Sitting of 15 March 1956

Preamble
The House met at half-past Two o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]
PRIVATE BUSINESS

  BARRY CORPORATION (BARRY HARBOUR) BILL
  (Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.)
  Bill read the Third time and passed.

  GLOUCESTERSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL BILL [Lords]
  (Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.)
  Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.
  IPSWICH DOCK BILL
  Read the Third time and passed.
  LEEDS CORPORATION BILL (By Order)
  Second Reading deferred till Wednesday next, at Seven o'clock.

ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
  TRADE AND COMMERCE

    Danish Bacon (Import Duty)
    Miss Burtonasked the President of the Board of Trade when, in view of the protest being made to the Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade by the Danish Government concerning the proposed 10 per cent. import duty on bacon, he will be able to make a statement upon the position.
    The President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): No such protest has been made. Since the hon. Lady put down her Question, our negotiations with Denmark have been concluded, and the resulting Agreement has been published in Cmd. 9707.
    Miss Burton: As the Minister of State, Board of Trade, on 28th February, said that we did not impose settlements on our friends, such as Denmark, can the President of the Board of Trade explain why the Prime Minister of Denmark has said that she could not sign a formal agreement accepting the principle of the tariff, though, at the same time, she had no means of preventing Britain from applying it? Is not that a rather strange interpretation by the right hon. Gentleman?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The whole matter is fully and accurately set out in Cmd. 9707. I do not think that I wish to add to it.
    Miss Burton: The right hon. Gentleman has not answered my question. If, as the Minister of State said, we do not impose settlements upon our friends, why has the Danish Prime Minister said that they have signed no agreement?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The hon. Lady's Question asked about a protest in connection with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and no such protest has been made.

    Toothpaste (Manufacturers' Claims)
    Miss Burtonasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is in a position to make a statement concerning the evidence submitted to him by the hon. Member for Coventry, South, on 15th February last, dealing with false claims made by toothpaste manufacturers; and what action is proposed under the Merchandise Marks Acts by his Department.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: My inquiries into the matter are not yet complete, but I will communicate with the hon. Lady as soon as possible.
    Miss Burton: Does the President think that his inquiries will take much longer? There is considerable disquiet in the dental profession about this type of advertisement.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: In view of the possibility of a prosecution, I would prefer not to make any comment at this stage.
    Miss Burton: I also would prefer the right hon. Gentleman not to prejudice the position.

    Motor Car Industry
    Mr. Mossasked the President of the Board of Trade (1) what proportion of their output has been exported by leading British motor car firms in each year from 1950 to 1955;
    (2) the value of exports of motor cars in each year from 1950 to 1955; and what proportion this was of the value of total production in each year.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: As the Answer contains a number of figures, I will circulate it in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
    Mr. Moss: Can the right hon. Gentleman say what steps he has taken, or proposes to take, to stimulate those firms which have done relatively badly in the export trade? Is he aware that, taking 1951 as a base, the whole of the extra cars produced since that year have remained on the home market?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I would rather not comment upon the figures. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would study those contained in the Answer which will be circulated.
    Mr. Jay: Does the President really think it sufficient for the Government to create unemployment in the motor car industry and just hope that exports will increase? Can he tell us a single step that he is taking to encourage exports?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have considered the proposals to ration steel which were put forward by the right hon. Gentleman, and I have rejected them.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Does my right hon. Friend agree that exports of commercial vehicles have been increasing every year, and now amount to about £85 million per annum, and that the exports of parts and accessories have also been increasing, and now amount to about £106 million a year? Is it not a fact that, taking the whole field of the motor industry, the value of exports has been going up year by year?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Yes.
    Mr. Jay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that I made no proposal for rationing steel? If his other information is as inaccurate as that it is not very sound.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I find it very helpful that no suggestion to ration steel is
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    being put forward as the official policy of the Opposition.
    Following is the Answer:

    —

    United Kingdom exports of new cars and chassis

    Percentage of total value of production exported

    £ million

    1950

    116·6

    66

    1951

    1191

    65

    1952

    111·3

    53

    1953

    103·9

    45

    1954

    118·5

    44

    1955

    122·5

    38

    The export figures are those recorded in the trade returns. The proportion of production exported has been calculated from returns by car manufacturers of the value of their total and export deliveries of motor cars, parts and accessories.
    It would be contrary to normal practice to publish statistics showing the contribution of individual firms to the exports of the motor industry.
    Mr. Yatesasked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the increasing amount of short time and redundancy in the motor car industry, what arrangements he is making to hear in person the views of both sides of the industry upon the present situation.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: None, Sir; both sides of the industry were represented at the meeting of the National Advisory Council for the Motor Manufacturing Industry on 7th March, and I have been informed of the views then expressed about the present situation in the motor industry. I doubt whether the industry would be able to add to the points so recently expressed but, as the hon. Member is aware, I am ready at all times to hear their views.
    Mr. Yates: The Minister said last week that he was quite willing to hear both sides of the industry. In view of the very serious perturbation about the situation in the motor car industry, would he not take the initiative and invite both sides of the industry to make a first-hand account to himself personally, as I understand he has not attended this committee?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The views of the committee have just been placed before the Board of Trade. I am quite willing to see the committee at any time, as it well knows.
    Mr. Bowles: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that free private enterprise under the present Government is creating not only redundancy but unemployment? Is that the policy of the Government? Unless the right hon. Gentleman takes steps, as he can, to remedy the situation, he may find himself redundant very soon.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The hon. Gentleman is raising a much wider point, rather a personal point. I do not stand here in any way to apologise for the measures introduced by Her Majesty's Government, which I think are entirely appropriate to the situation.
    Mr. H. Wilson: While the redundancy of the right hon. Gentleman is long overdue, may I ask if he is not aware, in relation to the export position dealt with me the Question, that certain other countries, not only Germany but France and Italy, have increased the value of their exports very considerably? Has he any comment to make on the fact that our own export efforts seem to be badly rewarded in comparison with the efforts of the nationalised motor car industries of France and Germany?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I did not know that it was the policy of the party opposite to nationalise the motor industry, but I take note of that point.
    Mr. V. Yatesasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that Britain now only occupies the fourth place among those nations which export cars to Switzerland; and, in view of the decline in the export of cars to that country, what action he is taking to assist in remedying this position.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am aware that direct exports of cars from the United Kingdom were marginally lower last year than in 1954. There are no restrictions on the import of cars into Switzerland.
    Mr. Yates: Is the President aware that more than 50 per cent. of the motor cars imported by Switzerland came from Germany—a very serious competitor of ours; and may I ask what he is prepared to do either to advise on or to remedy the situation?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: There are no restrictions in this market. We have exactly the same chance as have the Germans and the French, and the only
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    way to sell more cars is to produce a better car at a lower price than those of other countries.
    Mr. Jay: As the President of the Board of Trade keeps telling us what he is not doing in the matter, does he not really recognise any responsibility to try to encourage British exports, and can he tell us of any single thing that he is doing?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have said that I reject rationing of steel and the nationalisation of the motor industry, as proposed by hon. Members opposite.
    Mr. Bottomley: Will not the right hon. Gentleman take a responsible interest in this matter? Does he not think that he should say what the Government are doing to help this vital industry to recapture the markets that it once held?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It is important for the House to recognise that we have here an open market, with just the same chances of competition as anyone else. There is no easy short cut to getting that motor car trade except by producing a better car at a cheaper price.
    Mr. Ian Harvey: is my right hon. Friend aware that his Answers command complete support on this side of the House, and that the motor car industry is quite capable of looking after itself?
    Mr. S. Silverman: Is the President aware that the Answers which he has given to my hon. and right hon. Friends' main and supplementary questions are precisely the same answers—almost word for word—as those which he has been giving on behalf of the Government in respect of the Lancashire industry for four or five years? As the Government's policy there has now had the experience of five years of utter failure, will he not reconsider the matter with regard to both the Midlands and Lancashire?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: If I have from time to time expressed the view on a number of industries that their principal responsibility is to be competitive in the markets of the world, I am not ashamed of that.
    Mr. J. Johnsonasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will consider publishing at suitable intervals of time the statistics showing the export performances of the principal British car firms.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir. It would be contrary to normal practice to publish statistics showing the contribution of individual firms to the exports of the motor industry.
    Mr. Johnson: Since the Minister has been saying all the afternoon that what this industry needs is more aggressive overseas salesmanship, will he not agree that this is partly a psychological matter and that it would be a good thing to publish this league table not only to educate the public but also to make the firms export even more and do their job in overseas markets?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: No, Sir. All Governments need full statistics upon which to form their policies, but if it were known that they intended to use those statistics by publishing the trading results of individual firms, no Government would ever be able to collect them.

    Tobacco (Dollar Purchases)
    Mr. Doddsasked the President of the Board of Trade the cost of tobacco purchased by this country from dollar sources in 1955; and the estimated cost for 1956.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: The value of the tobacco and tobacco manufactures imported from the dollar area in 1955 was £55·7 million. These imports include tobacco worth $15 million acquired from the United States of America as Commodity Aid. I cannot yet give an estimate for 1956.
    Mr. Dodds: Can we really go on with this collossal dollar expenditure on tobacco? What has been done to get more tobacco from sterling sources, particularly from places in the Commonwealth?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: As the hon. Gentleman probably knows, there are long-term contracts for the purchase of tobacco from the Commonwealth.

    Apples and Pears (Imports)
    Mr. Baldwinasked the President of the Board of Trade why the import quota for Argentine apples and pears for the current year is £780,000, when the figure envisaged in the Anglo-Argentine Agreement on Trade and Payments of March, 1955, Command Paper No. 9463, is only £650,000.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: £780,000 is the c.i.f. equivalent of the Agreement quota of £650,000 f.o.b.
    Mr. Baldwin: Is my right hon. Friend aware that in the reply which he gave to a similar Question on 2nd February he said that this was not a matter of major importance? Has he had any further communication from the Australian Government, who look upon these increased imports as of great importance in view of their trade gap difficulties? Does not my right hon. Friend think that we should encourage the importation of Australian fruit rather than of Argentine fruit?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have had no communication from the Australian Government. I think there is another Question on the Paper on this subject.
    Mr. Baldwinasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he is aware that the import of pears from Argentina for 1955 amounted to about 4,300 cases, whilst supplies which have now arrived, or were due by 8th March, are approximately 140,000 cases; and if he will make a statement.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Imports of pears from Argentina in 1955 were very small. While I was not aware of these particular figures, they suggest that much fuller use will be made of the limited quota this year.
    Mr. Baldwin: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the increase of pears from the Argentine in the first two months of this year is enormous? In view of the difficulties of the trade gap, does he not think that he should take some steps by tariff or otherwise to restrict these imports so that we can supply these goods from the Commonwealth.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: These imports are strictly limited by quota.
    Mr. Baldwinasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will make a further statement on the supply of imported fruit, particularly apples and pears; what further considerations he has given to the protest made by the Australian Government with regard to the importation of apples and pears at a landed price, which indicates unfair competition resulting from currency manipulations; and what reply he has sent.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Imports of Australian apples and pears are admitted freely and amounted to £6,500,000 in 1955; imports from all non-sterling sources are restricted. Imports from Argentina are limited to £650,000 f.o.b. this year and take place at the free exchange rate. Full information on this subject has been supplied to the Australian Government.
    Mr. Baldwin: Should we not look after Commonwealth countries in these respects and not accept fruit from the Argentine which we can supply from sterling sources or from the Commonwealth? Will not my right hon. Friend give increasing attention to the fact that the trade gap will never be decreased unless steps are taken to stop importation of goods that we can provide?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: My hon. Friend will no doubt recognise that this is a very small proportion even of the Australian imports, and is in fact limited by quota.
    Mr. Bottomley: The hon. Gentleman made reference to the fact that the Australian Government had been informed. Has he received any reply from that Government?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: No, Sir, nor was one called for. I simply recorded that the facts had been made known to them.
    Mr. Beswick: Is it not a fact that many of the imports to which the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Baldwin) rightly objects come from the United States and are made available on condition that we manufacture an equivalent value of aircraft? Has this not had the effect not only of offending some of our Commonwealth friends but of overloading our aircraft industry?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: That raises rather wider questions. I was dealing here only with Argentina.

    German Radio and Television Sets (Imports)
    Mr. Beswickasked the President of the Board of Trade if he will review the growing imports of German radio and television sets in the light of the increasing unemployment and short-time working in the British radio industry.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir. The measures which have been taken to
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    reduce home demand apply equally to imported radio and television sets as to those made in this country. It would not be in our interest, as a country vitally dependent on export trade, to re-impose quota restrictions on imports in order to give the radio, or any other, industry protection additional to that provided by the tariff.
    Mr. Beswick: Do not the figures which the right hon. Gentleman gave last week show that imports from Germany are rising rapidly, and, in view of the fact that the Government appear to be doing nothing to help the employment situation in the radio industry, will they not review these imports?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have received no application to do so; in fact, the import duty is the same both ways, the German and our own.
    Captain Pilkington: Nevertheless, would my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the combined effect of the German and Swedish imports is very serious upon these producers?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: There is a 20 per cent. import duty on these sets, and on top of that Purchase Tax is paid, which increases the effect of the duties. Really, our own manufacturers ought to be able to compete on those terms.
    Mr. Bottomley: Is not the policy of introducing independent television responsible for these importations from Germany which are hurting our manufacturers?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I cannot see why the introduction of independent television should hurt our manufacturers of radio sets.

    Knitting Wool (Sale by Weight)
    Mrs. Mannasked the President of the Board of Trade if he is aware that knitting wool is sold in large quantities at one-ounce weight which is only approximately one ounce and, as these labels are misleading, if he will take steps under the Merchandise Marks Acts to stop this practice.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: No, Sir. I have not received any complaints on this subject, but if the hon. Lady will let me have particulars I shall be glad to examine them.
    Mrs. Mann: As this wool is sold in every kind of large store, it will be very difficult for me to send it to him. The right hon. Gentleman will find all the particulars in Command Paper 8219, on weights and measures legislation, where this practice is referred to and the statement follows that "these practices have laid the door wide open to abuse." Will the right hon. Gentleman now take action under the Merchandise Marks Act, or has he deteriorated so far from the days when he introduced the Bill for analgesia?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I was not aware that the hon. Lady had in mind the recommendations of the Hodgson Committee. I am aware of them and, of course, they will be brought into account in any legislation that may be introduced.

    Textiles (Flammability)
    Mrs. Mannasked the President of the Board of Trade, in view of the fact that the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research has accurate and detailed knowledge of the flammability of all materials, from 10 to 150 seconds in vertical line of 100 inches, and have figures of merit assessments as to non-flammability, if he will introduce legislation prescribing a system of labelling which will make these results of accurate research known to purchasers of materials.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I am not satisfied that compulsory labelling of textiles in accordance with this test would in itself be helpful to purchasers of materials.
    Mrs. Mann: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the women of America have forced their Government to label goods, such as materials and dresses, according to flammability and non-flammability? What is the good of the Department of Industrial and Scientific Research having these tests if they are not to be used? They are there to be used. If it is possible to label goods for washability, it is much more important that they should be labelled for flammability.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I am not sure that a lot of labels with complicated formulae on flammability would be of very much help to purchasers. It would depend very much on the material and the purposes for which it was bought. The Fire
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    Research Station is carrying out an investigation into this matter, and I shall await its report with interest.

    Castor Oil
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the President of the Board of Trade how many gallons of castor oil were sold during the past year; how much it cost; and how much it realised.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Sales of castor oil during the past year which were made in the normal course of managing the stock of this commodity amounted to 1,518 tons, or just over 350,000 gallons. This material was purchased at various times during 1953 at the market price then ruling, and sold by competitive tender at the best prices obtainable.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman does not think that his Answer is going to be swallowed without protest. Will he bear in mind that it was his suggestion, made last week, that I should put down a Question on this subject, otherwise I should not have dreamt of it? Will he not give figures to show how much has been lost on this transaction, and give some assurance that the waste of public money is not going to continue?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It is not a question of waste of public money. It is the ordinary turnover of public stocks such as has been practised by all Governments, and it has never been the practice of any Government to disclose figures.

    Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting
    Mr. Bottomleyasked the President of the Board of Trade what representations he has received from the Australian Government regarding their official proposals for revising the Ottawa Agreement at the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: It is not the practice to disclose the subjects to be discussed at meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
    Mr. Bottomley: Is the President of the Board of Trade aware that it has already been reported in The Times Survey that this is so? In those circumstances, does he not think that he should tell the House of Commons something about it?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I am not in the least responsible for what is reported in The Times.
    Mr. Stokes: Although it does not directly arise from the original Question—but it very nearly does—may I ask whether the right hon. Gentleman does not think it is about time that at this conference we should give the world a lead by making it quite clear that we no longer expect a developing country to have a favourable balance of trade, because that is nonsense?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not think that I can promise that that will be on the agenda of the conference.
    Mr. Stokes: Well, it ought to be.

    Film Industry (Policy)
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade what consultations he has had to date with representatives of the film industry about the approaching expiry of film quota legislation and the future of the National Film Finance Corporation.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I have invited the representatives of the industry to put forward their views on future policy to the National Film Finance Corporation who will in turn report to me. I have made it clear, however, that the various sections of the industry are free to express their views directly to the Board of Trade if they so wish. I have not at the moment asked for detailed comments on the film quota legislation.
    Mr. Swingler: Having received the views of representatives of the trade—and, presumably, of the trade unions—and having rejected the very reasonable demand for an independent inquiry, is the President of the Board of Trade going to make a statement of policy on behalf of the Government? In view of the importance of long-term programming in the film industry and the fact that the expiry of legislation on the quota and the Finance Corporation is getting very near, it is important that the Government should state their policy.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The object of getting advice is that it will help me to decide what is the correct course to pursue, and in due course and at the appropriate time I shall say what it is.

    Eastern Europe (Trade Agreements)
    Mr. Swinglerasked the President of the Board of Trade with which countries of Eastern Europe the United Kingdom now has trade agreements; for what duration; and with which countries no trade agreements have yet been made, and why.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: We have trade arrangements with Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, valid respectively, until the end of this year, the end of next year, and the end of this month. We are negotiating with Hungary about future trade arrangements, and about a debt settlement, and also with Czechoslovakia about both trade and debts. We are expecting a Roumanian delegation in the near future, also to discuss trade and debts.
    Mr. Swingler: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, in view of the need to find new and expanding markets for exports, it is important to extend these agreements as quickly as possible?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The agreements do not cover a very wide area of trade, but they deal with quotas for the exchange of less essential things on both sides and, I think, perform a very useful purpose.

    Factories, Development Areas
    Mr. Willeyasked the President of the Board of Trade what action he has taken to assist firms on trading estates on the North-East Development Area producing electrical equipment and furniture.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I do not know what form of assistance the hon. Member has in mind. Tenants of Board of Trade factories in the North East and other Development Areas benefit, of course, from favourable rental terms.
    Mr. Willey: Would the right hon. Gentleman agree that where there is this widespread redundancy the Government can do what has been done on previous occasions—place Government contracts and endeavour to avoid this redundancy spreading?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I do not think that the situation of demand in this country at present would justify it being artificially inflated by putting forward Government contracts.
    Mr. Chetwynd: Does the Government policy of giving priority of contracts to firms in Development Areas still stand—all other things being equal?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: The ordinary arrangements still obtain.

    Manufactured Bentonites (Protective Duty)
    Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenportasked the President of the Board of Trade whether he will consider increasing the import duty on manufactured bentonites in order to help the British industry.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: There are procedures whereby interests concerned can apply for changes in protective duties. I have received no application for an increased protective duty on manufactured bentonites.
    Lieut. - Colonel Bromley - Davenport: Surely the Minister could help firms in this country by slightly increasing the duty on manufactured bentonite, which is the same as that on non-manufactured bentonite?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: If I have an application for increased duty in this regard I shall, of course, examine it in the ordinary way.
    Mr. Stokes: Can we know what bentonite is?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It is a substance used for moulds in foundries.

    Dollar Imports (Licensing)
    Mr. H. Wilsonasked the President of the Board of Trade what percentage of dollar imports were subject to import licensing in 1954 and 1955, respectively.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: To make this calculation with the precision necessary for a valid comparison would involve considerable labour and time. According to calculations previously made, however, using imports in 1953 as a base, 50 per cent. of imports on private account from Canada and the United States of America were subject to specific import licensing at the end of 1954 and 44 per cent. at the end of 1955.
    Mr. Wilson: Do not these figures, which show a very considerable proportion of the imports to be still subject to
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    import licensing, make complete and utter nonsense of the argument of the right hon. Gentleman and of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that any extension of import licensing must involve rationing?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: No, I do not think that they do. I think one could make marginal alterations in liberalisation at any time, but the question one has to answer is whether one wants to go forward towards freedom or backwards towards restriction and control, as advocated by the right hon. Gentleman.
    Mr. Wilson: Since this Question relates to dollar imports, and since hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the House consider that a great number of dollars are being wasted on inessentials—including dollar coarse grains—would he not say that it is more a question of forward to a dollar crisis once again rather than the way in which he put it?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: It was happily phrased.

    Tobacco Trade Association (Boycott)
    Mr. Jayasked the President of the Board of Trade whether his attention has been called to the boycott organised by the Tobacco Trade Association against retailers who sell cigarettes manufactured by independent firms; and what action he proposes to take.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I understand that some members of the Tobacco Trade Association have boycotted a retailer who sold a brand of cigarette associated with a gift coupon scheme. Agreements embodying a boycott of this kind will, under the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill, be subject to registration and to examination by the Restrictive Practices Court.
    Mr. Jay: May I inform the firm—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—I am asking the President whether I can inform the firm which is subject to this victimisation that he will take action within three months after the passing of the Restrictive Trade Practices Bill.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: No. I think that would tie me down to put what I cannot think is an important or far-reaching restriction in the forefront of all others, and I do not think that would be the right sort of priority.
    Mr. Jay: Can the right hon. Gentleman name any date by which he will undertake to take some action on this particular practice?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: Neither I nor the right hon. Gentleman under his scheme for dealing with restrictive practices could lay down a timetable for dealing with them all.
    Mr. K. Thompson: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the situation in the tobacco trade is approaching something very near a monopoly and that if it is supported and buttressed, as it is, by the Tobacco Trade Association, which has quite extensive powers over small retailers, some mischief could result if that power were improperly used? Will he keep the whole matter under observation?

    Exports
    Mr. Bottomleyasked the President of the Board of Trade why exports have not expanded consistently with the increase in production since 1953.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Between 1953 and 1955 the volume of exports in fact increased at about the same rate as industrial production, though not sufficiently to meet the needs of our balance of payments. The reason we did not do better was mainly due to excessive home demand.
    Mr. Bottomley: Is not the excessive home demand entirely due to the Government's policy? Will the President not give further consideration to the very reasonable proposition put by the Opposition to help the export trade?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: No. The excessive home demand is due to a large number of factors, including wage rises and many other matters of that kind.

    Leather Imports (Representations)
    Mr. Bottomleyasked the President of the Board of Trade what representations he has received from the leather industry about subsidised imports into this country; and what reply he has made to them.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: I have received no representations within recent months about subsidised imports of leather, except in relation to imports of kid leathers from Germany. I have replied
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    that the only remaining official German Export Aid Scheme terminated at the end of 1955.
    Mr. Bottomley: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that industry itself at least has some observations on this matter, not only about Germany but about France? If he has had no representations, I can only hope that, as a result of the Question, some representations will be made to him.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have had those representations, and that is the answer which I have given.
    Mr. Shepherd: Is not my right hon. Friend aware that German leather is being sold in the United Kingdom market at prices measurably below those prevailing in Germany? What inquiries has he made into the causes of this disparity?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I have not had that representation, but I am willing to study any facts which my hon. Friend puts before me.

    Sheet Steel (Dollar Imports)
    Mr. Edelmanasked the President of the Board of Trade what was the expenditure in dollars on the import of sheet steel for the motor industry during the last twelve months to the nearest convenient date.
    Mr. P. Thorneycroft: Imports in the twelve months ended 31st January, 1956, from the dollar area of the type of sheet steel mainly used by the motor industry were £17·4 million valued c.i.f. No information is available to show what proportion of these imports was used by the motor industry.
    Mr. Edelman: Is it not very serious that we should be spending so many dollars on imported steel and then reselling so much of the finished product on the home market? Will the right hon. Gentleman not endeavour to relate the import of hard-currency steel to the export performance of the consumer?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay) and I are agreed that no allocations scheme for steel ought to be introduced.
    Mr. H. Wilson: While the right hon. Gentleman is right in saying that no one has suggested a detailed steel allocations

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    scheme, does he not agree that he should have accepted the proposal made from this side of the House last June that the motor car manufacturers should be sent for and that he should point out to them how much sheet steel they were importing and ask them to make special efforts to increase their exports as a condition of receiving this sheet steel? Secondly, does he not agree that it would have been reasonable during these years of excessive expansion of the motor car industry to have fixed a quota for sales in the home market?
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I quite agree that we should always impress upon manufacturers the importance of exports, but the point here is that we are all agreed that no allocations scheme for sheet steel should be introduced. That is the answer to the hon. Member's Question.
    Mr. Jay: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he is still talking nonsense? All I said was that I expressed no opinion about this matter, one way or the other.
    Mr. Thorneycroft: I think the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues ought to make up their minds about it.

  NATIONAL FINANCE

    Royal Colleges of Music (Grants)
    Mr. G. R. Straussasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what bodies he consults before allocating Treasury grants to certain musical colleges.
    The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Henry Brooke): None, Sir The colleges of music which receive grants-in-aid from the Treasury are the four Royal Colleges. Their reputation is undoubted, and their need for financial support is examined each year by the Treasury.
    Mr. Strauss: In view of the fact that this particular school is of the highest standing and is accepted by all the opera companies and leading people in the opera world as quite invaluable, will he not consider making such a small grant as that for which the Governors asked—small by comparison with the £60,000 received by the other institutions? Will he not consider these applications on their merits?
    Mr. Brooke: No school is referred to in the Question. If the right hon. Gentleman will give me an opportunity to
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    answer Question No. 36, which he has on the Paper, I might then be able to deal with his supplementary question.

    Opera School (Grant)
    Mr. G. R. Straussasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what grounds he has turned down the application of the governors of the Opera School for an annual grant of £1,500.
    Mr. H. Brooke: This school gives specialised professional training and my right hon. Friend considers that its training is best judged, and if necessary supported, by the opera companies who may benefit from it. He has in mind the large financial support already given by the Government to opera companies in this country.
    Mr. Strauss: Is there any difference between a school which specialises in musical training for opera and the other schools which deal with musical training in general? Surely this is a very important branch of musical training and, logically, there can be no ground for saying that one type of school shall have a grant whereas another type of school shall have no grant at all. This is a good and important school. Will not the right hon. Gentleman reconsider his refusal in the case of this school?
    Mr. Brooke: I think there is a difference. Grants to the musical colleges are given to the four old-established Royal Colleges. The Opera School was founded about eight years ago. I understand that is trains about twenty-five or thirty students entirely for opera. In view of the very substantial Government aid given to the opera companies, it appears to my right hon. Friend that any assistance to the Opera School should come from that quarter.
    Mr. Rankin: Does any of the money go to Scottish musical colleges?
    Mr. Brooke: The Royal Scottish Academy of Music receives grants according to the normal Goschen formula.

    Post-War Credits
    Mr. Haymanasked the Chancellor of othe Exchequer whether, in preparing his forthcoming Budget, he will arrange for persons who are totally disabled to get their post-war credits refunded on reaching the age of fifty-five.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Mr. Hayman: Will the Minister bear in mind that in the week during which I tabled this Question I had two letters from constituents who are in this unfortunate category? As the concession does not amount to much, will he urge his right hon. Friend the Chancellor to grant it?
    Mr. Brooke: I will certainly draw my right hon. Friend's attention to what the hon. Member has said.
    Mr. H. Wilson: The right hon. Gentleman said that he cannot anticipate the Chancellor's Budget statement. Taken in conjunction with his answer last week about advertising, when he indicated that the Chancellor's mind was closed on that matter, does it mean that the Chancellor's mind is open at any rate on this proposal?
    Mr. Brooke: My right hon. Friend authorised me to make a definite statement in answer to the Question about tax relief for advertising expenses last week, and he also authorised me, in the perfectly normal manner, to give an answer today on this subject of post-war credits that I could not anticipate his Budget statement.

    Provision for Retirement (Taxation)
    Sir I. Fraserasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has yet reached any conclusions with regard to the recommendations of the committee on the taxation treatment of provisions for retirement.
    Mr. H. Brooke: I must ask my hon. Friend to await my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Sir I. Fraser: While his right hon. Friend is preparing his statement, will the Financial Secretary impress upon him that there is this section of middle-class persons, self-employed persons and professional persons, which has no opportunity of saving, such as is available to wage earners generally?
    Mr. Brooke: I myself, on behalf of my right hon. Friend, received a very authoritative deputation a few days ago from the accountancy profession and both
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    branches of the legal profession, and I can assure my hon. Friend that both the Chancellor and I are fully seized of this issue.
    Mr. Isaacs: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the question of this Committee's Report has been raised over the last three or four years with the Chancellor, and can the right hon. Gentleman give some hope of relief, not only to the class referred to by the hon. Member for Morecambe and Lonsdale (Sir I. Fraser), but to working people who are in receipt of pensions, having as much as 4s. or 5s. a week deducted?
    Mr. Brooke: The right hon. Gentleman referred to "three or four years" ago, but the Report of the Committee was actually published two years ago. I must say that I should be surprised if my right hon. Friend the Chancellor could make his Budget statement this year without including some mention, positive or negative, of the subject.

    Temporary Civil Servants (Ex-Service Men)
    Sir I. Fraserasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether, in carrying out the proposed further reductions in the Civil Service, he will give special consideration to ex-Service men in non-established posts.
    Mr. H. Brooke: If temporary staff have to be discharged on redundancy it will be done under the arrangements laid down in the National Whitley Agreement on the order of discharge of temporary staff on redundancy. This Agreement incorporates the long standing pledge that ex-Service men of the 1914–18 war shall have preference for retention in temporary Government employment.

    Motor Car Industry
    Miss Burtonasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that since the October Budget cars have been stockpiled in all parts of the country; that since he increased the Bank Rate this position has become worse; and if he will take steps in his forthcoming Budget to aid the motor industry thus affected by Government policy.
    The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Sir Edward Boyle): I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Miss Burton: That is cold comfort to the motor industry. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that under the Labour Government the motor industry exported two-thirds of its production, but that under this Government its exports have fallen to less than half; is he further aware that this redundancy and short-time working in the motor industry will soon push up the unit costs of production and make exporting still more difficult; and is that what the Government have in mind?
    Sir E. Boyle: We cannot debate the motor industry now.
    Mr. Stokes: The Government have not got anything in mind.

    Non-Provided Schools
    Mr. L. M. Leverasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he is aware that the increases in the Bank Rate are causing hardship to the non-provided schools; and whether he will, in framing his Budget, consider granting reliefs to such schools.
    Sir E. Boyle: I cannot anticipate my right hon. Friend's Budget statement.
    Mr. Lever: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his mechanical reply will cause very grave disquiet in the minds of the managers of denominational schools; and is he further aware that this impact of an increased Bank Rate is imposing an unjust and iniquitous burden on the managers of non-provided schools, who are very anxious to maintain freedom of conscience and get the debts off their shoulders as soon as possible?
    Sir E. Boyle: The hon. Gentleman must not mind my making a traditional reply at this season of the year.
    Mr. Stokes: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that this high Bank Rate will altogether arrest, and is arresting, the building of non-provided schools? Is it not perfectly possible for the Ministry of Education, under his direction, to make revolving credits available for them at fixed rates of interest? As this has been done in some cases, why cannot it be done generally?
    Sir E. Boyle: Hardship in the educational field, if there is any, is primarily a matter for my right hon. Friend the Minister of Education.
    Mr. Lever: Will the hon. Gentleman bring it to the notice of the Chancellor?

    IMPERIAL INSTITUTE
    Dr. Strossasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he has noted the public disquiet at the proposal to demolish the buildings of the Imperial Institute; and whether he will take advice from other architects so as to ensure that the tower and façade are not destroyed.
    Mr. Fleetwood-Heskethasked the Secretary to the Treasury how many architects or firms of architects were consulted as to the feasibility of retaining intact the southern façade and campanile of the Imperial Institute in the proposed rebuilding of the site.
    Mr. H. Brooke: The plans for the development of the South Kensington rectangle, recently submitted to the London County Council, were prepared by the Imperial College and their architects, Messrs. Norman and Dawbarn, who co-operated fully in a detailed examination of the possibilities of finding means to retain the Collcutt building. The development is to be the subject of further discussions between the architect of the London County Council and the College authorities and their architects.
    Dr. Stross: The Financial Secretary having mentioned the name of the London County Council, would he bear in mind that this tower and façade occupies only three-quarters of an acre out of the 16-acre site; and as all of us are anxious that there should be as many places as possible for science students, would he ask the help of the L.C.C. to get another site immediately so as to make certain that something can be done without any ill-influence to further education?
    Mr. Brooke: There are further Questions down about the amount of land occupied by the Colcutt building, and also about the position of the L.C.C. in this matter, so I ought not to anticipate my Answers to those Questions.
    Mr. Fleetwood-Hesketh: Is my right hon. Friend aware that public opinion would be better reassured that the claims of science and amenity were reconciled to the greatest possible extent if a second opinion could be obtained?
    Mr. Brooke: I recognise my hon. Friend's point, but I must stress the fact that this is a university development and

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    the Government have no more right to give directions to the Imperial College about its choice of architect than they would have the right to give directions to a college of, say, Oxford or Cambridge as to the architect it should employ?
    Mr. Jay: Is it true that the Government took a decision—and announced it—on this issue without consulting the London County Council first, although the Council is the planning authority?
    Mr. Brooke: It was not for the Government to consult the London County Council. The Imperial College has submitted its plans to the planning authority.
    Sir I. Horobin: Could my right hon. Friend explain how, as an Act of Parliament is in any case necessary, it is possible to disclaim responsibility for these matters?
    Mr. Brooke: This is a matter of responsibility for the choice of architect. I quite agree that legislation will be necessary, and all those matters will come before Parliament then.
    Mr. Anthony Greenwood: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that, whatever is the final conclusion, a decision really must be reached very quickly indeed so that there is no further holding up of the development of technological education?
    Mr. Brooke: I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for stressing the importance of final conclusions on this matter at an early date.
    Dr. Strossasked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the total cost of the Imperial Institute building when it was erected; from what sources the funds were made available; and what would be the equivalent today of this sum in money terms.
    Mrs. Whiteasked the Secretary to the Treasury what consultations there have been with the Commissioners of the Exhibition of 1851 or with other bodies which donated land or substantial sums of money for the building of the Imperial Institute, now that it is proposed to pull the building down.
    Mr. H. Brooke: About £429,000 was contributed by public subscription, but I regret that no information is available to me about the source or amounts of
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    individual subscriptions. The amount spent on building the Institute, including plant, fittings and furniture, was £354,753. The present day equivalent, in money terms, would be about £1·7 million.
    No land was donated for the building of the Imperial Institute. The Commissioners for the Exhibition of 1851, who are the ground landlords, have been fully informed of the plans for the development of Imperial College.
    Dr. Stross: As the sum of money approaches, in today's value, nearly £2 million, which is quite considerable, should that not make the Financial Secretary and his right hon. Friend think again whether it is possible to achieve what we all desire, which is a decision almost at once, or as soon as possible, to house as many students as we can in this place without pulling down the tower and façade and have another site earmarked at once for further students?
    Mr. Brooke: I think we all wish that there should be the right outcome in respect of this very difficult matter. I must point out to the hon. Gentleman that, when he quotes a figure of nearly £2 million, one also has to take into account, if one is calculating that in economic terms, that the existing building is very wasteful of space, is inconvenient internally and does sterilise a considerable area of valuable ground.
    Mrs. White: While it might not be in order to ask whether the Royal family has been consulted, does the right hon. Gentleman not think it would be desirable for some statement to be made on that matter, as this is a very personal memorial; and does he not consider it incongruous for a Conservative Administration to agree to the demolition of a building which is a memorial to a very significant name in British history, as well as to a very great Queen?
    Mr. Brooke: I hope that the hon. Lady will forgive me if I say nothing about the Royal family in this connection. The Imperial Institute, which is itself a living memorial, is unquestionably to be carried on and given new and purpose-built premises at Government expense.
    Mr. Albu: Has the right hon. Gentleman observed the remarks in another place of the noble Lord, Lord Beveridge, who for many years worked in the

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    Imperial Institute, and whose opinion is that, as a building, it is a cut-rate job, that it is quite useless as a place in which to work, cannot be used for any purpose at all and has absolutely no value?
    Mr. Brooke: I had the privilege of listening to a great part of the debate in another place, and there is clearly—
    Mr. Speaker: We should not refer to debates in another place held during the current Session.
    Mr. Albu: I thought it was in order, Mr. Speaker, to refer to remarks made in another place so long as one paraphrased those remarks and did not actually use the words used by a noble Lord.
    Mr. Speaker: It is not in order to refer to debates in another place. The only exception is when a Minister in another place makes a statement on behalf of the Government.

    GOVERNMENT SURPLUS STOCKS (DISPOSAL)
    Mr. Doddsasked the Prime Minister if he can yet make a statement in respect of the investigations of Departmental Ministers in regard to Government surplus stock offered at public auctions.
    The Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden): I have asked my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer to consider the outcome of the Departmental inquiries which are being made and, in consultation with the other Ministers concerned, to report on the general procedure for the disposal of surplus service stores.
    Mr. Dodds: Arising out of that reply, does the Prime Minister recollect that on 1st March, in respect of the sale of nearly a quarter million gallons of surplus paint, he gave as an excuse in this House that it was special paint purchased for the war in Korea and became surplus when peace came to Korea? Is he aware that the surplus amounted to 4,800 gallons? Was it not misleading the House to talk about a quarter million gallons? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the strange coincidence that a Government Department which has never purchased paint before has purchased 1,500 gallons, with a saving to the taxpayer?
    The Prime Minister: I have asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer to review this question. If the hon. Member has further detailed Questions to put on the matter, perhaps he will put them to my right hon. Friend or to the Department handling the matter.
    Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Prime Minister when the inquiry is likely to be completed?
    The Prime Minister: I should not like to pledge myself to a date. We have to review the practice which has been established for some time, and see in what way it needs amending. I think the Financial Secretary has already made an interim report to my right hon. Friend on the problems which have to be met. I would rather not give an actual date.
    Lieut.-Colonel Liptonasked the Prime Minister how many Departments are concerned in the sale of surplus strategic stocks; and how other Departments are informed of these surplus stocks before they are sold to private buyers.
    The Prime Minister: The Board of Trade will be predominantly concerned. The Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply may also be concerned. Surplus stocks will be offered to other Departments before they are sold outside.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Is the Prime Minister aware that from the Answer which I received from the President of the Board of Trade to Question No. 15 today, it is quite impossible to find how much money is being wasted as a result of this disposal? Will the right hon. Gentleman take it upon himself to instruct the President of the Board of Trade or to take such steps as are necessary to enable the House and the taxpayers to find how much is being wasted as a result of these disposals?
    The Prime Minister: I think that probably the reason why the hon. and gallant Member could not find the amount is that the action has not yet been taken. As it is decided which stocks will be run down the Board of Trade will give other Departments a list of those commodities so that they may know which they are.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: That does not answer the Question.
    The Prime Minister: I thought I answered it rather well.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: On a point of order. Owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment.

  MALTA (REPORT OF ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE)
  Mr. E. Fletcherasked the Prime Minister if he will now make a statement as to Her Majesty's Government's policy in regard to the future constitution of Malta.
  The Prime Minister: The Government understand the importance of stating their position on the Report of the Round Table Conference, and my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House will announce arrangements for a debate in due course.
  Mr. Fletcher: Will the Prime Minister say, well in advance of the debate, what are the intentions of the Government?
  The Prime Minister: The intentions of the Government will be announced, as well as the date of the debate, in due course. I think the House realises that this is a matter of considerable delicacy, not only so far as it concerns the House, but so far as it concerns Malta also.
  Sir P. Spens: Will my right hon. Friend at least give us this information—whether the debate is likely to be before the Easter Adjournment or after?
  The Prime Minister: I should think that might be possible if we have discussions through the usual channels and that seems a reasonable thing to do. I think that what we all want to do is to handle this matter as skilfully and patiently as we possibly can.

  FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (TALKS)
  Mr. Emrys Hughesasked the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on his conversations with the Prime Minister of France.
  The Prime Minister: I was very glad to have the opportunity to welcome the French Prime Minister here.
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  The House will have seen the joint statement which was issued after our talks together. I do not wish to repeat it. There are just two comments I should like to make.
  The first subject which we discussed was disarmament. We found ourselves in full agreement about the need to make progress in this field and welcomed the opportunity which is provided by the forthcoming meeting of the United Nations Sub-Committee on disarmament. Our ideas on this subject were indeed very close together and we hope for British, French and United States collaboration in a common policy.
  The other main subject we discussed was the economic policies of the free world, with special reference to economic action in certain areas which we mentioned in our statement. Here also we found ourselves in agreement on the broad lines of policy, and on the need to develop the economic side of the regional organisations to which either of our countries belongs.
  Mr. Hughes: Will the Prime Minister tell us whether he summoned the French Prime Minister here as a result of a speech by the French Foreign Secretary, M. Pineau? Could he also tell us what was wrong with the speech of M. Pineau, and whether it would be possible, in view of general interest in the matter, to invite M. Pineau here to address an all-party meeting of hon. Members?
  The Prime Minister: It would be very wrong to suggest that I summoned the French Prime Minister here. That is not remotely accurate nor very helpful to Anglo-French relations. What I did was to invite him to come over here, as I wished to do after the Washington talks, but there has been certain pressure of work and not very much time to do that. I thought everybody was glad that we were in full agreement and thought it would help to see what the views of the two Governments were on the two subjects which seem to interest the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) so much.
  Mr. Younger: Is the Prime Minister aware that we on this side of the House very much welcomed the visit of the French Prime Minister, with its promise of improved consultations—a subject

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  which seemed to cause unnecessary difficulty, considering the great common interests of the two countries? Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm what I believe M. Mollet said in Paris, that the initiative on disarmament will be published very shortly and be made available to all of us? As the Prime Minister has confirmed that he would give his support to the French in their great difficulties in Algeria, can we take it that there will be consultation on the policies on which we are to give support in Algeria, as the reputations of both countries are deeply involved?
  The Prime Minister: I endorsed the speech which the Ambassador made on our authority—that Algeria is part of the Metropolitan France and that Her Majesty's Government can have nothing but sympathy with the efforts of the French Government to improve conditions and preserve peace in Algeria. I think that, broadly, is the view of this House. In reply to the first part of the supplementary question asked by the right hon. Member for Grimsby (Mr. Younger) about making the initiative public, I should be grateful if he would give me notice of that question, as I am not sure what is the position about it.

  TRIPARTITE DECLARATION (IMPLEMENTATION)
  Mr. Pagetasked the Prime Minister whether he will instruct the General Officer Commanding Middle East Forces to enter into consultations with the Israeli High Command as to the means necessary to implement the Tripartite Agreement, should this become necessary.
  The Prime Minister: No, Sir.
  Mr. Paget: Are not commitments like the Belgium commitment in 1914, in regard to which nobody quite knows whether they are to be implemented, a most dangerous sort of commitment? Would it not be a great deal safer if we did somethig practical which would evidence to the world our intention of fulfilling those commitments? What is the objection to having preliminary talks in order that we may know what we are going to do?
  The Prime Minister: I think the hon. and learned Member will consider on reflection that that is scarcely a practical
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  proposal. As he knows, the engagement is to all concerned, and his proposal presumably would involve consultations with all concerned. That is hardly a practical military matter on which we can engage.
  Mr. Gaitskell: As it is now several weeks since the Prime Minister announced that discussions were taking place in Washington about the implementation of the Tripartite Declaration, can he tell us what has happened as a result of those discussions, and whether any decisions have been reached?
  The Prime Minister: I said at the time that I could not give publicly details of the military decisions if any were arrived at. As to political matters, if the right hon. Member will put down a Question I will certainly see whether I am in a position to give him a detailed answer.
  Sir R. Boothby: In the meantime, can my right hon. Friend tell us whether these discussions in Washington are still continuing and, if so, when he expects them to reach a conclusion, as the matter is urgent?
  The Prime Minister: Yes, they are continuing and, as I said to the right hon. Member for Leeds, South (Mr. Gaitskell). I will see whether I can make a detailed reply next week. Part of them is necessarily bound to be of a confidential character. The difficulty will be to see whether a public statement can be made, apart from the confidential nature of the discussion.
  Mr. Gaitskell: Is the Prime Minister not aware that a great deal of the value of the outcome of the discussions will be precisely in the publicity accorded to them? Will he please bear that in mind when he gives the statement for which we have asked?
  The Prime Minister: I have that in mind, but there are different constitutional positions in the two countries, and there are some things which cannot be made public. The important part of the Washington discussions was the indication that plans were being made by the Powers upon whom the principal responsibility will lie. I think that is right. Where I cannot follow the right hon. Gentleman is in making public the plans of the individual countries concerned.
  Mr. Usborne: As the Foreign Secretary not long ago said in this connection that he hoped that there would be some kind of United Nations body policing the borderlands around Israel, can the Prime Minister tell us how that idea is progressing?
  The Prime Minister: That is, of course, quite a different question, although an important one. What I was dealing with was conversations arising out of our engagement under the Tripartite Declaration.

AGRICULTURE (ANNUAL REVIEW)
The following Question stood upon the Order Paper:
Mr. CROUCH: To ask the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food whether he will make a statement on this year's farm Price Review.
The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. D. Heathcoat Amory): Yes, Sir. The statutory Annual Review of the economic condition and prospects of the agricultural industry has been concluded. The Government have made their determinations on the guarantees to the industry in the light of the Review. These are set out in a White Paper which is now available. The White Paper also sets out the results of the Special Review which was held concurrently with the Annual Review.
The general production policy of the Government continues to be to foster the highest level of net output that can be achieved economically and efficiently, by encouraging in particular beef, mutton and lamb and the production and use of home-grown feedingstuffs. Until markets can be extended or costs reduced, it is desirable to avoid stimulating further the production of milk, pigs or eggs.
The net output of the industry in 1955–56 is forecast at 55 per cent. above pre-war as against 51 per cent. for last year. Falls in the tillage area and in pig production have been offset by record yields of cereal crops, a better hay harvest and more milk and eggs. I am sure the House will agree that this reflects credit on everyone concerned during the past year—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—following the adverse conditions of the previous year.
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The actual net income of the industry, which is forecast for 1955–56 at £299 million out of a gross income of about £1,400 million, is recovering only slowly from the setback of 1954–55 when it fell to £285 million. There has also been a substantial further increase in costs of about £37 million in a full year for review commodities. I am confident that the industry will help itself to meet these costs by continuing to increase its efficiency, mainly through improvements in husbandry and farm management. This will also help the nation by keeping down the total subsidy bill and the volume of feedingstuffs imports
The Government's conclusion is that a further increase in the value of the price guarantees and production grants is necessary to ensure that the industry has the resources it needs in order to play its full part in meeting the requirements of the national economy. The determinations now made have the effect of increasing the total value of the guarantees in a full year by £25 million.
It has been decided to increase the price guarantees for fat cattle, fat sheep, and milk for 1956–57 and for oats, barley, potatoes and sugar beet for the 1957 harvest to leave unchanged the price guarantee for hen eggs; and to reduce by small amounts the price guarantees for pigs and wool for 1956–57 and by a more substantial amount the price guarantees for wheat and rye of the 1957 harvest.
We have also decided to increase the fertiliser subsidies, the marginal production grants and the subsidy on steer calves; and to make provision for grants for silos for the conservation of silage. The Government have had particularly in mind the position of the smaller farmers in reaching the decision to increase the price guarantees for milk by ½d. a gallon and oats by 1s. 6d. a cwt., and in making additional provision for production grants.
The Government have also given careful thought to the form of the fatstock guarantees. They have decided to discontinue the individual guarantees for all classes of fatstock. These were a feature of the guarantee scheme introduced in 1954 after the end of control. But the risks for individual producers in the restoration of the auction markets which these arrangements were intended to meet

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no longer justify the complications and the elaborate machinery involved.
This will not only enable the fatstock guarantee system to be simplified considerably, but it will also save about 300 staff. A single guarantee payment will be made in future for each group of fat-stock. But to provide greater stability, this guarantee payment will be adjusted as and when necessary to ensure that the average total return to producers each week remains within a predetermined range on either side of the standard price.
I regret that on this occasion agreement has not been reached with the Farmers' Unions. I understand that, while in the prevailing circumstances, they would not have wished to dissent from the total increase in the guarantees, they feel unable to agree to the price determinations or to the changes to be made in the fatstock guarantee system. The Government are, however, satisfied that their determinations are fair and just and take a full and balanced view of the needs of the agricultural industry and of the national economy.
Mr. T. Williams: Is the removal of the individual guaranteed price for livestock consistent with Part I of the Agriculture Act, 1947, which distinctly states that guarantee prices and assured markets should be provided? Does the Minister think that an imposed settlement, for the first time, will help in our balance of payments problem? Although it is difficult at such short notice to make figures clear, if the profits of the industry for 1955–56 have increased by £14 million, compared with 1954–55 and as there has been a recoupment of £25 million out of the £37 million extra expenditure, leaving the sum of £12 million, does that not mean that profits increased over the low figure of 1954–55 by only £2 million? Did the right hon. Gentleman expect to get agreement with the National Farmers' Union in the light of those figures.
Mr. Amory: I will do my best to answer the three very reasonable questions which the right hon. Member has asked. I am sorry that we have not succeeded in getting agreement, particularly as the discussions this year have been held in a very friendly and temperate atmosphere. However, as the right hon. Gentleman himself knows, there is no obligation under the Agriculture Act,
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1947, necessarily to reach an agreed settlement.
The individual guarantee was introduced as a special measure of protection against the uncertainties of reopening the free markets. It was never intended to be a general floor price. It served its purpose in those circumstances, but today it is very doubtful whether, on balance, it is helpful. I have had a good many criticisms that the system, including the individual guarantee, is so complicated that it is difficult for producers exactly to understand where they will be. It is important to have a simple system which is understandable and I believe that the new arrangements which we have made, with the special provision for stabilising adjustments, will prove popular.
The right hon. Gentleman next asked me about the effect on the net income of the industry. This settlement has not, as settlements never have in the past, been made on a cost-plus basis. As against the £37 million which it is estimated the Review commodities will have increased in cost, we are making an increase in the guarantees of £25 million, but, fortunately, the industry shows every sign of continuing its steady improvement in productivity year by year. When that is taken into account, the effect on the net income of the industry of this settlement should be very beneficial indeed. Also, the industry has not yet received in full the benefits from the increases that were made in the Price Review last year. Some of these will be accruing during the next six months.
The right hon. Gentleman asked me a third question—
Mr. Williams: Relating to the removal of the individual minimum guaranteed price and whether that was consistent with the Agriculture Act, 1947.
Mr. Amory: The answer is that I am satisfied, and I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will be satisfied when he looks at it, that it is completely consistent with the spirit and letter of that Act.
Mr. Vane: Now that the collective guarantee for fatstock has been shown to provide a reliable support, would my right hon. Friend not agree that the value of the individual guarantee has not proved as great as was thought at the end of controls when it had a particular psychological value? Will he not agree that its

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elimination, without weakening the price structure, will be welcome because of the simplification which will result?
Mr. Amory: I agree that that will be the result. It has served a useful purpose, but I think that the balance of advantage is in favour of its removal and the substitution of a simpler system. Administratively, it is proving top-heavy and it is difficult to justify the use of 300 staff for the purpose.
Mr. Willey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that he has made his statement against a disturbing picture of British agriculture in that, despite the good weather last year, we have suffered a further decline in agricultural production? [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] There has been a fall of 4 per cent. compared with the figure given in last year's statement. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, whatever he may say about the individual guarantee, the fact that the Farmers' Unions have not agreed this time means that they are further disturbed by the action of Her Majesty's Government?
Is the right hon. Gentleman further aware that his statement must be considered together with the Chancellor's statement and that it means that the price support of the British farmer is being directly paid by the consumer and that the reduction in subsidy is being used directly this time for the increased price support? Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that the farmers will obtain the benefit and not the middlemen?
Mr. Amory: The hon. Gentleman is usually so clear and lucid that I have no difficulty in following him, but I honestly cannot follow the arguments which he has just adduced. I would remind him and the House that the forecast for the present year is of a net output at a level reached only once before—in the year before last—and which has never been surpassed. As to the effect on the industry, I am sure that when agriculturists consider it they will decide that in present circumstances an additional contribution to their resources in the form of additional guarantees amounting to £25 million will provide them with a very sure base on which to continue their increase in efficient productivity.
Mr. D. Marshall: Will my right hon. Friend clarify one point? Has there been disagreement about the total award, or only about the pattern of that award?
Mr. Amory: The farmers' leaders, at the conclusion of our discussions, told me that in the prevailing circumstances they would not have wished to have dissented from the aggregate award, but they felt that they could not agree to the pattern of the price determinations or the alteration in the fatstock guarantee arrangements.
Mr. Peart: The right hon. Gentleman's reference to increased production was cheered by hon. Members opposite, but is he aware that he is relating his figure to production last year and that last year's figure was comparable only to what it was in 1951? Is it not alarming that the increase in agricultural production since 1951 has been at the rate of only 1 per cent.?
Mr. Amory: For the year 1950–51, which was the last completed year before the Labour Government went out of office, the net output was 145 per cent. above pre-war. It is now 155 per cent. In the next year, the year ending May, 1952, which was six months after the party opposite went out of office, it had risen 4 points to 149 per cent. Between the last completed year under the Labour Government and this year there has been an increase of 10 points in the output over pre-war.
Mr. Speaker: Mr. Tom Williams—the last question.
Mr. Williams: I am sure that hon. and right hon. Members would like to have correct figures. What my hon. Friend the Member for Workington (Mr. Peart) put to the Minister was whether it was not the case that output between 1951 and 1956 has increased by only 4 per cent. If the right hon. Gentleman takes the year 1951–52, when the party opposite had been in office only for a few months and all the work had been done before we on this side of the House had left office, he will find that the figures are almost the same. In four years, output has gone up by only 1 per cent. per annum during the term of office of the party opposite.
Mr. Amory: I cannot agree with the right hon. Gentleman's figures. If he

565
takes the year 1950–51, which was the last full year for which his party was responsible, the figure was 145 per cent. of pre- war. This year it is forecast as 155 per cent.
Several Hon. Members rose—
Mr. Speaker: Order. This is becoming a debate, with no Question before the House.
Mr. Crouch: On a point of order, Sir. May I put a supplementary question to my own Question?
Mr. Speaker: I am afraid that the hon. Member missed his opportunity.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the Leader of the House to state the business for next week.
The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. R. A. Butler): The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY, 19TH MARCH—Supply [9th Allotted Day]: Report stage of Civil Supplementary Estimates.
Class VIII, Votes 1, 2 and 3 relating to Agriculture.
Class IV, Vote 6 (National Gallery).
At 9.30 p.m., under the provisions of the Standing Order, the Question will be put from the Chair on the Vote under discussion and on all outstanding Estimates, Supplementary Estimates and Excess Votes required before the end of the financial year.
Second Reading of the Validation of Elections (Northern Ireland) Bill, and, if agreeable to the House, the Committee and remaining stages.
TUESDAY, 20TH MARCH—Second Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill.
Debate on the Employment Situation.
Consideration of Motions to approve the several Civil Defence Regulations which are on the Order Paper.
WEDNESDAY, 21ST MARCH—Committee and Third Reading of the Consolidated Fund Bill.
Debate on the Findings of the Conference of Privy Councillors on Security.
THURSDAY, 22ND MARCH—Report and Third Reading of the Teachers (Superannuation) Bill.
Consideration of the Motion to approve the Draft Coal Mining (Subsidence) (Rateable Value) Order.
FRIDAY, 23RD MARCH—Consideration of Private Members' Motions.
I have also to announce for the convenience of the House that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will open his Budget on Tuesday, 17th April, and that we hope to adjourn for the Easter Recess on Thursday, 29th March, until Tuesday, 10th April.
Mr. Gaitskell: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he anticipates that there will be any other business, which has not so far been announced, on Wednesday?
Mr. Butler: I understand that the Chairman of Ways and Means has some Private Business which he proposes to put down for seven o'clock.
Mr. S. Silverman: Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House any information at this stage as to when the House will be given an opportunity of making further progress with the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill? In considering the question, will he bear in mind that the present position is, in a very special sense, anomalous, and that it will remain anomalous until the fate of the Bill, whatever it may be, is ultimately known?
Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir. This Bill will be treated by the Government in exactly the same manner as any other outstanding business. I cannot give an exact undertaking as to the day when we shall be able to make a start with the Committee stage, but it will be approached in the spirit which I undertook originally.
Mr. Stokes: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he is able to say when the Secretary of State for Air will make his promised reports to the House on, first, the loss of six Hunter aircraft, and, secondly, the tragic crash in Malta of a transport plane, in which 35 lives were lost?
Mr. Butler: I will discuss that with my right hon. Friend, and I will see that the House is informed.
Mr. C. Pannell: May I call the attention of the Leader of the House to the fact that, while the House rightly passed my hon. Friend's Bill to abolish capital punishment, hon. Members in all parts are greatly exercised by the mounting deaths of thousands of people on the roads? Can the right hon. Gentleman give an undertaking that the Road Traffic Bill, which has passed, largely on a non-political basis, through the Committee stage, will be brought before the House on Report before Easter?
Mr. Butler: I could not give any undertaking that it will be brought before the House before Easter, but I am aware of the importance of making progress with that Bill, particularly since it made such progress in Standing Committee.
Mr. E. Fletcher: Will the right hon. Gentleman consider postponing consideration of the Draft Civil Defence (South of Scotland Electricity Board) Regulations until later in the week, in view of the fact that the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments takes an adverse view of those Regulations, and there is to be a memorandum from the Secretary of State for Air?
Mr. Butler: That particular point has been brought to my notice, and I am considering that aspect of the matter. I cannot give an assurance to the hon. Member, but I will inform him of the result of my deliberations.
Mr. Albu: May I ask the Leader of the House whether it is the Government's intention to give time for a discussion of the White Paper on Technical Education, which contains a number of controversial matters, but which, I think he will agree, is of very great importance?
Mr. Butler: We will discuss that matter through the usual channels.
Mr. Silverman: While appreciating what the right hon. Gentleman said about the spirit in which the Government will approach the further stages of the Death Penalty (Abolition) Bill, may I ask him whether the Government's influence would be used, without derogating from the principle of a free vote, in restraining any attempt to produce what one might without disrespect call a prolonged filibustering Committee stage?
Hon. Members: Oh.
Mr. Butler: I think that raises wider issues than can be answered in reply to a question on business. It is, of course, in the Government's interests that not too much parliamentary time should be taken up.
Mr. L. M. Lever: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that the 10s. widows are still waiting for a debate on the Motion standing in my name?
[That this House deplores the decision of the Minister of Pensions and National Insurance on the matter of making more equitable provision for the 10s. widows; and calls upon him to give favourable reconsideration to this urgent question.]
Mr. Butler: Yes, Sir; I am only too well aware of it.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  Ordered,
  That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]
  Proceedings of the Committee of Ways and Means and on the Criminal Justice Administration Bill [Lords] exempted, at this day's Sitting, from the provisions of Standing Order No. 1 (Sittings of the House).—[Mr. R. A. Butler.]

  ORDERS OF THE DAY

    SUPPLY
    [8TH ALLOTTED DAY]
    Considered in Committee.
    [Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]

  Class VIII

    Vote 1. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
    Resolved,
    That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £350,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, for the salaries and expenses of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Food, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; of County Agricultural Executive Committees; of the Agricultural Land Commission; of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew; and of the White Fish Authority and the Scottish Committee thereof.

    Vote 2. Agricultural and Food Grants and Subsidies
    Resolved,
    That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food for grants and subsidies to farmers and others for the encouragement of food production and the improvement of agriculture; and for certain direct subsidy payments and certain trading and other services, including payments and services in implementation of agricultural price guarantees.

    Vote 3. Agricultural and Food Services
    Resolved,
    That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £190,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, for grants, grants in aid and expenses in connection with agricultural and food services;
    570
    including land drainage and rehabilitation of land damaged by flood and tempest; purchase, development and management of land, including land settlement and provision of smallholdings; services in connection with livestock, and compensation for slaughter of diseased animals; provision and operation of machinery; training and supplementary labour schemes; control of pests; education, research and advisory services; marketing; agricultural credits; certain trading services; subscriptions to international organisations; and sundry other services including certain expenses in connection with civil defence.

  Class IV

    Vote 6. National Gallery
    Resolved,
    That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £30,100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March 1956, for the salaries and expenses of the National Gallery, including a grant in aid.

    Vote 1. Pay, &c., of the Army
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £100,380,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c., of the Army, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    3.57 p.m.
    The Chairman: Mr. Wigg.
    Mr. Ian Harvey: On a point of order. May I have your guidance on the procedure to be followed this afternoon, Sir Charles? Is it proposed to take each Vote separately and vote on it at the end, or to have a general discussion on the Votes and vote on all of them at the end?
    The Chairman: No. We had a general discussion on the Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," and now we are taking them Vote by Vote. When it comes to half-past nine, under the Standing Order, the Question will be put on the Vote under discussion, and all the others will come under the Guillotine.
    Mr. George Wigg: There are two or three points which I want to raise with the Under-Secretary on Vote 1. The first concerns Service pay and pensions, which are dealt with in the White Paper. I will not go into the details of the merits of the White Paper again, because I do not think that would serve any useful purpose, but there is still one point that needs to be cleared up.

    571
    Would the hon. Gentleman be good enough to tell the Committee whether the new rates of pay apply to officers on short service commissions? This is a major point of doubt in the minds of some of us, and it may well be that the Government have given thought to it. I think they would be serving their own interests if they cleared up that point, and, while on the subject, would the hon. Gentleman also be good enough to clear up any other points of doubt?
    Reading the White Paper for the first time, I was struck by a point which it would not be in order to pursue now—the question of the Territorial Army—and the Secretary of State was quite unable to clear it up. It may well be that, with the hon. Gentleman's greater interest and knowledge, there are some further doubts which he would like to take this opportunity of clearing up.
    4.0 p.m.
    As I said in the debate on the Army Estimates, hon. Members in all parts of the Committee, even my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), have a common interest in seeing that the policy of this White Paper should succeed because if it does not the problem faces the entire country. It is not merely a question of embarrassing the Government. We want to give the policy our good wishes and a good start, so if there are any points of doubt which it is advisable to resolve. I urge the Under Secretary to take this opportunity of doing so.
    Having blessed the White Paper, I now turn to the question of the proof of the pudding being in the eating. Over the last few years we have depended on the competent and admirable duplicated returns which are available in the Vote Office, and which give those of us who are interested in this matter a considerable amount of information about the Services. Although this is primarily an Army matter, it concerns all the three Services. These returns could be amended to show the annual enlistments which take place under the new engagements.
    By this I mean that whereas, in the past, these returns have been in terms of men coming from civil life with no previous service, those with previous service, enlisted boys, those on short service engagements and normal Regular
    572
    engagements, if we want to calculate how the new policy is progressing, the numbers under the heading "Total Regular Engagements," would need to be divided into new engagements of three, six, nine, twelve years, and so forth.
    There is one further piece of information, which has been the cause of dispute between myself and the Secretary of State for War, and which goes to the heart of the policy of the Government. We want to know the number of extensions and prolongations. On 22nd November last, I asked the right hon. Gentleman whether he would make available to the House regularly, presumably through the Vote Office, the number of men serving on the new three-year engagement who extended their service. In view of the new policy, however, we now need to know more than that. We want the quarterly return available in the Vote Office to be amended to show the extensions in the three Services. Of course, it is out of order to pursue the question as regards the Air Force and the Navy, so I will concentrate my remarks upon the Army.
    The Under-Secretary of State for War (Mr. Fitzroy Maclean): Prolongations?
    Mr. Wigg: In my day these were called extensions or re-engagements. I do not know the modern jargon. However, the hon. Gentlemen knows what I am after.
    This should be a regular feature and should be available in the Vote Office to enable anyone who wishes to form an accurate view of how the policy of the Government is progressing to be able to do so without referring to the Order Paper, which sometimes gives us more heat than we want but not as much light as is needed.
    My next point arises under Vote A. In November last year there was a meeting of the Army Advisory Council for West Africa, at Kaduna, and at its conclusion the Chairman, who was the Nigerian Minister of Transport, stated that, in view of the general constitutional advance in the West African territories, the four West African Governments, together with Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, had agreed that Headquarters, West African Command, should cease to exist on 1st July, 1956.
    From that date the Royal West Africa Frontier Force will be in three separate

    573
    commands for the Gold Coast, that is, for Nigeria, for Sierra Leone and for the Gambia respectively, each having its own commander and staff. Since that time we have had the Memorandum from the Secretary of State for War, paragraph 48 of which states that there will be an administrative change in the West Africa Command on 1st July, 1956. In other words, the right hon. Gentleman has repeated the conclusions reached at the meeting of the Army Advisory Council for West Africa.
    It would be out of order for me to go into the question of the present political atmosphere in the Gold Coast, but it is tied up with this question. I have not the slightest doubt that the changes envisaged by the recommendation of the Army Advisory Council were extremely limited. They were tied up to the administrative changes and to the changed financial contributions from the Colonies, they certainly did not involve the handing over of the operational control of these Forces from General Herbert, G.O.C. West Africa to Mr. Kwame Nkrumah. I do not know whether the political opponents of Mr. Kwame Nkrumah see him as Field Marshal Nkrumah taking the field against them at the head of the West African Forces but some of them talk as if they believe this is going to happen.
    I should have thought that there is a great advantage in this for the Government provided they can make up their minds about what they are going to do; if they could say that it is only an administrative change, that the statement made after the meeting of the West African Army Advisory Council was limited, and that it just happened to be that the War Office and the Colonial Office could not jointly make up their minds as to the changes involved. In other words, this is an administrative change, which is happening quite naturally as a result of the West African Colonies moving towards independence, and that it is being blown up into a matter of major political importance simply because the Government have not said specifically what the decision taken on 4th November really means. Therefore, in the interests of the wellbeing of the Army, and still more the peace and security of the Gold Coast, I hope that
    574
    the Government will say what is in their mind.
    I now turn to another aspect of the colonial forces. It is true that when the Government were in opposition they dreamed of vast colonial forces which would take the place of the Indian Army. That did not work out. It was one of the discoveries made by the present Secretary of State for War, when he reached the War Office, that what he said in opposition was absolute nonsense. The right hon. Gentleman found that there were no vast African forces to be raised, and that even if there had been, the cost would have been prohibitive. He found that even if we had the financial resources available they pre-empted on just that range of N.C.O.s and officers of which we stand in the greatest need. So the realisation was much less ambitious than the policies which the right hon. Gentleman used to put forward with such charm and innocence when he sat on this side.
    One thing the Government did was to hold a joint conference in Lagos in 1953 between West African Ministers and representatives from the Colonial Office and the Services, and they put forward proposals to deal with officer shortage. As these countries move towards self-government and are concerned about raising their own forces and their efficiency, they have a natural pride in the past achievements of those forces and are concerned about the raising and training of their officer corps. The Government recognised that there was a limit on the number of places available at Sandhurst. The Colonial Office Paper recognised that it is difficult at present to get even the 20 candidates necessary to fill the existing places, but expresses the hope that this may be only a temporary phase.
    If there was to be Africanisation of the officer corps of the Royal West African Frontier Force, something new would have to be done about the training of West African officers. The Colonial Office Paper realises that even if a West African Sandhurst were established, it would be difficult to find sufficient instructors from this country. I congratulate the Government on the most valuable and imaginative proposal that an attempt should be made to loan instructors from Commonwealth countries, thus fulfilling

    575
    the first-class idea of an African Sandhurst in which the instructors would be drawn not only from this country but from all parts of the Commonwealth, turning out the young men to serve in the commissioned ranks of the West African forces.
    Nothing has happened since that time. I am quite sure that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, General Herbert, who has a responsibility for the efficiency of these forces, not only in their security rôle but for any part they might play in a future emergency, must be concerned about this problem. I should very much like to know from the Government what, if anything, they intend to do about it.
    I was appalled to read the report of a statement by the General Officer Commanding, East African Command, in Nairobi on 26th February, when General Lathbury paid tribute to the important part played by African warrant officer platoon commanders, many of whom, he said, had commanded platoons throughout the emergency. He went on to say that, as a reward for the splendid part they had played, their status should be raised. It was to be raised, not by sending them to Sandhurst or arranging for them to get further training as part of the policy of increasing the numbers of Africans holding commissioned rank.
    What General Lathbury proposed—presumably, with the authority of the War Office—was the thoroughly reactionary step of going back to the state of affairs which existed in East Africa up to 1932, when there was a special rank called "effendi" for African platoon commanders. I am sure that the idea was kindly meant, but this is the kind of thing that adds fuel to the violent African nationalism. When the men who have done the job and who have commanded platoons in the field during the emergency in Kenya get something which both we and they know to be second best, brave, courageous and well-disciplined warrant officers become thoroughly dissatisfied with their treatment.
    I do not underestimate the difficulties, but I should very much like to hear what the Under-Secretary has to say about the proposal to introduce the rank of effendi in East Africa. Are we to take it that, in view of the contents of the Colonial Office Paper (Colonial No. 304), the Government have one policy for East
    576
    Africa and another for West Africa or that they bracket the two together? Is there one policy on paper and none in practice?
    Without attempting to follow the Secretary of State into his grandiose conception of vast colonial forces, I have always thought that under both Governments—this was true not only when the Labour Government were in power, but it is even more true today—a great deal more could be done for the well-being of the Colonies by a planned and gradual method of making the best use of the reservoir of manpower which is certainly available in all the British Colonies.
    4.15 p.m.
    Vice-Admiral John Hughes Hallett: I wish to raise only one or two detailed and, possibly, dull points. First, I should like to refer to Subhead J of Vote I, which deals with lodging and London allowances. One would normally expect a subhead of this nature to move in sympathy with Vote A, which, this year, has gone down slightly, whereas, in Subhead J, provision is made for an additional £100,000. I should like my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State to look into this at the War Office and to make sure that we do not expend more money under this subhead than is actually necessary. Similarly, there is a rather more substantial rise in Subhead K.
    I raise these questions on the Army Estimates because they are being taken first and, unfortunately, I cannot be present later for the other Estimates, but what I have to say applies equally to either of the two other Services.
    The reason for the local overseas allowance, which I have never been fortunate enough to draw during my service, is clearly stated in page 23, which informs us that it
    "is issued at various rates in aid of the extra expense incurred by officers and other ranks serving in certain countries abroad where the essential expenditure from pay, marriage allowance and lodging allowance is greater than comparable expenditure in the United Kingdom."
    In other words, it is a kind of colonial national assistance paid to officers and men to help them maintain a reasonable standard.
    That being so, I should have expected the rates of the allowance to be reduced after the very substantial rise in the basic

    577
    rates of pay which is provided for under Subhead A. In other words, in view of the rise in the rates under Subhead A, I should have expected to find an inverse movement under Subhead K. Similarly, one would also expect Subhead K to move to some extent in sympathy with Vote A.
    I do not ask my hon. Friend to give a reply this afternoon. I recognise that these are points of detail, but I would be glad if he could give an assurance that the matter will be looked into on the principle that we wish to run the Services as economically as possible.
    Mr. James Simmons: Like my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), I welcome the recommendations on pay and pensions. In their Memorandum, the Government state that they have two urgent aims: to increase the number of Regular recruits and to increase the number of those who elect to undertake longer engagements. We are told that the pay code announced in the White Paper and embodied now in Vote 1 of the Estimates is designed to achieve both those objects. On the whole, they are very good. We hope sincerely that they will achieve the Government's aim of strengthening the Regular content of the forces and raising the numbers in the forces to such an extent that eventually we can do without the National Service content.
    We hope that we will be given an adequate yardstick by which to judge the success or otherwise of these measures. Can we have an assurance from the Financial Secretary that next year we shall know exactly how many men have taken on longer service and how many extra recruits have been obtained for Regular service at the end of twelve months as a result of the introduction of the new pay code? That is the only way in which we can form an opinion. We do not want the figures lumped together. We want to know the exact result of the pay code on recruiting for the Regular Army and on the extension to long service by men now in the Army on short service.
    I also want to say a few words on National Service grants under Subhead H. I notice that there is an overriding limit of £3 a week on the National Service grants. Those grants, we are told, are issued under certain conditions to National Service men to relieve cases
    578
    of financial difficulty where ordinary Service emoluments are insufficient to enable them to meet the obligations of their families and other dependants, or because of exceptional personal commitments. We have to be careful that the National Service man does not lose in one direction what we grant him in the other.
    The National Service man is to receive increased pay and will also be eligible for marriage allowances for which he was not eligible previously. I should like an assurance that the National Service grants will still continue and that increased pay will not be used as an excuse to do away with them. I hope that the National Service man, with his slightly increased pay and marriage allowance, will not be told, "You have these extra emoluments and, therefore, you are not now eligible for a National Service grant."
    Let us look at the position of the married National Service man. On entry he will receive 31s. 6d. plus 35s. marriage allowance, a total of £3 6s. 6d. At the age of 21, he will receive, so far as I can discover, 52s. 6d. plus 35s. married allowance, a total of £4 7s. 6d. Most of the National Service men are young but people now marry at an early age. Marriage at the age of 18 is nothing today. We may have a National Service man who has applied to continue his apprenticeship and enter into National Service after his apprenticeship is finished. By that time he may be aged 24 or 25 and a married man with one or two children. He will get £4 7s. 6d.
    No one will tell me that a married man, even without children, can live on £4 7s. 6d. a week. He is in the Army and his wife is at home, so he will go to the N.A.A.F.I. occasionally or to the wet canteen, although I understand that today the N.A.A.F.I. is more popular than the wet canteen. He will want money to spend as he would do if he were at home, but he will have only £4 7s. 6d. for himself and his marriage allowance.
    If this man has entered into the ranks of the Tory property-owning democracy and purchased a house, he may have very heavy commitments by way of interest and sinking fund charges. If he has purchased a house, he will be furnishing it and he may also have heavy hire-purchase commitments. These are burdens which he will find far too heavy for him to

    579
    bear, even with his emoluments under the new pay code and with marriage allowance. I hope that the fact that the National Service man's emoluments have been increased and that he has become eligible for marriage allowance will not be made an excuse for doing away with the National Service grant.
    There is, in fact, a case for a considerable raising of the overriding limit of the National Service grant of £3 a week. A man with all those commitments, if he receives the full £3 on top of £4 7s. 6d., which is only £7 7s. 6d., will have a very hard time while doing his duty by his country. He may be serving an apprenticeship and have to go back to that work when he has finished his Army career.
    Under Subhead O, there is a small item in respect of Korea gratuities of £80,000. Of that sum, £10,000 is for officers and £70,000 is for other ranks. Are we to imagine that there is one officer to seven other ranks in Korea? How is the money divided up? Why are officers getting £10,000 and other ranks £70,000? Is that a fair proportion? I should like to have a reply from the Under-Secretary.
    Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: In the discussion on the Estimates today and the discussions which have taken place on other Estimates, I have been horrified to find that there is always a demand for more and more expenditure. In other debates hon. Members have said, in effect, "Why not build a couple of aircraft carriers or provide a new parachute regiment?" No one on either side of the Committee asks for the expenditure in any way to be cut down.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Oh, yes we do.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Very few hon. Members do. Therefore, when the whole of the Committee is generally towards more expenditure it is extremely difficult for the Government ever to economise.
    Mr. Simmons: And have a cut price Army?
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Not at all. I will come to that in a minute.
    With that in mind, I should like to follow up with one or two practical suggestions. The Government have recently made very generous pay increases which, for Regular long-service men, will mean,
    580
    in my submission, that they will be in receipt of good pay fully in line with, if not above, that which they would get in civilian life. For instance, a fitter tradesman aged 20, if living away from barracks and receiving allowances for food and lodging, will be getting about £692 a year, or £13 a week. He is quite generously paid.
    Similarly, a 25-year-old married captain, on the same basis will receive £1,185 a year, which is every bit as good if not a good deal better than he would get in trade or industry. A 36-year-old married lieutenant-colonel, on the same basis, receives £2,008 a year. There again, I suggest that he is generously paid and probably rather better paid than his equivalent in trade or industry.
    4.30 p.m.
    With these generous payments in mind, I wish to ask my hon. Friend whether certain services in Army life are justifiable. For instance, can we still justify the expenditure on servants in married quarters, or private houses for officers? Can we afford assisted house-renting schemes which, I think, still obtain in the Army? Again, there are certain home to duty travelling allowances which, I believe, are given on a certificate that an officer is trying to find a house near the point of duty but is unable to do so. I wish to ask whether that sort of thing is being abused now?
    Mr. Wigg: On a point of order, Sir Rhys. I am the last person to wish to circumscribe the discussion, but is the hon. Gentleman in order in dealing with the subject of travelling and service allowances under this Vote?
    The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): I do not think that the hon. Gentleman is in order, because that comes under another Vote.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: I shall be glad to be corrected if I am wrong, but I thought that certain of these things came under Subhead J, lodging allowance and London allowance.
    The Deputy-Chairman: Yes, but not travelling allowances.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: I thought that the assisted house-renting scheme would come under this Vote. However I have made the point which I wished to make. Having introduced generous pay

    581
    scales, ought not we to economise in the provision of things which are not provided in civilian life? A man in civilian life receiving £2,000 a year would not expect servants and married quarters or assisted house-renting schemes, and so on, and I would ask my hon. Friend to examine that sort of thing.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: In Vote 1 we are asked to vote £100,380,000, which, as was said by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke), is a very large sum, and an increase of £35,979,930. I am glad that the hon. Member put in a plea for economy. He made the apt remark that we are liable to forget all about economy during these debates on the Service Estimates. When we have voted this money, we shall go back to talking about our economic troubles, but for about three weeks we have forgotten them, and I am indebted to the hon. Gentleman for reminding the Committee.
    I wish to make some practical suggestions about how this large sum can be reduced. I am not boggling at the rise in the standard of life of the ordinary soldier. I agree with the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) that if we have to have soldiers, if we propose to conscript them or ask them to join voluntarily, we have to pay them a reasonable wage. I do not for one moment suggest that this large sum could be reduced by cutting the rate of pay. My practical suggestion is that the number and the pay of officers under Vote A could be considerably reduced if we reduced our commitments, and as I see—
    The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss items under Vote A. The discussion must be limited to Vote 1.
    Mr. Hughes: I am sorry, my alphabetic sense got mixed up with my numerals. I wish to point out that this sum of £30,700,000 could be substantially reduced if we reduced our commitments, say, in Cyprus—
    The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Member would not be in order in discussing that under this Vote.
    Mr. Hughes: I was merely trying to submit one of my suggestions for economy.
    The Deputy-Chairman: That suggestion does not arise on this Vote. The hon. Member can deal only with pay and the other items under this Vote.
    Mr. Hughes: Should I be out of order in suggesting that the sum of £30,700,000 could be reduced and the pay of officers could be reduced were a certain number of these regiments demobilised?
    The Deputy-Chairman: That would be out of order because it would be dealing with commitments.
    Mr. Hughes: Well, I will make my suggestions for economy later.
    Mr. Stephen Swingler: On a point of Order, Sir Rhys. May I submit to you that on this Vote we are entitled to discuss the new pay codes produced by the Government? I take it that the object of those pay codes, which involve considerable expenditure, is to attract additional recruits into the Armed Forces? Therefore, is not one entitled to advance arguments about the pros and cons of attracting additional recruits to the Forces by this means in relation to the commitments which the Army has to fulfil?
    The Deputy-Chairman: That is not in order on this Vote. One is in order only in discussing pay. We are not entitled to go outside the terms of the Vote.
    Mr. Wigg: With respect, Sir Rhys, surely my hon. Friend is in order in discussing the application of the new Service pay codes and the extent to which they are attractive enough to get recruits for the Army?
    The Deputy-Chairman: That is in order, but I was dealing with the further point raised by the hon. Member.
    Mr. Hughes: I should like to ask a question on Vote 1. On page 17 of the Estimates is an explanatory paragraph which states:
    "The appropriations in aid include provision for contributions from the Federal German Government towards the support of the British Army in Germany. Expenditure on all supplies and services for the British Army in Germany is borne on the appropriation Vote."
    May we have some explanation of this paragraph?
    The Deputy-Chairman: That does not arise on this Vote. Appropriations in aid cannot be discussed on this Vote because it is not the appropriate Vote.
    Mr. Hughes: Do I understand that we are prohibited from asking questions on the Explanatory Notes to Vote 1?
    The Deputy-Chairman: Yes, about appropriations in aid. If the hon. Gentleman will read the end of the paragraph, he will see that it says that the expenditure is borne on the appropriate Vote, and this is not the appropriate Vote.
    Mr. Swingler: Like my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), I am entirely in favour of a proper and decent rate of pay for the men in the Army. I have always taken that point of view, and I think it should be the prior consideration of the Committee when we are discussing these Estimates. At the same time, I am not in favour of a policy of bribing men into the Army. I am against a policy of offering rates of pay which prove, in relation to rates of pay for other jobs, that the Government may be considered to be bribing men into the Forces.
    The rates of pay we have to consider in relation to these Estimates and which will involve a substantially increased expenditure are outlined in the White Paper Cmd. 9692. They reveal that the Minister is compelled into this action by the failure of his recruiting policy. The first thing we should note in relation to these Estimates is that the Government have come to the conclusion that the previous pay policy has failed, that the previous recruiting policy has failed, and that the Minister has now adopted an entirely different policy regarding pay which is a complete departure from the policies adopted since the end of the war.
    In previous discussions of these Estimates, two general principles were accepted. One was that the pay codes should be as simple and as uniform as possible. That need has often been stressed. In their redrafting of the pay codes, and their attempt to relate it to industrial rates of pay, the Labour Administration endeavoured to move in the direction of simplification because of the justified past criticisms of the complexities of the pay system of the Army and its unintelligibility to large numbers of soldiers. The second principle was that of equal pay for equal work; that, broadly speaking, rates of pay should be the same for soldiers of the same type.
    The new pay codes, which involve this increased expenditure, depart from
    584
    both those principles. We are now moving in the direction of a greater multiplicity of codes which will be more difficult to understand. The Secretary of State for War is now introducing a series of complicated differentials. One of the results is unequal pay for equal work. Rates of pay are now to be related not to the kind of work undertaken by a soldier but to the period for which he has signed on. This will result in soldiers who are working side by side upon exactly the same jobs receiving different rates of pay because they happen to have signed on for different periods.
    As the White Paper on Service Pay and Pensions says, the War Office has at last discovered that:
    "To man the Services on a basis of short engagements is both inefficient and uneconomical …"
    The Secretary of State for War may regard himself as having got off very lightly in respect of the criticisms which have so far been made upon this question. When we consider all the previous debates upon the Estimates and Supplementary Estimates which have been connected with the introduction of the three-year engagement period, it is somewhat startling to find that the Army has now discovered that to man the Services on the basis of short engagements is inefficient and uneconomical, and that all the pay codes must now be reshaped in order to provide special incentives to persuade recruits to sign on for the longer period.
    4.45 p.m.
    We now discover that all the hullabaloo about the tremendous increase in the number of recruits which would result from the introduction of the three-year engagement period was unjustified, because it did nothing to provide the Army with sufficient additional manpower to enable conscription to be dispensed with. It must be remembered that that is the main field in which we must economise. Economy can come only from a reduction in manpower on this Vote, and all the expenses in connection with pay and accommodation which go with it, and that must mean a reduction in conscripted manpower.
    The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Member is now going beyond the Vote. He was in order when he was dealing with the pay codes, but he has since become out of order.
    Mr. Swingler: I thank you, Sir Rhys, for directing me back to the specific subject of the pay codes, which is so closely related to the subject of recruiting policy—because it was the need for additional recruitment which caused the Government to introduce the new codes. I entirely support the offer of better rates of pay to men in the Army, and I agree that an increase in the rates was necessary anyway, but I am extremely critical and very concerned about the departure from previous policies which is involved in the new pay codes.
    In the first place, they must mean that the War Office will have to take special steps to make these more complex pay codes thoroughly intelligible to the men in the Forces. It will not be easy to explain the differentials which are involved. It is unfortunate that we must have a great multiplicity of pay codes. They can be justified only if, as a result of their introduction, more recruits are persuaded to sign up for longer periods of service.
    We should be kept continuously informed about developments in this direction. From time to time hon. Members on this side of the Committee are compelled to utter their great dissatisfaction with the War Office's policy in regard to the three-year engagement system. I can only regard it as a policy of concealment, arising from the guilt complex which developed in the War Office over this matter. We shall be continuously scrutinising the recruitment figures and the extensions of engagements which result from the introduction of these new pay codes. Reasonable success in this direction will be the only justification for passing this increased Estimate this afternoon.
    We warn the Under-Secretary of State that we shall watch this policy very carefully and critically. He must not expect us to swallow it easily. Since the principles upon which we have been acting hitherto are being abandoned, the War Office will have to prove that these new pay codes will produce extra recruits, and that the production of those recruits will enable it to pursue a more economical manpower policy in the future. Only if it can do so will it escape the most violent criticism in future Estimates debates.
    Lieut.-Colonel Marcus Lipton: I associate myself wholeheartedly with the remarks which have been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) about the colonial forces. The extent to which our colonial forces can be increased will reduce the liability of the War Office for sending British troops to colonial stations, on which a considerable amount of the expenditure envisaged in this Vote is incurred.
    I advised the Under-Secretary of State that in the course of the Committee on the Army Estimates I proposed to raise the position of British troops serving in Hong Kong and Singapore. I hope that he is in the position to announce the result of the discussions that we were promised would take place between the War Office and the Colonial Office on the subject of these troops who, when they get into trouble with the civilian authorities—
    The Deputy-Chairman: That matter does not arise on this Vote.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: Oh, yes, it does, Sir Rhys, because the pay of these soldiers is affected if they are sent to prison. The pay and allowances of a soldier can be amended as a result, and that must affect the Estimate which we are now asked to approve.
    The Deputy-Chairman: It is fairly remote from the Estimate.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: It may be remote, but it is connected with the Estimate.
    The Deputy-Chairman: I daresay one could argue that many things are connected with the Estimate if one went round the world. They would be connected in one way or another.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: If all the troops serving in Hong Kong and Singapore were sent to prison and flogged, as they are liable to be, it would affect this Estimate.
    The Deputy-Chairman: It has nothing to do with this Vote.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: We are asked to provide for National Service grants. In the circumstances to which I have alluded a greater demand would be made for National Service grants to provide for the dependants of the soldier who found

    587
    himself in such a predicament. You will see from the paragraph in the Vote that grants are made where the ordinary Service emoluments are insufficient to enable Service men to meet their obligations to their families and dependants. I am respectfully suggesting that soldiers may, in certain circumstances, find themselves obliged to ask for National Service grants.
    I will not go into the circumstances which could give rise to an application of that kind, but such circumstances could arise in Hong Kong and Singapore, for example, which would make it necessary—
    The Deputy-Chairman: Circumstances are not part of the Vote.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: The circumstances would compel the unfortunate soldier to apply for a National Service grant.
    The Deputy-Chairman: I have given my Ruling. The hon. and gallant Gentleman must now honour the Ruling.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I will proceed to the next point, if I may. Naturally, in connection with the pay of the Army we expect a certain standard of cleanliness and efficiency. I do not know whether you will allow me to allude to it, Sir Rhys.
    The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. and gallant Gentleman seems to have collected together a number of points which are not relevant to the Vote.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: You have ruled on this Vote, Sir Rhys, that what we get from the soldier in addition for his pay is not relevant, so we are precluded from referring to the counter-attack which has already developed against the Government's undertaking to abolish what its war minister has described as "bull" in the Army. If that is out of order, it cannot be discussed. We are asked to provide a very substantial sum of money for services which do not appear to some of us to be very satisfactory.
    I hope that in the course of his reply the Under-Secretary may be able, within the circumscribed limit that you, Sir Rhys, have laid down, to remove some of the anxieties which speeches made by hon. Gentlemen on both sides of the Committee have outlined.
    Mr. E. G. Willis: The new pay arrangements in the Army are much more realistic, but we should not consider them in the exaggerated form in which they have appeared in the Press. A private soldier with less than six years' service gets £5 19s. He is not the millionaire that the Press represents him to be in view of the fact that he has to give up his liberty and sign away his freedom for six years to earn it. He is at the beck and call of the Army for 24 hours, so we should not consider that money as too great a payment. That comment applies to other rates of pay in the new pay code.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: The £5 19s. that the hon. Gentleman has mentioned does not, of course, include keep.
    Mr. Willis: I am aware of that, but one calculates by the money one gets. It may be wrong to do that, but if the hon. Gentleman served for any length of time in one of the Services he will know that he did not pay any attention to his keep.
    The Deputy-Chairman: The point about keep is not in order on the Vote.
    Mr. Willis: I am sorry if I was led astray by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke).
    I want to raise a point about the National Service man who, under the new Service pay and pensions code, has been treated most shabbily. Prior to the introduction of the changes he joined at four shillings per day or 28s. per week. He is now given the magnificent sum of 6d. per day extra. That does not help to make a boy of 18, 19 or 20, who has probably been earning £7 to £9 in industry, very happy in the Army, to say the least. The proposals should have been much more generous. An increase of 3s. 6d. per week is rather absurd.
    To say that he will get another 3s. 6d. added to his pay when he reaches the age of 21 does not make the pay any more generous. I still cannot understand why no marriage allowance is paid before 21. Young men do get married before they are 21; who are we to say that they should not? Many marriages under 21 turn out to be quite happy and good marriages and nobody can complain about them. We fail to recognise that a man is married and we penalise him for it.

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    There might be an argument for giving no marriage allowance until 21 to a volunteer, because he volunteered on those conditions. National Service men are not volunteering, but are taken into the Army. They are probably married and enjoying a good income in civilian employment. They get married because they are earning enough to settle down and make a home. They are taken in the forces and paid the magnificent sum of 4s. 6d. a day. They may reach 5s. or 5s. 6d. There is nothing for their wives. They can, of course, apply for an assessment and for a National Service grant, and then they can get up to £3. If they have to apply in that way it is putting them in a strange position. Following an application, visits are made to the home and inquiries are made as to income. I should not have thought it would have cost any of the forces very much to have paid these marriage grants to men over 21.
    5.0 p.m.
    Mr. Wigg: I do not think that my hon. Friend is right. I have been waiting for the Under-Secretary of State to correct him. I think my hon. Friend has misread the condition in Appendix II of the White Paper on Service Pay and Pensions, which reads:
    "Married National Service officers and men aged 21 and over will be eligible to receive regular rates of marriage allowance."
    Under the age of 21 they receive a lower rate of marriage allowance, but they still get an allowance.
    Mr. Willis: As a matter of fact, I have had some of these cases brought to my notice, and a lot of them do not get the allowance.
    Mr. Wigg: They get the allowance when they join, but they do not get the allowance for their children.
    Mr. F. Maclean: They get a reduced rate under 21, and the regular rate above that age.
    Mr. Willis: Yes, and that brings it up to about 35s.?
    Mr. Maclean indicated assent.
    Mr. Willis: I have gone into this and find that a man and wife actually get less from the Army than they would on National Assistance. This is not a very
    590
    generous way to treat the National Service man. I cannot see why the day before a man is 21 he is not entitled to the full marriage allowance but on the day after that he is so entitled. If a man joins the Service of his own free will I can understand that there might be some case—although I would not necessarily accept it—but the position of the man who is conscripted is entirely different, and I am profoundly disappointed that the new pay code did nothing to rectify his position.
    Mr. F. Maclean: Perhaps I might begin by giving what I hope will be a satisfactory answer to the first question asked me by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg). He asked whether the new rates of pay applied to officers on short service commissions. The answer is that they do. He and other hon. Members asked how we intend to present future recruiting figures and figures of prolongations. As he knows, that is something which affects all three Services and the Ministry of Defence—although I think that perhaps the other two Services do not get quite as much of the benefit of his advice and interrogation as do we—
    Mr. Wigg: Oh, yes, they do. The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong. I have done my best for all three Services; but of course the Army is my chief love, if I may so put it, and the Secretary of State for War has my particular attention because of his past misdemeanours.
    Mr. Maclean: I hope that the hon. Gentleman intends putting on his other two hats later today—and no doubt he will do his stuff.
    All three Services and the Ministry of Defence are at the moment trying to work out the best way of presenting those figures so as to give the maximum information, and particularly to show ourselves and everyone else who is interested what are the effects of the new terms of service and the new rates of pay. It is, therefore, not yet possible for me to make a definite statement. I must say that I think there is every advantage in the suggestion put forward by the hon. Gentleman that as far as the Army is concerned we should show the different engagements and break down the figures into engagements of three, six, and nine years, and so on.

    591
    As to prolongations, as the hon. Gentleman knows better than anyone else, we have since April of last year been giving him figures of these, but I understand that he would like them issued as a regular statement—
    Mr. Wigg: Quarterly.
    Mr. Maclean: Quarterly, yes. I think that that is a reasonable suggestion and I see no reason why we should not do it. In any case, I hope that he will no longer find it necessary to generate quite so much heat over these questions.
    I should like to take up a point made by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler), who is, I think, being very unjust in accusing my right hon. Friend of concealment with regard to the three engagements. Our reason for not giving the figures sooner was that sufficient time had not elapsed to judge results. As soon as sufficient time had elapsed we produced those figures as he knows. That was in April of last year.
    The hon. Member for Dudley asked several questions about West Africa, and I will deal first with the future of the West Africa Command. As the hon. Gentleman indicated, that Command will cease to exist on 1st July, 1956. The troops in West Africa will then divide into four separate Commands—the Gold Coast, where the Governor will assume responsibility, and Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia, each of which will have its own commander and staff, who will come under the War Office.
    Mr. Wigg: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman made a slip of the tongue, but the communiqué issued by the Army Advisory Council for West Africa mentioned not four but three separate Commands.
    Mr. Maclean: Yes, I had noticed that, too. I did not have time to check it but my impression was that it must be a mistake. My information is that there will be a separate Command for each.
    Mr. Wigg: One for the Gambia, too?
    Mr. Maclean: Yes, I think so, but I will let the hon. Member know. I noticed that fact and noticed also that in another place there were four Commands mentioned.
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    Each of those Commands will come directly under the War Office. Of course, there will continue to be problems common to all four—or, if the hon. Member is right, to all three. For that reason close contact will be kept between the Commands, and the way in which that can best be done is still being worked out between the respective Governments and Governors and between the War Office and the Colonial Office. Another measure to ensure that the overall picture is kept in view is the retention of the Army Advisory Council for West Africa. That will, of course, remain in being.
    The question of the proposed West African Military Academy was discussed by the Advisory Council last November, when it was agreed that further consideration of proposal for the Academy should be postponed for the time being. That was largely on grounds of what it would cost to set up a separate establishment. Instead of that, for the time being—and I emphasise "for the time being"—the intention is that every encouragement should be given to the sending of suitable cadets to Sandhurst for training. I was asked about the vacancies there. At the moment there are ten West African cadets at Sandhurst, and up to now we have always been able to find vacancies for all applicants. If there is a great increase in the number of applications, the other projects will obviously become more urgent, but at the moment the problem is looked after very well by the present arrangements. One must go gradually in these matters; it is no good trying to rush them.
    The hon. Member spoke of the rank of effendi which is being introduced. An effendi will be a warrant officer. It is felt that by the introduction of this rank a gradual transition can be brought about smoothly and efficiently. I can assure the hon. Member that there is no intention of putting West African officers on a lower level. These people will be warrant officers.
    I was glad to find that such an old soldier, if I may so describe him, as the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) approved, on the whole, of the new pay code. He asked for more information to show results and, as I told his hon. Friend, that will be forthcoming. I hope that when they have studied this

    593
    information we shall have even better-informed speeches from both of them than we have had in the past.
    The hon. Member asked whether it was our intention to abolish National Service grants. It is certainly not our intention to do that, otherwise we should have made no provision for them in the Estimates. The reason the sum provided is slightly lower is that there has been a falling off in the number of applications for them, presumably because the need has been less, but I am surprised to find how many hon. Members do not know about these grants. I am continually having to write to hon. Members to remind them of the existence of National Service grants. I am not referring to the hon. Member for Brierley Hill, who knows all about them, and about a lot of other things, too.
    Mr. Simmons: Would the Parliamentary Secretary tell us what information is given to recruits about National Service grants, because often when I hear of hardship cases and tell men about these grants, that is the first they have heard about them? There ought to be a much more effective publicity service to men when they join and to their parents. Sometimes the men do not make an allotment to their parents. They should be told that they are entitled to National Service grants.
    Mr. Maclean: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman raised that point because, in addition to what I consider to be the very adequate arrangements which exist for informing soldiers about them, some months ago we drew up what I believe will be a useful pamphlet addressed not to the soldiers but to their parents, putting all these matters in clear and simple language. We have taken a great deal of trouble with it and I believe it will be very useful. I hope hon. Members will direct the attention of their constituents to it. We cannot do more than publish these documents, but hon. Members can sometimes help to get people to read them.
    5.15 p.m.
    Mr. Wigg: During the summer I went to the depôt of the Worcester Regiment about which my hon. Friend the Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons), who represents the constituency next door, is
    594
    worried. I found that the arrangements there were admirable. If the young men would only pay attention to the information which is available, I am sure there would be no trouble. What pleased me very much was that the commanding officer of the depôt went to endless trouble to make young men aware of the fact that to get a National Service grant they must make a voluntary allotment of 1s. 6d. a day and fill in a form.
    Every effort which can be made is made to help the young men coming from Dudley and Brierley Hill, but of course I am speaking only about the infantry and I am not sure what happens in the other services and the Artillery. The main depôt with which we are concerned is all right in this respect, but possibly other depots are not as good.
    Mr. Maclean: I am grateful to the hon. Member for what he said, and I am glad to hear of the situation at this depôt. The more that can be done to bring these arrangements to the attention of more people, the better.
    I was also asked a question about Korea gratuities. The explanation of the proportion between officers and other ranks is that the higher the rank the higher the gratuity. It does not mean that there is an unduly high proportion of officers in Korea.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) and the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) spoke anxiously about the upward trend in costs. I do not want to be out of order and I will not, therefore, speak about the Estimates as a whole, but perhaps I might draw the attention of those hon. Members to the beginning of my right hog. Friend's Estimates speech in which he pointed out that the Estimates are down by £100 million on a total of £500 million since 1953, which shows that the inflationary tendency has been checked, at any rate in the Army.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham asked a question about perquisites. He asked whether it was necessary to have all these allowances—some of which I will not mention because they ought not to be discussed on this Vote—in view of the pay increases. The answer is quite clearly that they were taken into account when the pay increases

    595
    were agreed. Anybody with any knowledge of Whitehall would realise that that is bound to be the case. We are concerned to see that soldiers are paid a reasonable rate of pay which compares favourably with that of other careers and professions.
    The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme made, I think, a less constructive speech than usual. He said he was disturbed by our departure from previous policies and then proceeded to demolish the previous policies. It is therefore difficult to see what he likes. He advocated simplicity, and I agree with him that the pay system in the Army has never been simple, but, desirable as simplicity may be, it is important not to sacrifice the results at which we are aiming in order to attain simplicity.
    The hon. Gentleman also suggested that we had concealed the results obtained from the introduction of the three-year engagement. As I have tried to show, that is definitely not the case. With all his enthusiasm, the hon. Member for Dudley succeeded in extracting from us only what he would have got in any case.
    Mr. Wigg: In the earlier stages, all we got was wrath and froth from the Secretary of State. Three years from the time he introduced his three-year engagement—about 1st November, 1954—we began to put down Questions to him. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Swingler) joined in those Questions. We got a set of figures which enabled us to establish beyond any shadow of a doubt that the Secretary of State's optimum, his hope—call it what you wish—of 33⅓ per cent. was just not on, and we said in our charity that it would be something less than 10 per cent. That angered the Secretary of State, and for a period of many months he did his best to conceal from the House and the country the fact that the policy was an abject failure and that he would never get even 10 per cent. That is the blunt truth. It is quite true that from April onwards, when the Secretary of State's policy of concealment could not be carried any further, he began to come clean, and we did get the actual figure of 4·5 per cent. from him. But very early on—
    The Deputy-Chairman: This seems to be a speech within a speech.
    Mr. Wigg: The hon. Gentleman did give way.
    The Deputy-Chairman: I know he gave way, but we are in Committee. The hon. Gentleman can speak as many times as he likes.
    Mr. Wigg: I thought I was quite in order as the hon. Gentleman gave way. The fact of the matter is that I want to bury the hatchet, but we are not going to have the hatchet buried in a great deal of untruth.
    The Deputy-Chairman: I am only concerned to prevent our having one speech within another.
    Mr. Maclean: I think I know what the hon. Gentleman was going to say anyhow, because I have heard him say it so often before. If this is the burying of the hatchet, I am sorry that my right hon. Friend should not be here for such an important occasion, and I am sure he will miss it as much as the hon. Gentleman. No doubt we may be able to unearth some other hatchets to take its place.
    I should like to say on the question of concealment that, as I have already said, and as my right hon. Friend has said over and over again, the reason why we did not give the information in question sooner was simply that it was not available. It was not possible to judge what the results of the three-year engagement were until it had been running for long enough to see. When the results were shown, two things emerged: first of all, that it had not come up to the optimum, which is quite a different thing from an expectation, because it was an optimum that my right hon. Friend had mentioned, and he was the first to admit that; and the other fact that emerged was that it was the three-year engagement—whatever the hon. Gentleman may say about it, and to whomsoever he may attribute its rather doubtful paternity, because I know that he likes getting in a left and a right on these occasions, if I may call it that—whoever takes the credit for it or the blame, that got us through the last three years as the five-year engagement would not have done.
    I am sorry that almost all the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton) were out of order, and that I am therefore deprived of the pleasure of giving him the information which I had prepared for him. Perhaps we might meet on a later

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    occasion, or perhaps he might put down a Question and we shall have the answer ready.
    The hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis) suggested that the new pay code was hard on the National Service man. I think that in general the rates at which we pay National Service men in this country compare favourably with those paid in almost any other country in the world. We should, of course, like to increase them, but the funds available are, as the hon. Gentleman will realise, naturally limited. We did ourselves feel that in this case, instead of concentrating on further increasing the pay of National Service men and further increasing the marriage allowances, we would concentrate on the Regular with the object of increasing our Regular recruiting, which, as everybody knows, is the chief aim of our policy.
    Mr. Willis: Surely it is quite wrong to compare the rates of pay of National Service men of this country with the rates of pay of National Service men of other countries. That might mean anything. We must compare them with the rates of pay in the Services here and the rates of pay outside the Services. The very fact that the hon. Gentleman admits that he gets so many letters from Members of this House concerning hardship indicates that these rates of pay and the very small marriage allowance of 1s. per day until a man is 21 is really too small for the National Service man. When we look, too, at the very size of this Vote in respect of National Service grants, the fact that it is almost £500,000 indicates that there is a great deal of hardship which could be avoided if the National Service man were treated rather more generously. To give him an increase of 6d. per day is really rather insulting in present circumstances. As I have said, to give him a very limited marriage allowance also puts the man in a very difficult position.
    I do not think the hon. Gentleman has answered the criticisms about National Service men too well. If the aim is to get a Regular Army and to abolish National Service, well and good; but then I should have thought there might also be a case for increasing the National Service man's pay, because the cost would become smaller in respect of National Service men and we could afford to be
    598
    rather more generous. In any case, I am bound to say that I still do not think the hon. Gentleman's answer is at all satisfactory regarding National Service men.
    Mr. Maclean: Perhaps I might draw attention to one fact, and that is that the hon. Gentleman spoke about the large sum we spend in National Service grants. First of all, that is what National Service grants are for, to relieve any hardship where there is hardship. Secondly, I would draw his attention to the fact that there has been reduction in the sum allotted for that purpose because there has been a reduction in the number of applications, which shows that it is becoming less necessary rather than more necessary. We are also, as he himself has said, doing something to help the National Service man. It is not only a question of policy, but is also fair that a man who makes the Army his career should get a higher differential, with which I know lots of hon. Members opposite agree.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £100,380,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, etc., of the Army, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 2. Reserve Forces, Territorial Army, Home Guard and Cadet Forces
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £16,370,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the Reserve Forces (to a number not exceeding 400,000, all ranks, including a number not exceeding 385,000 other ranks), Territorial Army (to a number not exceeding 306,000, all ranks). Home Guard (to a number not exceeding 1,900, all ranks), Cadet Forces and Malta Territorial Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: I would be much obliged if the Under-Secretary would explain an item on Vote 2. I think we should have some idea of the reason we are voting this sum of money. I find that in the paragraph on "Organisation," in the Explanatory Notes, there is a brief description of the rôle of the Army Emergency Reserve on the outbreak of war. The paragraph says that it is
    "(a) to provide units of the Mobile Defence Corps;"

    599
    I should like the hon. Gentleman to give us some idea of what the Mobile Defence Corps is to do.
    In paragraph (b), we are told—

    ROYAL ASSENT
    5.30 p.m.
    Whereupon, THE GENTLEMAN USHER OF THE BLACK ROD being come with a Message, THE CHAIRMAN left the Chair.
    MR. SPEAKER resumed the Chair.
    Message to attend the Lords Commissioners.
    The House went; and, having returned, MR. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

    1. Leeward Islands Act, 1956.

    2. Children and Young Persons Act, 1956.

    3. Therapeutic Substances Act, 1956.

    4. Police (Scotland) Act, 1956.

    5. Charles Beattie Indemnity Act, 1956.

    6. Agricultural Research Act, 1956.

    7. Dentists Act, 1956.

    8. Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act, 1956.

    9. Pakistan (Consequential Provision) Act, 1956.

    10. Monmouthshire County Council Act, 1956.

    11. Crosby Corporation Act, 1956.

    12. Blyth Generating Station (Ancillary Powers) Act, 1956.

    13. Dundee Corporation Act, 1956.

    SUPPLY
    Again considered in Committee.
    [Sir CHARLES MACANDREW ill the Chair]

    Vote 2. Reserve Forces, Territorial Army, Home Guard and Cadet Forces
    Question again proposed.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Before we were interrupted, I was asking a question about the Army Emergency Reserve, referred to in page 31 of the Estimates. I should like information about these three sentences:
    "The Mobile Defence Corps was formed on 1st April, 1955, and provides the second echelon of Civil Defence."
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    If the Mobile Defence Corps is the second echelon, could we have some information about the first echelon of Civil Defence and how exactly the Reserve will operate? We are told:
    "It will comprise 36 battalions. A Headquarters of the Mobile Defence Corps has been established to deal with their administration."
    5.45 p.m.
    I should like to know how far this Headquarters administration is facing the problem with Which, presumably, it is supposed to deal. What are the thirty-six battalions to do? Will they cooperate with the civil defence forces and are they to take part in the organisation of the twelve million evacuees? We have been told that twelve million people would be evacuated in an emergency and I was told this week that one million were to be evacuated in Scotland. I should like to know exactly how this Mobile Defence Corps will operate, whether its activities will be co-ordinated with Civil Defence and exactly what kind of activity is contemplated for the headquarters of the Corps.
    Mr. Ian Harvey: This year's figures in Vote 2, and particularly subhead E—"Training of the Territorial Army"—show a noticeable reduction. This is due to the reduced structure of the Territorial Army which has been announced by my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Defence. I should, however, like to put to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary a point concerning the training programme as now outlined and to suggest that there is danger that the sum which is allocated may not be well spent.
    I say that because under the new arrangement one year only is to be taken by the National Service men for training by the Territorial Army. There is a danger that we will get the worst of both worlds because the Territorial Army, which up to now has been responsible for training National Service men over a longer period and has had National Service men within its ranks, will now have them for such a short period that it is extremely unlikely that the National Service men will regard themselves as part of the Territorial units or that the money for which this provision is made in the Estimates will be well spent.
    Another aspect is that psychologically the National Service men, having been

    601
    trained by the Regular Army under excellent conditions, might as a result of this rather piecemeal method of training form a poorer opinion of the Army than would have been the case had they come out after their period of Regular Service training. I suggest that my hon. Friend should look at the training plan closely. A smaller amount of money spent on building up a purely voluntary Territorial Army on the old system would probably be a better method than spending this greater amount of money on a Territorial Army which will continue to have a National Service commitment but of a reduced nature.
    The Government could argue that this is similar to the commitment for the Z Reservists introduced some years ago by the previous Administration. The justification for the Z scheme—and, I assume, the justification for the present scheme—was that it associated men with definite Territorial Army units. I can appreciate that requirement, but whereas the previous Administration brought it in at a time when it was very necessary to have a quick mobilisation scheme I do not think that there is that necessity at present.
    If it is suggested that this arrangement will strengthen the Territorial Army, I submit that probably it will not but that, on the contrary, it will have the opposite effect. If, on the other hand, the reason for it is that men must be associated with Territorial units to provide an effective mobilisation scheme, I suggest that this is not the type of mobilisation scheme we need at present. If instead of this arrangement my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary would study closer association between Territorial units and their Regular counterparts and made certain that the men knew which Territorial units were involved, I suggest that he would achieve the exact results at which he is aiming in these proposals.
    I know that this is a matter of my opinion against my hon. Friend's, backed by experts at the War Office, but I should like him to consider the point and keep an open mind on this proposal, certainly for the coming year. If at the end of the year my fears prove justified, I hope that my hon. Friend will be prepared next year to propose that this scheme be changed and the Vote again reduced to have a purely voluntary Territorial Army
    602
    in the old style, with National Service men earmarked for Territorial units but not actually sent to them. The Territorial units, however, should have a very clear idea who the men are so that they can recruit them on a voluntary Territorial basis.
    On the question of the Army Emergency Reserve and the Home Guard, the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) and I are, for once, on the same point—probably with the same end in view but for different purposes. It seems to me that the money here expended is being expended on three different arms each with a similar end in view. The Territorial Army, the Army Emergency Reserve and the Home Guard are all concerned primarily with home defence commitments. The point made by the hon. Member for South Ayrshire indicates that there is a certain amount of confusion in people's minds. They feel that the whole of the home defence picture is now somewhat confused.
    I believe that the decision to appoint a commander-in-chief for the home front, responsible for these home commitments, is of the greatest possible importance. The Under-Secretary of State for War would do well to ask him to look at this important problem in the course of the year and make recommendations. If we are to have effective expenditure of money on home defence, one of the most important things to do is to change the national psychological climate on the home defence front. If we look at home defence as a sort of stirrup-pump operation not fully operational, the expenditure of this money will not be justified and we shall not have the type of home defence system we require in modern conditions.
    The hon. Member for South Ayrshire referred to civil defence, but I and the Under-Secretary of State for War would be out of order if we discussed that now. I believe, however, that this Estimate is closely related to the organisation of a civil defence force on an operational scale over the coming years. I hope that my hon. Friend will look at the Estimate with a view to greater co-ordination of the home defence forces.
    I suggest quite seriously to my hon. Friend that the expenditure now incurred on these three separate arms would be

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    better incurred if he considered the abolition of the Emergency Reserve and the Home Guard and the total concentration of the whole force under the Territorial Army. I would include, in particular, the new mobile defence battalions because these also are from a psychological point of view out on a limb. They are separate projects on which quite considerable sums have been spent. I suggest that my hon. Friend should look at the whole commitment with special reference to home defence operation, and consider presenting to the House in the Memorandum on the Army Estimates next year a very much more definite plan for the reserve forces within the home defence picture.
    Mr. F. Maclean: The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) asked what is the purpose of the Mobile Defence Corps. He must know that. It has been explained over and over again both in the House and in the Press. It will engage in rescue work in support of civil defence. He asked me to enlarge on what civil defence is going to do. That would be out of order. Therefore, I will now pass to the extremely interesting speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, East (Mr. Ian Harvey).
    My hon. Friend speaks with great authority—no one speaks with more—on the Territorial Army and on the reserve forces as a whole. I assure him that his extremely interesting suggestions will be very carefully studied. I was very glad to hear him say in an earlier debate that he thought there was a great future for the reserve Army. I wholeheartedly agree with him. What is more, it would be a great mistake to think, as has been sometimes suggested, that the fighting days of the Territorial Army are over. It is very difficult indeed to foretell with any accuracy what course any future war will take, and the next one is not likely to prove an exception to that rule.
    That is one of the reasons why, as my right hon. Friend said in presenting the Army Estimates, it would be folly for us to be left with untrained reserves in this country. That is our principal reason at present for retaining the one camp for National Service men. It is, of course, quite true that the emphasis is no longer
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    as heavy as it was on the need for large reserves of trained men, but we have to be ready for all kinds of eventualities and there is no doubt at all that, for the reasons which my right hon. Friend gave, even one camp is of use for the purpose of associating them with their units. That purpose would not be served to the same extent by simply earmarking them and having them posted on paper to a definite unit. It is most important that they should see each other and should know how they fit into the machine.
    6.0 p.m.
    My hon. Friend mentioned the possibility of doing away with the Army Emergency Reserve and merging the whole thing—the T.A., the A.E.R., the Mobile Defence Corps and the Home Guard—into a single Home Defence Force. The possibility of doing that is obviously one of the problems which the newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief, U.K. Land Forces, will be studying. All that I can say at the moment is that this is a transitional period. Quite obviously, there would be great advantage in having what my hon. Friend suggested, namely, an all-volunteer Territorial Army, and I know that there are a lot of Territorials, and for that matter a lot of Regular soldiers, who feel that it would be a good thing, but at present we need National Service men to make up the numbers in the Territorial Army units, especially those which are scheduled to go overseas in case of war. We feel that one year's training—one camp—is the minimum required to keep the National Service men up to date.
    We have had very big changes in the last year or eighteen months, and I think it is possible that in the future we shall have more big changes. Events are moving very fast and we are determined to keep up with them.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £16,370,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the Reserve Forces (to a number not exceeding 400,000, all ranks, including a number not exceeding 385,000 other ranks), Territorial Army (to a number not exceeding 306,000, all ranks), Home Guard (to a number not exceeding 1,900, all ranks), Cadet Forces and Malta Territorial Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 5. Movements
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £33,250,000 be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of movements, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: I cannot understand why, in Vote 5, the inland and coastwise conveyance of personnel, travelling allowances and expenses, in subhead A, has gone up by £850,000. As Vote A is down by some 38,000, or about 4 per cent., and as the Army is smaller by about 4 per cent., one would have expected that these travelling allowances would also have gone down by about £800,000. In fact, one would have looked for an economy in this direction of about £1,600,000 altogether.
    I want to ask my hon. Friend how the increase has come about, and whether it represents an additional use of concession tickets and concessionary fares. I motor about a certain amount at the weekends and I often pick up young men in the Army and give them lifts. It is astonishing how far they go at the weekend, perhaps 150 or 200 miles, by way of lifts on the outward journey. They then use their concession tickets to go back on the railway, and many of them do this about three out of every four weekends. Therefore, one would expect that the expense to the Army of these concession tickets has gone up very considerably.
    I should also like to ask whether the necessity for the home-to-duty travelling allowance is still justified. This was brought in during the war to enable officers and men to visit their wives when the latter had been bombed out of their homes in the bombed cities, but I understand that it is still in use in the Service. For instance, an officer who, say, has a house in the country and who makes a statement that he is making every reasonable effort to find a house nearer to his military base but cannot do so, therefore still receives this home-to-duty concession.
    That is something which, in civilian life, would be looked upon very adversely indeed, and it has been resisted very generally in industry. I should like to ask my hon. Friend whether it has been abused or in any way turned into a "fiddle." I should also like to know why we have not made the economy of £1,600,000.
    Mr. Wigg: I hope that when the Under-Secretary replies he will tell us whether the statements which have just been made by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) are accurate or not. I have always thought that concessionary fares were limited to authorised leave, and I am very surprised indeed to learn that literally thousands of troops are swarming round the country, apparently with unauthorised vouchers in their pockets. That must be so, unless the people whom the hon. Gentleman has picked up have been a little odd. The hon. Gentleman gives me the impression that almost every soldier whom he picked up had a return voucher in his pocket, and why a soldier should travel in the hon. Gentleman's car on the outward journey and go back on a concessionary voucher is utterly and completely beyond me.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: I am not suggesting that it is a free ticket, but a ticket at a reduced fare. That is what I am talking about.
    Mr. Wigg: Why do they do it?
    Mr. F. Maclean: Perhaps I can answer my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke). First, he asks why it is that, although the number of troops has gone down, travelling costs have gone up. The answer to that is fairly simple. The main reason is because railway fares and bus fares have gone up, and therefore it costs more for them to travel. There is another reason, and it is that, with the increase in the strategic reserve, there are more troops in the United Kingdom, and therefore more troops travelling.
    As regards the concessions, the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), as so often is the case, is quite right—I do not say always, but very often. A soldier may travel on a concessionary voucher only when in possession of a leave pass. Another point is that the cost of the concession is borne by British Railways and is not a charge upon public funds. We are extremely grateful to British Railways for granting this concession, so that the question really does not arise on this Vote.
    In regard to the home-to-duty travelling allowance, I think my hon. Friend answered his question himself. These allowances are given when soldiers, for

    607
    reasons outside their control, live at a distance from their work, and it is only fair that they should have these allowances. As I have said before, all these things were taken into account in fixing the new pay increases, and there is really no question, in spite of the very satisfactory nature of the increases, of soldiers of any rank getting more than they deserve, and certainly no case of a "fiddle."
    Mr. W. R. Williams: I should like to say a word or two about what has been said by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) because it seems to me that members of the Forces are in great danger when they accept lifts from the hon. Gentleman. I am wondering whether it is not the responsibility of the War Office and of the other Services to have a small notice published, so that they can put it in the hon. Gentleman's car, reading to this effect: "Beware. Do not accept any rides from this gentleman because he is only finding out something about you in regard to your concessionary fares which might in the long run be very detrimental to you."
    I think it is only fair that something of that sort should be done, as a result of the points raised by the hon. Member, especially when it seems quite clear that he has got his information under the pretence of appearing to be a benefactor to those poor chaps who are trying to get home to their wives and families. I think it is incumbent upon me to ask the War Office to prepare a document of some sort for the guidance of these boys.
    Mr. Ede: I have the same feeling as my hon. Friend, but I do not know by what right the War Office could put a notice on the car of the hon. Gentleman. It would be more effective if the troops were warned that it is still dangerous to have careless talk with inquisitive people, particularly if they look like being a Member of Parliament supporting this Government.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £33,250,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of movements, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 6. Supplies, etc.
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £55,030,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of supplies, etc., which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. Wigg: Great attention is paid to pay and accommodation of the Forces, but we do not often spend time on the question of rationing, which is an important subject. In February last it was brought to our notice that the Secretary of State for War was not as up to date on this subject as he might be, because an advertisement appeared in The Times asking for a nutrition adviser. It was clear from the terms of the advertisement that the Secretary of State was not aware that the authoritative body on this subject was the Nutrition Society. I hope, however, that as a result of the interchanges which took place on that and on a subsequent occasion, both he and his advisers at the War Office are now aware that there are competent people in the country who are carrying out research into balanced diet, and I hope that they are taking advantage of these researches.
    I understand that considerable work has been done on emergency rations which troops might be called upon to use during operations. This policy was developed during the war, but since that time not a great deal had been done until a year or so ago. As a result of the work of the Under-Secretary of State himself, I understand there has been a great improvement in the quality and variety of the combat rations which troops could use when called upon to undertake operations in conditions in which supply is difficult. Obviously this is of the greatest importance, because in certain circumstances the success of operations might be in doubt if supplies of rations had not been carefully planned.
    The Committee would be glad to learn from the hon. Gentleman of the developments which have taken place, because not only are these of value in the kind of operations which our troops are called upon to undertake at present—as for instance, in Malaya and Kenya, and perhaps even in Cyprus—but also if, unfortunately, larger operations ever developed they would have tremendous value.

    609
    I hope the Army is keeping in touch with the civil authorities to see that the Army Catering Corps is kept at the highest level. There was a time in the Army when it was thought that all the psychiatrists who had become a bit "touched" with their own psychiatry had gone into the Army Catering Corps. That view, when it becomes widespread, is not good for morale. It would be good for the Army, therefore, if we could hear from the hon. Gentleman that, now we are ten years away from the war, the Army Catering Corps is composed of cooks and not exclusively of unemployed psychiatrists.
    6.15 p.m.
    Mr. Simmons: Certain hon. Gentlemen who have just left us, who were so concerned about economy, will no doubt have been pleased to see that food and ration allowances are down by £4,220,000 on this Estimate. We ought to have an explanation from the Under-Secretary of State in that respect. I agree with my hon. Friend that the arrangements for the feeding of the men in the Forces are just as important as pay. Of course in the old days, when people went into the Forces because of unemployment and poverty, that was not so important, because what they got in the Army was better than what they were able to get when they were standing on the street corner or in the dole queue.
    I remember that in my old Army days there used to be a saying, "What is a fine sight?" The answer was, "Two hot dinners on one plate." That was a commentary on the kind of people who used to go into the Army in those days. Now, however, there is a higher standard of living in the country, and that must be maintained for the men in the Forces. Also it has to be proved to those entering the Forces that they will be given food comparable to what they could enjoy outside.
    I notice under Subhead A that provision is also made for animal feeding stuffs, including forage for horses and mules and food for dogs. Could we know what proportion of the money provided goes to the horses, mules and dogs and what goes to the human animal? Again, I hope that there is no sinister significance about this line on page 121:
    "Provision for the purchase of animals is made under Subhead D"
    610
    This comes under rations. I hope that we are not feeding our troops on horse flesh? Can we be told why that should be included at all? Then, under Subhead B, "Solid fuel, Electricity and Gas," there are these words in the last paragraph:
    "In order to control the consumption of food in commands at home and abroad, a fuel target based …"
    I thought a target was something that had to be achieved. Would not the words "fuel quota" be more explicit, or does Tory doctrinaire policy preclude us from having the word "quota" mentioned in these Estimates?
    On the question of barrack services, do barrack damages come under that heading? Also, what are the maintenance costs of the old barracks compared with the new barracks which are being erected today? I should imagine that much of the £750,000 is spent on maintenance of buildings, many of which it might be better to destroy and to replace by something more modern and habitable.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: If my recollection serves me correctly, there are about 700 horses on the establishment and it is presumably in respect of those horses that some of this forage is required. By some wise administration on the part of the War Office, about 12 million horseshoe nails are available for these 700 horses. That seems to disclose some discrepancy about which the Under-Secretary might like to furnish some explanation. I understand that some of these 12 million nails are to be sold in the near future. It strikes me as odd that with the diminution of the horse population of the Army, there has grown up this vast accumulation of 12 million horseshoe nails.
    Mr. F. Maclean: I will deal first with the remarks of the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton (Lieut.-Colonel Lipton). I am afraid that he is out of order, because horseshoe nails are not rations. [HON. MEMBERS: "Iron rations."] The same applies to the remarks about the maintenance of barracks and buildings made by the hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons). That comes under Vote 8, and I should therefore be out of order to discuss it.
    Mr. Simmons: It is mentioned in the last paragraph on page 123.
    Mr. Maclean: That makes clear what things are involved and it has nothing to do with the maintenance of buildings. It has to do with barrack services. The hon. Member also asked what proportion of the Vote was spent on feeding animals. That is made clear on page 122. As the hon. and gallant Member for Brixton pointed out, we have only about 700 or 800 horses and mules and we are not really in danger of them eating us or the Army out of house and home.
    The question why there has been a reduction in the Vote is simply answered by the reduction in the strength of the active Army and the Territorial Army. It is also accounted for by the reductions of certain civilian services in Germany and repayment services.
    The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) raised the topic of the combat ration. He may remember that when he came to see me about a year ago he found my room at the War Office filled with existing 24-hour rations unpacked and scattered all over the place. We looked at the pack together and we came to the conclusion that it had several disadvantages. They were that it was too heavy for the purposes for which it is intended, as a 24-hour ration for use on operations, mainly the sort of operations when the soldier will have to carry his food on his back—and that it was too complicated and too elaborate. There were four different menus, including items such as eggs and bacon, liver and bacon, steak and kidney pudding and tinned ginger pudding.
    It will be obvious to hon. Members that although that sort of ration is excellent if one is sitting still and has plenty of time to prepare and eat it, it is not ideally suited to combat conditions. The benefit of the extra variety is more than out-balanced by the need for the individual to carry extra weight. Speaking as an amateur, but as one who thinks a great deal about his food and who has also eaten a certain number of these rations when they were first started in the war, I would much sooner have something lighter and simpler, and I believe that most soldiers would feel the same way.
    During the past year we have been aiming at producing that. Subject to the results of the troop trials which are to take place in the summer, we have
    612
    succeeded quite well. We have had the advantage of the best professional and expert opinion in the matter and it has not been left to retired psychologists. We have had the advice of dietitians, or nutritians, or both—I can never member which it is; I know that the hon. Member for Dudley knows one of the most distinguished in the country, so that no doubt he finds it easier to remember the difference.
    I have with me a 24-hour ration of the new type. We have done away with tins completely. The ration can be carried in its pack and weighs only 27 oz. as against 4 lb., which makes a big difference. It is well packed and consists of a lump of dehydrated meat, which can be eaten cooked or uncooked, an oatmeal block, some chocolate, some cheese, soup powder and powdered tea, sugar and milk. I have not tried it, although I intend to try it, and I am assured that it is capable of all sorts of permutations and combinations which make it palatable and sustaining.
    Perhaps I can say a word about catering in the Army generally and about the general ration scale. We watch that very closely indeed. Most of the complaints that have been made about food and which have come to me have been found to be due to bad preparation and wastage of rations and not to the quality of the rations themselves. We have been, and still are, going into that carefully, and we have done everything we can to see that food is well cooked and that materials are well used and attractively presented. We are actively examining the possibility of a general improvement in ration scales.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £55,030,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of supplies, etc., which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 8. Works, Buildings and Lands
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £37,630,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and lands, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Lieut.-Colonel Lipton: I view this Vote with some suspicion, because according

    613
    to a note on page 135 it provides for expenditure on the construction and maintenance of War Department buildings, including the purchase of engineers' stores and materials. I suspect that these include paint of which about a quarter of a million gallons were recently sold as surplus. How much provision has been made under the heading of engineers' stores and materials for paint during the forthcoming financial year?
    The Under-Secretary informed the House that notwithstanding the tremendous sales of paint which I described on a previous occasion as a colossal Niagara on which very serious losses have been incurred, about 1,100,000 gallons have been taken into stock since 1st January, 1955. Most of it was ordered during 1953 or early 1954. If that is so, it seems that the War Department is more than adequately provided with paint. I should not like to think that in a few months time the War Department will find much of this paint surplus, and that we shall have further substantial sales of surplus paint.
    6.30 p.m.
    It used to be said in the old days that every soldier had a field marshal's baton in his knapsack. It looks now as if every soldier has a five gallon drum of paint in his knapsack, provided for him by the War Department. If the Under-Secretary can remove some of my serious apprehensions on this matter I shall be very grateful to him, and I think that the general public will be grateful to him. The Federation of Paint Contractors, a very reputable organisation, takes a poor view of the whole situation.
    Mr. F. Maclean: The hon. and gallant Gentleman asked me to remove one of his serious apprehensions. I can remove one of his serious misapprehensions immediately by pointing out that paint does not come under this Vote.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: I should like to draw attention to Subhead A: "Works-Construction and Maintenance Services, £35,290,000." That is a very large sum, and I should like to ask if it includes £29 million which I was told by the Secretary of State was to be spent on barracks and installations in Cyprus.
    Mr. Maclean: A great deal of this money is spent on maintaining existing barracks, including some in Cyprus. The
    614
    fact is, as my right hon. Friend has said over and over again, that a great many of our barracks are in very bad condition indeed. This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, as we are the first to admit. One of its worst features is that it involves, and has involved for the last fifty years, spending very large sums on the maintenance of buildings which are not really worth it.
    The only answer is to get on with our current twenty years' building programme, and to build new barracks as fast as we can. That we are doing, given the limitations which are imposed on us by competition from other sources and by lack of funds. In the meanwhile, we must have somewhere for the troops to live, and we have to make those premises as habitable as possible. That explains this expenditure under the Vote.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £37,360,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and lands, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1457.

    Vote 10. Non-effective Services
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £21,860,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. Simmons: I want to raise one or two questions on Vote 10. I notice that on page 165 of the Estimates we are told that,
    "In certain cases the provisions of the Pay Warrant, 1940, continue in operation."
    I presume that covers the pensions and allowances to which the Vote refers. The cost of living has gone up considerably since 1940, and I should like to know why, in certain circumstances, and in what circumstances, we are still having these cases computed on the Pay Warrant of 1940.
    Does the question of retired pay and half-pay, referred to on page 167 of the Estimates, mean that only field marshals get half-pay? That is how it reads to me. Field marshals get half-pay and they never retire. They are either on active service or on half-active service. How many of these half-pay field marshals are there to share the £10,000

    615
    provided for under that head in the Estimates?
    Under Subhead A there is a reference to wound pensions. Are these a survival? I notice that they apply only to officers; nothing is said about other ranks. I remember that in the 1914–18 war I had three wound stripes which I wore on my sleeve like vertical sergeant's stripes instead of across the sleeve, but there was no "lolly" attached to them. Should not these compensation payments for wounds come under the Ministry of Pensions and National Service, or are these additional to the disability pensions to which these officers would be otherwise entitled?
    I want to say a word about the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, under Subhead E. Why do we need 187 staff for 460 patients. This is about one to every two-and-a-half patients. That seems a little extravagant. Why are there only 460 patients when we are told that the establishment of the hospital is 558? I could find for Chelsea Hospital quite a number of eligible disabled men who would be very happy to go there if they had the opportunity. I should like to ask whether there is any liaison between Chelsea Hospital and the Ministry of Pensions and National Service, because the Ministry must know of thousands of deserving single men who are in need of care and attention.
    When I was at the Ministry of Pensions some time ago I went to Ireland, where there is one hospital which is kept open entirely for old pensioners in need of care and attention—not just medical attention. There must be many 1914–18 and even Boer War veterans who could be accommodated in Chelsea Hospital. I ask the Minister to tell us why it is below establishment, with only 460 patients when there is room for 558; and whether he will taken steps to direct the Ministry of Pensions, War Pensions Division, to see if something can be done to fill the vacancies.
    I should like to know why, when men go into Chelsea Hospital, their pension is taken away. That may be one of the deterrents to getting men into Chelsea. I should also like to know why the office staff at Chelsea get accommodation, pay or retired pay and pension. They receive accommodation, their pay and still get their pension, but the patients who go there lose their pension. I cannot under
    616
    stand why that is so, and I should be obliged if the Minister would let me know why this applies to Chelsea, and whether it would not be a good idea for Chelsea Pensioners to be merged into the general pensions scheme of the country, when we might be able to ge rid of some of the archaic regulations which govern the place at the present time.
    Mr. F. Maclean: The hon. Member for Brierley Hill (Mr. Simmons) raised a number of points of detail. He referred to the 1940 Pay Warrant, and asked for an explanation of the sentence to which he referred, which appears on page 165. The answer is that pensions, or whatever it may be, are drawn under the Pay Warrant in force when one retires. The hon. Member asked about pensions before 1921, and that again is something which has been replaced, except for the individual pensioners concerned, by the general scheme under the Ministry of Pensions. I seem to remember the hon. Member asking his question about field marshals on a previous occasion.
    Mr. Simmons: Not on the same point. My question before related to salaries.
    Mr. Maclean: Field marshals are on what is called half-pay. At one time I think there were large numbers of officers on half-pay, possibly that was before the 1914 war. This is simply a survival of that. As the hon. Member himself said, field marshals never retire, and this is a way of rewarding them for the great services which they have rendered to the country in order to reach that exalted rank.
    To answer the hon. Member's questions about the pensioners at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, the pension is taken away because the board and lodging and other amenities provided are considered to take its place. The office staff are paid their pensions because they are working for their living, and they have certain perquisites. In every case they are old soldiers with extremely good records, and I think it right that in those circumstances they should be allowed to keep their pensions.
    The hon. Member raised one or two other matters but he did not give me notice of his intention to do so. However, I will look into them and give him a detailed reply.
    Mr. Simmons: I intended no discourtesy to the hon. Gentleman. I thought it competent to raise matters of detail on the Estimates. Had I thought there was any difficulty about replying to the points I raised, I should have let the hon. Gentleman know that I proposed to raise them.
    Mr. Maclean: I meant that if the hon. Gentleman had informed me of the points that he proposed to raise he would have received a much better answer.
    Mr. Wigg: Surely the Under-Secretary is not correct when he says that the patients at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, have their pensions taken away in order to pay for their board and lodging? That may be the effect of it, but the point is that the pension is taken away irrespective of what it amounts to, and if a man cares to leave the hospital at any time, his pension is restored. Obviously, therefore, it means that a man may give up quite a large pens-ion—or perhaps when it comes to my turn to go to the hospital I shall give up only a few shillings; and therefore that has nothing to do with the cost of board and lodging.
    Mr. Maclean: The hon. Gentleman misunderstood me. I did not say the pension was taken away in order to pay for the board and lodging, but that the man got his board and lodging instead of the pension.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £21.860,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of non-effective services, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 11. Additional Married Quarters
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 1. Pay, etc., of the Air Force
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum not exceeding £100,160,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, etc., of the Air Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. Geoffrey de Freitas: One of the good things about discussing the Estimates of the three Services together
    618
    at this stage is that while one is waiting for the Air Force Estimates one learns so much of the problems of the Army. I never realised that horses and mules and bags of nails figured to such a great degree in the problems of the Army. I am only sorry that it is not relevant when discussing the Air Force Estimates to refer to the camels which are on the Air Force establishment, particularly as I read in the paper that someone said that obviously a camel is an animal designed and developed by a committee.
    Those of us who have taken part in these debates on Service Estimates over the last ten years will agree that our procedure in dealing with Votes in this way leaves much to be desired, because we are not getting enough information and consequently it is difficult to debate these matters. We must improve the procedure or we shall have less interest taken in the debates and the Services will suffer as a result. In fact, in the long run the whole administration of the country will suffer. We are spending £500 million on the Air Force and a considerable proportion of that money comes under Vote 1 which we are now considering. We need the fullest information to justify that, but we do not get it.
    6.45 p.m.
    It is our duty to make complaints and criticisms, and I will make one criticism which I intimated at an earlier stage in our discussions. I wish to ask the Secretary of State to look carefully into the procedure in the Air Force for inquiring into crashes to see whether some improvement could be made in the procedure and more publicity given. Surely an inquiry should be closed to the public only if matters concerning—
    The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): It is not clear to me what is the connection between crashes and what is contained in Vote 1.
    Mr. de Freitas: But this is Vote 1, and surely we are at liberty to discuss these things? The main bulk of the expenditure is under this Vote.
    The Deputy-Chairman: In debating Vote 1, we are limited to what is in the Vote.
    Mr. de Freitas: But surely it is relevant to discuss the pay of the officers concerned with these inquiries and the pay of the men? Surely that is relevant?
    The Deputy-Chairman: The question here is the amount of sums voted. I do not see that the policy regarding inquiries into crashes has anything to do with it.
    Mr. de Freitas: But that goes to the root of the whole matter. Surely I am entitled to argue that I object to these men being paid when they conduct inquiries from which the public are excluded? Surely that is the whole basis of the discussion on this Vote? Otherwise, why are we discussing it?
    The Deputy-Chairman: I thought that in his opening remarks the hon. Member was dealing with the question of crashes.
    Mr. de Freitas: Yes.
    The Deputy-Chairman: That does not arise under this Vote. What arises here is the amount of money for the different items enumerated in the Vote.
    Mr. de Freitas: But surely the whole point is that we are asked here to Vote a certain amount of money for the pay of officers, and I wish to know whether it is justified that these officers should receive that money under these various headings, if they are conducting inquiries in this way in accordance with the orders that they receive?
    The Deputy-Chairman: The inquiries are very remote from the items specified in the Vote, and once hon. Members were permitted to inquire into crashes, they could introduce a number of subjects which do not come under this Vote.
    Mr. de Freitas: I am not pressing my objection, but I am absolutely amazed a: this. Am I not able to bring up under the terms of this Vote the fact that people are killed in crashes and their relatives do not get the service that the public would expect?
    The Deputy-Chairman: That seems to me a very important question, but it does not come under this Vote at all.
    Sir Robert Boothby: Change the subject.
    Mr. de Freitas: I am not going to change the subject. Surely the fundamental point is that one has always been able to go considerably wider on this Vote than any other Vote?
    The Deputy-Chairman: So far as I am aware, that is not the case. Vote 1 deals
    620
    with what it says, that is, with pay for the various items set out in the Vote. I would remind the hon. Member that a general discussion such as he suggests now always takes place on the Motion, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair." In Committee we deal with specific details.
    Mr. de Freitas: I thank you for reminding me of that, Sir Rhys. I will deal with one or two points which I am confident are in order upon Vote 1, in connection with pay and allowances for the Commonwealth Reserve in Malaya. I raised this matter in the Estimates debate and indicated that I would do so again.
    In the case of an international force, such as N.A.T.O., a system which permits differing rates of pay and allowances works fairly well, but in the case of a Commonwealth Reserve, composed of men coming from different Commonwealth countries, wearing the same uniforms, having the same type of organisation and virtually the same regulations, differing rates of pay and allowances lead to a great deal of friction and difficulty. We ought to have some regard to this matter when we try to operate an integrated command. I should welcome any assurance from the Secretary of State that this point is being seriously considered. There is no point in discussing what happens in the case of N.A.T.O., because our men there are serving under different regulations altogether, and they recognise that fact.
    My second point concerns education allowances. It is all very well for the Air Ministry to say, "There is plenty of turbulence and postings, and men have to be moved, and therefore they should receive a special education allowance for their children," but the Estimates for this year show an increase of only £200,000 in respect of that allowance. There is a £7 million increase in the pay Estimates, but the increase in respect of the education of their children is so small that I am wondering if it will make anything like the difference which the Air Ministry must hope it will.
    There is no more important point for us to consider than the fact that when officers and men are moved about they must take care of the education of their children. This moving about, or turbulence, is bound to continue. Shortly after the war many calculations were

    621
    made upon the assumption that the turbulence would decrease, and it has—but not to the extent expected. This increase in the amount voted is very small when it is compared with the provision made in respect of civilian employees of the Air Ministry. I believe it is true that civilian employees, in certain circumstances, receive greater education allowances for their children than are received by Service men.
    The amount of money voted in respect of National Service men is also of very great importance. I am not arguing—as one of my hon. Friends did—that National Service men should receive the same rate of pay as Regulars; the whole idea is to induce men to become Regulars. But I want to know more about the planning of pay for National Service men, and how it will be related to the obvious future elimination of National Service and the reversion of Technical Command to its true purpose as a training command instead of an adult educational organisation as it is today.
    I notice that the Estimates contain a reference to special allowances given to officers, airmen and airwomen serving long-term appointments in the United States of America. We realise that we have a good deal to learn from the Americans in certain matters connected with procurement of aircraft. What do these people go to the United States of America to study? Do they go there to study the American system of procurement, or do they merely do the ordinary diplomatic and air attachè jobs over there? In any case, are these rates sufficient, in view of the enormous expense to which they are bound to be put in the United States of America? I hope that the Secretary of State or the Under-Secretary of State will be able to answer some of the points that I have raised.
    Mr. John Rankin: I want to deal with the question of the pay of airmen and airwomen, and also the various allowances which they are now receiving. Last year the amount voted in respect of airmen and airwomen was £49,150,000. For this year it has been increased by £12,550,000. The amount voted in respect of marriage allowance is now £12,515,000, and in respect of educational allowances,
    622
    £200,000. Then there are lodging allowances, miscellaneous allowances and National Insurance contributions, the amount voted for the last of which is now £3,480,000.
    We are entitled to an assurance from the Minister that the sums voted for the coming year will be sufficient to meet all the normal needs of the airmen and airwomen in the Service. We want to be assured that the personnel serving in the Royal Air Force are now being provided with what I would call a living wage. I ask this question because there is some doubt about the matter, due to the fact that the sum of £49 million voted last year was not sufficient, in certain cases. Yesterday afternoon, in reply to a Question of mine, the Minister said:
    "Thirty-six airmen at Hornchurch have at one time or another accepted casual employment at a local bakery in their spare time. I do not know of similar cases at any other station."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 14th March, 1956; Vol. 550, c. 370.]
    I put the point because I understand that this is a full-time job. I think we can assume that the reason why these airmen had to take this part-time job was that they were not being paid sufficient money to enable them to carry on normal life that we claim these citizens ought to be able to enjoy. Therefore, they had to take this type of employment in their spare time. The Minister told me it was casual employment but my information is that it was not. It was night baking, and the amount of money was in some cases as much as £12 per week. One could hardly say that that represented casual work.
    7.0 p.m.
    I hope that the Minister will tell us that this improvement of pay will be sufficient to make that kind of work unnecessary. A rapid calculation which I have made suggests that the improvement represents £1 per week, on the average, for airmen and airwomen. That does not include various allowances which will increase the average income. I want an assurance that airmen and airwomen will not be compelled, in order to improve their financial position because of our penurious attitude towards them, to spend their nights in this way, after they have spent their days looking after the defence of the country.

    623
    I do not know why the Minister sees anything funny in what I have said. It is wrong that even one airman should be in that position. I hope he will tell us with complete assurance that the system of which I complain is no longer necessary. He said that he did not know of any similar cases at any other station; I wonder whether he made inquiry or, since nobody got up in the House to call his attention to the matter, he has just assumed that there were no other cases.
    We are not seeking to interfere with the rights of an airman to do what he likes in his spare time, but I submit that during the night he should be sleeping so as to make himself fit for his duties next day. He should not spend his spare time doing night baking. The Minister appears to have a wrong attitude towards this matter.
    There is another aspect of night baking to which I want to call attention. It is—
    The Deputy-Chairman: Night baking does not come under this Vote.
    Mr. Rankin: I was not going too far into the point.
    The Deputy-Chairman: The hon. Gentleman cannot go into it at all.
    Mr. Rankin: Then I must let it rest there, in deference to your Ruling, Sir Rhys.
    I hope that the Minister will say that it is wrong for a man to increase his emoluments in that way, and will give us an assurance that the pay increases which we are granting tonight will be sufficient for the airman to live the decent kind of life which he would have been living had he still been a civilian.
    The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Nigel Birch): The hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) made strictures on the attendance in this debate. I hope the quality of those present will make up for the small numbers. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman could not make his point about inquiries. I was anxious to answer it, but as he could not make it I cannot answer it.
    The next point was that in Malaya we have an integrated headquarters in which are not only British officers from this country, but Australian and New Zealand officers, and whether their pay
    624
    ought not all to be the same. The hon. Gentleman sought to draw a distinction between headquarters with officers only from Commonwealth countries, and headquarters such as of N.A.T.O. with officers from many other countries. There is not really a distinction. If we are to pay our officers more, simply because they are serving with foreign or Commonwealth officers, we do something unfair to officers who are not serving in those conditions. The officer has to go wherever he is sent and to do the job which he is given. Leaving local overseas allowances out of account, the officer may have extra money if he is living in an expensive place, but I cannot see any justification for giving an officer more pay when he is serving at these headquarters than when he is serving in any other job.
    The hon. Member raised the question of the education grant. This has always been a worry to the Services in connection with the educating of children. The hon. Gentleman was wrong in thinking that civilian employees in the Royal Air Force got more than officers. They do not serve overseas. I think they get more at the Foreign Office and at the Commonwealth Relations Office. There has been a very recent improvement, which is a great deal better than nothing. If an officer is serving abroad he gets tax free the allowance which in England is subject to tax.
    Mr. de Freitas: I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, and I thank him for giving way. Is it not a fact that the Air Ministry Works Department civilian gets the same as the other Departments, and therefore more than the serving officer?
    Mr. Birch: I thought the hon. Gentleman was referring to civil servants within the Ministry and not to the Works Department. I am not quite certain about it and I will look that point up.
    The hon. Gentleman also raised the question of the small increase in pay for the National Service man and asked how it fitted in with our planning for the future of the Regular Forces. It fits into the plan very well. One object in not putting up the pay very greatly for National Service men while greatly increasing the pay for long-service men was to get the maximum recruiting effect, with the prospect of doing away with National Service and decreasing the requirement of National Service men.

    625
    The hon. Gentleman asked how officers serving in the United States were placed as regards pay in dollars, and so forth. I do not think it is too bad now. It is better than it was. I was talking only two or three days ago to an officer who had returned, and I asked him about this very point and how he managed with the number of dollars he was allowed. He did not seem to have any very great complaint. The United States is an expensive place to live in and the officer did not get an unlimited quantity of dollars. I do not think any serious complaint comes from that quarter.
    Mr. Ede: Is he a man who has to live on his pay?
    Mr. Birch: Yes, certainly—and he could not bring his own money over because he would not get the dollars anyway.
    The hon. Member for Govan (Mr. Rankin) raised the vexed question of night baking. I do not think that men take these casual jobs necessarily because they are frightfully hard up. However much they have most people can always do with a bit more. If I may say so, that is the principle on which all millionaires have been made.
    Queen's Regulations quite clearly lay down a number of conditions on which a man can take an odd job if he so desires. He cannot take it at less than trade union rates, for example, nor break a strike, but provided that his efficiency does not suffer and that he has the permission of his commanding officer—which was not the case at Hornchurch—he can do an odd job if he wishes. We are very anxious not to interfere with people if they want to do that. Provided that the efficiency of the Service is maintained and that the man wants to do the job we say "Good luck" to him.
    Mr. Rankin: The point is that the whole case put by the Daily Mirror was based on the fact that the men did this work because they found it necessary to do it. Would not the Minister agree that if a man has to work all night it will be very difficult for him to be an efficient airman during the day?
    Mr. Birch: The hon. Member will recollect that the vast majority of airmen in fact do not do any casual jobs at all and do manage to live quite well. I there
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    fore think that he will be mistaken if he always bases his opinions on what he reads in the Daily Mirror. The Daily Mirror is not holy writ, and I think that the hon. Member should treat it with reserve.
    Mr. Rankin: Surely, when a national newspaper raises a point of this nature it is the business of any hon. Member to explore the case to try to get at the truth.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £100,160,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, etc., of the Air Force, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 2. Reserve and Auxiliary Services
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £3,089,900, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the reserve and auxiliary services (to a number not exceeding 235,000, all ranks, for the Royal Air Force Reserve, and 11,000, all ranks, for the Royal Auxiliary Air Force), which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 7. Aircraft and Stores
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £183,500,000, be granted to Her Majesty' to defray the expense of aircraft and stores, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    7.15 p.m.
    Mr. de Freitas: Since the earlier stage of these debates the Fairey Delta aircraft has staggered the world with its record, and I think that we should all like to congratulate those concerned—Mr. Twiss, and Fairey's and Rolls-Royce. But when we come to think of the achievement in terms of aircraft for the Royal Air Force we must get it into perspective.
    Several years ago aircraft which we have discussed in the House many times—the Hunter and the Swift—both held the world's record for speed, I think. The Hunter is our fighter today, but in spite of that very great achievement of breaking and holding the world's record, the fact remains that today our fighters are greatly inferior to the American fighters. What this tremendous achievement of the Fairey Delta does is to reaffirm the excellence of our inventors, designers and test pilots, and shows that the Delta

    627
    wing seems to be on the right lines, but it does nothing to prove that the operational aircraft which we shall get within a measurable distance of time will be world beaters, and does nothing to prove that our aircraft industry is capable of developing and producing modern fighters.
    I still make the earnest plea that we should concentrate our design and development and concentrate our projects. We have about seven fighters in production today; the United States, with infinitely greater resources, has four, and I think it is right that we should think for a moment of the problems raised by our not concentrating. In the last stage of these debates we had reference to the firm that is making the Victor, but how can we really expect a small firm like Handley Page, with about 6,000 men, to develop and produce a bomber like the Victor, when everybody at the top of the industry believes that the unit of production for an airframe firm is much more likely to be 20,000 to 25,000 men?
    I shall not repeat what I said about other aircraft and stores—aircraft and guided missiles—except once again to ask for an assurance that the money which we are voting here shall not be used to duplicate any of the work that the Americans are doing. So far as fighters are concerned, we may have to swallow our pride and try to get American aircraft. The Australians are doing that. They have the American Sabre with a Rolls-Royce engine.
    When we are negotiating for American aircraft, I suggest that we should also investigate the question raised by the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) as to why the design and development of the F100, F102 and F104 was so much quicker than that of our own aircraft. We should then see if we can apply the lessons learnt to the field in which we are doing well and going ahead—the V-bombers, the super V-bombers, and, I hope, the intermediate ballistic missile.
    The way in which the United States Air Force works with the firms shows, I think, our lack of technically-trained officers in the Royal Air Force, because it is extremely difficult to have teams working at the firms in the same way
    628
    as the Americans do, right at the beginning. There, they have trained engineers as officers, and they go into the firm and into the team at the beginning. Our weakness is that we have not enough of such men in the Royal Air Force. If we cannot recruit them we must train them. We certainly cannot go on as we are doing now. While voting this money for aircraft we must not think that because we had this wonderful record-beating performance only a few days ago, such aircraft or anything like it are within measurable distance of operational service in the Air Force.
    Mr. P. B. Lucas: I have only one point to raise in relation to this particular Vote. In the debate last week my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, in reply to a Question by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wembley, North (Wing-Commander Bullus), referred to jet-training aircraft for the Service. In particular, he referred to the Miles 100 and the Jet Provost, and to the experiments being conducted
    "… on whether pilots should be taught from the beginning to fly jets, as opposed to the present system of flying piston-engined aircraft first and then going on to jets."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 5th March, 1956; Vol. 549, c. 1892.]
    I remember very well, in 1950 and 1951, when we on this side of the House were in opposition, raising with the then Secretary of State for Air, the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) the need for an intermediate jet trainer. I raised that matter on several occasions. We did not get an intermediate jet trainer but we got a compromise. We got a compromise in the form of the dual Vampire—the Vampire T 11. I never thought that was really the right answer, but it was very much better than nothing, because it narrowed the gap between the piston-engined trainer and the operational aircraft in the squadrons.
    The problem now centres not so much on the question of an intermediate training aircraft as on the best type of aeroplane on which a pilot should learn to fly. Should it be more—or less—advanced than the Jet Provost, with which many hon. Members will be familiar; or should it be a propeller-driven rather than a jet-engined aircraft? These and

    629
    other questions are obviously controversial—questions which the Air Staff must now be considering very carefully.
    As a small contribution to the controversy, may I say this? I am fully aware that there have been satisfactory reports from pilots about the handling qualities and characteristics of the Jet Provost, although I must say for myself that I find it difficult not to have some reservations about an aeroplane which was designed originally for a piston engine and which subsequently was modified to take a jet. But the question is really whether an aircraft of this character and specification represents a sufficiently advanced start for the modern Service pilot to make.
    Would it perhaps not be better to consider starting a pilot on a rather more difficult, a more severe, aeroplane, so that the gap between that and an advanced training aircraft of the Hunter class would be substantially narrowed? If that were done, the gap between the original aircraft on which the pilot learned to fly and the advanced operational training aircraft would indeed be narrowed. Would it not be better to consider that?
    I agree that that is a hard and almost brutal thought, and one which is apt to come rather more readily from a politician in the atmosphere of this Committee than from the more realistic mind of a pilot about to embark on his first solo flight. But these things generally are comparative, and I cannot help feeling that perhaps a more advanced start might in the end prove an advantage.
    All I would ask is that when the Air Staff makes up its mind about the particular aeroplane which it wants, proper account shall be taken of the claims of the Miles Aircraft Company to provide that aircraft. I have seen at Shoreham the prototype of the M100, which is an entirely private venture; £20,000 to £30,000 of private money has gone into that venture, with no help from public funds. I believe that that design has definite possibilities, although I appreciate that it may not meet the requirements of the Service, in its present form, as a basic trainer. Nevertheless, when it flies later this year—I hope it will fly this summer—I trust that the Air Ministry will take due note of the results.
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    As I have no financial interest whatever in that company I can, I hope, say without fear of being misunderstood, that as designers of aircraft, and particularly light aircraft—and here perhaps the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) will agree—the Miles brothers have a remarkable record. I for one believe that they may well yet have some further and important contribution to make in the field of aircraft design. For a long time I have felt that the M52, the fast manned fighter on which they were working at the end of the war, and which was stopped by the Ministry of Supply in 1946–47—I think wrongly, but I do not want to make a party point—was perhaps at that time the most advanced aircraft of its kind in the world. I believe that it had tremendous possibilities.
    The principle of the short, straight wing with the razor-sharp leading edge, which was embodied in that aeroplane and which now, interestingly, is being developed in certain of the latest American supersonic projects, was the product of the Miles mind. The conception was brilliant and it was, in my belief, ten years ahead of its time.
    I therefore believe that it would be a great pity, and indeed a loss to the British aircraft industry, if we were to cast lightly aside or to ignore the design genius and aerodynamic knowledge which are to be associated with the name of the Miles Company. And so I conclude by asking my right hon. Friend to keep in mind, when the decision to embark upon a new basic trainer for the Service is being taken, the claims of the M100 and any subsequent developments which may flow from it.
    Mr. John Rankin: I want to support what the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) has said about the Miles Brothers. I have no interest in the firm other than my personal knowledge and contacts with the two Miles brothers and the visit which I paid to the factory at Reading, where I saw the work which they were doing. Personally, I am sorry that they were not able to continue in production. That was a very serious loss, not only to military but also to commercial aviation, on which they were doing great work, and I do not think it would be wrong to say that basically the reason they did not continue in production was that they had a most unfriendly reception

    631
    from what we might call the "Big Five" in British aviation. Now that they have returned, I am sure to help us, I hope that they will have the support for which the hon. Member asked from the Mini-try of Supply and to which I should like to add my personal support.
    I notice from Vote 7 that we spent £186 million last year. I think it is pertinent, in view of the many criticisms which have been made, that we should ask the Minister to tell us tonight exactly what we got for that money. A great deal of doubt has been expressed on different occasions and now is the Minister's opportunity to tell us clearly what we who furnished the £186 million got for it. I am sorry to interrupt a private conversation—
    The Chairman: I, too, am sorry to interrupt. We are not dealing with the £186 million, but with the £165 million and what we are to get for that.
    Mr. Rankin: I realise that, Sir Charles, but I thought there was no harm in casting an eye backward before we cast the same eye forward. We have spent £186 million and it is pertinent to ask what we got for it, because now we are to spend £165 million.
    The Chairman: I said that that was not pertinent to our debate.
    Mr. Rankin: I am now looking forward. We are hoping to spend £165 million, and I think the Minister might tell us exactly what he expects to get for it and how much will be absorbed by the enormous profits which are being made by the firms concerned in this industry. Are the big dividends to be maintained during the year and are the bonus distributions to continue? Not only are we hoping to produce aircraft for this £165 million, but we are also subsidising the extraordinary profit which is being made out of the manufacture of aircraft today.
    Each of these firms which undertake this work goes ahead, as far as I know, with its own research and design. This is a national effort and it is important that we should know what co-operation exists between these aircraft manufacturers for the swopping of knowledge which each may derive in his own research. It seems to me a waste of money in the production and research
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    associated with the manufacture of aircraft if every firm has to go ahead and learn its own lessons. There is no reason why the experience and knowledge gained by one firm ought not to be available in the defence of the country, because that is what we are trying to do. I hope that the Minister will be able to tell us that there is that co-operation at research and design level which in the future will help to save a great deal of the money now being spent.
    7.30 p.m.
    Viscount Hinchingbrooke: It is very satisfactory that there has been a large decrease in this Vote over last year, but when we look to see the reason for it it gives cause for some disquiet. The decrease in the gross total of the Vote is due mainly, as the note explains, to a revised estimate of deliveries of aircraft, armament, ammunition, explosives and radar equipment. That means that the programme has been projected on the industrial resources of the country at too great a pace and we could not keep up with it. The Vote is lower, but I should like to ask whether this Estimate for this year is a realistic figure which is expected to be spent this year, or whether we shall see a future diminution of supplies during the course of this year. I wish to ask this question from two angles, first because I think it is bad accounting and bad estimating to produce a figure, as was the case last year, of £292 million and end up with £228 million, and secondly, and more importantly, because I hope there will be some very drastic economies in this Vote for the Air Force in the coming year.
    It is all very nice to see this magnificent aircraft, the Fairey Aviation Company machine, with its 1,130 miles an hour. We throw our caps in the air and congratulate ourselves that we have defeated the United States, and the news makes headlines; but I suppose it is about the most inflationary thing this country could possibly do at present to spend that money on that aircraft. One wonders, with the pace at which inflation is going in the country and the hard-pressed needs of the community, whether we can really afford these extravagancies. We would afford them if they were really for the defence of this country, but when we look up in the air and see these giant fighters

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    slicing the sky at enormous speeds we wonder whether they are at all applicable to modern conditions of warfare.
    They are too fast for the cold war; nobody suggests that this Fairey Aviation machine will help us in the Middle East, and they are quite out of date when it comes to long-range ballistic projectiles with hydrogen-bomb warheads. We know that about eight such warheads would knock out this country entirely; there is no defence aginst them, and in a year or two that will be the realism of the matter.
    We know that we are going to have our own fleet of fast bombers capable of carrying a hydrogen warhead to Russia or to any other great Continent of the world which is hostile to us, and those bombers will be located at different bases round the world so that we can make sure we can utilise them, and therefore the deterrent is fully there. But of what use to mankind, and at what frightful cost to the people of this country, are these experiments going forward year by year in fighter aircraft, radar and all the defence equipment, including civil defence at the present time?
    Some drastic rethinking on this whole subject must be undertaken by the Government in the course of the next twelve months, because it is not fair to the people of this country, to the taxpayers, and to the many many people who are suffering hardly at the present time, to have the Ministry of Supply grossly overstaffed with these people who are working on projects of Wellsian conception, when we can see the facts staring us in the face—that in a hydrogen bomb war they are of no earthly use, and in the sort of colonial war we want to fight and must fight in the future they are of no use at all.
    I beg my right hon. Friend, who is primarily an able economist and a very considerable financier as well, to look closely into these Estimates this year, and it we on this side of the Committee can help him to economise on these wasteful projects, we will certainly come to his aid.
    Mr. F. Beswick: The noble Lord, the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), has raised two points which I think deserve some reply. The first is about this short-fall on the expenditure. In the Explanatory
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    Memorandum it is stated that, in addition to other aid given to us by the United States, we have received 100 Hunters. They have been made available to us free, and a tribute was paid to the generosity of the United States in this respect. I wonder if one reason why we have been unable to carry out our own programme is because superimposed upon the programme outlined in these Estimates has been this offshore programme financed by the United States. If it be the case that our industry is over stretched on the basis of the expenditure we are discussing, then it would seem to me that the additional aircraft mentioned, the 100 Hunter aircraft which now come into the programme, must have placed an additional strain upon the resources of the industry. I am surprised this matter has not been discussed at greater length in the previous debate.
    The noble Lord also mentioned the continued expenditure on faster and faster types. I think he is right to ask to what use they are to be put. How are they to fit into our defensive system? That is really what we want to know before we agree to vote these sums of money, yet not a word has been said, in either this or the previous discussion on the Air Estimates, and I doubt whether we shall get much information today explaining how these are to fit into our defence arrangements.
    My hon. Friend has called attention and paid a tribute to the feat of the industry and individuals connected with it in flying an aircraft over a measured distance at 1,100 miles an hour. I understand that included in these sums of money is a sum for research and preliminary work—certainly preliminary work for the contracts have been placed, I believe—for the machine which will be based upon this Fairey Aircraft, the DR11. How are we to fit this machine into the pattern of defence? How are we going to position this machine at that speed against an aircraft coming against these shores at the speed of sound? Are we going to get the radar equipment to put behind it? We know nothing at all about how radar is to assist the positioning of these aircraft, nor whether it is physically possible to manoeuvre at these speeds. I agree with the noble Lord that if we are to discuss these matters intelligently we ought to be given some information about how the articles

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    of equipment for which we are paying are to be used and whether they will be worth the sums of money the nation is called to spend upon them.
    In the discussion we had on these Estimates before, I mentioned the fact that no detailed information has been given about the aircraft and, moreover, that such information as has been given has been proven in the event to be inaccurate. That has given rise to what I would call a cynical unbelief on the part of hon. Members about the information given to us with reference to aircraft. That is one reason why there are so few hon. Members present tonight. We have nothing to discuss as we are not told about these matters. I asked one or two questions in the last debate, but not a single answer did I get to questions about operational techniques of the aircraft concerned. We read in the Explanatory Memorandum this sort of information:
    "The English Electric P.1 flew at Farnborough and shows great promise."
    That really is treating us as children. It is a sort of schoolboy's descriptive piece. That cannot justify the expenditure of this money. We ought to know more about it than that. That sort of phrase has been applied to other aircraft. The Swift, for example, was described as the finest fighter in the world, but eventually it was scrapped. This P.1 flew at Farnborough, but no maiden has been so coy as the P.1 has been. I hope that it will prove a successful aircraft, but we are given very little information about it. Could we have a little more information about the Javelin? We are told that:
    "we can look forward to a progressive buildup."
    I am sure the noble Lord will agree with me on this. As guardians of the taxpayers' money are we entitled to Vote sums for a machine on the basis that "we can look forward to a progressive build-up," when there are all kinds of doubts and there have been all manner of delays? We should be told in detail what is happening to it.
    This unbelief about which I have been speaking is fostered in my mind by the story of the Comet II, an aircraft which I think I am right in saying comes under these Estimates. In the Explanatory Memorandum we are told:
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    "The Comet II's will also be a valuable addition to Transport Command."
    I wonder if the Under-Secretary can give unqualified support to that statement. Is the Comet II going to be a valuable addition to Transport Command in the light of what the Auditor-General has said in his Report for the year ending March, 1955?
    I have asked one or two questions about the Comet II. I asked them because they were proper questions to ask in the public interest. We have not had a full and frank reply about this machine and about what it is to be used for. In last year's discussions of the Air Estimates on 10th March, 1955, I put a question to the then Under-Secretary about this machine. It followed a question put by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Derby, North (Group Captain Wilcock) about the Comets and he was told:
    "We are to get strengthened Comets II in Transport Command."
    I had the impression that at least some of those machines had been already built, or that the fuselages had been already built. One of the modification requirements stated after the inquiry was that the aircraft should have a heavier gauge metal in the fuselage. I could not honestly see how we could modify those fuselages without virtually rebuilding them. That was one reason why I put the questions to the Under-Secretary of State at the time.
    7.45 p.m.
    I asked the hon. Gentleman:
    "… are the fuselages for delivery to the R.A.F. already built?"
    I must say that I thought the hon. Gentleman a little cross with me as he said that there was nothing funny about this at all. I had not suggested that there was anything funny, but that there was something I could not understand. I asked what precisely was to be the use for these machines and the hon. Gentleman said:
    "I do not propose to lay down any particular task for the Comet."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 10th March, 1955; Vol. 538, c. 637–8.]
    I put the same question to the present Under-Secretary the other day and he said that in addition to the modifications required by the Inquiry the military version was to be further strengthened by having a strengthened floor. We now

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    find according to the Report of the Auditor General, in paragraph 42, that:
    "Three unmodified aircraft for other duties in the R.A.F.…
    were to be purchased. I understand that is to be paid for out of the sums we are now discussing. The Report also stated that these unmodified aircraft were to have
    "a minimum flying life of 2,000 flying hours at a limited pressurisation."
    I ask the question again and I think I am entitled to an answer. With limited pressurisation, what is to be the purpose for this aircraft. If they are to have a limit of 2,000 hours, are we really justified in paying for them the amount which was to be paid for them had they been fully operational as passenger carrying aircraft? That is what we understand, not from information given to us in these Estimates, but from what the Auditor-General has reported. We are told that we are to pay the same price for these machines with a flying life of only 2,000 hours—which, I suppose, in military utilisation probably represents about two years—as British Overseas Airways Corporation was to pay for unrestricted use on the civil air routes.
    On the other modified aircraft we are to pay something extra. I do not get that information from the Air Estimates, although we ought to be given that information and there seems no reason why Members of Parliament should not be told as the information is given in the Report of the Auditor General. How much extra are we to pay and why are we to pay any extra at all in order that the machines should be brought up to the performance specifications originally laid down? This seems to be a story about which we should hear more. I shall not quote from the answers given me by the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, to whom I also addressed questions in an endeavour to get information. He said that he did not see why—as he nicely put it—I should be bothered about this matter. I think that as Members of Parliament we ought to be concerned with these matters.
    I hope that we can get two pieces of information about these machines which are being taken into the Royal Air Force. First, what is the operational use envisaged for these unmodified machines? Is it proposed to take them up to this
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    2,000 hours' flying and then scrap them? What is proposed to be done about the flying time. How are we to test them for metal fatigue, and so on? How are we to reassure the crews who are expected to fly them? Are any passengers to be carried in them? We ought to have some information about this. Then there is the question of the additional amount of the taxpayer's money which is being paid in order that the ten modified machines can be brought up to the specification originally laid down.
    It is sometimes asked in the country, and with increasing validity, whether the aircraft industry exists to serve the civil airlines and the Royal Air Force or whether the Royal Air Force and the civil airlines exist to provide customers for the aircraft manufacturing concerns. Certainly, when one sees what the Auditor-General has to say about this transaction, one is driven to the conclusion that in this case public money was paid out to support a private enterprise firm.
    I do not want to say anything against that firm, for which I have great admiration. I know the energy and initiative which those people show. We can all cast our minds back to the Mosquito and we have very high regard for that product of the firm. Nevertheless, it seems that public money was paid out for this purpose—and we are being asked to vote it tonight—to help a private company out of its financial difficulties. I hope that the Secretary of State will be able to tell us a little more about this tonight.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: I am very glad to hear hon. Members posing questions tonight that I have been posing for years. There has always been very great difficulty in finding out what we are getting for these astronomical sums of public money.
    In this Vote we are asked to spend £183,500,000 and there are hardly two dozen Members present. It is little wonder, because over and over again Members come to this Committee but simply come up against a blank wall. One only begins to find out facts about these aircraft when hon. and right hon. Members move over from one side of the Chamber to the other.
    I remember asking questions about the cost of a bomber when the Labour Government were in power. I always received the same answer—that the question

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    could not be answered for reasons of public security. But immediately the Secretary of State for Air in the previous Government came over to this side of the House, he proceeded to give an estimate of the cost of a bomber.
    The House of Commons is entitled to have a rough estimate of the cost of a bomber, and this information could be given to the House without breaking rules of public security. After all, we are entitled to have some vague idea of how this money is being spent. I do not want to give any information to the enemy. I believe that the intelligence services of the potential enemy know far more about the expenditure of this money than we know in the House of Commons.
    Why are we not told the cost of a bomber officially? The Minister who was responsible at the Air Ministry during the time of the last Labour Government has estimated the cost of a bomber at £500,000. By means of Parliamentary Question and Answer, I have succeeded in discovering that to train a pilot to fly a £500,000 bomber costs us £25,000. In times of economic stringency, how far can this nation go in for vast expenditure of this kind?
    This is a question that is being discussed in articles in the papers by ex-Service men and authorities. I have with me an article written by Rear-Admiral G. P. Thompson (Rtd.). I do not know exactly what sort of authority he is, but I assume that he has some authority, otherwise he would not be writting in the daily Press. [Laughter.] I assume there is some sense of responsibility and that when a gentleman who is a high-ranking ex-officer—a rear-admiral—writes about strategy, he is to some extent informed. If he is not well informed, the laugh that greeted my remarks was a reflection either on the officer or on the newspaper. These newspaper articles are read by millions of people. If the facts are not right, the Minister should do something to correct the impression they convey.
    Rear-Admiral Thompson talks about our £500,000 bomber again. Surely we are entitled to know whether this figure is approximate. He puts the argument this way:
    "But our V-bombers each cost £500,000 and there is no sound reason why the force should be large, in view of the adequacy of the
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    American deterrent. Within our limited resources we can manage £50 million for a token force of 100 bombers."
    What is a token force? If there is to be a force at all, what is the good of a token force? This military gentleman argues that it is quite impossible for this country to spend £500 million over the next few years on a worth-while force of 1,000 bombers if we are at the same time to have a sound home defence, large numbers of manned fighters and a network of ground-to-air guided missiles, which would cost little less.
    We are responsible for the taxpayer's money. Any hon. Member can go to his constituency and be asked questions on the cost of this or that, but we must simply say, "We are just not told." I have tried over and over again to ascertain, from all kinds of Ministers, in both the previous and the present Governments, the cost of a helicopter. I have never been told yet. If we are responsible for spending the taxpayer's money, we should have some little information so that we can reply when asked questions by our constituents.
    These are the days when the whole question of defence is being discussed by all kinds of people, because we do not know the answers to these questions. What we do know is that a vast sum for capital investment is contained in these Votes. After he had left the Treasury Bench, the previous Secretary of State for Air said:
    "The veil of secrecy which I was accused of putting up in 1951 has, I am afraid, become an iron curtain solid and impenetrable."
    We know that behind that iron curtain there is a vast expenditure of public money. I suggest that, allowing for security reasons and for the fact that none of us wants to give information to the intelligence departments of other nations, the time has come when we should be told some elementary facts, such as the cost of this and that, so that we can explain to our constituents that we are careful guardians of public money.
    8.0 p.m.
    Mr. Birch: A good number of points have been raised during the debate on this Vote, and I shall do my best to answer them. The hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. de Freitas) started by expressing his congratulations, as did other hon. Members, on the record-breaking by the

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    Fairey Delta. I am grateful to him. He is absolutely right, of course, in saying that this is a pure research aircraft and is not intended to be a weapon carrier in any way. I might add that it is not covered by this Vote. It is borne under a Ministry of Supply Vote. Therefore. I do not think that it would be wise to pursue the matter further.
    The hon. Member for Lincoln made the point, which was made several times in the debate on defence and on the Air Estimates, about the number of firms and number of projects. My right hon. Friend the Minister of Supply gave a long answer to that. He said that what really mattered was not the number of firms but the number of projects. He gave instances of the steps taken to reduce those projects. We shall certainly try to reduce them still further as time goes on.
    The hon. Member also mentioned the question of officers in aircraft firms. We have such officers. We have, for instance, officers watching the development of the Vulcan and the Victor and, as I said in my speech on the Estimates, we are taking very active steps to increase and improve the education of officers, particularly by means of the cadet scheme that we have at Henlow, which I believe in the long run will pay considerable dividends.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) spoke about jet trainers and canvassed the rival merits of the Jet Provost and Miles 100. As my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air said during the debate on the Air Estimates, no decision has been reached whether to adopt one or the other, or indeed either. But my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick has great experience in this matter, and I naturally value the advice which he has to give.
    My noble Friend the Member for Dorset, South (Viscount Hinchingbrooke), who has left the Chamber, raised the same point as was raised by the hon. Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Beswick). He asked whether the reason for the under-spending of our Estimates was that we were overloading the industry and ordering too many aircraft. I do not think that that is the reason. The reason why we have not got the aircraft we have budgeted for has been, every time, the
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    hold-ups in development and not in production. Once we have had the answers to the technical problems it has not been at all difficult to produce the aircraft. The bottlenecks are in research and development, not in production.
    Mr. Beswick: The Minister of Supply told a somewhat different story before, when he said that there were certain materials in short supply and he was changing the super-priorities scheme to make certain that there was no overloading on these important but limited number of materials. I can give an example where men are now on short time and are redundant simply because there is not enough titanium to go into the products.
    Mr. Birch: I think that that is a very small factor, and that the Minister of Supply said that he was altering the super-priorities scheme because there were only a few things which were in fact in short supply. I do not think that the question of materials really impinges at all upon the under-spending of my own Estimates. Every time it has been a question of difficulties with development.
    The hon. Member for Uxbridge and the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) also raised once again the question why the House cannot be told more about how many aircraft we are getting and how much they cost. No Government has ever disclosed those facts, and I do not think that it would be right to do so. To the hon. Member for South Ayrshire, who asked what a bomber costs, I am afraid the, answer is a lemon, though perhaps an unstated number of lemons might be a more appropriate reply.
    I was also asked about the P 1. We have not got that. It is still a Ministry of Supply aircraft but, so far as we know, the development seems to be going reasonably well. The Javelin, on the other hand, is covered by the Estimates which we are now considering. The Javelin has not long been delivered to the Air Force, but we have had fighter pilots from the Central Fighter Establishment flying Javelins for some time, and I have talked to pilots at Boscombe Down who have been flying the Javelin.
    Reports, so far as they go, are satisfactory. They are more satisfactory on this aircraft at this early stage than they have been on other aircraft. In

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    particular, there has been no difficulty with the guns, which has been the great trouble with the Hunters. I know that the hon. Member for Uxbridge is about to ask why an aircraft is mentioned in the Memorandum on the Air Estimates when no money is provided for it in this Vote.
    Mr. Beswick: I am sure that the Minister is interested in this matter, just as I am, from the Parliamentary point of view, but I am wondering what an explanatory Memorandum covering the Estimates for 1956–57 is for. If it refers to aircraft which are not in fact paid for in these Estimates it is a waste of time to publish the Memorandum at all.
    Mr. Birch: The object of the explanatory Memorandum is to explain. The point is that the Air Force does not pay for aircraft until they are delivered, and therefore no money is provided. The P1 is under development, and there is no question of it being delivered in the current financial year. Therefore, no money is provided for it in these Estimates. The money is provided for in the Ministry of Supply Estimates. That is a technical point. Because it is not in our Vote we are not precluded from offering information about it.
    The hon. Member for Uxbridge also spoke of the Comet. Subject to a certificate of airworthiness, we are buying strengthened Comets, which will carry out the duties common to aircraft of that type in Transport Command that is, shifting both men and goods about in emergencies and for special reasons. The unstrengthened Comets are not for Transport Command but are for use in tests with radar training and calibration and so on. Therefore, they do not need strengthening. They are not subject to the same degree of pressures.
    Mr. Beswick: Will the right hon. Gentleman go on to justify the price? A limited purpose has been found for the aircraft in calibration tests and the like, and they cannot be used for more than a limited length of time. How do we then justify the spending on them of the same sum of money as would be spent if they were aircraft with an unlimited certificate of airworthiness?
    Mr. Birch: We at the Air Ministry do not negotiate the price, as the hon. Member knows. Perhaps the hon. Member will put a Question to the Minister of Supply.
    Mr. Rankin: Will the right hon. Gentleman deal with the correlation of information?
    Mr. Birch: That is all organised under the Ministry of Supply. The development of all these aircraft depends partly on the manufacturers' own research and partly on research carried out in Government Departments. The information is centralised through Ministry of Supply channels, and I think that all that liaison is rather good.
    Mr. de Freitas: My hon. Friends and I are not satisfied with the Secretary of State's answer to the question about the price paid for Comets. It should not be thought that because we shall not vote against the Estimate, we have found the right hon. Gentleman's answer satisfactory. We may return to the attack later.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum not exceeding £183,500,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of aircraft and stores, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 8. Works and Lands
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £49,000,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works and lands, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1457.

    Vote 9. Miscellaneous Effective Services
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £5,940,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of miscellaneous effective services, including grants in aid to the Royal Society and a subscription to the World Meteorological Organisation, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 11. Additional Married Quarters
    Resolved,
    That a sum not exceeding £100, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of certain additional married quarters, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 1. Pay, &c., of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £63,688,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c., of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. Kenneth Robinson: The greater part of this Vote is for the pay of officers and men in the Royal Navy, and I should like to repeat the congratulations which my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan) offered to the Government when the Estimates were introduced for introducing these new scales of pay for officers and men of the Services. I agree with what the hon. Gentleman said in introducing the Estimates—that, by and large, pay in the Royal Navy now compares reasonably well with earnings in civil life outside, and that it should enable the Navy to obtain the Regular recruits that it wants in the coming years.
    Indeed, so far as comparisons are concerned, I looked rather wistfully at the pay and allowances of a lieutenant-commander with maximum service, because that was the rank in which I left the Royal Navy, and compared it with the present remuneration of a Member of Parliament, and I found that on the whole the Navy is not too badly treated by these standards.
    In the debate on the Estimates, I raised the question of National Service in the Navy, and in view of the fact that there is now a reasonable chance of getting the regular recruits which the Service wants, I should like to ask the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary whether the very small number of National Service men needed in the Navy is really justified in present circumstances. We know that it is Government policy that the National Service man should have a choice of the three Services, but it is a very nominal choice as far as the Navy is concerned—I think probably fifty to one against, if we take the figure of 2,000, the figure to which the Royal Navy expects to run down in the year 1957–58.
    I do not know whether the Parliamentary Secretary can give us any idea of the cost of training these men. Is it disproportionate compared with the rather different training arrangements that have
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    to be organised for Regular recruits? I am not saying definitely that I think National Service ought to stop forthwith in the Navy, but I should like some indication as to how uneconomic it is—because it must be uneconomic from the Service point of view—at the moment.
    There is one other point on which I should like to ask a question. It concerns Vote 1, Subhead L, in regard to education grants. I gather that that is a new subhead, and in the Estimates it is stated that this sum of £100,000 is for the payment of an education allowance up to £75 a year for children at boarding school, and also for the payment of maintenance allowances of lOs a week for children boarded out who attend day school. The Estimates go on to say that the allowances are payable in respect of children between the ages of 11 and 18 of personnel serving abroad and those serving in the United Kingdom who are subject to frequent changes of station. Is it intended that these allowances are to be available for both officers and ratings? Perhaps we could be given some intimation as to how this new arrangement has arisen, what the demand for it has been, and generally what arrangements have been made under this heading in the past.
    There is one other item under the Appropriation in Aid—Item Z. There is a sum of £500,000 which is expected as a contribution from the German support fund. I am speaking subject to correction here, but it appears to be part of the sum which the Government budgeted for and which they expected to get from the Federal Republic of Germany in support of our Forces stationed in that country. I believe it is a fact that, within the last 48 hours or so, the German Federal Government have said that they do not intend to make any cash payment at all. Perhaps we can have confirmation from the hon. Gentleman whether, in the light of these recent developments, he expects that figure of £500,000 to be realised.
    8.15 p.m.
    Miss Joan Vickers: I should like to raise one point in relation to Subhead C; but first I should like to add my congratulations in regard to rates of pay. I should like to say that although I am not a feminist, I should like to see some explanation why there

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    should not be equality between the different Women's Services in regard to pay.
    I have before me the total of the payment of these Services, and I should like to pay a tribute to the Women's Services and to the nursing services, because I have noticed during the debate on these Estimates that, up to date, no mention has been made of the very valuable services which they give in Her Majesty's Forces.
    If one looks at the table showing what is the pay in the Regular Women's Services, it is interesting to note that in eight different sections there is inequality of pay between W.R.N.S., W.R.A.F. and W.R.A.C. In the case of a second officer, captain or flight officer, the difference is as much as 7s. per day. That is in the category of four years' service, and even up to the rank of six years there is still a difference of 5s. a day. After that, there is 1s. a day difference until they have done eight years' service, and then they get equality of pay up to the final rank. I suggest that as aircraft-women and able seamen are to begin with equal pay, there is no reason why there should be any difference in pay in these eight categories. The women have the same expenses, and they have to go to the same N.A.A.F.I. organisation.
    All the Women's Services and the nursing services ought to get equal pay, and I should be very glad if the matter could be considered. I understand that their careers as officers are substantially the same in the final financial reward as for the other Services and it is only in the early stages that it is different. I should be very glad if my hon. Friend would look into it to see if there is any reason why there should not be equality with the other Women's Services.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Nobody is going to grudge the increase of pay to the sailors, who, like everybody else, are finding the cost of living going up under the present Government. Certainly, we would not grudge the W.R.N.S. their bit of birdseed which comes under Vote 1, but I think it is essential in these days that we should cut out waste and see that the utmost economy is carried out in the Navy, as in the other nationalised services.
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    I have been alarmed to read in today's Daily Herald an article by a gentleman named Hannen Swaffer. Nobody will accuse Mr. Hannen Swaffer of being anything but patriotic. He draws attention to the cost of the "Britannia", and I want to ask the Minister if he can tell us whether these figures about her payroll are accurate. Presumably they come under this sum of £63,688,000. After all, it is the people outside who read these articles, and they need to be satisfied that the Royal Navy is run economically and without any waste.
    We are told in this article that since her completion two years ago the "Britannia" has been renovated five times, and that over £100,000 has been spent on her refitting. The article states that it costs £2,500 a day to run her. I should like to know if that is correct. It states that she carries a crew of more than 200 officers and men who are badly needed elsewhere, when warships are held up for lack of crew.
    Those are startling figures, and the author of the article goes on to ask whether it was really necessary to take the "Britannia" to the Mediterranean for these maneouvres. Mr. Hannen Swaffer says that:
    "Even Tory newspapers which boast of their loyalty have joined in the widespread criticism of this continual waste. Yet, so indifferent is the Prince to this outcry that, instead of flying to the Mediterranean for the naval manoeuvres in a Service plane, the petrol for which would have cost the nation comparatively little, Philip decided that nothing short of the Britannia would suffice. How many more millions will Philip's passion for the sea cost the nation?"
    The Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (Mr. George Ward): On a point of order, Sir Charles. Is this in order on Vote 1?
    The Chairman: Yes. I thought it was the crew about which the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) is complaining. He is objecting to the pay of the 200 men in the Royal Yacht, is he not?
    Mr. Hughes: Yes, Sir Charles. Although the Minister is strange to the Navy, because he was in the Air Force, I did not think that he thought the "Britannia" could sail to the Mediterranean without a crew. We have not reached the stage yet when automation propels the "Britannia".

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    I have raised this matter before. There were times when we could afford to pay £2,500 a day for these men. I suggest, however, that when people who are much more conventional in these matters than I am are calling attention to them, it is up to the Minister to allay the public apprehension that there is extravagance in the Navy and that this pay-roll would be much less if, for example, the "Britannia" were sold to the United States of America or disposed of in some other way so that it would not be a burden to the nation.
    Mr. Ward: I shall start by replying to the questions of the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) whose first point was about National Service men. The hon. Gentleman asked whether they were justified, and whether their training was disproportionate and uneconomic.
    On the first point, we, in common with the other two Services, look forward to the day when we can have a long term or Regular Navy. Frankly, we would rather not have National Service men, but while we have them they are extremely useful to us in many ways. Although I agree that their training is uneconomic in that we are giving them the same training as we give long-term men, and yet are keeping them such a short time. At the same time there is some economy in that their training is not separately organised but takes place with that of the Regular sailors.
    Educational grants are available both to officers and ratings. They are necessary because one of the greatest disincentives to joining any of the Services is the difficulty of educating children because the father is moved around so frequently from place to place. A man posted overseas is faced with three almost impossible choices. Either he has to take his wife and children with him and trust to luck as to the kind of education he will find overseas; or he has to take his wife with him and find some means of boarding out his children during their education in this country; or he has to leave his wife behind to look after the children and face a long period of separation. Those are three extremely difficult choices. For these reasons we try to solve the problem by giving this education allowance so that people can board
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    out their children and avoid at least one of these unhappy choices.
    Mr. K. Robinson: Before the hon. Gentleman leaves that point, I was not suggesting that this practice was not desirable. I was wondering what provision had been made in the past in view of the fact that there was no sum in that subhead last year.
    Mr. Ward: This is an improvement which has been made recently for the reasons I have stated and as a result of experience.
    On the question of the German support funds the hon. Gentleman is right. This £500,000 is the provision which has been made in the Estimates for the amount of German contribution for the coming year. On the point about the newspaper reports, I am not in a position to discuss that beyond saying that negotiations are still going on and that this is only an estimate which we put into this year's figures.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Miss Vickers) raised the question of W.R.N.S. pay. I appreciate and understand her interest in the women's Services which she has mentioned to me before. As she knows, I tried in a letter a few days ago to explain the situation and I am sorry that I did not succeed in convincing her. I will try again, but this is not an easy matter to explain. It is a mistake to try to compare the three women's Services rank by rank. The principle is that in post-war years it has been the rule, in dealing with the pay of the women's Services, to give them about three-quarters of the equivalent pay for male officers. The pattern for male officers in the Navy differs very considerably from that of male officers in the other two Services, because they are promoted at quite different ages and it is impossible exactly to compare their various ranks.
    8.30 p.m.
    If we equate the women's Services to the comparable male Services and not to the other two women's Services, we get some idea of how this works out. If we corn-pare the women's Services age for age and not rank for rank, we will also find that they are very closely equated. Finally, the best test of all is to take the careers in each of the three women's

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    Services from say, the age of twenty to the age of thirty-two and see what each is paid over those twelve years. It will then be found that the W.R.N.S. comes out a little ahead of the other two Services. That, I am afraid, is the best explanation I can give, and I hope that that will satisfy the hon. Lady.
    The hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) disappointed me very much and I am sure that he disappointed other hon. Members by raising the topic of the expense of the Royal yacht. I have not read Mr. Hannen Swaffer's article in the Daily Herald, so I do not know what he says about it, although I can imagine. What he probably does not say is that Her Majesty's Ship "Britannia," besides being the Royal Yacht, is also a hospital ship.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: He said that.
    Mr. Ward: Did he? I am sorry. I said that I did not read the article. The hon. Member certainly did not say it. It is a hospital ship and would be so used in war time. Quite apart from that, I am one who firmly believes and will continue firmly to believe that Her Majesty The Queen should have a yacht.
    Mr. Hughes: In justice to Mr. Swaffer he said:
    "It was stupidly stated at the start, that, far from the money being wasted, the yacht could be so changed that she could transport wounded.
    The Admiralty carefully concealed the fact that, if war broke out, the dockyards would be much too busy to spend weeks on refitting a pleasure craft."
    Mr. Ward: That is not so. The "Britannia" is an operational ship and not a member of the reserve, and as an operational ship is capable of going to sea in an operational rôle very quickly indeed. I think that those are the main points, but if there are others, I will later write to the hon. Members concerned.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £63,688,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of the pay, &c., of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 2. Victualling and Clothing for the Navy
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £13,897,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of victualling and clothing for the Navy, including the cost of victualling establishments at home and abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. K. Robinson: There are only two points which I wish to raise on Vote 2, and the first concerns the new seaman's uniform about which the Parliamentary Secretary had something to say in introducing the Estimates. I should like to ask him whether we really are to have this new uniform at last. I understand that it has been under consideration for at least six years, and probably longer. From time to time there have been announcements in the Press, no doubt inspired by the Admiralty, about the new uniform always appearing as entirely fresh pieces of news.
    Is this the final form of the uniform and, if so, when is it to be issued to the men? When are we to have a Navy arrayed in the zip-fronted jumper? I always understood in the time which I spent in the Navy, which is now getting to be several years ago, that there were certain great advantages in having the jumper in its traditional design One of the things we were told was that it was essential for the safety of seamen. I hope we can have an assurance that there will be no diminution in safety through the new form of dress. Perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary will also tell us how the cost will compare with that of the old type uniform. If it is more expensive, and one would imagine that it would be, is it proposed accordingly to adjust the kit upkeep allowance for men dressed as seamen?
    Under Subhead G, I notice that there is a very considerable reduction in the amounts provided for provisions and victualling allowances. Like my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes), I am always glad to see economies in the Service Departments, but not economies at the expense of the men's food. I hope that we shall have an explanation on how this saving of something like £2 million has been achieved.
    There is one other small matter which I should like to raise under this Subhead

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    —grog money. The rate of grog money, we are told, is at present fixed at 3d. a day or 21s. a quarter. When I was on the lower deck, the rate of grog money was also 3d. a day. I should have thought that the cost of grog had gone up very considerably since then. Is this not in fact an encouragement to the man to take his grog rather than his grog money, and is it not time that the current value of grog was more accurately reflected in the grog money that the man gets who does not draw his grog every day?
    Mr. R. Gresham Cooke: Under Vote 1 we have voted a generous increase in pay, and we are all very pleased that the Navy, in common with the other Services, has been put on a good basis, so that both officers and men will draw pay that is in every way comparable and in many ways better than in civilian life. That being so, it brings me to the question of officers and men serving on home establishments, because all those men are praotically living civilian lives although they are working at naval works. Having regard to the fact that they are working in comparable conditions to civilians, I ask myself whether it is right that they should get Duty-free cigarettes and Duty-free rum at these home establishments.
    I am in agreement with the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. K. Robinson) that we do not want to see any economies in food, but I think that no one in this House would object if there were economies in the matter of rum and cigarettes. I feel that here there is a considerable temptation in the face of young Service men particularly. Many of them are non-smokers and many are non-drinkers, but we know that cigarettes and the rum which they can get have a market value that is considerably above 3d. a day for rum or the value of the cigarettes. So there is a temptation to take the allowance whether they want it or not and sell it. In fact, I hear that in naval towns there is quite a black market in cigarettes in the public lavatories surrounding the docks. I am assured that there is a certain amount of black market in rum in private houses and perhaps public houses.
    Mr. Emrys Hughes: Who buys it?
    Mr. K. Robinson: There is nothing new in that.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: There may be nothing new in that, but it may be done en a more extensive scale because, fortunately, we have in the Navy today a large number of young men who are non-smokers and possibly non-drinkers as well. I suggest to my hon. Friend that economies could be made by cutting out these duty-free items for men on home establishments. Not only should we make economies but we should be removing temptation from the men, and getting rid of what I think is a grievance among the civilian population that men working at almost similar jobs should get considerable "perks" to which civilians are not entitled.
    Sir Jocelyn Lucas: I wish to raise the question of the supply of fruit, vegetables and fish to the Royal Naval Barracks at Portsmouth. Recently we have been discussing monopolies, and whilst one naturally favours N.A.A.F.I., other things being equal, since it contributes to Service amenities; yet I think that a little competition is still a very good thing. There is a Fleet Order on the subject which stressed this, and states that if there is an appreciable advantage, taking into consideration price, quality, variety, reliability and promptness of delivery, purchases from local traders should be resorted to. I have in my hand a list of prices of commodities such as fruit and vegetables and other things which have been bought from the N.A.A.F.I.
    This Fleet Order stated that
    "…purchases from local traders should be resorted to only when there is an appreciable advantage to the ship, e.g., after taking into account of price, quality, variety…"
    and so on. That also applies to the naval barracks where last year, because of the excellence of the goods supplied by the local traders, their proportion actually went up to 50 per cent. of the only commodities which they are allowed to supply. I have here a comparison of some of the prices.
    Last December, a new officer arrived at the barracks. I will not mention any names, and in any case I have not had an opportunity to investigate this matter. Indeed, I do not think that one could go to the barracks in order to investigate these things, and one would be very unpopular if one attempted to do so. But these are the actual sample prices on 19th January, 1956, the first price being

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    the local private tender: imported Jonathan apples, fancy grade, 6d. a lb.; the N.A.A.F.I. price was 8d. English Jonathan apples, first grade, were 5d. a lb.; the N.A.A.F.I. had none. Canary tomatoes for cooking were 7½d. a 1b.; the N.A.A.F.I. price was 11d. Imported lettuce, large, were 5½d. per head; the N.A.A.F.I. price was 10d. South African plums were 1s. 2d.; the N.A.A.F.I. had no equivalent. Salad tomatoes were 10d. a lb.; the N.A.A.F.I. price was 1s. 1½d. Celery was 3½d. and 4d. a head; the N.A.A.F.I. price was 5d.
    On one occasion samples were brought to the barracks by a trader, and this new officer refused even to look at them. I gather that since 1st January no private tender has been looked at at all. Because he had been doing so much trade with the barracks, a local fishmonger spent £1,000 on the installation of refrigerating plant in order to keep the food fresh over Sunday to deliver to the barracks on Monday. So far as he is concerned that money has gone down the drain.
    I have a pile of complaints which I can pass on to the Minister, and I wish to quote from a letter from one trader, in which he says:
    "I would add that during my thirty years of business experience during which period I have been in contact with all ranks of the Supply Branch in practically all the Navies of the world, it has never been my sad misfortune to be addressed in such a manner, and to be the recipient of these remarks…leaves me surprised and shocked."
    There is a great deal of feeling about this matter in Portsmouth, because the traders feel that there is a great prestige attached to supplying the Navy, and if they are no longer allowed to tender people may get wrong ideas quite apart from their loss of business. It is a very severe blow to them suddenly to be struck off like that.
    8.45 p.m.
    The saving upon those fresh articles, which the private traders are not now allowed to supply, was £1,900 last year. That was a quite useful economy. My main argument, however, is that some competition should be allowed. If a monopoly exists, people have to take what it gives them. The barracks evidently found that they were being served very much better by private traders than by
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    N.A.A.F.I. in the matter of fresh fruit, fish and vegetables.
    It is quite easy for N.A.A.F.I. to contribute towards Service amenities if it puts up its prices; any firm can do that if it has a monopoly. I am not denying the good work that it does, but we should keep it on its toes. I ask my hon. Friend to look at this matter, and see whether it is necessary for traders in Portsmouth who have supplied the Navy for so many years in competition with N.A.A.F.I. to be suddenly struck off the list. It seems to me to be extremely unfair, and quite contrary to the Fleet Order.
    Miss Vickers: I want to draw attention to the Royal William Yard in Devonport. As its name suggests, this is a very old yard, and I gather that quite a lot of its equipment and crew are being sent inland, to a place called Wrangton. According to the Estimates, certain heating was to be installed in the existing building to make it more habitable to the people working there. Many of these men are ex-Navy personnel of considerable age, with physical disabilities, and the inconvenience from which they are suffering at present is most noticeable.
    The Deputy-Chairman (Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris): I am loth to intervene in the hon. Lady's speech, but she is on the wrong Vote. The subject to which she is referring comes under Vote 8.
    Commander Agnew: I have only one or two questions to put upon this Vote. I understand that, together with the coming into use of the new uniform, the seasonal change in the colour of the crown of the rating's cap will disappear. Broadly speaking, it used to be blue in winter and white in summer, and it will now be white all the year round. I do not think that any exception will be taken to that change by officers and ratings. When the time comes for them to wear them again in the summer, officers will no longer have cause to wonder where the white covers of their caps have disappeared to in the winter.
    Is it contemplated that white caps only will continue to be used even in time of war? It is quite conceivable that upon certain types of operation the wearing of a white cap at night would invite unenviable attention from the enemy, and it would not be a practical form of headwear.
    Mr. Ronald Bell: Does not my hon. and gallant Friend agree that in the last war, during the black-out, the wearing of a white cap cover at night was almost a safeguard to life in certain traffic conditions?
    Commander Agnew: I agree, but I did not experience those conditions.
    While I was looking through the Votes in connection with the necessary arrangements to be made in respect of victualling yards abroad, it struck me that there was one item connected with salaries and wages of the police which has undergone a very marked increase this year as compared with the Estimates for the previous year.
    They relate to overtime, which has shown very great increase from £700 to £5,500. It is possible that the wages and salaries of the police have been increased all round and that this has caused inflation of the figures, or there may be shortage of men on police duty at the victualling yards and in consequence they may have had to do overtime to keep the full roster of protection. I should be grateful for information on that point.
    What is the present source of supply of the rum issued to the Royal Navy? It used to be very good dry rum from British Guiana, but I understand that almost all the vintage stocks were purloined by the Army in World War I and that the Admiralty has never quite caught up with the quality.
    Mr. K. Robinson: Did the hon. and gallant Member experience the particularly nasty Australian rum that we had during the war?
    Commander Agnew: I do not think I met it. It was only by connivance and a slight irregularity that I was able to get a quantity of rum, but never sufficiently frequently to become a connoisseur. Does the Admiralty still use British Guiana rum and keep it in store, maturing it in victualling yards for a reasonable number of years before issuing it to the Fleet?
    Mr. R. Bell: My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Commander Agnew) has referred to grog. I was interested in the comments he made about the vintage grog. I have heard that the Army nobbled the stock, but I have also heard it suggested that the Army laid it down as port. The trouble with the Navy was that, having
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    got some fine dry rum it used to wet it and issue it to the men as grog.
    I see a mention in this Vote that those who do not like grog can take rum money in lieu. I have always thought it was to some extent a hardship that that privilege was not extended to officers, who have always taken a certain part of their emoluments as duty-free tobacco and alcohol. We always thought during the war that the fact that the Navy received half of its remuneration in that rather intangible form had the most unfortunate effect upon the calculation of naval pay in relation to Army pay.
    Whenever a discrepancy was pointed out, it was suggested that that was either because admirals received higher pensions than field marshals or because naval officers received duty-free tobacco and drink. During the six years that I served in the Royal Navy, as I did not smoke, I had to consume quite a ridiculous amount of gin in order to get my basic rate of pay. The result of such an intensive course as that has been to make me not only a non-smoker but a nondrinker. It has occurred to me that it might not be at all a bad idea if some of this advantage, at any rate in relation to tobacco, were quantified so that naval officers could receive a substantial part of the reward for the valuable services they render to Her Majesty in the form of currency rather than of benefits in kind.
    I have always thought, though I do not wish to elaborate on it now, that the Navy did a little worse on its victualling than did the other Services. Again, it was always pointed out to us that we paid so much lower in mess subscription than did the Army or the Air Force that it was right that we should be less well paid, but I think it is true that the victualling of the Navy costs a good deal less than that of the other Services. If that is so, it would appear that naval officers are not only on the whole rather less well paid than are their counterparts in the other two Services but that the Navy does not feed them as well either.
    Mr. E. G. Willis: I have two points in mind about the grog issue. First, I should like to know to what extent the habit of taking payment in lieu of grog is increasing or decreasing. There was at one time a tendency, I

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    understand, for the number of those draw-pay in lieu of grog to increase. Perhaps the Parliamentary and Financial Secretary can give some information on that matter.
    Secondly, the payment made in lieu of taking the grog is still the same as it was years and years ago—3d. I should have thought that anyone not taking his grog today was entitled to rather more. I do not know how the Admiralty's finances are affected, but the exchange value of grog on board ship is certainly higher than 3d., whether measured in terms of service or of barter. The amount was 3d. when I was in the Service, which is a long time ago, and that was the figure a long time before that. If the Admiralty were to increase the amount to something respectable, it is possible that quite a number of other men would no longer draw their grog, but at present it is a good bargain and can sometimes work wonders. It is really time that the Admiralty examined this allowance.
    Mr. Ward: The answer to the question about the seamen's new uniform is that, if there are no unforeseen production difficulties we should be able to start issuing it to the Fleet in about six months' time. It will cost about £28,000 a year more than does the existing uniform.
    The hon. Member for St. Pancras North (Mr. K. Robinson) asked about the reduction in the amount of money provided for victualling. I can say that there is no decrease whatever in the standard of the food but there is, of course, a smaller number of men in the Navy, which accounts for the reduction in that figure.
    Several hon. Members have talked about grog and grog money. I must confess that I used to like rum until about fifteen years ago, when I made the mistake of walking round a rum factory in Jamaica. The smell was so abominable that I have never been able to drink rum since. Nevertheless, I understand that it is very popular in the Navy. Supplies come, not from British Guiana or, my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Commander Agnew) will be glad to hear, from Australia, but from Jamaica or Barbados.
    9.0 p.m.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Mr. Gresham Cooke) asked about duty-free cigarettes and rum in shore
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    establishments, and wondered why this privilege should continue in days when economy is so necessary. This is rather more than a custom; it has the strength of law, since it was legalised in the Customs and Excise Act, and it has been the tradition of the Navy for a great many years. There would, I think, be considerable discontent caused quite unnecessarily for the saving of very little money if this privilege was withdrawn.
    I want to make it clear that it is a misconception—I am not saying that my hon. Friend is guilty of it; he knows too much about it—that sailors ashore are entitled to the same privileges as when afloat. This is not so. There are three categories of entitlement to the privileges, which vary, first, with the length of time a particular vessel is likely to spend at sea, and, secondly, with whether the sailor is in a ship at sea or temporarily in a shore establishment.
    My hon. Friend expressed some anxiety about the possibility of a black market arising from this concession in shore establishments. I can assure him that we are constantly on the look out for that, and we should be more than grateful if he could produce any instance, into which we would look very carefully so that we could put a stop to it.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: Is there any check on whether a man is a non-smoker or a non-drinker when he applies for these concessions?
    Mr. Ward: I understand that he has to register as a smoker before he is entitled to the concession, although I am not sure whether he registers as a drinker.
    My hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth, South (Sir J. Lucas) spoke on the subject of private traders versus the N.A.A.F.I. That is an important point. There is no question in our instructions of rejecting tenders from private traders out of hand. On the contrary, our instructions to supply officers provide for the purchase of supplies from private traders, but they say that N.A.A.F.I. should be the main source of supply for such things as fish and fresh vegetables and that purchases from private traders should be made only when there is an appreciable advantage in respect of price, quality, variety or reliability.

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    I think my hon. Friend will agree that this is only fair to N.A.A.F.I. which, after all, has to operate a world-wide canteen service to meet the requirements of the Navy and often has to operate in places which would not be at all attractive to private traders. I therefore emphasise that any tenders front private traders would continue to be considered and would be accepted if they gave appreciable advantages to the purchaser.
    My hon. Friend did mention one or two specific instances, particularly I think in regard to apples. I do not know, without looking at the matter very carefully, whether the private trader is always able to provide a better service in apples than N.A.A.F.I. I would say myself, however, that if, taken over quite a long period, it is found that there is very little advantage between the two, then N.A.A.F.I. ought to get the preference, although I dare say there would always be certain shorter periods when either one or the other might be able to provide a more attractive price. The principle, however, is quite clear—that all else being equal, and unless there is some considerable advantage to be gained from going to private traders, N.A.A.F.I. does have preference, for the reasons which I have stated.
    My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South asked about white caps and whether they would be worn in war time. The answer is, yes, they will; they are the permanent uniform, or will be from 1st May, to be worn all the year round in all climates, both in peace and in war. As to the wages of the police, the reason why overtime has increased is because the new conditions of the Service for the police provide for a shorter working week, and therefore more overtime.
    The only other outstanding point is once again a grog one, namely, about the cost of grog. I am informed that the cost of grog is actually half the amount of grog money available. In other words, grog money is 3d. per man and the cost of grog is lid 1½d. per day. I do not myself believe that the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis) is justified in saying that because, generally speaking, the cost of living has gone up in recent years the price of grog money should follow that upward trend. I think it is very reasonable indeed that a man should
    662
    receive twice the value of the actual tot of rum, and I see no reason for altering that.
    Mr. Willis: Could the hon. Gentleman say whether there is any increase in the number who take money in lieu?
    Mr. Ward: I am afraid that I have no information on that, but my impression is that it has remained fairly constant in recent years.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £13,897,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of victualling and clothing for the Navy, including the cost of victualling establishments at home and abroad, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 6. Scientific Services
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £16,884,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of scientific services, including a grant in aid to the National Institute of Oceanography, and a subscription to the International Hydro-graphic Bureau, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Mr. R. Bell: This Vote includes, I see, the Admiralty Compass Observatory, in my constituency, and I want to raise with the Parliamentary Secretary, or perhaps more specifically with the Civil Lord, a matter which has been raised with him on many previous occasions and with which he will be familiar, but which is one of considerable importance and is becoming, I venture to say, one of some urgency, and that is the conditions of employment, and more especially of remuneration, of the civilian staff at the Observatory. It is, I suppose, the 372 mechanics referred to on page 78. I see that the number is estimated to fall from 372 in the year 1955–56 to 338 in the year 1956–57.
    A great many of those men fall into the category of dilutees. That is to say, they entered Admiralty employment under the relaxation agreements of 1939 or 1940 and they are still governed by those agreements. Their conditions of pay are still as set out in those agreements. Many other of their conditions of service, such as those relating to pensions, retirement, security of employment and, above all, priority of dismissal are

    663
    all regulated by the fact that they are dilutees.
    In the past, this has not been considered a very urgent matter, although it has been recognised on all sides as anomalous. It has been possible to say that it does not matter very much as the number employed in these technical and engineering services has been constantly growing. Therefore, the question of redundancy has been purely academic and it has been hoped that before it ever became actual the matter would have been amicably settled by agreement between the Admiralty and the trade unions concerned. Undoubtedly progress has been made between the Admiralty and the trade unions concerned, but I think I am correct in saying that progress has not gone so far as it has between the Air Ministry and trade unions concerned in relation to dilutees employed by that Ministry. In some degree the status and entitlement of the dilutees employed in the Admiralty service is lower than that of those in the Air Ministry service.
    This Vote and information I have had given to me lead me to believe that that situation is passing and that the number employed as mechanics is beginning to go down. Whether that is part of the national economies which have to be made in some parts of the defence services or whether it is due to regrouping of effort in these scientific services, I do not know. The fact remains that the number is beginning to decline and, therefore, the question of redundancy is becoming urgent.
    This problem, which has been ticking along quietly enough for the last 10 years, is now ceasing to be one which we can allow to continue permanently unsolved. It is a very difficult problem; everyone recognises that. The trade unions, as a matter of principle, have to retain certain standards and certain requirements. They naturally say that the special conditions of wartime should not be prayed against them in peacetime.
    9.15 p.m.
    Against that, we have to remember that these technicians and mehanics represent a once-and-for-all operation. We earnestly hope that there will never be another war. Some of them have been in this status of dilutees now for fifteen
    664
    years and, broadly speaking, it is impossible for them by any means ever to get out of this category. They are dilutees for ever, they are deferred men for ever, and for however long they stay in the Admiralty Compass Observatory, even if for twenty or twenty-five years, when staff has to be cut they must be the first to go, and the youngest and newest entrants, who have been there for perhaps only a year, must stay in preference to them. That is not justice when it is carried on for that length of time and to that extent.
    We all want to see expenditure on defence eventually reduced. We hope that the state of the world will one day permit very much greater economies in our defence services. Before that happens this problem must be solved, otherwise the Admiralty will be left with some very difficult human problems on its hands, and I do not know how it will solve them without getting into serious trouble with the trade union. I ask my hon. Friend the Civil Lord, who has had this worrying problem on his hands for a long time, if tonight he can give any hopeful news about it and to undertake to regard it as urgent and to try to find an agreed solution very quickly.
    The Civil Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Simon Wingfield Digby): Perhaps I may make a brief reply to one or two of the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire, South (Mr. R. Bell). I am aware of his interest in this difficult problem of dilutees. I cannot at the moment give a full answer concerning the amount of work at the establishment he mentioned, but I believe that there has been a slight falling off in some of the work that it undertakes for another Department.
    The general question of dilutees is a difficult problem. We employ a number of dilutees in the Admiralty, not only under this Vote but under several other Votes. It has, therefore, been a matter to which we have devoted a good deal of attention.
    As my hon. Friend pointed out, a number of dilutees have been working at our establishment for a long time. The fact remains, however, that they did not serve an apprenticeship, and, although they may be thoroughly efficient at the job they do, some of them would not be able to turn their hands to the variety of work that a full craftsman would be able to do.

    665
    I have had conversations with some of the unions on the pay and status of dilutees. We have agreed with them to raise considerably the range of merit pay to which the dilutees are entitled, although they are not entitled to the full range of merit pay to which they would be were they fully qualified craftsmen. We have, in fact, recently reached agreement with one of the unions—it is not the only one—with a view to upgrading all those dilutees who are thoroughly efficient to the full status of craftsman, which will solve their particular difficulty. But we have not had the same success with every union and I suspect that the union which my hon. Friend has in mind is one with which we have not been able to reach agreement on the upgrading of dilutees. I can, however, assure my hon. Friend that we shall continue to give careful thought to the problem and will have further talks with the unions concerned as necessary.
    Mr. Bell: Has any progress been made on the vital aspect of their deferred status in relation to redundancy: that is to say, they must be the first to go when staff is reduced?
    Mr. Digby: As long as they remain dilutees and are not upgraded to full craftsman status, I am afraid that that problem must remain.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £16,884,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of scientific services, including a grant in aid to the National Institute of Oceanography, and a subscription to the International Hydrographic Bureau, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.

    Vote 10. Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad
    Motion made, and Question proposed,
    That a sum, not exceeding £17,950,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and repairs at home and abroad, including the cost of superintendence, purchase of sites, grants and other charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    Miss Vickers: I should like to draw attention to Subhead B relating to new works, additions and alterations, and to ask the Minister some questions about accommodation. Quite recently there has been an excellent suggestion that hirings
    666
    should be taken by the Navy. It would be of great value to families coming back from overseas. It is very difficult for them to obtain any quarters unless they are provided by the Navy, as they have to be for a certain period on the housing lists of local authorities before they become eligible for accommodation. It would be excellent if unfurnished quarters could be taken.
    Many people coming from overseas are stationed in an area for at least three years. I have been in communication with an officer in charge of married quarters. He says that it is quite impossible to find accommodation other than furnished accommodation unless it is in permanent buildings built by the Navy for the purpose. Therefore, there are many families with furniture of their own who have no chance of obtaining a place in which to live. This suggestion would also mean a considerable saving for the Navy. In places like Plymounth there are 500 empty houses, many of which could be made available for this purpose.
    The other matter about which I am concerned is the use made of blocks for the accommodation of chief petty officers. Quite recently in Plymouth, a block of this kind was built for the large sum of £750,000. What is to be the policy in future? Since the block was opened it has not been used to capacity and, with centralised drafting, what use will these blocks be in future? I feel that a considerable reduction could be made in this Vote if blocks of that kind were not built in future. At present they are not serving any very useful purpose.
    Mr. K. Robinson: I also have a question to put concerning married quarters. This is a matter which has always concerned my hon. Friend the Member for Stepney (Mr. W. Edwards), who probably would have been at this Dispatch Box but for the state of his health. What effect will the capital cuts announced recently by the Chancellor of the Exchequer have on the construction of married quarters for the Navy and also on the modernisation of barracks? We are in a slight difficulty over married quarters because some of them are constructed, as it were, under Vote 10 and some by loan under Vote 15, but I hope that we shall have a comprehensive reply about the extent to which they have been cut back as a result of the Chancellor's policy.

    667
    Under Subhead B of Vote 10 there has been a very considerable increase in the amount to be voted. A sum of £210,000 is to be voted for accommodation for personnel. There is another considerable increase in Item (g) for dockyards and factories—from £154,000 to £360,000. I should be glad if the Minister could give the House some idea of in what part of the world the greater part of that money will be spent.
    Mr. Wingfield Digby: The hon. Gentleman is quite right about the two items which he has picked out, because under the works programme in Vote 10 we are putting more emphasis on personnel accommodation, and we are endeavouring to make it very much better. In the earlier debate some remarks were made about accommodation afloat, and it was generally realised that it is very difficult to have a very high standard of accommodation afloat. Therefore, we are particularly anxious that the standard of shore accommodation should be improved.
    To deal with married quarters, although it is quite true that many of them—in fact, nearly all of them—come under Vote 15, there will be no question of cutting our married quarters programme. That is in full swing in the three home ports and in other places. We have had certain difficulties in finding sites, but we are now going ahead with that programme. We are also going ahead with other living accommodation for single men.
    The question of the barracks at Devonport and of the new block for chief petty officers has been mentioned. I should like to say to my hon. Friend the Member for Devonport (Miss Vickers) that it is incorrect to say that this has not been fully used. From the moment the block was completed it was 69 per cent. full. In addition to that, there were a very large number of chief and petty officers living out who came in there during the day. I was down there the other day, and I think the standard of accommodation is good, but we have to face the fact that much of the shore accommodation that we have is not very satisfactory and that it is desirable to improve it. That is why, in Vote 10 next year, we are placing increased emphasis on our personnel accommodation and
    668
    also on dockyard buildings, which were mentioned in the earlier debate. That is where the money is going.
    There is another point I should make in this connection: we are putting a great deal more money into care and maintenance to try to raise the standard of repairs. We have also been putting more money into minor works: small items which have tended in the difficult years since the war to get squeezed out.
    The hon. Gentleman asked me if I could say where this money was being expended abroad. I am afraid that I could not say for certain without notice. I would suspect that a certain amount of it is being spent in Malta, but I can assure the hon. Member that both at home and abroad we have comprehensive plans for improving service accommodation. A special survey was made a few years ago by a rear-admiral, who went round all the establishments and tried to decide which were those that most needed improvement to their accommodation. Although there have to be changes from time to time, because of a new emergency arising, we have attempted to stick to our plans, and I hope that we shall get the best possible value for money in the improvement of this accommodation.
    There is one further point which the hon. Member for Devonport mentioned in regard to hirings. She asked whether hirings could be unfurnished as well as furnished. I will look into that matter, but I am told that there are considerable difficulties in doing that, and that there is a danger that the civilian population might feel that the Royal Navy is taking more than its share of accommodation in the home ports. We are, however, trying to obtain more furnished accommodation, and I will look into the point which the hon. Lady has raised.
    Mr. Gresham Cooke: I notice that under Subhead C, relating to minor new works, the figure has gone up by £236,000. We do not want to build minor new works like castles, and I think that we should make some use here of modern technique in semi-permanent buildings. After all, these places have not got to last a very long time, and we should try to economise in new works. I notice that the amount under the heading of "Ordinary Repairs and Maintenance" has increased by a considerable amount, and I suppose that in some cases that

    669
    means renovation. Looking through all these Estimates relating to new works, I suggest that the time has arrived when we ought to look at them with the utmost care, because we do not want more capital expenditure or a greater call on our manpower and materials than we can afford.
    It being half-past Nine o'clock, The CHAIRMAN proceeded, pursuant to Standing Order No. 16 (Business of Supply) to put the Question necessary to dispose of the Vote under consideration.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolved,
    That a sum, not exceeding £17,950,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the expense of works, buildings and repairs at home and abroad, including the cost of superintendence, purchase of sites, grants and other charges connected therewith, which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957.
    The CHAIRMAN then proceeded to put severally the Questions, That the total amounts outstanding in such Estimates for the Navy Services for the coming financial year as have been put down on at least one previous day for consideration on an allotted day, and the total amounts of all outstanding Estimates supplementary to those of the current financial year as have been presented seven clear days, and of all outstanding Excess Votes, be granted for the Services defined in those Estimates, Supplementary Estimates and Statements of Excess:

    NAVY ESTIMATES, 1956–57
    That a sum, not exceeding £30,569,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1957. for expenditure in respect of the Navy Services, viz.:—

    £

    11. Miscellaneous Effective Services

    11,291,300

    13. Non-Effective Services

    19,257,000

    14. Merchant Shipbuilding and Repair

    20,600

    15. Additional Married Quarters

    100

    £30,569,000

    Question put and agreed to.

    CIVIL ESTIMATES AND ESTIMATES FOR REVENUE DEPARTMENTS, SUPPLEMEN TARY ESTIMATE, 1955–56
    That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £58,542,438, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, for expenditure in respect of the following Supplementary Estimate, viz.:—

    CIVIL ESTIMATES

    CLASS I

    £

    4. Treasury and Subordinate Departments

    19,500

    8. Civil Service Commission

    12,700

    9. Exchequer and Audit Department

    1,100

    12. Government Chemist

    3,235

    14. The Royal Mint

    10

    15. National Debt Office

    10

    16. National Savings Committee

    30,000

    24. Miscellaneous Expenses

    10

    26. Scottish Record Office

    10

    CLASS II

    2. Foreign Office Grants and Services

    9,875,025

    4. United Nations

    300,000

    6. Commonwealth Services

    10

    9. Colonial Services

    10

    CLASS III

    1. Home Office

    42,000

    2. Home Office (Civil Defence Services)

    10

    3. Police, England and Wales

    1,845,000

    7. Carlisle State Management District

    10

    8. Supreme Court of Judicature &c.

    10

    9. County Courts

    134,915

    13. Law Charges

    7,000

    15. Scottish Home Department (Civil Defence Services)

    10

    16. Police, Scotland

    239,000

    17. Prisons, Scotland

    9,000

    19. Fire Services, Scotland

    16,800

    20. State Management Districts, Scotland

    10

    21. Law Charges and Courts of Law, Scotland

    10

    22. Department of the Registers of Scotland

    10

    23. Supreme Court of Judicature, &c., Northern Ireland

    10

    CLASS IV

    £

    4. Imperial War Museum

    10

    8. National Maritime Museum

    343

    11. Grants for Science and the Arts

    92,000

    13. Broadcasting

    802,000

    CLASS V

    I. Ministry of Housing and Local Government

    10

    2. Housing, England and Wales

    1,700,000

    5. National Health Service, England and Wales

    11,499,010

    7. Registrar General's Office

    10

    9. War Damage Commission

    10

    11. National Health Service, Scotland

    1,122,640

    CLASS VI

    1. Board of Trade

    128,000

    2. Board of Trade (Assistance to Industry and Trading Services)

    10

    8. Ministry of Labour and National Service

    168,000

    9. Ministry of Supply

    5,400,000

    CLASS VII

    1. Ministry of Works

    775,000

    10. Stationery and Printing

    635,000

    11. Central Office of Information

    37,700

    CLASS VIII

    4. Fishery Grants and Services

    800,000

    9. Forestry Commission

    150,000

    12. Department of Agriculture for Scotland

    10

    Schedule

    Sums not exceeding

    Supply Grants

    Appropriations in Aid

    Vote

    £

    £

    1.

    Pay, &c., of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines

    …

    Cr. 100,000

    —

    2.

    Victualling and Clothing for the Navy

    …

    …

    …

    Cr. 500,000

    *- 400,000

    4.

    Civilians employed on Fleet Services

    …

    …

    …

    550,000

    —

    6.

    Scientific Services

    …

    …

    …

    800,000

    —

    7.

    Royal Naval Reserves

    …

    …

    …

    100,000

    —

    8.

    Shipbuilding, Repairs, Maintenance, &c.—

    Section I—Personnel

    …

    …

    …

    1,850,010

    600,000

    Section II—Matériel

    …

    …

    …

    950,000

    2,150,000

    Section III—Contract Work

    …

    …

    …

    Cr. 3,700,000

    —

    9.

    Naval Armaments

    …

    …

    …

    Cr. 500,000

    750,000

    10.

    Works, Buildings and Repairs at Home and Abroad

    …

    170,000

    200,000

    11.

    Miscellaneous Effective Services

    …

    …

    …

    Cr. 100,000

    —

    12.

    Admiralty Office

    …

    …

    …

    180,000

    —

    13.

    Non-Effective Services

    …

    …

    …

    300,000

    —

    15.

    Additional Married Quarters

    …

    …

    …

    —

    *- 300,000

    Total, Navy (Supplementary) 1955–56

    …

    £

    10

    3,000,000

    * Deficit

    Question put and agreed to.

    CLASS IX

    £

    1. Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation

    593,100

    2. Roads, etc.

    838,000

    4. Civil Aviation

    10

    7. Atomic Energy

    3,550,000

    8. Department of Scientific and Industrial Research

    10

    CLASS X

    1. Superannuation and Retired Allowances

    330,550

    2. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance

    83,800

    4. National Insurance and Family Allowances

    494,000

    REVENUE DEPARTMENTS

    1. Customs and Excise

    108,800

    2. Inland Revenue

    500,000

    3. Post Office

    16,199,000

    £58,542,438

    Question put and agreed to.

    NAVY SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATE, 1955–56
    That a Supplementary sum, not exceeding £10, be granted to Her Majesty, to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1956, for expenditure beyond the sum already provided in the grants for Navy Services for the year.

    CIVIL (EXCESSES), 1954–55

    That a sum not exceeding £20, be granted to Her Majesty, to make good excesses on certain grants for Civil Services for the year ended on the 31st day of March, 1955.

    Schedule

    Number of Vote

    Class V

    Excess Vote

    £

    s.

    d.

    £

    s.

    d.

    1

    Ministry of Housing and Local Government—

    Subhead B.1. (Grants under the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Acts, 1944 and 1951)—balance of excess expenditure not authorised to be met from savings on other subheads of the Vote

    402,758

    5

    0

    Less—Net savings available on other subheads

    402,748

    5

    0

    10

    0

    0

    11.

    National Health Service, Scotland—

    Subheads P.1. and P.3. (Civil Defence Services (Capital Expenditure), and (Purchase and Storage of Materials for Reserve))—balance of excess expenditure not authorised to be met from savings on other subheads of the Vote

    122,751

    8

    5

    Less—Net savings available on other subheads

    122,741

    8

    5

    10

    0

    0

    Total Civil (Excesses)

    £20

    0

    0

    Question put and agreed to.
    Resolutions to be reported.
    Report to be received Tomorrow Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

    WAYS AND MEANS
    Considered in Committee.
    [Sir CHARLES MACANDREW in the Chair]
    Resolved,
    That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ended on the 31st March, 1955, the sum of £20 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.—[Mr. H. Brooke.]
    Resolved,
    That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st March, 1956, the sum of £64,333,558 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.—[Mr. H. Brooke.]
    Resolved,
    That towards making good the Supply granted to Her Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st March, 1957, the sum of £1,764,835,100 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.—[Mr. H. Brooke.]
    Resolutions to be reported.
    Report to be received Tomorrow; Committee to sit again Tomorrow.

    CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION BILL [Lords]
    As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

    Clause 18.—(CONSTITUTION FOR PURPOSES OF APPEALS OF COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS FOR LONDON.)
    9.33 p.m.
    The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. W. F. Deedes): I beg to move, in page 17, line 8 at the end to insert:
    (4) For the purposes of section eight of the Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals) Act, 1933, in its application to appeals from a juvenile court, the panel constituted under subsection (2) of that section shall include, in addition to the the members provided for by that subsection, a special section consisting of—

    (a) fifteen justices to be nominated annually from amongst themselves by the members of the panel constituted for juvenile courts in the metropolitan stipendiary court area under paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule to the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933; and

    (b) one justice to be nominated annually from amongst themselves by the members of any panel constituted under paragraph 1 of that Schedule for juvenile courts in a petty sessional division of the county of London not wholly comprised in that area;

    and arrangements shall be made to secure that, so far as practicable, when an appeal from a juvenile court is to be heard by the court of quarter sessions for the county of London, members of the special section will be available to sit with the chairman of the court, and will be not less than half the justices so sitting:

    675
    Provided that this subsection shall not have effect in relation to any appeal entered by the clerk of the peace before such day as the Secretary of State may appoint by order made by statutory instrument
    This Amendment was put down to meet a point raised by the hon. Member for Widnes (Mr. MacColl) in Committee, where I undertook to meet his point with our draft. This is our draft. The hon. Gentleman was concerned that there was no provision to secure that justices with juvenile court experience were included in an appeal court hearing appeals from the London juvenile courts. I think this meets the intention which the hon. Gentleman had in mind.
    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 21.—(SHORT TITLE, EXTENT AND REPEAL.)
    Amendment made: In page 18, line 9, at beginning insert:
    "In addition to the enactments repealed by section nineteen of this Act."—[Mr. Deedes.]
    Bill read the Third time and passed, with Amendments.

    SUNDAY CINEMATOGRAPH ENTERTAINMENTS
    Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Borough of Hyde, [copy laid before the House 12th March], approved.—[Mr. Deedes.]
    Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Urban District of Mexborough, [copy laid before the House 12th March], approved.—[Mr. Deedes.]
    Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, extending Section 1 of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Rural District of West Lancashire, [copy laid before the House 12th March], approved.—[Mr. Deedes.]

    DRIVING TESTS, SHEFFIELD
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. E. Wakefield.]
    9.36 p.m.
    Sir Peter Roberts: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the question of the delay in the testing of learner drivers, a matter of which I have given notice to my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and I hope that he will attend the debate. I am very pleased to see my hon. Friend the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department in his place, and I hope that he will be able to answer the problems which I shall put to the House, but I am a little distressed to note that my other hon. Friend is not yet here.
    However, I will develop my argument as best I may and hope that he will at some time attend our deliberations and that if he does not come, my hon. Friend will make a note of what I have to say and suggest to his hon. Friend that he looks at it diligently. I have raised this question with the Joint Parliamentary Secretary by letter and in an interview with him. Whether it is because of the letter and the interview that he is not here tonight, I do not know. It would have been a little more courteous if he had been here, knowing that the House was likely to rise earlier than usual. These matters are of some concern to a number of people in Sheffield.
    The problem is that Sheffield has a waiting list for the testing of learner drivers which at present means that there is a delay of two months. By the time the summer comes, if my calculations and general information are correct, that delay, if nothing else is done, will increase to three months. Someone who wants to take a test and who puts down his name and feels able to take a test, possibly in June, will have to wait possibly until September. I believe that that is far too long.
    The matter is made even worse by the fact that, owing to the bad weather, 700 cases have had to be put back. These 700 who have already waited two months, will have to wait another two months, making a total of four months' delay. The total

    677
    number of people waiting for tests in the Sheffield area is 1,300. I should like to quote from the Sheffield Telegraph which says:
    "An official of the Yorkshire Traffic Area headquarters at Leeds"—
    and I hope my hon. Friend will note that this is from the Parliamentary Secretary's own Department—
    "told the Sheffield Telegraph yesterday: ' We have a tremendous back-log of people waiting to take their tests and it will be seven or eight weeks before we can fix them all up again."
    That is seven or eight weeks after they have already waited two months. I believe that this merits special consideration. It is not a question of the ordinary run of administration. The matter has become so bad in Sheffield that the Minister should take special cognisance of it and, I suggest, come down to the House of Commons when this matter is raised and deal with it as an emergency.
    I want to make it quite clear that I am not suggesting that those who are unqualified to drive should by some method of quick testing get through and possibly be allowed to drive on their own. I am not suggesting that or anything like it. I am suggesting that there is a duty upon the Minister, and through him the Ministry, to consider those people who have properly learned to drive a car and who wish to take their test, and not leave them waiting for this long period.
    I am glad to see that my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport has now arrived. I am grateful to him for coming to listen to this problem concerning Sheffield. I am sorry that the debate started a little earlier than was expected and that I have developed quite a large part of my argument. I do not propose to go over it again and I hope that the Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department will tell his hon. Friend what I have been saying.
    I will point out again the gravamen of the main charge which I am making. First, that there are 1,300 people waiting for driving tests in Sheffield. As I said, the Minister has a responsibility to these people, because some may have bought cars and have to wait a considerable time before they can enjoy the use of them. It is even more likely that they have to hire cars and also take lessons from
    678
    instructors, which is an expensive business, and they may have to go on hiring cars and taking instructions when they are already able to drive, in order, as they say, to keep their hands in. I believe, therefore, that the Minister has some responsibility towards these people.
    I should like to make some suggestions to him. The first and most obvious is one which I know he has carried out—that is to advertise for and to try to get more testers. I appreciate the difficulty, but I believe that is should not be beyond the powers of his Department to get more testers and to get them quickly.
    There are two temporary measures which I suggest because I believe the position in Sheffield has now become so bad that there temporary expedients should be taken. The first is that my hon. Friend should approach the Army authorities to see whether it is possible to get experienced Army driving testers, because there are many of these people about, to help deal with the present emergency in Sheffield.
    I was explaining, before my hon. Friend arrived, that owing to the bad weather about 700 cases have had to be put back and these people will have had to wait four months before they can be tested. Therefore, this is an emergency which needs special consideration. It might be possible to get over this "hump," as it were, by asking the Army to lend a certain number of men, which I believe it would be prepared to do.
    The second suggestion is that it might also be possible to approach the Army to see if sergeants and others, leaving the Forces at the end of their term of service and going into civilian life, could not be canalised into this form of occupation. My third suggestion is that it may be possible to draw in, as a temporary measure, testers from other areas where the backlog is not so great. I cannot believe that the backlog is so big in the rest of the country as it is in Sheffield. It would be a shocking thing if it were. I suggest that this is the sort of administrative problem which has to be met day by day. Such problems are successfully met and I do not think that this is one which the Minister cannot overcome.
    I wish to raise with my hon. Friend the question of the administration of these tests. As he knows, at present the administration is through the Leeds office

    679
    of the Ministry. I understand that in Sheffield about 350 people are tested each week. That is in Sheffield alone. If we took in the neighbouring areas of Rotherham, Barnsley, Chesterfield and Doncaster—I am glad to see the hon. Member for Doncaster (Mr. Barber) is present in the Chamber—it would make an administrative unit such as I believe it is possible to contemplate. When I put this to my hon. Friend during an earlier interview, I thought that he was unfriendly to the idea. I hope that tonight I may hear something more favourable. I should like to know whether he thinks the idea is practicable. I have made inquiries and I believe that there is accommodation available in Sitwell Street, in Sheffield, so that it is not the case that sufficient office room could not be found if an office were to be contemplated for Sheffield.
    I have drawn attention to examples of what I think is extravagance in the Leeds administration, such as the use of telegrams and telephone calls. I am glad to say that since I raised the matter the position has improved, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the action he has taken. I believe that the administration has been tightened up. Even so, one continually finds difficulty, if one does not make use of these more expensive forms of communication, because there is long delay regarding letters and communications of that kind. I believe that in Sheffield we have a right to the efficient service which we should get were an office operated in Sheffield to serve Sheffield and the surrounding district.
    That brings me to the point about the cost of the administration. I understand that each person tested pays a fee of 10s. which means that from the Sheffield area alone they must be taking about £170 a week. If one allows a reasonable fee for each of the testers it means that on balance there is a profit made out of Sheffield alone of about £70 or £80 a week. That could be used to run an office in Sheffield and so provide a better administrative machine there. The money is available and I see no reason why the service should not also be available.
    To sum up, the points which I believe the Minister must face are these. First, an emergency problem has arisen because of the bad weather which has resulted in
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    1,300 people having to wait to be tested; and I believe that emergency action should be taken, either by bringing in people from outside, or using Service personnel if necessary, so that the duties placed on the Minister by Act of Parliament may be carried out. Secondly, he should consider the provision of a centralised office in Sheffield, which would, I believe, provide a more efficient service for the residents living in Sheffield and district. I believe that that would also result in a financial saving, although my hon. Friend may be able to say more about that tonight. Thirdly, I believe that if my hon. Friend will come to Sheffield—it is not so far away—and look at the problem on the spot, he will realise that there is a special problem. We shall be pleased to see him and to give him every facility.
    It is a problem that is getting worse and not better, and one which it is a duty for him to solve. I have suggested some methods by which he might do so. I hope, therefore, that we shall be able to hear from him tonight that these people who are now waiting can have some hope of speedy testing in the future.
    9.50 p.m.
    The Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (Mr. Hugh Molson): I should like to begin by apologising to my hon. Friend the Member for Heeley (Sir P. Roberts) for the fact that, owing to transport difficulties in London, I was a little late arriving to answer the debate. It is an extremely good thing that those concerned with the Ministry of Transport should, on occasions, understand how difficult it is to move rapidly about the Metropolis.
    My hon. Friend has raised, on behalf of his constituents, the general problem of obtaining a rapid driving test for a person who is applying for a licence. My hon. Friend set out his problems in order. He suggested that the difficulties in Sheffield were worse than in other parts of the country, but I am sorry to say that that is not so. We are confronted with a great problem everywhere.
    The average waiting period in Sheffield—between the receipt of an application and the date of the appointment for a driving test—is now about seven weeks. That is also the average for all parts of the country. It is a little worse than it

    681
    was a short time ago, because many appointments had to be cancelled owing to the bad weather, but in view of our experience in the past of the great increase in the number of applications which occurs when spring and summer come along, we do not expect any great improvement in this respect in the near future.
    We are doing all we can to recruit additional driving examiners, and so far this year there has been a considerable improvement. At the same time, the number of applicants each year is increasing more rapidly than we can recruit examiners. In 1953, the Department received 691,000 applications for driving tests; in 1954, this figure had risen to 836,000, and in 1955, to 991,000. We expect that in the current year it may rise to over 1 million.
    Recruitment of driving examiners is reasonably satisfactory. We have had many applications, but we do not intend to lower the standard that we require of those who are to be entrusted with responsible work of this kind. I am bound to say, therefore, that although the number of new examiners whom we are recruiting is greater than it has been in the last few years, I am not at all sure that it will be sufficient to deal with the greatly increased number of applicants for driving tests.
    My hon. Friend asked whether we were satisfied that our present organisation was as well calculated to deal with the applications which are made as it could be. My hon. Friend sits for one of the divisions of Sheffield and naturally he is anxious to ensure that something special shall be done for Sheffield. That is the duty of all representatives of constituencies, and I make no complaint that he should be raising this matter.
    Our general system of administration is this. We have examiners in all the large towns, but we have a different arrangement for fixing appointments. It is obviously desirable that appointments shall be allocated among examiners from a central organisation. We have therefore, not departed from the principle that the allocation of appointments shall be done in the office of the traffic commissioners. Applications from Sheffield are dealt with in the office of the Traffic Commissioner for Yorkshire.
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    My hon. Friend put forward a plea in favour of Sheffield, which is a large and important city, but we have to take into account the logical consequences if we depart from the general principle that the appointments are allocated where the traffic commissioners have their offices. If we decentralised the job to Sheffield, we should obviously have to do the same for all other large towns. We could not do otherwise, for example, for Liverpool, which at present has no office where these appointments can be made.
    In my hon. Friend's own county of Yorkshire, the number of applications in Hull for driving tests last week was larger than it was in Sheffield. Therefore, if once we were prepared to concede the principle for which my hon. Friend is asking it could not be confined to Sheffield, historic and remarkable though that city is.
    Sir P. Roberts: Would that be necessarily bad? My hon. Friend has introduced no argument in favour of centralisation. It might be very good to decentralise these things.
    Mr. Molson: That was the third point which my hon. Friend raised, and I was going to deal with it in its logical sequence. I am only concerned at the moment to point out, when my hon. Friends puts forward this claim on behalf of Sheffield, that it could not be confined to Sheffield but would necessarily apply to other cities. We have decentralised the offices from which the examiners exercise their duties. The question is how far we should decentralise the making of appointments.
    This matter of making appointments is rather difficult. All applications are dealt with in the order in which they are made, and those who apply are able to say whether some particular day of the week suits them and whether there is some particular day when they are in any case unable to accept an appointment.
    Those matters are taken into account—
    It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Barber.]
    Mr. Molson: Those matters are taken into account, and appointments are made

    683
    to suit, so far as possible, the convenience of applicants.
    There are occasions when climatic conditions make it impossible or undesirable for the examination to be held. It would obviously not be fair to the applicant if he were asked to take his test on a day when, owing to frost or fog or snow or whatever it may be, the difficulties of driving were very much greater than they normally are. In those cases we try to give the earliest possible notice to the applicant. It is for that reason that in the application form the applicant is asked to give his telephone number, if any, in order that he may be given the earliest indication that it is not thought suitable for the test to take place that day.
    There are also a number of cases—and these give rise, perhaps, to the most bitter feelings—when the examiner himself, owing to illness or some particular cause, is unable to do his work on a certain day. Of course, it does create a great feeling of hardship in the applicant, when he himself is perfectly prepared to take the test and receives, either by postcard or by telephone or by telegram, at the last moment. notification that the examiner is unable to conduct the test. But it is obviously inevitable that that should happen on a number of occasions.
    I come, then, to the question of whether my hon. Friend's request is reasonable whether, in Sheffield and in every other place where there are a number of examiners at work, it would be reasonable also to have clerks giving out the appointments. In Sheffield, the work that would be required would be a little more than could be done by one junior clerk and would not be really quite enough to justify the employment of two junior clerks.
    Sir P. Roberts: I did suggest that it was easier to cover Doncaster, Rotherham and Chesterfield from Sheffield instead of from Leeds. It is a question of more easy administration.
    Mr. Molson: I will come to that question of ease of administration. At the moment I am dealing with the question of whether it is desirable to decentralise the allocation of appointments as well as decentralising the offices from which the examiners work.
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    When one is trying to allocate appointments for a large number of applicants amongst a number of examiners there is a great deal to be said for centralisation. It means that we are able to treat as a single pool all the applications which are made and to distribute them where the general demand makes it most convenient to do so. If all the applications for appointments, either for Sheffield or for the immediate neighbourhood of Sheffield, were to be made to clerks working in an office in Sheffield, it would be possible for them to allocate appointments amongst the examiners only from the applications which they were receiving from that particular area. We encourage applicants to let us know what day in the week and what hour is most convenient to them for the appointment and when it would be impossible for them to accept an appointment.
    If, therefore, we opened a new office in Sheffield, where the appointments were to be allocated, it would be necessary to have more clerks than we have at present in Leeds dealing with the applications from Sheffield and district, and it would also be necessary for one of the two officials dealing with the matter to be of a more senior status in order to deal with difficulties which arose.
    As my hon. Friend has been good enough to say, he has both written to me on the subject and discussed it with i me. We have looked carefully into it in order to see whether it would be possible to consult the convenience of the applicants in that area better than it is being consulted at present, and also whether that could be done without any substantial increase in expenditure. After that examination, we do not believe that it would result in any increase in the convenience of the applicants in the area, and we are quite convinced, after having gone into the figures, that it would result in employing officials of a higher category who could not be used as efficiently as they are at the moment. It would therefore result in an increase in public expenditure.
    During his speech, my hon. Friend indicated his view that the Government were at present making a profit from tests in Sheffield.
    Sir P. Roberts: No.
    Mr. Molson: He seemed to me to be of the opinion that we were making a

    685
    profit out of the tests now taking place in Sheffield. In fact, the cost of administration is greater than the amount which we receive, and we therefore should not feel justified in increasing the loss which we are sustaining at present. We believe that if we did so it would not result in any increase in convenience to his constituents.
    Sir P. Roberts: Should I be correct in saying that in my hon. Friend's answer tonight he has taken more account of the administrative convenience of his Department than of the convenience of those in Sheffield who are taking their tests?
    Mr. Molson: I had hoped that I had convinced my hon. Friend that from the point of view of his constituents, as from the point of view of everybody else, it is desirable that the allocation of appointments for the whole of Yorkshire should be centralised. I am in no way ashamed to say that the Government are not prepared at present to embark upon increasing facilities if that will lead to increased cost of administration.
    Question put and agreed to.
    Adjourned accordingly at ten minutes past Ten o'clock.

TRADE AND COMMERCE
  Flax Factory, Ripley
  Flax Factory, Ripley
  Tin (Production and Consumption)
  Tin (Production and Consumption)
  Bacon (Quota Restriction)
  Bacon (Quota Restriction)
  Manufacturing Industries (Reliefs)
  Manufacturing Industries (Reliefs)
  Television Programmes (Dollar Expenditure)
  Television Programmes (Dollar Expenditure)
  Electronics Industry, South-West Middlesex
  Electronics Industry, South-West Middlesex
  Imported Films
  Imported Films
  Pensions (Increase) Bill
  Pensions (Increase) Bill
  Greyhound Racing (Pool Betting Duty)
  Greyhound Racing (Pool Betting Duty)
  Ministers of Religion (Tax Assessment)
  Ministers of Religion (Tax Assessment)
  Sterling Area (Capital Development Projects)
  Sterling Area (Capital Development Projects)
  Industrial Production
  Industrial Production
  Technical Education (Overseas Students)
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  Civil Servants, London (Overtime)
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  Yeadon Aerodrome (Customs Facilities)
  Yeadon Aerodrome (Customs Facilities)
  Control Arrangements, South Africa
  Control Arrangements, South Africa
  Public Works Loan Board
  Public Works Loan Board
NATIONAL FINANCE
  Sterling Balances
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  New Rating Valuations (Income Tax)
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  Imperial Institute
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AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD
  Hill Farming and Livestock Rearing (Legislation)
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  Imported Ware Potatoes (Inspection)
  Imported Ware Potatoes (Inspection)
  Herring Fishery, East Anglia
  Herring Fishery, East Anglia
  Icelandic Fisheries (Negotiations)
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  Milk Sales (Survey)
  Milk Sales (Survey)
EMPLOYMENT
  Radio Industry, South-West Middlesex
  Radio Industry, South-West Middlesex
  Electrical and Musical Industries, Hayes
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  Coal-Mining (Lost Working Days)
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  Factory Inspectorate (Promotion Policy)
  Earnings and Cost of Living
  Earnings and Cost of Living
NATIONAL SERVICE
  Personal Case
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HOME DEPARTMENT
  Wild Birds Protection Order
  Wild Birds Protection Order
  Territorial Waters (Thames Estuary)
  Territorial Waters (Thames Estuary)
  Aliens (Communist Countries)
  Aliens (Communist Countries)
EDUCATION
  Commonwealth Co-operation
  Commonwealth Co-operation
  Constantine College, Middlesbrough
  Constantine College, Middlesbrough
  Teachers, Tipton
  Teachers, Tipton
  Technical Colleges (Part-Time Teachers)
  Technical Colleges (Part-Time Teachers)
  "Health and Education" (Publication)
  "Health and Education" (Publication)
  Technical College Students (Awards)
  Technical College Students (Awards)
  Building Programme
  Building Programme
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
  Rateable Value Tables (White Paper)
  Rateable Value Tables (White Paper)
PENSIONS AND NATIONAL INSURANCE
  Retirement Pension and National Assistance (Rates)
  Retirement Pension and National Assistance (Rates)
MINISTRY OF SUPPLY
  Government Surplus Stocks (Disposal)
  Government Surplus Stocks (Disposal)
  Ordnance Factory, Dalmuir
  Ordnance Factory, Dalmuir
SCOTLAND
  Hospitals (Cost of Food)
  Hospitals (Cost of Food)
  Herring Industry (Subsidies)
  Herring Industry (Subsidies)
  Mental Hospitals (Patients)
  Mental Hospitals (Patients)
  Teachers' Qualifications (Committee)
  Teachers' Qualifications (Committee)
  Roads (Transfer of Responsibility)
  Roads (Transfer of Responsibility)
Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers
  CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
  Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

  PRIVATE BILL STANDING ORDERS
  2.35 p.m.
  THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DROGHEDA): My Lords, the Amendments proposed to be made are purely drafting Amendments, consequential upon the passing of the City of London (Loans) Act last year. I beg to move that the Amendments be agreed to.
  Moved, That the following Amendments be made to the Standing Orders relating to Private Bills, etc.:—
  Standing Order 175, page 72, line 5, lines 10 and 11 and lines 44 and 45, leave out ("(Finance Consolidation) Act, 1912") and insert ("(Loans) Act, 1955")—(The Earl of Drogheda.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to: the said Standing Order amended accordingly.

  BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, on behalf of the noble Marquess the Lord President of the Council, I beg to move the Motion standing in his name on the Order Paper.
  Moved, That Standing Order No. 41 be considered in order to its being dispensed with for the purpose of passing the Pakistan (Consequential Provision) Bill
  446
  through its remaining stages.—(Earl Fortescue.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I have to inform your Lordships that it has been agreed, through the usual channels, that we shall not adjourn for dinner this evening but will sit right through.

  SUNDAY ENTERTAINMENTS ACT, 1932
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (LORD MANCROFT): My Lords, the three Orders standing in my name on the Order Paper are in the usual form and of the usual content, and there is nothing to which I need draw your Lordships' attention. Accordingly, I beg to move the first Order standing in my name.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending section one of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Borough of Hyde, be approved.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I beg to move that the second Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending section one of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Urban District of Mexborough, be approved.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.
  LORD MANCROFT: My Lords, I beg to move that the third Order be approved.
  Moved, That the Order made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, for extending section one of the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, to the Rural District of West Lancashire, be approved.—(Lord Mancroft.)
  On Question, Motion agreed to.

  ARCHDEACON JOHNSON'S ALMSHOUSE CHARITY (OAKHAM AND UPPINGHAM) SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, in rising to move the Second Reading of this Bill, I only want to say briefly that it has already passed all stages in another place. The purpose of the Bill is to substitute a new board of trustees for the board established in the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. The new governing body, composed of trustees living in the locality will be better able to take an active part in the administration of the charity. It is the dissolution of this ancient corporation that requires the authority of Parliament. The Scheme has been published and no objection has been received.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  BAPTIST CHAPEL AND OTHER CHARITIES (TOTNES AND TUCKENHAY) SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, in rising to move the Second Reading of this Bill, which has already passed through another place without opposition, I should like to say, briefly, that the purpose of the Bill is to amalgamate the Totnes Baptist Church with the Totnes Congregational Church. To do this it is necessary to remove the dedication of buildings (manse, schools, et cetera) and money to purposes of the Baptist and Congregational causes respectively: and at the same time to provide, to meet the wishes of the respective bodies, that if the experiment fails and there is a parting, each shall get its property back with the old trusts attached. The amalgamation cannot proceed unless Parliament approves, and accordingly I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  LEIGH ALMSHOUSE, STONELEIGH AND OTHER CHARITIES SCHEME CONFIRMATION BILL
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD AMULREE: My Lords, this is a similar Bill to the first one of which I have moved the Second Reading and, like the first, it has already passed through another place without opposition. The purpose of the Bill is to appoint a new board of trustees for these Charities in Warwickshire. It is felt that the new trustees, being local people, will take more interest than a widely scattered body of trustees, and the amalgamation of the charities will make for the better use of the money. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (Lord Amulree.)
  On Question, Bill read 2a; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

  SOLICITORS (AMENDMENT) BILL [H.L.]
  Amendments reported (according to Order).

  PAKISTAN (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISION) BILL
  2.41 p.m.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS (THE EARL OF HOME): My Lords, the 2nd March of this year was a landmark of some significance in the history of the Commonwealth because it was on that day that the Governor-General of Pakistan consented to the Republican Constitution, and it was on that day, too, that the Constituent Assembly passed a resolution that Pakistan, although she was a Republic, wished to remain in the Commonwealth. So I am happy now to move this Bill, the object of which is quite simple: to secure that the rights and privileges which the people of Pakistan enjoy under the law of the United Kingdom shall be maintained in their new status. Without this Bill those rights and privileges would lapse. Clause 1 therefore provides that

  449
  the conditions which apply personally or to the goods and property of the people of Pakistan in this country to-day shall continue to apply. There are. too, what might be called certain minor attributes and advantages of the Commonwealth relationship which under this Bill will also be maintained.
  The people of Pakistan have given much thought to the form of her Constitution, and in this they have been wise. Our Constitution has been running for some hundreds of years, and even now from time to time it gives us a little trouble. Nevertheless, we think it is the best of its kind. It is based, in our opinion, on sound principles, but it is, nevertheless, flexible enough to meet the changing needs of the people who are its masters. It is therefore a matter of great satisfaction to us to-day that Pakistan has adopted die British model for her Parliamentary system, and we can hope and trust that it will bring unity and strength to the nation. I have myself lately, in other fields, had the opportunity to see how Pakistan is showing a new strength of purpose and vitality. It was not easy, after the partition of the subcontinent of India, for the people of Pakistan to set about the task of building up their administration or their industry and commerce. Yet in the last seven years the country has. I think, achieved marvels.
  In the economic field, Pakistan is making steady improvement, and more and more she is playing a constructive part in world affairs and shouldering the responsibilities of an independent and a great country. I should like to say now how much the United Kingdom values the association with Pakistan in these fields of activity, which lead, we hope, to the increased security, peace and prosperity of the world. If to-day we have any regrets that Pakistan should cease to be a Dominion, they are swallowed up in our hopes and aspirations for her future. There is no limit to the benefit which our varied Commonwealth of free and adult peoples can confer upon mankind if we act together with understanding and wisdom. I am sure that your Lordships, in giving a Second Reading to this
  450
  Bill, will send your good wishes to our friends as they set out on this great adventure with us to-Jay. I beg to move.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.— (The Earl of Home.)
  2.46 p.m.
  LORD PETHICK-LAWRENCE: My Lords, in rising to associate noble Lords on these Benches with the Motion before the House, I desire to say that we are glad that the great people of Pakistan, with whom we have had so many happy associations in the past, have created a Constitution to their liking, and, still more, that they have decided to remain with us in the Commonwealth. We are confident that from their so doing, both we and they will derive much mutual benefit. It is a particular pleasure to me on this occasion to be flanked by my noble friend Lord Attlee who, as Prime Minister, played a notable part in the birth of Pakistan, and on my right by the noble Viscount, who went with me to the Indian sub-continent in 1946 and who worked so hard to solve the intricate political problems of that country. They have desired me especially to associate them with my expression of welcome to the new Republic, and to wish to it many years of growing prosperity and fruitful contributions to the welfare of mankind.
  LORD REA: My Lords, it is hardly necessary for me to add that we on these Benches wish the best of luck to this Bill and all that it entails, and all that it will bring about the future. It is customary to refer to such a measure as non-controversial. In this instance, it seems to me that that is a gross understatement, and I would only add that we wish that it will achieve all it seeks to achieve. I endorse the remarks of the noble Lord on my left, that it is fortunate that this Bill should go through on the day that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who is about to address your Lordships' House, should be making a maiden speech here on a subject not unallied with this.
  On Question, Bill read 2a; Committee negatived. Then, Standing Order No. 41 having been dispensed with (pursuant to Resolution), Bill read 3a, and passed.

  THE MIDDLE EAST
  2.48 p.m.
  EARL ATTLEE EARL ATTLEE rose to call attention to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and in Cyprus; and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I rise to move the Motion on the Paper in my name. I rise with some trepidation in your Lordships' House at making a maiden speech. If, after thirty-three years in another place, any rags of oratorical virginity still cling about me, I crave your Lordships' indulgence if I should make any mistakes or commit offences against correct procedure. I am the more disturbed by the fact that I know that on these Benches there are many noble Lords with a far greater and more intimate knowledge of the areas with which this Motion is concerned than I could possibly have. I understand that a maiden speech should be non-contentious. I may find some difficulty in observing that, but at least the substance of my Motion, that there is deterioration of the situation in these areas, will, I think, be generally approved.
  I read with great interest the debate that took place in this House in December on the subject of the Middle East, and I recall that the noble Marquess the Leader of the House then made a wide survey. He said that one must see incidents in their proper proportion—I take it that that means both in space and in time. I shall endeavour not to put too great a strain on your Lordships' attention by going too far, either geographically or historically, but it is necessary that we should see recent incidents in their proper proportion. Therefore I am not intending to take your Lordships a long way back. I thought that that was admirably done in the last debate in this House by my noble friend Lord Henderson.
  We have this problem of the Middle East area. I have never been able to find out who invented the term "Middle East" or what has become of the Near East, unless, indeed, the Near East is now those areas that have become satellites of the U.S.S.R. I should have preferred the old name of "the Levant" for this area. During our term of office, which was not an easy one in the international sphere, we were occupied with two major problems: one was the defence of the West after the Berlin blockade, and the building
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  up of N.A.T.O., and the other was support of the United Nations in Korea. We realised that, apart from those East and West preoccupations, there was this large area, and we were quite sure that sooner or later the rulers of Russia, who are the inheritors not only of Lenin but of Catherine the Great, would be likely to turn their attention to these places.
  To my mind, there has been taking place in Asia during these years a contest—not just a physical contest but a contest in the world of ideas—between the totalitarianism that runs right across the North from the Ural mountains to the Pacific, and the area in which we have the beginnings of democracy and freedom, the central point of which is India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, which inherits our own tradition of freedom. That is an obvious field for trouble. During our lifetime, we have seen a wave of nationalism—I might almost say "Asianism"—spreading right across Asia in various manifestations, and it is quite clear that that reaches the Middle East, right through the Arab countries. There, there are areas with a low standard of life: there, there are rather insecure Governments: there, there is the centre of Islam. And in that area there are many difficulties which certainly could not be attributed to the present Government or even the Government of which I was a member.
  Not the least of the conflicting issues in that area results from the double promises given at the end of the First World War to the peoples of Israel and the Arab States. It has led to the rivalry of the dynasties of the Hashemites and the Saudis. Not to go into great detail, I realise, and always have realised, that while there is an Israel case, there is also an Arab case. I have never taken a view prejudiced in favour of one or the other. What we must obviously endeavour to do is to try to get peaceful co-existence as the beginning of a real friendship, if possible, in all that area.
  Since we left office, the difficulties have increased. Various new factors have come in. I think there are two major changes. First of all, there is the advent of the hydrogen bomb, with its wide implications in the sphere of strategy. We saw that notably in respect of Egypt. At one time the protection of the Canal was thought to be of vital interest; but we had

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  a declaration in another place from Sir Winston Churchill that the hydrogen bomb had changed all that. I think, too, it has changed the position of Cyprus—but of that a little later.
  Another major change has been the great development in oil production which has put money into the hands of States formerly much impoverished. We see various uses made of this wealth. At the top, I think, stands Iraq, where 70 per cent. of this wealth is being used for the benefit of the inhabitants. In other areas it has put into the hands of rulers the possibilities of intrigue and bribery, which are not uncommon there. But it is rather a sad thought that, in all these countries, from Greece right across Arabia, which really owe their freedom to Britain, we are not so popular as we could wish to be. It is deplorable that there should be so much ill-will. I am not minimising the difficulties. One of the great difficulties is that, in dealing with affairs in the East, one is apt to depend very much on single personalities. One of the great tragedies in the whole of this question was the assassination of King Abdullah, whom I personally regarded as the wisest statesman there. We also saw the death of the work of years of Ibn Saud.
  Now we come to the immediate matters which have given rise to this debate. I think there are two concerned particularly with the Middle East, and one concerned with Cyprus. We have in this Motion linked Cyprus and the Middle East because I do not think they are really severable in a broad survey of the whole field. We had the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. We must all deplore the method employed. To my mind, its importance is that Glubb Pasha, who did great work in building up the Arab Legion, was one of the great influences against rash breakings out of violence. The other has been the giving of arms from Communist countries to Egypt—modern weapons too, particularly aircraft. That makes the danger of another outbreak of war more imminent. Our interests there are, first of all, peace and the fulfilment of our obligations, both to Israel and to the Arab States. Secondly, there is the need to raise standards of life in order to remove the soil in which the seeds of Communism might sprout; and, thirdly, there are the interests of the West, both
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  strategically and economically, in oil—an interest which we share with the United States.
  I cannot think that we have been sufficiently clear in our policy. My Leader in another place set out, I felt, admirably and clearly, what should be our objectives. We need full talks with Jordan. I do not think that the sending of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was a particularly happy thought. Then, I believe, we need to get an understanding with the United States. With all friendliness to our American friends, I sometimes feel that they are apt rather to stand on the sideline and leave us to carry on the fight. They are not participators in the Baghdad Pact, the shield intended to protect the whole of that area; yet they draw more oil from what might be called the soft underbelly of that region than we ourselves do. In my time, they were not always helpful when we had to deal wit difficulties in Persia and Egypt. I think it is partly due to an outdated anti-colonialism. I am not sure that there has always been a proper link-up between the State Departments and the commercial interests of the oil firms, but certainly we need a full understanding there. We are often put to considerable difficulty over Israel, for whom there is naturally much support in the United States of America. While one would welcome an interest, one would have liked a little more responsibility.
  The present position is that we see arms piling up—modern arms—in what is called the beginnings of an arms race. We all deprecate an arms race. I always think it is a little hard on the people who have not already got off the mark. We seem to allow an arms race, but then we deny any arms to the people who are far behind. No one has suggested that we need to pile up arms in Israel to create an equality in quantity with other States. What I think Israel requires is a certain amount of modern weapons, particularly aircraft, as a deterrent. I do not regard that as falling in with an arms race, any more than I regarded it as such when we formed N.A.T.O. We did not form N.A.T.O. to compete in conflict with the U.S.S.R., but in order to give adequate arms as a deterrent against a sudden attack. I feel that to-day there is great trepidation in Israel because of the piling up of these arms.
  It is not my purpose this afternoon to go into all these technical questions on Israel and the Arab world, or the serious question of the refugees, because the existence of a large refugee population anywhere always makes for a ready-made agitation for violent action. But I am sure we need positive action there. We formed the Baghdad Pact—an endeavour, so to speak, to put a hard skin around this soft area: a northern tier, purely defensive—as a defence against aggression. But that defence becomes hopelessly weak if there is turmoil and disturbance behind it.
  That brings me to the Cyprus question. It seems to me that when forming the Baghdad Pact, great consideration ought to have been given to the Cyprus question, because here was a possible bone of contention between two of the greatest participants in the Baghdad Pact—Greece and Turkey, both of whom were good friends of ours. In my view, the Cyprus question ought to have been faced then. To-day, we are faced with a tragic position. We must all be disturbed at the murders which are going on there, and at the terrible position of our troops. No one can condone for a moment a murder campaign, but we have seen that kind of thing result from certain causes. There is a particular danger of a campaign of this kind in any country that is seeking self-determination and self-government. It seems to me that a régime that is created by the bomb and the dagger finds it most difficult to shake them off afterwards. That should be a warning to the leaders in Cyprus. The Cypriots have for a long time demanded union with Greece. To begin with, I think that was rather a sentimental demand; it was put forward in a quite impossible form—a kind of union with Greece next day. There are all the difficulties which one inevitably gets in a matter of this kind. There are always minorities to be considered.
  There are, too, strategic interests. I should like here to say a word on the strategic interests, speaking with all due modesty in the presence of those with far greater experience. In the modern world we still are apt to attribute too great strategic importance to places like Cyprus. I am told, for instance, that if Cyprus were in the hands of some other country
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  the Turks would feel that it was a menace to them. I do not believe that in the hydrogen bomb age a hostile Power would attack Turkey by a landing or an air attack from Cyprus. In this modern age, if a Power is contemplating anything like a major war, it comes right home. If we were engaged in a major war, this, and not any outlying place, would be the place of danger and decision. We realised that in regard to Egypt; but old ideas die hard. We have to consider this area because undoubtedly we have strategic interests there. It was clear from the start that, with our friends the Greeks, they were perfectly willing that, whatever happened in Cyprus, we should have our bases, as, I understand, they are willing to provide bases themselves. If we were all in the Baghdad Pact together there seems to be no reason why there should be a quarrel over bases. I feel that there has been a rather slow acceptance of the validity of the Cypriot claim. The lesson to be learned in dealing with matters of this kind is that the Government should make up their mind early on how far they are going and not allow concessions to be dragged out gradually.
  In considering the concessions made by Archbishop Makarios it must be remembered that he is not only the spiritual leader but also the political leader of the Cypriots. The reason for that goes back a long way, to the old days under Turkish rule, and it is quite impossible in such a matter to say that it is all wrong for the Archbishop to be a politician. Probably nowadays we look back with some surprise to the activities of some of our own Archbishops in the past; but it is no good applying our present principles to the past, and Cyprus is not exactly in the same position as we are in to-day. We had the talks with the Archbishop. It may be said that the Archbishop has been connected with people who are dealing in terrorism. One has to make up one's mind whether one is to say: "This person is a person with whom we cannot deal, because he is mixed up in terrorism," or, alternatively, "Despite the fact that he is mixed up in terrorism we ought to talk to him." I believe Her Majesty's Government were very wise to go into these talks, because in the course of the year the Archbishop has gone a long way. When we were in office there was this demand practically

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  for Enosis next day; now there is in contemplation a period of constitutional government by the Cypriots over a period of years.
  I have a strong idea that if the Cypriots once got to manage their own affairs they might be less inclined to put themselves under a Government which no doubt has many virtues but, so far as I can make out, has even more parties. If I were a Cypriot I should hesitate about coming under the Greek Government at the present time. Talks took place and declarations were made. One must bear in mind what is the position of a popular leader. In any nationalist revolt there will always be people whom we regard as comparatively reasonable and there will always be the extremists. We even find that at home, in both Parties; and one has always to be prepared to stand up to these extremists. In negotiations it will always be our endeavour to give as much power as we can to the reasonable people, because if we do not give them the chance of standing out as leaders, then inevitably leadership passes to less responsible hands.
  We have had full discussions in another place, and we have had a White Paper showing the points on which negotiations finally broke down. I think they were very narrow ones. There was the question of whether there should be a majority for the Greeks. It was said that that would be left to a special Constitutional Commission which was coming over. In, my submission that is quite wrong. It is a political decision, not a decision to be left to a Commission; but it was a question of the Greeks having an overwhelming majority. In these matters it always pays for the majority to be generous in according representation to a minority. One must not, however, be over-generous. I can remember proposals being put forward some twenty years ago, when I was going round India, in which, by the time the claims of all the minorities were totted up, the majority had not a look in. I believe that there was certain need for clarification here. It was quite obvious that there was representation for a Turkish minority, but what was not so clear was whether there would be a nominating majority. I do not believe in this kind of limited responsibility.
  That goes also to the question of law and order. In setting up a new Government anywhere there is always the
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  temptation to say, "We will let you run things but we will retain law and order." I saw that done in India. I believe it is fatal, because it means that responsibility for law and order is then in the hands of what is considered to be an alien Power. I have always thought that one of the mistakes we made in the interim period in India, the period of diarchy, was that we gave the Indians all the pleasant things to do and retained all the unpleasant things for ourselves. If we are going to give self-government, it is better to give responsibility, for if they have responsibility, they will look after law and order in their own interests.
  Then there is the question of amnesty. We always display this feeling that "We will not shake hands with murderers," yet almost always it has to be done. Always, sooner or later, some kind of amnesty—a full amnesty may be the exception—ought to be given. I cannot think that we should have broken off negotiations on these points. The Prime Minister, speaking in another place, gave it as his opinion that, had we conceded these points, others would constantly have been raised. That was his intuition, but the intuitions of Prime Ministers are not always right. I noticed that The Times correspondent said that responsible opinion in the island took another view. I noticed that Mr. Francis Noel Baker, who did very good service in the negotiations and knew the Archbishop well, took another point of view. I cannot think that breaking off on that was at all wise.
  That brings me to the question of deportation. Deportation is a very serious matter. It may be justifiable. If, for instance, there is a place ruled by some absent ruler against the will of the people, it might be wise to remove him; but I do not believe it is ever wise to remove the leader of a nationalist movement. What happens? I recall what Parnell said when they put him in prison. Someone said to him: "Who will take over now?" He said: "Captain Moonlight." That is exactly what happens. History affords a number of instances where attempts have been made to shut up a constitutional leader and always, as a result, power has passed to the irresponsible. Then you have to consider, when you have deported him, what is to be done next. More often than not, after

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  a period of years or months the deportee has to be brought back.
  The question has been asked—and it was not answered in another place: "Where do we go from here?" It is possible to try repression, but it is extremely difficult to repress a movement of this kind. As everyone knows, the terrorists tend to become the heroes; they tend to become nationalist heroes—very often quite undeservedly—and they get the support of the population. It is possible to suppress movements of this kind. Hitler did it and Stalin did it, but Britain cannot do it. The last occasion when this was tried was under Mr. Lloyd George's Government, with the "Black and Tans." This country would not stand for it. The result of that sort of thing is a period in which there will be executions and murders of our troops—and it is not fair to expose our troops to this. And, in the end, you have to go back and negotiate somehow or other. By that time you will have discredited constitutional leaders, and you will find yourselves having to deal with far worse people than the Archbishop. One can trace the history of that sort of thing in many countries. Fortunately, in some countries we have stopped short of that course. I am sure that what I have indicated would have happened in Burma if we had not dealt with the Burmese as we did. Now, we have an admirable and courageous Prime Minister there—our good friend Mr. Nu. It would have happened in India. It happened in Ireland over and over again. I cannot think that deportation is wise.
  There is a further point. For our influence in the world we have to depend very much on public opinion. Times have gone by when, as Palmerston did in the past, we could send the British Fleet here and there if troubles should break out. We have not the greatest strength in the world; we have not the greatest wealth in the world. What we have is a great tradition for good will. And our role in the world, particularly in Asia—as we have exemplified in the British Commonwealth—is that we stand for freedom and democracy. As I see it to-day, in Asia particularly—as I said at the start—there is this test going on. We must not lose that position. I am afraid that events in Cyprus, as we know, have had bad echoes even in the United States
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  of America. We need to remember the lessons of the past. I realise all the difficulties. I hold no brief for the Archbishop, but I remember that the rebels of the past generally tend, sooner or later, to become Prime Ministers in the British Commonwealth. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.
  3.24 p.m.
  LORD REA: My Lords, it falls to me—rather surprisingly to myself, even to my horror—to be the first to congratulate on his maiden speech in your Lordships' House one who is respected and admired in every Parliamentary Party in this country, one who has held the highest office in Parliamentary life, and whose name is, indeed, a household word in five continents—and probably something like 100 million households. I am glad to think that my faltering words will not have that publicity but I consider it a great privilege to be the first to congratulate the noble Earl on speaking in your Lordships' House for the first time and to say how much we have admired his speech for its statesmanlike quality and its moderation, and also to say how much we hope that we shall hear him speaking frequently here and that his habit of oratorical proximity to the Dispatch Box in another place will not leave him in this Chamber. There is no doubt that this House will gain considerably in authority and debating force from the presence of the noble Earl.
  I do not propose to break my own personal rule of speaking very briefly to your Lordships. The matters which are the subject of the debate to-day have, of course, been discussed in considerable detail—possibly too much detail—in the Press, and yesterday there was a full discussion of them in another place. It is interesting to me, and rather significant, that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has not thought fit to discharge his criticism of the Government—I think that is a fair word—separately from two completely different barrels, if I may put it in sporting terms. One barrel would normally be aimed at the Foreign Office and the other at the Colonial Office. But he has put up his gun and shot off both barrels at the noble Marquess who I understand is to wind up the debate for the Government. I think that is rather significant, because the difference between colonial affairs and foreign

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  affairs has become more and more indistinct as time has gone by. Not only the barriers of customs and of language, but the obstacles to fellow feeling and internationalism are becoming fainter as we progress and as different parts of the world get to know their neighbours, better than ever before.
  It is difficult to try to pinpoint to what that is principally due, but I would say that a very significant name in this connection would certainly be that of Signor Marconi. He has indirectly been responsible for the fact that the younger nations—what we used to call the backward nations or the submerged tenth—are no longer in the state in which they were before his great invention came into world-wide use. They have something of the equality and of the same civilization as older and greater nations, and clearly it will not be long before there will be almost complete equality. That rising resurgence in the younger nations of the world will mean that they will naturally go through teething troubles and growing pains. These teething troubles and growing pains are, in my submission, inseparable from the feeling of nationalism which has to be gone through, and it is a painful process which, as events have sometimes shown, affects other parts of the world. But it has to be faced.
  We in this country and the other countries of the civilised world have gone through it, and even though one could then hardly call it growing pains the point at which we showed these attributes most clearly was about 100 years ago when we were very insular and very national, and very proud of it. There is a residue of that feeling amongst the people of this country now—and quite naturally. It used to be called "jingoism." I think it will be admitted that those people who do have these feelings are apt to belong, in the main, rather to the Party on the opposite side of your Lordships' House than to either of the Parties on this side. For that reason Her Majesty's present Government have, I think, our sympathy in this sort of brake in the background which makes them w some extent drag their feet when looking toward internationalism.
  These international questions must be handled with international, and not with national, mentality, and such difficulties as those that we are now considering will
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  have to be overcome before the world will be a peaceful and prosperous place again. It is, therefore, I repeat, very significant that the noble Earl has bracketed colonial affairs with foreign affairs in speaking on this question.
  I am not going to keep your Lordships any longer than to say that we must recognise this spirit of internationalism much more than we have done in the past: and there are opportunities for this comparatively near home, in Europe. We on this side of the House feel rather strongly that the Government have frequently given lip service to the idea of joining in with our brothers and sisters in various European organisations, movements and ideals, and that when the time comes we are rather apt to drag our feet. I would say no more. I beg Her Majesty's Government not to allow the criticism which is going to be levelled at them this afternoon to influence them to dig in their toes too far. The political atmosphere of the new world—and by "the new world" I mean the newer nations which are now coming to maturity—is Radical rather than Tory, I can assure them; and if they bear that in mind, they will have the good wishes and good will of all.
  3.31 p.m.
  THE EARL OF SWINTON: My Lords, may I at once follow the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberal Party in equally sincere congratulations to the late Leader of the Labour Party on one of the best maiden speeches—in fact I think the best—I have ever heard in this House. I do not say I agree with all of it. He and I have been colleagues and opponents for a great many years, ever since we were at the same college together, but we have always been friends, and it is really delightful to have him here. I hope he is not going to declare his innings completely closed but will be up with a good bat very often, as he did on this occasion.
  I should have been very content to give my silent, but firm, support, and vote if necessary, to the Government on this occasion: but, having been directly concerned as Secretary of State for the Colonies in dealing with a somewhat similar situation five and twenty years ago, I may be able to offer something which is pertinent and, I hope, helpful in this debate. Incidentally, I see that I figure in the opening speech in another

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  place yesterday. The noble Earl spared me that.
  In October, 1931, there was a serious outbreak of violence in Cyprus. The Government House at Nicosia, the capital, was burnt down, and there were similar, but not so damaging, scenes in other places. I regret to say that on that occasion church leaders figured prominently in incitement to not. The Bishop of Kyrenia actually led the rioters in the town where his See lay. The Bishop of Kitium also was involved and the Bishop of Paphos, who was in this country, was engaged in giving help from the sidelines. Of course, the cry of "Enosis" was raised. The disorder was effectively suppressed. Ten of the ringleaders, including the two Bishops of Kyrenia and Kitium, were deported, and a number of others who had taken part in the riots were brought to trial and convicted. My noble friend the Secretary of State for the Colonies is quite correct in what he said in another place: the deportations were actually made by my predecessor, Mr. J. H. Thomas, but I had taken over the Colonial Office just after the ship sailed with these people on board and I had to deal with the situation in the House and with everything that ensued.
  In November, 1931, as soon as the House reassembled—I think it was after the General Election—I made a full statement to the House. I am not saying that history always repeats itself or repeats itself exactly, but it is interesting to notice that on that occasion the action which the National Government had taken in deporting the ringleaders, including the two Bishops, was universally accepted, certainly in another place and in this House. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was at that time either the Leader or the Deputy Leader of the Opposition. I have been careful to verify from the OFFICIAL REPORT every statement I made and every question that was asked from any quarter of the House. No debate was asked for. Cyprus never figured in the debate on the Address. No debate was asked for later. Indeed, when the Colonial Office debate took place a few months afterwards, I think only one speaker—and he was a Liberal—in a roundabout way referred to Cyprus. The action was fully approved.
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  I can recall that Colonel Wedgwood, who sat on the Front Opposition Bench and afterwards was a very welcome Member of this House, particularly endorsed the action which had been taken against the Bishops and urged that, as a great deal of damage had taken place and as not a little of this had been due to incitement by ecclesiastics, ecclesiastical property should bear some share of the compensation. I recall Mr. Venizelos, whom we all respected so much, telling me at that time that it was contrary to the canon law of the Orthodox Church for Orthodox clergy to take part in politics. When I put that to the aged Archbishop of Cyprus a little later, when I visited the Island, he did not at all challenge that statement. I do not know whether that canon law still holds or whether we should accept, as the noble Earl suggested, that Archbishops of the Orthodox Church should always be national political leaders. But I am sure that the whole House, irrespective of Party, would agree that condonation of violence and murder and incitement to violence are contrary to the Christian ethic of every Christian Church.
  At that time I had just taken over, and my first duty was to see that law and order was restored. Then I had to improve the conditions on the island and try and make it a happier and more prosperous place. We did a great deal. The moneylenders, who were the greatest curse of Cyprus, were suppressed entirely. We established a Land Bank and cooperative societies, which grew apace. The farmers, with the aid of Imperial Preference and free from their load of debt, were able to find a profitable market for all they produced for export—their tobacco, wine and citrus. We did a good deal to improve education—not enough, I think, but a good deal—and we did not forget the antiquities, in regard to which my noble friend Lord Mersey played so helpful and generous a part.
  I visited the island some eighteen months later and received a very cordial reception. I should like to say a word or two on the impressions which I then formed, because I do not believe that an ancient people, living much the same life going back, not merely for centuries, as the noble Lord, Lord Winster, knows, but for thousands of years, without changing fundamentally, would change so very

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  much in ten or twenty years. Incidentally, it is not without interest to note that, though Cyprus has belonged to many countries and has had many masters over its long history, in all its long history, Phoenician, Persian, Egyptian, Mace-, donian, Roman, Byzantine, Lusignan, Turkish and British, I am fairly sure I am right in saying that never in those thousands of years has it been a Greek possession. That is not uninteresting. Of course, it is not conclusive. I would give this impression of the people of Cyprus, as I found them: fairly easily roused (Enosis was a good battle cry and rallying cry then); inclined to flow or row with the flowing tide; subject a good deal to ecclesiastical direction and influence and not exclusively in matters of the spirit. But the lasting impression formed was that what the great mass of the population wanted above everything was to lead a peaceful, prosperous life. They were not much interested in Government, or political issues or "isms," except when politics or political Government action came down and touched their daily life.
  LORD WINSTER: Hear, hear!
  THE EARL OF SWINTON: I am greatly interested to find the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who has had a much longer and later practical experience as a Governor, agreeing with this impression. I greatly doubt whether a desire for peaceful existence and peaceful co-existence with their Turkish compatriots is not what, in their hearts, 90 or 95 per cent. of the people of Cyprus want to-day. I listened carefully to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and I think that we should be careful about national aspirations. It is always a little dangerous to generalise, and when you come to an island like Cyprus—and those who know it would, I believe, confirm this—you have to be particularly careful that you do not mistake terrorist coercion for genuine national aspirations.
  I also found at that time a large Turkish minority—loyal, contented, living peaceably with their neighbours and passionately anxious to remain within the British Commonwealth. The Turks were then a quarter of the population of the island. I understand that the Greek or Greek-speaking population, which was then three-quarters of the whole, is now nearer four-fifths. Do your Lordships know why? It is not, I think, that one
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  race breeds more rapidly than the other. I believe it is true—and the Minister of State will correct me if I am wrong—that in the course of the last ten or fifteen years something like 100,000 Greeks have come into Cyprus from the Greek Islands or the mainland, because there, on that enchanted island, they could find a mote prosperous living and a happier place to live. I believe that all those who have first-hand knowledge of Cyprus would agree that I have given a fair picture of the island as it was before the Second World War.
  I do not want to speak too long, and I am not going to traverse all the recent events; I think the facts have been fully stated in ministerial speeches and in Government papers. However, I should like to put to the House, and to the noble Earl who initiated the debate, this question: is it fair or reasonable to take such a very different attitude about the deportation of Archbishop Makarios from that which the noble Earl and his colleagues, and both Houses of Parliament, took twenty-five years ago on the deportation of the Bishop of Kyrenia? There is no doubt—and there cannot be any doubt in anybody's mind—that Archbishop Makarios was deeply and personally implicated in this campaign of violence. It is not really, if I may say so to the noble Earl, a case of contrasting a moderate leader with Captain Moonlight. It would be more true to say that Makarios had identified himself with Captain Moonlight and that there was not this antithesis at all. And, surely, there can be no question but that law and order must be reestablished. I do not think anybody can deny that the continued presence, complicity and influence of the Archbishop would gravely prejudice and retard the restoration of law and order. I am quite certain—and I do not say this because I am a supporter of Her Majesty's Government; it must be true of any Government—that, having entered into negotiations with a leader like Archbishop Makarios, nobody would want to bring those negotiations suddenly to a brusque conclusion, but would exhaust every effort before corning to the conclusion that it was necessary to act in this drastic manner.
  I would ask this question: are the security, the stability and the good order in Cyprus less important today to the

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  British Commonwealth, and indeed to the free world, than they were twenty-five years ago? Cyprus is a vital strategic place to-day, not just for Britain but for the whole Grand Alliance. It is more important than ever in the atomic age—I really must challenge the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, on that point. Anybody who has taken part in the Defence Committee and who has had dealings with the development of atomic strategy—as I know the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, did in his time, with the greatest interest—must realise and accept that to-day as a base, as a necessary means of communication, Cyprus has increased tremendously in importance. If that be true—and I am certain it is—surely, we and our Allies must know for certain that that base will be safe and secure so long as the risk to peace lasts! And who can predict when that twilight period will end?
  Let me assume for the moment that the majority of the people in Cyprus, if they had the opportunity, would vote, or be induced to vote, for union with Greece. Would that give the security which is vital to-day to the interests of the free world and the Grand Alliance? I am going to say something which perhaps I can say more easily than the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House, or the Minister of State, but which we all must know in our hearts is true. Greatly as we hope for a free and firm Greece, steadfast in its alliance with the free world, there can be no guarantee that Greece might not go Communist or, at best, neutral. Greece and the free world should remember that it was, as the Prime Minister said last night, I think with complete justification, British intervention and British troops which saved Greece from Communist domination and from falling within the Iron Curtain at the end of 1944. I am sure it is utterly wrong to argue or to suggest that weakness in suppressing violence, disorder and subversion does not play into the hands of the Communists. Exactly the opposite is true. Surely, that is what we have always maintained in U.N.O.—that aggression must be resisted, and subversion and violence are only the aggression of the cold war. It is quite untrue to suggest that you beat Communism by appeasing that kind of aggression.
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  Finally, what about Turkey? Are the position, the rights and the co-operation of Turkey less important to-day than they were ten or twenty years ago? Turkey is to-day the bastion of the Middle East and the pivot of the whole of the defence of the free world there. Not only that, but this is not a question, as is so often assumed, merely between the people of Cyprus and us, or Greece and us. Turkey has a right. Not only has it got a population there, but in international law Turkey is entitled to be heard, and we are not entitled to act without her. After all, Turkey and Greece were both signatories of the Treaties of Lausanne which confirmed the British sovereignty in Cyprus. For all those reasons, I am convinced that the Government have gone to the limit in negotiation and conciliation, and that, faced with the situation which they have clearly encountered, they could do no other than they have done.
  3.52 p.m.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTER-BURY: My Lords, in what I have to say I, too, shall confine myself to Cyprus, and it is only with great reluctance that I add any more words to the too many words which have already been uttered in many quarters about the unhappy affairs of that island. But Archbishop Makarios is head of the Autokephalous Church of Cyprus. With that Church, as with the Greek Orthodox Church, the Church of England has long been on terms of close fellowship and friendship. Great perplexity and distress has been caused to Christian opinion, both in this country and elsewhere, by the arrest and removal of the head of one of the historic Churches of the world. I think it is only proper to stress the shock and uneasiness which Christians in many parts are feeling. But the Orthodox Churches regard this event with indignation as an act of sacrilege, persecution and barbarism. From the patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, from the Archbishop of Athens, from the Bishops of Cyprus and others, I have had urgent and emphatic telegrams of protest using those very terms. It would be resented throughout the Orthodox world if I said nothing in this debate; and the fact that my words will be scrutinised there as searchingly as those of the Government itself compels me to speak with a great sense of Christian responsibility.

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  Archbishop Makarios is the leading ecclesiastical and political figure of Cyprus. Whatever he does, he does simultaneously and equally as Churchman and as politician. The Eastern Churches find it hard to believe that the Archbishop of Canterbury is not also a political leader. They have not passed through that historical experience which has taught us that, while the concerns of Church and State are intimately related, and are equally involved in the issues of national well-being, yet under God the responsibilities and spheres of action of Churchmen and politician are different, and that when either tries to usurp the functions of the other disaster follows—whether it be the politician trying to stifle the free speech and free judgment of the Church, or the Church trying to operate by the methods of political power.
  Our friends in Greece and Cyprus must recognise that to us here it seems shocking that an Archbishop should take the lead in a political matter and involve himself in all the passionate partialities which political incitement always involves. I must ask our friends there to believe that, even though I am speaking in the House of Lords, I, as Archbishop, have had no share in these political matters and no previous knowledge of the actions taken. As a Churchman, I have one interest only, and that is in reconciliation: that hatred and division may be replaced by understanding, trust and co-operation. I trust that our Orthodox brethren will try, as I must try, to lay aside all political argument and, so far as possible, all national partialities and everything else which makes the way to reconciliation more difficult. We must all, as I would say, combine to seek an agreement which recognises not so much rights, on either side, as obligations, and which will hold together our responsibilities to one another and to the world—for it is a strategic issue—first in good order and then in peace.
  We must, however, recognise that in the Near East the kind of distinction I have just made between the functions of Churchman and politician hardly exists. In this country the Government naturally judges Archbishop Makarios on his political record since he has chosen to play the part of a politician: but in Cyprus he will be judged as a Churchman
  470
  doing what it is proper—whatever the Canon Law may say—for a Churchman to do. The British Government, therefore, must do a hard thing and recognise that, whatever his political activities, he remains the head of an independent Church, a religious and Christian leader, whose presence is indispensable to the proper functioning of that Church. There is bound to be uneasiness in any British mind when a political leader is arrested and removed without trial. It is even more alarming when such action has the effect of interfering with the functioning and the loyalties of a Christian community. It is important for the Government to realise that it is in terms of sacrilege that much foreign opinion is viewing their action.
  We must realise, too, as the noble Earl said, that the Greek Orthodox people have in the past survived centuries of terrible oppression and have won existence and freedom for nation and Church by violent strife and violent means. This is engrained in them from their history. Archbishop Makarios was continuing a tradition of the past when once again he identified leadership of his Church with a struggle for political freedom. But in all gentleness we must ask our Orthodox friends to understand our position. Taught by our own history as a nation, we believe that it is impossible to combine the two functions, and that if a man tries to do so he must be judged by the political aims and the political methods which he employs or allows, as other politicians are, and must take the consequences. My Lords, forgive me for taking so long to state what is obvious enough to us. If there is to be reconciliation, it must be patiently expounded here that it may be understood there in the East.
  So I come to the political field. Here, let me state frankly that in one matter of intense political and Christian concern, Archbishop Makarios has put himself very seriously in the wrong. To his own people and to others he has allowed himself to appear to condone violence (and the Government go further in saying that he connived at it) in a way which, wherever it occurs, Christian conscience must condemn. Archbishop Makarios has twice been a visitor in my own house. Last June I wrote a letter to him in

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  which, after referring to increasing evidences of violence, I went on:
  "I am somewhat worried lest the absence of any clear statement from the Church authorities and particularly from you as their undisputed leader may cause people to suppose that the Church is in fact supporting such outrages as have occurred."
  I asked him to give a lead in this matter. He said this in his reply:
  "I am profoundly grieved by the course events have taken in Cyprus in the last few days. Unfortunately the serious situation which has been created here cannot be remedied by suggestions or advisory circulars. I am sincerely afraid that an official condemnation of events by myself would not find at the present stage the necessary response, but would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably."
  I fear that he spoke then not as a Churchman called on to uphold a religious principle but as a politician calculating risks and chances, and ready to allow an evil which he regretted in private but would not publicly condemn. So he exposed himself inevitably to contradictory judgments.
  I can fully sympathise with Mr. Noel Baker's estimate of the Archbishop's character. Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that Archbishop Makarios was a moderating influence on those extremists who were associated with him in the Ethnarchy Council. His moderating influence might have been utilised far more profitably to reach a solution had the Government, in the earlier stages of this quarrel, had a clearer imagination and foresight of where they would have to come in the end. At the same time, even if the Government have not established their case for the Archbishop's direct complicity in the policy of violence and outrage, the Archbishop has made it hard to doubt it; and his refusal to condemn has had the same public effect as complicity would have had.
  Our Greek and Orthodox friends must be ready to recognise that the British Government in their political action have an absolute duty to restore civil order, and that they cannot stand idly by when confronted with civil disorder and incitements to kill and destroy. If our friends there wish to criticise the actions of our Government—and there is plenty of room for criticism, as in most human situations, and plenty of critics—they should criticise them on the grounds, not of insincerity or barbarism or sacrilege but simply of
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  political unwisdom and misjudgments, especially perhaps in timing; and they should honestly recognise that such political unwisdom is to be found on both sides.
  All that I have said, if honestly accepted on both sides, must lead to reconciliation Recrimination does not help. Nothing will help except a readiness to begin again the search for agreement and good will. For whatever reasons—and it does not help, in my judgment, to try to settle which side made the most or the worst mistakes—negotiations broke down. All that remained was the political fact of organised disorder and violence. In that situation, Archbishop Makarios and his companions were arrested and removed. Was that right or wrong? If it has brought the issue back to the funda mental political and Christian reality that what cannot be got by patience must never be sought by methods of terrorism or murder, then it was right. If, on the other hand, it has blocked the way to reconciliation unnecessarily, it was wrong. If, for example, there is any truth in the report that Archbishop Makarios, in visiting Athens, was hoping to get advice by means of which he could have advanced nearer to agreement, then indeed his arrest and deportation were wrong. However, it has happened. Reconciliation begins not by asking any one party to a quarrel to change his tune and attitude at once but by devising some temporary next step on which they can all agree.
  I venture to suggest that the following three steps, taken quickly, should have the approval of all the Governments concerned—British, Greek and Turkish—and would have the support of all the Churches, including the Orthodox Church. The first is this. The correspondence between the Governor of Cyprus and the Archbishop shows a very large area of common agreement as to the future Constitution of increasing self-government. Let the Government appoint at once a competent person or persons to draft a Constitution along the lines of that correspondence, with freedom to consult whom they will and instructed to attach to it a suggested timetable for its application. This draft would bind nobody, except by its merits, but it would become the basis for discussion with Archbishop Makarios and others concerned. By this means, time would be

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  gained in which passions could be cooled. Everyone could feel that progress was contemplated and was being made; and when negotiations were resumed, they would be greatly assisted by being related to a draft Constitution so that they could deal with defined proposals and not, as when the negotiations broke down, merely with fears and distrusted intentions. That is the first step.
  The second is that the Greek and Turkish Governments should then join with our Government in an immediate appeal to the Cypriots to end terrorism. Thirdly, Archbishop Makarios should be informed that his exile was temporary and would end as soon as public order in Cyprus was restored; and he should be assured that when a draft Constitution was in being direct negotiations with him would at once be resumed. Along these three lines it would seem to me possible for all parties to leave the past behind and go forward to a peaceful, orderly and generous acceptance of the mutual responsibilities of Cyprus and Great Britain to one another and to the peace of the world. It is in that direction, and for that end, that I trust that the Christian Churches of this country may work closely together with the Orthodox Churches with undiminished trust and with an ever-increasing fellowship.
  4.11 p.m.
  LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, the intervention of the most reverend Primate testifies to the importance and gravity of the subjects which we have to discuss. I can only hope that the most reverend Primate has used language which will be interpreted in Greek ecclesiastical quarters as a sufficiently strong reprobation of the refusal of Archbishop Makarios to denounce violence. It is something new among spiritual leaders, I think, to adopt the attitude that you do not do what is right, upon the ground that you cannot do so profitably to your own position. Since when has personal profit been an accepted doctrine of religious leaders? The feeling in country is deep and strong and, as I say, I can only hope that the most reverend Primate has adequately interpreted it in what was a most important speech in this debate.
  Before commenting, as I may venture to do, upon his constructive proposal, I feel that I ought to join with those who
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  have made reference to the maiden speech of Lord Attlee. I never dreamed that it would be my lot, as it is certainly my pleasure, to join in congratulations to the noble Earl on a maiden speech, but I do so with the warmest and most welcoming spirit, having regard to the fact, in particular, that we were elected to the House of Commons at just about the same time and that we were sworn of the Privy Council on the same day. On that occasion we wore frock-coats—a garment which has since been completely discarded. As with clothes, so with foreign policies, they have occasionally to be re-fashioned and to he brought up to date.
  Nothing could better illustrate the rapidity with which what remains of the old order in the Middle East is changing than the matter mentioned by the noble Earl at the operative outset of his remarks. He referred to the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. A long and loyal, indeed a lifetime of, devoted service to the Hashemite dynasty deserved a better end, and we must all feel that both General Glubb in his personal conduct and Her Majesty's Government acted with great restraint in provocative circumstances. In particular, when one casts one's mind back to the feeling of excitement which prevailed only a few days ago, it is just as well to praise Her Majesty's Government for not having entertained the proposals that we should try to reconstitute matters as they were by sending a parachute brigade and reinforcements to Jordan.
  The Arab Legion is a picturesque force, as any who saw it in the days of King Abdullah will testify, with its camels and its horses; but it is also an efficient force, perhaps the most efficient Arab force in the Middle East. None the less, how much longer could we have expected to prolong a system under which the national army of a sovereign State had a foreigner for the commander of its forces, and a Westerner at that? The question now arises, how much longer the other vestiges of this old system can remain. Here is an Arab Legion, an Arab national army, maintained, not out of the taxes of the Jordan Government, but by a direct subsidy from this county —a subsidy, moreover, paid not to the Jordan Government but to the commander of the Legion, to the authorities of the Legion itself. Thus, neither the

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  Jordan Government nor the Jordan Parliament have the administration of the funds dispensed upon their fighting forces. These forces are also the security forces of Jordan and are brought into play whenever there are internal troubles. My submission is that this is a very good opportunity definitely and finally to change that system; it is humiliating to Jordan.
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, spoke with eloquence about the rising tide of nationalism. We cannot resist it—we cannot stop it—and we do not, I am sure, with our great record, wish to appear to do so. One of the central themes of Russian propaganda in the Middle East and in the propaganda of the anti-Baghdad Powers who co-operate with Russia is that Jordan is not a free agent but is acting at the behest of Britain and that it does not even control its own troops. A national Army is the symbol of national independence. It is not fitting that we should allow any longer the gibe to be thrown at King Hussein that he is under the control, or that he can act only at the behest, of the British Government. This is the time to revise those arrangements. A military mission, if it were desired by Jordan, would stand upon an entirely different footing; but, in my submission, we should free our relationship with Jordan from any suggestion of suzerainty, we should free it from any tinge of justification for the taunt that the old principles of colonialism are applying. If we did that, I think we should clear the air in the Middle East. With regard to the actual sum of money, by all means let us give it, and more, and let it be used for fructifying purposes.
  My Lords, like the noble Earl who introduced the debate, I find it an easy transition to pass from Jordan to Cyprus, which is so interwoven with our Middle Eastern policy. I want to look entirely to the future. We went to Cyprus because it was a British Colony and we thought we should have a base there in which we could assure our own security —and, doubtless, we shall remain there and see our problems through. But we must have regard to the facts if we are thinking of how to direct our future policy. The utility of the base has been gravely compromised, as the Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War on
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  the Army Estimates shows. It says in that memorandum, at paragraph 30:
  "Throughout the past year, internal security conditions in Cyprus have progressively deteriorated as the murderous attacks on British Servicemen, on police and on civilians have increased. Whereas the Cyprus garrison in December, 1954, amounted to four major units who had to devote only a small part of their activities to internal security work, the garrison now amounts to fourteen major units, twelve of whom are devoting 90 per cent. of their time to the task of maintaining law and order in the Island."
  Consequently, the value of the base as a haven for a strategic reserve, is compromised.
  There is another factor. When we were looking for a base and eventually chose Cyprus, it was suggested that we should not repeat the situation from which we had extricated ourselves in Egypt; that we should not undertake as our sole, individual and exclusive responsibility the management of a base, but that we should do it on behalf of N.A.T.O. I myself spoke on those lines on more than one occasion in your Lordships' House. It is true that at that time there was no demand by N.A.T.O. to be interested in this matter. But the present circumstances are quite different: there is a dramatic change, of which I think we should wish to take account, and of which I am sure the Government will take account.
  To read the Press and the comments upon Britain's policy in the Press, one would think that the great controversy was not between the Free World and the Communist world, but that it was a controversy within the Free World. If there is one thing more dangerous than the abandonment of a bipartisan foreign policy—I was glad to gather from the speech of the noble Earl that he had no intention of abandoning it; he made a most public-spirited speech, fully in accord with the general lines of policy of the Government—it would be the breaking up of the Free World in dissension, for then Communism would be presented immediately with the break through that it desires and the triumph which it has been seeking. Only Russia and her friends can get any satisfaction from the dispute which is at present raging.
  But is there any substance in the case? President Eisenhower said yesterday—I am not taking the comments of Irresponsible Americans; I want to take the most

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  authoritative, and I think there is value in treating them with respect—that
  "there was no blinking the fact that American interests were very greatly jeopardised"
  by what was happening in Cyprus, and that
  "he would use every possible means to end the crisis in the Middle East."
  Mr. Hoover, the Under-Secretary, also said yesterday that
  "the Cyprus issue involves the direct interest of close friends and allies of the United States."
  The political aspect of this matter, with which the most reverend Primate properly concerned himself, is one thing. That political solution will be pursued by Her Majesty's Government, I hope with the good will of all Parties in the State, whether on the lines constructively put forward by the most reverend Primate or upon others. The conditions which the Government have laid down as qualifying the achievement of a free Constitution and of self-determination are, in themselves, highly proper qualifications. The House is well aware of these. We must secure our strategic interests; we must have regard to the Turkish minority and to Turkish feeling. All these conditions are, of course, proper, and Her Majesty's Government cannot give that position away. But they will pursue a political solution. That solution can be achieved only by patience. There is no ready-made specific by which it can be achieved. It may take a long time; it will require patience and magnanimity, and therefore we must wait for it. But the strategic solution cannot so well wait —the cold war is proceeding; the face of the world is altering. Russia and her friends are taking action every day. We must solve the strategic problem in a manner which has regard to the susceptibilities of our own Allies, and it is for that reason that I refer to these remarks of President Eisenhower and Mr. Hoover.
  It is possible to regard these comments by responsible Americans as interference; on the other hand, it is possible to regard them as an opportunity to consolidate our methods of consultation and common action. We are the first to complain when the Americans diverge from our policy or from what we conceive to be the general policy. The theme of almost every foreign debate and of many a speech by the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister is that we cannot be expected to succeed unless the Americans
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  and ourselves act together. Here is a case in which America is saying, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, that she considers her interests to be involved; and not only is America saying that, but Germany and Italy as well.
  Dr. Adenauer has been a constructive statesman who believes in co-operation. He offered France a federal solution of the European problem and would to goodness that offer had been seized! for France would have been very much strengthened. He has called for the expansion of the N.A.T.O. Alliance in
  "a political instrument for the free world capable of a uniform defence against Soviet manœuvres or, even better, of forestalling such manœuvres."
  He said:
  "You cannot call the Western policies in the Middle East a joint N A.T.O. policy."
  Italy's President Gronchi has been taking the same line in America, and the Italian Government are firmly of opinion that their interests in the Middle East are involved and that the problem should be tackled by all members of the Atlantic Pact together. France also has protested against divergences of policy and has said that she should not be expected to "go it alone" and that we should not do so. The Prime Minister had his conference with M. Mollet last week-end, and let us hope that it will put our relations on a uniform footing. These are very significant appeals by our Allies in N.A.T.O. and should not be ignored.
  What is the separate interest in the Middle East which Britain is claiming? What is the interest which we have, divergent from the interest of the other N.A.T.O. members? Is it oil? But the whole of 'Western Europe is dependent upon Middle Eastern oil; 75 per cent. of the consumption in Western Europe comes from the Middle East. America, also, is an importer of oil from the Middle East, and not only an importer but far and away the biggest producer. She was responsible for producing 87 million tons last year, whereas British and Dutch interests produced 47½ million tons. There is no exclusive British interest in oil. The industry of Western Europe would stop without Middle Eastern oil; and not only the industry of Western Europe, for there are 14 million tons of tankers being built to-day in the shipyards of the world, in every continent, to carry Middle Eastern

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  oil over the highways of the sea. We cannot claim that this is an exclusively British interest. Nor have we the military forces, nor the wealth, to assure the pursuit of an exclusive policy. We must have the association of our Allies.
  What is it that we fear about the oil? Do we fear that the Middle Eastern countries would sell it to Russia? Do we fear that they would close down their sales to the Western world and dispose of their oil to Russia? They would have to build very lengthy pipelines to do that —and, moreover build them through Baghdad Treaty countries, territories which they do not control. Do we think they are going to seize the oil by military means? President Eisenhower said recently that a global war is unthinkable. He said that
  "The world situation showed a world now awake to the fact that global war is well nigh unthinkable and in which the cold war was going to take a different direction entailing a great broadening of non-military programmes such as economic aid to our undeveloped countries."
  In those circumstances, we cannot expect the Middle East to bristle with bayonets in order to resist a Russian invasion. There is no sign of that. The danger is economic penetration by the Soviet Union and their undermining of the morale of the Middle Eastern peoples. It is the use of arguments, such as that Britain wishes to maintain a colonial system and the remnants of her colonial power in the Middle East, which advances their progress when they can produce any colourable instances in justification. Every expression of military thought on our part provokes a reaction of an economic kind. Russia is not employing military means or military arguments; she is not asking for bases. She is now sending trade and cultural missions, doing barter deals and generally trying to extend her influence. The danger from Russia comes in that she will assist the anti-Baghdad Powers in provoking, in the independent Sheikhdoms, discontent such as that of which we are now seeing evidence; that she will provoke the Arabs to put up their demands for royalties and otherwise compromise our position. That will not be done by military means.
  But in any event, whatever the form of resistance that we offer to Russia, it surely should be a combined resistance on behalf of the whole free world. That
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  seems to me to be the lesson to be derived from these events. Positions which we once regarded as positions of strength, relationships we once regarded as being essential to our defensive system, are no longer in that category. The free world as a whole must defend itself in common consultation and common action. For 100 years the British Fleet protected the integrity of America. It made possible the Monroe Doctrine. Why should we regard it as retrogressive or humiliating or in any way derogatory to our interests if, in entirely altered circumstances, we now have to rely for our security on the combined efforts of all the free peoples, most or many of whom owe to us either the establishment or the defence of their free institutions?

  THE AGRICULTURAL PRICE REVIEW
  4.39 p.m.
  THE JOINT PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL ST. ALDWYN): My Lords, with your permission I should like to make a statement similar to one made by my right honourable friend in another place in reply to a Question. The statutory Annual Review of the economic condition and prospects of the agricultural industry has been concluded. The Government have made their determinations on the guarantees to the industry in the light of the review. These are set out in a White Paper which is now available. The White Paper also sets out the results of the Special Review which was held concurrently with the Annual Review.
  The general production policy of the Government continues to be to foster the highest level of net output that can be achieved economically and efficiently, by encouraging, in particular, beef, mutton and lamb and the production and use of home-grown feeding-stuffs. Until markets can be extended or costs reduced, it is desirable to avoid stimulating further the production of milk, pigs or eggs.
  The net output of the industry in 1955–56 is forecast at 55 per cent. above pre-war as against 51 per cent. for last year. Falls in the tillage area and in pig production have been offset by record yields of cereal crops, a better hay harvest and more milk and eggs. I am sure the House will agree that this reflects credit

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  on everyone concerned during the past year, following the adverse conditions of the previous year. The actual not income of the industry, which is forecast for 1955–56 at £299 million, out a gross income of about £1,400 million, is recovering only slowly from the setback of 1954–55 when it fell to £285, million. There has also been a substantial further increase in costs of about £37 million in a full year for Review commodities. I am confident that the industry will help itself to meet these costs by continuing to increase its efficiency, mainly through improvements in husbandry and farm management. This will also help the nation by keeping down the total subsidy bill and the volume of feeding-stuffs imports.
  The Government's conclusion is that a further increase in the value of the price guarantees and production grants is necessary to ensure that the industry has the resources it needs in order to play its full part in meeting the requirements of the national economy. The determinations now made have the effect of increasing the total value of the guarantees in a full year by £25 million.
  It has been decided to increase the price guarantees for fat cattle, fat sheep, and milk for 1956–57 and for oats, barley, potatoes and sugar beet for the 1957 harvest; to leave, unchanged the price guarantee for hen eggs; and to reduce by small amounts the price guarantees for pigs and wool for 1956–57 and by a more substantial amount the price guarantees for wheat and rye of the 1957 harvest. We have also decided to increase the fertiliser subsidies, the marginal production grants and the subsidy on steer calves; and to make provision for grants for silos for the conservation of silage. The Government have had particularly in mind the position of the smaller farmers in reaching the decision to increase the price guarantees for milk by ½d. a gallon, and oats by 1s. 6d. a cwt., and in making additional provision for production grants.
  The Government have also given careful thought to the form of the fatstock guarantees. They have decided to discontinue the individual guarantees for all classes of fatstock. These were a feature of the Guarantee Scheme introduced in 1954 after the end of control, but the risks for individual producers in the restoration of the auction markets which these
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  arrangements were intended to meet no longer justify the complications and the elaborate machinery involved. This will not only enable the fatstock guarantee system to be simplified considerably but will also save about 300 staff. A single guarantee payment will be made in future for each group of fatstock. But to provide greater stability, this guarantee payment will be adjusted as and when necessary to ensure that the average total return to producers each week remains within a predetermined range on either side of the standard price.
  I regret that on this occasion agreement has not been reached with the farmers' unions. I understand that while, in the prevailing circumstances, they would not have wished to dissent from the total increase in the guarantees, they feel unable to agree to the price determinations or to the changes to be made in the fatstock guarantee system. The Government are, however, satisfied that their determinations are fair and just and take a full and balanced view of the needs of the agricultural industry and of the national economy.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I am sure the House is grateful to the noble Earl for making the statement which has already been made in another place. I think the importance of the White Paper which has just come into my hands, as he promised, is such that I think the Leader of the House might consider giving us as early a day as possible to discuss it. It contains two outstanding features. The first is the point that brought regret from the noble Earl; that this statement was not an agreed statement between the Government and the industry. Secondly, I think that the removal of the individual guarantee is likely to be exceedingly harmful, at any rate to the small farmer. I therefore hope that we may have the earliest opportunity of a debate. This is the first time since the war, I think, that a statement of this kind has been made which has not been an agreed statement.
  THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY): My Lords, in answer to the question by the noble Leader of the Opposition we shall, of course, be delighted to discuss through the usual channels the matter of a debate.

  THE MIDDLE EAST
  Debate resumed.
  4.47 p.m.
  THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (THE MARQUESS OF READING): My Lords, being the first Government speaker on this Motion, I should like to say, even though in his absence, that it is not every day that the House is able to welcome a former Prime Minister. Nor has it always been the case in the past that the new arrival has gratified the House by taking part in—or, indeed, in this case by initiating—a debate after only so brief a delay. My Lords, if it would not be presumptuous to congratulate the noble Earl on his maiden speech I should desire very genuinely and warmly to do so. Although a novice, he seemed to have a striking volume of general knowledge and particular experience in the field that we are discussing. I might perhaps even more suitably and respectfully felicitate the Opposition on being reinforced by so powerful a piece of artillery for their counter-battery work, and the House itself upon acquiring so eminent and so welcome a recruit.
  The noble Earl's Motion has a certain duality. If I may slightly vary the noble Lord Rea's simile, I would say that it is rather like a pair of field glasses, one glass of which is directed upon Cyprus and the other upon the Middle East. The division does exist between the spheres of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and I myself propose to confine what I have to say to the House, in as narrow a compass as possible, to the Middle East glass, leaving the Cyprus glass to my noble friend Lord Munster at a slightly later stage, and only adding that my noble Leader intends to wind up, what I may call bifocally, on both heads of the Motion at the end of the debate.
  So far as the Foreign Office interest goes, this debate is not taking place at the most advantageous of moments. We had a debate on the Middle East in this House not long ago and there have subsequently been various discussions on the subject in another place, but more particularly because my right honourable and learned friend the Foreign Secretary returned only this afternoon, while this debate has been in progress, from his extensive and arduous pilgrimage, which
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  has taken him to, amongst other countries, all the signatories of the Baghdad Pact. I have, consequently, not had the opportunity—which I should admittedly have liked—to consult him and to obtain from him his impressions of his various visits. But I can at least tell the House from the messages he has sent home that in all these countries he found the Governments concerned in a robust mood, and firm and faithful in their adherence to the Baghdad Pact.
  The noble Earl, moving his Motion, made reference to the need for raising the standard of life of the peoples of the Middle East, and I only say this much in passing. We have in all our dealings with the Baghdad Pact countries paid particular attention to the economic aspect of the arrangements which we are considering in that regard. I am going to speak a little more at length about the Baghdad Pact, but before doing so I would point to one small matter. If I understood the noble Earl aright, he made a slight slip. He indicated that Greece was in some way a member of the Baghdad Pact. That is not the position, of course, and I am sure that that was not the impression which the noble Earl wished to give. At the same time, I think it was the impression which the House derived from what he said, and I may perhaps be allowed to remove it.
  There are critics of the Baghdad Pact, both in this country and abroad—people who are apt to contend that the creation and continuation of this Pact is in some way a provocation and is, indeed, mainly responsible for the worsening of the situation in the Middle East which has come from the acquisition by Egypt and possibly by other countries through Egypt of arms of Czechoslovak origin. That is not in the least the view of Her Majesty's Government. It does not seem to us that it is in the least probable. The Soviet Government must undoubtedly be behind the actions of the Czechoslovak Government in this move. It is against all their normal habits to undertake a new move from one day to another without long deliberation, and only after such deliberation they bring it into operation when the moment seems more favourable. In our view, this arms deal was conceived far earlier as part of the usual Communist technique to

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  exploit and intensify the existing difficulties in the area. The Communist purpose was not merely to fish in troubled waters, but first to trouble the waters and then to fish in them. I recall that when my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, at the time when he was Foreign Secretary, raised this question of the arms deal with Mr. Molotov, both in New York and subsequently at the second Geneva meeting, in each case he was told that this was purely a commercial transaction—though I am bound to say that that allegation was not accepted with complete conviction by Her Majesty's Government. But this arms deal changed the situation for the worse in the Middle East, and, in our view, the Baghdad Pact came into being just in time to limit and to localise the scope and the effect of this Communist incursion into the Middle East.
  I confess I always find it a little difficult to understand the grounds for opposing, as a matter of principle, these various pacts which now exist in different parts of the world, such as the Baghdad Pact and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. It is surely a fair comment upon the line of criticism with which I have been dealing that if the grouping together of countries in, for instance, the Baghdad Pact constitutes an incitement to the Communists, the same must be true of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, for the character and purpose of them all are exactly the same. If we admit that these objections can be levied against all these arrangements, then surely we are accepting and endorsing the whole Communist thesis that N.A.T.O., for example, is designed for aggressive objects. One cannot help thinking that it must be a somewhat agreeable experience for the Russians to observe their case being thus guilelessly made on their behalf.
  They must also, I think, be somewhat comforted by the attitude of those who urge that they roust be brought into any discussions on the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact owes its origin solely to genuine fears of Soviet policy and to the determination of the member countries to make better defensive provision for their own safety by collective than they could ever have made by separate action. Had there been no such incentive to them thus to coalesce, there would have been
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  no Pact and no need for a Pact. Now it is suggested that the door which this Pact was spontaneously designed to close should be flung lightheartedly open and that those whom it was formed to keep out should be invited to step in.
  If that is the view, why not offer them membership of the Baghdad Pact? And if that, why not membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation? I do not remember that those who are now very vocal in urging that Russia should be asked to step into the Middle East were at the time very loudly in favour of agreeing to the Russian proposal that she should join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Your Lordships may remember that that was one of the Russian moves some time ago. I do not think it was very seriously considered by any Party in this country. Yet now the suggestion is that, in spite of the existence of the Baghdad Pact, she should be invited to step into the theatre of the Middle East. There is no logical distinction between the two positions, each one of which could, in my submission, result only in the collapse of the whole defensive structure of the free world. I am inclined to think that there is already quite enough Communist activity in the region of the Middle East without going out of one's way to increase it. If is does not create, it is at least prompt to exploit any incident which is unfavourable to the West. Certainly, we have had our anxieties lately in the Middle East, and those anxieties have been acute. General Glubb, since his return, has made plain his own attitude to what happened with a degree of generosity, wisdom and restraint that is perhaps the most effective commentary upon the circumstances of his dismissal after so many years of zealous and selfless service.
  The position in Jordan as a whole, however, seems to be clearing gradually. I am not going to venture into the realms of prophecy, but I think that so far one can go. Your Lordships will remember that the King of Jordan did not accept an invitation to the Cairo talks which recently took place between General Nasser, the King of Saudi Arabia and President Kuwatly of Syria, talks which resulted at least in an extremely lengthy and resonant communiqué. Yesterday, as your Lordships will have seen, there was also a meeting between the King of Iraq and the King of Jordan, who are

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  not only bound by geographical but also by dynastic ties. I would add only this: the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, called attention to the position in Jordan and the necessity of looking at the situation afresh; and a remark on the same lines was made by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in moving his Motion. The position is that in Jordan, at the moment, Her Majesty's Ambassador is engaged in talks with the Jordan Government on the existing situation, and the House will understand if I go no further than to say that those talks are being carried on.
  Our preoccupation with events in that part of the world, of course, is due only to the obvious fact that any sudden upheaval might at any moment disturb what is admittedly the precariously poised situation between Israel and the Arab States. The whole situation in that area of the Middle East is not made easier by the vicious and persistent broadcasts of stations such as "The Voice of the Arab". I do not intend to-day, with the number of speakers there are on the list, to go over the ground that I attempted to cover in our last debate on the Middle East on the more restricted field of relations between Israel and the Arab States. I propose only to say this. If there has been no actual outbreak of hostilities during the past six years or more since the State of Israel came into being, in my view, that condition, if not of peace, at least of "non-war," has been attributable in the main to the existence of the Tripartite Declaration. That Declaration is still of full force and effect. I can only repeat to-day the conviction I expressed in the earlier debate that the only solution which can give real and lasting relief from the present prolonged tension and animosity lies in a settlement between those directly concerned, with any assistance they may require from other countries, of difficulties which hitherto, unfortunately, the passing of time has only served to perpetuate.
  Sometimes it has been urged that since we have a Treaty with Jordan, under which we are bound to go to the aid of Jordan should she be attacked, we should conclude a similar Treaty with Israel. Our 1948 Treaty with Jordan, which is the existing one, was in replacement of a former Treaty made in 1946, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will remember, which, in its terms, gave form and substance and
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  definition to our relations with Jordan. Therefore, our treaty relations with Jordan stem from a situation which existed at a moment before the State of Israel ever came into being at all. The conditions which have existed in the area since the Armistice Agreement have been covered and protected by the Tripartite Declaration. The Tripartite Declaration is a phrase which is not altogether to be overlooked, because, as distinct from a Treaty, this is a Declaration which involves not us alone, but the United Kingdom plus the United States and plus France, and it therefore is a treble assurance—
  LORD HENDERSON: My Lords, may I intervene? I am interested in the last remark of the noble Marquess. I recall the Prime Minister in another place saying in the last debate, with reference to the Tripartite Declaration, that the representatives of the three Governments were meeting to consider the nature of the action to be taken to give effect to the Tripartite Declaration. In view of the fact that the noble Marquess has again rejected the idea of a bilateral Treaty with Israel, is he in a position to say what is the nature of the action that is to be taken, because that is the deterrent value of the Tripartite Declaration?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I quite follow the noble Lord's point. What was said was perfectly accurate. That aspect is being discussed, but I am not yet in position to say exactly what the outcome of it may be.
  Towards the latter part of his speech, the noble Lord, Lord Hore-Belisha, asked a question, I think not wholly rhetorical, about what separate interest this country was claiming in the Middle East. I think that question arose out of what he had been saying about Cyprus. So far as I know, we are claiming no separate interest in the Middle East. We are accepting perhaps a separate responsibility in Cyprus, because it happens that Cyprus is a British possession, and therefore the responsibility for Cyprus rests upon this country. But when the noble Lord asks what we feel about oil and whether we should sell it to Russia and so on—
  LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Marquess? My point was: why do we not discharge

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  the responsibility on behalf of N.A.T.O., instead of as a purely British responsibility?
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: I think we have a duty to discharge our own responsibility, though certainly with our eye upon N.A.TO. Indeed, it is the interests of N.A.T.O., as well as our own strategic interests, that have led us to attach the importance that we do to the geographical position of Cyprus and to its use as a base.
  LORD HORE-BELISHA: My Lords, forgive me. I think the point has some substance, and I am sure that the noble Marquess does not want to gloss over it. Is there, then, nothing in the claim of Mr. Eisenhower and of other foreign Powers, Members of N.A.T.O. that their interests are affected by what is happening in Cyprus, that they wish to be consulted and would make a composite policy? I think it necessary to call attention to this matter because it occupies a great deal of space in every newspaper, and I think it is worthy of consideration for the sake of good relationships.
  THE MARQUESS OF READING: Consultation is one thing; giving information is one thing; but discharge of responsibility is another thing. At the present time, as things stand, as I have said, it is our responsibility to discharge our task in Cyprus of establishing and preserving order and, at the same time, carrying on the base which has been installed there. Certainly throughout the Middle East, in all our dealings with the problem of that country, we have not only sought but have received a considerable volume of co-operation from other countries. Indeed, in an earlier passage of my speech I went in some detail into the position of such an Agreement as the Baghdad Pact, where, after all, we are working in close relation with other Asian countries. We quite realise that in many parts of the world to-day we cannot be responsible for security except by a combined effort of all those concerned. I suppose that one of the first and basic principles of foreign policy—I have said this before to your Lordships—is that in all these matters we have to match our resources with our responsibilities and not let one outweigh the other. That we have sought to do in our Middle East policy, as well as in our policy in other parts of the world.
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  There are many other matters with which I could deal in this particular field, but the weight of the debate so far has, I think, been on the Cyprus issue, and will perhaps continue to be. At the same time, I thought it right, in view of the double nature of the Motion of the noble Earl, that there should be, on behalf of the Government, at least a speech which should confine itself to the problems of the Middle East. With what I have already been able to say I shall content myself, and I can only hope that, to some degree, I may have contented the Home as well.
  5.13 p.m.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, this debate, as the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has pointed out, has been mainly concerned with Cyprus, in spite of his own valuable foreign policy contribution; and Cyprus is a subject on which I have had a Motion on the Order Paper for several months. I should like to express my gratitude to the noble Marquess, the Leader of the House for his courtesy in giving us this early opportunity of discussing this subject. We on this side of the House have never wished to hamper negotiations, which everyone hoped would succeed, by a premature debate here. We therefore readily agreed, at the request of the Government, to postpone my Motion until there was either a settlement or a breakdown in the negotiations. A breakdown has now unfortunately occurred, and the noble Marquess has been good enough to rearrange the Business of the House so that we can discuss the subject without any unnecessary delay. I propose to confine my own remarks to Cyprus, and I am pleased to observe that the noble Earl, Lord Munster, who is a former Colonial Office Minister, will soon be in a position to reply to me.
  The reason for my special interest in Cyprus is that I was a Minister at the Colonial Office at the time of the 1948 constitutional offer, when my noble friend Lord Winster was Governor of the island, and working so hard for its acceptance. Since then I have been a close and sympathetic observer of events in the island. There are two things that strike one particularly forcibly about the present tragic situation. One is that we cannot hope to find the right way out unless all the relevant facts are examined without

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  Party or national prejudice, with a mental willingness to see and understand the British, the Greek, the Turkish and the Cypriot viewpoints. This is not altogether easy at a time when Party and national sentiments have already been deeply stirred. The other thing that strikes me particularly forcibly is that responsibility for what has happened in Cyprus is widely distributed in time and space: it ranges from our failure to bribe Greece, by the offer of Cyprus, to come into the First World War in 1915, to the strategic requirements of the present cold war and the tension between Israel and the Arab States in the Middle East. If we on this side of the House deal with the special responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, it does not mean that we have forgotten these other relevant factors; it means simply that we are trying to do our job as Her Majesty's Opposition.
  We recognise, of course, that those primarily concerned with, and responsible for, the present situation are the British Government and British policy and the Greek-speaking Cypriot population. In my view, there have been mistakes on both sides—mistakes which ought to be frankly admitted—and the future of the island will depend on the rectification of those mistakes by both sides. The two most grievous mistakes of the Cypriots were, I believe, first, to refuse the liberal constitution in 1948, which would eventually have given them a Parliamentary weapon in the struggle for Enosis; and secondly, to start the present campaign of terrorism and violence, which would have been quite unnecessary if they had had a constitutional method of pressing their national claim. Terrorism has brought death to Britons and Cypriots; it has brought untold misery to their families and financial ruin to many people on the island. The longer it continues, the harder it will become to find the common ground necessary for agreement.
  I should now like to pass to the mistakes which, in my view, Her Majesty's Government have committed and which have led up to the present situation. I shall then go on to say something about the changes of policy that are now required, and I hope to allude to the interesting suggestions of the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of
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  Canterbury for putting an end to terrorism and coercion and achieving an agreed settlement. The policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Cyprus since 1954 has, I believe, been weak and vacillating —and I think that this was implied by something that was said by the most reverend Primate. This weakness has encouraged the belief that the British Government will surrender to force what they will not give to persuasion. Their inconsistency has obscured the limit beyond which concessions cannot go. Step by step, in response to pressure from Cyprus, the Government have retreated to the position which they should have occupied at the start.
  In July, 1954, a shadow of self-government, a Legislature without an elected majority—a much less liberal offer than that made in 1948—was held out to Cyprus. Thirteen months later, in August, 1955, the Foreign Secretary announced that this shadow had been given substance, and that Cyprus would have a Legislative Assembly, with an elected majority and powers of internal self-government. The unfortunate feature in this sequence of events was that shooting had started in Cyprus in the spring months of 1955. Self-government had thus been conceded, but not self-determination. In that regard the Cypriots were no better off after the Tripartite Conference in the autumn of 1955 than they had been before it; indeed, the failure of the Conference—to which, of course, Greece, Turkey and ourselves were parties—to reach any agreement merely worsened the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I should be surprised if Ministers looking back did not admit, privately at any rate, that the Tripartite Conference was a blunder and should never have been convened. International conferences should presuppose from the start a reasonable chance of agreement. With that general principle I am quite sure all those who have been concerned with foreign relations will agree.
  The public exposure of the differences over Cyprus between Greece and Turkey started the terrible anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Ismailia, and the refusal of self-determination preceded violence on the island. In November of last year the Governor had to declare a state of emergency. Then, quite suddenly, in the following month of December, only three

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  months after a categorical statement by the Foreign Secretary that exceptions must be made to the principle of self-determination of Cyprus, the same Minister informed the Members of another place that self-determination for Cyprus was no longer not in the foreseeable future and should come (and here I quote his words)
  "at some time and on certain conditions."
  The time and the place were not specified, but everyone realised that a right for which the majority of Cypriots had been striving for the last hundred years had been at last granted. If only these basic demands, self-government and self-determination, had been offered in 1954, instead of being conceded to mounting violence in the next eighteen months, Cyprus might have been today as peaceful an island and as useful and efficient a base as Malta is in the Mediterranean.
  It is thus against a background of agreement on essentials that in January and February of this year the talks between the Governor and the Archbishop proceeded. This, at any rate, was the view expressed by the Secretary of State at the beginning of the present month. I should like to quote his words. He said:
  "The big issues, the principle of self-determination and the question of self-government, are in a sense out of the way."
  The talks therefore broke down on matters of much less importance—matters essentially negotiable—and what I think the Government have to do to justify their policy in breaking off their talks; and what I do not think they have done hitherto by their explanations in another place, is to give a single valid reason for calling off the negotiations at this stage.
  Everyone is aware of the three issues —my noble friend Lord Attlee has dealt with them at length, and I will not repeat them—on which the two sides failed to agree. Too many people think that both parties could have made concessions without losing anything essential. Your Lordships will have noticed that that view was expressed in The Times yesterday by their correspondent in Cyprus. This report is a matter of such interest that I should like to read a few lines from it. He says:
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  "… your Correspondent has come to the conclusion that the talks with Archbishop Makarios should not have broken down, at least when they did. This is not the view merely of one or two minor and possibly disgruntled or prejudiced philhellenic officials; apart from the Greek Cypriots or the Greek representatives here, who are naturally unanimous, and for the most part genuinely so, that the deportation of Archbishop Makarios was a blunder, there are evidently many others who think that agreement might, and should if possible, have been reached."
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I think it would be convenient if we were now to adjourn during pleasure for the Royal Commission.
  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  ROYAL COMMISSION
  5.30 p.m.
  The following Bills received the Royal Assent:

  Leeward Islands,

  Children and Young Persons,

  Therapeutic Substances,

  Police (Scotland),

  Charles Beattie Indemnity,

  Agricultural Research,

  Dentists,

  Food and Drugs (Scotland),

  Pakistan (Consequential Provision),

  Monmouthshire County Council,

  Crosby Corporation,

  Blyth Generating Station (Ancillary Powers),

  Dundee Corporation.

  House adjourned during pleasure.
  House resumed.

  EASTER RECESS AND BUDGET DAY
  EARL FORTESCUE: My Lords, I have to inform your Lordships that Budget Day is April 17, and that the Easter Recess begins on March 29 and ends on April 10.

  THE MIDDLE EAST
  5.43 p.m.
  Debate resumed.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: My Lords, I was saying before the interlude that The Times correspondent in Cyprus and a number of persons in that island took the view, which was not shared by the Government, that there was a real possibility of agreement at the time when these talks were broken off. Surely, the benefit of the doubt in this matter should have been given by the Government to those who still saw the hope of agreement, however faint that hope may have been. I would only say in passing that the narrowing of the gap which has been going on ever since the negotiations began on the three points of difference must have been largely due to the negotiating skill of the Governor, Sir John Harding, who has shown himself in these protracted discussions to have the qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier.
  The decision—as we think, the disastrous decision—to break off the talks was followed by the decision to deport the Archbishop. The two reasons given for this action have been his refusal to appeal publicly against the use of violence and his direct or indirect complicity in terrorism. The Archbishop's answer to the first of these charges is that an appeal would have been useless; it would not have stopped violence unless he had been able at the same time to offer his supporters a political settlement. I cannot help thinking that the Archbishop is just as well qualified to know what the probable effect on his own supporters of an appeal would be as Her Majesty's Government. Whether or not people agree with the Archbishop's reply to this charge, I think, at any rate, it should be stated, because it was quite clear that in none of the ministerial statements that were made yesterday in another place was there any representation at all of the other point of view.
  On the other charge, the Government have adduced detailed evidence to support the complicity of the Archbishop and have stated that he was personally involved in the terrorist campaign. The Archbishop has not yet had an opportunity to reply to this charge, and fair-minded people will at least keep their minds open until they have heard his
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  side of the case. I understand that he denies this charge through those who are entitled to speak for him, but he obviously has not had an opportunity to make any comment himself. But let us assume for the moment that the Government is right and that the Archbishop is in fact a terrorist leader. The question then arises whether he should have been arrested when he was arrested or allowed to remain at large. On the Government's own showing, this was a matter of pure expediency and not of morality or principle. The Government were fully aware of the Archbishop's connections with the terrorists while the negotiations were going on, but they did not wish to prejudice a settlement by placing him under arrest at that time, and I applaud the Government for adopting that policy; I think they were perfectly right.
  Now, if the Archbishop had continued to be more useful to the Government at large, it is to be presumed that he would still be free. This makes it all the more culpable that the Government did not foresee and avoid the irreparable damage his deportation is now doing in Cyprus and its serious repercussions in Greece and on the rest of the outside world. There is now no moderate leader left in Cyprus with the authority to resume the negotiations, and we are faced with an indefinite period of coercion and no prospect at all of an agreed settlement. The leadership of this national movement in Cyprus has of course passed into the hands of the extremists—E.O.K.A. and the Communists—and they will continue to answer force by force. The bitterness this action has provoked in Greece threatens to wreck the N.A.T.O. alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean and will certainly impair its effectiveness, as indeed has already happened in the past, for a considerable time. We have also antagonised and shocked a large amount of world opinion. Even our most important and loyal ally, the United States of America, judging from the reactions of members of Congress, has been moved to express its sympathy with Cyprus and Greece. Those of your Lordships who know America will realise how deeply public opinion there can be stirred by manifestations of old-fashioned colonial rule. I only hope that Cyprus will not be in American eyes a symbol of British imperialism—another India, Ireland or Palestine.

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  The only solution that will give us a secure base for our commitments in the Mediterranean and the Middle East and bring back peace and normality to Cyprus is an agreed political settlement. The threefold basis of such a settlement already exists, although it may not last much longer: for the Greek Cypriots, management of their own affairs and ultimate choice of their political future; for the Turkish minority, adequate safeguards in whatever Constitution may be adopted; for us, the use of the island as a military base as long as we require it; and for N.A.T.O. a permanent base in the Mediterranean which, ipso facto, will be shared by Turkey. The only alternative to such a settlement is a continuation of coercion and bloodshed. Our men and airfields on the island will be surrounded by a hostile population, and the people of Cyprus will continue to lack the freedom and security for which British rule has always stood. We cannot therefore agree with the Government that the effort to reach a political settlement must now be abandoned.
  It is, I expect, clear—to me regrettably clear—so far as Cyprus is concerned, that the bipartisan tradition of colonial policy has been broken. If we had the authority of the Government we should reverse their policy; the Archbishop would be released and invited to resume the negotiations at the point at which they were broken off. But by that time, if and when it comes, the atmosphere in Cyprus may be so poisoned by hatred that a settlement will be impossible. I therefore beg the Government to have second thoughts now, to try once more for a settlement that will end violence and coercion, and to remember that that is what thousands of ordinary people in this country and all over the world most ardently desire.
  I should like particularly to ask the Government to consider the constructive and statesmanlike proposals that the most reverend Primate made at the end of his speech. If I understood him rightly, his main suggestions were that a Constitution could be drawn up forthwith, and that the Archbishop should be released as soon as law and order have been restored in Cyprus. Surely, that is an improvement on the sterile and negative policy of repression which is all that the Government have so far offered us. I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government not
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  only to study and examine these proposals with the utmost care and with the minimum of delay, but to communicate the results of their study to the House, because I know that the House was deeply impressed by the contribution of the most reverend Primate and I am quite certain that the whole House would wish to know the result of the Government's consideration of it.
  5.53 p.m.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: My Lords, I hope not to detain the House long in my remarks. May I start by echoing what has already been said in words of welcome to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Like so many other institutions and individuals, this House makes collections. The House of Lords collects Prime Ministers, end we are proud of the latest addition to our list. I am glad that the noble Earl opened his innings by raising a subject of great current importance. All of us must be deeply disturbed by the recent events both in Cyprus and in the Middle East; in particular, the dismissal of General Glubb by King Hussein of Jordan made a deep and painful impression on public opinion—an impression which I personally share. General Glubb had great achievements to his credit which we all gratefully acknowledge. The dust has settled a little since that event, and we certainly should not make premature judgments; but I fear that grave damage has been done which we ought not to underestimate—damage to the Anglo-Jordan Alliance and damage, I fear, to the reputation of the throne of Jordan. Those of us who have had the honour of meeting the King still entertain hopes that he may emulate his eminent grandfather, King Abdullah, to whom Lord Attlee referred. We must not abandon these hopes, and we must still trust that the young King may preserve his country and his dynasty.
  The Arab Legion is certainly a matter of grave concern for this country, but I hope noble Lords will not forget that under our Treaty, we occupy two highly important airfields in Jordan—Amman and Mafrah. They are part of the complex of airfields and bases which stretch from Malta, through Libya to Cyprus, and on, under our recent Treaty, to Iraq. I read with great care the Report of the debate in another place on the Middle East and I was glad that the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Gaitskell, recognised

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  explicitly the dependence of the economy of this country, as well as of Europe, upon oil from the Persian Gulf. But I could not join with him when he seemed, as I thought, to view the situation in the light that those States who produce oil must sell to us. I am sorry that the lessons of Abadan have not taken deeper root in the minds of the Opposition. Nationalism and anti-Westernism, Communist-stimulated, could quite easily create such chaos in those States that they will deny oil to this country even at the expense of great misery to themselves and disaster to this country. Therefore, I say again that we ought not to underestimate the part played in the pacification of that area by the air bases which are either occupied by us or upon which we have facilities. They stretch from Iraq down the Persian Gulf and along the Northern shore of the Indian Ocean, in the Aden Protectorate and in Aden colony, and the pivot of the whole complex is the Island of Cyprus.
  We know that we left the Suez Canal because we could not maintain a base when we had not the power of internal security. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, following a line of argument with which we must all be familiar, seemed to point to the inevitability of the process of representation in internal government as if it always brought benefits both to the countries concerned and to world peace. Sometimes the power of nationalism is so strong and our power not strong enough so that we have, at the point of insurrection, to concede it. We certainly ought not to seek to be deceived by the results of world peace. There is still violence on the border between Northern and Southern Ireland; in the Indian subcontinent strife is rife in Kashmir, and racial and religious antagonisms abounded when we left there; and in the near East, when we yielded up our Mandate of Palestine and planted it in the lap of U.N.O., we left a legacy of bitterness and racial hatred which still burns fiercely. So let us not seek to be deceived into thinking that when we yield up power in the face of insurrection we are making for world peace.
  We have responsibilities in the island of Cyprus quite beyond those particular responsibilities which attach to a British colony. No speaker from the Opposition has thought it worth while to maintain
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  the Turkish position, nor the fact that there are strong Communist elements both in Cyprus and in Greece. Viewed from the Turkish situation, how could they allow the possibility of a Communist-dominated Cyprus, attached possibly to a Communist-dominated Greece? And if we yielded to the demands made without an adequate safeguard to the Turkish minority, without adequate compensation to the fears of Turkey, in our extraordinarily difficult international situation we should do far more harm to the cause of the free world and to N.A.T.O. than we should by possibly offending some Western opinion and opinion in the United States. We cannot abdicate, because of our wide responsibilities, the power of law and order in the Island; and I personally regret that the neglect of these elements in the speeches of noble Lords on the opposite side of the House must have done, and must do, great harm to the cause of freedom.
  We have all read with mixed feelings the remarks attributed to the United States Ambassador in Athens. I have not seen an official version of them, but certainly they have given great and justifiable offence in this country, and nothing put out by the State Department which I have read has minimised what I would call the disastrous effect upon the unity of the two leading Powers in the free world. When our greatest Ally treats on terms of equality Great Britain and the Government of Cyprus, which has been pouring out subversion, or at least conniving in subversive propaganda and incitement to violence, I wonder they did not mention a third great friend, the Republic of Guatemala, where, I believe, constitutional government exists entirely free from external pressure. I hope that the United States Ambassador in this country, who is our great friend, will not fail to report to his country the intensity of the feeling here that we have been let down by a friend who should support us.
  At the time when I had the honour to be Secretary of State for Air, I did my best to make that partnership, so far as it concerned the Air Forces of the two countries, a reality; and I yield to no one in my belief in the vital importance of continued Anglo-American understanding. I am a deep admirer of the institutions and spirit of the great Republic, but speaking from that point of view I

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  say that we are entitled to expect a far higher degree of comprehension and sympathy than we have received. After all, we have done our best, sometimes under great difficulty, to understand their policy in the Far East and I feel we ought not to mince our words now, when we are supporting, at the expense of blood and treasure, and perhaps of reputation, the power of the free world in the Near East.
  I must deplore the fact that some noble Lords and some outside this House, treat on terms of equality the Government of Cyprus and those who are trying to subvert it. And to the most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, I would say, with the greatest possible candour, that I deeply regretted not hearing him deplore the murders which have taken place, at least with the connivance, if not under the inspiration, of Archbishop Makarios.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, I thought I made it perfectly clear that I dissociated myself utterly and entirely from the terrorism and murder which is in progress there.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: It is not enough to dissociate oneself. Surely it falls to the most reverend Primate utterly to condemn it.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, I thought if one dissociated oneself from such action, one condemned it. Certainly I condemn the Archbishop Makarios for not himself disowning it. I wish to make perfectly clear that I was not at all lacking in condemnation of the terrorism and murders in Cyprus.
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: I am very glad to have elicited that statement, if it was not already in the most reverend Primate's speech, because it is most important at this time that the forces of law and order should restore in the island of Cyprus good and stable government. For I am certain that the views of the Cypriots themselves, whether they are Greek-speaking or Turkish-speaking, can be made known only when fear of violence and murder has been removed. It is, and has often been, the case in situations of this kind that the agitators and those who are prepared to use violence completely suppress moderate opinion, which
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  will not emerge until law and order are restored. We ought not to yield up a position and a burden which we must carry in wider interests, as well as in national interests, because of the pressure of internal or external events. It is because I believe that Her Majesty's Government are doing so that I support them.
  6.5 p.m.
  LORD TWEEDSMUIR: My Lords, I should like to preface a rather short speech by paying my own tribute to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who initiated this debate. It would be impertinent for me to comment on the maiden speech of such an orator, beyond saying that I do not recollect when I heard a speech so easy to listen to. He and I first met twelve years ago in circumstances of Mediterranean strife, when he was Deputy Prime Minister in the Coalition Government. He came out to see the Gothic Line battle and was handed over to an officer, who was myself. I lost my way, and instead of having a distant view of the battle, the noble Earl had a most intimate view—which, of course, was no novelty to him, because among his many distinctions he had extremely distinguished service as an infantryman in the 1914–18 war.
  I should like to take up a point made by my noble friend Lord De L'lsle in his remarkable speech. Like him, I yield to no one in my feeling that the future of the free world depends almost above everything else on a close understanding and alliance with the Americans. Almost every speaker has drawn attention to the tremendous impact on world opinion caused by the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. The reaction of American public opinion was unfortunate, to say the least. I do not think it was unfair of a newspaper to plead to-day that His late Majesty, King George III, should be allowed to slumber in peace. When we in this country make a mistake it is not that we have not let rued the lesson, once or many times, but merely that we have learned it but forgotten it. We are a much older country than the United States and, with great humility, I would say that they make a mistake because they are finding themselves in a sphere in which they have never found themselves before, and in which they have no experience. They are still wedded to the belief that it is possible to be a great Power and, at the

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  same time, to be popular. To be popular as a country one requires to have no Army, no Exchequer, and no power, and to be picturesque. Then you can be popular at the price of being utterly powerless.
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in his interesting speech, said that much of our position in the world rested on public opinion. I go right with him if by that he meant our position of leadership in ideas in the world. I am sure he would not have suggested, or meant to imply, that public opinion in the world had anything to do with popularity. I would support no Government which shrank from taking a step which they thought right, because they thought that step would be unpopular. Noble Lords who have spoken are naturally disturbed and concerned in their minds, as we all are, about the position in Cyprus. It is tragic that we should be at odds with Greece, to whose classic past our own civilisation owes so much. When one first-class brigade, at just the right moment, prevented Greece from going behind the Iron Curtain, it was a British brigade—a matter of great pride to all of us. This is not a colonial or foreign affairs problem. This Enosis movement has acted as a burning glass on the dry tinder of the ancient feuds of Europe—for there is much dry tinder spread about; and to that fuel has been added by Archbishop Makarios and the Communists. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who is not here at the moment, made great play with an article in The Times, from its correspondent in Cyprus. I put great store by The Times correspondents, but it is only fair to point out that Her Majesty's Government have access to sources of information at least as good, and probably a good deal better, before they make up their mind.
  It is rather natural that this debate should narrow its focus, so far as Cyprus goes, on the deportation of Archbishop Makarios. This man's complicity is proved up to the hilt. It is not, I think, a question of saying "We have not heard his side of the story": his complicity is absolutely proved. The most reverend Primate told us earlier that the Archbishop had two capacities: that he was regarded as the political head of the country and as the head of that branch
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  of the Christian Church. That may be. A man may have two spheres to his life but he cannot have two characters, and the deeds committed by Mr. Hyde must be paid for by Dr. Jekyll. I have seen it written that
  "the Christian Church is an anvil that has worn out many hammers,"
  and will yet wear out many more. But, my Lords, murder is murder wheresoever and by whomsoever it is committed. If one tries to find excuses of this kind, if Christianity ever compromises on fundamentals, there is a danger not that that anvil will be broken but that it will be eroded.
  Archbishop Makarios was only too plainly committed to violence, either as a protagonist or as a puppet. We have given every evidence of our patience and sincerity. We have given him every chance. It was he and not ourselves who turned Cyprus into an armed camp. He cannot now escape his responsibilities. I believe that this ambitious man thought that moderation, let alone agreement, would weaken his position with his followers; and, whether he was a power-hungry man or a mere puppet, he believed that in the end, under the force of terrorism, we should crack. He was wrong; and our task is now to lower the temperature so that we can get back again to reasonable negotiations. When the agitators take hold of a country the moderates fall to a discount, because while you can argue moderation, counsel it, and preach it, you cannot agitate for it; so the agitators have the hustings all to themselves.
  I am in agreement with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, who said earlier to-day that he firmly believed that some 90 per cent. of the people of Cyprus wished an end to the whole thing; that they wished no part of these to-ings and fro-ings, but wished merely to be left alone to lead their own lives—because when there is violence and bloodshed it is the innocent, far more than the protagonists, who suffer and lose their lives. I feel that many a citizen of Cyprus now, if he could read English and had an opportunity of reading a certain poem of Rudyard Kipling's, might feel the circumstances applied to himself up to the time when the Archbishop left. Let us remember this line:
  "We are not ruled by murderers but only by their friends."

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  We have shown, I think, abundant evidence of good will, and we are there to go on with the conversations when any moderate and resolute man will come forward to continue them. As I say, the moderates in this wave of terrorism have gone temporarily to a discount.
  Our tasks are these. We have brought impartial justice. We must restore the Pax Britannica and then we must negotiate that last thing, some form of free and orderly government. This is going to take patience and resolution on the part of all concerned, not least on the part of that resolute, gallant, good-natured and most famous Britisher, Private Thomas Atkins and his cousin the policeman. This debate has been conducted with all the temperateness that one expects in your Lordships' House. It has not been so conducted beyond its walls, and our Party has been accused by one Party of madness and by another of folly in getting rid of Archbishop Makarios. That we had to take this step I, and I think all noble Lords on these Benches, shall remember with regret, but without a tinge of remorse.
  6.16 p.m.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: My Lords, I propose to confine my remarks to Cyprus, and I am extremely sorry to and myself in discord with the son of John Buchan. May I preface my remarks by saying how much I appreciate what Lord Rea said about approaching the whole matter from the international angle, and, if I may do so without presumption, may I add how much I admire the wisdom and statesmanship of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. May I say at once, in case anything I say later may be misunderstood—though I hope it will not be—how profoundly I abhor and condemn the outrages and barbarities now taking place in Cyprus and how deeply I, like the noble Earl who introduced this Motion, feel the terrible position of the troops and the police.
  I speak from a rather particular angle. Through my intimate connections with the World Council of Churches, as Chairman of its Central Committee for many years and now as the honorary President, I am necessarily in close touch with the opinion of many Churches of very different characters, reformed and unreformed, in many countries. I am not, of course, speaking here in any way for
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  the World Council of Churches, but I have heard from, and conversed with, officers of that Council, at Geneva and in London, and a personal statement was issued by the General Secretary, Dr. Visser 't Hooft, on March 13. I think it is important to appreciate the reason why the Archbishop, whoever he may be, must (he cannot help it) be the spokesman of the national as well as the ecclesiastical position in Cyprus. It is due to the historic opposition of the Greek Orthodox Church for many centuries to Turkish rule. Doctor Visser 't Hooft says:
  "Even though the activities of the Archbishop as ecclesiastical and as political leader are logically distinguishable, they cannot be separated in the minds of the people. It must therefore be made unmistakably clear to all concerned that this act of deportation against the head of a church is very deeply resented throughout the ancient Orthodox Churches."
  On various occasions in recent years the World Council of Churches has issued statements and resolutions condemning the actions of totalitarian réegims, and what they have said has been some comfort to hard-pressed Eastern churches. It is not surprising, therefore, that when an action which everybody must agree was totally unexpected from a great democratic Government in the West, what might be described as a thunderbolt from Britain, was launched, there was consternation amongst these Churches, and messages and protests and inquiries came in in a stream. I will not quote the text, for the most reverend Primate has referred to various messages and telegrams to the World Council and to him. I would just call attention to the fact that one of the protesters was the Greek Evangelical Church in Cyprus as well as the Orthodox Church. Perhaps the most disquieting feature of all in these protests or appeals was that in spite of that sufferings of Greece from the Communists, in spite of the great friendship of Greece for Britain, in spite of the fact—and the Prime Minister referred to this in another place yesterday—that it was British troops who delivered Greece from Communist control in 1944 to 1945, in spite of their abhorrence of Communist rule and Communist ideals, nevertheless the Greek Orthodox Church made an appeal to the Church of Russia. How curious! They asked the Church of Russia to show the
  "traditional protection you have always given the Orthodox Churches."

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  Colleagues of the World Council of Churches have spoken of the reaction through the whole world. "Throughout large parts of the world, Christian opinion", they say, "is greatly shocked and troubled by this event". Whilst I know that my view will not be agreed with, I think it is important to know not what I think (that is quite irrelevant) but what outside Churches think of us. They say: "We cannot understand." There is widespread bewilderment abroad, and they cannot understand that an action which, rightly or wrongly, they look upon as by-passing the law should have been taken, above all by Britain. And they would say that the action is an action which, so far as they can see from the facts that have been so far published, is without adequate moral basis. While the British Government may be thoroughly satisfied as to the rightness of this action, nevertheless from the point of view of many people in the international theatre it comes as a blow to British prestige and a reduction of Britain's capacity for moral leadership.
  I am very conscious of the strain which is placed upon that fine character and man of ability, Sir John Harding. Everyone must have great respect for him and great sympathy with him in the difficulties of his position in an intense political crisis. There is no dispute that the outrages are horrible, and that they are by all good Christian opinion wholeheartedly condemned. And I can understand the request which the Governor has made and which the Colonial Secretary has made to Archbishop Makarios to declare openly against terrorism. I deplore and condemn terrorism, and I wish with all my heart that the Greek Orthodox Church would publicly condemn it. But before we condemn Archbishop Makarios too vehemently I think we should remember the strength of the nationalist sentiment in Cyprus. It is far from certain that if Archbishop Makarios did make a public condemnation of the terrorist movement that the terrorist movement would cease. The most reverend Primate quoted those words of Archbishop Makarios in which he said that he was sincerely afraid that if there were an official condemnation of these events by himself it would not find, at the present stage, the necessary response, but
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  would involve the risk of exposing him rather unprofitably—
  VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE: If the right reverend Prelate will forgive my interrupting him, I should like to ask him this. Leaving aside the question of whether or not condemnation of terrorism by the Archbishop would be effective, does he think that he ought to have made such condemnation?
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I am asking the noble Viscount to pause before he is too vehement in his condemnation.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I quoted those words of Archbishop Makarios and I promptly said that in doing that he deserted his duty as a churchman and spoke as a politician.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I should like to ask the right reverend Prelate whether he agrees with or differs from the Archbishop in this matter.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: Which Archbishop?
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: The Archbishop of Canterbury.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I will in a moment answer the question which the noble Marquess the Leader of the House has put to me. First of all, let me say that when Archbishop Makarios made that remark I do not suppose he was thinking of himself and his own personal safety and position, but rather of the effect on his influence—a moderating influence, as I believe—that such a condemnation would have. It is not so simple for Archbishops and Bishops in any country, in times of revolution and war, to take a line which large bodies of their fellow countrymen resent and repudiate. I can speak from personal experience.
  I should also like to call your Lordships' attention to the fact that in the time of Sinn Fein the Roman Catholic Bishops in Ireland did not think they would increase their influence by a strong condemnation of violence there. Nor did the Church leaders during the Nazi occupation of Holland, while Dutchmen were doing acts of violence and sabotage, think they would help the position by open condemnation. I should like to call attention to Archbishop

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  Makarios's statement at a Press conference on March 5, after the meeting of the Ethnarchy Council. The report that I have says:
  "The Archbishop concluded by saying that until the British Government reviewed their position and showed respect and understanding towards the national aspirations of the Greek people of Cyprus the latter must remain cool and equip themselves with persistence and patience for the continuation of their peaceful struggle for self-determination."
  Those words are restraining words, and the whole emphasis of the paragraph is on peaceful action. So the answer to the question of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House is this. To my great regret, I do not find myself in complete agreement with what the most reverend Primate said, in the precise way in which he said it, during a certain portion of his speech; but I do find myself in agreement (and I am sorry that I agree with one and not the other) with everything that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said in dealing with a very difficult and delicate situation.
  Archbishop Makarios is undoubtedly a determined champion of the Cypriot case in negotiations. The real trouble is that there is no common ground between him and the British Government. In my opinion it is misleading for the Colonial Secretary to speak in London on March 5 at the Press conference as though the real issues had been settled and only local problems remained. The Colonial Secretary said that Archbishop Makarios
  "has refused to use his great influence to prevent violence. And I say of a man who refuses to use his Influence to condemn violence when great issues are out of the way and only small, local problems are involved, he is as guilty of violence as someone who promotes it."
  I regard that as evidence of a certain inability to see where the heart of a matter lies. The form of the Constitution which the Colonial Secretary described as a "local" problem is the crucial issue. Indeed, the letters of Sir John Harding of February 14 and of Archbishop Makarios of February 25 are completely at cross-purposes. The Archbishop and the British Government want different thing, and clarification at this stage is of little use.
  Let me state what I believe to be Archbishop Makarios's position. He asks for self-determination. It is a technical term; the right of a people to determine its own future. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, said that Cyprus was never a
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  Greek possession. Cyprus has a history of some 3,000 years. It is a Greek island; it was a free Greek island. It possessed itself for many years as a free Greek island with the free City States. It was a portion of Magna Graecia, the great classical Greece. It was part of the Byzantine Empire. Then there were certain vagaries of control after the collapse of the Byzantine Empire. For 300 years it was under Turkish rule, and for 78 years it has been under British rule. But all the time the people of Cyprus have been a Greek people. They have retained the Greek character and used the Greek language. And all the time there has been, sometimes strong, sometimes weak, but in these days stronger because of the pace of the times, the historic urge to fulfil their destiny in association with Greece.
  The position of the British Government at present is very different. To them, Cyprus is a British Colony. And the British Government offer not self-determination, or self-government, but self-government in a limited form, with large areas reserved for British rule; and at the heart of the Constitution there is a complete blank. It is an artificial solution in its present form; it is no solution at all. The Turks supply one-fifth of the total population; the Greeks are four-fifths. The Turkish Foreign Minister in London, in September last, said the guiding principle of any arrangements he would tolerate would be the granting of "full equality for the two groups" in Cyprus.
  I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that the British Government's refusal to say what proportion of membership in the Legislative Assembly, in both Houses, should correspond with the proportion of the population in Cyprus, is a matter to be deplored. Certainly it would be regarded by Archbishop Makarios as an ominous sign. I believe that while the Lower House might have a majority in proportion to the population, there is reason to suppose that the Upper House would not have that proportion, for, with some nominated members and some Turkish members, the proportion would not be in favour of the Greeks in Cyprus, the general population. I do not think that this Constitution can he described as a "liberal and democratic Constitution", drawn up "in consultation with representatives of all sections of

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  opinion in the Island". On these terms Cyprus would remain a dependent territory of lower grade for an indefinite period. Our policy at present lacks an adequate moral basis, and a policy without an adequate moral basis cannot succeed. The moral and the real in the end coincide.
  Listening to one or two of the speeches, I have wondered whether we are sufficiently alive to the fact that we are living in rapidly moving times; whether we realise that, because of the rapid pace of the times, mistakes come home to roost far sooner than they used to do, and that retribution, still certain, is much swifter than it was before. I believe that the deportation was a blunder, and that it is one of the blunders which the present policy reflects. This policy is out of touch with the realities of the modern world. I believe that Britain, in its own interests, cannot afford to isolate itself from the public opinion of the world and that the whole policy in the Middle East wants reappraisal.
  To keep colonialism as a plank in our policy in Cyprus is not consistent with realities, and it supplies an opening for the Communists to sweep in upon a new rift in the Western armour. I believe it is actually a threat to the defence of the West, and that the gravest danger of all from this policy is that we should lose Asia and Africa. Little has been said about the reactions of the Asiatic countries, which matter so much, and I believe that if we lose them, we lose nearly everything. It is not in the military field that our chief peril lies but in the field of ideas, in the whole moral and spiritual field. That is the field in which the real conflict of our day is being waged.
  The problem of Cyprus is not insoluble, but it has to be envisaged in its true nature. I do not think that the London Conference provided the right approach. I do not think that the then Foreign Secretary's statement that Cyprus was "the hinge of the North Atlantic and Middle East defence system" goes to the root of the matter, important as the position of that island is. There are perhaps too many pacts; but there is force in what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said about the way in which the hydrogen bomb makes obsolete so many military approaches of the past. With all respect, I do not believe this is the way to preserve
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  N.A.T.O. itself, or to win the confidence of the younger and uncommitted nations, or to advance true British interests. Let us start afresh. Let us make plain, first of all, that Britain is not an autocratic power; that it recognises the new situation in the world; and that it appreciates the desire of peoples striving for national recognition, as it has so often shown. Let Britain declare that Cyprus shall be given effective freedom to determine her future, although it may be by stages. Obviously, safeguards are necessary for the Turkish minority and for defence interests. Bases in Cyprus are wanted. Yet this requirement is laid down, not with any idea of colonial domination, but with proper regard for Turkish as well as British needs, in co-operation with Greece, for a better defence of the West.
  6.42 p.m.
  THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (THE EARL OF MUNSTER): My Lords, I feel sure that every noble Lord who has listened to this debate to-day will have appreciated the manner in which the Motion was introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. I, too, should like to offer my congratulations to the noble Earl on the occasion of his maiden speech. Before I come to a detailed reply to much of the criticism which has been levelled against Her Majesty's Government this afternoon, I want to deal briefly with some of the events that have occurred in past years. I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that there is no necessity to go back very far, and I intend to recall to your Lordships' minds what happened in 1946, during the time when the noble Lord, Lord Winster—who made an effort in that year to introduce a new Constitution—was Governor of Cyprus.
  Provision was made to set up a Consultative Assembly in order to consider the question of constitutional reform. That assembly met in 1947, but the right wing Greek Cypriots refused to attend on the ground that a local Constitution was no substitute for Enosis. This Constitution proposed that the new Legislative Council should have a substantial majority of elected members, and that, moreover, there should be three Greeks and one Turkish member on the Executive Council, and they would, in fact, be responsible for certain departments of State. The Consultative Assembly was

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  hardly representative, owing to the absence, as I have said, of the right wing leaders, and the proposals were accepted by only a narrow majority.
  The Government at that time, which was the Government led by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, came to the conclusion that, in view of the narrowness of the majority and the composition of the Assembly, further steps should not be taken at that stage to implement the new Constitution. However, the noble Lord, Lord Winster—who I am glad is going to take part in this debate—told the Assembly at that time that if at any time there appeared to be genuine manifestations of public opinion in favour of the proposals, the British Government would take the necessary steps to enable this to be done. That Constitution remained open for six years, but no request came from local leaders in Cyprus for its implementation. I think that here is clear and unmistakable evidence that the late Labour Government and Her Majesty's present Government were both anxious to see a new Constitution implemented, but the Cypriot people had not become co-operative. I want to remind your Lordships that under that Constitution—if I may, I will describe it as the Winster Constitution—the future status of the island could not he discussed, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, is quite wrong in thinking that if that Constitution had come into operation the Greek elected members of the Assembly would have been able to discuss Enosis. That was definitely ruled out of discussion.
  THE EARL OF LISTOWEL: I agree with the noble Earl. I did not say that the Greek elected members would be able to discuss Enosis. I was closely connected with that Constitution, and I know that they would not have been able to discuss it.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am sorry if I misunderstood the noble Earl, but I thought he said that they would have been able to discuss Enosis. At any rate, the one thing that is quite clear is that the late Government were no less anxious than the present Government in their desire to see a new Constitution implemented. However, the new Constitution which we hope will come into being on this occasion contains no such reservation about Enosis, and any subject could come up for discussion at any time in this far
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  more liberal Constitution. Here let me say that I do not honestly believe that the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of Chichester, has ever bothered to read the White Paper which was issued by the Government on the question of Cyprus.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: I would assure the noble Earl that I have read it carefully.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: Then I am bound to say that, if the right reverend Prelate has read it, if he would exercise his intelligence in the right direction, he would observe that this is a far advanced liberal Constitution; it is common in many territories throughout the British Commonwealth, and is working extremely well in many of them.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: May I interrupt again to point out that what I said was that the two letter; of Archbishop Makarios and Sir John Harding showed that they were at cross-purposes, and the heart of the matter wad not really dealt with in an adequate way by Sir John Harding.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am coming to the speech of the right reverend Prelate at a later stage, and I will leave my further comments until then. In July, 1954, we announced our intention to introduce a modified Constitution. It had been impossible to make progress when a wave of terror began in April of that year. In September last, as your Lordships will remember, the Foreign Secretary called a Tripartite Conference together in London and laid before them the text of the Government's proposals. I do not agree with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who said that he thought this Tripartite Conference was a remarkable blunder. There was every reason to believe that it might have been a remarkable success, and, in any event, in the difficulties which were facing us at that time it was well worth trying to see whether agreement could be obtained. There was this meeting in London. The House may recall that important proposals were put to that Conference—namely, for the introduction of a new and liberal Constitution, leading to the fullest measure of self-government which was compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation.

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  It is well that the House should be reminded of what has occurred during the last ten years while successive Governments have endeavoured to introduce representative government for all the people of Cyprus. We have made strenuous efforts and great concessions to that end, but so far we have not met with much success. In October last year, the present Governor, Sir John Harding, in exploratory talks with the Archbishop and other Cypriot leaders, attempted to reach some political settlement which would offer prospects of substantial constitutional advance. All the correspondence which took place between the Archbishop and the Governor has been published in the White Paper.
  I wish to draw the attention of the House to the first section of that Paper which states the Government's policy on both the short-term and the long-term aspects. That statement was in due course explained to, and discussed with, the Archbishop and with the leaders of the Turkish community, who, as my noble friend Lord De L'Isle has said, must always be considered in any question dealing with Cyprus. The Archbishop informed the Governor that he was not prepared to associate himself with the statement, but that he was prepared, on certain conditions, to co-operate in framing a Constitution. These conditions concerned the form of the Constitution, and the amnesty. That in itself marks a vast improvement and a step forward towards final agreement, because the need to establish self-government was recognised on every side, and the principle of self-determination was therefore no longer a stumbling block. Discussions on the outstanding questions continued, and it soon became clear that the reservation of public security to the Governor for as long as he thought necessary, and the question of a Greek-elected majority and the amnesty, were matters requiring further clarification.
  In an all-out effort to try to reach a final settlement, my right honourable friend the Colonial Secretary decided to visit Cyprus himself. He saw the Archbishop and told him of certain undertakings which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to give if the Archbishop would co-operate in framing a Constitution and would encourage his fellow-countrymen to do the same. He also
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  asked the Archbishop to make an appeal for the cessation of violence, and to use all his influence for the restoration of law and order. The undertakings which my right honourable friend offered were that there would be an amnesty for all those convicted under the Emergency Regulations, except cases involving violence against the person or the illegal possession of arms, which would in any event come up for review in accordance with the normal rules. The release of detainees would begin at the same time as the amnesty, and all Emergency Regulations would be repealed at a pace commensurate with the re-establishment of law and order.
  My right honourable friend further elaborated the Governor's letter of February 14, and he told the Archbishop that we would send a Constitutional Commissioner to Cyprus to frame a Constitution in agreement with representatives of all sections of the population. Foreign affairs and defence, however, would be reserved subjects, and so would public security for as long as the Governor thought necessary. The House will observe at once that at that time foreign affairs and defence were no difficulty whatever: it was agreed by everyone that they should be a reserved subject and under the control of Her Majesty's Government. The control of Departments was to be handed over to Cypriot Ministers who were to be responsible to a Legislative Assembly, and the transfer was to take place as soon as possible. The Constitution was to provide for an elected majority, in which the interests of all the races would be safeguarded.
  After prolonged discussion, the Archbishop was still not prepared to accept the Colonial Secretary's statement, and in particular he emphasised that he would not agree to the exclusion from the amnesty of those who had been convicted of carrying arms or the reservation of public security for as long as the Governor thought necessary. The Archbishop also insisted that the composition of the elected majority should be defined to his satisfaction and in advance of the recommendations of the Constitutional Commissioner. Those were the three points upon which agreement could not be reached. They have now become the subject of criticism not only from the Opposition, who maintain that it ought to have been possible to reach agreement, but also from the right

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  reverend Prelate. Indeed, it has been said—and here I quote from the Daily Telegraph of March 12, when Mr. Gaitskell is reported to have said:
  "that the points at issue are much less important than those already agreed, and that they could have been bridged with a little more patience."
  The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said more or less the same thing this afternoon: that the three subjects were of much less importance. How ridiculous is that suggestion! For a period of five months Her Majesty's Government and the Governor exercised unlimited patience, but whenever agreement appeared to be in sight the Archbishop invariably produced other points which had not hitherto been raised.
  Let me deal with them. First of all, let me deal with the amnesty. It had been agreed that, when law and order had been established, an amnesty would be granted to all those who had been convicted of offences under the Emergency Regulations, except those involving violence or incitement to violence or the illegal possession of arms, ammunition and explosives. Sentences for those crimes would come up for review, as I have told your Lordships, under the normal rules. During the discussions with the Archbishop, my right honourable friend, in the hope of reaching agreement, agreed to delete incitement to violence and violence not against the person from the exceptions; but the Archbishop was not satisfied with this proposal. He appeared to believe, this great Churchman, this great Christian, that carrying arms, ammunition or explosives was a harmless occupation and ought, therefore, to be removed from the exceptions.
  I venture to think, without fear of contradiction, that every normally minded person in this country would agree that no responsible Government could conceivably agree to give way there. Surely, any person found carrying arms could only have the intention of endangering life or committing murder and assassination. As we all know, security of life has always been an essential ingredient for every community and the first responsibility of all good Governments. To have conceded that point—I think the Opposition, in pressing this, are a little weak in their arguments—would have meant that anyone determined to commit murder to suit his political ends but, fortunately,
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  detected before doing so, would be able to claim the benefit of the amnesty. Surely, to-day, as in years past, the intention to commit murder is one of the most serious crimes known to civilised people. It is impossible to understand the attitude of mind of any man, let alone a Church leader, who thinks along other lines. In reply to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who raised that specific point, let me say at once that we could not and should not be prepared to concede that point.
  Secondly, my right honourable friend confirmed what the Governor had already made clear: that he was prepared to repeal all Emergency Regulations at a pace commensurate with the re-establishment of law and order. It must, I think, be clear to everyone that a period of instability might in all probability have followed the cessation of the Emergency, and to abandon the control of internal security might not, indeed would not, be feasible without a serious risk of a further loss of life. Her Majesty's Government's faith in the Cypriot people was so strong that they were prepared to hand over to Cypriot Ministries full control of all Government Departments other than pub-lie security and with the exception of defence and foreign affairs. That is not a limited form of self-government. I wish the right reverend Prelate would believe that that is a very advanced form of self-government for people who have never governed themselves before.
  THE LORD BISHOP OF CHICHESTER: May I ask the noble Earl to address himself to the basic points which remain unclear, as set out in Archbishop Makarios's letter of February 25, 1956, especially regarding representation in the Assembly?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am coming to that. If the right reverend Prelate will wait, I will deal with all these points. It had always been our intention—and the Archbishop was yell aware of it—eventually to transfer public security to local Ministers, but it was not possible to lay down in advance the time and date when the transfer should be made.
  I now turn to the third point, namely, the composition of the elected majority, which was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and also by the right reverend Prelate. We had proposed the appointment of a Constitutional Commissioner

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  to determine the composition of the Legislative Assembly, whilst at the same time safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community. The Archbishop declined to accept what is quite a normal constitutional procedure and demanded instead that the composition of the elected majority should be defined to his satisfaction and before the Constitutional Commissioner even began his inquiry. The noble Earl who introduced the Motion asked me whether there was to be in this Legislative Assembly a majority of Greeks. The Archbishop was told, and indeed it is mentioned in the Governor's letter, that the Constitution would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority. That also affirmed what the Secretary of State told the Archbishop in person on February 29. The Archbishop, on the other hand, was not told whether or not there would be any nominated members, but he was clearly told—and, so far as we know, he fully understood—that there would in fact be an elected majority.
  EARL ATTLEE: On that point, is it not clear that it would have been possible then to have a majority of elected persons but an actual majority in the Chamber of the minority representatives with the nominated members which would have meant, in effect, no guarantee that the majority people in the island would have had a majority? Surely that is a clear point. What I would ask the noble Earl is: on what principle was the Commissioner to act? He would have to have some instructions. Surely that is a political act and not a judicial act.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: As I understand it, if the noble Earl will read Sir John Harding's letter of February 14 (which no doubt he has) he will there see under paragraph 2 (c):
  "The constitution would provide for an Assembly with an elected majority".
  and there was to be, as I clearly understand it, an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly, quite apart from any nominated members. In other words, the nominated members could not sway the result either one way or the other.
  EARL ATTLEE: I am not quite clear on that point. Does the noble Earl mean that there would be representation of majorities and minorities or that it would
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  be impossible for minorities plus nominees to have a majority? We have seen that happen in other Constitutions. I think the Archbishop probably was not clear. I am not clear.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: It is clear that the Archbishop was told that there would be an Assembly with an elected majority, and that is, in fact, precisely what my right honourable friend told the Archbishop as well. He has been told in all this correspondence published throughout this White Paper that there would be an Assembly with an elected majority. But to agree with the Archbishop that the elected majority should be defined to his satisfaction, and before—I am coming back to the matter in a moment—the Constitutional Commissioner had visited the island, would have made the purposes of the inquiry a complete and utter farce, quite apart from the fact that the Turkish community had also to be considered. The purpose of sending this Constitutional Commissioner out there was that he might well decide that it would be a good thing if they had two Legislative Chambers. He might, on the other hand, have wanted certain Bills reserved to the Governor or he might have wanted certain Bills to have a majority of both Greek and other reprecentatives in order that they might be carried into law. I should have thought it was very much better to let the Constitutional Commissioner visit the island and discuss these matters with the Greek and Turkish communities in the island.
  May I pass from that matter to deal with the other problem which was also mentioned by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Some people—he did not say so, nor do I—may well have asked why Her Majesty's Government ever authorised the Governor to enter into negotiations with the Archbishop when there was every reason to believe that he was personally implicated in acts of terrorism. As Sir John Harding has stated now, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Archbishop was so committed to the use of violence for his own political ends that he could not, or would not, abandon it. Is it not pertinent to ask whether the Archbishop ever really attempted to extinguish the blaze of assassination and murder? Indeed, did he not really seek to pitch further fuel on to the fire?
  However, under the curious position which prevails in Cyprus, the Archbishop

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  was the traditional leader of toe Greek community there; he was their spiritual leader as well. As the noble Earl said in his introductory remarks, he was the only single personality with whom we could deal. This being so, and because it was our earnest desire to reach a lasting settlement, we were prepared to enter into negotiations and go to great lengths to achieve a final and permanent agreement. During all these discussions Her Majesty's Government have made many concessions. The Archbishop has not been, as has been suggested in some quarters, the only person to give way. I have discussed at some length the three outstanding points upon which it was impossible to reach an agreement, and I believe those points were so important for orderly government that no further concessions could be made; and there then was no alternative but to break off negotiations.
  Here let me turn to one or two observations which were made by the most reverend Primate this afternoon. I am surprised that the Eastern Church should have thought that the action of Her Majesty's Government was (to use the most reverend Primate's words) "sacrilegious and barbaric."
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Not my words; I was quoting from the telegram from the Archbishop of Athens and the Patriarch.
  THE EARL on MUNSTER: I agree they were not the most reverend Primate's words; he was quoting them. But we have no desire whatsoever to stifle the Church. All we wanted to do was to stifle the terrorism which was reigning in the island. I should have thought, frankly, that if these great Church leaders of the Eastern Church would read the White Paper to-day they would see that there was every reason why Her Majesty's Government should have taken the action they did. There was, in fact, no attack whatever on the Church in Cyprus or on any other Church throughout the world.
  I was very glad to know that the most reverend Primate had communicated privately with Archbishop Makarios about the outbreak of violence in Cypris, but the reply which the most reverend Primate summarised in his speech to your Lordships this afternoon is surely complete and ample evidence that Archbishop Makarios did condone all acts of violence
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  and terrorism. For the political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots to say that his appeal would meet with no response really puts the Archbishop in his true light.
  I was also asked whether there would be any chance of introducing a Constitution now and whether, if one were introduced, we should contemplate and consider allowing Archbishop Makarios to return to Cyprus.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Is the noble Earl referring to my suggestion?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: No, I was referring only to the latter part of the most reverend Primate's suggestion.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My suggestion was not that Constitution should be introduced but that a Constitution should be drafted. There is a great deal of difference between the two.
  THE EARL, OF MUNSTER: And then, I gather, the Archbishop should come back to the island.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I am sorry to intervene again, but may I repeat my suggestions? The first was that a Constitution should be drafted; there would then be something about which to start negotiations. My second suggestion was that the Archbishop should not return until law and order had been restored, but that as soon as that was restored he might return and negotiations might begin.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: Yes; I quite understand the most reverend Primate's views. But one thing is essential: co-operation is desirable if a Constitution is to be introduced at all, and at the moment it is quite clear that there would be no co-operation in the island. As regards the other point, I can give no assurance whatever that Archbishop Makarios would be allowed to return to Cyprus, even in the event of the cessation of violence. However, I will communicate the most reverend Primate's views to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for his consideration, though I am bound to admit that at the present moment I see no possibility whatever of meeting the most reverend Primate's request.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: May I ask the noble Earl whether he would suggest some other way of getting the reconciliation process going?
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: I am coming to that in a few moments.
  As your Lordships are aware, Archbishop Makarios and the Bishop of Kyrenia, and two others, were deported from the island last Friday. Her Majesty's Government and Sir John Harding were forced to the conclusion that their deportation was absolutely essential. We had, and we still have, no desire whatsoever to impose restrictions on freedom of movement by deportation further than public security requires; but to leave the Archbishop and the three others who were deported with him roaming the island at large and being able, as they would have done, to condone further acts of violence and terrorism would merely have added still further to our difficulties. As my noble friend Lord Swinton pointed out, the deportations in 1931 were accepted without a word. They were approved by everyone, and I can see very little difference between the deportations to-day and the deportations at the time of which the noble Earl was talking. We are all now aware, every one of us—even, I think, the most reverend Primate—that from first to last the Archbishop's motives were shrouded, until they were uncovered, in a haze of gross insincerity in all his dealings. Neither we nor any British individual have at any time had any craving for revenge. Her Majesty's Government have only an irresistible desire, which has been shown throughout all these discussions between the Governor and the Archbishop, to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.
  My Lords, the question has been asked: Where do we go from here? Is there any hope of reconciliation? The future is by no means certain. We have not slammed the door. We have our hopes that, through the restoration of law and order, and of the freedom of thought and expression, others may come forward to bring about the formation of a new and liberal Constitution. I do not believe, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, that power will pass to irresponsible elements; nor do I believe as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, said that power will pass to
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  the extremists. I think we may well see other people coming forward who up to date, through fear of the terrorism which was reigning in the island, were not prepared to co-operate with the Governor or with Her Majesty's Government. We shall continue to use all our efforts to reconcile conflicting interests, and I hope that these efforts may ultimately achieve success. But there can be no rapid road to reconciliation.
  I pass now to deal just for one moment with the observations which were made by the right reverend Prelate who told your Lordships that he was the honorary President of the World Council of Churches. I am bound to admit that I do not think the right reverend Prelate could have been speaking this afternoon for anyone but himself. The views which he expressed were so different from any that I have heard—they were certainly not re-echoed by any noble Lord who spoke to-day; nor, indeed, were they echoed in any speech which I heard in another place last night. I hope that when the right reverend Prelate reads his remarks tomorrow he will realise the disastrous consequences that utterances like that may well have at a very difficult time.
  LORD PAKENHAM: My Lords, I am afraid I did not hear all the remarks made by the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester but since he has been denounced in such unbridled terms by the noble Earl I would say that, to my certain knowledge, there is no man in this House who commands a wider respect in this country and abroad.
  THE EARL OF MUNSTER: That seems to be a very unnecessary intervention because I cordially agree with the noble Lord.
  Let me conclude by saying that all noble Lords, on whichever side of the House they sit, will wish to pay their tribute to all the security forces, the permanent officials and the Governor for the restraint and the patience, for the courage and gallantry, they are showing in these difficult and trying circumstances.
  7.20 p.m.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, before I go on to the main subject of my remarks I should like, with your Lordships' permission, to refer for one

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  moment to something which I have seen in a publication of the Fabian Colonial Bureau called Venture. I do so only out of a sense of fairness to those officers of the Colonial Service whom I saw doing their duty so admirably when I was in Cyprus. I should like also to say that I regularly read Venture, and have always found it most accurate and moderate in its remarks. On this occasion, however, it has slipped up. The passage that I wish to quote refers to the grant of financial aid towards the £38 million development programme, and it says:
  "There is much to be done in improving communications, water supplies, irrigation, forestry, education and the social services. So much indeed is included in the programme, from trunk roads to technical schools and ports to social insurance, that the main impression is how much must have been neglected."
  My Lords, that statement is ignorant and ill-informed; it is grossly unfair to the officers of the Colonial Service who have done their duty admirably and have given of their best to Cyprus; and, of course, it is "jam" to those who carry on propaganda against us, especially the Greek newspapers in Cyprus which are never tired of referring to us as oppressors of an enslaved people, whose faces we grind from morning to night. On that account I felt justified in venturing those remarks in regard to that passage.
  May I go on to say how deeply interested I was in the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. I am acquainted with the history of the island, especially since 1931, and I know that the noble Earl was a good friend to the island of Cyprus and did a great deal for its Administration. I am not entirely sure about the feeling in the country to-day on Enosis. Certainly, in my time—and here I entirely agree with the noble Earl—it was not a matter of great concern to the majority of the population who lived on the land. I have always found that the peasant is the same man whether he is working in my native Westmorland or in Cyprus. His outlook is the same: all he wants is to get on with his work and earn a good living; he is not vastly interested in political questions. But that was a long time ago. Since then these people have been subjected to an intensive propaganda coming out from the towns.
  May I remind your Lordships that, at the time when I was in Cyprus, and for
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  some time thereafter, the Government had absolutely no means whatever of replying to that propaganda? There was one small English newspaper, which certainly was not in any way an instrument of the Government; but there were something like forty-seven Greek newspapers which were daily pouring out stuff the nature of which I have just mentioned; and the Archbishop had, of course, got his pulpit and his priests in each one of the 620 villages in Cyprus. To all that intensive propaganda the Government had no means whatsoever of replying, and se it may be that the feelings of the countryside are not quite as the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and I remember them. One other thing the noble Earl mentioned which I should like to confirm concerns the Dodecanese Islands. After Greece assumed sovereignty over those islands, there was a distinct and severe economic recession—there was no doubt whatsoever about that.
  If I may now refer for one moment to the speech of the noble Earl who has just sat down, I thought it was a characteristic, hard-hitting speech, in which, if he will allow me to say so, he made the best of what I. regard as a rather poor case—but then, of course, in the view of the noble Earl I am hot what he described as a "normally minded person". I must admit that. I should like, with his permission, to check his speech tomorrow against my papers: I am not quite sure that he was entirely accurate in describing the events of 1947. But even if he was not entirely accurate, I have no quarrel with the main substance of Hs remarks, it was the case that the Constituent Assembly which I endeavoured to assemble was permitted by its terms of reference to discuss only a Constitution or the drafting of a Constitution; its terms of reference did not permit it to go outside that sphere. A movement started in favour of discussing not self-determination but self-government, but the Colonial Office decided that they could not go so far as that and that the Assembly must confine itself to its terms of reference; and on that the Assembly broke up.
  My Lords, in all that is being said about Cyprus to-day I think there is only one thing which is not in dispute, and that is that the Government, whether through their own fault or not, have got into a real mess in Cyprus. They appear to me

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  to have marched into a cul-de-sac and are now engaged in knocking their head against the wall at the end of the cul-de-sac. Having rolled the stone, as it seems to me, very nearly to the top of the mountain—I think it is fair to say that they had got it nearly to the top of the mountain—they then let it slip and roll down again to the bottom. All has to be done again, and it seems clear to me that the Government have no idea, or very little idea, of how to begin again. I have read and re-read the debates on the subject and the White Paper, but I am still not entirely clear as to why the breakdown occurred. There are still points of obscurity which I feel have not yet been fully explained; but, as I say, I confess to being not a normally minded person—they are probably beyond me.
  The Government say that it became impossible to negotiate with the Archbishop because of his proved bad faith and complicity in terrorism. I say this with some trepidation, but I feel that it would be a good thing if the factual evidence on which the Governor's statement was based could be assembled and published, possibly in a White Paper. In my view, much of the evidence was certainly circumstantial. I say that in no way to cast any doubt or criticism upon what the Governor has said, but because this matter has now assumed such international proportions that I feel that a factual statement of the evidence would be a good thing. According to the Governor's statement, which is backed by the Prime Minister and by the Colonial Secretary, we have known all the time we have been negotiating, and for even longer than that, about the Archbishop's character. I knew something about it myself; we have really known about the Archbishop's character for many years. Why the sudden change in attitude towards him? Character really cannot be made a condition of negotiating. Even that great Christian, Mr. Gladstone, had some dealings with Parnell.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Could the noble Lord tell us what he knew about the Archbishop's character?
  LORD WINSTER: I should be happy to tell the noble Marquess. I will only say that we knew that possibly he was, shall I say, rather a "slippery customer."
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Perhaps the noble Lord will submit that to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester.
  LORD WINSTER: My Lords, the Bishop of Chichester is Bishop of my diocese so I am rather careful what I say. But why the sudden change? Mr. Gladstone had dealings with Parnell; Mr. Neville Chamberlain had dealings with Hitler, and he can never have been in any doubt about Hitler's character; Sir Winston Churchill had dealings with Stalin, and I do not think he can have been under any illusion as to what kind of man Stalin was: and Earl Lloyd-George and Conservative leaders had dealings with the leaders of Sinn Fein. So that to say that character must be a condition of negotiation will not bear historical analysis. I really do not know why we suddenly got so squeamish over the Archbishop. I am not saying that there was not enough to be squeamish over, but we had overcome it for some five months, and then suddenly these feelings surged up. The Archbishop represented someone who could be dealt with on this question and I agree with the letter in the Daily Telegraph which said:
  "To treat a man one day with the utmost respect as an ecclesiastical dignitary and the leader of a national movement and the next to hustle him away tinder guard to exile is hardly calculated to inspire confidence in British diplomacy."
  It seems to me that for a long time there has been an absence of common sense—I will not say of normality—in our actions generally regarding Cyprus. There has been much neglect, many downright mistakes and many crass stupidities. In consequence, the problem has become so bedevilled that it would puzzle anyone to know how, at this juncture, we are to begin again. But a new beginning has to be made, and Her Majesty's Government have to find someone to negotiate with or else they have no hope of settling the question. With the Archbishop out of the Island and in exile, a great many Greek patriots who are still indifferent to the subject of Enosis will feel very deeply and bitterly about the deportation of their Archbishop. That is my conviction; and it is really no good for the Government to say, paraphrasing Browning:
  "Makarios is in the Seychelles,
  All's right with the world,"

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  and leave it at that, with no future plans. We are entitled to be told that there are plans, and to know with whom the Government contemplates beginning to plan.
  The noble Marquess, Lord Reacting, once rebuked me, in a most friendly way which aroused no hard feelings, for saying that I sometimes got the feeling that the Foreign Office begin to think about things only when they happen. Two things recently have rather borne out my point of view. It had been known for many months, if not longer, that General Glubb was likely to be dismissed. That was common knowledge. When the inevitable happened, the Prime Minister came down to the House of Commons and said he had nothing to say and no new policy to announce. Now we have this breakdown of negotiations in Cyprus, and one gets, from the White Paper and debates, a clear impression that this also was anticipated; and once again there are no plans to deal with the situation.
  I spoke of mistakes and stupidities. The story has several times been told of the maladroit statements by the then Mr. Oliver Lyttelton as Colonial Secretary, and the then Mr. Hopkinson, who was Minister of State; and there was the London Tripartite Conference which, as The Times said, was a blunder, since the British Government had virtually no new proposals to make, so that it did more harm than good. I certainly thought that the proposal for a standing Tripartite Committee to be set up in Cyprus itself was a perfectly hopeless one. I believe the trouble goes even further hack. When the Prime Minister was Foreign Secretary he was in Athens, and my information is that he declined to discuss the question of Cyprus with Marshal Papagos, who was then Greek Prime Minister; and in one of the monthly magazines this month I see that in reusing to discuss the matter the Prime Minister said:
  "There is not a Cyprus question and there never will be a Cyprus question."
  I wonder whether he thought of those words when he was making his speech yesterday. The question has been there ever since 1931. Surely the Prime Minister has heard of Government House being burnt down in 1931, which was pretty good evidence that there was such a thing as a Cyprus question. The writing has been on the wall for a very long time. There were three unofficial Greek-Cypriot
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  members of the Executive Council: first of all, Mr. Chryssafinis resigned; then a short time ago Sir Paul Pavlides resigned, and now, within the last day or two, the last of them, Mr. Clerides, has gone, so that the Executive Council now consists of the official members and one Turk. A Government speaker yesterday spoke of our Greek-Cypriot friends. Well, we have outworn the patience of those Greek-Cypriots who served us long and faithfully upon the Executive Council, as I have reason to know.
  Until these last abortive negotiations began, I do not know precisely what has, been done since 1948. I think the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will not take it amiss if I say I had always hoped that at that time he would appoint a politician as. Governor of an island where a political issue of the first magnitude was quite clearly brewing up. I am sure there was a good reason why the noble Earl did not feel able to do that, but I hoped far it and always regretted that, for some reason, it was not, possible to do it, or it was not done. Instead, he left the Cyprus Colonial Secretary as Acting Governor for six months. I do not know whether he satisfied himself of that gentleman's capacity for carrying out a difficult task of political conciliation. When that Acting Coverner's time came to an end he was replaced by a colonial civil servant. Thought have never put myself out to hear anything or to get information from Cyprus, I have inevitably heard something from the island. The impression left on my mind is that during an interregnum of six years little has been done in the sphere of what I will call political conciliation. A Times leader said yesterday:
  "The Labour Party … must bear the blame of having left the Cyprus question lying fallow during the quiet years."
  I equally regret these six years of lying fallow but it is only fair to say that the blame must be properly apportioned between Labour and Conservative Governments who have handled Cyprus since that date.
  Now let us look at what Mr. Macmillan said on December 5 last, when he was Foreign Secretary. He said
  "The only good settlement of the Cyprus problem will be a political settlement."
  That seems to me to confirm my view that a political Governor would have I been the right appointment for Cyprus

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  in the past. But, in spite of Mr. Macmillan's remark, the Government now seem to have converted a political problem into a military problem: at any rate, if all your Lordships do not look at it in that way I can assure you that that is how the Cypriots look at it. They view it in no other light. Indeed, to-day, since the breakdown in the negotiations, they suggest only a military settlement. Mr. Macmillan spoke of
  "the accepted working rule to-day, the principle of self-determination.… We have accepted it in the Charter of the United Nations,"
  but he watered that down by reference to the Austria State Treaty Bill, which, he said,
  "takes away in perpetuity the right of six million people to self-determination."
  I think a Foreign Secretary, especially in these days, should know better than to talk of "treaties" and "perpetuity" in the same breath. The dusty pigeonholes of the Foreign Office are mute witnesses of the folly of associating "treaties" and "perpetuity." But challenged as to whether he meant self-determination "some time," or "not in the foreseeable future," he said, "Some time and under certain conditions"; and when further challenged as to the "conditions" Mr. Macmillan declined to define them. Then came this passage in that speech:
  "We certainly shall not be the people to move the closure on discussions which might lead to co-operation instead of strife."
  But that is exactly what the Government have done: they have moved the closure. In their own words:
  "The possibility of negotiation has ceased to exist."
  I have spoken about the London Conference. What followed that Conference? Following a change of Governors the new Governor came home for consultations with the Government. He came home several times, but the last time he came home he gave a television interview before he returned to his post. In what the Governor was reported to have said—I have only a newspaper report of it—I found no reflection whatsoever of Mr. Macmillan's references to self-determination, vague and half-hearted as those references had been. Instead the Governor stated at some length the
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  military case for not granting self-determination but for staying put. I do not think I am mistaken in my interpretation of the interview because I notice that a commentator in a Conservative newspaper wrote:
  "I felt he had the soldier's rather than the politician's outlook"—
  this at a moment when what was needed above everything was the politician's outlook upon the problem. It is quite possible, at the same time to feel the highest respect and admiration for Sir John Harding's qualities and character. His handling of these negotiations, though they have been abortive, has been a great tribute to his qualities. Nevertheless, it is fair to ask whether, at this juncture in the disturbed state of the island, a Governor can wear two hats and can switch suddenly from responsibility for political negotiations to responsibility for repressing terrorism.
  So self-determination appears to have vanished, and the Prime Minister in his speech yesterday said:
  "We must safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our allies. Neither N.A.T.O. obligations nor the Tripartite declaration nor the Baghdad Pact can be carried out unless we have the sure and unfettered use of Cyprus."
  Your Lordships will note those last words—the "sure and unfettered use of Cyprus." What has become of the self-determination of the 5th December in all this? I remember reading of an epitaph over an infant's grave which ran as follows:
  "Since doomed to be so early done for I wonder what I was begun for?"
  Having muttered "self-determination," the Government seems to have repented of its temerity, to have emptied the baby out of the bath with the bath water and to have come down on the side of staying put. The White Paper dismisses self-determination as "not now a practicable proposition." Then why have brought it up in December? Why have taken the step of mentioning self-determination in December if by the middle of March it is no longer a practicable proposition? What hope can there be for self-determination when it is to be contingent on British strategic interests, upon British oil interests, upon allied strategic interests and upon treaties to which Britain is a party? Where does self-determination

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  nose in amongst this series of contingencies? It seems to me that such reservations are designed to give the Government every possible "out" in any possible circumstances where self-determination for Cyprus is not deemed to be present. I see that the White Paper quotes Archbishop Makarios as saying that self-determination had been:
  "made dependent on conditions so general and vague, subject to so many interpretations and presenting so many difficulties as to the objective ascertainment of their fulfillment as to create reasonable doubt as to the positive nature of the promises."
  I am bound to say that I agree. I think those remarks of the Archbishop were fully justified. Why waste time talking about self-determination when it is hedged round in such a fashion?
  My Lords, it was an ambiguous statement of this nature which the Government told the Archbishop "admitted of no alteration or change," and I am hound to say that I think the letter addressed to the Archbishop really had a ring of "Unconditional surrender" about it. He was to make a statement in terms dictated to him which admitted of no change. There was nothing snore to be said. The door was closed to further discussion and he was to sign on the dotted line and without delay. Surely that is very unusual language to address to the man with whom you have been negotiating over five months on terms of equality—I should mention that it was before the breakdown had occurred that he was addressed in those terms. Nevertheless, the Archbishop agreed to co-operate in framing a Constitution "providing it shall be genuine self-government"—he did not say "genuine self-determination" but "genuine self-government". As I understand it, either before or after the breakdown he had stated his willingness to discuss the terms of a Constitution with a Constitutional Commissioner who was to be sent out from this country.
  So far all we have been told about the breakdown is that it occurred on three points which the Archbishop considered were, in accordance with our own words, "a wider measure of self-government". He considered that they fell within that framework. The Archbishop wanted an amnesty. He wanted a Greek-Cypriot majority in the Assembly, which would, of course, be in accordance with the proportional composition of the population,
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  and he wanted security to be in the hands of a Cypriot Government when established. My view on this matter is a purely personal view—perhaps I should have explained before that I am speaking in no Party sense or terms, but only out of my great desire to get a peaceful and a good settlement in Cyprus. Nothing else weighs with me for one moment in discussing this problem. My own feeling is that if we could get a firm and satisfactory settlement—really firm and really satisfactory; not something agreed for the sake of getting agreement—I think we should agree about amnesty. After all, these were political crimes. Historically, political crimes have always been treated on a different footing from civil crimes. These were political crimes such as have been amnestied elsewhere. If those of our men who have been killed in this horrible fashion could be asked whether they would want a settlement to be missed because of insistence upon retribution for their deaths, what would be their reply? They would say: "Never mind; go ahead and get your settlement."
  Then about this Greek-Cypriot majority in the Assembly, I cannot imagine there being anything but a Greek-Cypriot majority in the Assembly if and when it is set up. I cannot conceive that we intended otherwise in view of the ethnologic figures for the island. I do not see how there could be an honest-to-God Cypriot Government unless the Greek-Cypriots were in a majority. On security, again I would say, "Not yet", owing to the present state of the island and with recent events so much in our minds. But possibly some purely civilian departments of security could be handed over at once to a new Cypriot Government. I am bound to say that I think the decision as to when all security could be handed over ought not to be entirely at the discretion of the Governor: he is an interested party. Also, I think it would have been wise to accept the Archbishop's offer to discuss with a Constitutional Commissioner. It would have kept him in play, instead of breaking the line—if not, indeed, breaking the rod. And between them some suitable and effective compromise might have been found on the Archbishop's three points.
  The Times leader to which reference has been made to-day recites the reasons for our retaining Cyprus and includes the necessity for protecting our oil interests

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  in order to preserve our standard of living. Our enemies will certainly pounce upon that as an example par excellence of "colonialism." I would utter a word of caution on the subject of Turkey. This same leader speaks of practical certainty that a settlement in Cyprus will be violently resisted by the Turks and dismisses union with Greece "in the teeth of Turkish opposition" as impracticable. We have heard something on the same lines to-day. There is not time to discuss the Turkish case in detail, but I would utter a word of caution against believing that the Turkish Government will push the Turkish case to extremes. I think it is arguable that the Turks have been used rather recklessly as an argument in favour of our "staying put" in the island. I think that question cannot be taken for granted quite so easily and that it deserves very careful consideration.
  THE MARQUFSS OF READING: My Lords, will the noble Lord forgive me for putting this point to him? Has he studied any of the statements that have been made by the Turkish Government—not statements made by us on behalf of the Turkish Government, but statements made by the Turkish Government themselves?
  LORD WINSTER: I have read those statements, and I have also read the opinion of a highly qualified expert on Turkish matters, to the effect that we must not assume too readily that the Turkish Government will push the Turkish case to extremes.
  In conclusion, I ask: what of the future? Nothing constructive emerged from yesterday's debate on the part of the Government. Terrorism is to be stamped out. The Colonial Secretary said very grandiloquently: "We have the resolution and the force". That is a magnificent phrase. Certainly we have the force. We have poured 14,000 troops into an island of 500.000 people, 100,000 of whom are entirely friendly to us. But to stamp out terrorism in Cyprus is not a policy but an operation. It is not a policy. We really cannot hand this matter over to the "Captain Waterhouses" of this world to settle. We shall not settle the real problem that way. The Governor said sonie time ago that the net was
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  closing round the terrorists. That statement reminded me of Mr. Malcolm Macdonald in Malaya. He used to say almost every month that the end was in sight, that victory was just over the hills, and so on. Statements about Kenya on rather the same lies were made. I do not know about the net. What I do know is that you have let the Djinn out of the bottle and you will have a job to get him back into the bottle.
  I wonder whether this Government can achieve a settlement. I doubt if it really can take the steps necessary to make a fresh start in Cyprus with any hopes of success. To do that would involve the Conservative Government in "eating" so many words. And, after all, the Government cannot be expected to establish a shuttle service of frigates between the Seychelles and Cyprus playing a game of "In again, out again," with the Archbishop. Considering all that has been said, especially in these recent debates, I find it difficult to believe that the Government will find themselves able to make a new start and effect a settlement. And in all seriousness I am bound to conclude by saying that I feel it quite possible that a change of Government may be necessary before a final settlement is arrived at in Cyprus.
  7.58 p.m.
  VISCOUNT HAILSHAM: My Lords, at this somewhat late hour a conscientious Peer must necessarily ask himself: Why make a speech at all? And great numbers of his noble colleagues will undoubtedly re-echo the word "Why?" I would, I confess, have scratched my entry for this race but for two speeches that have been made in this debate. Those were the speech to which we have just listened and the speech of the right reverend Prelate, the Lord Bishop of Chichester. Perhaps I may say that I have the greatest regard for the right reverend Prelate because he is, in fact, my right reverend Father in God. I live in his constituency and his business is to point my unworthy soul ever upwards—a task he wisely delegates to a Suffragan. On the other hand, I have a great desire to point the reverend Prelate ever upwards in the political sphere. The Christian Church has two parts, the clergy and the laity. We always dutifully take the lead from the clergy in matters of faith and morals. I wish that the

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  Bishops would sometimes take the lead from the laity in matters of politics.
  I have begun on a slightly humorous note at this late hour, but that is not to say that my feelings about this subject are other than deeply serious. The thing which I feel it my duty to emphasise is simply this. I have never been slow to criticise the Government of my own Party when I thought it wrong, but on this occasion I think the only necessary thing, the abundantly necessary thing, for a patriotic Englishman and an unworthy Churchman to say, is that I give the Government wholehearted support in the difficult situation which they are having to face at the present time. I do that not because I am insensitive in any way of the many considerations which have been eloquently urged on the other side, and not because I am not alive to the complexity and difficulty of the situation, but because the real moral and political truth—and I emphasise the morality of it no less than the politics of it—is that the British Government, and through it the British people, have been most shamefully used by their friends, who owe them nothing but gratitude for services rendered in the past, while they were undertaking a difficult, delicate and dangerous responsibility for the people of the world—a responsibility which is, after all, far more important than purely local interests or parochial loyalties. That I believe to be the fundamental political and (if I may say to the right reverend Prelate) moral issue here, to which I am bound to say I was bitterly disappointed that he gave no adequate expression.
  About Archbishop Makarios, I will say very little. It is not my business to criticise Archbishops. But I think that I can recognise enough about a political leader to appreciate one when I see him. We have heard read out to-day by the most reverend Primate some words from Makarios: they are closely similar to the words which he wrote to the Governor of Cyprus. A more damning indictment of a political leader I have never heard. We in this country have a tradition of moderate statesmanship. When a moderate statesman refuses to obey the unequivocal duty, I will not say of a Christian, but of an honourable man, to repel and repress the extremism of his own followers, then as a political leader he is utterly worthless. If I were talking
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  about him as an Archbishop, I would remind him that there was a Church of Laodicea, of which the Apostle John said that it blew hot and cold on the subject of morality, of murder and force, and was spewed out by the Apostle. I cannot help thinking that Archbishop Makarios would have been a suitable candidate for the diocese of Laodicea. When, in the place where he has gone, Archbishop Makarios reflects on the consequences of his action, it might occur to him that though, as I recognise, the long and unhappy story of the Greek Orthodox Church has put him in a position where he is equivocally placed as Ethnarch and Archbishop, in the last resort a Christian Bishop can serve only one Master. By speaking with two voices on this subject of murder and refusing to exercise his authority as an Archbishop, Makarios has been serving at least two.
  I turn from Makarios to the Greeks. I hope that it will never he thought, in spite of what we have suffered in the past weeks from an irresponsible public opinion in Greece, that I am otherwise than implacably friendly, towards that country. Since I was nine years old I have drunk in the language and culture and literature of Hellas. There is nothing more built into my nature, apart from the Christian religion. There is nothing more deep than my loyalty to that culture, that literature and that people. Many a man has broken his heart by thinking that the modern Greeks are the lawful heirs of that culture, but I shall continue to think so. I think that the Cypriots are part of that culture—indeed I would respectfully have joined issue in one small respect even with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, on that point. It is not simply, as the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester reminded us, that the Greek language was spoken in Cyprus when Ulysses sailed from Troy to Ithaca, although that is a fact, and has been spoken continuously since that time. When we say that Cyprus has never belonged to Greece, we are saying something which, although literally true, is substantially misleading.
  The Greek-speaking inhabitants of the Mediterranean, whether they are to be found in Alexandria, in Constantinople, in Cyprus or in Athens, or, until 1922, on the Eastern Coast of the Aegean Sea,

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  are in fact nothing more nor less than the legitimate descendants of the Greek Christian inhabitants of the Roman Empire. We are apt to forget in this country that the Roman Empire was predominantly Greek in language and culture for longer than it was Latin. For a thousand years it was Greek and Christian under its Basilius in Constantinople. These Greek inhabitants of the Aegean Islands through centuries of persecution have retained the love of their own political unity for which they feel deeply at all times. I hope that I have said enough to show that, whatever else I am, I am not insensitive to the feeling of the Cypriots about Greece. I believe that I have interpreted it correctly. If this were viewed as a long-term aspiration, as an ultimate political ideal, I should have no words of reproach or criticism to offer. Outside this feeling, to my mind, is the undoubted fact that, legitimate as nationalist aspirations may be, they are not the only aspirations in the world, and sometimes they have to take second place.
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to whom I should like to join in paying tribute on the debate which he notably initiated, was responsible when he was Prime Minister for granting independence to India. Although opinions may differ about details, there was not a single Englishman of any political persuasion who did not rejoice at that time, if not for anything else, at least for the testimony that was paid to British good faith in dealing with India for over 150 years, promising it self-government, and giving it in the end. We gave independence to India, and we can rejoice. But we gave independence in 1947. We should not have been right to give it when it was no less urgently demanded, in 1942; and we should have been wrong in 1937 to make the same concession. On the contrary, I remember the labours of my noble friend Lord Templewood at that time, which brought self-government nearer but were not based upon an immediate grant. Self-government and self-determination, although perfectly legitimate demands in the abstract, must often take second place to things like the peace of the world.
  What was wrong in pressing our strategic needs in 1942 against the legitimate nationalistic demands of India? We should have been betraying our trust as a great Power, as the champion of free-
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  dom and civilisation, if we had not done so, and if we had not resorted to measures of repression to do so. The fact that nationalistic aspirations may be legitimate does not entitle the Power which desires to encourage the irredentist movement to attack its friends with outrage and propaganda. We fought the last war because of what Herr Henlein did in Czechoslovakia, and what Hitler claimed to do because of the irredentist minority in Poland. When one saw on the television the other day the Greeks claiming that the British were equivalent to the Nazis, one wondered whether they had considered the Nazi policy of using an irredentist minority in another country where they did not enjoy sovereignty in order to advance political ambitions. We fought for that principle, and although one may treat our legal sovereignty, which is undoubted, as lightly as one chooses, it is none the less a fact. I must remind our friends that it is the fact that, politically speaking, you cannot disregard legal sovereignty if you want to keep the peace of the world.
  When we move from the question of political aspirations in the abstract to the realities of the Cyprus situation, it is here that I part company both with the right reverend Prelate and with the noble Lord who has just sat down. What is really wanted of us in Cyprus? What is it that our American friends demand? What do they expect us to do? Do they want peace between Israel and Transjordan? How is that peace to be secured? Do they want us to remain a party to the Tripartite Declaration, as to what we should do if aggression takes place further away in the Middle East; or do they want us to repudiate our obligation there? If they want us to keep our pledges under the Tripartite Declaration, how can we get out of Cyprus now? How can we do other than hold our base securely, as the Foreign Secretary said? What is it that it is claimed we are doing wrong? Our duty Ito world peace is to remain in Cyprus at the present time. Are we, therefore, to be assailed as oppressors and tyrants, and to have our soldiers and policemen murdered? Cannot our Bishops speak out at least as boldly on these lines as they do when they are so anxious to explain that our Government are wrong? To me this is just as much a moral issue as a political issue.

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  I do not believe the British nation can afford to betray the peace of the world. If the Almighty has a part in human history, it is our destiny at the present time to try to ensure that peace, and to attack us and let us be vilified and attacked because we have done no more than try to do our duty as civilised and Christian men is to miss the whole morality and politics of a complex situation. I say this, with respect, to our American friends. "Mr. Facing Both Ways" does not get very far in this world. It is all very well to talk to this country as if we were the greatest friend of the United States. I am half American. My mother was an American: I love America, and I always shall. But when, in a situation such as this, I see them attacking my country, for no other reason than that it has sought to discharge the share of responsibility which it bears for the maintenance of security in the world, when the world situation is manifestly deteriorating, I am hound to say this to the Americans. I agree with the noble Earl who initiated this debate. We have got to pay a great deal of attention to public opinion these days; and I hope that I always shall pay great attention to the opinion of other countries. But there is a factor which other countries, essentially in the free world, have been rather apt to neglect in the last ten years; and that is British public opinion. The Americans must clearly understand that what we think of them is just as important as what they think of us; and they must clearly understand, too, that the demarche of their Ambassador in Athens has left a nasty taste in the mouths of many good friends of the United States which it will take many long years to wipe out, and something much more, and much less equivocal, than President Eisenhower's statement of yesterday.
  I turn from America back to the subject that is being mainly debated to-day. I agree that in the course of long and legitimate negotiations it is always difficult to know the point at which it has become impossible to negotiate any longer. There is always a point, if the negotiations are going to break down, at which one asks: "If I had gone on another five minutes, could it have been better?" The guarantee, to my mind, quite apart from Party politics, that this has not happened here, is the known,
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  demonstrated patience of Her Majesty's Government in these particular negotiations. They have not hesitated to negotiate with Archbishop Makarios: I agree that they were right to do so. But there comes a point when one is bound to say to a political leader with whom one is negotiating: "Are you prepared to repress terrorism in your extremists, or are you going to allow them to continue?" The Archbishop did not agree to repress them, even after the seriousness and importance of it had been brought home to him again and again. It was therefore legitimate for Her Majesty's Government to break off negotiations and to treat him as a person upon whose word no reliance could be placed.
  Of course, we have to think of the future. I do not believe that the atmosphere is such as to encourage an immediate resumption of negotiations, but I hope that that unhappy situation will not persist very long. The sooner that an atmosphere of security, an atmosphere wanting in the hysteria which has characterised the Greek attitude towards Britain, is re-established, the better it will be both for them and for us. In the meantime, though the Government cannot, I think, negotiate at the present time—I believe they have demonstrated that—I hope they will not cease to try and think oat some new formula, and to publish it, if they find it possible, difficult as it may be.
  I myself was never quite certain whether the absolute insistence upon the word of sovereignty was well advised. It may have been, and I do not say that it was not; but I rather doubted it at the time. After all, what we want is control of the base and security in Cyprus. We do not want the word of sovereignty, as such, although we may be legally entitled. I remember Mr. Amery—for whose memory I entertain a deep affection—many years ago, in reviewing this very problem, suggesting a system of dual nationality so that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should be able to enjoy a kind of nationality with their parent country. I feel certain that if the defence and security and foreign policy of the island could be controlled firmly, as it will have to be, some kind of working arrangement could be made under which Cypriots of both religions and of both races could live peaceably together and determine their own future. The

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  present situation is not one which is particularly hopeful for that end. But I should certainly rejoice if Her Majesty's Government found it possible to initiate some new political idea or formula which stood a chance of success. In the meantime, I fear in a rather lengthy speech, I felt it only right to give the reasons which I had for supporting wholeheartedly the painful and desperate course which Her Majesty's Government have felt compelled to take.
  8.40 p.m.
  LORD JEFFREYS: My Lords, the Motion of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, draws attention to the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. May I say a few words about the Middle East? The situation there is certainly far from satisfactory, and it is due in no small degree to the fact that successive British Governments, including the noble Earl's Government, have not realised that, whatever other mistakes may be made in dealing with Orientals, there is one which we can never afford to make, and that is to be or appear to be—and that is much the same thing—weak. Orientals get the idea that under continuous pressure we shall always give way in the end. There are notorious and recent examples. There is the example of Abadan, as bad as it possibly could be in its management by the British Government; the example later on of another Government dealing with Egypt and the Sudan, and now the example of Cyprus. I venture to say that we must learn to be firm and, where it is necessary, learn to say "No" in no uncertain terms.
  Egypt, which was a source of strength to us in the past, is now a great source of difficulty. We administered it extremely well, and it is partly because we missed an opportunity that we are suffering now. When the Neguib and Nasser coup was brought off not so long ago, that was a revolutionary Government, and we were bound by no sort of obligation to that Government. We should have taken advantage of that fact and put our affairs and our relations with Egypt on a different footing. There is only one thing respected in the East, and that is strength. There are good reasons for being strong in the Middle East—and not only strategical reasons, important though those are. With regard to the strategical
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  value both of Cyprus and our position in the Middle East, I would say let nobody think that the hydrogen bomb has made any sort of operation impossible. The hydrogen bomb is a deterrent which we must have, and which undoubtedly our opponents have; but it is only a deterrent, and it is only men—troops and the air force—who can deal with events on the ground, as we may have to do. That is the reason why we have to be strong in the Middle East and, under present conditions, strong in Cyprus.
  The noble Lord, Lord Winster, mentioned The Times leader about Cyprus, but I am not at all sure that that leader was not referring to the Middle East in general—I have not had time to refer to it—and not particularly to Cyprus. Undoubtedly, we must not think only about the strategic situation, but we must think about the supply of oil to this country—the vital supply of oil, I would call it. Again, as in other things, we must expect reasonable co-operation from the United States. But American oil interests are powerful, and they have not much sympathy for us in our desire to get any oil at all out of the Middle East. I think I may say that those American oil interests are definitely hostile to British interests. At any rate, no adequate support in that matter has been given to us by the American Government. I venture to repeat that the supply of oil to this country from the Middle East is an essential for this country, and is vitally affected by our Middle East policy.
  Then there is the policy in Jordan. Apart from the Baghdad Pact, there is the recent and notorious case of General Glubb. Dismissal in the particular manner in which General Glubb was dismissed was in fact an affront to this country, as, indeed, it was described in another place by the Prime Minister. I agree that it is difficult to know what to do. To act strongly and to break entirely with King Hussein would be a mistake, and General Glubb himself urged that we should not, as he expressed it, "get tough" with Jordan. Possibly the right thing to do might be to point out that dismissal in such a manner was an affront, not only to General Glubb, but to this country, and that he should be restored to his position and be allowed to remain on leave until the due date for his retirement, which I

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  understand is not far distant. That would be a different matter entirely. Then it has to be recognised that feeling, against Israel is very strong in all the Arab States. We must reckon with this and expect, again, support from the United States of America in this matter, because they have always supported Israel, although they refused a mandate to administer that country and left it to us to undertake—reluctantly, I think.
  Now to turn to Cyprus. In the first place, as was pointed out by my noble friend Lord Swinton, Cyprus has never belonged to Greece. By the Treaty of Lausanne, this former Turkish-owned island was ceded to this country, having been for many years occupied by us. Incidentally, Greece was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne. A large section of the Cyprus population—there has been some argument as to the proportion—is Turkish; and these Turks are not friendly to the Greeks and certainly would not wish to serve under them. Apart from all this, the strategic imporance of Cyprus is very great. It is closely adjacent to the Turkish coast—I think this point has not been brought out to-day—and the Turks take a great interest in the occupation of Cyprus. Moreover, its general importance to the Middle East is considerable and has been much increased since our evacuation of the Suez Canal. In this respect we should be able to count again on American support, instead of the ill-informed criticism which has taken place and the action of the American Ambassador in Athens.
  Undoubtedly, the object has been to push us out, thinking that we should give way to pressure in the end. I believe that, in spite of the opinions both of the right reverend Prelates and of the Opposition, the Government, to the relief of the great majority of the population of our country, have resorted at last to action and have deported Makarios. The noble Earl who introduced this Motion was against deportation and against, so far as I gathered, strong measures. So was the noble Lord, Lord Winster. What they never said, and what the right reverend Prelates never said, is what they would suggest as a method of dealing with this matter.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: Did the noble Lord say "Prelates" in the plural?—because I did suggest a method.
  LORD JEFFREYS: I apologise to the most reverend Archbishop of Canterbury, but I did mean it in the plural.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: I did suggest a method.
  LORD JEFFREYS: I am afraid I did not think it a very effective method.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: That is quite a different matter. Being ineffective is one thing, but to say that did not suggest a method is another thing.
  LORD JEFFREYS: I apologise to the most reverend Primate. At any rate, it is certain that the noble Earl who introduced this Motion did not suggest any means of dealing with it. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, practically suggested giving Makarios all he wanted, but I hardly think that that is a course which would commend itself either to Her Majesty's Government or to the people of this country. As I say, I believe that the people of this country are relieved that at last the Government have taken action and have sent the Archbishop to another sphere where he can talk as much as he likes but will not have any influence. Many people are asking why he was not put out long ago. Although he is a nominally Christian Prelate, he has constantly incited to violence, and has not only not condemned but has encouraged murderous assault. The Governor's statement which was published was about as strong and convincing as any statement could possibly be.
  In this connection, many of our own newspapers have been too mealy-mouthed and have refrained from even using the word "murder"; for murder it has been—Murder with a very big "M," Murder most foul. We ought to condemn it; we cannot condemn it too much. It is amazing to me that some of our newspapers and some of our people do not condemn it as murder ought to be condemned. I venture to say that any troops but British would not have stood what they have had to stand in Cyprus—often doing police duties unarmed against mobs armed not only with stones but with grenades. They have had to suffer terrible and considerable injuries. I do not think it is fair to ask them to go on doing this and to take no steps against the leaders of the other party.

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  Then there are youths and schoolboys who have used not only stones and other missiles but more dangerous weapons, such as hand grenades and firearms. I venture to suggest that the proper treatment of these youths and boys is to give them sound thrashings, which should be both painful and ignominious. It would do them a great deal of good and would have a considerable effect in stopping this campaign of stone-throwing and outrages by youths generally. Every possible step should be taken to stamp out the E.O.K.A. terrorism. It is time to talk about giving Constitutions and so forth when there is peace in the island and the people are law-abiding. It is absurd to talk about granting responsible government to people in the present condition and frame of mind of the Cypriots. There has been too much of such experimentation of late. What may be good for the people of Britain is by no means necessarily good for people of a more excitable nature, with less sense of responsibility or civilisation. I say it is most unfortunate that the United States, who know little or nothing about either the Middle East or Cyprus, should have taken up a positively hostile attitude as regards Cyprus.
  Again, it is necessary and desirable to remind the Greeks that it was this country and not the United States which came to the rescue of Greece and saved it from Communism in 1944 and 1945. It is necessary that that should be remembered. They ought to be grateful for it. It is to be hoped that the Government will support the Governor of Cyprus in restoring law, order and safety before any other steps are taken, and that there will be no more discussions or any question of self-government for Cyprus until peace, quiet, and decent behaviour have been full restored.
  8.47 p.m.
  LORD BIRDWOOD: My Lords, one of the curious features about finding oneself, through the luck of the draw, low down in the batting order is that one rises to find that most of the runs have already been scored. That being so, I find myself relieved of the obligation to say much about Cyprus. I would confine myself to one comment, and that is this. In all the negotiations that have taken place over these last few months in Cyprus, it
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  seems to me that up to now no Greek Cypriot leader and no Turkish Cypriot leader have yet met face to face over a table and talked about the future. Your Lordships may recall that, when the late Sir Stafford Cripps went to India in 1942, he sadly had to admit that he had gone 5,000 miles to meet the Indian leaders, and that the Indian leaders had not moved across the road to meet each other. All I am meaning to imply is that, if and when we reach the stage when the Constitutional Commissioner arrives to thresh out the Constitution, I trust that the talks will not be bilateral talks as between the Constitutional Commissioner and the Turk and Greek representatives, but that it will be a round table conference affair. If the round table conference principle is established at the beginning, there may be some hope. As I see it, it would be hopeless to proceed and then find that these leaders had not met each other, and that consequently months had been wasted and we should be faced with an entirely different situation.
  With regard to the wider aspect of Middle East affairs, I find it fairly simple to differentiate between the situation in Jordan and the eternal riddle of the relationship between Arab and Jew. As regards policy for Jordan, when we learned of the treatment that had been meted out to General Glubb, the nature of that treatment was so conflicting with all one's ideas of Arab manners that I was one of those whose immediate reaction was that this was only the beginning and that in a few weeks' time all British officers would have disappeared from Jordan and we should then be faced with a quite new situation. It may be of assistance if I remind your Lordships of the purposes for which we conceived the Arab Legion. It was established in 1921. At that time, Jordan was a young and weak kingdom. There was the Wahabi raiding, there was the Bedouin raiding, and it was to give stability and strength to this young, inexperienced kingdom that the Arab Legion was conceived.
  Time went on and it has grown and expanded. In 1941 it was used outside Jordan in connection with crushing the Raschid Ali rebellion in Iraq. It was used in the Syrian campaign. So there is a precedent for the use of the Arab Legion outside Jordan territory. Then, as we all remember, in 1948 it was the

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  spearhead of the Arab attack on Israel. Later on it came to be regarded as Jordan's sure shield against aggression. It is in that light that we have always viewed it: as a weapon against aggression. It is in that light, as I believe, that General Glubb conceived it: a weapon against aggression rather than the spearhead of the future Arab potential attack.
  I have elaborated, as I see it, the rôle of the Arab Legion only to emphasise that apparently now, if it is used, it will be in an entirely different rôle from that which we originally conceived for it and, indeed, from that for which we have hitherto given a subsidy of £9 million. One's immediate reaction was that it would perhaps be folly to continue giving this subsidy: on the one hand we should be paying out of the British taxpayer's money a considerable sum; and on the other hand, under the tripartite guarantee British troops might conceivably have to he ordered to resist that Arab Legion which we were supporting. That was by no means a logical situation, and so the temptation was there to cash is on the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian proposals. One wonders how they would have liked to dole out some £9 million—or £12 million, if the economic aid is included. It is a lot of money, even for an Arab country such as Saudi Arabia; it is about one-tenth of their income from oil royalties. Even so, one knows that in any case oil wealth is no necessary guarantee for internal and economic stability when it comes to Saudi Arabia. So the temptation there was to cease paying out this money.
  Then, having read General Glubb's extremely balanced and generous letter in The Times, I confess one had to modify one's views. Yet I do claim there is a difference between a policy of "getting tough," as General Glubb put it, and a normal right of merely asking the Jordanians that the money should be spent not in conflict with the principles in support of which we anticipated the Arab Legion would be employed. What I suggest is that in the Arab Legion we have a card in our hand and at the moment we should just retain that card; we do not play it. Apart from the subsidy there is another aspect of our relationship with Jordan. We have the 1948 Treaty and, as the noble Viscount, Lord De L'Isle, reminded us, we keep an armoured regiment on the Gulf of
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  Akabar; we keep there a squadron of the Air Force; we have two aerodromes at Amman and Mafrah. Presumably that is of some interest to those who have to plan under the terms of the Baghdad Pact. The question arises, therefore, whether we should not cut our losses entirely: perhaps move the aerodromes 150 miles only to the East where they would be on the more healthy territory of Iraq; perhaps abrogate the 1948 Treaty and therefore anticipate a move which we have always understood the Jordanians themselves were anxious to make; to end what might he termed a penny-packet kind of policy.
  Yet, on reflection, I still come back to the conclusion that there is greaser wisdom in a slightly different approach. The days are gone, of course, when British officers will continue to command formations or units of Arabs. But as to the further consideration of the Treaty with Jordan, I suggest that the paramount consideration now is what exactly it is that Jordan wants—and that refers to a subsidy or anything else. A recent visit to Jordan made me certain of only one thing, and that was the uncertainty in Jordan's own mind. The Prime Minister is, as I see it, attempting to walk a tightrope of neutrality—a kind of projection of Indian neutralism into the Middle East. I wonder very much whether he can go on doing it. It seems to me that, sooner or later, Jordan will have to make up her mind on which side of the fence she sits; but that decision must come from within Jordan, without any prodding from us or anybody eise.
  Now that means adopting a go-slow policy. It is not often that one finds oneself advocating a policy of "Wait and see," and yet I find that that is the right one in this particular case: a readiness either to abrogate the Treaty or to go on with it; either to send troops or to take them away, just as the Jordanian's require. To some extent I find that policy of waiting on events to be the right one to apply in the wider problem of Arab and Jew. I assure your Lordships that I put this in a spirit of inquiry, but I find myself always encountering the same problem as to the interpretation of the tripartite guarantee.
  Now Her Majesty's Government have on many occasions recently reaffirmed their firm intention to stand by the

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  guarantee, and it has been reaffirmed, I think, by the noble Marquess this afternoon. Yet when I study this guarantee I find myself asking this question: Is any American dispensation really going to move against Israel? Is a British dispensation really going to move against the Arabs? They are awkward questions, and they may be embarrassing questions to ask; but with reality apparently round the corner the thinking citizen is bound to ask these questions. A situation that paradoxically I believe would suit us the best would be to find a kind of "mix-up" in which it was extremely difficult to determine who was the aggressor. From the political point of view that would be the easiest kind of situation to deal with, as I see it.
  In view of all these difficulties I am wondering whether Her Majesty's Government have really set aside all prospect of international participation in the guarantee—only in the guarantee. Mr. Dulles, whose somewhat acrobatic handling sometimes of Middle East affairs leaves us a little bewildered, was quite right when, on February 24, he said that the State of Israel was a United Nations creation and to that I would add that, whether one agrees or disagrees with that creation—and I was one who at the time did not agree—one cannot see the United Nations, even in its more ineffective moods, permitting Israel to be swept into the sea.
  The Foreign Secretary on January 24 seemed to play with the idea of international participation. He spoke of the prospect of some bodies of United Nations' derivation being introduced to keep the peace. Now the arguments against international participation are well known. If action were taken within the Security Council, it would be subject to the Soviet veto. Alternatively, if action such as not to merit the Soviet veto were taken, it could mean only the inclusion of perhaps forces from the Soviet bloc within the terms of the tripartite guarantee, which would effectively ensure international confusion added to a situation already fairly well saturated with trouble. If, in contrast, the United Nations push on without the Soviet bloc, the Soviet, it is said, would exploit their opportunities in the Middle East. I suggest that whatever we do or do not do will not make the slightest
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  difference to the Soviet or to their intentions. We have seen them, now perhaps trickling into the Sudan; they have already achieved a treaty of friendship and a trade agreement with the Yemen, which indicates that they do not much mind whether the nation of their choice is a young nation struggling to assimilate democracy, or perhaps a primitive feudal anachronism.
  Your Lordships will recall that the Tripartite Declaration speaks of
  "preventing the violation of frontiers within or outside the United Nations."
  When I was studying this matter I tried to discover exactly what was the advice that the Secretary-General of the United Nations had to give. It was not very helpful. He held a Press Conference recently, on February 27, on his return from his visit all round the Middle East. He made it clear that, so far as he was concerned, he did not want United Nations action to come from within. He was asked this straightforward question:
  "Do you, in your opinion, consider the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 within the framework of the United Nations?"
  I should just like to read an extract from his answer. He said:
  "Is the system of regional pacts compatible with the United Nations Charter? On that point I have given one and the same reply every time.…I would not like to express here and now a personal opinion.… I note that a majority of the members of the United Nations consider it to be in conformity, and I find personally that the decisive factor is not primarily a legal one, but one concerning the aims and purposes, the guiding motives of these various arrangements. That is to say, I do not see any contradiction between a guarantee or a regional arrangement, to broaden it to that question, if the policy of that regional grouping or guarantee is compatible with the obligations of the member nations taking part in it under the United Nations Charter."
  My Lords, if we follow the legal implications we shall not be able to "see the wood for the trees"; but the reply of the Secretary-General seems to indicate, in broad terms, first, that initiative must come from the Tripartite Powers, and secondly, that if action outside the United Nations is taken by those Powers and it is in sympathy with the Charter then there is nothing to prevent such action from being taken. That being so, the number of Powers associated with the Tripartite guarantee could be increased, and such increase could be regarded as in the

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  interests of the maintenance of the principles of the United Nations Charter.
  I have no doubt that practical physical assistance from outside is probably not practicable, but I suggest that there may he value in a formal form of moral support. Could not the three Powers canvass the United Nations members with a view to obtaining signatures to add to the Tripartite guarantee—to this effect: that any unpleasant move that had to be made in connection with this guarantee would have their full support? It may be said that would be a meaningless gesture. I suggest that moral support, expressed openly in a formal understanding, can have effects quite unpredictable in scope. In any case, should we not welcome the opportunity to remove the focus of responsibility and the blame a little away from our own shoulders and spread it on to the wider shoulders of an international dispensation?
  There are those who take the rather tragic view that perhaps the power of oil is irrevocably linked with tins problem of Anglo-Israeli-Arab relationships, and that the flow of oil would be jeopardised. If it is a question of a global war, of the Baghdad Pact Powers being called into operation, then of course oil is in danger; but in a, purely Arab-Israeli war I suggest that such a war can be localised. The sources of oil are far removed from the zone of operations. The oil of Northern Iraq, the Kuwait oil and the oil of Southern Persia could have little political connection, and in geography is far away from a possible showdown around the frontiers of Israel. One asks oneself: would Syria jeopardise her pipeline royalties in such a position? I suggest that though possibly the movement may be in doubt, the sources are perfectly safe.
  If Syria did not permit oil to flow, then that oil would have to come round through the Canal, and people would say "Well, there is Egypt in a dominating position on the Canal. With a war going on, the oil will not get to Europe." We need not differentiate between the power of the Egyptians to prevent ships from going to Israel in a situation in which the Egyptians have always said "This is not a peace; it is not an armistice leading to a peace, but just a lull in a war," and their preventing tankers from going to Europe. If the Egyptians were so
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  foolish as to prevent tankers from going through the Suez Canal in the course of a war, they would bring upon themselves the odium and abuse of the whole world. They would have contravened the 1888 Convention to which they subscribed again when, in 1954, we negotiated with them the new arrangements; and they would also probably endanger their prospects for taking over the Suez Canal finally in 1968.
  Finally, I refer to Soviet penetration—a process that is relentless, not really, as I see it, over-concerned with this or that particular situation but always perfectly prepared to exploit an opportunity. There is one weapon to meet either Soviet penetration or Egyptian or Saudi-Arabian misrepresentation: it is a weapon that we have not yet fully exploited—namely, the voice on the air. We may regard the Arab as illiterate. He may not be able to read or write, but he can and does listen. No modern invention has had a more profound effect upon the Middle East, either in the political field or the social field, than the wireless. Every Arab sits in the coffee-house and he knows how to listen; yet for our own purposes this medium has been comparatively neglected. I am reminded of the old man who, when asked what he is doing, says, "Sometimes I sits and thinks, and sometimes I just sits." We all know that Her Majesty's Government, if they are sitting, are certainly doing a lot of thinking as well. The point is that other people do not know it, and I think the time has come when we have to show exactly what we think and why we think it, otherwise we are never going to meet such a challenge as is offered to us by "the Voice of the Arabs" from Cairo. When I was in the Middle East it was put to me that there are ways and means of developing this weapon.
  My Lords, that is the only positive aspect of policy which I would advocate. For the rest, I would say that flexibility must continue to govern all our thinking. There is reason to believe, I am told, that perhaps what we are watching in the Middle East is a kind of shadow boxing exhibition; that Nasser does not really wart to go to war, and that he realises just what it would mean if he did. If that is so, then time is on the side of peace. Perhaps, under those conditions, one day, not this year or next year, but

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  perhaps in two or three years' time, Arab leaders and Israeli leaders may be prepared to meet. Some of your Lordships may have read that book Lord M., and I am sure the noble Marquess will confirm that passage when Melbourne is extremely irritated with a friend who thumps the table and says always: "This must be done," and Melbourne turns to him and says: "Whenever I hear you thump the table and say that, I know you are going to do something damned silly." Some of the measures that we have heard proposed as remedies for the Middle East remind me that perhaps Melbourne's comment on the clear-cut but over-hasty decision applies.
  9.3 p.m.
  LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, at this stage in the debate I do not wish to speak for more than a few moments. I wish to say just a few words, because I want to deal with a subject that has not, so far as I know, been touched on in the debate so far. First of all, I wish to mention the question of Cyprus and to say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, when he condemns most strongly the terrorism on that island. On the other hand, I cannot help feeling that a certain amount of this terrorism is the result of the refusal of the Government to grant the principle of self-determination. First of all they said, quite categorically, "Never"; then they shifted the position slightly and said "Perhaps"; and now they have gone back on their tracks and have said that they admit the principle of self-determination but this is not now a practical proposition.
  I think there have been mistakes on both sides, and while I condemn most strongly the terrorism, on the other hand, we Liberals on these Benches take the strongest exception to the repressive measures to restrict liberty that have been taken by the Government. I think it would not be an exaggeration to describe these measures as almost draconian. May I remind your Lordships that Cypriots are not allowed to read reports of debates in your Lordships' House and in the other place; newspapers are not allowed to publish articles advocating Enosis; and Athens radio has been jammed. I notice that that causes a certain amount of hilarity on the Government Front Bench.
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  I wonder what we in this country would think if we were not allowed to read newspapers that were critical of the Government's policy, or if during the war we had not been allowed to tune in to the German radio.
  I think it is clear that the great majority of Greek Cypriots desire Enosis, and that was borne out by what the noble Lord, Lord Winster, said. I think we must try and understand their point of view. I heard with great interest the words of the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Chichester. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, said that Cyprus has never been a Greek possession. That, of course, is perfectly true. On the other hand, the Cypriots do not desire union with Greece on historical grounds but because they feel strong racial and cultural ties, and also because they speak the same language. The diplomatic correspondent of The Times of August 27 last year said that:
  "The Greek speaking majority feel, however, that the island has never lost its Greek character; that they share a cultural heritage with Greece; that the island is the last Greek-speaking territory since the Greek War of Independence which has yet to be united to modern Greece; and that Cypriots would acquire Greek citizenship as full equals with a real chance, as one observer has said, of becoming Prime Minister and not merely of becoming a prosperous restauriant proprietor."
  One has a good deal of sympathy with those aspirations when one thinks of all that Greece has meant to our civilisation. The Cypriots feel, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, but they feel very strongly, I think, in their breasts, that they are the heirs of this great civilisation which, in the words of Gilbert Murray, has never been surpassed and rarely equalled.
  The noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, has said that Greece owes us a great debt for our help to her in opposing Communism in 1944. I thoroughly agree with him. On the other hand, may I remind your Lordships that Greece also stood alone with us in 1940 and 1941. She fought the Italians and the Germans in the same passes in which she had fought the Persians, and I know that at that time she identified herself very much with her ancient civilisation. These ties between Cyprus and Greece I think were recognised by the British Government when they offered Cyprus to Greece in 1915.

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  I admit, as several noble Lords have said to-day that there is at present a deadlock, but one hopes that some day a solution will be found.
  Perhaps in time the Turkish minority on the Island will come to feel that if Cyprus passes to Greece, they will be accorded the same liberties and privileges as are now enjoyed by the Turkish minority in that part of Greece which is Western Thrace. Perhaps Turkey one day may come to feel that, although Cyprus is only forty miles from her coastline, nevertheless, there are other islands, such as Chios and Samos, which are part of Greece, and which are nearer; and, furthermore, that surely an island which has a British base cannot be a menace to her security. The British Government even may come to feel, if Greece should grant her the use of bases in Cyprus, that this would be more of advantage with a friendly population than retaining those same bases in the face of the hostile opposition they are having to contend with now. But, as I say, at present there is a deadlock.
  I wonder whether it is not possible to consider an alternative to this problem. For instance, is Cyprus the only base in that area? Is it not possible for the. Government to consider the possibility of another base? I am myself one of those who think that when we left Suez we perhaps made a mistake in establishing our base in Cyprus. I think it would have been better if we had entered into an agreement with Israel to have had a base at Haifa. The harbour there is much better than any in Cyprus, and such a base would have the advantages of land communications which are denied to an island in the sea. There would be the additional advantage of a friendly population. I would suggest to Her Majesty's Government that it might be possible to approach Israel now as an equal and to enter into a bilateral treaty with her whereby a second base could be established in Haifa. I cannot see that this would be counter to the Tripartite Declaration, because the Anglo-Jordan Treaty is not. From such a Treaty would surely flow, as a corollary, a supply of arms to enable Israel to keep parity with those received by the Arab States. I cannot agree with the Minister of State when he says—as he did in another place—that a balance of strength has been main-
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  tamed to date. I find myself much more in agreement with the Leader of the Opposition in another place who said that this reminded him of our nonintervention policy in the Spanish Civil War. I feet that the advantage of this second base would be that it would strengthen our strategic position, would afford Israel greater security, and would surely have a stabilising effect on the Arab-Israel dispute.
  9.12 p.m.
  VISCOUNT ALEXANDER OF HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, when I look at the clock I think that the best thing I can do is to be as brief as possible. I have sat through most of the speeches which have been made to-day, and some of them have been quite long. I am bound to say that we on this side of the House have immensely enjoyed the opportunity which has arisen for the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, to make his maiden speech on a really memorable occasion; and we have not been disappointed in what has happened in that connection. We shall hope to have the noble Earl with us on many occasions, speaking with all that wisdom and clarity for which he is so well known. The debate is approaching its end, and I am sure your Lordships are anxious to hear it wound up by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I should not presume after the manner in which the various points have been deployed and explored during the last seven hours or so to go over them all again, but there are one or two things to which I want to make sure the noble Marquess replies.
  My noble friend's speech in opening this afternoon gave a masterly survey of the Middle East, and I appreciate that it will be quite impossible to have a general reply to that to-night. I understand that the Foreign Secretary is only just back in this country, and no doubt it will he thought desirable to have a few consultations. Nevertheless, there is one point raised by my noble friend Lord Attlee upon which I think it is essential to have some statement—I refer to what he said upon the situation with regard to the security of Israel in the light of the arms race which has now been launched. I think that my noble friend put the matter very quietly and fairly, and without undue incitement to either side, in suggesting that Israel ought now, in view

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  of the changed situation in the arms race, to be supplied with quality, and modern quality, weapons sufficient at any rate to give her some security against a sudden attack upon her. I do not wish to ask any further question on the general side, as I understand that the noble Marquess the Leader of the House wishes to leave the subject of the Middle East in general to another occasion.
  With regard to Cyprus, may I say that I listened with great interest to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Swinton. He and I are old friends. We often disagree, but when it comes to matters of strategy and the value of bases or equipment, one has to sit up and listen to him carefully to make sure whether one agrees with him or not, for he has great experience in these matters. When he talked about Cyprus as a valuable base to-day in spite of this being the atomic age, I began to wonder how much better a base it could have been than Egypt, which was evacuated under the assurances of the then Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, that there was no need to stay there now because of the hydrogen bomb. That factor must be taken into account (the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has already referred to this) if the Government are looking at it merely as a position of strength from which to go to the assistance of Israel, on the one side, or an Arab people, on the other, under the Tripartite Declaration. And is it not clear that we ought to remember in our discussion that if the negotiations had been carried a little further the Government could have had within Cyprus the base they wanted for that sort of purpose in spite of the fact that they would have been granting the main national aims of the Cypriots? That is a thing to be remembered when talking about bases.
  Now I come to a point of substance put by my noble friend Lord Attlee—a point which has been touched upon by later speakers, and more firmly than anyone else, I think, by the most reverend Primate, but it has not been effectively answered in the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Munster. I refer to the question: Where do we go from here? Now that Archbishop Makarios and the Bishops have been deported, where do we go from here? That is the kind of question that we should have answered in the speech of the noble Marquess the Leader of the
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  House. I hope that when he makes his final reply he will deal with it. I should like to make my own personal position clear. I am not here to defend any part of the actions of Archbishop Makarios. I personally hold that many of his actions have not redounded to the possibility of a co-operative and amicable settlement. If there has been any condonation on his part of the violence which has been exercised in the campaign in Cyprus, that, of course, is something which is reprehensible—no weaker term could possibly be used to describe it. And I think my noble friend Lord Attlee said as much in his speech.
  The point is that, because of the practice, apparently quite widespread, in the unreformed Churches like the Greek Church and the Roman Church of having hierarchies in which the leaders of the hierarchies can be both political and religious leaders, this sort of thing inevitably happens. They are unable to exercise to the full the Christian doctrine and the Christian spirit which they are charged to uphold because of the fear of what might happen in the political field. That seems to have happened in this case. So you have to look at the political side and see, when you have deported these people, what happens.
  The most reverend Primate the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury made a threefold suggestion—it has been referred to as twofold, but as I remember it it was a threefold suggestion. It was suggested that proper steps should be taken to get an alternative (and I put these words into the suggestion), perhaps an even more progressive, draft of a Constitution, which should be considered to see whether we could make progress with it. It would be essential, in the second place, that there should be a joint appeal by the Greek and Turkish leaders in Cyprus to their people to refrain from further violence whilst negotiations were going on. In the third place, I understood that the most reverend Primate was anxious to secure that it should be known in advance that the deportation of the Archbishop would be for a limited period, which might vary according to the period which was taken to bring about a cessation of violence. I think that that is the most substantial suggestion made in the debate.
  I think that something, more than has yet been said by the Government speakers

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  is due from the Government. Though the noble Earl, Lord Munster, took this point up to a certain extent, I did not feel reassured by what he said. Let us face the alternative. We might have to face the kind of campaign we have lad in other countries where we have not been successful in keeping those countries within their previous form of control, either within or without the Empire. It seems clear that negotiations prior to the deportations had broken down, for reasons which can hardly now be justified in the light of the history of negotiations in other countries where there has been a nationalist uprising for freedom. My noble friend Lord Pakenham pointed out to me this afternoon some references in Sir Winston Churchill's book The World Crisis and the Aftermath to the Irish dispute. I have not time to quote them now, because I do not want to take long, but they show how foolish it would be for the Government, however reprehensible the violence has been, to take the line that we cannot consider an amnesty which would be complete enough to meet the needs of those negotiating on behalf of the movement seeking liberty. I hope the noble Marquess will not think that I have nothing else to say about this subject. I have a great deal to say. But I feel it essential that he should be given time to-right to deal with this matter more adequately than it has been dealt with by the Front Bench. That is the only reason why I sit down now and leave it to him.
  9.23 p.m.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I rise to speak at the end of what I am afraid has been a very long debate. I have sat through practically every moment of it, and therefore propose to be as brief as I can. In any case, your Lordships 'have already heard two speakers from the Front Bench. You have heard my noble friend Lord Munster, who spoke on behalf of the Colonial Office and who dealt with recent events in Cyprus; and you have heard my noble friend Lord Reading who, speaking for the Foreign Office, dealt with the great problem of the Middle East. I rise merely to say a few words with regard to these two topics in the light of further comments that have been made in the debate.
  As we all know, Her Majesty's Government have been the subject of certain
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  pretty violent attacks in another place over Cyprus in particular, though to a much lesser degree in your Lordships' House. In this House, it was the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who was chosen to open the attack. Before I go any further, I should like to say, like other noble Lords who have already spoken, how happy we are to welcome so distinguished a new Member to cur debates. It is a special pleasure to me, for I worked so much with the noble Earl in the past during the war. I could not help feeling a little sorry for the noble Earl on account of the occasion which had been chosen by his Party for his debut before your Lordships, because even in this House a maiden speech is supposed to be non-controversial. I am sure he did his best, but no doubt it was asking a great deal of him to expect him to be impartial at these two topics; and, if he did go a little beyond the uncontroversial, in the circumstances one cannot blame him. In any case, he tackled these matters with such skill, charm and moderation that I think he won the approval of even those noble Lords who do not altogether agree with him.
  If I may be so allowed, I do not propose to follow the noble Earl and other noble Lords who have spoken in those portions of their speeches which have dealt generally with the Middle East. For one thing, the noble Marquess, Lord Reading, has already spoken on that topic: and, moreover, so far as the noble Earl was concerned at any rate, I found little cause for disagreement. Over the policy which the Government had adopted over the Baghdad Pact, the noble Earl was in broad agreement with us, so far as I could make out. Over the policy with regard to Jordan, I do not think he agreed so entirely, but he made two definite recommendations. The first was talks with the Jordan Government, and the other was closer co-operation with the United States. I de not quarrel with either of those suggestions: indeed, they are almost the identical policy which Her Majesty's Government are trying to apply at the present time. I should have liked to say a good deal more about Jordan, particularly in view of the important speech made towards the end of the debate by the noble Lord, Lord Birdwood. I hope he will understand that if I do not go further to-night into the

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  suggestions which he raised, it is not because they are not of great importance, but because time is short. But I can assure the noble Lord—and I know I am speaking not only on behalf of myself but also on behalf of other Members of the House—that what he told your Lordships will be read with interest and studied, as we know that he speaks with special authority on this subject.
  Now I cone to the subject of Israel. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, skated so skilfully over this topic that I hardly knew exactly what policy he wished the Government to adopt. But he made one specific proposal with regard to the supply of arms to Israel, and perhaps I ought to say something about that, especially in view of the further appeal I have had from the noble Viscount. Lord Alexander of Hillsborough. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said that in his view the specific proposal, to which I shall refer in a moment, would not constitute an arms race. What exactly constitutes an arms race is almost a metaphysical argument, into which I do not intend to enter to-night. I think it can be said that in a race the object of each competitor is to get ahead of the other. If, therefore, the purpose of one party to an arms race was only to keep level with the other, then, in the strictest sense of the term, it could not be said to be a race. I suppose that that is technically true, but, in fact, in a competition of that kind, both parties inevitably become more and more heavily supplied with arms. A pace would be set for both of them by each other which neither could keep up beyond a very limited time, and at the end of that time there is very liable to be explosion—at least, that is the lesson of past experience.
  In a modified degree, I think that that consideration is applicable even to the less extensive proposal of the noble Earl, which is, as I understand it—he will correct me if I am wrong—that Israel should be supplied, not with unlimited arms, but with certainly selected arms. Of course, I will pass on that particular proposal to my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary who, as your Lordships know, is just back in this country. In the meantime, I feel certain the noble Earl will not expect me to say more to-day, except this. In the ultimate event—and I think it is important that we
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  should remember this— I am certain it will not be the arms in the possession of Israel which will deter Egypt from invading that country if she really wants to fight. If she is to be deterred it is the knowledge that by doing so she will bring in the signatories of the Tripartite Agreement—and Britain and the United States are two of those signatories—who, with the means at their disposal, would be able, if they were forced to do such a thing, utterly to crush her. It is that fact, of which the Tripartite Agreement is the written pledge, which is, to my mind. Israel's main safeguard, and I think it is right to say that to your Lordships.
  LORD HENDERSON: If I may interrupt the noble Marquess, what I should like to get at is this. I asked him whether any result had yet been reached in the consideration of what the Prime Minister called "the nature of action to be taken." The important thing is not that action shall follow after aggression has been committed, but that aggression shall be stopped; and unless all sides know that the three major Powers are in a position, ready and willing, to take action to prevent aggression, then the lack of arms to resist aggression would lead them to be sadly knocked about in the first twenty-four hours.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I appreciate that, and I agree about the importance of the point that the noble Lord has made. But it does not alter the general import of what I said. I am not ruling out or prejudicing in any way the proposal of the noble Earl—that is a matter which has to be properly considered—but I do not think a proposal to supply arms to Israel would, by itself, be important. As I say, I will bring to the notice of my right honourable friend, the Foreign Secretary, not only the point made by the noble Earl, but the further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Henderson. In short—and this is really the only thing I want to say about the Middle East; I am afraid it is very little, but it is the most I can do before I pass to Cyprus—I believe that our policy in the Middle East should be based, first, on the Baghdad Pact; secondly, on the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, properly interpreted; and thirdly, on a continuation of our friendly relations with the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. I believe that that policy, in the difficult

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  circumstances in which we are placed, is the only wise one, and I hope it will continue to be pursued by all Parties in this country.
  I am now going to turn to the question of Cyprus, with which the greater part of this debate has been concerned, and especially I feel I ought to say something about Archbishop Makarios and his deportation, to which so much reference has been made from all sides of the House to-day. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, in the speech with which he opened the debate, painted an agreeable picture of the Archbishop, from which I think any ordinary listener without other sources of information might have got the impression that he was a perfectly respectable, God-fearing, law-abiding person. The noble Earl actually used in this connection the words—I thought it was slightly odd—that he was a constitutional leader. I did think that was painting him in rather more agreeable colours than was justified.
  There are, however, certain plain facts about Archbishop Makarios, about his negotiations with the Governor and the reasons for his deportation, which, in view of some of the things that have been said here and elsewhere, I feel I must bring once more before the House. The first is this—and it has not been said this afternoon. The Archbishop is, in fact, a British subject. He has enjoyed throughout his life the advantages of British citizenship; he has possessed, and, for all know, still possesses, a British passport, with all that that implies. He has held strongly, as he is perfectly entitled to do, certain views with regard to the future of Cyprus. I am not suggesting for a moment that that is anything improper; I am not even going to complain—and I say this to the most reverend Primate—that it is improper that he should hold such views as a Churchman, who perhaps should not be interested in active politics. In the British Commonwealth and Empire it is, as we all know, open to anyone to hold any views he likes, so long as he remains within the law. Indeed, as the noble Viscount. Lord Hailsham, rightly pointed out this afternoon, the very fact that the Governor, with the full approval of Her Majesty's Government here, has continued to negotiate with the Archbishop, in spite of those known views, is, I think conclusive proof of that fact.
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  But what I think no one can excuse, either in a Churchman or in a layman, is that he has used his British nationality, which throughout he has made no attempt to discard, and the special position which attaches to his religious rank, not only for subversive purposes—which, in itself, I think, is not very agreeable—but, far worse, for the fomentation of violence and terrorism which has resulted in the death of many innocent people. The Governor's statement, which your Lordships will have read and which was issued at the time of the Archbishop's arrest, gives ample evidence of this. I will quote one or two sentences from that statement, because I do not think it would be right to forget these things It says:
  "Over the past two years information has been received from a number of different sources indicating that the Archbishop has personally supplied funds to agents in Greece for the purchase and supply of arms and explosives for use in terrorist operations in Cyprus."
  The second sentence I quote is this:
  "He has remained silent while policemen and soldiers have been murdered in cold blood, while women and children have been killed and maimed by bombs.— His silence has understandably been accepted among his community as not merely condoning but even approving assassination and bomb-throwing."
  It has been suggested that Her Majesty's Government have not established complicity. I can assure noble Lords that there is no doubt about the fact as exposed in this statement. If the sources are not given it is because, purely for security reasons, they cannot be given. But I believe that neither the Governor nor anybody else who knows the facts has any doubt about it. That is the man whom the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and even more strongly the right reverend Prelate the Lord Bishop of Chichester, has charged the Government with treating far too harshly.
  I must confess—I only wish he were here; I know that he had to leave—that I listened very sadly to the right reverend Prelate this afternoon. He has the respect of us all we know that he has complete intellectual integrity, and I am not in the least suggesting that there was any derogation from that. But he talked of the British Government as bypassing law and order in deporting Archbishop Makarios. Your Lordships have heard, and the right reverend Prelate must know, what Archbishop Makarios has

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  done; and if the right reverend Prelate had been here I should have liked to ask him: Does he regard Archbishop Makarios himself as having by-passed law and order? Does he think he should have been allowed—and that was the alternative—to continue with immunity to foment and organise terrorism and the murder of British soldiers? Does he think that? He did not put forward any alternative, and yet that is the problem which the British Government and the Governor had to face, and that is the problem which I feel we all have to face. Whatever our views, we cannot blink those facts. It is not a question in this matter of violence as an abstract principle—"Is it ever justified or is it not?": the sort of debate we used to have in our school debating societies. It is a question of plain bleak murder—murder of men and women.
  I was driven to the conclusion, as I listened to the right reverend Prelate—and I do not want to misrepresent him—that he cared so desperately about the World Council of Churches, and the continuation of that great movement, that he subordinated everything else to it; that nothing mattered to him but that. That is really (I do not want to use an unpleasant term), applying ecclesiastical politics. It is merely thinking in terms of expediency; and that. I thought, if I may say so, underlay every word he said. There must be many of us, I hope good Christians, humble members of the Church, who simply could not accept the union of Churches at that price. The union of Churches must represent to us a high standard of conduct, as I am sure it does to the most reverend Primate.
  THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: May I say that I entirely agree with the noble Marquess on this matter? I am very sorry that the right reverend Prelate quoted the Secretary of the World Council of Churches, who I think exceeded all his rights in issuing this statement at all.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am grateful to the most reverend Primate for what he has said. Your Lordships may feel that I have said too much. If so, I express my regret; but this is really a matter about which I feel extremely strongly. Frankly, I do not think I have ever been more shocked by any speech
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  than I was by the speech of the right reverend Prelate that I heard this evening. Archbishop Makarios has not been treated too harshly. On the contrary, I should have thought there were few examples in history of such tolerance being extended to a man who was known by the authorities to be plotting secretly to overthrew by violence the established Government of his country, and in the interests of another State.
  The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, expressed fears that the firm steps that have been taken by Her Majesty's Government had had, and would have, more unfavourable reactions in other countries, and notably, I think he said, in certain circles in the United States. As your Lordships know, I have been, and I shall continue to be, the most ardent champion of a close understanding between Britain and the United States. I believe that on that depends not only future peace but the survival of Western civilisation in this sadly distracted world. But perhaps for that very reason I may be allowed to say this. If a man of American nationality—and the Archbishop, I repeat, is of British nationality—had, in a territory under American sovereignty, condoned and even fomented, in the interests of another nation, a campaign of violence and terrorism which resulted in the death of American soldiers, I do not believe that the attitude of American opinion would be quite so detached as it has been on this occasion.
  I may be told that no doubt, strictly speaking, Her Majesty's Government were within their rights in taking the action they have taken. But the Government have been asked this afternoon: Was it wise to break off negotiations with the Archbishop when there was still a chance of a successful outcome? Had the main difficulties not been surmounted? Were the remaining difficulties so important? That I understood to be the view of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, this afternoon, and I know that it is widely held, especially by members of his Party. But it is necessary to remember what I think is often forgotten: that there were limitations to any negotiations with Archbishop Makarios at the present stage. If we were under a moral obligation to try to find a solution to this terrible problem that was acceptable to the Greek community in Cyprus, we were equally under a moral obligation, as my

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  noble friend Lord Swinton rightly said, to try to find a solution which was acceptable to the Turkish community. That was our undertaking, not only to the Turks in Cyprus, but to the Turkish Government as well. If we had not observed this we should have been guilty, and we should have been regarded by the Turks as guilty, of a breach of faith with them.
  The purpose of these talks with Archbishop Makarios, which were in a sense preliminary, was to get as far as we could in the direction of an agreement, so as to ensure the co-operation of the Greeks and Cypriots in the later negotiations, in which the Turkish community were also going to take part, for a self-governing Constitution which should precede self-determination. That was the object of these talks. They were never intended to take the place of those later negotiations. They could, in the nature of things, not do that. That is the cardinal fact which, I submit, should never be forgotten, for it is the real criterion, and the only real criterion, as to whether the outstanding issues on which the talks broke down were important or unimportant.
  If we use that criterion, two of them, at any rate, I should have thought, were of the first importance. The first is the point that public security must be reserved to the Governor of Cyprus so long as he thinks necessary. That is, of course, a wider issue than what I may call the Turkish issue. That, as the Prime Minister emphasised yesterday, affects the Cypriot community as a whole. But, in particular, it was necessary to safeguard the Turkish community until experience showed that the steps that Her Majesty's Government were proposing to take would leave no danger to them. That, to my mind, is an important point, and yet it is one which I do not think was mentioned at all from the Opposition Benches to-day. Secondly, there was a point made in the Secretary of State's last statement to Archbishop Makarios on February 29, 1956. I will quote the last two sentences:
  "The Constitution would provide for an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly and would safeguard the interests of all sections of the community. It would he for the Constitutional Commissioner to recommend what arrangements should be made for this purpose, including the precise composition of the elected majority which he would define in accordance with normal liberal constitutional doctrine."
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  Clearly, Her Majesty's Government could not agree to decide by negotiation with the Greek Cypriots alone the form and the composition of the Legislative Assembly before the opening of the negotiations, under the Constitutional Commissioner, in which the 'Turks were also to take part. Yet am afraid that was just what Archbishop Makarios wanted. He wanted everything signed, sealed and delivered before the Turks came in at all. Can anyone say that those two issues which I have described are minor differences? They are fundamental differences.
  Finally, there is the question of the amnesty, to which I think the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, referred. Of course, it is a matter of opinion how important that particular issue was. But I should have thought, that the Governor and Her Majesty's Government went a very long way to meet the Archbishop. They were ready, as I think my noble friend Lord Munster has said, to grant an amnesty to everyone who had committeed offences under the Emergency Regulations before a certain day, except those involving violence against the person and the illegal possession of arms. Cases under those two heads were to come up for review in accordance with the normal rules. I cannot agree that, in a great emergency, where murder is being done, those provisions were very savage. And yet the Archbishop refused even those. In any case, of course, even if there had been agreement on that point of the amnesty, the other two would still have remained. If the Archbishop wanted agreement he could have had it by deferring those outstanding points until the negotiations with the Turks. We could go no further at the present stage without a breach of faith with the Cypriot Turks and with the Turkish Government. Indeed, the Turkish Government, as I think your Lordships will have seen from a statement they published only a day or so ago, thought they had already gone a little bit too far. That was the position with which Her Majesty's Government were faced, and I cannot believe that it ought to be seriously contended in the light of the facts which I have tried to expose that the Governor broke off negotiations on flimsy grounds. Indeed, contrary to what has been said by some noble Lords, it was not the Governor who

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  broke off the negotiations at all; it was the Archbishop.
  With the final and lamentable failure of these talks, the Governor was of course, faced with a new situation. He knew, from the information which was already in his hands that the Archbishop was already actively fomenting terrorism. He had condoned that, while any hope of an agreement remained, although it must have been a very difficult decision for him to take. I gather from what he said that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, thought that on that point he was right to give every chance for the success of the talks. But was it possible for him any longer to defend leaving Archbishop Makarios at large in Cyprus, sitting in his archiepiscopal palace planning sabotage and fomenting terrorism? I do not believe that any Governor, or any Government, worthy of the name could, in fact, have taken that course. I am certain—I have enough respect for noble Lords opposite—that, if they had been in office, they would have found it necessary to adopt exactly the same course. Could they let him go to Athens and then refuse him the right to re-enter Cyprus? That is one suggestion that has been made. But that would have left him free to foment rebellion and terrorism on just as large a scale from Greece. The only course was to place him where he could do no harm. That the Governor decided to do, as your Lordships know, after consultation and in full agreement with Her Majesty's Government. I believe that in doing so he, and we, took the only course that in these unhappy circumstances was open to us.
  I have been asked: What about the future? The question was asked, I think, by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and by the noble Viscount, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough, and others. The answer is—and I think the most reverend Primate himself mentioned it—that, first of all, law and order must be restored. And then, with the coming of more normal conditions, we firmly believe that there will emerge more moderate leaders, who certainly exist but who have been driven out of active politics by the extremism of recent months. I am sure they are there. I saw a letter given to me to-day from someone who has just been in Cyprus which gave quite a different
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  account of Cyprus from that given by the noble Earl. Lord Listowel—a great friendliness on the part of the population, even open expressions in some quarters, of the dislike of the methods adopted by what are known as the gangsters. In such circumstances as those that have existed during recent weeks and months, one cannot expect moderate leaders to show themselves. It is as much as their lives are worth to do so; but we are hoping that, with the return of law and order, these people will become available. I can assure the noble Viscounts, Lord Alexander of Hillsborough and Lord Hailsham, who also mentioned this question, that there is no desire at all on the part of Her Majesty's Government to sit still and do nothing. That would be a futile policy.
  There must, no doubt, be some delay while things become normal. I cannot say how long that will take, but so far as I and, I am sure, all my colleagues are concerned, the shorter that period, the better. I know that there are those in the Party of noble Lords opposite—I do not say the noble Lords themselves but in the Party of noble Lords opposite—who would have preferred a different policy. There were those who would have liked to hand over Cyprus immediately to Greece, relying on the terms of some treaty, without considering what would happen in the present inflammable state of the Middle East if another Government came in in Greece, possibly a Government of the extreme Left which did not feel itself bound by the treaty obligations of its predecessors. What then, in those circumstances, would happen to the safeguards of the Turkish community? What would happen then to the security of our base? We have had exactly that experience once already in Egypt. Is it really suggested that we should repeat it while things in the Middle East are in their present state of turmoil?
  The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, suggested that in the hydrogen world Cyprus was no longer strategically important. I could not, any more than the noble Lord, Lord Jeffreys, could, accept that for a moment.
  EARL. ATTLEE: In a major war.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: In a major war. But would the, noble Earl say the same about a cold war?
  EARL ATTLEE:: No.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: That is it. The cold war is what we have got. That is why it is so important, in our view, for us to be there I am quite certain that our friends in Asia, the Turks, the Iraqis, the Jordanians and the Jews, would all be very sorry if there were no British forces within reach at the present time. Are we to imperil all these important things by a policy of what I can only describe as ignominious scuttle? I hope sincerely that that is not the view which will be taken by your Lordships' House. I do not believe for a moment that it is the view of the British people. I believe that the news of the firm action which has been taken with regard to Archbishop Makarios has been received with a sigh of relief throughout the whole country.
  This afternoon the most reverend Primate, in, if I may say so, the movingly sincere speech which he made to your Lordships, advocated an alternative course. I did not know, of course, what the most reverend Primate intended to say. I have had no time, as he will understand, to consult my colleagues, so I am sure he will not take it badly if I cannot give him any definite answer to-day. The main feature of his proposals, as I understood them, was that a draft Constitution should be drawn up which could be submitted to the Greek and Turkish communities. That proposal is nor widely different from what has always been the intention or policy of Her Majesty's Government. We have always envisaged consultations, as a result of which a draft should be prepared. The real difficulty up to now, as I tried to explain earlier in my speech, has been that Archbishop Makarios required substantial concessions to be made before those negotiations began at all. That was really the main difficulty. If other leaders now emerge who are willing to adopt a less rigid attitude, a new and happier situation will, of course, begin. Constitution-making could start and there could be agreement on a Constitution which might he followed by the grant of self-government; and that, in turn, would lead to a situation in which self-determination might be considered as and when the strategic situation allowed.
  Those are the stages which have always been envisaged by Her Majesty's Govern-
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  ment. But first, of course, everything must depend inevitably on the restoration of law and order. Clearly, to bring back the Archbishop in his present mood, and after all that has happened, would not accelerate that process—it would, indeed, put off any advance. There, if I may say so, I profoundly disagree with the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and the noble Lord, Lord Winster, who also, I think, made the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Winster, said that the Government had got into a cul-de-sac. It would he far truer to say that the. Government had removed a road block: that represents much more accurately the present position. I cannot, therefore, give any undertaking at all about the date for the Archbishop's return. The question of his future plans, as I am sure the most reverend Primate himself will appreciate, must depend on the course of events.
  The noble Lord, Lord Winster, after giving a good "dressing clown" to Her Majesty's Government, also complained that nothing had been done in the days of the late Labour Government. Of course, we too regret it: if something had been done at that period, perhaps the country would not have been faced with the difficulties with which it is now confronted. But I do not propose to threw any stones at the Labour Government tonight. NO one cart pretend that a solution of the problems of Cyprus which is to be satisfactory to all concerned is going to be at all easy to find. But I am convinced that the policy on which Her Majesty's Government have embarked gives, in the long term, the best chance. I believe it is the only way in which freedom—and by "freedom" I mean ordered freedom as opposed to anarchy—can be preserved in the island itself; and I believe it to be the only way that accords with our responsibilities, political and strategic, in this most troubled and vital part of the world.
  10.2 p.m.
  EARL ATTLEE: My Lords, at this late hour I should not think of inflicting any further observations on this House. I should like to thank many noble Lords for the kind things they have said about me. I should also like to thank the noble Marquess, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, for correcting an obvious slip on my part. For the rest, I am bound to say that I leave this debate in rather

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  a feeling of gloom, thinking that Her Majesty's Government's attitude represents a triumph of hope over experience. I beg leave to withdraw my Motion.
  Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

  BARRY CORPORATION (BARRY HARBOUR) BILL IPSWICH DOCK BILL
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  ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION
  ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION