intervene by force in the last resort. If military precautions were justified a month ago, they are justified today, and I must make it plain that the Government have no intention of relaxing them.
It is also, we think, right and proper that our French allies should be placed in a position to defend their numerous nationals and interests. We have, therefore, extended to them any facilities available to us which they require.
I should like to finish, if I may, on this personal note. In these last weeks I have had constantly in mind the closeness of the parallel of these events with those of the years before the war. Once again we are faced with what is, in fact, an act of force which, if it is not resisted, if it is not checked, will lead to others. There is no doubt about that. If Egypt continues to reject every effort to secure a peaceful solution, a situation of the utmost gravity will arise.
Many other eastern lands now begin to understand that the fate of their country is included in Colonel Nasser's schemes. The Leader of the Opposition warned us the other day of what would happen if he had his way. He said :
"If Colonel Nasser's prestige is put up sufficiently and ours is put down sufficiently, the effects of that in that part of the world will

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be that our friends desert us because they think we are lost, and go over to Egypt."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1620–21.]
That is true. I would only add that the consequences of this would be that the standard of life in Western Europe and many lands in Asia would be at Colonel Nasser's mercy.
Of course, there are those who say that we should not be justified and are not justified in reacting vigorously unless Colonel Nasser commits some further act of aggression. That was the argument used in the 1930s to justify every concession that was made to the dictators. It has not been my experience that dictators are deflected from their purpose because others affect to ignore it. This reluctance to face reality led to the subjugation of Europe and to the Second World War. We must not help to reproduce, step by step, the history of the 'thirties. We have to prove ourselves wiser this time, and to check aggression by the pressure of international opinion, if possible ; but, if not, by other means before it has grown to monstrous proportions.
As has been rightly said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary, for this country military action is always the last resort and we shall go on working for a peaceful solution so long as there is any prospect of achieving one ; but the Government are not prepared to embark on a policy of abject appeasement, nor, I think, would the House—or most of the House—ask them to, because the consequences of such a policy are known to us. A stimulus is given to fresh acts of lawlessness. With the loss of resources the capacity to resist becomes steadily less, friends drop away and the will to live becomes enfeebled.
We will continue to make every effort, in concert with our Allies, to secure our rights by negotiation, but should those efforts fail the Government must be free to take whatever steps are open to them to restore the situation. That is the policy of the Government which I ask this House to approve
3.22 p.m.
Mr. Hugh Gaitskell: At the beginning of his speech the Prime Minister referred to our debate of 2nd August, and spoke of the general agreement
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which then prevailed. I do not deny that over a certain part of the field that agreement certainly existed, but I must point out to the Prime Minister that since then wide differences of opinion have emerged in the country, and there has been, indeed, a very animated and serious debate in the Press. I had hoped that these differences, of which I shall have a good deal to say, would have been narrowed by the Prime Minister today. I am sorry to say that what he has told us this afternoon cannot but divide the nation even more deeply. Some, indeed, of the steps of which he has spoken have the very gravest implications, and of these I shall also speak a little later.
In a free democracy, differences of opinion on matters vitally important cannot and should not be suppressed. Issues of this kind must be argued out ; argued, of course, with a due sense of responsibility. I wish to make it plain that, far from opposing the Government for opposition's sake, we have always recognised that there are moments, in international affairs particularly, where restraint by the Opposition is clearly enjoined. I must remind hon. Members that for many months, despite the gravest misgivings on our side, we refrained even from pressing for a debate on Cyprus. I wish I could say that at certain difficult moments during the period of office of the Labour Government, and particularly during the Abadan crisis, the same degree of restraint was shown by the Conservative Party.
But restraint of this kind must never be carried so far as to involve the suppression of differences of vital importance. On such occasions it is the duty, not only the right, of the Opposition to speak out loudly and clearly. That is what, on this side of the House, we feel we must do today.
What is the precise nature of the difference between us? I shall shortly criticise the Government for what they have done and for what they have not done during this past six weeks, but before I do that I wish to make it abundantly clear that because we attack the Government here we in no way condone or excuse the original act of President Nasser. Hon. Members opposite really must not get into their heads the assumption that because we condemn Colonel Nasser we must support, without reservations, everything that they do.

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I made clear my views about Colonel Nasser's action in my speech on 2nd August, and I stand by what I said at that time. We criticised that action, not because of the act of nationalisation but for other reasons. May I say in passing that if, in fact, it is the view of the Government that the act of nationalising the Suez Canal Company was illegal, then it is their duty to refer the matter to the International Court? I do not propose to argue whether or not this act was legal, but there are undoubtedly differences of opinion about it. There exists an international body to settle differences of this kind and it is our duty to refer this one to it.
Our objection to Colonel Nasser's action I explained on three grounds. First, because—and here I do not think there is any disagreement—the Suez Canal is an international waterway of vital importance which had been under the control of an international body, and we could not be indifferent to the change of ownership involved in Colonel Nasser's act. Secondly, we objected to the method by which the nationalisation was done and the circumstances surrounding it. Thirdly, I gave a very definite warning to the House of the possible implications that that act might have for the Middle East. I stand by that, too. I believe that, by and large, the House accepts all these things.
I would also endorse without hesitation the general aims which, I think, we all have in mind and which were set out very fully in the so-called Dulles plan ; that is to say, that while there should be proper compensation—and I am glad to say that the implication of that was that opposition to nationalisation as such had been dropped—that while there should be proper compensation, while Egypt should get a fair return financially, the users of the Canal should be assured that the charges would be reasonable, that there would be no discrimination, that the Canal would be properly developed, and that there would be full freedom of passage. All those things are agreed and, indeed, those things are agreed by President Nasser, too. [An HON. MEMBER : "What about Israel?"] I shall come to that point later.
I also accepted—and I have no reason to withdraw in any way—the desirability of a Suez Conference taking place, as it
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took place, in London. I certainly believe that the Conference did a good job. I think that it undoubtedly brought us somewhat nearer a solution of this problem. I also say—and I do not withdraw from it at all—that the Government were entitled to take genuinely precautionary military steps. I have no idea—nor have the Government told me—exactly on what scale those steps were taken, though I must say that they appear from Press reports to have been very much more substantial than many of us, at any rate, expected originally.
But these are not the points at issue between the parties in this country. The points at issue are, I think, fundamental and quite specific. They concern the attitude of the Government to the use of force as a means of solving this dispute and the closely related question of the Government's attitude to the United Nations and the United Nations Charter. I propose to devote a little time to both these subjects.
The Prime Minister has spoken of the Government's attitude on force, but he has not told us the full story. At first, after the announcement on that Thursday evening of what Colonel Nasser had done, the general impression that most of us had, and certainly the Press had, was that military measures were not being contemplated. Some five days later, however, largely, I think, as a result of a report of the Foreign Secretary's address to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Conservative Party in the House, our views on this subject began to change—so much so that my right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelly (Mr. J. Griffiths) and I twice before the debate on 2nd August saw the Prime Minister. I do not think he will mind me saying that amongst the things which were discussed was the question of force. I then gave him some warning that if he contemplated the use of force to impose a solution, then he could not rely on the support of the Opposition.
The debate followed. The Prime Minister, in his speech, made virtually no reference to that subject at all. All he told us was that certain precautionary measures of a military nature were being taken. When he said just now that the Government stuck to the policy which they had adopted, the plain fact is that no policy of force was then announced.

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During that debate I myself, however, made a very specific reference to this subject. Perhaps the House will forgive me if I read one or two sentences which I used. I said :
I must, however, remind the House that we are members of the United Nations, that we are signatories to the United Nations Charter, and that for many years in British policy we have steadfastly avoided any international action which would be in breach of international law or, indeed, contrary to the public opinion of the world. We must not, therefore, allow ourselves to get into a position where we might be denounced in the Security Council as aggressors, or where the majority of the Assembly were against us."
I went on, a little later, to say :
"We should try to settle this matter peacefully … While force cannot be excluded"—
and I had already mentioned the circumstances in which it might be necessary ; that is, in self-defence or as part of some collective defence measures—
"we must be sure that the circumstances justify it and that it is, if used, consistent with our belief in, and our pledges to, the Charter of the United Nations and not in conflict with them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1624–25.]
On the day following the debate, there appeared in virtually every newspaper a story that it was, in fact, the Government's intention, after the Conference and if Colonel Nasser refused to accept the conclusions of the Conference, to impose that solution by force. I do not think I need read all the extracts from all the newspapers, but I will trouble the House with one or two. The Times said :
"The position is that Britain and France are prepared to take action, if reasonable agreement cannot be reached."
The Daily Telegraph said :
"If no unanimous agreement has been reached by the end of the time limit, Britain and France will feel called on to act to impose whatever solution has been agreed to by a majority. Britain and France have spared no pains to make perfectly clear to the United States their intention to use force if peaceful means fail to persuade Col. Nasser to accept international control."
The News Chronicle said :
"If necessary both countries are prepared to impose the international authority by force."
We had not been told that in the debate on 2nd August. I see several hon. Members opposite shaking their heads. If I have correctly quoted what I said, it is quite clear that what I said was in flat contradiction to the imposition by
20
force of the conclusions of the Conference. It may be asked why the Government, if that had been their intention, did not say that they disagreed totally with what I said
The question, however, is this. Here were these stories—and it is within the recollection of all of us that they went on for several days. They came from Government sources, of course. What the Government were not willing to tell the House of Commons was put out through Downing Street and the Foreign Office news department. If those statements were authorised, as I think they must have been, they should have been made publicly by Ministers ; and if they were unauthorised I think it is a major scandal that civil servants should be given such powers, and such dangerous powers.
As the Prime Minister knows, when I read those reports I was indeed so dismayed by them that I sat down and immediately wrote him a letter, again warning him about what our attitude would be. I wrote to him again while I was on a short holiday, making perhaps even more emphatically the same point.
On 13th August we had a meeting of our Parliamentary Committee, and again, because of these statements which were then still very current, we thought it right to refer to the matter in the statement which we issued. We said :
"In view of public anxiety, the Committee call upon the Government to make plain that the military measures taken in the last ten days are purely precautionary solely intended for defence against possible aggression and not preparations for armed intervention outside and inconsistent with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations."
We went to see the Prime Minister and his colleagues the following day. We argued with them on this point. We begged them to issue such a statement. Unfortunately, they did not do so ; they did not do so presumably because they were not in agreement with what we suggested they should say.
There was another development at this time which cannot be ignored, and that was the very considerable publicity being given to the troop movements and to the scale on which they were taking place. There can be no doubt that the combination of these two things—the stories emanating from the Government that they intended to use force, and the scale of the military measures as they

21
unfolded—gave the impression that the Government intended simply to impose a solution by force.
What was the effect of that? I do not think there is much doubt about the effect in the rest of the world. In the Middle East, far from diminishing Colonel Nasser's prestige, it in fact led to a rallying of all the Arab States to him. In Asia, it produced upon the people and Government of India a profound shock. In Europe, it certainly had no support whatever. There is not the slightest doubt that the United States was extremely worried about it. Above all, it gave Colonel Nasser the best propaganda opportunity he could possibly have, because he was able to represent his action and all that followed as part of a struggle on the part of Eastern against Western nations, of the darker races against the white races, of the small countries against the large countries, and of the ex-colonies against the imperialists. This was as he was able to represent it, a piece of nineteenth century gunboat diplomacy.
The London Conference did something, in my opinion, to restore the situation. Some hon. Members seemed to doubt my words when I said that this implication as to the use of force had no support in Europe. I can assure them from personal knowledge that none of the countries there, and this includes our Allies in N.A.T.O., were in the least favourably inclined towards the use of force, with the exception, of course, of France. If hon. Members are really content to "go it alone" with France, the rest of the world being against us, then they are simply making for disaster.
The London Conference, I quite agree, achieved some considerable improvement. It reduced the temperature. It pushed force into the background. Above all, it broke the line-up between East and West, and that was extremely important. I should like to say straight away that I think the choice of the five nations was wise, and I have no criticisms to offer of the way in which those five nations presented the case to President Nasser.
The fact remains, however, that this sabre-rattling—because that is what it was—had a disastrous effect on world opinion and is still a very grave handicap in the way of a proper solution to this
22
problem. I ask myself why the Government allowed these statements to be put out. They have not said them in public, of course, but they allowed them to be put out. I can conclude that there are only two explanations, either that they did and do seriously intend to use force—and what the Prime Minister said this afternoon certainly seems to suggest that—or they were simply bluffing.
If the Government intend to use force in this way, in the absence of any further deliberate provocative action or aggression by Colonel Nasser, and if they propose to do so simply to get a solution of this problem, the consequences to this country, far from being good, will be disastrous. Such a step involves abandoning the whole basis which we have accepted and which is set out in the Charter of the United Nations. It means that in future other countries will have an open invitation from us to do the same. It means that if, for instance, in the next few weeks North Korea were to launch a further attack on South Korea, we should not be able seriously to object to it. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] Hon. Members must understand that in ignoring the Charter of the United Nations and taking the law into our own hands, we are reverting to international anarchy. We are asserting the view that each nation decides in its own right what it is going to do, and we are saying that only power counts.
I ask hon. Members to consider rather more seriously than they have done so far whether we should gain from that. If they feel indifferent to these moral considerations, I would ask them nevertheless to look at the probable consequence of military action taken in these conditions. There can be not the slightest doubt that the other Arab States will rally wholeheartedly to the side of Egypt. There can be no doubt at all that if there is anxiety about oil supplies now, those anxieties will be enormously aggravated.
There can be no doubt about the reaction in India, which may leave the Commonwealth in consequence. If hon. Members are indifferent to what happens in India, I would ask them to read what the Foreign Secretary of Australia had to say on that subject, as reported this morning, when he came down very firmly against the use of force, there being an implication in what he said that that was the view also of Canada.

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I ask hon. Members to consider something even more serious. Have the Government really thought out and seriously considered what Soviet Russia is likely to do if we go to war to impose a solution by force on Egypt? The Russians may not come in, but is it not extremely probable that within a very short time indeed there would be Russian volunteers sent to the help of Egypt? [An HON. MEMBER : "Khrushchev said so."] Exactly ; and if we believe him, we should consider seriously what that means. Does it mean that the Government are prepared to risk what might even become a general war merely over this issue? The attitude of the Government to Russia has changed somewhat since last April.
I dare say that the Government may believe—I have seen reports to this effect—that they can achieve a quick victory, that it is a matter of landing a few parachute brigades, seizing the Canal, overthrowing Nasser in Egypt, and then they will have got control. Control over what? Exactly how is one then to proceed? Exactly how is one to bring about a settlement there? Are we to leave there the troops which the Government themselves withdrew only very recently, or are we to withdraw again? If the Government do this, they will leave behind in the Middle East such a legacy of distrust and bitterness towards the West that the whole area will be thrust almost forcibly under Communist control. That is the greatest danger of all. If the area is simply destroyed, if a savage war is conducted there, can there be any doubt that that would be the greatest breeding ground of Communism that there could possibly be?
I am, of course, not saying, nor have we ever said, that there may not be circumstances in which force is justified. I have said it again and again. [An HON. MEMBER : "Tell us."] I will tell hon. Members. If they have read the Charter, they should know. Of course, we should be justified in using force if in fact the United Nations, by its collective decision, so decided. We were perfectly justified in using force to resist aggression in Korea. We should also be justified in using force if, under Article 51, we or Allies of ours were the subject of Arab attack. [An HON. MEMBER : "Israel."] Certainly ; if Israel were attacked by the Arab States, we should be bound, under the Tripartite
24
Declaration, to go to her assistance. That is perfectly true.
Where hon. Members make an appalling mistake is to assume that the act of nationalising the Suez Canal is comparable with an attack by armed force against the frontiers of another country. If hon. Members really still doubt that, let them consider what, in those circumstances, the American reaction is likely to be. I shall have some questions to ask about the latest proposal in a moment, but there is not the slightest doubt, from what President Eisenhower has said, what the attitude of the United States would be.
If, on the other hand, all this talk, re-emphasised again this afternoon, is merely to frighten Egypt, well then, is that not a tremendous risk to take? If in fact President Nasser calls the bluff, as so far he has done, then there is, of course, the gravest danger of a second and perhaps even more substantial prestige victory for him.
Indeed, our indictment against the Government is that they have brought this country into a position where we are in this dilemma, that either we carry out the threat of force or we face the greatest diplomatic climb-down in our history. The Government could have avoided this. They could, while standing completely firm on their attitude towards Colonel Nasser's action, which, as I said, does not differ from our own, have accepted in the first place the statement which I made in the debate on 2nd August about the United Nations Charter and the use of force. Or they could have refrained, even after that debate, from putting out those reports that they intended to use force to impose a solution. Or they could, again, have disavowed subsequently the use of force. But they have done nothing. They have increased the stakes, and indeed the Prime Minister this afternoon has done it once more.
Our second major disagreement is concerned with the United Nations. We asked originally that the plan for international control over the Canal should be under the United Nations. No answer was given at the time of the debate, but I was glad to see that that proposal was accepted by the 18 Powers ; nor was there in the Prime Minister's speech on 2nd August, apart from a rather slighting reference connected with Israeli shipping, or in his television broadcast, a single

25
mention of our obligations to the United Nations. That, frankly, inevitably added weight to the opinion that the Government were ignoring it and were indifferent to it.
We also made a proposal on 13th August that the Government should refer the whole issue—the dispute—after the Suez Conference, which we did not contest at all, to the United Nations, to, in fact, a special Assembly. But that, too, was ignored. I regret that. I think that it would have been much better if the conclusions of the London Conference had been referred directly to the United Nations because we might have avoided the position that Colonel Nasser took up, a very rigid attitude which, I think, in the light of what had gone before, was almost certain to happen.
I turn to the future. The Prime Minister has told us a little of what it is intended to do. I will first make some reference to this users' organisation. If it were the purpose of the organisation to provide a bit of machinery for negotiating with Egypt, I should not object to it. There are good reasons for having an association of user nations to conduct negotiations. But what has alarmed me, and I think alarmed my hon. and right hon. Friends, is what it is apparently proposed that this organisation should do ; above all, the statement that it intends to employ its own pilots to pilot ships through the Canal and that it intends that the payments or the dues should, as I understand it, be made not to Egypt but to the organisation seems to me to be dangerously like a highly provocative step.
I really must remind the House that whatever our views may be—and they do not differ about the act of nationalisation—these ships are going through Egyptian territory, and it is extremely difficult to see by what authority they can go through that territory on the lines of the arrangement suggested by the Prime Minister. He has told us that if the Egyptian Government refuse, it will be in breach of the Convention of 1888. That may be a very clever legalistic statement—I should very much doubt its validity myself—but it is not likely to convince anybody that this kind of step at this kind of time is justified.
We are told that if the Egyptian Government refuse co-operation our Government
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reserve the right to take further steps, either through the United Nations or by other means. What do the Government mean by "other means"? [HON. MEMBERS : "Answer."] Why should there be any other means? Why should the matter not go, if there is such a dispute, to the United Nations? That is what the Charter enjoins, and that is what should happen.
I should like to put one particular question here. As I understand it, the United States has indicated its support for this user organisation. Are we to take it that it also agreed with the proposition that the ships are to have pilots of their own and are to go through the Canal whether or not Egypt likes it? Are we to take it that the United States itself will employ pilots in this way and will be prepared to send its ships through the Canal? I think that we must have an answer to that question.
I would remind the Foreign Secretary of what President Eisenhower said this morning on the use of force ; it hardly seems consistent with the statement that the United States contemplates that should Egypt not co-operate, force will be justified. [An HON. MEMBER : "That was not what was said."] Heaven knows, we have waited for six weeks to try to get some clarity on this. Let us have it. I do not feel that the vague reference about informing the United Nations in the least meets the situation at the moment. The United Nations Charter, which the Foreign Secretary referred to at some point during the six weeks, in defending the procedure hitherto adopted—Article 33, was, I think, the Article he called in mind—also provided as follows :—
"Should the parties to the dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article"—
by negotiation, etc.—
"they shall refer it to the Security Council."
On what grounds do the Government refuse to do so? Why should they not go to the Security Council immediately? That is surely the clear answer.
We are members of the United Nations. I thought that we stood by the Charter. We did until six weeks ago. Why do not we take the matter to the Security Council? I do not say that the Security

27
Council will produce an automatic solution ; of course not. We are all very well aware of the veto rule. Indeed, what worries us—I must make this quite plain—is lest, even if the Government were to do that, they would be in fact from their point of view going through a mere formality. I want to emphasise with all the strength that I can that that must not be the attitude adopted. The purpose of taking this dispute to the United Nations is not just to go through formalities so that we may thereatfer resort to force. It is that there may be a further period of negotiation ; and negotiation is what I mean on this occasion.
I should have thought that if that were the intention of the Government, which, I am afraid, does not appear to be the case, they would at least make some effort at this stage to win over world opinion to our side. They really cannot try to ride both horses at the same time—the threat of force and the appeal to world opinion.
I believe that as a matter of fact it is not particularly difficult to find a compromise solution. The 18-Power plan was never regarded by the Powers themselves as the last word in this dispute. What matters in this are the ultimate aims, to which I referred earlier, and I again say that President Nasser is on record as having said that he quite agrees on that.
I have never said that we could accept his word. I do not think we can. However, he has said something else as well. He has said that he is prepared to agree the tolls, the charges to be made for the Canal, and he has said that he accepts the Convention of 1888. That Convention provides—nobody seems to have noticed this—that :
"The Agents in Egypt of the Signatory Powers of the present Treaty shall be charged to watch over its execution."
I do not see why it should not be possible to have an agreement under which there is a supervisory board of the users concerned, which would negotiate with Colonel Nasser the tolls which should be charged, and I do not believe that it is necessarily impossible that it should agree also with the Egyptian board the development plan and the disposal of the Suez Canal revenues.
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But we have to ask ourselves, if Colonel Nasser does not agree to negotiate, is force then justified? I must repeat again what I said before. Force is justified in certain circumstances clearly laid down under the Charter. It is not justified if no actual, violent armed attack has taken place or if the United Nations has not approved it. It is as clear as that, and I must again say that so far, although I would not deny that Nasser's action involves threats to us, they are threats only. It is nothing more than that ; and I cannot believe that the world in general or indeed public opinion in this country would really support going to war on the difference between having a supervisory board or an advisory council.
Finally, let me remind hon. Members that what we are faced with is not only that Egypt has now seized the Canal Company but the fact that she has, and always has had since we withdrew our troops, physical force. The real thing that will stop the Canal, obstruct the Canal, is the use of force by Egypt. It is not the same thing or indeed necessarily associated with the ownership and management of the Canal. Therefore, to go to war on the question of the ownership of the Canal, on the management of the Canal, is in effect leaving on one side what is the main issue here, which is her decision, which might be made at some time and has been made in the case of the Israeli ships, to use force herself.
I would interpose here that if the matter goes to the United Nations I hope that the question of the freedom of those ships will be raised again, as I think it should be, though I cannot accept the argument that, because the members of the Security Council have not been able or seen fit to implement the Resolution which was passed in September, 1951, therefore the United Nations has failed. That argument really will not do. Everybody knows that the reason why the British Government have never lifted a finger to enforce that Resolution is the fear that the Arab States would not like it.
Force is not justified as a solution of this problem. Force is justified in self-defence, and that is a totally different matter. I say that if Colonel Nasser refuses to negotiate we should cling to the line adopted by Mr. Menzies and his committee in presenting this case to

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Egypt. We should go for the alternatives. I think we should say to Nasser, "Very well, if you will not come to terms with the Canal users you cannot blame them if they have no faith in the future of the Canal and if they decide to make alternative arrangements—if they go in for building large tankers, if they build additional pipelines through Turkey".
The Prime Minister spoke of the extra cost. Is it so very great? Does he know how much difference it makes to the price of petrol? I think I am right in saying that it is about a penny a gallon. When one remembers that two-thirds of the traffic through the Canal is oil, it is not terribly convincing. If he says, as he did say, that it will take a long time to build the tankers, the Canal is open meanwhile. It is a different situation if President Nasser, in the absence of any provocation from us, blocks the Canal.
I am pleading for an absence of provocative action. I want to make that plain. If the Canal is not blocked and traffic can go on we can certainly say -I think we should—that we do not think that Colonel Nasser is going to be able to develop it and we can take steps accordingly. [HON. MEMBERS : "What steps?"] The large tankers. Really, hon. Members ought to know the facts of the situation, and they are that two-thirds of the traffic through the Canal today is oil, and in ten years' time it will certainly constitute four-fifths of the traffic.
That is the problem, and I say there is an alternative. It is an alternative which is less convenient for us. It is very much less convenient for President Nasser as well, and I do not think myself that there is much doubt that had this question been negotiated he would probably have seen the validity of the argument.
I come to the question of the pilots. I regard this as a very grave matter indeed in the light of what the Prime Minister has said. Today's news is that the Company has informed the pilots that they are authorised to withdraw. I can well understand that there are many pilots who feel great uncertainty and dissatisfaction about staying in their posts. I think that that is genuine, and independent of anything that may have been said to them by anybody outside, but frankly it seems to me so clear that our policy in this matter
30
should have been from the start to do everything possible to avoid any outside pressure upon them to withdraw, and indeed to get the maximum of influence upon them to stay.
Let us just see what happened. What did the Canal Company do? On 6th August it sent out a circular, which seemed to me totally unnecessary, telling the pilots they must choose by 105th August whether to continue with the Egyptian administration or to resign altogether. Most of them appear to have said they would resign. Why was this statement issued? Was it issued with the authority of the British Government? Did the members of the board appointed by the British Government vote for it and support it? That was the first step which I think was unjustified. There are rumours of very handsome offers made to them to withdraw, but I do not press that, though I should like some facts about them.
Now we have a statement by the Company that the time limit has expired, and it is really a plain invitation to stop the use of the Canal. Again I ask, were the British Government party to this decision, as they are said in the Press to have been? If they were, since they are talking about other people breaking the Convention of 1888, I would ask the Government if they have considered whether they are not themselves in breach of that Convention. [HON. MEMBERS : "Oh."] Oh, yes. Hon. Members should not speak too soon. They should look up the Convention first, because it pledges the signatory Powers to do nothing whatever to obstruct the Canal in any way.
The other thing I want to say about the pilots, and I am saying it on behalf of our party, is that if there is a slowing down of traffic through the Canal as a result of shortage of pilots, I must make it plain that in our view that would not on its own justify war by us. I shall not say more than that but I want to make that perfectly plain.
I want to make one further general comment. Surely it is of some concern to hon. Gentlemen opposite what is the reputation of this country abroad? Do they really want it to be said all over the world that the British and French Governments deliberately provoked an excuse for armed intervention against Egypt, because that is exactly what will

31
be said? I can only say that hon. Gentlemen opposite are desperately wrong if they think that we are the only people saying this kind of thing. They really should try to find out what people in other countries are thinking.
I want to say positively what I think we ought to do. We ought to take this matter at once to the Security Council, and we ought to take steps to influence world opinion in our favour. We can do that in two ways. We can first renew the appeal which was made up to a certain point by the British and French Governments to the pilots, asking them, despite their difficult conditions, to do everything they can to keep the Canal open. It is obvious that if the Canal traffic is blocked in this way, we should want everybody to accept that it was the direct result of Colonel Nasser's action and not the result of any provocation from Britain and France. That is the argument—[An HON. MEMBER : "Who started it?"] Are we trying, or are we not, to get a settlement of this dispute? Of course I know that many hon. Gentlement opposite do not want a settlement at all, but I understood the Prime Minister to say, despite other things in his speech, that the Government would do all they could to get a settlement. Well, here is something they could do.
Mr. Cyril Osborne rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Gaitskell: Secondly, the Government should make a declaration now that they will not use force except in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Thirdly, they should make it plain that they will accept any decision of the United Nations on this dispute.
The issue which is before us today is not whether we are pro- or anti-Nasser. It is not what our case is—I think we have a good case. It is not what our aims are for the operation of the Canal. They have been stated by the Government and I repeated them earlier. We agree with them. The issue here, in this House and in the country, and indeed beyond, is whether we are to press this case through the United Nations in accordance with the Charter or whether we are to try to decide that for ourselves. Yesterday's statement referred to the intention of the British and French Government
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to uphold the rule of law, but all that we have heard since then from hon. Gentlemen opposite is that they intend not to do that, but to take the law into their own hands. Upholding the rule of law means allowing other people, independent persons, to decide for us and not deciding for ourselves.
I realise, of course we all do, that the United Nations is imperfect and not yet the world authority which we, at least, would like to see it become, but the real issue before us today is a fundamental one. It is whether we wish, as a country, to create that world authority or whether we wish to relapse into international anarchy. Every motive—self-respect, self-interest, our responsibility for world leadership, our membership of the Commonwealth, our alliances—all these things point to the same conclusion : that we should stand by our pledges to the United Nations honestly and fairly and, by our restraint and our patience, set an example to the world
4.17 p.m.
Mr. Clement Davies: With the statement that was made by the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister at the beginning of August, and with the steps and actions that have since been taken by Her Majesty's Government, I can say that I was in agreement. Colonel Nasser had committed a gross, flagrant breach of international law. He had done it not in the interests of the Canal or of free navigation ; he had done it in retaliation, as he said in his speech, and he had done it in a most provocative way.
Undoubtedly the Government were faced with one of the most difficult problems that ever faced any Government, because this was a matter which affected not only ourselves but really every country in the world. Thereupon what was the decision of the Government? It was that before taking any action they would consult with other nations. Very naturally they consulted with the Commonwealth. They consulted with France, who had been largely, if not almost entirely, responsible for the building of this Canal originally, and they consulted with the United States of America against whom the retaliation had really been made.
Then, as a result of that consultation, the representatives came together. So far, so good. They then took the very

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bold step of sending out invitations to 24 nations. They might easily have had a refusal but they did not, and 22 accepted. Thereupon the 22 discussed fully what should be done, what kind of control would be satisfactory in the interests not only of Egypt but of the whole world ; not merely in the interests of those who were using the Canal, but of those on whose behalf, not maritime countries, it was also being used. They arrived at certain conclusions. Unfortunately they were not unanimous but, with one exception, the same ideas underlie all the proposals which were put forward, and 18 were in complete agreement.
Thereupon the 18 decided that the right thing then to do was not to send those proposals to Colonel Nasser as a kind of ultimatum, but to appoint a delegation of five, headed by the Prime Minister of Australia, to go to Cairo, present the proposals, discuss them, explain them. The whole world is deeply indebted to these five people, and particularly to their chairman, for the way in which they did their work. Unfortunately, Colonel Nasser rejected their proposals. I do not think it is of any advantage whatsoever to discuss these proposals or to put forward other proposals or do anything like that at the present moment. They have been discussed solemnly for days by the representatives of 22 Governments.
Thereupon, the five representatives came back, and having come back, what then happened? Now, instead of the five representatives reporting back to the 22 countries—and I agree that all the world knows about the rejection of their proposals—so far as I understand, the chairman has reported to the chairman of the Conference, namely, the Foreign Secretary, and to nobody else.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): The chairman of the committee, Mr. Menzies, reported to the 18 countries and had a meeting with their representatives.
Mr. Davies: But, personally, he reported only to the chairman of the Conference. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] The members of the Conference have scattered. They have all gone. Of course, they have.
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Thereupon, for some reason or other, the Government changed their policy and their attitude, and I must say that that shocked me profoundly. This is a matter which the Government realise concerns not merely ourselves alone, but every country in the world. The Government sent out that invitation to 22 nations, and they received replies, and I should have thought that surely it was merely courtesy and the right thing to summon them back again and tell them what had happened.
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: I think there is some misunderstanding. Mr. Menzies summoned a meeting of the 18 countries to whom he made his report.
Mr. Davies: But summoned them back again in exactly the same way as they were summoned originally? I do not know why the Prime Minister should be surprised. I should have thought that that was the right thing to have done. [HON. MEMBERS : "It was done."] But not in the original way. The Foreign Secretaries of the various countries who came here on that occasion were not here on this occasion. It was merely a report which was conveyed again to the various countries through their Ambassadors here, saying "This is what we were told." I should have thought that the right thing to have done was to have asked them to come here again and to have said to them, "This is what has happened ; what is our next step to be? What do we do now? Do we start again with fresh negotiations with Colonel Nasser?".
Certainly, Colonel Nasser has put forward other proposals which are a great improvement upon what he originally suggested. They might have come to the conclusion that it was not worth their while to come back ; I do not know ; but they might, on the other hand, have come to the conclusion that it would be worth while, and in that way we might have got a direct agreement which we would all prefer to have. But, if not, surely the right thing then to do would be to pose the question "What is the next thing to do?", and the next thing must be an appeal to the United Nations. I should have thought that an appeal to the United Nations would have been all the stronger coming from 22 nations, all combining together and saying, "We have done our best, 18 of us, in complete agreement, and here we are now coming before you as

35
the Council of the World in the United Nations and saying 'You will have to deal with this matter.' "
Instead, for some reason or other, Her Majesty's Government and France decided to go alone, for that is really what it is. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] Of course, it is. They decided to take some separate definite action on their own, which is a most dangerous thing to do. They are going to organise this, and appeal again for something else to happen, but surely the right thing to have done, if they had failed in their negotiations acting with 22 countries, was to call them together again and say "Let us discuss what our next step should be. Let us see if we can agree on the next step, and, failing that, take the matter before the United Nations."
When I listened to the speech of the Prime Minister today, it looked to me really as if the United Nations Charter had never been drawn up. That speech, coming from the right hon. Gentleman, was disappointing to me, for the right hon. Gentleman represented this country in the signing of that document, and indeed it was very largly due to this country that that amazing document was drawn up. Why has it now been ignored?
Mr. Hector Hughes: A scrap of paper.
Mr. Davies: That it can never be. Even if Her Majesty's Government do not have the due regard for it which it deserves, other countries, and especially the smaller ones, which regard it as their one safeguard to which they will always refer, know it can never become a scrap of paper. We of all countries owe it a duty, because of our position, because we are the centre of a great Commonwealth, and because of the fact that at all times we have been regarded as the main supporters of the rule of law. It is for us to show an example to all the other countries of the world, and at the moment we are not doing it.
May I warn the Government of this? In the act which Colonel Nasser committed, he may have done something which appealed to the emotions of the Arabs, who might regard him as a great political leader who dared to flout the rest of the world : but we carried with us
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the sympathy of all the world, and that is a most valuable asset which any country can have. I beg the Government not to endanger that position. The moral strength of this country today is a force of greater power to us than any material power which we may have, and therefore I beg the Government to reconsider this action. Surely, the right thing to do is what they did at the outset. Call these people together again and get them to decide on what the next step should be, and urge upon them the fact that, failing everything else, the right thing to do is to take the matter to the United Nations.
I want to say one last word about the pilots. All of us are anxious that the Canal should be kept open. Surely, it is our duty, on behalf of all other countries, to make an appeal now to these pilots. If some do not answer the appeal—and it is a matter entirely for them—we should do our best to replace them for the time being. By doing that, we shall make it plain that we do so not because we are anxious for any quarrel, but because of our anxiety to maintain the Canal open for the traffic of the world, without any selfish motives at all, and acting in the best interests of all nations. I appeal once more to the Government not to endanger by any foolish act the great position of leadership which really belongs to this country
4.29 p.m.
Sir Victor Raikes: I feel that this debate is one of the most vital that we have had in this House for very many years. In many ways, it resembles the problem that arose in 1936, and I want to say this about that problem. In 1936, I was one of those who accepted the specious arguments then advanced in order not to oppose unduly the advance of Hitler into the Rhineland. I did it honestly ; I was utterly and completely wrong.
If at that time, the last opportunity of avoiding a major war a few years later, Britain and France had acted, the whole position of 1939 would have been transformed. Instead, the matter was referred to the predecessor of U.N.O., the League of Nations, and nothing was done, and from that time onwards the clouds of war—world war—grew darker every day.
I think it would be as well, in view of the way in which a certain number of excuses are made for President Nasser,

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to look clearly for a moment or so at what we are up against. We are up against the dictator of a police State. It is a police State which today is giving third degree to British citizens before trial. It is a police State which is in the closest co-operation with the Communist dictatorship outside.
We are dealing with a man who not only is at war with Israel, but has sworn to destroy that country and has imposed a blockade upon that country in defiance of the Resolution of the United Nations. This may amuse hon. Members opposite, but it is a good example of showing how little a dictator cares for pious resolutions unbacked by force.
Not only that, but we are dealing with a man who has boasted, as his Government have boasted, that in due course he intends to set up an Arabian empire which will include most of North Africa. If such a project were ever started, the carnage which it would ensure would be beyond all words.
Finally, Colonel Nasser seized the Suez Canal Company with the deliberate intention of inflaming the Arab world and causing dissension among the peace-loving nations. To some extent he has been successful in both aims.
The Government had two courses open to them. One was for immediate action to be taken by Britain and France as soon as the Canal was seized, within 48 hours. It may be that if that had been done much of our troubles might not have taken place. On the other hand, risks were entailed. The Government took the other possible and reasonable course of joining together with those nations who mainly use the Canal to try to formulate some way by which justice to all could be ensured.
We have had the report of the eighteen nations. It went out to Cairo. Whether it was advisable, in view of Nasser's mood, for a delegation to seek to see him in his own country I do not know. Maybe that strengthened Nasser in the view that we were bluffing, because victims do not generally go out in a polite delegation to the home of the offender. Be that as it may, the committee went to Egypt and received a blank snub.
It has appeared during the last week or two as though Nasser believed that the
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West was bluffing. The one thing in which I agree with the Leader of the Opposition—it is almost the only thing—is that if the West is, indeed, bluffing and we are not prepared to carry conclusions, if need be, to the final resort, then we should have the greatest diplomatic reverse in our history.
Mr. A. E. Hunter: Does the hon. Member want force?
Sir V. Raikes: Nobody wants force. Nobody wants war for the sake of war. I may be interrupted by the apologists of Soviet Russia opposite, but that is not going to keep me quiet today. I repeat that no one wants force, but unless one is prepared to use force in the last resort one will get no sense out of Colonel Nasser.
The intransigence of Colonel Nasser in Cairo was backed up by two things. On the one hand, he knew the desperate anxiety of the United States to make some form of settlement at almost any cost. Secondly, he was encouraged by the voices of those in this country who had been saying in the Press, and on the platform, "Everything but force, but never force." I say deliberately that those who have taken the opportunity to say time after time that in no circumstances should there be force—I am not including the Leader of the Opposition—have done more harm to the chances—[Interruption.] They have indeed done so, and they have written letters about it, too. One letter was signed by an hon. Gentleman opposite.
Mr. Sydney Silverman: The hon. Gentleman is mistaken. The document to which he refers is exactly in accord with what the Leader of the Opposition said on 2nd August and has repeated today, namely, that force should not be used except under the authority of the United Nations.
Sir V. Raikes: I am glad the hon. Member has said that.
Mr. Silverman: It should not have been necessary.
Sir V. Raikes: Perhaps the hon. Member will keep quiet for a moment. He has made exactly the point that I wished to hear made. The Leader of the Opposition went further than that, saying that for self-defence force need not be used.

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The letter to which the hon. Gentleman refers spoke of force with the sanction of U.N.O., the hon. Member knowing in his heart that if one goes before the Security Council, where Russia has a veto, there is no opportunity of ever using force.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman has correctly said that this is a very important debate, and, therefore, I do not apologise for interrupting to make the matter clear. The hon. Gentleman will realise that the document to which he refers spoke of force only in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. If he would take the trouble at his leisure to read the Charter of the United Nations he would find that to repel an attack upon one, one does not need to refer any question anywhere. One can defend oneself against that attack, and one's obligation under the United Nations Charter is then to refer the question to it but to continue to defend oneself.
Sir V. Raikes: If the hon. Gentleman is right in his somewhat wide interpretation, I wonder whether, if in the course of the next week or two a pilot employed by the new international organisation were forcibly stopped in the Canal and cast into prison, the hon. Gentleman would say that that was force to which we could reply by force. I should be astounded to hear him or any of the extreme left of his party accept that as an interpretation of the Charter of U.N.O.
Mr. Silverman: The hon. Gentleman should look some time at Article 31 of the Charter, which says that nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individuals to collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.
Sir V. Raikes: I will not carry the matter any further except to say that it is still my view that if the form of attack which I mentioned were to take place in the next week or two the first to howl against the use of force in defence of an international pilot would be the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman).
This is a matter which could well be discussed by U.N.O., but we cannot wait for further interminable discussions before we decide what steps we are prepared
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to take to keep the Canal open meanwhile. If we give way on that, the end of all that talk, the end of U.N.O. consultations and Russian vetoes will be an increasing number of cold feet among the international pacifists of the world who have been working even during the last few weeks to disunite a country which was almost united a month ago.
I welcome the steps which the Government are taking. I welcome the attitude that we are prepared at all costs to maintain the principle of international control. It is no good for the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party to say that Nasser has come a great deal nearer since recently he put forward his counter-proposals after we left Cairo. He did not come one step nearer. He laid down in no uncertain terms that the question of international control was not even a matter for negotiation. For this country and for other countries using the Canal international control is absolutely vital.
I know that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary will be attacked in various newspapers tomorrow as warmongers and everything else, but they need not trouble unduly, because no one except a fool or a knave could seriously put forward the view that Britain wants war for the sake of war. What we do want is to prevent a situation which, in a few years' time, may mean that a triumphant Egypt, having got away with this, having increased her power with Russian aid throughout the Arab world, with Russian weapons and Russian prestige backing her, will sweep Israel to the sea, as Egypt has sworn to do, and cast out, perhaps to death, another million Europeans. By the time the Egyptians have done that, I have no doubt that hon. Members opposite will have brought the matter to U.N.O.
Today, I honestly believe that courage and determination can pay great dividends. I welcome the attitude of the Prime Minister and I say without hesitation that weakness or faintheartedness now can mean carnage for our children within years
4.43 p.m.
Mr. Arthur Henderson: The hon. Member for Garston (Sir V. Raikes) has clearly crystallised the differences between the

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two sides of the House. Although he believes that we are dealing with an international problem—he reiterated on several occasions that the point of issue was the international control of the Canal—he believes that it is not a matter which should be taken to the United Nations, very largely because he thinks that there might be too much delay.
At the beginning of his speech he indicated that in the inter-war years he had great faith in the old League of Nations, but that in the course of time he realised how futile and ineffective it had become for dealing with the developments which took place just before the outbreak of war in 1939.
Sir V. Raikes: I do not want to be innocently misrepresented, nor to misrepresent myself. I did not say that. I said that I accepted the specious arguments which were put forward to permit Hitler to occupy the Rhineland. I did not say that I had any enormous faith in the League of Nations at that time. I said that the matter was referred to the League of Nations, but nothing was done. It is only fair that I should say that.
Mr. Henderson: I hope that the House will agree that I did not unfairly misrepresent what the hon. Member said. The point is that he expressed the view that the old League of Nations failed to deal with the great international issues which arose between 1930 and 1939. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition dealt very fully with that aspect this afternoon when he pointed out that the old League of Nations—and, indeed, its successor, the United Nations—was not a world government. Like the United Nations, the League of Nations did not have its own forces at its disposal.
In the old League of Nations—as in the United Nations—we had a great alliance and association of 70 nations, each of whom insisted upon retaining its sovereign equality. Therefore, if there were a failure in the old days of the League of Nations, it was a failure of those Governments which constituted the League. What we are now saying is that if we do not want history to follow the same course as in the inter-war years, we must prevent the United Nations falling
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into the moribund state of the League of Nations in 1939.
In 1950, when South Korea was invaded by North Korea, many of us thought that the action of the Security Council, subsequently approved by the General Assembly, to which a very large number of members of the United Nations loyally responded, made it clear that the present generation of world opinion would have no repetition of what took place between 1930 and 1939—which eventually led to the outbreak of the Second World War. It is because we are apprehensive that the destruction of the effectiveness of the United Nations may lead to the Third World War that we want the United Nations to play a powerful and effective part in dealing with disputes between nations.
It may be argued that this is not an international dispute, but merely an argument about whether there should be a different form of institution in control of the Suez Canal than was the case before the speech of President Nasser. The Prime Minister has again indicated today that there have been considerable movements of naval, land and air forces, not only those of the United Kingdom, but those of our ally, France. If we require more evidence of the existence of a dispute between countries than exists today, with Egypt on the one side and France, Britain and perhaps the 16 other countries associated with the London proposals on the other, I should like to have that evidence produced.
The acid test of the attitude to be taken by our country and the others associated with us in this dispute with the Government of Egypt is our compliance with the Charter of the United Nations. Are we to exhaust all the machinery in the Charter of the United Nations, or are we to visualise that in certain circumstances it may be necessary to go outside the Charter and adopt the other means to which the Prime Minister referred this afternoon, particulars of which we have not been given? I hope that the Foreign Secretary will tell us what the Government have in mind when they talk about other means outside the United Nations.
Do they mean other means when the machinery of the United Nations Charter has been exhausted, when the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly have both

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failed to carry out their responsibilities—because they have responsibilities just as much as do the Governments of the United Kingdom and France?
Do the Government mean that in the remote future the possibility of the United Nations refusing to take any action whatsoever and to implement the provisions of the Charter, the Government reserve the right to take military action? If that is so, why do the Government not tell us so? The House and the nation might be prepared to listen more than carefully, perhaps sympathetically, to such a statement of future policy, provided that before that position is reached the British Government have gone to the United Nations. When I say "have gone to the United Nations", I do not think it sufficient for the Prime Minister merely to tell the House that a letter has been written to the President of the Security Council under Article 33, informing the Security Council that there is a dispute between this country and Egypt. I say that Article 34 should be invoked. I refer to that Article because it is very relevant to my argument.
The Prime Minister has referred to action under Article 33, which permits of information being sent to the Security Council bringing the existence of a dispute to the attention of the Council or of the General Assembly. The British Government are a member of the Security Council. Why is it necessary to rely on the machinery for sending information to the Security Council when, under Article 34, the Council is given power to investigate any dispute or situation which may endanger world peace? Why are Her Majesty's Government so reluctant to have this question of the Canal placed on the agenda of the Security Council? This is the acid test of the sincerity of this country in relation to the obligation which it undertook when, in San Francisco in 1946, its signature was appended to the original Charter.
It may be asked what is to prevent Russia from exercising the veto if the matter goes to the Security Council. The Prime Minister referred today to the way in which the issue at Abadan was dealt with by the Security Council in 1950. I am sure that the Foreign Secretary would agree with me that there is a great difference
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between the question of a refinery belonging to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. at Abadan and what the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and every other speaker for the Government have reiterated in recent weeks is an international canal and therefore an international problem. There was nothing in the treaty between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. of the kind that there is between this country and the Government of Egypt in the matter of the Suez Canal.
Mr. E. Shinwell: There was a contract.
Mr. Henderson: That may be one of the difficulties about having this matter taken to the Security Council and having it referred to the International Court. Just as the contract between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was held to be outside the purview of the International Court, so the agreement between the Egyptian Government and the Suez Canal Company might be held to be in the same position.
As to the control of the Canal following the arbitrary act of President Nasser in taking it over, there are treaties which have a direct reference to the international status of the Canal. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954 contained direct reference to the fact that the Suez Canal was of international importance from the strategic, commercial and maritime points of view. Both these treaties have the signature of the Egyptian Government to them. Therefore, there has been an acknowledgment by the Egyptian Government in 1936 and again in 1954 that they agreed that the Suez Canal is a waterway of international importance.
Reference has been made from the other side of the House to the question of the veto. We had experience in June, 1950, of what might have happened if the Soviet Union had attended the meeting of the Security Council which within 24 hours authorised the use of force in resistance to the aggression of North Korea. In November, 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Resolutions which are known as the "Uniting for Peace" Resolutions to deal specifically with the problem of the use of the veto.
I notice that an editorial in The Times this morning rather brushes on one side the validity of these Resolutions on the ground that they were neither designed

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nor capable of overriding the use of the veto on the Security Council. One Resolution, incidentally, was adopted by 52 votes to 5—I do not think I need indicate to the House who the five were.
The Resolution states that the General Assembly
"Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
The main purpose of the Resolution was precisely to overcome the use of the veto. The Times also suggested that that is merely a recommendation and therefore would not imply authority on the part of the United Nations if action were taken on it.
I suggest that his is really splitting hairs and that following the reference of the dispute to the Security Council—as we on this side of the House suggest—and possibly to the General Assembly, with majority decisions both in the Security Council and the General Assembly, there would be, even in spite of the exercise of the veto at the Security Council, moral authority behind any country which sought to enforce the recommendation.
What is the alternative? It is not to go to the United Nations. It is to ignore the provisions of the Charter. It is apparently, in certain circumstances to "go it alone" or to go it with our French . That would be a gross betrayal of our obligations under the Charter and would be a step which would split this country in two and make the position of the Government impossible.
I was very sorry indeed that the Prime Minister should have spoken as he did this afternoon. I remember that in the days between the wars he was a stalwart supporter of the old League of Nations. He risked his political career and his reputation on his loyalty to the League of Nations. I expected the right hon. Gentleman to come to the House today with a clarion call, even at this late stage, to rally round the Charter and the United
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Nations. I was very disappointed, and I am sorry that the Prime Minister is not here to hear me say so.
I agreed with my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition when he said that in the Prime Minister's speech on 2nd August there was nothing more than a perfunctory reference to the United Nations and a reference to the fact that it took no action over the embargo on Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal. That was not the fault of the United Nations but, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, the fault of the nations represented at the United Nations.
If we were to take this issue to the United Nations and the Governments of the United Nations for the second time contented themselves with recommendations and refused to take any action, that would be a clear indication that we cannot look to the Charter or to the United Nations Organisation as the instrument for safeguarding the security of the various nations of the world, whether small or powerful.
President Nasser may think that he has done a smart thing in seizing the Canal in defiance and in breach, as I think, of international obligations. Before the League of Nations was formed, the small countries were continuously complaining that they were subjected to the sovereign interests of the great Powers. The complaint was not against the rule of law but against the rule of power and of power politics.
The Prime Minister will, I think, agree that the United Nations gives greater security to the small nations than to the more powerful nations. By his action President Nasser is weakening the United Nations, the one international organ of protection to which all the small nations owe so much.
If I could speak to President Nasser, I would say this to him : "It is all very well for you to keep on reiterating the fact that you must have sovereign status and independence, but if you are to be a member of a great association of nations like the United Nations you must realise that the very essence of that association means that sovereign independence and sovereignty itself, whether of the small nation or the large, must be qualified to the extent that it is necessary to live in peace and harmony, and, indeed, to

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enjoy the equal status that is provided in the United Nations Charter for the small nation as compared with the large nation. If you take away the Charter, you will be back again in a situation in the international world in which the great nations will again dominate the small nations."
I believe that President Nasser has done a great disservice, not only to his own country and to the small neighbouring Arab nations, but to all the small nations of the world. Therefore, I appeal again to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Secretary to reconsider the view that we on this side hold so sincerely and passionately. We are not suggesting that we have a monopoly of interest or of loyalty to the United Nations, but I repeat to the Prime Minister that I for one believe that this present situation is the acid test of our concern for our obligations under the Charter.
If we fail the United Nations on this occasion, we shall have set an example to other countries. We shall destroy the effectiveness and validity of the United Nations Organisation and the Charter. I believe that if the Prime Minister would think again, he could carry the whole country behind him provided he employs all the machinery of the United Nations, not merely as a prelude to making war upon Egypt but by placing the responsibility for dealing with what is admittedly an international problem on the shoulders that should bear it : namely, the international organisation represented by U.N.O.
5.5 p.m.
Major Patrick Wall: I will not attempt to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) in discussing the subject of the United Nations, about which he knows so much more than do I. For three generations a branch of my family has lived and worked in Egypt, and I should like, therefore, to put before the House some of the factors of the strength of the present President of Egypt and of his weakness, not only in his own country but in the Middle East as a whole.
The modern history of Egypt, before and during the last war, has been one of the interplay of three major forces : the British, the Palace and the Wafd.
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Sometimes two of these three combined against the third, and sometimes another two combined together. Now the British have gone from Egypt, the Palace was eliminated by Neguib and Nasser has eliminated the Wafd. Therefore, there are no longer three powers in Egypt who are playing off each other, but only one power—the President, the dictator of Egypt. Therefore, he is in a very strong position. At the same time, he is in a weaker position, because he now has the responsibility of power firmly on his shoulders.
Like any dictator, he must have success to continue in power with the support of his country. He must have success in his own country and he must have success in leading the rest of the Arab nations. He has used the fear and hatred of Israel, he has used Arab nationalism and invoked it against the West and—let us face it—since he has been in power, since the overthrow of King Farouk, Nasser has had an uninterrupted chapter of success, and to that he owes his present position.
I suggest, however, that Nasser also has great weaknesses. In his own country, he is unpopular with practically every section of the population, with the possible exception of the army. Neguib was venerated by the Egyptian fellahin. They regarded him, rightly, as a man who at last would do something for them. Nasser has made promises but all he has done in his own country is to produce great schemes of road development, statues, and so on, to glorify the régime without helping in any way the fellahin in the fields, without helping to raise their standard of living in any way. Therefore, Nasser is not popular with the peasants of his own country.
He displeased sections of the navy and air force in Egypt during the revolution. Obviously, he is not popular with all the educated and literate opinion in Egypt because he has dethroned, possibly justifiably, the pashas and has eliminated the Wafd. There are therefore many factions in Egypt who dislike him and support him only because he is successful the Arab world in general, we must remember that Egyptians are not an Arab people. Many of the Arab nations dislike and are jealous of the Egyptians, because they are the most developed and the strongest of all the countries of the

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Middle East and because they have had such an uninterrupted run of success.
The Arab States realise and appreciate that in spite of Egypt's lead she has feet of clay, because her population is increasing to such an extent that her own soil can no longer support even the present population. Therefore, unless she can be the leading nation of an Egyptian empire, she is doomed. Other Arab nations know that and fear these facts. Our ally and, I believe, the future leader of the Arab race—Iraq—knows that only too well. She, on the other hand, has money, which Egypt does not have, and sufficient territory to absorb a greater population. In this crisis, therefore, there are great elements of unity in the Arab world as long as Nasser is successful, but the certainty of disunity once Nasser fails to be successful. This applies both in the Arab world in general, in the whole of the Middle East, and in Egypt in particular.
The effect upon this country of the seizure and, possibly, the closure of the Canal has been discussed ad infinitum during the past few weeks, with its effect on oil supplies, the standard of living, the resultant unemployment in Western Europe, and so on. There are, however, bigger factors than that. It is not purely an economic question. The whole future of this country as a great Power is involved. If Nasser gets away with this act, British prestige, which has suffered many blows since the war, will be completely eliminated from the Middle East. Our friends will fall away from us and Nasser will, I believe, have a very good opportunity of creating his dream empire, which will stretch from Casablanca to the Caspian.
Let us remember what such an Egyptian empire could mean to ourselves, to the Commonwealth, and to the world as a whole. Nasser has had to rely for his success on help from the Soviet. This new Egyptian empire, when created, might well try to become a neutralist bloc. The idea of politicians in Egypt is that it would stand between East and West and play one off against the other.
However, Egypt has had to rely so much upon the Soviet that it seems very likely that the new empire would fall under Communist domination. That is a factor the importance of which we have to realise because the future of the Commonwealth is directly involved. Such a
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neutralist bloc might well attract India and if Egypt and her new empire became dominated by the Soviet Government, India might go the same way. The future of this country and of the Commonwealth, as undoubtedly the future of France, are affected intimately by a solution of the present problem.
I would digress from my main theme in order to put before hon. Members one or two points about the importance of joint Anglo-American policy in this part of the world. I myself am very pro-American, but I believe that American policy in the Middle East since the end of the war has been wrong in almost everything it has done, and that a lot of the troubles we are facing in the Middle East today can be laid at the door of American diplomatists and business interests. This applies to Persia, to Egypt before and at the time of the revolution, and to other Middle Eastern countries.
If Nasser wins once more and we are defeated over this matter, the United States will also be defeated. Some economic interests in the United States might think that by taking over British influence they will absorb British oil interests and British economic interests in the Middle East, but if the Egyptians get away with this it will mean, in the long run, that American economic and oil interests will be eliminated from the Middle East as well. It would also mean that two of the firmest and most loyal allies of America, namely, Britain and France, would have passed away as great Powers. I hope that American politicians will give this point of view a great deal of thought in spite of the lobbying of certain business interests that might be putting the opposite point of view.
Mr. Stan Awbery: Is the hon. and gallant Member for Haltemprice (Major Wall) telling us that war will satisfy the problem of the Suez Canal and will not aggravate other and greater problems to be thrown up afterwards?
Major Wall: That is a point that I was coming to. I was pointing out that the weaknesses of Nasser have not been fully discussed, certainly not in the Press, during the past few weeks.
Now what do we do? I agree with the hon. Gentleman opposite who said

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that we should try to march with our Allies as we have done throughout this dispute. There was a conference of 22 nations, and the representations of 18 nations have been put to Egypt. We have heard my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister say that the United States and France are with us in the users' organisation which is to be set up. We heard my right hon. Friend say that we are going to the other nations represented at the recent London Conference to ask for their support. I maintain that we are marching with our Allies, although to listen to some of the speeches made from the Opposition benches it would almost appear that the Prime Minister declared war on Egypt this afternoon.
Mr. R. T. Paget: When the hon. and gallant Member says that Britain needs Allies against Egypt, does he mean that we shall go at the speed of the slowest, which is no speed at all? When we make this trade union of users and we are told that the Americans are in it, does the hon. and gallant Gentleman realise that we are handing the leadership over to the country that has been the leading blackleg throughout?
Major Wall: My point was that we should go as far as possible with our Allies. Let me develop that theme a little more, and first say a word with regard to the pilots. Anybody who has lived in Egypt will know how extremely unpleasant it can be during a period of crisis to be in a country where the mob can take charge, especially if it is supported by the leaders of the country. The situation is very grave.
These pilots have done great service to all nations by running the Canal efficiently. We must leave it to their good judgment whether they intend to work for the Egyptian Government or not. It has been said that they could be replaced by pilots from Soviet Russia and other parts of the world, although we have been told how difficult it is to pilot ships through the Canal. We have been told that it needs ten years' experience on a master's ticket and five years' training on the Canal itself. Can we imagine that pilots brought in from the Soviet and other countries will be allowed to take ships through the Canal, or that insurance
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companies will insure ships placed in the hands of such pilots?
That is the kind of thing that Nasser has brought upon himself. He is stopping the navigation of the Canal by his own action. The people who will suffer in the short run will be the Egyptians because they will not get anything like the revenue that they got in the past and they have sacrificed the greater revenue that was promised to them by Mr. Menzies.
What should we do? We should apply economic pressure wherever possible and as far as possible we should boycott the Canal, although as has been explained we cannot do that altogether. We could take one or two other measures. One I might describe as the nationalisation of the head-waters of the Nile. Any threat to the Nile waters has been the great fear of Egyptians for 3,000 years. Control imposed on the head-waters of the Nile in Uganda might bring Nasser to reason. I appreciate that there are very great difficulties about that, but it is a point that should be borne in mind on both sides of the House.
We should go to the United Nations. Indeed, the Prime Minister told us this afternoon that a letter was being sent to the Secretary-General. My right hon. Friend did not exclude in any way a reference to the United Nations eventually ; but can we rely upon that? I have tried to paint a picture to show that Nasser is not really strong and that he will be strong only as long as he continues to win. Can we leave him the three, four or five months during which the ponderous machinery of the United Nations turns round, and possibly nothing happens in the end?
We should do all we can from the economic point of view, short of war, and we should take the matter to the United Nations. However, if all else fails, I believe that hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House will be at one with us in saying that we must win, even if it means war
5.18 p.m.
Mr. A. Blenkinsop: In the course of the analysis made of the present situation by the hon. and gallant Member for Haltemprice (Major Wall) he attempted to face some of the problems. I do not think we can

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say that about the Prime Minister. It will be interesting to follow up some of the points which the hon. and gallant Gentleman raised.
He suggested alternatives to the rule of Nasser in Egypt, he described Nasser's weaknesses and he told us of the other forms of power that went before. Are we to accept responsibility for reinstating some of those other forces which proved their weakness in Egypt? What sort of alternative government has the hon. and gallant Gentleman in mind as preferable to Nasser? It is no use talking in general terms.
Major Wall: Let us remember that General Neguib is under house arrest and is still the idol of the mass of the Egyptian people.
Mr. Blenkinsop: However much Nasser may have offended different groups in Egypt the one thing most likely to add to his prestige and importance is the kind of action which this country is taking against him. It is most likely to encourage support. Some of the proposals of the hon. and gallant Gentleman would be the very best for Nasser's prestige.
Many of us came here today almost certain that the Prime Minister would at least make clear that we were making use of the United Nations Organisation as the proper avenue of appeal on this issue. Although the hon. and gallant Member for Haltemprice appears to have been convinced that that was in the mind of the Prime Minister, we on these benches certainly are not. Indeed, we were deliberately told that the reference of the dispute to the United Nations was one of the possible alternatives in the future, but only that. That is not good enough for hon. Members on this side of the House.
We have, in fact, been asked to give the Government a blank cheque with which to do whatever they like. I hope that the House will not give that blank cheque and, what is more, that the House is not quietly going back into Recess in order to enable the Government to write out any sort of cheque they like. I very much hope that until we are given much clearer undertakings from the Government as to their future course of action the House will not resume its Summer Recess. If we are to pay some regard to our democratic procedures—and we are
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all conscious of the critical situation with which we are faced at the moment—this is surely not the time to send the House packing as soon as practicable after the Government have tried to win a party Division in the next day or two.
Viscount Hinchingbrooke: We do not want a Division.
Mr. Blenkinsop: The Prime Minister may very well be the cause of a bitter division in this House. Indeed, his speech today is already the cause of a very real and bitter division throughout the country. The right hon. Gentleman must accept full responsibility for that. There is no doubt that the majority of feeling in the country was that every attempt should be made to solve this problem through the available channels.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition rightly pointed out that the issues of division are now so modest in character that it seems obvious that a solution to the practical issue of the transit of shipping through the Canal could satisfactorily be found without Naser winning a complete victory, and certainly without the Prime Minister winning a complete victory. That, surely, is the very basis of the kind of compromise that we expect and have to accept, and certainly the basis of the work of the United Nations.
What appalled me more than anything both in the debate that took place in this House before the Summer Recess and again today was and is the obvious glee of hon. Members opposite in their effort to destroy the effectiveness and openly strip away all the responsibility of the United Nations. I have always had my suspicions about the sincerity—
Mr. F. A. Burden: The hon. Gentleman's right hon. Friend stated that the United Nations had failed over Abadan. Because of that failure circumstances might well be created in future which would debar a matter in which action was necessary being taken to the United Nations.
Mr. Blenkinsop: I regard the pledge which we have given concerning the Charter as a binding pledge. I accept the fact that we may not always be satisfied with the decisions come to by the United Nations, and that the case which we put forward may not always receive the

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support which we think it ought to have, but that is no reason for throwing overboard an international organisation which already exists and which has the opportunity of development.
Hon. Members opposite are quite willing at election times to sign all sorts of declarations affirming their support for the United Nations Organisation and for what it stands, but when it comes to the test, what do those pledges amount to? They amount to just about as much as we expected from hon. Members opposite before the war. Of course, there are now some converts on the benches opposite. Indeed, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Sir V. Raikes) has confessed that he was wrong from 1931 onwards—presumably to 1939. Pretty soon we may have the Lord Privy Seal making an apology for doing a deal with Hitler before the war. But what relevance has that to the issue which faces us at the moment?
Hon. Members opposite are back at their old game of attempting to destroy, just as they did before the war, the international organisation which, however weak it may be, offers the hope, chance and opportunity of progress for the future.
Mr. R. Brooman-White: The hon. Gentleman and his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition have been delivering great tirades against the alleged intentions of hon. Members on this side of the House and saying that we wish to strip away the responsibility of the United Nations. Does he not seriously think that we all want to build up the strength of the United Nations? The hon. Gentleman knows the realities of the situation. He knows that the attitude of the Soviet Government has been made perfectly clear during the negotiations. He knows the General Assembly attitude of the Arab nations. Does he really think it is helping the United Nations to demand that, whatever the circumstances, a problem which that organisation may not be able to solve should be shoved on its plate?
Mr. Blenkinsop: The hon. Gentleman has been making a speech. I do not blame him because he may not get another chance. The comment which he has just made is precisely the kind of comment that was made before the war. The comment then made was that
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because the League of Nations was weak we must assert our own individual power or, rather, give in to Powers which were great and menacing. The benches opposite are now in favour of military action being taken against Nasser.
Not only have we on these benches not been impressed by the determination of hon. Members opposite to weaken the United Nations, but we have had other evidence of that determination quite recently. Indeed, just before the Recess an Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office made a speech which was widely commented upon throughout the country about how this nation could not afford the miserable contributions which it was making to the United Nations Agencies, and that those contributions were affecting our whole financial economy. The noble Lord the Member for Dorset South (Viscount Hinching-brooke) supported that view. That is the true voice of the Tory Party.
It is true that hon. Members opposite have covered up their real intentions for a number of years and have made some foolish people believe that the Tory Party was anxious for real international action and international authority. Of course, it is not, and this is the real test and evidence of it. In his statement today the Prime Minister has, in fact, shocked very many of us who were hoping that he would make a kind of appeal for the use of the United Nations which we had expected, and would take the opportunity of rallying the support of many parts of the world on the issue of the use of the Canal.
As has often been said, this is not a matter that concerns us alone. The Prime Minister of India and others have made it clear that they are also anxious about it. But it seems to me that we are doing everything in our power to make enemies rather than friends of all those who have common interests with us in the use of the Canal.
I wonder who has thought up this "canal hauliers association", which has apparently been proposed by the Prime Minister? We want to know a good deal more about it. It has been said, rather glibly, that this association has been approved by France and America, but when the question was raised whether America was prepared to support the use of force if Egypt did

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not accept this form of association, or did not make facilities available, there were some mutterings on the Treasury Bench. I take it from those mutterings that America is not prepared to go that far.
She may be prepared to go as far as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said he was prepared to go—and as far as many hon. Members on this side of the House are prepared to go—namely, the formation of some sort of association of users to discuss the matter further. That may be a possibility, but, so far as we could understand it, the only country that supported this proposal, in effect, was France. We should like to know how many of the 18 countries that were joint signatories to the proposals put forward to Colonel Nasser in Cairo recently—never mind the 22 countries who were parties to the Convention—would support the full implications of this new brain-child of the Prime Minister's. How many of them would be prepared to support, with force, the implementation and development of this association—of it providing pilots and taking dues—irrespective of the attitude of Egypt? These are essentially matters for us to be clear about before we can know what is really in the Government's mind.
We come again to the question, to what extent did the Prime Minister suggest that the matter should be referred to the United Nations? He has said that he has made the United Nations aware of it. I am sure that we are all very grateful for that—but I should not be surprised if the United Nations was aware of it already. As I understand the matter, Colonel Nasser has already made the United Nations aware of it. There is not very much in that suggestion. I understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that it was possible that an approach might be made to the United Nations. What a wonderfully slighting reference to the United Nations.
The right hon. Gentleman says that there are other measures than taking the matter to the United Nations. Of course, he did not specify them. But he must specify them before this House has any right to give a blank cheque to this Government to use them. Are we, as a House of Commons, going to say that this Government can ride roughshod, and do what they like? We already have very
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grave suspicions about the extent of the call-up. It was understood when the House rose that although a special Proclamation had been issued, this was merely in order to collect together a relatively small number of special people who were needed, and we were assured that we should be recalled if anything more were needed.
We are recalled, Presumably that means—or does it?—that something more is needed. It seems to me that in all these ways the Government are showing their utter disregard of the one international organisation that can be of avail and was of avail in a very vital case which arose not so long ago, where our own Labour Government were responsible for taking action jointly with the United States.
Mr. Charles Ian Orr-Ewing: Abadan?
Mr. Blenkinsop: No ; in Korea.
The Prime Minister spoke, no doubt very properly, of the work which the Prime Minister of Australia has done on the committee of which he was chairman, but we wonder how strong is his position. Reference has been made to Colonel Nasser's weakness, but when there is published to the world the declaration of the views of the Foreign Secretary of Australia—it is here for all of us to read—which seem to be widely different from the views of his Prime Minister, it would seem that even in Australia there is not unanimity.
Mr. Ronald Bell: The hon. Member has not given chapter and verse of the quotation to which he is referring. Is he, possibly, referring to what appeared in this morning's Manchester Guardian, which, as I read it, appeared to be a bit of speculative journalism?
Mr. Blenkinsop: The hon. Member may say so. It is the report of a speech which, I understand, has been made publicly and has been circulated in Australia, and it is there for any hon. Member to read, if he cares to do so. I am only asking, in view of the very grave doubts even about Australia's attitude in this matter—and we must not forget the possible doubts about all the other 18 nations which supported the proposal for discussions with Colonel Nasser—what evidence there is that these countries are prepared

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to support the sort of action hinted at by the Prime Minister and his supporters.
I can assure hon. and right hon. Members opposite that this is a bitter issue and a very real division. I warn them that feeling in this country is deeply divided upon the issue, and that that feeling is very real. There is a great mass of opinion that the Prime Minister, after allowing placards of his features to go on the hoardings at the last Election as a peacemaker, is, now that the Election is over, leading us into very different waters. I ask all hon. Members opposite to realise that we have the combined determination of the Trades Union Congress in its recent resolution—[HON. MEMBERS : "Oh."] Hon. Members can scoff at that as much as they scoff at Nehru, the leader of India, and at others, but what does it profit us in the end?
Militarily, I am sure, we can again occupy the Suez Canal zone, but did we not occupy it before? Did that prevent the blockade of Israeli shipping? Will it prevent it now? Is not it true that Her Majesty's Government today are proposing actions which will lead us, in the Suez area and in Egypt, into a further development of what we are already suffering from in Cyprus and elsewhere? Is it not therefore clear that the Prime Minister must be prepared quickly to sacrifice some of his personal feelings in order to secure a real and satisfactory settlement of this issue—or would not it be better if we got a new Prime Minister altogether
5.39 p.m.
Major Tufton Beamish: The hon. Member for Newcastle-upon-Tyne, East (Mr. Blenkinsop) has treated the House to a lot of loose talk about the Government's wanting to overthrow the United Nations. He even went so far as to say that many hon. Members on this side of the House were attempting to destroy the United Nations. All I want to say about it at this moment—although I shall come back to the subject of the United Nations later—is that there is not one scrap of evidence that that is true.
Mr. R. E. Winterbottom: The Prime Minister's speech today.
Major Beamish: The criticisms made of the Prime Minister I will also touch
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on later, but I should like to say that I think the Prime Minister has made a very great speech indeed, which will be widely acclaimed throughout the country.
I am sorry that the Leader of the Opposition is not in his place—[HON. MEMBERS : "Why should he be?"] I am not blaming him, but I wanted to make a brief reference to his speech, which I regarded as being full of special pleading. I was very sorry that he could not see some of the most unhappy faces of those sitting behind him, and especially the look on the face of his right hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison), who I hope especially will contribute to this debate.
The Prime Minister referred to the remarkable degree of unanimity that he had noticed during the debate in this House at the beginning of August, just before we rose for the Summer Recess. That was something which was widely remarked on in the Press of the country and it appeared to be true from what was said by the Leader of the Opposition. I know that the right hon. Gentleman "got it in the neck" from Tribune and very quickly changed his mind.
However, the main reason why I wish to contribute to this debate is because I want to make some comparison between what the Leader of the Opposition said on 2nd August and what he said today. I also wish to look briefly at the Suez crisis in its rather wider setting of the whole struggle in the world which has been going on since 1945, and, in fact, earlier, between international Communism and those countries which wish to stop the spread of Communism.
I cannot help remarking that it would seem that one of the main reasons why Parliament has been recalled is to enable the Leader of the Opposition to apologise to the House for making such a good speech on 2nd August. I think it as well that some of the things he said then should be on the record again today. He said then—I am paraphrasing—that while the nationalisation of the Canal might not of itself be wrong—given fair compensation which he thought it improbable that Egypt would be able to pay—he was strongly opposed to the termination of the concession.
Mr. Winterbottom: He said it again today.
Major Beamish: If hon. Members opposite will give me an opportunity, they can judge later whether I am right in saying that there is all the difference in the world between what was said then and what was said today. Perhaps they will listen to what I have to say.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that he "resented," he "objected and took strong objection to" Colonel Nasser's action on three grounds. First, he regarded the promise to maintain the principle of the 1888 Convention as of "very doubtful value" because of Egypt's attitude to Israeli shipping and Nasser's reply to the United Nations Resolution of September, 1951. Secondly, he said that his confidence in Nasser was "profoundly shaken" by the manner of seizure by force and the promise to finance the Aswan Dam to the tune of 100 million dollars a year which he described as equal to the "whole gross revenue of the Canal"—[Hon. Members : "Hear, hear."] Well, I was just repeating these things.
The third reason why the right hon. Gentleman was unhappy was because he thought the episode must be recognised as "part of the struggle for the mastery of the Middle East"—[HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear."] That is still agreed, is it? [HON. MEMBERS : "Hear, hear."] That is rather an extraordinary thing—[Laughter.]—but I am glad to hear it. The more we can agree about these things, the better.
What the right hon. Gentleman also told us was that Nasser "wanted to challenge the West and to win." He even compared Nasser with Mussolini and Hitler. The right hon. Gentleman went so far as to do that. Hon. Members opposite do not cheer that, so I will give them an opportunity to do so. The right hon. Gentleman said that he saw a greatly increased threat to Israel, that the effect on British interests in other Arab States would be very dangerous indeed and that the economic measures taken by the Government were fully justified. All I can say is that if that speech, which was violently attacked by Tribune and other Left-wing newspapers, is compared with what the right hon. Gentleman said today, it will be found that he has turned a complete somersault.
Mr. Blenkinsop: The hon. and gallant Gentleman has given the House the pleasure of hearing him read out parts of a
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speech made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) on an earlier occasion. Perhaps he will go on and repeat the rest of that speech, which may be more interesting to the House than any remarks which the hon. and gallant Gentleman may himself make.
Major Beamish: If the hon. Gentleman is not interested in my remarks, he is under no compulsion to stay in the Chamber.
In the same debate the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South strongly denied the legality and morality of Egypt's action. He described recent Government policy towards Egypt as "excessive appeasement". He asked himself the question whether force should or should not be a possible element in settling the matter. I hope that hon. Members opposite will listen to this. After saying that he favoured taking the matter to United Nations which, in his own words, should "stop dodging vital international issues," the right hon. Gentleman clearly stated that if the Government and "our friends" came to the conclusion that the use of force would be justified it might well be, to use his own words again,
"the duty of hon. Members, including myself, to say that we would give them support."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956; Vol.557, c. 1666–7.]
There is now dead silence from hon. Members opposite. Do hon. Members opposite still agree about that? Do they agree with the views of their ex-Foreign Secretary? Perhaps, later, some hon. Members opposite will have an opportunity to say whether they do or not. All I could gather from the speech of the Leader of the Opposition was that they radically disagree with these words of the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South.
Mr. Paget: Today, the Leader of the Opposition said most emphatically that there were a number of circumstances in which he would regard force as justified.
Major Beamish: I am going on to deal with the same subject. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman said anything of the kind ; not in those words, anyhow. When the record is examined it will show whether I am right. In my opinion, directly the House rose the rot began to set in in the Socialist Party.

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I listened to a broadcast speech made by the right hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens) and the clear impression left in my mind, and the minds of some of my hon. Friends who also heard the broadcast, was that the right hon. Gentleman, speaking on behalf of the Socialist Party, was opposed to the use of force in any circumstances whatsoever. It was only a couple of weeks before that the same right hon. Gentleman was recommending in this House that there should be an arms embargo on all countries in the Middle East after more arms had been provided for Israel. I interrupted the right hon. Gentleman's speech and asked whether he meant that there should be an arms blockade.
I should also have liked to have asked him at that time what he meant by "the Middle East" in that context. After giving me a short lecture which, when paraphrased, amounted to the statement that politics was the art of the impossible, the right hon. Gentleman made it perfectly clear that it was definitely the view of the party opposite that there should be an arms embargo in the Middle East after Israel had been provided with more arms.
Mr. R. H. S. Grossman: It was made perfectly clear, both by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Robens) in the last debate, and today, that we have always been prepared, as in Korea, where there is aggression, and united action against it, to regard our support as inevitable. My right hon. Friend said that there might be cases where there is a direct attack on oneself and where one has to defend oneself and ask the consent of the Security Council afterwards. Those are two occasions in which we would feel that the use of force was justified. What is the good of all this dreary reading out of former speeches?
Major Beamish: I am sorry that the hon. Member does not like it. I make no apology to the House for reading the quotations, as I wanted them to be on the record in today's debate. [HON. MEMBERS : "They are on the record."] I wanted to compare what was said on 2nd August with what was said today.
Let us look back for a moment at the Abadan crisis, which occurred in June, 1951. The Foreign Secretary at that
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time told the House, on 21st June of that year :
"I have said we are prepared, and we have given an undertaking that we would do everything we can to protect British lives."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st June, 1951 ; Vol. 489, c. 829–30.]
The right hon. Gentlemen said, five days later, that the cruiser H.M.S. "Mauritius" had been ordered to proceed forthwith to the vicinity of Abadan. Personally, I thought that those precautions were very proper. I think that every hon. Member on this side who was then on the Opposition side of the House agreed. I did not hear anyone talking about "gunboat diplomacy" then, but if we had taken those same precautions that remark would have been made by some hon. Members of the Socialist Party.
Whether our military preparations at the time of the Abadan crisis were inadequate and Mossadeq called the bluff I do not know, but I certainly do not agree with the right hon. Member for Blyth, who said in his broadcast that in his opinion it was probable that the military preparations the Government are now taking were too large. I say that it is much better that they should be too large, although I do not think they are, than that they should be too small.
I want to make two more quotations. I am very glad to see the right hon. Member for Dundee, West (Mr. Strachey) in his seat. I was going to leave out this quotation, but now that I have the advantage of seeing him here perhaps the House would like to hear his words of wisdom. It was reported in The Times quite recently that he said :
"Of all the foolish and wicked things which the present Government has done over Suez this inviting of French troops to Cyprus is the most dangerous."
The right hon. Gentleman went on to ask :
"Are we to try to occupy every Arab State from Iraq to Morocco?"
How very different was the tone of that from what the Leader of the Opposition said on 2nd August. There is no resemblance whatever.
Mr. John Strachey: As the hon. and gallant Member has quoted my remarks I should be very glad if he would try to answer the two points I made. That would seem more relevant.
Major Beamish: I can very easily answer. What I say is that we have in France a friend and ally, and I cannot see why we should not work in concert.
In a Sunday Times article quoting an extract from a forthcoming book by Lord Strang there is an exceptionally good and brief analysis of "appeasement", a word which will no doubt be bandied about in different ways during this crisis. Lord Strang writes that appeasement acquired its evil repute when too heavy a price began to be paid, a price which not only failed to bring permanent easement, but also carried with it an impairment of national credit. That is an excellent description of what we have come to know as appeasement.
Mr. S. Silverman: It has taken the hon. and gallant Member twenty-one years to find that out.
Major Beamish: I am very glad that the hon. Member has said that. It has not taken me nearly so long to find it out. The trouble is that he and most of his colleagues have not found it out yet. Whatever mistakes were made in the 'thirties, we on this side of the House have learned our lesson. We know what appeasement can mean. I remember the Prime Minister saying upon an earlier occasion that the people who hate war most are those who have seen most of it.
Mr. Silverman: Does the hon. and gallant Member attach no significance at all to the fact that those who, in 1935, took the view of appeasement which he did not take then but does take now, are the very people who think the Government today are wrong, whereas those who supported appeasement in 1935 are the very ones who now think that the Government are right?
Major Beamish: I do not want to get into a detailed argument about this, but really that argument is completely topsyturvy. Since the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) asked the question, I would say that what characterised the Socialist Party between 1934 and 1939 was a quite pathetic belief in unilateral disarmament and in collective security on paper. As a matter of fact, I was not guilty of appeasement in the year the hon. Member mentioned because I happened to be a Regular soldier then. Quite apart from that, whatever mistakes we made in the late 'thirties which may
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have caused Hitler to think that we had not the will or power to resist, we are not going to make the same mistakes today.
Because of the very helpful interruptions I have suffered I am afraid that my speech is getting very long. Before getting on to the Suez question in its wider context, I wish to say a little about the United Nations. It is a very grave mistake, indeed at any time to use the United Nations Organisation as an excuse for not defending vital British interests. That does not mean that I do not want to see the United Nations working. I want to see the machinery improved. [Laughter.] Hon. Members opposite may laugh ; I have just as much faith in the United Nations as any other common-sense person, but I realise what is deficiences are.
Mr. K. Zilliacus rose—
Major Beamish: I cannot give way again. I wonder what hon. Members opposite would have done at the time when North Korea attacked South Korea if the Soviet Union had not been in a huff and had attended the Security Council and vetoed condemnation of the North Korea aggression. I wonder how many would have used that as an excuse not to oppose that aggression.
Mr. Silverman: All of us.
Major Beamish: I am very grateful. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that that would have been so. I believe that a very large section of the party opposite would have decided in those circumstances, veto or no veto, that appeasement at that particular time might have led to much worse things. I do not like to think that the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne was right in saying "all of us."
In my opinion, it is escapist to state flatly that force will not be used in any circumstances unless the United Nations agrees. I do not believe that any responsible Government can be bound by United Nations inaction to do nothing to protect its own security. As an example of that I should like to quote once again—I prefer to quote than to paraphrase-what the Leader of the Opposition said on 2nd August about the use of force :
"Force is justified in certain events. Indeed, if there were anything which he had done.…"

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"he" in that context was Colonel Nasser—
"which would justify force at the moment, it is, quite frankly, the one thing on which we have never used force, namely, the stopping of the Israeli ships."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956 ; Vol. 557, c. 1625.]
In other words, the Leader of the Opposition expressed the definite opinion on 2nd August that force ought to have been used to protect Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, yet he told us today—he implied—that in the same circumstances force should not be used to protect British ships through the Canal. Is that right or wrong? Has some difference crept in?
Mr. F. Beswick rose—
Major Beamish: I cannot give way. I am sorry if I am being unduly provocative, but I do not think that quoting the right hon. Gentleman's speech should be provocative. I cannot see why I have been interrupted so much. I am quoting the right hon. Gentleman in the kindest and friendliest possible way.
The question arises which ought to be answered during the debate : in what circumstances would the Socialist Party be willing to use force?
Mr. Hunter: Why not state what the Conservative Party would do?
Major Beamish: My own party has made its views very clear.
Mr. Hunter rose—
Hon. Members: Sit down.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Charles MacAndrew): If the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Major Beamish) does not give way, the hon. Member for Feltham (Mr. Hunter) should resume his seat.
Mr. Hunter: On a point of order.
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I do not see that any point of order can arise.
Mr. Hunter: Is it in order, when an hon. Member rises to ask another hon. Member to give way, for 30 or 40 hon. Members to shout out, "Sit down"?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I think that hon. Members shout that out when the speaker does not give way.
Major Beamish: I never mind giving way within reason. After all, this is not Question Time. Generally, the more I give way the more I like it, but there are a lot of things which I wanted to say and I have been side-tracked so much that I should now like to make my own speech in my own way. The subject of the use of force seems to be rather touchy and I think I will leave it alone.
Mr. Harold Davies: It is most important.
Major Beamish: It appears to me to be the main point.
Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order. It has long been the rule that hon. Members taking part in the debates should not read their own speeches. Is it not equally out of order for an hon. Member to read the speeches of half-a-dozen other hon. Members?
Mr. Deputy-Speaker: It is quite in order for hon. Members to use copious notes.
Major Beamish: The hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget), who is smiling, was one of the few Opposition Members who, I thought, made an outstandingly good speech on 2nd August. I agreed with almost every word of it.
Mr. Paget: Do not quote that.
Major Beamish: I do not want to be unfair in this matter, but I have reached the conclusion that when in power the Socialist Party has invariably acted in the field of foreign affairs in what it believed to be the best interests of the country as a whole, but that when in opposition it is prepared sometimes to embarrass the Government against the national interest in order to gain its own party political ends. When I was a small boy I was brought up on very charming books written by a man named Hugh Lofting. One was the story of Doctor Dolittle. There was a strange animal in that story called the Pushmi-Pullyu. One could never tell whether it would go backwards or forwards or stand obstinately in one place. It had a head at each end. I am very much reminded of that animal by the behaviour of the Socialist Party during the last month or so.

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I had hoped to have a little longer to devote to the next section of my speech, but in my closing sentences I want to look briefly at the Suez crisis in its wider world context. I do not think it can be said that there is any evidence that the violent abuse of Stalin which has been indulged in recently in the Soviet Union means that there has been a fundamental change in the strategy of international Communism.
I was talking recently to a senior member of the Soviet Ambassador's staff, and he reminded me that it was one of the tenets of international Communism that capitalism would wither away. He added, at the end of rather a good lunch, for which he very kindly paid, "Of course, the trouble is that you are not withering away quickly enough." It seems to me that that is a very good brief description of what Soviet policy consists of today.
In spite of what has been said about Stalin, none of the plans made by international Communism for its activities abroad have, as far as I know, radically changed. In 1920—and I have quoted this once before in the House—Stalin wrote :
"England's back will be broken, not on the banks of the Thames, but on the banks of the Ganges, the Yangtse and the Nile."
There is no doubt whatever that if the Soviet Union could achieve that she would be wholly delighted.
I want to remind the House of the sudden change in Soviet policy towards Egypt. In 1953, the Egyptian Government was officially described as
"madly reactionary, terrorist, anti-democrat and demagogic."
Two years later, Mr. Shepilov, who was then editor of Pravda, went to Cairo. Everything was praised. Since then Moscow has been getting its hooks on Egypt to an increasing degree. Egypt has already mortgaged more than one-third, if not 40 per cent., of her exportable cotton crop to the Communist bloc. She has a loan, I suppose and believe, at very low interest, from the Communist bloc amounting to 145 million dollars ; whereas during the last three years all the other Arab countries put together have received loans totalling only 15 million dollars.
When these facts are coupled with the trade agreements which Egypt has with all the Iron Curtain countries and China,
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it must become increasingly obvious that Egypt is running grave risks by playing this game with the Soviet Union. I wish these facts were widely known in the United States, where some people have not shown sufficient understanding of the rôle which Egypt may unwittingly be playing in the world's struggle. These efforts at economic penetration have quite clearly been accompanied by political penetration, and hon. Members who have not heard of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian Countries and do not know of its activities in Egypt could well find out a little more about it, in the same way as they might find out a little about the activities in Egypt of the World Federation of Trade Unions. They are extremely interesting.
I wish Colonel Nasser would make a special study of the treatment of Moslems in the Soviet Union. I do not know the exact number of them, but in 1939 there were about 21 million. There is no doubt that ever since the Russian Revolution they have gone through stages of violent persecution. Only as recently as 1953 Islam was described in the second edition of the Soviet Encyclopedia in these terms—and I should like every Moslem in the Middle East to understand this attitude of the Soviet Government towards Islam :
"Islam has always played a reactionary rôle, being a weapon in the hands of the exploiting classes for the spiritual oppression of the toilers, and has been used by foreign colonisers to enslave the peoples of the East. … In the U.S.S.R. Islam exists only as a survival of one of the idealogical forms of exploiter society."
I wonder how many people in Egypt realise the official attitude of the Soviet Government to the 21 million or more Moslems now living within their borders.
I turn over half-a-dozen pages—[Laughter]. Unfortunately, it is not possible to have them circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT, as would be the case in Congress. They were very good pages, very good indeed.
I want to say the briefest word about the American attitude to this crisis. I do not think that it is reasonable to say that since the Suez crisis occurred the Americans have been other than extremely co-operative. I speak here of the Administration. Certainly, there have been voices in America, as there always will be—the voice of Mr. Lippmann, for instance—singing very different tunes.

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Only a few days ago Mr. Lippmann wrote that what happened in the Middle East was not of vital interest to the United States. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth, and I am quite sure that President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles are as well aware of that as are any of us in this House.
In any case, Mr. Lippmann is contradicted by equally famous columnists such as Mr. Alsop, who writes a good deal more common sense. I think that it would be well if Mr. Lippmann and others like him in America realised that if the same threats were made to the Panama Canal as are now being made to the Suez Canal there would be no one in America who would not be immediately ready to take the strongest possible action to defend their rights. I should like to see what Mr. Lippmann would write if those threats were made to the Panama Canal.
I apologise for taking so long, although I have been helped in that matter by hon. Members opposite in their usual friendly fashion. I should like to sum up. After the evidence I have given in my speech the Opposition should be thoroughly ashamed of its "rock 'n roll" behaviour. In my opinion, Colonel Nasser's Government are playing a very dangerous and risky game with the Soviet Union, in whose political and economic grip they may soon find themselves inextricably held.
Colonel Nasser—and this is a paraphrase of some of those pages which I put aside—has undisguised ambitions to dominate the Arab countries for his own aggrandisement. I think that that is one of the main reasons for his bitter resentment over the successful conclusion of the Bagdad Pact between four Moslem countries and the United Kingdom. Incidentally, I think that the significance of that Pact has been noticed too little. In my opinion, unless there is the closest possible understanding and co-operation with the United States over the Suez crisis, it may prove immensely more difficult of solution.
Finally,
"While force cannot be excluded, we must be sure that the circumstances justify it and that it is, if used, consistent with our belief in and our pledges to the Charter of the United Nations …"
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"By all means consider all the pros and cons, but I ask the Government not to be too nervous, because if they are too nervous we shall begin to evolve a situation in which countries can set themselves up against international practice, international morals and international interests, and, in that case, we are not helping the peace of the world ; we are helping anarchy, conflict and bad conduct among the nations."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 2nd August, 1956; Vol. 557, c. 1625–1669.]
I wonder how many right hon. and hon. Members opposite recognise those words? The whole of that paragraph was lifted, direct and verbatim, from the speeches made on 2nd August by the Leader of the Opposition and by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South. I agree with every word.
My constituency letters and my personal contacts during the last few weeks reinforce my considered view that the Government have handled this crisis since it first broke out with skill and tact combined with firmness and patience. I regard the criticisms made of the Government today and during the last few weeks, both by the Left-wing Press and by hon. Members opposite who should know better, as carping, contradictory, weak and self-destroying, and I say to the House, "Thank heavens we have a Conservative Government.
6.15 p.m.
Mr. R. J. Mellish: I understand that the hon. and gallant Member for Lewes (Major Beamish) has recently recovered from a very serious illness. I am sure that the whole House would wish me to say how pleased we are to see that he has overcome that illness and come back to this House—and we really mean that. I think it is also fair to say that his long absence is partly responsible for the fact that we have heard such a deplorable speech. No one can speak in this House for a very long time without saying something worth while, but the hon. and gallant Gentleman took a very long time to say nothing, except to read other people's speeches which we could read for ourselves at our leisure.
This is, indeed, a time of great crisis not only for the people of Britain but for the people of the world, and the question is what we should do now and in the future in regard to it. I recently went to America and afterwards spent a whole month in the Middle East. I came back at the time when the

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Americans had announced the rejection of the Aswan Dam project. I was there at the time of the announcement. The parts of the Middle East to which I went were Iraq, the Lebanon and Syria, and the impression I gained from personal contacts out there, and from personal knowledge, is that, in fact, the Prime Minister has achieved what Colonel Nasser has himself been trying to achieve for a long time—to foster a sense of unanimity amongst the peoples of the Middle East. Nasser was not able to do that whilst I was there. I understand that many of the Arab countries, Iraq in particular, were bitterly opposed to his policy.
What we must face quite clearly is that the one thing that does unite the Middle East is that they are all anti-Jew. No matter to what part of the Middle East one goes it is evident that that unites them. It would be right to say also that if this Government blundered into war, attacked Egypt, such action would unite the whole of the Middle East against us. I say that because I believe that, undoubtedly, Israel would support us in that fight—and we can all understand why. The consequence would be that we should have the whole of the Middle East ranged against us.
If such be the case, as I think it is, it completely destroys much of the argument which the Prime Minister attempted to elucidate on television to the people of Britain. He then told the people just how important to our trade the Suez Canal was. He also said that, if necessary, we should take all necessary measures to ensure that the Suez Canal was kept under international control. He did not mention the United Nations on one single occasion. In that speech he conveyed that, as a Government, they would do everything possible to keep the Canal open. He went on to say what would happen if we failed, but the fact is that if we did what the Prime Minister wanted to do we should get no oil at all and the Canal would be of no use to us.
We talk about "our" oil, but the oil belongs to the Arabs. It comes from their lands. It is true that we have the pipelines, and people and capital there, but the oil belongs to the Arabs. If we adopt the mental attitude that
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because of the ingenuity of British personnel in the past this oil rightly belongs to us we shall lose the support of those who, in my view, are being helped by the way in which the oil companies are now operating. We want to ensure that the Arab countries that are supplying the oil to us continue that support. We must analyse just what the use of force means. Is it thought that if we bomb Cairo and put forces in the Canal area, Iraq will continue to supply oil freely, and that Kuwait and Persia will continue to send oil?
We should not get any oil at all. Above all else, we know that the Egyptian policy has been to try to get a united Middle East, and the one thing which will keep the Arabs together for a long time is that they are all anti-Jew. There is no doubt that any action by this Government involving the use of arms, although it might bring the Jews on our side, would bring the whole of the rest of the Middle East against us. When we talk of force let us understand what it means. Let the people of Britain know what force means.
Sir Robert Boothby: The hon. Gentleman says that the oil is Arabian oil. In the sense that the Arab countries deserve the payment of royalties, he is quite right. But what is the use of oil until it is brought to the surface? How can the Arab countries produce the hundreds of millions of pounds which are necessary to do that?
Mr. Mellish: Those countries which are producing oil, such as Iraq and Kuwait, are working with us and are doing a good job of work, but if war came, all that would be pushed aside.
We have heard from the Prime Minister that there are only enough reserves of oil in this country for about a month. This is a statement from the Prime Minister whose reputation was established in this House by his action in trying to keep alive the League of Nations. This is the story of a Prime Minister whose past record is one of which he may well be proud, and yet on this issue he throws overboard all his principles.
The Prime Minister indicated dissent.
Mr. Mellish: The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. Yet in his television broadcast he never mentioned

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U.N.O. at all. He created alarm in the hearts and minds of many people in this country. He is largely responsible for our present position. He has ruined all the chances that we had of discussing the matter sensibly at U.N.O. The whole thing has been smeared by the action of this Government.
I wish this matter had been referred straight away to U.N.O. so that we could have shown the world that we were anxious for an international settlement. Instead of that we heard the right hon. Gentleman, not only in this House but also on the television, and the Foreign Secretary demanding that war should come with Egypt. The Daily Express and the Rothermere rags are advocating the same policy—"supporting Eden", they say, "in a fight against Egypt".
Is that the way for a man who believes in collective security to act? It is the behaviour of a man who has given way to the benchers behind him, known as the "Suez rebels". The Prime Minister's reputation in his own party is getting low. The 1922 Committee has attacked him bitterly. They attacked him for getting out of the Suez Canal. The reason why the Prime Minister took what we regard as this unnatural action for such a man was that he was literally frightened by a large number of his own back benchers who had already declared their animosity because of the Suez withdrawal.
Mr. I. J. Pitman rose—
Mr. Mellish: I cannot give way now, if the hon. Gentleman does not mind. There are others who wish to speak.
I am not satisfied that the economic difficulties which would arise from using routes other than the Suez Canal would be so great as the Prime Minister has alleged. I submit that anything is better than war, and I would be prepared to spend the extra money involved and to ask the people of Britain to undergo extra hardships if necessary as a result of using those other routes.
Mr. J. C. Jennings: And then hon. Gentlemen opposite would blame the Tory Government.
Mr. Mellish: If the Tory Government can keep the country out of war, they have a very good trump card to put
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before the people. The Government can say, "We have kept you out of war with Egypt and we have not fired a single shot". A great deal of Labour Party propaganda would be needed to keep the Tories out of office at the next Election.
The policy of the Tory Party at the moment is hell-bent for war. If war should come with Egypt it could not end there. It would be no trouble to defeat Egypt. The Egyptian Army must be very poor and ineffective. But war would not end there. If we were to occupy the Suez Canal base and if we were to establish free passage for our ships, first, I do not think that the oil would come through because the Arab countries would not allow it to do so, and, secondly, there is no knowing where events would lead.
Perhaps Russia, and certainly India, would take a view which would lead to the possible destruction of much of the Commonwealth which many of us on these benches have supported. [An HON. MEMBER : "Since when?"] The trouble with hon. Members opposite is that they talk in terms of the Empire. We on this side of the House like to talk in terms of the Commonwealth.
If we were to have a war with Egypt, I do not think that the Suez Canal would be at all effective, in which case we should have to use other routes. The whole argument in favour of force is absolutely false. It might be all right if it could be shown that by using arms we could retain the Suez Canal and get our ships through. But I do not think we could. Therefore, we should have to use other routes.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) recently wrote an article in which he pointed out—and this needs to be said—that in twelve years' time the ownership of the Canal is reverting to Egypt anyway. In addition, in a few years after that the Canal would be ineffective to deal with the amount of tonnage going through. What sort of long-term plan have the Government got? Do they still have the idea that for twelve years we are going to rule the Suez Canal and then give it up? What sort of argument is that?
Egypt has done something which we know is wrong, but we can understand why she has done it. After all, the Aswan Dam project was important to the Egyptians. While I was in the Middle

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East I heard it said again and again that the Suez Canal would be taken over by the Egyptians. I do not know why our Government were so surprised—although I suppose I ought to understand it, for they are such an inefficient crowd. They do not seem to understand what everyone in the Middle East was saying.
Whatever else anyone does in this House, I for my part cannot and will not support this Government in the use of force. I am not an important Member of this House, but I make this promise. I will fight this Government on this issue. I will take that fight down to the docks, and I shall say that the Government have precipitated this crisis, and that instead of getting world opinion behind us we have world opinion ranged against us.
The Labour Party has given a lead to the world. If the Government challenge that statement, let them go to the country and find out. Let the Prime Minister ask the people. He smiles at that, but the people do not think that war is anything to smile at. He will not get the support of the people of this country which there was in 1939. In fact, he could not use force now ; the country is completely divided, and he knows it. But he has got to try and find a way to satisfy the mob behind him. Those who really matter are the people of Britain. Let us ask them for their views. If there were a straight fight on this issue, I am confident that Labour would be returned.
6.30 p.m.
Sir James Hutchison: There is only one individual remark made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) to which I should like to refer. It is on all fours with a remark made by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. The hon. Member for Bermondsey accused the party on this side of the House of being "hell-bent for war". The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition said that we did not want a settlement. Those remarks are unworthy, completely untrue, and shocking. I believe that hon. Members on this side of the House have at least as much experience of war and its horrors as have hon. Members opposite. The only difference between us is that we believe that our course is the one which will cost the country the least.
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It is not surprising that the position of the United Nations and the question of reference to the United Nations should have occupied some part, often the major part, of every speech today. What is surprising is that hon. Members should have so misread and misinterpreted the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and misinterpreted the words of the Charter of the United Nations in making the speeches which they have done. I took down in longhand, as best I could, the words of my right hon. Friend. I understood him to say that the Government held themselves free to take other steps, either through the United Nations or by any other means, and that he had, jointly with the French Government, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council.
What do hon. Members want? [An HON MEMBER : "An explanation."] If hon. Members have looked at the Charter, which they are so happy to quote, they will have read Article 35, which says :
"Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly."
That is precisely what my right hon. Friend has done.
There has been much discussion—and it is this theme which I propose to treat of this afternoon—on the legality of what President Nasser has done. I do not believe that there is in this House much disagreement with our view that his action has been completely illegal. In the country there is, I think, a certain amount of doubt, and I should like to spend a few minutes in tracing back what has in fact happened and how the Convention and the Concession have been broken.
We find that in the last century two most important agreements were concluded. The Convention of 1888 laid down fundamental principles upon which the Canal should work, holding it open to all nations in peace or in war, without distinction of flag. Incidentally, I may mention, for the benefit of the apologists for President Nasser who are making themselves so vocal, that that agreement was reaffirmed by President Nasser in 1954 under the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, when he said he agreed to uphold the Convention of 1888. It has been accepted, I think, that that Convention was already broken by the refusal of the

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use of the Canal to Israeli ships. That refusal was condemned by the United Nations, with no effect upon such a staunch supporter of agreements as Nasser. It has been reported, whether accurately or not I do not know, that a few days ago he threatened to discriminate against British ships if British pilots left his service. It does really seem to matter very little to President Nasser what the Convention of 1888 says.
Now let us look for a moment at the Concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French architect and designer of the Canal, which was given in 1856 and was to endure until 1968. The wording is in a significant form ; it says that he shall form
"a company composed of capitalists of all nations"
and grants him
"exclusive power for the establishment and direction of a universal company."
Those are unusual words to find in the charter or articles of an ordinary company which is merely a national concern.
As though to underline the international character of this particular company, Article II says that
"The Director of the company shall always be appointed by the Egyptian Government and be selected as far as practicable from the shareholders most interested in the undertaking."
This is no ordinary national company which has been seized, having as it does its headquarters in Paris and an international board. Yet Nasser claims the right to be able to nationalise it just as though it were an Egyptian railway company. There is a world of difference between the two. Incidentally, with his tongue in his cheek no doubt, he did in June, 1956, a few days before he seized the Canal, endorse the Concession. What a tongue in what a cheek.
President Nasser has given evidence of bad faith all along the line, in breaking both these international agreements and also in hysterical vilification of this country immediately after our agreement on the Sudan and immediately after we had evacuated the Canal, both of which great steps he at one time contended would at once improve relations between our two countries.
Let us for a moment consider the purpose for which he stated he was
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nationalising the Canal. It is important to do this in order to show his real intention. Apart from the enhancement of his prestige, and he, like all dictators with some success behind them, has begun to suffer from the folly of grandeur—a word which he used continually in the speech which is quoted in The Times this morning—and apart from an ambition to form and, no doubt, lead, an Arab empire, the real purpose, so it is said, was to pay for the High Dam at Aswan. It has been reliably calculated that that project will cost about £400 million. The dividend paid by the Suez Canal Company over the last five years has averaged £10 million a year.
If we consider the interest to be paid on the money with which he would pay off and compensate the expropriated shareholders, and the interest on the money which he would have to borrow to build a dam, we find that there is in fact very little of the £10 million dividend, upon which he casts covetous eyes, left to him. It must be perfectly clear, therefore, that he intends to raise the dues and raise them steeply. His apologists say that he has not done so. Of course he has not ; it would be madness, in so delicate a situation, for him to behave otherwise than correctly, after his original seizure. With all his contemptuous and inflammatory language, he must be careful.
He has, without consultation and in contravention of two international agreements, seized a waterway of supreme importance to the world. There is another waterway of supreme importance to many nations—the Nile. Egypt's life literally depends on the waters of the Nile. So, to a lesser extent, does the Sudan, and so, to a lesser extent also, does Ethiopia, and, to some extent, Uganda. Egypt claims, and has claimed for many years, complete sovereign rights over all Nile waters—a curious situation which we, surprisingly, went a long way to recognise in 1924.
Let us consider the composition of the Nile. It is made up of the Blue Nile, the Atbara, the Sorbat, all Ethiopian tributaries which join the White Nile in the Sudan. These three rivers have an immense flow of water in flood time, which sinks away to very little when the weather becomes hot. All these projects, the Tana Dam, the High Dam at Aswam,

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and others, have been devised to store this rush of waters at one time in the year in order to release water at another time in the year, to everybody's benefit. While all this is going on, this flood and this ebb, this disappearance of water from these three Ethiopian rivers, the White Nile, which rises in Victoria Nyanza, goes on flowing with relative stability. It is in fact a much more reliable river.
Nasser has said, quite publicly, quite openly, and it is generally realised, that he wants more water. So in fact does the Sudan. At the moment they have failed to reach agreement as to what the proportion of water would be if the Aswan Dam were in fact to be built. Here, then, we have the paradoxical situation of Egypt claiming complete control of one waterway, the Suez Canal, which is geographically in its territory, and also claiming complete control of the waters of the Nile. We have Egypt using such words as "No work shall be started which would deprive Egypt of one pint of water anywhere in the Nile," and claiming complete sovereignty over a river which lies only partly in Egypt's territory. This is a classical example of trying to have one's cake and eat it.
Mr. Paget: Egypt goes further than that. It claims it on Lake Victoria, too, when we try to move the water there to where it is urgently needed in Kenya and Tanganyika.
Sir J. Hutchison: I was coming to that point. I am much obliged for the help which the hon. and learned Gentleman has given me.
These rivers produce at present 84 milliard tons of water a year. Of these 84 milliard tons, 32 milliard are lost and 52 milliard are used, 48 milliard by Egypt and 4 milliard by the Sudan. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Sudan disputes that division of rights. So in order to try to come to some conclusion in this complicated and delicate matter, a body called the Nile Waters Commission was set up in 1925, and its Report became part of an exchange of letters which virtually constituted an agreement between this country and Egypt in 1929. In the conclusion of its Report, the Nile Waters Commission wrote these words. I think that it would be of advantage to read them to the House and I hope that
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they will be read again by President Nasser.
"The Commission has been impressed by the fact that future development in Egypt may require the construction of works in the Sudan and neighbouring territories such as Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika. It does desire, however, to record emphatically the view that neither the elaborate drafting of an agreement nor the provision of special machinery for adjudication should be allowed to obscure the importance of mutual confidence and co-operation in all matters concerning the river and its waters."
Where is this confidence today? We have played our part. In 1954, two years ago, our Queen opened a dam at Owen's Falls, damming up some of the water which flows out of Victoria Nyanza. The dam was designed to supply hydro-electricity to Uganda for its industries. At the request, no doubt, of Egypt, or, at any rate, of the users of the waters of the Nile, we built a dam 3 ft. 3 in, higher than we need have done for our own requirements, thereby setting up storage capacity to that extent. The sort of action which we have suffered from and the sort of language which Nasser has been using do not encourage us to go on supplying that water which we have dammed up for him or to co-operate in the way which the conclusions of the Nile Waters Commission say will be so vital and essential to the future of Egypt. Nasser would do better to remember his own words about dependence on the Nile. In that context, may I read to the House one sentence written by the Manchester Guardian, which is not particularly friendly to the Government in this matter, when it said the other day :
"Commercial breaches are a cause for energetic action short of war."
Mr. Emrys Hughes: It said a little more than that.
Sir J. Hutchison: I know, but here is some energetic action which the hon. Gentleman might think over.
In the First World War, I spent weary and sweltering months sitting on the banks of the Suez Canal, allegedly defending it from the Turks. In the Second World War, thousands of gallant young men from this country—much more gallant than ever I was—were laying down their lives, and this country was pouring out money, to defend the Canal and incidentally to defend Egypt. It was not Egypt that we were concerned with defending ; it was the Canal. Having

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fought in two wars to stop the Canal from falling into unfriendly hands, I am not going to stand by and see just that thing happen today.
We can have no confidence in the word of a man who has so patently broken it so often. In any case, the lives and careers of dictators are short. What would happen if Nasser were succeeded by a Communist Government controlling the Suez Canal? Some people have said that they are afraid of what the Arab countries would do if we stop him. I am very much more afraid of what the Arab countries would do if we did not stop him. It would be a signal for grab and ransom all over the Middle East. Ownership of the Canal does not matter. Let Nasser have his dividends, but let us not cease to demand through the United Nations or otherwise that the management must not be in exclusive hands. I have given an indication, if hon. Gentlemen like to think over what I have said today, that there are other means of bringing Nasser to book.
Many national or international organisations are being set up. It is the day for them. We have the Coal and Steel Community, the World Bank, E.P.U. and probably another on atomic energy, but the nations who take part in these international organisations do not scream to high heaven about having done so or about their loss of national sovereignty and prestige. This sort of pattern may have to be repeated elsewhere under the United Nations.
As we stand here today it would be tragic if this country and this House did not recognise the dictator that Nasser is. He has been recognised, as my right hon. Friend has already pointed out, and as has been pointed out by the Leader of the Opposition in his speech of 2nd August, a very much better speech than his speech of today, and by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison). With the examples of Mussolini and Hitler before our eyes the pattern should be familiar.
The plan is a dictator's—uniting an Arab empire, vilifying an imagined enemy. The language is a dictator's, inflammatory and hysterical, intermingled with expressed good will if we only give way. There are high-sounding phrases like the Army of Liberation, Liberation
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from what? The action and the threats are those of a dictator—forcible entry into the premises of the Canal Company ; arrest of individuals and third-degree confessions ; reluctance to allow those in prison to be visited.
The pattern is sickeningly familiar. Let not the next generation have cause to say, as they look back, as so many of us have said so often when we think of Hitler and his entry into the Rhineland, "That was the time when we should have stopped him."
6.49 p.m.
Mr. R. H. S. Grossman: I was reflecting, when I heard the last words of the hon. Member for Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison), that he was also repeating the Prime Minister's dangerous mistake of drawing political parallels. I have heard a great deal in this debate and during the last four weeks about the resemblance of Nasser to Hitler and Mussolini. I think that Nasser in certain ways is a dangerous man, but if we are to have parallels we ought to have them in some relation to perspective.
We can compare Nasser to Kernel Ataturk, although he is not so strong and constructive. It is slightly ridiculous to try to put forward the view that there is any analogy with the problem which faced us in Europe, when we faced the greatest single military Power in Europe, rearming fast, and the problem which we face in the Middle East, with a weak, backward Egypt, with 70 per cent. of the population so poor and destitute that they cannot be called up for the army and, in my opinion, with not enough capacity to fight the Jews if it came to war. For the Prime Minister and hon. Members behind him to say, "We are faced with another Hitler," is somewhat ridiculous. I would remind them that it is sometimes useful, despite one's British skin, to comprehend how the rest of the world listens to us when we talk that ridiculous language.
Sir J. Hutchison: The hon. Gentleman's own leader used that language.
Mr. Crossman: With great respect to the hon. Gentleman, I would point out to him that I am making my own speech.
It is quite ridiculous to compare Nasser with either Hitler or Mussolini, and those who do so are rather like the person who supposed that Goliath thought he was the

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fellow who was in danger and the likely victim of aggression and got it into his head that David, with his sling, was a dangerous little fellow and that one had really got to deal with him before he brought his sling into operation.
Those who compare Nasser with Hitler and Mussolini should inquire in Asia and in Africa, when they would discover that it is true that to many people in the world, including people in those continents, the British Government seem to be indulging in hectoring and bullying behaviour. To them the British Government look like a great European, and the Egyptians look like little fellows who are being bullied. We had better get it clear how we look to the rest of the world.
We have heard a great deal today about how peaceful we have been, how we have sought every possible means of pacification, how determined we have been to seek negotiation. There has been no negotiation of any sort up till now. Since the Canal was grabbed by Nasser there has been—
Mr. C. I. Orr-Ewing: Nasser was invited, and it was his choice not to come, and he thought it not desirable to negotiate.
Mr. Crossman: Negotiation does not consist in telling the other chap to do everything according to one's own terms. What we have had so far has been negotiation by ultimatum by both sides. Nasser presented us with an ultimatum, the fait accompli of nationalisation of the Canal. We have presented him with another ; we have said that we have a plan for internationalisation, and that that plan is our minimum. It is a strange sort of negotiation in which one starts with minimum demands, which one knows to be totally unacceptable to the other side.
Then we told Mr. Menzies to trot off to Cairo for five days. We instructed him not to negotiate. We said that he was limited simply and solely to explaining to the Egyptians exactly what our plan was. Therefore, the Foreign Secretary must admit that up till now negotiations have not begun. There has been merely a confrontation of views.
Mr. Zilliacus: I would point out to my hon. Friend that the Prime Minister's broadcast on the eve of Nasser's possible
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arrival was deliberately designed to make it impossible for him to come.
Mr. Crossman: I think there will be agreement in the House that up till now, in the five weeks since the grab, negotiations have not started. We have had the views presented, and we have had Nasser, in certain particulars, moving slightly from his original view—on tolls, certainly, although that offer was not taken up, but, immediately he made it, it was slapped down by our side.
I ask this question of the Foreign Secretary. Does he believe in negotiation with Nasser? I ask him for a particular reason. I have heard and read many speeches, including what the Foreign Secretary has said and what the Prime Minister said on the wireless, about Colonel Nasser, and we have just heard the speech of the hon. Gentleman the Member for Scotstoun, who said that Nasser is a dictator ; speeches in which it has been said it is obviously impossible to negotiate with Nasser. Do the Government think that? We should like to know. What is the view of the Government about Colonel Nasser?
Is it their view—it is a perfectly tenable view ; I am not saying that it is not possible to hold it—that he is the sort of person with whom it is impossible to negotiate? That was my view of Hitler, and I was against appeasement because I thought we could not possibly negotiate with him otherwise than on the issue of war. Is that the Government's view of Nasser? Is it their view that it is impossible to negotiate with him?
If it is, I find that the whole of their policy since the end of July makes perfect sense. If they think negotiations are impossible, if they think the task is to topple Colonel Nasser over, and that all our work should be designed to overthrow Colonel Nasser, and to substitute for him a Government more amenable, then I can make sense of their policy. Let them, however, at least tell us that that is their policy. Let them openly tell us, and then the public will know what the Government are about, which is not the seeking of a peaceful solution, not the seeking of an agreed settlement, but the seeking—and it is a perfectly tenable proposition—of the overthrow of a man they think such a danger to the world that we must take the risk—and it is a very considerable risk—of overthrowing

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him either by psychological warfare, a subject to which I shall come back in a minute, because I am interested in it myself, or, if psychological warfare fails, in the last resort by military action.
I do not underrate the intelligence of the Foreign Secretary or that of the Prime Minister. I do not think that they are fools. Therefore, if I watch a policy which makes sense only on the basis that they have decided to seek to topple Nasser over, then I believe that that is their policy. I should like to illustrate that by what they have been doing for the last five weeks.
Before they start the purported negotiations they vilify the man on the other side. That does not exactly help negotiations. That is done by people who do not know much about psychological warfare. They think it a good way of weakening his support in Egypt. In fact, it strengthens his support. They think that if they talk loudly enough and vilify him enough the Egyptians will not like him.
That is one of the theories people have who start psychological warfare without knowing much about it. They think that by that means they will induce his fellow-countrymen not to like him and that they will automatically throw him out. It is notable that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary seem to think that if they make unpleasant enough speeches about Nasser they will somehow make him disappear.
The next thing to do, if one plays this game, and one thinks that speeches are not enough, is to organise a military demonstration, to organise a sufficient mobilisation of forces to make the Egyptians believe in it. Many of them do not like Nasser. Most of the bourgeoisie do not like him. He is not at all popular with those classes he has dispossessed. His only mass support is among the very poor. Therefore, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary no doubt thought that there would be elements—I think the hon. Gentleman the Member for Scotstoun said this—we could put in his place, if they would rebel, in a coup such as the Americans carried out in Persia, the only successful coup there has been in the Middle East.
We should like to know whether that is so. We can understand it, even though
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we may not agree with it. We should like to know. We should like them to be candid with us and to tell us. They are not being candid with us.
Here I come to the problem of psychological warfare, with which some of us had something to do during the war. In wartime one can play this game because one is actually at war and, therefore, if one threatens to knock somebody out and to use physical force, one can support words with action. In war, one has the force to do so. In wartime psychological warfare operations can be supported by the use of force in the last resort.
The psychological warfare the Government have conducted since last July has been utterly disastrous. It has had exactly the opposite effect from that which was intended. I will tell them why. Because if we have not got the ultimum threat of force, then, of course, the fellow we assault with words is strengthened by the assault.
Have we not yet learned from our mistakes about Franco? By spending our time hating and abusing Franco when we were not prepared to send an Expeditionary Force to Spain we did more to strengthen Franco there than by any other single thing. I say that because I was one of the people who, at that time, said that if we talk enough against a man, it weakens him, but, in fact, it does not do so ; it strengthens him. Nasser is infinitely stronger in the Arab world, therefore, because of the military posturing of Britain and France against him.
Unless we actually go out and hit him—which will not be done because the Americans will not permit it—the postures merely build him up as a hero. People will say, "Here is this little man facing the great empires of the West. They are marshalling their forces." Incidentally, it is interesting to see the rusty nature of the old sword. It took five weeks to take it out of the scabbard before it was waved. It must have impressed Russia and Nasser to see how long it took to get sufficient troops together to look something like an Expeditionary Force.
I ask the Foreign Secretary to consider the spectacle we present to the eyes of the world. For weeks I thought it was a joke. It was not until I came back to this country that I realised that some

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people were mad enough to think that they could try to overthrow Nasser without the ignominy of General Eisenhower ordering them out. Because that is what will happen if they try. Within 48 hours the Security Council, under American leadership, will tell them to stop. And rightly so, because we cannot afford a world war for the sake of the personal reputations of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.
This brings me to the central announcement of the Prime Minister today, the latest piece of psychological warfare, the users' association. I hope that we shall have more details from the Foreign Secretary tomorrow about this. I am exceedingly interested in that association. That is because I live near the Midland Railway. I take it that when the Midland Railway was nationalised on this argument I would have been entitled to set up a users' committee of those who disliked nationalisation, and to say that we would collect the ticket fees in protest. I say with great respect to the Foreign Secretary that there is no more basis in international law for setting up a users' association which we select. No doubt Panama could set up a rival users' association and hire another group of pilots to operate at the other end of the Canal.
No, the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows, and I know, that this is not a serious suggestion. This is a method of provoking Colonel Nasser. The sole purpose of the users' association is to bring war a stage nearer. Here I give the Government credit not for the desire to have an actual war, but for knowing that each step of this kind in psychological warfare needs to look more and more like war each time each bluff is called.
Dr. Barnett Stross: Would my hon. Friend agree that it is not psychological warfare to do what I hear has now been done, to collect so much liquid blood from our hospital reserves that our civilian population is becoming short of it?
Mr. Crossman: I am afraid that this is part of the game of keeping up the appearance of going to war in the hope of intimidating the other side and of toppling the other fellow over. Each time it is done one is committed to another dangerous stroke and the Government have to think of something else to
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do which threatens war and, therefore, brings war nearer.
Why do I say that the users' association threatens Nasser with war? It is obvious that the users' association will supply its own pilots. We now know that the Company timed the departure of the pilots for this week with the announcement about the users' association, so it is obvious that the Company is acting in full collusion with the French and British Governments in the timing of this matter.
This could result in a situation in the Canal where Colonel Nasser, not unreasonably from his point of view, might say that a Canal pilot means a Canal pilot ; that it does not mean a pilot used by somebody called a users' association, but by somebody controlling the Canal. He might say, "I cannot let your ship through because you have not a Canal pilot on board." We might say that there was a real Canal pilot on board, and so the clash would be brought one stage nearer in the hope that Colonel Nasser would climb down.
Colonel Nasser will not climb down. He watches America very carefully. He read about the Press conference of General Eisenhower yesterday, so he knows exactly how far the Americans will go. Perhaps the Foreign Secretary will tell us? No doubt the Americans said, "Have a go, boys." But will they go to the point where, if a ship carrying a users' association pilot enters the Canal and is challenged, they are prepared to send an American battleship of the Sixth Fleet to see it through?
Of course, they are not prepared to do so before the American Election, and they will not be prepared to do so afterwards, because they are sensible on this subject. In this latest trick in the Government's game of psychological warfare the bluff will again be called. They will have to think of something else, and, in turn, of something else again, until they come to terms with their backbenchers and say to them, "We are sorry, but we cannot get it that way." Because we have either to fight or to negotiate. What we cannot do is to try to overthrow Colonel Nasser without the use of physical force.
I advise the Government to give up the idea of overthrowing Colonel Nasser by psychological warfare. The Public Relations Officer of the Prime Minister is responsible for all the Press releases about

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war preparations. I have looked at this objectively and I can come to only one conclusion about him. I think he must be a secret agent of Colonel Nasser, what one might call an Egyptian Burgess and Maclean, for every action he has taken has actively assisted Colonel Nasser and has strengthened his position by this bogus war preparation and rumour, unless it was seriously meant.
The terrible thing is that if these bogus things are done often enough there may come a point where one is faced with an appalling choice between humiliation on the one side and war on the other, and one may blunder into a war which was never meant because one meant to get the results not by war but by psychological warfare. So I beg the Government to be careful, because they are getting near that point with the users' association.
One other general comment about the situation we face. It is fair to ask : what would you do? I tell the House candidly that we have to face one thing. After the events of the last five weeks there is no way of restoring even the weak position we had in the Middle East before these disasters started. Whatever way it comes out, whether by war or negotiated settlement, the result will now be a devastating defeat for Britain. That will be the result of all this war talk.
If the Government had started negotiating straight away, a settlement could have been reached which would have been regarded as perfectly honourable and would not have looked like a triumph for Nasser. But after all the blowing of military trumpets and weeks of war propaganda, a perfectly reasonable settlement, such as will have to be made in the end, will be a defeat for us. That will be entirely due to the activity of this Government, and nothing the Opposition could do if they came to power could remedy that terrible thing.
I am convinced that we have to negotiate. The Leader of the Opposition was right when he said that if we study objectively in the White Paper the excellent summary of the Committee of the 18 nations, and of Nasser's latest proposals, it is absurd to say that negotiation could not reach a settled compromise if both sides wanted to reach one. It is ridiculous to say that, when there has not been one day of negotiation.
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Therefore, the first thing we say from our side is that we would not be ashamed to negotiate. I hold the view that the international plan is better than what Nasser has done by grabbing the Canal. I would rather have international control, although I feel embarrassed that we, who as a country have stood aside from every possible international organisation in Europe, should always find it a good thing that other people should be submitted to international control but not the British. It does not only apply to the Government : it applies to us, just as we were responsible for the Schuman Plan, but it is really embarrassing, and the Egyptians have noticed it, to recommend complete international control of Egypt's most important asset when we said that the British coal mines could not possibly be submitted to an international authority.
I agree, in principle, that the international plan is better, but I ask myself, in terms of security, what is the advantage in terms of security of an international control of the Canal? I have never understood this. There are some international gentlemen there—civilians—and they are in control. Why does this stop Nasser and his army from their actions? It has never been made clear why we think it is worth while risking a war to have an international civil authority in charge there rather than Nasser's authority, for it is clear that it is not the type of the authority which controls the Canal, but which is the territorial Power with the army to control it.
Once the party opposite had agreed that British troops should go from Suez, it was obvious that Nasser was the territorial Power who would have the physical force to blockade the Canal at any time he liked, and it makes no difference to the type of organisation which we have to control the Canal. Though I prefer the international organisation, I do not say that it is worth while risking a world war on the difference between one type of organisation and another.
I think that if this country took a more reasonable view of this matter, it would be easier to negotiate a satisfactory settlement. If we saw the differences in proportion and not exaggerated in the clichés of, in the one case, the Canal being international and free, and, in the other case, national and controlled, in

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neither case can we prevent Egypt, if Nasser wants to, from blocking or blowing up the Canal. The only way in which we could do that would be by having an international military force on the Canal, and nobody has proposed that.
I put it to the House that we should negotiate sensibly. Let us get what we can and realise that the last five weeks have made negotiations infinitely more difficult because we have got on such a confoundedly high military horse that getting off it will take all the agility of the Prime Minister. I do not underestimate the right hon. Gentleman's capacity for doing so. I remember him in the 'thirties as the hero of the League of Nations, when he became a replacement for Lord Templewood and then did the very job of demolishing Abyssinia which he was sent there to stop.
If the right hon. Gentleman could do that then, he can do this one in reverse. He can be sent there to be adamant against Nasser, and I think that after six months, if we negotiate, he will come out with a great triumph at the other end, although, in fact, it will be a fifty-fifty deal, and one of those which I would call the Edenesque settlement of the type which we always regarded in the past as an achievement of such conspicuous skill, as in the case of Indo-China.
I beg of the Foreign Secretary, in negotiating about the Canal, to have one point of principle in mind, although I know it is a lot to ask. It refers to the blockade of Israel. I think it would be ridiculous for us to enter this business with Egypt still having the right to blockade Israel and nobody else. The Israeli problem should be kept out of this as far as possible. Simply on the issue of the Canal, I am interested in the Government sitting on their high horse and fighting for a principle which they have sedulously avoided mentioning.
The only issue in the last five years on which Nasser could be said to have violated international law I have not seen mentioned in the speeches of the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minister. I know why it is. It is because we are appeasing Arabs on the subject. On this we should not be too high minded. We should make sure that on this issue, whatever final settlement comes, there can no longer be a settlement which allows one nation to
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blockade another and still say that the Canal is free.
Having said that, however, I agree with those who say that our oil is at stake. The Canal is not the only issue. One of the things which the Government have done by their five weeks of psychological warfare is to make it certain that after the Canal crisis is settled the oil crisis will come. Nothing can now prevent the demand for the nationalisation of the Iraqi oil. I think it was inevitable anyway, but it will probably come ten years earlier owing to the Government's toughness. It will be impossible for an Iraqi Government to hold that demand back.
We have to think very carefully and learn something from the terrible disasters which have afflicted us in the last five weeks. We have to learn from those mistakes. We have to learn that we could do one of two things in the Middle East. We can either restore an Anglo-French empire in the Middle East, or, rather, build one up, because there never was one, and it is conceivable, at least, to do it, but if we do not restore an Anglo-French empire in the Middle East we have to face the fact that the sort of indirect, covert Foreign Office colonialism that we have here is far more irritating to the Arabs than the overt colonialism of being a member of a British Colony, because we have exercised an indirect Foreign Office colonialism in the area.
We have assumed that Governments can be seated and unseated by us at will. We have had our Glubb Pashas not only in Jordan, but in every part of the Middle East, where we have assumed that we have the right to dictate the sort of Government these countries should have by a mixture of bluster and threats one day and blandishments the other.
The ghastly fact about the Middle East is that we have alternated the big stick and the carrot to a point which has made Arab nationalism completely out of gear. Look at the history of our treatment of General Neguib and Colonel Nasser. First we wooed Nasser, then we threatened him, then we wooed him again, and after three years of alternating every six months there was the climax of the Aswan Dam, when we first rushed to him and said, "If you are a good boy and are not too pro-Russian, we will give you the Aswan Dam". We appeased him and tried to buy him out of the hands of the Russians.

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Let us be candid about it. Six months later, we abruptly changed, saying, "You are a bad man." If we treat Arabs in that way, if, one day, we say, "You are bad boys" and next day say, "We will give you some lovely sweets if you are good," if we treat them as children in that way we soon find out that they do not happen to be children at all. They happen to be very civilised—at least, if decadent, they are a civilised lot of people—and they respond to being treated as immature children with a xenophobia which it is impossible to describe.
The hatred of the West and of the Jews which has been created by ten years of alternating threats and appeasement is an appalling phenomenon, and I do not believe that we can deal with it by holding out, because it will blow up. It has been blowing up in place after place. Glubb Pasha was a lesson, but we are still paying £10 million to Jordan. Why is the Foreign Secretary paying £10 million to Jordan for the Legion when Jordan is neutral? Pure appeasement. Why did he offer the Aswan Dam to Nasser? Again, appeasement, and so we get this alternation of appeasement and the growth of nationalism which the Russians are busily exploiting.
I say perfectly frankly to the Foreign Secretary, and I know it is a difficult thing to swallow, that the final thing to link Britain with France in this crisis has been more damaging to us in the Arab world than anything I can think of. What does the Foreign Secretary think Lebanon and Syria think of French troops arriving in Cyprus and Britain backing the Algerian war de facto? That is what we are doing. Does this really help us to keep the oilfields, unless we are prepared to have a British soldier every 100 yards along the pipeline for 1,017 miles from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean in eternity? If that is the problem, let us be told, but if we are not prepared to patrol and guard the area and resurrect a sort of Kipling empire, then let us face the facts.
The only other alternative is to give the Arabs genuine independence and treat them as completely independent nations, even if they are young nations and they are rough, immature and rude to us. Here we have the problem of a conflict between ourselves and America, to which many of my hon. Friends have referred.
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It is a conflict of policy. This is the American policy in the Middle East. Recently, I was talking to someone who had just come back from Saudi Arabia, where he was concerned with developments in Aramco. He told some fascinating stories of how Aramco behaves. Apparently there are certain rules in Aramco. The Americans live entirely separately. Nothing can be bought in the PX which can be bought in a store outside. If a person uses one swear word against an Arab, he is sent straight home. Even more ironical, Aramco has laid it down that Catholics must fast on Wednesdays and have their Sundays on Fridays in order not to upset the Arabs.
This is a very interesting way of doing things. Aramco was sent to Saudi Arabia with clear instructions. It was told, "Do what you can to get money. You will probably get it all. We shall help you to get your profits. If you lose and the concern is nationalised, then you must make enough profits to make it worthwhile, because the U.S.A. will not be behind you." That is called "good neighbour policy." It is the opposite of "dollar imperialism." The concern is told to be nice to the Arabs, and, if it stays there, to get as much as it can without upsetting the Arabs.
There is a contrast between the American ultra pro-Arab attitude in Saudi Arabia and the British semi-boss, semi-appeasing, semi-tough, semi-leaving it, which we call the Tory policy. The contrast between the two is total. The Arabs watch the two and play one off against the other. I suggest that the Americans are having the greater success. If we want the oil, we shall have it on condition that it is a purely commercial relationship and nothing else. If we just do a deal, our companies will be there, and we shall be wise to tell the Arabs that, if they like to nationalise them, we will control the distribution and they will have the production.
Indeed, we should regard what has happened in Persia not as a disaster but as a tremendous success forced upon us by our own stupidity. What has happened in Persia is a perfect arrangement. The Persians have the production and national ego is satisfied, and we have the distribution. Now the way flows smoothly. However, instead of learning

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from Persia, the Tories regard Persia and Abadan as disasters. They were disasters in that we were forced to act against our will. We should have voluntarily proposed this arrangement to the Persians.
I suggest that we should voluntarily propose to the Arabs that in future the relations should be purely commercial, that in future every Arab State should be neutral if it wishes, and that they have a perfect right to do whatever they like. Of course there will be a risk. The Russians might come in. However, they are coming in much faster through the Bagdad Pact, and they are coming in faster because of the tough policy on the Suez Canal. Everything the Government have done not only strengthens Nasser but strengthens the Russian position in the Middle East.
I plead with the Government to think twice now. I know it is difficult to get off a very high horse, but I beg them to get off this high horse with as good grace as possible, remembering that Mr. Dulles had to do it over Indo-China and did it very nicely with the present Prime Minister's assistance.
7.24 p.m.
Mr. F. A. Burden: I have never before had the pleasure of following in debate the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman). I listened very carefully and with great interest to what he said and I find that practically the whole of his speech has been a justification of Nasser.
The hon. Gentleman talked about being friends with Nasser. It seems to me that he has gone out of his way to be, and to prove himself to be, a friend of Nasser's. I am not really surprised, remembering a dinner about a year ago. I have wanted to give the hon. Gentleman an opportunity to explain words he used then in the company of two very eminent Arabs, one an ex-Premier of the Lebanon.
I understood the hon. Gentleman to say on that occasion that it was he who had instructed Colonel Nasser how to use his commandos in order to get the British out of the Canal Zone. The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was at the dinner, and so was one of my hon. Friends who also understood the hon. Gentleman to say that. We may have been mistaken, but the fact that we
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could have been sincerely mistaken in understanding the hon. Gentleman to say that, clearly shows that both Arab gentlemen, who were very pro-Nasser and supporters of the Pan-Arab world, might very easily have formed the same opinion. I should be very glad now to give the hon. Gentleman the opportunity of explaining precisely what he said.
Mr. Crossman: It is a most extraordinary performance to talk about a dinner. If I remember the dinner rightly, all I said was that Nasser had told me that he was interested in how the Jews organised themselves and had asked me to see him because I had come from Israel. I told the story to remind people that Nasser is not as anti-Jewish as one might imagine. I was one of the people who regularly came from Israel and saw him because he was interested in the Jewish connection. I think that that is the explanation.
Mr. Burden: I am glad to have the hon. Gentleman's explanation, but I and my hon. Friend were sincerely under the impression which I stated. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should take up with his right hon. Friend the Member for Belper precisely what he said. It seems to me that the hon. Gentleman has had a blind faith in Colonel Nasser.
I am surprised that most of the remarks and suggestions for the future emanating from the Opposition are on the basis that Colonel Nasser will abide by his words and any undertaking he may give. The hon. Gentleman's suggestion certainly was that Colonel Nasser could get away with almost anything because he was looked upon by the world as a little weak man heading a weak nation and if we reacted against him in any way we should be looked upon as a great bully knocking down a little man. I see that the hon. Member for Coventry, East nods his agreement.
What is the position? We and the rest of the world—particularly the British—are to be placed in a position where we cannot react against Colonel Nasser in any way which will preserve our interests, because if we do so the rest of the world will say, "You big bullies harming the poor little man, Nasser! How dare you behave like this against him!" I find that a most peculiar attitude. The fact that the hon. Gentleman should make

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such a speech as he has in this House will lead Colonel Nasser to further excesses.
I must admit that I was one of those who were opposed to getting out of the Canal, not because I wanted war but because I wanted to avoid it. I have an instinctive distaste of and mistrust for dictators. I believe that Colonel Nasser, from the time when he took advantage of the attack upon his life in Alexandria to overthrow Neguib, has shown himself to be without loyalty to his colleagues or his master at that time. I believe that everything that he has since done shows that he is a man not to be trusted. His record shows that he will take any steps to promote his own power and further his own ambitions.
I was among a number of hon. Members from this side of the House who a year ago went to the Middle East, visiting Syria, Jordan and the Lebanon, and also Egypt, where we had conversations with, among others, Colonel Nasser and his henchman at that time, Major Salem, I actually took notes at the time of the conversations, questions and answers. They were notes made not after a meeting, but while the meeting was in progress. What Colonel Nasser said makes most enlightening reading. I will return to that later.
When some of my colleagues and I mistrusted Nasser to such a degree that we thought that our getting out of the Suez Canal Zone would give him an opportunity of taking further aggressive steps—that is the general pattern of the life of a dictator—how few of us anticipated the seizure of the Suez Canal. I certainly did not. I doubt whether any of my hon. Friends really anticipated it. If they did, they certainly did not make that point in speeches in the House. Nasser, as an act of brigandage, annexed a piece of private property which serves a vital function in the western world.
Mr. Wedgwood Benn: What the hon. Member has just said touches the very centre of the controversy. Was the Canal just a piece of private property, or was it under a great international authority? The hon. Member cannot take that view and share the view of the Prime Minister.
Mr. Burden: It was private in that it was operated by a private company, but
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it was under international control through the private company—I mean private as opposed to nationalised, of course. I would be the first to admit that a case can be made out for the nationalisation of a private industry—certainly when it operates within the territory of a certain nation—but the main point which we must consider is whether Nasser will use his control of the Suez Canal to further his own political ends.
There lies the danger and there is every reason to believe that the answer to that question is, "Yes." The first reason is his general anti-western attitude, which even the hon. Member for Coventry, East admitted, and the likelihood that Nasser, backed by Russia, will use the Canal as a weapon of the cold war. The second reason is that even before he seized the Canal the advantages of Egypt's geographical position made it possible for her to promote an anti-Israel campaign by closing the Canal to cargoes to Israel, despite the Convention of 1888 which said in effect that the Canal should be open in time of peace or war to every vessel under any flag. Of course, nothing was done about it and so Nasser got away with the first act.
I have said before that I and some of my colleagues visited the Middle East last year and I propose to illustrate the sort of man with whom we are dealing, to illustrate the way his word can be trusted, to illustrate his future aims by quoting some of the questions put to and answers given by both Major Salem and Colonel Nasser. Our first meeting was with Major Salem. He admitted that the economic position of Egypt was serious. He stated that in the last year of the British occupation of the Canal Zone the national income of Egypt was the equivalent of only £39 per head of the population.
Let me add that at that time the cost of supplies and services to the British troops in the Canal Zone was Egypt's second largest asset, second only in importance to the export value of Egyptian long staple cotton. Egypt has no natural resources no oil and no minerals—it has a little oil, but it was then admitted that the amount was infinitesimal and would certainly not solve Egypt's problems and do no more than, if as much as, redress the loss of income from British troops in the Canal Zone.

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The economic welfare of Egypt suffered a severe blow as the result of the removal of British troops from the Canal Zone. Of course, the topic of help from the West was raised and I and my hon. Friends said that we felt quite sincerely that the western world and particularly Britain would be willing to help Egypt as much as possible to get her economy on sound and sure foundations. The question of the relations with the western world and Britain as the result of their help was raised. Salem said, "We, the Egyptian Government, cannot sell the idea of a pact with the West. The very thought of a pact with the West is repulsive to the Arab people and implies British and western domination."
It was then pointed out, "But yours is a military dictatorship. You command and control the means of propaganda and for conditioning the minds of the people to accept that all this is in their interests and the interests of Egypt." To that there was no answer. That was very easily hived off. Throughout the whole of that discussion with Salem there ran through every word and through practically every sentence the hatred of any idea of a pact with Britain and the West.
I remember Salem saying—I made a note at the time—"You do not understand Arabs and Arab aspirations." I felt that I was right and justified in saying to Major Salem, "That may well be, but you too must try to understand the British point of view and our vital interests." Then—and this is vitally important, because it shows the pattern which is likely to develop from this dictator in the future—the content of Salem's Beirut speech was raised. He said that he was misquoted, but he admitted saying, "The first aim of the Revolutionary Council is to get the British out of the Canal Zone and the second is to deal with Israel". Let there be no mistake about it, there was no doubt about how he intended the phrase "deal with Israel" to be used.
I remind the House that only recently when the bringing to trial of British and other citizens, who have been subjected to third degree police methods, was raised—they were charged with spying—the public prosecutor said that he would demand the death sentence as he was entitled to do, because Egypt was still at war with Israel, a war of quiescence at the moment, waiting for this to blow
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over. We were not quietened. There was nothing to give us any hope in our discussions with Colonel Nasser which followed almost immediately.
He expressed fears about the continuation of the stability of the Middle East, but again he said, "Under no circumstances will we have a pact with Britain or the West. Although we want your help, your economic aid, we will not have a pact with you." Those are the dangerous words. He said, "The relations between our two countries can be built up through confidence, not even in the present Government, but in myself, my popularity, the popularity of Abdul Gamel Nasser." That is the important thing. That is the voice we have recognised before. That is the voice we have heard before, the theme which issued from the mouths of Mussolini and Hitler.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) put this question to Nasser, "How are you going to educate the people your way?" Colonel Nasser said, "The people of Egypt are always fearful of the Government not working in their interests. There is a hatred of foreign domination."
Mr. S. O. Davies: Why not?
Mr. Burden: Exactly, but does the hon. Member not see that that is the sort of thing used by Nasser to unite the Arabs behind hatred of the Jews and to further any plans of aggrandisement in the eyes of the world which he may have? Colonel Nasser added, "Public opinion is still suspicious on these two points. If I persuade the people that I have solved these two points"—and that is why this act of seizing the Canal has been brought about—"I am sure that I can get the people behind me." In other words, behind the aims and ambitions of Colonel Nasser. "It is a question of getting the people behind me. It is a question of confidence and faith in me by the people."
The question was raised why action had been taken against Neguib, and Colonel Nasser said, "I cannot release Neguib because he is popular. He is the only card that those people can play." I may be wrong but I wonder whether the spy trials may not be used as an implement to get Neguib to trial before a military court, something which Neguib's popularity has hitherto denied to Nasser.

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Colonel Nasser admitted that Neguib was a threat to him and was the only man who might overthrow him because of his general popularity. In Colonel Nasser's words Neguib's crime is that, "He gave the impression that we want democracy and we are against it," Therefore, Neguib is put behind bars. I wonder how long it will be before he is brought to trial.
The question of the Sudan and the control of the waters of the Nile then came up. It was only a little while previously that Nasser had made an agreement not under any circumstances to intervene ; and to allow the Sudanese to arrive at a free decision on which way they would go. But in the interview he said, "I cannot concede that the Sudan would be outside our sphere of interest. I cannot concede that the Sudanese, even of their own free will, will stand absolutely outside in sovereign independence."
My hon. Friend the Member for Lanark asked, "If the majority decide to stand outside, would you interfere? Do you consider yourself, despite the undertaking, free to send money, agents and propaganda to persuade the Sudanese to agree to the unity of the Nile Valley?" Colonel Nasser said that he did.
Then the all-important question was put to him, "What would you do if there was an emphatic choice of sovereign independence?" Colonel Nasser replied, "We really could not accept this." There would be a revolution in the Sudan within two years. It would be a revolution inspired by Egyptian propagandists and agents.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison) so pertinently asked, what is to happen if Colonel Nasser's aim is to control the head waters of the Nile? It implies not only control of the Sudan but of Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanganyika. Nasser said, "We do not want to see Arab countries dispersed. All must adopt the same policy. This is essential in defence of the area." In other words, Colonel Nasser is to impose his will upon the Arab States. His aims and ambitions cannot be achieved without recourse to arms. His aims and ambitions are no less grand—and I use the word not in the sense of "admirable"—than those of Hitler and Mussolini.
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We hon. Members were even shown a modern arms factory in order that Nasser could disclose to us how the Egyptians were preparing. At that time there was no suggestion of trouble with this country. In January of last year we visited a factory which had been opened in the previous October. It was equipped with the most modern machinery and up-to-date methods of small-arms production. Nasser was careful to advise us that three such factories were running and would produce four million rounds of small arms ammunition a day. What were the Egyptians producing arms for at that time?
Mr. S. O. Davies: Would the hon. Member be kind enough to tell the House who supplied Colonel Nasser with the arms of which the hon. Member is now so afraid?
Mr. Burden: It is perfectly obvious that the country now supplying the arms, since Egypt has become a danger and become more aggressive, the country that is giving more and more arms and physical support, is Russia—the country which the hon. Member loves so much.
Mr. Davies: Why not?
Mr. Burden: Colonel Nasser believes in power politics. He believes in conquests. He will continue ruthlessly to abrogate treaties and friendships in pursuit of his own ambitions. He sees himself as the emperor of the Middle East. The pattern has been drawn but only the first cut in the pattern has been made. I believe that his next aim is an attack on and the elimination of Israel. That was made perfecly clear. Do not hon. Members appreciate what that means? It does not mean the mere military defeat of Israel. It means a bloody holocaust with thousands of innocent men and women destroyed.
Mr. Awbery: That is what we want to avoid.
Mr. Burden: It is essential to Colonel Nasser's aims that he should have the full support of the Arab States if he is to attain his object against Israel speedily and effectively.
I have been to Israel and to the Arab States. In my view, Israel is indefensible for any reasonable period against a concerted attack by all the Arab States

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equipped with modern Russian arms. Does anyone believe that when Colonel Nasser carries out his avowed intention of attempting to eliminate the State of Israel he will allow ships to go through the Canal to the aid of Israel? I remind the House that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, in response to an intervention of mine this afternoon, said that if Colonel Nasser attacked Israel the party opposite would support going to war with him immediately. [An HON. MEMBER : "Through the United Nations."] I wish hon. Members opposite would make up their minds.
Mr. Harold Davies: The hon. Member is putting up Aunt Sallies which do not exist. He knows full well that there is a tripartite agreement and that if there were an attack on Israel there is the Charter of the United Nations, and this side of the House has constantly reiterated that case. These arguments have nothing to do with this problem and the leaning for war on the part of the party opposite in the last few months.
Mr. Burden: It is perfectly relevant. The hon. Member should not quarrel with me but with his own colleagues. That is where the division seems to be, and that is what makes war possible. That is what encourages dictatorships. The sooner the party opposite makes its position clear in the event of Nasser attacking Israel the more certain it will be that he will not attack.
Time is the essence of all this. Time is the one thing for which Hitler played. Whenever he carried out a coup he agreed to talk—after the coup. He hoped and trusted—and it was a fact—that the longer he talked, the less possibility there was of any action to stop his next move or to destroy the move he had made. Nasser is following precisely the same line.
Does any right hon. or hon. Member opposite deny that in his emotional approach to the Arab world with regard to the Jews, Nasser is following precisely the same line as Hitler followed? It is so easy to unite a people, particularly a backward people, especially when all the mediums of propaganda are controlled, behind hatred. Why should Nasser be doing this unless his stated intention is still his declared intention?
Unless some action is taken, because of what is happening every Arab State
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will be anxious to get in on the kill. That is where the danger lies. They will be anxious to ride with the avenging Nasser in the chariot that scythes down the Israelis. They should first consider that if they do that, they will immediately sign their own death warrants as independent sovereign States. I suggest that the leaders of the independent Arab world should look cautiously on any embarkation on warlike activities against Israel, because if Nasser is successful--and if we talk for months after the attack has been carried out before any action is taken, it will be impossible to take any action—
Mr. Awbery rose—
Mr. Burden: I am sorry, I have given way a great deal already. As soon as he has achieved that, Nasser is thrown back on his final demand and need. He will have set himself up as the leader and king of the Arab world. Right hon. and hon. Members should remember the background that Egypt alone is a poor, impoverished State whose population is increasing at the rate of a million a year. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] These are the figures which were given to me by Colonel Nasser.
Mr. Alfred Robens: The figure is 360,000.
Mr. Burden: They may have overestimated to try to bolster their position. At any rate, the figure is considerable. It may be a million each three years.
Egypt has no natural resources and no way of improving the condition of its people. Even its major export—long staple Egyptian cotton—is now being superseded by man-made fibres in a great many industries. Therefore, the only way in which Colonel Nasser can maintain the popularity that he is so anxious to build up as the leader of a great Arab empire is to draw in, to unite in the economy of Egypt, the economy of all the small Arab States that own and control the oil around him. In so doing, does any hon. Member believe that those States would be allowed to retain any independence of action or any semblance of sovereign independence? They would be under the domination of a Nasser who controlled the oil.
Then, I believe, he would give full expression to his hatred of the West.

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Right hon. and hon. Members in the House, and people outside, say, "But he has got to sell his oil." Unfortunately, we are in the position of having to take and buy the oil, or our whole economy would fall down and there would be widespread unemployment. Therefore, we should consider this pattern, which I believe to be the logical pattern and which certainly was the implication of what has been and is being carried out by Colonel Nasser.
I am the last person in this House to say that we should go to war over the Canal. I hope that every possible measure will be taken to avoid war, but I say that this is our last chance of stopping war. As Nasser has avowed that he will attack Israel, and as we are pledged under the Tripartite Declaration to resist such an attack, I believe that the logical move for us to make is to disclose to him, and to the rest of the Arab countries who might support him if they thought they could get an easy kill, that such an exploit would not be profitable.
We might invite Israel into the Commonwealth of Nations, but if that is not possible the next step we should take is to ensure that there are two divisions of British troops, and, I hope, American and French contigents, in Israel at the earliest possible moment.
Mr. Harold Davies: This is—
Mr. Burden: I wish that the hon. Member, who will probably be called, would not be so impatient. I believe that that is the danger, that this is the first cut in the pattern, that the pattern is laid and that Nasser will pursue it unless his knife is blunted.
7.56 p.m.
Mr. Maurice Edelman: The personal evidence given by the hon. Member for Gillingham (Mr. Burden) has been an important contribution to this debate. [An HON. MEMBER : "Does my hon. Friend really believe that?"] I do indeed. Much of what the hon. Member said underlines what was said by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition in his speech of 2nd August, which he confirmed today.
I cannot help feeling that the questions posed by this debate resolve themselves into three. The first is whether
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the Government's purpose is right ; the second, whether their methods are right ; and thirdly, in the event of the Government's methods not being right, what alternative methods are proposed by the Opposition for dealing with the crisis with which we are faced?
Let me say at the outset that I for one do not impugn the intentions of the Government. I do not believe that the Government seek war. I do not believe that they prefer a violent resolution of these matters instead of a peaceful solution. Therefore, I will address myself chiefly to the substance of our dispute with Nasser and, secondly, to the way in which the Government have conducted their affairs in this matter.
One central point which I do not feel has been adequately stressed throughout this debate is the effect on our own national economy of an abuse by Egypt of the control which it has taken of the Canal.
Mr. Zilliacus: Will my hon. Friend give way?
Mr. Edelman: Let me continue the point a little further before I give way. I believe that in certain circumstances, if an arbitrary Egyptian control of the Suez Canal were either to raise the tolls or interrupt the traffic or, at worst, were to deny to Britain the materials which in the normal way of commerce flow through the Canal, it is conceivable that there would be 3 million unemployed in this country directly resulting from the interruption of that traffic. That is very serious, and I cannot help feeling that if the time were to come when many of those who have spoken today had to answer to their constituents in such a contingency and to explain what attitude they took today or what attitude they may take tomorrow, they would have a serious burden of responsibility to carry, and would indeed have to do a lot of explaining away.
Mr. Zilliacus: Will my hon. Friend animadvert on the economic consequences of going to war with Egypt over this business?
Mr. Edelman: In the first place I do not regard war as in any sense inevitable. Secondly, in the choice between the disastrous economic consequences which may result from permitting the Egyptians

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to "get away with it" this time, and the alternative, if necessary, under the proper auspices, of taking forcible action to defend our legitimate interests, it is better in the circumstances to take that forcible action and defend what we consider right and necessary.
Mr. Hunter: When my hon. Friend speaks about using force, does he mean through the Charter of the League of Nations or as the Tory Party proposes in its propaganda?
Mr. Edelman: I hope to come to that point in due course. I am merely saying that in certain circumstances it is desirable to use force, and that I acquit the Government of impropriety in making the necessary preparations to use force in certain contingencies.
I urge that this dispute with Egypt should be referred to the Security Council of the United Nations. If the Security Council decides that it is necessary to restrain Egypt by force from certain courses of action, we shall have to play our part. It is no good saying that we will refer the matter to the Security Council if we are not prepared to back up that decision by being ready to put at the disposal of the Security Council the necessary armed forces, and to discharge our obligations.
The Prime Minister was perfectly right when he said that when the crisis blew up he felt it necessary to take certain precautionary measures of a physical and military pattern in order to safeguard British interests in the Middle East. He would have been guilty of grave dereliction of duty if he had failed to do so. If there had been violence in the Middle East and he had neglected to prepare the necessary forces to safeguard our proper interests he would rightly have been held guilty by Parliament and by the whole country of having failed to make provision for circumstances which might well have arisen, and which indeed may arise in the future.
That does not mean that the Government have acted all along in a way which commends itself to the people of this country. Their neglect of the proper approach to the United Nations at the right time, long ago, may have weakened their case in the eyes of the people of Britain in a manner which the case does not deserve. Unless the Prime Minister
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interprets his purpose more satisfactorily to the people of Britain he will have undermined his policy. One thing is certain : no Government can fight a war without the backing of the trade union movement. Unless the Government are able to carry the trade union movement of this country with them by the force of their argument it will be impossible for them to carry out any policy involving the use of force.
There is ambiguity in what the Prime Minister said today, and the gravest ambiguity was that in which he stated that the Americans would be associated with us in the users' association. I cannot help feeling that the attitude of the Americans has all along been ambiguous and equivocal. In the minds of most hon. Members present there is still a lively image of Colonel Neguib fondling the pistol which Mr. Dulles presented to him on his birthday. We are suffering from the consequences of the equivocal attitude of America in the Middle East and in North Africa. The steady sapping of the French position in North Africa has to a great extent been due to propaganda carried out from Cairo with the backing of the United States. Indeed, I believe that the Americans, and Mr. Dulles in particular, suffer from the belief, which is shared by some of my hon. Friends, that nationalism is necessarily a step forward from colonialism.
The Labour Party has always been bitterly opposed to colonialism and imperialism. The sentiments that we feel on this side of the House when we hear about imperialist and colonial exploitation are deep and are rooted in the history of our party. Nonetheless, I urge my hon. Friends not to confuse this anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism with the course that certain modern sovereign States are taking, and which may be as sinister and dangerous in its purposes, and as inimical to the peace of the world, as were the policies of the old imperialists. It was always a Marxist dogma that the emergence of the sovereign State as a reaction against imperialism was progressive and a step forward in civilisation. That was valid in the nineteenth century and in the early part of the twentieth century. I believe it to be no longer valid.
One of the great disasters of the postwar world has been the emergence in

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Asia and Africa of sovereign States the creation of which had no relationship whatever to the great material and physical problems which are present in the modern world and which can be solved only by bringing people into relationship with each other across frontiers and into focal points of mutual co-operation.
An example of that in Europe is the Schuman Plan, which became the European Iron and Steel Community. It is an embryonic organisation which bodes well for the future. As my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) said not long ago, it is a great pity that we did not associate ourselves with that new institution, because today we could have declared, with even greater authority and moral influence than we can now, that great physical or geographical resources which are of interest to the world or to a group of nations should be controlled—I do not say "owned"—not by the countries which by the accident of geography contain them, but by those who use them, benefit from them and may have to operate them.
That brings me to the question of the users' association. That association should not be merely a political device to keep together the interests involved in the dispute with Egypt, but an agency in the ultimate organisation of the Suez Canal Board in which we can marry two ideas. These ideas are those of ownership being vested in the country where the Canal lies—this applies to all similar institutions—and of control lying with those who are the tenants of the resources in question. In relation to Suez the application of those ideas can be simply stated.
No one has ever for one moment suggested that Egypt should not be the sovereign owner of the resources of the Suez Canal. If ever that was stated or thought, nobody thinks of it today. The objections to the nationalisation of the Canal have now been removed. In other words, all of the 18 nations freely and wholly acknowledge the fact that the Canal belongs to Egypt ; that the Canal's physical installations and equipment are Egyptian. Therefore, the dignity, prestige and sovereignty of Egypt in that respect are fully preserved.
What is in question? The metaphor has been used that the relationship between the 18 nations, or those who use
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the Canal, and Egypt should be the relationship of tenant to landlord. I believe that is a good statement of what the relationship should be, and I think that, in fact, we have narrowed the gap, even between Nasser and ourselves, to a question almost of semantics. We have now almost reached the stage where it may well be possible to bridge the gap, provided that we do not become involved in terms such as "sovereignty," "internationalisation," etc.
For us I think that the essential must be that whoever owns the Canal, the tenancy of the Canal must be international. I believe that this is an essential point of principle, and I believe that when we refer the matter to the Security Council, as it must at some time be referred, we should go forward with that proposal, which is in some sense a compromise proposal but one which retains the substance of our needs and retains for Egypt the substance of her prestige. I believe that that is a formula that can be applied but I also believe that it is the minimum formula which we should accept.
The Suez crisis today is not the—I repeat "the"—crisis. If this crisis is solved, or rather if this crisis is allowed to settle itself in conformity with the present attitude taken up by Nasser, then, indeed, it will be merely the beginning of a whole series of crises of different kinds. I think that it was Trotsky who once spoke of "permanent revolution." I think that the crisis which confronts us today will merely become the beginning of a permanent crisis which may well end in disaster for all of us.
I do not share the view of some of my hon. Friends who say that if we take a firm and positive stand now, then in some way or another we are knocking Nasser over the head, because Egypt is a small country and all the rest of it. I do not believe that. I believe that what is involved today is the whole future of Great Britain. I do not mean merely as a great Power but as a country which enjoys a standard of life with which we are now familiar.
Listening to the debate, I could not help wondering what a former Foreign Secretary would have said in these circumstances—a Foreign Secretary with whom, on certain matters, I disagreed, but who always had before him the fact that the

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British economy depended on free passage through the Suez Canal and on the unimpeded flow of oil to Great Britain. I speak, of course, of Ernie Bevin. I am quite sure that were he responsible today for the decision which we are obliged to take, he would not retreat from the central position—I am not talking about the approach to the matter used by the Government—
Mr. Ellis Smith: That makes all the difference.
Mr. Edelman: He would not retreat from the central position taken up by the Government ; namely, that the Egyptian dictator must not be allowed to get away with aggression, because that would be merely the beginning of a whole series of aggressions.
Mr. R. E. Winterbottom: I wonder what my hon. Friend means when he says that "the Egyptian dictator must not get away with aggression"? In the first place, he agrees that the nationalisation of the Canal is not at issue at the moment. Would my hon. Friend mind telling us what kind of aggression the "Egyptian dictator" has committed?
Mr. Edelman: Yes. I would say that it consisted, in the first instance, in the arbitrary, physical and violent seizure of the installations of the Suez Canal and in his unilateral denunciation of the Convention to which we are signatories. I consider that to be his basic aggression. I think that the whole of history points to the fact that his aggression will be repeated, and I believe that it is the duty of all of us, in certain circumstances, to be prepared, if necessary, to use the resources which are at our disposal—in certain circumstances—in order to defend our basic industries.
The Leader of the Labour Party himself stated certain circumstances in which he considered that force should be used. I believe that we must be prepared to back up our resolution, if necessary, by the use of force, under the aegis of the Security Council, and therefore that the preparations which we have taken, the determination which we have shown, and the support which the Leader of this party gave to the central purpose enunciated by the Government on 2nd August is something which requires our support and, more than that, our determination.
8.17 p.m.
Mr. J. E. S. Simon: Until the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) addressed the House, this debate differed sadly in its temper from that which took place on 2nd August. Differences of opinion in our political life are to be expected ; but in matters that affect the well-being of this nation, momentous matters like issues of peace and war, international order and the sanctions that lie behind it, it must be a matter of regret to us all if conscientious differences exacerbate the temper of a debate.
Mr. John Hynd: Abadan.
Mr. Simon: Abadan, certainly, although I was not then a Member of the House.
Today, as then, minds are confused, and one great service, as it seems to me, that the hon. Member for Coventry, North has done is to show that fundamentally there are certain great principles at stake on which the overwhelming majority of Members of this House are agreed, and which, if they are seen to be transcendent in this issue, I believe can lead again to that unity of temper which is always desirable in the conduct of our foreign affairs, whichever party is in power, and which was never so much necessary as it is today on this great issue.
What is it that is at stake? If we come to consider it, it is really this : are we to live under a régime of international anarchy or international law? [An HON. MEMBER : "The Charter."] Yes, there is the Charter, which is a source, but not the only source, of international law. Certainly, it should be made the main, but not the exclusive, source. We all recognise that it has its limitations. It has its limitations on the face of it, because it recognises that it is not all-exclusive ; that there are, if I may echo the words used by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, other means of action outside the Charter, recognised by the Charter itself. But nevertheless it has sufficient authority for one to say that no action that we take—and I agree with the hon. Gentleman who referred to the Charter—should be in derogation of the Charter, much less in contradiction of it.

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Let us recognise, however, that not only does the United Nations Charter itself envisage action other than through the United Nations institutions, but that we must also sadly face the fact that owing to the writing of the veto into the Charter and owing to the division of the world into the Iron Curtain and Bamboo Curtain countries on the one hand and the West on the other, action through the United Nations in vindication of the rule of international law is not bound to be effective and may well fail.
That is the question that we really have to face. Are we going to abide by the rule of international law? Are we going to have a régime of international anarchy or a régime of international order? I say at the outset that no action of ours should be in derogation of or in conflict with the Charter. But let us face this fact at the outset, that what Nasser has done is an act of international lawlessness and of international wrong. I will not repeat—it has already been read today—what the right hon. Member for Lewisham, South (Mr. H. Morrison) said in the previous debate on Suez.
What Nasser has done and the way in which he has done it is an international wrong. It is perfectly true, as the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell) and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister have pointed out, that an act of nationalisation of domestic assets is an act of which international law will take no cognisance. It is a perfectly legitimate act of government. But when it comes to the seizure of foreign assets, that is an international wrong and particularly when it is done without the prompt, full and secure payment of compensation. Hon. Members will have seen the letters which Professor Goodhart, a great authority on these matters, and Lord McNair, possibly an even greater authority on international law, have written on these matters. Let us not lose sight of our point of departure here, that Nasser has committed an international wrong. If we wish to see international order and the rule of international law vindicated he must not be allowed to succeed.
Mr. J. Hynd: Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman will explain this to me. He says that the seizure of the Canal Company is an international wrong
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and that Nasser must not be allowed to get away with it. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman explain why in the 18-Power proposal to which we are party, we endorse the recognition of that act and recognise that the company now exists as a nationalised company of Egypt, that it is Egyptian property, and therefore we have already let the Egyptians get away with it?
Mr. Simon: The reason is that by the 18-Power agreement that act of lawless ness is merged in a new and higher act of international order. That is why it seems to me that we were perfectly right and justified in endorsing the proceedings of the Conference. We recognised the nationalisation of the assets, leaving aside the question of compensation, because it was a quid pro quo for something which is of greater importance, which is the organisation of a new international organisation for the Canal—
Mr. Rankin: Is the new organisation which the Prime Minister proposes to create part of the new international organisation?
Mr. Simon: I propose to deal with that. I always give way if I possibly can to hon. Members who wish to intervene. I do not want to detain the House too long, for I know there are many Members whom the House will wish to hear, but I can give the hon. Gentleman an assurance that I propose to deal with that aspect of the matter.
It is not only that Nasser is in breach of international law and has offended seriously in letter and in spirit against international order in his seizure of the Canal assets, and his mode of seizure. He is also in breach of the very convention by which he declares himself to be bound—by his denial to Israeli shipping of the passage of the Canal. How, then, can we possibly accept his assurance that he regards himself as bound by the Convention of 1888?
Again, when Nasser says that he is willing to pay compensation I cannot do better than echo what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition when, following my right hon. Friend, he analysed in great detail how the compensation was going to be paid. We know that the revenues which would be needed to pay for the compensation of shareholders are pledged twice over—once to develop the Canal and

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secondly to build the dam. How, then, can they be used yet a third time to compensate the owners?
This is a matter upon which I believe the House to be united, although we may differ—I hope we shall not by the time we have thrashed out the issues—as to what the consequences are. But do not let us for a moment condone what has happened. Let us recognise it for what it is—a gross breach of the international order—and if it succeeds, as the hon. Member for Coventry, North pointed out, it may have very serious repercussions, just as Hitler's and Mussolini's breaches of the international order had in the 1930s.
Mr. Hynd: It is quite different.
Mr. Simon: The hon. Gentleman says it is quite different. I heard the interesting speech of the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) on that matter. But is it really so different? It is easy to lose perspective in these matters. When Hitler came to power, Germany was a weak force. She had been occupied. She was struggling under a burden of war reparations, and she was divided, her political system in ruins, subject to perpetual party warfare which rent the nation. Anybody would have said that she was in a hopeless plight, and, let us remember, many were the arguments put forward that she was doing no more than was justified to restore her position.
I do not want to revive ancient party controversy. I can speak with a perfectly clear conscience myself ; hon. Gentlemen who may have then voted against rearmament should perhaps search their consciences.
Again Mussolini appeared to the world as an inconsiderable force ; and, when it came to the struggle, so he proved to be. But what ruin and misery he brought on the world before being shown to be the lath that he was. [An HON. MEMBER : "Who supported him?"] I certainly did not.
The hon. Member for Coventry, North was perfectly right in saying that an act of international lawlessness of this sort may have the most serious repercussions unless it is checked and unless the rule of international law is vindicated. It is here that I quarrel with the speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the
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Opposition. He made a very clever speech today, but what does it ultimately amount to? I agree with him when he says that we must make use of the existing organs of international order. I agree when he says we must abide by the Charter of the United Nations.
But what does the right hon. Gentleman say is to be done if that fails? What it comes to is this. He says we must accept what Nasser has done and cut our coat accordingly. We must build these vast and expensive tankers, and we must accept the cost to us. That would be serious enough. But what would be much more serious would be that an act of international lawlessness would have succeeded. [An HON. MEMBER : "It would be cheaper than war."] It is said that it would be cheaper than war.
That brings me to the question as to how far the use of force is justified. I think it was the hon. Member for Bermondsey (Mr. Mellish) who said that anything is better than war. That was said, so to speak, off the cuff, and I do not believe he really thinks that. Although I know—and I respect their views—that a small number of hon. Members would take that view, the vast majority would not take that view today any more than they did in 1939. There are certain things which we would think worse than the catastrophe of war, immeasurable though that would be—such as the loss of our faith, the loss of our liberty, and so on.
Mr. R. E. Winterbottom: The point advanced by the hon. and learned Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon) raises this question. In the five weeks of controversy on the Suez question, has the prestige of Britain increased, kept level, or diminished in world opinion? I can say quite categorically that the prestige of Britain, through the Suez crisis and through the action of the Government, has never stood lower in world opinion than it does today.
Mr. Simon: I disagree entirely with that assertion. If I had known that the hon. Gentleman was going to abuse the right of proper intervention, which I always concede, in order to introduce something completely irrelevant to the argument I was advancing, I should not have dreamed of giving way.

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How far is the use of force justifiable? We all recognise, I think, that in certain circumstances it is. Most hon. Members would say at once that it would be justifiable as part of collective action with the authority of the United Nations. It was on that ground that most hon. Members, though certainly not all, endorsed the action of the Socialist Government in engaging in actual warfare in Korea. The hon. Member for Coventry, East, in an intervention, went further than that, I think, because he recognised that force is also justifiable as an act of self-defence against direct territorial aggression.
Mr. Kenneth Younger: That is under the Charter too.
Mr. Simon: Yes. But it does go beyond that. For example, the use of force is justifiable—I am speaking not only of international law, but of accepted international morality—in the defence of the lives of one's own nationals. I see the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas), who is a great expert on these matters, nodding in agreement, and it is very comforting to have his agreement.
Mr. Ellis Smith: Who was that? Who is this expert?
Mr. Simon: I can assure the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South (Mr. Ellis Smith) that the hon. and learned Member is a very great expert on these matters.
That certainly must be so ; no nation will stand by and see its nationals butchered and persecuted, their lives endangered, and take no action. It seems to me that that alone, in view of what Colonel Nasser has been doing in the last five weeks, justifies, and more than justifies, the military precautions about which so much has been heard today. I see that Professor Goodhart, in his letter to The Times, goes further than that, and says that he thinks the use of force is justified wherever a vital national interest is at stake.
Mr. Rankin: We should be fighting all over the world.
Mr. Simon: I myself would not agree with that as a universal proposition ; but one must recognise that one may be driven to the defence of vital national
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interests if the organs of international order which we have established prove incapable of performing their function. I am certainly one of those who believe that the essential thing in international organisation is that we should each give up our own private right of determining our own quarrels, and particularly of vindicating that judgment by force of arms. But we are far from that at the moment.
Mr. Paget: I find this a little difficult. In the United Nations, we have what is, substantially, a secretariat of a great-Power concert which does not exist. If one says that force cannot be used except in pursuit of a decision of the United Nations, that is a general licence for lawlessness—the police are on strike, and therefore I must allow my house to be burned. That being the situation, surely Professor Goodhart is right : old international law stands, and people, in the absence of a real international authority, have to support their vital interests.
Mr. Simon: The hon. and learned Gentleman has put the point most persuasively. There it is for the consideration of the House. I do not myself think that it necessarily arises at the moment.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East, oversimplifies the issue when he puts it as if there were, on the one side, a question of psychological warfare, and, on the other side, armed intervention and the use of guns. It is not so. There are infinite degrees of pressure and sanctions between those two. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) and the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), in their letter to The Times, advocated the use of every diplomatic and economic sanction available. There was no mention of acting through the United Nations in that respect. There are certain sanctions which are available.
Mr. Philip Bell: Has my hon. and learned Friend in mind the sort of thing that international lawyers call reprisals—hostile acts which are short of war?
Mr. Simon: I am obliged to my hon. and learned Friend. Let us recognise that all those sanctions are acts of force. The firing of the gun is not the only act of force. An economic sanction is every bit as much an act of force as

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a military sanction. It is done to bring pressure. It is used quite correctly to bring pressure in order to vindicate the law, and in order to give a sanction to the law. A law without a sanction, as I think the hon. and learned Member for Northampton was indicating, is valueless.
I myself would be very slow to see the use of force in this matter. I think we should weigh the consequences. We should recognise that London can be bombed from Cairo. We should not delude ourselves that any use of force would be quick or easy, without serious repercussions. On the other hand, I agree with the sentiment expressed by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewis-ham, South when he urged the Government not to be too nervous in these matters.
Over and above the physical dangers which I have indicated, there is the infinitely greater danger that the rule of international law may be flouted, and that we may sink again into a régime of international anarchy. Therefore, I would urge the Government to continue with the use of every sanction at their command, but certainly making no use of force without having used the existing United Nations Organisation.
The hon. Member for Govan (Mr. Rankin) mentioned the users' association. That seems to me to fit perfectly well into the pattern, and I myself welcome it. Let us remember that Colonel Nasser's action is illegal. It is a breach of international order What then? One is not bound to accept an international pilot when a national pilot can take one safely and conveniently through the Canal.
There is no reason at all why we should not, if we think it better, use national pilots. When we consider that, let us remember what the alternative is. The international pilots are probably going to resign from the service. [Interruption.] An hon. Member says, "Blacklegs". We would assume a very serious responsibility, in view of the way in which foreigners in the past have been treated in Egypt, in view of the threat made against the pilots themselves quite recently, in view of the prevailing xenophobia in Egypt, if we gave them advice, contrary to their inclinations, to remain in the service. If they go, the only way of getting our shipping through
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the Canal is to use the national pilots ; and I for one can see nothing contrary to international law or to any of the Suez Conventions or agreements in so doing.
Mr. Rankin: In using national pilots?
Mr. Simon: In using national pilots.
Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: As I understand it, the hon. and learned Gentleman is putting a case in favour of the users' co-operative upon the view—he has expressly put it—that the nationalisation of the Canal is illegal. Would he then agree that if nationalisation of the Canal is legal the users' cooperative would be outside the law?
Mr. Simon: No. I think that it would be perfectly in accordance with the law even in that case, whether the seizure of the Suez Canal, to adopt the hon. and learned Gentleman's own term, was legal or illegal. I speak subject to correction by hon. and learned Gentlemen who know more about these matters than I do ; but as far as I can see there would be nothing illegal, nothing wrong, in using one's national pilots to pilot shipping through the Canal. However, perhaps someone in the Foreign Office will reply to that.
The second matter concerns the payment of the dues. In saying that these will be paid in London we are doing no more than continuing existing sanctions, and sanctions which had the approval of the Leader of the Opposition when he spoke on 2nd August. If, as the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Lewisham, South argued on the previous occasion, this seizure is illegal, it is perfectly proper to say that the shipping dues shall be paid to the users' association, and not to the person who has illegally seized the Canal installations.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East says that we must negotiate. To my mind there is something much more fundamental involved. One does not ask the law-abiding citizen to negotiate with the robber. It is easy to over-simplify, it is easy to give too legalistic a view ; and I recognise readily that into these things diplomacy must enter and that one must ultimately shift one's position from the rigidities of the law, although I personally regard the vindication of the rule of international order as of great importance.
Mr. Younger: If I may interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman, he seems to be basing his argument on the assumption of the illegality of this act by Egypt. He may or may not be correct, but is he aware that there is a proper international tribunal where that point can be decided, and that it is not right for any member of the United Nations to base all its policies, including the possible use of force, on an assumption of that kind without taking the trouble to put it to the test?
Mr. Simon: I am obliged to the right hon. Gentleman and I was aware of that fact. But I cannot remain blind to the fact that the Hague Court, to which I think he was referring, refused jurisdiction in the case of the Abadan nationalisation, which was a much stronger case, because there, written into the concession, was an undertaking not to nationalise. In any case my argument is not based solely on the illegality of this act. It is in any event a breach of international order, even though it may not be the breach of international law which I believe it to be.
I was saying that the hon. Member for Coventry, East argued that we must negotiate. But even accepting that, one must negotiate from positions of equal strength. For that reason, if for no other, it seems to me that we should apply sanctions so as to make Colonel Nasser more amenable to negotiation. I see no sign in his actions up to now that he is, so to speak, negotiable.
What other things can we do? I believe that in order to test the value of his assurances on the Convention of 1888 we should now invite the State of Israel to pass some of her shipping through the Canal and let us see Nasser's reaction. We shall then be able to judge the value of his assurances. I did not follow the hon. Member for Coventry, East when he said that that is the one point of principle on which we should stand. That seems to me quite illogical. It is all part of a broader matter of principle, which is that covenants freely negotiated should be observed until a negotiated modification has come about.
The second thing which I feel we should do is this. I was much attracted by the line of approach of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison). We can bring great pressure to bear on Nasser by exploring alternative
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methods of irrigation. It has always seemed to me inadvisable, to say the least, to build one's point of maximum water storage at the point of maximum evaporation. I should have thought there were strong arguments for now encouraging the Sudan Government, the Uganda Government, and the other Governments concerned to go forward with their own schemes of irrigation, paying no more regard to Nasser's susceptibilities than he has paid to ours. I put that forward. I do not say that that is ultimately the best solution for the problem of using the Nile waters ; but at any rate it is something that would bring Colonel Nasser to a more negotiable frame of mind.
I now come to another proposal that I think would be well worth exploring. There has been put forward the suggestion that we should buy from Egypt for about £200 million a strip in the Gaza area in order to seal off Egypt from Israel ; so that on the one hand we should have a space in which to build, if necessary, an alternative canal, where we could build a pipeline, and where we should be sealing off an area of great danger to the peace of the world. It would have the advantage, it is said, in addition, that the £200 million would enable Colonel Nasser to build his dam. I believe that that would be absolutely fatal. It would give him the fruits of his intransigence and would be paying him for flouting international law and order and international decency.
What we might do, however, and what would be preferable to my mind, would be to negotiate with the Israeli Government to see if we could buy an area of their frontier land in which the same purposes could be fulfilled. I would ask the Foreign Secretary, when he replies to the debate, to say if that is one of the matters that has been considered.
Ultimately, we come to the point—and I find myself in complete agreement with the hon. Member for Coventry, North—that this is a question of international law and order. Unless, on the one hand, we show ourselves as being bound by the covenants which we have signed and, on the other hand, determined to uphold the covenants to which we are a party and of which we are a beneficiary, then the result, in terms of international

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anarchy, could be very serious indeed and could bring untold misery upon the world.
8.52 p.m.
Mr. K. Zilliacus: The hon. and learned Member for Middlesbrough, West (Mr. Simon) produced a most extraordinary mixture of lip service to the rule of law and advocacy of pure international anarchy and power politics. He says that we should respect and observe the United Nations Charter, but that we should use force in defence of our vital interests. The two things do not happen to be consistent.
Mr. Simon: I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. I did not say that. It was an hon. and learned Gentleman opposite who put forward that point of view.
Mr. Zilliacus: The hon. and learned Gentleman quoted with approval Professor Goodhart as saying that very thing.
Mr. Simon: Not with approval.
Mr. Zilliacus: Well, then, the hon. and learned Gentleman disapproves of it. Does he accept the position that, under the Charter, a country is not allowed to resort to force unless with the authorisation of the Security Council, or, alternatively, in the exercise of the right of defence against an armed attack, and then with the obligation to bring the matter at once before the Security Council and to do nothing to impair its authority? Would the hon. and learned Gentleman accept these limitations on the use of force?
Mr. Simon: As the hon. Gentleman is asking my views, I say at once that those are the circumstances envisaged by the Charter as sanctioning and permitting the use of force, but I did venture to point out that the United Nations Charter has its limitations. It is not exhaustive, and one of the matters in which a national State is entitled to use force is in defence of the lives of its own national subjects.
Mr. Zilliacus: It may not do even that without reference to the Security Council and abiding by its authority. As to whether or not Egypt has violated international law and order by nationalising the Suez Canal Company, that is a very
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controversial question. The obvious body to settle it is the International Court. Egypt and this country are both parties to the optional clause, Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court, by which either may summon the other and both are pledged to accept the verdict of the Court in all legal disputes concerning
"(a) the interpretation of a treaty ;
(b) any question of international law ;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation ;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation."
It is our solemn duty, if we believe that there has been a breach of international law, and if we respect the rule of law, to refer that issue to the International Court. We have no right whatever to take the law into our own hands and to attempt by a policy of force to impose our own views of our rights and interests in the matter. If we do that, we are international anarchists and power politicians, and not loyal to the Charter of the United Nations.
The speech of the hon. and learned Gentleman, as well as the whole course of the debate, has made it abundantly clear that the analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) was perfectly correct. The Government do not want to negotiate with President Nasser. A different way of putting that is that they do not want a settlement with President Nasser ; what they want is a bash at Arab nationalism personified by President Nasser. That is the real issue.
It is also plain that the Government are trying to manoeuvre into a position where they can get away with resort to force to impose their view on a Suez Canal settlement on President Nasser. A full-blooded expression of that policy is one which hopes to find a pretext, and the withdrawal of the pilots and the new Canal users' association lay the foundation for the pretext—for intervening with armed force, reoccupying the Suez Canal and eventually Cairo, and overthrowing the Nasser regime and putting in a puppet Egyptian Government, after which the advocates of this policy believe that the Arab world would be overawed and frightened and, in some cases, secretly

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pleased at Nasser's downfall and we should bask in the glory of a sort of warmed-up Neo-Disraelian imperial grandeur.
The only thing wrong with that policy is that it comes from the wrong century. I think that the new Canal users' association, with the functions attributed to it, might be rechristened "The Nineteenth Century Club", because that seems to be more or less what it amounts to.
There are four assumptions underlying this policy which make it so dangerous. The first assumption is that Arab nationalism is a negligible quantity, that we could have a short sharp victory, that a defeat would be accepted, and that there would be no repercussions in the way of Arab solidarity. I believe that all that is tragically mistaken. Our real troubles would begin after we had won a military campaign, because we should not be able to set up a puppet Government which could survive the withdrawal of the British occupying forces. We should have increasing trouble throughout the Arab world. Our experience in Cyprus, the experience of the French in Algeria, past experiences in Ireland, experience in Yugoslavia, where the Tito partisans held down 40 German and Italian divisions—all this shows that where one has a population in sympathy with partisans or guerillas or irregular fighters very small forces can pin down large numbers of troops indefinitely, and the cost of such an operation is absolutely staggering.
The second assumption is that our economy is strong enough to stand that kind of adventure. It is not. It is already shaky, and it could not stand up under the strain of a prolonged and large-scale military adventure such as we should be embarking upon if we attempted this policy. One small item from the Press today will serve to illustrate this. The National Federation of Grocers' and Provision Dealers' Associations has already issued the warning that food prices will rise rapidly if there is a conflict over Suez. That is a very small and mild foretaste of what lies ahead.
The third assumption is that the United Nations is pie in the sky, with no basis in reality, that it does not provide a practical basis for a policy which would work, and that it has no hold on the loyalty or emotions of any Government
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or any people, including our own. In point of fact that, also, is a very serious mistake, because if we put ourselves in the position of committing Charter-breaking aggression, we shall get into very serious international trouble. We shall be denounced in the United Nations as aggressors and have the whole of world opinion against us. The effect on our own national unity is something to which I will come in a moment.
I remind the House of what was said by Walter Lippmann in connection with the Korean War, in remarks addressed to the United States public. He said that in America they might feel that they did all the fighting and that the British and other contributions were very small in military terms. But the fact that they came in and so it became a United Nations operation turned a dirty little colonial war into something supported by public opinion. I have always looked upon the Korean War as exactly that and thought that it was a tragic mis-use of the Charter. But the fact remains that respectability was lent to that operation because it was done under the authority of the United Nations.
Contrariwise, if we indulge in a dirty little colonial war, which, on top of that, is Charter-breaking aggression, this country's position in the world will be unenviable indeed. The split in national unity will become more serious than hon. and right hon. Members opposite can imagine. For they still assume that patriotism means cannon fodder citizenship, the attitude of the Light Brigade charging to destruction at the command of criminal imbeciles because
"Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do or die."
Frankly, that will not be the position in this country if the Government commit the reckless folly of breaking the Charter by an act of aggression.
I draw attention to the remarks of Mr. Geddes at the Trades Union Congress, in his capacity of President, when he said :
"We must make it abundantly clear that we are not going to precipitate war simply to remove a dictator or let Tory back benchers use it as an excuse for re-occupying the Canal Zone…. The nation will be roused to a deep, implacable, bitter anger such as has never been seen before if you take this country into an unnecessary war."
Perhaps it would be as well not to forget that the Labour Party and the trade

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union movement have been pledged for a long time to a world peace loyalty that is very appropriate to the present situation. It is contained in the reports of the Trades Union Congress and the annual Labour Party Conference of 1934. The operative part is this :
"Loyalty to the world community on the issue of peace over-rides any national duty and notably our duty to the Government in war."
It includes the duty
"… to refuse to accept our Government's unsupported claim to be using force in self-defence ; insistence on submitting this claim to the test of international judgment ; refusal to support our Government if it were ever condemned as an aggressor by the League of Nations"—
which, today, means the United Nations.
We should not forget Lloyd George's remark to the National Executive of the Labour Party in the First World War, when asking for its support. He said that no Government could be carried on in this country, in peace or war, without the co-operation of labour, and on its determination to help in winning that war everything depended.
I warn the Government that if they are mad enough to treat the Charter as a scrap of paper and resort to force in circumstances where they clearly violate the Charter by aggression, they will get no help and no support from labour. The war already declared by the trade unions on the Government's economic policy will extend to defence of the standards of the workers against the economic consequences of the Government's war policy.
There will be an all-in political campaign up and down the country by the Labour Party to settle this issue, not only in the House, but in the factories, the workshops and the mines. If the Government now, in 1956, after two world wars, after swearing themselves blue in the face that the collective peace system and the Charter are our only hope for peace and the foundation of world civilisation, destroy the United Nations because they are mad enough to believe that they can revive the policies of the nineteenth century and end Arab nationalism by resorting to power politics, they will rouse such a storm in this country as will sweep them out of office and put in a Government that is on the side of peace and civilisation.
The road back to imperialism and power politics is closed. Labour has
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hung a "No Thoroughfare" sign on it. The Government will neglect that sign at their peril. But the road of the United Nations is open. It is not a road that this Government are capable of taking or even understanding. But it is a road along which we could find an honourable and decent settlement.
There are two problems in this matter. So far as the actual question of arrangements for assuring satisfactory operation, maintenance and development of the Suez Canal is concerned, as various speakers have observed, the difference between the 18-Power Dulles plan, which President Nasser rejects, and the four-Power Indian plan and his own latest proposals, is a negotiable difference. If that was the only thing in it, it would be perfectly possible, particularly by using the machinery of the United Nations, to work out a satisfactory compromise.
The real issue is the question of Arab nationalism. I agree that it is not a pretty phenomenon. It is a real problem of how-to reconcile this kind of militant nationalism with international obligations and standards. But that, too, is something that can be done through the United Nations. We have to think of this in terms not of bullying, but of bargaining, of a give-and-take settlement in which we decide what we are prepared to concede and what we want in exchange. But the difficulty from the Government's point of view is that they have to give up some of the things which they cherish very much.
They will not work and are failing, but, never mind, the Government hang on to them. For one thing, they cannot treat Israel any longer as a bargaining counter, an object to be used for appeasing the Arabs. They must treat Israel on the basis of the Charter and make the restoration of peace between Israel and the Arab States one of the cardinal factors in the solution of the Middle Eastern conflict. Then they have to face the fact that the act of nationalising the Suez Canal Company was to a great extent provoked by the withdrawal of the offer relating to the Aswan Dam. We should be prepared to go in for a policy of international economic aid for the Middle East, including the Aswan Dam, in exchange for the Arab States adopting a policy consistent with the Charter and accepting a satisfactory compromise somewhere half-way between the Dulles and Indian plans on the Suez Canal.

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Above all, we should learn to think in terms of giving leadership through the United Nations in new techniques of international relations. Imperialism will not work. We are a third-class Power in that field. But we could be the leaders of all mankind if the political genius of the British people, which has shown itself in the Mother of Parliaments and in the free Commonwealth, would also show itself through the United Nations in working for the development of the United Nations into a system of world government based on the equal rights of all nations.
9.9 p.m.
Mr. Kenneth Younger: After the statement of policy which we had from the Prime Minister this afternoon, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition analysed, in a way in which I think the House found impressive, whether it agreed with it or not, the policies which have been followed in the last six weeks—policies which we on this side of the House think have been very ill-advised and indeed dangerous. The inquest which we have been holding in the House this afternoon on the relatively short period of under two months has shown just how far the Government have managed to make the worst of what could have been essentially a very good case indeed.
I believe that there was at the outset, and perhaps there even could be now, very wide support not only in the country but throughout the world for the good case that can be made over the Suez Canal. Indeed, we have found, not only in this country but in the London Conference and in even wider circles, that there is a general acceptance—at least, an acceptance in words—of the principles for which we profess to stand : the principles of free navigation through this international waterway, of fair dues, of the need for progressive development of the Canal, and so on. It is perfectly clear that Colonel Nasser's action at the end of July gave rise to legitimate fears among all the users of the Canal, which means, in one way and another, almost the whole world, for it involves not only those who are shipping countries but those whose cargoes are carried in the ships.
I think it is generally agreed that the manner of Colonel Nasser's conduct, and
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particularly the speech with which he accompanied his announcement of nationalisation, was little more than an act of international anarchy and was an act of calculated hostility towards the West. On a rather different plane, there has also been some signs that there is a good deal of fear among countries who are not the main users, particularly, perhaps, countries in Asia, who are economically in need of development, about the repercussions of this sort of incident upon the possibility of their getting international investment or international aid. They are all afraid that international aid, on which they are extremely keen and which they want to see expanded, will become more and more the pawn of the political policies of the Powers involved, particularly if incidents of this sort occur.
Therefore, I think there was wide support, in East as well as in West, for a reasonable and firm reaction to what Colonel Nasser did with a view to checking such incidents. The only way in which this general support could be dissipated was to give the impression that we were ready—by "we" I am thinking primarily, but not exclusively, of this country—to reimpose the western domination which until quite recently existed in the area and especially to give the impression that we were, if we thought right, prepared to do this by the use of force unrelated to anything in the Charter of the United Nations with a view to enforcing the conditions which we in our own judgment thought correct. I believe that this was the impression which, wittingly or unwittingly, Her Majesty's Government gave in the early weeks of this story.
Instead of enlisting the widest possible support throughout the world for our case, the Government seem to me to have taken the narrowest possible line. When the announcement was made, for the first few days one might have thought that this was a matter which principally concerned French and British shareholders. The question of the ownership of the shares of the Canal was right in the forefront, at least equal with the much wider issue, which interested a far wider number of countries, of free transit through the Canal. Even later, when the London Conference was called—that was a step we welcomed as an improvement—nevertheless a rather narrow interpretation was

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still put upon the conception of the nations who are interested in free transit through the Canal.
As the House knows, other suggestions were made. One of them, which may have been an extreme one, put up by the Soviet Union, would have expanded the Conference to over 40 nations. Even if we consider that excessive, we can surely agree that the formula adopted by the British, French and American Governments, for the type of nation which was entitled to be consulted in the matter, was a very narrow one. Moreover, the impression was certainly given initially that this group of nations would produce some kind of plan which they would then put to Colonel Nasser with the intention of taking action on their own account if the advance was rejected.
The result of these tactics—there can be no dispute about this because it is a question of fact—was to split the Commonwealth countries, who were found on opposite sides in the Conference itself, and to split the Bagdad Powers. We have always been led to believe that the Bagdad Pact is one of the twin pillars of the Government's policy in the Middle East, although we on this side have never attached as much importance to it as the Government have done. The Bagdad Powers were split on this issue and, in addition, there was a big difference of emphasis between ourselves and the United States. I have quite a large packet of international Press cuttings here to substantiate that statement in case it should be challenged. I do not want to weary the House by reading them unless that is necessary.
It is surely very well known to anybody who has been reading the Press, other than the Press of this country, that there has been great misgiving in many of the most responsible organs of the Press in the United States, and not entirely on account of the American election, although that influences them, and that diplomatic circles in Europe have been worried at the apparent belligerence of Britain and France. In Western Germany, a country almost as highly industrialised as ourselves and almost as dependent upon Middle Eastern oil, there has been not one word of support in the Press, from the extreme right to the extreme left.
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The Government's policy has done much to rally to Colonel Nasser opinion which might otherwise have been very much more favourable to us. Colonel Nasser, who has been compared with Hitler and many other dictatorial characters of the past, can be really dangerous to world peace only if he becomes the spearhead of militant Arab nationalism or if he becomes a Soviet satellite. The policy of recent weeks has done a good deal to help Colonel Nasser to get into both those positions. We should appreciate, when dealing with countries of the Middle East and most of Asia, their nervousness about the possibility of a return to some kind of paternalism on the part of the West. This fear has rallied to Colonel Nasser the whole Arab world, whether inside or outside the Bagdad Pact, and many other countries.
On the question of Egypt's becoming either immediately or gradually a protege of the Soviet Union, we offered an absolutely overwhelming temptations to the Soviet Union. Only a short time ago we were led to believe in this House that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary had reached some kind of understanding on the Middle East with Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev, and there were signs right up to the time of the Aswan Dam affair that the Soviet Union was not anxious only to fish in troubled waters in the Middle East, as had previously been the belief of the Government and many other people.
I doubt whether, if we had stuck to a clear-cut case for the Suez Canal being treated as an international waterway, the Soviet Union would have opposed us. I know that Soviet policies are to some extent incalculable to outsiders but it is doubtful whether, if we had taken that line and gone to the Security Council, the Soviet Union would have voted against us. Because we went so much further than that, we offered to the Soviet Union the overwhelming temptation to ingratiate itself with the Arab world at our expense. I never saw at any international conference a man who appeared to be so much in clover as Mr. Shepilov. He had merely to sit there and offer not a single thing and leave it to the Western Powers to do his work for him.
Nevertheless we regard the London Conference as a step forward and we feel that it did a good job. If one reads the

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world Press, one becomes aware that the credit for this is given far less to us than to the United States. It must be rather odd for the Prime Minister to find Mr. Dulles playing the rôle to him that he was playing to Mr. Dulles at the Geneva Conference on South-East Asia only a short time ago, of trying to pull the reckless finger off the trigger.
I think that the 18-Power plan which emerged from the Conference was one of considerable merit, and I do not think that it has been substantially attacked in any quarter of this House. If it were possible to get international management of the Canal that would, I think, in the view of most people be a progressive step. The trouble was that its chances of acceptance were largely ruined by its being put in the context of the Anglo-French threats, which had been uttered consistently ever since the incident began.
I could not help feeling, when I read the two public statements of the Menzies Committee on its return—that is to say, its own statement and the reply of Colonel Nasser—that in drafting their statement, which I thought was an excellent statement, the Committee had felt it very necessary in the opening paragraphs to lean over backwards to emphasise how friendly it was to Egypt, and that it had had to do so precisely because of the extreme hostility which had been unnecessarily shown by the Prime Minister, particularly in his broadcast.
When one read Colonel Nasser's reply, which had, I think, a number of disingenuous points and, perhaps, even more, certain very important omissions from it, nevertheless one could not help sympathising with what he said about the apparent inconsistency between the honeyed words spoken by the Menzies Committee and the deductions which he was bound to draw from both the words and actions of the British and French Governments.
Most of us on this side feel that the London Conference was all right as a preliminary, but, because of its composition, it had no authority to make any demand on Egypt which could form the basis of action if the demand was refused. Indeed, we regarded it as a start to negotiations and not as an end. I do not see, any more than have any of my
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hon. Friends who have spoken, why there should not be further negotiations.
We have heard that there is a great gap between the two sides—that Mr. Menzies in Cairo made no progress in bringing Colonel Nasser nearer to his point of view—but it does not seem to me that the gap is so enormous. It seems to relate merely to the question of the ownership of the operating agency, and is that, after all, the real nub of the question of obtaining some kind of international guarantee for transit? Surely the ownership of the operating company is not by any means the most important thing.
After all, we are bound to recollect that when the Suez Canal Company was in full control from that point of view, that fact made no difference to the ability of the Government of Egypt to interfere, contrary to the wishes of ourselves and of the United Nations Security Council, with the transit of Israeli ships. That, in itself, surely shows that ownership is not really the crux of the matter. What, I think, is the crux of the matter is that there should be established—and I think established in a modern form and not on the basis of an old Treaty of 1888—a clear international obligation coupled with a sufficient willingness on the part of the parties to the Agreement to enforce it and to see that it is observed ; and the willingness to enforce it, in turn, depends very largely on whether there is sufficient international support for the principles enshrined in the Convention.
If the whole world is, in fact, agreed that this is absolutely essential to international commerce I do not believe that it is beyond the wit of man to establish a system, backed by sufficient sanction to give reasonable security to the users of the Canal. Unfortunately, Her Majesty's Government have gone rather a long way towards selling out the principle of freedom of navigation by their failure to take action when the difficulties related only to Israeli shipping.
I hear the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary saying that we were the Government. It is perfectly true that we were the Government which took that matter to the United Nations. I am not suggesting that our firmness of purpose in this has always been absolutely beyond reproach, but it is true that we left office

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almost immediately after the Resolution had been passed, and the task of implementing it did, undoubtedly, lie with our successors in office. It is also true that we have constantly pressed the Government to take action about this and, indeed, to take a firm line with Egypt over the question of arms and the Israel issue generally.
The plain historical fact is that nothing in those years was done when only a small nation was threatened. Perhaps if right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite are looking for analogies with the pre-war period they may like to think of the analogy between that and what occurred in 1938. Nothing was done when it was only a small nation that was threatened, and then when we felt our own interests involved, instead of giving support to the international organisation charged with collective security, the Government have tried to revert to the out-of-date "go it alone" policies which were familiar many years ago and were, indeed, possible then, as they are no longer possible now.
I do not like carrying too far this analogy with pre-war years, which has run through so many speeches today. To begin with, what we were dealing with in most cases then was actual aggression, actual movements of troops and invasions of territory in the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Surely hon. Members must agree that there is a difference of kind, as well as of degree, between military aggression by force and other methods. Certainly that distinction is clearly made in the Charter, and particularly the distinction is made between remedial military measures and remedial measures of other kinds which bring pressure upon people who are breaking the peace.
The matter upon which we must seek to be consistent is support for collective security through an international authority. Hon. Members opposite have talked as if the thing upon which we must be consistent is always to be willing to use force. But that is surely only a means. Sometimes it may be a question of military force and sometimes it may not. What we should be doing, and what was not done by the Conservative Government before the war and is not being done by them now, is to give full support to the authority of the world organisation.
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We on this side of the House put our emphasis upon the United Nations so strongly, not—as some people seem to think—because we shirk the use of force should that become necessary, but precisely because in a dispute where there is a danger of force, even if only in the last resort, it is essential that that force should be used only within the Charter, and it should receive sanction of some kind, whether from the Security Council or the Assembly through the United Nations. This is essential to the moral position of any power which seeks to take armed action in the modern world. But it is not only a moral question. It is also a question of the degree of international support which one can enlist for any such action. The question whether military sanctions against Egypt are a practicable proposition depends upon what international support we can get.
My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition challenged the Government as to whether they had really thought of the consequences of the sort of military action which was talked about. What was to follow once an initial operation had occurred? The question whether this sort of policy is possible or not depends largely upon what degree of international support there is. There are many countries which would be prepared to support sanctions, even military sanctions, provided they knew that the authority of the United Nations was behind them, but would support them in no other circumstances and would, indeed, oppose them very strongly.
In our earlier debate on this subject at the beginning of August, the Prime Minister seemed to me to brush aside the United Nations as something to which, of course, he gave his moral blessing but as something to which he could not resort when serious British interests were at stake, because it would be ineffective. It struck the country forcibly that the right hon. Gentleman did not refer to the United Nations Organisation in his television broadcast. He referred to the length of time United Nations procedures might take, the possibilities of a veto and so on.
What it seems to add up to is that his Government have reached the conclusion that if there is any risk of a United Nations decision being unacceptable to us we are not even going to

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approach that organisation to see what the decision may be. Any more certain means of sabotaging an international organisation would be difficult to imagine. No doubt, he has realised that the case of the French and the British Governments would not be likely to get the measure of support which would be required in the United Nations, just as I think the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has probably decided that it is not a good idea to take the question of legality of Colonel Nasser's act to the International Court because he is uncertain of the verdict which would be reached there.
The Prime Minister said that he would not exclude reference to the United Nations. That is a crumb of comfort, but I want to ask him whether his new plan, which is a new feature of today's debate, for what he called a users' association is intended as a further effort at a peaceful solution prior to going to the United Nations should it fail.
I do not quite see myself how it could have that effect. It does not seem to me to partake at all of the character of further negotiation. On the face of it the purpose would seem to be to seek to provoke a refusal of transit rights on the part of Egypt and to force Egypt to be the first to take some kind of physical action with regard to the traffic going through the Canal. What purpose that could have except as a prelude to force used on our side, at the moment I do not see. If that is the purpose I am sure that my right hon. and hon. Friends would be utterly opposed to this, especially when it is coupled with the Prime Minister's comment that if cooperation were refused by Egypt he would feel free to take action.
I have only got my own notes and they may not be verbatim, but I think he said that he would feel free to take such action as he might think necessary either through the United Nations or through other means. My right hon. Friend has always expressed his opposition to the use of force outside the Charter. This would be reinforced if the force were to arise out of what would seem to be an engineered incident.
In the very short time available to me I have found it extremely difficult to get a clear idea of what the legal situation
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of this plan is with regard to the Convention. It seems to me at best to be dubious. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will try to clarify this for the benefit of the House. Is it the contention that Egypt is obliged to grant free transit to international shipping not only if the pilots are unconnected with the company controlling the Canal but also if the dues are not paid to any international or Egyptian company or to Egypt but are paid to this newly-formed association? I understood the Prime Minister to be saying that the payments would in fact be made to this newly-formed association.
I should also like to ask certain questions about the origin of the plan. We had an 18-nation plan not so long ago. This apparently is a three-nation plan, so we are told. Were the 18 nations consulted or asked about it? Were they offered the opportunity of joining in? If so, have they all said "No"? I am surprised to find that the United States was said to be in on this on an equal basis. I must accept it if that is stated as a fact, but I should like to ask, in particular, whether the United States are associated not merely with the plan for trying this way of putting traffic through the Canal but also with what the Prime Minister said about being prepared to take such action as is necessary through the United Nations or other means if Egypt refuses co-operation.
Is there a hard and fast agreement not only with the French but with the United States Governments reached on this matter since the Menzies Committee returned? I believe that for the purpose of our debate tomorrow the House is entitled to have answers to these questions.
In conclusion, we stick to the view which we have never ceased to express that this is a matter which should be referred to the United Nations. We think that the time has come now for it to be referred, and referred not just for the information of the President of the Security Council, which apparently is what the Government are doing, but in order to get negotiations going and to try to recover some of the world's support which has been lost in these intervening weeks. We on this side cannot support the delay which the Prime Minister talked of in going to the United

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Nations, especially since the Prime Minister has told us that he proposes to employ the time not with a serious attempt at further negotiation but with this ill-conceived and, it seems to me, provocative scheme which he announced today.
The conduct of the Government in these six weeks has very gravely damaged Britain's international reputation without so far shaking Colonel Nasser at all. It is a fact—it is not just my belief—that they have united neither the country nor the Commonwealth nor our Allies in support of them and, in particular, not in support of their threats of force. Having failed to do that, frankly I do not believe that they can use force even if they want to.
I believe that we are heading rather for a diplomatic disaster due to the Government's incompetence. It is only by changing course now, with very little more delay, that we can save the country from paying the price of that incompetence.
9.35 p.m.
Sir Robert Boothby: I think that it is a matter for great regret that this issue, which is one of the greatest which has confronted the country for a very long time, has been made a party issue in the debate today. [HON. MEMBERS : "No."] I had hoped that that would not be the case, and I think that many other people in the country had hoped that it would not be the case. I was fortified in my hope by reading a most interesting article by the hon. Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) over the weekend, in which he said :
"The Labour Government sowed the seeds in the Middle East of the harvest of hate which Sir Anthony Eden has been reaping."
If that is really the case, it seems to me that perhaps both sides of the House are a little to blame for the present situation.
Mr. Crossman: One has repented but the other has not.
Sir R. Boothby: It is perhaps a greater crime to sow the seed than to reap the harvest. It was they who ran away from their obligations in Palestine, leaving the Jews to fight for survival at odds of 20 to 1.
Mr. S. Silverman: What were the Tory Party doing about that?
Sir R. Boothby: Their best. The hon. Gentleman and myself were working together in those days, and we nearly produced a result ; in fact, we did help to produce a result. But it was they who did it, and they who left in the Middle East the festering sore of the refugee problem. It was they, too, who did much to encourage the spirit of rabid nationalism in the Arab world ; and, more particularly, in Egypt. To be absolutely fair, I cannot completely exculpate Her Majesty's Government from all past misdemeanours, although I think that the Government of the United States are even more to blame for the situation in which we now find ourselves.
The Nasser story would be incredible if it were not true. He was put there by the American Ambassador in Cairo. His ban on Israeli ships was acquiesced in by all, despite the order of the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation. Arms were given to him and denied to Israel. And all this time he was working against us in the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Jordan and Syria ; and beaming anti-British propaganda at every part of Africa and Arabia within range. He then buys Communist arms and is rewarded with the offer of a loan for the Aswan Dam. The offer is then precipitably withdrawn ; whereupon he seizes the Suez Canal. I am content to recite these bare facts.
It seems to me that there are two basic lessons to be drawn from these startling events. The first is that it is really the absence of effective Anglo-American cooperation which has been, and is, the primary cause of the present decline of the West ; and the crumbling of the Western defence system, not only in the Middle East but in south Asia and the eastern Mediterranean. Instead of acting together in advance of events, we have reacted separately as events have caught up on us.
The United States of America even refused to join the Bagdad Pact, although the original conception of a "northern tier" was that of Mr. Dulles ; and the only practical result of the Washington Conference last January was to take the guts out of the Tripartite Declaration. We did not really get co-operation there.
The second lesson, I believe, is even more fundamental. It is that the nationalism which has been developing in this century is a bad and not a good

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thing. The hon. Member for Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus) came very near to admitting that in his speech. I believe that the rabid nationalism which is now developing is reactionary and atavistic—a revolt against the demands of the modern world and of life itself, and is used by the Communists for their own purposes, to the point at which it has become an intrinsic part of the Communist dialectic.
I share the views of the hon. Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) expressed in an admirable letter which he wrote to The Times two or three days ago. I believe that insistence on absolute State sovereignty is a primary cause of the evils which now confront us all, and that the only solution lies in a merging or pooling of national sovereignty ; not so much the surrender as the joint exercise, by common consent, of defined sovereign powers by international authorities in the interests not of one nation but of all nations. That, as it seems to me, is what the Government are now seeking to do ; and is what should be the fundamental principle on which their actions and policy should be based.
I would go further than that, and say that this doctrine applies to Europe as well as to the Middle East ; and I agree with the hon. Member for Coventry, East, who referred to this matter, particularly his comment that the record of the Government of his own party had not been too happy in this matter of effective international co-operation.
I also think that this doctrine applies to oil. The hon. Member said we must now make a new approach, when this Suez Canal thing is out of the light one way or another—a new approach to the whole problem of oil in the Middle East ; and he suggested taking it over from the national Governments in the Middle East—
Mr. Crossman: The production.
Sir R. Boothby: the production—and that we should equally take over the distribution. I believe that he is behind the times. I believe that the only solution to the problem of oil production in the Middle East is international action at every level ; and I believe it for one reason, that no country—including this country—now has the capital available that will be necessary to develop those oil
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fields over the next few years, about £600 million or perhaps even £1,000 million. That will demand an international rather than a purely national effort. So I think that the hon. Member for Coventry, East did not go far enough.
Now let me bring the House back for a moment to the issue which confronts us tonight. There has been much talk about Nasser. I do not think there is any use in blinking the facts. Nasser is a dictator. I do not think he would himself claim to be anything else. His methods certainly cannot be condoned by us. He has established in Egypt a police State. In November last he declared that the Egyptian Government had full confidence in the attitude of the Suez Canal Company. In June he came to a new agreement with it. In July he described it as an instrument of imperialism inside Egypt, plotting against his country's freedom and sapping her blood ; and said he was going to take action against "the pirates" who were responsible for this. He then proceeded to seize the Canal—the Prime Minister was perfectly right on that : "seize" is the correct word, and there is no other—by unilateral action, without any consultation with anybody : not even, according to what I think are valid reports, with members of his own Administration.
That is, whether we like it or not, the language of Hitler and the rule of the jungle ; and if we were to allow him to get away with it, it would be a most damaging blow to the whole conception of international law and every ideal for which the hon. Member for Gorton has fought throughout his life.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East challenged the Government and the House and said, "I want to know, and I want a plain answer, do you regard Nasser as a dictator like Hitler and as the sort of man, therefore, that you cannot conduct negotiations with under any circumstances? Is your policy, therefore, simply designed to overthrow him at all costs? Or are you prepared, in certain circumstances, to negotiate?".
I say that Nasser is a dictator, but I think it could be possible to negotiate with him under certain conditions, and I believe that these may well come about. One reason why I say this is because I agree with the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) that ownership is not the crux of this problem.

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We agree to the ownership of the Canal by Egypt. What matters—and after all is it not what matters in industry today?—is not ownership but control. That is the vital point. It is the international control of the Canal that we are after.
We are prepared to give Nasser the ownership of the Canal. We are prepared not to impinge to any extent upon his legitimate sovereign rights. We are even prepared, in Mr. Menzies' own words, to put him in a position whereby he will be relieved from all responsibility for the future maintenance and development of the Canal, which will cost a tremendous amount. Further we are prepared to allow Egypt to be the only country in the world to make a profit out of the Canal. That is the essence of the Menzies proposals which in Mr. Menzies' own words are based—perhaps I should now say were based—upon the legitimate sovereign rights of Egypt.
I say perfectly sincerely that since the crisis developed I do not think the Government's handling of it can be faulted. I believe that with absolute sincerity, in spite of all that has been said by hon. Gentlemen opposite. I think that the London Conference, disparaged by many people to begin with, was a quite startling success ; and I would like to pay my personal tribute to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the manner in which he handled it, a tribute which has been endorsed by everybody who took part in that Conference.
I think the Menzies mission was dead right. I think the Prime Minister was perfectly right in saying that it would not have been advisable just to transmit the recommendations of the 18 Powers to Colonel Nasser, and a copy perhaps to the United Nations organisation, and to let it go at that. I think he was right to send the Menzies mission, and I think that the mission itself was well chosen. I have not heard it suggested on either side of the House that it was not. Nobody can say that Mr. Menzies did not play his part with tact and with infinite patience. He put the case well. It is not true, as has been suggested, to say that he did not consult, the representatives of the 18 Powers. He consulted them before he left, he consulted their ambassadors in Cairo when he was there, and he consulted them again when he got back.
Now we have a new proposition put forward by the Prime Minister, the Canal
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users' association. I am not—unfortunately for them—a member of Her Majesty's Government—[Laughter]—perhaps I should add, and for the country. It does not, therefore, devolve on me to give a detailed explanation of the Canal users' association plan. I will leave that to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
However I say to the hon. Member for Coventry, East that he cannot have it both ways. In the course of his speech, a fascinating speech as always, the hon. Gentleman said at one moment that we were in collusion in this plan with the United States to provoke an incident which might lead to war. And almost before the words were out of his mouth he was saying that President Eisenhower was so determined to prevent the use of force that, if we attempted to use it, he would order us out of the Canal.—[An HON. MEMBER : "Within 48 hours."] He cannot have it both ways. We cannot be in collusion with President Eisenhower to provoke a war, and at the same time stand ready to be thrown out of the Canal by him. One or the other, but not both. As he so often does, the hon. Gentleman chose both.
I believe that this proposal could result in negotiations. I agree with the leading article in the Star tonight, which says :
"Unless Nasser is quite regardless of his country's interests and is merely a power-crazed dictator, he must surely agree to negotiate on the basis of this Western plan."
That is what the Star says tonight about the Canal users' association.
The United States is back with us. That is a tremendous thing, and it may well be the prelude to that effective cooperation with the United States in the future which has been so tragically lacking in the past.
France is with us, and I do really object to the disparaging tone in which the hon. Member for Coventry, East, spoke about France. France is an old ally. We have been through some rough times together in this century. France is a very great country, and has finely backed us up throughout this crisis, and has not been provocative or difficult, but steady and helpful at all stages. One can laugh at France. One may abuse France. But in fact France is Europe. If we do not get on with France, there can be no hope of any form of European

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unity in the future. Not only is France with us but all the 18 countries which are the principal users of the Canal are also with us, and I say without fear of contradiction that that is a great achievement.
Many references have been made in this debate to the United Nations organisation, and I should like to recall what the Prime Minister said. My right hon. Friend said that France and ourselves had jointly written a letter to the President of the Security Council drawing his attention to the Suez Canal problem. He added that it places us in a position to ask for urgent action if that becomes necessary. I do not see how we could have gone beyond that, in view of this new canal users' association, this new plan which must certainly be tried before this matter is formally presented to the United Nations. [HON. MEMBERS : "Why?"] Because it is part of the Charter of the United Nations that any country should make its own efforts at conciliation in negotiations before it brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council.
I would only say that I am all in favour of it. I have always expressed the view that this matter cannot be finally settled without reference to the Security Council ; but, for goodness sake, let us bear in mind that the Security Council is subject to the Russian veto, and that its fiat in connection with Israeli shipping has been blatantly disregarded for years ; and that the Assembly as such has no power to give any authority for international action. It can only make recommendations. Do not let us delude ourselves that the United Nations, as such, can easily solve this problem.
One word about the pilots. We have twice asked the pilots to stay on, despite the fact that they have been threatened with imprisonment, and I do not think we can do so any longer. I do not honestly think that we can force people to remain in jobs against their will, and I think that the Canal Company has been perfectly right to say that the pilots must now be allowed to do what they themselves wish to do. I do not believe that one can force people to remain in jobs indefinitely under the threat of imprisonment if they do not wish to do so. I do not think that that is really a tenable proposition on either side of the House.
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What is at stake? It is not simply the future of this country as a great Power. It is not simply the control or mastery of the Middle East—to use the words of the Leader of the Opposition—it is the whole industrial future of Western Europe, and ultimately of the Western world. The Leader of the Opposition gave some figures about oil this afternoon, and suggested that if the Canal was closed it would involve an increase of only a penny a gallon in the price of petrol. I have made some inquiries of the oil people since then, and they say that if we add to the increase in freight charges the additional refineries and wharfage that would be necessary, the figure would be more likely to be an increase of fivepence over a period of two or three years. In addition, by 1961 the United States will be importers of oil. What shall we do then, if we lose the oil of the Middle East? I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. Bevan) is not here ; he is very sound on this oil business.
I further say that the Canal is vital for the East as well as for the West. If this business were to end in a paralysis of the Canal, India would suffer just as much as we should, and perhaps more. Therefore, I say that a guaranteed system, free from politics, is essential ; and that we can accept no other solution.
The hon. Member for Coventry, East said that he found it difficult to draw, a distinction between an international agreement and a purely national undertaking by Nasser, because unless we had troops there, there was no difference between the two. Carried to its logical conclusion, that means, if it means anything, that all international agreements are perfectly valueless unless there are troops standing about to enforce them at any given place. To claim that an international agreement is of no greater value than a purely national undertaking is nonsense. Hon. Members will be able to read the hon. Gentleman's remarks clearly set out in HANSARD tomorrow.
I do not believe that the Arab States are panting to come under Nasser's domination. They are waiting to see how things go. If he gets away with this, his prestige will get a big boost. It has been asked : would he use his power, then, to blackmail the West and bully the Middle East? The Daily Express, with which I do not always agree, gave the answer this

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morning : "Did Hitler use his power, after seizing the Rhineland, to blackmail France and Britain while he grabbed Austria and Czechoslovakia?" I only wish the Daily Express had said that at the time, but better late than never.
I would remind the House that this time there is a sharp difference. On Nasser's own showing, Israel is next on the list. But, as against Czechoslovakia, Israel will fight. Therefore, if we run away from this problem, what shall we do then? I do not think that any hon. Member will be prepared to stand by and see the State of Israel destroyed with Communist arms ; but if we allow Nasser to get away with this action, that is the inevitable next step.
So far as Nasser is concerned, I believe that we must stand absolutely firm on the principles which have been laid down by the Prime Minister. We have both been in this House a very long time. [HON. MEMBERS : "Too long."] I do not agree. We were very young and bright when we first came here, and now we are getting our second wind.
We went through all this in the 1930s, and it was not much fun. Shameless appeasement does not really pay. We are not going to get anything much out of it. There are many steps, judicious steps, which we can take at the present time, apart from the Canal altogether, in the way of building tankers and, possibly, of constructing a pipeline from Iran through Turkey to the coast. Those things should be done ; but at the same time, on the basic issue of the international, non-political control of the Canal, I believe that we must, and should, stand absolutely firm
As I listened to the Prime Minister this afternoon, I thought of what Nasser had been saying about what he was going to do to establish an Arab empire from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, and how he was going to eliminate Israel altogether. That is all in his speeches, and in a horrible little book called "A Philosophy of Revolution", which is like a potted edition of "Mein Kampf". As I heard the Prime Minister speaking, I said to myself, "Well, thank goodness, at any rate we shall not have to go through all that again", and we shall not.
It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

RESERVISTS (CALL-UP)
Motion made, and Question proposed. That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]
10.0 p.m.
Mr. George Wigg: It is a reflection upon our times that since 2nd August this country has been in a state of mobilisation. Forty-odd years ago it was similar mobilisations which set in train the events which led to the First World War. I do not intend tonight to have an inquest upon all our defence preparations. That will come later. The House will have many opportunities for that on the Supplementary Estimates and perhaps some of my right hon. Friends might seek a debate upon the Government's preparations for defence.
Today the House has been discussing whether we should use force. I am a little doubtful whether, even if the Government had set about the job some six weeks ago, we should have been able to do all that we think they wanted to do, for there are certain quite marked deficiencies. There are deficiencies in tank landing craft and transport aircraft and our position regarding long-range fighter aircraft leaves much to be desired.
However, there is one aspect of this problem which must be probed before the House again adjourns. That is the topic of manpower. Somewhere tonight are about 20,000 men who have been taken from their homes, their businesses and their families and who are wondering when they will get back again. Between the wars there were three occasions, in 1921 during a strike, in 1927 at the time of the Shanghai crisis and in 1936 on the occasion of the Arab revolt when we called up Section A of the Army Reserve. On some of those occasions we had scenes which were not a credit to the Army, because, to put it in a nutshell, the troops got "browned off". Nothing I say tonight should be taken as condoning anything of that kind. These men have been called up to do their duty, and whatever we think of the Government's policy, these men are doing their duty and doing a vital job in loyally carrying out orders.
Much has happened of which the House does not seem to be aware. Not only have Section A reservists been

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called up, but National Service men who should have been released have not been released. I do not think that that applies to men in this country, nor to those in the Middle East, because plenty of empty transport is coming back and the Government have no difficulty in bringing those men home. However, I am sure that there are National Service men in the Far East in that position. If the present situation continues for any time, that number will grow.
The Government have been forced to take the very difficult decision to "freeze" Regular men due for release. That is a very serious step indeed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) had to take the same step at the time of the Korean war. If one calls up reserves, one cannot release Regulars and even if one did, one could play a trick and call them up the next day and the troops would soon see through that.
The fact is that in every unit of the Army today are men who have grievances against the Service, who have decided to go, but who cannot leave. If there is a single thing which has "cooked" Regular recruiting from 1950 onwards it is that the memory of the "freeze" still remains and now the Government have had to do it again. I hope that when the right hon. Gentleman replies he will tell us something about the plans for the release of National Service men. How many are being held? How long does he anticipate that they will be held? What steps have the Government in mind to get things back to an even keel? Above all, the right hon. Gentleman must tell the men what will happen to them. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will tell us the number of Regulars who have been "frozen" since the date the "freeze" was introduced up to 31st August, and perhaps he would be good enough to give the House an idea of how many men per month he thinks will be "frozen" as long as this is necessary.
The House ought to have a look at some of the other problems which are thrown up as a result of the decision to call up Section A. First of all, how large is Section A itself? I have no doubt that on this point I shall "buy a coconut." The Government will not give me the information and so I will give it to
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them. First of all, I fall back on General Cobb. Time and time again I quote him in the House. He is a man of whom the Army should be very proud. He knows a great deal about its manpower problems.
At the time of Korea we called up 4,500. How many of them were from Section A I do not know. Between the wars we had a Section B of about 80,000 and we called up under 4,000 on the three occasions when Section A was recalled.
At the moment, we have about 169,000 National Service men serving in the Army Emergency Reserve and there are about 3,000 volunteers who have accepted a liability for recall. I would, therefore, like to have a little bet of sixpence that the Section A recall figure in the present emergency is not greater than 4,000. If I am right, then we have a problem which is rather worrying, for when the Prime Minister made his announcement that it would be necessary to recall not only Section A but Section B, together with the Army Emergency Reserve, he spoke of the recall of a "limited number" and when the Secretary of State for War spoke he talked about the recall of a "small number".
What, then, is the real figure recalled? I rely for my information upon the authority of the Daily Telegraph, a thoroughly reliable newspaper, particularly on military matters, for its Military Correspondent, General Martin, gets more "leaks" than anybody in the business. The Daily Telegraph last week gave a figure of 20,000 as the number of reservists recalled. It seems to me, therefore, that if that figure is right and Section A is not larger than 4,000, the number recalled has neither been "small" nor "limited".
When the Government announced their intention to call out the Army Reserve I had a pretty shrewd idea of the kind of categories they would want. For instance, they would require a number of men at the Royal Engineer Port Unit at Marchwood, but I thought, and indeed I said to the House, that the numbers involved would appear to be in terms of tens or hundreds.
I thought in small numbers for I related what was happening to the Korean operation and the occasions between the wars when similar steps were necessary. It

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seems to me, therefore, that the Government have been caught out. I will not convenience Colonel Nasser by telling him the results of my researches, but I believe that fifteen major units have left the country since the emergency began and in addition a 3rd Division has been built up to some sort of operational level.
In raising this matter I am as concerned as the Secretary of State for War about the morale of the Army and the reservists. There must be in all about 240,000 reservists. There is no secret about it. There is the Ministry of Defence Statement of 22nd August which gives the number on the A.E.R. Then in the Abstract of Statistics for 1955 the strength of Section B is given as 70,000. Therefore there is a total strength of about 240,000. Therefore, if the right hon. Gentleman is still calling up men, if the word goes round that letters are still being put into the postbox fetching men back to the Colours, the degree of uncertainty must continue over the whole range of these 240,000 men.
I want, therefore, to ask the right hon. Gentleman two questions, the second of which I consider to be the most important question asked in the House today. First, what was the last date upon which a reservist was asked to join the Colours as a result of the Secretary of State's original announcement? Secondly, when questioned on 2nd August, the right hon. Gentleman gave the House an assurance that men would not be called beyond the scope which the Prime Minister himself indicated. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War told the House that neither the range nor the numbers of the call-up would be extended without the House being recalled. That puts the House and the Opposition in a delicate position.
Will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that no more reservists will be called up? If they are to be called up—the right hon. Gentleman has fetched back about 20,000 Section B and 4,000 Section A men—he still has another 230,000 to play with. The Opposition will have lost their safeguard, because they had an assurance that no more men would be called up until the House had been recalled. Now the House has been brought back.
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I am not suggesting that the right hon. Gentleman will "pull any quick ones". In the past, he and I have had our differences. I am on to a different point and I want to defend the War Office, and I will move to a field in which it needs to be defended. I do not think that the actual mobilisation scheme itself has been found to be wanting. A number of the complaints—I get my share—which I have examined have shown the War Office in a very good light.
I want to mention three definite categories. First, when the mobilisation scheme began, there were a number of complaints from agricultural workers ; the weather were extremely bad and a considerable number of men were being fetched back. Before shedding any tears, however, one needs to remember that a considerable number of these boys who were moaning had accepted 1s. 6d. a day for this obligation. All the Section A reservists, if private soldiers, got 1s. 6d. a day. The Army Estimates show how the scale rises.
Turning to the Army Emergency Reserve, three of the categories were also volunteers and they get bounties and additional pay. Those in Section 2A, of course, are National Service men. I should like to know from the right hon. Gentleman how many National Service men in this category have been fetched back. The position of these men seems to me to be rather bad. They have had neither bounty—but I must be careful or I shall be treading ground which requires legislation to correct it, and that would be out of order. I will not ask the right hon. Gentleman for anything more than the numbers involved. How many men have been fetched back in Section 2A?
I think that the War Office and the National Farmers' Union did a very good job in relation to the agricultural workers who were fetched back and concerning whom hardship was caused. The matter was attended to with a great deal of sympathy and understanding. I had instances also of men whose wives and parents were sick. The system worked extremely well. All that a man had to do was to go to the Ministry of Labour Employment Exchange, when he would be allowed 14 days while the matter was investigated and then the War Office

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would take its decision. The system worked well.
In another case, I consider that the War Office did extremely well. I mention this because I want also to criticise a newspaper, the News Chronicle, which, in accordance with its normal procedure, was both late and wrong. It got hold of a letter which had been written to The Times concerning an officer named Birtwhistle. Mr. Birtwhistle was a member of the Regular Army Reserve of Officers. He had volunteered and, therefore, there was no grumble on that score.
As soon as I read of this matter, I telephoned to the headmaster. I got in touch with the right hon. Gentleman's private secretary. The same day, the War Office took steps to release the man, and the Secretary of State for War has been kind enough to tell me that the man has been released. So far, so good. The fault was with the Minister of Education. I do not ask the right hon. Gentleman to agree with me on that, but the people who were at fault in not looking at the problem were those in the Ministry of Education.
I want to give the right hon. Gentleman as much time to reply as I have had, because I have asked him a number of questions. I would like him to find time to tell us the comparable figures for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, although I do not think that this problem touches the other two Services very much. It is primarily an Army problem. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will also bear in mind my main object in raising this matter. Many of the reservists will be reading this debate, even if they have never read a debate before in their lives, because their return to their homes depends upon what the House of Commons decides. It is most appropriate that both sides of the House should show some concern for these men who, whatever we may think of the policy of the Government, are engaged in doing their duty.
10.17 p.m.
The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head): I am obliged to the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for the responsible way in which he has raised the problem which, whatever hon. Gentlemen may think about the policy of the Government, had to be brought about, and
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which involves a disturbance in the lives of a considerable number of men.
I am only too well aware of the reluctance, difficulty and domestic problems associated with a call-up of reservists. Speaking merely from my own point of view and from what I know, which is, I admit, limited, I am entitled to say that I admire the general spirit in which this unwelcome recall has been taken, and I believe that the House as a whole would like to admire it. There has been a remarkable absence of real complaint or of obstruction to its execution.
It would be right, in replying to the hon. Gentleman, to give a general outline of the problem and to say what we have been doing. The first important thing is that the House should have some appreciation of the size of the call-up and of the field from which it has been taken—we now enter a somewhat technical matter—which concerns solely the Army.
The field from which the call-up has been taken is, first, Section A of the Regular Army Reserve. This consists entirely of men who have volunteered to be in the Regular Army Reserve or who have been designated, as the hon. Gentleman said, into it. Secondly, there are those who belong to Category I of the Army Emergency Reserve. These are solely volunteers. It is not within the capacity of the War Office to designate men into that category. Both of these categories can be called up without Proclamation and are the main sources from which the call-up has been taken.
The hon. Member said he doubted whether I could give figures. I have gone carefully into the question of giving figures. Although I may not be believed, it is, nevertheless, a fact that I always cross-question the War Office very carefully about any obstruction to the giving of figures. I am convinced that to give figures in this case would not be wise, so I have turned them into percentages. The ceiling of these reserves is laid down in the Estimates and I can say that we are not a very long way below them, so that is going some way.
Of Section A of the Regular Army Reserve we have called up about 60 per cent. Of A.E.R. 1, that is, the volunteers within the Army Emergency Reserve, we have called up about 50 per cent. That is the scope of the call-up

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which involves those who are volunteers or are within the scope of designation and liable to call-up without Proclamation.
I now turn to the call-ups which are outside these spheres. There is Section B of the Regular Army Reserve, of which we have called up about 7 per cent., and there is Category II of the Army Emergency Reserve of which we have called up under 3 per cent. I hope that that gives an indication that the vast majority of the recall has been of those who are either volunteers or designated, and who, in both cases, are paid because they are within the scope of recall. Of the remainder outside Section B and A.E.R. II and Section A and A.E.R. I we have not called up any one at all. The numbers there, as the hon. Member has said, are very large indeed, but no one has been recalled outside the categories I have mentioned. Nor, unless most unexpected conditions obtain, will there be any recall within that field.
Mr. Charles Royle: Would the Minister say what percentage of National Service men has been called up, compared with other reservists?
Mr. Head: I am coming to that. Hon. Members always say, "I am coming to that" but I really am coming to it.
The next point I think I should mention is that when the Proclamation was announced in this House I stated, and the Prime Minister stated, that the reason was that we particularly and essentially needed certain specialists within A.E.R. II, and that their numbers were limited. They are strictly limited, and I think that I have given an indication by saying that under 3 per cent. of A.E.R. II have been recalled. They are specialists, and by any present expectations it is most unlikely that any more will be recalled within that category.
The point raised by the hon. Member, as to our expectations on the future recall of reservists is, in the present situation, obviously a difficult question for me to answer. If our present policy of trying to settle this matter by negotiation succeeds, there will obviously be no cause for any further recall of reservists except, possibly, that occasioned by wastage. If, on the other hand, it turns to active operations, there is the whole question of first reinforcements and extra administrative backing. My answer, therefore, is that
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if there is no necessity for military operations there will be negligible further recall. If, on the other hand, military operations are required, the whole question of first reinforcements and further administrative units arises. I do not think that anybody would expect me to go further than that in that respect.
On the question of speed, the hon. Gentleman—and I am entirely with him—said to me, "You must give an undertaking to the House that you will do it as quickly as possible." He is quite correct. No one wants to leave in suspense as to whether they are to be called up more people than necessary. Of the total number we have recalled to date—which, I may say, has not appreciably exceeded the number we originally anticipated calling up when the House met on 2nd August—by 7th August we had called up 70 per cent.; by 14th August we had called up 80 per cent.; and the complete total was reached some time about the end of August.
It is true that there has been a gradual call-up of very small numbers since then, but we introduced the call-up by only calling up the exact number we needed without, so to speak, aiming for a surplus. Had we done that it would have been wasteful in so far that a number of those found to be unfit, or in reserved occupations, or for other reasons exempted from call-up, are specialists. Therefore, it would have been wasteful to call up an overall surplus. We waited until we could see what the surplus was, and then, having found the deficiency, we called up replacements within their special categories. I believe that that was right and that it avoided calling up more men than were necessary.
Mr. Wigg: Have the others been warned?
Mr. Head: Nobody has been warned. Either a man is called up or is not called up. The question of warning does not arise.
The next point I ought to mention is the question of screening. It is well known that a certain number of men have received their notices and have been either deferred or let off. People say that it is very stupid to call them up because in civilian life they were farmers, policemen, miners, and so forth.
Mr. Emrys Hughes: And doctors.
Mr. Head: Yes, and doctors.
I think that I should say a word or two about this. First, there is the Regular Army Reserve, Sections A or B. It has for long been laid down and is accepted that within the Regular Army Reserve—men who have been Regular soldiers—nobody is deferred. As it happens, since that original ruling was made, it was felt that it would be stupid for men who had been Regulars, and especially for the shorter terms, to be recalled when they are in certain essential jobs. Therefore, policemen, firemen, miners, and so on, have not been recalled although they have been Regulars.
Next, there is the A.E.R., consisting of the National Service men and those who have a liability which is entirely voluntary. They are screened by the Ministry of Labour and National Service during the first five months after they have left the Colours. The Ministry of Labour and National Service goes through them all and takes out anybody who is within the Ministry's screening list of reserved occupations. They are not available.
We called up these men in A.E.R. II and we caught some whom we ought not to have called up. The fault lies mainly, though not entirely, in the fact that a man does not notify a change of occupation after the first five months of his leaving the Colours. He goes out of the Army and is screened by the Ministry of Labour and National Service. He changes to a new job ; he is in a reserved occupation and is then called up. Directly he is called up, the Ministry which sponsors him or he himself may apply for deferment. He is then given 14 days' deferment from being called up. The case is then considered—
Mr. Wigg: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not forget my point about the "freeze."
Mr. Head: The hon. Gentleman has raised this subject, and if he wishes me to deal with the "freeze" in the remaining time I will do so.
The position is this. We have in the Army two categories of Regulars—the 22-year man who has completed his service and is pensionable, and the man who has completed any period less than that—all the engagements right down to three and four years. Our principle has been to let the 22-year man go unless he is vital to some local situation. The remainder we have "frozen" for the reasons which the hon. Gentleman has stated. It is running at about 3,000 a month in the Army, 500 a month in the Navy, and 250 a month in the Air Force.
In the case of National Service men, the delay is much less than I expected. I expected a big pile-up. There is no delay in the Middle East, Germany or Kenya. There is a delay building up in the Far East. At the moment it is only about 8, but by 18th October it will be 608. We are trying as far as we can to reduce that number, but at present there is no long delay in returning National Service men who should be released.
Mr. Royle: May I have the information for which I asked—the percentage of National Service men called up as compared to the total number of men called up?
Mr. Head: I am coming to that. The total number of National Service men called up all fall within the category—
The Question having been proposed at Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned at half-past Ten o'clock.

BRITISH ARMY
  Tea (Purchases)
  Tea (Purchases)
ROYAL AIR FORCE
  Binbrook Aerodrome (Road)
  Binbrook Aerodrome (Road)
Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, having been called together by the Lord Chancellor, in pursuance of the Resolution of the 9th June, 1955: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord Cottesloe—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
2.38 p.m.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords. before we start the Business of the Day, your Lordships will no doubt wish to know what arrangements the Government are proposing for these emergency meetings of the House. A large number of your Lordships; have notified y our intention of speaking in the debate on the Suez Canal situation, which will extend over to-clay and tomorrow. We expect to rise at about 7 o'clock each day.
Noble Lords opposite have already, I understand, given notice of their wish to debate the situation in Cyprus. We have arranged, therefore, to meet on Friday morning at 11 o'clock. There will be no adjournment for luncheon, and we shall hope to conclude these emergency Sittings at about 4 o'clock on Friday afternoon, when we shall adjourn once more until Tuesday, October 23. The arrangements for a further recall, of course, if this should become necessary, are governed by the Sessional Standing Order which can always he invoked.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, I would ask permission to ask a Question of Her Majesty's Government by Private Notice. The Question is as follows: Whether, before to-morrow's debate, they will issue a statement showing the method by which the Government controls the British financial interest in the Suez Canal Company, the terms of the contract with the pilots, any communications from the company concerning their
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relation to the now Authority, and, in particular, any money offers made to them.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I hope very much that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, will understand if I arrange for his Question to be answered by one of the Government speakers during the debate. I received notice of his Question only shortly before luncheon, and of course it requires careful consideration and careful inquiry. I can assure the noble Viscount that I will see that his points are considered and dealt with in the, debate.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am extremely grateful to the noble Marquess. I took this unusual course only because I was anxious that before to-morrow exact information should be in the possession of the House.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: We will tell the noble Viscount anything we can.

THE SUEZ CANAL
2.40 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords. your Lordships will remember that on August 2 last, when we last discussed the topic of Colonel Nasser's action in forcibly taking over the assets and activities of the Suez Canal Company.. Opposition Parties, both in your Lordships' House and in another place, asked the Government to give an undertaking that they would call Parliament together if events required. or if there was anything definite to report. That undertaking, as your Lordships know, the Government readily gave, and it is in virtue of that undertaking that we are meeting this afternoon.
I have thought, and I hope that the House will agree, that in these circumstances it will be for your Lordships' convenience if I start the proceedings by making a statement on the events that have occurred since we met last, and if I explain, so far as I am in a position to do so, the views of Her Majesty's Government on the issues raised by Colonel Nasser's action in the light of those events. The House will remember the position as it existed on August 2. Only

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seven days had passed since Colonel Nasser had proceeded against the Suez Canal Company, and the critical situation to which his action had given rise was at that moment still under urgent discussion by the Foreign Secretary, M. Pineau and Mr. Dulles, who had come to London for that purpose. No conclusions to the deliberations had yet been announced, and therefore I was in no position to say anything about further plans. Had I been able to do so, I feel sure that my words would have been received with general satisfaction by the House, for the decision that the three Foreign Ministers reached, as your Lordships will remember, was in full accord both with common sense and with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It was to call a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of those countries which were principally concerned with the conduct of the Canal. These were, of course, the signatories of the 1888 Convention, so far as these still existed, and the chief users of the Canal both in the way of shipping passing through and in the way of goods that were carried.
It has been suggested in some quarters that an even wider circle of nations ought to have been invited, but the object of this conference, as we all know, was to produce practical constructive results, and for that purpose I suggest that what was clearly needed was not a vast heterogeneous gathering of nations, many of whom had no personal knowledge or direct interest in the problem, but a smaller body of representatives of countries with personal experience of the Canal. That was in full accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, which, as your Lordships will remember, states:
"The parties to any dispute. the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation. conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."
That is exactly what was done with regard to the conference which was called at that time. Twenty-two invitations were sent out and twenty acceptances were received. Only two of those who were invited refused—that is, Egypt and Greece—and all the rest, including Russia, came.
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The deliberations lasted seven days, and, at the end of this conference, all eighteen nations, including all the main users of the Canal. agreed on the terms of a resolution which, in the main, was based on the draft which is known as the Dulles Plan, but with amendments by Ethiopia, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. In short, this Plan was as follows—and though I expect most of your Lordships know it, I make no apology for repeating it because I think that it should be in the records of this House.
First, the eighteen countries affirm that, as stated in the Preamble of the Convention of 1888, there should be established "a definite system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez maritime Canal." Secondly, such a system would be established with due regard to the sovereign rights of Egypt. Thirdly, it should assure, first, the efficient and dependable operation, maintenance, and development of the Canal as a free, open and secure international waterway, in accordance with the principles of the 1888 Convention; secondly, the insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation; thirdly, a return to Egypt for the use of the Suez Canal which would be fair and equitable, and increasing with enlargements of its capacity and greater use; and, lastly, Canal tolls which would be as low as was consistent with the foregoing requirements, and, except for what went to Egypt, would allow for no profit. I am afraid that I have put these main points extremely briefly, but I think they cover the main characteristics of this scheme.
The Plan went on to say that to achieve these results a Convention should be nogotiated with Egypt. This Convention would set up a Suez Canal Board which would be responsible for operating, maintaining and developing the Canal and enlarging it so as to increase the volume of traffic in the interests of world trade and of Egypt. The members of the Board, in addition to Egypt, should be other States chosen from among the States party to the Convention, with due regard to use, pattern of trade and geographical distribution. The Board would make periodic reports to United Nations.

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That was the scheme, and I am sure that it will be agreed by everybody that it is a remarkable example of international collaboration for the purpose of trying to find the solution for what I think, in the fullest sense of the term, is an international problem. I am sure that your Lordships in all parts of the House would like me to pay tribute to the notable skill and patience which was shown by the Foreign Secretary, on whom, as the Conference Chairman, fell the main burden for the conduct of a Conference which produced such an impressive measure of agreement.
As your Lordships know, the Conference appointed a committee of five members—Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the United States—uncler the chairmanship of the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, to communicate the conclusions and proposals of the Conference to Colonel Nasser. That committee was not empowered by the Conference to negotiate with Colonel Nasser, but they could expound the proposals and elucidate any obscurities there might have been in the report which was being delivered to him. It was hoped in this way that within the broad principles which were laid down by the eighteen nations there would be found enough common ground to justify further joint discussions between the Egyptian Government and those other Governments which had been represented at the Conference. In any event when the Mission had been concluded, the committee had to report back to the nations represented at the Conference from whom they had received their mandate.
I am sure that every one of us owes a deep debt of gratitude to the chairman of that committee, Mr. Menzies, for undertaking what was, inevitably, an onerous and in some cases an invidious task. Every one who knows him will support me in saying that no-one was better fitted both by experience and outstanding ability to perform it, and I am sure that he had the fullest support from the distinguished colleagues who went with him. If then, this committee was not successful—and I am afraid that it was not—we may be sure that it was not for want of patience and persuasive advocacy. But unhappily, in spite of all their efforts, they were unable to move Colonel Nasser to consider any solution
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which was consonant with those broad principles which the eighteen nations regarded as essential to the proper maintenance and free navigation of the Canal.
That is the situation with which the world, and especially the maritime nations of the world, are to-day faced. That is a situation, I submit, to the dangers of which we in this country, in particular, cannot afford to close our eyes. For, after all, we, the British, are the greatest user of the canal. Our tonnage which passes through the Suez Canal is, I believe, double that of any other nation, and, as the Prime Minister has said, the free passage of this great waterway is essential to our very existence. Her Majesty's Government, as I am sure the House can well imagine, have given most serious and urgent consideration to this problem, which I believe to be certainly the most formidable that has confronted us since the end of the Second World War. Here what I have to say is, I think, of such importance that I hope the House will allow me to use the same words as are to be used, or are being used, by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in another place.
The House will certainly agree that the 22-Power Conference in London and the mission of Mr. Menzies' Committee represented a very considerable effort to reach a solution by agreement. However, it unhappily failed. In consequence, we have carefully considered, with our French and American Allies, what the next step should be; and we have decided, in agreement with them, that an organisation shall be set up without delay to enable the users of the Canal to exercise their rights. This Users' Association will be provisional in character, and we hope that it will help to prepare the way for a permanent system which can be established with the full agreement of all interested parties.
Though discussions are still proceeding between the three Governments about the details of this plan, I can now give the House this broad outline. It will be as follows. The members of the Users' Association will include the three Governments I have already mentioned—that is to say. ourselves, the French Government and. the Government of the United States—and the other principal users of the Canal will

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be invited to join. We hope that the pattern of membership will be as representative as possible. The Users' Association will employ pilots; will undertake responsibility for co-ordination of traffic through the Canal; and, in general, will act as a voluntary association for the exercise of the rights of Suez Canal users. The Egyptian Authorities will be requested to cooperate in maintaining the maximum flow of traffic through the Canal. It is contemplated that Egypt shall receive appropriate payment from the Association in respect of facilities provided by her in this connection, but the transit dues will be paid to the Users' Association and not to the Egyptian authority.
We believe that in this way it will be possible to establish a system of transit of the Canal for a substantial volume of shipping. We should thus reduce, both for Europe and for Asia, the economic dislocation caused by Colonel Nasser's arbitrary action. Of course, we realise that we cannot expect that a provisional organisation of the kind I have outlined, designed to meet an emergency, will be in a position to provide for the major developments which are becoming urgently necessary if the Canal is to continue adequately to serve the interests of its users. We also recognise that the attitude of the Egyptian Government will have an important bearing on the capacity of this Association to fulfil its functions. But I must make it clear that if the Egyptian Government should seek to interfere with the operations of the Association, or refuse to extend to it the essentional minimum of co-operation, then that Government will once more be in breach of the Convention of 1888. And in that event Her Majesty's Government and others concerned will be free to take such further steps as seem to be required, either through the United Nations or by other means for the assertion of their rights.
I shall no doubt be asked—
I am till referring to this what I may call the marked portion on which I embarked a few minutes ago—
what are the intentions of Her Majesty's Government about the refer-
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ence of this dispute to the United Nations. As I have stated, I certainly do not exclude that—quite the contrary. Indeed, it may well be necessary. Meanwhile we have considered it our duty, jointly with the French Government, to address a letter to the President of the Security Council informing him of the situation that has arisen. This letter does not ask for any action at this stage, but it puts us in a position to ask for urgent action if that becomes necessary.
No one, I am sure, will disagree with those last words that I have just used. We are, after all, members of the Organisation of the United Nations, and. by our membership, we have undertaken certain obligations towards it. It is therefore clearly right, I think, that we should bring to its attention a situation so menacing as that created by the arbitrary action of Colonel Nasser, which is contrary to every principle for which the United Nations stands. For, after all, the United Nations Organisation stands not only for the preservation of peace, but for the maintenance of justice and good faith in the relations between nations It is there, in our view, that Colonel Nasser has so grievously erred. He has, by his arbitrary seizure of the Suez Canal Company, not only put in jeopardy the maintenance and free navigation of the Canal, but has undermined that faith in the sanctity of international engagements which is, and must be, the basis of all civilised relations between States.
His defence for his action apparently rests on the assumption—which, indeed, seems to he the whole basis for his policy —that every nation has the sovereign right to nationalise any enterprise within its borders. But, in fact, the whole of this elaborate argument, which he has so laboriously built up, rests, I submit, on an entire perversion of the idea of nationalisation. Nationalisation in its proper sense —as anyone could find out by merely looking in a dictionary—means the transfer of an enterprise from private to public control. It does not mean, and it cannot mean, the transference of an enterprise from international to national control. That, as I see it, is the basic fallacy which underlies the analogy which some people seek to draw between what has been done in this country and what Colonel Nasser is doing now.

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The industries which we nationalised in this country were purely our own concern. They were not international in any sense of the term. All that we did here—all that we could do—was to take from those industries their private character. But no-one could possibly say that the Suez Canal was not an enterprise of international scope. If anyone ever had any doubts about that, the fact that twenty-two countries sent their Foreign Ministers to London to discuss its future, and that many more countries complained because they were not invited to the Conference, is surely proof of that. It may, indeed, well be doubted whether the Suez Canal Company was ever a private enterprise in the strict sense of the term. A Company on the Board of which the British, French and Egyptian Governments are represented by directors could hardly, I should have thought, be regarded as either purely private or a purely Egyptian concern.
But, in any case, what Colonel Nasser had done is something quite different from nationalising an enterprise, whether private or not, in the accepted meaning of that term. He has not merely taken from the enterprise its private character, if, indeed, it ever had one the has, if I may coil a rather clumsy but, I think, accurate word, de-internationalised a great international waterway. That waterway has been an international concern in the fullest sense of the word for the whole period of its existence. This was recognised, I think, in the original firmans which granted the concession to the Company. It was inherent in the 1888 Convention. Ever since the Canal was originally built it has been open, as a right, to the commerce of the world. But from now on, if Colonel Nasser has his way, it will be open only to those whom he permits to go through it.
That is a very far cry from nationalisation as we have hitherto known it. It is something, I believe, far more formidable and far more reprehensible. Indeed, the act of a Government which, unilaterally and in defiance of existing Treaties and Agreements, removes by force its international character from an international waterway, is surely contrary to the whole spirit of the Charter as laid down in the Preamble. It partakes of the nature of what we have come to know as aggression. For I submit that aggression does not necessarily mean the crossing of a
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frontier of one country by the armed forces of another. It can, as we know from events in the world even since the last World War, take many and widely differing forms. But it must, I believe, have one essential attribute which is common to all. It must be, to use the words of the great Oxford Dictionary, an "unprovoked attack". That is the essence of aggression; and, my Lords, what else is this? Here was a Company, quietly, efficiently and legally performing an international function and guaranteed in the performance of that function by an International Convention. Then, with no provocation, suddenly, unilaterally and arbitrarily, its international character has been abrogated, its premises have been occupied by armed force and its funds have been sequestrated. I should have thought. as I have just said, that that partakes of the very nature of aggression.
Moreover, in any case we must not forget that the United Nations Organisation exists not merely for the purpose of suppressing aggression; it exists also, if I may quote the actual words of the Preamble of the Charter:
"For the establishment of conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising ram treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained."
That is the principle to which I think we must all sincerely hope the United Nations will always give their unequivocal support. It is the principle for which we and France are firmly determined to stand to-day. There is no dispute—so far as I know there never has been any dispute—as to who owns the banks of the Canal. Everybody agrees that they belong to Egypt. But the management and control of the Canal were international, and they must remain international in the future if they are to be effectively managed and if the free navigation of the Canal is not to be subject to the changing winds of Egyptian policy.
That was the essence of the Dulles scheme which we and sixteen other nations, including all the main maritime countries, supported. If I am told, to use a phrase that seems to be fashionable to-day, that the doctrine which I have tried to enunciate is colonialism, I would reply that that is all nonsense, and pernicious nonsense at that. It was not thought to be colonialism when the vision of M. de Lesseps conceived the Suez Canal, and when British and French

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capital poured in to make that vision a reality. That was not thought to be colonialism; it was considered quite all right. It is only now. when the wealth and skill of the progressive Western countries have produced something which the Egyptians could not achieve for themselves that this cry of "colonialism" is raised to justify the Egyptian Government in repudiating their side of the bargain.
In fact, as we all know, the concession to the Suez Canal Company was never something imposed by an exploiter on an exploited; it was a contract between equals from which both sides benefited, and which neither side had a right to repudiate. If the Egyptian present contention is accepted in this case—that it is the sovereign right of every country at will to repudiate any contract into which it has entered—this will be the precursor of a steadily increasing number of others. The whole currency of international relations will be debased, and we shall drift again nearer and nearer the abyss.
The time to call a halt is now. As Her Majesty's Government have said again and again, we would far rather see a settlement by peaceful means, if that is attainable; and, while making every effort we can to get one, the course we followed, first, by sponsoring with the United States and France the Conference of eighteen nations, and, secondly, by bringing the dispute to the notice of the United Nations, as we now have, is proof of this. And so is the action which we took in doing our utmost to persuade the Suez Canal pilots to stay at their posts pending the result of the Committee of Five's discussions with Nasser. The House will have seen in the papers this morning that the Suez Canal Company have now withdrawn their request to their employees to stay at their posts, and left it entirely to them to come to a decision whether they shall remain in their present employment or whether they should leave it. I am quite certain that noble Lords opposite in particular will not complain of this, nor will they suggest that a free workman ought to be compelled to remain at work he has come to dislike, under employers he has come to distrust. It must here, as elsewhere, be a question for the workmen's own decision. If they want to stay, they are perfectly free to
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do so. If they want to leave that is a matter for them.
Let noble Lords not think that Her Majesty's Government are not concerned to get a solution without force—we are. We have done our best, and we are still doing our best. We should be happy to have a solution which safeguards both peace and the sanctity of international engagements. If we can get both, no one will be better pleased than we shall be. But do not let us assume too readily, as some people seem to do, that you can always get both. It may be that we shall have to choose between them. In that situation, I think there can be no doubt which alternative we ought to choose. We must support respect for international engagements, and for this reason: it is only on respect for international engagements that enduring peace can ever be based. Without that, we should get neither peace nor security; we should get only a steady, dreary deterioration into anarchy.
Such are the circumstances in which Her Majesty's Government and the French Government have thought it right to take military precautions against all eventualities, whether in respect of protection of their own nationals or, if need should unhappily come, in defence of that great principle to which I have just referred. My Lords, respect for the sanctity of engagements, international as national, is the very keystone of civilised life. That is the faith which has always inspired this country, and in that faith. whatever befall, we shall go forward. It is for that that I ask the support of all those in this House and outside to whom international honour and international good faith are dear. In any case, let us remain firm and united, for in firmness and unity, I am profoundly convinced, lies by far the best chance of a peaceful issue from our present troubles.
3.11 p.m.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, if ever there was any doubt at all as to the need for the recall of Parliament at this present juncture the very grave and important speech of the noble Marquess will have afforded a complete justification; and, indeed, the very large attendance of noble Lords who have come here—presumably at very great inconvenience in some cases, as in my own—affords a further

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justification arid is an appreciation of the sense of the gravity of the occasion.
The noble Marquess has announced the policy which the Government intend to follow. It puts one in some difficulty in immediately replying to his statement because, quite frankly, it has taken me, and, I imagine, a great many other noble Lords, completely by surprise. All one can do is to give one's first reactions, which may be modified by subsequent closer examination of his proposals or by discussion with one's friends. But my first reaction to what he has said is that the action proposed strikes me as being somewhat provocative action to take, and may well lead to incidents. I do not say that it is designed to create incidents, but it may well lead to incidents, which will have the results which all of us, I imagine, are most anxious to avoid.
I myself would much rather that this matter pursued the course on which the Government started—namely, that of acting strictly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The first action of convening a number of interested nations was, as the noble Marquess said, within the Charter and Article 33 and, in my view, was a very proper action to take. The Government were fully justified in convening that meeting in London and I think they are to be congratulated on the response which that meeting had. I should like to join with the noble Marquess in congratulating the Foreign Minister on the way in which that Conference was conducted and also on the very successful issue which resulted from it. It was a remarkable achievement to get eighteen nations of all kinds, types and interests from the different Continents to subscribe to the principles which were laid down, in the first instance, by Mr. Dulles and on which these eighteen nations were unanimous. Moreover, even the other nations, I think, agreed that something; more than reliance upon Colonel Nasser alone was necessary, because they also put forward a proposal for some kind of international consultative body. thus recognising that the control of the Canal was not a matter which could be left to Colonel Nasser alone.
It may be convenient if we review, in the light of present circumstances, the situation which we saw on August 2, and see how far we want to withdraw or modify any of the views that we then
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expressed. In response to the last words of the noble Marquess, I want to say to him that in this very serious position none of us would wish to disagree with the Government. for the sake of disagreeing. We want to make sure that the measure of disagreement is as restricted as possible and to agree to as much as is possible in the Government's actions. I can assure the noble Marquess that it will not be desire of any of us on this side to treat this matter as a political issue.
Looking back on August 2, I myself took the view, as did a number of my noble friends, that the nationalisation of the Canal was contrary to International Law. I made no attempt to give reasons —I do not think the House was particularly interested. I notice that in the course of this debate we are to have a speech from the noble Lord, Lord McNair, who is an authority on these matters and whose words we shall listen to with great interest and respect. He has already indicated his views in a letter to The Times and I shall be very glad indeed, as we all shall, to hear him elaborate those views. If he is right, it seems to me to put the matter beyond all question that the action of Colonel Nasser is a breach of International Law. There are differences of opinion on the matter, possibly legitimate differences, but I subscribe entirely to what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said about the nature of the Suez Canal Company and the clear distinction between the nationalisation of an ordinary industrial or commercial concern in one's own country and the nationalisation of a concern of this kind. So I have little or no doubt that the view expressed on August 2 as to the illegal character of the nationalisation still stands.
But, whether that be so, or not, I feel that the view which all of us then held, that it was essential that the fate of the Suez Canal should not be in the hands of one man or one nation, still holds good, and with renewed force. We cannot, and any nation which depends so much upon the Suez Canal for its very life blood cannot, afford to depend upon the whim of one man, upon what are his views as to his own national interest or national politics and as to what his economic circumstances may be from the point of view of the dues which he would charge for passage through the Canal.

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Therefore we were fully justified in urging that the Canal should be under international control, with whatever safeguards might be necessary, to preserve the dignity of Egypt and her interests. Nobody has suggested that the actual territory of the Suez Canal is anything but Egyptian; but, after all, it is of international interest, and Egypt is privileged to have a water which is of international interest, and we are all concerned that it should be used in the proper way.
I have said that I thought that, in the circumstances, the Government took the right action in convening the Conference, and I should like to join the noble Marquess in congratulating Mr. Menzies on the very patient and tactful way in which he handled his Mission in Cairo. It is certainly not his fault that he did not come back with greater success. Up to that point I can say that we have no disagreement with Her Majesty's Government as to the action they took in order to arrive at an understanding with Egypt. But at that point I am bound to express profound disagreement with the steps they took, from the point of view of military action.
Of course, it is quite right that we should be ready to resist an unprovoked attack against British lives or the threat of an attack against British lives—nobody could complain about that; but we do feel that the steps which Her Majesty's Government in fact took went far beyond mere defensive action. In our view, they were quite definitely a threat, and a threat at the same time as we were conducting these negotiations. It is a challenge to anybody, particularly to a dictator, to be asked to negotiate, on the one hand, and to have threats of military action held out to him, on the other; it makes it difficult for him even to be as conciliatory as he might want to be if he feels that he is acting under duress. Therefore, I feel that it was a mistake on our part to have put up such a great show of force at the very time that we were seeking to negotiate.
Moreover, so far as I could make it out, we never made clear what was the purpose of this great show of military force. Was it purely defensive? I hardly think so, because we used such expressions as "in the last resort". We never explained what we meant by "the
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last resort". Whether "the last resort" meant that if we could get agreement in no other way we should use force, or what it meant, nobody could understand. At any rate, the Government were extremely vague about it; and that, we think, was not calculated to bring about a climate which would lead to successful negotiations. I should like to ask the Government, seeing that they do contemplate the use of force in certain circumstances: what do they intend to do with this force? Is it their purpose, in certain circumstances, to occupy Egypt? What do they think they can achieve by the use of force?
I do not know whether Her Majesty's Government have ever considered what is the purpose of it all and what they could possibly hope to achieve as the result of the use of force. I would ask Her Majesty's Government very seriously to consider whether any useful outcome can flow from the continued threat of force "in the last resort". We do know that we shall have the whole of the Arab world against us—and we have been spending years in trying to pacify and appease the Arabs. But if anything is calculated to unite the Arabs—and by no means have they been united hitherto—this would be the one thing that would bring them all together, and we should have to contend not merely with Egypt but with the whole of the Arab world.
Moreover, we should not have even our own friends behind us in the use of force. If the Press to-day is to be accepted, President Eisenhower has definitely declared himself against the use of force, and I have grave doubts whether the members of the Commonwealth would be behind us. I believe that we should certainly not have India. I doubt whether we should have Canada or Australia, behind us. So far as the United Nations are concerned, it is quite on the cards that we should be regarded as the aggressors—and it would be a very sorry state of affairs if we were actually branded as aggressors by a majority of the members of the United Nations.
Even more important I believe that we should have public opinion in this country against us. I do not know whether the noble Marquess attaches any importance to Gallup Polls, but they have been remarkably accurate in the past, and I

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would advise him to look at the News Chronicle Gallup Polls that have taken place and been published in the last two days. The question was asked, "Do you approve of the use of force?", and replies showed that while 34 per cent. approved the use of force 49 per cent. disapproved. Your Lordships may put whatever trust you like in those figures, but they de at least indicate that a substantial section of the community is against the use of force, and the noble Marquess can be assured that the whole of the Labour Party is against the use of force in the circumstances in which he visualised it.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: In any circumstances?
LORD SILKIN: No.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Would the noble Lord define the circumstances?
LORD SILKIN: Certainly I will, but will the noble Marquess allow me just to develop my argument, and then I will tell him in what circumstances I think that the use of force would be legitimate? I would ask him also to consider the economic consequences that would flow. We should he destroying the very thing that we are fighting for. We can be quite sure that if ever we went to war in order to preserve passage through the Suez Canal, that would be the very thing that we should lose, because it is so easily capable of destruction. Finally, I would warn him of the danger of a world conflagration. I need not enlarge on what that might mean. So I do ask the noble Marquess to take all these things into consideration and not to talk so lightly of the use of force.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No, no.
LORD SILKIN: Well, I thought he did.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
LORD SILKIN: Well, the impression I had—I do not apologise for it at all—is that if we could get our way without force, well and good; but that if we cannot get our way without force, then in the last resort we shall be compelled to use it. If we seriously intend the use of force, then we are embarking upon a most dangerous course and one which is fraught with the gravest of consequences, not only to our people but to the whole world.
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If, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government do not really intend to use force and regard this as a demonstration of strength which they feel may have some effect on Colonel Nasser—in other words, if it is really a gigantic piece of bluff—then I am hound to say that I think it is a stupid piece of bluff. It will make us look foolish if our bluff is called, and will tend to encourage us to use force in the last resort, if only to save our own face.
Moreover, it is surely bad tactics if one seriously wants to negotiate. We have always talked about negotiating with the Eastern countries from strength. I remember trying on several occasions to get the noble Marquess to explain exactly what he meant by "negotiating from strength". In the end, his view was that it meant negotiating from equal strength, and that generally we ought not to be put at a disadvantage as regards the Soviet Union and her satellites in negotiating from a strength substantially less than theirs. I fully accept that as a very wise view, but if that is so, surely Colonel Nasser is entitled to take the same view; and he would not be negotiating from strength. It would be we who would be negotiating from overwhelming strength. while he would be at: a disadvantage.
Apart from these, in my view, unnecessarily elaborate military steps which we have taken, have we not rather accentuated the position by permitting the landing of French troops in Cyprus, as if we had not enough trouble on our hands already there? That seems a wholly unnecessary action. There is one other piece of provocation to which I would refer. I believe the noble Marquess has promised that this would be elaborated upon in the course of later speeches—I refer to the withdrawal of the Canal pilots, or the invitation, or permission, for them to withdraw. I believe that it would have been wiser had they been left alone for the time being and given no advice.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the pilots are not being withdrawn. Neither the Suez Canal Company nor Her Majesty's Government are taking such action. Up till now, we have begged them to stay, but now they are to be allowed to do as they wish.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, it struck me as being provocative to be giving the

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pilots a pretty broad hint that they can go just at this moment.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: No.
LORD SILKIN: My Lords, I am sorry if noble Lords do not altogether agree with, or like what I am saying, but I feel it my duty to say what I honestly believe. This is a very grave moment and nobody would thank me for merely saying "Hear, hear!" to everything Her Majesty's Government are doing. If the Government have had nothing at all to do with this matter of the pilots, and it is merely one for the Suez Canal Company, then I believe they were ill-advised to make this statement at this moment. But I imagine that there has been consultation between the Company and Her Majesty's Government. It seems a pity that we should have taken this step while there is still a vestige of hope left that some agreement might be reached.
What ought we to do? In my view, we ought to go immediately to the United Nations. I feel that the formation of the proposed new organisation is a mistake which may lead to trouble and violence and may have the very result we are trying to avoid. We should go immediately either to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations and abide by their decision. We must also find alternative means of supplying our oil needs from America, and we must be prepared to abandon the Suez Canal, at any rate for a time. That would involve certain hardships on the people of this country, but war would mean even greater hardships; and, after all, let us remember that the Egyptians and the Arab peoples —those in whose countries oil is situated —are at least as dependent upon us as we are upon them. We want to buy their oil, but they want to sell it. It is no good their "sitting on" their oil; they will not get very wealthy merely by retaining the oil in their possession. Nor will Colonel Nasser get much satisfaction from "sitting on" the Canal. In the last resort, those people have to get revenue from the Canal and from their oil, and I believe that if we were to show a certain amount of independence and suffer a certain amount of inconvenience for a time—and I believe that it would be only for a time—we should he in a position to negotiate a satisfactory solution.
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The noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, asked me whether I entirely renounced the use of force in any circumstances. My answer is that I entirely renounce the use of force as an instrument of policy, but I am not suggesting that in no circumstances should we be entitled to use force. I want to explain to the noble Marquess the circumstances in which I believe the use of force would be justified. We are entitled to resist armed attack against us, but otherwise to act only if authorised by the United Nations in accordance with its Charter. That Charter contains the provision for the use of force. The noble Marquess referred to various Articles. I should like to quote from Article 51:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
We have subscribed to the United Nations Charter and are committed to it, and we are entitled to resist an armed attack against us. I would not subscribe to the definition of the seizure of the Canal given by the noble Marquess as an "armed attack." I do not think the United Nations Charter contemplated any such view of an armed attack as the noble Marquess has put forward. I believe that we are entitled to use armed force, with the consent of the United Nations; and if we feel that it is justified we should go to the United Nations and ask for its approval.
I feel, as the noble Marquess has said, that moral issues are involved here, issues relating to good faith between nations and concerning the future of our international relationships. But I feel that we ourselves must set an example to the world in the promotion and maintenance of international law through the United Nations Organisation which we played so noble a part in creating. If we, of all people, ignore or by-pass the United Nations Organisation, we shall be doing incalculable harm to the future of the world.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not like interrupting the noble Lord, but I never suggested that we should by-pass the United Nations. I went out of my way not to say that.
LORD SILKIN: The last thing I want to do, as I hope the noble Marquess

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knows, is to do him any injustice; but I gathered that what he was doing was not going to the United Nations except to the extent of giving them notice, and taking entirely different action, setting up an organisation and forcing its way through the Canal.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I will quote to the noble Lord what I said. I said:
"Meanwhile we have considered it our duty jointly with the French Government to address a letter to the President of the Security Council informing him of the situation that has arisen. This letter does not ask for any action at this stage but it puts us in a position to ask for urgent act. on if that becomes necessary."
That is all any member of the United Nations can do.
LORD SILKIN: I think the noble Marquess also said that he does not rule out the possibility at some stage of going to the United Nations. I am in a difficulty in that I have not had the opportunity of studying the staternent—I can only go upon my recollection. But I think he did say somewhere that he did not rule out the possibility. One does not wane to play with words, but is it not by-passing the United Nations to take action different from that of going to the United Nations; taking some other entirely different step? At any rate, that is my view of what is being done. It seems to me that at this stage the Government are by-passing the United Nations Organisation, although they do not rule out the possibility of going to the United Nations at some future stage. In the meantime, they have given notice. I believe that we were virtually the founders of the United Nations Organisation—certainly we played a very great part in its foundation—and I feel that it is our duty above all to go to the United Nations at the earliest possible moment, and to put this problem before them.
I realise that there are difficulties. I realise the problem that is before the Government: whether to go to the Security Council or to the Assembly. If they go to the Security Council there is the probability of one nation imposing the Veto. If they go to the Assembly. they may not get the majority that is necessary. I see all these difficulties. Nevertheless. I think that it is the duty of the Government to go to the United Nations to get a decision. Then, if they
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fail, and the position is not what they would like it to be, there are the other possibilities which I have mentioned—such as that we and our friends should do without the Suez Canal for a time—and I have no doubt that in clue course it would be possible to enter into some agreement.
In my view, all this leads to the conclusion that the real difficulty is that, while the United Nations Organisation is an ideal body, and was designed for the purpose of dealing with disputes, and passes its resolutions, as it did in the case of Israel, unfortunately it is not in a position to enforce them. I should have thought, apart altogether from the Suez Canal dispute, that we might well take a lead in endeavouring to provide the United Nations Organisation with the means of enforcing its decisions. So many of our problems could be avoided if we could secure that. If one of the outcomes of the difficulties through which we are now going should he that we take a lead whoa the occasion comes for revising the Charter of the United Nations (as will he the case within a very short time), and in securing that the United Nations Organisation has the necessary powers to enforce its decisions, then I think we shall have made one of the greatest contributions to international good will and international amity that was ever made in the history of this country. I conclude by saying that we on this side of the House have very great sympathy with the Government in the difficulties now confronting them. It is no pleasure to disagree with them on any issue at the present juncture, but we do feel most gravely that the Government are making a mistake with this demonstration of force. For that reason we may well want to put some Motion before the House at a later stage.
3.48 p.m.
LORD REA: My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, I find myself in some difficulty in having to speak at such an early stage in the debate in reply to a statement which has brought out a considerable number of new points. In the present general situation, as it has developed and as it has been so clearly put to the House by the noble Marquess, it is, I think, suitable and proper that both Houses of Parliament should record their opinions. I should like to express

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the appreciation of at least noble Lords on these Benches to the Government for recalling Parliament as they undertook to do when we last met. At that time, and, in the circumstances which then prevailed, it seemed right and proper to give the Government a totally free hand in the delicate negotiations which were then being undertaken. I, personally, do not regret our decision to ensure that those who were engrossed in that very delicate and responsible task should not be distracted or embarrassed by any form of Parliamentary criticism or interrogation, and should feel free to concentrate their efforts with the moral support of all three Parties and, I feel personally, of the overwhelming majority of the people of this country.
The stage of primary negotiation has been faithfully carried out, and I should like to join in congratulating the Government on the way in which they have handled the matter, particularly in calling together the twenty-two nations, and on the dispatch with which the work of the committee was done. We now need, as I see it, to indicate to Her Majesty's Government, representing not merely the Conservative Party but the country as a whole, what we consider to be the acceptability or the non-acceptability of the various possible lines of conduct in the immediate future.
The cherished British tradition of open debate, whereby our Parliamentary utterances are recorded and read in all parts of the globe, obviously has some disadvantages, particularly in a situation like this where we are really at one on the general principle—in this case the absolute necessity to safeguard the international character of the Suez Canal—but where we feel also the need to criticise certain courses of action, either potential or actual, in pursuing that general principle upon which we are agreed. It is because this criticism in Parliament can be subject to misinterpretation by those unfamiliar with our British Parliamentary procedure that we, on this side of the House—and I feel that I speak for all Members on this side—are indeed conscious of a great responsibility. I would make it abundantly clear that there is no suggestion of trying to make out of this question any sort of Party capital or of embarrassing Her Majesty's Government
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in the grave situation which it is now their duty to handle.
It would be idle to describe the situation as other than very serious, as Mr. Menzies has repeatedly described it, and that description implies that we are within the purview of potential war, incredible as that may seem in this age of so-called enlightenment and with the knowledge that war nowadays may lead to the total extinction of human civilisation. In the last hundred years we have been involved in two catastrophic wars through no fault of our own, but due to the policy and philosophy of the German nation; but we have also been involved in two other wars—the Crimean War and the Boer War—quite unnecessarily, in my opinion, because, in general terms, we did not handle the situation very cleverly. In the case of the Boer War, in fact, we forced our adversaries to make a declaration of hostilities. I do not draw any strict parallel here, but I suggest that past experience should be kept well before our eyes.
It was after the First World War, as your Lordships well know, that the cry of "Never again!" arose in every civilised country, with the result that the League of Nations came into being. The tragedy of the ultimate failure of the League of Nations was due, of course, to the unwillingness of several countries to support it from reasons either of aloof isolationism or of militaristic obduracy. And who would maintain that in the present world either isolation or militarism can lead anywhere but to ultimate disaster? After the Second World War, the same cry of "Never again!" rose with even more insistence and, undeterred by the fate of the League of Nations—indeed, realising that such an organisation was more than ever necessary—the countries of the world put their faith in the United Nations Organisation. Surely it is precisely the sort of situation now facing us which is precisely the function of the United Nations Organisation to handle, for the good of the world and for the peace of the world. We cannot now go back to the old order of individual battle and contest. This nation has for so long been in the proud position of being in the very forefront of seeking international peace and international prosperity by international co-operation and not by force of arms. The constant

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and only difficulty has been the fear that one of the more backward nations, when put to the test, might succumb to nationalistic selfishness and refuse to accept the objective and benevolent decision of the majority.
It would surely be incredible if we, the leaders of this hopeful international conception, should be the ones to take such a retrograde step. I hope that we shall not even consider doing so, even if we are asked to take a line which not only is unwelcome to the present Government and their supporters but which may well be equally distasteful to us all. In this nuclear age, our international responsibility must embrace and include our national responsibility, for the latter can no longer continue to live without the former. It is perhaps because of our past supremacy both in power and in status that we are tempted to look backwards and maintain that when we decide that a certain course is right, everybody else must know that it is right and. it must therefore be enforced. But the levelling-up of national status throughout the world has made it impossible for any one country, even for America or China or Russia, the biggest States in the world to-day, to succeed in a unilateral outlook; and it is essential that we avoid; the pitfall of regarding 1956 in the terms of 1856.
I do not advocate defeatism or escapism: I applaud, like the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, the strong line taken by the Government in making military preparations as they did. It was a realistic preparation which had value, a value which would not have been there had it been merely a sham instead of the real thing. It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, has contradicted himself, because this is being done in case it should be necessary to use force as a result of some action which Egypt, in her present mood, might take, in contravention of the United Nations Charter; and by the acknowledged standards of the United Nations and with their backing we should then be perfectly justified in using that force. Equally I deplore the shut-minded rejection by Egypt of the reasonable and constructive proposals of the Eighteen Nations.
But as this matter, as the noble Marquess himself has said, is an international matter, I cannot concede that
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the heavy responsibility which, without doubt, we have borne for the last one hundred years in respect of the Suez Canal, to the benefit of the whole world, necessarily entitles us, in the conditions of to-day, to a greater say in the future of the Canal than that of the majority of the nations comprising the United Nations. particularly, of course, those who were signatories of the 1888 Agreement. It seems to me that the present impasse is largely one of bluff on one side and of prestige on both sides. I submit and deeply hope that it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that some formula, possibly the one announced by the noble Marquess, may be taken up with the blessing of the United Nations, and which. by setting up some such international body, described neither as "supervisory" nor "advisory", would be able to achieve the safeguards in respect of the Canal which are desired by virtually the whole of the world, while at the same time conceding to Egypt, in spite of what has happened, a position which she would be able to accept with sonic measure of national pride and without that quality of humiliation which, deserved. or undeserved, cannot be a part of the pattern of the modern world.
3.53 p.m.
LORD RATHCAVAN: My Lords, this is the first occasion upon which I have had the honour of addressing your Lordships and I would ask therefore for your indulgence for anything I may say and for your consideration in respect of any errors into which I may fall. In my view, this crisis is something far more vital and important to us, and to the whole of the Western World, than a mere dispute over the ownership and operation of the Suez Canal: it is one further incident, and one most important to us, in the long list of incidents in the cold war for supremacy in the Middle East—incidents which amount to aggression on the part of the Communist, totalitarian world.
First came Abadan, when we were unceremoniously turned out of the great oil-producing industry that we had built up in Persia. We acquiesced, and withdrew. Then came the dismissal of Glubb Pasha from the command of the Arab Legion in Jordan, a great blow to our influence and prestige in a key position in the Middle East. And again we

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acquiesced. Then came the arming of Egypt by Russia and her allies, about which we have been doing nothing; the stream of hostile propaganda against us on the part of the Egyptian Government. Now comes this seizure of the Suez Canal. Surely there comes a time when we have to make a stand. And surely that time has come now. There should be no weakening in, or deflection from, the policy of genuine international control of the Canal, by which I mean the control and operation of the Canal by an international body, and not merely by Egypt, advised by an international body. If we were to agree to that suggestion, we must admit defeat.
What has been happening in the Middle East since Russia's reversal of policy and decision to support the Arab countries bears a strong resemblance to Hitler's technique in the years before the Second World War. I well remember the occasion when Hitler marched in and occupied the Rhineland. France was in favour of military action to push the Germans back, but in the end she refrained, because we would not support her. I was in the House of Commons at the time, and I recall especially a largely attended meeting of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee in Committee Room 14. The question was whether or not we should back France. A minority thought that we should, but the view of the majority was that we should not. The argument was that, after all, Hitler had only occupied what was German territory; that France was unreasonable, and that the situation was not worth a war. We now know that the whole thing was a gigantic piece of bluff on the part of Hitler. He was completely unprepared for war, and if France had taken action he would have been compelled to withdraw.
The same sort of arguments are being used to-day. It is said that Egypt has every right to nationalise the Canal; that she is merely exercising sovereignty in her own territory, and so on. Just as our timid policy at the time of the Rhineland Occupation was one of the crucial factors which eventually led to the Second World War, so I believe that, if the Western Powers allow themselves to be out-manœuvred and agree to compromise in this crisis, it will prove to be one of
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the main factors which will eventually lead to a Third World War.
In the struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist Powers the Middle East is of vital strategic importance. Russia has realised this, and has been using the Arab States as a camouflage behind which she intends to consolidate her position. The Arab States seem to have fallen into the trap. And, of course, Egypt is adopting her present uncompromising attitude only because she knows that Russia is behind her. Russia is, either directly or indirectly, behind all the subversive movements now troubling the world, whether in Malaya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, or even, I believe, Cyprus. The sudden change of Russian policy, when she decided to support the Arabs, having before seemed to favour Israel, must surely lead us to reconsider our own policy in the Middle East. For years the cultivation of friendship with the Arab countries has been the cornerstone of that policy. Yet how easily has it fallen in pieces! The Arabs seem to have no gratitude for all that we have done for them, but have been ready to join the Russian camp, presumably because they think it is the strongest. Ought we not now to reconsider our policy in the direction of a closer association, or even an alliance, with Israel, who would probably be willing to co-operate? At present we seem to be drifting without any very definite Middle Eastern policy at all.
The noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, stated to-day what is the immediate policy of Her Majesty's Government, and, like noble Lords who have spoken before me, I do not feel competent to make any detailed observations upon it. However, I understood the noble Marquess to say that a Users' Association was to be set up, and I believe that he said that ourselves, France and the United States would co-operate in the formation of that Association. What strikes one, on first hearing of this policy is: does it really carry us much further? What can a Users' Association do in Egypt, or in the running and maintaining of the Canal, unless it has the consent of the Egyptian Government? I do not follow—I do not think it was made very clear—how this Users' Association is going to function against a hostile dictator without some form of force.

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However, no doubt we shall hear in greater detail in subsequent speeches what is the policy of the Government regarding that aspect.
I should like to say a word or two with regard to the submission of this dispute to the United Nations. Obviously, if force has to be used at any time, it is far better that it should be used with the knowledge and consent of the United Nations. But recent happenings in the United Nations do not give us great faith in believing that much would result from such a reference. To take the case of the Israel ships alone, that matter, I believe, came before the United Nations, and either the Security Council or the General Assembly (I forget which body it was) passed a resolution condemning Egypt for discriminating against Israel ships. But nothing was done. I do not see how the United Nations can be a great force for maintaining peace in the world unless, in the last resort, it has behind it some form of backing by force. We are up against a very grave situation. The issues at stake are critical and the decisions to be taken are grave. In my belief, the situation can be saved only if the Western Powers have the courage, in the last resort, to meet this aggression —because it is an aggression—with the same steadfastness of purpose as they met the aggression in Korea six years ago.
4.0 p.m.
LORD McNAIR: My Lords, on the last occasion upon which your Lordships' House discussed this matter I was prevented by necessary absence abroad from attending that debate. I noticed that one or two of your Lordships on that occasion inquired whether there was any lawyer in the House who could throw any light on some of the difficult points of law that obviously arose. It therefore occurred to me that possibly, as a lawyer belonging to no political Party and representing only myself, I might say a few words on the purely legal aspect of the matters which concern us. I have very little, if anything, to add to the clear and effective description given to the House by the noble Marquess as to the peculiar status of the Canal Company. One thing one can say with certainty is that it is not a purely Egyptian company. It has been held by the Mixed Court of Appeal of Egypt to be partly Egyptian and partly French
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and it is understood that certain competent Continental lawyers have expressed the opinion that it possesses an international status or character.
I should like to stress, in particular, a matter to which the noble Marquess referred, and that is the Preamble to the Canal Convention of 1888, because there is one expression in that Preamble which seems to me to indicate very clearly the international character of this company. In the Preamble to that Convention we find this expression:
"wishing to establish. by a Conventional Act"—
that is in fact the Convention—
"a definite system designed to guarantee at alt times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal, and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, dated the 22nd February, 1866, and sanctioning the Concessions of His Highness the Khedive.…"
That Preamble seems to me to be one of the crucial documents which throw light upon this very complex affair.
In the next place, I wish to bring to your Lordships' attention certain observations on the subject of these great inter-oceanic canals that were made by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1923, in a case affecting the Kiel Canal, where the question arose whether or not the neutrality of Germany would be compromised by the passage through that Canal of a ship carrying a cargo of munitions to Poland which was then at war with Russia. Now this is what the Court said about the Suez Canal. It referred to the Suez and Panama Canals though your Lordships know, of course, that the regulations affecting those two Canals are different. It described them as "great international waterways", and then said that these precedents
"are merely illustrations of the general opinion according to which when an artificial waterway connecting two open seas has been permanently dedicated to the use of the whole world, such waterway is assimilated to natural strait; in the sense that even the passage of a belligerent man-of-war does not compromise the neutrality of the sovereign State under whose jurisdiction the waters in question lie."
In this case we are not concerned with the question of the neutrality of the local State. The Suez Canal is a great international waterway, and it has been dedicated permanently to the use of the whole world. That fact is in no way

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inconsistent with the sovereignty of the local State. The Court pointed out in this case that the right of entering into international engagements is itself an attribute of State sovereignty, so that the international regulation of the Canal by Treaty cannot be regarded as an abandonment of sovereignty by the local State—a fact which the Egyptian Government do not appear to realise.
I have not time to mention any other legal factors relating to the Canal and its nexus with the Company, but, in my opinion, the combined effect of those legal factors is that we are fully entitled to press for the negotiation of some kind of international system or guarantee to secure the uninterrupted and efficient use of this "great international waterway," located, as it is, in one of the most politically sensitive spots and in one of the geographically most important spots in the world. And it is proper that Great Britain, as the principal user of that great waterway, should have taken the lead in such a negotiation.
But I must now turn to a more serious aspect of this matter, which I mention with reluctance and under a strong sense of duty. I am in agreement with the initiative of the Government in seeking to obtain the negotiation of some kind of international system or guarantee for the Canal, but I regret that, as a lawyer. I find difficulty in reconciling the whole of the Government's recent action with the existing rules of law governing the threat to use armed force. I have been puzzled by the massing and display of armed force in the Eastern Mediterranean that we have witnessed during the past five or six weeks. Fifty years ago, yes. At that time, armed force was a remedy of last resort which Governments could use at their discretion in aid of their diplomacy in order to attain the ends which they regarded as essential. At that time the law made no attempt to regulate the occasion upon which armed force should be used and was content to endeavour to regulate the operation of that armed force when it was being used. But during the last fifty years there has been a complete transformation in the attitude of the law towards resort to armed force, as I shall endeavour to show. It is true that a Government is entitled to use a necessary amount of armed
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force, and no more, for the protection of its nationals in a foreign country and their property and its property, when the local authorities are unable or unwilling to protect them against violence. But, in the present case, I am not aware that our Government have made it clear that the use of the armed force that has been assembled is limited to those objectives. I must say that the speech of the noble Marquess was ominous in this respect, not in what he said but in what he refrained from saying.
Now I must endeavour to sustain that thesis. I pass by the Covenant of the League which placed limitations upon the use of force. I come to the KelloggBriand Pact of 1928, an instrument to which more than sixty States, including Egypt and Great Britain. became parties. By that instrument the high contracting parties agreed two things:
"(1) that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another; and (2)"—
and more relevant—
"that the settlement or solution of all disputes Or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise between them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
I am gravely perturbed by the second of those provisions. This Pact is not a mere gesture. It was not just a pious aspiration. It is a Treaty. It is a Treaty that has been judicially construed and judicially enforced.
Before leaving the Kellogg Pact I may ask, are we going to invoke a statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain, then Foreign Minister, sometimes called the British Monroe Doctrine, made three months before we signed the Pact? This statement referred to certain unnamed
"regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety."
It continued:
"Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect."
There are no "regions of the world" falling within this category which are now exposed to the threat of an attack. This so-called "Monroe Doctrine" has no relevance, in my opinion, to the present

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case and in no way qualifies our obligation under that Pact not to seek the settlement or solution of all disputes except by pacific means. May I add that the Pact is, of course, entirely independent of the Covenant of the League and entirely independent of the Charter of the United Nations. It stands by itself.
I now come to the Charter of the United Nations. The noble Marquess drew our attention to Article 33 whereby the parties to any dispute which endangers peace
"shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,"
and so forth. We have, of course, been following that course and complying with that Article. But what about Article 2 of the Charter, whereby the members of the United Nations agree, in paragraph 3, to
"settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered",
and, in paragraph 4, to
"refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the the purposes of the United Nations."
It is perfectly true that Article 51 provides that
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
But there has been no armed attack upon us. The noble Marquess based the policy of the Government upon respect for international engagements. I venture to ask him to include these international engagements within the benefit of that respect.
Now, in order to pursue this question of the control of force by law, I must draw your Lordships' attention to a decision of the Hague Court in the Corfu Channel case where the legitimate and the illegitimate use of armed force came under discussion. The Court held—it was in the year 1949 when the judgment was given —that the British Government was legally justified in sending through the North Corfu Channel in order to affirm the right of passage a flotilla of four ships of war, with crews at action stations
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and with orders to fire if attacked. Why? The reason was that six months earlier British ships of war had been attacked by Albanian gunfire when passing through that strait. Accordingly, the Court held that Albanian sovereignty had not thereby been violated by the British action. On the other hand, when three weeks later the British Government amassed a very considerable naval force for the purpose of covering the British operation of sweeping mines in Albanian waters the court described the assemblage of this naval force as the manifestation of a policy of force and a violation of Albanian sovereignty, though with heavily attenuating circumstances.
My Lords, the combined effect of these Treaty provisions has completely transformed the legal position of armed force. It is no longer a discretionary instrument of policy but its use is regulated by law. That, I believe, is the view of the use and threat of armed force which is now held in the large group of countries with whom we normally co-operate and whose good opinion we cannot afford to forfeit. In all sincerity and humility, I would beg the Government to reflect upon my attempt to state the present rules governing the threat and the use of force, and to examine and to check it. If they come to the conclusion that I have stated those rules correctly, I think they are also bound to come to the conclusion which I have reached, which is as follows: that so far as the events in the present controversy up to date are known to us, I am unable to see the legal justification of the threat or the use of armed force by Great Britain against Egypt in order to impose a solution of this dispute.
The noble Marquess has told us that our Government has addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council, which fact I was glad to hear. May I inquire whether he has asked the President of the Security Council to put this matter on the agenda, so that it may be discussed? Have the Government taken any steps to secure an earlier meeting of the Assembly so that this matter may be discussed? Would it not be much more prudent for us to initiate these discussions that are about to take place in the United Nations, so that we may go there as plaintiff instead of as defendant? The Charter permits any member to bring these matters to the attention of the United Nations, and—if I may remind the

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House of one of the distinctive differences between the Charter and the Covenant—the Security Council is in constant session and may meet at a moment's notice. My Lords, I have attended many meetings of the organs of the United Nations in an official capacity, and I think that perhaps I know something of the climate of opinion at those meetings. I do not envy the man who is going to present our case if we are haled before these bodies instead of taking the initiative.
To conclude, may I say this. I have the deepest respect for our Prime Minister; I have the deepest sympathy for him in the grave problems with which he has had to grapple since he took office, and I should hate to say any word which might in the least cause any embarrassment; but I attach so much importance to the maintenance by this country of its leadership as an exponent of the rule of law that I feel that I should be failing in my duty as a Member of your Lordships' House if I did not present these remarks for your consideration.
4.35 p.m.
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: My Lords, the last two speeches to which we have listened this afternoon have dealt with two aspects of the present situation, each exceedingly important but somewhat different. The noble Lord, Lord Rathcavan, upon whose maiden speech I am glad to have an opportunity of congratulating him, warned us in grave terms of what he conceived to be the political implications lying behind the present conflict. The noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, to whom no one can listen without the greatest respect and attention, gave us the view of the law in these matters. If I venture to address your Lordships, it is not with any pretension to either of these qualifications; it is merely that, having some concern in the course of my ordinary life with the usage of the Canal, I think it is worth reminding ourselves, as one factor that we should take into account in judging these issues, of the practical working of the waterway and what its interruption or deterioration is likely to mean, in practical terms, to the people not only of this country but of a very much wider area.
From that point of view, the first observation I should like to make is that it is of singularly little practical importance
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if the freedom of the Canal is assured unless, in fact, the Canal works. No doubt it is most right and proper that the political freedom of the Canal should be assured. No doubt it is most right and proper that those who are attempting to assure it should not themselves put a foot wrong. But if, while these matters are being discussed and debated, the Canal becomes unworkable, the loss to the ordinary person is nearly the same as if those forms were not being gone through. Indeed, it seems extremely likely that from the beginning of next week the operation of the Canal will deteriorate very seriously indeed. Therefore, it seems to me that, from the general good, time is one of the most important things which we should bear in mind.
We all agree that it is essential that a solution should be found. It is almost equally essential that it should be found quickly. We have reason to suppose that the foreign pilots of the Canal will in large numbers decline to serve the Egyptian Authority. and we have heard that pressure is no longer to be exercised upon them to continue to serve in the Canal. I am bound to say, speaking quite unofficially, as one with no connection with the Canal Company at all, though with some slight knowledge of the conditions of operating through the Canal, that I have been astonished not that these pilots should be wanting to go home now, but that they should have been prepared to remain at their posts as long as they have. I think all of us owe them and, in some measure, through them, the old Suez Canal Company, a considerable debt for having made it possible, in very difficult circumstances, for that waterway to go on working as well as it has to date, with very little delay to shipping and performing up to now those functions for which it was designed. But do not let us blind ourselves to the difficulties which I believe, in any circumstances, must be foreseen in the future.
If I rightly understood what the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, said about what may be called the "Users' Club", it was to be a body which would employ pilots and, presumably, feel able to offer them conditions of security which they do not feel they are likely to receive from the Egyptian Government. Let us

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hope that that may be so, and that it will work. But it is one thing to say one will employ pilots, and quite another thing to get pilots of the requisite quality and qualifications. The Suez Canal Company has been trying for many years to work in with the Egyptian Government by employing an increasing number of Egyptian nationals as pilots. They have found it exceedingly difficult to recruit even a small number possessing those qualifications without which passage of ships through the Canal may become so hazardous as to block the waterway and make it unusable for a considerable period of time. It is difficult to exaggerate the skill which is required and which up till now has every day been displayed by the pilots and others responsible for the working of the Canal in maintaining the flow of traffic which we have hitherto seen through it. It will take very little indeed to disrupt that.
We well know, too, that if traffic through the Canal is to be maintained in the future, very large development works will be required, culminating, possibly in some fifteen years hence, in doubling the waterway. Without such a development it seems unlikely that it would be able to accommodate the traffic which, in the ordinary course of events, would by then be seeking to flow through it. I make no apology for reminding your Lordships that over 14,600 ships passed through the Canal last year, which, if my arithmetic is correct, is something like forty a day. Rather over one half in number of those, and well over one half in tonnage, contained what is called "dry cargo," general cargo of various kinds. Of those forty ships passing through the Canal each day, some twelve are British, in the proportion, speaking very roughly, of seven dry cargo to five tanker ships, but carrying approximately the same amount of tonnage. In the face of that, I find it hard to agree with what fell from the noble Lord, Lord Rea, when he said that he did not see why this country had a greater interest than any other in the operation of the Canal.
LORD REA: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Viscount? I do not think I used quite those words. It is obvious that on the basis of the user of the Canal we have the greatest interest, but what I said was that that did not signify that we had necessarily a greater right to dictate
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as to the future of an international waterway.
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Rea, if I misquoted him. Nevertheless I should have thought that on the basis of interest, which carries with it the basis of paying for the services, any waterway, international or national, should have very considerable regard to the views of the greatest user of that waterway. It would be arrogant of the greatest user to think that he should have more influence than anyone else, though should err on the side of that user.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Viscount a question? Is it true, as has been reported, that for some time British ships have been accepting the services of the Canal without paying anything at all for them?
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: My Lords, I am not sure that I am in a position to give the noble Viscount a comprehensive answer—I can speak only of those ships of which I have personal knowledge. In that case, those which have been in the habit of paying their clues to the offices of the Suez Canal Company in London have continued to do so.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: That may be so, but would it be right to say that they paid dues because the office in London was rendering services? The office in London can now render no services, and therefore ships going through the Canal free of any charge have services rendered by the new authority.
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: My Lords, I do not seek to dispute what I confess seems to be the rather odd logic of that observation. As a user of the Canal, I can only put my hand on my heart and say that at least I pay dues to somebody—to those I believe to be the properly constituted authority to receive them.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear!
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Viscount a question: Are dues not largely in respect of services rendered by the pilots, and who has been paying the pilots?
VISCOUNT RUNCIMAN OF DOXFORD: My Lords, am grateful to the noble Lord for that question, the answer to which may be left to your Lordships to decide for yourselves.
I do not wish to weary your Lordships with many further figures, but I would add this fact. In terms of cargo carried, in 1937 some 27 million metric tons of dry cargo passed through the Canal. In 1955, the figure was some 39 million metric tons; but the quantum of world trade moved by sea was the same in 1937 as it was in 1954. I do not know the 1955 figures, but I imagine that they were not very different. Your Lordships will see, therefore, that, apart altogether from tanker tonnage, the importance of the Canal, relative as well as absolute, has been increasing through the years. As to the oil figures, the tonnage passing through the Canal multiplied by more than ten between 1937 and 1955, being 6 million tons in the former year and some 67 million tons in the latter. I have quoted these figures because we have heard it suggested that if a satisfactory arrangement cannot be reached by any other means, if this country should go to the United Nations and get an unsatisfactory answer there, the only thing we can do is to accept the position and to attempt to get on without the Canal. Clearly, in this matter one can exclude no possibility. If the Canal is blocked as a result of war-like action we shall have to attempt to get on without it, though, if I may hazard an opinion, a blockage by war-like action would be more readily repaired than a blockage resulting from a general deterioration of standards over a period.
Those who use the Canal have declared in public principles for its use which correspond almost exactly with those which were submitted to President Nasser by Mr. Menzies and his Committee. I need not therefore burden your Lordships with any attempt to elaborate on what those of us who use the Canal think should be its future status. That is clear enough. I would only say that, so far as one can judge from hearing them once. I personally welcome the proposals which have been laid before the House to-day by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House, if only on the grounds that they are at least an attempt to get something done and to get it done quickly. I started by saying that I believe time
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is very much of the essence of this problem. It would be unduly optimistic to hope that, pending discussions in the various bodies to whom this question may be referred, the Canal can possibly continue to work so satisfactorily as to remain a major international waterway from the point of view of those who use it. Under those conditions it will be necessary increasingly to attempt to divert ships round the Cape of Good Hope.
The loss in time and carrying capacity which that course involves differs very much according to the voyages on which ships are engaged. If one is going to Australia it is not a very serious matter, but if one is trading with India, while the effect differs very greatly in a variety of circumstances, as between ship and ship. I think it means reducing the available tonnage on that route by something over a quarter. It means one month longer, roughly speaking, for average cargo ships. Or, putting it in a short practical way, it means that a ship will be able to make only three voyages a year. whereas she would normally be expected to make four. The loss in carrying capacity over a period must, therefore, be very great. I have not attempted to work out the arithmetic or to show what, apart altogether from oil, Western Europe, on the one hand, and Asian countries, and in particular India, on the other, will have to go short of if the Cape route is the only one left open.
If this Canal, for whatever use, is closed, those who will suffer will not be primarily the ship owners who may possibly, even, find themselves in the happy position, if I may so put it, of having a commodity in even shorter supply and with even greater demand for it. So their selfish interests, it may be said, will, if anything, gain. Those who will be the sufferers will be the merchants and the traders, and, above all, those whose needs they are seeking to supply. It will be the British workman who will suffer, perhaps, even more than the Indian workman and the Indian peasant. While these matters are being, debated, the people who are going to be in real trouble will be the little men, and there are very many more little men in Asia than in Europe. The people who are going to bear the real brunt of this are not only—and possibly not even mainly—the people of the Western World: the people who are going to suffer are those who hitherto, I am

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sorry to say, have not been making the most helpful contributions towards a settlement. I do not venture to do more in relation to this statement of policy which we have heard than repeat what I have just said. So far as one can see, it does at least promise possibilities of speedy action. I finish, as I began, by saying that in this problem, perhaps more than any other that we have had before us recently, he gives twice who gives quickly.
4.53 p.m.
LORD WINSTER: My Lords, I confess that in this matter I address your Lordships with some considerable perturbation of mind. It is not a grateful task to utter any words of criticism of one's Government when that Government are engaged in a crisis, such as the present crisis, so fraught with very dangerous issues. In particular, it is no pleasure to criticise a Prime Minister who is carrying such a tremendous burden upon his shoulders at the present moment as our Prime Minister must be carrying. But, remembering the debate which took place before we adjourned, I confess that I detect an atmosphere to-day rather different from that which prevailed on that occasion, because time for reflection has undoubtedly revealed all the difficulties in the way of much that was then proposed by certain speakers. In particular, I think the most powerful and remarkable speech of the noble Lord, Lord McNair, must have given many of your Lordships very serious grounds for reflection. I imagine that the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack will feel it necessary to reply to that speech, and I cannot help thinking that his reply will be one of the highlights of our discussion, one of the most important speeches which will be made in the course of this two-days' debate.
I was particularly interested when the noble Lord, Lord McNair, referred to the Albania case which went to the International Court. I was interested because I have so often thought of that in connection with the glib way in which people recommend referring some dispute to one of these august bodies such as the International Court. In the case of the Albania affair, as far as I recollect, Great Britain was awarded a very large sum of money indeed against the Albanian Government. We have never had one pound of that
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award and, my Lords, we never shall. That is perfectly certain. The case relating to the use of the Canal by Israeli ships was referred to the United Nations. The United Nations gave a decision to which the Egyptian Government have never paid the slightest attention, and to which they have no intention of paying any attention at all. I merely mention those two cases as a slight warning to those who think that great matters can be so easily disposed of by referring them to some outside body.
I gather from the speech of the noble Marquess in introducing the debate that we now have the latest thoughts of the Government on this mater. It was difficult to follow. As my noble friend, Lord Silkin, said, one wants to have a little time to look at what was said. It was shot at one at rather short notice —not that one blames the Government for that, because the Government are obviously working under great pressure of events. But I am not quite clear why it is hoped that a Users' Association—that, I understand, was defined by the noble Marquess—offers any advance on what has already been proposed or offers any sound hope of a solution. It seems to me that this idea of a Users' Association is rather putting in a different way something that Colonel Nasser has already had put before him and rejected.
Incidentally, may I say that I am sure we all join in the tribute which has been paid to Mr. Menzies for his handling of the interviews with Colonel Nasser. But really the Government can hardly have been surprised at the rejection of the proposals which Mr. Menzies encountered. In fact, I should think that the least surprised man of all was Mr. Menzies, who must have realised that he had been sent in to bat on what he probably regarded as an Old Trafford wicket. The rejection of the proposals by Colonel Nasser was absolutely certain. It was a foregone conclusion.
I cannot at this moment see the relation which would exist between the Users' Association, as proposed by the Government, and the Convention of 1888, or why an offence against the Association would be an offence against the Convention. I may, on second thoughts, be able to see some connection; but at the moment I cannot see any relation between the proposed body and the Convention of 1888. What happens, in any

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case, if Colonel Nasser rejects the jurisdiction of the Association? It seems to my mind to embody arrangements which he has already most decisively rejected. Is it considered, for instance, that the Users' Association would operate the Canal in face of Egyptian opposition? I really cannot believe that that would be feasible.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Silkin that there was a certain note of menace in the speech of the noble Marquess. Perhaps that is going a little too far, but I think we can fairly say that there was nothing very conciliatory in it. It seems to me very difficult for a representative of the Government to speak in terms of menace in this matter when we know that we have against us the opinion of our principal ally, America, of a great deal, certainly a majority, of world opinion, of some Commonwealth opinion and of a large body of public opinion here, all of which is allied against the use of force in this dispute. It is very difficult to talk in terms of menace under those conditions.
It can, at least, be said that with the passage of time—and this dispute is now many weeks old—the likelihood of the use of force has diminished. I am sure that the advocates of the use of force would agree with me in this, though they would not agree with other things I have said. If force was to be used, it could only have been effective and commanded a wide measure of support had it been employed immediately. With every week that has gone by during which force was not employed, opinion has been mustering against the use of force; and short of some direct act of hostility on the part of Colonel Nasser, an act of hostility which might conceivably stem from this latest instruction given to the pilots, which I think is a very dangerous business, the likelihood of the use of force has diminished and is diminishing as time goes on.
In any case, it seems to me that in this matter of the use of force, the Government have been riding two horses. While undoubtedly in the broadcasts of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, and in many of the statements made by that anonymous gentleman "a Government spokesman", "Government sources" or something of that sort, there
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was a great deal of talk about the use of force, at the same time the Government were going on with their proposals for calling the London Conference, which clearly was entirely contrary to the idea of the use of force. The Prime Minister and members of the Government must realise this. I remember in my days in the Navy that the lively old gentleman who instructed me in naval history used to give me so many lines to write when I incurred punishment. They were not lines from Latin or Greek authors. I had to write out, perhaps 200 times, the statement that "a Council of War never fights". It was a very good piece of training. It is equally true that an international conference always compromises. There is never much hope of getting a decision out of an international conference. The Prime Minister, with his vast experience, must know that full well. There was an inconsistency between this repeated talk of the use of force if we could not get what we wanted, and the calling of the London Conference.
May I make one remark about that Conference? It is true that we got sixteen nations to go along with ourselves and France in putting these proposals before Colonel Nasser, but I do not believe that any of those sixteen nations would go on and support us in the use of forcible measures to impose that proposal. I get the impression that, having deferred to France and ourselves and the demarche having failed, they are now prepared for almost any compromise and their thoughts are probably turning towards the compromise put forward by the Indian representative as interpreting their collective view far more nearly than the idea of the use of force.
For some mentalities it is an easy thing to talk about the use of force, to teach people "where they get off" and so on; but the advocates of the use of force must be prepared to answer some questions. Are they quite satisfied that we dispose of the necessary military forces for the imposition of force in this matter? Would the war be long? Would the war be costly? Would the war be confined to Egypt? Would the war make the oil supplies more, or less, secure? Above all, would the cause for which we want this war be good in international law? I do not suggest the answers, but I do suggest that those are questions to

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which the advocates of force must be prepared to give reasoned answers. Their excuse for resorting to force might be that we must keep the Canal open and secure our oil supplies. The immediate result of force, of course, would be to close the Canal and have the oil cut off probably at the source.
Another consideration which weighs in my mind is that all this talk about the use of force and the justification for the use of force rests upon apprehensions: an apprehension that Colonel Nasser might close the Canal, that he might not compensate the shareholders of the old Company, that he might let the Canal fall into disrepair, that he might do all sorts of things that he has said he is willing to enter into an agreement not to do. "Might" is a very bad reason for resorting to armed might. I think it is most important that we should bear in mind that the arguments in favour of the use of force are all based upon apprehension.
To go to war one must have a clear case against Colonel Nasser of having done things. What exactly has he done up to date which the world would recognise as a casus belli? Although it is not our duty to do so, perhaps we might with advantage look at this affair front Colonel Nasser's point of view in one particular aspect. We want to come to an agreement with him, and Mr. Menzies went to Cairo in the hope that Colonel Nasser would agree to the proposals of the London Conference. What would have happened to Colonel Nasser if he had agreed? He would have been out of power the same day, and very likely he would have been dead the next day and been replaced by somebody even more intractable than he is himself. That, I think, has to be remembered. While, naturally, we disapprove of what he has done—and I share those feelings —the fact remains that he would not have lasted a day if he had agreed to these proposals. I certainly do not want to make a case for Colonel Nasser— nothing could be further from my mind.
LORE BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: The noble Lord is doing very well.
LORD WINSTER: I do not know; I cannot see that. I think we should have from Her Majesty's Government a statement of why we cannot negotiate with Colonel Nasser on the basis of the offers
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he has made. He has made certain offers, but we say that they do not afford any ground for negotiation. Some of these offers seem to me to go a long way to meet our requirements, but apparently we cannot negotiate on them. The only reason I can get for that is that we cannot trust him. That also is what is said over Cyprus about Archbishop Makarios: that we cannot negotiate with him because we do not trust him. Surely it is a new principle in diplomacy that we can negotiate only with people we can trust. We seem to have had considerable talks and negotiations with Mr. Khrushchev—I do not know if he enjoys the unbounded confidence and trust of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office. As I say, this seems to me to he a new principle indeed.
What is to be done in this situation, which is almost an impasse? I fear that the Government, with all this talk of force, have landed us in a most serious situation. I earnestly hope that the talk of force will riot be revealed as bluff, for if there is one thing that is worse than talk of force, it is to find that the talk of force has been bluff. I feel that there are certain things that should be done. Let me say, incidentally, that in my view at this moment the Government should be giving the most urgent attention to the ideas about alternative routes which have been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, which I feel have never received the attention they deserve. There must be a vast amount of information of this subject of alternative routes. It is not a brand new proposal, and one would like to hear that the Government have those ideas under the most urgent consideration. With regard to the question of alternative routes, I think the reluctance of the Government to consider it will be overcome by the force of events. As orders are now being given for 80,000-ton tankers—and there is talk of even 100,000-ton tankers—it is clear that an alternative route may become not merely something desirable but a necessity, and that the construction of those large tankers may largely detract from the economic advantages of the Suez Canal.
As to what can be done at this moment, I should like to throw out this idea. I believe that one of our great hopes resides in recognising the new world in which we live, and the surge of

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nationalism, and in fostering by all means in our power international recognition of mutual interests and universality of treatment in such cases as we have to consider with the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal is not the only essential world trade route. There must not be differentiation between the treatment of one essential route and another. That only produces a sense of inequality and inferiority, and that, in turn, produces restiveness, which, as we have seen, is liable to blaze into an outbreak. Possibly the United Nations could devise some standard system of administering such essential trade routes.
Then again, raw materials needed by the world comprise other things than oil. The world is dependent on many raw materials other than oil, and these raw materials lie in the territories of other countries. My view—and I am sure it is shared by the majority of your Lordships—is that a nation has no right to deny to the world the use of an essential trade route, or the enjoyment of access to the essential raw materials. But the point is that there should be equality of administration in these matters. Until we have such unified administration, I think the nation which owns the trade route or owns the territory containing the raw material is likely to have an exaggerated view about sovereignty. I believe that in a consideration along those lines rests the great hope of avoiding in the future such situations as those with which we in Europe now find ourselves confronted. I am certain that a settlement of this dispute will be facilitated if the Government, without delay, make a formal disclaimer of any intention to use force, outside the sanction of the United Nations, except in face of some quite unforgivable act by Colonel Nasser. I am sure that such a declaration would greatly facilitate the settlement that we all hope to see.
5.18 p.m.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down talked about a body of opinion which he considers exists in your Lordships' House, and perhaps outside—what he labelled the "advocates of force". I search to find out who are the advocates of force. I think the noble Lord would find it as distasteful if I said that he was
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an advocate of surrender as I do, supporting Her Majesty's Government, to hear myself labelled, perhaps, as one of those advocates of force. It was the noble Lord who said that the Government have landed us in this difficult and dangerous situation. It is not Her Majesty's Government who have landed us in this situation; it is Colonel Nasser and his action.
The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, made some remarks that did not meet with complete agreement on this side of the House, whereupon the noble Lord said, quite rightly, that he proposed to say what he felt. Therefore I am sure he will extend to me the same grace and opportunity if I comment upon his speech in the way of saying what I feel. At the outset, the noble Lord labelled the policy of the Government as "provocative" —that was his word: I took particular note of it. I would label his speech as one which seemed to me to aim at avoiding facing the dangers and the realities of the past weeks, the present and the future. I would describe his speech as a ruthless determination to stop at absolutely nothing, short of ensuring decision.
As the noble Viscount, Lord Runciman of Doxford, showed in such a convincing way, the Suez Canal is vital to our economic life. Its denial would not be just an inconvenience, as it seemed to me the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, made out in saying that we could get along, though with some difficulty, without it. It is an absolutely vital link for the maintenance of full employment which he and his Party, just as much as Her Majesty's Government, are committed to pursue. As I understood the advocacy of the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, it was, "No steps beyond reference to the United Nations." Surely, that must mean no action, pending timeless discussion and debate at the United Nations, irrespective of what happens meanwhile. The noble Lord said that we must abide by the decision of the United Nations. But I would ask him this question: Supposing there is no decision. what then? It does not seem to me that the policy he is advocating leads us to a positive solution of the situation.
Meanwhile, Colonel Nasser would be consolidating a position which Her Majesty's Government have made it quite

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clear we in this country cannot accept: that, while the ownership of the Canal is not in dispute, we cannot accept the position where the Canal is an economic and political pawn in the hands of a dictator pursuing his own particular policies in his own particular country. It seems to me that the proposition put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—accepting, as I am sure he does, that the Canal is vital to our interests—is: "Put Britain's vital interests and safety in pawn to Colonel Nasser; then hand the ticket to the United Nations, who may have neither the wish nor the means to redeem the pledge." That is really what the noble Lord is saying we should do. I submit that we must look at not only the present situation, but also the future dangers, upon which the noble Lord did not touch to any extent.
The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that our fears of Colonel Nasser were based largely on apprehension. Colonel Nasser is a dictator. I was one of those who, in the years before the war, in another place, made the mistake of believing that we could negotiate, talk to and respect the opinion and the words of dictators. It was the Party opposite who used to twit the Tory Party with being too deferential to Hitler. To-day, it is the Party opposite, and the noble Lord. Lord Silkin, who are far too deferential to Colonel Nasser. The noble Lord said that we were facing Colonel Nasser with a threat; that he was being asked to negotiate under duress. Those must be comforting words to the dictator. What we are doing is preparing the necessary forces, should we have to protect our nationals in the Canal area.
LORD SILKIN: Is that all we are doing?
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: There has been no military action at all. The treble Lord, Lord Silkin, admitted the need for protection of our nationals against attack. Egypt possesses jet fighters and modern weapons. If we are to be able to protect our nationals, surely we must have comparable and adequate weapons of the modern sort in order to fulfil that obligation. I cannot see that we are being provocative by using modern weapons as a means of preparation for a position which we hope will not arise. but upon which, if it did arise, and there were some terrible disaster to our
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nationals, Her Majesty's Government would be vulnerable to criticism—and quite rightly so.
LORD SILKIN: I should like to get this clear, if the noble Lord does not mind. Is the noble Lord now saying that the only purpose of our arms is to defend us against attack; to defend the British rights against attack, and for no other purpose?
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: It is not for me to say what the purpose of the armed force is. All I am saying is that one obvious purpose which alone would justify the present military preparations, is the safeguarding of our nationals in the Canal area. On that, I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Silkin—I will willingly give way to him —whether he will clarify his remarks upon the Canal pilots. Does he in any way question the freedom of those men to resign now? Does he question the freedom they had to disobey their Company in the past weeks, and to resign, had they wished, or the right, which they undoubtedly have, of continuing to serve under the Egyptian Canal seizure? Surely, unless there is to be introduced some form of direction of pilots, some form of conscription of labour, those men have the absolute right to follow what course they wish. It seemed to me that, running through the noble Lord's speech, he denied them that right. I hope that I interpret his speech wrongly.
LORD SILKIN: You do.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: So when the noble Lord made those remarks about the pilots, and said that he regretted that the pilots had that freedom extended to them by the Company, under this new direction, he does not deny that those men have an absolute right to choose for themselves. I am glad we have that position clear, because it was not quite clear from the noble Lord's speech.
Finally. the noble Lord, Lord Silkin. referred to public opinion and the News Chronicle Gallup Poll as showing that Her Majesty's Government have not any great weight of public opinion behind the policy they are following. All of us have recollections of the Peace Ballot, and I do not think it helps to quote public opinion polls. In spite of the

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vituperation of the Press on the Left, which has conducted a campaign of abuse and misrepresentation such as we have rarely seen in recent years, I believe that there is a great body of public opinion behind Her Majesty's Government—men who do not know much about the Canal issue but who say that Colonel Nasser must not get away with it; men who remember 1936 to 1939, when the dictators did get away with it, and who would support Her Majesty's Government in their determination to see that a vital British interest, without which we cannot exist as a nation, is not used as a pawn for a dictator seeking power and position in his own country.
5.29 p.m.
VISCOUNT BRIDGEMAN: My Lords, I am glad to follow my noble friend who has just sat down because I feel, as he does, that the major point of difference in this debate has been the question which some people have described as the use of force, though when I listened to one or two speakers I felt that it might have been more correct if they had been referring to the movement of Armed Forces, which is not necessarily the same thing. That, at least, was the point that was made much of by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, and very nearly as much of by the noble Lord, Lord Rea; and the task of commenting upon the problem has not been made any less formidable after listening to the weighty speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair.
I think one can start, however, by asking exactly what is the background of the whole problem. Are we simply talking at the moment about the immediate problem of the Suez Canal, or are we taking into account the background of the problem, which is that, as we see it, Egypt has flagrantly broken one international Agreement, and may do the same thing again? Are we not right to ask ourselves: Since Egypt has taken this action now, and if the present Egyptian Government continue in power, what next? All sorts of things may happen next. Your Lordships and I can all think of them, and I am not going to add fuel to the fire by naming them. But it is quite clear to me that the need to intervene, whether it is by law or by war, cannot be considered solely in relation to this particular state of affairs but must
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be considered in relation to what we believe to be the general attitude of the Egyptian Government. My noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye and others have mentioned what happened twenty years ago, at the time of Abyssinia and the time of Munich, and our minds go back to something that was written in the National Review at the time:
"'Wait and see' is almost invariably the prelude to 'Too late'."
I have been looking at this problem, rather understandably, from the Service point of view, because I have been a Regular soldier, in the same way as others have looked at it from other points of view. One thing that is vital when considering the employment of forces for any purpose whatever is to make sure that, if they are to be used at all, they are used at the right time, because the earlier and the more timely their use, the more likely they are to achieve their supreme object, which is to get what is desired with the minimum casualties and the minimum expenditure of blood and treasure. Therefore, if we are envisaging (and I use the word "envisaging" deliberately) in the future the possibility of using Armed Forces, it is no good waiting until the damage has happened and then expecting to be able to use Armed Forces, if we so desire, to any good purpose. The timing of such a conception would be wholly wrong. That is why one should consider what has actually happened. I put it to your Lordships that what has actually happened is not the use of force but certain movements of troops.
I should be the last person to say anything whatever about the legal points which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, put to us just now about the movement of troops—I have no doubt whatever that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will be answering that in due time—but it seems to me, as one who is not a lawyer, a strange doctrine that the movement of troops, in our own time, in accordance with what we consider the strategic rights of the country on land, water and in the air, where we have a perfect right to move our troops, is something that we should not do. After all, down history the whole of our British strategy in the employment of our Armed Forces has been based on the idea that far-sighted Governments

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moved troops to the right places at the right time, and thereby forestalled further trouble, and exercised the pressure which was necessary without bloodshed. That is what I believe Her Majesty's Government are doing now. If so, then I am sure they arc abundantly right.
There are two main criticisms, I think, of the troop movements to date. The first one may describe as saying "What are you going to do with the troops, anyway, when they are there?" I think that was one of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Winster—I will come hack to it in a moment, but not for long. Much more of the criticism has been directed at the proposition that the mere fact than troop movements have been made has worsened the background. to negotiations and has created the wrong atmosphere for their successful and positive conclusion.
A certain amount was made by the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, about the Gallup Poll, and a certain amount more about the Arab League. With reference to the Gallup Poll, I think one can he very much misled by those Polls, because a great deal depends on exactly how the question is asked. If I may talk Latin for a moment in this House, does the question use the word "num" or the word "nonne"? My noble friend Lord Balfour of Inchrye reminded us of the Peace Ballot twenty years ago. If I remember aright, the question we were asked could easily have been interpreted by those who were not very versed in these things as "Do you prefer peace to war?" And so most of us said we did. I am not sure how this Gallup Poll has gone out, but I should hazard a guess that, if another Gallup Poll went out saying "Do you favour strong action by the Government to preserve what belongs to them?", you would get a fairly high percentage of affirmative replies. That is a guess, but I think it is a fair one.
When we come to what the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said about the Arab League, there again, I hesitate to speak. The noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, may have something to say on that. But I would not accept it for a moment as a solid proposition on which to found our policy that any success gained by the Egyptians in saying what they want to do over the Canal will bring universal joy to the whole of the Arab League. I should
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like to hear a remedy proposed by someone more expert.
To deal with the second proposition, that we have set a bad background for future negotiations, I must say that I think most of the arguments that I have heard in the debate so far lead pretty directly to an argument for total disarmament, because they all (or at least the ones I have heard) preclude the use of armed force in any conceivable circumstances except after we have been attacked. And that, as I say, strikes me as being an utterly wrong conception of the use of Armed Forces in a free country. I have not heard a single argument so far for keeping any. Armed Forces at all. It is a great pity and one of the minor tragedies of this Suez situation that we have been deprived of the opportunity of talking about disarmament by not debating the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Henderson, before the Recess. I should like to see that Motion reinstated on the Order Paper because I think we need to clear oar ideas about disarmament after listening to some of the things that have been said to-day.
If we feel we have no use for Armed Forces, let us come out flat as protagonists of complete disarmament, and then we shall know where we are. That would not be my idea, because I feel, as I think the Government do, that our forces are there to be used to forestall aggression and, if that is right, they must he moved to the proper places at the proper time. That makes me look forward to the answer that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will give as to whether there is the clear distinction that I see in my mind between the movement of Armed Forces and the use of forces, armed or otherwise. As I say, I have spent a part of my life as a professional soldier, and therefore have read so many cases in military history where we did too little and too late, and so few instances where we were in time and made proper strategic use of the forces we had. Curiously enough, I cannot help feeling that one of the most recent and best examples of the timely use of forces for limiting a conflict may turn out to be that of Korea. It is possible that our friends in the United States may not draw so clear a parallel between the quick use of force to prevent a war all over China and the quick use of force which we may have to use to

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prevent a conflagration through the Middle East. Anyhow, Korea seems to me to be by far the best recent parallel of the quick use of force to prevent worse happening.
When I say this I want to make it absolutely clear that I am certainly not taking the view that troop movements of any sort are inevitably the prelude to war, or will lead inevitably to war. They will do no such thing. After all, when we are thinking of the character of Colonel Nasser, let us remember that he, too, is a professional soldier, and it is quite possible that in his youth he may have been taught to see some of the arguments that I have produced in much the same way as I have tried to put them. Therefore, he will not. I think, be likely to take a false view of our real object in moving these troops. In other words, and in plain English, he knows perfectly well why we have moved them and will appreciate, I hope, the action that Her Majesty's Government have taken in the employment of Armed Forces as being sound action. I feel quite certain of that.
Far less would I say that if our movements of troops through the Mediterranean do not lead to operations, then those movements will have been futile and will have failed. I think the absolute reverse—they will almost certainly have succeeded in their purpose; and I feel that they will contribute an immense amount by their presence, as a token that this country and France are determined to put an end to policies of piracy. It is my earnest hope, as I am sure it is of us all, that their presence there will influence the course of negotiations on the sound lines that we want. But in the last resort this problem is an economic one. It is to the interest of everybody concerned that the Canal should be working to the good of the users and of Egypt, as a sovereign Power, and for other reasons. Therefore, so much is at stake that one can perhaps hope that in the end common sense will prevail, and that the matter will be seen to be one which requires an economic solution, a commercial solution, and that sovereignty, however strongly it is put forward by the Egyptians, is not really the point at stake. After all, in commercial life—as I say, this is an economic problem—it would be a strange proposition to say that the owner
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of any property should always, and automatically, be the person to manage it. That proposition would make no sense in business, and I am not sure that it makes a great deal of sense in foreign affairs. I believe that that is the line on which, in the end, the negotiations will go.
As many noble Lords have said, however, it is no good thinking that we have endless time—as if the matter were something like some long law suit, where time does not matter and where all that matters is that the right decision is found in the end. Time does matter, because the right decision cannot be had, as I firmly believe, unless it is had in time. I am sure that everything my noble friend Lord Runciman of Doxford has said is right. I also think that our movement of forces will have a considerable effect on the correct timing of these most difficult negotiations. We have been told by all sorts of people, including the other side, that the use of armed force is wrong. We can discount what people on the other side say. I think we also can discount, to a certain extent, the views of a number of people—Job's comforters, one might call them—who, although sympathetic, have not the vital interest in the working of the Canal that the French and ourselves have. I hope that we and the French will not be left alone in this matter; but if we are, I would not say that we should be wrong in the last resort to "go it alone." We have "gone it alone" before now, and we have not always been wrong.
5.44 p.m.
LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, as a soldier I am glad to be able to follow the noble Viscount, and I am most grateful to him for having put this matter of the movement of troops in its true perspective. If it ever came to operations, you cannot just move troops like turning on water from a tap; you have to position them. I think the trouble probably arose because a certain amount of undue publicity (which must have been an embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government) was given by the Press to the movement of troops. That, I think, is to put the matter in its true perspective. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin asks: to what purpose are these troops going to be put? It would, of course, be highly improper if we knew. The last thing that any security officer would wish would be that

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we should expose potential plans. I think that the more secret troop movements can remain, the better both from the military point of view and from the psychological point of view.
I hope not to delve into the labyrinth of detail in which it is possible to discuss and which surrounds this issue; I want to cling to principles if I can. But I am tempted just to make one reflection on a matter which has been raised—namely, the possibility of a second canal, a matter upon which I imagine the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, will have something to say to-morrow. Of course it is true that the traffic through the Suez Canal is reaching saturation point. Possibly it is going to be doubled within a few years, and perhaps trebled within a few more years after that, and there is probably going to be room for two canals. Surely the deduction is that if there are two canals there should be one international control over the two in order to be able to direct traffic. The trouble with the second canal, as it has been envisaged so far, is that it is bound to be under the sole control of Israel. and the fact remains. although we may regret it, that no Arab State is going to permit its oil to leave its shores if it is going through a canal under Israeli control. The noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha has said. I think, that we should not allow that. How can we prevent it? We are not in a position to dictate to an Arab State as to the disposal of its oil.
My Lords, with that exception, I want to try to stick to the principles. The noble Marquess reminded us of the principle of the respect for the sanctity of international engagements. I should like to put a slightly different emphasis on the same kind of principle—that of respect for the sanctity of international negotiation, which has, of course, been flouted. A lot has been said about Egyptian sovereignty and Egyptian sovereign rights. Well, to-day the world, the family of nations. has its sovereign rights just as much as any of the components, and it is within that context that I think we should weigh till decision, and weigh the decision of which we have been informed, to set up a Users' Association. Possibly results may flow from that decision.
It is not at all an easy matter, and I find myself in disagreement with those of your Lordships who say that. this
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should or should not be done. It is particularly difficult to decide what is right in connection with the potential use of force. Some say it must be used; others say that on no account must it ever be used. I find both those views wrong, because the results and the effects of the use of force are in themselves by no means clear. There is, for example, in the minds of some people—those who say, "Drop one paratrooper in the Canal Zone and all is lost"—a fixed conviction that such action would lead immediately to a Third World War, and that since a Third World War probably would be a nuclear war, the argument goes, it would he the last war, for there would be no more world to wage war. I do not accept that iconoclastic and tragic view, and I hope to show that, it is quite hypothetical and wishful thinking, wishful in that those who argue on those lines hope it to be true and vet have no real logical arguments to hack their belief. They assume first of all that such a war could not be limited in a geographical sense; secondly, they believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said and as the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, has just reminded us, that the whole of the Arab world would rise in support of Egypt and Colonel Nasser. Thirdly they assume that oil would cease to flow. I am not saying that those people are necessarily wrong in those assumptions but that there is absolutely no certainty whatever that they are right.
I would take first the large question mark which surrounds oil and its possible flow in conditions of war. If it were a matter only of the reactions of Arab Governments, I would say that those Governments probably would not cut off their nose to spite their face. Iraq today is able to envisage future years of ordered planning because of the certainty of the arrival of oil revenue. But I have to acknowledge that the inclinations and better judgment of Arab Governments often have to yield to the irresponsible will of the mob; and the mob is not necessarily ready to count the cost.
There is every indication that some Arab Governments are heartily sick of Colonel Nasser's dictatorship; and the question arises: how much dare they do about it? In any case, I suggest that they would not resent others doing anything about it. I believe they

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are prepared to watch a kind of shadow-boxing game from the ringside, and to say that force should on no account be used and that they are prepared to name the eighteen nations as aggressors if force is used. But would they still cling to that view if the shadowboxing were ended and the opponents had closed with each other? I do not for a moment under-estimate the power or even the validity of much of the militant Arab sentiment. I do not under-estimate Colonel Nasser's ability to appeal to the bazaars over the heads of Arab Governments. But I do suggest that Colonel Nasser's behaviour for the last two or three months, and particularly during the past month, is by no means welcome to Arab Governments, and that therefore Arab reaction throughout the Arab world is a matter of judging the relationship between those Governments and their people—and that is something completely unpredictable. I may be wrong, but those who say that force must never be used in any eventuality have to prove me wrong, and I believe it cannot be done.
Again, in considering the use of force I would underline what was said by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House: if force is used. it is used to restore a situation which has been created by the use of force. I believe this point is very important, because it is said that if it is armed intervention it represents aggression and therefore is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. It is arguable that Egypt has already contravened Article 51 of the Charter. The fact that no blood was shed on July 26 because the Company was unarmed does not qualify or alter the conditions of aggression. On the contrary, it seems to me to underline the Hitler technique for which we presume the United Nations Charter was framed as an effective limitation. One searches for an analogy to the use of force. I find an analogy in the Korean War, to which the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, referred. It is quite true that up to a point that war was infectious, but it never devoured the world; and if force were ever used in this present case I cannot see any great enveloping flames of destruction. Rather I can see the extension creeping from one area to another, hateful, sinister and insidious, but perhaps by virtue of its nature always under some control and
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capable of being adjusted to a changing political background.
If that is true, then, in turn, talk of a nuclear war is quite hypothetical. We cannot visualise the exact circumstances, but one imagines troops on the Canal, and in that particular situation who is going to drop a nuclear bomb? Who is going to risk destroying the Canal which we are trying to preserve? If troops are in Egypt intermingled with Egyptian troops and the Egyptian population, who is going to drop a nuclear bomb on Egypt, where the troops are inseparable from the local population? Certainly none of the Canal Powers is likely to sanction such useless folly.
To return to the principles which we are trying to defend, I believe we are apt to forget that this trouble started when Colonel Nasser announced that he was going to divert the Canal revenue away from the Canal towards building his High Dam. That point is forgotten, and it seems to me that Colonel Nasser is conveniently trying to forget it in the hope that the world will also have short memories. Colonel Nasser may have had second thoughts, but we cannot afford to allow an international canal to fall into the hands of a man who has a first thought that is wrong. Nor can we overlook the fact that the same man has quite recently spoken of building his Arab Empire all the way from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf.
That intangible element in international affairs—confidence—is a very delicate plant: it thrives or withers according to the political morality of the men who have to manipulate it. It can be lost overnight as it was on July 26. When the noble Lord, Lord Winster, speaks of apprehension, I would suggest that it is this loss of confidence which has caused that apprehension, and it is as well if, in noting the essential element of the loss of confidence, we rid ourselves of any delusion that this is a matter of East against West. Your Lordships may remember that when we previously debated this matter, the noble Lord, Lord Coleraine, most eloquently drew our attention to a situation in which Western prestige and even Western civilisation itself might be at stake. He stressed that it was up to us to accept the challenge to defend everything for which Europe can answer in human progress. I think

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we were all profoundly impressed by that particular presentation. At the same time, I feel sure it was not in Lord Coleraine's mind to suggest that this Canal controversy was a matter between a Western capitalist bloc and an Eastern underdeveloped bloc.
There could be no greater misapprehension than that which was so insidiously fostered by the Soviet: that the London Conference represented an alignment of rival interests of Asia, on the one hand, as represented by India, Indonesia and Ceylon, with the backing of the Soviet, against a number of Western Colonial Powers on the other. My talks with Indians in London lead me to believe that they themselves regarded this as a wicked distortion of the truth and it was quite obviously resented by them. I think it is a pity that one of the smaller Powers at the Conference did not remind us that the Soviet, who are now posing as the champions of Egypt's nationalism and sovereign rights, were responsible a few years ago for the complete liquidation of three Baltic sovereign States.
The point I would make is that the principles which we are trying to defend cut right across all alignments of East against West or colonial against anti-colonial. In defending these principles once again, I. ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are alive to the overwhelming importance of an effective presentation of our case: first, to our own people in this country; secondly, to the Arab world; and thirdly, to the world at large. Some of your Lordships may have received, as I did—I imagine that they came to all of us—pamphlets labelled "To all Britons". It was literature sent from Cairo with the rather curious optimism which a statement on the envelope involved. This read: "We cherish your friendship." The significance of this literature is not that we find that particular sort of thing a matter for ridicule— third-form classroom stuff. The point is, that in sending it out the Egyptians clearly do not regard it in that light. They regard it as effective. If they regard it as effective when directed at us, they probably would regard it as effective if directed at them.
I have sometimes thought that we convey the impression that we are lazy in this matter. I was pleased to read. I think it was in yesterday's issue of The
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Times, that the chairman of the Liberal Candidates' Association had taken the trouble to reply to Colonel Nasser concerning one of these pamphlets. The positive reply, I am sure, is going to be much more effective than some negative protest. Of course, there will be protests from Cairo, but the degree of success of propaganda is measured by the amount of indignation in the protest. I am not asking Her Majesty's Government for any details—it would be improper for the Government to give them. But I should like, and I am sure many of your Lordships would like also, an assurance that something is being done.
Finally, I would emphasise the international aspect of these principles. The proposals we have heard this afternoon, as I see them, without having had time to study them in detail, seem to me to be both wise and skilful. I say skilful in that the onus of aggression seems to me to be now placed on the shoulders of Egypt. The conclusion I think is inescapable: that if international control, as opposed to just mere advice, is to be finally insisted upon, it is not going to he effective without, I do not say the use of force, but I say the readiness to use force. I think there is a legitimate distinction. And in contemplating that very grave prospect, it seems to me a matter of common sense to reflect that it would be far more satisfactory, to put it mildly, if readiness to use force emerged with international sanction and approval, preferably by an actual international decision by the United Nations itself within its own right. It seems to me unfair to ourselves to be always shouldering the major burden of responsibility. How different might the tone from Cairo have been if the movement of troops, instead of being a matter of French and British troops, could have been spread wider and there had been evidence of participation by some others of those eighteen nations who were with us at the London Conference! Then, instead of the venom being reserved for Britain and France, it might have been spread on broader shoulders. We have to admit—and I say this quite objectively—that the movement of French troops, the publicity given to the movement of those troops, is not having a very good effect in the Levant, in countries such as Lebanon and Syria.

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I am not sure how specific proposals could fit into the decisions we have heard this afternoon, but, as a start, I would suggest that the Security Council should at the right moment be called on to act under Article 40, which, as I understand it, enables the Security Council to put forward provisional measures aimed at the maintenance of the status quo pending a permanent settlement. And these provisional measures would clearly include the payment of dues from the users of the Canal into a blocked account under United Nations supervision. It would enable pilots to continue to be paid and it would perhaps persuade pilots, if they had left, to return. Such a move would be a great test both for Colonel Nasser and for the Security Council. Colonel Nasser would find it extremely difficult to refuse such a suggestion coming from the Security Council. If he did, I suggest Egypt's position would become untenable.
It is not for us at this stage to explore and debate the various possibilities, but it seems to me to be apposite to remind your Lordships that there is a United Nations resolution, passed by the General Assembly by fifty-two out of fifty-nine votes on November 3. 1950, known as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The General Assembly, as I understand, is the sole judge of its own powers, and under that resolution it gave itself power, on a summons of any seven members of the Security Council (nothing to do with the Big Five the veto was by-passed) to take note of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or any act of aggression. Any seven members of the Security Council can summon a meeting, in an emergency, of the General Assembly, and it then becomes just a matter of persuading two-thirds of the Assembly of the justice of our cause. If I remember aright, the collective measures were the inspiration of Mr. Acheson at the time, because it became realised that it was only because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet from the Supreme Council that action could be taken in Korea. The Assembly is entitled to take note of a breach of the peace or act of aggression and it can recommend collective measures which include the use of armed force. That seems to me the kind of machinery that can be borne in mind in relation to future, hypothetical, perhaps, but still potential, developments.
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In the past we have been shy of turning to the United Nations in our international difficulties. Certainly these post-war years are littered with failures of the United Nations—evaded decisions and decisions not implemented. In the new international democracy which levels nations down rather than raises them up, some of us find that those nations like ourselves with a thousand years of experience of democracy in operation are apt to feel penalised when we put issues in which we have a major interest to the United Nations. Yet I suggest that a wiser approach would be to regard it as a challenge. We should have many countries behind us. We should have to persuade two-thirds of the General Assembly. with all the eloquence and sincerity which we could command. of the complete justice of the case for international control. But I suggest that it could be done; and if it can be done, as the Foreign Secretary said when he was asked, "What happens now?". it would be for Colonel Nasser to say what happens next.
There is a wider aspect of this matter of reference to the United Nations and the task of coaxing the United Nations into a recognition of those responsibilities. We have led the world in many phases of international history. We led the world in an industrial revolution and in the ideals behind that revolution. We led the world in the abolition of slavery, and in the extension of free democracy and political institutions to others. In all this we have been in the van. When I said that. that was a challenge for us, it seemed to me that here was another aspect of human affairs in which once more we can be in the van: in the conception of bringing collective life and responsibility, courage and integrity, to an international organisation which has been too long a lifeless corpse without a glimmering of its potential powers for international justice and progress among the nations. A great statesman once said of us that we were no longer creators, only acceptors. Here, perhaps, might be eventually our chance to create.
6.14 p.m.
THE MARQUESS OF LINLITHGOW: My Lords, let me first of all say that, as an irregular attender of your Lordships' debates, I count myself fortunate to be able to take part in this debate. I have listened with great care to the words that we have heard from experts on

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International Law, on military affairs and from the Front Bench, and I suppose that I am in the position of being the first of those Jacks-of-all-trades, the Back Benchers, to raise his voice. I can only believe that what I have in mind to say may be of value in that it possibly represents what a large number of inarticulate people have in mind—people who are befogged by the extremely difficult legal questions surrounding what is fundamentally a dangerous threat to our standards of living, to our security and, what is more important, to what we believe should be the future for international co-operation.
I have been trying to find some measure of agreement between those who have been speaking from the other side of the House and those speaking from this side. Perhaps I am making a mistake, but it strikes me that there is a wide measure of agreement that what in fact precipitated this crisis was in itself an act of aggression. I had hoped to hear the noble Lord, Lord Winster, admit that much, but I did not hear him say so. I find it extremely hard to discover any formula by which the seizure of the Canal in the way in which it was done is not to be described as an act of aggression. I believe that the word "nationalization" was used quite deliberately to confuse the plain facts of the case, to muddle the issue. I believe it to be the measure of the Government's patience that the compromise put forward with other nations at Cairo the other day goes so far as to recognise Egypt's doubtful claim to sovereignty over the Canal. I think that people are inclined to forget how doubtful that claim may well be. However, be it said that we have already gone a long way in endeavouring to compromise with Colonel Nasser and his Government.
All that the nations concerned ask is perfectly reasonable: they have asked for a maximum guarantee that the Canal, which is their lifeline, should be kept open for everybody, and in good condition, and that over the years its capacity for traffic should be steadily increased. No other guarantee, it seems to me, can be considered satisfactory, than that the control and management of the Canal should be taken over by a group of what, after all, are only tenants, the main users of this waterway. I have asked myself what possible challenge that can be to
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the sovereignty and the dignity of Egypt. There is challenge to the dignity of Colonel Nasser, but I beg your Lordships to ask yourselves, "Whose fault is that?" Apart from the manner of seizing the Canal, any reasonable man has only to read the speech of Colonel Nasser on July 16 to come to the conclusion that the method by which the Canal was seized was evidently designed to bolster up the personal reputation of Colonel Nasser at the expense of Western security, and, what is more important still, the principles of international co-operation in which we all believe. Inevitably we can be accused of aggression. But inevitably, too, in defending ourselves, the users of the Canal, Western and Eastern, must challenge Nasser's own position. That is the fault of nobody but Colonel Nasser himself.
Those are the facts as I see them, and on which I personally—and I can speak only for myself—have based my readiness to support Her Majesty's Government in any action that they may consider reasonable to take, even, if necessary, the use of force. For the life of me, I do not see how any Government could have done less than the present Government have done. Any Government worthy of their responsibilities must have clone exactly what this Government have done, and not one thing less.
We are members of the United Nations Organisation, and there is no doubt that the position as to our right of action, on the one hand, and our membership of the United Nations Organisation, on the other, is not an easy one to unravel. But I believe that the facts are fairly clear. I have been interested, in listening to the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, who made a suggestion in which I am not versed. He has made the suggestion that the General Assembly can by-pass the Veto; can come to a conclusion and institute an action. I should like to hear an official view from the Government as to whether or not that is possible. My own view, subject to hearing more on the point. is this. I believe that any conference, and any supra-national body ready to hear and take part in discussions, is usually severely limited in its power of coming to decisions and its power of acting on them; and this is particularly true of the United Nations Organisation.

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Let us suppose that this dispute does go to the General Assembly or me united Nations. I believe that there are a limited number of decisions from which a particular action might spring. I suppose that it might provide a solution, a compromise, which both Egypt and ourselves, being too close to the problem involved, may very well have missed. But I take leave to doubt that that would be possible; and I also take leave to doubt that Colonel Nasser has any intention of moving one iota from his present position unless compelled to do so. It might well be that all parties to the dispute, when put before the United Nations Organisation, would be prepared to accept a majority opinion. I ask myself again: Is Nasser prepared to do that? Certainly I believe that we should be. Failing either of these decisions—and, I repeat. subject to hearing more on the suggestion put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood—I do not believe the United Nations has the power, in face of the Veto, to implement any decisions that it might take.
Where do we go from there? In my view—it is an inexpert view, but I have tried to think this thing out as logically and honestly as I can—we are left with the probability that the United Nations Organisation may easily express a majority opinion but, in the final event, will be forced to throw the parties to the dispute back to their own resources. I should be the last person to suggest that we should not submit this dispute to the United Nations Organisation, but we must be honest with ourselves as to what the results of such a course would be. I think it is quite inevitable that our own membership of the United Nations Organisation, and our devotion to the cause of international co-operation. make it essential that we should do that very thing. But what I am concerned about is lest the astonishing patience shown by Her Majesty's Government, in face of this brutal act of aggression, should be misread as other than our devotion to the cause of international co-operation, in which we have up to now —and, I hope, always shall—played such a leading part.
The next two points I have to make are points which worry me, because I believe that we stand in grave danger of misleading world opinion, and Egyptian
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opinion in particular. It may well be that Colonel Nasser supposes that we should do nothing, even if we believed it to be right, without seeking what he might be pleased to call the permission of the United States of America. I hope that the Government will make it quite plain to our American friends that we believe our case to be so clear that, though we may hope for the full support of the United States, we can, and will, do all that we believe to be right, if necessary without them.
There is this other point. I have a shrewd suspicion that Colonel Nasser supposes that a fear by us of Russian intervention may cause us to back down. I hope it will be made quite plain to the Russians, if they are, in fact, thinking of intervention, that, in spite of all the risks, we are not prepared to live in a world subject in the last resort to Russia's will, and always to surrender, due to a fear of Russian intervention. I believe those two points to be of vital importance. I believe it may well be that still, in the back of his mind, Nasser thinks we are bluffing. I should he greatly shocked if I thought for one moment there was any doubt at all in the mind of the Government on these two points. I make a plea that these facts—if, indeed, the Government take that view—should be made plain at the earliest possible moment.
Finally, I think we are in danger of being over-impressed by the shadow of Colonel Nasser himself. We are in danger of being blind to the fact that all over the Middle East, not least in Egypt itself, there are men of wisdom and moderation whose position would surely be hopeless, and in many cases highly dangerous, if we retreated from what is our evident obligation. In that event, I believe that in a year or two few of them would be alive, and those few probably, almost certainly, exiles from their own country.
I am not a "sabre rattler." Other noble Lords have drawn a parallel between events as they are now and events in the late 'thirties. I have refrained from mentioning the fact, other than to pay tribute to those noble Lords who have done so, because I find myself wearily thrown back to those terrible days. I find myself comparing, inevitably, the futility of the League of Nations to handle

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Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia. I remember believing so well, with the logic of the situation of collective sanctions, that a time would come when force would have to be used, and only those who were cowards would not use it. I remember the dreadful disillusion that came over me when we heard of the Hoare-Laval Pact. It is because I remember that, as all of us do, that I am convinced in my own mind that this is "where we came in" before. I believe that we must see this thing through, with or without the help of our friends, the United States, but after taking the fullest possible measures of presentation of a case to the United Nations, to assure the world, if they need assuring, that our cause is clear and that we believe in it. I believe that we have a duty to perform which may well be unpleasant, but I comfort myself with this thought: that it is a duty as much to Egypt as to the rest of mankind.
6.33 p.m.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: My Lords, I must say that I was perturbed by the implications of the statement made by the noble Marquess in opening this debate. I believed the military measures taken to be precautionary, in ease British lives were threatened or their freedom curtailed. The noble Marquess seemed to go further in a way which might well be in conflict with the terms of the Kellogg Pact, to which the noble Lord, Lord McNair, referred. I can only say that I should like most sincerely, and with respect, to support the plea which he made so ably.
Perhaps in the matter of troop movements, as the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood, has suggested, the publicity which has been given rather distorts the picture. But I feel that we should take to court all possible issues. We should go to the Security Council, not leisurely, but as a matter of urgency. I think we should go to the International Court to contest the legality of the alleged nationalisation. and I hope the Canal Company will join issue in the Court of Appeal in Paris, to which they are entitled to go in the event of a dispute.
Then I should like to make a plea for the separation of what I regard as the two problems involved—the question of international rights and obligations, and the operation and management of the Canal, which I look upon as two
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separate matters. It is interesting to recall that the 1888 Convention was directed against this country. Our troops were then in occupation of Egypt, and the Convention was designed to prevent the waterway from falling exclusively into the hands of one Power. This safeguard, which was pressed upon us, at the time, and accepted by us, was to extend beyond the expiry of the concession granted to the Universal Canal Company which expires in 1968.
This is our plea to-day. On the necessity for a reaffirmation of the Convention there appears to be no disagreement between the Powers and Colonel Nasser. But what powers of enforcement there should be in the event of a breach is not clear. Surely, this is the first necessity to be cleared up, particularly in view of the violation of the Convention already by Colonel Nasser by interference with Israeli ships. If this matter of international rights and obligations can be settled, then there is the second problem of the operation and management of the Canal. As understand it, the Universal Company is an Egyptian Company domiciled in Alexandria, but declared to be subject to French law, and disputes with the Company, as I have already said, go to the Court of Appeal in Paris. Colonel Nasser's action, therefore, can be challenged in that it annuls the concession and ignores the provisions regarding the application of French law.
I know that the case for the protection of private property, as the current number of the Swiss International Review has pointed out, has been greatly weakened. Even in States where the rule of law is supposed to be respected, private enterprise is no longer protected, and the editor of that review states this month that:
"Bad conscience, therefore, has prevented both Great Britain and France from placing themselves unequivocably on the standpoint of law."
Her Majesty's Opposition have done a great deal to make the position of the Government more difficult in this matter.
I agree with the Government that it is desirable to keep the operation and management of the Canal out of politics. But how are we to do this? If we have a nationalised company, the politics of the country where the company is nationalised are involved. If we have an international company, it seems to me you

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may embroil the management of the Canal in the politics of many countries, and that is what is making difficult this question of advice to pilots. If it is a private company, and a private company gives advice to its pilots, there are no international repercussions. But if this company, as some claim, is an international company where Governments appoint the directors, then advice to the pilots immediately has international repercussions. So I should like to see the operation and management of the Canal vested, not in a nationalised company or an internationalised company, but in a company formed for efficient business management, technical ability and knowledge, with a board constituted for technical knowledge and ability.
I think this is all the more necessary as this part of the problem, unlike the first part of the problem to which I have referred, is a question not of politics but of business. If we could have a new commercial company, having cleared the position with a new international Convention and having provided in that international Convention what is to be done in the event of a breach, then perhaps something in the nature of the powers of a debenture holder could be exercised over the company operating and managing the Canal. It could well be, as the present Company, an Egyptian company, and it would be perfectly natural that a distinguished Egyptian should be chairman of the company. This is rather on the lines of what I gather was the Spanish proposal at the recent Conference. I ask Her Majesty's Government, before there is too much confusion over this matter, to consider the possibility of a solution on these lines which might provide a satisfactory basis to all parties.
6.41 p.m.
THE EARL OF L1STOWEL: My Lords, I think I should say at the outset, because I do not wish to be misunderstood later on, that I do not think my worst enemies would say that I have a record of appeasement of dictators. In the 1930s I opposed Mr. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement both in this House and elsewhere to the best of my ability, and I had the honour of being included in Hitler's White Book. I opposed this policy because I believed that aggression or threats of aggression were the worst
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crimes that any nation could commit. I still hold that belief, and that is why I shall say what I propose to say this afternoon.
Our main anxiety on this side of the House is that force shall not be used by this country against Egypt except in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The speech of the noble Marquess to which we listened at the beginning of the debate I fear did nothing to allay this anxiety. It can be taken for granted, or as almost certain, that Egypt will not accept or co-operate with the Users' Association which the Government and other Governments propose to set up to manage the Canal. This, indeed, may be a seriously provocative action; but if Egypt does not co-operate with this body, the Government, as the noble Marquess stated, will take further action, either through the United Nations or by other means, for the assertion of our rights. We regard this expression of "by other means" as extremely sinister, because, quite clearly, it may be presumed to include the use of force.
The Government claim that their policy since the Canal was taken over has been completely consistent with the spirit as well as the letter of the Charter of the United Nations. I do not think that this claim can pass unchallenged, for the Charter expressly declares—and here I would refer your Lordships to Article 2 (4)—
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force."
It is true that the Government have at present refrained from the use of force, but they have certainly given the impression, not only here but all over the word, that they might use force if Egypt did not accept international control of the Canal. Moreover, they have deployed more strength in the Mediterranean than could reasonably be required to protect British lives in Egypt. Such threats of force are certainly inconsistent with the Charter and have also, as my noble friend Lord Silkin pointed out, been bad policy because they have made President Nasser more obdurate and have had an unfavourable effect on a very large section of world opinion. if the Government really believe, as they profess to believe, in the Charter, and have the deep respect for international agreements expressed by the

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noble Marquess in his speech, why cannot Ministers say now that they will not resort to force in future except in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations? This is only asking the Government to honour the most important of all the international agreements they have entered into since the war.
What we should like to make entirely plain to the Government is that they would not have the support of the Labour Party or of the millions of Labour supporters in the country if they were to use armed force against Egypt without the authority of the Charter of the United Nations. We on this side of the House do not believe in force or threats of force as a legitimate instrument of national policy. That cynical doctrine of force has led to most of the wars in European history. It will lead to future wars if it ever becomes the settled policy of any powerful nation. But we are not pacifists—some of us are, but the majority of us are not by any means pacifists—and we should certainly not flinch from the use of force in accordance with the terms of the Charter.
According to my reading of the Charter —I am not a lawyer, but I presume an instrument of this importance should be intelligible to the layman—there are three different sets of circumstances in which a nation would be justified in the use of force. The first of these sets of circumstances is this: to carry out the decisions of the Security Council about the use of armed force to resist an aggressor. This was done by us and our fellow members of the United Nations in the case of Korea. The second set of circumstances is for us to discharge obligations undertaken in regional or other defensive treaties, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The third set of circumstances apply when a country is acting in self defence. It is clearly this third set of circumstances, action in self defence, that has the most direct bearing on our relations with Egypt at the present time and in the immediate future.
What constitutes aggression, and therefore justifies retaliation with armed force, is described in Article 51 of the Charter as "an armed attack". This Article dealing with self-defence is extremely important. I will not weary your Lordships by reading the whole Article. I should, however, like to read the first sentence as it seems to me a vital consideration
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when we are dealing with the justification of the use of force.
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
This definition of aggression as "an armed attack" is alarmingly different from that of the noble Marquess. According to the noble Marquess, Egypt has already committed an act of aggression against us by breaching an international agreement at the time it took over the Canal. I made a note of the words of the noble Marquess at the time and I think he described this illegality as "unprovoked attack" or "aggression". We do not agree with this view of aggression, and in our opinion it is not in accordance with the Charter. It is very difficult to see that the taking over of the Canal, whether it was legal or illegal, can be regarded as "an armed attack … against a member of the United Nations." The Suez Canal Company is an international company and not even a British company. Surely the right procedure to deal with this matter, which it is alleged by the Government and maintained by many is a breach of international law, should be to refer it to the International Court of Justice.
My Lords, I think we have a great deal of common ground. We all condemn President Nasser's action in seizing the Canal without consultation or consent. We share the concern felt by everyone that our oil supplies depend on his personal undertaking to keep the Canal open and to run it with reasonable efficiency. President Nasser's treatment of Israel proves that he will use the Canal. so long as he continues to control it, as an instrument of Egyptian national policy, and there is this continuing danger of turning the Canal into an instrument of local politics. President Nasser's recent refusal to meet the views of the vast majority of the canal's users may bring traffic almost to a standstill and must be regarded as an example of obdurate nationalism. But none of these actions, wrong, foolish, chauvinistic as they may be, in our view constitutes an act of aggression against this country. Of course, the fact that such art action has not occurred in the past does not mean that it may not occur in the future, and

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in that event, obviously, we should have to defend ourselves.
But a far greater danger of war lies, in our minds, in the refusal of the Government to give up the use of force if they fail to get what they want by other means. There was no guarantee whatever, so far as I could make out, in the speech of the noble Marquess, that armed force would not be used either without reference to the United Nations or after reference to the United Nations if the decision of that body was unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. I hope that Her Majesty's Government and the public will pause to consider carefully the likely consequences of an attack by our country, whether in association with other countries or not, against Egypt.
The first, and probably the least important, result would be the effect on our own economy. There would be a complete stoppage of our oil from the Middle East. Egypt would block the Canal, and other Arab countries would sabotage the pipelines that run through their territory. The wider and longer-term consequences of a war of this kind with Egypt would be far more serious. As we all know from past experience, a war often starts as a local war and becomes a general war. We cannot be certain that a war in the Middle East would not spread. Certainly it would unite all the Arab countries, from Casablanca to Baghdad, against us and our allies, and would give Russia the influence in that area that she has been striving recently to obtain. Of course, Russia has already gained considerable prestige in the Arab world by not siding with the majority of the nations at the London Conference; she would gain still further if we had the misfortune to find ourselves in armed conflict with Egypt.
Even more serious than this increase of Russian influence would be the effect on the Commonwealth. I believe that the Commonwealth would be split from top to bottom. Canada would follow the lead of the United States—and President Eisenhower has said quite clearly that force cannot be justified save in the event of (and I quote his words) "some form of aggression" by Egypt. Australia is most sensitive to Asian opinion and would find it difficult to support us. Pakistan has already expressed some sympathy for the Egyptian
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case Our action would certainly be strongly condemned in India and Ceylon, and these countries might well decide to leave the Commonwealth. This would have a disastrous effect on our Colonies in Africa and South-East Asia.
More serious still would be the loss of confidence in the United Nations as the instrument of world peace. The effectiveness of International Law is undermined if it can be broken with impunity. The League of Nations was discredited because its Convenant was successfully breached by Japan and Italy. The United Nations will go the same way as the League unless its Charter is respected by its member nations and it continues to show, as it did in Korea, that it can successfully stop aggression. We cannot afford, whatever our view of the case maybe, to be regarded by the United Nations as an aggressor nation, and to antagonise world opinion by destroying what most countries still regard as their main safeguard against another war.
The alternative policy to that of the Government is to renounce the use of force and to refer our dispute with Egypt forthwith to the Security Council of the United Nations. This would certainly be useless unless the Government sincerely desired to ask our fellow members to try to make a fresh approach to open negotiations with President Nasser about the Canal. The user nations have certainly tried unsuccessfully, but that is no reason why a further attempt should not be made. The advantages to users and producers of oil of agreement about the Canal are so outstanding that no one could say that a settlement is impossible. Moreover, I believe that President Nasser has moved nearer to our position since the dispute began. Let us, at any rate, adopt a policy that will show by our example that we, as a nation, believe that reason and not force should prevail in international relations, and let us give the rest of the world a lead in this, the right direction.
6.56 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, before I proceed to deal with the many and interesting points that have been raised in to-day's debate, I have one pleasant task, and that is to congratulate my old friend Lord Rathcavan on addressing your Lordships' House for the first time. It

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is almost a work of supererogation to congratulate one who was for so long in the House of Commons and who was Speaker in yet another Legislative Assembly; but I think that all his old friends would like him to know with what pleasure we heard his views and how much we hope to hear him again.
I am afraid that in the remarks which I have to address to you there will be bound to be a certain amount of stressing of the legal factors and dealing with legal points. I do not make a great apology for that, because I think it is extremely important, not only for your Lordships but for the country at large, that the legal aspects of this matter should be put on record and that they may be there for people to see and appreciate. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, in the speech which he has just made, was careful not to commit himself as to whether the action of President Nasser was legal or illegal. He suggested that that should be tested before the International Court of Justice. But it escaped his memory for the moment that Egypt has not signed the compulsory clause of that Court, and therefore is not within its jurisdiction.
The first point that I want to make to your Lordships is that the action of President Nasser in purporting to nationalise the Suez Canal Company is a flagrant breach of International Law, and in particular of the international obligations implicit in the solemn Treaty into which Egypt entered by the Convention of 1888. Your Lordships have in mind, I am sure, the preliminary history of this matter, and I do not want to take up your Lordships' time by going through it in any detail; but it is important, when one is considering the Convention of 1888, to have in one's mind the outline of that background. Your Lordships will remember that in 1854 there was the original concession to M. de Lesseps. Then in 1856 a Company was formed with its seat in Alexandria but its administrative and directive domicile in Paris. A second concession gave to the Company further rights and introduced the conception of free passage. Subsequent to that, there was another contract between the Company and the Egyptian Government which was confirmed by a Firman of the Sultan of Turkey in 1866. The Canal was opened in 1869. It was clear at that moment that the Canal was of immense international importance, and proceedings
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began which culminated with the Treaty of 1888. The importance of that is that the system under which the Canal began and extended was an increasingly international system.
I have put that background to your Lordships, very briefly, in the hope that it may be useful, and it is against that background that I ask your permission to deal with the breach of the international obligations implicit in the Convention of 1888. I am very glad that on this point I have the support of my noble and learned friend Lord McNair. As he reminded your Lordships, one has first to look at the preamble to the Convention which states that the Powers wished:
"to establish by a conventional act a definite system destined to guarantee at all times, and for all the Powers, the free use of the Suez Maritime Canal."—
and I draw your Lordships' attention to the next words—
"and thus to complete the system under which the navigation of this Canal has been placed by the Firman of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan dated 22nd February, 1866 …sanctioning the Concessions of His Highness the Khedive."
In my view, it is plain that the words I have quoted indicate that it was the intention of the signatories to this Convention that the Company to which the concession had been granted by the Khedive was to be indissolubly linked with the "definite system" created by the Convention. It is an integral part of that system, and if anyone doubts this, let him look at the Convention itself, when he will find the Company expressly mentioned in Articles 2 and 14. I am very glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair, made that point to-day, as he had already made it in his letter in The Times on Monday last.
As this Convention was introduced in order to complete the system of the concession, it contemplates that the system will continue for the period provided by the concession. Article 14 of the Treaty provides that the engagements resulting from the Treaty are not to be limited—I quote the words:
"by the duration of the Company's concessions."
This clearly indicates that the Convention was based on the assumption that the concession would continue for the full period. It is therefore an implied term of the Convention, which is in the fullest

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sense an international Treaty, that an end could not be put to the Company's concessions except with the consent of the Powers, and to expropriate the concessionary is in practice to terminate the concession just as surely as to repudiate it directly.
We need not remain in the nineteenth century. The 1954 Agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the present Egyptian Government (that is, in effect, President Nasser himself) contained a clear provision that both Governments recognised that the Canal, although an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway of international importance, and expressed their determination to uphold the 1888 Convention. This is a clear indication that Colonel Nasser had reaffirmed the status of the Company which, as I have shown, it was the declared purpose of the Convention to recognise and establish. In nationalising the Canal, he has therefore not only committed a breach of the obligations implicit in the 1888 Convention but has broken his own pledge, made as recently as 1954. That is the first point.
The second point I wish to make to your Lordships is that it is entirely fallacious to suggest that the Company is a purely Egyptian Company and that the nationalisation is no different from the nationalisation of a domestic industry in Britain. The Suez Canal Company is in law manifestly an international body. It is true that the Company is registered in Egypt, but that does not make it solely or exclusively an Egyptian company. Let us take the tests that would be applied to any company for any purpose. One would consider the locality of its principal attributes, its treatment by the Egyptian Government and the law which the Egyptian Government has always agreed is applicable to its constitution, which my noble friend Lord Grantchester has mentioned. One would then consider whether the Egyptian Government has sought to make Egyptian legislation applicable to the Company and what rights Egyptian Governments, Khedivial, royal or revolutionary, have allowed to be vested in the Company itself. These are severe tests, as any lawyer or international lawyer would agree. I do not shrink from any one of them.
On the first point, the fact is that the Egyptian registration is a formality, and,
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like so many registrations, is in the nature of a facade, covering an entity which is in foreign ownership and under foreign direction, with directors and general meetings in Paris, and with legal personality under French law. The international aspect of the Company has been recognised by the Egyptian mixed courts. I give your Lordships one fairly recent example—the Hoirs Setton case of February 28, 1946. By the agreement of the Egyptian Government. the law covering the Company is not exclusively Egyptian law, and is certainly not Egyptian law in the context of the present issue. The context of the present issue is that President Nasser has now purported to replace the Company's directing board, the Conseil d' Administration, by an Egyptian authority. This clearly affects the internal constitution of the Company, but by an agreement made between the Egyptian Government and the Company—in fact, it is Article 16 of the Agreement of 1866—made long ago, but never altered, it was agreed that in matters relating to its constitution it is to be governed by French law, and all disputes under that head should be regarded as being subject to the jurisdiction of the French courts. Therefore, under provisions agreed to by the Egyptian Government and never altered, the matter is not one governed by Egyptian law.
I am now coming to what a Legislative Chamber might well consider the strongest point—namely, that Egyptian legislation does not apply to the Company unless the Company agrees. For eighty-four years, from 1863 to 1947, the relations between the Company and the Government had always been regulated by the special agreements, each of which amounted to a reaffirmation of the Company's concessionary rights. So for eighty-four years Egypt never even tried to make its legislation applicable to the Company. In 1947, when the Egyptian Government attempted for the first time automatically to enforce an Egyptian law (it was a Companies Act) on the Company, the Company took the opinion of two famous international lawyers, Professor Gide!, of France, and Professor Sauser-Hall, of Switzerland. Both, after a most careful and full review of all the relevant documents and precedents, advised categorically that the registration in Egypt was not conclusive; that the Company had an international character;

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that the Egyptian Government was not, in matters affecting the status of the Company or the provisions of the concession, able automatically to make Egyptian legislation applicable to it.
I agree with that opinion of those famous international lawyers. What is far more important, so did the Egyptian Government, for the opinion was communicated to the Egyptian Government, who raised no objection, and must be taken to have accepted the underlying arguments, for the very good reason that it proceeded to deal with the matter in question by a further special agreement made in 1949. The plain moral of this is that if the Egyptian Government, on its own admission of as late as 1949, cannot legally make Egyptian legislation applicable to the Company in particular points of its constitution, it unquestionably cannot do so for the purpose of ending the international character of the Company and so abrogating the concession which the latter possesses.
I want to put these things as shortly as I can, but I think it is very important that they should be stated, and stated clearly. And, my Lords, there can be no doubt from what I have said that successive Egyptian Governments, including Colonel Nasser's own Government, have recognised that the Company has definite rights vested in it which are far more than mere unilateral concessions which Egypt can at any time withdraw. Professor Sauser-Hall, the eminent Swiss jurist to whom I have previously referred, advised some years ago that the contractual relationship between the Company and the Egyptian Government could not be interfered with without a breach of the well-known doctrine of International Law in regard to vested rights. I do not think that any international lawyer could quarrel with that view.
I have seen it stated (and I am sure most of your Lordships have seen it also), as if it were a mitigating circumstance, that the Company's concession provides for the eventual taking over of the Company's assets by Egypt. That was to be in 1968 not now. The assets were to be taken over only on payment of their value, and the Egyptian Government have offered nothing for the value of the Company's installations but have claimed automatic ownership of all the assets. If
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your Lordships were to look at Article 16 of the Concession of 1866 you would see that at the expiry of the ninety-nine years the Egyptian Government will re-enter into possession of the Canal.
"on condition in that event"—
I am quoting
"of taking over all the materials and installations utilised for the operation of the Canal and of paying the Company their value as fixed either by agreement or by experts."
This gives no automatic right to the assets, but an obligation to take them over and pay their 'value as a condition of re-entering into possession of the Canal. The words "in that event" are significant in showing that there was a possibility that Egypt would not re-enter. That is confirmed by the following paragraph of the same Article, which provides that if the Company should continue for further ninety-nine year periods, the royalty reserved to the Egyptian Government should increase by 5 per cent.
What is most important, and what we should remember in trying to take an objective view of this matter, is that these provisions which I have mentioned imply an opportunity to negotiate or propose an extension of the concession, or, failing agreement, an orderly transfer of the Company's assets and undertakings. In this case the expropriation was done suddenly, arbitrarily and forcibly, with the declared object of using the proceeds for the national purposes of the Egyptian Government. As certain people have tried to find every justification for President Nasser's action, may I make it plain, in a word, that the nationalisation by the Egyptian Government is equivalent to total abrogation of the Company's concession which, as I have shown your Lordships, was confirmed by the Convention of 1888 in such a way as to make any fundamental breach of the concession a breach of international law.
I hope that your Lordships will think it is worth my saying again and especially (I mean no disrespect) after the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, dealing with nationalisation in general, that this is not a real case of nationalisation: it is not a general measure affecting a class of property or an industry. The measures taken here were measures of expropriation having an obvious confiscatory element directed against a particular undertaking which is

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foreign-owned, financed and administered. A parallel would be for the Swiss Government to nationalise the International Red Cross, on the ground that it is registered in Switzerland. It is part of a plan—as my noble friend the Leader of the House said—to destroy the international status of the Canal. It may seem a comparatively small point, but the compensation is inadequate, ineffective and illusory. It is ineffective because the Egyptian Government have made the payment of compensation dependent on the Company's assets in Egypt and abroad being handed over to them. They cannot have it both ways. Having purported to nationalise the Company they are liable to pay compensation in any event. It is illusory because it is clearly impossible for the Egyptian Government to pay compensation while at the same time adequately maintaining the Canal and financing the Aswan Dam without raising dues and charges to an intolerable extent.
I come now to the Egyptian attitude to the employees of the Company. I have some right to speak, because as Chairman of the Legal Committee of the Council of Europe I had a small part in the coming into force of the Convention of Human Rights for Europe. I find that in forcing the employees to continue in work, at any rate for a period, under the threat of imprisonment, the Government have committed a further illegality. This is not part of a general measure directed to keeping people at work in war or in emergency conditions. This is part of an act in itself illegal, directed against a specific entity. This is a case of forcing employees to give their services to an employer they have never agreed to serve. The new authority has no right to stand in the position of the old Company. Breach of contract of employment is a civil wrong which cannot possibly be met by threat of imprisonment. This is forced labour and amounts to a violation of human rights, as well as a breach of the accepted principle of International Law, by which every country has a duty to afford a certain minimum standard of treatment to foreigners within its bounds.
I have dealt with the Convention, the position of the Company and this purported nationalisation and its circumstances, but we must look further in the matter. The effect of nationalisation or
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expropriation, particularly in destroying the Canal's international status, is incompatible with the 1888 Convention. After this action, the maintenance and development of the Canal are subject to the prior demands of the Egyptian Government, who have declared their intention to use the revenue of the Canal for their own purposes. It is only necessary to take the declaration of Egypt's object, of financing the Egyptian national project of the Aswan Dam, to see that it is not consistent with the purely international purposes for which the Canal was established and cannot, consistently with the duty of the maintenance and improvement of the Canal, together with the payment of compensation announced, let alone further compensation possibly due, be carried out without such an increase in the tolls and charges as would amount to a serious hindrance to the use of the Canal by shipping on an economic basis. Even without the Dam, it is extremely unlikely that if due provision for maintenance and improvement is to be met, this could be done without a considerable rise in dues.
If this purported nationalisation creates a situation in which a breach of the Convention must occur, or almost certainly must occur, this not only is a further fact in making nationalisation illegal, but also threatens the existence of the Canal. Despite the words of the noble Lord. Lord Winster, to which I listened, in my opinion, if the Canal is to be used as an instrument of Egyptian policy for economic purposes, it is a reasonable assumption that it will he used as such for political purposes also. It could be opened or closed at the whim of President Nasser. The blockade of Israel, which was condemned by the United Nations in 1951 but which still continues, five years later, is an example of what will happen. It may well be said—because every argument is grasped —that the blockade was condoned and that the Security Council are to be reproached for not having taken effective action against Egypt in respect of it. However that may be, surely we are entitled to look at these past events in order to judge how much reliance can be placed on President Nasser's intentions now. I think that that is fair and reasonable.
This is a clear case of an illegal attempt to alter the status of an international waterway. The resultant problems

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must be considered on an international plane. International physical entities such as the Suez Canal have always had a special position in International Law. If it were a matter of our interests alone, then there would be room for argument as to whether these interests were vital and whether we had a right to protect them; but where it has been declared with all possible international solemnity, in a treaty of eight Great Powers, that there are international interests, as indeed no-one denies, then it becomes not merely a right but a duty to protect them. Obviously this duty falls most heavily on the users of the Canal for whose benefit the Canal was made international and the duty of leadership falls on Great Britain, who is the greatest user.
Let us look at this for a moment from the standpoint of Egypt. Here I am glad ton be in accord with the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair. It must be remembered that every sovereign State is subject to the treaty obligations which it has freely accepted and which impose certain limitations on its unrestricted use of sovereign power. This does not in any way detract from its status as an independent sovereign State. Egypt concluded, and President Nasser accepts to-day, the Convention of 1888, which, as I said, was a solemn international treaty. The sovereignty of Great Britain, too, is limited by numberless treaties.
In spite of the fact that our national interests are deeply involved, in this dispute we have never forgotten our international duties. We have never forgotten that this is an international cause. We immediately took counsel with the United States and France. That consultation gave rise to the London Conference, which was a Conference of all those mostly concerned. The result was that eighteen nations from all over the world declared for international control, and also agreed terms in which the political and economic interests of Egypt were most carefully safeguarded. President Nasser has now rejected the principle of international control, and it is quite clear that it is a condition of any plan of President Nasser that the Canal must not be an international body, working in the interests of users from all over the world, but that the Canal should be available as an instrument of Egyptian policy.
The Government had to take into account—they could not do anything else
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—that to leave the Canal in the hands of a man whose untrustworthiness has been so often proved would be a threat to our economic existence. So far as I know, nobody denies this. Therefore, I find it difficult to see who then can deny our duty to strengthen our forces. One has to look at what actually has happened in the world, and because I want to be studiously careful in this matter, I should like to put it in the words of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. He said:
"It might he regarded as provocative if were to retell all the circumstances which could arise in Egypt. I will therefore mention only one. I have not forgotten the appalling massacre of foreigners which took place in Cairo in 1952. Many people of several nationalities, including ten British, were murdered in the most brutal conditions. I was then in charge of the Government, for my right honourable friend for Woodford was on his way back from the United States. It is true that on that occasion the Egyptian Army intervened to stop further bloodshed. Members can judge for themselves how much that action was due to the knowledge that we had a plan to intervene by force in the last resort."
That must be remembered; and I must say, in answer to the question that my noble friend Lord Bridgeman was good enough to put to me, that I take the same view as I understand he does: that the movement of troops is not in itself a case of force; it a matter of being prepared for whatever action may ensue.
The noble Lord, Lord Sillkin, suggested that our action in regard to the pilots had been provocative. Again, I want to be absolutely clear that no word of mine is exaggerated. if I can prevent it. Therefore, again, with your Lordships' permission, I will put it in the language of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. He said:
"I must new make some reference to the question of the pilots. The Company agreed, at the earnest request of the French Government and ourselves, to urge the pilots to remain, first, until the London Conference had taken place, and again, until Mr. Menzies' mission was completed. How little they liked this can be illustrated by the comments of one Swedish pilot. 'I have no intention', he said, 'of going back to Suez as long as the Canal is under Egyptian administration, and the same applies to my sixty colleagues who are at present in Europe.' And he went on: 'I have no confidence in the Egyptians. I was there during the days of terror in 1952. For my part, f hope no sea captains get caught on Nasser's boot'."
The Prime Minister went on to say:
"After Nasser's sudden seizure oil the Canal Company it was only natural that the

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non-Egyptian staff of the Company should consider their own future very carefully. They were expected to work for a Government to which they owed no allegiance, and the House should not forget that they were threatened with imprisonment by the Egyptian Government if they did not continue with their work. These men have undoubtedly been operating in the most difficult and trying conditions. It was a heavy responsibility for any Government to exert their influence on the International Suez Canal Company to keep these men at their posts, as we did. But when the Menzies' mission came to an end the Government felt they could not any longer maintain this pressure. These men are human beinas, free to choose. They have no security in present circumstances. If they decide to leave Egypt, it will clearly be the responsibility of the Egyptian Government. It is they who have created conditions in which these men have taken the decision that, despite their many years' service on the Canal. and their many personal ties, they find that they must leave."
That is a very fair statement of the position, and I challenge anyone, with that in mind, to say that there is provocation.
I thought this would be a convenient time to answer the question—the quadrupartite question. if I may put it that way —put by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. The answer to the first part of the question is that Her Majesty's Government own between 43 and 44 per cent. of the shares of the Suez Canal Company and appoint three directors to the governing board. It would not be in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's settled practice to seek to exercise day-to-day control of the affairs of a Company of this sort, even if our shareholding entitled us to do so.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE.: The noble and learned Viscount said that there were four questions. That is the answer to the first.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am answering the four together. I am only trying to be helpful to the noble Viscount. Her Majesty's Government had no knowledge of the terms of the contracts between the Suez Canal Company and their various employees. Now the third part of the question. On September 11 the Suez Canal Company Board made public a message to its employees in which it told them that, with the completion of Mr. Menzies' mission, the further period of work called for by the Company a fortnight ago had come to an end. Consequently, all non-Egyptian employees of
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the Company who had responded to its invitation and declared their loyalty to it were authorised, so far as the Company was concerned, to stop work on either September 14 or 15. The answer to the fourth point of the noble Viscount's question can be given only by the Company.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The purpose of the question was this. The Company consists of shares, of which we hold 44 per cent. or thereabouts. What I was endeavouring to find out was whether Her Majesty's Government took responsibility for the action of the Board, or, at any rate, for the opinion expressed on the Board by their own nominees; because it was said in The Times—in fact. I believe a Foreign Office spokesman said it—that this was a matter entirely for the Company. My first question is: Are not the Government ultimately responsible for, at any rate, the advice given by our directors on the Company?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not want to give a debating answer to the noble Viscount. What I said is perfectly clear: that it would not be in accordance with the Government's settled practice to seek to exercise day-to-day control in the affairs of a Company of this sort. Since the Government of which the noble Viscount was so distinguished a member, Her Majesty's Government own shares in a considerable number of companies—many of them will come into mind—and it is the practice not to exercise day-to-day control. I can remember members of that Government announcing in another place that they would not exercise day-to-day control but would leave that to the boards on which they nominated their members. Of course, they have the ultimate sanction of not putting that member on to the Board again, and, if the contract allows, of removing him at once.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I gave notice of these questions because I think they are important. May I ask the noble and learned Viscount this? What are the terms of the employment of these men? Are they due to give six months' notice, or can they walk out when they like? The Lord Chancellor must know that. He has directors on the Company, and he could have inquired as to that matter. The second point is this. Have these men been told—I do not know whether this is true or not—that if they

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leave the Company there will be a couple of years' money in their pocket? You see, the point of the question is that it is alleged
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Order, order!
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: The point of the question is this. It is alleged that in this controversy there is an attempt at sabotage. My question was to find out whether the Government were able to repudiate any part in that charge.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I entirely repudiate any part in that charge, and I repeat what I said to the noble Viscount—I know it is difficult to pick up an answer as it is given—that Her Majesty's Government had no knowledge of the terms of the contracts between the Suez Canal Company and their various employees. The noble Viscount may take it from me that it was a matter that received attention from the Government of which he was a member—that they would not take the responsibility of answering in Parliament questions relating to day-to-day management of companies in which they had an interest. That attitude has been taken by every Party. Let me say at once that if there is any other point which occurs to the noble Viscount overnight that we can get information on, he has only to ask. I will repeat what the noble Marquess said—that we want to give all the information we can.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: I am grateful, and I shall revert to the matter to-morrow.
LORD GRANTCHESTER: Would it be possible to find out what the French position is? I think there are sixteen French directors, and one wonders what instructions have been given to these directors by the French Government.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: May I say that I will try and make inquiries.
LORD SILKIN: I wonder whether the noble and learned Viscount could tell me this. He was answering a point that I had made. I. agree that his statement is, generally speaking, correct, that the Government do not interfere in the day-to-day operations of a company in which they hold shares; but could the noble and learned Viscount say whether, in this particular case, the advice which was
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given by the Company to the pilots was given after consultation or not?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: As I said, that was a matter for the Company, and the Canal Company made public their message to their employees. What is clear, of course, is that there must have been some consultation in order to indicate to the Company the period of the Menzies Committee. Clearly, the Government must have communicated to the Company and given them some sort of idea how long, in their estimation, the Menzies Committee would take. To that extent there probably was communication. I have not any details, but again, if I can help in any way, I will try.
I have dealt with the position of the Company and I now want to come for a moment to the wider matters that have been raised, and especially to the speech of my noble friend Lord McNair. I do not want to get involved in theoretical arguments on International Law, but I do want to indicate the practical position as I see it, and then to indicate why, in my view, the action that Her Majesty's Government have taken is within the letter and the spirit of the Charter. The noble Lord, Lord McNair, mentioned the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and, as some words of his indicated, I, if anyone, ought to know what was in the Briand-Kellogg Pact. But I remind him that it outlaws war as an instrument of national policy—I emphasise the words "national policy" —and this does not exclude, as I think he would concede, the use of force in all circumstances.
If he will refresh his mind from a work he knows very well, Oppenheim on International Law, Volume page 182. where the learned author, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, comments on the Pact, he will find there that it is stated that:
"the fact that the signatories have renounced in their mutual relations recourse to war as an instrument of national policy means that resort to war still remains lawful—(a) as a means of legally permissible self-defence; (b) as a measure of collective action for the enforcement of international obligations by virtue of existing instruments such as the Charter of the United Nations; (c) as between signatories of the Pact and non-signatories; and (d) as against a signatory who has broken the Pact by resorting to war in violation of its provisions."
Those are the two points I want the noble Lord to note—that this is a matter limited to an instrument of national

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policy and subject to these exceptions which I have mentioned.
I then proceed to the Charter of the United Nations. I remind your Lordships, as my noble friend the Leader of the House reminded you, that the purposes of the United Nations include two aims: one, to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and, secondly, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from Treaties and other sources of International Law can be maintained. These two aims are interdependent. If there is no respect for Treaties the consequences are invariably and inevitably anarchy and war.
Now I come to Article 2, which was quoted by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel. In Article 2 the positive words of paragraph 3 must be considered, as well as the negative provision of paragraph 4, which the noble Earl quoted. May I quote them both? Paragraph 3 says:
"All Members should settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice"—
I repeat "and justice"—
"are not endangered."
As the noble Earl told us, paragraph 4 says:
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
I comment again that it is an important obligation and duty on us all. There is one clear purpose, which is that disputes shall be settled so as not to endanger justice and the respect for obligations arising from Treaties. We cannot get away front that duty. We may fail to carry out the duty, but the duty remains on us, and the more that we are internationalists, the more we have to find a way to carry out our duty.
I ask your Lordships to follow me therefore in, as I have said, a careful examination of the Charter. The first alternative to the threat or use of force is set out in Article 33 which deals with seeking a solution by negotiation, the course which has been observed in the present case by the London Conference and the Cairo meetings. Your Lordships have heard to-day that there are further
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steps, namely, the Users' Council, which are being taken still at that stage. The noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said that this also was provocative. I hope I have shown without serious fear of contradiction that the Egyptian action was illegal in destroying the Company which had the concession and which was a basic matter in the Convention of 1888. The Egyptian Government destroys that Company, an international Company. Is it to be provocative to say, "You have destroyed a lawful company we put a provisional organisation into its place"? Where is the provocation there? That is surely a reasonable method of dealing with people who act illegally against you.
But it does not stop there. They have turned down the Eighteen Nations' proposals put forward by the five delegates. They can still join in this Users' Council; they can still come into it. Why, why, why, must we assume that people will inevitably do what is wrong and apparently conspire to make their wrongdoing a success? We put forward an alternative and it is open to Egypt to join that if she repents of her wrongdoing and takes the right course. But that is action under Article 33. Noble Lords have been looking at the Charter and have sought to criticise us on it. But after Article 33 there is Article 35, which says that the matter may be brought to the attention of the United Nations. Your Lordships heard from the noble Marquess the Leader of the House that a letter has already been sent bringing it to their attention. Then there is Article 37 which says that if what you do under Article 33 fails, then you shall bring it to the Council. We are still working under Article 33 we are still trying to make a success of the procedure under Article 33. I say that there is no fair and reasonable criticism against us for what we have done because we have carried out that procedure.
That is the situation. I do not want— and I do not think it is really profitable —to anticipate failure. But there it is. Action is being arranged now and it may succeed. But I think it is right to go this far. Suppose it fails suppose our action under Article 33 definitely fails. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister said to-day
"I shall no doubt be asked what are the intentions of Her Majesty's Government about the reference of this dispute to the United Nations."

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That arises under Article 37 when Article 33 has failed.
"I certainly do not…exclude that—quite the contrary; it may well be necessary."
Surely that is the right position when you are acting under Article 33, and that is what my right honourable friend has said in that regard.
Of course, the position in the United Nations is that a resolution in the Security Council—as the noble Lord, Lord Silkin, said, if I may say so, with perfect accuracy—may be vetoed by one Power. The Assembly has no executive power but only powers of recommending. A resolution of recommendation in the Assembly may be blocked by one vote over one-third. That is the position. I say that there should go out from your Lordships' House and from all men and women of good will the hope that, if it does come, if it is necessary, if our action fails, the United Nations will be inspired by the duty of preserving international treaties and obligations, as my noble friend mentioned to-day.
I wish to reiterate what I have already said about the importance of international obligations and international entities. There has been much talk about the rule of law. I welcome it, so long as it is clearly remembered that the rule of law is founded not merely upon the facile assertion of rights but upon the hard fulfilment of duties. When steps for the peaceful solution of problems arising out of the enforcement of international obligations have been taken and have failed in their object, the duty still remains.
May I quote what I venture to think is an arresting passage from a book by one of the foremost international jurists of our time—I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord McNair. will agree with me—Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, now British Judge on the Court of International Justice at The Hague. It appears in the Eighth Edition of the famous book of Oppenheim on International Law. At pages 336 and 337, he says this:
"It is often maintained that a State, as a sovereign person, can have no legal responsibility whatever. This is only correct with reference to certain acts of a State towards its subjects. Since a State can abolish parts of its Municipal Law and can make new Municipal Law, it can always avoid legal. although not moral, responsibility by a change of Municipal Law. The position is different with regard to the external responsibility of
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a State. Responsibility in that sphere attaches to every State as an International Person. State responsibility concerning international duties is therefore a legal responsibility. For a State cannot abolish or create International Law in the same way that it can abolish or create Municipal Law. Every neglect of an international legal duty constitutes an international delinquency, and the injured State can, subject to its obligations of pacific settlement, through reprisals or even war compel the delinquent State to fulfil the international duties."
My Lords, in my opinion, international obligations apply particularly to international entities, in which I include those on which a certain character has been mposed—such as the Rhineland in 1936, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Ratheavan, or a land corridor or an international waterway. In such instances the international delinquency of the State may injure many, though the extent of the injury done may differ from State to State. Is it not plain that in such circumstances States which are party to the agreement, in the fulfilment of their international obligations, have not only the right but a positive duty to take such steps as may be necessary Ito compel the delinquent to fulfil his international obligations?
Our own history is not lacking in instances of individual men who have stood forth for the rights of others. Take what your Lordships may consider a trite, but it is an obvious, example. Were not the protests of John Hampden against the imposition of ship money made for the common good? Your Lordships may remember Burke's famous speech, where he said:
"Would twenty shillings have ruined Mr Hampden's fortune? No, but the payment of half twenty shillings on the principle it was demanded, would have made him a slave."
I ask your Lordships to-night to consider what is your individual reply to the moral duty. Certainly I hope you will agree with me that the United Nations, should our action under Article 33 not be successful, should take that view of international obligation which does not forget the duties of life.
My Lords, one of the dangers of which I think we are all conscious—the last thing I desire is to attempt to appear to your Lordships as more conscious than those I see around me—in maintaining respect for treaties and their obligations is that the fait accompli, although achieved by the most glaring use of force, as here, quickly acquires a prescriptive right over

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events and the slothful hearts of men. We must never forget that these international entities, whether they be canals or land corridors, are the landmarks of international achievement in the cause of peace and orderly arrangement of the world. If another part of the world machinery fails to work, I say again, the duty remains of preserving their international character, and no such failure excuses us from our duty.
My Lords, this is a most important matter. I have tried to the best of my ability, and with the forbearance of your Lordships, to put the matter fully, clearly and as dispassionately as I can, and I think it is right that in these circumstances I should to-morrow call on your Lordships to pass this Resolution: That this House condemns the arbitrary action of the Egyptian Government in seizing the Suez Canal; endorses the proposals adopted by the eighteen Powers at the London Conference to ensure that an international waterway so essential to the economic life, standard of living and employment of this and other countries should not remain in the unrestricted control of any single Government; welcomes the sustained and continuing efforts of Her Majesty's Government to achieve a peaceful settlement, and affirms its support for the statement of policy made by Her Majesty's Government to this House on September 12.
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My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That this House condemns the arbitrary action of the Egyptian Government in seizing the Suez Canal; endorses the proposals adopted by the eighteen Powers at the London Conference to ensure that an international waterway so essential to the economic life, standard of living and employment of this and other countries should not remain in the unrestricted control of any single Government; welcomes the sustained and continuing efforts of Her Majesty's Government to achieve a peaceful settlement, and affirms its support for the statement of policy made by Her Majesty's Government to this House on September 12.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE MARQUESS OF ABERDEEN AND TEMAIR: My Lords, in these last few moments, may I propose a hearty vote of thanks to the Lord Chancellor for his excellent address to us to-night?
EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, I beg to move that this debate be now adojurned.
Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Earl Attlee.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and debate adjourned accordingly.
House adjourned at five minutes past eight o'clock.