Sitting of 3 May 1956

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRAYERS
  PRIVATE BUSINESS

    BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION (No. 2) BILL
    Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown and the Duchy of Lancaster, signified.
    Bill read the Third time and passed.

    CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [Lords]
    Read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.
ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  EDUCATION

    Teachers, Midlands
    Mr. Mossasked the Minister of Education what consultations he has had with education authorities in the Midlands about the teacher-supply position; and with what results.
    The Minister of Education (Sir David Eccles): Representatives of the Birmingham, Nottinghamshire and Walsall authorities have come to see me recently. We have had full discussions on their staffing problems and have considered measures that they might take to improve the position in their own areas. I shall be seeing Nottingham and Smethwick shortly.
    Mr. Moss: Is the Minister not prepared to say what he has in mind to improve the position? Is he aware that it is possible for one chief education officer to say that he can pick and choose among applicants for jobs, whereas in some industrial areas irremediable harm may be done to education because of the inadequate supply of teachers?
    Sir D. Eccles: It is a very difficult problem. It is perfectly true that certain areas have a greater drawing power for teachers than have others, but I think that
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    the shortage areas can do quite a lot to help themselves, and I am discussing with them the ways and means. I want to see a number of them in order to get a clearer picture of the difficulties which, I am sorry to say, quite a considerable number of areas will face.
    Mr. Swingler: Is the Minister aware that many education authorities are extremely disappointed that he has turned down the recommendation of the Advisory Council, and think that he should exercise some control over the areas in which teachers are difficult to replace?
    Sir D. Eccles: Certain education authorities are disappointed, but not the teachers. The hon. Gentleman must make up his mind on which side he is. The teachers, quite rightly in my view, do not want direction of labour, and it is my guess—though I cannot be certain—that if we had a direction of labour preventing teachers from going where they wished, the net result would not help the shortage areas.

    School Building Programme
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Minister of Education how many primary and secondary schools were under construction at the latest date for which figures are available; how many of these were comprehensive, grammar, and bilateral schools, respectively; and how the total figures compare with those for the same date in 1955.
    Sir D. Eccles: On 31st January this year there were 309 primary and 510 secondary schools under construction, compared with 372 primary and 414 secondary schools a year earlier. I am sending the hon. Gentleman the further details for which he asks.
    Mr. Swingler: Is the Minister aware that many education authorities, including that of Newcastle-under-Lyme, are very disturbed at the low and inadequate level of this programme? Will he not reconsider the position in view of the fact that we are only now beginning to experience the bulge in the secondary schools, and that many people are forecasting a very much worsening situation through overcrowding?
    Sir D. Eccles: It is no use giving authorities more work than they can do; the hon. Gentleman's next Question deals with that particular subject.
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Minister of of Education if he will now publish in HANSARD a table showing, for each local authority, the number of schools included in the 1955–56 school building programme which had not been started by 31st March.
    Sir D. Eccles: Yes.
    Mr. Swingler: May we know from the Minister how many schools had been scheduled to be started in the last building year but could not be started owing to the Government's lack of control over building resources?
    Sir D. Eccles: The hon. Gentleman, I think, should study the list, which certainly contains one or two rather regrettable cases. I do not accept that it is a case of lack of building control. It is generally known that we are in a boom, in which the pressure upon building resources from industrial investment exceeded what we expected.
    Dr. King: Is the Minister aware that local education authorities are behind in their school building programmes, that the speed has gone down because of unrestricted building of other kinds, and that, far from cutting those building programmes. as he has done, by some 200 schools, he should have tried to get materials for the local education authorities?
    Sir D. Eccles: There is no way to help them better than the "squeeze." The hon. Gentleman will, I hope, agree that the "squeeze" is a good thing, and he will see that, as education is excepted, the schools will benefit.
    Following is the table:

    Number of major primary and secondary school projects* in 1955–56 programme on which building work had not started by 31 st March, 1956

    ENGLAND

    Administrative county areas

    Bedfordshire

    6

    Berkshire

    3

    Buckinghamshire

    7

    Cheshire

    8

    Cornwall

    1

    Cumberland

    5

    Devon

    7

    Dorset

    1

    Durham

    4

    Essex

    6

    Gloucestershire

    4

    Hampshire

    4

    Herefordshire

    3

    Hertfordshire

    1

    Huntingdonshire

    3

    Isle of Ely

    2

    Kent

    23

    Lancashire

    14

    Lincs (Holland)

    3

    Lincs (Kesteven)

    4

    Lincs (Lindsey)

    1

    Middlesex

    21

    Northamptonshire

    2

    Northumberland

    7

    Oxfordshire

    6

    Salop

    3

    Somerset

    3

    Staffordshire

    20

    Suffolk, West

    2

    Surrey

    35

    Sussex, East

    4

    Sussex, West

    7

    Warwickshire

    4

    Westmorland

    1

    Wiltshire

    3

    Worcestershire

    6

    Yorks: East Riding

    1

    Yorks: North Riding

    5

    Yorks: West Riding

    6

    LONDON

    7

    County boroughs

    Birkenhead

    1

    Birmingham

    14

    Blackpool

    2

    Bolton

    1

    Bournemouth

    1

    Bradford

    3

    Bristol

    3

    Carlisle

    1

    Dudley

    I

    Gateshead

    2

    Leeds

    3

    Liverpool

    1

    Manchester

    1

    Middlesbrough

    1

    Northampton

    1

    Nottingham

    2

    Oxford

    1

    Plymouth

    4

    Reading

    1

    Rotherham

    1

    St Helens

    1

    Sheffield

    4

    Southampton

    1

    Southport

    1

    South Shields

    2

    Sunderland

    1

    Tynemouth

    1

    Wallasey

    1

    Walsall

    1

    West Bromwich

    1

    West Ham

    1

    WALES

    Administrative county areas

    Denbighshire

    1

    Glamorgan

    6

    Pembrokeshire

    2

    Radnor

    1

    County boroughs

    Merthyr Tydfil

    1

    Newport (Mon.)

    3

    Swansea

    3

    * The list covers all projects costing more than £10,000, whether complete new schools or extensions to or adaptation of existing premises

    Pupil-Teacher Ratios
    Mr. Swinglerasked the Minister of Education his latest average figures, for England and Wales, of the pupil-teacher ratios in senior and junior classes, respectively; and the figures for Staffordshire.
    Sir D. Eccles: In January, 1955, the numbers of pupils per full-time teacher in Staffordshire were 33·4 for juniors and 22·9 for seniors. The corresponding figures for England and Wales as a whole were 31·5 and 21·0.
    Mr. Swingler: Is the Minister aware that those education authorities in whose areas the ratios are higher than the national average want to see, not the direction of teachers, but the Minister putting some control over the areas that have managed considerably to reduce the pupil-teacher ratio, namely, by giving them some quota of staff which they are allowed to appoint, which is very different from the direction of labour?
    Sir D. Eccles: I think that if the hon. Gentleman will look into the question of putting on control, as he suggests, he will find that the net result would not be likely to be helpful to what he has in mind. For example, the part-time teachers will teach only near their own homes. If I put on this control, they will not teach at all, and the total number of teachers available for teaching in this country will go down.
    Mr. M. Stewart: Does not the right hon. Gentleman's reply suggest that what we ought to be looking at is the general supply of teachers for the country as a whole? Is he satisfied that, with the present facilities for training teachers, that supply will be adequate to meet the requirements of the growing number of children in the secondary schools?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am not satisfied, but we have reached a point when it is really too late to increase the size of the training colleges, because of the position of the bulge that is now going through the schools. When it would have been possible to create more training places, when the hon. Gentleman's party were in power and just after we came into power, there were not the candidates. It is no use blaming past Ministers. At the time when they might have increased the size of the training colleges, they were scraping
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    the barrel for applications to fill places. Now we have more applications than places.

    School Milk
    Mr. E. Johnsonasked the Minister of Education what percentage of all school milk supplies are now being bought at some discount below the maximum retail price; and what steps he is taking to effect further saving in the cost of school milk.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Education (Mr. Dennis Vosper): The percentage of school milk supplies now being bought at some discount below the maximum retail price will not be known until about the end of next month, but it will certainly be considerably higher than it was a year ago. I am sending my hon. Friend a copy of a letter sent to all local education authorities last December.
    Mr. Johnson: While welcoming that improvement, may I ask my hon. Friend if he can say how many county boroughs are now being charged the full retail price for all their supplies of school milk, and how that figure compares with a year ago?
    Mr. Vosper: A year ago, 55 county boroughs were being charged the maximum retail price for all their milk. Today, only five are being charged the full maximum price, and that is a very considerable improvement.
    Mr. Hastings: May I ask the Minister whether, while taking every reasonable care to get milk as cheaply as possible, he will make sure that the milk supplied in schools is either pasteurised or comes from an attested herd, or preferably both?
    Mr. Vosper: I think that I can give the hon. Gentleman that assurance. Sometimes, the reason it is not possible to supply liquid milk to schools is that it is not possible to get a supply of a sufficiently high standard.

    Building Projects, Barking
    Mr. Hastingsasked the Minister of Education whether he will make a statement regarding the rebuilding of St. Joseph's Aided Primary School, Barking, and the building of a new county junior school to supply the needs of the Thames View Estate, Barking.
    Sir D. Eccles: The Essex local education authority has asked for both these projects to be included in its building programme in 1957–58. I am considering its proposals.
    Mr. Hastings: Does the Minister realise the urgency of the situation, because this new school is required to replace a school destroyed during the war by enemy action? Is he aware that the Thames View Estate is rather isolated, and, when completed, will contain nearly 2,000 new houses, and there must be somewhere for the many children on that large estate to go for their education?
    Sir D. Eccles: I will pay attention to the reasons which the hon. Gentleman has given.

    Primary School Places (Cost)
    Captain Pilkingtonasked the Minister of Education what, in terms of December, 1952, prices, was the cost of one primary school place in 1949 and in 1954.
    Sir D. Eccles: In terms of December, 1952, prices, the average cost of a primary school place was £262 in 1949 and £129 in 1954.
    Captain Pilkington: Can my right hon. Friend ensure that this very satisfactory economy will be mentioned by hon. and right hon. Members opposite in their constituencies?

    Direct Grant Schools (Fee-Paying Places)
    Mr. McKayasked the Minister of Education if he is aware of the discontent with his decision to curtail the opportunities for free education in Northumberland County, in that scholars who have passed the examination tests and have obtained free places in the public grammar schools, and who then choose to go to a denominational or other direct grant school, are now, at his instructions having to pay fees where, before his intervention, they were accommodated by the county education committee, free of cost to the parents; what is the saving to the Exchequer from this intervention in Northumberland County; and if he will reconsider allowing the Northumberland County discretion as in the past.
    Mr. Vosper: My right hon. Friend was concerned to correct a misunderstanding of his Regulations and not to curtail educational opportunities with a view to reducing expenditure. There is no need for education authorities to assist parents to meet the cost of fee-paying places at direct grant schools since such assistance is already available from the governors in the form of reduced fees. Authorities have power to offer free places at independent and direct grant schools to supplement the places available in maintained schools, and my right hon. Friend is discussing with the Northumberland authority whether more places are needed for this purpose.
    Mr. McKay: Is it true that this problem indicates that people who want to have their children educated in denominational schools are being penalised as compared with the parents of other children, and could not that be avoided by some means or other?
    Mr. Vosper: That is a much wider question. The position in Northumberland Is now in line with the practice prevailing among other education authorities throughout the country.
    Mr. McKayasked the Minister of Education whether he is aware that the income test scale for the children who have obtained scholarships in the public grammar schools but have chosen a direct-grant school, denominational or otherwise, is such that parents are having to pay fees in the two- and three-children family group when they are well below the Income Tax basis; whether he will abolish the income test scale altogether in such circumstances; or, if not, whether he will either refrain from applying it to parents below the Income Tax basis to the extent of £25, or else only apply it when the standard of family income has reached the level where at least some Income Tax is being levied.
    Mr. Vosper: My right hon. Friend goes not regard the existing arrangements for assisting the parents of fee-paying pupils at direct grant schools as unsuitable, and he sees no reason to alter them in the way suggested.
    Mr. McKay: Is the Minister aware that, when these scales were fixed—as I understand, about: 1950—the basic

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    figure for the one-child family was based exactly on the average industrial wage then obtaining, which was £7 10s. 0d.? Is he aware that since then the cost of living has gone up by one-third? Surely, the fact that it has gone up by one-third since the scale was fixed indicates a reason for the necessity to reconsider the scale now? Will he go into that matter?
    Mr. Vosper: The Question I am asked here is whether we will relate the scales to the Income Tax level, but that, I think, would be an unreasonable suggestion. I will do as the hon. Gentleman suggests, however, and look at the scales in their present form.

    Broadstone Primary School (Accommodation)
    Captain Pilkingtonasked the Minister of Education, in view of the representations which he has made to him, what reply he has made regarding the present accommodation in Broad-stone Primary School.
    Sir D. Eccles: I received representations from a number of local residents a week ago, and am considering what reply should be sent.
    Captain Pilkington: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the need at this school is very great indeed, and that here is another opportunity for economy which the Minister can secure by doing what is necessary in one undertaking instead of taking two bites at it?
    Sir D. Eccles: I noticed that, but I am not at all sure that we could not in some other way do what is required.
    Mr. M. Stewart: Will the right hon. Gentleman remember that, in any help he may be able to give to this school, he will profit from the useful economies made in reducing the cost of school places as a result of his Department's work under the administration of the late George Tomlinson?
    Sir D. Eccles: I am grateful for anybody who has had any connection with the Architects and Buildings Branch of my Ministry, which has done very good work.

  COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

    War Graves, South Africa (Maintenance Contribution)
    Mr. P. Williamsasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations whether he will make a statement on the provision of moneys by the Government for the maintenance of war graves in South Africa.
    The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Commander Allan Noble): We are corresponding with the Union Government regarding the maintenance of known graves of British soldiers in South Africa other than those for which the Imperial War Graves Commission is responsible. Pending the outcome, token provision has been made in the Commonwealth Services Estimates for a contribution by the United Kingdom Government.

    High Commission Territories (Education)
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations the numbers of Africans from the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, respectively, receiving higher education in the United Kingdom and South Africa; and what steps he is taking in expanding secondary education in those territories so that there may be men and women candidates for the new multiracial university of Central Africa.
    Commander Noble: The information asked for in the first part of the hon. Member's Question is not readily available, but I am taking steps to obtain it and will write to the hon. Member.
    For the second part of his Question I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given by my predecessor on 10th March, 1955, to the hon. Member for Eton and Slough (Mr. Fenner Brockway). The programme for developing secondary education in the territories described in that reply is making satisfactory progress.
    Mr. Johnson: Can the Minister give an assurance, in relation to the second part of the Question, that there will be African teaching staff in the new university at Salisbury, particularly in the faculty of African languages? Would it

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    not be unfortunate if this new university began with an all-European teaching staff?
    Commander Noble: I think that question goes a little far from the original Question. If the hon. Gentleman likes to put the question down, I will certainly answer it. I can assure him that we attach great importance to this matter. For example, Basutoland is applying for £29,000, Bechuanaland is spending £41,000, and Swaziland has been granted £12,000 for the purposes of secondary education.
    Mr. Dugdale: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that candidates from these territories and indeed from anywhere else, while successful in passing the examination into this university, are still subject to a veto by the Southern Rhodesian Government? Was that fact taken into consideration before making the grants?
    Commander Noble: I think that that is another question. If the right hon. Gentleman will put it down, I will try to answer it.
    Mr. Hale: Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that many of the difficulties of administration in the High Commission Territories arise from the continued existence of the headquarters of the High Commissioner in the Union of South Africa? Has not the time come when this whole question should be reconsidered?
    Commander Noble: I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Johnson: On a point of order. Is the hon. and gallant Gentleman aware that he has invited me to put on the Order Paper Questions which, no doubt, he will be very glad to answer, but unfortunately I cannot get those Questions past the Table?
    Commander Noble: I do not think that that is a matter for me.
    Mr. Speaker: I see no point of order in that. I am afraid that many Questions are put down which do not pass the Table.

    University College, Salisbury (Grants)
    Mr. Haleasked the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations the amount of the grant already paid from
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    United Kingdom funds to the university college of Salisbury, Central Africa; what further grants have been promised; and to what extent it was made a condition of the grant that the college should be fully multiracial.
    Commander Noble: The amount paid up to 31st March, 1956, is £242,776. The United Kingdom Government have agreed to provide up to £1¼ million in all. When Her Majesty's Government originally agreed to make a grant, it had already been made quite clear that this college would be open to students of all races.
    Mr. Hale: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman refer to what the former Secretary of State for the Colonies said about this in the debate on Central African Federation, in which the fullest undertaking was given that this would be a multi-racial university in every sense of the word? Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman make it clear that public opinion in this country will not tolerate the sending of another £1 million to a very excellent institution which is excellently staffed, and which no one desires to criticise, if racial segregation becomes part of its practice?
    Hon. Members: Answer.
    Mr. Speaker: I think that the question contained an injunction to the Minister to remember certain things. I do not think that it called for an answer.
    Mr. Beresford Craddock: Has my hon. and gallant Friend seen a report in the Press of a statement alleged to have been made by the principal of this university to the eflect that these allegations about segregation in the university are misguided and mischievous?
    Mr. Speaker: Order. We really cannot have newspaper comments laid at the door of the Minister.
    Mr. J. Griffiths: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman refresh his memory on the pledge given by the former Secretary of State for the Colonies during the discussion on Central African Federation, and ensure that the intention is carried out in the new university? May I also ask the hon. and gallant Gentleman to bear in mind that these Questions are put not for any mischievous reason but with a desire

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    to see that money provided by this country is used for purposes in conformity with the views of the House?
    Commander Noble: I will certainly refresh my memory, but I would not say that this university is not multi-racial in the full sense of the word. I am quite sure that the House will realise that the council of this university is an autonomous body, and it would be most improper to try to influence its policy by financial pressure.
    Mr. Griffiths: May we have an assurance that decisions concerning this university are taken by the university council and the authorities without political influence?
    Commander Noble: I think it has been made quite clear both in the letter from the principal of the university to the Leader of the Opposition and in the statement which has been reported in the Press in this country that the decisions are taken by the council itself.
    Dame Irene Ward: Will my hon. and gallant Friend express to the university from this side of the House our best wishes for this new experiment, and will he also ask the other side of the House why they want to torpedo this very excellent experiment?
    Mr. Ede: Will the hon. and gallant Gentleman bear in mind that tolerance in universities in this country was only secured by the action of this House?

  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Overseas Advertisements (Language)
    Mr. Langford-Holtasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that certain British exporters and British Railways advertise in foreign countries in English; and, in view of the loss of trade which results from this practice, if he will provide facilities for the translation of such advertisements into the language of the countries for which they are destined.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): I agree that it is usually best to advertise overseas in the customer's own language, and my Department advises exporters in this sense. I am informed that British Railways do this
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    except in Switzerland, where special considerations apply. This, like other aspects of sales promotion, is a matter for the exporter's own commercial judgment. I have no evidence that translation facilities available to British exporters are inadequate.
    Mr. Langford-Holt: Whilst accepting what my right hon. Friend has said, may I ask whether he is not aware that there is evidence that considerable numbers of export orders are being lost for this reason, and could he devise some method whereby assistance, not necessarily in the form suggested in the Question, can be provided to overcome the difficulty?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have drawn the attention of exporters to this matter, and very wide translation facilities are available inside and outside the country to exporters.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in certain parts of other countries it is considered rather chic if simple advertisements are printed in English, and that such advertisements have a special sales appeal?

    Portugal
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that, for the first time, Britain has now ceased to be the main supplier of Portugal; and what action he is taking to encourage the increase of British exports, particularly in motor cars, to this country.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: This was true in 1955, though we have again been in the lead over the first two months of this year. There are no restrictions on the import of cars or of most other British goods into Portugal.
    Mr. Johnson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the British colony in Portugal feels that it was let down by the Government when they failed to exhibit at the National Fair in Lisbon this year? Since he was forced to send an exhibit to Damascus, why could not the right hon. Gentleman consider doing the same thing for our oldest ally, Portugal?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: We must be guided by the opinion of industry itself as to the value of any particular fair, and it is quite out of the question to try to exhibit

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    at all of them. The fact is that we are in the lead again in the first months of this year, and that market is open. There is no quota restriction and there is no reason why Britain should not sell freely in it.

    Liberia
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that Liberia is a dollar market; and what steps he has taken in the last 12 months to encourage the increase of British exports, particularly in motor cars, to this country.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Yes, Sir; and I am glad to say that our exports of motor cars to Liberia increased last year to a value of £60,000, as compared with £2,000 in 1954.
    Mr. Johnson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the biggest single handicap to the selling of cars in that country and West Africa is the lack of a decent spares organisation? Would he send a circular to the leading car firms on these lines, indicating that it would be a good thing to back their sales organisation?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The advantages of a good after-sales service are quite obvious to everybody and provide a useful concomitant to an export drive in motor cars, but the motor car manufacturers do not need me to tell them that.

    G.A.T.T.
    Mr. Biggs-Davisonasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a statement on the latest tariff negotiations at Geneva under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am not yet in a position to add to the Answer which I gave on 26th January to the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade). But I hope to be able to announce the results of the negotiations after their completion towards the end of this month.

    Monopolies Commission
    Mr. Allaunasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that on 10th April representatives of the Tobacco Trade Association for the second time threatened a shopkeeper, of Salford, that, if he did not cease selling certain brands of cigarettes, he would be placed on the stop list and prevented from
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    obtaining other brands of cigarettes; and if he will now refer the activities of this Association to the Monopolies Commission.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I have seen a Press report on this matter. The answer to the second part of the Question is "No, Sir," for the reason given in my reply to the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay), on 15th March.
    Mr. Allaun: Is the Minister aware that only this week the Tobacco Trade Association, the instrument of the Imperial Tobacco colossus, has announced that it will not end its ban?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Mutual restrictions of this kind on the sale of, or agreement not to sell, packets of tobacco or cigarettes containing gift coupons would be registrable under the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill, with which I hope, with the help of the House, we shall make good progress this afternoon.
    Mr. Jay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the monopolists in this industry have plucked up courage since they have found that his Bill does not ban their activities by any definite date? Is he aware that retailers are being put out of business while the Bill goes through the House? Will he not include such agreements in the first group which he has undertaken to call up for registration immediately after the passage of the Bill?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Nobody on either side of the House has suggested that any practice of this kind should be banned without a hearing.
    Mr. Allaunasked the President of the Board of Trade what representations have been made to him by shopkeepers to refer to the Monopolies Commission the practice in the wholesale tobacco trade of placing shopkeepers on a stop list if they do not cease selling certain brands of cigarettes.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I have received no representations of the kind described by the hon. Member.
    Mr. Allaun: Is it not true that small shopkeepers and petrol pump and garage proprietors are being increasingly dominated by a handful of monopolists, and that the system which his party upholds is itself strangling free competition and the small man?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: All that the Question asks is whether I have had representations about some practice in the tobacco trade. The answer is, "No, Sir".
    Mr. Jay: Can the right hon. Gentleman at least say that this practice will be within the group which he will call up for early registration?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not propose to make an announcement about which practices will be registered first until I make the Order. That would be the appropriate time to do it.
    Mr. Vane: Can my right hon. Friend assure us that the Refreshment Department of the House will not be put on a stop list?

    Waste Paper (Processing Plant)
    Mr. Vaneasked the President of the Board of Trade the approximate annual capacity of the existing plant in the country for the processing of waste paper; and whether he is satisfied that this is sufficient to process all waste paper supplies that can be economically collected in the country.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Nearly all paper and board mills have been working at full capacity. The industry's consumption of waste paper was about 1·1 million tons in 1955. I am satisfied that capacity exists for processing the waste paper now being economically collected.
    Mr. Vane: Does my right hon. Friend's reply mean that there would be no saving in foreign currency if this industry were expanded?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It is difficult to estimate how far the economic collection of waste paper can be carried. I think there is the capacity for what is being economically collected at present, but it is a matter of opinion which I shall be happy to discuss with my hon. Friend.

    U.S.S.R.
    Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will publish a White Paper giving further details of the range of industrial goods that are required by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics but are subject to strategic restrictions; and to what extent this would benefit British trade and industry.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The detailed information asked for by the hon. Member was published last Tuesday and will be republished in the Board of Trade Journal this week. This shows the large proportion of goods on the Russian list that are unaffected by strategic controls. We welcome this scope for increased trade with the Soviet Union. The full benefit will only be seen when individual contracts have been concluded in due course with the Soviet purchasing organisations.
    Mr. Hughes: Is the Minister aware that there has been a renewed interest, since the publication of the White Paper and the document to which he has referred, in the whole question of trade with Soviet Russia, especially by firms in the West of Scotland? Does he not think it time to go over the whole question of revising the strategic list?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: That raises a different question.
    Mr. Bottomley: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that in the days of the hydrogen bomb these strategic controls are not of great value? Further, is it possible for him to say whether the Soviet Union is prepared to place orders even if the strategic list continues?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Certainly. It is not conditional upon the removal of the strategic controls; a greater part of the Soviet proposals are not affected by the strategic list.

    Commonwealth and Colonial Markets
    Mr. Pageasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will give an assurance that appropriate steps will be taken to ensure that the proposed increase in exports to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not be allowed to cause a contraction in the development of potential markets for British goods in the Commonwealth and Colonies.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I cannot give assurances as to how particular firms may conduct their business, but it is certainly the Government's hope that this trade will he additional to our exports elsewhere.
    Mr. Page: Could not my right hon. Friend give as much glamour publicity to the list of exports required by the Colonies and Commonwealth as has been

    581
    given to the list required by Russia? Would he use his influence, while welcoming this trade with Russia, to prevent manufacturers and exporters from reaching for the moon of the Russian trade to the detriment of the markets waiting for them for the asking in the Colonies and the Commonwealth?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The answer is that we cannot have too many export opportunities. We need all the opportunities we can get, and we must seize them.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Research (Expenditure)
    Mr. Callaghanasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer his estimate of the annual sum spent by the Government and by British industry, respectively, on research, excluding defence and atomic research.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): As to Government expenditure on such research, I would refer the hon. Member to the reply given to him on 24th April. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is conducting an inquiry at this moment to arrive at an estimate of the sums spent by British industry. I hope that industrialists will co-operate in this inquiry by providing the material from which an esimate may be made; information about individual firms will, of course, be kept confidential.
    Mr. Callaghan: Is the Financial Secretary aware that the Stationery Office, for which I suppose he takes responsibility, recently estimated that German Government expenditure was about £50 million a year, as compared with £30 million to £35 million a year by our Government; and estimated that German industry's investment was also about the same—£50 million? Is not that both alarming and surprising—surprising that the Treasury can give figures for Germany but does not know the figures for Britain?
    Mr. Brooke: This is not normally one of the researches carried out by the Stationery Office. I hope that the hon. Member appreciates that the D.S.I.R. is now seeking to improve greatly the information which we have on the subject.

    Double Taxation, Nigeria
    Mr. Biggs-Davisonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will give consideration to the possibility of revising the Double Taxation Convention between Nigeria and this country, so that members of the teaching staff of the Nigerian College of Arts, Science and Technology, who are not Government servants but are working side by side with Government servants, may enjoy like exemption from United Kingdom tax.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I would not favour such an amendment to the Convention, which is drawn up in standard form. Clause 10 of the Finance Bill now before Parliament may afford relief from United Kingdom tax in some of the cases my hon. Friend has in mind.
    Mr. Biggs-Davison: While thanking my right hon. Friend for that reply, may I express the hope that it will be found possible to remove the sense of injustice which exists at this college and which discourages people from taking up this kind of appointment overseas?
    Mr. Brooke: I hope that Clause 10 of the Bill will assist in this matter, and I shall welcome my hon. Friend's support in getting it on to the Statute Book.

    Income Tax (School Fees)
    Mr. G. M. Thomsonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will take steps to ensure that, where business undertakings make grants to their employees for private school fees, such grants shall be subject to Income Tax, payable by the recipient.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The application of the law to particular cases depends upon the precise facts, but I am advised that such grants are normally assessable to tax as emoluments of the employee.

    Post-War Credits
    Mr. Hamiltonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the estimated loss in purchasing power of post-war credits worth £100 in 1945; and whether he will take steps either to pay interest on all such outstanding credits or revalue them according to present costs.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The present purchasing power of £100 of post-war credits is approximately the same as that of £62 10s. 0d. in 1945. The answer to the latter part of the Question is, "No, Sir."
    Mr. Hamilton: In view of the answer to the first part of the Question, how can the right hon. Gentleman be so heartless as to give the second part of his Answer? Why do the Government persist in the deliberate purloining of money belonging to these people, which has been a forced loan now for more than 10 years?
    Mr. Brooke: The hon. Member suggests paying interest on the credits. I think that if we had the money to pay interest it would be better to use it to speed up the rate of repayments. As for the depreciation, he will realise that nearly three-quarters of it took place in the time of the Labour Government.
    Mr. H. Butler: Is it the Government's policy to withhold the repayment of these post-war credits until they are entirely wiped out?
    Mr. Brooke: I am not quite sure whether I appreciate the force of that question. We are repaying them at the rate of £18 million a year.
    Mr. Butler: But £100 of certificates is now worth only £62 10s.

    Initial Allowances (Motor Cars)
    Mr. Vaneasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the approximate benefit to the Exchequer of withdrawing the initial allowance for Income Tax on the purchase of motor cars used for business purposes.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The estimated yield in the first full year if initial allowances for passenger cars used for business purposes were withdrawn would be between £7 million and £10 million. The yield in future years would be gradually reduced as the withdrawal of initial allowance was offset by larger annual allowances.
    Mr. Vane: Would my right hon. Friend consider this point sympathetically during the passage of the Finance Bill?
    Mr. Brooke: This matter has been raised and has been considered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is not always appreciated that the withdrawal of this initial allowance would hit very hard certain classes of professional people, such as doctors, who must have a car for their professional purposes.

    Pool Betting Duty (Fixed Odds Betting)
    Mr. Lewisasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that a large number of bookmaking concerns are illegally carrying on a cash postal betting business; that betting duty is not charged on these bets; and what action he proposes to take to ensure that the Treasury receives its betting duties and taxes from this business in the manner prescribed by law.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I have seen the hon. Member's recent Questions to my right hon. Friends on this subject. The pool betting duty does not apply to fixed odds betting, but if the hon. Member has any specific evidence that payment of this or of any other tax is being evaded, I will gladly look into the matter if he will send me full details.
    Mr. Lewis: Surely the Minister is aware that illegality is taking place? Will he not consult his right hon. Friend to see that these big bookmaking concerns are treated in the same way as the street-corner bookmakers, and that when they break the law action is taken against them? Treat them all alike; that is all I ask.
    Mr. Brooke: My business is to see that the tax is collected. If somebody is acting illegally in a betting matter, that is not a question for the Chancellor of the Exchequer or for me.

    Investment Allowance (British Shipping Companies)
    Lieut.-Commander Baldockasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will take action to assist shipping companies flying the British flag to compete with ships registered in countries where the incidence of taxation is relatively light.
    Mr. H. Brooke: British companies are to retain the benefit of the investment allowance in respect of expenditure on new ships, and my right hon. Friend hopes that this may be of material assistance to them.
    Lieut.-Commander Baldock: In view of the declining proportion of world trade carried in British ships, and the vital importance of invisible imports, would the Chancellor further consider reducing

    585
    taxation on British ships to make them more competitive with others, and even consider putting a levy on ships working under certain flags of easy virtue?
    Mr. Brooke: I do not think that I should venture on the ground suggested in the last part of the supplementary question, but I would emphasise that my right hon. Friend is proposing, in his Budget, to give specially favourable tax treatment to British shipping.
    Mr. Blenkinsop: Is the Chancellor in touch with the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation about this matter, as that right hon. Gentleman assured me that he is investigating the possibility of some assistance?
    Mr. Brooke: I have answered the Question on the Order Paper and declared the present intentions of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the matter.

  AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

    Argentine Meat Supplies
    Mr. Peytonasked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food the estimated quantities and values of Argentine meat to be imported into the United Kingdom in 1956.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. G. R. H. Nugent): It is impossible to forecast future supplies of meat from the Argentine, but there is no reason to expect any sharp changes in the future supply position. I will circulate in the OFFICIAL REPORT details of supplies in the first quarter of 1956.
    Mr. Peyton: Has my hon. Friend considered the possibility and desirability of limiting the quantity of imports in future? Further, is he satisfied with the arrangements which exist for inspection not only of carcases before and after shipping, but also of the animals before they are slaughtered?
    Mr. Nugent: On the question of restriction of imports, as supplies of carcase meat are still running at below prewar level, we think it desirable to allow all available supplies to come in. In regard to veterinary arrangements before
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    the carcases come in from the Argentine, I would say that we have our own veterinary officers out there and the arrangements are as good as we can make them.
    Following are the details:

    U.K. IMPORTS OF CARCASE MEAT AND OFFAL FROM ARGENTINA

    —

    January-March 1956

    Quantity '000 tons

    Value £'000 c.i.f.

    Chilled beef

    53·9

    10,322

    Frozen beef and veal

    14·4

    Lamb

    19·5

    3,036

    Pork

    1·5

    271

    Offal (estimated)

    7·1

    (not available)

    Fat Cattle (Standard Price)
    Mr. J. E. B. Hillasked the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether he will consider varying the standard price for fat cattle seasonally so as to match the difference in the production costs of cattle fattened in winter and of those finished on grass during the summer.
    Mr. Nugent: Careful consideration has been given to the possibility of seasonal variations in the standard price, but we have concluded that a uniform standard price for the year is in the best interests of the industry as a whole.
    Mr. Hill: Is my hon. Friend aware that, unlike the case of pigs, the bullock fattener consists of two classes of farmer, the winter fattener and the summer grazier, and those two classes do not normally follow on the same farm. Would my hon. Friend, therefore, keep this position under review so that production will come forward evenly during the year, in the winter as well as in the summer months?
    Mr. Nugent: The whole object of the present arrangement is that the supply shall come forward evenly in order to meet the current demand, and the fifty-two weeks' rolling average is the best way of doing that.
    Mr. Royle: Can the hon. Gentleman say whether it is the intention of his hon. Friend that there should be an increase in the price of store cattle or a reduction in the price of grass cattle?
    Mr. Nugent: I am afraid I do not know what the intention of my hon. Friend is.

  EMPLOYMENT

    Furniture Trade, Gateshead
    Mr. Moodyasked the Minister of Labour the latest available figures of the number of furniture trade operatives registered as wholly unemployed at the Gateshead employment exchange; the number who are on short-time working; and the comparative figures of a year previous.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service (Mr. Robert Carr): The number registered as wholly unemployed on 16th April was 13; the corresponding figure on 18th April, 1955, was six. The number at present on short-time is 45, which is about the same as a year ago.
    Mr. Moody: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that while those figures may appear small, in a small community they represent a big percentage of unemployment and that unemployment is directly due to Government policy? The Government have a responsibility for these people; what are they going to do about it?
    Mr. Carr: There are in all about 460 workers in the furniture industry in this town. I cannot believe that 13 unemployed is something about which we need be unduly worried.
    Mr. Willey: The Parliamentary Secretary referred to the position last year. Is he aware that there was very serious short-time working in the furniture trade in the North-East at this time last year and that now it is worse? That is a matter of serious concern to the workers in the, new estate factories.
    Mr. Carr: There are 45 on short time—[Interruption.] The Question on the Order Paper relates to Gateshead—losing one day a week.
    Mr. Moody: On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the first opportunity.

  HOME DEPARTMENT

    Prostitution (Committee)
    Mr. Stokesasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what evidence was received by or what bodies were recalled since 30th August, 1955, to give evidence before the Departmental Committee on Homosexuality and Prostitution on brothels and profit-making out of the exploitation of prostitution.
    The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister for Weigh Affairs (Major Gwilym Lloyd-George): I understand that no bodies or individuals have submitted to the Committee since 30th August evidence directed exclusively to the matters mentioned in the Question. Some witnesses who have given evidence relating to prostitution in general have naturally touched on these matters in the course of their evidence, but as the Committee is meeting in private it would not be appropriate to disclose the nature of the evidence given by particular witnesses.
    Mr. Stokes: Does the Home Secretary mean that no written evidence has been received since that date? Can he say how soon he expects the oral evidence to be completed and the Report issued?
    Major Lloyd-George: I really could not give the date when the Report will be issued, but the secretary of the Committee made it clear last July that no more written evidence would be received after 31st August. Certain oral evidence, particularly where it had not been given in the first instance, will be called for again, but I could not say the date.

    Government Surplus Stocks (Confidential Document)
    Mr. Doddsasked the Secretary of State for the Home Department under what circumstances copies of confidential reports concerning persons prominent in Government surplus sales activities and headed "Exhibit No. 36 Metropolitan Police Fraud Department, New Scotland Yard", have been received from an outside source; and if he will also give details of the circumstances connected with the disappearance from Scotland Yard of the file containing the original documents.
    Major Lloyd-George: The document in question appears to be a copy of an exhibit at the trial of a former police officer at whose residence it was found,

    589
    and who was convicted of retaining the document in contravention of the Official Secrets Acts and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in respect of that and other offences. The circumstances in which copies of this exhibit came to be circulated are not clear. There is no question of the relevant file having disappeared from Scotland Yard.
    Mr. Dodds: In view of the damning indictment in the report of top-level dealers in Government surplus stocks, can the Home Secretary say why all of them up to now have escaped long terms of imprisonment? Can he also give the real reasons why two police officers responsible for the report left the Yard and why, I understand, one transferred from the Yard to the full-time employment of racketeer No. 1? Why is the law so helpless against these rogues?
    Major Lloyd-George: I think it would be a very good idea if the hon. Member put down another Question, because his supplementary question covered a deal of ground. I have answered the original Question which he asked me. That particular officer responsible for taking the document has been dealt with. If the hon. Member puts down his other questions, I shall be happy to answer them.

    GOLD COAST AND NIGERIA (IMPORTS FROM UNITED KINGDOM)
    Mr. N. Pannellasked the Secretary of State for the Colonies under what international treaties or agreements the Colonies of the Gold Coast and Nigeria are still prevented from according preferential treatment to imports from the United Kingdom; and whether he will seek to abrogate these agreements in the interests of inter-Commonwealth trade.
    The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs (Mr. John Hare): In addition to the Anglo-Dutch Convention of 1871, which applies to the Gold Coast, the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which applies to the Gold Coast and Nigeria, prevent the granting by those territories of any new preferences. In reply to the second part of the Question, I would refer my hon. Friend to the Government's statement of
    590
    policy on the General Agreement contained in Cmd. 9413, which was laid before this House in April, 1955.
    Mr. Pannell: Is my hon. Friend satisfied that the other parties to these agreements are strictly observing them and, in particular, that the French Colonies in the area concerned allow the importation of British goods without discrimination?
    Mr. Hare: I am satisfied that other parties are observing the agreements, but, if my hon. Friend has any examples to the contrary, I shall be glad to be made aware of them.

  MINISTRY OF SUPPLY

    Guided Weapons (Exchange of Information)
    Mr. Stokesasked the Minister of Supply whether he will now make such representations as may seem necessary to the Government of the United States of America so as to bring about the pooling of knowledge with regard to the design and production of guided missiles and weapons system.
    The Minister of Supply (Mr. Reginald Maudling): Arrangements already exist for the exchange of information between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States in the field of guided weapons. They are on the whole working well, but we miss no opportunity of further improvement.
    Mr. Stokes: That is all very well, but is the Minister not perfectly well aware that there are restrictions on the exchange of information with regard to nuclear development, without which the production of guided missiles becomes futile? Does he not consider it absurd that we should find ourselves spending as much in competing with our friends as in defending ourselves against our enemies? Can the right hon. Gentleman not do something to achieve a pooling arrangement?
    Mr. Maudling: There are certainly restrictions, as is well known, on the supply of information about nuclear warheads, but, nevertheless, the information that we obtain is of the very highest value.
    Mr. Stokes: What is the use of a guided missile without a nuclear warhead?
    Mr. Maudling: It is quite possible to design a warhead in one country and put it on a weapon built in another country.
    Mr. Tomney: The Minister must be aware that there is great wastage of technical and scientific manpower and time in duplication between ourselves and the United States? Is he aware also that in our own country there is the same kind of wastage between Service Departments operating on the same projects for the same Services? Will he do something about it?
    Mr. Maudling: I would not deny the existence of some wastage, but this is a problem to which we are giving the most urgent and serious attention.
    Mr. Stokes: Is the Minister not aware that there is a considerable body of opinion in America which takes the same view as do my hon. and right hon. Friends and myself, that there should be greater pooling of information on the question of nuclear warheads? Will he do something about it? I want to know. It is no use for him to remain sitting down and saying nothing. What is he going to do about it?
    Mr. Gaitskell: If the Minister is unable to think of an answer to that one, will he consider making a statement showing the degree of specialisation in weapons production which exists between America and ourselves and other N.A.T.O. countries?
    Mr. Maudling: The right hon. Gentleman must realise that, in the interests of security, detailed statements of that kind would be quite impossible.

    CYPRUS (N.A.T.O. POWERS)
    Mr. E. L. Mallalieuasked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will make a statement about the placing of the Cyprus question before the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord John Hope): No, Sir. Discussions at the North Atlantic Treaty Council are confidential, and I cannot disclose premature information concerning them.
    Mr. Mallalieu: Seeing that no possible purely national advantage can accrue to us from remaining in Cyprus, and seeing that if there are any advantages in our remaining there they must accrue to all the N.A.T.O. Powers in their defence of Western Europe, would it not be appropriate to invite them into consultation on this matter?
    Lord John Hope: The Answer which I gave is the only possible one to the hon. and learned Member's Question.
    Mr. J. Griffiths: Have the Goverment yet formed the conclusion that the best way of preserving peace would be for them to reopen negotiations towards making a settlement?
    Mr. Nicholson: Does my hon. Friend recollect that when this Question arose at the Council of Europe, it resulted in a complete triumph for the British case?

    DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
    Mr. Callaghanasked the Prime Minister if he will transfer the responsibility for answering Questions on the work of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to a senior Minister.
    The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): No, Sir.
    Mr. Callaghan: Is the Prime Minister aware that if one wants to find out information about certain aspects of scientific matters, it is necessary to ask not only the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Works, but the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Health, the Lord Privy Seal, the Minister of Supply—
    Mr. Stokes: And the Minister of Labour.
    Mr. Callaghan:—yes, the Minister of Labour—
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: And the Secretary of State for Scotland.
    Mr. Callaghan: There are a whole host of others. Is the Prime Minister not aware that there is growing concern about the lack of co-ordination of our scientific effort and, indeed, that that effort is not sufficient? Does he not think that be should appoint a senior Minister to review our programme in that direction?
    The Prime Minister: That is not what the hon. Member asked in his Question. He asked whether I would appoint a senior Minister to answer Questions in the House. It is a quite ordinary procedure for a junior Minister to answer Questions in the House, if there is Ministerial responsibility—even very important Questions. Indeed, I seem to remember that the hon. Member himself served the House very well in that respect.
    Mr. Callaghan: I hope that the Prime Minister is not trying to get me into trouble with my constituents. Is he not aware that the D.S.I.R. is responsible for most of our civilian scientific research? When that is of such fundamental importance to Britain at the present time, should not a senior Minister be responsible for handling that matter, especially as the Lord Privy Seal is responsible for handling Questions on atomic energy?
    The Prime Minister: It is quite true that my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal is responsible in that way. What the Question is concerned with is simply who answers Questions in the House. It is a common procedure that when a senior Member of the Cabinet is in another place, a junior Minister answers Questions in the House.

    MR. BULGANIN AND MR. KHRUSHCHEV (VISIT)
    Mr. Stokesasked the Prime Minister whether he has considered a memorandum from the Polish community in London regarding the restoration of freedom in Poland, the massacre of Poles in the Katyn Forest and the continued detention of many thousands of Poles in prisons and concentration camps in Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and what representations he made on these matters to Marshal Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev during their recent visit to this country.
    Mr. Warbeyasked the Prime Minister what discussions he had with the Soviet statesmen regarding the international regulation of the supply of arms to the Middle East countries.
    The Prime Minister: I do not wish to depart from the Answer I gave on Tuesday to the right hon. and learned Member
    594
    for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) and the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes).
    Mr. Stokes: Does the Prime Minister recognise that the people who made these representations were for the most part our gallant allies during the war, and that they feel they were ratted upon, both at Teheran and Yalta? Does he not feel that it is quite intolerable that they should find that their friends and relations are locked up in Poland without trial and that, therefore, the strongest possible representations should be made?
    The Prime Minister: It is really a question of what one wants. If one wants to put one's representations on record, that can always be done. If, on the other hand, one wants results, it is perhaps better to treat the matter differently. I really ask the House to believe that. I should like to take this opportunity to say—and I must say it—that the Government have no responsibility at all for lists which have appeared in certain newspapers. We cannot take that responsibility. More than that I am not prepared to say.
    Mr. Maclay: Can my right hon. Friend give any information about the amnesty in Poland, about which reports have begun to appear in recent days?
    The Prime Minister: We have heard from our Embassy in Warsaw, and I understand that the position there is that an amnesty law providing for the remission and reduction of sentences for crimes against the State is before the Polish Parliament. I also understand from our Ambassador's report that the effect of this list will be that some 80,000 people now in prison, of whom 9,000 are political prisoners, will benefit. Of the 30,000 to be released at once, 4,500 are political prisoners. If anything of that kind should occur, it would receive a welcome, I know, from all parts of the House.
    Mr. Warbey: On the different subject of Question No. 47, as the joint Anglo-Russian statement on the maintenance of peace in the Middle East was probably the most important and valuable outcome of the London talks, will the Prime Minister say whether he is actively pursuing the suggestion thrown out by Mr. Khrushchev at his Press conference for

    595
    a collective agreement for the stopping of the supply of all arms shipments to the countries in the Middle East?
    The Prime Minister: That is obviously a question of the greatest complexity, concerning not only us but a great many other Powers. What has been agreed is that the United Nations should be supported in its efforts to resolve this trouble, and I think it is something if everybody will join in doing that. If everybody joins in doing it, we may have a chance of getting a truce which is reality, and then negotiations, which we have both undertaken to assist. That is the first step. As regards what may be done about the arms, that is a matter also, so far as we are concerned, that could well be discussed in the same forum.
    Mr. Gaitskell: To return to the question of the list, details of which have appeared in at least one newspaper this morning, is that a list which the Prime Minister handed to the Soviet Ministers? If so, was its being made public an act by the Government? If not, is this not a very serious leakage?
    The Prime Minister: I thought I had made quite clear that the Government have no responsibility whatever for that list—none at all—and still less, of course, for its publication. I personally regret it very much, for the reasons that I have already given. I am not prepared to say whether anything was done about a list by us—I am sorry, but I am not. As regards where the list could come from, the right hon. Gentleman can, no doubt, draw his own conclusions about that. He knows that there are a number of organisations in this country who produce these lists. Whether the list came from them or not, I do not know. I am not indicting anybody. All I can say is that the list did not come from the Government.
    Mr. Gaitskell: Can we have this absolutely clear? Will the Prime Minister state definitely that no information on this question—and information was provided, I think, before today, or appeared in the newspapers—came from any Government source whatever?
    The Prime Minister: None that I am aware of, and my noble Friend who is at the Foreign Office says that he knows of none. I am not interested in making
    596
    any kind of issue out of this business except to try to get a result. I do not care in the least about any list at all, nor about parties, dinners or anything else. I want to make this clear: I was only sorry to see the list because I did not think it would help.
    Mr. Shinwell: While appreciating the right hon. Gentleman's desire not to make an issue of this, and while at the same time welcoming his interest in the matter, may I ask if he can make some inquiry to find out, if at all possible, how the Manchester Guardian succeeded in obtaining the information that the right hon. Gentleman discussed the question of political prisoners with the Russian leaders?
    The Prime Minister: I did not say I had discussed this list. I did not say I had handed in this list. I am not prepared to say these things here at all. What I do say is that that list which appeared in the Manchester Guardian, which has a perfect right to publish the list, did not come from official sources. There are all sorts of other sources from which it may have come, and, of course, it is within the power of any newspaper, if it thinks it right to do so, to publish it.
    Dame Irene Ward: Is it not perhaps a good thing on this occasion to allow Right to talk to Left?
    Mr. Shinwell: Will the right hon. Gentleman address himself to the question which I put to him? A statement appeared in the Manchester Guardian this morning that the right hon. Gentleman had discussed the question of political prisoners with the Russian leaders. This has nothing to do with lists. If that statement is correct, can the right hon. Gentleman say so? If not, how did the Manchester Guardian get such information?
    The Prime Minister: Naturally, anybody can form any conjecture about the contents of the talks. I cannot help that. I have made no statement either in this House or anywhere else about what I discussed outside the terms of the communiqué, and I am not prepared to do so. If the House will just consider the national issues here it will see how very unwise we should be to fall into that trap.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Lord Privy Seal to state the business for next week?
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY. 7TH MAY—Supply [12th Allotted Day]; Committee, which it is proposed to take formally.
A debate will then arise on a Motion to take note of the Report of the Guillebaud Committee into the Cost of the National Health Service.
Report and Third Reading of the Licensing (Airports) Bill [Lords].
TUESDAY, 8TH MAY—It is hoped to complete the Committee stage of the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill.
WEDNESDAY, 9TH MAY—Second Reading of the Finance Bill.
THURSDAY, 10TH MAY—Second Reading of the Coal Industry Bill.
Committee stage of the necessary Money Resolution.
Report and Third Reading of the Local Government Elections Bill.
Consideration of the six Representation of the People (Parliamentary Constituencies) Orders, which are on the Order Paper.
FRIDAY, 11TH MAY—Consideration of Private Members' Bills.
It may be convenient for me to inform the House that it is proposed to adjourn for the Whitsun Recess on Friday, 18th May, and to meet again on Tuesday, 29th May.
Mr. J. Paton: Can the right hon. Gentleman say now when we shall resume proceedings on the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill?
Mr. Butler: I cannot give an actual date, but I hope we shall have the next day upon it before Whitsun.
Mr. Mikardo: In view of the fact that current developments in automation are affecting the policies of a number of Government Departments, does not the right hon. Gentleman think that he ought to provide Government time in the very near future for a debate on this important subject?
Mr. Butler: Our time immediately before Whitsun is somewhat taken up by business to which, I think, we have to give priority. I do not underestimate the importance of automation; nor do I underestimate the possibility of the Opposition's finding time for it on a Supply Day. If we can have a debate on such a subject on a Supply Day at a later date it will be quite reasonable to do so, but I must not hold out any hope of it before Whitsun.
Mr. E. Fletcher: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell the House whether it is intended to make any progress with the Copyright Bill during the current Session?
Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir.
Mr. R. Edwards: Is there any special reason why the Government should not provide special facilities for the passage of a non-controversial Private Member's Bill entitled the Automation and Electronics Bill?
Mr. Butler: If the hon. Member has the ingenuity to produce such a Bill I should very much like to look at it.

STANDING ORDER No. 1 (SUSPENSION)
Proceedings on the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill exempted, at this day's sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[The Prime Minister.]
ORDERS OF THE DAY

  RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES BILL
  Considered in Committee. [Progress 2nd May.]
  [Sir RHYS HOPKIN MORRIS in the Chair]

  RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES BILL

    Clause 16.—(PRESUMPTION AS TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST.)
    3.35 p.m.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): I beg to move, in page 13, line 33, at the end to insert:
    "of any one or more of the following circumstances, that is to say".
    This is barely more than a drafting Amendment. All it does is to indicate that to get through the first stage of proof the parties will have to show one or other of the matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (g). We shall be discussing the merits of each of those paragraphs, but I think that everyone in the Committee will agree that the parties would not have to prove all of them at once, and so we propose putting in these words.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: I beg to move, in page 13, line 34, to leave out paragraph (a).
    Paragraph (a) narrows the scope of the Clause and would reduce the benefits which are clearly intended by the Clause. It would prove difficult of construction and difficult of implementation, and would, therefore, cause delay and frustration in carrying out what are the manifest benefits of the Clause. The obvious purpose of the Clause is twofold: first, to construe in the widest way the meaning of the term "public interest"; and, secondly, to deem a registered agreement contrary to the public interest in certain cases and to place the burden of proving otherwise on the parties to the agreement. Those purposes can be defeated and, in my submission, will be defeated by a number of exceptions.
    A great number of exceptions are included in the Clause, from paragraph (a) to paragraph (g). Paragraph (a) is in particular one of too limiting and damaging a character. It involves a number of definitions of phrases. It includes such expressions as "restriction,"
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    "reasonably," and "necessary," and speaks of
    "…the protection of the public in connection with the purchase, consumption, installation or use of goods requiring special knowledge or skill in that connection."
    One of the difficulties which people who have to administer the Clause will have to face will be the definition of phrases of that kind. The definitions will involve interminable arguments and reference to Reports and other documents and probably statistics, all of which arguments will tend to delay decision and frustrate the purposes of the Clause. It will protract the hearing of issues arising from the Clause and will in every way delay and frustrate its manifest purposes.
    I invite the Committee to omit this damaging paragraph (a) so that the Clause may have some reasonable chance of carrying out the beneficial purposes which are obviously intended by it.
    Mr. Eric Fletcher: I support the Amendment. We are now embarking upon one of the most important parts of a Clause which was very carefully analysed in a leading article in The Times yesterday under the significant heading, "How Straight are the Gates to Be?" In other words, we now have to consider the conditions which enable the trader to claim exemption from the provisions of the Bill on one or other ground that his restrictive agreements are not contrary to the public interest.
    Our first criticism of paragraph (a) is that it is quite unnecessarily wide. As I understand, the genesis of this paragraph is a suggestion that originates from a paragraph in the Report of the Monopolies Commission. The Commission, in recommending that all restrictive practices should be condemned, recognised that there might well be some circumstances in which restrictive practices should be condoned. As I understand, paragraph (a) is an attempt by the President of the Board of Trade to translate into the terminology of the Bill the recommendation which is set out in paragraph 240 (a) of the majority Report of the Monopolies Commission.
    3.45 p.m.
    Throughout, we on this side of the Committee are critical of the Government because they appear to us to be unnecessarily lenient towards traders who

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    engage in restrictive practices. Therefore, I hope that I shall not be wearying the Committee if I analyse for a few moments the precise recommendations made by the Monopolies Commission in that paragraph and then compare that with the much wider phrases which the Government have sought to use.
    The Commission's words are worthy of quotation. They are:
    "Where final consumers are not able to judge the standard of service which it is in their interests to demand from distributors, e.g., where they are unlikely to appreciate fully the risks resulting from faulty installation or service. Where special risks arise they are normally dealt with by special legislation. If in relation to particular goods this legislation is inadequate it can be strengthened and we think that it should not be necessary to have restrictive arrangements in addition. There may, however, be rare cases in which there is no legislation and it is more convenient, temporarily at any rate, that there should be restrictive arrangements so that it is not left only to the discretion of individual manufacturers or traders to decide on the standards of safety. Such arrangements should, however, specify precisely the standards to be observed and should secure that they are in fact observed."
    It will be appreciated from that paragraph that the general view of the Commission is that in so far as any restrictive practice may be sought to be excused on the ground that it requires some special technique or skill, that should be a matter in the ordinary case for legislation and should not be a ground for exemption under this Bill.
    We on this side of the Committee agree with that view. We think that if there are these special cases and if existing legislation in inadequate to deal with them, existing legislation should be strengthened. In other words, we do not think that it is right, under the cloak of a quite rare and exceptional commodity requiring a particular technique, to give a general blanket exemption enabling restrictive agreements of that kind to escape from the ordinary prohibitions of the Bill.
    I regret that the President of the Board of Trade has thought it necessary to include any of these paragraphs in Clause 16 at all, but in so far as he has thought them necessary, we condemn paragraph (a) in particular because we think that the right hon. Gentleman has inserted different words, which are much wider than is necessary and which go far
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    beyond the recommendations of the Commission. The President says in paragraph (a) that one ground of exemption should be,
    "that the restriction is reasonably necessary for the protection of the public in connection with the purchase, consumption, installation or use of goods requiring special knowledge or skill in that connection…"
    That goes far beyond what was suggested by the Monopolies Commission and, in our view, goes far beyond what is necessary.
    We think that it opens the door to a large class of traders to seek from the Restrictive Practices Court exemption on the quite spurious ground that they are rendering a service or providing the public with a standard of quality which they could not render or provide without a restrictive agreement. Once we allow that argument to enter into the matter there is no telling where we can stop it, because throughout the ages the justification which manufacturers and traders have sought to urge for the maintenance of these restrictive covenants is that without them they could not serve the public.
    This is pivotal and central to our approach to this Bill. We believe that throughout recent generations, at any rate since we became a great manufacturing country, manufacturers have sought to inflate prices, to charge the public excessive prices for goods, on the ground that unless they did so they could not maintain quality. That is the ground on which the motor car tyre manufacturers, the electric lamp manufacturers, and all the monopolists and quasi-monopolists who, inferentially at any rate, are being condemned by this Bill, have in the past sought to justify their malpractices. The ground has always been taken that it was necessary to do so to maintain the standard of service to the public.
    In our view, that argument is bogus and should be condemned. We do not want any loophole in the Bill which will enable manufacturers and traders to urge that reason as an excuse for being freed from the obligations of this Bill. Not only The Times, in its leading article yesterday, but, indeed, all the Press—not merely the anti-Government Press but all of what I might call the objective, independent, fair-minded Press such as The Times, the Manchester Guardian, the Economist—have been critical of the construction of this Bill and of its details.

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    It has been pointed out over and over again by the Press that the Bill is full of loopholes, that it is a weak Bill, and that unless it is strengthened—which is the task to which we on these benches are committed in this Committee stage—the Bill will not serve the purposes which the President of the Board of Trade wishes it to serve, and I give the right hon. Gentleman personally every credit for his aspirations in the matter.
    I hope that my hon. Friends will support this Amendment and that by our arguments we shall be able to convince the Government that if this Bill is to make sense, and if the evil of restrictive practices—which has been clogging British industry for so long and has been hampering us in our competitive efforts with other countries—is to be removed, it is essential that we should reduce the grounds on which anybody is able to argue that a restrictive practice is in the public interest. This is most important, and I hope that the Amendment will be accepted.
    Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke: All this depends on the definition of the words "protection of the public", and on reading paragraph (a) one gets the impression that this largely limits it to the protection of the public against personal injuries. The purpose of this Clause, which is a reasonable one, is that in the case of dangerous goods—such as, for instance, a complicated wiring system—the public should not be confused and burn themselves. So it may be necessary to have provisions restricting the numbers of installers and suppliers to ensure that the goods are installed properly.
    That is right, and I am sure that no hon. Gentleman opposite quarrels with that, in so far as it is not already provided for by public legislation. However, protection is an ambiguous word and there is a school of thought, advanced largely by the hon. Lady the Member for Coventry, South (Miss Burton), that the public requires much more protection. Presumably the public is unable to judge for itself as to the value of goods, owing to modern methods of packaging in various attractive ways, such as in cellophane covers. Thus, the public is reduced to a juvenile status, unable to decide for itself what is good value and what is not. If that kind of protection to the public
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    is to be allowed as an excuse for restriction, it would be going rather far. I therefore ask my right hon. Friend to clarify the meaning of the word "protection".
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I compliment the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hector Hughes) on having put the argument on this Amendment so precisely and clearly. I agree that we have now passed from the machinery of the Bill to the tests which have to be applied, and that we are all agreed that some tests have to be applied. They are desirable in any circumstances, but they must be as closely defined as possible if we are to have a Court.
    Whatever the view about restrictive practices and arrangements I should have thought that there would have been unanimous agreement on all sides of the Committee that if the restriction was for the purpose of safeguarding the public against some injury, that would be acceptable. After all, the onus is upon the industry in this matter. It is fairly and squarely on the shoulders of industry. Industry has to come forward and say that these arrangements are necessary to safeguard the public.
    I shall not try to prejudge what these cases would be, but I will take an example. Suppose the chemists entered into mutual restrictions to ensure that dangerous drugs were sold to chemists to make up rather than to grocers. On the whole, I think the public would feel that this was quite a reasonable arrangement. We would not want the wrong ingredient in a cough mixture, for instance. Again, if people who build houses decided that they would employ only electrical engineers to install the wiring in a house in such a manner that it is not burned down, they might have a stop list or an exclusive dealing arrangement. That would be a restrictive arrangement, but a sensible one and that is what this Clause is intended to provide.
    I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) put his finger upon the real point. I agree with him that the word "protection" is a little uncertain and too wide. Although it is not intended to do so, it could go further than the recommendation in the Report of the Monopolies Commission. We are concerned with other things later, but in

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    this Clause I want us to be concerned with the safety of the public, Where an industry, or a man, can come along and show that a restriction is necessary for the safety of the public in some way or another, he ought to be admitted through that gateway.
    I suggest to the Committee that on the Report stage we should substitute for the word "protection" the word "safety", and on that basis I hope that the Committee will reject the Amendment.
    Mr. E. Fletcher: In my view, it would make matters much clearer if the word "safety" were substituted for the word "protection".
    4.0 p.m.
    Mrs. Barbara Castle: I am sorry, but I do not think that the concession which the right hon. Gentleman has announced that he will make really covers the anxiety which we feel on this side of the Committee. We are agreed—or I hope we are—on the desirability of getting the maximum protection for the consumer. Indeed, as the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke) pointed out, there have been a number of demands from various hon. Members on this side of the Committee that the President should take a good deal more interest in the consumer and in his or her need for protection than he has shown himself willing to take—protection through higher standards of manufacture. He has not been prepared to be very active on this matter.
    If we were satisfied that a result of this subsection would be an improvement in the standards of installation of electrical or other goods which might affect the safety of the public, for instance, we should be behind it 100 per cent. But does the subsection ensure that? Even with the alteration of the word "protection" to the word "safety" we have no guarantee in the subsection that the arrangements made would result in increased safety.
    We know perfectly well the arguments advanced by the manufacturers for the practice of having an approved list of dealers and wholesalers. They say that it is to ensure that the outlet for their goods is in hands which will deal properly with the public. That is the manufacturers' argument, and it is an argument which will be used with great forcefulness
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    in connection with such goods as electrical goods, where the standards of maintenance and installation are so important.
    The manufacturers who enter into these agreements have made use of these arguments in favour of them, but they are not necessarily the overwhelming considerations which the manufacturers have in mind. When the Government's policy on monopolies was first anounced I had long talks with Mullards, who manufacture radio valves, television tubes and other things, which are, of course, directly affected by our consideration of this kind of arrangement, in particular.
    I had long and very frank discussions with them on the sort of arrangements which they make, both through the B.E.A. and, independently, with the dealers. One of the points which struck me was when they told me that they maintain an approved list of wholesalers and the criterion for remaining on that list is the amount of business the man does. They put this point to me, "We try to strike a reasonable balance between an adequate number of outlets to ensure fair competition without too much expense to us, for every additional wholesaler is an additional expense and an accounting cost."
    I quote that not because I think they are the villains of the piece. On the contrary, I think they have very high standards. I quote it simply to show that the motive behind so many of these agreements is often the interest of the manufacturer rather than the interest of the public. Nevertheless, in this field the argument about the interest of the public would undoubtedly be advanced.
    The manufacturers of electrical goods can urge the claim that they must have this restrictive control of outlets in the public interest and they can put forward all kinds of arguments, based on the fact that if there is cut-throat competition and reduced margins and competitive prices we shall not have the right sort of wholesaler who will handle the goods in such a way that the public will benefit.
    That is the argument which they would use, but I am saying that in the manufacturer's mind there are very different considerations—considerations of easing his problems. It is, therefore, absolutely specious, in my opinion, for manufacturers to use the argument of public interest unless they take steps, which at

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    present they do not take, to ensure that a system of a limited number of outlets, with guaranteed margins of profit, results in a higher standard of workmanship; and at present there is no such guarantee.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) has quite rightly pointed out that when the Monopolies Commission considered this matter it said, "This is an argument and we are prepared to listen". The President of the Board of Trade smiles, which I think shows his generally frivolous attitude to the public interest in this matter. If he had been concerned to pursue the public interest here he would surely have considered paragraph 240 (a) of the Monopolies Commission Report—which my hon. Friend has quoted—with much greater care. This is, surely the kernel of the matter.
    First, the Monopolies Commission said this where public safety is involved there ought to be special legislation; it ought not to be in the hands of the manufacturers to provide devices. Indeed, if the President is to alter the words "protection of the public" to the words "safety of the public", the situation is even worse, because if the actual physical safety of the public is involved, then it is a matter which ought not to be left to private agreements, however supervised. It ought to be a matter for legislation. This Committee ought to step in and say that children's lives are possibly being endangered, or the physical security of the home is being endangered, because of the inadequacy of the present arrangements for the safety of the public; and that, therefore, legislation is necessary.
    We all know that the largest number of accidents in this country takes place not on the roads but in the homes. If the President is taking the safety of the public as the criterion, therefore, this is a matter which above all, as the Monopolies Commission says, ought to be dealt with by legislation. The Monopolies Commission went on to say:
    "There may, however, be rare cases in which there is no legislation and it is more convenient, temporarily at any rate,"
    —it made that qualification—
    "that there should be restrictive arrangements so that it is not left only to the discretion of individual manufacturers or traders to decide on the standards of safety."
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    It adds:
    "Such arrangements should, however, specify precisely the standards to be observed and should secure that they are in fact observed."
    There is no guarantee in the subsection that the intentions of the Monopolies Commission in this respect will be met. I suggest very seriously that we are laying ourselves open to a situation in which a group of manufacturers could go to the Restrictive Practices Court—particularly bearing in mind that they have to go to a court and not to a tribunal created out of the Monopolies Commission, which is used to this kind of specious argument—and argue that they are acting solely from the highest motives and that no commercial considerations enter into it. They could argue that nothing could be further from their minds and that they were concerned merely with the safety of the public by maintaining the standards. That is the argument they could advance, without having to produce a shred of evidence that there is, in fact, any supervision over the standards of work and maintenance employed, or anything else.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft indicated dissent.
    Mrs. Castle: The President shakes his head, but has he met the point? In what way is this opinion of the Monopolies Commission to be met? What is to be done about the precise definition of standards and the insistence that they are observed?
    We have here a loophole through which, purely on the say-so of manufacturers, agreements which do not protect the public can be escape. I do not believe that the alteration the President says he will make meets the really important point which my hon. Friends have raised.
    Mr. J. Grimond: I am very glad that the President has accepted the suggestion of the hon. Member for Darwen (Mr. Fletcher-Cooke). I am sure everyone must have realised that this Clause, as originally drafted, was far too indefinite and wide in its terms. The lawyers will have a very profitable field day, I think, in any case; indeed, it is rather public-spirited of the hon. Member for Darwen to reduce his fees in this way, when no doubt many arguments could have been adduced for a very long time about the precise

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    meaning of the expression "the protection of the public".
    The Amendment which he proposes will make it clear that the Clause refers only to the safety of the public, but I will go further and say that the remainder of the paragraph might well be reconsidered. It goes on to say:
    "…in connection with the purchase, consumption, installation or use of goods requiring special knowledge or skill in that connection."
    I do not know what "in that connection" means in that paragraph. If it be said that there may be cases where some restrictive practice is required to prevent the public harming itself, surely that requirement arises whether the goods require special skill or knowledge or not. It can be argued that no special skill or knowledge is required to plug in an electric plug; indeed, I can even do it myself; but if somebody puts on the market a plug which the moment one tries to switch on the electricity, blows one up, although what is done does not require special skill or knowledge, that is certainly an instance where the public needs protection.
    I feel that the President has not answered the point. We have already some protection at common law against dangerous objects on the market, and, if that is insufficient, there are in existence the appropriate special statutes, and more can be passed, by which the Government does protect the public. This is very important. I agree with those hon. Members who have said it is not the business of manufacturers to set up restrictive price rings or whatever it may be, and then to try and justify them by arguing that they are protecting members of the public from blowing themselves up. That, surely, is a matter for the common law or the Government. It does seem to me that the President has not really dealt with that question.
    My hon. Friends have an Amendment upon the Notice Paper which would make it justifiable to continue a restriction upon the ground that it protected the public only if there were no other way of doing it. This is not the time for me to argue that, but I do think it should be made clear that there must be some special reason—which, at the moment, completely escapes me—justifying leaving this matter in the hands of the manufacturers. Personally, I should have
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    thought they were the worst people to be the judges. I must confess that, offhand, I found it extremely difficult to visualise the sort of case in which this paragraph could be justified, and I rather hoped that the President might say a word on the point.
    Mr. Wilfred Fienburgh: I am happy to accept the word of the President of the Board of Trade at its face value and to believe him when he says that in this Clause he is concerned really with the safety of the public. From that, I would at once argue that the proper custodians of the safety of the public are the Members of this House of Commons and of another place. Where we have responsibilities for the public safety, they are fulfilled only by bringing before the representatives of the people in this House provisions designed to secure the greater safety of the public.
    Here, in this Clause, we have the worst of all possible worlds, because, by insisting that the whole matter of restrictive practices shall be shoved off on the judiciary and shall be removed from the purview of the Board of Trade, the Minister takes the matter away from any reasonable control by Parliament; and in so doing he is effectively reducing the amount of control by the representatives of the people over these matters which, on his own words, concern the safety of the public.
    4.15 p.m.
    I will take the analogy of road safety. There are various lethal instruments being driven about the roads of this country all the time, and they execute a fair measure of mayhem and slaughter. We do not, however, suggest that the manufacturers of motor cars, London Transport Executive, and retailers of motor cars should come together and agree a series of restrictive practices which will improve or guarantee safety on the roads. We do not allow garage men plus public service vehicle operators plus motor car manufacturers to come to agreements whereby motor cars shall not be sold to people who have many convictions for drunkenness.
    We do not allow them to say they will not sell motor cars to people who have shown themselves in the past unfit to drive a motor car. We do not allow them to lay out pedestrian crossings on

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    the road. We say that this is a matter in which the public safety is involved, which should not be left to agreements between manufacturers, whether they can be sustained in Court or not. We say that it is the responsibility of the representatives of the people whose proper concern it is.
    As my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) and my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) have pointed out, this is a matter in which the Monopolies Commission was absolutely right. We see no reason at all why the President of the Board of Trade should be unwilling to accept the recommendation of the Commission. We say that where there is an issue involving public safety, the responsibility for drafting legislation to protect the public rests upon Parliament, and the way to handle the problem is not through restrictive practices arrived at for quite other purposes by private manufacturers, but to place the responsibility and retain it in Parliament where it belongs.
    Mr. M. Turner-Samuels: I ask the President to look at this particular paragraph again and ask himself whether it is really necessary. I do not doubt for a moment that the object he has in mind is a good one and his intention in putting in this paragraph is well meant. But I ask him to consider very carefully whether it is, in the words of the paragraph itself, reasonably necessary.
    This is an exemption Clause. In any legislation where it is proposed to exempt either a class of goods or a class of persons from the operation of some Measure, the greatest possible care must be taken. Sometimes, I agree, it is necessary to allow exemption because there is no counter or alternative provision which would cover the matter but I put it to the President that in the circumstances here the proposed paragraph is unnecessary.
    The machinery of the Bill is designed to work in such a way that all restrictions will come within the cognisance, examination and decision of the Court. If there is a restriction of the nature specified in the paragraph in very special circumstances, the Court would, of course, be asked to look at that. If, in all the
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    circumstances, for the safety or protection of the public—and I think it matters little which expression we use—it was shown to be essential that that stipulation should be there, then the Court would uphold it. The onus would be upon the party who desired to sustain the restriction.
    As this Clause intends it should be, the onus will be put upon him to satisfy the Court that the circumstances are exceptional and that the particular restriction should stand, without this paragraph being in the Clause at all. Therefore, I cannot see why it is necessary to put in this provision. On the other hand, I do see that if there is an exemption Clause of this kind, there might be a lot of hocus-pocus about alleged necessary restrictions. I ask the President of the Board of Trade to be rather cautious about this matter, where the words of the paragraph are superfluous and where, if they are kept there, this legislation may work, in allowing possible loopholes for that sort of hocus-pocus.
    There is another element in the matter which the President should also consider. In most of these instances, where we have articles which are dangerous to the public as to content or user and which might be used by either children or adults in a way that would lead to danger, there is almost always special legislation to deal with that. It is only in the rarest possible case that there is any likelihood that such a matter would not be covered by legislation. In those circumstances, the facts would come under the consideration of the Restrictive Practices Court to be decided. The Clause is, consequently, unnecessary and, as I say, may prove very dangerous and not beneficial to the public interest.
    Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas: As the President of the Board of Trade said, we are, of course, dealing with one of the most important and difficult Clauses in the Bill. It is a Clause which shows up the fundamental defects in the Bill. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that when this decision is put in the hands of the Court, then tests and carefully defined cases have to be laid down. The difficulty is in deciding fairly and properly on the tests. It is an innate contradiction in the Clause itself which makes any answer to the problem which is posed by the method which the President has chosen impossible of solution.

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    In other words, one cannot, in the last resort, put a matter of public interest into terms which are justiciable, because one cannot satisfactorily define them. So, at whatever conclusion we eventually arrive on the actual tests in the Clause and the actual formation of the Clause, no solution will be satisfactory. It is with that rather sceptical attitude that I approach the Amendments, as well as the Clause.
    There is another difficulty which confronts us, particularly in connection with paragraph (a). It has already been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle). It is the conflict between the public interest and the private interest in our economic organisation as we now have it. I am not making any sort of cheap point, but just trying to face the difficulty which is inherent in approaching this problem. The public interest, of course, is to protect the public interest. Our economic organisation is such that a commercial interest may be different.
    I am not, of course, blaming the directors of a company for trying to make as much profit as they can. It is their job and their duty; and it would be a breach of duty if they did not try to do it. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Of course it is. They are not there as a philanthropic organisation. The hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Remnant) seems to think that the directors of a company are a philanthropic organisation. They are nothing of the kind. They are hard-headed businessmen, whose job is to make profits. We can argue whether profits are a good thing or not, but that is an entirely different argument. I am not criticising the directors of companies.
    The Temporary Chairman (Major W. J. Anstruther-Gray): We are not discussing the directors of companies on this Amendment.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We are here considering the private interests of company organisations, the purpose of company organisations, on the one hand, and the public interest on the other. The difficulty in the Clause—and my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn put a finger on it, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Fienburgh)—is that one is trusting a question of public safety to private
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    organisations whose purpose is not public safety, but an entirely different purpose.
    I am not casting any reflection upon companies or the directors of companies, who may be the most philanthropically-minded people in the world. All I am saying is that it is not their job to do so. We should not leave it to an organisation by restrictive practices to cover matters of public safety. That is a matter with which a body responsible for that purpose should deal.
    Mr. Anthony Fell: Surely the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) will agree that it is normally in the interests of directors to produce things which are safe.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: It may or may not be. For instance, we have the simple case of electric fires and guards for them. That is a very simple case which will be within everybody's recollection and which happened in recent months. We had to deal with them, because it was a matter of public safety. The hon. Member for Yarmouth (Mr. Fell) should not be so touchy about it. I am not making any kind of personal allegation at all. The simple point is that matters of public safety should not be left to organisations whose concern is not public safety, but a very different concern. It should not be left to them as a by-product and, above all, it should not be left to them to be used to justify practices which in the Bill are regarded as fundamentally undesirable.
    I have been led away by interventions. I do not like the approach of justifying restrictive practices on the ground of public safety, because public safety should be dealt with in other ways; but we recognise—and I concede this to the President at once—that there are cases which legislation does not sufficiently cover. Therefore, it is reasonable, as long as there is legislation which does not cover a particular piece of protection, that there should be sonic provision such as that in paragraph (a). We could not say that in cases of this kind, even in this rather haphazard way, if we are leaving private concerns to ensure protection and that is the only method by which the safety of the public is ensured, we should, nevertheless, do away with it. Of course, we cannot.

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    4.30 p.m.
    We are concerned with what happens after registration becomes available to deal with it. I should imagine that application could be made by the Registrar for variation of this order, and I suppose that that will be done. We should like to hear a little more on that point. How would the machinery work? Would the Registrar inform the President of the Board of Trade that a particular concern came within paragraph (a) for this or that reason? Would the right hon. Gentleman consider whether the point could be dealt with by legislation? At what stage of the proceedings should it be dealt with? Or are we to get a whole range of restrictive practices justified on a ground of safety which could be dealt with perfectly happily by legislation without having this tremendous incubus of restrictive practices at all?
    We were relieved to hear that the President of the Board of Trade proposes to limit this paragraph to cases of safety and not of general protection. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) referred to the last words of the paragraph; I should have thought that the retention of them was valuable, because the purpose of the practice is to ensure that the person handling the goods has the necessary special knowledge. It does not deal with inanimate objects, but with persons.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: This discussion has taken a little time. We need to get on with the Bill. I gathered from the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) that everybody agrees there have to be tests. He speaks of the methods adopted, but I have never understood from him that the provisions we discussed before were to be left so lax that the public interest would be left wide open. I must give him credit for seeking some kind of definite approach to the matter.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: If the ultimate decision were with the Government, as we said it should be, we should have a much more flexible system than this hidebound system in Clause 16.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It would throw a lot of very wide questions on to some lay tribunal. The public must judge. It is
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    agreed that under this system, and, I should have thought, under any other, we must have tests and they have to be clearly defined. Would any fair-minded person say that it should not be open to an industrialist or supplier to ask whether a particlar restriction is in the interests of the safety of the public and is reasonably necessary?
    If legislation already safeguards the public interest, the industrialist will not get very far with that argument. That is the short answer. The Registrar will say, "Look at the Act dealing with electric wiring. That covers the whole thing." The only way in which this argument could be sustained would be to show effectively before the Court, presided over by a High Court Judge, that the restrictions reasonably necessary for the safety, as it now will be, of the public.
    "in connection with the purchase, consumption, installation or use of goods requiring special knowledge or skill."
    I agree that those last few words are important. This was recommended by the majority Report of the Monopolies Commission, and it is right upon its merits. Any section of the Committee ought to hesitate before publicly recording an opinion against it.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: May we have the answer to the question I put to the President of the Board of Trade? In spite of his great debating skill, he has not answered it. We are not concerned about the position where an Act of Parliament already provides for safety. It does not require a great deal of intelligence to come to the conclusion that in that case the Court would take it into consideration and there would not be very much chance of an applicant succeeding under paragraph (a). The right hon. Gentleman could have assumed that.
    We are concerned with the case which the President has not answered, where there is no Act of Parliament applying. What is to happen? Is there to be an arrangement by which the Registrar will inform the President of the Board of Trade, who will then consider whether the case should be dealt with by Parliament so that we do not have all this incubus of restrictive practices? The matter could then be dealt with quite shortly and briefly in an Act of Parliament. We are concerned with this liaison between the Registrar and the right hon. Gentleman. It is a substantial point.

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    Provisions in the Bill allow variation of an order. It may very well be that legislation could not be brought in until the order has been made. One can easily envisage circumstances of that kind. I am not arguing the point that the Act should necessarily be brought in before the order is made to avoid the order having to be made. We are concerned with the liaison between the Registrar and the President so that the right hon. Gentleman can keep the matter under review and in appropriate cases we should not have unnecessary restrictive practices.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The Registrar will certainly have responsibilities in this matter, but I am not going to be drawn into any suggestion that the Board of Trade should start directing the Registrar.
    I apologise for not answering the point put by the hon. and learned Member. It escaped me. He asked me about variation. I am not dealing with it, because we shall do so on Clause 17. As to the point about material change in the circumstances. I express the opinion that if there was subsequent legislation that completely covered the point there would be a material change in the circumstances, and it would then be a perfectly proper case for review by the Court on the application of the Registrar. There is no doubt about it.
    I do not suggest that we should approach the Bill on the basis that every agreement which is introduced for the safety of the public should be the subject of legislation in this House. That would not only bring the Restrictive Practices Court to a standstill but this House of Commons, if we were not careful. The register will be open to public inspection and the arguments advanced will be in public hearing, certainly in a matter of this kind. If a whole range of cases shows that some particular danger always has to be avoided by the same kind of restriction, it would be a matter of public comment, and public opinion would be expressed in the ordinary way in the House of Commons.
    Amendment negatived.
    Mrs. Castle: I beg to move, in page 13, line 38, to leave out paragraph (b).
    The Temporary Chairman: I understand that it would be for the convenience of the Committee to discuss with the
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    Amendment which has been moved the eight following Amendments.
    Mrs. Castle: If the Amendment which we have just discussed pointed to the essential weakness of the Bill, how much more so does this one? Paragraph (b) can render null and void the whole attack which the Bill makes on restrictive practices. I suggest that it is not only covering ground which is entirely new, and which was not visualised in the Report of the Monopolies Commission, but is drawn in terms which are so ludicrously wide that they show the impossibility of the job which will be facing the Restrictive Practices Court.
    I would draw the attention of the Committee to the wording of the paragraph, which is:
    "that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by them as such whether by virtue of the restriction itself or of any arrangements or operations resulting therefrom;"
    I should have thought that a paragraph worded like that was just about as wide as the general proviso which concludes the Clause and which has caused The Times, for one, so much anxiety. As has already been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher), in a leader yesterday The Times objected to the proposed Amendment which we are coming to shortly, pointing out how wide was the general proviso, and how undesirable it was to have a court of law trying to discuss these matters of public interest except within very narrow limits. Surely nothing could be wider than this Clause.
    I am wondering what the President can possibly have had in mind in including it in the Bill. The argument contained in this paragraph is the whole case of the restrictionists, put into a nutshell. In fact, if we pass the Clause as it is we shall have completely given away the case to the restrictionists. We can see how satisfactory it is to them by the number of Amendments which have been tabled by hon. Members opposite who, throughout the whole of our discussions, have been steadily plugging the restrictionists' case, and who now say, "Whoopee, boys, this is it. Add a few words, such as 'directly or indirectly' and 'whether by way of price or otherwise,' and leave out the word 'substantial' and, chaps, we have

    619
    the whole case of the Federation of British Industries."
    I wonder if the President has studied that interesting pamphlet circulated by the Federation, called "Restrictive Business Practices in the Public Interest"? Here we have the bible of the restrictionists, and here it tells us, very sadly, that there has been a lot of misunderstanding about restrictive practices; that it is quite true that they limit production and keep up prices, but if anybody thinks that is contrary to the public interest he does not understand how British industry works. That, in effect, is what the pamphlet says. The argument of the Federation is that if the public only knew where its true interests lay it would welcome restrictive practices with open arms.
    4.45 p.m.
    This is a very impressive document. I read it with tears in my eyes, because it said quite definitely:
    "Whereas it used to be a motive of industry in practising restrictive arrangements to avoid the fluctuations of unrestricted competition in times of slump, now the need is very different, and we need the restrictive practices because of the growing mechanisation of British industry and the need for stability within it."
    The whole public interest case is employed here. It is that we must have restrictive practices; we must limit competition, and we must stabilise prices, even if competition would make them lower, because this will ensure research and runs of production and stability within the industry. The pamphlet says:
    "Agreements which contribute to high and stable levels of demand and output bring benefits which are reflected in the quality and price of the products."
    That is the restrictionists' case. They tell the public that it would not be better off if competition were restored and prices reduced.
    I thought that the President introduced the Bill because he did not accept that case. Yet, if it looked at the paragraph, the Federation would say, "Of course, the removal of any of these restrictions would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers and users of goods substantial benefits and advantages enjoyed as the result of the modern organisation of British industry." I wonder where on earth the President got this paragraph. He has argued all along that the Monopolies Commission has accepted the need for
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    some exceptions to be allowed for in the attack upon restrictive practices, but in doing so he has given us the impression that he appreciated that those exceptions had to be upon narrow and strictly defined grounds.
    There is nothing in the Report of the Commission to justify the inclusion of a paragraph of this kind. In fact, it is very interesting to note the cautious tone with which the Commission approached the whole question of its exceptions. It said, in fact, that, whereas some might be necessary,
    "We have not in the course of our inquiry come across any instances in which we were clearly satisfied that such practices were beneficial."
    But it went on to say that it had not had time to consider all these arrangements in detail and, therefore,
    "We…cannot conclude that there should be no exception to our general conclusion."
    But the Commission couches its opinion in negative and not positive language. It goes on to say:
    "It appears to us that the exceptional use of practices of this kind might be justified, subject to safeguards…"
    But it wanted those exceptions strictly limited to the headings which it listed in paragraph 240.
    We have already dealt with one category of exceptions which the Commission was prepared to entertain. Having studied the other three categories with care, however, I cannot see that they could be the source and origin of this paragraph. Except for the report of the Federation of British Industries, I do not know where the President can have got this paragraph. It occurred to me that he might have had in mind paragraph 240 (c) which, as the Committee will be aware, points out that in respect of agreements to charge common prices,
    "There might be particular cases in which a common price agreement was found after inquiry to operate in the public interest, and where the effective operation of that agreement might depend upon the use of incidental practices of these types."
    I am wondering if it was within the ambit of that paragraph that the President found his inspiration for paragraph (b).
    If so, I really do suggest that he is cheating because the reason why the Monopolies Commission included paragraph (c) was not because it was really convinced that there might be common

    621
    price agreements which could legitimately in the public interest be enforced by restrictive practices of this kind. On the contrary, it put this in because common prices were excluded from its terms of reference. Being scrupulously fair, as Monopolies Commission has been throughout, it had to point out that it had not examined the field of common prices, and it might be that if it had examined the field it would have found that some of these might be justified in very exceptional circumstances.
    Common prices were referred to the Monopolies Commission separately, but the President withdrew that reference before the Commission reported. He did so on the ground that he is going to be a little quicker than that; he has done it as proof, he tells us, of his great desire to get ahead with tackling this giant evil. But really we are faced with this situation. The President has now told us that he is going to register common prices among the first of the agreements to be registered, but, then, having done that, and having stopped the Monopolies Commission from producing a report on common prices, he gives instead the loophole of paragraph (b) in the Bill. It is obvious that he has prices in mind, or, if not, some of his restrictionist friends have, because there is an Amendment on the Order Paper to include the words,
    "Whether by way of price or otherwise."
    I suggest in all seriousness to I he President that he should look at paragraph (b) again. It is absolutely impossible for the Restrictive Practices Court to construe what is in the public interest in the light of these wide terms of reference. Surely there is no Member in this Committee who doubts that if the Monopolies Commission had continued its inquiry into common prices it would have come out flatly against them.
    We see that sort of arrangement in the Report on the tyre industry. It is true that the tyre manufacturers claimed, and the Monopolies Commission accepted their claim that they had no common prices agreement, but had an identical price arrangement, and discussions had led to identical prices being charged throughout the field and all price increases taking place simultaneously, and the Monopolies Commission condemned this arrangement as contrary to the public interest.
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    I for one have no doubt that if we had had a report by the Monopolies Commission on common prices, it would, in fact, have condemned them. But we have not that report. All that we have is a reference by the President of the Board of Trade to his intention to register common prices first among the priorities and then to follow that up by examination by the Court. All the common price arrangements generally can then come along and claim exemption under this paragraph. The arguments used will range over the whole field of the restrictionist case.
    I ask the President of the Board of Trade specifically if he had paragraph (c) of the Report in mind when he put paragraph (b) in the Bill. Is it his belief that any price arrangements operate in the public interest or may be expected to operate in the public interest? If not, under what recommendation of the Monopolies Commission has he produced this paragraph? Is it under the Monopolies Commission's recommendation (a), (b), (c) or (d)? If it is not under any of these recommendations, are we now not back in the position in which he has abandoned the whole case of the Monopolies Commission, that exceptions should only be allowed within very narrow limits as defined in paragraph 240 of the Commission's Report?
    I suggest to the President that this is possibly the most important Amendment in the Bill. It is a complete rejection of the case of the Federation of British Industries which has argued and continues to believe that restriction of competition operates in the public interest, and that maintenance of high prices in some way, by spreading the cost of research and by enabling high capital investment in modern industry, is in the interests of the public.
    The whole reason that we have this Bill is that the Government presumably reject that argument. It is a serious matter that the President, having started off with a great show of firmness in attacking and resisting the restrictionists' case, should by inserting this paragraph have now capitulated so speedily to the very attitude which it is our purpose to prevent.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Perhaps I may reply very shortly to what has been said about this paragraph, which is important.

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    First of all, about where the idea came from, I would say to the Committee that it is not necessary—and I am sure that I carry the Committee with me on this—to have a report of the Monopolies Commission or any other Commission to produce a Bill in the House of Commons. We are responsible here ourselves, all of us on all sides, for what we legislate. We shall consider any Report that we have, and we shall do so in this discussion, but we are entitled to our own ideas about these things.
    I want to say briefly what is the Government's approach to this matter. It is that the restrictions we are considering are presumed to be against the public interest. That is the first thing, and it is the answer to a good deal of what the hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) has been saying. Whether they are common prices or collective discrimination or the rest of it, they are presumed to be against the public interest. It is important to realise that these separate paragraphs are not a final answer in this matter. They define an argument which could be admitted before the Court, and what paragraph (b) says is that someone who is engaged in a restrictive practice may go to the Court, not to say that it benefits him—that is not permitted in this paragraph at all—but that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public, not even the general public, but
    "to the public as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by them as such, whether by virtue of the restriction itself or of any arrangements or operations resulting therefrom".
    To deny that argument to someone who has a restriction would be an extraordinary state of affairs. I cannot imagine any tribunal, whether a court, a lay tribunal or a commission, or anything else, which would not at least admit the man to place in front of it an argument in support of that contention.
    5.0 p.m.
    I would only say this: I am anxious, and I know that the Committee realises it, not to widen these Clauses. I know that I am pressed in a number of Amendments to tighten it, and some people are pressing me to make it wider in other directions. I will listen to the
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    arguments which I am sure will be expressed concisely to me on this matter. But I suggest to the Committee that this Clause, which has been most carefully drafted, is designed to do exactly what I have said so far; namely, not to establish some different principle or restrict our right to impose the onus fairly and squarely on the man. It presumes that a restriction is contrary to the public interest, but admits at this stage—and it is only the first stage—simply the argument that it operates not in his own interests but in the interests of the consumers of the country. I should think it astonishing were that contention rejected.
    Mr. Douglas Jay: I do not think the President has answered the argument. He rests his case by saying that all this paragraph does or indeed any of the other paragraphs, is to permit the claimant, or plaintiff or whatever we call him, to use certain arguments. But the paragraph does not do only that. It goes further. It permits him to make out his case on these grounds and thereby get approval for his action whatever it is.
    The President said that it is not for him to say where the idea came from which is contained in this paragraph. The right hon. Gentleman says he is at liberty to make up his mind as he chooses. Of course he is. But nevertheless it is pertinent to point out that most of the paragraphs in this Clause are founded on the suggestions in paragraph 240 of the Report of the Monopolies Commission. They are clearly modelled on the Commission's proposals, though they are slightly different from those proposals. When we find one which, as has been pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) in no way derives from that Report, I think we are entitled, and it is our duty, to examine it rather carefully and to ask what it means. We inevitably ask ourselves—even though the President will not answer our question—where it comes from.
    What does it mean? The President did not tell us. What are these,
    "special and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed"
    by the consumers as a result of restrictions which prima facie are contrary to their interests? I do not know what the

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    President has in mind. I can only suppose that what he has in mind is the argument that in return for a higher price and a restrictive arrangement people will enjoy a certain higher standard of service or supply of goods, or whatever it may be. That was the argument which was considered by the Commission, and it is one of the defences advanced by restrictionists. I feel bound to say that it does not convince me. If what we are considering is the weighing of the one disadvantage to the consumer of higher prices against some advantage of getting better service, I consider that to be something which should be decided by the consumer.
    Mr. Reader Harris: Not always, where safety is concerned.
    Mr. Jay: We have already dealt with safety in paragraph (a).
    Mr. Harris: The same applies here.
    Mr. Jay: If it is a choice between getting better service at higher prices and rather less service at lower prices, it is for the consumer and the purchaser to decide. All that is done by the restrictive agreement is to deprive the consumer of his freedom of choice. It means that once the agreement has been approved under this heading, it is the producer and not the consumer who chooses which advantage he gains.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Is the right hon. Gentleman really contending that if it were shown to a court of law that the removal of the restriction would remove a specific and substantial advantage from the consumer, he would say that was an argument which ought not even to be advanced?
    Mr. Jay: I will not admit the argument until I know specifically the substantial advantages which the President has in mind. In answer to his question, I will read to the right hon. Gentleman what the Commission said on this very point. So far from suggesting this type of exception, it advanced arguments against it. It quoted a case where the principle is put forward that in return for a restrictive arrangement and higher prices there are certain better standards of service supplied. The Commission states in paragraph 83
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    "However, if suppliers…collectively determine what the standard of service shall be and then protect those who give that service, they will probably lay down standards which are higher than some buyers need or would wish to pay for. There are individual buyers who because of the size of their purchases, or because of their own technical and commercial qualifications, require less service than others…".
    Then it goes on:
    "Such buyers, it may be thought, should at least have the opportunity of placing their orders with concerns which give no more than the service they require and should not be forced to deal only with concerns which provide services they do not need."
    I think that a conclusive answer to the argument. Since, so far as we know, and on the information which the President has given, that is the only case which this paragraph is intended to cover, I am still led to the conclusion that this is an issue which should properly be for the consumer and purchaser to decide. It should not be decided either by the producer or by the Restrictive Practices Court.
    Mr. Peter Remnant: In his last few words the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) has confirmed what was my feeling earlier—particularly during the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle)—that the basis of the difference of view between the two sides of the Committee is in two main parts. First, right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite seem all the time to be saying, "Do not trust the Restrictive Practices Court to take a fair and reasonable judgment about what is or is not against the public interest when all the facts are put before it." Indeed, the right hon. Member for Battersea, North seemed Ito deny that when a restrictive agreement was referred to the Court, a trader should have any right to put his case before the Court.
    Mr. Jay: I did not say that if there was a Court the trader should not have the right to put his case before it. I said that certain arguments should be admissible and certain others should not. Obviously, the President himself admits that by only having paragraphs from (a) to (g) and not from (a) to the end of the alphabet. The only point at issue is which particular argument should be admissible.
    Mr. Remnant: The right hon. Gentleman must read his speech in the OFFICIAL REPORT tomorrow. He denied that the trader should be allowed to make out his own case, and I differ entirely from him. It is not only the trader whom I wish to be allowed to make out his own case, but whoever is the counsel acting for the Registrar as well. I wish to emphasise that it is the public interest which we are all endeavouring to safeguard and the means of achieving that under the Restrictive Practices Court. The object of certain Amendments in my name were to ensure that the Court should not rule out as remote something which it might have considered pertinent with regard to a particular practice.
    The instance I had particularly in mind—and I should perhaps declare an interest in this—is that of an agreement reached to relate supply and demand with an adequate margin by Committee on which representatives of a foreign Government sit and to which agreement that foreign Government's consent is required before it can be put into effect. Just what is going to happen in the sterling countries connected with that practice if the Restrictive Practices Court rules that that particular arrangement is against the public interest, though the arrangement is made in obedience to the instructions of the foreign Government?
    The hon. Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) starts from the assumption that no agreement can be anything but harmful to the public interest. She is entitled to her own view, just as I am to mine, although with all respect I would suggest that perhaps I have a closer connection with business and its workings than she has. My view may be a biassed one, but I should be very surprised if, after two or three years, this Court, if put into operation on the basis proposed, does not find that quite a considerable number of the agreements of trade are not in any way against the public interest. Hon. Members on both sides are wrong if they expect too much to come out of this Bill.
    I want to re-emphasise that in my view the fundamental principle of this paragraph which the hon. Lady seeks to remove is to see that all pertinent factors are placed before the Court by anyone who has a useful contribution to make, whether it be from the consumers' or from the manufacturers' side—that this
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    Court is as independent as others. In that connection I must say that the hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) just now rather shook my faith in the law, though my faith in the High Court judges still remains.
    I am glad that my right hon. Friend has spoken as he did. If I may use a commonplace term, I hope that he will stick to his guns over this, and, if not, give me an assurance that there is very little excluded by this paragraph which the Court cannot take into consideration.
    5.15 p.m.
    Mr. Donald Wade: I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to a series of Amendments standing in the name of my hon. Friend the member for Bolton, West (Mr. Holt) and myself. I take it, Sir Charles, that there will be an opportunity to move them formally, if necessary, at an appropriate time?
    The Chairman: No, I do not think so.
    Mr. Wade: I am at any rate in order in debating them. I am well aware that the main problem now facing the Committee is the question as to whether, and if so to what extent, Parliament should delegate to another body the task of deciding issues which are wholly or partly political and economic. The Amendments which I am now discussing do not raise quite such a fundamental problem, but do raise matters which are not merely points of emphasis in wording.
    Before I deal with the Amendments, may I make this general observation? My colleagues and I would not have dealt with this subject in quite the same way, as I think we have made quite clear already. For example, we do not accept the view that it is reasonable to draw up definitions of exemptions which are applicable to all forms of restrictive practice. We think that the limits of price rings should be defined differently from—and incidentally, very much more tightly than—other restrictive practices, such as zoning. However, I must not go into that now.
    The Government have adopted this method, and we have to consider whether the definitions in the Clause are either too wide or too ambiguous. I submit that if the President would accept the wording

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    we suggest—if not the precise wording then in principle—it would remove a certain ambiguity. Paragraph (b) as amended, would then commence "that the restriction provides" and would conclude with the words "without the restriction it is not reasonably practicable to provide such benefits or advantages." Had our Amendment to paragraph (a) been called I should have put forward a similar proposition, but the same argument applies to both paragraphs (a) and (b).
    The purpose of the Amendments is to ensure that the Court will consider, first, whether in fact these restrictions do provide the benefits and advantages alleged by the parties to the agreement; and secondly, whether there may not be some other way of providing those benefits. As the Bill stands, there is some uncertainty as to what the Court will be entitled to consider. The Minister may contend that it follows from the present wording that before reaching a conclusion the Court would consider whether there was some other method whereby these advantages could be provided without restrictive practices, but I am not at all sure that as the Clause is at present worded, the Court would be entitled to consider that.
    We must remember that these are new courts. The judge and those assisting him will be feeling their way. Any decisions that are made in the earlier stages may be regarded as precedents, and if the Court decides that it is not concerned with the question as to whether these benefits could be provided in some other way, the effect will be to widen these exemptions to an extent which I do not think was intended by Parliament. I say "widened" because those who make their applications will be entitled to argue that all they have to prove is that these advantages are provided for the public, and that it is no concern of the Court to consider whether or not those advantages could be provided in another way.
    Last night the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) gave the example of the electric fire and the guard. and the same subject has been mentioned again today. I can quite understand a body of manufacturers contending that certain restrictive practices—including, may be, a stop list—are necessary to ensure that retailers only sell a particular kind of electric fire with a particular type of safe guard. I think it
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    might well be contended that that safeguard to the public could be better provided in some other way, and what I am asking the Committee to consider is that the Court should have within its purview the question whether or not the advantages can be provided in some other way than by these restrictions which, on general principles, we have already decided are contrary to the public interest.
    Dr. Horace King: Before I make the point I wish to make. I think someone from this side of the Committee should reply to the speech of the hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Remnant). It is not the view of the Opposition that the Court will be a prejudiced court in favour of those making restrictive practices, but, at the moment, we are devising a set of provisos or instructions to the Court itself. Obviously, we have to frame these provisos very carefully, because anyone who indulges in restrictive practices and who naturally thinks them right will take advantage of every opportunity of self-defence provided by the words of these provisos.
    Although I take the view of my right hon. and hon. Friends that we must watch carefully how these provisos are drawn lest they be drawn too widely, and although, indeed, I also believe with my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) that this subsection may be the point in this Measure through which the traditional coach and horses may be driven, I am troubled because this is the only proviso of the whole series in the subsection which seems to me to give sonic protection to a group of restrictive practitioners whose interests I want to plead this afternoon.
    May I say that I have no interest to declare. I am a bookish man, who has spent more time in booksellers' shops and libraries than perhaps I ought to have done, but I have been asked by the little' booksellers—my friends up and down the country—to put their case. Their case, it seems to me so far, can only be dealt with in this subsection.
    I want to say a few words about the bookseller himself. He is not merely a seller of books; he has to carry an enormous stock, he has to act as adviser, counsellor and friend to those who buy from him, and he thinks that he will be seriously jeopardised if the abolition of

    631
    net sales price agreements by the wholesalers concerned were to make it possible for his customers, who use the free library service which he provides to take advantage of getting to know new books by handling them in his shop, were then to turn to some of the multiple stores and obtain these very books at cut prices. If some subsection to safeguard him is not included in the Bill, then indeed the little bookseller of England fears that his position may be jeopardised.
    I think it goes deeper than that. I think the bookseller and the small town bookshop provide one of the instruments in the country which preserves the British book culture when it is being challenged more and more today by cheap commercial culture and that the disappearance of the little bookman from the towns of England would be a great loss to British life. On the other hand, the case of the bookseller is that the publisher himself is keenly competitive. This is not monopoly that I am defending. The Macmillans, the Pitmans, the Murrays and the rest of them fight each other in the world of buying authors and books and fixing competitive prices against each other. Their prices, between themselves, are competitive, so much so indeed that publishers are not interested in the Amendment which the hon. Member for Carlisle (Dr. D. Johnson) placed on the Order Paper earlier. It is because of that fact that I ask my hon. Friend who moved this Amendment and my right hon. Friends during the course of this debate to say what they feel about the case for preserving this particular restrictive practice as far as booksellers are concerned, the removal of which I believe would injure not only them, but the British public.
    Mr. Eric Johnson: The hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle), who is no longer in her place, made some reference to an Amendment on the Order Paper in the names of some of my hon. Friends and myself about benefits in connection with prices. The hon. Lady did not appear to approve of that Amendment, and she appears to think that all arrangements about common prices are necessarily iniquitous.
    I should like to point out that the purpose of my Amendment was not to
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    say whether fixed prices are right or wrong, but only in order to make quite sure that, under this subsection of Clause 16, members of trade associations will have the opportunity of arguing their cases before the Court. If this Amendment was accepted, the effect would be that trade associations would be denied the opportunity of proving to the Court that the benefits which they give to the public are in fact real and substantial. I was very glad to hear my right hon. Friend say that the reason for this subsection is to give manufacturers the opportunity of proving their case.
    As far as I am concerned, so far from wishing to delete this Clause, I must say that I must disagree with my right hon. Friend because I do not think it goes anything like far enough. I hope he will see his way to accepting some of the Amendments on the Order Paper, although I must say that the only one which would give effect to what I have in mind has not, unfortunately, been called. It is the Amendment which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Heston and Isleworth (Mr. R. Harris) and myself, in page 13, line 32, to leave out "shall" and insert "may".
    What I am specially anxious to do is to make quite sure that, under this subsection, trade associations will have a chance of arguing their cases and the justification for fixing prices, and will be given the opportunity of proving that the public derive a substantial advantage from that practice. The hon. Lady the Member for Blackburn, and certain hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, do not seem to think that agreed prices ever give any benefit to the public, but I could, of course, give very many examples to prove that in fact they do.
    It is undoubtedly the case that in times of scarcity when supplies are short, there are always customers who are willing to pay a higher price than the agreed price of the association in order to get larger quantities of the goods they want or to get quicker deliveries. If there are no trade associations, there is a great temptation to individual manufacturers to accept the higher prices, and if one starts to take the higher price, the others very soon follow suit. If manufacturers are banded together in an association, they are much more likely to resist that temptation, because they know that their

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    competitors are not taking advantage of it, and they will try to keep prices steady.
    It is undoubtedly the case that whenever prices have been increased in times of scarcity, whenever advantage has been taken of shortage conditions, it has been done by those firms or suppliers who are outside an association, and it has been the association in these cases which has exercised restraint.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Is the hon. Gentleman's argument that all associations of this kind confer substantial benefits of the public?
    5.30 p.m.
    Mr. Johnson: What I am saying is that I hope an opportunity will be afforded under this paragraph to enable associations which believe they give substantial benefits to the public to prove that they do. I went on to say that I could give evidence that many such associations have given substantial benefits. I propose to mention one example very briefly.
    The industry concerned deals with the supply of brass and copper tubes. I have no connection with this industry at all. The Committee will be aware that there has been a great shortage of copper in the last few years, notably between 1950 and 1952, and during that time the brass and copper tube association did not take advantage of those conditions to increase prices. The association did its best to keep prices down. I would stress this point, which no doubt will be more relevant on a later Clause. In that industry there is no agreement about resale price maintenance, and the association could not prevent certain retailers from asking excessive prices. As a result, certain retailers were making huge profits out of the scarcity conditions while the manufacturers were keeping prices down.
    Mr. Albert Evans: How does the hon. Gentleman reconcile what he is saying with the undoubted fact that the supply of nonferrous metals has constantly declined ever since the Korean War, and that if one asks the suppliers of non-ferrous metal sheets and bars for prices, almost invariably the prices given agree to within £1 or so?
    Mr. Johnson: I do not find that in the least surprising. There is nothing wrong
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    in the prices being identical. They will be the same if the manufacturers are in an association. What I have said is that the manufacturers who are in such an association and who agree on their prices do their best to keep the prices down, but there are people outside the associations who can and do ask what they like.
    Associations have in many cases conferred substantial benefits on the public as a whole. I do not want to weary the Committee with a lot of examples, but I was about to say that it is not only in creating stable prices and keeping prices down that these associations confer benefits. One could give a long list of examples. The fact remains that if this paragraph is deleted, the effect will be to deny the associations the opportunity of proving that what they do is in the public interest, as they believe it to be.
    I know that hon. Members opposite have always been critical of trade associations which fix prices, but I suggest that if they are not allowed to agree prices, those trade associations will very soon disintegrate, in precisely the same way as trade unions would disintegrate if they were not allowed to have any control over fixing wages.
    If we are to have unrestricted price competition in addition to the competition which already exists between firms in regard to quality, general service and so on, I admit that the result may well be lower prices. There will also inevitably be a deterioration in quality. It might facilitate the disappearance of the less efficient firms, but the progress of the efficient firms would also be curtailed. What would undoubtedly happen would be that small firms would go bankrupt, and we should find that the control of an industry would be in the hands of a few firms or groups of firms with the largest financial resources. Instead of having more competition, they would tend to avoid competition with each other by concentrating on certain types of goods which might well develop into a monopoly. If the associations were not allowed to prove their case, the buyer would have a smaller choice and there would be less competition than there is now.
    I regret, Sir Charles, that you have ruled that I cannot move this small Amendment in my name. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend would see

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    fit at a later stage to include words of the kind suggested in my Amendment. I am aware that he does not want to widen the scope of the Clause. However, I ask him to give a definite assurance that trade associations which have price agreements will be given the opportunity to argue a case in favour of what they are doing.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: I think the hon. Member for Blackley (Mr. E. Johnson) has made a very striking and interesting speech. He expressed regret that he was not able to move a small Amendment, but I must say that I do not think the subject he dealt with in his speech was at all small. It is a very big subject which relates not only to paragraph (b), but to the Bill as a whole.
    The argument that the hon. Gentleman was advancing was a complete argument in favour of common pricing and price rings in as wide a range of British industry as it is possible to have. Let me deal with the suggestion that it would be a powerful argument to say that trade associations operating a common policy might perform a public service at a time of shortage of certain commodities.
    Mr. E. Johnson: I was not arguing in favour of price rings. What I was saying was that there was evidence that in certain cases they provided benefits to the public, that they ought to be given the opportunity of proving this, and that to delete this paragraph would deny them that opportunity.
    Mr. Jenkins: I think the hon. Gentleman went a great deal further than that, and I want to show exactly how far he went.
    When he interrupted me, I was about to say that he gave one or two specific examples and suggested that the price ring was useful at a time of shortage of a particular commodity, and that the traders should be allowed to deploy this argument in the Restrictive Practices Court. But it is impossible to think of a commodity which may not become in short supply in the future. Are trade associations to be allowed to say, "There is no shortage of our commodity at present, but it might become short, in which case we would pursue a policy which might
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    result in keeping prices down"? That would certainly provide plenty of scope.
    The hon. Gentleman, going still further, used the old argument that common pricing was essential unless we were prepared to have industry increasingly swallowed up by the large and more efficient firms. That is an old chestnut, that it is necessary to have a certain amount of restrictive practice in order to prevent an industry becoming almost a complete monopoly. On the evidence before us it is not the industries which most effectively apply restrictive practices of one sort or another, and in particular agree common prices, which are the industries in which there is a wide range of firms operating. We have all had our attention directed to the motor tyre industry. That industry has plenty of restrictive practice and common pricing, but it is not what one thinks of as an industry controlled by a vast multiplicity of small firms. Take the tobacco industry, as another example. It is hardly a paradise for the small firm.
    Mr. Johnson: Might I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to the wire industry, which has a very large number of small manufacturers in it and has agreements about prices?
    Mr. Jenkins: I am certainly not going to argue that there are not industries of which that is true, but I say that the hon. Gentleman's general proposition cannot be held to be true from a consideration of the picture over British industry as a whole.
    When I came into the Chamber my hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mrs. Castle) was saying that her Amendment was the most important of all. I thought at the time that she was indulging, most unusually, in a little hyperbole, but having listened to the debate, I am not sure that she was not near the truth. A number of hon. Members opposite have shown great enthusiasm in supporting the President in resisting the Amendment.
    The hon. Member for Heston and Isleworth (Mr. R. Harris), a most enthusiastic supporter of the Bill, said "Hear, hear" a great deal more often during the President's speech in reply to the Amendment than I have heard him do on any other part of the Bill. That makes me think that the removal of the

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    paragraph would do a great deal to strengthen the Bill, though I am not unaware of the point of substance raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Itchen (Dr. King). There is something in the point about booksellers, but I think that that falls much more under Clauses 19 or 20 than under this Clause. What booksellers are concerned about is not the maintenance—
    Mr. Douglas Glover: Ought not the hon. Gentleman to declare his interest in books?
    Mr. Jenkins: I have written a number of books, but they do not sell very much. They are very highly priced. I freely admit that I am an opponent of individual resale price maintenance. I should say that bookselling was an exception to the general point, but it is essentially individual resale maintenance which booksellers are concerned about maintaining and not a whole range of common prices, which does not operate at present. I do not think that that is directly concerned with the problem with which we are dealing. Possibly it may be dealt with under other Clauses.
    In his speech the President took the point that it would be unreasonable to exclude the paragraph not because he is convinced that very much will come of it when cases go before the Restrictive Practices Court, but because it would be most unreasonable for an industry affected by the operation of the Court not to be able to argue almost anything which it thought would be of assistance to it. If it were accepted, that would be an argument not in keeping with the other paragraphs. If it is reasonable that everyone should be able to make the best case they can on their own behalf, as it may be, why do we have the list of limitations? The fact that we have, means that the President and the Government recognise that the mere fact that a point may help somebody who is trying to uphold a restrictive practice is not in itself a reason why it should be admissible evidence before the court.
    The subsection with which we are dealing goes very wide. I have been surprised to discover exactly how wide it goes. All that has to be shown is
    "that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other specific and substantial benefits or advantages.…"
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    It does not say "benefits or advantages on balance." It does not say anything about the price which people may have to pay to get the benefits. It is difficult, particularly when we listen to wide-ranging speeches like that of the hon. Member for Blackley (Mr. E. Johnson) to imagine any restrictive agreement for which it could not be claimed that the consumer might get some advantages or benefits from it. Surely the basis of our approach to the subject in the Bill must be that the consumer himself ought to be allowed to judge what advantages he wants.
    I am surprised at the attitude of hon. Gentlemen opposite on this point. My right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) who also writes books—I dare say more copies of them are sold than of mine—wrote a book before the war in which he used a phrase not at all in the context in which hon. Gentlemen opposite think he used it that about the gentleman in Whitehall sometimes knowing best. My right hon. Friend used that phrase in the middle of a passage where he was arguing very strongly in favour of the widest possible consumers' choice. Many hon. Members opposite who have quoted that phrase tearing it from its context, are now proclaiming that the gentleman in the board room knows best what sort of service the consumer wants and what he ought to pay.
    Mr. Philip Bell: If so, who would buy?
    5.45 p.m.
    Mr. Jenkins: This is a very different point. It is the job of the gentleman in the board room to try to judge what the consumer wants, but, having judged that, it is his job to put his judgment to the test under the free competition brought about by what the consumer really does want and not, having made his judgment, to go round to gentlemen in other board rooms and say, "We will now come to an agreement so that, whether or not we have judged correctly, the consumer will have to pay what we decide." That is the danger with which we are dealing.
    We have argued what are justiciable issues and what are political issues. This seems to be a political issue. Is it reasonable to leave it to the court to decide in general whether it agrees with the hon.

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    and learned Member for Bolton, East (Mr. Philip Bell), the hon. Member for Blackley and others of that sort, who really feel that gentlemen in board rooms, acting in collusion with gentlemen in other board rooms, know best, or whether under conditions of free competition the consumer should decide for himself what services he wants and what he wants to pay for the services when he wants them and should not have to pay for them when he does not want them? This seems to me to be preeminently a political decision and one which the President and the Committee ought to take. Unless the President takes it I cannot imagine how the court can usefully deal with these matters.
    Mr. I. J. Pitman: Might I have your Ruling, Sir Charles, on a point of order, whether, in view of the prohibition on collective price maintenance in Clauses 19 and 20, we are in order in importing into this discussion the question of common prices, or whether we may talk about common prices because there is an Amendment to Clause 19 to remove that prohibition in certain cases?
    The Chairman: The Amendment is to leave out paragraph (b). Everything that I have heard so far seems to be in order.
    Dr. Donald Johnson: I rise to resist the Amendment. I speak as a restrictive practitioner. As a book publisher, I should like, in particular, to thank the hon. Member for Itchen (Dr. King) for his sponsorship of the small bookseller. I have also to thank the hon. Member for Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) for the few crumbs of comfort which he offers the book trade.
    I assure the hon. Member for Stechford that we are very closely affected by the Bill, and as he seems to be somewhat vague as to the manner in which we are affected, I hope in my remarks to put him right. It is a public assumption which has been held through the years that books are always the same price. I am sure the hon. Member likes to see his books in different shops always at the same price, and not 15s. in one, 9s. 6d. in another and perhaps even 2s. 6d. in another. That arrangement depends essentially on the agreement we have in our trade, which is known as the "net
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    book agreement." That arrangement was started at the beginning of the century subsequent to a price-cutting war in the book industry in the last years of the nineteenth century. It was finally fixed in 1899 and has continued since as the sheet anchor of the book trade. That is an agreement to maintain prices.
    On our side, as publishers, we agree to maintain the price of a book—in the case of a fiction book, for two years and, in the case of a general book, for three years—unless we give special notification in our trade magazine to the booksellers and give credit accordingly, and the booksellers arrange for a shorter time. Later, we shall be discussing sanctions for enforcement under later Clauses, but here I want to explain how this subsection will help us to justify our arrangements.
    The purpose of our price arrangements is to enable the bookseller to buy the slow moving stock which is the essential of our trade. As can be seen, the average bookshop of any standing has a varied stock, some items of which may take two or three years to dispose of. If it is not quick sales stuff, which sells in a week, a fortnight or a month or two, many items may take a year, two years or even three years to sell. It is essential for the bookseller to have confidence that he will be able to maintain his prices. The advantage to the public is that this stock is the culture of our country.
    That is the advantage which this price maintaining arrangement in the book trade has for the public and under which it can be presented to the Court under this Clause. It is equally true that great knowledge and skill is essential in the book trade in the acquiring of this stock. That is why I think it would be the wish of the book trade that it should be able to submit its agreement under the qualifications granted by this Clause. We shall talk about sanctions when we discuss a later Clause.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: I am trying to follow the argument of the hon. Member carefully. I gathered from what he said that I was right in saying that it is individual resale price maintenance in which the book trade is interested today. It is not a system of common prices. There is nothing to prevent one publisher, if he wishes, bringing out a novel for 9s. 6d., whereas another charges 15s.? It is not

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    an attempt to get common prices, but the retention of individual resale price maintenance, although clearly the means by which that can be effected is a matter for argument.
    Dr. Johnson: I think the hon. Member for Stechford is bringing in something which we shall be discussing when we reach Clauses 19 and 20. The question I am discussing at the moment is the agreement to maintain prices, however they may be enforced, whether individually or collectively. That is the agreement. Under Clauses 19 and 20 we shall be discussing whether to maintain them collectively or individually.
    Mr. Jenkins: The hon. Member has misunderstood what I am asking, with the greatest fairness to the trade. We all want to understand the problems. Will the hon. Member tell us exactly what it is the book trade wants to maintain?
    Dr. Johnson: Essentially we want to maintain the price structure of the book trade so that, for instance, a book written by the hon. Member is not sold for 15s. in one shop and for 12s. 6d. in the next. I do not think I can use simpler words than those. It is only by an agreement of some kind that we can do that.
    Dr. King: This is a point of importance to the Committee. I understand that what the hon. Member is asking for is not the maintenance of common prices between the wholesaler and the publisher, but the maintenance of a specific price for a specific book, whereas between publishers there are competitive prices.
    Dr. Johnson: If I publish a book I can fix the price at any price I like. That is the case now. I am sorry I did not make that clear. I have complete freedom to fix what price I like for my own books in competition with other publishers. There is no restriction on competition whatever as between individual publishers.
    I wish to go on from there to assure the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed- Thomas) that profit is not the only motive force in the book trade. On both sides of the trade—publishers and booksellers—there are a great many people who are struggling on a very narrow margin of profit because they think they are doing something which is very much worthwhile in other ways. That is, the promoting of
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    ideas that come to them to retail as booksellers and create what we consider to be the culture of the country. That is why we hope our agreement will be acceptable under this subsection.
    Dr. Barnett Stross: I find myself in a little difficulty over the Amendment because with one part of the speech of the hon. Member for Blackley (Mr. E. Johnson) I must agree, as I am compelled to give another illustration similar to the one which he gave.
    In one section of the pottery industry which makes tiles there is a collective agreement that no prices should be charged to the public above a certain level. It appears to me that if people are organised to see that the public are not exploited it would be difficult to attack that. The general secretary of the trade union representing pottery workers has brought this question to my attention. It is a small matter, but there is something in the point that not all agreements are connected with extorting the maximum price from the public. Obviously some protect the public by ensuring that, whether the article concerned is in short supply or not, the charge shall not be above a certain level. I should have thought such agreements were admirable.
    Mr. George Darling: It is unusual.
    Dr. Stross: It is not unusual. We can think of the co-operative society, which, when everything was in short supply, did not raise its prices.
    Mr. Arthur Holt: Will the hon. Member tell us more about the agreement he has mentioned? Is it a general maximum price agreement, or a minimum price agreement in disguise as a maximum price agreement?
    Dr. Stross: I hope I am not wrong, but I am advised that it is as I have described it. It may have come into existence for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Blackley. After the war tiles were in short supply, but they were wanted for the purposes of housing. The trade did everything it could to see that its goods did not come into disrepute through retailers taking advantage of the shortage and charging much more than they should charge, but the agreement

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    has continued. This may be a small point, but I felt that I should make it. It follows on one part of the argument of the hon. Member for Blackley.
    6.0 p.m.
    Mr. Pitman: We are really in the situation of Abraham and Lot in that we are asking whether there are not a number of just men who should be spared, and I am glad to pay my tribute to the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Dr. King) and to several hon. Members opposite who feel that there are, or may be, a number of such just men and who are anxious that the Court should be given the opportunity of examining, not only the question of the merit of a case, but also the precise means by which a meritorious case may be made effective.
    I am a publisher, and should like to declare my interest in that respect. I would also desire to reserve until later, on Clauses 19 and 20, the question of collective versus individual price maintenance. For the moment, it seems to me that there are a great number of trade practices, certainly in the book trade, which are essential—or seem to me, at least, to be essential—to a proper service to the public. As the hon. Member for Itchen said, books are indeed a vital part of our culture, and it would be a sad day if in the passing of the Bill we made it impossible, as the Amendment would make it impossible, for the Court to approve really decent and well performed practices which have been going on for such a long time.
    Mr. Grimond: In his remarks earlier, the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) made a very forthright defence of the consumer and said that he could be trusted and relied upon to buy the best in the market. Coming from one who had been widely painted as the Robespierre of bureaucrats, that was a notable pronouncement. Clearly, the right hon. Gentleman has been very much misunderstood hitherto, and I hope that we may eventually welcome him into the Liberal Party.
    Mr. Jay: I assure the hon. Member that I have always held the views that I expressed today and, indeed, have expressed them in both spoken and written form exactly as I expressed them
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    today but I do not think they will lead me to the Liberal Party.
    Mr. Grimond: Obviously, the right hon. Gentleman has been widely misunderstood, and I am glad that this afternoon we have been able to correct a public impression. Subsequently, however, a good many doubts have been cast upon the right hon. Gentleman's argument and various arguments have been put forward for restrictive practices, particularly in regard to the book trade.
    I myself at one time had an interest in a small bookshop, and I share very much the feelings of those who think that bookshops are agreeable places and that one should browse in, say, Blackwells and not buy one's books at Woolworth's. I am, however, forced to admit that if that is the case, presumably the public are willing to pay a little for the privilege of browsing. In my case, I must admit that they were not, but in theory that should be the answer.
    Mr. Pitman: The real trouble is when somebody goes to select his books at Blackwells, who have all the overhead expenses of stocking and showing the books, makes a list of what he selects and then buys them at a cut-price shop which keeps no stock.
    Mr. Grimond: I agree that people much abuse the privilege of small bookshops, as everyone knows, but the book trade, with which I have great sympathy, must be a little careful about what is almost double talk in this. It is all very well to say that the public like books but will not go into the bookshops, but that does not make sense. I agree that the bookshops could be allowed to make their case, which falls largely under the later Clauses, before the Court.
    As the Bill is drawn in its present form, I find it difficult to believe that one can do without paragraph (b). It may well be that the Bill should not have been drawn in this form—that is another matter—but the Bill received a Second Reading, for better or for worse. If there is any reason for maintaining a restrictive practice—on the whole it would be difficult to make out convincing reasons—it would be that it conferred substantial benefit on the public and on customers. It is unfair to the Court for us to argue that the whole matter should be left wide

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    open for the Court to decide. It must be given some indication of the grounds on which it should proceed.
    Having said that, I feel that the Clause should be drawn as precisely and, I would say, as narrowly as possible. Like other hon. Members, I have been a little alarmed by the arguments put forward for restrictive practices, which would, in fact, drive a cart and horse through the whole Bill if they were accepted, and would make it valueless. Therefore, we must try to make this subject specific.
    I should like to end by drawing the President's attention to the phrase "likely to be enjoyed." I concede that it would not be altogether fair to tic down an association to proving that at any one moment the public was gaining from its restrictions. I also concede that one must rely upon the Court to act reasonably and to put a reasonable construction on those words, but I ask the President whether we are not in fact asking the Court to do something difficult if it is to take into account whether a restrictive practice is conferring benefits which are "likely to be enjoyed." What does that expression mean? Does it mean likely in the future, or in the far-distant future? It opens up an immense range of argument.
    I ask the right hon. Gentleman, between now and the next stage of the Bill, to look at these words again. I agree that it is difficult to find suitable words, but these are rather vague, and it is, I suggest, unfair to ask the Court to construe them.
    Sir James Hutchison: I make no apology for delaying the Committee for a few moments, although much more weighty questions than mine are being considered. Nevertheless, I should like to draw my right hon. Friend's attention to an alteration of comparatively minor importance in connection with the wording of line 38. There is a slight conflict in wording, which might lead to misapprehension in the Court, between paragraph (f) and the wording, used in almost identical circumstances, in line 38.
    Therefore, I wonder whether, when he is considering the Clause again, my right hon. Friend would remove any doubt as between the form of the wording of paragraph (f) and the wording which, we
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    suggest, should be inserted in line 38. If in almost identical circumstances the two sets of wording are different, misapprehension might be caused in the mind of the Court as to the intention of the Clause.
    Mr. John Baldock: I should much regret the omission of paragraph (b), and I believe that most hon. Members who have spoken against it would like to see a statutory prohibition on every kind of price agreement and restrictive practice and very little opportunity for those practising it to give reasons for their doing so. I profoundly prefer my right hon. Friend's method of dealing with this matter empirically, and I am glad that the House has already accepted that method of doing it on Second Reading.
    I believe that there is just as much danger to the community and to the consumer from an absolutely unregulated jungle of cut-throat competition as there is, on the other hand, from an economy tightly drawn by restriction and monopoly. I am convinced that the answer is somewhere between the two, and I believe that the Bill is the most courageous and far-sighted attempt that any Government has ever made to achieve it.
    My reason for supporting the retention of paragraph (b) is that I think that trade associations—I have no connection with any nor do I derive benefit from any personally—have a great job to do. They have a great job to do in maintaining standards, in co-ordinating research, in exchanging information, and, perhaps, in going overseas to learn how industries are carried on in other countries. I should be very sorry to see those trade associations broken up.
    I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley (Mr. E. Johnson) in seeing certain dangers of trade associations disintegrating if they are no longer able to regulate prices. Be that as it may, I very much hope that the result of the passing of the Bill, if it is passed, will not be the diminution of trade associations in this country, because I think that they have a job to do, and I should like to hear a word go out from the Committee, or, at any rate, from some of us, of appreciation of what trade associations can do in maintaining standards and in ensuring orderly marketing.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Baldock) for the support which he has just given to the Clause, and I agree with him that we must find a balance between cut-throat competition and the tight arrangements of monopoly and restriction. We believe that this Bill is a sensible approach to the finding of that balance.
    In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison), I would say that we believe that the words
    "removal of the restriction would deny to the public … specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by them"
    means the same as the words "reasonably necessary" used in the previous paragraph in other cases. However, I will look at the case that he has made to me.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Wokington (Mr. Remnant) asked me a number of questions. I would say to him that there is nothing which can be properly and reasonably argued on the basis of benefit to consumers which would be excluded by the Clause. It is clearly necessary to have that provision. One has only to consider the Reports of the Monopolies Commission itself to see that—for example, those about cables and electric lamps. The Commission went into those matters and found that, on balance, there was benefit in having arrangements which led to the exchange of technical information within the groups.
    I do not say that such arrangements could be sustained in all cases. I am very far from saying, or accepting the argument, that unless there is a ring we do not have any research. I simply do not believe it. However, I think that the effect of research and the exchange of technical information are matters which cannot be omitted or denied in argument to the Court, and I think it would be unfair to the Court if they were.
    Mr. E. Johnson: Does that mean that it would be permissible for manufacturers to argue before the Court that there were benefits to be derived from agreed prices?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Certainly it is possible for manufacturers to argue that, if
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    the benefit is not for themselves. That is why the Clause is drawn as it is. My hon. Friend is perfectly right, but the argument must show by evidence that the consumers derive the benefit from these arrangements. I know there are cases where it is deeply and sincerely held that the consumers do derive benefits from such arrangements, and I believe that there may be cases in which the users of the products would themselves be willing to give evidence of that to the Court, and to say that they prefer things that way. To put it no higher, that would be evidence on which the Court could reasonably hold that the removal of the restriction would deny a specific and substantial benefit to the users. It would be rash of the Committee to try to deny the submission of evidence of that sort.
    6.15 p.m.
    The hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) and the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) said the Clause must be specific, and I agree that it should be as specific as possible. I am going to consider the suggestions of my hon. Friends. I believe that there is very little difference between the meaning of the paragraph as it is and its meaning were the words which the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West would like imported written into it. However, I shall not debate that drafting point now.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman), the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Dr. King) and my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Dr. D. Johnson) all pointed to an illustration of the need for the paragraph. I was very grateful to the hon. Member for Itchen, who was the first to mention it.
    I think the Committee would agree that whatever view may be ultimately held about the net book agreement it should be possible for argument in favour of it to be brought forward. The answer to the hon. Member for Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) is that the agreement falls within Part I of the Bill. The essence of the not book agreement is mutually accepted restrictions under which everybody concerned agrees to exercise price maintenance, and to publish the prices which must be maintained for the books that they sell: and that is a registrable agreement under Part I.

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    It is quite clear to my mind, when there is an agreement of that kind, which can be registered, and which will be registered, under Part I, that the arguments which have been canvassed in the Committee in favour of that agreement are arguments which can properly and legitimately be put forward to the Court within the compass of the Clause as drafted. That is why we have the Clause.
    Hon. Members have concentrated on the net book agreement, but I am sure they will agree that there are many other agreements of this kind, many other arrangements which exist in industry, of varying merit and demerit and varying importance and unimportance. The arguments which have been adduced about that agreement illustrate the need for a Clause which will enable the parties to those arrangements to show by evidence, by the ordinary court procedure, that the removal of the restrictions would deny a specific and substantial benefit to the consumers.
    Mr. Jay: It is, is it not, the essence of the net book agreement that it is enforced—it could not exist without enforcement—by a collective boycott? That collective boycott to enforce the agreement will be banned outright by Clause 19. Therefore, the plea in justification of the essence of that agreement should not arise on this Clause and should not come before the Court.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The right hon. Gentleman is quite wrong about this. I am not blaming him, and I am not criticising him, for this is a matter which it is not, perhaps, easy to apprehend at first glance. There are two things which must be kept distinctly separate, the substantive agreement and the method of enforcement. They are quite different things.
    First there must be the substantive agreement. There can be no talk of enforcement until there is some agreement. The essence of the net book agreement is that publishers mutually accept restrictions, all of them to maintain their prices—it is a mutually accepted agreement to maintain prices—and they are registrable restrictions under Part I. They have to advance arguments to get those restrictions through one of the various openings in this Clause.
    Assuming they justify them, we come to the question whether the new method
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    of individual enforcement proposed in Clause 20 or the old method of collective enforcement banned by Clause 19 is the most appropriate. We shall debate that presently, but it is a quite separate question from the one we are now discussing.
    It is quite clear that the net book agreement itself would be out altogether—finished, outlawed—without this Clause, which would allow publishers to argue their case, as, I think, they properly should be allowed to do.
    Mr. Jay: I am not disagreeing with the right hon. Gentleman but I think that we are not quite clear on this matter. I am sure he would agree that if Clause 19, as it stands, becomes law then, although the net book agreement without enforcement could be argued under the Clause, it would not be possible to come forward and justify the enforcement part of it, which is the only thing that enables it to continue.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: We shall debate later whether enforcement is to be effected by individual enforcement through the courts or whether it is necessary to have the full panoply of the stop list and all the rest, but no method of enforcement is much good unless there is the agreement. We must face reality, and the reality is that there must be an agreement, and the first matter in question is the mutual arrangement of the book trade to maintain prices.
    Without this Clause the net book agreement would be banned. It would be presumed to be contrary to the public interest. I have taken the net book agreement as an example merely because it has been mentioned. There are many others. It is absolutely essential, for the reasons which I have mentioned, that we should have a Clause of this kind and that a proper opportunity should be given to people to argue that the removal of the restriction would cause specific and substantial damage to the consumer.
    Mr. Nigel Nicolson: As yet another publisher who has refrained from speaking in the debate on this point, may I ask a question? I agree that under Clause 16 (b) publishers may argue that the net book agreement should be retained, but they can only do so by arguing that failure to retain it would cause a great many bankruptcies among the booksellers.

    651
    Is that justifiable? Can one say that that is an argument in interest of the public, that is, the consumers? It strikes me as an argument in the retailer's interest. Is it therefore permissible as an argument, as the Clause is now drawn?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I want to make it perfectly plain that the argument that must be advanced here is the benefit to the consumer. The protagonists of the net book agreement are prepared to argue that. They are not without arguments on that score. There are powerful arguments for saying that the maintenance of the net book agreement, particularly having regard to certain types of bookshops and types of books, is a valuable benefit which if it were denied, and some say that it is denied in other countries, would be a very great blow to the consumer. I express no opinion about the merits of that argument. I would only say that there are arguments which it is claimed can be properly advanced, under the Clause, before the courts.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We have sympathy with those who are engaged in the book trade and who are primarily concerned about the cultural aspects of the occupation which they follow. We are all anxious to have a good, flourishing book trade in this country. The concern of the book trade and those who are advancing the interests of the net book agreement is for the retail shops. As the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East and Christchurch (Mr. N. Nicolson) said quite frankly, concern for the retail shop is the whole hub of the argument on the book trade. But in order to get within the terms of this provision, those concerned must come within paragraph (b), which deals only with the position of the consumer. They are having to distort their argument, as they say quite frankly. Although they are primarily concerned with the retail position, nevertheless they have to come within this provision about consumer benefit.
    We all sympathise with the retail book trade problem, and it is quite possible that something could be done to meet that kind of case. There are all kinds of distinctions between that case, which one might call the cultural case, and the ordinary economic case. We are concerned about the general effect of paragraph (b), and we have had speech after
    652
    speech from the other side of the Committee directed towards that concern.

    The hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Remnant) stated that he does not think that any substantial difference will be made by the Bill. The hon. Member for Blackley (Mr. E. Johnson) said that trade associations with price agreements were generally for the benefit of the public, because they maintained prices. But the same maintenance of prices is precisely what is assumed—as the foundation of the Bill—to be something not of itself beneficial. It is quite clear from the debate that we shall have applications under paragraph (b) covering almost every conceivable trade association with retail price maintenance.
    If something could be formulated to avoid the complete inrush of applications which would be covered by paragraph (b), we on this side of the Committee would be prepared to approach this matter as objectively as we have approached other features of the Bill in Committee, but paragraph (b) simply enables a vast mass of applications to be made upon the ground which was rejected in the Monopolies Commission's Report on discriminatory practices. The Commission considered all the arguments about benefit to the public and about maintaining a bight standard of service, the answer, of course, being that given by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. J. Grimond)—that there should be consumer choice instead.
    All that has been prejudged before we came to the Bill, which is largely before us for that very reason. By means of paragraph (b) we are really reopening the whole matter and allowing these trade associations to reconsider again the very reason why we ourselves are considering that something ought to be done.
    Sir Lionel Heald: Is it a fair way of putting what the hon. and learned Member and his hon. Friends are saying today to say that there may be deserving cases which would come under paragraph (b) but, in the interest of pure Socialist doctrine, they ought to be excluded?
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: The right hon. and learned Member is pungent in his reasoning, as he so frequently is. He has come into the debate again, and I am sure that we are all delighted to see him.
    Sir L. Heald: I have been here for many boring hours.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: So have we.
    Mr. G. Darling: Listening to vested interests.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: There may be matters like the net book agreement which ought to be provided for somehow or other, but paragraph (b) is far too wide a proposal to deal with anything of that kind. If Amendments are brought forward to deal with something reasonable and specific within Clause 16—
    Mr. Julian Snow: My hon. and learned Friend keeps on saying that we are all in favour of these net book agreements. I can
    assure him that that opinion is not unanimous.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I did not say that we were all in favour of net book agreements. I said that we were all in sympathy with those in the book trade who experience the difficulties which have been brought before us. If an Amendment is brought forward dealing with specific cases, that is quite a different matter, but paragraph (b), which we are now discussing, is a wide provision which would enable a horse and cart to be driven through the Bill.
    Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Clause:—
    The Committee divided: Ayes 225, Noes 173.

    Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

    Roper, Sir Harold

    Turner, H. F. L.

    Partridge, E.

    Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

    Vane, W. M. F.

    Pickthorn, K. W. M.

    Russell, R. S.

    Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

    Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

    Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

    Vickers, Miss J. H.

    Pitman, I. J.

    Sharpies, R. C.

    Vosper, D. F.

    Pitt, Miss E. M.

    Shepherd, William

    Wade, D. W.

    Pott, H. P.

    Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

    Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

    Powell, J. Enoch

    Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

    Walker-Smith, D. C.

    Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

    Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

    Wall, Major Patrick

    Profumo, J. D.

    Stevens, Geoffrey

    Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

    Raikes, Sir Victor

    Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

    Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

    Rawlinson, Peter

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

    Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

    Redmayne, M.

    Studholme, H. G.

    Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

    Rees-Davies, W. R.

    Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

    Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith & Border)

    Remnant, Hon. P.

    Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

    Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

    Renton, D. L. M.

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

    Ridsdale, J. E.

    Teeling, W.

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Rippon, A. G. F.

    Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

    Woollam, John Victor

    Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

    Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

    Yates, William (The Wrekin)

    Robertson, Sir David

    Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

    Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

    Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

    Touche, Sir Gordon

    Mr. Barber and Mr. Bryan.

    NOES

    Ainsley, J. W.

    Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

    Pargiter, G. A.

    Albu, A. H.

    Griffiths, William (Exchange)

    Parker, J.

    Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

    Hale, Leslie

    Paton, J.

    Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

    Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

    Peart, T. F.

    Bacon, Miss Alice

    Hamilton, W. W.

    Plummer, Sir Leslie

    Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

    Hannan, W.

    Popplewell, E.

    Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

    Hastings, S.

    Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

    Benson, G.

    Hayman, F. H.

    Probert, A. R.

    Beswick, F.

    Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

    Proctor, W. T.

    Blackburn, F.

    Herbison, Miss M.

    Pryde, D. J.

    Blyton, W. R.

    Hobson, C. R.

    Rankin, John

    Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

    Holmes, Horace

    Redhead, E. C.

    Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

    Houghton, Douglas

    Reeves, J.

    Bowles, F. G.

    Hubbard, T. F.

    Reid, William

    Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

    Robens, Rt. Hon, A.

    Brookway, A. F.

    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

    Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

    Hunter, A. E.

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

    Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

    Ross, William

    Burden, F. F. A.

    Irving, S. (Dartford)

    Royle, C.

    Burke, W. A.

    Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

    Shurmer, P. L. E.

    Burton, Miss F. E.

    Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

    Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

    Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs, S.)

    Skeffington, A. M.

    Callaghan L. J.

    Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

    Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

    Castle, Mrs. B. A.

    Johnson, James (Rugby)

    Snow, J. W.

    Champion, A, J.

    Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

    Sorensen, R. W.

    Chetwynd, G. R.

    Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

    Sparks, J. A.

    Clunie, J.

    Kenyon, C.

    Steele, T.

    Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

    Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

    Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

    Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

    King, Dr. H. M.

    Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

    Corbet, Mrs. Freda

    Lawson, G. M.

    Stross, Dr. Barnett(Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

    Summerskill, Rt. Hon, E.

    Cronin, J. D.

    Lindgren, G. S.

    Swingler, S. T.

    Daines, P.

    Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

    Sylvester, G. O.

    Darling, George (Hillsborough)

    MacColl, J. E.

    Taylor, John (West Lothian)

    Davies, Harold (Leek)

    McGovern, J.

    Tomney, F.

    Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

    McInnes, J.

    Turner-Samuels, M.

    de Freitas, Geoffrey

    McKay, John (Wallsend)

    Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

    Delargy, H. J.

    McLeavy, Frank

    Viant, S. P.

    Dodds, N. N.

    MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

    Warbey, W. N.

    Donnelly, D. L.

    Mahon, Simon

    Weitzman, D.

    Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

    Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

    Wells, Percy (Faversham)

    Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

    Mellish, R. J.

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

    Messer, Sir F.

    Wheeldon, W. E.

    Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

    Mikardo, Ian

    White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

    Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

    Mitchison, G. R.

    White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

    Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

    Monslow, W.

    Willey, Frederick

    Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

    Moody, A. S.

    Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

    Fernyhough, E.

    Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

    Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

    Fletcher, Erie

    Mulley, F. W.

    Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

    Forman, J. C.

    Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

    Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

    Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

    Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

    Winterbottom, Richard

    Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

    Oliver, G. H.

    Woof, R. E.

    Gibson, C. W.

    Oram, A. E.

    Yates, V. (Ladywood)

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

    Oswald, T.

    Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

    Greenwood, Anthony

    Paget, R. T.

    Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

    Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Grey, C. F.

    Palmer, A. M. F.

    Mr. Short and Mr. Deer

    Mr. G. Darling: I beg to move, in page 14, line 1, to leave out paragraph (c). The purpose of the paragraph that we seek to delete is to allow a group of small firms to take countermeasures against, for instance, a large firm which is seeking, perhaps by improper methods, to put the small firms out of business. It will allow the small firms, by permission of the Court, to carry on their proposed measures against the big competitor.
    We seek to delete paragraph (c), not because we lack sympathy with the small firm, but for two other reasons. First, we think that this is another good illustration of the fact that one cannot deal with such real problems as this under the legal procedure laid down in the Bill. We suggest that the proper body to deal with such questions is an expanded, reconstructed Monopolies Commission. The second reason is that we think that the gate is opened far too wide and that, with the help of astute lawyers, many restrictive practices which ought to be caught by the Bill will be able to get through.
    In considering the paragraph, we must take notice of Clause 18. While the Court may deal with one or two straightforward cases in which public opinion would probably agree that the small firms ought to be allowed to continue their measures to protect themselves against sonic monopoly development, in coming to those decisions the Court will be laying down case law to be used on subsequent occasions. Although the first two or three judgments may be satisfactory, the case law so established may be used to determine judgments in subsequent cases in which, although the legal situation may be the same, the economic and social circumstances may be entirely different.
    Consequently, we say that, in the public interest, it is improper to deal with all the cases of this kind by means of the legal procedure. The reduction in the power, influence and size of the Commission will mean that many of the issues which we think ought to be examined by the Commission will have to undergo the Court procedure. We believe that many cases ought not to be judged as involving very narrow legal questions but ought to be considered in the light of their wider political and economic aspects.
    658
    I should probably be out of order if I suggested how the Commission could be improved and widened to deal with those cases. It may well be that the defensive practices of the smaller firms, taken by themselves, will fall foul of the Bill, but they may be permitted to be carried on because they are defensive practices against the action of the big firm which is trying, probably improperly, to put the small firms out of business. The Court ought to be concerned not so much about the defensive practices as about the restrictive practices against which the small firms are trying to defend themselves. Yet in many cases those practices will not come within the purview of the Court and will not be considered by it.
    6.45 p.m.
    Let us take the case of petrol companies. We have petrol companies individually—not by any collective action—making exclusive arrangements to supply petrol to garages and turning private garages into tied garages. In doing so, they will probably, as seems to be the case already, make it difficult for the smaller lubricating oil companies, which are not concerned in the petrol trade, to carry on. The oil companies may be barred from their sales outlets by the action of individual petrol companies.
    It may be that the small oil companies and the manufacturers of other motor car equipment and materials will get together in a defensive arrangement against the petrol companies. If they resort to practices which would otherwise be banned, all that the Bill will deal with under this paragraph will be the practices of the small firms employed in defending themselves. Whatever they do, the big petrol companies will be outside the scope of the Bill because they will not be resorting to collective action but will be behaving individually.
    Consequently, the Court will be concerned not with the real cause of the complaint, which is the exclusive trading development of the big petrol companies, but the defensive arrangements of the smaller companies. That is dealing with the matter the wrong way round, and is why we think that these matters should be dealt with by the Commission and not by the Court.
    There is the second aspect, that of opening the door too wide. Let us suppose that, on the very good grounds of

    659
    the case that I have mentioned, the oil companies were allowed to develop some defensive action against the petrol companies. Case law would be built up which would be cited in other cases. We might get all kinds of cases of small firms getting together and adopting practices, which would otherwise be made unlawful by the Bill, and being given permission to continue those practices. No one can say at this stage how wide that will go. We suggest that that would be opening the door far too wide, and that it would be better to delete paragraph (c), and at a later stage of the Bill provide for the Commission and not the Court to deal with cases of that type.
    We believe that what is in mind here is groups of firms or persons getting together in order to keep competition going in an industry. Consequently, we believe that that sort of case ought to be referred to an enlarged Commission. It would be far better to let the Commission deal with such problems than to submit them to the Court and open wide the door to all sorts of arrangements which would otherwise be made unlawful by the Bill.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: This paragraph is concerned with a narrow point. It is simply to admit the argument before the Court that persons have entered into mutual restrictions in order to deal with a large competitor in industry who is himself resorting to restrictions. It is really taken from the majority Report of the Monopolies Commission itself, paragraph 240 (d), which says,
    "Where the arrangement is a necessary means of enabling smaller concerns in a trade to compete effectively with a very large concern in that trade which is itself resorting to restrictive practices."
    I am sure the Committee would generally agree that that is a reasonable provision to include. The cases may in fact be very few.
    We are putting down an Amendment to establish that precedents under Clause 18 are not simply precedents at law but precedents on the facts. We will deal with that when we reach that Clause. I quite agree that there may be cases of larger firms—the petrol companies might be one example—suitable for a proper judgment by the Monopolies Commission. I think that is a perfectly fair and proper point to take, but at the same
    660
    time I do not think it answers the case put forward by the majority of the Monopolies Commission itself, that in provisions of this kind one ought to admit, at any rate, the argument that these are protective arrangements directed against a large competitor in the trade.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Our attitude to this paragraph has been put so completely by my hon. Friend the Member for Hillsborough (Mr. G. Darling) that I have very little to add. We recognise that we must accept this paragraph in the Bill as it stands; there obviously must be some arrangement of this kind, and, as the President said, it was in fact recommended by the Monopolies Corn-mission, although, as he also said, that is not necessarily the final word. But, on this occasion, it is generally accepted.
    We should be glad of a little help from the President on one point. Where there is, under paragraph (c), a restriction, and the restrictive practice is allowed to continue because it is necessary in order to sustain someone's position against some monopolist of one kind or another, what happens then, if that other monopolist has been dealt with? This is very much the same point as that which I raised on the earlier provision, namely, how is it proposed to deal with such a case when the reason for the applicant coming within paragraph (c) has itself disappeared?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think that the answer is clear, that if the monopoly or a large firm had been dealt with in some other way, there would probably have been a material change of circumstances within the terms of Clause 17, giving ground for an application for review.
    Mr. Robert Edwards: The President has not, I think, been very convincing in his reply. I will give a concrete example to illustrate my reason for saying that. For many years, Imperial Chemical Industries Limited concentrated on the production of dyestuffs, acids, alkalis, and all the heavy chemicals. Then they moved into the production of drugs. The small drug firms, in order to protect themselves against the challenge of I.C.I., did precisely what is provided for in paragraph (c); they got together and formed what seemed a very harmless protective cartel. Experience has, however, proved otherwise.

    661
    After an exchange of pamphlets between the head of Boots, the drug firm, and the Chairman of I.C.I., each conclemning one another for a few months—those pamphlets, incidentally, being reviewed in the The Times very extensively—quite suddenly this controversy disappeared because there was an understanding between the group of small drug firms forming themselves into a protective cartel against the inroads of the big monopolist, and out of that agreement came fixed prices for hundreds of lifesaving drugs, and those fixed prices are maintained to this present day.
    This is precisely what will be repeated under the protection of the law enunciated in paragraph (c). The example that I have given can be treated as a sort of blueprint of what will happen in the future, and the proposed paragraph seems to me very much of a backhanded way of going about creating the best method of maintaining competition in order to safeguard the public interest against one single monopoly.
    I presume that it would be wasting time to press the Amendment moved so ably by my hon. Friend the Member for Hillsborough (Mr. G. Darling); nevertheless, the statement should be on record in this Committee that this is a very dangerous procedure which can lead to a wide range of small cartels which will be competitive with the big firm in the initial stages but which ultimately might well come to terms. The result will be that our economy will be blanketed by small cartels and big monopolies which, out of the original conflict, have come to secret agreements with one another. Even though there seems to be very little support for the Amendment at this stage, I hope that the President will answer the point which I have made. How does one deal with the problem that I have posed to him, of which I have given a concrete example—something which did in fact happen and is existing today?
    Mr. A. J. Irvine: We ought not to end the discussion on this Amendment without having from the President of the Board of Trade an assurance about one question in particular. A measure taken by any person not party to the agreement might be deemed a measure of becoming a party to another registrable agreement. That seems to present a possible difficulty. Unless we were vigilant, there might be
    662
    some attempt made to make use of this paragraph to set in motion what would, in effect, be a series of competing rings. I think that that was the sort of thing which my hon. Friend the Member for Bilston (Mr. R. Edwards) had in mind. There is a danger of that, and it would obviously be absurd if one ring was to be caught by the Bill for its operations, but, if there were two equivalent operations proceeding at the same time, they could both escape.
    I have in mind that in a subsequent Amendment it is proposed to make it quite clear "any one person" is meant. With all respect, I do not think that entirely meets the difficulty which I am facing, because, as a matter of strict construction, it would be, I should have thought, a measure taken by one person when he entered into another registrable agreement. I should welcome an assurance about that.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The answer to the first point is that it will be entirely a matter for the Court, not for me, to say whether what had been done was reasonably necessary to counteract measures taken, and the Court would have to say whether that was established or not. I do not want to go any further into the Clause at the moment, but the Court would have to go on from that point to strike a balance between that and any other detriment to the public interest. I do not want to debate that now, because we shall do so later.
    With regard to competing rings, it is very much in our minds that we want to restrict this provision to one person. Might I deal with the matter on the next Amendment, because these questions are so interlocked that it would be very much simpler to deal with the two together?
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: There is a point here which I think we should ask the President to be so good as to look at. Suppose an applicant comes before the Court, saying that it is necessary for him to have protection against another person or, perhaps, interconnecting bodies or anything of that kind. That body being a person, interconnected bodies corporate, or partnership, none of that would come within the scope of the Bill, unless it happened to be another cartel, or something of that kind, which would be dealt with entirely separately and would not come within paragraph (c). There could

    663
    not, I take it, be an application under paragraph (c) for protection on the ground of a restrictive practice which could later come before the Court and claim protection on the ground of the restrictive practice which had originally come before the Court, thus creating a vicious circle. As I understand it, that position could not arise, because, as the President indicated, a person or interconnected bodies corporate or a partnership, if it falls into evil ways, will come within the scope of the Monopolies Commission and not under the Bill.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: That is certainly our intention, and I believe it to be the effect of the Clause.
    Mr. G. Darling: In view of the President's explanation, and the fact that we can return to this subject again when we reach Part III of the Bill, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    7.0 p.m.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I beg to move, in page 14, line 2, after "any", to insert "one".
    The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): It might be for the convenience of the Committee to take together the Amendments, in page 14, line 2, after "any", to insert "one", and in page 14, line 2, after "person", to insert:
    "or any two or more persons being interconnected bodies corporate".
    Mr. Thorneycroft: This is to meet the point which hon. Members have in mind. We do not want to give the right to argue that a ring exists because another ring exists. That would be a sort of unending situation. We are therefore anxious to make it absolutely plain that the provision is restricted to a person, to interconnected bodies corporate, or partnerships. It does not operate in the case of another ring, for the very good reason that if there is another ring or an arrangement of that kind, the Court can be seized of that and that would be the right way to deal with it and not through this particular subsection.
    I accept in principle the Amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade), but I hope that the hon. Member will not press
    664
    it, because we have an Amendment to the same effect in page 14, line 41. That meets the substance of what he wants.
    Mr. Wade: I have not counted the score; I am not sure how many of my Amendments the President has accepted. On matters of major principle, I have not been very successful, but I am thankful for small mercies. His Amendment meets my point and I shall not move mine.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I beg to move, in page 14, line 8, to leave out from "supply" to "a" in line 11 and to insert:
    "of goods to, or the acquisition of goods from, any one person not party thereto who controls".
    We are now moving to paragraph (d). I should like to remind the Committee what it is about. This deals not with trade with a rival competitor, but trade, supply or acquisition from someone who holds a preponderant part in the trade. It says:
    "that the restriction is reasonably necessary to enable the persons party to the agreement to negotiate fair terms for the supply or acquisition of goods to or from … persons … not party thereto who controls or together control a preponderant part of the trade or business of acquiring or supplying such goods."
    The Clause as it stands allows the argument that the agreement is necessary to deal with an outside person—somebody not in the ring—who holds a preponderant part of a trade of acquiring or supplying. This series of Amendments covers the case where the outside person is not in the trade at all. They are irrelevant in the case of supply, because if one carries on supply, one inevitably carries on a business of supply.
    However, that does not necessarily follow in the case of acquiring. There are probably many cases, say, public authorities of various kind, either alone of together, who are quite outside the realm of the Restrictive Practices Court, or, indeed, the Monopolies Commission, because no one would suggest referring a local authority to a Monopolies Commission, but it might hold a monopoly in acquiring goods of a particular kind. In that case, the argument ought to be permitted. Normally the Clause will be sufficient, because, normally, the people who acquire or supply will be carrying on the

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    business of acquiring or supplying, but one can think of cases where they are not carrying on business in any sense of the term, but are acquirers of the goods in question.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: In view of the explanation which the President has been good enough to give, it is a little difficult to see that it is in the public interest—if that is the eventual test and it is the governing test under Clause 15—to say that one could have a monopoly, combination, cartel, or restrictive arrangement of this kind against public authorities, but could not have it against other people. If that is what it comes to, that hardly seems a justifiable ground.
    On the other hand, I can well appreciate that it would be a real hardship upon people not to be able to combine together in circumstances where one person holds the monopoly. It would be difficult, in principle, to draw a distinction between any kind of public authority and any kind of private authority in those circumstances.
    it is a difficult problem and I am inclined to agree with the President that the best course is to leave it here within the paragraph, to leave the Court to deal with it and to see what the balance is in the public benefit. I am concerned with one point which is not an entirely drafting matter. Would the Amendment in page 14, line 12, at the end to insert:
    "or for the supply of goods to any person not party to the agreement and not carrying on such a trade or business who, either alone or in combination with any other such person, controls a preponderant part of the market for such goods."
    lets in the vicious circle of the combination of restrictive practices which we mentioned in our last discussion? Why do we have the distinction between the
    "combination with any other such person"
    which is introduced in the Amendment in page 14, line 12 and not in this Amendment?
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: That point puzzled me for some time. The answer is that as they are not carrying on business, the Court could never be seized of their activities. They would be outside Clause 5, and therefore they are in a class different from that of the persons carrying on business and a ring of them—and it might be public or private—would not
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    be open to challenge in any way. That is why we have included them in this Clause.
    Mr. A. J. Irvine: In view of the fact that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. UngoedThomas) has said that the view of the President of the Board of Trade is probably correct, I hesitate, in that context, to intervene.
    If this provision goes through, the beneficiary of it will not be the monopoly supplier. The monopoly supplier has what, to him, is a satisfactory price for his product largely because a cartel which purchases from him is, by the exercise of a restrictive practice, maintaining at a high level the prices of the goods that it sells. If the restrictive practice has to come to an end because of the Bill, nobody will be left to pay the monopoly supplier the high price of the article of which he has a monopoly. I express my doubt about this provision somewhat diffidently. Throughout our consideration of these Clauses I am vigilant that too much is not getting by. If the President of the Board of Trade can offer a further word of assurance in this matter I shall be much obliged.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: This is not an easy point. We want to deal with cases where there is a strong or perhaps a monopoly buyer who is not in the trade, while the sellers are in a very weak position. Their defence for coming together is that it offers their only possibility of bargaining with the monopoly buyer. It is not a very common arrangement, but there is historical precedent on both sides of industry. We do not want to extend this matter too far and get to the point where a ring against the local authority can be justified in every locality. We have to deal with the case of a supplier who is without access to other markets and is at the mercy of a monopoly buyer.
    That is what the Amendment is intended to do. I do not think it will happen very often on a national scale. It might conceivably happen on a more limited scale, but it would still be the rare case. I think the Clause deals with it, particularly when we bear in mind the question of detriment to the public which we have to discuss at a later stage.

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    I assure the Committee that our purpose here is to include in the Clause not only persons who are engaged in the business in acquiring, but others who would be technically omitted because they are not in the trade or business.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Harold Steward: On a point of order. May I ask whether the Amendment in page 14, line 10, after "who" to insert:
    "generally or in a particular area"
    will be called?
    The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): That Amendment has
    not been selected.
    Further Amendment made: In page 14, line 12, at end insert:
    "or for the supply of goods to any person not party to the agreement and not carrying on such a trade or business who, either alone or in combination with any other such person, controls a preponderant part of the market for such goods ".—[Mr. P. Thorneycroft.]
    7.15 p.m.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I beg to move, in page 14, line 13, to leave out paragraph (e).
    This paragraph has to come out because we have covered the point already in the Bill.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We almost whoop for joy when we hear the President of the Board of Trade move this Amendment. The point is covered already in the Bill only in the sense that it has been, by Amendment, taken out of the Bill altogether as included in Clause 6.
    That was done in these circumstances. Paragraph (e) covered the case where a rationalisation scheme has been approved by the Board of Trade and one of the grounds is that the scheme is in the national interest. Therefore the Board of Trade in that case is deciding a matter of national interest which might be in complete conflict with another decision on national interest as well as in complete conflict with the jurisdiction on the question of national interest, if this matter were brought before the Court. Quite rightly, the matter of national interest should be decided by the Government and not by the Court at all.
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    I am almost tempted to quote passages from the speech which the President of the Board of Trade made the day before yesterday when we welcomed him with open arms to speak on this side of the Committee. I ventured to mention on the Second Reading debate this conflict between paragraph (e) and the Clause, and on that occasion I was met with contradictory jeers from the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) and the hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Waterhouse) who is sitting beside him. There was conflict between those two, and we very much welcome that the conflict is resolved in favour of the Board of Trade politically, rather than in favour of the Restrictive Practices Court judicially. In this respect we are glad to have converted the President of the Board of Trade.
    Mr. Wade: I agree that paragraph (e) is inappropriate in this Clause.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Wade: I beg to move, in page 14, line 18, to leave out paragraph (f).
    The Deputy-Chairman: If it meets the convenience of the Committee, this Amendment may be taken with the Amendments in page 14, line 20, to leave out from "likely" to "to" in line 25, and in line 21, to leave out "and" and to insert "or".
    Mr. Wade: My hon. Friends and I have endeavoured to show some discrimination in dealing with the Clause and in amending it. The paragraph which I am proposing to omit will make an appalling task for the Court. I do not think I can do better than to quote the last two lines of a leading article which appeared in The Times yesterday.
    "Is it right that a Court should have to weigh the alleged likelihood that the removal of a restriction would 'cause a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings of the export trade' against the alleged discomfiture of consumers or would-be new entrants into the industry? Argument on such a matter would be far more general and doctrinal than anything commonly heard in the Royal Courts of Justice."
    I do not want to make a second Second Reading speech. I have just two general points to make. First, I think that it is well recognised that most of these restrictive arrangements have grown up out of a fear of large-scale unemployment, or a fear of insecurity—and the

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    experience of the pre-war years has added to those fears. It is the duty of the Government so to guide the economy that there is not large-scale or unnecessary unemployment, and that does not appear to me to be the prime function of employers. There is a danger that if the paragraph were accepted the principle might be established that it is right and proper for employers to get together in some form of association and make agreements of this nature in order to safeguard their own security and the security of their employees. That might be a very dangerous principle.
    Secondly, there is a fairly widespread fear of the effects of automation. I recently received a delegation of employees from a firm in Yorkshire, and they were worried about the subject of automation. Yet, if these new technical advances do not take place, the effects upon our economy may be very serious. If one allows, in principle, the proposition that employers are entitled to get together for their own security, out of fear of unemployment, it would be extremely difficult to persuade employees to cooperate in these changes, which might involve temporary unemployment.
    It is for these general reasons that think it would be inadvisable to leave the paragraph in the Bill. Added to that, it would be extremely difficult for any court to decide the kind of issue which would be argued before it by those who attempted to claim exemption within the paragraph.
    Sir Peter Roberts: First, I should like to take up the point made by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) about the suitability of the Court to deal with these problems of employment and unemployment. As I understand the matter, the Court will have assessors, taken from industry, who will sit to assist the judge. I would remind the hon. Member that the Railway and Canal Commission had to deal with very similar matters. It is possible to deal with industrial problems in such a court, and I do not think that that point made by the hon. Member should weigh with the Committee.
    I also have two points to make. First, I support the President in his view that this paragraph should remain in the Bill. Any suggestion to take it out would be quite wrong. Unemployment is best
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    dealt with by collective arrangements between employers. In 1930 and 1931, nearly 49 per cent. of the people engaged in the lighter steel trade in Sheffield were unemployed. It was only by associations of trade, which enabled us to hold prices steady and have stable markets, that we were able to build up again a great body of employment in the city. It now has a greater volume of employment than ever before, and this has been made possible by price-level associations.
    We have had some interesting speeches upon the question whether these associations are good or bad. It is impossible for anybody to make a generalisation. Some are good and some are bad. The benefit of my right hon. Friend's proposal is that it enables us to discuss the matter and sift the good from the bad. There are different kinds of trades to consider in this respect, and I would make a great distinction between the distributive and shop trades and the main, basic productive industries. There is a very important distinction between the two.
    I listened with a certain amount of interest to the arguments of hon. Members opposite about book sellers, chemists and petrol companies, but it is surely the productive associations which are built up mainly in order to improve our industry, and I should have thought that the trade union movement would have as much interest as the employers in maintaining that form of employment.
    Having dealt with the question why we must have a paragraph of this kind in the Bill, and how the Court can deal with the matter, I want to ensure that the paragraph is effective. I cannot think that the Court would be able properly to deal with the matter as the paragraph is at present worded. I would draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the words,
    "serious and persistent adverse effect on the general level of unemployment in an area …"
    The words "serious and persistent" make it difficult for those of us who wish to support the President. I am not saying that the substitution of the word "or" for "and" is the answer, but with the present wording it may be difficult for the Court to deal with the question whether serious and persistent unemployment together may result.
    There are pockets of unemployment which may be of a temporary nature, and where it may be possible to remedy

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    the situation by some form of stocking arrangement within industry. For instance, in the case of the cotton trade, the Government gave orders to build up stocks. Industries can help themselves in that way. Some kind of association might be able to deal with a pocket of unemployment. So far as I can see, however, we should not be able to get through the gate here provided in the Bill, because such unemployment would not be "serious and persistent".
    It would be difficult to prove that it was persistent. I suggest that it would be better if my right hon. Friend divorced the two words in some manner, and made the fact that employment was likely to be serious a sufficient cause to bring an association before the Court. If he thinks that there might be some niggling persistence, which would not be sufficient to require special action, he could no doubt find words to cover the point.
    If the Court is able to decide this matter, I believe that it will assist in maintaining employment. I am certain that nobody on either side of the Committee wishes to do anything which might increase unemployment. Therefore, I beg hon. Members opposite not to press for the deletion of this paragraph—and I ask my right hon. Friend to see if he can in some way amend the wording so that it can cover cases of unemployment which, though serious, might not be persistent.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: If I say a few words at this stage it may assist the Committee. First, I agree with the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) and my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts) about the importance of the paragraph. It is by no means an easy matter to deal with. I share my hon. Friend's view that this paragraph should remain in the Bill. I think that there would be an obvious flaw in a Bill which did not permit the argument to be raised that certain restrictions were being maintained because serious and persistent unemployment might result if they were abandoned. I hope that the Committee will take that view.
    At the same time, I fully recognise the dangers pointed out by the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West. Unless carefully handled, this Clause, if widened or
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    weakened, could ruin the purpose of the Bill. It is one of the most dangerous and difficult Clauses that we have had to discuss. The interests of both sides of industry are very much together on this matter. It is important to understand what has to be shown and what is insufficient. It is not sufficient to show temporary unemployment. I do not think that would be enough because there are other ways of dealing with temporary unemployment.
    7.30 p.m.
    In the world in which we live today—I do not say that we always expect to be successful—there are broad measures of Government policy designed to encourage the tempo of demand and the like, and I do not think that it would be appropriate to encourage the idea that by restrictions on either side—I do not restrict myself here rigidly to the employers' side—we should attempt to deal with temporary pockets of unemployment. Nor does this Clause say that restriction is necessary because otherwise there would be an effect upon unemployment in industry. It may well happen that by restriction we can get employment in a particular industry absolutely fixed, or we can attempt to do so. It would be quite wrong to permit, that argument because that would be to accept the theory that we ought to allow groups of persons, among themselves, by mutual restriction to attempt to freeze the economy.
    The right answer is that if restrictions cause some unemployment, and some people may, as a result, have to leave employment in a particular industry, they should go to some other industry and take up jobs in it. That is an essential prerequisite to a growing, thriving economy.
    We are very anxious—and that is why I say that the wording of this Clause has to be watched so carefully—not to open that particular loophole in these arrangements. I do not think we have done so; in fact I am sure we have not. We have considered this matter very carefully and we say—and I think it is right that we should provide for it—that where a case can be made out that there is a likelihood of large-scale, persistent unemployment, it should be be possible to advance that argument to the Court.
    I say that because we have in mind the sort of case which many hon. Members

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    in the Committee will remember in their political experience. Let us take the shipbuilding industry on the North-East Coast. It may be that the position there was very far removed from what we have now when the order books are full and everything looks all right. Nevertheless, although the argument would not be accepted in the courts today—it could not be sustained for a moment—I think that both sides of the industry would think me a little unrealistic if we did not include in the Bill a provision so worded that if the situation alters and things change the kind of argument which governs that sort of situation could be advanced.
    This Clause admits argument upon that basis, but it is upon that basis only, and I hope that no one in the Committee will press me to widen the Clause or to weaken it or to do anything which would admit of temporary pockets of unemployment being dealt with in this way. I think that I can assure hon. Members that as the Clause is drawn it does not weaken the Bill, and is a proper provision.
    Mr. Jay: I think that the President in this case is perfectly right to put this paragraph into the Bill even though it was not recommended by the Monopolies Commission. I do not agree on this matter with the Members of the Liberal Party, and to that extent I cannot join the Liberal Party, despite my views about consumer choice.
    I think that the President this time has got his economics right. Apart from the human argument, it is not good economic policy to break up some agreements at the cost of creating serious and persistent unemployment. That does not even increase the national income; it simply put some people out of work, and they do not find alternative employment. The right solution, as I think the President will agree, for such a situation is action planned by the Government to bring additional and perhaps different work into an area.
    To take another instance before the war, even more specific than the one on the North-East Coast, there was the case of Dundee, almost wholly dependent on one industry which suffered from very heavy and persistent unemployment. I do not know whether there were restrictive practices by the jute manufacturers
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    or not in Dundee before the war, but if there were, such practices maintained hundreds and thousands in employment who would otherwise have been unemployed. I cannot convince myself that it would be right to break up those restrictive practices and do nothing else whatever. Nevertheless, on the whole I agree with the President that it is right to keep in the words, "serious and persistent". I think that on balance they are probably better than "serious or persistent", although I think that that Amendment is a rather tempting one. I think that on balance "serious and persistent" is better because clearly this Clause is liable, like many others, to be pushed too far.
    Sir P. Roberts: How would the right hon. Gentleman prove to the Court that something was likely to be persistent in the future?
    Mr. Jay: The hon. Gentleman supports the argument that I have been constantly putting forward from this side of the Committee that it will be almost impossible to prove these things before a court of law at all. This again illustrates our main argument that these are most extraordinary decisions to expect a court of law to take.
    Mr. Simon: Why does the right hon. Gentleman think that it would be any easier for a tribunal to make up its mind on exactly the same problem?
    Mr. Jay: It would be easier, in our opinion, for the Monopolies Commission and the Board of Trade to make up their minds on that kind of problem, and it is precisely the kind of problem upon which the Board of Trade does make up its mind when it decides, for instance, to schedule an area as a Development Area. What will the evidence be? The evidence presumably that will be brought before the Court to prove that there was likely to be serious and persistent unemployment will be evidence from the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour. I suppose that that would be necessary—I should like to know whether that would be in order before the Court—and the only way effectively to prove it would be to bring statisticians of the Ministry of Labour before the Court and judges in order to prove the case.

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    I think that that is most extraordinary procedure. Accepting that we have the scheme of things that we have, I think that the subsection is necessary, and I think that the same conclusion applies to the substantial export earnings which are included in this paragraph, as well as the reference to employment. I think that as this country's balance of payments situation at the moment is so difficult and likely to be so difficult for as long as we can foresee, we cannot afford the luxury, so to speak, of breaking up restrictive agreements which may be undesirable in themselves if they are going to have a substantial and serious effect on our export earnings. It is possible that neither of these cases may ever arise. I do not think that it is very likely that the kind of situation envisaged under the unemployment wording is likely to arise, but in case it does I think that it is perfectly right and wise to have that wording in the Clause.
    Mr. Angus Maude: As will be seen by the Amendment which we have put down, my hon. Friends and myself are less concerned about the escape clause in respect of export earnings than is the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade). Regarding the unemployment proviso with which we are concerned, I was considerably encouraged by the speech of the President but, I am afraid, not quite encouraged enough. I was glad to know that my right hon. Friend recognised the great danger inherent in this paragraph and that he was not proposing to weaken it in the way suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts). It has been generally appreciated how extraordinarily difficult of decision are these questions and how great is the risk that, for human and possibly emotional reasons, there could be a tendency to exaggerate the circumstances for which exception is claimed.
    Both my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) sought to justify this paragraph by reference to events which took place before the war and during the slump of the 1930s. This seems to me precisely the sort of argument which makes this paragraph so dangerous. We are not dealing with a period of general unemployment; and I suggest that were we
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    to run into a period of general and serious unemployment, the onslaught on a number of the provisions in this Bill would be so enormous that it would be virtually impossible for any Government to hold the line. I hope that the Government would hold the line in respect of most restrictive practices, but nevertheless there would be a general campaign to enable a number of restrictive practices, of the sort we got to know so well during the rationalisation period between the wars, to be reinstated.
    But in a period of full employment, which may yet be characterised by the decline of certain individual industries, very different considerations arise in certain areas, and I do not believe that we ought to risk the sort of impediments in the way of economic progress which this paragraph might admit. For example, it would. I think, be reasonable for an industry to claim before the Court, if this paragraph remained part of the Bill, that it was perfectly reasonable for it not only to fix its prices but also to restrict the quantity of production in order to keep prices up and thus keep a large proportion of its original labour force working on short time; instead of making them available for transfer to other industries which might, as so many are now, be crying out for additional labour.
    For one thing this is a perpetual temptation to any Government—and to the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour and National Service in particular—to avoid the task of trying to diversify the industry of an area, and to take some steps in a less harmful economic way to mitigate the unemployment which might be arising. If a declining industry is frozen into its present pattern and at its present level of production, prices and employment, the most dangerous developments conceivable may follow. I should have thought that this was one case in which, for once, I could agree with some of the things said by hon. Gentlemen opposite about the difficulties of arguing these things before a court of law.
    I do not take the view that it is impossible for a court of law to deal with industrial matters. Nor do I take the view that it is impossible for a court to judge what is a reasonable degree and then—and this is what I think may very well always prove a temptation in this case—to give rather more than the benefit of a reasonable doubt in favour of those

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    who say that serious and persistent unemployment is likely. If we look at the words of the paragraph we find that not only conditions "actually obtaining" are to be taken into account, but the conditions to be "reasonably foreseen" at the time of the application.
    That seems to me a most extraordinary thing to have to argue before a court. During his Budget speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer talked about the difficulties of economic forecasting, and said that experts were always looking up trains in last year's Bradshaw. But to think of them looking up trains in next year's Bradshaw before a judge who has not even a copy of it is even more terrifying.
    7.45 p.m.
    Mr. Jay: Would not the hon. Gentleman agree that if the question was whether a large steelworks or a shipyard employing practically the whole population of a town were to close down it would not be difficult to know that that would cause unemployment?
    Mr. Maude: We are not talking about the closing down of a steelworks or a shipyard in a particular place. But if the only thing which keeps a shipyard or a steelworks going, and keeps employment up in a particular area or town is a restrictive practice and the exploiting of the consumer by keeping up prices, the sooner—in a period of full employment—a readjustment is made which enables that situation to be remedied, the better.
    Sir P. Roberts: Would my hon. Friend—
    Mr. Maude: No, I cannot give way. I wish to finish this argument.
    We cannot adduce that as a satisfactory argument. The danger is that if we do not allow this readjustment to be made at a time of general full employment, when other industries and areas are crying out for labour, we shall get the thing fossilised until perhaps a period when unemployment is beginning to rise in other industries and areas. Then restrictions will be clamped down more firmly and we shall not be able to make the general structural readjustment in the pattern of the industry.
    Before my hon. Friend interrupted me I was proposing to make one last appeal to the President. I recognise that the emotional, social and political pressures
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    here are very strong indeed, because of the aftermath of unemployment and the feeling of insecurity between the wars. It may well be that some sort of recognition of that must be made. But I wonder whether, in this one case, my right hon. Friend might feel that it is not inconsistent with his principles to strengthen the safeguard a little more.
    I should like him to consider whether, on Report stage, he might so amend this paragraph as to make it necessary for an affirmative Resolution to be laid before Parliament which would justify restriction of this kind being reintroduced. Suppose that they had been broken up and it was desirable that they should be reintroduced, I think that would be a case in which it would be wholly reasonable that Parliament should be able to weigh the evidence and consider it again. But I should like to say once more that I am very worried, and so are some of my hon. Friends, about the dangers inherent in this paragraph, and we would much rather that the right hon. Gentleman took it out altogether.
    Mr. R. Edwards: I listened with attention to the speech of the hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude), and I find myself in agreement with a great deal of what he had to say. Very rarely do I differ with my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay), but on this point I find some small difference of opinion exists between us.
    It seems to me that the experiences of monopoly high prices between the war resulted in prolonging unnecessarily the recessions and depressions. We had high prices artificially maintained for basic strategic goods when wholesale, retail and world prices were falling. If in a period of recession we maintain an artificially high price with the object of maintaining local employment, we defeat the whole purpose for which that high price was applied because, automatically and inevitably, we maintain the recession longer than otherwise it would be maintained. That is simple, common sense economics.
    I am afraid this Clause can be abused. It can become a premium on inefficiency. We have inefficient industries which would use this escape Clause as an alibi for maintaining high prices based on the social needs of the local population, which

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    may be very short term and may not be based on the general economic interest of the nation as a whole. That is why I think the problem posed in this Clause is a problem which can be dealt with only by economists, businessmen and trade unionists—not by a judiciary. Basically this is the responsibility of the Board of Trade rather than that of even the Monopolies Commission. Basically it is the responsibility of this House rather than that of a judge and two laymen sitting in a High Court.
    Take the whole question of the introduction of new means of production, the introduction of automation in old-established industries. The Americans, the Germans, the Japanese and the Russians may have completely automated production in those industries and may be beating us in the markets of the world, but in a certain locality, because a thousand jobs may be in jeopardy, and industry which is the leader in that particular trade might refuse to introduce automation which would cause some redundancy, maintain artificially high prices and argue its case on the basis of this Clause. Such an argument and a diversion in their favour would do harm to the economy of the nation. It would be only of short-term service to the nation and, in the long run, it would be harmful to the workers whose jobs this Clause was being used to protect.
    I think this is a very dangerous Clause. I have mentioned that I am a trade union general secretary. In the normal course of events I would be very sympathetic to safeguards of this nature, but there are times when trade union general secretaries have to consider the needs of the whole trade union movement and not the sectional needs of the workers in a particular industry. There are times in history when purely sectional interests have to be swept away in the general interest of the whole nation. Therefore, I do not like this Clause at all. I do not think it would do what it is intended to do—namely, protect the worker and protect exports. I think it would give a very substantial escape and provide for the maintenance of restrictive practices for different reasons from those in the Clause, the maintenance indeed of restrictive practices and high prices.
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    In any case, I think the Clause is defeatist in relation to our economy. It suggests that we are afraid of expanding the economy and that we may again go down into the depths of depression. I think that is psychologically bad at this time. It also suggests that this House, industry, and intelligent people generally, are afraid of temporary redundancy. I do not think we should be afraid of short-term redundancy with the development of increased production. On both sides of industry, and on both sides of this House, we must have courage to face the social consequences of redundancy in the interest of the general standard of living of the people and in the interests of an economy moving towards abundance. For these reasons—which differ in some small respects from the views of some of my hon. Friends on this side of the Committee—I repeat I have very serious doubts about this Clause.
    Sir J. Hutchison: I was delighted to hear my right hon. Friend resist the pressure which has been brought to bear on him to abandon this Clause. I have been bewildered and alarmed at the amount of optimism which has been shown by hon. Members on both sides of this Committee that the present conditions, apparently, are going to endure permanently.
    Hon. Members may say that my outlook is psychologically coloured by the fact that I ran some part of industry during the period which has been quoted once or twice and that I know just what a desperate time the industry of the country went through. We are legislating and talking today as though permanent full employment were normal. I am one who thinks it will be extremely difficult to have permanent full employment unless we have a national wages structure. We have been enjoying our standard of employment in circumstances extremely favourable to trade and to full employment. For example, the German competition has not really started, nor has the Japanese competition.
    I wonder how many hon. Members have thought what is likely to be Russia's next card. She has quite frankly and blatantly told us that she is still out for world Communism. She has a five-year plan which is likely to put her into the ranks of the big exporting nations. She controls her costs and her policy completely through monopolies. The other

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    day when I was in Germany I found German industrialists talking in exactly the same way. I hope I am not a pessimist, but I think that in a few years' time we are likely to have a completely new international competitor.
    For my hon. Friends to speak, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude) spoke just now, as though we are to continue as we are now indefinitely and, if some difficulties rear their ugly heads, we have only to go back and alter legislation, is, I think, a very foolish attitude to take.
    Mr. David Ormsby-Gore: Surely my hon. Friend is not suggesting that if we got back to serious unemployment retaining restrictive practices would be all the Government action that would be necessary? Very much more than that would be needed. Surely private restrictive practices would not save the situation?
    Sir J. Hutchison: I saw private restrictive practices save the situation for the whole of the shipbuilding industry of this country. There is no doubt in my mind that unless the private arrangements made by the shipbuilding industry had been put into force the shipbuilding industry of this country would largely have disappeared.
    8.0 p.m.
    Mr. Holt: There is unemployment when there is a lack of effective demand. That occurred in the 'thirties, as the hon. Member will agree. Will he explain how a continuation of restrictive practices increases the effective demand?
    Sir J. Hutchison: Because it limits the amount of competition temporarily until the situation is readjusted and it allows the producer of an article to get a price for it which allows him to carry on. In the shipbuilding industry, the price for ships internationally was so bad that one yard after another was closing its doors, and so the National Shipbuilders' Securities was set up to buy up those yards which were closing their doors and to prevent their use for further shipbuilding for a period of time.
    Mr. A. Blenkinsop: Does the hon. Member not recognise that the activities of Shipbuilding Securities almost meant that we were
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    not able to produce the ships that were urgently needed throughout the war?
    Sir J. Hutchison: I do not agree. If it had not come about we might have produced none, because the whole industry was going gradually under.
    I am prepared to say that in connection with the paragraph (f) we would not be likely to get a situation of grave competition without getting unemployment. Therefore, that set of circumstances could be argued before the Court and the sub-clause could, I think, provide a measure of safeguard against the situation which the Committee would be very unwise to ignore. I hope that the word "persistent" is drawn somewhere between permanent and temporary. I am at one with my right hon. Friend in agreeing that a temporary patch of unemployment should not be handled in this way. Labour must be flexible and be able to move from one industry to another. I hope that "persistent" will not be argued as being "permanent," because to prove that unemployment was going to be permanent would be an impossible task.
    I should like to make one other appeal to my right hon. Friend. I believe I shall be successful in the appeal I have already made, because he has stated his intention to retain paragraph (f) and I have tried to show how important it is to keep it. I hope he will do something to protect a particular trade which is hard hit by unemployment but which nevertheless does not rank as sufficiently important to cause an adverse effect on the general level of employment in an area. I should like to hear my right hon. Friend say that if a small strategic industry was being put out of business, there would be some protection for it. Its products, though small in quantity, might have a strategic significance with weapons, for example, and be of immense importance to the country. A circumstance of this nature should be able to be taken into account.
    Therefore, I hope that my right hon. Friend will agree to the Amendment in the name of my hon. Friends and myself, in line 21, after "on," insert:
    "the availability of skilled labour in the trade or industry to which the agreement relates or".
    In other words, when a certain industry was being hard hit it would be able to have its case considered by the Court.

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    I apologise for having held the Committee's attention for some little time, but I regard the Clause as being the most important part of the whole Bill. Once again, I urge my right hon. Friend not to weaken it.
    Mr. Holt: After hearing the speech of the hon. Member for Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison) I am even more concerned than ever that the President of the Board of Trade should seriously look again at the Amendment. In his own words, he said that paragraph (f) might ruin the Bill, and if he considers it more closely I think it will be obvious that it has every chance of ruining it.
    I do not want to follow the hon. Member for Scotstoun in the argument which was implied in my intervention, but he and others of his hon. Friends who have the same view must consider the argument again. One simply does not increase demand by restrictive practices. All that happens is that if there is cut-throat competition because of the reduction in demand and firms then try to get together to make things profitable, they can do so by further restricting their output to meet the demand and employing fewer people. That was the kind of thing that happened in the 'thirties, and the consequence was that even more people were thrown on to the employment exchanges to receive their dole.
    If circumstances of that kind were to return, the Government should not permit a return to those restrictive practices but should manipulate credit in the ways that we here pretend we know. Perhaps we do not know quite so much as we think. There seems, however, to be a chance that we might ride the storm through the control of credit and by creating demand.
    I do not know whether the hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude) and his hon. Friends intended this, but their Amendment would make possible, as almost certainly would happen, the subsidising of exports by the home market. It is indeed possible to form that view from the Clause as it stands, because that is happening now.
    The Ford Motor Company and other motor car concerns are selling their cars abroad below the home market price, entirely behind our tariff barriers.
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    Whether the barriers existed or not, they could say that competition was so severe abroad that unless they could charge more on the home market by getting together and keeping up their prices, they would not be able to subsidise exports and would, therefore, lose the oversea market.
    The most pernicious practices could pass the Court if Parliament accepts paragraph (f). As my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) said earlier, if there is any question of unemployment in an area, we must not allow the position to become rigid. We must allow the ordinary economic forces to operate in the area. If necessary, the Government have many other ways open to them through subsidies of one kind or another by which they can help the position.
    The President, I know, wants to get on with the Bill but I assure him that we feel extremely strongly on the Clause, the dangers of which he recognises himself. If only he would give an assurance that at least he will reconsider the matter again, we could make progress.
    Mr. William Shepherd: I do not want to delay the Committee, but I urge my right hon. Friend to look again at the Clause. I should be much happier if paragraph (f) were removed. It opens an immense loophole and I do not believe that many people outside would be beyond exploiting it. I am always sceptical when people say that they want restrictive practices because they wish to protect the small man. In the same way, I am sceptical about the use of this gateway in the Clause. I think there is a very good case indeed for eliminating it, and I am glad to have heard the speech of the hon. Member for Bilston (Mr. R. Edwards) upon the matter.
    It has been said that certain things happened in the 'thirties and that we are still suffering from the effects of restrictive actions taken in those years. The coal situation rests almost entirely on restrictions that took place in the 'thirties. It is a mistake to have in the Bill a provision which reflects that outmoded mentality. It is a hangover from those days when our economic thinking was formed. I am disappointed to find my right hon. Friend putting such a provision in the Bill. I want to see flexibility, and

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    I do not want to see anything in the Bill because in the 'thirties we were foolish enough to take a certain course. We ought not in 1956 to pursue mistakes made in the 'thirties, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will think again about this matter before the Report stage.
    Mr. Ede: I support generally the line taken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea. North (Mr. Jay). It was a very courageous speech which the hon. Member for Glasgow, Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison) made. I say it was courageous because I think that point of view ought to be mentioned, although I disagree with almost every word that the hon. Member said. I am certain of this, that if his interests had been on the Tyne rather than on the Clyde he would not have viewed the activities of National Shipbuilding Securities, Ltd. with the favour he apparently does.
    Let us face the fact that we lost from the shipbuilding industry men whom we could not trace even in the most desperate days of the war. In my constituency and elsewhere on Tyneside there are sites on which ships ought now to be building, and men employed who were lost to the industry; but not a ship may be built there for forty-two years from the date on which National Shipbuilding Securities, Ltd. took over.
    Let us recognise that the depression of the 'thirties was appalling in its magnitude, and that anything done under this Bill is not likely to be very much help one way or the other in such a situation. I am quite certain that every Member of the Committee, irrespective of which side he sits, and whatever his views may be on general economic theories, is determined that if we ever look like being in that sort of situation again the most drastic remedies will have to be put through Parliament to avoid the appalling waste of human and physical power which we then experienced and from which we are still suffering. I do not think that consideration of things of that magnitude arise on this paragraph of this Clause, however.
    Mr. Hugh Fraser: I would support the Amendment to which my hon. Friend the Member for Scotstoun (Sir J. Hutchison), has put his name, and to which he alluded a few
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    moments ago. There are industries such as the pottery industry, in which there has been a loss of skilled labour in the same way as there was a loss of skilled labour in the shipbuilding industry prior to the war. In those industries, what is provided by my hon. Friend's Amendment would be a valuable consideration, which could be argued by the industries, and which should be at least viewed by the Court. I hope, therefore, that although my right hon. Friend proposes, as he says, to stand firm, he will look carefully at my hon. Friend's Amendment and consider whether he could not include the words which my hon. Friend's Amendment would insert.
    They would meet the very trouble the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) has just spoken about, the loss of skilled labour from certain industries. An argument from the point of view of the pottery industry in particular would, perhaps, be beyond the scope of the debate on this Amendment, and so I shall say no more of that now, but certainly the loss of skilled labour should be a consideration for review by the Court. I do not put it higher than that. We have in the past seen skilled labour lost to important industries, and my hon. Friend's Amendment would be a means of safeguarding against such loss of skilled labour in the future.
    8.15 p.m.
    Mr. A. J. Irvine: I desire as one privileged to represent a constituency on Merseyside to identify myself with the remarks of my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) my right hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Ede) and their view of this paragraph. It is a most extraordinary cross-current of opinion which the debate has revealed, and I find myself in agreement with the President of the Board of Trade and in disagreement with my hon. Friend the Member for Morpeth (Mr. Owen).
    There is a fallacy in the Amendment moved by the hon. Member for Bolton, West (Mr. Holt). It is quite true that it is not a justiciable issue, but where the hon. Member in my view, goes wrong in considering this in the context that there is to be a court dealing with these issues is that he then tries to draw a boundary line beyond which it must not

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    go. If we are to refer questions of public interest in terms of commercial and trade policy to a court, we have to refer the whole thing. We cannot stop half way, and I should undoubtedly regard it as a very serious and undesirable thing if any court applying its mind to problems of this kind were to think itself free to exclude from its consideration such a vitally important matter as the likelihood of there being serious and sustained unemployment.
    The hon. Member for Ealing, South (Mr. Maude), speaking of his Amendment, spoke of the danger that in discussing unemployment there was an emotional upsurge, and that the realities of the situation were too easily forgotten. He also said that the paragraph might have the effect, should it remain in the Bill, of discouraging the possibility of diversifying industry in an area, which was, in his view, a much better way of combating unemployment than the maintenance of a restrictive practice. I think that the point which he overlooks is that, of course, those considerations to which he referred and to which he gave weight are matters to which the Court will give weight. They are all to be considered, and evidence is to be given upon them all. It would be a matter of evidence and not a matter of emotion, and the discretion of the Court in the matter is fairly satisfactorily preserved in the last part of the Clause. As for this paragraph, I am in entire agreement with the view expressed by the President of the Board of Trade and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Battersea, North.
    Amendment negatived.
    Mr. Basil Nield: I beg to move, in page 14, line 25, to leave out from the beginning to "or" in line 26.
    It would be convenient, Mr. Hynd, if you and the Committee were to permit it, to consider this Amendment with the next in my name, in page 14, line 26, at the end, to insert:
    (g) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the removal of the restriction would be likely to cause a substantial reduction in the volume of earnings of the export trade of the United Kingdom either generally or in respect of the said trade or industry; or.
    The Temporary Chairman (Mr. H. Hynd): I was about to suggest that.
    Mr. Nield: I am much obliged, Mr. Hynd.
    This is a drafting Amendment, not designed to alter the sense of the Clause in any way, but to improve its shape. The design of the Clause is to set out various sets of circumstances in which a restrictive practice may be justified, and they are set out in paragraphs numbered from (a) to (g), although one of them has now been omitted.
    There is one set of circumstances in each paragraph. But for some reason, as drafted, paragraph (f) embraces two such sets of circumstances, namely the question of the level of employment and the question of export trade. It seems to me and to my hon. Friends who have put their names to the Amendment that it would be much more convenient to separate these two quite separate matters and place each in a separate paragraph.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: This is a matter of drafting, and I think that it is an improvement if these two subjects are placed in separate paragraphs. I am sure it would be agreed that it would be much clearer to have the two separate sets of circumstances dealt with in separate paragraphs.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I question whether this is just a matter of drafting, though I accept at once from the President of the Board of Trade and the hon. and learned Member for the City of Chester (Mr. Nield) that drafting is what is intended. If the point is really one of drafting I conform immediately, but as we are all agreed on the intention, there should be no substantial difference in the wording.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I apologise to the hon. and learned Member. I omitted to mention the matter because I was thinking of that as something in a separate Amendment. There is a difference in the words. The hon. and learned Member is quite right, and I apologise for not drawing attention to it.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I quite appreciate that there was some misapprehension in the President's mind, and that drafting was really the intention of the

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    hon. and learned Member for the City of Chester (Mr. Nield). But what the hon. and learned Member has done is not to follow the words of the President in paragraph (f). In that paragraph the material words are,
    "… a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings of the export trade of the United Kingdom."
    whereas in the second Amendment the words are,
    "… a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings of the export trade of the United Kingdom either generally or in respect of the said trade or industry …"
    Therefore, the words of the Amendment makes the onus on the applicant appreciably less.
    They do not have to be earnings which really substantially affect the United Kingdom's position. In other words, they are not earnings which affect the position of the country as a whole, not as it were public-interest earnings, but earnings of the particular trade or industry which is concerned with this restriction. Therefore the test, instead of the public interest, becomes—and I do not want to use unnecessarily controversial words—a private profit test and that makes a substantial difference to the effects of the paragraph.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I should like to apologise again for what I am sure the hon. and learned Member will accept as a slip. I had meant to mention the second Amendment which we are now discussing, which is important and separate in that it provides that it must be admitted as a ground for argument that the effect of the removal of the restriction would be a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings of the trade or industry concerned. I think that that is right.
    We might well have a small trade exporting a high proportion of its products. Surely it must be permitted to argue that the removal of the arrangement which it had entered into and which might be of a complex nature, sometimes inside, sometimes outside the country and very often interlocked, would have a bad effect upon the exports of that industry. The total export position of the country is made up of exports from often quite small industries, and it would be very damaging to the country if that particular argument were not admitted.
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    It is not a private-profit argument in quite the sense which the hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas) suggested. Throughout the Bill we have been really concerned to see that we do not do damage to our export trade. We have had several discussions on that at various stages and if it really can be shown on evidence that damage will result to the export trade of one of these industries by the removal of these restrictions, I certainly think that that should be an argument which could properly be put before the Court.
    Mr. Holt: The right hon. Gentleman is constantly being pressed by industry to get Germans or Frenchmen, for example, to remove their export subsidies. Does he not realise that, in allowing this arrangement, that is just what will not happen? People will be made to think that unless they can subsidise their exports by holding up some high prices, through a ring, at home they will lose their exports. This is in fact an argument for export subsidies. We understood that the whole of the right hon. Gentleman's policy recently has been not to support export subsidies but to try to get other people in other countries to stop that practice. Do I understand that in this Bill the right hon. Gentleman is reversing that policy and is now in favour of export subsidies?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: No, Sir, that is only one isolated example of something that can happen occasionally and no doubt does happen occasionally. Industries all over the world sometimes sell abroad at a lower price than they sell at home. That in its technical sense may be treated as dumping. It is treated as such under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade if it results in a damaging effect on the importing country. The point here, however, is rather wider. It is concerned with a whole range of arrangements and restrictions. Sometimes these arrangements are entirely internal. For example, high and stable prices at home may be argued as a good basis upon which to export anyway, but very often there are mixed agreements, part internal and part external. Some of them may have the effect of arranging markets and matters of that kind.
    I am not saying that they are always right or always beneficial. The arguments about them are sometimes com-

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    plex and difficult. There is no doubt that they are entered into by industry often for the purpose of maximising their sales abroad, and that many industries and trades hold, and sincerely believe, that the removal of those networks of arrangements would do substantial damage to them. I am not accepting those arguments, but I say that they are arguments on which we ought properly to be advised.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: I hope the right hon. Gentleman will change his mind about this Amendment. It is evil because it considerably reduces the onus of proof on the person who seeks to have his agreement exempted from Clause 16. Under Clause 16 the onus is on the party to an agreement who seeks to have it excluded from the Clause, and it seems to me to be an evil thing to reduce that onus of proof on the party to the agreement, because it would limit the usefulness of the Bill.
    8.30 p.m.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I am not happy to leave this matter as it stands. I will put my difficulty as concisely as I can. First, we are agreed that if there is a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings of the export trade of the United Kingdom, that should be a ground for coming within the application. The difficulty arises solely about the additional words included in the Amendment. The words are "in respect of the said trade or industry".
    I grant at once to the right hon. Gentleman that it is not intended to take the trade or industry isolated from the United Kingdom; it must be the earnings of the export trade of the United Kingdom in respect of the said trade or industry. To that extent it is a little stronger than it would be if it were severed completely from connection with the United Kingdom. But it is intended to have some meaning, and the meaning which I suppose it has is that although the amount of reduction in the earnings of the United Kingdom might be negligible, and not worth bothering about, nevertheless, if there is a substantial reduction in the amount of the earnings of the United Kingdom trade or industry as a whole, then the agreement comes within the subsection.
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    Obviously the trade might be an extremely small one, and it might also be a trade with substantial earnings, but the export part of which is very small. Neverthless it would come within this Amendment because the reduction would be a substantial one in the amount of the export. Therefore, in this last instance we are in the ridiculous position, where the reduction in the volume of earnings does not matter to the United Kingdom because they are negligible in quantity, they do not matter even to the trade or industry because they are a negligible part of it, yet they come within the application. Obviously that is too wide.
    I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that we do not want to take a severe line about this, but I hope that it will be possible to come to some arrangement, because there is a point here which is not in accordance with the intention of the President and his general approach to this matter. Would the right hon. Gentleman therefore be good enough to consider this point before the Report stage, because it is a difficulty which merits looking into?
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: My intention is not to discriminate against an industry just because it is small. The Bill, as drafted, would only admit the argument in the case of a few vast industries because the loss of no other industry's contribution to the export trade could conceivably be said to make a substantial diminution of it. Therefore it is necessary to alter the words and take not simply the United Kingdom but
    "the United Kingdom either generally or in respect of the said trade or industry".
    The Amendment reads:
    "a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings …
    and if that can be shown, then I think the argument should properly be advanced. I would remind the hon. and learned Gentleman again that even if one succeeds upon that argument, it is not the end of the matter. We have to balance this advantage against any other detriment to the public when we consider later provisions in the Clause. In the case he cited, where the export earnings were, say, 6s. 3d. a year, reduced to, say, 4s. 5d., I do not imagine for a moment that it would be held under this Clause as being a justification for a network of arrangements. Certainly it would not be

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    so held under Clause 16. A substantial reduction in export earnings would have to be shown.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We must get this point perfectly clear. The President says that what must be taken into account are the export earnings of the United Kingdom in relation to the trade or industry. He has squarely faced the case which I put to him of a substantial industry with a small fraction of its earnings being export earnings but there nevertheless being a substantial reduction in that amount.
    First, in the instance which I am taking, we are arguing on the footing of the export earnings being negligible from the point of view of the United Kingdom position. Consequently, the point is negligible to the United Kingdom. We then look at the matter from the point of view of the trade or industry, and it is here that the President says that the export earnings must be taken into consideration. Why should they be, any more than that the internal earnings should be taken into consideration?
    It is something which does not matter to the United Kingdom. We have got rid of that side of it. We are now considering the welfare of or hardship to the trade or industry, and in this instance the President selects the export earnings. That is irrational. Why give more weight to export earnings than internal earnings? The export earnings might be negligible and the internal earnings substantial, or vice versa; to the trade or industry concerned, one is as important as the other.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Let me put the matter this way. I am not concerned here with the interests of the trade or industry. I am concerned about the export earnings, and that is the point to which the argument must be addressed. That is a satisfactory answer to part of the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument.
    As to the point that it might be a trade or industry whose export earnings were in any event negligible even in relation to that trade or industry, I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that that would not be a proper argument to advance. If the Clause admits an argument of that kind, I should certainly be prepared to look at the point.
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    I am concerned that we should not limit the benefit of the Clause simply to the very large industries. We should allow the argument in the case of the smaller ones where there is a substantial export in relation to the trade or industry which is hit if the restriction is removed.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Perhaps we might go over the matter rather more carefully after the President has had an opportunity to consider the arguments. Perhaps we can return to it at a later stage and not spend more time on it now. It is obviously a matter upon which various representations can be made and which can profitably be discussed before the Report stage.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Wade: I beg to move, in page 14, line 26, to leave out from "Kingdom" to the end of line 34.
    The object of the Amendment is to delete paragraph (g), which will presumably become paragraph (h) in view of the President's acceptance of another Amendment. There is much that could be said about the paragraph, but I will make my point briefly in view of the desire to make progress, and then I shall be grateful to hear the President's reasons justifying it.
    The purpose of the paragraph is to allow parties to argue that a restriction should be allowed because it is
    "… reasonably required for purposes connected with the maintenance of any other restriction.…"
    Presumably this refers to restrictions that cannot be justified on any other ground. In spite of all the other exemptions that we have allowed, we are now asked to approve this additional provision. As we have agreed to such a wide range of grounds upon which restrictions may be justified, I question whether it is necessary to have another exemption.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am much obliged to the hon. Gentleman the Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) for putting down the Amendment and moving it in so brief and clear a speech. The purpose of this paragraph is really quite limited. It is to apply where the Court has found, perhaps after prolonged examination, that some major restrictive arrangement is in the public interest under one of these heads we have been discussing. It nearly always happens in

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    these cases that associated with the major arrangement there is a number of little ones of minor importance. As an example, there may be a common price ring and, as very often happens, the common price ring is supported by aggregated rebates. Probably, the provision for aggregating rebates has no particular purpose save that it happens to be a method of fortifying the common price ring and is necessary to it.
    When considering this matter, the majority of the Monopolies Commission in its Report took this as an illustration of one of the exceptions which ought to be allowed. I will not read the passage in full; it is paragraph 240 (c).
    Rather than try to spell out all sorts of further detailed exceptions, I think we would be wise to say that where, and only where, a principal arrangement has been approved under one of these heads—and when I say "approved" I mean admitted for argument under the next head—the Court should also be allowed, as a matter of tidiness, to say that the aggregated rebates, perhaps even an agreement for price maintenance, or whatever it may be, that the Court thought was reasonable for its enforcement or maintenance should be allowed to go with it.
    Mr. Mulley: Would the President tell us if this would apply to the imposition of stop lists? Would they come in under this paragraph?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: If there were a restrictive agreement, it would be open to the Court to say, I think, that the stop list was reasonably necessary for it. May I just quote an example? Suppose a group of suppliers agree amongst themselves that they will supply only a limited group of people having special qualifications, and suppose that they manage to justify that agreement upon the basis that it is necessary, within the terms of paragraph (a), for the safety of the public, because they are selling something requiring special skills or whatever it may be. If that arrangement were approved and they established their case, their arrangements about stop lists would be subject for argument—which might not be accepted—as being reasonably necessary for the support of that arrangement. But they would have to show that the stop list was reasonably necessary.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: I am not entirely happy about this question. Might I refer to an example which we discussed a little earlier, the question of what I think is called the publishers' association net book agreement? What is important in the first place here is the principal agreement; one worries about that before worrying about the machinery of enforcement. Clearly, the net book agreement is an agreement of a much simpler nature than almost any other type of restrictive agreement one could envisage.
    If one has a situation where an agreement of this sort is accepted, what we are being asked to do is to accept automatically every possible machinery of enforcement also which might be used, with the one exception of the collective boycott, which is clearly ruled out by Clause 19.
    Mr. Mulley: The collective boycott is ruled out only in matters of resale price maintenance and can be used to enforce other agreements.
    8.45 p.m.
    Mr. Jenkins: That is quite right. All we are ruling out is a particular means of enforcing an agreement relating to resale price maintenance, although resale price maintenance is not only separated out, so the collective boycott may not be used to enforce it, but is also separated out in the sense in its individual form it is given special blessing, which no other form of restrictive agreement is given. I find it odd that in one Clause the President should go out of his way automatically to ban a particular and probably the most effective method of enforcement on a particular set of agreements, whereas in this part of the Bill he is asking us without examination to accept almost every other method of enforcement, provided that the arrangement itself is accepted. That is going much too far and much too quickly.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I am rather disturbed about this. I can understand the point which the President is making, that it may be necessary to have a method of enforcement in order to carry out some restriction which is, for instance, within paragraph (a). If that is so, I should have thought that the application, so far as it is necessary to carry out the purposes of paragraph (a), would be made for the restriction itself under paragraph (a), so that then the test would

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    be whether a restriction was reasonably necessary for the protection of the public in connection with consumption, installation and so on.
    I know that under paragraph (a) the restriction has to be reasonably necessary for the protection of the public. Here we have these extremely wide words that the restriction is "reasonably required." I do not know why there is the change from "necessary" to "required". I suppose that it is a lower standard of requirement. If it is the same thing, perhaps the President will put "necessary" instead of "required," because "reasonably required" means that the applicant has to say that his reason is "reasonable" and that it is "reasonable" for him to ask for something. That is different from saying that it is "reasonably necessary" for purposes connected with the maintenance of any other restriction.
    Why are those words inserted? They are not inserted to make the paragraph longer. They are inserted to bring in things which would otherwise not be brought in. Otherwise, things would be "reasonably necessary" for the maintenance of any other restriction. It is not limited to that and I should have thought all that was required in enforcing a restriction might have been properly covered—and it would be dangerous if more than that were covered—by making application under paragraph (g) where the application for exemption is made for the restriction in aid of which paragraph (g) is conceived.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The position is plain, and I have the full support of the Majority Report of the Monopolies Commission, which we all call in aid whenever it is on our side. The matter is clear beyond a peradventure. One has a restriction which one says is "reasonably necessary" to prevent large scale and persistent unemployment and which we have just approved. It is very difficult to say that an aggregate rebate is necessary to prevent persistent and large scale unemployment, but it may be a necessary part of other arrangements which have been successfully pleaded on this matter, and it is very necessary to have some Clause linking the two. That is what the Monopolies Commission proposes and I hope that the Committee will accept it.
    Mr. E. Fletcher: I am not at all happy about this matter. I do not think the President of the Board of Trade can shield himself behind the Monopolies Commission's Report. I have just been re-reading what it said, and it does not say anything like what the right hon. Gentleman has suggested. If he is really relying upon it he ought to study it a little more closely.
    Paragraph 240 (c) of the Report is concerned in the main with matters of collective enforcement, and the Commission comes to the conclusion that all matters of common enforcement and restrictive practice should be banned. It says, however, that there are cases in which particular restrictions should be permitted. It is because of that that we have these subsections in the Clause which the Committee has already approved.
    This is a sort of general sweeping-up Clause. I grant that it is based upon paragraph 240 (c) but it seems to go much further. I was disturbed at what the President of the Board of Trade said just now about collective rebates. He also suggested that stock lists might be justified under the Clause. Paragraph 240 (c) says that there may be
    "agreements to charge common prices,"
    and that such agreements are
    "often associated with, or supported by, arrangements for collectively agreed price discrimination, aggregated rebates and the maintenance of common resale prices"
    Then they say:
    "There might be particular cases in which a common price agreement was found after inquiry to operate in the public interest, and where the effective operation of that agreement might"—
    these are the operative words—
    "depend upon the use of incidental practices of these types."
    What does the Clause seek to do? I hope that we may have the assistance of the Attorney-General on this matter because there is a vital difference between what is suggested in the Monopolies Commission's Report and a restriction which is "reasonably required for the purpose". It is the word "reasonably" which is troubling us.
    If the right hon. Gentleman wants to follow the recommendations of the Monopolies Commission he should make

    699
    it clear that the restriction is not reasonably required but is necessary and essential. Only on that basis could it be required. Otherwise, where do we get to? We have an agreement which has this restrictive practice attached to it, and the argument is whether the practice is reasonably required. It would be much easier for the trade to say, "It is much easier for us to enforce that particular agreement if it has stock lists, secret courts and the other paraphernalia of that kind."
    If the person concerned were driven to saying that the agreement was dependent for its enforcement upon collective enforcement, which is so objectionable, he would find at the outset that it would be far more difficult to persuade the Court, on the reverse side of the argument, that the agreement could operate in the public interest. For these reasons I hope that the hon. Member for Huddersfield, West (Mr. Wade) who moved the Amendment, will press it.
    Mrs. Castle: The President is rather cool to plead in aid at this time of night the Report of the Monopolies Commission. Earlier, when some of us were trying to discover where he got paragraph (b) from, he told us that we must not fall back upon the Monopolies Commission Report but must think of our arguments for ourselves. When some of us expressed anxiety about paragraph (b), which seemed to us an enormous loophole, he said that it was absolutely imperative to have a Clause which would enable public advantage to be pleaded. Many hon. Members had quoted in aid the net book agreement. At that point the President insisted that it was important that we should separate completely—
    The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): The hon. Lady now seems to be dealing with something which we have already dealt with and not with paragraph (g).
    Mrs. Castle: I do not know why it is, Sir Rhys, but you seem to have a propensity for interrupting me in the middle of a sentence—before I can conclude it and show that I am in fact dealing with the Amendment, and using an earlier discussion merely as an illustration. I was
    700
    going on to say that earlier on the President had said that it was important to discuss the nature of an agreement quite separately from the methods of enforcement. Now that we have reached a later paragraph of the same Clause he says that if an agreement per se is acceptable, all the methods of enforcement automatically fall to be approved.
    I am pointing out that he has now completely joined up our discussion of pararaph (b) with our present discussion, because he is now saying that if any agreement falls to be acceptable by the nature of that agreement rather than by the nature of the methods of its enforcement, those methods of enforcement automatically also become acceptable—and his own sharp distinction, drawn earlier, is surrendered. His explanation is therefore entirely unsatisfactory. All he has said is that he falls back upon the Monopolies Commission Report—an argument which he himself considered unsatisfactory earlier on.
    Mr. Pitman: I rise with the intention of giving a helpful explanation of what I imagine to be the sort of instance in point. I am thinking of a product which can be sold only to qualified chemists, and only to those qualified chemists with good refrigerators. In that case the possession of a good refrigerator would be a condition of sale. It might be that there were a number of independent chemists' undertakings, all under the same management and having a central buying department but, in point of fact, being different legal entities. It might be a really necessary part of the denial of supplies to shop A to deny supplies also to shops B and C, who were the central controlling powers for all the shops. That would be a matter
    "connected with the maintenance of any other restriction"
    because the other restriction would not otherwise be effective.
    Mr. Mulley: I appreciate the point which the hon. Member for Bath (Mr. Pitman) has just made, but if that really is the purpose of the paragraph why does it not say so? We should have far less objection to the paragraph if it were in the form suggested by the hon. Member, namely that it was really necessary for the operation of the restriction concerned. "Reasonably required" is a weaker form

    701
    of words than is contained in any other paragraph in the Clause.
    I think that I am speaking for all my hon. Friends when I say how much I welcome the sight of the Attorney-General taking part in the proceedings. I do not know whether his presence is an indication that the Government feel that they are in a difficulty or whether it would be safer to predict that they will soon be in a difficulty as a result of his assistance. Perhaps he will explain to the Committee the difference between "reasonably necessary" and "reasonably required", because there must be some significance in the change of wording, otherwise I cannot see why the draftsmen would have altered it.
    9.0 p.m.
    If this paragraph is to remain in the Bill, I suggest that it needs to be drafted on much tighter lines. After hearing my hon. Friends, I have considerable doubt about the merits of the paragraph in the Clause. The President was rather offhand in saying that if we had a few trimmings, by way of aggregated rebates and perhaps a collective boycott or two, that did not matter if the root restrictive practice was approved by the Court. I do not think that we are bound to agree to the trimmings just because we accept the main restrictive practice.
    I thought that the President and the Bill were against restrictive practices per se, and that the whole question of proving that they were necessary and in the public interest had to be gone through before they were allowed to
    remain. The point of this paragraph, if it means anything at all, is in connection with the reinforcement provisions. It really is not necessary, just because there is a restrictive agreement on common prices approved by the Court, to have an aggregated rebate system as well.
    The President would have been far better advised to give people the power to go to the public courts to have their agreements enforced rather than to allow them the paraphernalia of stop lists, secret courts and the like. I know that that is a controversial view, but certainly if they have no other redress and if this provision is in the Bill it will provide a loophole through which a great many of the particularly obnoxious practices which we are all against will be allowed to continue, and I ask the President to give a little more consideration to this matter before we go any further.
    Mr. Wade: I listened very carefully to what the Minister had to say. I find from time to time that I have to remind myself that I must not rely entirely on the good intentions of the Minister in considering wording that has to be interpreted by the Court. In my opinion this provision may be interpreted in too wide a way. For that reason I think that the paragraph would be rather dangerous, and I do not think that I can conscientiously ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Question put, That "or" stand part of the Clause:—
    The Committee divided: Ayes 192, Noes 143.

    Division No. 168.]

    AYES

    [6.30 p.m.

    Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

    Fletcher-Cooke, C.

    Jones, Rt. Hon. Aubrey(Hall Green)

    Aitken, W. T.

    Fort, R.

    Joseph, Sir Keith

    Arbuthnot, John

    Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

    Joynson-Hicks, Hon, Sir Lancelot

    Armstrong, C. W.

    Freeth, D. K.

    Keegan, D.

    Ashton, H.

    Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

    Kerr, H. W.

    Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

    George, J. C. (Pollok)

    Kershaw, J. A.

    Baldwin, A. E.

    Gibson-Watt, D.

    Kimball, M.

    Barlow, Sir John

    Glover, D.

    Kirk, P. M.

    Barter, John

    Godber, J, B.

    Lagden, G. W.

    Baxter, Sir Beverley

    Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan

    Lambert, Hon. G.

    Beamish, Maj. Tufton

    Gower, H. R.

    Leavey, J. A.

    Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

    Graham, Sir Fergus

    Leburn, W. G.

    Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

    Green, A.

    Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

    Biggs-Davison, J. A.

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

    Bishop, F. P.

    Grimond, J.

    Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

    Black, C. W.

    Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

    Linstead, Sir H. N.

    Body, R. F.

    Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

    Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

    Bossom, Sir A. G.

    Gurden, Harold

    Low, Rt. Hon. A. R. W.

    Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

    Hall, John (Wycombe)

    Lucas, Sir Jocelyn (Portsmouh, S.)

    Boyle, Sir Edward

    Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

    Lucas, P. B. (Brentford & Chiswick)

    Braithwaite, Sir Albert (Harrow, W.)

    Harris, Reader (Heston)

    McAdden, S. J.

    Brooman-White, R. C.

    Harrison, A. B. C. (Maldon)

    Macdonald, Sir Peter

    Browne, J. Nixon (Craigton)

    Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

    Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

    Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

    Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

    McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

    Burden, F. F. A.

    Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

    Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

    Butler, Rt. Hn. R.A.(Saffron Walden)

    Hay, John

    Maclean, Fitzroy (Lancaster)

    Campbell, Sir David

    Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

    Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

    Carr, Robert

    Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. C.

    Maddan, Martin

    Channon, H.

    Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

    Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W.(Horncastle)

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Hill, Rt. Hon. Charles (Luton)

    Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

    Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

    Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

    Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

    Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

    Markham, Major Sir Frank

    Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

    Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

    Marlowe, A. A. H.

    Corfield, Capt. F. V.

    Hirst, Geoffrey

    Marples, A. E.

    Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

    Holland-Martin, C. J.

    Mathew, R.

    Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. O. E.

    Holt, A. F.

    Maude, Angus

    Crouch, R. F.

    Hope, Lord John

    Mawby, R. L.

    Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

    Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

    Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

    Cunningham, Knox

    Horobin, Sir Ian

    Milligan. Rt. Hon. W. R.

    Currie, G. B. H.

    Horsbrugh, Rt. Hon. Dame Florence

    Molson, A. H. E.

    Dance, J. C. G.

    Howard, Hon. Greville (St, Ives)

    Moore, Sir Thomas

    Deedes, W. F.

    Howard, John (Test)

    Morrison, John (Salisbury)

    Doughty, C. J. A.

    Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

    Nairn, D. L, S.

    Drayson, G. B.

    Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

    Heave, Airey

    du Cann, E. D. L.

    Hulbert, Sir Norman

    Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

    Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

    Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh.W.)

    Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

    Duthie, W. S.

    Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

    Nield, Basil (Chester)

    Eden, Rt. Hn. Sir A. (Warwick & L'm'tn)

    Hyde, Montgomery

    Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

    Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

    Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

    Nugent, G. R. H.

    Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn

    Iremonger, T. L.

    Oakshott, H. D.

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

    Fell, A.

    Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

    Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

    Finlay, Graeme

    Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

    Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

    Fisher, Nigel

    Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

    Page, R. G.

    Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

    Roper, Sir Harold

    Turner, H. F. L.

    Partridge, E.

    Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

    Vane, W. M. F.

    Pickthorn, K. W. M.

    Russell, R. S.

    Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

    Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

    Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

    Vickers, Miss J. H.

    Pitman, I. J.

    Sharpies, R. C.

    Vosper, D. F.

    Pitt, Miss E. M.

    Shepherd, William

    Wade, D. W.

    Pott, H. P.

    Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

    Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

    Powell, J. Enoch

    Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

    Walker-Smith, D. C.

    Prior-Palmer, Brig. O. L.

    Spens, Rt. Hn. Sir P. (Kens'gt'n, S.)

    Wall, Major Patrick

    Profumo, J. D.

    Stevens, Geoffrey

    Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

    Raikes, Sir Victor

    Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

    Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

    Rawlinson, Peter

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

    Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

    Redmayne, M.

    Studholme, H. G.

    Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold

    Rees-Davies, W. R.

    Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

    Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith & Border)

    Remnant, Hon. P.

    Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

    Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

    Renton, D. L. M.

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

    Ridsdale, J. E.

    Teeling, W.

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Rippon, A. G. F.

    Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

    Woollam, John Victor

    Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

    Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

    Yates, William (The Wrekin)

    Robertson, Sir David

    Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

    Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

    Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

    Touche, Sir Gordon

    Mr. Barber and Mr. Bryan.

    NOES

    Ainsley, J. W.

    Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)

    Pargiter, G. A.

    Albu, A. H.

    Griffiths, William (Exchange)

    Parker, J.

    Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

    Hale, Leslie

    Paton, J.

    Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

    Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

    Peart, T. F.

    Bacon, Miss Alice

    Hamilton, W. W.

    Plummer, Sir Leslie

    Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.

    Hannan, W.

    Popplewell, E.

    Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

    Hastings, S.

    Price, Philips (Gloucestershire, W.)

    Benson, G.

    Hayman, F. H.

    Probert, A. R.

    Beswick, F.

    Henderson, Rt. Hn. A. (Rwly Regis)

    Proctor, W. T.

    Blackburn, F.

    Herbison, Miss M.

    Pryde, D. J.

    Blyton, W. R.

    Hobson, C. R.

    Rankin, John

    Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.

    Holmes, Horace

    Redhead, E. C.

    Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

    Houghton, Douglas

    Reeves, J.

    Bowles, F. G.

    Hubbard, T. F.

    Reid, William

    Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

    Robens, Rt. Hon, A.

    Brookway, A. F.

    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

    Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)

    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

    Hunter, A. E.

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)

    Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)

    Ross, William

    Burden, F. F. A.

    Irving, S. (Dartford)

    Royle, C.

    Burke, W. A.

    Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

    Shurmer, P. L. E.

    Burton, Miss F. E.

    Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Simmons, C. J. (Brierley Hill)

    Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

    Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs, S.)

    Skeffington, A. M.

    Callaghan L. J.

    Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

    Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

    Castle, Mrs. B. A.

    Johnson, James (Rugby)

    Snow, J. W.

    Champion, A, J.

    Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

    Sorensen, R. W.

    Chetwynd, G. R.

    Jones, Jack (Rotherham)

    Sparks, J. A.

    Clunie, J.

    Kenyon, C.

    Steele, T.

    Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

    Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

    Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

    Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

    King, Dr. H. M.

    Strauss, Rt. Hon. George (Vauxhall)

    Corbet, Mrs. Freda

    Lawson, G. M.

    Stross, Dr. Barnett(Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

    Summerskill, Rt. Hon, E.

    Cronin, J. D.

    Lindgren, G. S.

    Swingler, S. T.

    Daines, P.

    Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

    Sylvester, G. O.

    Darling, George (Hillsborough)

    MacColl, J. E.

    Taylor, John (West Lothian)

    Davies, Harold (Leek)

    McGovern, J.

    Tomney, F.

    Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

    McInnes, J.

    Turner-Samuels, M.

    de Freitas, Geoffrey

    McKay, John (Wallsend)

    Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

    Delargy, H. J.

    McLeavy, Frank

    Viant, S. P.

    Dodds, N. N.

    MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

    Warbey, W. N.

    Donnelly, D. L.

    Mahon, Simon

    Weitzman, D.

    Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

    Marquand, Rt. Hon. H. A.

    Wells, Percy (Faversham)

    Edwards, Rt. Hon. John (Brighouse)

    Mellish, R. J.

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

    Messer, Sir F.

    Wheeldon, W. E.

    Edwards, W. J. (Stepney)

    Mikardo, Ian

    White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

    Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

    Mitchison, G. R.

    White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

    Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

    Monslow, W.

    Willey, Frederick

    Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

    Moody, A. S.

    Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

    Fernyhough, E.

    Morrison, Rt. Hn. Herbert (Lewis'm, S.)

    Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

    Fletcher, Erie

    Mulley, F. W.

    Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

    Forman, J. C.

    Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

    Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)

    Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)

    Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

    Winterbottom, Richard

    Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

    Oliver, G. H.

    Woof, R. E.

    Gibson, C. W.

    Oram, A. E.

    Yates, V. (Ladywood)

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

    Oswald, T.

    Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

    Greenwood, Anthony

    Paget, R. T.

    Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

    Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Grey, C. F.

    Palmer, A. M. F.

    Mr. Short and Mr. Deer

    align="center">Division No. 169.]

    AYES

    [9.2 p.m.

    Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

    Godber, J. B.

    Aitken, W. T.

    Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

    Gomme-Duncan, Col. Sir Alan

    Arbuthnot, John

    Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

    Gower, H. R.

    Armstrong, C. W.

    Corfield, Capt. F. V.

    Graham, Sir Fergus

    Ashton, H.

    Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

    Grant, W. (Woodside)

    Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

    Crouch, R. F.

    Green, A.

    Baldwin, A. E.

    Crowder, Sir John (Finchley)

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Barber, Anthony

    Cunningham, Knox

    Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

    Barlow, Sir John

    Currie, G. B. H.

    Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

    Barter, John

    Dance, J. C. G.

    Gurden, Harold

    Baxter, Sir Beverley

    Deedes, W. F.

    Hall, John (Wycombe)

    Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

    Doughty, C. J. A.

    Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

    Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

    Drayson, G. B.

    Harris, Reader (Heston)

    Biggs-Davison, J. A.

    du Cann, E. D. L.

    Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

    Bishop, F. P.

    Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

    Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

    Black, C. W.

    Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

    Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)

    Body, R. F.

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Hay, John

    Bossom, Sir A. C.

    Finlay, Graeme

    Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

    Boyle, Sir Edward

    Fisher, Nigel

    Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.

    Brooman-White, R. C.

    Fletcher-Cooke, C.

    Hicks-Beach, Maj. W. W.

    Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

    Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

    Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

    Butler, Rt. Hn. R.A.(Saffron Walden)

    Freeth, D. K.

    Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

    Channon, H.

    George, J. C. (Pollok)

    Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Gibson-Watt, D.

    Hirst, Geoffrey

    Holland-Martin, C. J.

    Markham, Major Sir Frank

    Robertson, Sir David

    Hope, Lord John

    Marlowe, A. A. H.

    Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

    Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

    Marples, A. E.

    Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

    Horobin, Sir Ian

    Marshall, Douglas

    Roper, Sir Harold

    Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

    Mathew, R.

    Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

    Howard, John (Test)

    Maude, Angus

    Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

    Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

    Mawby, R. L.

    Sharpies, R. C.

    Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

    Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

    Shepherd, William

    Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

    Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

    Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

    Hutchison, Sir James (Scotstoun)

    Molson, A. H. E.

    Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

    Hyde, Montgomery

    Moore, Sir Thomas

    Stevens, Geoffrey

    Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

    Morrison, John (Salisbury)

    Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Nairn, D. L. S.

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

    Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

    Neave, Airey

    Studholme, H. G.

    Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

    Nicholson, Godfrey (Farnham)

    Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

    Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

    Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th E. & Chr'ch)

    Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

    Joseph, Sir Keith

    Nield, Basil (Chester)

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

    Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

    Teeling, W.

    Keegan, D.

    Nugent, G. R. H.

    Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)

    Kerr, H. W.

    Oakshott, H. D.

    Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

    Kershaw, J. A.

    Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

    Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R. (Croydon, S.)

    Kimball, M.

    Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

    Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

    Kirk, P. M.

    Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

    Touche, Sir Gordon

    Lagden, G. W.

    Orr-Ewing, Sir Ian (Weston-S-Mare)

    Turner, H. F. L.

    Leavey, J. A.

    Page, R. G.

    Vane, W. M. F.

    Leburn, W. G.

    Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

    Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

    Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

    Partridge, E.

    Vickers, Miss J. H.

    Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

    Pickthorn, K. W. M.

    Vosper, D. F.

    Lindsay, Hon. James (Devon, N.)

    Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

    Walker-Smith, D. C.

    Linstead, Sir H. N.

    Pitman, I. J.

    Wall, Major Patrick

    Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

    Pitt, Miss E. M.

    Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

    McAdden, S. J.

    Pott, H. P.

    Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

    Macdonald, Sir Peter

    Powell, J. Enoch

    Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

    Mackie, J. H. (Galloway)

    Profumo, J. D.

    Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)

    McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

    Raikes, Sir Victor

    Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

    Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

    Rawlinson, Peter

    Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

    Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

    Redmayne, M.

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Maddan, Martin

    Remnant, Hon. P.

    Woollam, John Victor

    Maitland, Cdr. J. F. W. (Horncastle)

    Ridsdale, J. E.

    Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

    Rippon, A. G. F.

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

    Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)

    Mr. E. Wakefield and Mr. Bryan

    NOES

    Ainsley, J. W.

    Fernyhough, E.

    McInnes, J.

    Albu, A. H.

    Fletcher, Eric

    McKay, John (Wallsend)

    Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

    Forman, J. C.

    McLeavy, Frank

    Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

    Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

    MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

    Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

    Gibson, C. W.

    Mahon, Simon

    Benson, G.

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Beswick, F.

    Greenwood, Anthony

    Mellish, R. J.

    Blackburn, F.

    Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

    Mikardo, Ian

    Blenkinsop, A.

    Grey, C. F.

    Mitchison, G. R.

    Blyton, W. R.

    Griffiths, William (Exchange)

    Monslow, W.

    Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

    Grimond, J.

    Moody, A. S.

    Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

    Hale, Leslie

    Mulley, F. W.

    Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

    Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

    Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

    Brockway, A. F.

    Hamilton, W. W.

    Oliver, G. H.

    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

    Hannan, W.

    Oram, A. E.

    Burke, W. A.

    Hastings, S.

    Oswald, T.

    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

    Hayman, F. H.

    Owen, W. J.

    Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

    Herbison, Miss M.

    Paget, R. T.

    Castle, Mrs. B. A.

    Holt, A. F.

    Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

    Champion, A. J.

    Houghton, Douglas

    Palmer, A. M. F.

    Clunie, J.

    Hubbard, T. F.

    Pargiter, G. A.

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

    Parker, J.

    Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

    Paton, J.

    Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

    Hunter, A. E.

    Peart, T. F.

    Corbet, Mrs. Freda

    Irving, S. (Dartford)

    Plummer, Sir Leslie

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Isaacs, Rt. Hon. G. A.

    Probert, A. R.

    Cronin, J. D.

    Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

    Pryde, D.J.

    Daines, P.

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Redhead, E. C.

    Darling, George (Hillsborough)

    Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs. S.)

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    Davies, Rt. Hon. Clement (Montgomery)

    Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

    Johnson, James (Rugby)

    Ross, William

    Deer, G.

    Jones, David (The Hartlepools)

    Royle, C.

    Delargy, H. J.

    Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

    Shurmer, P. L. E.

    Dodds, N. N.

    Kenyon, C.

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Donnelly, D. L.

    Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

    Skeffington, A. M.

    Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

    King, Dr. H. M.

    Slater, J. (Sedgefield)

    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

    Lawson, G. M.

    Sparks, J. A.

    Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

    Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)

    Steele, T.

    Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

    Lindgren, G. S.

    Stokes, Rt. Hon. R. R. (Ipswich)

    Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

    Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

    Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

    Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

    MacColl, J E.

    Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

    704

    705

    Swingler, S. T.

    Weitzman, D.

    Williams, W. T. (Barons Court)

    Sylvester, G. O.

    Wells, Percy (Faversham)

    Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

    Taylor, John (West Lothian)

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Woof, R. E.

    Tomney, F.

    Wheeldon, W. E.

    Yates, V. (Ladywood)

    Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

    White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

    Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

    Viant, S. P.

    White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

    Wade, D. W.

    Willey, Frederick

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Warbey, W. N.

    Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

    Mr. Simmons and Mr. Short.

    Amendment made: In page 14, line 26, at the end insert:
    (g) that, having regard to the conditions actually obtaining or reasonably foreseen at the time of the application, the removal of the restriction would be likely to cause a substantial reduction in the volume of earnings of the export trade of the United Kingdom either generally or in respect of the said trade or industry; or.—[Mr. Nield.]
    Sir P. Roberts: I beg to move, in page 14, line 34, at the end to insert:
    (h) that the removal of the restriction would be likely to have a serious and persistent adverse effect on the carrying out of technical education, research and development in the industry concerned.
    The Amendment deals with technical education, research and development. I do not think that there is any need at this time of night to stress to the Committee the need for these three sciences. I understand that the main principle of a research association would be covered by paragraph (b), but there is the case of the production association using the price level in order to finance its research and development and then exchanging the results of that research and development between its members.
    It is on that point that I should like my right hon. Friend to advise us tonight, because the position would be that if the general association became illegal there would be a good deal of cut-throat competition and loss of faith and no exchange of information such as is going on at present. In some of the smaller industries, particularly, they are up against the competition, not only of America, but also of Russia, for the lead. I believe it is essential that this exchange of technical knowledge should go on in this country as far as possible, and that if we were to lose it we should, to a large extent, also lose the lead which we now have.
    I should like my right hon. Friend to consider this point very carefully. An industry may have a research association that in itself is covered by paragraph (b)—I think that is correct—and a price-fixing arrangement to enable it to pass on the results of all its research and development which is essential to industry, but
    706
    there may be one or two firms which will not do that. They may be prepared to cut, if they can, to make it uneconomic for such development to take place. We want to know whether restrictions allowing such development that would come under paragraph (b). I think that is the point which should be covered this evening.
    9.15 p.m.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts) for moving this Amendment in order that I may make the position quite plain.
    Under paragraph (b) a person concerned is entitled to prove
    "that the removal of the restriction would deny to the public as purchasers, consumers or users of any goods other specific and substantial benefits or advantages enjoyed or likely to be enjoyed by them as such, whether by virtue of the restriction itself or of any arrangements or operations resulting therefrom."
    I am not going to specify all the arguments that would be used because they would very infinitely between one industry and another, but certainly those arguments could be used about technical education, research and the like. Certainly they can use those arguments, but they would have to establish that the removal of the arrangement would mean that those things would be lost, or lost to a substantial degree. I do not say that in every case the Court would accept the fact that research would go on in an industry only so long as there was a price ring. The argument might be rejected in some cases. At the same time, there is nothing to prevent those arguments being put forward in the context of establishing specific and substantial advantages to the consumer.
    Mr. Geoffrey Hirst: I am not quite happy with what the President of the Board of Trade has said, although I think he has tried to meet the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts). I speak on this matter with some experience, and I should like to give my right hon. Friend an instance of what happens.

    707
    For a great number of years I was connected with the heavy chemical industry. A particular section of that industry had a remarkably good arrangement. There were common prices, but, before any hon. Member opposite shouts me own, I wish to tell the Committee what the result was. All the individual firms in that association made a complete exchange of research work—the whole bag of tricks was exchanged—and the price was very much reduced. We did not require anything like the wholsale charges for research which individual firms would have had to pay if they carried out research separately.
    I am not at all happy that the Clause would cover such a point. We require a little more assurance. It is all very well to say, "I think those things would come in; I can see no reason why they should not". That is the way in which we conduct affairs and often we are wise after the event. If possible, I want to be wise before the event and to ensure that systems which have been of enormous benefit to certain sections of the chemical industry should be retained. I think this addition would be a very wise one to make, and I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley will press the Amendment. I am not satisfied with what the President has said, and, if the matter is taken to a Division, I shall vote in favour of the Amendment.
    Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: I think it very important that these firms and industries should have the opportunity of making their case under paragraph (b) of Clause 16. I understand that this question affects chiefly the heavy engineering and electrical industries. In those industries the amounts of money devoted to research are very large. I have been told that one machine required for testing purposes in the electrical industry cost £1 million.
    It would be ridiculous if the products of those industries were sold at their barest cost, only covering the direct cost of production, without anything being left for research, technical education, or technical development. Some of these industries have been criticised severely for level tendering and level prices, but I believe there is a great deal of justification for what they have done in the past, as they have devoted money which has come from level tendering to provide vast
    708
    sums for research. In one industry alone these sums have amounted to £10 million.
    Therefore, I am pleased to hear the President say that this matter will be covered by paragraph (b). It would be disastrous if we were forced into the position that these heavy industries had to give up research because of cut-throat competition and to give up installing big machines, whether gas turbines or for electrical engineering or atomic energy.
    It was said from the other side of the House at Question Time today that we are not spending as much money as we should on scientific and industrial research. It was suggested that we are spending only £35 million when we should be spending £50 million. Therefore I hope that the Court will be able to take into account a benefit that the public derives from the money spent in research, even if obtained from level prices and level tendering in some of the heavy industries.
    Sir Hugh Linstead: I wonder whether my right hon. Friend would look again at the wording of his original paragraph (b)? I gather that he does not disagree with the Amendment on its merits but is saying that everything for which it provides can be achieved under paragraph (b). Paragraph (b), however, seems singularly badly designed to deal with the advantages of education, research and development.
    Paragraph (b) refers first to the advantages to "purchasers, consumers or users"—not to the public or to industry generally, but to individual people who purchase, consume or use. Then it uses the words "of any goods". The limitation to goods seems to me to cut out entirely services such as electricity or other forms of energy. Therefore, to rely solely upon paragraph (b) for education, research and development would impose a limitation to education, research and development connected with goods and not with a number of other industrial things or processes which should enjoy the benefits but which, I think, could not be brought in under paragraph (b) as it is drafted.
    There is merit in this objection. Paragraph (b) should be looked at again and extended somewhat in the sense of the Amendment, and I hope that my right hon. Friend will be willing to look at it again.
    Mr. Mulley: If hon. Members opposite press their threat to divide on the Amendment, I shall have great pleasure in going into the Division Lobby against the Amendment, for it seems to me unreasonable to create another loophole in the Bill. Hon. Members opposite adopt a rather different attitude when they come near to feeling the blast of competition in contrast to their traditional election cries about the virtues of competition. Their own arguments condemn the Amendment.
    We have been told that we are backward in our provision for research. The reason for that is largely the price agreements and restrictive arrangements which have operated against industry for so long.
    Mr. Hirst: The hon. Member cannot get away with that. Research has developed, and has been able all the more to develop, as a result of these trade associations which have encouraged progress.
    Mr. Mulley: The hon. Member is speaking complete nonsense. The comparison that is made is with the U.S.A. Any American will say that the reason why America has made progress in research and development is because there is competition and the type of restrictive practices which the Amendment would perpetuate are not allowed.
    The incentives to an individual firm which wants to do a job of research are discouraged because if its members belong to a price-fixing association they cannot lower their prices and secure the increased market that their new technical developments would make possible. I do not think anyone has given any evidence, and I do not think any evidence exists, to show that research has been done in a significant way by joint research associations. Most of the technical advances which have been made have been made as a result of research financed by Government money, or, alternatively, research done by individual firms. If anyone likes to give me a very good example of a substantial advance in technology as the result of a pooling arrangement depending on a fixed price agreement, I shall be very happy to give way to him. No one has been forthcoming with that information.
    Mr. Hirst: If the hon. Member is going to attack me—not that I mind that a bit
    710
    —he must listen to what I say. I gave him a case from the heavy chemical industry. It was in the case of sulphuric acid. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Have hon. Members opposite never heard of it?
    Mr. Mulley: I do not accept that for a moment. There was no need to have a restrictive practices arrangement to obtain research. I think that a firm like I.C.I. has done much more for research on its own than has been done under any restrictive agreements.
    Mr. E. Johnson: As the hon. Member says these arrangements have not worked I would quote to him an extract from an answer to a questionnaire by the Monopolies Commission to the British Steel Wire Industries Association. It refers to
    "a scheme of common research in which all members of the British Steel Wire Industries Association are automatically entitled to share the benefits and most recently, a mutual aid scheme for subsidising imported raw material. A firm is not likely to subscribe to a common research arrangement with another with whom it is conducting a price war."
    Mr. Mulley: The hon. Gentleman has given me no evidence that there was a substantial advance in technology. If he wants any evidence on this matter let him compare the efficiency and technological developments of this country with those of the United States, where there is no provision of the sort that hon. Gentlemen opposite seek to put into this Bill.
    We have gone a long way already to meet them. Patents have been excluded, and the President has said that a reasonable case for a common research arrangement is already covered by paragraph (b). If the Amendment was accepted I suppose there would be people who would say that they would have to send their representatives on sandwich courses. A wider form of words could hardly be designed, and I would ask the President not to give way to the blandishments of his hon. Friends.
    Mr. Hirst: I think we should have some further answer to the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts). My right hon. Friend may not like the way I put it, but that does not matter, but I think that the very reasonable case of my hon. Friend calls for further answer. I hope he will consider giving us an assurance that what we are aiming at is covered by paragraph (b). If my right hon. Friend can give

    711
    that assurance that that is specifically covered, I shall be happy. Otherwise I shall not.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I do not think that there is any doubt about what the Clause does in the matter. We have had a long discussion on paragraph (b), and have gone into this matter in very great detail indeed. I listened with the greatest interest to my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts), who argued, as he was entitled to do, and argued very properly that research, technical education, the exchange of techniques, were of great benefit to the consumers of these goods. That is quite true, and there is substantial support for that. If my hon. Friend refers to Reports of the Monopolies Commission he will find that it laid special stress on the advantages of this kind of thing.
    9.30 p.m.
    Indeed, it was with the idea of permitting arguments upon research that we drafted paragraph (b) in the form it has been drafted, and there is not the slightest doubt that arguments of that kind can be admitted. I do not say that the Courts will accept the argument. It may say that the research can go on perfectly well without a price ring. Indeed, research does very frequently go on without a price ring in free enterprise, but there may be occasions when knowledge and technique are fostered by mutual restrictions. These are matters which can be properly argued in the courts.
    Sir P. Roberts: My right hon. Friend has given me the assurance for which I asked. No one maintains that before there can be an advance in technology there must be a price ring. All we want is for it to be permissible to be argued before the Court whether or not there is a reasonable case for maintaining a restriction in certain circumstances. Before I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment, I would say to the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) that I do not know how he can suggest that we are backward in research. In some respects we lead the world. To hear the hon. Member denigrating some of the technicians in Sheffield was really a shock to me.
    I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Hon. Members: No.
    Mr. Mulley: My information was derived from the Government's own White Paper.
    Hon. Members: No. Amendment negatived.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I beg to move, in page 14, line 35, after the first "and", to insert "is further satisfied".
    I think it may be convenient if we discuss this Amendment with the Amendment in page 14, line 35, to leave out from "restriction" to "persons" in line 37 and insert:
    "is not unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circumstances and any detriment to the public or to".
    and the Amendment in page 14, line 41, leave out from "goods" to end of line and add:
    "resulting or likely to result from the operation of the restriction".
    I think it will be convenient also if I explain what the effects of these Amendments are. Their object is to make some clarification of what I might conveniently call the tailpiece of Clause 16. Up to now, we have been discussing the various paragraphs (a) to (g), and I might remind the Committee of the way in which we are dealing with this matter. The presumption is that the restriction is against the public interest and if anyone wishes to repudiate that presumption he has first of all to establish one, but not all, of the circumstances in paragraphs (a) to (g).
    Then he must go on to establish something else and I think that it would be convenient if I read out the tailpiece incorporating the Amendments but, to make it simpler, omitting the definition of the public as being consumers and users and so forth, which is not directly relevant to the point which I am making. The tailpiece would then read as follows:
    "… and is further satisfied (in any such case) that the restriction is not unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circumstances"—
    that is the (a) to (g) circumstances—
    "and any detriment to the public or to persons not parties to the agreement resulting or likely to result from the operation of the restriction."
    That is how it will read. I hope that it is convenient to the Committee that I have read it out like that, because it is not always easy to recognise from Amendments what the final result will be.

    713
    I will put quite shortly the principles which I have in mind here. The first principle, which I think is shared by the Committee, is that, throughout, the onus should be on the industry, on the people who practice particular arrangements, to show that they are not contrary to the public interest. They must do that because they alone know what it is they want to do and why it is they want to do it. We discussed that on Second Reading, and that is a basic presumption the whole way through the Clause.
    This is a difficult realm in which complete solutions are not always possible, and the second one is a little more difficult. We are anxious not to throw the issue of the public interest wide open; that is to say, so far as possible we should circumscribe the task which the Court, or whoever is to judge this matter, has to perform. But we should not ask the Court vaguely, "Is it, or is it not against the public interest?" and permit in every case all the range of arguments which go on as to whether price rings are good or not. Once we started arguing as widely as that, there would be no end to the deliberations of the Court in those circumstances.
    So what we do is to ask, first, that the parties should establish one of the paragraphs (a) to (g). Secondly, they should show that it
    "is not unreasonable, having regard to the balance between those circumstances and any detriment to the public …"
    I think it is necessary to put those words in because there has been much misunderstanding about this point. It has been felt that if we go through paragraphs (a) to (g) so to speak, the whole operation has to start afresh.
    That is not so. Clearly, when one comes to think of the way these proceedings would take place, it must not be so. They all take place in front of the same Court and in the same proceedings. The party to the restrictive arrangement will have shown that it was reasonably necessary for the safety of the public or that its removal would have caused specific and substantial damage. When the Court comes to the end of Clause 16 it is right, and should be demonstrably clear in this Clause, that the circumstances which they have considered in paragraphs (a) to (g) should be weighing with them.
    714
    "Weighing" is the right word because this is a question of balance which, I admit frankly, is not easy. But, however difficult the task may be, it is right that I should set out what we want to happen here. Therefore, the Court must weigh the various advantages or benefits or avoidance of evils that have been shown in paragraphs (a) to (g) and then weigh them against any detriment to the public. It is not exactly a measuring operation. It is not enough to show that they could not avoid the damage to the public because of the necessity to do the specific thing. That is not enough. They must weigh the balance of advantage, which they have already shown, against any detriment to the public which may flow.
    We all admit that in the vast majority of these cases there must inevitably be some detriment to the public. I hesitate to give long examples but I will give one example of the kind of questions which will arise. Supposing it was shown that a series of arrangements, with stop lists and the rest, were proved to be reasonably necessary under paragraphs (a) to (g). On the tailpiece I think it would certainly be right to show that they did not operate to an unreasonable extent to the detriment of the public. The court might well ask, "What arrangements are there for anyone to come in on this list?" This question would be properly asked and properly debated and no doubt hon. Members can think of many others.
    I do not think there is any great alteration—that certainly is not our intention—in the tailpiece as drafted, but what it makes plain is, first, that the onus remains fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the persons practising the restrictions, and, second, that when they have gone through paragraphs (a-g) they do not suddenly lose the benefit of any arguments that they have adduced but can ask that they be weighed and balanced against any detriment which has been caused to the public.
    Mr. E. Fletcher: The Committee will give the President credit for having stated his intentions about the Amendments with complete candour. Where we differ from him is on his claim that the Amendments make no real change in the Bill as drafted. My opinion is that they make a very

    715
    radical change going to the root of the Clause, if not to the root of the Bill.
    I do not think the President would deny that since the Bill was published a great deal of attention has been directed by trade and industry generally, including chambers of commerce, to this Clause, the tailpiece, as the President describes it, which we are now considering. Representations were made that the tailpiece imposed onerous conditions on industry. I thought it did, and I thought it was intended to do so. I object to the Amendments because I believe that the President is making a totally unnecessary concession to industry as the result of representations made since the Second Reading, and this will mean changing the whole character of the Bill.
    Those who have had occasion to study the Clause since the Bill was presented have focussed their attention on this very point. They pointed out that for a trader to escape under the Clause it was not merely necessary first of all for him to bring himself within one of the provisions in paragraphs (a-g) but, after that, he had to go further and discharge the onus of showing that, notwithstanding that he came within the provisions of paragraphs (a-g), his restrictive agreements were still not detrimental to the public.
    I thought that was the whole purpose of the Clause as originally drafted. I thought that was implicit in the professions which the President has hitherto made about wanting to be serious about this matter. I thought that was his intention. In other words, I have understood that the sting was in the tailpiece, and that it was meant to be effective. The President is now taking the sting out of the tail and rendering it almost nugatory, because he is now taking away from the industry concerned the obligation of discharging the onus of showing—
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No.
    Mr. Fletcher: Yes, it is. He is taking away from the industry concerned the obligation of showing that the restrictive agreements are not detrimental to the public.
    Mr. Thorneycroft indicated dissent.
    Mr. Fletcher: We must pursue this. I have here a circular which is typical
    716
    of many others, and I have no doubt the President has seen it. It contains an interpretation from the London Chamber of Commerce which raises this very point. It states that what I have said was the result of the Clause as originally drafted. I think that was the intention. Otherwise the public interest would be defeated. The circular urges hon. Members opposite to support an Amendment earlier on the Order Paper in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald), which for some curious reason has not been moved. I suspect that the reason why the Amendment has not been moved is that after it appeared on the Order Paper the President—
    Sir L. Heald: On a point of order, Sir Rhys. The Amendment referred to by the hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) was not called. There never was an opportunity to move it.
    The Deputy-Chairman: The Amendment in the name of the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) cannot be discussed.
    Mr. Fletcher: Obviously, a fortiori, if it was not called it was not moved.
    Mr. Godfrey Nicholson: It was not selected.
    9.45 p.m.
    Mr. Fletcher: Neither selected nor called nor moved. I said it was not moved.
    The Deputy-Chairman: It not having been selected, of course, it cannot be discussed.
    Mr. Fletcher: I hope I am not being disrespectful, Sir Rhys, either to you or to anyone else. I am not complaining that it was not called or moved. I merely remarked that there was an Amendment on the Notice Paper, which was not for some reason being discussed—perhaps for very good reasons. The reason why we are not discussing it is because of the fact—
    The Deputy-Chairman: Order. There must be no further discussion on it.
    Mr. Fletcher: I do not want to make a point about it. The only relevance of it is that after that Amendment appeared on the Notice Paper, during the last day or two, the President has put down his

    717
    own Amendment, the one we are now discussing, which has given rise to this debate and also to some concern in other quarters. If I may say so, it is not of the greatest significance; I only mentioned that other Amendment on the Notice Paper in order to show how this matter has developed during the last two or three days.
    What I am arguing is that, so far from it being the case, as the President contended, that there was not very much substance in this Amendment, in our view it makes a very great deal of difference to the construction of this Clause and to the task with which the Court will be confronted.
    In support of that argument, perhaps I might quote what The Times said in a leading article on this particular subject yesterday. Under the heading, "How Strait are the Gates to Be?", this is what was said:
    "A Government Amendment to Clause 16"—
    which is the one we are now considering—
    "throws into still clearer relief a problem which has beset this legislation from the beginning."
    A little later it says:
    "The Amendment is officially regarded as neither strengthening nor weakening the Bill."
    Hon. Members: Read on.
    Mr. Fletcher: I am intending to read the whole thing, because this is very important. I shall read on, but I propose to take it in my own way, and comment upon it as I go. Obviously, this is a matter of great interest; so let us proceed. The article continues:
    "It is strengthening in that it makes clear that the Court is not to take account of any advantages claimed for the agreement except the particular advantages specified in the seven grounds for exemption."
    Let us pause there, and see if that is right. The President was careful to read out the effect of this tailpiece as amended. The new relevant wording which he has introduced by this Amendment requires that the Court has now to decide between the detriment to the public and "those circumstances". There is no definition of "circumstances".
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: It is all in the Clause.
    Mr. Fletcher: I accept that.
    The assumption behind the President's speech so far was that the industry might be able to bring this only within one or other of the paragraphs (a) to (g). There is no need to make that assumption. It is as at least likely, if not probable, that any industry coming before the Court will claim the benefit of perhaps three or four out of the seven paragraphs. A trader may have to prove only one to succeed, but may well say that he is entitled to benefit from them all and, if he has any sense, he will do so. Having done so, the Court does not produce a verdict and say that it comes within one or the other and, if so, which one.
    The trader will say, "All these apply to me", and the Court, without having to say that the trader falls within (a) and not the others, or within (c) and not the others, will have to listen to the whole of the argument and at that stage, under the President's Amendment, the Court will be able to weigh up all the contentions which the industry has made against the public interest. Therefore, it is not correct for the President to say that the Court will be limited to one particular set of circumstances. That is the assumption which The Times makes. The Times says, and I think wrongly, that the Amendment strengthens the Clause.
    I will now read on:
    "But the effect of the old wording might have been doubtful."
    We should all agree with that—
    "It is clear now that the Court must pronounce on the balance of advantage between the positive merits claimed for an agreement under paragraphs (a) to (g) and the detriment which it may inflict under the general proviso. This takes the Court some way from the ordinary judicial function. It emphasizes the importance of the knowledge, and indeed the economic views, of the members of the Court. There is no reason why Parliament should not delegate to the Court the power to judge the balance of economic advantage within limits laid down by statute. But those limits should be narrow. Is it right that a Court should have to weigh an alleged likelihood that the removal of the restriction would ' cause a substantial reduction in the volume or earnings of the export trade' against the alleged discomfiture of consumers or would-be new entrants into the industry? Argument on such a matter would be far more general and doctrinal than anything commonly heard in the Royal Courts of Justice. These seven gateways may yet have to be subjected to stricter scrutiny."

    719
    I have read the whole article. I want to comment on it and then, if hon. Members opposite wish, I will give way.
    This is merely confirmation, if more confirmation were wanted, of the contention which we have been advancing throughout, that these matters are not justiciable at all, but are rather matters in which economic advantages have to be weighed in the balance. It is very unfortunate that the Amendment was put down at such a late stage and after we had had the argument about whether these matters should be referred to the Court or to a tribunal, because the President has made more abundantly clear than ever before that the Court is being asked not to try a justiciable matter, but to come to a view on the balance between circumstances of detriment to the public.
    As the Clause stood previously, he could plausibly, although not very successfully, have put forward the argument that the trader had to discharge an onus of proof before he could succeed. He might have been able to allege, with far more success than he could now have, that the language of the tailpiece required the Court to declare an agreement contrary to the public interest, unless the trader proved what used to be set out in the tailpiece. Under the Amendment that onus no longer exists.
    Mr. Thorneycroft indicated dissent.
    Mr. Fletcher: Forgive me. It no longer exists. The Court weighs in the balance one economic advantage against another, and gives a decision accordingly. The President shakes his head; I know he has a very difficult and thankless task with all the pressure from the ranks behind him. It is with some regret that I have to say on this occasion that the President of the Board of Trade has given way to pressure against his better judgment.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have not given way to pressure. The hon. Member has had some legal training. He has had an opportunity to study these words. He says that they shift the onus. How can he substantiate that, in view of the words "further satisfied"?
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: It would be helpful to me if the right hon. Gentleman
    720
    would say precisely what, in his intention, is the difference between the words now in the Clause and as they would be if the Amendment were accepted. I do not mean that he should read out the words, but should tell us the difference in effect.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: There was doubt expressed about just precisely what these words meant. It was thought in some quarters that after (a) to (g) were over the whole issue was started de novo and that some new approach was to be made to it with no relation—this was put to me—to what had been established before. Without calling in aid the rights or wrongs of these restrictive practices, they had then to be judged in relation to the onus on the industry.
    Our intention is always the same about the onus. The words are quite clear:
    "Is further satisfied (in any such case)."
    That makes it clear beyond a peradventure that the onus is still there. We have tried to make it plain that the benefits or advantages which have been shown by the parties in evidence in front of the Court can be called in aid and a balance has to be struck between those advantages and any detriment to the public. That is what courts are doing all the time.
    The quotation from The Times was helpful to the hon. Member for Islington, East but on the wrong point, that which we debated and finished with, whether there was to be a court or a tribunal. It said quite plainly that the Amendment strengthened the Clause in the sense that it makes it definitely plainer.
    Mr. Grimond: I appreciate that the tail-piece to the Clause is important but is a little difficult, and I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman is going to reconsider paragraphs (a) and (g). Will he tell us what is meant by the word "public"? I understand that the Clause safeguards the general public.
    10.0 p.m.
    It does more than safeguard people who are directly affected by the restrictive practice, or the people who buy the goods from the association which is enforcing any particular practice. It places upon the court the onus of taking into account the effect of the practice upon public life. I hope I am right about that. Earlier on some reference was made to Dundee and the jute industry. It was suggested that

    721
    the heavy unemployment in that industry might have been alleviated to some extent by the maintenance of restrictive practices. That was put forward as an argument when we were dealing with paragraph (f).
    I have grave doubts about that paragraph, one of which is that although it is possible to conceive circumstances in which one industry might be able to minimise unemployment by being allowed to continue restrictive practices, it might well be at the expense of other industries. In the case of Dundee, new industries were brought into the area. It might have so happened that, had rigid restrictive practices been enforced in the jute industry, those other industries would not have received the advantages which they did receive and would not have created the very important new occupations in the town. Would that consideration have been taken into account under this tailpiece? Does the word "public" cover the public at large and also other industries? I should be very grateful if we could be assured on that point.
    Secondly, how is this public to be represented? It is all very well to say that the onus is on the association to prove that its operations are not against the public interest, but surely the public interest will have to be represented to the Court in some way. The Court will surely have to be placed in a position in which it can call evidence as to the effect of certain restrictive practices upon the public interest. I am not certain how that is to be done. Will it be open to anyone who feels that he may be affected by the maintenance of a restrictive practice—even though he is not a purchaser, consumer or user of the goods concerned—to ask to be heard at the Court? Will it be open to individuals, associations, consumers and other industries? Or will such representation be left to a Government Department, such as the Board of Trade? Or will the Court be allowed to call evidence at its own discretion? We should be informed about this point before we leave the Amendment.
    Lieut.-Colonel Wentworth Schofield: I support the Amendment because it accepts the very important principle of balance. It will enable the Court, if it thinks fit, to rule that a particular practice or agreement is not neces
    722
    sarily contrary to the public interest if the Court is satisfied that, on balance, the benefit which would accrue to the public is so small as to be out of all proportion to the damage which would be caused, not only to those who are parties to the agreement, but also to other sections of the public who may be affected by the withdrawal of the restriction. Work-people engaged in the industry may well come within that category. What we must watch is that when the Bill becomes law it will be just and fair, not only to the general public, but also to those who engage in industry and commerce.
    I presume that that is why the Bill provides that any practice or arrangement which comes before the Court shall be considered and judged by judges. As an ordinary layman who has never yet been before a judge—fortunately—I cannot claim to know as much about courts and judges as many hon. and learned Members. But I have always understood that judges are impartial and are accustomed to hearing evidence from both sides—the pros and cons—and are able to weigh up that evidence fairly and squarely before coming to their verdict.
    If I read the Amendment correctly, it will give the right to the Court to hear such arguments as may be necessary and, having done so, to determine whether on balance the restriction is reasonable or otherwise. If the restriction takes place it is certain that agreements or practices will vary in the degree to which they may or may be against the public interest. What worries many people engaged in industry is that an agreement may be comparatively harmless to the general public but be declared contrary to the public interest purely because the Court would not have a chance of assessing the findings on the balance of evidence. Prior to this Amendment being moved by my right hon. Friend, there appeared to be no power for the Court to take into account that there are some industries where the slight amount of benefit to the public would be completely outweighed by the damage which would be caused if the practice were discontinued in that particular industry or trade.
    One such case which comes to my mind, about which I have special knowledge, is the cotton spinning industry, an industry which works on large productions and small margins. Let us take,

    723
    for example, the cotton spinning mill, spinning the kind of yarn which is normally sold to a manufacturer to make overalls. A pair of overalls commonly described as the bib-and-brace type has approximately 2¼ 1bs. of cotton yarn in it. These overalls are normally sold at about 25s. in the shops. If the price of the yarn were reduced by 2d. per 1b.—and I can assure hon. Members that 2d. per 1b. reduction on that type of yarn, which is twenties, would be a very considerable reduction indeed, because we talk about a farthing, an eighth and a sixteenth in adjusting our prices—and that adjustment was passed on in subsequent stages to the retail shops, the most that the retail shops could reduce the price of that pair of overalls would be by 4½d.—from 25s. to 24s. 7½d. I doubt very much whether any member of the public would feel that he was getting much benefit from such a reduction.
    Let us look at the effect that that reduction would have on the spinner who has to spin the yarn if he had to knock 2d. per 1b. off the price of his yarn. The modern spinning mill today would spin 82,000 1bs. of that yarn every week and 82,000 1bs. at 2d. per 1b. amounts to £683 a week or £34,000 a year. The industry is so balanced that it makes no difference whether it is spinning coarse or fine yarns.
    If we take as an example the ordinary poplin shirt which many hon. Members may be wearing, and reduce the price of the yarn which goes into that shirt by 6d. per 1b., which is a considerable amount, it would have the same effect of costing the industry £34,000, and all that the public would get by way of reduced cost would be 4½d. off a shirt retailed at 35s. to 40s. That is a perfect example of what it means.
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: How does the hon. and gallant Gentleman arrive at the extraordinary figure of 4½d.?
    Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: If the hon. Gentleman is wearing a shirt which contains3¾ 1b. of yarn and the price of the yarn is reduced by 6d. the reduction in the price of the shirt would be only 4½d. I am sorry that I had to go into this question with someone who has established himself as an economist.
    Mr. Jenkins: Does not the hon. and gallant Gentleman recognise that a retailer works on a percentage margin and that a reduction in cost on the primary subject is carried through, all the time being increased?
    Lieut.-Colonel Schofield: I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman, in spite of being an economist, does not understand.
    I said that the price of the yarn is reduced by 6d. a pound and passes through all its subsequent stages, and I was referring to the raw material which goes into the making of the shirt. No one else can have any effect on that reduction. It is still 4½d. for the shirt. I am not talking about the tail of the shirt, but the shirt as a whole.
    A short time ago the President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, when making a survey of the industry, said that during 1955 the average profit of the cotton spinning mills was £27,000 a year. I submit that if the industry had to make the reductions of which I have spoken, that average of £27,000 profit would be converted into a loss. No industry can live on losses and, sooner or later, there would be unemployment. I support this Amendment, because it lays down that the balance between benefit and damage shall be taken into consideration.
    Mr. Jay: I do not wish to spin yarns on tailpieces but to ask the President this question. By the introduction of these new words, whatever he intended, has not the right hon. Gentleman in fact weakened the scope of the Clause? Did not the previous words means that the applicant had to prove that the agreement caused no unreasonable detriment to the public, to paraphrase the words, and do not the words which are now introduced mean that the applicant has to prove that the detriment to the public does not exceed the advantage claimed under the other Clauses?
    Whether that is right or wrong, it surely must be easier to prove that the detriment to the public, however great, is not greater than certain other advantages, than to prove that there is no detriment at all? Is that correct, and if not can the President explain why?
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Before answering that question I wish to thank my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for

    725
    Rochdale (Lieut.-Colonel Schofield) for the courteous and lucid way in which he has supported my Amendment.
    The answer to the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) is that under the Bill as drafted the words are as follows,
    "and (in any such case) that the restriction has not operated and is not calculated to operate to an unreasonable extent to the detriment of persons …"
    When the Court is faced with these words and has to decide what was "to an unreasonable extent," there would be a good deal of doubt as to what it ought to take into account. We thought it right to spell that out clearly in the Bill itself. I do not think there is much difference of opinion on either side of the Committee that what ought to be taken into account are the advantages and benefits on the one side against the detriment on the other.
    10.15 p.m.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: I did not intend to trouble the Committee until I listened to the very entertaining speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Rochdale (Lieut.-Colonel Schofield). He gave us a very interesting performance with figures, but we know other people who come from Rochdale who give us much more interesting performances in another sphere. As I listened to the hon. and gallant Gentleman's speech it seemed to me that his argument was really one in favour of the Clause without the Amendment now under discussion.
    I propose to counter the hon. and gallant Gentleman's argument with some further reasons why this Amendment is undesirable, and I shall put them very succinctly. The first is that it adds to the already long list of escape paragraphs in the Clause which run from (a) to (g), but this escape Clause is not like the others from paragraphs (a) to (g), which are frankly set forth as escape Clauses. This escape Clause is designed and disguised as an omnibus Clause. In fact it is an escape Clause in terms which are far too generous. It would place too great a burden upon the Court and would tend to defeat all the purposes of the Bill by the delay which it would involve in the administration of the Bill.
    Let us consider what the Court will have to decide if this Amendment is
    726
    accepted. The Court will have to be satisfied not only on the seven issues arising on paragraphs (a) to (g), but it will also have to be satisfied that the restriction is unreasonable. What is the criterion of "unreasonable"? No criterion is given beyond
    "having regard to the balance between those circumstances and any detriment to the public or to persons not parties to the agreement."
    Who are these persons to be? They may be legion. They are described in generic terms, but not in any particular terms.
    I submit that it is placing an impossible burden upon the Court to have to determine questions of that sort. The questions will include the meaning of "unreasonable" and what are the circumstances envisaged—the word "circumstances" is used—but which are not defined, and what is the balance of circumstances. The Amendment adds nothing of advantage to the Clause. It only makes the Clause more complicated, more difficult to construe and far more difficult for the unfortunate people who will have to administer it. Therefore, I oppose it.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I accept at once that the onus remains upon the industrialist. There is nothing between us at all on that. The word "balance" seems to be the next point of importance in the Amendment. Again, I say, as I stated on Second Reading, that I have always taken the view that on the construction of this Bill as it originally stood the words "unreasonable extent" in the second line of the tailpiece always brought into operation in the tailpiece the "balance" as against the items in paragraphs (a) to (g). As I say, I have taken that view throughout, and I was interested to see that that was, in fact, what the Lord Chancellor stated in his speech in Glasgow, shortly after the Second Reading debate, as being his interpretation of the tailpiece. There has certainly been doubt about it.
    What the Amendment does, quite clearly, is to make it impossible for the Court to avoid the political economic decision which is involved in balancing the economic advantages and disadvantages of what is included in paragraphs (a) to (g) with what I will call the general detriment to the public which is included in the latter paragraph. It

    727
    has the advantage of clarification, but clarification in the sense which is contrary to the way in which we should like to have it clarified.
    The second item is the words "detriment to the public". The whole of this tailpiece involves some difficult questions of construction. "Public" and "detriment to the public" are terms which are capable of more than one meaning and terms which obviously have to be interpreted in their context. It is arguable as to what is meant by "detriment to the public." The phrase in the Bill as it stands is at the end of the tailpiece. After dealing with consumers, etc., the paragraph gives as a general omnibus arrangement,
    "or otherwise to the detriment of the public."
    Rightly or wrongly, I have always taken the view that those words mean everything that could be brought within the term "public interest". I do not know whether that was the intention, but that was the view I formed to the best of my ability on the words,
    "or otherwise to the detriment of the public"
    at the end of the Clause.
    Now we have the words
    "balance between those circumstances and any detriment to the public or to".
    but they are used in a different context and as a term capable of a wide or narrow meaning according to the context in which it is found. The difficulty I find about this term in the Amendment is that it may be interpreted in a very much narrower sense than it would be interpreted in the original wording of the Bill.
    These are difficult questions of construction, and it is perfectly possible for "detriment to the public" to have one meaning in one context and a different meaning in another context. It seems to me that in the Amendment it has a much narrower connotation than in the original wording. Was the intention in the original wording that "detriment to the public" should bring in all questions of public interest or not? I gather that the intention is that it should have the same effect, but it is intended to bring in all matters of public interest, or is it not?
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: "Detriment to the public" is the detriment resulting,
    728
    or likely to result, from the operation of the restriction in both cases.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: Yes, but we are dealing with the balance of advantage, and I wish to ask if "detriment to the public" means anything, for instance, which affects the public, not the public merely as consumers, but generally?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: These Amendments are difficult to follow if they are not set out completely, but the Amendment makes it plain that any detriment to the public, or to persons not parties to the agreement—which is in the subjunctive—is detriment to the public, which is preserved in both cases.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman does not intend any change in meaning, but I gathered earlier that in the Bill as it stood originally one could bring in, under "detriment to the public", any matter of public interest, anything in the interest of the public, anything, in other words, which is within the meaning of "public interest" in Clause 15, whereas it may have a very much more restrictive meaning and may mean just members of the public, "the public" in that sense. Shall we be quite clear on this? [Laughter.] That is the object of the Committee stage. I am certainly not letting it pass until I am clear upon it.
    Does "detriment to the public" in the Amendment mean the same as "public interest" in Clause 15? If it does, I am content. If it does not, I am not content, because in my view it would restrict the meaning of the Clause.
    The Chairman: I think the Committee is ready to come to a decision on the Amendment.
    Mr. R. Harris: I have been waiting[HON. MEMBERS: "Divide."]—a long time to speak. I regard this as one of the major controversial issues of the Bill, on which I feel strongly. As a trade association secretary, I may be one of the people who has to go before the Court. Therefore I am anxious to know exactly what the Bill means.
    My feelings on the Amendment have fluctuated. Every time a Member of the Labour Party has put his views on it my hopes have risen, and every time my right hon. Friend has risen to speak they have fallen. I hope that all the things that the

    729
    Labour Party says about the Amendment are true. Even if they are true, they do not go nearly far enough.
    The whole Clause is one which I do not like. I do not like a system under which people go before a Division of the High Court and are guilty before they open their mouths. I put down an Amendment because in my opinion there should be something that should be proved by the Registrar or there should be a shift of onus on to the Registrar or the Court. I do not like a Clause which puts the complete onus on to the operators of an agreement. I hoped that anything in this tailpiece, as we are calling it, would have to be proved by the Registrar or by the Government or their representatives. If the operators of an agreement have to prove the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (g), there is enough onus on them and I should have thought that the final all-embracing condemnation should be the responsibility of the Registrar. My Amendment was designed to shift the onus.
    I hope that what the Labour Party has said about this is right, and I hope that the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) is correct in his summing up of the new situation. I shall not oppose the President of the Board of Trade if there is a Division. I shall have to go into the Lobby behind him. [HON. MEMBERS: "Shame."] I shall go with dragging feet. I am diametrically opposed to the views of the Labour Party, and so there would have to be a third Lobby for me, which is an impossibility.
    There will undoubtedly be great resentment by industrialists and traders who are affected by registration and appearance before the Court. They are as modest, hard-working and respectable as those who sit in this House, but they must go before the Court and find themselves guilty before they start. It would have been much fairer had that which has to be proved in this tailpiece been made the responsibility of the Registrar. However, as the President of the Board of Trade has moved an Amendment which goes a little of the way, while I entirely agree with the right hon. Member for Battersea, North, I must be satisfied.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: If anyone had doubt as to where the onus lay, my hon.
    730
    Friend's speech will have removed it. I do not want to reply at length to the points of construction which were very properly put by the hon. And learned Member for Leicester, North-East (Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas). These are not easy or simple matters.
    On the words "public interest", we have in the opening phrases of the Clause put the presumption that all these restrictions are against the public interest. Both in the Amendment and in the Bill as drafted we have avoided the words "public interest". We have avoided them for reasons connected with the case law with which the hon. and learned Gentleman will probably be familiar.
    10.30 p.m.
    It might be as well to make a fresh start about this, to get the presumption that it is against the public interest and then to say that the following circumstances have to be proved—(a) to (g)—and any detriment to the public which might result or is likely to result from the operation of the restriction; that is to say, the detriment that one has to judge in both cases is the detriment or injury which might flow from the operation of the restriction.
    What the Court does—and we have argued on other occasions as to whether this is the appropriate tribunal—is to balance the advantages or benefits of this against the detriment in that sense, the detriment to the public either in general or to persons not party to the agreement.
    Mr. Grimond: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what power the Court will have to call evidence of the public interest?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The Registrar represents the public interest in this sense and he will, of course, call any evidence which appears to him to be appropriate whether of other industries or private persons.
    Mr. Philip Bell: Is there a difference between "not unreasonable" and "reasonable"?
    Question put, That those words be there inserted:—
    The Committee divided: Ayes 176, Noes 115.

    Division No. 170.]

    AYES

    [10.32 p.m.

    Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

    Harrison, Col. J. H. (Eye)

    Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

    Aitken, W. T.

    Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

    Nugent, G. R. H.

    Arbuthnot, John

    Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

    Oakshott, H. D.

    Armstrong, C. W.

    Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.

    Ormsby-Gore, Hon. W. D.

    Ashton, H.

    Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

    Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

    Baldock, Lt.-cmdr. J. M.

    Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

    Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

    Baldwin, A. E.

    Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

    Page, R. G.

    Barber, Anthony

    Hirst, Geoffrey

    Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

    Barlow, Sir John

    Holland-Martin, C. J.

    Partridge, E.

    Barter, John

    Holt, A. F.

    Pickthorn, K. W. M.

    Baxter, Sir Beverley

    Hope, Lord John

    Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

    Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

    Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

    Pitman, I. J.

    Bell, Ronald (Bucks, S.)

    Horobin, Sir Ian

    Pitt, Miss E. M.

    Biggs-Davison, J. A.

    Howard, Hon. Greville (St. Ives)

    Pott, H. P.

    Bishop, F. P.

    Howard, John (Test)

    Powell, J. Enoch

    Black, C. W.

    Hughes Hallet, Vice-Admiral, J.

    Profumo, J. D.

    Body, R. F.

    Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

    Raikes, Sir Victor

    Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

    Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark (E'b'gh, W.)

    Rawlinson, Peter

    Boyle, Sir Edward

    Hyde, Montgomery

    Redmayne, M.

    Bryan, P.

    Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

    Remnant, Hon. P.

    Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Ridsdale, J. E.

    Channon, H.

    Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

    Rippon, A. G. F.

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

    Robertson, Sir David

    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

    Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

    Robinson, Sir Roland (Blackpool, S.)

    Cooper, Sqn. Ldr. Albert

    Joseph, Sir Keith

    Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

    Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

    Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

    Roper, Sir Harold

    Corfield, Capt. F. V.

    Keegan, D.

    Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

    Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

    Kerr, H. W.

    Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

    Crouch, R. F.

    Kershaw, J. A.

    Sharpies, R. C.

    Cunningham, Knox

    Kimball, M.

    Shepherd, William

    Dance, J. C. G.

    Kirk, P. M.

    Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

    Davies, Rt. Hn. Clement (Montgomery)

    Lagden, G. W.

    Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

    Deedes, W. F.

    Lambert, Hon. G.

    Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

    Doughty, C. J. A.

    Leather, E. H. C.

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

    Drayson, G. B.

    Leavey, J. A.

    Studholme, H. G.

    du Cann, E. D. L.

    Leburn, W. G.

    Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

    Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

    Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

    Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

    Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

    Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Linstead, Sir H. N.

    Teeling, W.

    Finlay, Graeme

    Lloyd, Maj. Sir Guy (Renfrew, E.)

    Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

    Fisher, Nigel

    Macdonald, Sir Peter

    Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

    Fletcher-Cooke, C.

    McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

    Touche, Sir Gordon

    Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

    Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

    Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

    Freeth, D. K.

    Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

    Vickers, Miss J. H.

    Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

    Maddan, Martin

    Vosper, D. F.

    George, J. C. (Pollok)

    Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

    Wade, D. W.

    Gibson-Watt, D.

    Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

    Walker-Smith, D. C.

    Godber, J. B.

    Marlowe, A. A. H.

    Wall, Major Patrick

    Gower, H. R.

    Marples, A. E.

    Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

    Graham, Sir Fergus

    Mathew, R.

    Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

    Grant, W. (Woodside)

    Maude, Angus

    Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

    Green, A.

    Mawby, R. L.

    Whitelaw, W. S. I. (Penrith & Border)

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

    Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

    Grimond, J.

    Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

    Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

    Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

    Molson, A. H. E.

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

    Morrison, John (Salisbury)

    Woollam, John Victor

    Gurden, Harold

    Nairn, D. L. S.

    Hall, John (Wycombe)

    Neave, Airey

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

    Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

    Mr. R. Thompson and

    Harris, Reader (Heston)

    Nield, Basil (Chester)

    Mr. E. Wakefield.

    NOES

    Albu, A. H.

    Clunie, J.

    Fletcher, Eric

    Allen, Arthur (Bosworth)

    Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

    Forman, J. C.

    Allen, Soholefield (Crewe)

    Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

    Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

    Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

    Corbet, Mrs. Freda

    Gibson, C. W.

    Benson, G.

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

    Beswick, F.

    Cronin, J. D.

    Greenwood, Anthony

    Blackburn, F.

    Darling, George (Hillsborough)

    Grenfell, Rt. Hon. D. R.

    Blenkinsop, A.

    Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

    Grey, C. F.

    Blyton, W. R.

    Delargy, H. J.

    Griffiths, William (Exchange)

    Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

    Dodds, N. N.

    Hale, Leslie

    Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

    Donnelly, D. L.

    Hall, Rt. Hn. Glenvil (Colne Valley)

    Brockway, A. F.

    Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

    Hannan, W.

    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

    Hayman, F. H.

    Burke, W. A.

    Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

    Herbison, Miss M.

    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

    Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

    Houghton, Douglas

    Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

    Evans, Edward (Lowestoft)

    Hubbard, T. F.

    Callaghan, L. J.

    Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

    Champion, A. J.

    Fernyhough, E.

    Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)

    732

    733

    Hunter, A. E.

    Mikardo, Ian

    Short, E. W.

    Irving, S. (Dartford)

    Mitchison, G. R.

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

    Moody, A. S.

    Sparks, J. A.

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Mulley, F. W.

    Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

    Jeger, Mrs. Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs, S.)

    Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

    Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

    Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

    Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

    Sylvester, G. O.

    Johnson, James (Rugby)

    Oram, A. E.

    Taylor, John (West Lothian)

    Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech(Wakefield)

    Oswald, T.

    Tomney, F.

    Jones, Elwyn, (W. Ham, S.)

    Owen, W. J.

    Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

    Kenyan, C.

    Paget, R. T.

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Key, Rt. Hon. C. W.

    Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

    Wheeldon, W. E.

    Lawson, G. M.

    Palmer, A. M. F.

    White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

    Lindgren, G. S.

    Pargiter, G. A.

    White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

    Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

    Parker, J.

    Willey, Frederick

    MacColl, J. E.

    Peart, T. F.

    Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

    McInnes, J.

    Plummer, Sir Leslie

    Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

    McKay, John (Wallsend)

    Probert, A. R.

    Woof, R. E.

    MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

    Pryde, D. J.

    Yates, V. (Ladywood)

    Mahon, Simon

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Mellish, R. J.

    Ross, William

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Mr. Deer and Mr. Simmons.

    Further Amendments made: In page 14, line 35, leave out from "restriction" to "persons" in line 37 and insert:
    "is not unreasonable having regard to the balance between those circumstances and any detriment to the public or to".
    In line 41, leave out from "goods" to end of line and add:
    "resulting or likely to result from the operation of the restriction".—[Mr. Walker-Smith.]
    Mr. Roy Jenkins: I beg to move, in page 14, line 41, at the end to add:
    In determining whether the restriction has not operated and is not calculated to operate to an unreasonable extent to the detriment of persons or the public as hereinbefore provided all matters which appear in the particular circumstances to be relevant shall be taken into account and amongst other things regard shall be had to the need consistently with the general economic position of the United Kingdom to achieve the objects stated in paragraphs (a). (b), (c) and (d) of section fourteen of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act. 1948.
    We have spent all today until now dealing on this Clause with considerations which the Court should take into account in order that restrictive practices may be allowed to continue. We think it not inappropriate that at the end of this Clause there should be inserted certain considerations in the other direction which the Court should also keep constantly in mind when pronouncing upon these cases. We thought that the most appropriate thing to do was to take a part of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, and to insert a part of it at the end of this Clause as balancing points against those which we have been considering throughout the day.
    I will read briefly to the Committee the part of the 1948 Act which we propose here to insert:
    734
    "… regard shall be had to the need, consistently with the general economic position of the United Kingdom, to achieve

    (a) the production, treatment and distribution by the most efficient and economical means of goods of such types and qualities, in such volume and at such prices as will best meet the requirements of home and overseas markets;

    (b) the organisation of industry and trade in such a way that their efficiency is progressively increased and new enterprise is encouraged;

    (c) the fullest use and best distribution of men, materials and industrial capacity in the United Kingdom; and

    (d) the development of technical improvements and the expansion of existing markets and the opening up of new markets."

    It is important that the Court, in pronouncing on these issues, should bear in mind what I hope is the general idea of the Committee, that we should have a dynamic approach to our economy and to the problems which the Court is called upon the consider.
    In the light of some of the speeches to which we have listened, it is a little difficult to remember that this is a Bill to end and not to uphold restrictive practices, certainly in view of the applause given to some of the speeches made within the last hour or so. For instance, the suggestion was made by the hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Hirst) that if there is to be any progress, any technical development, any research and rapid development in British industry, there must be a price ring or monopolistic practice to make that possible.
    This is a point of view which we reject completely, and I hope that the President of the Board of Trade and the Parliamentary Secretary will reject it also. It is important that we should keep the main object of this Bill before our eyes.

    735
    It is also important that we should keep in our minds the fact that there is a great deal wrong with British industry at the present time, and that is why we are having this Bill.
    It is no use hon. Members coming before the Committee and trying to put forward the suggestion that almost every restrictive practice which exists in British industry is fully justified, has a great deal to recommend it, and it is desirable that it should continue. We are faced at present with the hard fact that the rate of growth of the British economy is almost certainly less than that of any other comparable economy in the world, and something should be done about it.
    10.45 p.m.
    In our approach to the Bill, let us bear in mind that not only must we safeguard existing vested interests but we must be prepared to sacrifice them in order to get a little dynamism into our economy. It is for this reason that we have taken these provisions from the 1948 Act and suggest that they should be inserted at the end of the Clause as balancing considerations—the President likes the phrase "balancing considerations "—to be kept in the mind of the Court and set against the other considerations which we have been debating for so long.
    The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. Derek Walker-Smith): As the hon. Member for Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) has reminded the Committee, we have now been debating the Clause for more than six hours, and almost everything that could possibly or usefully be said has been said about almost every aspect of it. I will certainly emulate the conciseness with which the hon. Member has spoken and try to emulate his admirable clarity.
    I am sure the hon. Gentleman, in wishing to add these words to the Clause, is desirous of improving and strengthening it. However, let me say straight away that the addition of the words, far from strengthening it, would give rise to grave danger of weakening the Clause as now drafted. I fully appreciate that the Amendment was, no doubt, thought out and tabled before we tabled our clarifying Amendment to which the decision of the Committee has just given effect.
    736
    We consider that as a result of that Amendment we have now got the right test by way of justiciable issue for the Court defined in the way in which my right hon. Friend put it in moving that Amendment. The essence of the test is that it should be definite and that there should be a balancing of the advantages under such of paras. (a-g) as the industry has been able to establish before the Court as against any detriment to the public or the parties which can be established.
    That principle is put in jeopardy by the addition of these words because of the very largeness of the principles set out in Section 14 of the 1948 Act. If those tests are written into the Bill, it will invite a general discussion on the second part of the requirements under the Clause—that is, of the balancing—and it will admit of arguments in aid of restrictive practices more widely based than merely on the benefits established under paras. (a-g). These words make the matter wide open, and it would be possible for a person justifying restrictive practices to base his case much more widely than he will be able to do it under our balancing test.
    If the hon. Gentleman will look at the words with care, he will appreciate that some of the tests to which he has referred are merely vaguer and more generalised versions of some of the specific points which are spelt out with considerable precision in paras. (a-g).
    Mr. Roy Jenkins indicated dissent.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. If he will turn to the reference to the export position in 14 (a) and 14 (d), and to the words about the opening up of new markets, he will see how much vaguer and imprecise is the phraseology in which the tests would be applied than in (a) to (g) of the Clause.
    Though the hon. Gentleman's intention is to make the tests stiffer, he is in fact proposing to weaken them with these very wide and generalised words. I do not want him to misunderstand me. I am not saying that the principles are not in themselves admirable, but that they are vaguely and widely expressed and not helpful in framing a justiciable issue for the Court. If the Bill had followed the desires of hon. Gentlemen opposite and was to work in a

    737
    different way from having a Court, the Amendment might have been in some circumstances suitable; but it is not suitable for a Court.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: We have had a long and exhausting discussion on the Clause and I am sure we want to bring it to a head as soon as we reasonably can. I appreciate the point which the right hon. Gentleman has just made about disturbing the balance and all the rest of it.
    I accept that the Amendment is not as well drafted as it might be to achieve our purpose, but the principle that we have in mind—this is decisive from our point of view—is whether or not the matters in consideration, and which were mentioned in Section 14 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the 1948 Act, could be brought into the consideration of the detriment of the public in the Bill as now amended. If so, we are satisfied. If not, the sub-
    stance of our Amendment has not been met.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I will answer in this way. The Court has to do the balance test, and the people seeking to justify a practice can only put forward matters under (a) to (g). That is their side of the test. The Court will be able to approach the detriment to the public side from two aspects, one being the detriment to the parties who are defined in the Clause. In the same context of detriment to the public I have no doubt that these matters will come in. I do not want the hon. Member to think that the Court is to be compelled on each occasion to look at these very wide matters. I do not want to impair the balance that we have got.
    Question put, That those words be there added:—
    The Committee divided: Ayes 104, Noes 168.

    Division No. 171.]

    AYES

    [10.54 p.m.

    Albu, A. H.

    Forman, J. C.

    Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)

    Allan, Arthur (Bosworth)

    Gaitskell, Rt. Hon. H. T. N.

    Oram, A. E.

    Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)

    Gibson, C. W.

    Oswald, T.

    Benn, Hn. Wedgwood (Bristol, S.E.)

    Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.

    Owen, W. J.

    Benson, G.

    Greenwood, Anthony

    Paling, Will T. (Dewsbury)

    Beswick, F.

    Grey, C. F.

    Palmer, A. M. F.

    Blackburn, F.

    Hale, Leslie

    Parker, J.

    Blenkinsop, A.

    Hannan, W.

    Peart, T. F.

    Blyton, W. R.

    Hayman, F. H.

    Plummer, Sir Leslie

    Bowden, H. W. (Leicester, S.W.)

    Herbison, Miss M.

    Probert, A. R.

    Braddock, Mrs. Elizabeth

    Hubbard, T. F.

    Pryde, D. J.

    Brockway, A. F.

    Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)

    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)

    Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.

    Hughes, Hestor (Aberdeen, N.)

    Rogers, George (Kensington, N.)

    Burke, W. A.

    Hunter, A. E.

    Ross, William

    Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)

    Irving, S. (Dartford)

    Short, E. W.

    Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)

    Jay, Rt. Hon. D. P. T.

    Silverman, Julius (Aston)

    Callaghan, L. J.

    Jeger, George (Goole)

    Sparks, J. A.

    Champion, A. J.

    Jeger, Mrs.Lena (Holbn & St. Pncs. S.)

    Stross, Dr. Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)

    Clunie, J.

    Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)

    Summerskill, Rt. Hon. E.

    Collick, P. H. (Birkenhead)

    Johnson, James (Rugby)

    Sylvester, G. O.

    Collins, V. J. (Shoreditch & Finsbury)

    Jones, Elwyn (W. Ham, S.)

    Tomney, F.

    Corbet, Mrs. Freda

    Kenyon, C.

    Ungoed-Thomas, Sir Lynn

    Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)

    Lawson, G. M.

    Wells, William (Walsall, N.)

    Cronin, J. D.

    Lindgren, G. S.

    Wheeldon, W. E.

    Davies, Stephen (Merthyr)

    Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson

    White, Mrs. Eirene (E. Flint)

    Deer, G.

    MacColl, J. E.

    White, Henry (Derbyshire, N.E.)

    Delargy, H. J.

    McInnes, J.

    Willey, Frederick

    Dodds, N. N.

    MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)

    Williams, W. R. (Openshaw)

    Donnelly, D. L.

    Mahon, Simon

    Willis, Eustace (Edinburgh, E.)

    Dugdale, Rt. Hn. John (W. Brmwch)

    Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)

    Woof, R. E.

    Ede, Rt. Hon. J. C.

    Mellish, R. J.

    Yates, V. (Ladywood)

    Edwards, Robert (Bilston)

    Mikardo, Ian

    Younger, Rt. Hon. K.

    Evans, Albert (Islington, S.W.)

    Mitchison, C. R.

    Evans, Stanley (Wednesbury)

    Moody, A. S.

    TELLERS FOR THE AYES:

    Fernyhough, E.

    Mulley, F. W.

    Mr. J. Taylor and Mr. Simmons.

    Fletcher, Eric

    Neal, Harold (Bolsover)

    NOES

    Agnew, Cmdr. P. G.

    Barber, Anthony

    Black, C. W.

    Aitken, W. T.

    Barlow, Sir John

    Body, R. F.

    Arbuthnot, John

    Barter, John

    Bowen, E. R. (Cardigan)

    Armstrong, C. W.

    Baxter, Sir Beverley

    Boyle, Sir Edward

    Ashton, H.

    Bell, Philip (Bolton, E.)

    Buchan-Hepburn, Rt. Hon. P. G. T.

    Baldock, Lt.-Cmdr. J. M.

    Biggs-Davison, J. A.

    Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (SaffronWalden)

    Baldwin, A. E.

    Bishop, F. P.

    Channon, H.

    Chichester-Clark, R.

    Hughes-Young, M. H. C.

    Partridge, E.

    Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)

    Hutchison, Sir Ian Clark(E'b'gh, W.)

    Pilkington, Capt. R. A.

    Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.

    Hyde, Montgomery

    Pitman, I. J.

    Corfield, Capt. F. V.

    Hylton-Foster, Sir H. B. H.

    Pitt, Miss E. M.

    Craddock, Beresford (Spelthorne)

    Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)

    Pott, H. P.

    Crouch, R. F.

    Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)

    Powell, J. Enoch

    Cunningham, Knox

    Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)

    Profumo, J. D.

    Dance, J. C. G.

    Johnson, Eric (Blackley)

    Raikes, Sir Victor

    Davies, Rt. Hon. Clement (Montgomery)

    Joseph, Sir Keith

    Rawlinson, Peter

    Deedes, W. F.

    Joynson-Hicks, Hon. Sir Lancelot

    Redmayne, M.

    Doughty, C. J. A.

    Keegan, D.

    Remnant, Hon. P.

    Drayson, G. B.

    Kerr, H. W.

    Ridsdale, J. E.

    du Cann, E. D. L.

    Kershaw, J. A.

    Rippon, A. G. F.

    Duncan, Capt. J. A. L.

    Kimball, M.

    Robertson, Sir David

    Elliot, Rt. Hon. W. E.

    Kirk, P. M.

    Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)

    Errington, Sir Eric

    Lagden, G. W.

    Roper, Sir Harold

    Finlay, Graeme

    Lambert, Hon. G.

    Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard

    Fisher, Nigel

    Leavey, J. A.

    Schofield, Lt.-Col. W.

    Fletcher-Cooke, C.

    Leburn, W. G.

    Sharpies, R. C.

    Fraser, Hon. Hugh (Stone)

    Legge-Bourke, Maj. E. A. H.

    Shepherd, William

    Freeth, D. K.

    Legh, Hon. Peter (Petersfield)

    Simon, J. E. S. (Middlesbrough, W.)

    Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.

    Linstead, Sir H. N.

    Smithers, Peter (Winchester)

    George, J. C. (Pollok)

    Lloyd-George, Maj. Rt. Hon. G.

    Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)

    Gibson-Watt, D.

    Macdonald, Sir Peter

    Stoddart-Scott, Col. M.

    Godber, J. B.

    McLaughlin, Mrs. P.

    Studholme, H. C.

    Gower, H. R.

    Maclay, Rt. Hon. John

    Summers, G. S. (Aylesbury)

    Graham, Sir Fergus

    Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)

    Sumner, W. D. M. (Orpington)

    Grant, W. (Woodside)

    Maddan, Martin

    Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)

    Green, A.

    Maitland, Hon. Patrick (Lanark)

    Teeling, W.

    Gresham Cooke, R.

    Manningham-Buller, Rt. Hn. Sir R.

    Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)

    Grimond, J.

    Marlowe, A. A. H.

    Thompson, Lt.-Cdr. R.(Croydon, S.)

    Grimston, Hon. John (St. Albans)

    Marples, A. E.

    Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. P.

    Grosvenor, Lt.-Col. R. G.

    Mathew, R.

    Touche, Sir Cordon

    Gurden, Harold

    Maude, Angus

    Vaughan-Morgan, J. K.

    Hall, John (Wycombe)

    Mawby, R. L.

    Vosper, D. F.

    Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)

    Maydon, Lt.-Comdr. S. L. C.

    Wade, D. W.

    Harris, Reader (Heston)

    Milligan, Rt. Hon. W. R.

    Wakefield, Edward (Derbyshire, W.)

    Harvey, Air Cdre. A. V. (Macclesfd)

    Molson, A. H. E.

    Walker-Smith, D. C.

    Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel

    Morrison, John (Salisbury)

    Wall, Major Patrick

    Heath, Rt. Hon. E. R. G.

    Nairn, D. L. S.

    Ward, Hon. George (Worcester)

    Hill, Mrs. E. (Wythenshawe)

    Neave, Airey

    Ward, Dame Irene (Tynemouth)

    Hill, John (S. Norfolk)

    Nicolson, N. (B'n'm'th, E. & Chr'ch)

    Waterhouse, Capt. Rt. Hon. C.

    Hinchingbrooke, Viscount

    Nield, Basil (Chester)

    Whitelaw, W.S.I.(Penrith & Border)

    Hirst, Geoffrey

    Noble, Comdr. A. H. P.

    Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)

    Holland-Martin, C. J.

    Nugent, G. R. H.

    Wills, G. (Bridgwater)

    Holt, A. F.

    Oakshott, H. D.

    Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)

    Hornsby-Smith, Miss M. P.

    Orr, Capt. L. P. S.

    Woollam, John Victor

    Horobin, Sir Ian

    Orr-Ewing, Charles Ian (Hendon, N.)

    TELLERS FOR THE NOES:

    Howard, John (Test)

    Page, R. G.

    Colonel J. H. Harrison and

    Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral J.

    Pannell, N. A. (Kirkdale)

    Mr. Bryan.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Amendment made: In page 14, line 41, at end add:
    (2) The references in this section to any one person include references to any two or more persons being interconnected bodies corporate or carrying on business in partnership with each other.—[Mr. P. Thorneycroft.]
    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 17.—(VARIATION OF DECISIONS OF THE COURT.)
    Mr. Holt: I beg to move, in page 15. line 12, after "of" to insert "or aggrieved by."
    The Deputy-Chairman: I think it would be convenient if the Committee also discussed the Amendment in Clause 18, line 27, in the name of the hon. Gentleman, at the end to insert:
    (b) for enabling any person aggrieved by any restriction contained in or created by any
    740
    agreement for the time being registered under Part 1 of this Act to appear before the Court.
    Mr. Holt: If circumstances change after an agreement of a restrictive nature has been allowed, and a party feels aggrieved, he should have the opportunity of stating his case to the Court. It would seem necessary, therefore, to insert these Amendments in the two Clauses.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: This is a Court, and the justiciable issue will be tried between the Registrar and the parties to the agreement. We debated yesterday the possibility of others than the Registrar initiating proceedings, and I pointed out the inconvenience of that procedure.
    It is not contemplated that it should be open to persons who are not parties to the agreement to take part in the proceedings as parties to the litigation. In that way the actual parties to the litiga

    741
    tion might well be doubled. The hon. Member should appreciate that does not mean that people in the position of those with whom he is concerned will not, so to speak, have their part to play before the Court and their interest borne in mind. Because it has to be borne in mind in the scheme of proceedings under this Bill that the Registrar is, as it were, the custodian of the public interest.
    I would think that the proper place for people who have a point of view to put regarding the detriment arising from restrictions in these schemes is not in the capacity of parties but in the capacity of witnesses, because it is always possible for them to volunteer that their evidence should be put at the disposal of the Registrar, and it is then for him to deploy that as part of his case. I think that is really the tidy way in which these proceedings should work.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I should like to make our position on this clear. We support this Amendment. It seems to us that a party aggrieved should have access to the Court, because he is the person who is aggrieved, and he should not be shut out from remedy. But the principle of this Amendment is exactly the same as the principle of the Amendment which was debated and moved from the Liberal benches yesterday. We supported that Amendment, and the Committee divided on it, and at this late hour we certainly want to get as far ahead as we possibly can. As the principle of it was decided on the previous occasion, perhaps I might indicate to the Liberal benches that in all the circumstances we would not press the Amendment, because we are in favour of it and have already supported the principle in the Lobbies.
    Mr. Grimond: I should like to reiterate, or to ask in a different form, a question which I have asked before, but to which I have not yet got any answer. Is the public to be considered as being anyone who feels that his interests are affected? Can a local authority go to the Registrar and say, "Owing to restrictive practices we consider that employment in our city is affected, and we would like to be represented"?
    Does this Bill enable anyone who feels he may be aggrieved by the continuation of a restrictive practice—even if he is not a consumer, or buyer or association
    742
    —to go to the Registrar and ask to be represented? And can he be separately represented, or is he simply represented by the Registrar?
    Mr. Walker-Smith: He cannot, as I was seeking to point out in my previous observations, be separately represented in the technical sense of the word, because that would make him a party to the proceedings. But it is open to him to get in touch with the Registrar, in that he is presenting the case for the public, and if the person thinks that there is a detriment of which he has evidence it is for him to bring that evidence to the attention of the Registrar. In that way it is within his discretion and judgment in the deployment of his case in the ordinary way, and can be brought to the attention of the Court.
    On the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, the word "public" is used in a wide sense in Clause 16, because the public there is wider than the parties which are set out in the proceedings.
    Mr. Holt: Does this mean that if the third party feels that he has a very strong case and puts it to the Registrar, and the Registrar says, "That is of no interest to me, but I will call you as a witness and you can give this kind of evidence ", the Registrar can put a limit to the case that the third party can put? That seems rather important. Either the third party must, through the technique described by the Parliamentary Secretary, be enabled to put the whole of their case, or, otherwise, the public interest is not properly safeguarded.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I realise that, unlike his hon. Friend, the hon. Gentleman is not a lawyer, but he will appreciate that the third parties will not be parties in the technical sense to the case at all. They will not be putting a case, and it is not strictly correct to use that phrase. There will only be the parties to the agreement, on the one side, and the Registrar on the other. Their appearance before the Court will be in the capacity of witnesses and, as such, the ordinary relationship will exist between them and the Registrar as exists between a witness and a party in an ordinary proceeding.
    Amendment negatived.
    Clause ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Clause 18.—(RULES AS TO PROCEDURE.)
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I beg to move, in page 15, line 27, at the end to insert:
    "and the place art which the Court is to sit for the purposes of any proceedings thereunder."
    This is really a technical Amendment. It is to ensure that the rules which are made shall provide for the place where the Court is to sit. Questions may arise from time to time as to whether the Court should appropriately sit in England or in Scotland. The basic principles which should govern that are not, I think, proper to be incorporated within the Bill itself, and I hope that the Committee will agree that they should properly be dealt with in the rules which will themselves be submitted to Parliament.
    Sir L. Ungoed-Thomas: I do not know whether there is any confusion between the Amendment and the provision in paragraph 2 of the Schedule, which says:
    "… and the Court when sitting in public in London shall sit at the Royal Courts of Justice, or at such other place as the Lord Chancellor may from time to time appoint."
    I am wondering whether there is some confusion between the two.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think not, but I will certainly look at it when we come to the Schedule. It merely means that when sitting in London the Court will sit at the Royal Courts of Justice or at some other place in London. The Amendment has to do with the rules to be made as to whether the Court shall sit in London or elsewhere.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I beg to move, in page 15, line 32, at the end to insert:
    "by all parties to any proceedings, including the Registrar."
    In a sense, this Amendment is really a clarification of the real purpose of the Bill. Subsection (2) of the Clause specifies certain matters which may be dealt with under the Lord Chancellor's rules relating to the procedure of the Restrictive Practices Court. Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) deals with the power of the rules to make provision for discovery in these cases. In particular, it secures that all material facts and considerations are brought before the Court.
    744
    11.15 p.m.
    The Amendment is designed to make it clear that the rules can deal with discovery of the relevant material and information in the possession of the Registrar as well as in the possession of the parties to the agreement. The rules which the Lord Chancellor will make will presumably follow as closely as possible the analogous rules of the Supreme Court. The effect is to make it clear that both parties are on a footing and that the material facts will be in the possession of the parties in the ordinary way as a result of discovery and will thus be brought before the Court.
    Sir L. Heald: I should like confirmation that I would be right in thinking that the object of the Amendment is to meet, at least in part, the request which has been made for the implementation of the statement made by my right hon. Friend on Second Reading. The words which he used on that occasion are set out in an Amendment which I have put down to my right hon. Friend's proposed Amendment in page 15, line 40, and they are these:
    "It shall be the duty of the Registrar to ensure that all relevant facts are placed before the Court …"
    It was said that it was quite unnecessary to put in anything of this kind but I am glad to see that these words now appear and to know that they set out the Government's intention.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: My right hon. and learned Friend is quite correct. The point was raised by him. It is intended that there should be full discovery in all proceedings, and I am obliged to my right hon. and learned Friend for his help in the matter.
    Mr. E. Fletcher: Will the President of the Board of Trade clear up this point for me? Suppose, for example, there is a great argument about the effect of a series of agreements on unemployment in an area or number of areas. Suppose there is an inquiry about shipping. Such an inquiry might well involve the disclosure of a great deal of statistical information about the level of unemployment in a number of various other industries and questions of that nature. Does this mean that interrogatories can be addressed to the Registrar about that?

    745
    I want to visualise how the information required for this kind of issue will come before the Court. It is not the kind of information that the Registrar is likely to have in his possession. It is one thing to call upon the Registrar to produce relevant documents; what he has might be very limited. On the other hand, the right hon. and learned Member for Chertsey (Sir L. Heald) seemed to me to be aiming at something different, requiring the Board of Trade to produce documents in its possession. The two things are not parallel.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: This is much more limited. It does not entitle anybody to serve interrogatories on the Board of Trade. It merely provides—very properly, I think—for full disclosure of documents on both sides by the parties to the proceedings, including the Registrar and other parties. If there was the mass of statistical evidence which has been suggested, I think everyone would agree that it should be available to both sides to study before there was an argument on it in the Court.
    Sir Lancelot Joynson - Hicks: While I realise that the President of the Board of Trade has taken an appreciable step towards meeting the point we have been trying to ensure, namely, that there is no relevant information in the possession of the Registrar which does not get before the Court, I must point out one essential difference between my right hon. and learned Friend's phrase in the Amendment to which he referred, which is:
    "It shall be the duty of the Registrar to ensure that all relevant facts are placed before the Court"
    and the Amendment which we are now discussing, which is simply that rules made under the Clause may provide for the provision which my right hon. Friend now suggests. It is a small point, but I hope that my right hon. Friend will be able to help us in ensuring that the rules which may be made are, in fact, made.
    Mr. E. Fletcher: I want to get the position quite clear. Suppose an industrialist wants to raise an issue about the level of unemployment in shipbuilding. I can understand that there may be a lot of evidence in the archives of the Board of Trade that would be relevant, but surely it would be the duty of the Court
    746
    to get that information from the Board of Trade. Surely it is not contemplated that the Registrar should produce it.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The Amendment is merely to ensure that the right arrangements should be made in these rules for the mutual pooling of this information in the ordinary exchange of documents before the proceedings start.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: I beg to move, in page 15, line 34, to leave out from "agreement" to "in" in line 36, and to insert:
    "where it appears to the court that the relevant provisions of the agreement and the circumstances of the case are substantially similar to the provisions and circumstances considered, in relation to any other agreement."
    This is, in essence, a clarifying Amendment. It deals with subsection (2, c), which is an important provision which has been referred to before during the proceedings. It enables rules to be made to enable the Court to determine in a summary way issues appearing to be governed by principles established in previous proceedings. As the Committee is aware, this is a provision relied upon to facilitate the conduct of the proceedings before the Court and to save a good deal of time and trouble to the parties in the cases concerned.
    The reason for the Amendment is that the words in the Clause as drafted are more appropriate to a previous determination based on a question of law. The words "principles established" rather suggest that. As the Committee is aware, the decisions of the Court will not be mere questions of law, and what is intended here is to devise a procedure to enable the Court to deal expeditiously where the provisions of the agreement and the circumstances of the case appear to be on all-fours with those of a previous case. The Amendment is more aptly worded for that than the words in the Clause as drafted.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. E Fletcher: I beg to move, in page 15, line 36, at the end to insert:
    "(d) for enabling the Court to dispose of any proceedings before them notwithstanding that in the course of the proceedings there has been a change in the persons sitting' as members of the Court."
    I hope that no one will minimise the great importance of the rules made by

    747
    the Lord Chancellor. The whole tempo of the proceedings before the Court will be governed by the rules of procedure which are laid down. The object of the Amendment is to give the Lord Chancellor further powers than it appears he has at present. We are anxious that the regulations to be made under the Clause should specifically deal with the possibility of there being some inevitable change in the constitution of the Court from one stage to another, and that there shall not be any unavoidable delay because there has to be a change in the persons sitting as members of the Court.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I think that the answer is that this point will be dealt with in the rules. I appreciate the difficulty. In ordinary High Court proceedings, if one of the judges dies, or anything of that kind happens, the case cannot proceed when half the evidence has been heard by the full court. There is a substantial difficulty here. Whether it may be solved is another question, but it is covered by his rule.
    Mr. Fletcher: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
    Amendment proposed: In page 15, line 38, leave out from "instrument" to end of Clause and add:
    "which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."—[Mr. Hector Hughes.]
    Mr. Walker-Smith: The effect of the Amendment will be to make the rule subject to annulment in pursuance of a Resolution of either House of Parliament. This will be in line with the provisions of Section 212 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, which relates to the rules of the Supreme Court. I have no doubt that it would seem appropriate to the Committee that the same provision should apply here, and we are very happy to accept the Amendment.
    Mr. Hector Hughes: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman. I think that this is the only Amendment proposed from this side of the Committee that the Government have accepted.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I beg to move, in page 15, line 40, at the end to add:
    748
    (4) In any proceedings before the Court under this Part of this Act in which the Registrar is represented by counsel, counsel for the Registrar shall be nominated by the Attorney General, the Lord Advocate or the Attorney General for Northern Ireland, as the case may be.
    I thing that it is right to record the object of the Amendment in the Bill. We have had certain discussions in the Chamber about the position of the Attorney-General and I believe that the whole Committee is anxious to see that these proceedings are placed upon a basis which is not only just and fair but generously just and fair. At a later stage I shall make a proposal, in respect of Clause 1 that the Registrar may consult the Attorney-General, through the Treasury Solicitor, on appropriate matters of doubt and difficulty. No doubt he can do so in any case but it is right to record the fact.
    Sir L. Heald: It would be indeed churlish of me not to recognise that my right hon. Friend has taken into account our pleas to him, and we are very glad to hear that he is to do something about this matter. Its importance in relation to the Registrar has been underlined very much by the very valuable discussion, initiated from the Liberal bench, in which it was pointed out that there was no guarantee what the Registrar would do or whether, if he were asked to bring forward the views of the parties who were interested or affected, he would do so.
    That will be seen to if my right hon. Friend takes the step of allowing the Registrar to have the advantage of the beneficial and paternal advice of the Attorney-General. Then it will be in the Registrar's mind quite clearly that he ought to see what is to be done if matters of this nature arise, and that there ought to be the safeguard that the view of the other party is put forward or that, if necessary, proper representations are made to the Board of Trade. I hope that something really material will be achieved in that way.
    Amendment agreed to.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
    11.30 p.m.
    Sir L. Joynson-Hicks: There is one minor point about which I should be grateful for elucidation. I refer to line 20, which reads:

    749
    "… the fees chargeable in respect of such proceedings, shall be such as may be determined by rules made by the Lord Chancellor."
    There is a curious provision later in the Bill which rules that the Court has no power to award any costs. Presumably, therefore, these fees are those chargeable to the parties upon the interlocutory and other proceedings before the Court. I should be glad to have clarification of the fees that my right hon. Friend has in mind, the nature of them, and against whom they are likely to be charged.
    Mr. Walker-Smith: As my hon. Friend indicates, the question of costs is dealt with in the Schedule. This subsection refers to fees, those being in this context the fees provided for by the Clause.
    Clause, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
    To report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.—[Mr. P. Thorneycroft.]
    Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

  THE ROGER CASEMENT PAPERS
  Motion made, and Question proposed. That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Barber.]
  11.32 p.m.
  Mr. Montgomery Hyde: I am not raising the case of the Roger Casement papers in any partisan spirit. I am not concerned whether Casement was a national hero or a traitor or a misguided idealist, but merely with the question whether certain diaries and other notebooks attributed to him are genuine or false. These diaries are understood to be preserved in the so-called "Black Museum" of Scotland Yard.
  Copies of this material were circulated at the time of Casement's trial in 1916, and they played a significant part in the events leading up to his execution. These documents purported to show that Casement was a homosexual, and they had the effect of alienating the sympathies of a number of individuals who would otherwise have supported the movement for his reprieve.
  People who knew Casement, including some still living, amongst them Mr. William Cadbury, the well-known Quaker,
  750
  take the view that these documents are spurious. I understand that Mr. Cadbury has recently communicated this view to the hon. Member for Ladywood (Mr. V. Yates). Mr. Cadbury, and others like him, think that these documents, or at any rate certain portions of them, are the diaries of a scoundrel and pervert named Armando Normand, whom Casement came across when investigating the rubber atrocities in the Putumayo for the Foreign Office, and that Casement translated these diaries from the Spanish in which they were originally written and kept a copy in his own handwriting, as he considered that they could not be entrusted to a typist.
  The subject has come into prominence lately through two recent publications. One of these is a book called "The Eyes of the Navy" by a former Member of this House, Admiral Sir William James. That book deals with the life of Sir Reginald Hall, who was in charge of naval intelligence at the Admiralty in the First World War and, as such, was entrusted with the interception and decoding of German naval messages, including those about Casement's activities in Germany and his last ill-fated voyage in a U-boat to the Irish coast. According to the author of that book, it was Captain Hall, as he then was, who was mainly responsible for the surreptitious circulation of extracts from the diaries, having previously received the text from Sir Basil Thomson, at that time Assistant Commissioner of Police and head of the C.I.D.
  The other book is a new life of Casement by the well-known journalist, Mr. René MacColl. Mr. MacColl, as he states in his book, wrote to my right hon. and gallant Friend the Home Secretary asking, not to see the diaries, but merely whether their existence could be officially confirmed. Mr. MacColl was informed that my right hon. and gallant Friend was unable to supply him with any information on the matter. This has been the stock official answer for many years, certainly since 1930, and it has recently been given to the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and myself.
  In 1930, Professor Denis Gwynn, who was engaged on a biography of Casement, asked to see the diaries and referred to a description of them which had been given by Sir Basil Thomson in one of his

  751
  books. The then Home Secretary, Mr. J. R. Clynes, replied:
  "On inquiry, I find that it was decided long ago not to make any official statement as to the existence or non-existence of these diaries. I have carefully considered whether it is still necessary to maintain that rule, and there seem to me to be very good reasons why in the public interest it is desirable not to break the official silence."
  Mr. Clynes did not state what these reasons were, but on the subject of Sir Basil Thomson he added:
  "You mention that reference to these diaries has been made by Sir Basil Thomson, but any such statements were completely unauthorised."
  In fact, the official silence had already been broken and the existence of the diaries had been admitted.
  Five years before that, in 1925, another journalist, Mr. Singleton Gates, who had had access to typed copies of the diaries, announced that he was publishing a book based on the diaries. He was sent for by the then Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, and was threatened with the application of the Official Secrets Act if he persisted in his intentions to publish his book. He was also seen by the authorities in Scotland Yard. In a letter to the Evening Standard dated 18th April, 1956, Mr. Singleton Gates wrote:
  "A few days later I was seen at Scotland Yard by the chief of the C.I.D., Sir Wyndham Childs, whose main concern was whether I had seen the documents during his régime. He confirmed the existence of the diaries and copies. He went much further, though I had never doubted the authenticity of the diaries."
  I think it can be inferred from that statement that Mr. Singleton Gates actually saw the originals of these diaries.
  On the other hand, it has been suggested that the diaries were deliberately faked by Sir Basil Thomson, who intermingled some Casement genuine diaries with the obscene Putumayo diaries of Armando Normand. Sir Basil Thomson's family, with whom I have been in touch, are naturally distressed by this accusation, which they regard as unfounded, and they are anxious to have his name cleared.
  Sir Basil Thomson has given four accounts of how the diaries were discovered and subsequently used. They differ on minor points, but all agree that they were found by the police in one of Casement's trunks as a result of a search
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  of his old lodgings some months before his arrest, while he was still in Germany.
  There is no doubt from the published writings of Sir Basil Thomson that he believed the diaries to be genuine, as indeed did everybody else to whom photographs of several of the pages and typed extracts were shown. The then Attorney-General, Sir F. E. Smith, later Lord Birkenhead, was anxious that the defence should, if it wished, use these diaries as evidence of the possible insanity of Casement, but Casement's leading defence counsel, Serjeant Sullivan, refused to agree or even to look at them at the trial to support such a plea. The material was also shown by Sir Basil Thomson to the then legal adviser to the Home Office, the late Sir Ernley Blackwell.
  In his autobiography, published in 1939, Sir Basil Thomson quoted a passage from his own diary, the entry being a few days after Casement's appeal had been dismissed. It is dated Saturday, 22nd July, 1916, and is as follows:
  "Saturday, July 22, 1916 … Yesterday I … saw Sir Ernley Blackwell who read me his memorandum to the Cabinet on the execution of Casement. It was very well written. He had incorporated in it all the information that I had collected and which was circulated on Wednesday. The waverers accepted the position that the law was to take its course, but on Thursday Lord Crewe circulated a letter from Eva Gore-Booth, Countess Markiewicz's sister, alleging that Casement's object in coming over was to stop the rebellion. Blackwell confessed he did not know, with such a weak Cabinet, what the result would be."
  A copy of the Memorandum of 17th July, 1916, has come into my possession and it might be of interest to the House if I read it:
  "Exercise of the Prerogative on the ground of Insanity.
  Casement's diary and his ledger entries covering many pages of closely typed matter, show that he has for years been addicted to the grossest sodomitical practices.
  Of late years he seems to have completed the full cycle of sexual degeneracy and from a pervert, has become an invert—a 'woman' or pathic who derives his satisfaction from attracting men and inducing them to use him. The point is worth noting, for the Attorney-General had given Sir E. Grey the impression that Casement's own account of the frequency of his performances was incredible and of itself suggested that he was labouring under hallucination in this respect. I think that this idea may be dismissed. I believe the diaries are a faithful and accurate record of his acts, thoughts and feelings just as they occurred

  753
  and presented themselves to him … No one who has read Casement's report to the Foreign Office on the Putumayo atrocities (at a time when his sexual offences were of daily occurrence), his speech from the dock … his private letters to friends … could doubt for a moment that Casement intellectually at any rate is very far removed from anything that could properly be described as insanity.
  His excesses may have warped his judgment and in themselves they are of course evidence of disordered sexual instincts, but they have not in my opinion any relevance in consideration of his crime, such as drunkenness, sexual excesses, jealousy, revenge, provocation, etc., have in the case of crimes of violence …"
  In a second memorandum, Blackwell concludes:
  "So far as I can judge, it would be far wiser from every point of view to allow the law to take its course and by judicious means, to use these diaries to prevent Casement attaining martyrdom."
  That is precisely what happened. Those who were shown the typed copies or photographs included Dr. Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury; Dr. Henson, Bishop of Durham, and the Irish Nationalist leader, John Redmond. They all refused to sign a petition for Casement's reprieve, in consequence. They were also shown to President Wilson, who got them from the U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Page, who in turn got them from Sir Basil Thomson. Another American, Mr. Ben Allen of Associated Press news service, was shown the original by Hall, and offered copies for cabling to New York. He asked if he could confront Casement with them in prison, but this request was repeatedly refused.
  I have here a letter from Mr. Allen, who is still alive, dated 7th March, 1956, in which he says.
  " My only concern when I was solicited by Hall to cable the story of the alleged diary to New York, was to pay due heed to the ethical code of the Associated Press which prevented me from handling the story until I had verified every pertinent fact connected with it. That was the only discussion I had with Hall—my insistence that I take the copy of the diary to Casement to get his side of the story. His repeated refusal convinced me that there was something back of it that he dared not disclose. Now I am sure of it. To me, the purpose is now obvious; to blacken Casement's character so that the United States Senate would not ask for his reprieve."
  These stories reached Casement in the condemned cell and he immediately denied them to his solicitor, the late Mr. C. Gavan Duffy. It is about time that this matter was cleared up. No one
  754
  wants to see the diaries published, but I would suggest to my hon. Friend that a small committee of experts might be appointed, say two drawn from Ireland and two from this country, to examine the diaries and any relevant available evidence. They could do that and give an opinion whether or not they really are Casement's. Such an inquiry, incidentally, would also serve the purpose of establishing Sir Basil Thomson's bona fides or otherwise.
  The question of these diaries has excited, and will continue to excite, public interest, particularly in Ireland. It inspired the Irish poet, W. B. Yeats, to write a poem of which each verse ends with the lines:
  "The ghost of Roger Casement
  Is beating on the door."
  I can assure my hon. Friend that his ghost will continue to beat on the door of his office until he allows these diaries to be seen by reliable experts. Only then will it be possible to resolve all doubts about this matter once and for all, and I invite him to take that step.
  11.45 p.m.
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: I cannot see why the Home Office does not accede to the very reasonable request made by the hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Hyde). This appears to be a dirty little secret of the Home Office, kept in some safe after forty years, and the Home Office appears to be as anxious to hide the documents now as it was to exhibit them in 1916. So long as this attitude is adopted by the Home Office, so long will there be doubt in Ireland—a doubt which this country will share. I cannot see any reason why the documents should not be handed over to experts, to Irish authorities, to any relatives who may still be living, or to some museum in Ireland, and not continually be hushed up.
  We never shall hush up anything like this; it will be a matter of controversy and argument, fanning the flames of resentment, so long as the Home Office adopts this attitude. If they are indecent documents, why should the Home Office cling to them as though they were ancient documents, like Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights? It is to the discredit of the Home Office that it should take this attitude, advancing no

  755
  argument except that previous Governments have persisted in this attitude. If the documents are genuine, let them go to some authority.
  The very fact that the Home Office pursues this hush-hush policy is enough to make anyone believe that there is some mystery which it does not want to reveal. After all, we cannot hide the facts of history for ever. I believe that, at the time, these documents were used very wrongly, because they were irrelevant to the charge made against Sir Roger Casement. They were used to discredit him, and they undoubtedly prevented a reprieve. They were used to kill him, and are now used to discredit him and him reputation after death.

  Whatever is in these documents, I hold, as many Irishmen hold, that Sir Roger Casement rendered great service in exposing the atrocities in Putumayo. He was an Irish patriot, and the Home Office is doing no good service to history, morality or anything else by adopting this attitude. I appeal to the representative of the Home Office to grant the request of the hon. Member for Belfast, North.
  11.48 p.m.
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. W. F. Deedes): My hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Hyde) has given a very detailed account of the events surrounding and subsequent to the execution of Sir Roger Casement, and I am quite sure that he does not expect me to comment in detail upon the version which he has given. I think I should do best if I addressed myself to his main request, which has been reinforced by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), that there should be an outside examination of these papers. It would be fairest if I went on to say, straight away, that I think it unlikely that I shall be able to give him much satisfaction in his quest.
  It is always rather disagreeable for all the parties involved to have to be stubbornly uncommunicative at this Dispatch Box, particularly upon a matter which has aroused, and continues to arouse, so much curiosity. Before today the Home Office has been accused of being secretive, obscurantist and even blackguardly in its attitude
  756
  about this matter. I do not think that such charges are merited, nor in this instance, are they original. We are here faced with the difficulty, as in many matters affecting the Home Secretary, that any effective attempt to justify secrecy or silence about this must involve breaking that silence—
  Mr. Leslie Hale: But the diaries have been exhibited.
  Mr. Deedes:—and revealing evidence and committing, without any good reason at this moment, a complete breach of the policy which I believe, has been rightly upheld for many years.
  Mr. Hale: We should not complain about the secrecy, had there been secrecy from the start. Then no one would have complained at all. The complaint is that these documents were exhibited round the House while hon. Members were waiting the execution of Casement. Is that true or not? And if they were, why cannot they be exhibited now?
  Mr. Deedes: If the hon. Member will allow me to proceed, we shall come to that question.
  I said that I believed that the policy had been a right one. I have studied the correspondence over the years on this issue with great care. My hon. Friend is not the first to seek information about the Roger Casement papers. He is the last of a long line extending over a quarter-of-a-century, and Home Secretaries of both parties have consistently refused to give any information to anyone. They have resisted pressure from many sources, some highly responsible, some not so responsible. But the plea made to the Home Secretary has generally had the same foundation, and my hon. Friend has indicated it tonight.
  I will attempt to put it as fairly as I can. The allegations are that the Government used diaries, real, copied or deliberately forged, to smear Casement and influence opinion in America; that such infamous allegations should be met by publishing the diaries and that continued silence is unfair—
  Mr. Hale: It was said by Member after Member in 1916.
  Mr. Deedes:—and gives substance to the allegations. I think that that is a fair summary of the case. This most

  757
  seductive argument is used whenever any new book on the subject appears, and there have been a good many books.
  It is a difficult argument for any Government to meet, but in each case it has been resisted and tonight my hon. Friend has not advanced any fresh grounds for saying that at this moment my right hon. and gallant Friend should submit to it. Whenever any controversialist stirs up the dust on this or any like issue, we are told that only a complete disclosure will lay the dust. I do not think that is an argument which bears examination, and I will try to explain why. The important point was made the other day by, I believe, the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger), that the most respectable precedents should be reviewed from time to time, and I can give my hon. Friend the assurance that that is done and that there are no cobwebs on this particular file.
  Mr. Hale: Does the Parliamentary Secretary deny that hon. Member after hon. Member of this House has recorded in his reminiscences that he was shown copies of the documents before Casement was shot—
  Mr. Hugh Delargy: He was hanged.
  Mr. Hale: I thought he was shot—
  Mr. Delargy: He was hanged.
  Mr. Hale:—and that some refused to intervene because they had seen documents which they believed came from the Home Secretary? Where did they come from?
  Mr. Emrys Hughes: Alfred Noyes.
  Mr. Deedes: As I was saying, we do from time to time review the decision which has been taken by successive Home Secretaries. It is not taken for granted and I can assure my hon. Friend that a review has been carried out on this occasion. But where there exist good general grounds for not departing from the policy of silence on this issue, I think that the onus lies on those who seek to change it to bring forward strong reasons for changing it at this moment.
  The attitude of the Home Office is not that of mere secretiveness. Official papers are not normally disclosed until
  758
  a considerable time has elapsed. The practice is now to deposit papers in the Public Record Office after 50 years, and those on capital cases are not open to inspection. It is asked, "Is this in the interest of historical truth?" It has often been necessary to allow a passage of time before uncovering the whole truth about historical events. That is a fact which genuine historians accept.
  Although the rule is at times very irksome, it has sound foundations, and one relevant to this case is that as time elapses and as generation succeeds generation, the passion goes out of political controversy. This convention was not invented by the Home Office for Casement. But the Casement case is a good example of the convention's soundness. The events are still a source of passionate partisanship. Whatever the truth, and however we were to reveal it, the inevitable consequence would be to stimulate and not to mollify those passions. Moreover, any disclosure about this tragedy, whether it be the diaries do or do not exist, are genuine or otherwise, must lead to renewed controversy about Casement's character and his part in the events which occurred.
  He landed in Kerry on Good Friday, 1916, and while these events are beyond the recollection of my generation, and are growing dim in the recollection of an older generation, they are remembered in Ireland with pride and bitterness. Whatever we said about this now would incite, first, curiosity, then a demand for more evidence, and, finally inevitably a good deal of bitter controversy. The embers would most certainly be fanned into flame—and to what good? To provide material for a fresh research—[HON. MEMBERS: "Truth."]—for truth, if you like? Truth might be found to be manysided. To vindicate those concerned 40 years ago? Or to vindicate Casement? That was the point raised by one hon. Member.
  This brings me to the question of whether the diaries were genuine. The latest version quoted by my hon. Friend, is, I gather, that they are. So it is said that there would be no harm in confirming it. But, on the contrary, if it were true, and we were to confirm it, we would be giving from official sources information detrimental to the character of a man who had been a prisoner. It is

  759
  an important principle that the Home Office does not do that, and it is doubly important when the prisoner has paid the extreme penalty.
  I foresaw the arguments which would be raised against it. What right has the Home Office to decide what is fit for publication? I think that the Home Office has a very heavy responsibility, more serious than anyone else. I do not take the decisions of the last 25 years by Home Secretaries, or even the 50-year rule, as conclusive. I think there is much more to it than that, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to pay attention to this point.
  There is a fundamental principle that no official disclosure should make it possible for anyone further to blacken the memory of a man who has been imprisoned and hanged. I put that first. There is a second, which, I think, will commend itself to the House, that where to break silence may only stimulate memories bitter and bloody, then it is better to remain silent. The day may come when these considerations will either not apply, or will apply with a great deal less force than they do today. It will then be for the Home Secretary of that time to determine whether or not the moment has arrived to make the disclosure for which my hon. Friend asks.
  12 m.
  Mr. Hugh Delargy: We have just heard about the weakest and the most ill-informed reply that I have ever heard in an Adjournment debate.
  760
  The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department speaks about his refusal not to publish the diaries. That was not asked for. What was asked for was that a small committee of experts, some of them in the confidence of the Irish people, should be allowed to examine these documents if they exist and then to say, without necessarily divulging their contents, whether or not the documents are genuine original personal records. That is all that is asked for.
  The Joint Under-Secretary is talking about a complete disclosure. No one has asked for that. What has been asked for is a small thing. The hon. Gentleman takes refuge in trying, as he says, to defend the memory of Casement when, in fact, Casement's memory was blackened in order that he should be the more conveniently hanged. It is really not good enough merely to say that the Home Office is now doing what Home Secretaries have previously done.
  I will also say to the hon. Gentleman—and it may give him some comfort—that it is not to the credit of Irish Governments that they have refrained—
  The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock on Thursday evening, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
  Adjourned at two minutes past Twelve o'clock.

EDUCATION
  Building Programme, Essex
  Building Programme, Essex
COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
  United Kingdom and Ceylon
  United Kingdom and Ceylon
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Business Expenses (School Fees)
  Business Expenses (School Fees)
  Income Tax and Surtax (United States Citizens)
  Income Tax and Surtax (United States Citizens)
  CIVIL SERVICE (SECURITY REGULATIONS)
  CIVIL SERVICE (SECURITY REGULATIONS)
  N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES (NONMILITARY CO-OPERATION)
  N.A.T.O. COUNTRIES (NONMILITARY CO-OPERATION)
AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Reorganisation Commission on Pigs (Report)
  Reorganisation Commission on Pigs (Report)
  Dehydrated Potatoes (Stocks)
  Dehydrated Potatoes (Stocks)
  Argentine Meat
  Argentine Meat
CYPRUS
  New Hospital, Paphos
  New Hospital, Paphos
TANGANYIKA
  African National Union
  African National Union
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
  Poliomyelitis Vaccination
  Poliomyelitis Vaccination
HOME DEPARTMENT
  Police Pensions (Widows)
  Police Pensions (Widows)
HOUSING
  Loan Charges
  Loan Charges
EMPLOYMENT
  Training Centre, Leicester
  Training Centre, Leicester
PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  Old-Age Pensioners
  Old-Age Pensioners
SCOTLAND
  Secondary School Places
  Secondary School Places
SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
  Automation (Report)
  Automation (Report)
RAILWAYS
  Automatic Train Control
  Automatic Train Control
ROADS
  Crossing, Astley (Accidents)
  Crossing, Astley (Accidents)
Preamble
The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
The Lord Inverclyde—Took the Oath.
Prayers
  BEDFORD CORPORATION BILL
  Read 2a.
SCOTTISH UNION AND NATIONAL INSURANCE, COMPANY BILL
Read 2a.

SEIZURE OF BRITISH BIBLES IN SPAIN
3.6 p.m.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
[The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can now make a statement on the report from The Times correspondent in Madrid, to the effect that on April 24 Spanish officials visited the premises in Madrid of the British and Foreign Bible Society (which is British property), seized and removed 36,189 volumes of the New Testament and some books of the Old Testament in various languages, ancient and modern, and deposited them at the Ministry of Information; and whether any steps have been taken, or are contemplated to be taken, to protect human rights and religious freedom in this matter.]
THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, according to my information, officials of the Spanish Ministry of Information searched the premises of the British and Foreign Bible Society in Madrid on April 20. On April 24 one of the Ministry's inspectors returned to remove all the Society's stocks of literature, including over 9,000 copies
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of the complete New Testament and a further 20,000 copies of various separate books of the New Testament. The Spanish authorities have not yet given any explanation of their seizure of the Society's literature. It is however possible that they will claim that some of the literature had been imported without import licences or printed without the authority required by Spanish law.
On learning of this incident, Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid at once requested the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to investigate the matter, with a view to the restoration of the property seized. Her Majesty's Government deplore the seizure of these Testaments, but I should prefer to avoid further comment until Her Majesty's Embassy have had a reply to their representations. The Society has experienced recurrent difficulties in printing in Spain or importing into Spain the plain text of the Bible in Spanish. It is to be hoped that the Spanish authorities may now be willing to find a solution to these difficulties.
VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble Marquess for the statement he has made and for its nature. I should have been tempted, but for the statement, to have made comment by way of further inquiry to-day, but in view of the statement that he has made, and the fact that Her Majesty's Government are so clearly doing what we think is their duty in this matter, we desire to applaud them for the steps they have taken and hope that they will follow them up.
VISCOUNT STANSGATE: My Lords, in view of the very satisfactory statement of the noble Marquess, is he aware that people in Europe are hungry to have the Bible, and that since the Vatican control in Poland was removed 1,020,000 copies of the Holy Scriptures have been sent to Poland by the British and Foreign Bible Society?
THE MARQUESS OF READING: My Lords, I am perfectly prepared to accept the noble Viscount's figures, but the immediate matter I was dealing with was the question of what had been happening in Spain.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I hope that I shall not be out of order, but as one of my ancestors not only was one of

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the founders of the Bible Society but also translated the Bible into Spanish for the first time, I should like to associate myself with the mover of the Question and, if I may, with the Government's reply.

PENSIONS (INCREASE) BILL
3.10 p.m.
Order of the Day for receiving the Report of Amendments read.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (THE EARL OF SELKIRK): My Lords, in moving that this Report be now received, may I refer to one of the Amendments which was put down on Committee stage in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Burden, but which is not on the Order Paper to-day—namely, the Amendment he put down to the Second Schedule, paragraph 7. I agree that this is rather a wide paragraph and its purpose is to enable the structure of the Bill to be "tailored" a little in certain cases where otherwise a category of pensioners might be dealt with a little harshly as compared with other pensioners. We have to remember that in this Bill we are dealing with a large number of pensioners—about 300,000 to 400,000, whose conditions of service and pension terms vary widely. In order to deal with them all in precise equity, it would be necessary to have a Bill running not to thirteen clauses and five Schedules but probably to three or four times that number. Accordingly, we have inserted this paragraph which will enable the roughness to be evened out in certain cases.
I think perhaps I can make the matter clear by giving a simple example. Apart from any regulations made under this paragraph, the professional stipendiary magistrates would have a cut-off date on December 31, 1947—that is to say, they would not be eligible for any increase in their pensions if they retired after that date. But their salaries and their rate of pension had remained virtually unchanged since before the war and were not increased until 1951. In such circumstances as this, the cutoff date for this category of pension would be brought forward to 1951. This would enable all those retiring at the old rate of pension to receive pension increases, while those on the new,
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higher rates of pension would not qualify. To sum up, the intention of this paragraph is to give fair play to all concerned. The noble Lord, Lord Burden, has asked me for an explanation. I hope that he will be satisfied with what I have said. I beg to move that this Report be now received.
Moved, That the Report be now received.—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
LORD BURDEN: My Lords, may I first thank the noble Earl for his explanation? The intention of the Amendment to which he referred was to endeavour to make sure that the benefits provided in the Bill were not cut down. But having received the assurance that that is not the purpose of paragraph 7 of the Second Schedule, it being a mere matter of adjustment of the kind indicated by the noble Earl, I do not intend to raise the matter any further. It is understood that there will be no whittling down at all; it is just that broad justice should be done. With regard to the Amendment now on the Marshalled List, it will be within the recollection of the House that a similar Amendment was down—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT KILMUIR): My Lords, if the noble Lord is going on to the first Amendment the House will wish first to pass the noble Earl's Motion that the Report be received. May I put that to the House?
On Question, Motion agreed to. Bill reported with Amendments.
Clause 1:
Increase of pensions specified in First Schedule
(2) Subsections (2), (3), (4) and (6) of section one of the Act of 1944 (which define the circumstances in which a pension may be increased under that section) shall apply for the purposes of this section as if any reference in those subsections to the said section one included a reference to subsection (1) of this section; and, subject to the next following subsection, in the application of those subsections for the said purposes, the expression "dependant", in relation to a pensioner, shall be construed as meaning a person who the pension authority are satisfied is wholly or mainly supported by the pensioner and who either has not attained the age of sixteen years, or, having attained that age is [(and except for any period of whole-time service in the armed forces of the Crown under the National Service Acts, 1948 to 1955, has at all times since attaining that age been)] either receiving full-time instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession

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or vocation in such circumstances that he is required to devote the whole of his time to that training for a period of not less than two years.
(3) Where, immediately before the appointed day, an increase under the Acts of 1944 and 1947 or the Act of 1952 was payable in the case of a pension by reason only that some person was a dependant of the pensioner by virtue of subsection (5) of section one of the Act of 1944, then, so long as the pension authority are satisfied that that person continues to be wholly or mainly supported by the pensioner, that person shall be deemed to be a dependant of the pensioner for the purposes of the application of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of section one of the Act of 1944 to increases under subsection (1) of this section:
Provided that—

(a) this subsection shall only apply to a person by virtue of paragraph (a) of the said subsection (5) so long as that person would continue to be a dependant of the pensioner under the last foregoing subsection if the words from "and except" to "been" and the words from "in such" onwards were omitted therefrom;

(b) where this subsection applies to any person by virtue of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of the said subsection (5) and an increase under subsection (1) of this section is payable in the case of a pension by reason only that that person is deemed under this subsection to be a dependant of the pensioner, the annual rate of that increase shall be reduced in respect of any period by the amount, if any, by which the pension authority are satisfied that the annual rate of the total income in that period of that person from any other source exceeds one hundred and fifty-six pounds a year.

LORD BURDEN LORD BURDEN moved to leave out, in subsection (2), all words after "sub-section (1) of this section", and the whole of subsection (3), and to insert instead:
"(3) For the purposes of this section and of the First Schedule to this Act, the expression 'dependant' means, in relation to any pensioner, any person other than the pensioner with respect to whom the pension authority are satisfied that he is wholly or mainly supported by the pensioner being either—

(a) a person who has not attained the age of sixteen years, or who, if he has attained that age, is receiving full-time instruction at any educational establishment or is undergoing training for any trade, profession or vocation; or

(b) the father, mother, brother, sister, child, uncle or aunt of the pensioner, or of the husband or wife of the pensioner, or of the deceased husband or wife of the pensioner; or

(c) the child of any such person as is mentioned in the last foregoing paragraph; or

(d) the stepfather or stepmother of the pensioner;

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and in this subsection the expression 'child' includes, in relation to any person, a stepchild, an illegitimate child and a child adopted by him in pursuance of an adoption order made under the Adoption Act, 1950, or any corresponding enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, or adopted by him in accordance with the law of the place where he was domiciled at the time of the adoption.
In calculating, for the purposes of this subsection, the income of any such person as is mentioned in paragraph (a) thereof, no account shall be taken of any income accruing to that person as the holder of a scholarship or other educational endowment:
Provided that where this subsection applies to any person by virtue of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) and an increase under subsection (1) of this section is payable in the case of a pension by reason only that that person is deemed under this subsection to be a dependant of the pensioner, the annual rate of that increase shall be reduced in respect of any period by the amount, if any, by which the pension authority are satisfied that the annual rate of the total income in that period of that person from any other source exceeds one hundred and fifty-six pounds a year."
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it will be within the recollection of the House that on the Committee stage a similar Amendment to that now appearing on the Marshalled List was not moved and it was agreed that there should be consultations with the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, in connection with the points then raised. I am happy to say that, with the noble Earl's usual courtesy, those discussions took place, and on one point the case submitted has, think, been partly met by two Amendments which stand in the noble Earl's name later in the Marshalled List. Those relate to the position of trainees. Unfortunately, Her Majesty's Government have not seen fit to meet what I believe was the very real case submitted to the noble Earl, and therefore, much to my regret, I have to ask your Lordships' indulgence while I endeavour to prove the justice of the case set forth in the Amendment. I will deal only with persons not covered by the noble Earl's latter Amendment, on the assumption that that Amendment affects a pensioner who is either a young or middle-aged widow or an elderly lady approaching the age of sixty who is struggling to maintain on a small pension a near relative wholly or partly dependent on her. Surely people falling within those categories are not those whom one would expect to find treated less generously in a Bill of this character, when the means test is being abolished—aid I readily grant that Her Majesty's Government are

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making substantial improvements for other pensioners.
In the Second Reading debate the noble Earl agreed that the word "dependant" had been narrowed somewhat, but the case I submit to your Lordships is that there is no ground for treating less generously these hard-hit female pensioners, for whom, indeed, one could well make out a case for more, and not less, generous treatment than they receive under the Bill as it stands. Your Lordships will be aware that under previous Acts dealing with pensions increases (those of 1944, 1947 and 1952) a pensioner who was a widow under forty or a lady under sixty was entitled to pension increase only if she was wholly or mainly supporting a dependant as defined in Section 1 (5) of the main Act of 1944. That entitlement was subject to a means test, in respect of a figure of £52 and then, under the 1952 Act, of £104.
I submit that it is not wholly unreasonable to have hoped that this means test—now based on a figure of £156—might have been entirely wiped away in this Bill, which abolishes means tests for other classes of pensioners. By the Bill the income limit has been abolished in respect of female pensioners making a claim for pension increase for the first time when this Bill becomes operative. The existing definition has operated, and so far as I am aware, operated fairly satisfactorily, under the previous Acts, and I cannot for the life of me see why a young widow or an elderly lady struggling to maintain on a small pension herself and perhaps an infirm old father or other near relative should now be penalised; or if that be too harsh a word, why she should be denied benefits now made available under this Bill. As was put to us, it may well be that female pensioners now affected by the definition of "dependant" are limited in number, but if that is so, surely that is not a reason for depriving them of the increase; rather, I should think, the matter ought to be looked at in the other way. I understand that the cost to the pension authorities would not be very large. Is it worth while for a relatively small sum to leave with a sense of hardship or injustice these people to whom I have referred?
It was put, I believe with force, by the National Advisory Committee for the Local Government Services of the Trades Union Congress, when they saw representatives of the Treasury on February 17 this year, that the people concerned are such female officers as nurses, health visitors and matrons of children's homes who, under present superannuation Acts, have the right to retire at fifty-five. Those framing the superannuation schemes rightly thought that the nature of the employment—particularly of nurses, those in mental hospitals and so on—was such that at the age of fifty-five they were really due for retirement. I am sure that noble Lords will realise that a woman of fifty-five may have someone dependent upon her. In those circumstances, on a reduced income arising from superannuation, the struggle is likely to be pretty grim. It has been urged that the new Bill abolishes any means test restriction and therefore that the pensioner might enjoy a very large income and be able to support a dependant and so be eligible for an increase without deserving one. It has already been said, and agreed, that the number of pensioners affected is likely to be small. As to the number with very large pensions, I am aware, from my knowledge of the rates of salaries in the local government service, that the superannuation received is not likely to be of a very substantial kind.
The other persons affected will be those receiving widows' or allocated pensions. Neither widows' pensions nor allocated pensions can exceed one-third of the pension of the husband or allocator. Speaking from experience of the association in contact with these people, I can say that the other income is never likely to be very large. In any case, that could be dealt with, I believe, if it were feared that someone would be getting money in a case where it would not be necessary. Again, it is urged that a pensioner may also be receiving a National Insurance pension. My reply to that is quite simple. The retirement pension is not payable before the age of sixty; nor is unemployment benefit payable if the person concerned is not seeking employment. And, of course, a widow under the age of forty is entitled to a pension only if she is left with a child. That is provided for in the Family Allowances Act of 1945. A third objection raised is that a dependant may have means of his own. I put it to your

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Lordships that the local authority responsible for administering this Bill, when it becomes an Act, will be aware from their own knowledge of the circumstances. If that were the case they would clearly be able to deal with the position.
I apologise for speaking at such length on this matter, but I can assure your Lordships that while it might not seem of very great importance to you, and while the number of persons concerned is not likely to be very large, that is not a reason for depriving these people of the benefits of this Act. I urge the noble Earl to have a look at this matter again, and at any rate to give us some more substantial reason why these increased benefits should be denied to these people. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 8, leave out from beginning to end of line 3, on page 3, and insert the said new words.—(Lord Burden.)
3.26 p.m.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I do not think there is any more invidious task in this House than to try to explain the limits of a pensions increase scheme, because necessarily we all have the deepest sympathy and regard for those who are pensioners. These people necessarily are not extremely well off; in fact very often they are badly off. My task is the more difficult because, like so many of these things, the matter is exceedingly complicated to explain at all. This makes it all the more easy to give a slightly false impression. Frankly, what the Government are doing is trying equitably to improve pensions within a certain figure (a figure of about £12 million has been allocated), and it has been sought to make that money available for pensions increases as equitably as can reasonably be done.
I really do not think it is fair to say that this Bill penalises anyone or causes injustice. There are, as there must always be in the case of pensions, people who fall on one side of the line and people who fall on the other side. I am afraid that in the circumstances that is quite inevitable. The noble Lord has raised this point, and, if I may say so with great respect, I am still not quite convinced that he understands exactly what we are doing. I wish I was absolutely convinced that I knew myself. As I say, it is a complicated matter, but I will try
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to put it as clearly as clearly as I can because I think the Bill is more generous, shall I say, or covers a wider section of people than the noble Lords seems to think. We have agreed here that the only point he is raising is in regard to widows under forty and women who have retired in their own right under sixty.
LORD BURDEN: From fifty-five to sixty.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: So far as children are concerned—the noble Lord has not dealt with them—we have broadly come to an agreement. I am moving an Amendment in a few minutes' time which will not cut a child out in the event of a break in the education. I looked at the period of education of two years, and it seemed to me that for anyone undergoing a period of education of less than, two years the education they received would not be a very serious one. I think we want to encourage people to take some form of serious education.
Now we come to the other point, that of a pensioner who has been maintaining, say, an infirm relative of some kind The first thing I should like, the noble Lord to be clear upon is this. Anyone who is already receiving any benefit under the 1952 Act will get a 10 per cent. increase straight away. It is very important to appreciate that, because that means that there are not many people who retired before 1952 who fall into the category which the noble Lord has in mind and who will not be receiving some increased pension under the 1952 Act and accordingly will not get a 10 per cent. increase automatically under this measure. I have looked at this matter and, so far as I can see, the only people who fall into that category would be pensioners whose outside income was so high that they were excluded by the means test in the 1952 Act, or dependants who had outside means which brought their income to such a level that they are excluded from benefit under the 1952 Act. All the people below that level would come under the 1952 Act and would be cut off, except for averaging, under the Act. So that those who already receive that benefit would automatically get 10 per cent.
Therefore, I am forced to the conclusion that the people affected by this Amendment must be very few and almost all of them must have some outside means. As the noble Lord says, it is

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true that something may happen in the future, but I think we have to recognise frankly that here there is an element of compromise. When this Bill was put forward, great pressure was brought to bear to abolish the means test, and, as the noble Lord knows, that has been achieved. I think we are all glad about that. There has been a great sense of relief. It has many advantages, including great administrative simplification. It means that when a pensioner gets to sixty, he will get his increase regardless of the means of his dependants. If we granted increases for those under sixty, I think it would be difficult to do so without imposing a means test of some kind. The noble Lord says that we can trust the local authorities. I do not say that we cannot trust them, but, after all, it would put them into an invidious position to have to decide whether a person is dependent or not without any means test at all. I think that Parliament would have to face this squarely and put into it a means test of some kind. We have not done that and, on the whole, I think the method we have chosen is the fairest way of doing it, and the only way of keeping a means test out of future legislation. I do not pretend that this explanation is clear or simple, but I have gone into this matter with the noble Lord and have since looked at it again. Whilst I admit that there are always bound to be hard cases just outside the borderline, I think there is a strong logical case for the line the Government have taken. I think the noble Lord will find that those who are already within the scope of the 1952 Act will get the 10 per cent. and there will be very few of those hardest hit who did not get benefit and who conceivably could come into this measure. I have gone so far as I can to meet the noble Lord in the other matter and I hope he will not press this Amendment any further.
LORD BURDEN: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I should like to say
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that I am grateful to the noble Earl for what he has said. I know it would be useless to pursue this matter much further in view of the line that he has taken. All I can say is that I profoundly regret that such hardship as will arise under this Bill through drawing this line will fall on the hardest-worked category of female labour in local government service, who will not be able to retire at fifty-five and will have to go on until they are sixty to get full pension. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK THE EARL OF SELKIRK moved in subsection (2), to leave out all words in parentheses, beginning "(and except for" down to "been"). The noble Earl said: My Lords, this is the Amendment to which I have already referred. The noble Lord, Lord Burden, advanced the view that a break in education should not necessarily remove the benefit of education, and this Amendment takes out the necessity for education to be continuous. I hope that this meets the noble Lord's point. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 14, leave out from ("is") to end of line 16.—(The Earl of Selkirk.)
LORD BURDEN: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Earl appreciates that I had not intended to deal with this Amendment and I only mentioned it in my previous speech. I readily recognise that the noble Earl has gone as far as he could in this Amendment. It does not give us all we ventured to ask for, but it goes some distance along the way; and for that we are grateful.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE EARL OF SELKIRK: My Lords, I beg to move the next Amendment.
Amendment moved—
Page 2, line 36, leave out from ("if") to ("the") in line 37.—(The Earl of Selkirk)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT CLAIMS
3.37 p.m.
LORD ROCHDALE LORD ROCHDALE rose to draw attention to the increased responsibilities of employers of labour in respect of accidental injury to employees, to the increase in Common Law actions in respect of such accidents, and in particular to the effects of certain provisions of the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the Motion that I put before you this afternoon concerns industrial accidents. As I shall try to put to your Lordships later on, there are certain wider aspects of this matter, but before I embark on what I want to say I would make my own position clear. I hope that nothing I say can possibly be construed by anyone as suggesting that I am trying to protect employers of labour who do not deserve to be protected, or to make it easier for employers of labour to evade their full and proper responsibilities. By exactly the same token, my purpose is not to deny to employees who for one reason or another, probably through no fault of their own, have suffered injury their proper compensation, which will help to make amends for the injury they have suffered. My Motion is not of that kind and I want to underline that point from the very beginning. What I want to do is to focus the attention of your Lordships on what seems to me to be a definite injustice that needs to be put right. I speak with some diffidence, because the Motion is concerned largely with legal matters and I am a complete layman in the law; but I hope that my legal friends will bear with me if I make mistakes in their sphere.
This matter is not something that has come into existence in the last month or two. For some time there has been a growing concern amongst employers of labour at the increased burden laid upon them by the claims of employees in respect of accidents met with in the course of their employment. I am well aware that there should be no accidents at all, and that they could be minimised by appropriate expenditure on proper appliances and by having the best forms of management and so on, and that a great contribution can be made by responsible and careful employees. But here, as in everything else, we are still a long way from perfection. The result, therefore, is
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that we have accidents, and we have to deal with them.
If your Lordships have read the last Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories, that for the year 1954 (Command Paper 9605), published in November of last year, you will probably have noticed that although, comparing 1954 with 1953, there was an increase of 1·8 per cent. in the number of factory accidents, over the last five years there has been a small net decrease in the number of accidents; and in the same period of five years there was a small decrease in the number of accidents per thousand employees. That is not an unsatisfactory position, bearing in mind the tremendous increase in activity in industry as a whole. Taking the same period of five years, however, according to the best information that I have been able to obtain—and it comes from a very authoritative source—the increase in claims against employers has been of the order of 75 per cent., which compares very differently with the slight decrease in actual accidents.
LORD RENNELL: Does the noble Lord mean in number, or in value of award?
LORD ROCHDALE: In number. There seems to be a real danger that the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, may come to be regarded not as the normal remedy for the victims of industrial accidents but as a mere adjunct to a claim pressed directly against the employer under the threat of civil action for damages. There has been recent legislation, and the decisions of the courts arising out of that legislation seem to me to have established the position that the employer to-day is responsible, wholly or in part, for virtually all the risks to which an employee may be exposed during t he course of his employment. There can be few cases where an accident is not in some way originally due to some person's negligence; but unless that negligence can be proved to be wholly or solely that of a third party not employed by the employer in question, or that of the injured employee himself, the employer is new held responsible and must cover by private insurance at his own expense all the risks involved.
I am aware that whereas previously, under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, it was a question of an employee

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choosing whether he would claim under the Acts, on the one hand, or make a claim under Common Law, on the other, under the Act of 1946, to which I have referred, he can now employ both. What he usually does is to get all he possibly can under National Insurance, and then follow on with a claim for damages as well. I am also aware that the Act provides that in assessing damages, if there are any, the court can disallow part of the compensation that the man has received under National Insurance. So far is it goes, that is all right. But the most important thing there, as I shall show in a moment, is that the vast majority of these cases never get into court at all, with the result that that part of the Act does not apply in the context to which I am referring. As a result, National Insurance benefit, which was presumably meant to be a comprehensive cover, has become subsidiary and in no way relieves the employer of the responsibility which, as I have said, now rests entirely upon him.
When I referred a moment ago to recent legislation I had in mind, first, the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1943, and, secondly the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945. I am not going to say much about the Act of 1943, which of course abolished the old doctrine of common employment, except this: that with the present high demand for labour, which we all know exists in the industrial world, it is almost inconceivable that an employer, however careful he may be in the selection of those whom he takes on to work for him, may not at some time, perhaps unwittingly, employ someone—either the very old, or perhaps the very young, or someone in between—who, if not to be regarded as entirely careless or irresponsible, at any rate, has not had experience of industrial hazards and is unsuitable for employment anywhere where the exercise of care and common sense is necessary for the safety of his colleagues. Yet if one of those people, by his action, becomes the sole cause of an accident to a fellow-employee, responsibility rests wholly on the employer of both of them; and that is a risk which no employer can reasonably foresee or wholly guard against.
The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, was concerned with the negligence of the injured employee
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himself. Until then, if the employee's own negligence was even partly the cause of the accident the employer could not be held responsible for the injury suffered. But the effect of this Act is that the court must decide to what extent the employee's negligence was to blame, and the balance of responsibility lies at the door of the employer. I would say that that is fair enough, and I certainly do not wish to impugn either of these Acts to which I have referred—obviously, on balance, they are beneficial, and they are with us to stay. But by accepting the possibility that an employer could be held even partly responsible for an accident due primarily to the negligence of an injured employee, surely the Act of 1945 opened the door for claims; and in the present circumstances the mere existence of a claim (as I hope to show) results in damage to the employer which may be far from just, but which he has little or no opportunity of avoiding.
There is another factor which has greatly extended the responsibility of the employers. That is the increasing tendency to found claims not on the employer's duties and obligations as defined by the Factories Acts but on his more general obligations under Common Law. I suppose every responsible and conscientious employer (and I should like to make it quite clear that I hold no brief for any employer who does not come within that category) will do all he can, with the advice and assistance of the factory inspectorate—and I should like to pay tribute to them for the work and help that they give—to equip himself to meet all his obligations under the Factories Acts. If he is a good employer he will probably, to his own advantage, do a great deal more. Indeed, I think it would be fair to say that it would be folly if he did not, especially when one considers the tremendous competition for labour in the present circumstance of full or overfull employment. But if an accident happens which can fairly be attributed to his neglect of these regulations, then it is obviously his own fault, and he is not entitled to any particular sympathy.
When we come to the Common Law claims, however, the position is obviously entirely different. Here there is only a general obligation, and how that general obligation may apply on his particular factory floor it is almost impossible for

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an employer to foresee. Take the platform off which no one has ever slipped; the step over which no one has ever stumbled. No employer or no employee could possibly think that the platform or the step constituted a risk, any more than any of us would think that his front door step constituted a risk. They are certainly not covered by any provision of the Factories Acts. But once an employee has slipped over the step or slipped off the platform a risk has been demonstrated, and if the court—should it come to a court action—so decides, he may be held responsible for something which in practice he could not possibly have foreseen or guarded against.
Nearly every injured employee making a claim these days does so, at least in the alternative, under Common Law. It may easily be a case which the best of employers, with the very best intentions, finds it almost impossible to defend. That puts the employers in an extremely difficult position, and I have often heard it said, perhaps in exasperation, how much better it would have been for them if it had been possible to have some precise statutory code covering all the employers' obligations in this sphere. But attractive as that idea may sound on the face of things, I recognise that it is obviously impossible. In the first place, it would have to overrule the Common Law, which wipes it out straight away; and in the second place, if it were going to be really comprehensive it would be so complicated that it would not help the employer at all.
We are therefore left with this situation. So long as an accident is attributable in any degree to negligence—as, of course, in one way or another, nearly all accidents are—and unless that negligence can be shown to be wholly and solely that of a total outsider or of the injured employee himself, the employer, whether or not there was anything that could possibly be construed as negligence on his part, is responsible and may be faced with a claim for damages. A claim for damages obviously implies the threat of action in the civil courts; that is the only sanction underlying such a claim. Once an employee decides to make a claim directly against his employer, the employee at that moment is a potential plaintiff, and his employer a potential defendant. In the vast majority of cases the matter will never come to court at
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all; it is settled by negotiation long before. I have it from one big insurance company that something like 95 per cent. of these claims are settled without being brought into court. But, of course, the strength of the claimant's position in negotiating such a settlement out of court depends on, and in fact equals, his potential strength as a plaintiff in the civil courts.
That brings me to what I believe is perhaps the core of the whole matter. An industrial employee suing his employer will apply for assistance under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, and will sue, if he has to come to court, as an assisted person. The employer, or his insurance company acting on his behalf, will defend without such assistance. I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not in any way questioning the need for the Act, nor its value in securing justice for great numbers of people whose chance would have been slight or non-existent. Nor am I questioning or trying to repeat or add to criticism which one has heard from time to time of the way in which the Act is administered, or the way in which local committees have sometimes exercised their judgment in the granting or withholding of legal aid to applicants. Nor is it my particular wish to draw attention to what might be regarded as frivolous cases which are, by the operation of the Act, maintained by the State at the expense of the taxpayer. But there are other aspects of the Act, the working of which I believe is open to serious criticism and which are particularly relevant to the point that I have in mind.
The liability of an assisted person under the Act is strictly limited—indeed, the whole purpose of the Act is that no-one need be deterred from seeking justice for fear of incurring expenditure which he cannot reasonably sustain. An assisted person, therefore, goes into his case knowing that, win or lose, he will not be required to pay out a sum which he cannot afford. But this is far from being the case with the defendant who is not assisted under the Act. His risks in the action are not only those of the ordinary defendant but are much greater, because, even if his defence is successful and he is not ordered to pay any damages, he knows that he cannot, in practice, recover his costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff who, by definition,

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is unable to pay. So for that employer it really is a case of, "Heads you win, tails I lose". The result of that is that, whatever the intrinsic merits of the threatened action, the claimant is, to say the least of it, in an extremely strong bargaining position, whereas the employer or his insurance company—and I want to underline that little word "or" to which I will come back in a minute—unless the claim is a very large one or almost totally lacking in merit, is obviously tempted to cut his losses and to settle out of court a claim which might cost him in any event a great deal to defend. Can we therefore wonder that a great number—I mentioned 95 per cent.—of these claims are settled out of court?
I want now to come back to what I said just now—"the employer or his insurance company"—because, in point of fact, every employer, having inevitably covered himself by his private insurance against the risk of these claims, has surrendered to the insurance company the right to settle or defend on his behalf any claims made against him. The insurance company, being a commercial concern, very rightly cannot be blamed for taking what might be regarded as a hard-headed view of the matter. The insurance company cannot be expected to share the righteous indignation of the employer against an outrageous claim, nor is the insurance company concerned with the adverse effect which an admission of liability—and I should have thought that a settlement out of court was tantamount to some admission of liability—may have on the reputation of the employer, who may, in fact, be an exemplary employer in his care of his employees.
The insurance company is concerned with only one thing: to weigh the financial advantages or disadvantages to itself of each case. For the reason I have given, over and over again the advantage lies in settling out of court without much regard to the legal merits of the claim. I hope my noble friends who are in the insurance business will not think I am being unfair to them—that is not my intention at all. Of course, we cannot do without insurance companies, who are a great source of strength and support to us; but the fact remains that that situation is the subject of almost universal complaint among industrial employers. I could cite a great many examples to
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illustrate that, but I will confine myself to one or two.
I should like to cite the case of an employee working in a mill who sustained rather severe injuries to one hand whilst lubricating moving parts of a machine—a very common occurrence. Unfortunately—and, of course, one's sympathies obviously go entirely to the man—his hand had to be amputated. The important part of this case was that the machinery was correctly guarded and there was a prominent notice beside the machine warning employees not to lubricate while the machinery was in motion. More important still, the factory inspector was completely satisfied that everything that the employer had done was correct under the Factories Act, but, unfortunately, the man disregarded his instructions; he oiled the machine when it was running and his hand was caught in the machine.
What happened? I am not certain of the original amount of the claim but, after very long negotiations, the insurance company paid out the sum of £750 without going to the court, and the question of liability—this is an important point—was never legally decided. It may be said, "That is too bad, but the insurance company paid; so that is that". But, of course, the matter does not finish there. As I have already reminded your Lordships, insurance companies are commercial concerns and cannot go on incurring increased risks without requiring, obviously, increased premiums. Also, do not let us forget that even in successfully defended cases insurance companies themselves have considerable costs to meet.
I should like to give your Lordships another example. This is a case that started about three years ago. A man was injured and he first of all applied through his union—and they put him on to the union's solicitors—for a legal aid certificate. It was disputed, the solicitors realised that there were no grounds for a claim and they dropped it. A little later on the man again applied through other solicitors for a legal aid certificate. He was not granted the certificate and those solicitors dropped it. The third time he applied through another lot of solicitors, and on that particular occasion he managed to get a legal aid certificate. The case was brought into court

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and the action was lost. I will not go into all the other details of the case except to say that the judge, to mark his severe disapproval of certain aspects of the case, ordered the claimant, who incidentally at that time was earning £15 a week, to pay £60 towards the insurance company's costs. That £60 yet has to be paid to the insurance company. But the point of this particular example is that the actual costs incurred by the insurance company will certainly be of the order of £400. The obvious result is that premium charges for this type of insurance have risen and are still rising.
Let me give your Lordships some idea of the order of magnitude by which premiums rise. I have a case here of a firm which was paying a premium of £60 a year. It was subjected to a claim for £3,000. While that claim was pending, the next premium fell due and the firm was required to pay as an annual premium not £60 but £400, a very substantial increase indeed. During the following year the claim was settled eventually for £1,000, and the next time the premium fell due it was raised again to £475. So there was an increase in premium from £60 to £475. In another case, a firm was subjected to no claims at all during a five-year period, and yet at the end of that period the premium which that company was paying for this form of insurance had gone up by 80 per cent. I have another important case in which an insurance company refused altogether to meet risks. In 1952, a most responsible company, which had for thirty years insured the whole of an industry in the Midlands, in view of its experience with claims expressed its inability at that time to cover the industry any longer against Common Law liability.
In another and very recent case, one of the big insurance companies had covered a certain North country firm for every kind of risk for the past five years and was then for the first time presented with a Common Law claim by an injured employee. The claim is still undecided; but at the next renewal date the insurance company has refused to renew on any terms its cover on employers' liability. That may be an exceptional case, but it illustrates the point I am making—namely, the position of the employer. He must insure and he must do so on the
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terms offered him by the insurance company. He has little say in the handling of claims, but suffers doubly as a result of them: first, by the payment of steadily increasing premiums for insurance; and, secondly, as I have already said, by the damage to his reputation as an employer which necessarily results from the implied admission of liability. In these days of very full employment, this is a matter which is of no little concern to any industrial company. It may be vital to it. These are real and growing burdens with which employers of labour and industry are saddled.
I should possibly be criticised by some as not giving the full picture if I did not make some reference to the position of the trade unions in this matter. I have heard it said by some employers that the unions must bear some share of the responsibility for the present position. One sometimes hears that irresponsible claims are put forward with union backing, or perhaps on the advice of a union's solicitors. My own opinion is that a matter of this type has to be approached with the greatest caution. After all, a trade union is a voluntary body pledged to help its members in every way. A voluntary body, whether of employers or employees, lives and retains the loyalty of its members by the individual service it can give to them, quite apart from its own collective responsibility in a wider sphere. I think it is therefore unquestionably reasonable to expect a union, if one of its members feels that he has a grievance of this sort, to support him in an effort to obtain redress. All I want to add to that is that I think we should also remember that the unions were helping their members in this way long before anyone thought of legal aid; and in fact substantial sums of money have been paid out of union funds in payment of heavy costs awarded to employers who have successfully defended actions in the courts. So far as the position of the unions goes in this matter I should prefer to leave it at that.
My Lords, the question is, what are the remedies? Before I make any precise suggestions as to the remedies in this matter, I would say that I believe that, in part, the trouble is one which can be cured only by the education of public opinion. What one may perhaps call claim-mindedness, the urge to make a good thing out of a chance misfortune,

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is perhaps a disease of the age. A man feels, with a greater or less degree of justice, that he has suffered and is entitled to some compensation; and he is not particular on whom, or with what justice, the liability is laid—somebody has got to find the money, whether it is the insurance company or the employer. This attitude of mind is one from which not only employers of labour suffer today; I believe that probably doctors suffer from it; perhaps local authorities suffer from it; the authorities of the National Health Service probably suffer from it, perhaps more heavily than even employers of labour. It may be that the only real cure is a change in public opinion reflected in a stiffening attitude in the courts. That is a wide and a not very tangible remedy, but I believe that there are some specific remedies which it is within the power of Parliament to carry out and which would help to minimise these troubles.
The last thing that any one of us would want to do is to undo what is the essential purpose of the Legal Aid and Advice Act: that is, to enable every man to seek justice in the courts undeterred by the threat of expenditure which he cannot afford. But I believe there are changes that could be made: first, still further to ensure that unworthy cases did not go forward with the assistance of State funds; and secondly, to ensure that where a case goes forward and fails, the successful defendant should not be allowed to suffer from the action of the State which, however well-intentioned, has in fact supported unsuccessfully a case against him—and, indeed, has done so with taxes which he himself has contributed.
The first purpose, to limit still further the possibility of the State supporting unworthy cases, is, in a way, perhaps the least important in the present context—for two reasons. Whatever may have been the case previously, my information is that there is little reason to suppose that to-day legal aid is often granted without a thorough scrutiny of the merits of the case. On the other hand, and perhaps more important, an employee does not generally apply for legal aid until he has decided to go to the court; and in the great majority of cases, as I have already said, the matter does not go that far, because the claim is settled by negotiation, and though the employee negotiates
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as a potentially assisted plaintiff, he may not yet have applied for assistance under the Act. While, therefore, it is obviously desirable to ensure that unworthy cases do not go forward with State assistance, action directed to this end may not do very much to ease the lot of the employer.
I should like to ask, however—and perhaps the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor may be able to answer this question—why, when a person applies to the legal aid committee for assistance under the Act, the other party, the potential defendant, should not be given notice of the application and allowed to show cause against it. As your Lordships no doubt know, there is precedent for this, because such a provision is included in the Scottish Act, and I can see no objection on principle to it. Nor can I see any reason why a right granted to a defendant in Scotland should not also be accorded to his brother employer on this side of the Border. I should have thought that it would have been welcomed by the legal aid committees in their sometimes difficult task of deciding whether or not assistance should be granted. Many of the cases and examples that I have seen when looking into this matter would seem to bear out that point.
The other possibility which might help is one to which my noble friend Lord Hailsham, referred in a supplementary question that he asked the Lord Chancellor on January 31 of this year, when he asked whether it would be possible for the legal advice part of the Act to be implemented. I read the reply of the noble and learned Viscount, and I was much encouraged. I gather that Her Majesty's Government are under pledge to introduce that part of the Act during the life of the present Parliament. But it may be that my noble friend Lord Hailsham may have something further to say on that later in the debate.
This brings me to my main objective, which I think is the key to the problem. Is it right that an unassisted party should be penalised by a case unsuccessfully brought against him with State aid? I should have thought that this would be regarded as a palpable injustice. I was interested to see that it was an injustice which was pointed out at the time that the Act (then the Bill) was going through another place in 1949, and the then

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Attorney-General described the existing provisions of the Act as
"the solution which will result, I do not say in no injustice, but in the least injustice."
My Lords, I would suggest that this injustice has, in fact, attained proportions, directly, in the courts, and indirectly, in the cases that have never come into the courts, which were never contemplated when the matter was being considered in 1949; and it should now be put right. If, as we all agree, it is true that no person should be deterred from seeking justice by the fear of incurring expenses which he cannot afford, surely it must also be equally true that no person, whatever his means, should be deterred from entering a just defence by the knowledge that his defence, even if successful, will cost him more than an unjust admission of liability. As I see it, that is really the position to-day.
I agree that the plaintiff, whom the State has assisted in his case, cannot and should not be required to find the defendant's costs if the defendant wins his case; and the only logical answer, therefore, is that the State, having assisted the unsuccessful plaintiff, must also be chargeable with costs if he fails. I am going to ask the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor to consider whether it would not be possible for the court to be given power to award costs to a successful unassisted defendant against the fund which has paid the costs of the unsuccessful plaintiff. I realise that there are difficulties in the way, and that many people in different parts have canvassed this possibility from time to time. I submit, however, that here is something to which a solution really must be found. As I have said, it is a matter to which I attach the greatest importance. Nothing is further from my mind than to try to weaken the working of the Legal Aid and Advice Act. All I want to do is to try to strengthen it and make it more complete; but I cannot believe that any such measure of public justice is the stronger if the justice which is procures is partial, and if it leaves in the minds of any of Her Majesty's subjects a feeling of having suffered injustice, or, as one employer wrote to me two days ago, a feeling of suffering from something almost amounting to blackmail, by the deliberate act of the State.
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My Lords, I am afraid that I have taken a very long time, and come a very long way from the narrow subject of employers' liability; but I believe that a solution lies in the direction to which I have pointed. I realise that it may have very much wider implications in other spheres and if that is so I hope that it will be discussed on the widest possible basis. I beg to move for Papers.
4.22 p.m.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, has raised a number of questions of some importance which this House might well discuss, as your Lordships will agree. Needless to say, we accept the assurances of the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, in his opening passage and concluding words, that he has no wish to deter those who have just rights from pursuing them; nor, as I understand it, has he any wish to deter those whose means do not otherwise permit them to pursue their rights from doing so through lack of means.
The noble Lord has quoted a number of figures. Frankly, I am not in a position to deal with them, but there are one or two points which perhaps I might deal with in preliminary fashion. I understood the noble Lord to say that industrial injury benefit was now subsidiary to the Common Law claim. I really cannot accept that. There must, surely, be a great many more injured persons, some of whom may have claims for negligence, drawing industrial injury benefit, than those who pursue a claim for negligence; at least, I should certainly have thought so. Then the noble Lord raised the question of costs being made payable by unsuccessful plaintiffs to successful defendants. It is within the province of the court to order an unsuccessful plaintiff to pay costs or to pay such proportion of the costs as the court thinks he might properly be ordered to pay, having regard to his means. Admittedly ex hypo-thesi, the applicant for legal aid is a person of small means who has to have a disposable income of less than £420 a year, and no doubt courts have regard to that fact, and in my experience they do not frequently make an order for payment of costs by an unsuccessful plaintiff.
The noble Lord then raised the point that insurance companies prefer to settle rather than fight a case. I know of insurance companies who do not adopt that

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practice, although there may be some who, on economic grounds, think it might prove cheaper to settle some cases out of court where, in their view, they have an adequate defence. Other insurance companies of which I know make a stand against that kind of thing, as they are perfectly entitled to do. Where, in their view, there is a reasonable chance of a successful defence, they do not hesitate to fight a case rather than settle it in the fashion described by the noble Lord. It is quite impossible to draw any general principle from the cases which the noble Lord indicated, as the facts are not wholly before us; but the noble Lord appeared to be criticising the decision of the courts in some of the cases rather than criticising the procedure or the law, which is a matter for Parliament.
Owing to the undoubted increase in Common Law actions, it is true that increased responsibilities are being placed upon employers. As we all know, and as Her Majesty's Government rightly claim, there are now more people employed in this country in one capacity or another than has ever before been the case in our history. Obviously, with more people in employment more responsibility must fall on employers, who, either themselves or through insurance companies, have to provide cover for claims from that increased number of employees. Secondly, as the noble Lord himself said, there is much greater activity, much more machinery and possibly much greater danger of accidental injury than there was in former days. To that extent, therefore, the facts make it certain that, other things being equal, there may be more claims.
LORD ROCHDALE: My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord—he did not interrupt me—but, to complete the picture he drew I should like to remind him that though, as he said, there is more of "this and that," there are fewer accidents.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: My Lords, if that be so, so much the better, and I am very glad to hear it. To some extent that seems to have disposed of the noble Lord's claim. I was going on to say that, as the noble Lord said, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act provided for an apportionment of liability in cases of contributory negligence. That may have resulted in more
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cases being brought. On the other hand, it may well have reduced the liability of employers. In the old days, when there was the defence of contributory negligence, perhaps there was a tendency for courts to give a verdict for a substantial amount and to disregard the contributory element. Nowadays, thanks to that particular Act, the responsibility may be divided, in such proportion as the court may think fit, between the plaintiff who has contributed to his own injury and the employer. To that extent, therefore, the responsibility on the employer may be less than formerly was the case.
The noble Lord also mentioned that the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act abolished the defence of common employment. I doubt whether that has had much effect, as I do not believe that that defence was put up very much in former days. It may be that, to some extent, successful actions are now brought where previously that defence might have prevailed. Apart from those factual or legislative provisions, it is not at all clear that there is an increase in Common Law actions in respect of accidents to employees; and, in my submission, it is still less clear that the Legal Aid and Advice Act has contributed very materially to any such increase. The total proceedings in the King's Bench Division in 1938 numbered some 83,000, whereas in 1954 and 1955 the figures were 115,000 and 116,000 respectively. So it will be seen that those actions in rather less than twenty years have increased by less than 50 per cent. I should have thought that having regard to the many developments that have taken place in so many different directions, that was not an undue increase. There appear to be no figures indicating what proportion of the increase is due to the increased number—if there be an increase in the number—of Common Law actions against employers. As we all know, there has been a great increase in running down cases and actions of that kind, which may well make up the difference.
Since January of this year, the Law Society (who have been good enough to give me these figures, and who, of course, have a responsibility under the ægis of the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack for the Legal Aid Scheme) have endeavoured to separate claims in respect of alleged negligence leading to accidents at work from other

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Common Law claims. There were 383 such cases—that is to say, claims in respect of injuries received in accidents arising from alleged negligence at work—between January 1, 1956, and March 31, out of a total number of 4,832 legal aid certificates granted throughout the country. Those are the figures for the whole of the three months in respect of certificates granted to applicants who desired to bring actions for damages resulting from injuries caused by alleged negligence while at work. Out of a total of 4,832 certificates granted there were 383 such cases in the three months I have mentioned.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: Could the noble Lord say how many of the 4,800 certificates he has mentioned were certificates granted in matrimonial causes? If he can do that, I think it would enable us to evaluate his figures more precisely.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: It is true that there were a great number of certificates granted in respect of matrimonial cases. But does that affect the number?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: If I may say so, it clearly affects the mathematical proportion between employers' liability claims and other Common Law claims in respect of which certificates are granted. My impression is—and I wondered whether the noble Lord's figures would support it—that legal aid certificates are given in an outstandingly large proportion of cases relating to matrimonial disputes, and I suggest that these ought really to be excluded from the figure if a just proportion is to be arrived at.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: The noble Viscount may be right in that view. Let us take the figure of 383. That represents the number of cases throughout the country in three months. I would submit to your Lordships that that is not a very large number. It means something like 1,500 in the course of the year—1,500 legal aid certificates granted in respect of claims for damages arising out of injuries sustained in accidents at work. I suggest that that is comparatively a very small number indeed.
Furthermore, the total number of all kinds of certificates which were being granted, curiously enough, is decreasing year by year. Whereas in 1951–52 some 38,000 such certificates were granted (including, I agree, certificates in respect
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of matrimonial causes) only 28,000 were granted in 1953–54 and 25,000 in 1954–55. This indicates a considerable falling off of applications for such certificates. And, of course, such applications shortly after the war were very numerous. It may be that the extension of the Legal Aid Act to the county courts will result in an increase in the total number of such certificates, but that is not at all certain, because a number of the actions which were formerly brought in the High Court may conceivably now be brought in the county court. We can only wait and see the results.
I do not know whether or not the noble Lord intended—indeed I am sure he did not—to reflect in any way on the operation of the Legal Aid and Advice Act. He mentioned the work of the certifying committees. I have sat on more than one of these committees. Without question, these committees look into the facts as put before them, and it is their duly to determine whether it is reasonable on the facts that a certificate should be granted. The noble Lord suggested that the prospective defendant, if I may so call him—that is to say, the employer—should have the opportunity also to put forward his side of the case. I do not really think that that would be very practical. It would mean that the certifying committee were to some extent prejudging the whole issue. In point of fact, 91 per cent. of actions in respect of which certificates are granted are successful. That would appear to indicate that local committees give serious consideration to the applicants' claims and that their judgment in the majority of cases is correct. It is also worthy of note—and the noble Lord referred to the position of trade unions—that the form a person has to fill up to obtain legal aid contains a paragraph in which the applicant must give particulars of his trade union, his friendly society, his ex-Service organisation, or whatever other body it might be, or any other authority which might conceivably give him financial aid; and it is only on the Committee being satisfied that, every reasonable effort having been made, help is not coming from any of those quarters, that they are entitled to give an applicant aid under the Legal Aid Scheme.
I really think one ought to try to look at this from another angle. Admittedly, none of us would dispute that the present

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figures of accidents in industry are far too high, and that there is a real challenge to employers, to trade unions, to the Government Departments concerned, particularly to the Factory Department of the Ministry of Labour, and to employees, to endeavour to minimise these accidents. In the latest figures given in the Report which the noble Lord mentioned, accidents reported under the Factories Act alone account for 700 men and women killed in industry in the year ended March 31, 1954, and 180,000 injured. The total number of days lost to industry through industrial injuries is little short of 20 million man-days a year—a very great loss to the nation. The accident rate has changed very little in recent years.
For many years past, and from many quarters, particularly from the Trades Union Congress, a number of points have been pressed which might help materially to reduce accidents at work and hence reduce the responsibility of employers. For example, it has been urged—I think with justification—that there is great need for increasing the resources of the Factory Department of the Ministry of Labour, including a substantial increase in the strength of the factory inspectorate. According to the Factories Act Report, the strength of that inspectorate a year ago was 361 inspectors for the whole of the country. Obviously, that number is inadequate. Factory inspectors have many other duties to perform in connection with public health and conditions of one sort and another, and 361 is quite an inadequate number of inspectors. It is unreasonable to expect them to examine the vast quantity of machinery which is now to be found in our factories throughout the country. That is one step which the Government might well take: to increase substantially—to double, at least—the number of factory inspectors.
Then there is the need for increasing the number of joint works safety committees. They, of course, exist on a voluntary basis. There is also a great need for better training and supervision of young persons entering industry. Apparently there is a high accident rate among young persons and that is a matter for particular concern. I believe that at present there is a special committee of the Ministry of Labour sitting on the general question of greater freedom from
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industrial accidents. I hope that when it reports its report may be of value. It is in the interests of employers to ensure the safest possible working conditions. That would decrease their responsibility both financially and otherwise, and would obviously reduce the necessity for legal proceedings or for recourse to the Legal Aid Act.
That is almost all that I can usefully say at this juncture. I was not fully aware of what the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, was going to deal with, and I should like to mention one other matter. There is considerable complaint that the court lists in the Queen's Bench Division are run in such a way as to cause a great deal of inconvenience and expense, which in these cases might be an expense to employers, because of an apparent difficulty or lack of system in fixing cases on a definite day. In the Divorce Division it is generally possible to ascertain the approximate date on which a case is to be heard. Frequently, indeed, one can fix that date many weeks beforehand. In the Queen's Bench Division that does not seem to be so, and in the majority of cases it is impossible to fix hearing dates. If something could be done in that direction—and I call the attention of the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack particularly to this point—it would result in some alleviation of the expense to which the present system frequently gives rise. The noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, has rendered a service in raising this subject to-day, and I hope that the matters to which he has referred will attract the attention they deserve and will result in the taking of some action in some of the directions I have indicated.
4.43 p.m.
LORD MESTON: My Lords, the noble Lord who has moved this Motion is to be congratulated on having raised a matter of considerable importance. It is a difficult matter to speak upon because it cannot be discussed within a narrow compass: on the contrary, it covers a wide field. Therefore, I will comment on only one or two aspects of the subject. So far as these unfortunate accidents are concerned, no words of mine or of anyone else will have any effect upon them. These accidents will be minimised, in number and in gravity, only if people take more care and when better and more

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scientific safety devices are invented. It may be that Acts of Parliament and regulations will have some small effect, but, generally speaking, it is acts and not words that will count.
So far as the Legal Aid and Advice Act is concerned, this is a matter of almost universal interest. The noble Lord raised an important point when he talked about the unfortunate position of successful defendants who are not legally aided by the State. I feel that that raises the whole question of justice in this country. From time to time all of us have attended functions at which speeches have been made about the impartiality and greatness of British justice, and we have been told that justice is open to everyone. I think that we are all proud of the courts in this country, but does that show the whole picture? An eminent man once said that justice in England was open to everyone, like the Ritz Hotel. I think to-day that this should be phrased in another way: justice is open to everyone who cannot afford to pay for it.
Let us look at this matter from a practical point of view, from the layman's point of view, and not from the point of view of some other Members of your Lordships' House whom I will not identify but whom I see with great pleasure. Going to law is one of the misfortunes of mankind. If you break your neck, you go to Harley Street, and you will hew passed on from one surgeon to another surgeon, to a physician, to a radiologist and then to an X-ray specialist; and eventually you will come round to the medical man who saw you in the first instance. That is a very amateur way of spending money compared to getting involved with the law. I want to make it clear that when I am talking about the law in this debate, I am referring to contentious actions and not to non-contentious actions.
What is the remedy? I do not know, but I am going to make a suggestion which will probably qualify me for the lunatic asylum. There are 23·53 million people in this country who are insurable under the National Health Scheme. If we insure against ill-health, why should we not insure against the equal peril of getting involved with the law? Even making a handsome allowance for those people who are sick or unemployed, there are still over 20 million insurance cards
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in active operation—that is to say, 20 million stamps are affixed every week. I suggest that a penny a week should be added compulsorily to the charge for every stamp, to protect us against getting into the hands of the law. A penny a week is 4s. 4d. a year, and if we multiply 4s. 4d. by 20 million, the answer is about £4½ million a year. I am not in favour of restricting legal aid: I want it largely expanded and made available, either entirely or partly, to everyone who gets into the hands of the law.
There are certain objections which I can foresee. In the first place, it is said that there would be a flood of unworthy applications. But there always are these nervous fears beforehand. When I was a young, man, a great many years ago—more years ago than I care to remember, and more years than many noble Lords can remember—a Bill was introduced whereby a man was to be allowed to marry his deceased wife's sister. People then said that in no circumstances must that Bill be allowed to become law, because after it became an Act husbands all over the country would be murdering their wives to marry their more attractive sisters-in-law. That Act has been on the Statute Book for nearly fifty years, and I am not aware of anybody who has been induced to murder his wife for that reason, though no doubt many men have murdered their wives, or would like to murder them, for other reasons. No doubt if we have an enormous extension of legal aid there will be a great flood of applications in the early stages. Later on, that will be smoothed out and everything will work quite happily.
Then it may be said that if we make insurance against getting into the hands of the law compulsory, there will be many people who will never get any benefit from it. But they ought to be very glad of that. Many millions of people who buy insurance stamps to-day get no medical benefits at all, for the simple reason that, by the grace of Providence, they enjoy good health and find no necessity either to call in the doctor or to go to hospital. That is merely a suggestion that I brow out. We are insuring this country against ill-health, unemployment and old age. Why should we not insure against one of the greatest misfortunes of mankind—namely, getting into the hands of the law?
5.0 p.m.
LORD RENNELL: My Lords, I do not think there is much that I can add to what has been said by the noble Lord who moved this Motion, but there are one or two points I should like to make on the insurance side, and I should tell your Lordships that I am closely associated with insurance in this country and therefore have an interest in what I say. I am sorry in some ways that the noble Lord has raised, as I think, two subjects in one Motion. The two subjects are that which he spoke of in the first part of his speech, namely, the rise in claims for compensation under Common Law generally, and the cost of those claims on the economy of the country, as a whole, as I understood it, by reason of the rise in premiums to which people who had suffered these claims were subjected by insurance companies—I will come to that point in a moment—and secondly, in the latter part of his speech the noble Lord raised the question of legal aid, and legal aid, in particular, in that context.
The claims made on employers, and therefore on their insurance companies, in respect of compensation are, of course, long-standing, and it is difficult to say that they have increased greatly by reason of legal aid having been provided to successful plaintiffs, whether those cases got into court or whether they were settled out of court. The fact of the matter is that the compensation was granted by courts, and therefore, as a measure of that, the compensations for which insurance companies will settle out of court have grown both in size and in number, for many of the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, mentioned. But it is not at all clear that those claims, either in volume or in number, have been substantially increased by reason of legal aid being provided to plaintiffs.
It is perfectly manifest (and here I should like to emphasise what the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, began his speech by saying) that the insurance world in this country welcomes the provision of legal aid for impecunious plaintiffs, both for compensation and, of course, for any of the other cases to which legal aid is applied, notably the very large proportion of matrimonial cases which figure in the certificates. But the claims on insurance companies, and their settlement of those
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claims out of court, have not been influenced by the unfairness of the fact that the Legal Aid Scheme does not provide for the award of costs to successful defendants. It is no new thing for an insurance company to be under pressure to settle out of court, or to take the case into court. It is clear that there must be times when an insurance company is in some doubt about the liability of the insured person and prefers to settle for a sum rather than indulge in a long argument, irrespective of who pays the costs. There may be a number of cases which it is undesirable, for commercial and other reasons, to have heard in court, and where it is much more desirable in the public interest of insurance that they should be settled out of court without argument. There are many cases where, in particular, an employee may be liable, but where it is such a hard case that, for obvious reasons, and perfectly rightly, no insurance company would wish to fight it in court. It does not, however, follow that that has any connection with the risk that the insurance company might feel itself incurring of winning a case and not having its costs paid.
Therefore, I should like to see this debate divided into two parts. If it is desired by other noble Lords to continue this question of the amount of compensation, and how far National Insurance ought to cover it, that is one subject; but I should prefer not to have it involved in the injustice or otherwise of the application of legal aid, whereunder a successful defendant cannot recover costs. On the latter point, there is obviously something to be said, as various noble Lords have indicated—notably the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, and I think, by implication, the noble Lord, Lord Meston—about the operation of legal aid being a little one-sided: where it is "Heads I win, and tails you lose," so far as the plaintiff is concerned, because if he wins the case, that is fine, and if he loses, he does not have to pay. There is an obvious remedy there, and I do not quite see the force of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, that to allow a prospective defendant to consider with the committee before legal aid is granted is in a sense pre-judging the case, inasmuch as that is already the practice, I believe, in Scotland; and if it does mean pre-judging the case, then they are pre-judging cases in Scotland. It

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seems to me very arguable that defendants should be allowed to put a case and to claim that to grant legal aid in respect of a certain cause for compensation is, in their view, frivolous and that the committee should decide.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: The noble Lord will forgive me for interrupting. I did indicate that 91 per cent. of the cases in which legal aid was granted in respect of negligence cases occurring at work—I think I am right in limiting it to that—were successful. If that be so, the defendants would have full opportunity in those cases to put forward their cases to the courts, and it would not appear that any great advantage would accrue to them by having the opportunity of putting their version before the certifying committee.
LORD RENNELL: Leaving out for the moment the noble Lord's odd 9 per cent., I think it would, at any rate, remove a sense of injustice on the part of a prospective defendant, which undoubtedly does exist, if he were allowed to state his case when legal aid is sought. That is not to say that insurance companies, or the insurance world as a whole, feel that this legal award, as such, and the certificates granted have had any material effect or consequence on actions brought for compensation. They were as much subject to pressure, both to pay as the result of a court finding, or to pay out of court, before the situation to which the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, has referred was created.
I should like to add only one point to that, and it concerns the rise in premiums for compensation. I do not think it is fair to leave the impression in anybody's mind that, because certain companies have decided to go out of the compensation business altogether, or because premiums have been raised against a particular trade or industry, or indeed, a particular employee, that that is unfair. The rise in premiums for all types of insurance has taken place, and is taking place throughout this and other countries. An increase in the risk or experience from floods or fire in any one year, above all from motor car accidents to third parties and motor cars, will inevitably bring about a rise in premiums against sections of the country and people living there, against types of auto-
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mobiles and against certain owners of automobiles. Insurance is, after all, purely a question of how much an insurance company can afford to pay against premiums received. If it has to pay more, it collects more premiums. It is merely a financial balance. If, therefore, in their wisdom, courts—and they are ultimately the measure of the price at which insurance companies will settle out of court—award a sum this year which is 2x as compared with what it was, say, five or ten years ago—x—it follows that the premiums must inevitably rise, because insurance companies, no more than other financial, commercial or industrial institutions, are not philanthropic organisations.
If, therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, and other noble Lords feel that an undue burden is being placed on industry as a result of the rise in premiums due to larger claims being proffered and made in court and out of court, the remedy is to limit, or for the courts to limit, the amount of the compensation payable. If they were cut to smaller amounts, premiums would undoubtedly fall. Premiums are purely a reflection of experience and are not a penalty imposed on any person or any trade. They are, in exactly the same measure, a measure of risk of fire in a certain type of building or flood in a certain type of country. I should not like anybody to leave with the idea that there is any penalty or any imposition by insurance companies as a result of the rises in premiums that are being demanded for compensation policies.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: If the noble Lord will forgive my interrupting, would be not agree that the fact that large payments have to be made is really due to the increase in the cost of living and to the drop in the value of money? That is the main factor, surely, in the increased sums which have to be paid, resulting, quite naturally, in increased premiums.
LORD RENNELL: I am not going to be drawn into an economic discussion by the noble Lord. We started one on Thursday and shall continue it on Tuesday, and I think that will be quite enough for your Lordships at the moment.
5.3 p.m.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: My Lords, my reason for asking your Lordships to listen to me for a few moments to-day is that on two separate occasions this year I have addressed Questions to the Government on this subject of legal aid. May I make it quite clear at the outset that I support the Motion which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale? I have no desire at all to advocate, in any sort of way, the limitation of a workman's right to pursue his legitimate claims for injury. All I want to do is to assist in making the Legal Aid Scheme as fair as possible for all concerned, in respect not only of the industrial cases which have been specifically drawn to your Lordships' attention to-day, but also of every kind of case that may be brought within the scope of the Scheme.
The noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, has given your Lordships an informative and illuminating speech on the subject of legal aid as it applies to industrial cases. He ended that part of his speech by suggesting certain remedies. As I understand it, the remedies to be achieved by legislative action or, it might be, by administrative order under the Legal Aid Administration Scheme, were, first, the lessening of the number of unworthy actions, and secondly, the lessening of the injustice resulting to the defendant even from reasonable actions. He proposed to do that, in the first case, by implementing the provisions contained in the Act for a Legal Advice Scheme and by adopting the Scottish practice of hearing the possible defendant before granting a certificate for legal aid. The second remedy would be to a large extent achieved by making the fund chargeable, in the discretion of the court, with the costs of a successful unassisted defendant.
With the indulgence of your Lordships, I propose to go back to the Questions which I put in your Lordships' House which dealt with these very remedies. On January 31, 1956, I addressed a Question to the Government dealing with a case to which Mr. Justice Roxburgh, on January 13, 1956, had made certain references in court. It was a case which he described as a most unreasonable action—indeed, a shocking action. I asked whether, in relation to that particular case, in which the defendants had to bear
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the costs of the case (it was dropped by the plaintiff in the middle of the action) and having regard to the observations of the judge, the Government would introduce into the administration of the Legal Aid Schemes such changes as might preclude cases of that nature from being brought before the courts, in order to avoid the possibility of defendants in future being subjected to the same unfair results. The noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack was kind enough to give me a detailed answer on the subject. The substance of his reply was this [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 195 (No. 54), col. 635]:
"It does not seem to me to be possible to guard against occurrences of this kind. No-one with any experience of the law would ever guarantee the outcome of a case. All lawyers have experience of the most cast-iron case failing and the most unlikely succeeding. All that can be done in a Scheme of this kind is to attempt to ensure that no case is brought or continued unreasonably, and to bear in mind the consequences of a grant of legal aid on all the parties to the litigation. I think those principles were in the minds of those concerned in this case."
Well, no doubt they were. But then I asked the noble and learned Viscount a supplementary question. I asked:
"In an action of this character, where the costs of the plaintiff are paid by the State and the plaintiff gets off scot-free, would it not be fair and equitable that the State should pay the costs of the defendant?"
I also asked the noble and learned Viscount this further question:
"Whether Her Majesty's Government will now consider the advisability, if necessary by an alteration of the law, of allowing Judges in these legal aid cases to use their discretion in ordering that the costs of defendants be borne by the State?"
To that, the noble and learned Viscount answered:
"… the first suggestion of the noble Viscount is one that was put forward during the Committee stage of the Bill in 1949 … at the moment I do not feel that, on balance, taking a purview of the whole operation of the Scheme, it would be right to put this additional burden on the State; but, as I told the noble Viscount. I am closely considering the working of the Scheme and I shall consider his advocacy of the suggestion with the other relevant material matters."
May I continue the review of the subject—it deals with the point put by the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale? I came back again on March 27 of this year and asked Her Majesty's Government [OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 196, col. 788]:
"Whether it is the case that in Scotland before a legal aid committee can consider an

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application for a legal aid certificate the applicant must have given notice to the intended defendants, whose letter in reply must be before the legal aid committee when considering the application; and, if so, or in any event, whether Her Majesty's Government will consider the advisability of introducing a provision of the foregoing nature into the administration of the Legal Aid Scheme in England?"
I do not want to repeat the whole of the noble and learned Viscount's Answer, but he gave reasons why there were differences, as he said, between the English and Scots law. Then he said:
"I think it would be an expensive innovation and doubt whether it would help assisted persons' opponents to any significant extent. May I remind the noble Viscount that a legally-aided person's opponent at present may at any time make representations to the legal aid committee to show why the legal aid certificate ought to be withdrawn."
Then I asked the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack:
"whether this is not one of the things which is better in Scotland than in England?"
The noble and learned Viscount, with a twinkle in his always friendly eye, if I may say so with great respect, said:
"If I may put it colloquially, the noble Viscount has pulled a fast one' in phrasing his supplementary question in such terms as to appeal to a Scot's heart. Coming down to more pedestrian matters, I would remind the noble Viscount that if this suggestion were adopted in England, the expense which I mentioned would be incurred through serving every prospective opponent—perhaps some 30,000 a year, as compared with about 5,000 a year in Scotland—for an anticipated very small saving in applications refused."
Is that a good reason? Is it fair and equitable that the Scottish system of administration should not be adopted on grounds of expense? That is the first point I put. The noble and learned Viscount went on to say [col. 789]:
"there are other reasons … and I am sure he will see the force of wanting to avoid that any pre-trial of the question should be conducted by the Committee."
But surely the Scottish system does not, in effect, include a pre-trial system. I propose to ask the noble and learned Viscount to-day whether, in his reply, he will be good enough to deal again with the particular objections which he has to the Scottish scheme, and why, in his opinion, England cannot be brought up, if I may say so, to the same level as Scotland in this matter.
With great respect, I must say that I was not much impressed with the noble
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and learned Viscount's further reason, which was that:
"advance notice of intended litigation might prejudice the applicant because the intended respondent might try to avoid service by leaving the country."
I wonder in how many cases that would apply. Using that argument, would it not, in effect, be a case of legislating for the minority and not for the majority? With great respect, I do not think there is much in that argument.
I do not want to deal with any of the other aspects of the question with which other noble Lords have already dealt. All I want to say is that, whether it be right or whether it be wrong, it is quite clear that the Legal Aid Scheme has introduced a new mentality amongst the population in the approach to the courts; in other words, the changed mentality that I have in mind is the mentality of the person who, because he can pursue a case under the Legal Aid Scheme and possibly escape scot-free, even though he has lost his case, does not concern himself with the question of who is to be burdened with the costs of the case. I suggest that that mentality is obviously one which ought not to be fostered; it ought to he checked if a means can be found of checking it by fair aid equitable methods. It is to that objective that I hope that the efforts of Her Majesty's Government will be directed.
5.17 p.m.
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, I feel that the whole House will agree with me when I say that my noble friend Lord Rochdale has performed a service in drawing what is a very important matter into public discussion. I apologise to the House for having made speeches on two successive days, but on this matter I think I can profess a certain interest. I am one of the very few Members of your Lordships' House who is a practising member of the Bar, unadorned with any type of judicial honour. I can claim honestly to have interested myself in accidents and their compensation for upwards now of nearly twenty-five years. Therefore, this debate is of peculiar interest to me.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Rennell that, in a sense, the debate has fallen into two parts—criticism of the Legal Aid Scheme and the more general

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questions affecting the basis of compensation in accidents. To some extent, it is fortuitous that that division has taken place, but it would be convenient if I divided my own remarks into the same two categories. As the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, knows, with one of his two proposals I am in almost whole-hearted agreement; but I venture to suggest, diffidently, because I have not had the opportunity of consulting the professional bodies concerned in this country, that there probably would be a certain amount of opposition on the part of the English profession to the introduction of the Scottish principle of serving a defendant with notice of an application for legal aid.
The objection I see to it is this, and I must say it was a matter of some surprise to me when I learned that the Scottish profession was taking a different view. When a case occurs, whether it is an accident case, a matrimonial case or any other kind of case (one cannot draw a distinction in this between these classes of case), when an applicant comes to the legal aid committee, he makes a statement which is, of its nature, a somewhat confidential one. I do not think it is protected by professional privilege in the same sense that the man's statement to his own solicitor is protected by professional privilege when he seeks advice as to whether he should initiate unassisted proceedings. But, whether or not it is protected by privilege in the strict sense, it is, in the first place, confidential; and, in the second place, it would, if seen by the potential opponent, afford a fairly reliable clue as to what the man had said to his own solicitor or what he was going to say to his own solicitor when he sought legal advice under the Scheme.
The objection which I see to the proposal that a defendant should be served with notice of a proposed application for legal aid is this: either the service of the notice would include particulars which would give the proposed opponent a fairly reliable clue as to the contents of confidential statements, in which case I think it would be objectionable, or it would not, in which case I think it would be useless. I do not for a moment suggest that my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack should, for that reason, turn down this proposal out of hand, but I hope that at the time when he considers the proposal he will also take into
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account whether or not this objection which I feel in my own mind has any foundation in it. I cannot help feeling that there would be some objection from the English profession if, without consideration of that point and without meeting it, there were an attempt to bring it in here.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: If the noble Viscount will forgive me, would that same objection not apply in Scotland?
VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: It would indeed. That is exactly why I said it occasioned me some surprise that the Scottish profession was taking a different line. There is, of course, a distinction between Scottish litigation and English litigation, based on the nature of the type of pleading involved; and it may be that that explains the difference in the outlook of the two professions. It may be that the Lord Chancellor will be able to tell us something about that. All I was saying was that I hoped my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack will look into the possibility that the English profession might find an objection to the introduction of such a system in England. I am not by any means saying that further investigation will not be favourable to the scheme.
The second thing that I should like to say is this. Hitherto, we have considered, I think rightly, the injustice which is done to the unassisted litigant who succeeds. I myself have always espoused that cause, and when I hear from the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, that out of the immense number of claims which are presented 91 per cent. are successful as against the unassisted litigant, it encourages me to think that if my noble and learned friend on the Woolsack were to go to the Treasury and say, rather sternly, "You are dealing only with 9 per cent. of the cases anyway; and of those 9 per cent., possibly some are abandoned before they reach the court," it may turn out, on investigation, that we could, at a relatively low cost, do substantial justice where now injustice is being done. At any rate, without pressing my noble and learned friend unduly on this matter at present, I rather wish he would investigate the possible cost to the Treasury of supporting the successful unassisted litigant, at any rate to some extent. Before he turns his back, on behalf of the Government, on this

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suggestion I hope that he will cause further inquiries to be made.
But we also need to look at the matter from the point of view of the assisted party. Here there is a suggestion that I should like to make. In the course of my experience of the working of the scheme there have been some cases in which the assisted party is hit rather hard by the operation of the scheme, which in one respect is extremely rigid. The Treasury (no doubt it is the Treasury, because I do not think it would be the generous heart of my noble and learned friend or of his predecessor) has insisted that the money recovered, if arty is recovered, by an assisted litigant in the course of proceedings which are assisted, should bear as a first charge the cost of litigation in so far as it cannot be recovered from the unsuccessful party. In principle, that is a perfectly just rule, and I would not quarrel with it, but in the course of my experience of the scheme I have come across at least half a dozen cases where the rigidity of the rule has operated hardly on an assisted litigant; and my own view is that the Lord Chancellor should consider whether or not a certain degree of elasticity is possible.
I can remember a particular and rather ludicrous case in which both parties were assisted—they were suing one another about the possession of a house. One party won and it turned out that the house was then deemed or claimed to bear as a first charge the cost of the litigation. That, in fact, proved very hard, because the successful party was hardly used. My own feeling is that while nobody would criticise the Legal Aid Scheme in its essentials, in this respect a certain elasticity might be allowed.
There is one other point that I want to make to the Lord Chancellor as a possible means of improving the Scheme. Experience has shown in a number of different cases, one very prominently featured in a recent judgment of Mr. Justice Devlin, that a possible conflict can arise between the assisted person and his legal advisers. The particular reported decision that I have in mind arose on a review of taxation in which the counsel involved was put in an invidious position, both by his own professional body, which insisted on his taking the matter up, and by the artificial way in which reviews of taxation have to take place. I myself—
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and I am sure I speak also for the profession—should be grateful if my noble and learned friend, in conjunction with the professional bodies concerned, would look into that case and allied cases and consider whether machinery for the review of taxation could not be introduced which would avoid the embarrassment that inevitably attends a conflict of interest between a professional man and his client. I myself should welcome some ruling on another matter which causes some conflict of interest—I refer to the occasional demand by a defendant that one should or should not accept a settlement without costs. My own feeling is that that puts the professional adviser in a most difficult position, where the client is assisted, and I should welcome it if the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor would consider that matter too.
I turn from this aspect of the case to the more general matter, with, I must say, an expression of delighted surprise that, despite the injustice which is at any rate theoretically, and in practice also, I think, involved, Lord Rennell, who knows so much about these matters, was able to assure the House that the injustice did not operate on the minds of insurance companies when they effected settlements. I must say that that came as a matter of surprise to me, but I never attend your Lordships' House without learning something interesting and something new from an acknowledged expert on the subject.
When one comes to look at the general aspect of the law relating to claims for compensation, it is not too much to say that there has been a complete revolution in the matter since I first studied the law nearly twenty-five years ago. In those days my noble friend Lord Rochdale was dealing only with employers' liability, but much of what one says has equal application to other types of accident claims. The occupiers of property, the users of the road, local authorities, and many other types of body are faced with the same kind of situation. But when I first came to the Bar, the law of employers' liability was somewhat rigidly divided into two categories—that of workmen's compensation, which was admittedly inadequate and which was supported by the employer, usually fortified by an insurance company, and the law of

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Common Law liability, which was judge-made law almost in its entirety. The law of Common Law liability, both in its Factory Act aspect and in its negligence aspect, was purely judge-made. In passing I sometimes think that some of our trade union friends are a little unjust to the legal profession when they underestimate the extent to which judges came to the aid of injured workmen by judge-made law, at a time when injured workmen were receiving rather less than justice from other classes in the community.
But both aspects of judge-made law were limited by two important doctrines. The first was the doctrine of common employment, and the second was the law of contributory negligence as it then existed. Both these doctrines operated to take out of the sphere of employers' liability altogether a very large proportion of the potential numbers of claims, and, at least in my view, the increase in the number of claims in recent years to which my noble friend has rightly drawn attention is much more the consequence of the abolition of the rule of common employment and the modification of the rule of contributory negligence than of the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme; because even before that Scheme very large numbers of professional men assisted impoverished litigants in one way or another, and behind organised labour there was the force of trade unions who, with very great skill and generosity, undertook the best of the cases on behalf of their members.
So the situation now is that the judge-made law continues to operate without either of the judge-made limitations on that law. I feel that that is behind the very large increase—and I am sure that it is a very large increase, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, told us—in Common Law claims in respect of employers' liability. I do not think that very much can be done about it, on the assumption that Parliament was right to make those two modifications in the law which it has made in the last ten or eleven years, because, in my view at least, it is quite unlikely that Parliament would ever consent to a reversal of those two alterations.
I am beginning to wonder whether the time will not come when the insurance
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principle will be applied more generally to the question of compensation for accidents. Litigation is always in the nature of a lottery, which we are told is inherently wicked. The best judges differ as to the measure of damages. When one comes to measure things like pain and suffering in terms of pounds, shillings and pence, one person's guess is as good as anybody else's. The only solid measure of damages about which prediction has hitherto been in the least possible is loss of earning capacity; and even that has now been thrown in the melting pot by the recent decision of your Lordships' House, in its Judicial capacity, that income tax has now to be taken into account in assessing the amount of compensation.
I am beginning to wonder (and perhaps my noble and learned friend can contemplate this possibility) whether loss of earning capacity could not be dealt with by the insurance principle, in which case liability would be predictable and not a matter of fallible human opinion. I also wonder whether the loss of amenity and pain and suffering, now dealt with, on an inadequate scale, by industrial injuries benefit, could not equally well be dealt with on the principle now recognised in the pensions field; that as between one man and another who is in need and suffering the same type of injury, rough justice can be done by regular scales of payment. If that were done, the employer of labour would at any rate know where he stood, and much money which is now diverted into the pockets of my own profession, to our considerable advantage, might be diverted into an insurance scheme. Frankly, I do not know what the financial consequences to anyone would be, but when I contemplate the vast changes that have taken place in the application of the law in the last twenty-five years, I am wondering whether we are not moving in that direction.
5.35 p.m.
LORD AMULREE: My Lords, it is with some degree of diffidence that I rise to address a few words to your Lordships on this subject, because I do not feel capable of following noble Lords who have expressed such expert views on insurance and other matters this afternoon. When I saw that the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, had put his Motion on the Paper, I wondered whether one could

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get some light on or information of the workings of the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme by studying what has occurred under the National Health Service Act in regard to the number of legal actions brought by patients against doctors and hospitals. We are told that since the National Health Service Act came into force about nine years ago there has been a considerable increase in the number of legal actions brought against doctors and hospitals—I cannot give the total numbers, as they do not appear to have been recorded in any of the documents I have consulted. According to the last Report of the Ministry of Health, however, the peak of these actions appears to have come in 1954 and the Ministry do not expect any great increase on that figure.
The bulk of these legal actions were brought by people assisted under the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme—about 80 per cent. of the total number. I will pose a question to the noble and learned Viscount though I do not expect an answer now. I am wondering whether we may know what proportion of these actions were successful and what proportion were unsuccessful, because there has been a good deal of comment in the Press about the fact that a large number of these actions were stupid and frivolous and need not have been brought at all. Whatever be the facts, these actions, as reported in the Press, are notorious. I was impressed by what the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said—that about 90 per cent. of the actions brought were successful. That seems to be a considerable justification for the continuance, and perhaps the expansion of, the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme.
By looking at published figures, I tried to find out whether we could get comparable figures showing what is occurring on the medical side. One of the medical defence societies(there are two in England and one in Scotland), covering a majority of qualified doctors who are practising, states that the number of requests for information and assistance have gone up from 1,600 before the passing of the National Health Service Act to 2,100 now. Not all these were from people threatened with legal action—their cases may have been on other matters—but the figures showed that there was a real increase. There was another point on which I tried to find information. From the Report of
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the Ministry of Health I got some idea of the amount of money which is being paid in compensation. It has gone up, rather startlingly, from about £24,000 in the first financial year of the Act to almost £160,000 in the year ended March, 1954. That figure includes third party cases. One has to look at this figure carefully, because it does not necessarily mean a vast n umber of cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Rennell, pointed out, a certain amount of the increase arises from the fact that the courts are now apparently giving bigger damages than before. In the first financial year under review, the largest amount of damages given was £1,000; and according to the report, in the year 1954 the largest sum was £17,500. There, again, one cannot really compare the two amounts, because one does not know the circumstances; but it looks as though some of the increase in compensation was due to the fact that courts are recognising that the value of money is not what it was, and accordingly, the sums awarded are going up in that way.
The fact that these sums of money are being awarded and that, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, 91 per cent. of the actions were successful, shows that the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme, certainly under the National Health Act, is working rather well, and that people who should get money for damage, either by a doctor or by a hospital, appear to be getting the money they deserve. I should like to conclude by joining in the plea of other noble Lords, that something should be done for the defendant, whether he be a hospital, an employer, or a doctor—and that includes a doctor consulted under one of the trade societies. If the action brought against him is proved to be frivolous, he should get something; otherwise the plaintiff loses the action and the defendant is left to pay the quite substantial costs of the defence.
5.40 p.m.
LORD CHORLEY: My Lords, before the noble and learned Viscount who sits on the Woolsack replies, I should just like to add my plea to those which have been put forward by other noble Lords that something should be done for the successful defendant in these assisted cases. Undoubtedly this weakness in the scheme which was, as I think Lord Rochdale said, observed as being there from the

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start, has proved more serious than was anticipated. It might be thought that with only one case in ten failing it was not very serious. My own experience, however, suggests to me that while there may be defendants who are large business corporations, by whom the expense may be written down, in a sense, as a business expense, there are much smaller defendants—there have been several of them whose difficulties have come to my own knowledge—who have been hit very hard indeed as a result of this Legal Aid Scheme. The noble and learned Viscount knows that to fight an action, even a comparatively simple type of action, in the High Court is impossible without the expenditure of several hundreds of pounds, and for a small business man or a small professional man that may be very serious indeed. Over the last few years there have undoubtedly been a number of cases of this kind.
I think the Government should provide some small fund, or initiate some insurance scheme under which this type of hard case—and undoubtedly it can be very hard indeed—is met. I am sure that the whole amount involved would not be more than a few thousand pounds a year. It could, perhaps, be limited to a certain type of defendant who himself is often not so very much better off, if better off at all, than the assisted litigant. Unquestionably, that is the type of case where the shoe pinches. I think the Government owe it to the community and to the cause of justice to do something about this matter.
5.42 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I am sure that the first duty that falls upon me will receive the enthusiastic approval of all of your Lordships—that is, to thank my noble friend Lord Rochdale for introducing this Motion to the House, and, if he will allow me to say so, to express our admiration for the thoughtful, careful and moderate way in which he put the subject before us. There is no doubt that, as noble Lords have stated, the debate has tended naturally to fall into two parts, and I should like, if I may—and I think it is following the general feeling of the House—to deal with it in that way. I shall first deal with the general question of the increase in claims, and then proceed to the Legal
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Aid Scheme. I hope the House will approve of that method.
My noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham has already drawn attention to the first problem—which I think ought to be stated and our views upon it expressed in consequence of this debate. And when one considers objectively and fairly the state of the law before the changes to which my noble and learned friend referred, and then considers the changes that have been made, I do not think any of your Lordships would seriously challenge that these changes have been immensely for the better. Indeed, I do not remember any suggestion in this debate to the contrary. But in view of the general point that my noble friend Lord Rochdale has made, I think it would be useful if I just stated very shortly my reasons for saying that.
I think it is true to say that until 1948 the scales in an action for damages for negligence brought by an employee against an employer were weighted in favour of the employer. The basic position at Common Law was, I think, sound and fair. The employer was under an obligation to take reasonable care and use reasonable skill, first, to provide and maintain proper machinery, plant, appliances and works; secondly, to select properly skilled persons to manage and superintend the business; and, thirdly, to provide a proper system of working. I am sure Lord Rochdale would agree that every good employer should do these three things. At least no one could complain—not even the noble Lord, Lord Meston—that in this case there is any divergence between common sense and Common Law. The difficulty was that they were limited by the two matters which have been mentioned—first, by the rule of contributory negligence—and I will quote Lord Blackburn:
"If there is blame for causing the accident on both sides, however small that blame may be on one side, the loss lies where it falls."
That meant—and I ask your Lordships to realise this—that if an employer could satisfy a court that injuries caused to his employee were to the slightest degree attributable to the employee's own negligence, the employee could not recover any damages at all. That was the first point.
The second was the doctrine of common employment, under which an employer was held not to be responsible

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for harm done to one of his employees by the negligence of a person engaged in common employment with the injured man. I think my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham will agree that the extent to which that was carried, both vertically, between people who were in very different circumstances of life, and horizontally, between people who were in very different jobs, did make it something with which Parliament was ultimately compelled to deal. I would add a third point—I do not know whether your Lordships will agree with me, but in my view there was a third point which told very much against the workman. That arose out of the Workmen's Compensation Acts, by which an employee who accepted money under the Acts was debarred from proceeding at Common Law. Often, immediately after an accident, with the breadwinner taken away from his work, there was every temptation to take what was offered him at once. Then, when he had taken that as compensation, he was debarred from making a claim, though there might be the clearest evidence in the world that there had been negligence. I think that again was something which required putting right. Of course, the position was rather better when he could sue his employer for breach of statutory duty, because the defence of common employment then went out.
But those were the circumstances which had to be dealt with, and I hope that your Lordships will not think it too conceited if I inform your Lordships that the legislation which dealt first with this matter—the Act of 1945, which changed the law on contributory negligence and, instead of entirely depriving a workman, made his damages proportionate to the amount of negligence—was introduced by me into another place on February 22, 1945. That was followed by the Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 1948, which abolished the doctrine of common employment; and workmen's compensation was replaced by the industrial injuries scheme. Also (and I assure your Lordships that this is my last personal reminiscence), I had the privilege of presenting Lord Beveridge's scheme to another place some eleven or twelve years ago. So I have been very much "in" on this change of law. But, trying to view it as objectively as I can, I think that, considering the law as it originally was and the mischiefs that were caused
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by it, and considering the law as it is to-day, no one can deny that these changes were fair and just. I think that is the first conclusion to which we come.
My noble friend Lord Rochdale raised one point which rather surprised me. He said that whereas under the Factory Act or similar safety provisions the employer knew where he was, negligence under Common Law might be discovered only when an accident had occurred, so that the risk was one which could not in reason have been foreseen or prevented. I hope that my noble friend will accept from me that the last thing I desire to do is make debating points on this matter, but I suggest that he has put the matter in too formidable a way. To-day the employer has only to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen, and there is no lack of reasonable care when an accident occurs from an unforeseeable risk. I hope that in that regard my noble friend has been too pessimistic, though no doubt he has found cases where it appeared in that way. The essence of the matter is that an employer should be liable for a danger that is reasonably foreseeable and should not be answerable beyond that point. I agree that the changes in the law, which I think were right, for the reasons I have explained, have produced a larger number of actions.
With regard to my noble friend's point on the Industrial Injuries Act, in which he said that he thought that it was being pushed into the background as a remedy, I well remember that at the time the Industrial Injuries Act was being considered (if my chronology is correct) a strong Committee was set up, under the chairmanship of my right honourable friend who is now the Minister of Defence (Sir Walter Monckton, Q.C., then practising at the Bar), in order to investigate whether there should be an alternative remedy in the strict sense. All except two members of the Committee decided that there should not be, and the provision to which my noble friend referred, that a workman can take industrial injury compensation and then bring an action later on, subject to bringing in half of what lie had been paid, was the result of the Report of that Committee. Again I think that that was right, and I do not think we should turn the clock back on that point. My noble friend will appreciate that a man must prove neglect, either

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in Common Law or in the shape of a breach of statutory duty. If, having waited five years, leaning back and taking compensation during that time, he suddenly says that the accident was the result of a breach of statutory duty but that it had not occurred to him until a month or two earlier, his chances of recovering are pro tanto, even ipso facto, reduced. He has to prove the negligence; and that, of course, is a safeguard.
I am interested in what has been said in regard to insurance, first of all by my noble friend Lord Rochdale and then by my noble friend Lord Rennell. My noble friend Lord Rennell's exposition of a subject with which he is so familiar interested me immensely. I accept, as we all do, what he said: that it is the assessment of what the courts are likely to do which primarily determines the premium. Without getting involved in next Tuesday's debate, I think it would be right to say that in assessing damages (and this applies equally if the party is an insurance company who think that the damages are likely to be assessed against them), the court estimate the annual loss and then multiply it by whatever period they think is right, in the usual way. Undoubtedly, in reaching a result the change in the value of money comes in, and how much it costs people to live. That, in turn, is bound to be reflected in the premium. But with regard to the general point of whether a company would desire to cover this form of risk, that must be a matter for them and the class of business into which they want to go.
It would be interesting to know more on the point which my noble friend Lord Rochdale mentioned about settlement. May I give my noble friend Lord Rennell a converse example? In the case of solicitors who insure against negligence on their own part, or on the part of their employees, there is often a provision that they will be entitled to dictate the settlement of an action—it is, as I say, the converse of Lord Rochdale's position—because they do not want the action to come into court. The noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, puts the other side, where they want an action to be fought when the insurance company desire to settle it. I should have thought that that was a matter which would also be reflected in the amount of the premium, if it was
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desired to keep such a right. That is one side of it.
As to the other side, that the workman might think he was a bad employer because there had been a settlement, again, with great respect to the noble Lord, and simply giving him my own experience of many years when I was dealing with that class of case, I think that he was overstating the fears. To take one of the cases he gave, where someone has lost an arm, or to take the case of a boy who has lost a leg. I should have thought that the fact that in cases where there is obviously some extreme doubt as to liability—because in these cases there is usually some evidence of carelessness on the part of the person using the machine, as well as what is alleged about the lack of guard and so on—the reasonable sum in compensation which a company pays through an insurance company for the injury would be held as grace on their part and not as evil in their employment methods. There is that side of it. I appreciate the point the noble Lord made, but there is the other difficulty: that the mere fact that the employer takes the responsibility for something that is outside his hands may involve him in difficulties one way or the other. I see the point, but I cannot see any answer to it. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, would agree that for any company of moderate size to try to carry their own risks in this regard would be something that he, as a business man, would not contemplate for a moment.
I come now to the point which the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, raised about the question of injuries in hospitals and the damage suffered by patients in hospitals. There the pendulum swung in favour of the patient. Again, if it is not boring your Lordships, I should like to quote one passage from the judgment of Lord Justice Denning in the case of Cassidy v. The Minister of Health. Lord Justice Denning said:
"For over thirty years, from 1905 to 1942, it was the general opinion of the profession that hospital authorities were not liable for the negligence of their staff in the course of their professional duties."
That case decided that a hospital was liable for the negligence of medical officers and house surgeons, where the circumstances showed that one of them was responsible, even if it could not be identified which one it was. That case

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was in 1951. But three years before that case the Health Scheme came into operation, and that led to a different attitude towards litigation against hospital authorities.
There then came the Legal Aid and Advice Scheme, with which I shall deal in a moment. The changed situation of hospital authorities led to a similar complaint to that which has been advanced in some portions of our debate to-day. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, knows it, but these complaints were investigated in the autumn of 1955, when it was found that the number of claims against hospitals was falling, it may be as the result of the activities not only of the Minister of Health but of the two associations in England and the one in Scotland that the noble Lord mentioned. I am not saying this in a critical way at all; they are carrying out what they have to do. So it may well be—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Amulree, would incline to this view from his own researches—that the pendulum had swung, and was beginning to swing back. That is the position, as I see it, and I thought it might be useful to the noble Lord to know that I had considered it. It is, at any rate, slightly more optimistic from his point of view than it might have looked a year or two ago.
Before I come to the question of the Legal Aid and Advice Act I want to say a word or two on what one might call an intermediate subject—namely, the matter of the Factories Acts, which was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, in his interesting contribution to the debate. I was interested to note that the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, was not so concerned about Factories Act cases. I confess that when I acted for a plaintiff at the Bar I always used to look for a breach of a statutory duty: from the plaintiff's point of view, it made the case so much easier. But I think it raises an important point. As the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, will know, the scheme of the Factories Acts, and the scheme of most health and safety Acts, is to enact a skeleton and then put on the flesh and blood by regulations. Your Lordships' House has often shown suspicion of subsidiary legislation, but in this field I am quite certain that it is right (I am sure my friends know that I have been a stern critic of subsidiary legislation in my time)
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because it gives two things. First of all, it gives an opportunity for consultation with the people affected. It is extremely important that you should consult both employers and employed before you make health or safety regulations. That is done. The second point is that it secures flexibility. The noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, gave an example where he thought there was the greatest difficulty in seeing any misconduct oil any kind on the part of the employer in regard to his guard. Of course, it is often discovered that a guard is not the best form of protection, and you can change your regulations in that way. This is a point about which I am very concerned.
I thought it might interest my noble friend to know that I made inquiries of the Ministry of Labour, not only with regard to the general practice which I have mentioned, but with regard to the practice of special regulations. With your Lordships' permission I will read it, because I think it is important:
"When making special regulations on safety and health under the Factories Act it is the Minister's established policy to ensure the fullest consultation with those affected on both sides of industry. The practice is to prepare a preliminary draft of the regulations which is sent to all interested organisations whose comments are invited, and if necessary discussions are then held with representatives of any organisations which have submitted comments. In the light of those discussions a revised preliminary report may be prepared and further discussions take place or a formal draft of the regulation may be published in accordance with the statutory procedure laid down by the second Schedule of the Factories Act, 1937. Under this procedure all special regulations must be published in draft and the persons affected by the regulations may make objections to them. The Minister is under an obligation to consider any objections and may, if he thinks fit, amend the draft regulations to meet them, republish and follow the same procedure with the original draft."
I think that is important, because it achieves the two purposes which I mentioned. I thought your Lordships would be glad to know that that careful consultation was followed.
The noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds, raised the question of the factory inspectorate, and my right honourable friend the Minister of Labour and National Service expects to receive a report very shortly from a Working Party of officials who have reviewed the organisation and staffing of the factory inspectorate. So the noble Lord will be glad to know that

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that matter is being considered. As he himself said, the other matter which he mentioned is also being investigated at this time.
I am sorry to take up so much of your Lordships' time, but the debate has interested me and, therefore, I want to deal with all the points. May I turn quite shortly to the questions arising under the Legal Aid Act? It is interesting that the consensus of opinion expressed by your Lordships, and certainly, if I understood him correctly, by my noble friend Lord Rennell, is that it is doubtful whether the incidence of legal aid has substantially increased the claims which we are considering to-day. Indeed, I should have thought so, because from my own experience, when I was a junior engaged in this class of work, very largely the cases were prepared and examined by the appropriate trade union, and they brought the matter forward. There are some cases where the trade union turned down the case and the plaintiff persuaded the Legal Aid Committee, but I should have thought that in the main they are trade union cases.
The other way in which the problem is affected is one which many of your Lordships have mentioned—namely, the effect of Section 2 (2) (e) of the Act, under which a losing assisted person is required to pay only such of the other side's costs as is reasonable in all the circumstances. As the main circumstance to be taken into account is the means of the assisted person, the vast majority of assisted cases brought by employees result in the employers having to find a large proportion of their own costs, whether they win or lose. I thought I was going to be the person to produce all the interesting figures on this point, but your Lordships have anticipated me. In fact, the figure which I had, which was up to the end of March, 1955, is not so striking as that of the noble Lord, Lord Milner of Leeds. Up to that year 86 per cent. of the cases were successful. But there is one aspect which I think is interesting; that is, that 85 per cent. of the assisted persons who lost their cases in the Queen's Bench Division were required to pay no costs at all. Of assisted persons, 36 per cent. are nil contributors. The interesting number we are left with is the 64 per cent. who were not nil con-
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tributors and who were not ordered to pay any costs—of course, that is 64 per cent. of 14 per cent.
If my arithmetic is right, only 14 per cent. of the cases were lost; in only 12 per cent. of these was there no order as to costs and in only 8 per cent. did one come down to the question where there was no order for costs and where the plaintiff was making any contribution towards his own costs. So whichever way the argument goes, it is a very small section of litigation altogether. There is not a grave measure of injustice here. My noble friend Lord Hailsham I think realised that, and asked why, therefore, do I not go to the Treasury, because the baby is a small one and the paternity order ought to be paid. It is interesting to realise that we are dealing with quite a small problem on that point.
May I deal shortly with the three suggestions that were constructively made? The first one which my noble friend Lord Rochdale made—and he was supported in it—was to introduce as soon as possible the Legal Advice Scheme in the hope that that would mean greater consideration at an earlier time and in that way cases might not be brought if they were not properly based. There is this difficulty: as I said, we are under an obligation to introduce this Scheme, but at the present time your Lordships are in the middle of an economic debate and know why the moment is not propitious to get additional sums of money from the Treasury. But I do not want your Lordships to think that the matter is going to sleep. The Law Society, who have been most helpful in regard to this Scheme, are considering whether they cannot find a better and cheaper method than they thought of at first. Of course, the more they can reduce the cost, the more chance I have of receiving approval for getting the Scheme into operation as quickly as possible.
The second point is the one on which the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, always tries to stir my Highland blood: why will we not introduce the Scottish system? May I put it very shortly and, if the noble Viscount is in any doubt, I am sure he will write to me and I will elaborate any matters with which he is still concerned. In fact—and this is a good point—the Scottish practice only

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very rarely leads to the refusal of an application for legal aid. I agree with the point that was adumbrated by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, that the Scottish system, as I understand it, first considers the competence of the action—that is to say, whether, assuming that everything that the plaintiff has said is pro veritate, an action will lie—and only after that stage is reached does approval of the evidence come. That is broadly the Scottish system.
The English system is rather to come into the law after the facts of the particular case have been established. I have put that crudely but I think that is the difference between the systems. Therefore, on that basis one can see that the Scottish system might have attractions which it would not have in England. I still maintain, having considered the matter, that it would be expensive to send out 30,000 notices of this kind if it were to have the small effect that it has in Scotland. I agree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham that one would have to be very careful about the confidential side of this matter. I am not being legalistic; I am sure the noble Viscount will not misunderstand me.
VISCOUNT ELIBANK: Of course.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will simply consider it from the point of view that any man of honour would. If things are brought in confidence, one is not entitled to spread them abroad. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, made a good point on that. Then there is a point to which I attach great importance, and I hope the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, will consider it. I said in answer to him—and I will say it again—that in England there is the procedure by which the other party, when the matter is under way, can suggest to the committee that the certificate ought not to be continued. That is when people begin to know what is happening. I regard that as a live procedure and something which should be used in proper cases. I wanted to emphasise that to-day.
LORD MILNER OF LEEDS: May I say that it is also the practice of responsible solicitors, when they discover during the progress of a case that it is not so good as it was thought to be, to report accordingly, in which event the certificate may be withdrawn.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am grateful to my noble friend, but the point I wanted the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, especially to know was that defendants could do that and it would be considered in a proper case. Although nobody could have a higher opinion of Scottish justice than I have, I see a difficulty if one has a pre-trial at the earliest stage—I am only expressing my own difficulty. The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, made a perfectly good answer to that. He said, "Anyway, they carry it out in Scotland." I see the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, locking at me on this point. As I believe he is the only Scottish advocate present in your Lordships' House now, I will not go into any more details, in case I am wrong.
The noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, asked me to deal with advance notices. In this class that we are considering to-day there would not be much in it, but in the class that has been mentioned, where perhaps a wife is trying to get money or furniture from a recalcitrant husband—and the noble Viscount would be amazed if he had the experience of our profession of the ends to which husbands will go to resist their wives' claims—there is something in my point. That is the position.
The other point, of course, is whether the State should pay. Again, I should like to put my difficulties before the House. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Rochdale, who suggested to-day that it should be left to the discretion of the judge. Of course, that the judge should have a discretion as to the expenditure of public money is a new suggestion, because this is not penalising a party or deciding who should bear the costs; this is a question of whether a public fund should bear them. I want to put my difficulties. The proposal does not state how that judicial discretion is to be exercised. Presumably, the judge would be asked to take into account the means of the defendant to pay his own costs (which is already done to a certain extent), and the means of the plaintiff. Or is it desired that the judge should pre-judge the question of the certificate and say at the end of the day: "I do not think this is a case where a certificate should have been given"? I think my noble friends who have considered it will see that that raises difficulties.

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On the one hand, one may come to the conclusion that it would be difficult to refrain from charging the fund in all cases—and I put this seriously to my noble friend Lord Rochdale; I hope that, if he thinks that I am talking nonsense, he will say it with the privilege of an old friend—but it might mean that cases were fought which should have been settled, because parties to legal proceedings always have a most fanatical belief in their own case. There was the case which the noble Viscount, Lord Elibank, mentioned of a judge saying in the midst of his strictures that the plaintiff had a complete belief in his own case though he (the judge) did not think much of the case. The parties would expect an order to be made against the fund if they lost. It is really a serious point. They would be inclined to go on for that reason. It also might mean the issue of certificates which should be refused. There are all these serious points. As noble Lords know, the Select Committee on Estimates in another place have been considering the working of the scheme and I expect to get a report in the near future. Their views on these matters that have been raised by the noble Viscount and by my noble friends to-day I await with great interest. I shall consider carefully what they have to say, but I want to assure the House of this: that the Legal Aid Scheme is under continual and day-to-day examination and consideration. I think it has made an excellent start, considering that it was new ground. I want your Lordships to believe that I am constantly looking for improvements. I shall continue to do so; indeed, that is one reason why I am grateful for what has been said to-day.
I will consider the point of the assisted plaintiff, which has been put to me by my noble and learned friend Lord Hailsham, and by Lord Chorley. That shows an aspect of the whole problem that every Minister has always to consider—the whole tendency of human beneficence is defined as another opportunity for helping someone at the public expense. That tendency and to-day's debate has demonstrated it; but as I say, it is something that I shall consider and watch.
I was greatly interested by Lord Hailsham's philosophic discussion about damages in relation to the introduction
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of insurance principles. I tell him that I shall treat the idea with great respect. I do not think we are very near it at the moment, but I can only tell him that I thought the original system of workmen's compensation was an admirable one. My opinion was completely changed on that point, as I have told the House to-day. It is, I feel, extremely valuable that we should keep an open mind and consider how these problems are affected by the changing conditions of the modern world. I do not think he would want me to go further than that, but I will certainly express my view.
My Lords, I apologise for taking such an unconscionable time in speaking to you, but I have tried to deal with the points involved. I think your Lordships will bear with me if, speaking in a circle, I return to where I began, and once again convey your Lordships' thanks to my noble friend Lord Rochdale for introducing this debate.
6.22 p.m.
LORD ROCHDALE: My Lords, at the end of the speech I made introducing this Motion I said that I felt sure the point I was raising had implications over a far wider field, and the course of this debate has proved, I think, that that was so. Not only has the debate ranged over a wide field, but as my noble friend Lord Rennell said, it fell into two distinct parts, and it was in that way that it was subsequently debated.
I suppose the length of a debate is some measure of the interest that is taken in the subject, and I can only say how extremely grateful I am to all noble Lords who have taken part and who have shown interest in this matter. I should like particularly to thank my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. I am glad that I have landed on a subject which was evidently quite dear to his heart. I should also like to thank him for the immense amount of trouble that he has obviously taken in going into the various detailed points that I have raised. I would not for one moment at this stage mention any details of what he has said. I will say merely that I am sure that, when I come to read his speech, I shall still think that what he said was really sympathetic to many of the points that I made and not without some measure of encouragement. After all, in raising the matter I had no idea that we should be

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able to arrive at any solution to this most complex and intangible problem. What I have achieved is that the subject has been aired; and when a subject is aired, it means that we have gone one stage further forward and that the situation will be improved.
I will conclude by saying most strongly that I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Viscount the Lord Chancellor said, that no one can deny that the changes (he was referring to the changes in the law) were right, and that none of us would wish to put the clock back. I would emphasise, at the end of the debate, that that was, in so many words, what I said at the beginning. I thank all your Lordships who have taken part in this debate, and I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

THE WHITSUN RECESS
6.34 p.m.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: My Lords, before the House adjourns this evening I should like to inform your Lordships that the House will adjourn for the Whitsuntide Recess on either the 17th or 18th of this month, and will reassemble for Public Business on Tuesday, May 29.

AGRICULTURAL MORTGAGE CORPORATION BILL
Reported, without amendment, and re-committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
LONDON NECROPOLIS BILL
Reported, with Amendments.
BRITISH TRANSPORT COMMISSION (No. 2) BILL
Brought from the Commons, read 1ª, and referred to the Examiners.
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to with Amendments.
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